ML13217A056
| ML13217A056 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 07/03/2013 |
| From: | Stephenson C Arizona Public Service Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 102-06731-TNW/RKR/CJS | |
| Download: ML13217A056 (35) | |
Text
I PVNGS Technical Requir,._mentsManual (TRM)
Revisioll 58 Replacement Pages and Insertion Instructions The following LDCRsare lcluded inthis change:
LDCR 07-R002 removes the Technical R_;luirements Manual (TRM) Section 3.7.200, Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs), requirement for two ADV lines per steam generator to be operable. This reqt irement had been included in the TRM as an interim action until the Technical Sp_:cifications were changed. Since License Amendment (LA) 191, dated April 11, 2013, has been issued by the NRC; this TRM requirement is no longer n_.,ededand is being deleted.
LA 191 requires four ADV lines be OPERABLE when in Modes 1,2, 3, and in Mode 4 when the steam generators are being use( for heat removal.
LDCR 13-R002 removes TRM Sections 3..204, Shutdown Control Element Assembly (CEA) Insertion Limits, and TRIV 3.1.205, Regulating Control Element assembly (CEA) Groups Insertion Limits.
hese sections of the TRM were added as an interim action until a non-con _ervativeTechnical Specification issue was resolved. LA 168 was issued by the I_IRCon July 25, 2007, which made the TRM sections unnecessary and as a resu11they are being deleted. This is a corrective action from CRDR 4402533.
Instructions Remove Pa,qe:
Insert New Pa,qe:
Cover Page Cover Page Table of Contents (Page i)
Table of Contents (Page i)
List of Effective Pages, List of Effective Pages, Pages 1through 4 Pages 1 through 4 T3.1.204-1
[No replacement page]
T3.1.205-1
[No replacement page]
T3.7.200-1 T3.7.200-1 T3.7.200-2
[No replacement page]
T6.0.100-9 T6.0.100-9 through through T6.0.100-37 T6.0.100-35 Stephenson, Carl J(Z05778)
Digitally signed by Stephenson, Carl J(Z05778)
DN: cn=Stephenson, Carl J(Z05778)
Reason: I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Date: 2013.06.28 16:03:33 -07'00'
Technical Reqwirements Manual Revi_;ion58 July 133,2013
- _Lpn"'-e-'-enson
.ZO_.._,DigitallysignedbySteph Carl DN:cn=Stephenson,Carl J(Z05778)
IJ(Z05778 _......,0t,
......h
....... o/and Car integrlty ofthis d......
t Date: 2013.06.28_5:48:17-0T00' PALOVERDEUNITS I, 2, 3
TABLEOFCONTENTS TI 0 USEANDAPPLICATION Definitions T1.1.100-I Logical Connectors.............
T1.2.100-1 Completion Times...............
TI.3.100-I Frequency......................
+.............................
T1.4.100-I T2 0 SAFETYLIMITS..................
T2.0.100-I T3 0 TRMLimiting Condition for Operi_tion (TLCO) APPLICABILITY....
T3.0.I00-1 TRMSurveillance Requirement (T_;R) Applicability T3.0.I00-3 T3 1 REACTIVITYCONTROLSYSTEMS T3.1.100 Flow Paths - Shutdown.............................
T3.1.100-1 T3.1.101 Flow Paths - Operatin T3 1 I01-I T3.1.102 Charging Pumps-Shu T3 1 102-i T3.1.103 Charging Pumps- 0
_ting T3 1 i03-i T3.1.104 Borated Sources - ShuLdown....
T3 1 104-I T3.1.105 Borated Sources Ope°ating...
T3 1 105-1 T3.1.200 Shutdown Margin - Rea:tor Trip Breakers Closed....
T3 1 200-I T3.1.201 Shutdown Margin - Rea:tor Trip Breakers Open......
T3 1 201-1 T3.1.202 Control Element Assem)ly - Alignment..............
T3 1 202-I T3.1.203 Control Element Assem)ly - Drop Time..............
T3 1 203-1 T3.2 POWERDISTRIBUTIONLIMITS T3.2.200 Azimuthal Power Tilt T_.........................
T3.2.200-I T3.3 INSTRUMENTATION T3.3.100 Supplementary Prot.
S stem (SPS) Instrumentation
.. T3.3.100-I T3.3.101 Radiation Monitoring nstrumentation T3.3.101-I T3.3.102 Incore Detectors T3.3.102-I T3 3.103 Seismic Monitoring T3.3.103-1 T3 3.104 Meteorological Instrb entation T3.3.104-1 T3 3 105 Post Accident Monitor ng Instrumentation T3.3.105-I T3 3 106 Loose-Part Detection nstrumentation T3.3.106-1 T3 3 107 Explosive Gas Monitor ng System...................
T3.3.107-1 T3 3 108 Fuel Bldg Ess. Vent.,,ctuation Signal (FBEVAS)....
T3.3.108-1 T3 3 200 RPSInstrumentation Operating...................
T3.3.200-1 T3 3 201 ESFASLogic and Manua Trip T3.3.201-I (continued)
PALOVERDEUNITS1, 2, 3 i
Rev58 7/03/13
Technical Rec_irementsManual LIST OF EFFECTIVEPAGES Page No.
Revision No.
Page No.
Revision No.
TOCpage i 58 T3.3.103-3 13 TOCpage ii 48 T3.3.103-4 13 TOCpage iii 33 T3.3.104-1 46 TOCpage iv 52 T3.3.104-2 0
TI.1.100-1 0
T3.3.105-1 46 T1.2.100-1 0
T3.3.105-2 48 T1.3 100-I 0
T3.3. 105-3 48 T1.4 100-1 0
T3.3. 106-1 46 T2.0 100-1 0
T3.3. 106-2 14 T3 0 100-1 47 T3.3.107-1 56 T3 0 100-2 40 T3.3.107-2 46 T3 0 100-3 23 T3.3.108-1 0
T3 0 100-4 47 T3.3.108-2 0
T3 1 100-1 0
T3.3.200-1 46 T3 1 100-2 0
T3.3.200-2 31 T3 1 101-1 0
T3.3 201-1 0
T3 1 101-2 54 T3 4 100-1 28 T3 1 101-3 0
T3 4 101-1 0
T3 1 102-1 0
T3 4 101-2 0
T3 1 103-1 1
T3 4 101-3 0
T3 1 104-1 0
T3 4 101-4 0
T3 1 104-2 0
T3 4 102-I 0
T3 1 105-1 46 T3 4 102-2 0
T3 1 105-2 0
T3 4 103-1 53 T3 1 105-3 50 T3 4 104-1 28 T3 1 200-1 46 T3 4 104-2 55 T3 1 200-2 24 T3 4 200-1 52 T3 1 201-1 0
T3 4 201-i 46 T3 1 202-1 53 T3 4 202-1 46 T3 1 202-2 46 T3 4 203-1 46 T3 1 203-I 29 T3 4 204-1 46 T3 2 200-1 53 T3 5 200-1 46 T3 3.100-1 46 T3 5 200-2 0
T3.3.100-2 10 T3 5 200-3 0
T3.3.101-I 40 T3 5 201-1 16 T3.3.101-2 46 T3 5 201-2 47 T3.3.101-3 18 T3 5 202-1 46 T3.3.101-4 18 T3.5.202-2 39 T3.3.101-5 52 T3.5.202-3 47 T3.3.102-1 21 T3.5,202-4 0
T3.3.102-2 40 T3.5.203-1 46 T3.3.103-1 51 T3.5.203-2 35 T3.3.103-2 54 T3.6.100-1 48 PALOVERDEUNITS 1, 2, 3 1
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Revision No.
Page No.
Revision No.
