IR 05000298/1997013: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML20199B375
| number = ML20216J628
| issue date = 11/13/1997
| issue date = 09/12/1997
| title = Ack Receipt of 971014 Ltr Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp 50-298/97-13 on 970912
| title = Insp Rept 50-298/97-13 on 970728-0814.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Surveillance Procedure
| author name = Powers D
| author name =  
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
| addressee name = Horn G
| addressee name =  
| addressee affiliation = NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
| addressee affiliation =  
| docket = 05000298
| docket = 05000298
| license number =  
| license number =  
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = 50-298-97-13, NUDOCS 9711180291
| document report number = 50-298-97-13, NUDOCS 9709180014
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE
| package number = ML20216J621
| page count = 5
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 12
}}
}}


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q ,y  NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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    .ENCLOSURER    j
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV    ;
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Docket No.: 50 298
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   - License No.: DPR 46     ,
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Report No.: _50-298/97 13 Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station
 
  : Location: P.O. Box 98    [
i November 13,1997 G. R. Horn, Senior Vice President--
,   Brownville, Nebraska Dates: July 28 through August 14,1997 4  Inspectors: P. C. Gage, Reactor inspector, Maintenance Branch W. M. McNeill, Reactor Inspector, Maintenance Branch LApproved By: Dr. Dale A. Powers, Chief, Maintenance Branch Division of Reactor Safety ATTACHMENT: Supplemental information -
  'of Energy Supply      ;
Nebraska Public Powar Dietrict 141415th Street Columbus, Nebraska 68601     ,
  ' SUBJECT: RdSPONSE TO NRC NOTICE OF VIOLATION (INSPEC s .ON REPORT 50-298/97 13)
 
==Dear Mr. Horn:==
' Thank you fet your letter of October 14,1997, in response to our September 12,1997,'-
letter and Notice of Violation concerning a f ailure to initiate a problem identification and resolution report foi a test on the automatic depressurization system. We have ieviewed your reply, and additional information discussed with Mr. Mike Peckham, Plant Manager, and members of your staff, during a telephone call on October 28,1997.
 
Inspection Report 50-298/96 31 and followup resident reports have identified f ailures to document conditions adverse to quality according to the problem identification end resolution .eport process. During the telepho s call, your staff clarified that a historical review for determining generic implications from the failure to initiate a problem identification resolution report is included within the scope of a problem resolution team comprised of plant staff and contracted personnel.
 
We find your respon::e and specifically, the clarification on a historical review for determining any generic implicatiom which may have resulted from the failure to initiate a problem identification and resolution report, as a sufficient response to the concerns raised in our Notice of Violation. We will review the implementation of your corrective actions during a future inspection to determine that 'ull compliance has been achieved and will be maintained.
 
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I 9709180014 970912  "
PDR ADOCK 05000298-G  PM
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Sincerely,
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-r6 (, . D v, Dr. Dale A. Powers, Chief Maintenance Branch Division of Reactor Safety  7 {
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5-The inspectors noted that the instrument and control shop equipment use log did not include certain instruments drawn from the instrument and control group shop, which were used by operations personnel. The inspectors confirmed that the operations department had no similar equipment use log, nor computer records that would allow timely identification of what tests would be suspect given a calibration f ailure. The inspectors noted that operations, as well as all other departments, annotated the instruments used for testing in the surveillance testing records. The log enhancement perrnitted an efficient record retrieval system to provide a timely evaluation should a calibration failure occu During a surveillance test on primary containment, performed on July 29,1997, in accordance with Procedure G.PC.503, "Drywell to Suppression Chamber Leakage Test," Revision 2, the inspectors noted that Step 8.2.7.2 required the operators to raise drywell pressure to a value between 0.55 and 0.60 psig (3.79 - 4.14 kPa).
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The irispectors verified that the maximum drywell pressure permitted during the surveillance was correctly identified in a note as 0.75 psig (5.17 kPa). However, the note was located before Step 8.2.9, two steps after the initial raising of drywell pressure instead of prior to initial drywell pressurization. The inspectors noted that Step 8.2.9 required the operators to use indicating Device PC PIC-513 to establish drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure between 14 and 15 inches of water (3.48 - 3.73 kPa). The inspectors observed that the referenced indicating device was not capable of supplying the necessary information required by '
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Step 8.2.9, since it did not measure a differential pressure, but instead measured pressure with units of psig, not inches of wate The inspectors found several examples of incomplete or inaccurate data sheets and discrepancy sheets documenting the results of various safety system surveillanc The inspectors noted that Surveillance Procedure 6.EE.601, "125V/250V Station and Diesel Fire Pump Battery Weekly Check," Revision 3, Step 7.5 required the applicable procedure number be recorded on an attached discrepancy sheet. T_he inspectors identified that the discrepancy sheet for the weekly battery check performed on July 7,1997, did not have a procedure number identified, yet Step 7.2.5 was initialed as being performed. The inspectors noted that Step 6. required that the measuring and test equipment data be recorded on Attachment The inspectors found that Attachment 1, measuring and test equipment data sheet, for the weekly battery check dated July 23,1997, f ailed to identify the steps, which were performed using the documented equipmen 'The inspectors identified two examples of omitted data from surveillance testing involving the main steam safety valves. The inspectors noted that the as-left seat leakage pressure was not documented in the as-left test data sheet, dated November 27,1995, even though the satisfactory block was checked in the adjacent block. The inspectors observed that no initials, or date, were annotated to signify that nuclear licensing and safety department had been notified of the test summary results being unsatisfactory for surveillance testing performed on April 9, 199 r
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6-i . In addition to the omitted data deficiencies previously noted, the inspectors identified numerous examples of inaccurate or inconsistent information documented on various surveillance procedures and their corresponding data sheets. . For example, the inspectors noted that minimum Technical Specification values for specific gravity of the 125V and 250V Class 1E station batteries were.1.195 for the _
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weekly check and 1.190 for the quarterly check. : However, the inspectors observed that the values referenced in the appropriate data sheets as Technical Specification limits were identified as 1.198 for the weekly check and 1.193 for the quarterly check. -Section 2.17 of Administrative Procedure 0.26, " Surveillance Program,"
Docket No.: 50 298-License No.: DPR 46 ;
Revision 29 C1, states, in part, that the Technical Specifications limit as the
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  ' allowable value stated or referonced in Technical Specifications. The inspectors verified that the documented differences between the limits found in Technical Specifications and those identified as such on the Class 1E battery data sheets were inconsisten The inspectors found that Attachment 3 for the weekly battery check provided the specliic gravity correction associated with electrolyte level within the tested battery
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  - cell. The inspectors observed that the only reference to using Attachment 3 was provided in the administrative limits section of the procedure for the weekly check of the battery, but no reference to Attachment 3 was provided in the quarterly battery procedure, although the data sheets indicated that the attachment was use The inspectors noted an inconsistency involving the administrative limit regarding individual cell voltage. The inspectors observed that in both the weekly and quarterly battery checks, an administrative limit requires that the system engineer be contacted in the event individual cell voltage was less than 2.15V. The inspectors noted that this limit was on the data sheet for the quarterly _ battery check, but was not on the weekly data shee '
' John R. McPhail, General Counsel Nebraska Public Power District P.O. Box 499 -
The inspectors identified an inconsistent approach regarding the use of initials or annotating at "not applicable" a step within various surveillance procedure Surveillance Frncedure 0.26, " Surveillance Program," Revision 29 C1, Section 8.4, required that a step marked not applicable shall be recorded as a discrepancy unless
Columbus, Nebraska 68602-0499 P. D Graham, Vice President of Nuclear Energy Nebraska Public Power District P.O. Box 98
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  :Brownville, Nebraska 68321
the step clearly indicates it is not applicable. While reviewing Surveillance
- B. L. Houston,- Nuclear Licensing and Safety Manager Nebraska Public Power District
  - Procedure 6.EE.601, "125V/250V Station and Diesel Fire Pump Battery Weekly
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' P.O. Box 98 Brownville, Nebraska 68321 Dr. William D. Leech MidAmerican Energy 907 Walnut Street P.O. Box 657 Des Moines,' lowa 50303 0657 Mr. Ron Stoddard
Check," Revision 3, the inspectors noted that documentation of the completion of
: Lincoln Electric System 11th and O Streets
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Step 7.4.5 (adjustment DMA 35), Step 7.4.6 (if different DMA 35 selected),
Lincoln, Nebraska 68508 Randolph Wood, Director Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality P.O. Box 98922 Lincoln, Nebraska 68509-8922
~ Step 8.3.2 (system engineer review), and Step 8.4 (acceptance criteria) of the weekly Class 1E battery checks performed during the month of July 1997, was not
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= consistent. Two records, reviewed by the inspectors, and discussed below, had
  ~ Nemaha County Board of Commissioners Nemaha Countv Courthouse -
  .~ steps inappropriately marked as not applicabl !
1824 N Street A'uburn, Nebraska ' 68305 :
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Nebraska Public Power District 3-Cheryl Rogers, LLRW Program Manager Environmental Protection Section Nebraska Department of Health 301 Centennial Mall, South P.O. Box 95007 Lincoln, Nebraska 68509-5007 R. A. Kiscera, Department Director of Int <,rgovernmental Cooperation Department of Natural Resources
  ' P.O. Box 176 Jefferson City, Missouri 65102 Kansas Radiation Control Program Director
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Nebraska Public Power District  -4-E-Mail report to T. Frye (TJF)
E-mail report to T. Hiltz (TGH)
E-Mail report to NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS)
E-Mail report to Document Control Desk (DOCDESK)
bec to DCD (lE01)
bec distrib. by RIV:
Regional Administrator DRP Director  Project Engineer (DRP/C)
DRS Director  Resident inspector DRS Deputy Director DRS PSB Branch Chief (DRP/C)  MIS System Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)  RIV File DRS ACTION ITEM NO: 97-G-0117 DOCUMENT NAME: R:\_,CNS\CN713AK.PCG To receive copy of document. Indicate in box:"C" = Copy without enclosures "E" = Copy with enclosures "N" = No copy RIV: SRI:MB & N C:MB  E    l PCGagellmb ~ DAPowers f('
104,9 97  1$$$97 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY


