ML13002A030: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:1212112012                    U.S. NuclearRegulatory Cmnmission Operations Center Event Report                      Paze I Part 21 (PAR)                                                                                Event#        48621 Rep Org: ABB INC.                                              Notification Date / Time: 12/21/2012 16:27    (EST)
Supplier: ABB INC.                                                    Event Date / Time: 10/25/2012          (EST)
Last Modification: 12/21/2012 Region:    1                                                Docket #:
City:  CORAL SPRINGS                          Agreement State:            Yes County:                                                    License #:
State:  FL NRC Notified by:  BRYAN TAUZER                          Notifications:  GORDON HUNEGS                    R1DO HQ Ops Officer:  HOWIE CROUCH                                          BRIAN BONSER                      R2DO Emergency Class:      NON EMERGENCY                                          KENNETH RIEMER                    R3DO 10 CFR Section:                                                          BLAIR SPITZBERG                  R4DO 21.21 (a)(2)        INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION                              PART 21 GROUP                    EMAIL DEFECT DISCOVERED IN COM-5 AND SSC-T PROTECTIVE RELAYS DISTRIBUTED BY ABB, INC.
The following information was obtained by ABB, Inc. via fax:
"ABB Coral Springs received notice from ABB Inc. in Florence, South Carolina of a return request by NextEra Energy (Point Beach Nuclear Plant) for one of [their] COM-5 relays. The customer complaint was identified as 'A pin on .the telephone relay fell out.
"ABB Coral Springs received the relay on October 25, 2012 with the telephone relay armature and armature pivot pin disassembled. The assembly process for the telephone relay armature calls for the armature pivot pin to have a knurl at one end and a flare at the opposite end. The knurl and flare secures the armature to the pivot pin. [ABB's]
investigation found that on this telephone relay, the pivot pin was flared on the same end as that which had the knurl. It was determined that this was due to an operator error while performing a secondary operation.
  "The telephone relay was stamped with a manufacturing date code 08-38, indicating the thirty-eighth week of 2008.
It is important to note the date of manufacture, as in mid-2010 the supplier and the assembly manufacturing process of the pin was changed. The hole and flaring was changed such that it is performed prior to cutting the pin to length, eliminating the secondary operation and potential for error.
  "In addition to the change to the flaring process described above, corrective action includes the addition of an additional step to [ABB's] final Product Inspection procedure where all telephone relays are verified to have the knurl at one end of the armature pivot pin and a flare at the opposite end.
"Inspection of [ABB's] stock identified no similar condition.
12/21/2012                    U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission OperationsCenter Event Report                        Paze 2 Part 21 (PAR)                                                                                  Event#        48621
"[ABB has] identified COM-5 and SSC-T relays which shipped that may have a telephone relay of the same vintage as that of the subject telephone relay. There were eleven orders shipped, totaling twenty-five units to three customers; ABB Inc. Florence, S.C., Exelon Business Services and WESCO Distribution, Inc.. ABB has determined that it does not have the capability to perform an evaluation to determine if a defect exists, and therefore in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(b), [ABB is] notifying [their] affected customers so that they may evaluate the deviation or failure to comply, pursuant to 10 CFR 21(a).
"A failure of the Telephone Relay to operate on either the COM-5 or SSC-T relay can result in the breaker not tripping during an overload condition. This condition could compromise the ability of the relay to perform its intended safety function.
"[ABB is] providing [their] customers with the option of inspecting for evidence of the knurl and flare or returning the relays so [they] may perform the inspection."
05:33:34 p.m. 12-21-2012        1 /2 9547555677            ABB CORAL SPRINGS ABB December 21, 2012 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001
==Subject:==
10 C.F.R. Part 21 Notification to Customers - COM-5 and SSC-T Protective Relays
                    -Telephone Relay Armature Pivot Pin Notification By: ABB Inc.
Distribution Automation 4300 Coral Ridge Drive Coral Springs, FL 33065
==Dear Sir or Madam,==
ABB Coral Springs received notice from ABB Inc. in Florence, South Carolina of a return request by NextEra Energy (Point Beach Nuclear Plant) for one of our COM-5 relays. The customer complaint was identified as "A pin on the telephone relay fell out".
ABB Coral Springs received the relay on October 25, 2012 with the telephone relay armature and armature pivot pin disassembled. The assembly process for the telephone relay armature calls for the armature pivot pin to have a knurl at one end and a flare at the opposite end. The knurl and flare secures the armature to the pivot pin. Our investigation found that on this telephone relay, the pivot pin was flared on the same end as that which had the knurl. It was determined that this was due to an operator error while performing a secondary operation.
The telephone relay was stamped with a manufacturing date code 08-38, indicating the thirty-eighth week of 2008. It is important to note the date of manufacture, as in mid 2010 the supplier and the assembly manufacturing process of the pin was changed. The hole and flaring was changed such that it is perfonned prior to cutting the pin to length, eliminating the secondary operation and potential for error.
In addition to the change to the flaring process described above, corrective action includes the addition of an additional step to our final Product Inspection procedure where all telephone relays are verified to have the knurl at one end of the armature pivot pin and a flare at the opposite end.
Inspection of our stock identified no similar condition.
We have identified COM-5 and SSC-T relays which shipped that may have a telephone relay of the same vintage as that of the subject telephone relay. There were eleven orders shipped, totaling twenty-five units to three customers; ABB Inc. Florence, S.C., Exelon Business Services and WESCO Distribution, Inc. Please see Attachment 1. ABB has determined that it does not have the capability to perform an evaluation to determine if a defect exists, and therefore in accordance with 10 C.F.R. 21.21 (b), we are notifying our affected customers so that they may evaluate the deviation or failure to comply, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 2 1(a).
05:33:53 p.m. 12-21-2012        2/2 9547555677            ABB CORAL SPRINGS ABn A failure of the Telephone Relay to operate on either the COM-5 or SSC-T relay can result in the breaker not tripping during an overload condition. This condition could compromise the ability of the relay to perform its intended safety function.
We are providing our customers with the option of inspecting for evidence of the knurl and flare or returning the relays so we may perform the inspection.
Very truly yours, fb, Dennis Batovsky Managing Director}}