T3 6 100-2 0
T3 10 201-1 0
T3 6 200-1 22 T3 10 201-2 0
T3 6 200-2 22 T3 10 202-I 40 T3 6 201-1 47 T3 10 202-2 0
T3 6 300-1 48 T3 11 100-1 40 T3 6 300-2 48 T3 11 100-2 38 T3 7 100-1 27 T3 11 100-3 38 T3 7 100-2 27 T3 11 100-4 38 T3 7 101-I 46 T3 11 100-5 38 T3 7 101-2 46 T3 11 100-6 38 T3 7 102-I 0
T3 11.100-7 38 T3 7 102-2 0
T3.11.100-8 38 T3 7 102-3 0
T3.11.100-9 38 T3 7 200-I 58 T3.11 101-I 40 T3 7 201-1 46 T3.11 101-2 46 T3 7 202-1 46 T3.11 101-3 46 T3 7 203-1 46 T3.11 101-4 39 T3 7 204-1 46 T3.11 101-5 46 T3 7 205-1 46 T3.11 102-1 46 T3 7 205-2 46 T3.11 102-2 4
T3 7 206-I 0
T3.11 i02-3 4
T3 7 207-1 46 T3.11 102-4 4
T3 8 100-I 46 T3.11 102-5 18 T3 8 100-2 0
T3.11 103-1 46 T3 8 101-1 46 T3.11 103-2 49 T3 8 101-2 40 T3.11 104-1 44 T3 8 101-3 12 T3.11 104-2 4
T3.8.101-4 0
T3.11.104-3 4
T3.8.102-1 0
T3.11.104-4 18 T3.8.102-2 0
T3.11.105-1 46 T3.8.200-1 0
T3 11.105-2 4
T3.9.100-1 0
T3 11.105-3 18 T3.9.101-1 0
T3 11.106-1 40 CORRECTED T3.9.102-1 0
T3 11.106-2 49 T3.9.102-2 0
T3 11.107-1 40 CORRECTED T3.9.103-1 0
T3 11.107-2 4
T3.9.104-1 0
T3 11.107-3 4
T3.9.104-2 0
T4 0.I00-i 0
T3.9.104-3 0
T5 0.100-1 0
T3.9.200-1 46 T5 0.200-1 0
T3.9.200-2 29 T5 0.300-1 0
T3.9.201-I 46 T5 0.400-1 0
T3.10.200-1 40 T5 0.500-i 53 PALOVERDEUNITS 1, 2, 3 2
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T5.0.500-2 24 T6 0 I00-25 58 T5.0.500-3 0
T6 0 100-26 58 T5.0.500-4 53 T6 0 100-27 58 T5.0.500-5 0
T6 0 100-28 58 T5.0.500-6 0
T6 0 100-29 58 T5.0.500-7 0
T6 0 100-30 58 T5.0.500-8 22 T6 0 100-31 58 T5.0.500-9 0
T6 0 100-32 58 T5.0.500-10 0
T6 0 100-33 58 T5.0.500-11 57 T6 0 100-34 58 T5.0.500-12 57 T6 0 100-35 58 T5.0.500-13 57 T7 0 100-I 52 T5.0.500-14 57 T7 0 100-2 52 T5.0.500-15 57 T7 0 100-3 0
T5.0.500-16 57 T7 0 200-1 52 T5.0.500-17 57 T7 0 200-2 52 T5.0.600-1 37 T7 0 200-3 0
T5.}.600-2 37 T7 0 300-1 57 T5.0.700-1 34 T7 0 300-2 41 T6.0.100-I 40 T7 0 300-3 57 T6.0.100-2 40 T7 0 300-4 43 T6.0.100-3 40 T7 0 300-5 32 T6.0.100-4 40 T7 0 300-6 32 T6.0.100-5 46 T7 0 300-7 32 T6.0.100-6 40 T7 0 300-8 32 T6.0.100-7 54 T7 0 400-1 0
T6.0.100-8 46 T7 0 400-2 0
T6.0.100-9 58 T7 0 400-3 0
T6.0.100-10 58 T7 0 400-4 51 T6.0.100-11 58 17 0 400-5 0
T6.0.100-12 58 T7 0 500-1 0
T6.0.I00-13 58 TA-i 52 T6.0.I00-14 58 TA-ii 52 T6 0 100-15 58 TA-iii 52 T6 0 100-16 58 TA-1 52 T6 0 100-17 58 TA-2 52 T6 0 100-18 58 TA-3 52 T6 0 100-19 58 TA-4 52 T6 0 100-20 58 TA-5 52 T6 0 100-21 58 TA-6 52 T6 0 100-22 58 TA-7 52 T6 0 100-23 58 TA-8 52 T6 0 100-24 58 TA-9 52 PALOVERDEUNITS 1, 2, 3 3
Rev 58 07/03/13
Technical RecuirementsManual LIST OF EFFECTIVEPAGES Page No.
Revision No.
Page No, Revision No, TA-IO 52 TA-11 52 TA-12 57 TA-13 52 TA-14 52 TA-15 52 TA-16 52 PALOVERDEUNITS 1, 2, 3
4 Rev 58 07/03/13
AtmosphericDumpValves (ADVs)
TRM3,7.200 T3.7 PLANTSYSTEMS T3.7.200 Atmospheric DumpValves (AD_fs)
TLCO 3.7.200 Refer to PVNGSTechn cal Specification LCO3.7.4.
APPLICABILITY:
Refer to PVNGSTechncal Specification LCO3.7.4.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIREDACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of TSR A.1 Documer_tthe condition in Immediately 3.7.200.1 not met.
the cor'rective action prograrlland initiate an operab-ity determination, as nec_ssary, to determine the impact on equipment in the te:hnical specifcations, SURVEILLANCEREQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.7,200,1 Verify that the nitro!jen accumulator 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> tank is at a pressure _ 615 PSIG indicated.
i i
J I
PALOVERDEUNITS 1, 2, 3
T_3.7.200-1 Rev 58 07/03/13
TRMSpecification Bases TRM6.0.100 TRMSPECIFICATIONBASES T3.1 200 Shutdown Margin Reactor Tr p Breakers Closed (See the ITS 3.1.2 Specification Base_.)
T3.1 201 This TRMspecification is nct used and is intentionally left
- blank, T3.1 202 Control Element Assembly - $ i)gnment (See the ITS 3.1.5 Specification Base_.
T3.1 203 Control Element Assembly -
rop Time (See the ITS 3.1.5 Specification Base.)
T3.2 200 Azimuthal Power Tilt
- TQ The limitations on the AZIMUTHALPOWETILT are provided to ensure that design safety margins are maintained.
An AZ:MUTHALPOWERTILT greater than the limit specified in the COREOPERATINGLIMIT I REPORTwith COLSSin service or 0.03 with COLSSout of service is not expe:ted and if it should occur, operation is restricted to only those conditions
'equired to identify the cause of the tilt.
The tilt is normally calculat_
I by COLSS. A minimum core power of 20%
of RATEDTHERMALPOWERis assumedby
,he CPCsin its input to COLSSfor calculation of AZIMUTHALPOWERTILT.
The 20%RATEDTHERMALPOWERthreshold is due to the neutron flux detector syst,,m being inaccurate below 20%core power.
Core noise level at low power is too arge to obtain usable detector readings.
The surveillance requirements specifi,,d when COLSSis out of service provide an acceptable means of detecting the _,resence of a steady-state tilt.
It is necessary to explicitly account for p(,wer asymmetries because the radial peaking factors used in the core power distribution calculations are based on an untilted power distribution.
The AZIMUTHALPOWERTILT is equal tl (Pipit/Puniest)-1.0where:
AZIMUTHALPOWERTILT is measured by assuming that the ratio of the power at any core location in the presence o a tilt to the untilted power at the location is of the form Pt_it/Punt_t= 1 + TQg COS(Theta Th_tao) where Tq is the peak fractional tilt amplitude at the core periphery g is the radial normalizing factor Theta is the azimuthal core locatior (continued)
PALOVERDEUNITS1, 2, 3 T_ 0.100-9 Rev58 7/03/13
TRMSpecification Bases TRM6.0.100 TRMSPECIFICATIONBASES Thetao is the azimuthal core locati,,n of maximumtilt Ptilt/Punt_t is the ratio of the power at a core location n the presence of a tilt to the power at that location
_ith no tilt.