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;4ebraska Public Power District  -4-E Mail report to T. Frye (TJF)      i E-mail report to T. Hiltz (TGH)      I
' E-Mail report to NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS)
E-Mail report to Document Control Desk (DOCDESK)
bec to DCD (IE01)
bec distrib. by RIV:
Regional Administrator DRP Director  Project Engineer (DRP/C)
DRS Director  Resident inspector DRS Deputy Director  DRS-PSB Branch Chief (DRP/C)  MIS System Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)  RIV File DRS ACTION ITEM NO: 97-G 0117 DOCUMENT NAME: R:\_CNS\CN713AK.PCG To receive copy of docurnent, indicate in box:"C" = Copy without enclosures "E" = Copy with enclosures "N" = No copy RIV: SRI:MB W N C:MB E  l  l PCGage/tmb ~  DAPowers 10!Jy97  10A%97 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY l
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Surveillance Test Record 6,2PCIS.303, "PCIS Main Steam Line High Flow Calibration and Function / Functional Test (Div 21," Step 8.4.15.2, dated July 3, 1997, read: "(For Calibration Only) Adjust instrument scale as necessary." Test-personnel marked Step 8.4.15.2 not applicable; however, Attachment 4, Table 2 showed a scale calibration was performed in addition, Surveillance Test Record 6.2RCIC 301, " ADS Reactor Pressure Permissive Calibration and Functional
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Nebraska Public Power District    "em,""
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NLS970179      -@ 0 0 Si f.5 l7 3 ~!l I!
and Logic Tests (Reactor in Run) (C y 1)," Step 8.12.2, dated July 1,1997, stated,
October 14,1997     .. OCT2 0m 3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
  "(Calibration only) Adjust instrument scale as necesmry." Test personnel documented Step 8.12.2 not applicable: however, atachment 1, Table 4 indicated that a scale callLration was accomplished.
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Gentlemen:
Subject: Reply to a Notice of Violation NRC Inspection Report No. 50-298/97-13 Cooper Nuclear Station, NRC Docket 50-298, DPR-46 Reference: 1. Letter to G. (NPPD) from A. T. Howell III (USNRC) dated September 12,1997,"NRC Inspection Report 50-298/97-13 and Notice of Violation" By letter dated September 12,1997 (Reference 1), the NRC cited Nebraska Public Power District (District) as being in violation of NRC requirements. This letter, including Attachment 1, constitutes the District's reply to the referenced Notice of Violation in accordance with 10 CFR 2.201 The District admits to the violation and has completed all corrective actions necessary to return CNS to full compliance.


