ML22280A029

Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Programs) Inspection Report 05000416/2022013

ML22280A029
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	10/11/2022
From:	Vincent Gaddy NRC/RGN-IV/DORS/EB1
To:	Kapellas B Entergy Operations
George G
References
05000416/2022013, IR 2022013
Download: ML22280A029 (18)

See also: IR 05000416/2022013

Text

October 11, 2022

Mr. Brad Kapellas, Site Vice President

Entergy Operations, Inc.

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station

P.O. Box 756

Port Gibson, MS 39150

SUBJECT: GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE

INSPECTION (PROGRAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000416/2022013

Dear Mr. Kapellas:

On September 8, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an

inspection at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station and discussed the results of this inspection with you

and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed

report.

Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Two of these

findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited

violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this

inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection

report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional

Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector

at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection

and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document

Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public

Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

Signed by Gaddy, Vincent

on 10/11/22

Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief

Engineering Branch 1

Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Docket No. 05000416

License No. NPF-29

B. Kapellas 2

Enclosure:

As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV

ML22280A029

OFFICE DORS/EB1/SRI DORS/EB1/SRI DORS/EB1/RI DORS/EB2/RI DORS/SRA DRS/EB1/C

NAME GGeorge JBraisted DReinert JLee D. Loveless VGaddy

SIGNATURE /RA/ JBD /RA/ JEL DPL VGG

DATE 10/7/2022 10/11/2022 10/7/2022 10/7/2022 10/11/2022 10/11/2022

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Inspection Report

Docket Number: 05000416

License Number: NPF-29

Report Number: 05000416/2022013

Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc., Grand Gulf Nuclear Station

Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station

Location: Port Gibson, MS

Inspection Dates: August 15, 2022, to September 08, 2022

Inspectors: J. Braisted, Senior Reactor Inspector

G. George, Senior Reactor Inspector

J. Lee, Reactor Inspector

D. Loveless, Senior Reactor Analyst

D. Reinert, Reactor Inspector

Approved By: Vincent G. Gaddy, Chief

Engineering Branch 1

Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees

performance by conducting a design basis assurance inspection (programs) inspection at Grand

Gulf Nuclear Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight

Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power

reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Perform Diagnostic Testing of Low Margin Valve Within the Required Test Interval

Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report

Aspect Section

Mitigating Green None (NPP) 71111.21N.

Systems NCV 05000416/2022013-01 02

Open/Closed

The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR

50.55a(b)(3)(ii) when the licensee failed to establish a program to ensure that motor-operated

valves continue to be capable of performing their design basis safety functions. Specifically,

the licensee failed to shorten the diagnostic test frequency for motor-operated valve E21F011

from 10 years to 6 years following the identification of low safety margin for the closed thrust.

Failure to Ensure Standby Service Water Pump House Dampers Would Withstand Pressure

Differential Associated with a Tornado

Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report

Aspect Section

Mitigating Green None (NPP) 92701

Systems NCV 05000416/2022013-02

Open/Closed

The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR

50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the failure to assure that applicable

regulatory requirements and the design basis, for those structures, systems, and components

to which this appendix applies are correctly translated into specifications, drawings,

procedures, and instructions. Specifically, Grand Gulf failed to correctly translate the design

basis for tornado depressurization conditions into specifications for the standby service water

system ventilation inlet and exhaust dampers.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status

URI 05000416/2020012-04 Failure to Ensure Standby 92701 Closed

Service Water Pump House

Dampers Would Withstand

Pressure Differential

Associated with a Tornado

2

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in

effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with

their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-

rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared

complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met

consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection

Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records,

observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance

with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.21N.02 - Design-Basis Capability of Power-Operated Valves Under 10 CFR 50.55a

Requirements

POV Review (IP Section 03) (10 Samples)

The inspectors:

Determined whether the sampled POVs are being tested and maintained in

accordance with NRC regulations along with the licensees commitments and/or

licensing basis.

Determined whether the sampled POVs are capable of performing their design-basis

functions.

Determined whether testing of the sampled POVs is adequate to demonstrate the

capability of the POVs to perform their safety functions under design-basis

conditions.

Evaluated maintenance activities including a walkdown of the sampled POVs (if

accessible).

(1) High Pressure Core Spray Injection Shutoff Valve 1E22F004

(2) High Pressure Core Spray Pump Suction from Suppression Pool Valve 1E22F015

(3) Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Steam Supply Drywell Outboard Isolation Valve

1E51F064

(4) Main Steam Safety Relief Valve Solenoid 1B21F505C

(5) Residual Heat Removal Pump Suction from Suppression Pool Valve 1E21F004A

(6) Low Pressure Core Spray Injection Shutoff Valve 1E21F005

(7) Low Pressure Core Spray Minimum Flow to Suppression Pool Valve 1E21F015

(8) Containment Cooling Exhaust Containment Vent Valve 1M41F035

(9) Standby Service Water Loop B Return to Cooling Tower B 1P41F005B

(10) Standby Service Water Inboard Supply to Drywell Coolers/CCW Heat Exchangers

1P44F054

OTHER ACTIVITIES - TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL

92701 - Followup

Followup (1 Sample)

3

(1) Unresolved Item 05000416/2020012-04 Failure to Ensure Standby Service Water

Pump House Dampers Would Withstand Pressure Differential Associated with a

Tornado

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Perform Diagnostic Testing of Low Margin Valve Within the Required Test Interval

Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report

Aspect Section

Mitigating Green None (NPP) 71111.21N.0

Systems NCV 05000416/2022013-01 2

Open/Closed

The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10

CFR 50.55a(b)(3)(ii) when the licensee failed to establish a program to ensure that motor-

operated valves continue to be capable of performing their design basis safety functions.