The AZIMUTHALPOWERTILT allowance
_sed in the CPCsis defined as the value of CPCaddressable constant TR-I.0 T3.3.100 Supplementary Protection
- ystem (SPS) Instrumentation The OPERABILITYof the reactor protec ;ive and Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systems instrumentation and bypasses ensures that (1) the associated Engineered Safety Features Actuation
_iction and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitorec by each channel or combination thereof reaches its
- setpoint, (2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, (3) sufficient redundancy is maintained tc_ permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and (4) st_fficient system functional capability is available from diverse parameters.
The OPERABILITYof these systems is r_quired to provide the overall reliability, redundancy, and diversit_
assumedavailable in the facility design for the protection and mitigaton of accident and transient conditions.
The integrated operation of each of tllese systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyst,s.
The quarterly frequency for the channi_l functional tests for these systems is based on the analyses presented in thl NRCapproved topical report CEN-327-A, "RPS/ESFASExtended Test Interval Evauation,"
and CEN-327-A, Supplement i, and calculation 13-JC-SB-200-Rev. 01 The verification of response time at _;hespecified frequencies provides assurance that the protective and ESFaction function associated with each channel is completed within the time imit assumedin the safety analyses.
The instrumentation response times are male up of the time to generate the trip signal at the detector (sensor respon_;e time) and the time for the signal to interrupt power to the CEAdrive mechilnism (signal or trip delay time).
Response time may be verified by any ;eries of sequential, overlapping or total channel measurements, including allocated sensor response time, such that the response time is
- verified, tQlocations for sensor response times may be obtained from records of test
- resuts, vendor test
- data, or vendor engineering specifications.
Topical leport CE NPSD-1167-A, "Elimination of (continued) i PALOVERDEUNITS 1, 2, 3
T6.0.100-10 Rev 58 7/03/13 I
TRMSpecification Bases TRM6.0.100 TRMSPECIFICATIONBASES Pressure Sensor ResponseTime Testing Requirements,"
provides the basis and methodology for using allocated senso_ response times in the overall verification of the channel response ime for specific sensors identified in the Topical Report.
Response time verfication for other sensor types must be demonstrated by test.
The allocation of sensor response times must be verified prior to placing a new compollent in operation and reverified after maintenance that may adversely affect the sensor response time.
T3.3.101 Radiation Monitoring Instl'umentation The OPERABILITYof the radiation moni ;oring channels ensures that:
(I) the radiation levels are continually measured in the areas served by the individual channels and (2) the alarm or automatic action is initiated when the radiation level trip setpoint is
!xceeded.
T3.3.102 Incore Detectors The OPERABILITYof the incore detecto's with the specified minimum complement of equipment ensures that the measurerlents obtained from use of this system accurately represent the spatial neutl'on flux distribution of the reactor core.
T3.3.103 Seismic Monitoring The OPERABILITYof the seismic instrurlentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly d_termine the magnitude of a seismic event and evaluate the response of those fe_itures important to safety.
This capability is required to permit compiLrison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for the faci ity to determine if plant shutdown is required pursuant to Appendix A of 10 CFRPart 100.
The instrumentation is consistent with the recommendations o Regulatory Guide 1.12, "Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation for Earthquakes " Revision 2 as identified in the PVNGS FSAR.
T3.3.104 Meteorological Instrumentation The OPERABILITYof the meteorological instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data are available for estimating potential radiation doses to the public as a result of routine or hccidental release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere.
This capability is required to evaluate the need for initiating protective measures to
)rotect the health and safety of the public and is consistent with the rec(_mmendationsof Regulatory Guide 1.23 (continued)
PALOVERDEUNITS 1, 2, 3 T.0.100-11 Rev 58 7/03/13
TRMSpecification Bases TRM6.0.100 TRMSPECIFICATIONBASES "Onsite Meteorological Programs," Feb_'uary 1972.
Wind speeds less than 0.6 MPHcannot be measured by the meteoro ogical instrumentation.
Surveillance requirement TSR 3.3.104.
is modified by a NOTEto indicate that the windspeed sensors are excluded fr m the CHANNELCALIBRATION. The device is fixed by design and no adjustments are possible.
T3.3.105 Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation The OPERABILITYof the post-accident toring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following accident.
This capability is consistent with the recommendations Regulatory Guide 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Plants Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident,"
December1975 and NUREG0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and Short-Te1"mRecommendations."
T3.3.106 Loose-Part Detection Instrunlentation The OPERABILITYof the loose-part detc_ction instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to detect loose metallic parts in the primary system and avoid or mitigate cJamageto primary system components.
The allowable out-of-service times and su1"veillance requirements are consistent with the recommendations of Regulator_
Guide 1.133, "Loose-Part Detection Program for the Primary System of Liglt-Water-Cooled Reactors " May 1981.
T3.3.107 Explosive Gas Monitoring System The explosive gas instrumentation is l)rovided for monitoring (and controlling) the concentrations of potentially exposive gas mixtures in the GASEOUS RADWASTE SYSTEM. The OPERABILITYand use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of G_neral Design Criteria 60, 63 and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFRPart 50.
T3.3.108 Fuel Bldg Essential Ventilal,ion Actuation Signal (FBEVAS The FBEVASis an instrumentation chanllel that actuates the Fuel Building Essential Ventilation System (FBEVS) :o minimize radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly durilg a Fuel Handling Accident, TLCO3.3.108 requires one channel of
_BEVASwhich includes the Actuation
- Logic, Manual Trip, and radiation mon tor to be OPERABLE.
(continued)
PALOVERDEUNITS 1, 2, 3 TI.0.100-12 Rev 58 7/03/13
TRMSpecifi cati on Bases TRM6.0.100 TRMSPECIFICATIONBASES The cross-train trip function is provded as a defense-in-depth capability and is not required for FBEVASchannel op_._rability.
During movementof irradiated fuel as'.;emblies in the fuel building with the required FBEVASchannel inoperable, al OPERABLEFBEVStrain must be immediately placed in the emergency m(de of operation (i.e.,
fan running, valves/dampers aligned to the post-FBI!VAS mode, etc.)
or movementof irradiated fuel assemblies must be su_;pendedimmediately.
The first action ensures that no undetected failures p1"eventing FBEVSsystem operation will
- occur, and that any active failure wi l be readily detected.
If an OPERABLE FBEVS train is not placed in the eme'gency modeof operation, this action requires suspension of the movemento irradiated fuel assemblies in order to minimize the risk of release of radio, ctivity that might require the actuation FBEVS. This does not preclude the mo,,ementof fuel to a safe position.
Movementof spent fuel casks containirlg irradiated fuel assemblies is not within the scope of the Applicability of this technical specification.
The movementof dry casks containing irra_Jiated fuel assemblies will be done with a single-failure-proof handling systerl and with transport equipment that would prevent any credible accident that cot_Id result in a release of radioactivity.
T3.3.200 RPSInstrumentation Opera_ ng (See the ITS 3.3.1 Specification Base! )
If a valid CPCcabinet high temperatut'e alarm is
- received, it is possible for an OPERABLECPCand CEACto be affect_d and not be completely reliable.
Therefore, a CHANNELFUNCTIONALTEST lust be performed on OPERABLECPCsand CEACswithin 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
The Completio_ Time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is adequate considering the low probability of un(letected failure, the consequences of a
single channel failure, and the time
'equired to perform a CHANNELFUNCTIONAL TEST.
T3.4.100 Auxiliary Spray System The auxiliary pressurizer spray is re luired to depressurize the RCSby cooling the pressurizer steam space to permit the plant to enter shutdown cooling.
The auxiliary pressurizer spray is requirl_d during those periods when normal pressurizer spray is not available, stlch as during natural circulation and during the later stages of a normal R(;Scooldown.
The auxiliary pressurizer spray also distributes boron to the pr'essurizer when normal pressurizer spray is not available.
(continued)
PALOVERDEUNITS I, 2, 3 T.0.100-13 Rev 58 7/03/13
TRMSpecification Bases TRM6.0.100 TRMSPECIFICATIONBASES T3.4.101 RCSChemistry The limitations on Reactor Coolant System chemistry ensure that corrosion of the Reactor Coolant System is minimiz_d and reduces the potential for Reactor Coolant System leakage or failure due to stress corrosion.