Should you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me.
Sincerely, P&nuk P. D. Grahain Vice President of Nuclear Energy
/rar Attachment cc: Regional Administrator USNRC - Region IV l
Senior Project Manager l USNRC - NRR Project Directorate IV-1 93-Ol'i-D
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NLS970179 October 14,1997 Page 2 of 2 Senior Resident Inspector USNRC NPG Distribution
In Surveillance Test Record 6.2PCIS.301, "PCIS Main Condenser Low Vacuum Calibration and Function (Div 2)," Step 8.1.9, dated June 3,1997, a dit.crepancy was documented involving the failure to obtain the as found data on the first  ,
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attempt. This occurred because the main condenser test pressure on MS-PS-1038 was released too fast. Test personnel documented on the discrepancy sheet that a second attempt was in tolerance, and the corresponding data recorded in the as-found column, with no actions identified to address the resolution of the discrepancy. Also, the inspectors noted a similar occurrence in the performance of
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Surveillance Test Record 6.1 ADS.301, Step 8.30. The record identified a discrepancy in that a second attempt and consecutive attempts to calibrate a
   . pressure switch were in tolerance, and that the avleft data were satisfactory without adjustments, " Nh no' actions identified for resolution of the initial
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discrepancy.


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4-The inspectors inquired as to the basis for no documented resolution of a discrepancy identified in Surveillance Test Record 6.2PCIS.304, " Main Steam Line Low Pressure Calibration and Functional (Div 2)," Step 8.1.2, dated June 4,199 The record stated that no allowed outage time was required to perform the surveillance test. The inspectors noted that the resolution of the discrepancy failed
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< Attachment 1-
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i REPLY TO SEPTEMBER 12,1997, NOTICE OF VIOLATION
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COOPER NUCLEAR STATION    ;
to identify that Instrument MS-PS 134B was inoperable before the surveillance test, and that a maintenance work request was written as justification for the acceptability of the discrepancy. Following the inspectors' request for the basis of resolution of the discrepancy, the licensee's staff added clarifying information to the resolution section of the test record.
NRC DOCKET NO. 50-298, LICENSE DPR-46.  '
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: During NRC inspection activities conducted from July 28,1997, through August 14,1997,one violation of NRC requirements was identified? The particular violation and the District's reply are i
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set forth below:
Violation TechnicalSpect) cation 6.3.2, states, inpart, that writtenprocedures andinstructions shall
  - he established, implemented, and maintainedfor thefollowing: ...B. Actions to be taken to correct specific ... malfunctions ofsafety-related systems or components.  <
. Surveillance Prccedure 6. LADS.301, " ADS Reactor Pressure Permissive Calibration and
. Function and Logic Tests (Reactor in Run) (Div 1), " Revision 1, Step 8.27, states, in part, that test personnel are to connect a meter to read resistance and venfy the contacts are closed, i
Administrative Procedure 0.5, " Problem Idents) cation arulResolution, " Revision 8, Section 14.2, requires, inpart, that allpersonnelare responsiblefor reportingproblems that are, or potentially could be, conditions adverse to quality through the process of this procedure.


Contrary to the above, on July 23,1997, the licenseefailed to write a problem identspcation and resolution reportfor a knownfailure tofollow a safety-relatedprocedure. Specifically, duringperformance ofStep 8.27 ofSurveillance Procedure 6. LADS.301, when contacts were faimd open rather 6ais closed, testpersonnel raised the testpressure (which closed the contacts), and thenproceeded with the test without reporting this condition in a problem - ,
identspcation amiresolution report.    '
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1his is a Severity LevelIV violation (Supplement 1)(298/9317-02).
The inspectors noted that Administrative Procedure 0.26, " Surveillance Program,"
Revision 29 C1,' did not require resolution of discrepancies be documented on the
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  - discrepancy sheet. The inspectors found, therefore, that the lack of a requirement for documentation of resolutions to discrepancies was a weakness in Procedure 0.26.


Admission or Denial to Violation
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: The District admits the violation.
Test personnel noted a discrepancy when an inconsistent response was observed as
 
  - they attempted in accordance with Step 8.27 of Surveillance Test Record 6.1 ADS.301, dated July 23,1997, to verify that pressure switch contacts were closed. Instead the contacts were found open, and the reason for their being
Reason for Violation The failure to generate a Problem Identifict. tion Report (PIR)is a procedural adherence problem.
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; - Administrative Procedure 0.5," Problem Identification and Resolution," contains the appropriate requirements with respect to initiation of a PIR; however, strict compliance with the Procedure
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8-open was unknown. The discrepancy noted further that test personnel raised the pressure to establish the " closed contacts" condition, and then continued the test.
Attachment I to NLS970179 Page 2 of 3 0.5 was not enforced by supervision. The failure to meet procedural conditions stated in Procedure 6.l ADS.301 was recognized and documented on a Discrepancy Sheet per Administratise Procedure 0.26, " Surveillance Progiam." However, the action plan to resolve the immediate condition created a " sense of correctness" in the plan and led to the completion of the surveillance without the generation of a PIR; An additional contributing cause for the failure to generate a PIR when surveillance procedure conditions are not met is the redundancy in requirements of the 0.26 and 0.5 Proceduresc The documentation of procedural discrepancies with Procedure 0.26 Discrepancy Sheets without the accompanying Procedure 0.5 PIR is a recurring problem at CNS.


Corrective Steps Taken and the Results Achieved Corrective actions taken include:
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The test personnel stated that "no resolution of the discrepancy was necessary
The generation of PIR Seiial Number 2-16718.
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because set points were in tolerance and appropriate action was taken." The
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inspectors found the pressure increase to be a nonapproved deviation from the procedure (a condition adverse to quality).


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Conducting an informal discussion of this event and the need to generate PIRs during a subsequent Instrument and Control (IAC) shop morning meeting.
-The inspectors determined that Administrative Procedure 0.5, " Problem identification and Resolution," Section 14.2, Revision 11 C1, requires all personnel to report problems that are, or potentially could be, conditions adverse to quality through the problem identification and resolution program, in this caso, the potential condition adverso to quality consisted of surveillance steps not being
- performed as specified. The inspectors determined that the consequences of not initiating a problem identification and resolution report were twofold: (1) a failure to approve a deviation from the test procedure, and (2) a f ailure to evaluate the generic impact of the calibration discrepancy. The inspectors identified the
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failure to writo a problem identification and resolution report in accordance with Procedure 0.5 as a violation (50-298/9713 02).


