05000311/FIN-2014003-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Solid Pressurizer Control Resulted in Low Temperature Overpressure Relief Lifting |
| Description | A self-revealing, Green NCV of TS 6.8.1, Procedures and Programs, was identified when PSEG did not control reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure in accordance with a procedure. Consequently, on April 13, 2014, while shutdown for a refueling outage, this resulted in lifting a low temperature over-pressure protection valve during solid pressurizer operations. PSEG completed a prompt investigation and an apparent cause evaluation, entered this in the CAP, and submitted a Special Report to the NRC in accordance with TS 6.9.2. This issue was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected its objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (i.e., the reactor coolant system) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. It was also similar to IMC 0612, Appendix E, example 4.b in that not accomplishing activities in accordance with procedures is more than minor if it results in a trip or transient. Specifically, not following the procedure resulted in a reactor coolant system pressure transient that caused a protective relief valve to lift. The issue was evaluated using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, and determined to be associated with the Barrier Integrity cornerstone based on the PORV acting as an RCS boundary mitigator. Since the finding was associated with a shutdown event, IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Exhibit 4.A, was used to determine significance. Since the finding was not associated with a freeze seal, nozzle dam, criticality drain-down path, leakage path, or safety injection actuation, and did not involve or result in PORV unavailability or a setpoint issue, it screened to Green. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Challenge the Unknown, in that individuals should stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Specifically, a PSEG operator did not stop his activity after his first attempt to control pressure, communicate the unexpected RCS pressure response to supervision, nor resolve the issue prior to resuming activities. |
| Site: | Salem  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000311/2014003 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2014 (2014Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | P Finney R Barkley R Nimitz A Ziedonis C Cahill E Andrews F Arner G Dentel H Gray J Hawkins J Schoppy |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.11, Challenge the Unknown |
| INPO aspect | QA.2 |
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Finding - Salem - IR 05000311/2014003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Salem) @ 2014Q2
Self-Identified List (Salem)
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