IR 05000272/2015008

Ir 05000272/2015008 and 05000311/2015008, May 4, 2015 June 18, 2015, Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2 - Problem Identification and Resolution

ML15202A314
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	07/21/2015
From:	Dentel G T Reactor Projects Branch 3
To:	Braun R Public Service Enterprise Group
DENTEL, GT
References
IR 2015008
Download: ML15202A314 (25)

Text

Mr. July 21, 2015 Mr. Robert Braun President and Chief Nuclear Officer PSEG Nuclear LLC N09 P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038

SUBJECT: SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000272/2015008 AND 05000311/2015008

Dear Mr. Joyce:

On May 22, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an onsite inspection at your Salem Nuclear Generating Station (Salem). The results of the onsite portion of the inspection were discussed with Mr. John Perry, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. In-office review continued after the conclusion of the onsite inspection, and a telephone exit was conducted on June 18, 2015, with Mr. Kevin Chambliss, Manager of Regulatory Affairs, and staff. This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to identification conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel. Based on the samples selected for review, the inspectors concluded that PSEG was generally effective in identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems. PSEG personnel identified problems and entered them into the corrective action program at a low threshold. PSEG prioritized and evaluated issues commensurate with the safety significance of the problems and corrective actions were generally implemented in a timely manner. This report documents one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors determined that this finding also involved a violation of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating this as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Further, inspectors documented a licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance. The NRC is also treating this violation as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. If you contest the violations in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to R. Braun -2- the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspectors at Salem. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to the finding in this report, you should provide a response, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Resident Inspectors at Salem. In accordance enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/ Glenn T. Dentel, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311 License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000272/2015008 and 05000311/2015008

w/Attachment:

Supplementary Information cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ R. Braun -2- the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspectors at Salem. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to the finding in this report, you should provide a response, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Resident Inspectors at Salem. In accordance enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/ Glenn T. Dentel, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311 License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000272/2015008 and 05000311/2015008

w/Attachment:

Supplementary Information cc w/encl:Distribution via ListServ DISTRIBUTION w/encl: DDorman, RA DLew, DRA HNieh, DRP MScott, DRP RLorson, DRS JTrapp, DRS GDentel, DRP RBarkley, DRP MDraxton, DRP CHighley, DRP BLin, DRP LCline, DRP PFinney, DRP, SRI AZiedonis, DRP, RI COtt, DRP, AA RPowell, DRP ADeFrancisco, DRP KMorganButler, RI, OEDO RidsNrrPMSalem Resource RidsNrrDorlLpl1-2 Resource ROPReports Resource DOC NAME: G:\DRP\BRANCH TSAB\DEFRANCISCO\SALEM PI&R 2015\SALEM 2015 PIR REPORT FINAL.DOCX ADAMS Accession No. ML 15202A314 SUNSI Review Non-Sensitive Sensitive Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available OFFICE RI/DRP RI/DRP RI/DRP NAME ADeFrancisco / AD RPowell/ RJP GDentel/ GTD DATE 07/16 /15 07/16 /15 07/20 /15 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 1 Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I Docket Nos.: 50-272, 50-311 License Nos.: DPR-70, DPR-75 Report Nos.: 05000272/2015008 and 05000311/2015008 Licensee: PSEG Nuclear LLC Facility: Salem Nuclear Generating Station Location: Hancocks Bridge, NJ Dates: May 4 June 18, 2015 Team Leader: Anne DeFrancisco, Project Engineer Inspectors: Leonard Cline, Senior Project Engineer Adam Ziedonis, Resident Inspector Brian Lin, Project Engineer Approved by: Glenn Dentel, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects 2

SUMMARY

IR 05000272/2015008 and 05000311/2015008; 05/04/2015 06/18/2015; Salem Nuclear Generating Station; Biennial Baseline Inspection of Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors identified one finding in the area of effectiveness of corrective actions. This NRC team inspection was performed by three regional inspectors and one resident inspector. The inspectors identified one finding of very low safety significance (Green) during this inspection and classified it as a non-cited violation (NCV). The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) ermination -cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, -olicy, dated February 4, 2015power reactors is described in NUREG- Problem Identification and Resolution The inspectors concluded that PSEG was generally effective in identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems. PSEG personnel identified problems, entered them into the corrective action program (CAP) at a low threshold, and prioritized issues commensurate with their safety significance. The inspectors concluded that PSEG adequately identified, reviewed, and applied relevant industry operating experience to Salem operations, and completed self-assessments and audits as required. PSEG adequately screened issues for operability and reportability, and generally performed causal analyses that appropriately considered extent of condition, generic issues, and previous occurrences. The inspectors also determined that PSEG typically implemented corrective actions (CAs) that addressed problems identified in the CAP in a timely manner. However, the inspectors identified a violation of NRC requirements in the area of effectiveness of corrective actions. Based on interviews the inspectors conducted over the course of the inspection, observations of plant activities, and reviews of individual CAP and employee concerns program issues, the inspectors did not identify any indications that site personnel were unwilling to raise safety issues through various available means.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, because PSEG did not assure that an identified condition adverse to quality was corrected. The condition adverse to quality was associated with improper maintenance of the 12 chiller which led to the chiller failure on August 23, 2014. Specifically, a procedure related to compressor rebuilds was not effectively updated to address the improper maintenance practice. PSEG entered this violation into the CAP as notification 20690927, has placed compressor rebuilds that would require use of this procedure on hold, and has purchased new compressors for contingent replacement pending completion of the compressor maintenance procedure changes.