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Following the onsite inspection, the licensee's staff provided to the inspectors Problem Identification and Resolution Report 2 22597, which documented a discrepancy sirnilar to that which oxisted during the surveillance test discropancy, which occurred on July 23,1997. Af ter unsuccessful attempts to demonstrate the relationship of this report to the above described condition which existed on July 23,1997, the licensoo's staf f initiated Problem identification and Resolution Report 2 16718 on August 12,1997, in addition, the inspectors found that surveillance test records for Procedure 6.1 ADS.301, performed on July 15,1997, referenced Problem identification and Resolution Report 2 22598. The licenseo's staff reported to the inspectors that no record existed for Problem identification and Hosolution Report 2 22598, but Raport 2-22600 was issued on the same dato and had identified the same discrepanc The inspectors noted that the licensee's staff had trended problems by collecting similar problem identification and resolution reports into a condition report. The inspectors found that Condition Report 971078 did not include Problem Identification and Rosolution Report 2 22569, dated June 24,1997, which addressed a similar calibration tolerance proble The inspectors noted that the licensee's staff initially documented the problem regarding contacts failing to bo in the correct designated position during surveillance testing, on July 15,1995, in Problem identification and Resolution Report 1-11535,
The development of a tailgate training session for maintenance personnel on the requirements to generate PIRs in accordance with the guidance contained in Procedure 0.5.
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and subsequently, in Report 1 21864, dated April 30,1996, and again in Report 2 22597, dated 101997. In addition, the inspectors found that pressure switches were frequently, either out of instrament or calibration tolerancos. The inspectors found that instrument tolerances determined when equipment required adjustment, and calibration tolerances determined when equipment required repai .    . .--,


Implementation of this training has been initiated.
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As a result ofinformal discussion, during the weekly performance of this procedure, and the associated D; vision 11 procedure, six additional PIRs have been generated.
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    . The inspectors noted that the licensee documented this continuing problem in the following problem identification and resolution reports with their corresponding dates:
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Report  Data 1 20350  January 12,1996
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1-20351  January 12,1996 1 20352  January 12,1996 1 20353  January 12,1996-
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2-02616  July 16,1997 2-05402  September 17,1996 1 21484  February 27,1997 2-22744  May 28,1997 2 22628  June 17,1997 2 22589  June 24,1997 2-22621  June 26,1997 2-22600  July 15,1997 2 22602  July 16,1997 During discussions with the licensee's staff, following the onsite inspection, on the problem identification and resolution reports and the associated condition reports, the licensee's representative stated that an engineering evaluation was being performed to consider an option of installing nonenvironmentally qualified pressure
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switches in an effort to address the surveillance discrepancies over the past few years regarding these component The inspectors noted that environmentally qualified pressure switches as typically used on safety-related equipment are required to meet the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 50.49. The NRC review of the corrective actions taken for pressure switches and the use of nonqualified pressure switches is an inspection followup item (50-298/9713-03).
On going currective actions to address the site wide issue of proc.edural adherence have been made a station alignment issue and incorporated into the business plan.


C_onective Steps That Will Be Taken to Avoid Further Violations
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CNS will revise Procedure 0.26 to climinate the redundant procedural requirements which exist within Procedure 0.26 and Procedure 0.5.


This action will be complete by 10/24/97.
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CNS will conduct additional tailgate training sessions to ensure Maintenance, Operations and Engineerinb Personnel that perform surveillance testing have been trained to the requirements of Procedure 0.5.
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1 . Conclusions
- Although.the individual items identified by the inspectors in surveillance performed
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on safety systems were of minor safety significance, the large number of deficiencies, including omission of data, inaccurate identification of calibration due -
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dates, inconsistent application of procedure signature, failure to identify discrepancies, and inadequate resolution of discrepancies, was indicative of a lack of attention to detailin the implementation of the surveillance progra The failure to correctly label and enter appropriate information regarding the
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calibration due dates for measuring and test equipment used to perform surveillance activities involving safety systems constituted a noncited violatio The failure to initiate a problem identification and resolution report to resolve a nonapproved deviation from a surveillance test procedure of the automatic depressurization system represented a violation of Procedure The review of nonenvironmentally qualified pressure switches will be tracked by an inspection followup ite M8- Miscellaneous Maintenance issues M8.1 Violation 50-298/9612-01 (Closed): Failure to include certain structures, systems,
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. and components in the scope of the Maintenance Rule progra During this inspection, the inspectors verified that the licensee's corrective actions described in the response letters were implemented. The inspectors verified that-the implemented corrective actions were adequate and identified no additional problem M8.2 ' Violation 50-298/9612-02 (Closed): Failure to demonstrate that reliability performance criteria for certain structures, systems, and components preserved the assumptions used in the probabilistic risk assessmen During this inspection, the inspectors verified the implemented corrective actions
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s described in the licensee's response letters. The inspectors identified no additional problem '
M8.3 Violation 50-298/9612-03 (Closed): Failure to monitor the unavailability of certain functions performed by the automatic depressurization, emergency diesel generator,
- high pressure coolant injection, and residual heat removal systems when the plant status required the functions to be availabl ,
~ During this inspection, the inspectors verified that the implemented corrective
- actions were adequate and identified no additional problem y 1,im+a -v' - g y y- ,--k g- ,--- r-y-,-- 4 g-- w mg -~ y w- r ,m-


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    -11-M8.4 ylotation 50-298/9612-04 (Closed}: Failure to provide adequate instructions to ensure 'isk assessments were performed when removing safety-related equipment from service for monitoring or preventive maintenanc During this inspection, the inspectors verified that the implemented corrective actions were adequate and identified no additional problem M8.5 Violation 50-298/9612 05 (Closed): Failure to initiate a risk-significant window checklist before removing the emergency diesel generator from service for planned maintenanc During this inspection, the inspectors verified that the implemented corrective actions were adequate and identified no additional problem V. Manecement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors discussed the progress of the inspection on a daily basis and presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the onsite portion of the inspection on July 31,1997. In addition, supplemental telephonic exits were held on August 14 and September 10,1997, to discuss the enforcement findings from the inspection. The licensee personnel acknowledged the findings presented and stated that they would review the issues to determine if they had any differing position The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie ... _ . . . _ . -_ _ - , . .. -. .. .. - . ... _ _ . _ ._ . _. ._.- . . . _ . . .
Attachment 1
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CNS will incorporate the above training requirements into recurring Industry Events training for Maintenance, Operations and Engineering Department personnel that perfctm surveillance t
ATTACHMENT -
;  testing.
          .
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION    -
          ,
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED-Licensee'-        ;
  --
J[Dorn, Containment Engineering Supervisor c c. Gaines._ Maintenance Manager-      ,
  ; R. Gardner, Operations Manager
,_
P.- Graham, _Vice President Nuclear
   .W. Hofmeister, Senior Maintenance Engineer B. Houston, Licensing Manager -
_
          -
D. Madsen, Licensing Engineer
  - B. Newell, Assistant Maintenance Manager O. Olson, Plant Engineering Manager B. Seidl, Operations Support Engineer      i R. Wachowiak, Reliability Engineering _ Supervisor NBC M. Miller, Senior Resident inspector C.-Skinner, Resident inspector Other
#
L. Dugger, Institute Nuclear Power Operation


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CNS will train Maintenance, Operations and Engineering Department personnel that perform t surveillance testing on the requireroents of revised Procedure 0.26.
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The above actions will be completed by November 30,1997.
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CNS is continuing to review samples of surveillances with Procedure 0.26 discrepancy sheets attached to identify additional areas where PIRs should have been generated. Based on the results of the review, appropriate corrective actions will be implemented.