Maintaining the chemistry within the Steady State Limts provides adequate corrosion protection to ensure the structural i_Itegrity of the Reactor Coolant System over the life of the plant.
The assoc:iated effects of exceeding the oxygen,
- chloride, and fluoride limits are tim_ and temperature dependent.
Corrosion studies show that operation may be cotltinued with contaminant concentration levels in excess of the Steady State
.imits, up to the Transient
- Limits, for the specified limited time intervals
/ithout having a significant effect on the structural integrity of the Reactm Coolant System.
The time interval permitting continued operation within the restrictions of the Transient Limits provides time for taking corrective a(:tions to restore the contaminant concentrations to within the Steady Si;ate Limits.
The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that concentrations in excess of the limits will be detecl;ed in sufficient time to take corrective action.
T3.4,102 Pressurizer Heatup and Coolcown Limits The limitations imposed on the pressur'izer heatup and cooldown rates and spray water temperature differential are pr(_vided to assure that the pressurizer is operated within the design criteria a_sumedfor the fatigue analysis performed in accordance with the ASMECode Requrements.
T3.4.103 Intentionally Blank (continued)
PALOVERDEUNITS 1, 2, 3
T_.0.100-14 Rev 58 7/03/13 I
I
TRMSpecification Bases TRM6.0.100 TRMSPECIFICATIONBASES T3.4.104 RCSVents (Reactor Head Venls)
Reactor Coolant System vents are provded to exhaust noncondensible gases and/or steam from the primary system :hat could inhibit natural circulation core cooling.
The OPERABILITYof at east one Reactor Coolant System vent path from the reactor vessel head ensmes the capability exists to perform this function.
A vent path is the flow capability frc_mthe reactor vessel head to the reactor drain tank (RDT) or from the reactor
'essel head to containment atmosphere.
The four vent paths are:
- 1. From the reactor vessel head th'ough solenoid operated valve (SOV) HV-101, then through SOVHV-105 to the RDT.
2.
From the reactor vessel head thr'ough SOVHV-I01, then through SOVHV-I06 directly to containment atmosphc_re.
3.
From the reactor vessel head thr'ough SOVHV-102, then through SOVHV-105 to the RDT.
- 4. From the reactor vessel head thr'ough SOVHV-I02, then through SOVHV-I06 directly to containment atmosph_,re.
The valve redundancy of the Reactor C(,olant System vent paths serves to minimize the probability of inadvertert or irreversible actuation while ensuring that a single failure of a v_nt valve, power supply, or control system does not prevent isolation of lhe vent path.
The function, capabilities, and testirg requirements of the Reactor Coolant System vent systems are consistent wilh the requirements of Item II.B.I of NUREG-0737.
T3.4.200 RCSPressure and Temperature (P/T)
Limits (See the ITS 3.4.3 Specification Base_ )
T3.4.201 Pressurizer An OPERABLEpressurizer provides pressure control for the Reactor Coolant System during operations with both forced reactor coolant flow and with natural circulation flow.
The minimun water level in the pressurizer assures the pressurizer
- heaters, which are recuired to achieve and maintain pressure
- control, remain covered with water to
)revent
- failure, which could occur if the heaters were energized uncovered.
The maximumwater level in the pressurizer ensures that this paramet_
is maintained within the envelope of operation assumedin the safety analysis.
The maximumwater level also ensures that the RCSis not a hydraulically solid system and that a steam i
(continued)
PALOVERDEUNITS 1, 2, 3
T#.0.I00-15 Rev 58 7/03/13
TRMSpecifi cati on Bases TRM6.0.100 TRMSPECIFICATIONBASES bubble will be provided to accommodat_pressure surges during operation.
The steam bubble also protects the pressum'izer code safety valves against water relief.
The requirement to verify th,lt on an Engineered Safety Features Actuation test signal concurrent with a loss-of-offsite power the pressurizer heaters are automatically shed from tlle emergency power sources is to ensure that the non-Class 1E heaters do not 1"educethe reliability of or overload the emergency power source.
The requiremc_nt that a minimum number of pressurizer heaters be OPERABLEenhances the capal)ility to control Reactor Coolant System pressure and establish and maintain niltural circulation.
T3.4,202 Pressurizer Vents (See the ITS 3.4.12 specification Basc_s.)
T3.4.203 RCSOperational LEAKAGE (See the ITS 3.4.14 Specification Bas_s.)
T3.4.204 RCSPIV Leakage (See the ITS 3.4.15 Specification Bas_s.)
T3.5.200 Safety Injection Tanks (See the ITS 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 Specifici_tion Bases.)
T3.5.201 Shutdown Cooling System The OPERABILITYof two separate and ir_dependent shutdown cooling subsystems ensures that the capability of initial.ing shutdown cooling exists when required assuming the most limiting s ngle failure occurs.
The requirement to verify the functionality of an inoper ble shutdown cooling subsystem minimizes the time exposure of the plant to an,vent requiring shutdown concurrent with the failure of a component on the other shutdown cooling subsystem.
The shutdown cooling subsystem operat on is described in UFSAR5.4.7.
Many of the components comprising the shutdowr cooling system have specific requirements during Modes 1-3 in the lechnical Specifications (e.g.,
emergency core cooling, containment
- spray, and (ontainment isolation).
However, several components do not have specific operaLility requirements in Technical Specifications, and some components function differently in their shutdown cooling role than they do when perforning the other functions required by Technical Specifications.
These fact(rs must be considered when determining the OPERABILITYand/or functionality f
the shutdown cooling subsystems.
The safety analysis assumes that shut own cooling may be placed in operation once cold leg temperature is less thar or equal to 350°F and pressurizer pressure is less than approximately 4[0 psia.
Additional information (continued)
PALOVERDEUNITS 1, 2, 3 T_ 0.100-16 Rev 58 7/03/13
TRMSpecification Bases TRM6.0.100 TRMSPECIFICATIONBASES regarding the shutdown cooling system is in UFSARSection 9.3.4.
Since the subsystem is manually initiated, tempc)rary changes in the position of shutdown cooling system valves from their norm,ll line up do not necessarily make them inoperable with respect to their shut_lown cooling safety function.
The action for one shutdown cooling si_bsystem inoperable requires verification that the inoperable subsystem is stil functional.
Functionality requires the subsystem to be capable of performing its safety function given a transient (e.g.
Small Break LOCA, SGTR). Functionality will be established utilizing the Operability Determination Program The allowed outage time is consistent with the durations permitted for
- thos, major shutdown cooling components whose operability is controlled by Technica Specifications.
The specified outage time allows a reasonable opportunity o effect repairs while providing acceptable limits for the duration of intervals where the system may not be OPERABLE.In combination with the maintenance rule requirements in 10 CFR 50.65, the allowed outage times help,,nsure that the shutdown cooling subsystems will be functional when re uired.
If the subsystem cannot be restored o
functionality verified within the stated time frame, the associated ACTIONplaces the unit in Mode4 where the steam generators are still available
_or heat removal and the stored energy of the NSSSis much less than it is duri ig power operation.
While in Modes3 and 4 continued actions to restore the su system to OPERABLEare required.
The action for both shutdown cooling ubsystems inoperable require verification of functionality of at last one subsystem within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.
The shorter duration is consistent with t
e increased safety consequences that exist when the equipment required to establish cold shutdown conditions is inoperable.
If at least one subsysten cannot be restored or verified functional within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />, the associ ted ACTIONagain places the unit in Mode 4 where the steam generators are avai able for heat removal and the stored energy in the NSSSis minimized.
Whi e in Mode 3 and 4 continued actions to restore the required subsystems to OPERABLEare required.
The surveillance requirement to place each train of shutdown cooling in service every refueling interval demorstrates that the subsystems are functional.
In combination with other testing performed to support Technical Specifications, including that conducted as part of the in-service testing and inspection programs, the specified surveillances provide reasonable assurance that the system will be able to perform its intended safety functions.
I (continued)
PALOVERDEUNITSI, 2, 3 T_.0.I00-17 Rev58 7/03/13
TRMSpecification Bases TRM6.0.100 TRMSPECIFICATIONBASES The SDCsystems are normally in a stalldby, nonoperating mode.