3 The inspectors determined this performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating System cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, improper torqueing of the No. 4 discharge valve plate bolts for the 12 chiller caused the trip of that chiller on August 23, 2014, and, absent the procedural change, the vulnerability continued to exist for the occurrence of future improper torqueing and subsequent chiller failure. The inspectors determined that this finding screened to Green in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, because the finding did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in evaluation, because PSEG Root Cause 70169007 did not identify the improper torqueing of the discharge plate bolts as a condition adverse to quality. Consequently, PSEG assigned an action (ACIT) to address the problem, rather than a corrective action (CA) which, per LS-AA-125, requires additional reviews that verify the quality of completed corrective actions before closure. [P.2] (Section 4OA2.1.c(1)) Other Finding A violation of very low safety significance (Green), that was identified by the licensee, was reviewed by the inspectors. The issue has been entered into program. This violation and corrective action tracking number are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

4

REPORT DETAILS

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

This inspection constitutes one biennial sample of problem identification and resolution (PI&R) as defined by Inspection Procedure 71152. All documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.

.1 Assessment of Corrective Action Program Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the procedures that describe and implement PSEG's corrective action program at Salem. To assess the effectiveness of the corrective action program, the inspectors reviewed performance in three primary areas: problem identification, prioritization and evaluation of issues, and corrective action implementation. The inspectors compared performance in these areas to the requirements and standards procedure LS-AA-125, "Corrective Action Program." analysis and reviewed notifications selected across various cornerstones of safety in the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process. The security cornerstone was not covered as part of the scope of this inspection because security issues at Salem and Hope Creek are addressed using the Hope Creek corrective action process. Based on this arrangement correction action process effectiveness under the security cornerstone at Salem was reviewed during in February 2015. The results of this inspection are documented in IR 05000354/ 2015008 (ML15085A348). Additionally, the inspectors attended Plan-of-the-Day, Station Ownership Committee (SOC), and Management Review Committee (MRC) meetings. The inspectors selected items from the following functional areas for review: engineering, operations, maintenance, radiation protection, chemistry, and oversight programs.

(1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification In addition to the items described above, the inspectors reviewed system health reports, completed corrective and preventative maintenance work orders, completed surveillance tests, and periodic trend reports. The inspectors completed field walkdowns of various systems and components on site, including the auxiliary building ventilation system, the chilled water system, accessible portions of containment fan cooling unit support systems, the charging system, and a sample of various motor control centers that contained safety and non-safety related breakers. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of notifications written to document issues identified through internal self-assessments, audits, the operating experience program, and operator workarounds/burdens. The inspectors completed this review to verify that PSEG entered conditions adverse to quality into their corrective action program as appropriate. (2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues The inspectors reviewed the evaluation and prioritization of a sample of notifications issued since the last NRC biennial PI&R inspection completed in July 2013 (IR 05000272;311/2013008, ML13238A066). The inspectors also reviewed notifications that were assigned lower levels of significance that did not include formal cause evaluations appropriateness of the assigned significance, the scope and depth of the causal analysis, and the timeliness of resolution. The inspectors assessed whether the evaluations identified likely causes for the issues and developed appropriate corrective actions to address the identified causes. Further, the inspectors reviewed equipment operability determinations, reportability assessments, maintenance rule functional failure determinations, and extent-of-condition and extent-of-cause reviews for selected problems to verify these processes adequately evaluated equipment operability, reporting of issues to the NRC, maintenance rule impacts, and the extent of the issues. (3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions cumentation review, interviews, and, in some cases, field walkdowns to determine whether the actions addressed the identified causes of the problems. The inspectors also reviewed notifications for adverse trends and repetitive problems to determine whether corrective actions were effective in addressing the broader issues. The inspectors reviewed precluding recurrence for significant conditions adverse to quality. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of notifications associated with previous NCVs and findings to verify that PSEG personnel properly evaluated and resolved these issues. In addition, the inspectors performed an expanded, five year corrective action review to evaluate actions related to the Units 1 and 2 radiation monitor process channels, and the auxiliary building ventilation, chiller, and charging systems. Lastly, the inspectors performed a walkdown inspection on the reactor vessel level instrumentation, containment fan cooling unit service water valves, and control power breakers, focusing . b. Assessment (1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification Based on the selected samples, plant walkdowns, and interviews of site personnel in multiple functional areas, the inspectors determined that PSEG generally identified problems at a low threshold and entered them into the corrective action program as appropriate. The inspectors observed staff and supervisors at SOC and MRC meetings appropriately questioning and challenging notifications to ensure clarification and proper classification of the issues. Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that PSEG trended equipment, human performance, and programmatic issues, and generally entered identified problems into the CAP as appropriate. However, the inspectors identified one unresolved item (described in Section 4OA2.1.c(1)), and two dentification (described below). Entry of Conditions Adverse to Quality into the Corrective Action Program 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI requires in part that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, the inspectors identified several examples, between January and May of 2015, where PSEG did not initiate notifications for conditions adverse to quality until prompted by the NRC. These include: (1) notification 20677723, after an equipment operator found an auxiliary feedwater storage tank nitrogen supply valve out of position; (2) notification 20681597, after the 13 chiller control power breaker failed to close during testing; and, (3) notifications 2066873, 20678037, 20677859, 20668732/20668490 regarding an adverse trend in the performance of various relief valves during refueling outage 1R23 testing. Although issues were not entered into the CAP in timely manner, none of these issues were considered more than minor in accordance with g, because the impact of the untimely entries did not adversely impact the objective of the applicable cornerstone in each case.