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    - INSPECTION PROCEDURlS_,QffR
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IP 61725 Surveillance Testing and Calibration Control Program
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ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED      .
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Opened'        ;
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  <298/9713 01 NCV Failure to control calibration due dates associated with-measuring and test equipment used in surveillance activities    ,


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    (Section M1.1)
Qate When Full Con 1pliance Will Be Achievest
. The District is in full compliance with respect to the cited violation.


L 298/9713-02 NOV - Failure to initiate documentation to identify a problem with a    <
q    surveillance procedure, and to provide for its adequate evaluation and resolution (Section M1.1)
          .
  -298/9713-03- IFl Review of nonenvironmentally qualified pressure switches (Section M1.1)
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Closed        ,
298/9612 01 NOV Failure to include 4 nonsafety-ralated systems functions in Maintenance Rule program (Section M8.1)
298/9612 02 NOV Failure to demonstrate reliability performance criteria conformed to the probabilistic risk assessment
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    (Section M8.2)
298/9612-03 NOV Failure to track unavailability when the reactor was subcritical (Section M8.3) .
298/9612 04 NOV- Inadequate procedure to require risk assessment when-
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removing equipment from service (Section M8.4)
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  :298/9612-05 NOV Failure to initiate risk significant checklist when required 4-    (Section M8.5)'
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298/9713-01 NCV Failure to control' calibration due dates associated with measuring and test equipment used in surveillance activities (Section M1.1)
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l ATTACHMENT 3 LTST OF NRC COMMITMENTS
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Correspondence No:lhS970179 The following table identifies those actions committed to by the District in this document. Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by the District. They are described to the NRC for the NRC's information and are not regulatory commitments. Please notify the Licensing Manager at Cooper Nuclear Station of any questions regarding this document or any associated regulatory commitments.


COMMITTED DATE COMMITMENT     OR OUTAGE CNS will revise Procedure 0.26 to elindnate the redundant    10/24/97 procedural requirements which exist within Procedare 0.26 and Procedure 0.5 CNS will conduct additional tailgate training sessions to ensure Maintenance, Operations and Engineering Department    11/30/97 personnel that perform surveillance testing have been trained to the requirements of Procedure 0.5 CNS will incorporate requirements of training to ensure Maintenance, Operations and Engineering Department personnel that perform surveillance testing have been    11/30/97 trained to the requirements of Procedure 0.5 into recurring Industry Events training.
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LIST OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES REVIEWED -
  -PROCEDURE     REV,  TITLE Ouality Assurance Program 12.a - Cooper Nuclear Station Quality Assurance Program for Operations Policy Document Procedure 0.26     -29 C1 Surveillance. Program Procedure 0.37      3 Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE) Calibration Program Guidelines -
  -Procedure 0.38      3.12 Process instrumentation Calibration Program Procedure C1 Problem Identification and Resolution Procedure 7. Conduct of Maintenance c_  Procedure 7. .11 C1 Work Item Tracking - Preventive Maintenance LIST OF SURVEILLANCES REVIEWED PROCEDURE        TITLE  ,
6.EE.601    125V/250V Station and Diesel Fire Pump Battery Weekly Check 6 EE.602 -  125V/250V S'tation and Diesel Fire Pump Battery Quarterly Check '
6 EE.603    125V Battery Service Test 6.EE.607    125V Station Battery Performance Discharge Test 6.PC.503    Drywell to Suppression Chamber Leakage Test 6.1 APRM.301  - APRM System Excluding 15% Trip Functional Test (Div 1)
6.2AP.RM 301  APRM System Excluding 15% Trip Functional Test (Div 2)
J 6.1 APRM.305    APRM System (Flow Bias and Startup) Calibration and Functional Test'
      (Div 1)
6.2 APRM.305 -    APRM System (Flow Bias and Startup) Calibration and Functional Test -
      (Div 2)
  ' 6.MS.401-  . Main Steam Safety Valve (SV) Testing
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CNS will train Maintenance, Operations and Engineering Department personnel that perform surveillance testing on    11/30/97
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the requirements of revised Procedure 0.26 CNS will continue to review samples of surveillances with Procedure 0.26 discrepancy sheeets attached to identify    N/A additional areas where PIRs should have been generated.


_
  -4-6.HPCI.301 HPCI Steam Line Space Temperature Switch Functional Test 6.1 ADS.301 ADS Reactor Pressure Permissive Calibration and Functional and Logic Tests (Reactor in Run) (Div 1)
Based on the results of the review, appropriate cort-ctive actions will be implemented
6.2PCIS.301 PCIS Main Condenser Low Vacuum Calibration and Function (Div 2)
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6.2PCIS.303 PCIS Main Steam Line High Flow Calibration and Function / Functional Test (Div 2)
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6.2PCIS.304 Main Steam Line Low Pressure Calibration and Functional (Div 2)
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6.2 PRS.303 Turbine First Stage Pressure Permissive Calibration and Functional (Div 2)
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6.2 PRS.300 Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Calibration and Functional (Div 2)
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6.2RCIC 301 RCIC Steam Line High Flow Calibration and Functional (Div 2)
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6.2RCIC.303 RCIC Steam Supply Pressure Low Calibration and Functional (Div 2)
l PROCEDURE NUMllER 0,42 l REVISIJN NUMllER S    PAGE 9 OF 13 l  l
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Revision as of 17:15, 5 March 2021

Insp Rept 50-298/97-13 on 970728-0814.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Surveillance Procedure
ML20216J628
Person / Time
Site: Cooper Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 09/12/1997
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20216J621 List:
References
50-298-97-13, NUDOCS 9709180014
Download: ML20216J628 (12)