As such, flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases.
The method of ensuring that any voids or pockets of gases are removed from the shutdown cooling suction piping is to vent the accessible suction piping high
- points, which is controlled by PVNGSl)rocedures.
Maintaining the shutdown cooling system suction piping full of water ensures the system will perform properly by minimizing the potential
- or degraded pumpperformance, preventing pumpcavitation, and preventing pumpillg of noncondensible gas (e.g.,
- air, nitrogen, or hydrogen) into the react_)r vessel during SDC. The 31 day Frequency takes into consideration th_ gradual nature of gas accumulation in the SDCpiping and the adequacy of th_ procedural controls governing system operation.
References:
1.
UFSARSections 5.4.7 and
.3.4 2.
Combustion Engineering Owers Group Joint Applications Report for Low Pressure Safety Injec;ion System AOTExtension, CE NPSD-995, dated May 1995, as submit;ed to NRCin APS letter no. 102-03392, dated June 13, 1995, with updates described in letter no. I02-04250 dated February 26,
.999.
Also see TS amendmentno. 124 dated February 1, 2000.
(continued)
PALOVERDEUNITS I, 2, 3 T_.0.100-18 Rev 58 7/03/13
TRMSpecification Bases TRM6.0.100 TRMSPECIFICATIONBASES T3.5.202 ECCS-Operating (See the ITS 3.5.3 Specification Base.)
SURVEILLANCE TSR3.5.202.4 REQUIREMENT Maintaining the ECCl suction piping full of water from the Refueling Water Tanl and the containment sumpto the ECCS pumpsensures that he system will perform properly by minimizing the potetltial for degraded pumpperformance.
The 31 day frequency tal:es into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the ECCSpiping and the adequacy of procedural controls governing system operation.
T3.5.203 ECCS-Shutdown (See the ITS 3.5.4 Specification Base_.)
T3.6.100 Hydrogen Purge Cleanup Syst_
The OPERABILITYof the equipment and _ystems required for the control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipm_nt will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containrlent below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions.
The purge systl_m is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with (i.)
zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water and (3) corrosion of metals within containment.
The hydrogen control sy_,temis consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1 7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Followi tg a LOCA," March 1971.
The use of ANSI Standard N509 (1980) n lieu of ANSI Standard N509 (1976) to meet the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, Positions C.6.a and C.6.b, has been found acceptable as d(,cumented in Revision 2 to Section 6.5.1 of the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-08(,O).
T3.6.200 Prestressed Concrete Contai ment Tendon Surveillance The prestressed concrete containment endon surveillance program ensures the structural integrity of containment i
maintained in accordance with ASMECode Section XI, Subsection IWL of the ASMi Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable addenda as required by 10 FR 50.55a, except where an exemption or relief has been authorized by the NRC I
(continued)
PALOVERDEUNITS 1, 2, 3
T6.0.100-19 Rev 58 7/03/13 I
I
TRMSpecification Bases TRM6,0.100 TRMSPECIFICATIONBASES T3.6.201 Containment Spray System The containment system is normally in
- standby, nonoperating mode.
As such, flow path piping has the potential to d_velop voids and pockets of entrained gases.
The method of ensuring that any voids or pockets of gases are removed from the containment spray suction pipilg is to vent the accessible suction piping high points, which is controlled by PVNGSprocedures.
Maintaining the containment spray system suction piping full of water ensures the system will perform properly by minimizing the poteltial for degraded pumpperformance, preventing pumpcavitation, and prevent ng delay of spray delivery to the containment atmosphere.
The 31 day Freluency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in tie containment spray piping and the adequacy of the procedural controls gov,_rning system operation.
T3.6.300 Hydrogen Recombiners BACKGROUND The function of the hldrogen recombiners is to eliminate the potential breach of
,c')ntainment due to a hydrogen oxygen reaction.
Per 10 CFR50.44, "Standards for Combustible Gas Control Systems in Li, ht-Water-Cooled Reactors" (Ref.
1),
and 10 CFR50, GDC41 "Containment Atmosphere Cleanup" (Ref.
2),
hydrogen re, ombiners are required to reduce the hydrogen concentration7 in the containment following a Loss Of Coolant Accident (I_OCA)or Main Steam Line Break (MSLB).
The recombiners acco_)lish this by recombining hydrogen and oxygen to form water lapor.
The vapor remains in containment, thus eli linating any discharge to the environment.
The hyd'ogen recombiners are manually initiated since flamm,_bility limits would not be reached until several days af;er a Design Basis Accident (DBA).
Two 100%capacity ind_ pendent hydrogen recombiners are shared amongthe thre_
units.
Each consists of controls, a
power supply, and a r__ombiner located in the Auxiliary Building.
Recombinat on is accomplished by heating a
hydrogen air mixture
,Ibove 1150°F.
The resulting water vapor and discharge g,lses are cooled prior to discharge from the recombiner.
Air
=lows through the unit at 50 cfm with a
5 hp centrifugal blow_r in the unit providing the motive force.
A single recorlbiner is capable of maintaining the hydrogen concentratiolllin containment below the 4.0 volume percent (v/o) flammab ity limit.
Two recombiners are provided to meet the _'equirement for redundancy and independence.
Each re,combiner is powered from a separate Engineered Safety Fea;ures bus.
(continued)
I PALOVERDEUNITS 1, 2, 3 T6._.100-20 Rev 58 7/03/13 I
TRMSpecification Bases TRM6.O.100 TRMSPECIFICATIONBASES APPLICABLE The hydrogen recombin_rs provide for controlling the bulk SAFETYANALYSES hydrogen concentratiol in containment to less than the (continued) lower flammable conceltration of 4.0 v/o following a DBA.
This control would prevent a containment wide hydrogen burn.
thus ensuring tle pressure and temperature assumedin the analysis are not _xceeded and minimizing damageto safety related equipment located in containment.
The limiting DBArelative to hydrogen generation is a LOCA.
Hydrogen may accumulate within containment following a LOCA as a result of:
a.
A metal steam reaction between the zirconium fuel rod cladding and the reactor coolant; b.
Radiolytic decomposition of water in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and the containment sump c.
Hydrogen in the RCSat the time of the LOCA(i.e.,
hydrogen dissolved in the reactor coolant and hydrogen gas in the press rizer vapor space);
or d.
Corrosion of mel Is exposed to Containment Spray System and Emercncy Core Cooling Systems solutions.
To evaluate the poten;ial for hydrogen accumulation in containment following a LOCA,the hydrogen generation as a function of time foll,)wing the initiation of the accident is calculated.
Conserw_ive assumptions recommendedin Reference 3 are used ;o maximize the amount of hydrogen calculated.
TLCO Two hydrogen recombin_rs shared amongthe three units must be OPERABLE.This en ures operation of at least one hydrogen recombiner i the event of a worst case single active failure.
Operation with at lea t one hydrogen recombiner ensures that the post LOCAhydrogel concentration can be prevented from exceeding the flammaLility limit.
(continued)
PALOVERDEUNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.,.100-21 Rev 58 7/03/13
TRMSpecification Bases TRM6.0.100 TRMSPECIFICATIONBASES APPLICABILITY In MODES1 and 2, two hydrogen recombiners are required to control the post LOCAhydrogen concentration within containment below its flammability limit of 4.0 v/o, assuming a worst case single failure.
In MODES3 and 4, botl the hydrogen production rate and the total hydrogen produced after a LOCAwould be less than that calculated for tle DBALOCA. Also, because of the limited time in these MODES,the probability of an accident requiring the hydroge7 recombiners is low.
Therefore, the hydrogen recombiners
_re not required in MODE3 or 4.
In MODES5 and 6, the probability and consequences of a
LOCAare low, due to
- he pressure and temperature limitations.
Therefore, hydrogen recombiners are not required in these MOD_S.
ACTIONS The required ACTIONSlave been modified by a Note stating that all three PVNGSJnits (Units 1, 2, and 3) shall simultaneously comply with the REQUIREDACTION(s) when the shared portion of the hydrogen recombiner(s) is the cause of a CONDITION. This is necessary since the three PVNGSUnits share the two hydroge7 recombiners that are required by this LCO. It will be necessary for the Control Roomof the Palo Verde Unit that discolers an inoperable shared portion of the hydrogen recombiner(s) to notify the other two Palo Verde Unit's Control Rooms)f the inoperability.