Chiller Stainless Steel Cotter Pin Fatigue Condition Adverse to Quality Chiller stainless steel cotter pin fatigue failure vulnerability was not identified as a condition adverse to quality and assigned corrective actions in accordance with root cause procedure LS-AA-125-1001, in root cause 70169007. Specifically, the root cause evaluation identified that a previous causal evaluation conclusion on the cause of cotter pin fatigue failures was incorrect - in that the failed cotter pins had been stainless steel, and not carbon steel, as the previous evaluation had concluded. This called into question the current vulnerability of stainless steel cotter pins to repetitive fatigue failures. PSEG did not identify the fatigue failure mechanism of the stainless steel cotter pins as a condition adverse to quality (CAQ), and address the CAQ with formal, documented actions. The lack of formal, documented corrective actions to address the stainless steel fatigues failures was not more than minor, because it did not adversely affect the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of mitigating the effects of initiating events to prevent core damage. Specifically, other corrective actions to modify the chiller operating setpoints, and to address gasket leakby, were expected to minimize the likelihood of failure by cotter pin fatigue. In addition, new compressors, which include new stainless steel cotter pins, were installed in the chillers. PSEG initiated notification 20691006 to capture the stainless steel cotter pin fatigue failure vulnerability, and to document the intended corrective actions to address the issue. (2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues The inspectors determined that, in general, PSEG appropriately prioritized and evaluated issues commensurate with the safety significance of the identified problem. PSEG screened notifications for operability and reportability, categorized the notifications by significance, and assigned actions to the appropriate department for evaluation and resolution. The notification screening process considered human performance issues, radiological safety concerns, repetitiveness, and potential impact on the safety conscious work environment.

Based on the sample of notifications reviewed, and the SOC and MRC meetings attended, the inspectors noted that the gui action program implementing procedures was sufficient to ensure consistency in the categorization of issues. Based on the inspected sample, operability and reportability determinations were performed when conditions warranted, and the evaluations supported the conclusion. Causal analyses generally appropriately considered the extent of condition associated with the problem, generic issues, and previous occurrences of the issue. However, in the area of evaluation, the inspectors identified one observation.

Containment Fan Cooler Unit (CFCU) Relay Failure On January 14, 2015, the 25 CFCU failed to start during the performance of surveillance testing. PSEG captured this issue in the corrective action program (CAP) under notification 20678550, and performed a maintenance rule functional failure cause determination (FFCDE) under order 70173690. FFCDE 70173690, step 9, determined that the cause of the 25 CFCU failure to start was attributed to excessive contact resistance that was introduced from a manufacturing defect. FFCDE 70173690, step 10, evaluated the extent of condition (EOC) for the January 14, 2015 relay failure and extent of condition in accordance with (IAW) equipment apparent cause evaluation The inspectors determined that this EOC was not appropriate to address the January 14, 2015, failure, because EQACE 70154315 was performed in response to a May 2013 ftype. The January 14, 2015, failed relay was actually a newer model relay that had been installed as a corrective action for the May 2013 failure and would have had a different extent of condition. ER-AA-310-1004-d documentation of the EOC associated with the Maintenance Rule Functional Failure. The inspectors concluded that due to this error the EOC documented in the FFCDE did not adequately determine the EOC associated with the January 14, 2015, relay failure and this was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined this performance deficiency was not more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appeg, because the delay in the timeline for extent of condition corrective actions did not result in additional failures. In addition, at the time of inspection, tplanned corrective actions to address the vulnerability were reasonable to address the EOC going forward.

(3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions The inspectors concluded that corrective actions for identified deficiencies were generally timely and adequately implemented. For significant conditions adverse to quality, PSEG identified actions to prevent recurrence. The inspectors concluded that corrective actions to address selected NRC NCVs and findings since the last problem identification and resolution inspection were adequate and timely. However, the inspectors identified one finding that was characterized as an NCV, in the area of corrective action implementation (described in section 4OA2.1.c(2)). Additionally, there was one licensee identified violation also related to corrective implementation (described in section 4OA7).

c. Findings

(1) Unresolved Item (URI) Inadequate Maintenance Rule System Performance Criteria Selection

Introduction.

The inspectors identified a URI associated with inadequate Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria selection. Specifically, the inspectors determined that PSEG did not follow station procedures to: 1) determine that the number of maintenance preventable functional failures (MPFF) allowed per 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3) evaluation period was consistent with the assumptions in the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA); and 2) review and approve reliability performance criteria (PC) that was higher than the number of PRA-supplied basic event failures. The inspectors determined that additional information was needed to determine if these performance deficiencies were more than minor. Description-Assessment (FASA) of the Maintenance Rule (MRule) Program, completed August 30, 2014, to determine if PSEG was appropriately assessing MRule program performance in accordance with LS-AA-126--was to ensure the MRule Program was implemented in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65, as well as PSEG program procedures. The inspectors noted that the MRule Program FASA met the requirements of LS-AA-126-1001, was sufficiently critical, identified As a result of the FASA, PSEG determined that multiple structures, systems, and components (SSCs) in (a)(2) status had to be re-evaluated for (a)(1) status, due to those SSCs having had their Functional Failure Cause Determinations (FFCDE) and unavailability (UA) amounts incorrectly assessed in the past.

The inspectors reviewed the list of systems re-evaluated for (a)(1) status due to the FASA, as well as a listing of systems that remained in (a)(2) status and actual SSC performance data against the PC established under ER-AA-310-100Rule approximately 25 high safety significant systems (HSS) with reliability PC greater than two maintenance preventable functional failures (MPFFs). According to ER-AA-310-HSS SSCs, with reliability PC greater than or equal to two MPFFs require SSC past performance documentation. Additionally, Attachment 1, steps 2.B.3 and 2.B.4, state that for HSS SSCs with high risk achievement worth (RAW) values, a reliability PC greater than or equal to zero or one MPFF requires SSC past performance documentation. The inspectors requested that PSEG provide past performance documentation for the HSS SSCs with reliability PC greater than two MPFFs. PSEG provided documentation of HSS SSC PC approval from 1997, when the MRule Program was first implemented by PSEG. The inspectors determined this documentation did not support the assigned PC, because it did not consider the last 18 years of SSC past performance.