Text

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.ENCLOSURER j

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV  ;

Docket No.: 50 298

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- License No.: DPR 46 ,

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Report No.: _50-298/97 13 Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station

Location: P.O. Box 98 [

, Brownville, Nebraska Dates: July 28 through August 14,1997 4 Inspectors: P. C. Gage, Reactor inspector, Maintenance Branch W. M. McNeill, Reactor Inspector, Maintenance Branch LApproved By: Dr. Dale A. Powers, Chief, Maintenance Branch Division of Reactor Safety ATTACHMENT: Supplemental information -

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I 9709180014 970912 "

PDR ADOCK 05000298-G PM

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5-The inspectors noted that the instrument and control shop equipment use log did not include certain instruments drawn from the instrument and control group shop, which were used by operations personnel. The inspectors confirmed that the operations department had no similar equipment use log, nor computer records that would allow timely identification of what tests would be suspect given a calibration f ailure. The inspectors noted that operations, as well as all other departments, annotated the instruments used for testing in the surveillance testing records. The log enhancement perrnitted an efficient record retrieval system to provide a timely evaluation should a calibration failure occu During a surveillance test on primary containment, performed on July 29,1997, in accordance with Procedure G.PC.503, "Drywell to Suppression Chamber Leakage Test," Revision 2, the inspectors noted that Step 8.2.7.2 required the operators to raise drywell pressure to a value between 0.55 and 0.60 psig (3.79 - 4.14 kPa).

The irispectors verified that the maximum drywell pressure permitted during the surveillance was correctly identified in a note as 0.75 psig (5.17 kPa). However, the note was located before Step 8.2.9, two steps after the initial raising of drywell pressure instead of prior to initial drywell pressurization. The inspectors noted that Step 8.2.9 required the operators to use indicating Device PC PIC-513 to establish drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure between 14 and 15 inches of water (3.48 - 3.73 kPa). The inspectors observed that the referenced indicating device was not capable of supplying the necessary information required by '

Step 8.2.9, since it did not measure a differential pressure, but instead measured pressure with units of psig, not inches of wate The inspectors found several examples of incomplete or inaccurate data sheets and discrepancy sheets documenting the results of various safety system surveillanc The inspectors noted that Surveillance Procedure 6.EE.601, "125V/250V Station and Diesel Fire Pump Battery Weekly Check," Revision 3, Step 7.5 required the applicable procedure number be recorded on an attached discrepancy sheet. T_he inspectors identified that the discrepancy sheet for the weekly battery check performed on July 7,1997, did not have a procedure number identified, yet Step 7.2.5 was initialed as being performed. The inspectors noted that Step 6. required that the measuring and test equipment data be recorded on Attachment The inspectors found that Attachment 1, measuring and test equipment data sheet, for the weekly battery check dated July 23,1997, f ailed to identify the steps, which were performed using the documented equipmen 'The inspectors identified two examples of omitted data from surveillance testing involving the main steam safety valves. The inspectors noted that the as-left seat leakage pressure was not documented in the as-left test data sheet, dated November 27,1995, even though the satisfactory block was checked in the adjacent block. The inspectors observed that no initials, or date, were annotated to signify that nuclear licensing and safety department had been notified of the test summary results being unsatisfactory for surveillance testing performed on April 9, 199 r

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6-i . In addition to the omitted data deficiencies previously noted, the inspectors identified numerous examples of inaccurate or inconsistent information documented on various surveillance procedures and their corresponding data sheets. . For example, the inspectors noted that minimum Technical Specification values for specific gravity of the 125V and 250V Class 1E station batteries were.1.195 for the _

weekly check and 1.190 for the quarterly check. : However, the inspectors observed that the values referenced in the appropriate data sheets as Technical Specification limits were identified as 1.198 for the weekly check and 1.193 for the quarterly check. -Section 2.17 of Administrative Procedure 0.26, " Surveillance Program,"

Revision 29 C1, states, in part, that the Technical Specifications limit as the

' allowable value stated or referonced in Technical Specifications. The inspectors verified that the documented differences between the limits found in Technical Specifications and those identified as such on the Class 1E battery data sheets were inconsisten The inspectors found that Attachment 3 for the weekly battery check provided the specliic gravity correction associated with electrolyte level within the tested battery

- cell. The inspectors observed that the only reference to using Attachment 3 was provided in the administrative limits section of the procedure for the weekly check of the battery, but no reference to Attachment 3 was provided in the quarterly battery procedure, although the data sheets indicated that the attachment was use The inspectors noted an inconsistency involving the administrative limit regarding individual cell voltage. The inspectors observed that in both the weekly and quarterly battery checks, an administrative limit requires that the system engineer be contacted in the event individual cell voltage was less than 2.15V. The inspectors noted that this limit was on the data sheet for the quarterly _ battery check, but was not on the weekly data shee '

The inspectors identified an inconsistent approach regarding the use of initials or annotating at "not applicable" a step within various surveillance procedure Surveillance Frncedure 0.26, " Surveillance Program," Revision 29 C1, Section 8.4, required that a step marked not applicable shall be recorded as a discrepancy unless

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the step clearly indicates it is not applicable. While reviewing Surveillance

- Procedure 6.EE.601, "125V/250V Station and Diesel Fire Pump Battery Weekly

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Check," Revision 3, the inspectors noted that documentation of the completion of

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Step 7.4.5 (adjustment DMA 35), Step 7.4.6 (if different DMA 35 selected),

~ Step 8.3.2 (system engineer review), and Step 8.4 (acceptance criteria) of the weekly Class 1E battery checks performed during the month of July 1997, was not

= consistent. Two records, reviewed by the inspectors, and discussed below, had

.~ steps inappropriately marked as not applicabl !

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Surveillance Test Record 6,2PCIS.303, "PCIS Main Steam Line High Flow Calibration and Function / Functional Test (Div 21," Step 8.4.15.2, dated July 3, 1997, read: "(For Calibration Only) Adjust instrument scale as necessary." Test-personnel marked Step 8.4.15.2 not applicable; however, Attachment 4, Table 2 showed a scale calibration was performed in addition, Surveillance Test Record 6.2RCIC 301, " ADS Reactor Pressure Permissive Calibration and Functional

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and Logic Tests (Reactor in Run) (C y 1)," Step 8.12.2, dated July 1,1997, stated,

"(Calibration only) Adjust instrument scale as necesmry." Test personnel documented Step 8.12.2 not applicable: however, atachment 1, Table 4 indicated that a scale callLration was accomplished.