A.1 With one containment lydrogen recombiner inoperable, the inoperable recombiner must be restored to OPERABLEstatus within 30 days.
In tlis condition, the remaining OPERABLE hydrogen recombiner i
adequate to perform the hydrogen control function.
Th 30 day Completion Time is based on the availability of the o her hydrogen recombiner, the small probability of a LOCAor MSLBoccurring (that would generate an amount of hydrogen that exceeds the flammability limit),
and the amount of tim,_ available after a LOCAor MSLB(should one occur) for operat)r action to prevent hydrogen accumulation from exc__edingthe flammability limit.
i (continued) i PALOVERDEUNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.D.100-22 Rev 58 7/03/13
TRMSpecification Bases TRM6.0.100 TRMSPECIFICATIONBASES ACTIONS B.I and B.2 (continued)
With two hydrogen rec)mbiners inoperable, the ability to perform the hydrogen ]ontrol function via alternate capabilities must be lerified by administrative means within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
The alternate hydrogen control capabilities are provided by the H/drogen Purge Cleanup System.
The I hour Completion Time _llows a reasonable period of time to verify that a loss of hydrogen control function does not exist.
In addition,
- he alternate hydrogen control system capability must be verified every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter to ensure its continued
_vailability.
Both the initial verification and all
_ubsequent verifications may be performed as an administrative
- check, by examining logs or other information to _letermine the availability of the alternate hydrogen colltrol system.
It does not meanto perform the Surveillallces needed to demonstrate OPERABILITY of the alternate hydn)gen control system.
If the ability to perform the hydrog_n control function is maintained, continued operation i:
permitted with two hydrogen recombiners inoperabl_
for up to 7 days.
Seven days is a reasolable time to allow two hydrogen recombiners to be inol)erable because the hydrogen control function is maintainecl and because of the low probability of the occurrence of a L()CAthat would generate hydrogen in amounts capable of exc:eeding the flammability limit.
C,1 If the inoperable hydt'ogen recombiner(s) cannot be restored to OPERABLEstatus wi;hin the required Completion Time.
TLCO 3.0,100.3 must be ent_!red immediately SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.7.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR ensures that
_;here are no physical problems that could affect recombin_r operation.
A visual inspection is sufficient to determir_e abnormal conditions that could cause
- failures, The 6 mont_l Frequency for this SRwas developed considering that the ncidence of hydrogen recombiners failing the SR in the )ast is low.
SR 3.6.7.2 A functional test of
_achHydrogen Recombiner System assures that the recombiners
'emain operational, The functional test shall include op,rating the recombiner including the air blast heat exchan(rer fan motor and enclosed blower motor (continued)
PALOVERDEUNITS 1, 2, 3 T6.
,100-23 Rev 58 7/03/13
TRMSpecification Bases TRM6.0.100 TRMSPECIFICATION BASES continuously for at l_ast 30 minutes at a temperature of approximately 800°F r_action chamber temperature.
The frequency recommendedfor this surveillance in the Improved Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-1432,Rev. 1) is 18 months.
The bases for NUREG1432 was developed for permanently installed hydrogen recombiners.
The two portable hydrogen rec)mbiners at PVNGSare shared amongthe three units; therefore, the 6 month frequency from the initial licensing bas s is retained for reliability considerations.
SR 3.6.7.3 Performance of a CHANilELCALIBRATIONto include a system functional test for e_ch hydrogen recombiner ensures that the recombiners are ol)erational and can attain and sustain the temperature necessary for hydrogen recombination.
In particular, this SR r,_quires 1) resistance checks of motors, thermocouples, and heater systems, 2) testing/calibration of all flow
- elements, switches, and temperature
- elements, and
- 3) operation of the r,_combiner to include a functional test at 1200°F (+/-50°F) for at least 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
Operating experience has shown ;hat these components usually pass the Surveillance when per:ormed at the 12 month Frequency.
Therefore, the Frequeilcy was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpo nt.
REFERENCES 1.
2.
3.
Regulatory Guid< 1.7, Revision O.
4.
UFSAR,Section
.2.5 T3.7.100 Steam Generator Pressure an Temperature Limitations The limitation on steam generator presstre and temperature ensures that the pressure induced stre_;ses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximumal owable fracture toughness stress limits.
The limitati
)ns to 120°F and 230 psig for Units 1
and 3 are based on a ;team generator RTNDTof 40°F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.
The limitations to 70°F and 650 psig for Unit 2 are based on a steam generator RTNDTof
-20°F and ar_ sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.
(continued)
PALOVERDEUNITS 1, 2, 3 T6._.100-24 Rev 58 7/03/13
TRMSpecifi cati on Bases TRM6.0.100 TRMSPECIFICATIONBASES T3.7.101 Snubbers All snubbers are required to be able
- o perform their associated safety function(s) to ensure that the structural integrity of the reactor coolant system and all other safety-related s,stems is maintained during and following a seismic or other event initiating d,namic loads.
Snubbers excluded from this inspection program are those ins;ailed on nonsafety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed, would have no adverse effec:t on any safety-related system.
Whenone or more snubbers are unable ;o perform their associated safety function(s),
either the supported sys;em must be declared inoperable immediately or TS LCO3.0.8 must be erltered.
TS LCO3.0.8 may only be entered if the restrictions described in the
.CO3.0.8 TS Bases are met.
TS LCO3.0.8 is an allowance, not a requirement.
Jhen any snubber is unable to perform its associated safety
- function, the suppo'ted system may be declared inoperable instead of utilizing LCO3.0.8.
Required Action A.2 must be completed whenever Condition A is entered.
This Required Action emphasizes the need tc_ perform the evaluation to determine if the components to which the nonfuncti
_nal snubbers are attached were adversely affected by the non-functionality of
- he snubbers in order to ensure that the component remains capable of meeting
- he designed service.
Restoration alone per Required Action A.1.1 or A.1.2 is insufficient because higher than analyzed stresses may have occurred arld may have affected the supported system.
A list of individual snubbers with del;ailed information of snubber location and size and of system affected shall be available at the plant in accordance with Section 50.71(c) of 10 CFRPart iO.
The accessibility of each snubber shall be determined and approved by t_e Plant Review Board.
The determination shall be based upon the existing radi ition levels and the expected time to perform a visual inspection in each slubber location as well as other factors associated with accessibility during
_lant operations (e.g.,
temperature, atmosphere,
- location, etc.),
and the
'ecommendations of Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10.
The addition or deletion o
any hydraulic or mechanical snubber shall be made in accordance with Secton 50.59 of 10 CFRPart 50.
The acceptance criteria specified in
- he 2001 Edition, 2003 Addenda, of the ASMEOMCode, Subsection ISTD are to
_e used in the visual inspection to determine the functionality of the snubbers.
(continued)
PALOVERDEUNITS 1, 2, 3 TI.0.I00-25 Rev 58 07/03/13 I
TRMSpecification Bases TRM6.0. 100 TRMSPECIFICATIONBASES To provide assurance of snubber functional reliability one of the two functional testing methods specified in the 2001 Edition, 2003 Addenda, of the AMSEOMCode, Subsection ISTD, shall
)e utilized.
The service life of a snubber is esta)lished via manufacturer input and information through consideration of ;he snubber service conditions and associated installation and maintenan,'e records (newly installed
- snubber, seal
- replaced, spring
- replaced, in high ra, iation
- area, in high temperature
- area, etc.).
The requirement to monitor th_ snubber service life is included in the 2001 Edition, 2003 Addenda, of the ASIIEOMCode, Subsection ISTD to ensure that the snubbers periodically undergo) a performance evaluation in view of their age and operating conditions.
-hese records will provide statistical bases for future consideration of snu)ber service life.
T3.7.102 Sealed Source Contamination The limitations on removable contamin,ltion for sources requiring leak
- testing, including alpha emitters, is based on 10 CFR70.39(c) limits for plutonium.