The inspectors also reviewed ER-AA-310- Periodic (a)(3) evaluation period is c-AA-310-1007, step 5.11.4, the last two periodic (a)(3) assessments performed by PSEG: April 1, 2011 through September 9, 2012; and October 1, 2012 through June 30, 2014; did not verify that the number of MPFFs allowed per evaluation period was consistent with the assumptions in the PRA. Additionally, ER-AA-310-1003, step 4.3.2, states, in number of MPFFs selected, as a Reliability PC, may not be higher than the PRA- The inspectors then reviewed SC-MRULE-subsequent to the most recent update performed in October 2014. The inspectors noted that to complete this verification, PSEG requantified the PRA model by changing the failure probabilities of Salem base core damage frequency (CDF) of 1.55E-data was reflective of SSC reliability PC above the PRA-supplied number of basic event failures. As such, contrary to ER-AA-310-1003, step 4.3.2, the number of MPFFs selected as reliability PC was higher than the PRA-supplied number of FFs, and, based on the lack of documentation supplied by PSEG, the inspectors concluded this was not justified or approved by Maintenance Rule Expert Panel. The inspectors determined that the failure to meet ER-AA-310-1007, step 5.11.4, and ER-AA-310-1003, step 4.3.2, was a performance deficiency. However, at the time of inspection, the inspectors did not have the information needed to determine the consequence of the performance deficiency. Information was needed to determine whether the performance deficiency was more than minor. Specifically, PSEG did not provide SSC past performance documentation for HSS SSCs with reliability PC greater than the PRA-supplied number of basic event failures in accordance with ER-AA-310-10 and 3. The inspectors will use this information to determine whether the performance or condition of HSS SSCs was effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2), and also to determine if those HSS SSCs being monitored under 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) were assigned appropriate goals and monitoring when considered against the appropriate reliability PC threshold. This issue was determined to be a URI IAW Inspector Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612. (URI 05000272;311/2015008-01, Inadequate Maintenance Rule System Performance Criteria Selection) (2) Failure to Correct a Condition Adverse to the Quality of the Chillers

Introduction.

The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, because PSEG did not assure that an identified condition adverse to quality was corrected. The condition adverse to quality was associated with improper maintenance of the 12 chiller which led to the chiller failure on August 23, 2014. Specifically, a procedure related to compressor rebuilds was not effectively updated to address the improper maintenance practice.

Description.

The chilled water system at Salem consists of three 50% capacity safety-related chillers per unit. The safety functions of the chilled water system are to remove sufficient heat loading from the emergency air conditioning units and emergency control air compressors under accident conditions, and remove sufficient heat loading from the main control room air condition units under normal operating conditions. Therefore, a trip of one of the safety-related chillers adversely affects the reliability of each of those units. On August 23, 2014, Salem Unit 1, 12 chiller experienced a trip on low oil pressure. Operators immediately entered Technical Specification limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.7.10.A, which required restoration of 12 chiller to operable status within 14 days, or plant shutdown to Mode 3 if the chiller could not be restored. PSEG performed troubleshooting, replaced the compressor and restored the 12 chiller to operable status on August 29, 2015. On September 17, 2014, PSEG approved the charter for Root Cause Evaluation (RCE) 70169007, to investigate longstanding and recurring equipment problems in the chilled water system. The approved scope included the equipment failure analyses for three August 2014 chiller failures that included the August 23, 2014 failure. PSEG determined through this evaluation that the cause of the August 23, 2014, 12 chiller trip was maintenance technicians used an improper torque pattern when they re-torqued the chiller compressor No. 4 discharge valve plate. The improper torque pattern caused uneven torque on that plate that allowed plate movement, bolt failure, and eventually internal valve and piston damage that led to compressor failure. To address this cause PSEG ultimately created action tracking item (ACIT) No. 8 to revise the appropriate chiller maintenance procedures to provide more detailed steps to verify the required torque values for the compressor discharge valve plates. Among other items, the additional steps would require the technicians to record the torque applied to each bolt in the procedure step directly adjacent to the torque specified by the procedure. Recording these values in this step would more likely preclude technicians from failing to apply appropriate human performance tools (i.e., self-checking) when they applied the torque to the bolts. The inspectors reviewed the completed changes for the affected procedures and identified that for procedure, SC.MD-CM.CH-Maintenance, Revision 21, the assigned action for ACIT No. 8 was not completed as directed. Specifically, the procedure was not updated to include sign-offs for the torque requirements for the discharge valve plate bolts. PSEG procedure LS-AA-final confirmations will document that the assigned action was completed as directed or describe the bases for why a different action or no action was taken. The inspectors determined that the ACIT No. 8 final confirmation was completed on March 25, 2015, but it did not include the required additional documentation to describe why the action was not taken as specified. The inspectors concluded that not completing the required procedure revision left the chillers susceptible to the cause of the August 23, 2014, failure, if and when the applicable maintenance was performed.

The inspectors also noted that PSEG did not identify the cause of the 12 chiller failure as a condition adverse to quality (CAQ) even though, as described above, the affected chillers performed safety-related functions and 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI states that CAQs include for example, a failure, malfunction, deficiency, deviation, defective material and equipment, or a nonconformance. Similarly, PSEG procedure, LS-AA-120, defined a CAQ as a failure, malfunction, deviation, and/or defective material and equipment associated with structures, systems and components. In accordance with the regulatory definition, ainspectors concluded that the inadequate torque applied to the 12 chiller discharge plate was a CAQ. PSEG procedure LS-AA-required that a corrective action (CA) be assigned to track completion of corrective actions for a CAQ. The inspectors determined this was important because LS-AA-125 required additional reviews for completing and closing a CA that were not required to close an ACIT. Specifically, closure of a CA required peer review and Department Head approval, as well as department corrective action program coordinator (CAPCO) closure review of the final confirmation for completion of the CA. The inspectors concluded that these additional reviews would likely have prevented the inadequate corrective action for the chiller failure, and therefore, not assigning a CA to track completion of the chiller maintenance procedure changes resulted in the inadequate corrective action.

Analysis.