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In Surveillance Test Record 6.2PCIS.301, "PCIS Main Condenser Low Vacuum Calibration and Function (Div 2)," Step 8.1.9, dated June 3,1997, a dit.crepancy was documented involving the failure to obtain the as found data on the first ,

attempt. This occurred because the main condenser test pressure on MS-PS-1038 was released too fast. Test personnel documented on the discrepancy sheet that a second attempt was in tolerance, and the corresponding data recorded in the as-found column, with no actions identified to address the resolution of the discrepancy. Also, the inspectors noted a similar occurrence in the performance of

Surveillance Test Record 6.1 ADS.301, Step 8.30. The record identified a discrepancy in that a second attempt and consecutive attempts to calibrate a

. pressure switch were in tolerance, and that the avleft data were satisfactory without adjustments, " Nh no' actions identified for resolution of the initial

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discrepancy.

4-The inspectors inquired as to the basis for no documented resolution of a discrepancy identified in Surveillance Test Record 6.2PCIS.304, " Main Steam Line Low Pressure Calibration and Functional (Div 2)," Step 8.1.2, dated June 4,199 The record stated that no allowed outage time was required to perform the surveillance test. The inspectors noted that the resolution of the discrepancy failed

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to identify that Instrument MS-PS 134B was inoperable before the surveillance test, and that a maintenance work request was written as justification for the acceptability of the discrepancy. Following the inspectors' request for the basis of resolution of the discrepancy, the licensee's staff added clarifying information to the resolution section of the test record.

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The inspectors noted that Administrative Procedure 0.26, " Surveillance Program,"

Revision 29 C1,' did not require resolution of discrepancies be documented on the

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- discrepancy sheet. The inspectors found, therefore, that the lack of a requirement for documentation of resolutions to discrepancies was a weakness in Procedure 0.26.

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Test personnel noted a discrepancy when an inconsistent response was observed as

- they attempted in accordance with Step 8.27 of Surveillance Test Record 6.1 ADS.301, dated July 23,1997, to verify that pressure switch contacts were closed. Instead the contacts were found open, and the reason for their being

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8-open was unknown. The discrepancy noted further that test personnel raised the pressure to establish the " closed contacts" condition, and then continued the test.

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The test personnel stated that "no resolution of the discrepancy was necessary

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because set points were in tolerance and appropriate action was taken." The

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inspectors found the pressure increase to be a nonapproved deviation from the procedure (a condition adverse to quality).

-The inspectors determined that Administrative Procedure 0.5, " Problem identification and Resolution," Section 14.2, Revision 11 C1, requires all personnel to report problems that are, or potentially could be, conditions adverse to quality through the problem identification and resolution program, in this caso, the potential condition adverso to quality consisted of surveillance steps not being

- performed as specified. The inspectors determined that the consequences of not initiating a problem identification and resolution report were twofold: (1) a failure to approve a deviation from the test procedure, and (2) a f ailure to evaluate the generic impact of the calibration discrepancy. The inspectors identified the

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failure to writo a problem identification and resolution report in accordance with Procedure 0.5 as a violation (50-298/9713 02).

Following the onsite inspection, the licensee's staff provided to the inspectors Problem Identification and Resolution Report 2 22597, which documented a discrepancy sirnilar to that which oxisted during the surveillance test discropancy, which occurred on July 23,1997. Af ter unsuccessful attempts to demonstrate the relationship of this report to the above described condition which existed on July 23,1997, the licensoo's staf f initiated Problem identification and Resolution Report 2 16718 on August 12,1997, in addition, the inspectors found that surveillance test records for Procedure 6.1 ADS.301, performed on July 15,1997, referenced Problem identification and Resolution Report 2 22598. The licenseo's staff reported to the inspectors that no record existed for Problem identification and Hosolution Report 2 22598, but Raport 2-22600 was issued on the same dato and had identified the same discrepanc The inspectors noted that the licensee's staff had trended problems by collecting similar problem identification and resolution reports into a condition report. The inspectors found that Condition Report 971078 did not include Problem Identification and Rosolution Report 2 22569, dated June 24,1997, which addressed a similar calibration tolerance proble The inspectors noted that the licensee's staff initially documented the problem regarding contacts failing to bo in the correct designated position during surveillance testing, on July 15,1995, in Problem identification and Resolution Report 1-11535,

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and subsequently, in Report 1 21864, dated April 30,1996, and again in Report 2 22597, dated 101997. In addition, the inspectors found that pressure switches were frequently, either out of instrament or calibration tolerancos. The inspectors found that instrument tolerances determined when equipment required adjustment, and calibration tolerances determined when equipment required repai . . .--,

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. The inspectors noted that the licensee documented this continuing problem in the following problem identification and resolution reports with their corresponding dates:

Report Data 1 20350 January 12,1996

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1-20351 January 12,1996 1 20352 January 12,1996 1 20353 January 12,1996-

2-02616 July 16,1997 2-05402 September 17,1996 1 21484 February 27,1997 2-22744 May 28,1997 2 22628 June 17,1997 2 22589 June 24,1997 2-22621 June 26,1997 2-22600 July 15,1997 2 22602 July 16,1997 During discussions with the licensee's staff, following the onsite inspection, on the problem identification and resolution reports and the associated condition reports, the licensee's representative stated that an engineering evaluation was being performed to consider an option of installing nonenvironmentally qualified pressure

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switches in an effort to address the surveillance discrepancies over the past few years regarding these component The inspectors noted that environmentally qualified pressure switches as typically used on safety-related equipment are required to meet the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 50.49. The NRC review of the corrective actions taken for pressure switches and the use of nonqualified pressure switches is an inspection followup item (50-298/9713-03).