This limitation will ensure that leak,lge from byproduct,
- source, and special nuclear material sources will not exc_._edallowable intake values.
Sealed sources are classified into th_'ee groups according to their use, with surveillance requirements commensuratE.
_ with the probability of damageto a
source in that group.
Those sources l_hich are frequently handled are required to be tested more often than those whch are not.
Sealed sources which are continuously enclosed within a shieldc._dmechanism (i.e.
sealed sources within radiation monitoring or boron measurillg devices) are considered to be stored and need not be tested unless they arc removed from the shield mechanism.
T3.7.200 Atmospheric DumpValves (JDVs)
Background
See TS Bases B 3..4 Applicable TS Bases B 3.7.4.
Safety Analyses Actions A. 1 I
If the requiremen s of TSR3.7.200 are not met, the condition must be documented in the corrective action program and an op_!rability determination must be initiated as necessary to d_!termine the impact on equipment in the (continued)
PALOVERDEUNITS i, 2, 3 TI.0.100-26 Rev 58 07/03/13
TRMSpecification Bases TRM6.0.100 TRMSPECIFICATIONBASES TSs.
This action is required to assure compliance with the TSs.
I Surveillance TSR3.7.200.1 i
Requirements The nitrogen accurlulator tank pressure must be verified to have a pressure o at least 615 psig indicated to ensure that it has suffi ient pressurized gas to operate the ADVs for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> at ho standby plus 9.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> of operation to reach cold shutdo_
under natural circulation conditions in the event of fililure of the normal control air
- system, as described in UISAR10.3.2.2.4 and based on the RSB5-1 cooldown evaluati
_n in UFSARAppendix 5C.
(continued)
PALOVERDEUNITS 1, 2, 3 T,,.0.100-27 Rev 58 07/03/13
TRMSpecifi cati on Bases TRM6 0.100 TRMSPECIFICATIONBASES T3 7 201 AFWSystem (See the ITS 3 7 5 Specification Base.)
T3 7 202 Essential Cooling Water (EW System (See the ITS 3 7 7 Specification Base.)
T3 7 203 Essential Spray Pond System (ESPS)
(See the ITS 3 7 8 Specification Base._.)
T3 7 204 Essential Chilled Water (EC System (See the ITS 3 7 10 Specification Bas s.)
T3 7 205 Control RoomEmergencyAir lemperature Control System (CREATCS (See the ITS 3 7 12 Specification Basc,s.)
T3 7 206 Fuel Storage Pool Water Lew (See the ITS 3 7 14 Specification Ba._
.)
T3 7 207 Secondary Specific Activity (See the ITS 3 7 16 Specification Bas_,s.)
T3.8.100 Cathodic Protection If any other metallic structures (e.g.,
buildings, new or modified piping systems, conduit) are placed in the ground in the vicinity of the fuel oil storage system or if the original syslem is modified, the adequacy and frequency of inspections of the catho(lic protection system shall be re-evaluated and adjusted in accordance
,ith Regulatory Guide 1.137.
T3.8.101 Containment Penetration Con uctor Overcurrent Protective Devices Containment electrical penetrations a_d penetration conductors are protected by either deenergizing circuits not r_,quired during reactor operation or by demonstrating the OPERABILITYof primary and backup overcurrent protection circuit breakers during periodic surv, illance.
The circuit breakers will be tested in accordance with NEMAStanda d Publication No. AB-2-1980.
For a frame size of 250 amperes or less, th, field tolerances of the high and low setting of the injected current will J,e within
+40%/-25%of the setpoint (pickup) value.
For a frame size of 4_0 amperes or greater, the field tolerances will be +/-25%of the setpoi tt (pickup) value.
The circuit breakers should not be affected when tested wihin these tolerances.
The surveillance requirements applicable to lower voltage circuit breakers provide assurance of breaker reliability by testing at least one I
i (continued)
I i
PALOVERDEUNITS 1, 2, 3
T_.0.100-28 Rev 58 07/03/13
TRMSpecification Bases TRM6.0.100 TRMSPECIFICATIONBASES representative sample of each manufacl;urer's brand of circuit breaker.
Each manufacturer's molded case and metal
- ase circuit breakers are grouped into representative samples which are then tested on a rotating basis to ensure that all breakers are tested.
If a wde variety exists within any manufacturer's brand of circuit break_rs it is necessary to divide that manufacturer's breakers into groups al_dtreat each group as a separate type of breaker for surveillance purposes.
T_ere are no surveillance requirements on fuses.
For in-line
- fuses, the applicilble surveillance would require removing the fuses from the circuit which woul( destroy the fuse.
The test data for surveillance on the other fuses would not indicate whether the fuse was degrading which has been stated by th_ fuse manufacturer and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
T3.8.102 MOVThermal Overload Protec on and Bypass Devices The OPERABILITYof the motor-operated
/alves thermal overload protection and/or bypass devices ensures that th_se devices will not prevent safety related valves from performing their Junction.
The surveillance requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITYof
- hese devices are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.106, "Thermal Over oad Protection for Electric Motors on Motor Operated Valves,"
Revision 1, Mi_rch 1977.
i (continued)
PALOVERDEUNITS 1, 2, 3 T_.0.I00-29 Rev 58 07/03/13
TRMSpecification Bases TRM6.0.100 TRMSPECIFICATIONBASES T3.8.200 AC Sources Shutdown (See the ITS 3.8.2 Specification Base_.)
T3.9.100 Decay Time The minimum requirement for reactor st bcriticality prior to movementof irradiated fuel assemblies in the rea(:tor pressure vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow
- he radioactive decay of the short lived fission products.
This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
T3.9.101 Communications The requirement for communications caI_ability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity condition dtlring COREALTERATIONS.
T3.9.102 Refueling Machine The OPERABILITYrequirements for the efueling machine ensure that:
(i) the machine will be used for movementof uel assemblies, (2) the machine has sufficient load capacity to lift a fu, l assembly, and (3) the core internals and pressure vessel are protected fro_t excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.
T3.9.103 Crane Travel The restriction on movementof loads n excess of the nominal weight of a fuel assembly, CEAand associated handling tool over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool ensures that in the even this load is dropped (i) the activity release will be limited to that conta ned in a single fuel assembly, and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in th_ storage racks will not result in a critical array.
This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumedin the safety analyses.
Howe_er, the use of a single failure-proof crane to move spent fuel cask componerts over irradiated fuel stored in an approved cask is allowed by this LCO.
I (continued)
PALOVERDEUNITS 1, 2, 3 T#.0.I00-30 Rev 58 7/03/13
TRMSpecification Bases TRM6.0.100 TRMSPECIFICATIONBASES T3.9,104 Fuel Building Essential Vent lation System (FBEVS)
The limitations on the fuel building
_sential ventilation system ensure that all radioactive material released fro l an irradiated fuel assembly will be filtered through the HEPAfilters and charcoal adsorber prior to discharge to the atmosphere.
The OPERABILITYof t_is system and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with
- he assumptions of the safety analyses.
If one FBEVStrain is inoperable, act on must be taken to immediately verify that the OPERABLEFBEVSis capable of being powered from an emergency power source and to restore the inoperable
- rain to OPERABLEstatus within 7 days, During this time period, the remainin, I OPERABLEtrain is adequate to perform the FBEVSfunction.
The 7 day Complei:ion Time is reasonable, based on the risk from an event occurring requirin!r the inoperable FBEVStrain, and ability of the remaining FBEVStrain to provi(te the required protection.
During movement of irradiated fuel as emblies in the fuel
- building, if the Required Actions of Condition A canno be completed within the required Completion Time, the operation (i.e.,
fan running, valves/dampers aligned to the post-FBEVASmode, etc.)
or movemer_tof irradiated fuel assemblies must be suspended immediately.
The first action ensures that the remaining train is OPERABLE,that no undetected failures preventing system operation will
- occur, and that any active failure will be r_,adily detected.
If the system is not placed in the emergency modeof operalion, this action requires suspension of the movementof irradiated fuel assemL,lies in order to minimize the risk of release of radioactivity that might require the actuation of FBEVS. This does not preclude the movementof fuel to _ safe position.