The inspectors determined that inadequately implementing procedure changes specified to address the condition adverse to quality was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined this performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating System cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, improper torqueing of the No. 4 discharge valve plate bolts for the 12 chiller caused the trip of that chiller on August 23, 2014, and, absent the procedural change, vulnerability continued to exist for the occurrence of future improper torqueing and subsequent chiller failure. The inspectors determined that this finding affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone in accordance with IMC 0609, Attachment 4, because the safety-related function of the chillers is to provide cooling for main control room ventilation and the emergency air compressors. The inspectors determined that this finding screened to Green in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, because the finding did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time.

The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, evaluation [P.2], the cause of the 12 chiller low oil pressure trip did not ensure that the identified resolutions addressed the cause. Specifically, PSEG Root Cause 70169007 did not identify the improper torqueing of the discharge plate bolts as a condition adverse to quality. Consequently, PSEG assigned an action (ACIT) to address the problem, rather than a corrective action (CA) which, per LS-AA-125, require additional reviews that verify the quality of completed corrective actions before closure.

Enforcement.

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, between March 25 and May 19, 2015, PSEG measures did not assure that an identified condition adverse to quality associated with the performance of safety-related chiller maintenance was corrected. Specifically, PSEG determined that the cause of the 12 chiller trip on August 23, 2014, was improper torque of the No. 4 discharge valve plate during a compressor rebuild on May 8, 2014.

PSEG entered this violation into the CAP as notification 20690927, has placed compressor rebuilds that would require use of this procedure on hold, and has purchased new compressors for contingent replacement pending completion of the compressor maintenance procedure changes. This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. (05000272;311/2015008-02, Failure to Correct a Condition Adverse to the Quality of the Chillers)

.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of notifications associated with review of industry operating experience (OE) to determine whether PSEG appropriately evaluated the operating experience information for applicability to Salem and took appropriate actions, when warranted. The inspectors also reviewed evaluations of OE documents associated with a sample of NRC generic communications to ensure that PSEG adequately considered the underlying problems associated with the issues for resolution via their corrective action program.

b. Assessment The inspectors determined that PSEG adequately considered industry OE information for applicability, and used the information to identify and prevent similar issues when appropriate. The inspectors determined that OE was adequately applied and lessons learned were communicated and incorporated into plant operations and procedures when applicable.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of audits, including the most recent audit of the corrective action program, departmental self-assessments, and assessments performed by independent organizations. Inspectors performed these reviews to determine if PSEG entered problems identified through these assessments into the corrective action program, when appropriate, and whether PSEG initiated corrective actions to address identified deficiencies. The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the audits and assessments by comparing audit and assessment results against self-revealing and NRC-identified observations made during the inspection.

b. Assessment Based on the inspected sample, the inspectors concluded that self-assessments, audits, and other internal PSEG assessments were adequate to meet program requirements. The inspectors observed that PSEG personnel knowledgeable in the subject completed these audits and self-assessments in a methodical manner. PSEG completed these audits and self-assessments to a sufficient depth to identify issues which were then entered into the corrective action program for evaluation. Based on the inspected sample, the inspectors concluded that the station implemented corrective actions associated with the identified issues commensurate with their safety significance.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Assessment of Safety Conscious Work Environment

a. Inspection Scope

During interviews with station personnel, the inspectors assessed the safety conscious work environment at Salem. Specifically, the inspectors interviewed personnel to determine whether they were hesitant to raise safety concerns to their management and/or the NRC. The inspectors also interviewed the station Employee Concerns Program coordinator to determine what actions are implemented to ensure employees were aware of the program and its availability with regards to raising safety concerns. The inspectors reviewed the Employee Concerns Program files to ensure that PSEG entered issues into the corrective action program when appropriate. b. Assessment During interviews, Salem staff expressed a willingness to use the corrective action program to identify plant issues and deficiencies and stated that they were willing to raise safety issues. The inspectors noted that no one interviewed stated that they personally experienced or were aware of a situation in which an individual had been retaliated against for raising a safety issue. All persons interviewed demonstrated an adequate knowledge of the corrective action program and the Employee Concerns Program. Based on these limited interviews, the inspectors concluded that there was no evidence of an unacceptable safety conscious work environment and no significant challenges to the free flow of information.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On May 22, 2015, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. John Perry, Site Vice President, and other members of the Salem staff. Following additional inspection activities, the inspectors conducted an exit meeting over the telephone on June 18, 2015 with Mr. Kevin Chambliss, Manager of Regulatory Affairs, and staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violation

The following violation of very low security significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy for disposition as an NCV.

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to the above, PSEG did not establish measures to assure that a condition adverse to the quality related to safety-related chillers was promptly corrected. Specifically, PSEG determined that previous corrective actions for chiller operating temperature setpoint overlap, which were directed in several previous CAP evaluations that were completed between 2009 and 2013, were not implemented in a timely manner. This caused excessive chiller cycling and load sharing and prolonged and cyclic operation at low load conditions, which caused component fatigue and compressor damage. In response to this issue, PSEG completed a root cause evaluation and established corrective actions to develop and install a chiller operating setpoint design change package. The inspectors determined that this finding screened to Green in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, because the finding did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time. This issue is tracked in the corrective action program under RCE 70169007.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

J. Perry, Site Vice President

L. Wagner, Plant Manager

B. Booth, Regulatory Affairs Manager

K. Chambliss, Regulatory Affairs Manager

T. Cachaza, Regulatory Affairs

F. Possessky, Regulatory Affairs

J. Racer-DeSanctis, Performance Improvement Manager

R. DeKnight, Operations Director

S. Taylor, Radiation Protection Manager

R. Truhan, Nuclear Oversight

P. Duke, Regulatory Affairs

D. Schuman, Employee Concerns Program Manager

P. Essner, Engineering

A. Zhang, Engineering

J. Giunta, Engineering

M. Pennington, Engineering

J. Thompson, Procurement Engineering Manager

H. Balian, Engineering

C. Beeson, Engineering

S. Boesch, Engineering

S. Bowers, Engineering

L. Oberembt, Engineering

B. Ohmert, Engineering

J. Hargrave, Operations

P. Martino, Maintenance Director

G. Delp, Maintenance

NRC Personnel

P. Finney, Senior Resident Inspector, Salem

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED

Opened

05000272;311/2015008-01 URI Inadequate Maintenance Rule System Performance Criteria Selection (Section 4OA2.1.c.(1))