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1 . Conclusions

- Although.the individual items identified by the inspectors in surveillance performed

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on safety systems were of minor safety significance, the large number of deficiencies, including omission of data, inaccurate identification of calibration due -

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dates, inconsistent application of procedure signature, failure to identify discrepancies, and inadequate resolution of discrepancies, was indicative of a lack of attention to detailin the implementation of the surveillance progra The failure to correctly label and enter appropriate information regarding the

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calibration due dates for measuring and test equipment used to perform surveillance activities involving safety systems constituted a noncited violatio The failure to initiate a problem identification and resolution report to resolve a nonapproved deviation from a surveillance test procedure of the automatic depressurization system represented a violation of Procedure The review of nonenvironmentally qualified pressure switches will be tracked by an inspection followup ite M8- Miscellaneous Maintenance issues M8.1 Violation 50-298/9612-01 (Closed): Failure to include certain structures, systems,

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. and components in the scope of the Maintenance Rule progra During this inspection, the inspectors verified that the licensee's corrective actions described in the response letters were implemented. The inspectors verified that-the implemented corrective actions were adequate and identified no additional problem M8.2 ' Violation 50-298/9612-02 (Closed): Failure to demonstrate that reliability performance criteria for certain structures, systems, and components preserved the assumptions used in the probabilistic risk assessmen During this inspection, the inspectors verified the implemented corrective actions

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s described in the licensee's response letters. The inspectors identified no additional problem '

M8.3 Violation 50-298/9612-03 (Closed): Failure to monitor the unavailability of certain functions performed by the automatic depressurization, emergency diesel generator,

- high pressure coolant injection, and residual heat removal systems when the plant status required the functions to be availabl ,

~ During this inspection, the inspectors verified that the implemented corrective

- actions were adequate and identified no additional problem y 1,im+a -v' - g y y- ,--k g- ,--- r-y-,-- 4 g-- w mg -~ y w- r ,m-

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-11-M8.4 ylotation 50-298/9612-04 (Closed}: Failure to provide adequate instructions to ensure 'isk assessments were performed when removing safety-related equipment from service for monitoring or preventive maintenanc During this inspection, the inspectors verified that the implemented corrective actions were adequate and identified no additional problem M8.5 Violation 50-298/9612 05 (Closed): Failure to initiate a risk-significant window checklist before removing the emergency diesel generator from service for planned maintenanc During this inspection, the inspectors verified that the implemented corrective actions were adequate and identified no additional problem V. Manecement Meetinas X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors discussed the progress of the inspection on a daily basis and presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of the onsite portion of the inspection on July 31,1997. In addition, supplemental telephonic exits were held on August 14 and September 10,1997, to discuss the enforcement findings from the inspection. The licensee personnel acknowledged the findings presented and stated that they would review the issues to determine if they had any differing position The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie ... _ . . . _ . -_ _ - , . .. -. .. .. - . ... _ _ . _ ._ . _. ._.- . . . _ . . .

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ATTACHMENT -

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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION -

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED-Licensee'-  ;

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J[Dorn, Containment Engineering Supervisor c c. Gaines._ Maintenance Manager- ,

R. Gardner, Operations Manager

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P.- Graham, _Vice President Nuclear

.W. Hofmeister, Senior Maintenance Engineer B. Houston, Licensing Manager -

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D. Madsen, Licensing Engineer

- B. Newell, Assistant Maintenance Manager O. Olson, Plant Engineering Manager B. Seidl, Operations Support Engineer i R. Wachowiak, Reliability Engineering _ Supervisor NBC M. Miller, Senior Resident inspector C.-Skinner, Resident inspector Other

L. Dugger, Institute Nuclear Power Operation

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- INSPECTION PROCEDURlS_,QffR

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IP 61725 Surveillance Testing and Calibration Control Program

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ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED .

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Opened'  ;

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<298/9713 01 NCV Failure to control calibration due dates associated with-measuring and test equipment used in surveillance activities ,

(Section M1.1)

L 298/9713-02 NOV - Failure to initiate documentation to identify a problem with a <

q surveillance procedure, and to provide for its adequate evaluation and resolution (Section M1.1)

.

-298/9713-03- IFl Review of nonenvironmentally qualified pressure switches (Section M1.1)

Closed ,

298/9612 01 NOV Failure to include 4 nonsafety-ralated systems functions in Maintenance Rule program (Section M8.1)

298/9612 02 NOV Failure to demonstrate reliability performance criteria conformed to the probabilistic risk assessment

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(Section M8.2)

298/9612-03 NOV Failure to track unavailability when the reactor was subcritical (Section M8.3) .

298/9612 04 NOV- Inadequate procedure to require risk assessment when-

removing equipment from service (Section M8.4)

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298/9612-05 NOV Failure to initiate risk significant checklist when required 4- (Section M8.5)'

298/9713-01 NCV Failure to control' calibration due dates associated with measuring and test equipment used in surveillance activities (Section M1.1)

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LIST OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES REVIEWED -

-PROCEDURE REV, TITLE Ouality Assurance Program 12.a - Cooper Nuclear Station Quality Assurance Program for Operations Policy Document Procedure 0.26 -29 C1 Surveillance. Program Procedure 0.37 3 Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE) Calibration Program Guidelines -

-Procedure 0.38 3.12 Process instrumentation Calibration Program Procedure C1 Problem Identification and Resolution Procedure 7. Conduct of Maintenance c_ Procedure 7. .11 C1 Work Item Tracking - Preventive Maintenance LIST OF SURVEILLANCES REVIEWED PROCEDURE TITLE ,

6.EE.601 125V/250V Station and Diesel Fire Pump Battery Weekly Check 6 EE.602 - 125V/250V S'tation and Diesel Fire Pump Battery Quarterly Check '

6 EE.603 125V Battery Service Test 6.EE.607 125V Station Battery Performance Discharge Test 6.PC.503 Drywell to Suppression Chamber Leakage Test 6.1 APRM.301 - APRM System Excluding 15% Trip Functional Test (Div 1)

6.2AP.RM 301 APRM System Excluding 15% Trip Functional Test (Div 2)

J 6.1 APRM.305 APRM System (Flow Bias and Startup) Calibration and Functional Test'

(Div 1)

6.2 APRM.305 - APRM System (Flow Bias and Startup) Calibration and Functional Test -

(Div 2)

' 6.MS.401- . Main Steam Safety Valve (SV) Testing

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-4-6.HPCI.301 HPCI Steam Line Space Temperature Switch Functional Test 6.1 ADS.301 ADS Reactor Pressure Permissive Calibration and Functional and Logic Tests (Reactor in Run) (Div 1)

6.2PCIS.301 PCIS Main Condenser Low Vacuum Calibration and Function (Div 2)

6.2PCIS.303 PCIS Main Steam Line High Flow Calibration and Function / Functional Test (Div 2)

6.2PCIS.304 Main Steam Line Low Pressure Calibration and Functional (Div 2)

6.2 PRS.303 Turbine First Stage Pressure Permissive Calibration and Functional (Div 2)

6.2 PRS.300 Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Calibration and Functional (Div 2)

6.2RCIC 301 RCIC Steam Line High Flow Calibration and Functional (Div 2)

6.2RCIC.303 RCIC Steam Supply Pressure Low Calibration and Functional (Div 2)