Specifically, the licensee failed to shorten the diagnostic test frequency for motor-operated

valve E21F011 from 10 years to 6 years following the identification of low safety margin for

the closed thrust.

Description: On March 18, 2016, the licensee completed motor-operated valve (MOV) static

diagnostic testing of low pressure core spray minimum flow valve E21F011 following a

complete replacement of the valve. E21F011 is a 4-inch gate valve which has safety

functions in both the open and closed positions. E21F011 is categorized as a low risk, Joint

Owners Group (JOG) Class B valve.

The licensees MOV periodic verification program is described in procedure EN-DC-311,

MOV Periodic Verification. The licensee is committed to the JOG MOV periodic verification

program summary as described in MPR-2524-A, Revision 1. The JOG program requires that

the interval between periodic verification (i.e., static or dynamic diagnostic) tests be based

upon the MOVs risk significance and safety margin. Valves with smaller margins or higher

risk are tested more frequently to ensure that the MOV functional margin does not decrease

below the acceptance criteria prior to the next test. Procedure EN-DC-311 includes a matrix

which illustrates the required JOG test interval as a function of a valves risk significance and

safety margin.

The inspectors reviewed work order 398999 which recorded the results from the March 18,

2016, test. The work order documented a margin of 2.5 percent for the closed thrust. Per the

JOG MOV program and the EN-DC-311 JOG test interval matrix, Class B valves having a

margin less than 5 percent are required to be tested every 6 years. The inspectors

questioned why no periodic verification tests had occurred since 2016 for valve E21F011. In

response, the licensee concluded that, when initially reviewing the test data in 2016,

engineers had failed to recognize the low margin and had failed to initiate an action to change

the periodic verification frequency from 10 years to 6 years

Corrective Actions: The licensee initiated condition report CR-GGN-2022-08682 to document

the failure to adjust the periodic verification test frequency. The inspectors reviewed recent

quarterly stroke time tests and preventative maintenance records for valve E21F011 and did

not identify any adverse trends or indications of degradation since the 2016 test.

Corrective Action References: CR-GGN-2022-08682

Performance Assessment:

4

Performance Deficiency: The failure of the licensee to adhere to the appropriate diagnostic

test interval in accordance with the JOG test interval matrix in procedure EN-DC-311, MOV

Periodic Verification, for valve E21F011 was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor

because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating

Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the

availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent

undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to conduct testing to conduct more

frequent periodic verification testing of a low margin valve can allow for degradation in the

available thrust to go unrecognized and could lead to the failure of the valve to perform its

safety-related functions. This is consistent with more than minor examples 2.a and 2.b of

NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0611, Appendix E.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609

Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using

Exhibit 2 - Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the inspectors determined the finding

was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the

design or qualification of a mitigating system, structure, or component and that the system,

structure, or component maintained its operability or probabilistic risk assessment

functionality.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to

this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee

performance.

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(3)(ii) states, in part, the licensee must establish a program

to ensure that motor-operated valves continue to be capable of performing their design basis

safety functions. Procedure EN-DC-311, MOV Periodic Verification, Revision 7, is the

licensee procedure for establishing a program to ensure motor-operated valves continue to

be capable of performing their design basis safety functions.

Contrary to the above, since March 18, 2022, the licensee failed to establish a program to

ensure that motor-operated valves continue to be capable of performing their design basis

safety functions. Specifically, the licensee failed to conduct periodic verification testing of

valve E21F011 within six years in accordance with EN-DC-311 Table 1, JOG Test Interval

Matrix, to demonstrate that E21F011 continued to be capable of performing its safety

function.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with

Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Failure to Ensure Standby Service Water Pump House Dampers Would Withstand Pressure

Differential Associated with a Tornado

Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report

Aspect Section

Mitigating Green None (NPP) 92701

Systems NCV 05000416/2022013-02

5

Open/Closed

The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the failure to assure that applicable

regulatory requirements and the design basis, for those structures, systems, and components

to which this appendix applies are correctly translated into specifications, drawings,

procedures, and instructions. Specifically, Grand Gulf failed to correctly translate the design

basis for tornado depressurization conditions into specifications for the standby service water

system ventilation inlet and exhaust dampers.

Description: As documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000416/2020012(ADAMS No.