05000272;311/2015008-02 NCV Failure to Correct a Condition Adverse to the Quality of the Chillers (Section 4OA2.1.c.(2))

Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution

Audits and Self-Assessments FASA, Fire Protection Triennial Inspection (20637469) FASA, Locked HR area controls and remote monitor (20595366) FASA, Maintenance Rule Program (70162305) FASA, Operations Training (70159592) FASA, Risk Management Program (70138251) Maintenance Rule Program Training and Users Group Meeting (70162313)

NOSA-SLM-14-03, Maintenance Audit Report (80111247)

NOSA-SLM-13-08, Radiation Protection Audit (80111776)

NOSA-SLM-14-04, Chemistry, Radwaste, Effluent and Environmental Monitoring Audit (80111776)

NOSA-SLM-15-04, Corrective Action Program Audit (80114016)

NOSPA-SA-14-3C, Nuclear Oversight Performance Assessment Report

NOSA-HPC-14-02

NOSA-HPC-13-02

NOSA-SLM-13-09, Operations, Operations Training, and PORC Audit (80110237) Operations Fundamental (20637516, 70162930) Operations Fundamental IBM (70162930) Operations, Operations Training, and PORC Audit Report (80110237) Reactivity Management (20592091, 70149516) Reactivity Management Informal Benchmarking (IBM) (70162929) Risk Management Documentation (70149585) Unit 1 and 2 Quarterly Operator Burden Assessment (30279587)

Cause Evaluations ACE, 13 Chiller Excessive Cycling (70135613) ACE, 21 Chiller Tripped on Low Oil Pressure (70156720) ACE, 24NM306 Isolator Found Low (70173371) ACE, Evaluation of the Unsatisfactory Shutdown Margin that Contributed to the Removal of Unit 2 from Service (70163361) ACE, POPS Relief During Solid Plant Operations (70165208) ACE, POPS Actuated during Restoration of Charging Flow Path Following Unexpected Closure of In Service Charging Pump Discharge Valve (70170378) ACE, Potential Finding for FHB Positive D/P (70173449) PSEG Failed to Initiate a Notification to Review

FIN 2011004-002 and Develop Appropriate Corrective Actions per Procedure

LS-AA- CCE, 12 Chiller Tripped on Freeze Protection (70136073) CCE, Salem 1 and 2 AC and DC Molded Case Circuit Breakers (70174576) EQACE, 13 Charging Pump Failed to Couple (70155459) EQACE, 15 CFCU No Service Water Flow (70154315) EQACE, 21 CFCU No Flow (70168067) EQACE, 22 CFCU High Speed Cable Degradation (70160037) 23 Charging Pump Flow Loss, (70172012) 12 CRDM Vent Fan Breaker Tripped (70131132)

RCE, 2014 WANO Related AFI in Maintenance Fundamentals (70170180) RCE, Increasing Trend in Chiller Failures,

70169007 RCE, Multiple Failures of the 12 and 13 Chillers (70106293) WGE, 13 Chiller Would Not Fully Unload (70156627) WGE, 23 Chiller Moore Temperature Switches Failing (70161179) WGE, Chiller Compressor Cotter Pin Material (70163248)

Non-Cited Violations, Findings and Licensee Event Reports

FIN 05000311/2013008-01 Failure to Evaluate Performance Deficiency for an NRC finding

FIN 05000311/2014002-01 Failure to Follow Fire Protection Test Procedure Resulted in Fuel Oil

Spill

NCV 05000311/2014003-01, Inadequate Sold Pressurizer Control Resulted in Low Temp OP Relief Lifting

NCV 05000311/2013003-05 Failure to Follow Rad Protection Procedures

NCV 05000272/2014005-01, Procedural Non-Compliance Resulted in Low Temperature

Overpressure Relief Lifting

NCV 05000272/2015001-01, Failure to Ensure Adequate Negative Differential Pressure During

Fuel Movements

LER 272013001/08/22/2013 TS Required S/D due to Exceeding Reactor Coolant System

Unidentified Leakage Limit

LER 311201400201/31/2014 Manual Reactor Trip due to a Partially Dropped Rod

LER 2722015001/01/16/2015 Fuel Move in Progress with FHB ventilation Inop

LER 3112015001/01/20/2015 Condition Prohibited by TS for one channel OTDT inop

Notifications

(* indicates that notification was generated or updated as a result of this inspection)