Latest revision as of 16:59, 11 November 2019

Part 21 Notification - Defect Discoveredd in COM-5 and SSC-T Protective Relays Distributed by Abb, Inc
ML13002A030
Person / Time
Site: Point Beach  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/21/2012
From: Batovsky D, Tauzer B
ABB
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
48621
Download: ML13002A030 (4)


Text

1212112012 U.S. NuclearRegulatory Cmnmission Operations Center Event Report Paze I Part 21 (PAR) Event# 48621 Rep Org: ABB INC. Notification Date / Time: 12/21/2012 16:27 (EST)

Supplier: ABB INC. Event Date / Time: 10/25/2012 (EST)

Last Modification: 12/21/2012 Region: 1 Docket #:

City: CORAL SPRINGS Agreement State: Yes County: License #:

State: FL NRC Notified by: BRYAN TAUZER Notifications: GORDON HUNEGS R1DO HQ Ops Officer: HOWIE CROUCH BRIAN BONSER R2DO Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY KENNETH RIEMER R3DO 10 CFR Section: BLAIR SPITZBERG R4DO 21.21 (a)(2) INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION PART 21 GROUP EMAIL DEFECT DISCOVERED IN COM-5 AND SSC-T PROTECTIVE RELAYS DISTRIBUTED BY ABB, INC.

The following information was obtained by ABB, Inc. via fax:

"ABB Coral Springs received notice from ABB Inc. in Florence, South Carolina of a return request by NextEra Energy (Point Beach Nuclear Plant) for one of [their] COM-5 relays. The customer complaint was identified as 'A pin on .the telephone relay fell out.

"ABB Coral Springs received the relay on October 25, 2012 with the telephone relay armature and armature pivot pin disassembled. The assembly process for the telephone relay armature calls for the armature pivot pin to have a knurl at one end and a flare at the opposite end. The knurl and flare secures the armature to the pivot pin. [ABB's]

investigation found that on this telephone relay, the pivot pin was flared on the same end as that which had the knurl. It was determined that this was due to an operator error while performing a secondary operation.

"The telephone relay was stamped with a manufacturing date code 08-38, indicating the thirty-eighth week of 2008.