Movementof spent fuel casks containirg irradiated fuel assemblies is not within the scope of the Applicability of this technical specification.
The movementof dry casks containing irra(iated fuel assemblies will be done with a single-failure-proof handling systen and with transport equipment that would prevent any credible accident that COLd result in a release of radioactivity.
(continued)
PALOVERDEUNITS 1, 2, 3 T_.0.100-31 Rev 58 7/03/13
TRMSpecification Bases TRM6.0.100 TRMSPECIFICATIONBASES Whentwo trains of the FBEVSare inop_rable during movementof irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel
- building, acti(,n must be taken to place the unit in a condition in which the LCOdoes not a,ply.
This LCOinvolves immediately suspending movement of irradiated fue assemblies in the fuel building.
This does not preclude the movementof fue to a safe position.
The use of ANSI Standard N509 (1980) n lieu of ANSI Standard N509 (1976) to meet the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2,
Positions C.6.a and C.6.b, has been found acceptable as d(,cumented in Revision 2 to Section 6.5.1 of the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-08(O).
T3.9.200 Boron Concentration (See the ITS 3.9.1 Specification Base_.)
T3.9.201 Containment Penetrations (See the ITS 3.9.3 Specification Base: )
T3.10.200 Liquid Holdup Tanks The tanks referred to in this specifi(ation include all those outdoor radwaste tanks that are not surrounded by liners,
- dikes, or walls capable of holding the tank contents and that do not haw tank overflows and surrounding area drains connected to the liquid radwase treatment system.
Restricting the quantity of radioacti e material contained in the specified tanks provides assurance that in the vent of an uncontrolled release of the tanks'
- contents, the resulting concen rations would be less than 10 times the limits of 10 CFRPart 20.1001-20.2402 Appendix B, Table 2, Column 2, at the nearest potable water supply and the earest surface water supply in an UNRESTRICTED AREA.
The limit of 60 curies is based on th analyses given in Section 2.4 of the PVNGSFSARand on the amount of solube not gaseous) radioactivity in the Refueling Water Tank in Table 2.4-26.
(continued)
PALOVERDEUNITS 1, 2, 3
T6.0 100-32 Rev 58 7/03/13 i
I
TRMSpecification Bases TRM6.0.100 TRMSPECIFICATIONBASES T3.10.201 Explosive Gas Mixture This specification is provided to ens re that the concentration of potentially explosive gas mixtures contained in tie waste gas holdup system is maintained below the flammability limits of hydr(gen and oxygen.
(Automatic control features are included in the system t(
prevent the hydrogen and oxygen concentrations from reaching these flammability limits.
These automatic control features include isolation of the source of hydrogen and/or oxygen, or injection of dilutants to reduce the,oncentration below the flammability limits.)
Maintaining the concentrati, n of hydrogen and oxygen below their flammability limits provides
- assuranc, that the releases of radioactive materials will be controlled in confo mance with the requirements of General Design Criterion 60 of Appendix A to 0 CFRPart 50.
T3.10.202 Gas Storage Tanks This specification considers
- postulat, d radioactive releases due to a waste gas system leak or failure, and limit_
the quantity of radioactivity contained in each pressurized gas storage tank n the GASEOUSRADWASTE SYSTEMto assure that a release would be substantially below the guidelines of 10 CFRPart 100 for a postulated event.
Restricting the quantity of radioacti\\ity contained in each gas storage tank provides assurance that in the event,,f an uncontrolled release of the tank's
- contents, the resulting total body ex,osure to a MEMBEROF THEPUBLICat the nearest exclusion area boundary will
_ot exceed 0.5 rem.
This is consistent with Standard Review Plan 11.3, Branc_ Technical Position ETSB11-5, "Postulated Radioactive Releases Due.o a Waste Gas System Leak or Failure,"
in NUREG-0800,July 1981.
T3.11.100 FIRE DETECTIONINSTRUMENT,,TION OPERABILITYof the fire detection inslmumentation ensures that adequate warning capability is available for tI_e prompt detection of fires and that fire suppression systems, that are acl;uated by fire detectors, will discharge extinguishing agent in a timely manner'.
Prompt detection and suppression of fires will reduce the potential for d_mageto safety-related equipment and is an integral element in the overall fa(:ility fire protection program.
(continued)
PALOVERDEUNITS 1, 2, 3 T.0.100-33 Rev 58 7/03/13
TRMSpecification Bases TRM6.0.100 TRMSPECIFICATIONBASES Fire detectors that are used to actuate fire suppression systems represent a
more critically important component ol a plant's fire protection program than detectors that are installed solely fc early fire warning and notification.
Consequently, the minimum number of OFERABLEfire detectors must be greater.
The loss of detection capability for lire suppression systems, actuated by fire detectors, represents a significant degradation of fire protection for any area.
As a result, the establishr_ent of a fire watch patrol must be initiated at an earlier stage than wo_Id be warranted for the loss of detectors that provide only early fir_
warning.
The establishment of frequent fire patrols in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability unti the inoperable instrumentation is restored to OPERABILITY.
Wheninoperable fire detection instrunent(s) are inside containment, REQUIRED ACTIONsB.2 and C.2 require either (1]
a fire watch patrol inspect the containment zone(s) with the inoperable instrument(s) at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, or (2) monitor the containmert air temperature at least once per hour at each of the 7 locations listed in he Bases for Technical Specification SR 3.6.5.1.
The plant computer with the control room installed multi-point recorder and annunciator is an acceptable means of monitoring temperatures inside containment when required.
Th_ continuous monitoring of containment air temperature by the plant computer and multi-point recorder exceeds the requirement of hourly monitoring.
The plant computer and multi-point recorder utilizes pre-set alarm points for each monitored location.
If setpoints are exceeded, an audio annunciation is received that alerts the operator of an abnormal condition.
The fire zones listed in Table 3.3.11.100-1, Fire Detection Instruments, are discussed in Section 9B of the PVNGSLFSAR.
T3.11.101, 102, 103, 104, 105, and 10( FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS The OPERABILITYof the fire suppression systems ensures that adequate fire suppression capability is available tc confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the facility where _afety-related equipment is located.
The fire suppression system consists of the water system, spray and/or sprinklers, C02, Halon, fire hose stations, and yard fire hydrants and associated emergency response vehicles.
The collective capability of the fire suppression systems is adequate to mirlmize potential damageto safety related equipment and is a major element in the facility fire protection program.
(continued)
PALOVERDEUNITS 1, 2, 3 T(.0,100-34 Rev 58 7/03/13
TRMSpecification Bases TRM6.0.100 TRMSPECIFICATIONBASES In the event that portions of the fir_
suppression systems are inoperable, alternate backup fire fighting equipment is required to be made available in the affected area(s) until the inoperable equipment is restored to service.
Whenthe inoperable fire fighting equipment is intended for use as a backup means of fire suppression, a longer period of time is allowed to provide an alternate means of fire fighting than f the inoperable equipment is the primary means of fire suppression.
The surveillance requirements provide
_ssurance that the minimumOPERABILITY requirements of the suppression systems are met.
An allowance is madefor ensuring a sufficient volume of C02/Halon in the C02/Halon storage tank by verifying either the weight or the level of the tank.
The interval for some required surveillances for C02 and Halon systems is based on the statistical reliability methodology provided in Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
Technical Report 1006756, Fire Protection Equipment Surveillance Optimization and Maintenance Guide.
Componentfailure will be entered into the corrective action program for analysis and trending.
In the event the fire suppression water system becomes inoperable, immediate corrective measures must be taken since this system provides the major fire suppression capability of the plant.
3.11.107 FIRE-RATEDASSEMBLIES The OPERABILITYof the fire barriers and barrier penetrations ensure that fire damagewill be limited.
These design features minimize the possibility of a
single fire involving more than one fire area prior to detection and extinguishment.
The fire
- barriers, fire barrier penetrations for
- conduits, cable trays and piping, fire dampers, and fire doors are periodically inspected and functionally tested to _erify their OPERABILITY.
PALOVERDEUNITS1, 2, 3 T_.0.I00-35 Rev58 7/03/13