20651917

20617541

20618915

20647016

20653344

20655128

20667095

20681811

20681689

20543399

20609298

20310335

20401984

20672018

20649790

20663696

20669992

20682394

20632413

20607323

20617427

20684460

20645608

20664792

20656479

20664264

20664492

20669516

20583256

20595583

20683146

20618979

20628749

20654206

20659685

20680792

20655065

20658461

20680290

20656114

20670175

20670453

20670965

20679120

20503346

20588427

20589036

20598974

20621927

20611068

20621927

20632309

20646012

20668809

20622181

20531565

20527578

20502811

20510934

20506179

20511440

20531370

20534320

20535088

20613330

20634555

20570446

20588947

20596644

20479848

20649778

20678550

20681954

20521721

20539885

20539888

20604760

20578310

20578312

20602319

20604215

20632422

20642368

20673735

20658404

20658699

20646192

20668883

20638374

20659886

20649575

20655172

20675102

20683706

20670965

20623581

20616484

20635706

20618915

20506179

20628749

20624740

20626855

20626854

20626923

20626922

20624153

20626637

20626638

20626636

20626434

20624128

20626181

20626807

20626921

20626805

20626853

20624214

20651092

20651237

20650976

20649040

20651578

20651615

20651558

20651557

20651468

20651569

20651823

20651444

20651605

20651255

20645528

20645053

20645115

20645064

20645276

20645445

20644775

20644774

20645454

20644832

20645604

20645603

20645495

20622295

20631083

20645130

20647927

20651469

20655074

20658116

20659577

20660393

20672684

20675581

20681567

20667538

20628740

20683745

20653263

20629925

20689323*

20690095*

20616485

20638387

20681569

20683841

20672190

20601766

20639301

20645039

20666000

20666129

20636958

20669487

20597430

20601403

20675662

20655041

20653895

20677723

20683640

20608365

20681427

20626619

20624037

20629217

20629218

20637653

20661236

20668102

20681427

20626619

20624037

20672486

20672484

20649720

20610353

20673569

20620137

20638020

20668967

20671524

20681597

20681717

20681718

20614075

20632057

20638818

20656909

20658821

20668967

20681597

20614075

20632057

20681285

20639058

20643693

20643777

20672190

20637517

20637516

20592091

20689529

20661782

20680377

20680379

20680384

20665176

20661743

20688764*

20688863*

20688859*

20689866*

20690713*

20694641*

20690095*

20592558

20657565

20661289

20660250

20660309

20660381

20660382

20660383

20660385

20660386

20660387

20660388

20660390

20660430

20660434

20678417

20658821

20693283

20693282

20693281

20692902

20692901

20694648*

20692343

20693625

20684033

20682668

20682669

20689323

20691064*

20691243

20691859

20679690

20460584

20676392

20676395

20676396

20676397

20675783

20679690

20676930

20675624

20684726

20684495

20684496

20684498

20688601

20625500

20664247

20672883

20677161

20673027

20673028

20673133

20673134

20673129

20673240

20653344

20649640

20638803

20657300

20657301

20657302

20657303

20657304

20657772

20657773

20657774

20657775

20657776

20682394

20677427

20678063

20687732

20676871

20677581

20677028

20646740

20665897

20687727

20690927*

20690237*

20682921

20691006*

20498660

20680655

20680822

20675158

20679740

20667519

20686521

20658384

20645763

20641084

20641025

20640006

20666615

20584272

20688508

20688517

NRC Generic Communications and Industry Operating Experience

RIS 2007-21, Adherence to Licensed Power Limits OPEX309627, Misalignment of Two Control Rods during Moveable Control Assembly Surveillance

TR-109641, Guidance on Routine Preventative Maintenance for Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers

IN 91-78, Status Indication of Control Power for Circuit Breakers Used in Safety Related Applications

IN 2010-09, Importance of Understanding Circuit Breaker Control Power Indications

IN 96-43, Failure of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers

Procedures

EI-AA-101-1001, Employee Concerns Program Process, Revision 9

CC-AA-309-101, Engineering Technical Evaluations, Revision 10

PIA-004, Work Group Evaluation, Revision 3

RP-AA-401-1001, Special Instructions for Highly Radioactive Incore Components, Revision 0

NO-AA-200-002, NOS Regulatory Audit Procedure, Revision 17

FP-AA-024, Fire Drill Performance Revision 0

NOS-AA-200-002-1001, NOS Audit Handbook, Revision 20

WC-AA-101-1002, On-line Scheduling Process, Revision 17

ER-AA-310-1005, Maintenance Rule

Dispositioning Between (a)(1) and (a)(2), Revision 9

ER-AA-310-1003, Maintenance Rule

Performance Criteria Selection, Revision 6

ER-AA-310-1007, Maintenance Rule

Periodic (a)(3) Assessment, Revision 7

ER-AA-600-1044, Maintenance Rule Support, Revision 5

ER-AA-2002, System Health Indicator Program, Revision 13

ER-AA-2001-1001, Evaluation of Equipment Reliability Strategies, Revision 1

ER-SA-310-1009, Salem Generating Station

Maintenance Rule Scoping, Revision 5

WC-AA-105, Work Activity Risk Management, Revision 3

OP-AA-108-111, Adverse Condition Monitoring and Contingency Plan, Revision 8 S2.IC-SC.RVL-0020(Q), Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation System Transmitter Calibration, Revision 16

SC.MD-PM.ZZ-0135(Q), Ventilation Damper Inspection and Guidelines, Revision 16

HU-AA-104-101, Procedure Use and Adherence, Revision 6

LS-AA-115-1006, Manual for Processing OE6 Documents (Vendor 10CFR Part 21 Documents),

Revision 0

LS-AA-120, Issue Identification and Screening Process, Revision 13

LS-AA-125, Corrective Action Program, Revision 18

LS-AA-125-1001, Root Cause Evaluation Manual, Revision 9

LS-AA-125-1002, Common Cause Evaluation Manual, Revision 7

LS-AA-125-1003, Apparent Cause Evaluation Manual, Revision 14

LS-AA-125-1004, Effectiveness Review Manual, Revision 5

LS-AA-125-1005, Coding and Analysis Manual, Revision 7

LS-AA-125-1006, Performance Improvement Integrated Matrix (PIIM), Revision 5

LS-AA-126, Self-Assessment/Benchmarking, Revision 13

LS-AA-126-1001, Self-Assessments, Revision 7

OP-AA-108-115, Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments, Revision 4

OP-AA-102-103, Operator Workaround Program, Revision 3

OP-AA-102-103-1001, Operator Burdens Program, Revision 2

PIA-004, Work Group Evaluation, Revision 3

LS-AA-115, Operating Experience Program, Revision 13

SC.RE-ST.ZZ-0002(Q), Shutdown Margin Calculation, Revision 23

SC.MD.IS.4KV-0001, 4KV and 13 KV Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers Inspection and Test, Revision 28

LS-AA-1003, NRC Inspection Preparation and Response, Revision 13

MA-AA-716-210, Preventative Maintenance (PM) Program, Revision 10

IST-SC-I4-PROG-U1PUMP TBL, Salem Generating Station Units 1 and 2 Fourth Interval