It is important to note the date of manufacture, as in mid-2010 the supplier and the assembly manufacturing process of the pin was changed. The hole and flaring was changed such that it is performed prior to cutting the pin to length, eliminating the secondary operation and potential for error.

"In addition to the change to the flaring process described above, corrective action includes the addition of an additional step to [ABB's] final Product Inspection procedure where all telephone relays are verified to have the knurl at one end of the armature pivot pin and a flare at the opposite end.

"Inspection of [ABB's] stock identified no similar condition.

12/21/2012 U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission OperationsCenter Event Report Paze 2 Part 21 (PAR) Event# 48621

"[ABB has] identified COM-5 and SSC-T relays which shipped that may have a telephone relay of the same vintage as that of the subject telephone relay. There were eleven orders shipped, totaling twenty-five units to three customers; ABB Inc. Florence, S.C., Exelon Business Services and WESCO Distribution, Inc.. ABB has determined that it does not have the capability to perform an evaluation to determine if a defect exists, and therefore in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(b), [ABB is] notifying [their] affected customers so that they may evaluate the deviation or failure to comply, pursuant to 10 CFR 21(a).

"A failure of the Telephone Relay to operate on either the COM-5 or SSC-T relay can result in the breaker not tripping during an overload condition. This condition could compromise the ability of the relay to perform its intended safety function.

"[ABB is] providing [their] customers with the option of inspecting for evidence of the knurl and flare or returning the relays so [they] may perform the inspection."

05:33:34 p.m. 12-21-2012 1 /2 9547555677 ABB CORAL SPRINGS ABB December 21, 2012 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

10 C.F.R. Part 21 Notification to Customers - COM-5 and SSC-T Protective Relays

-Telephone Relay Armature Pivot Pin Notification By: ABB Inc.

Distribution Automation 4300 Coral Ridge Drive Coral Springs, FL 33065

Dear Sir or Madam,

ABB Coral Springs received notice from ABB Inc. in Florence, South Carolina of a return request by NextEra Energy (Point Beach Nuclear Plant) for one of our COM-5 relays. The customer complaint was identified as "A pin on the telephone relay fell out".

ABB Coral Springs received the relay on October 25, 2012 with the telephone relay armature and armature pivot pin disassembled. The assembly process for the telephone relay armature calls for the armature pivot pin to have a knurl at one end and a flare at the opposite end. The knurl and flare secures the armature to the pivot pin. Our investigation found that on this telephone relay, the pivot pin was flared on the same end as that which had the knurl. It was determined that this was due to an operator error while performing a secondary operation.

The telephone relay was stamped with a manufacturing date code 08-38, indicating the thirty-eighth week of 2008. It is important to note the date of manufacture, as in mid 2010 the supplier and the assembly manufacturing process of the pin was changed. The hole and flaring was changed such that it is perfonned prior to cutting the pin to length, eliminating the secondary operation and potential for error.

In addition to the change to the flaring process described above, corrective action includes the addition of an additional step to our final Product Inspection procedure where all telephone relays are verified to have the knurl at one end of the armature pivot pin and a flare at the opposite end.

Inspection of our stock identified no similar condition.

We have identified COM-5 and SSC-T relays which shipped that may have a telephone relay of the same vintage as that of the subject telephone relay. There were eleven orders shipped, totaling twenty-five units to three customers; ABB Inc. Florence, S.C., Exelon Business Services and WESCO Distribution, Inc. Please see Attachment 1. ABB has determined that it does not have the capability to perform an evaluation to determine if a defect exists, and therefore in accordance with 10 C.F.R. 21.21 (b), we are notifying our affected customers so that they may evaluate the deviation or failure to comply, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 2 1(a).

05:33:53 p.m. 12-21-2012 2/2 9547555677 ABB CORAL SPRINGS ABn A failure of the Telephone Relay to operate on either the COM-5 or SSC-T relay can result in the breaker not tripping during an overload condition. This condition could compromise the ability of the relay to perform its intended safety function.

We are providing our customers with the option of inspecting for evidence of the knurl and flare or returning the relays so we may perform the inspection.

Very truly yours, fb, Dennis Batovsky Managing Director