S1.OP-SO.CVC-0002, Charging Pump Operation, Revision 37 S1.OP-PT.CVC-0003, Appendix R Testing

13/23 Charging Pump S1.OP-ST.CVC-0005, In-service Testing

13/23 Charging Pump

S1.OP-SO.CVC-0023, CVCS Cross-Connect Alignment to Unit 2, Revision 8

SC.MD-CM.CVC-0001, Numbers 13 and 23 Charging Pump Repacking Plunger and Valve Repair or Replacement, Revision 17

SC.MD-CM.CVC-0005, 13 and 23, Charging Pump: Bearing Inspection; Power Frame disassembly, Inspection, Repair, and Reassembly And Fluid Cylinder Replacement, Revision 12

SC.MD-CM.CVC-0013, Replacement and Charging of Suction Stabilizer and Discharge Pulsation Dampener Bladders, Revision 9

SC.MD-CM.CH-0001, ACME Chiller Compressor Maintenance, Revisions 1 and 2

SC.MD-PM.CH-0001, ACME Chiller Compressor Inspection and Repair, Revisions 20 and 21 S1.OP-SO.CH-0001, Chilled Water System Operation, Revision 28 S2.OP-SO.CH-0001, Chilled Water System Operation, Revision 31

Completed Surveillances 18 month Unit 2 ST RVLIS Trains A&B Scaling and Calibration, completed April 15, 2014 18 month Unit 1 ST RVLIS Trains A&B Scaling and Calibration, completed October 6, 2014

18 month Unit 2 ST RVLIS Trains A&B Scaling and Calibration, completed October 11, 2013 S1.OP-ST.INST-0001(Q), Revision 20, Instrumentation

Accident Monitoring, completed

March 25, 2015 S1.OP-ST.INST-0001(Q), Revision 20, Instrumentation

Accident Monitoring, completed February 21, 2015 S1.OP-ST.INST-0001(Q), Revision 20, Instrumentation

Accident Monitoring, completed

April 24, 2015 S2.OP-ST.INST-0001(Q), Revision 16, Instrumentation

Accident Monitoring, completed

March 7, 2015 S2.OP-ST.INST-0001(Q), Revision 16, Instrumentation

Accident Monitoring, completed February 7, 2015 S2.OP-ST.INST-0001(Q), Revision 16, Instrumentation

Accident Monitoring, completed

April 11, 2015

Work Orders

60121389

60122687

70167903

70168048

70168874

70172181

70173261

70173690

70174280

70174554

70174875

70174930

60121389

60122687

70149711

70167903

70168048

70168409

70168504

70168645

70168874

70169007

70170894

70171684

70172181

70173261

70173690

70174280

70174554

70174875

70174930

70164312

Miscellaneous

12 SI Pump Breaker Fail to Close on Demand,

20660365 Chilled Water System ILOT 13-1 Systems Training, 07/23/2013 Event Notification 51053, Potential Part 21 Involving Struthers Dunn Relays With Contact

Resistance Greater Than One Ohm, dated 05/07/2015 Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria Verification Following Salem SA112A PRA Update, SC-

MRULE-002, Revision 3 Maintenance Strategy: S1CVC-1CVE22 (Unit 1), Revision 1 MRC Meeting 04/22/15, 0900-0930 OOB Operability Evaluation 16-006, Relays Manufactured with Fiberglass Reinforced Actuator

Boards, Revision 0 Operator Burdens Program Action Plan, Revision 1 Plan of the Day, Wednesday, April 22, 2015 RVLIS Train B 14 Hot Leg Hydraulic Isolator Monitoring,

OP-AA-108-111, Adverse Condition Monitoring and Contingency Plan, Revision 8 Salem Maintenance Rule 2014

Periodic (a)(3) Assessment,

SC-MRULE-005, Revision 0 (70149711) Salem Station Ownership Committee Agenda for 4/22/15 System Health Report, Chemical & Volume Control, Unit 1 and 2 System Health Report, Chilled Water System, Unit 1 and 2, Q1-2015 System Health Report, Containment Building Ventilation, Unit 1 and 2, Q1-2015 System Health Report, Radiation Monitoring System, May 5, 2015 Temporary Modification, 1 ST14-007, Cut and Cap RVLIS Train A Capillary

VTD 130887, Chilled Water System Compressor Vendor Manual, dated 11/01/04

VTD 325458, Chilled Water System Evaporator Vendor Manual, dated 01/17/03 Utilities Service Alliance Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment, February 2015 Safety Culture Monitoring Panel 2014, 2015 Meeting Minutes

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACE Apparent Cause Evaluation

ACIT Action Item

ADAMS Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System

CA Corrective Action

CAP Corrective Action Program

CAQ Condition Adverse to Quality

CCE Common Cause Evaluation

CFCU Containment Fan Cooling Unit

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CR Condition Report

DCP Design Change Package

EQACE Equipment Apparent Cause Evaluation

FASA Focused Area Self-Assessment

FIN Finding

FF Functional Failure

FFCDE Functional Failure Cause Determination Evaluation

HSS High Safety Significance

IMC Inspection Manual Chapter

LCO Limiting Condition on Operation

LER Licensee Event Report

MPFF Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure

MRC Management Review Committee

NCV Non-cited Violation

NOTF Notification

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

OE Operating Experience

PARS Publicly Available Records System

PC Performance Criteria

PCM Performance Centered Maintenance

PCR [[]]

PM Change Request

PDP Positive Displacement Pump

PI&R Problem Identification and Resolution

PM Preventive Maintenance

POPS Pressurizer Overtemperature Protection System

PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment

RCE Root Cause Evaluation

RMCS Reactor Manual Control System

RPS Reactor Protection System

RVLIS Reactor Vessel Level Indication System

SCAQ Significant Condition Adverse to Quality

SDP Significance Determination Process

SOC Station Ownership Committee

SSC System, Structure, or Component

TS Technical Specifications

URI Unresolved Item WGE Work Group Evaluation