ML20336A237), on October 8, 2020, the inspectors identified that the safety-related, standby

service water system pump house inlet and exhaust ventilation dampers were not designed

or purchased to withstand a tornado design basis pressure differential. Calculation MC-

Q1Y47-17001, "Evaluation of Standby Service Water Pump House Safety Related Ductwork

for Tornadic Conditions," Revision 0, was performed in response to condition report CR-

GGN-2017-9728; this calculation evaluated the effect of a 3 pounds per square inch-

differential atmospheric pressure change on the ductwork in the standby service water pump

house to ensure it would remain functional. In October 2020, the inspectors noted that the

calculation did not address the inlet and exhaust dampers which could be in their closed

position and subject to differential pressure during a tornado. The inspectors also noted that

the damper purchase specification, 9645-M-617.1, Rev. 11 did not require the dampers to

remain functional after the pressure differential associated with a tornado event. The

inspectors communicated a concern that questioned whether the licensee had assurance that

the dampers would be capable of opening to perform their safety function after a design basis

tornado event. The failure to design the dampers to remain functional after the pressure

differential associated with a tornado event was entered into the corrective action program as

CR-GGN-2020-10908.

In response to this concern, the licensee issued calculation MC-Q1Y47-20001, "Evaluation of

Standby Service Water Pump House Safety Related Dampers for Tornadic Conditions,"

Revision 0. This calculation determined the maximum pressure differential across the closed

dampers, evaluated the structural integrity of the dampers, and concluded that dampers were

robust enough to withstand a tornado depressurization event. However, the inspectors

determined the calculation did not fully demonstrate that the dampers would remain

functional. Specifically, the inspectors had additional questions on the volume of the pump

rooms, the dimensional modeling of openings in the building, and the differences of the

dampers as-built configuration compared to the design assumed in the calculation. Based on

inspectors questions, the licensee completed additional walkdowns which identified

additional as-built differences from the design for building openings and as-built damper

configuration. Because of the additional as-built configuration issues, the licensee determined

additional analysis was necessary to determine if the standby service water ventilation

system would remain operable to meet the specified safety functions. The inspectors issued a

unresolved item (URI 0500416/2020012-04) to review this analysis once it was complete. The

licensee updated the analysis to address the as-built configuration differences and issued

Revision 1 to calculation MC-Q1Y47-20001 in January 2021.

In August 2022, the inspectors reviewed calculation MC-Q1Y47-20001, Revision 1, and

completed a walkdown of the standby service water pump house ventilation system to

confirm the calculations assumptions and initial conditions. The results of the calculation

determined that the dampers would remain functional because the results met the

acceptance criteria of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III Appendix F-

1323.1(a). Specifically, primary stresses in the damper blades did not exceed 120 percent of

6

the materials yield strength. However, the inspectors identified that the licensee did not apply

the additional provisions of the Appendix F-1323.1(a) acceptance criteria; specifically, the

results were not compared to the more limiting condition that primary stresses shall not

exceed 70 percent of the materials ultimate stress. The inspectors determined that the

results of the analysis failed the more restrictive acceptance criteria and did not support

functioning of the inlet and exhaust dampers. This concern was entered into the corrective

action program as CR-GGN-2022-08597. The licensee reperformed the analysis with a more

detailed physical model of the damper blades. The new analysis, MC-Q1Y47-20001, Revision

2, results determined that the dampers would remain functional.

Corrective Actions: In October 2020, the concern that the safety-related dampers inlet and

exhaust dampers were not designed for design basis tornado differential pressure was

entered into the corrective action program as CR-GGN-2020-10908. A compensatory

measure was initiated for control room operators to start the ventilation system when notified

of tornado warning, until the design analysis could be completed. This action ensured the

standby service water pump house would depressurize to reduce differential pressure across

the dampers. Following inspector review of the analysis, the licensee entered the

misapplication of ASME Code acceptance criteria into the corrective action program as CR-

GGN-2022-08597. The licensee maintained the compensatory measure while a new analysis

was completed. The new analysis, MC-Q1Y47-20001, Revision 2, results determined that the

dampers would remain functional.

Corrective Action References: CR-GGN-2020-10908 and CR-GGN-2022-08597.

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The failure to translate design basis tornado design requirements

into specifications for service water pump house ventilation dampers to ensure that the

dampers remain functional following a design basis pressure differential in accordance with

GDC 2, Design basis for protection against natural phenomena, was a performance

deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor

because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems

cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability,

reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable

consequences. Specifically, the failure to design the dampers to withstand effects of tornado

depressurization could cause them not to open, which causes standby service water

pumphouse temperatures to exceed equipment limits.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609

Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using

the significance determination process mitigating screening questions from MC 0609

Appendix A, the issue screens to a detailed risk evaluation because the degraded condition

represents a loss of the PRA function. The NRC Senior Reactor Analyst performed an initial

detailed risk evaluation.

The Risk Assessment of Operational Events, Volume 2, External Events, Section 5.0,

Other External Event Modeling and Risk Quantification, provides the best method for

quantifying the initiating events of concern for this evaluation. Referenced is the Review of

Methods for Estimation of High Wind and Tornado Hazard Frequencies, prepared by Amitava

Ghosh from the Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses and Scot Rafkin, from the

7

Southwest Research Institute, in December 2012. Using these methods, the Office of Nuclear

Reactor Research developed tornado hazard curves for U. S. nuclear power plants. The data

for these curves were published in the Tornado Frequencies by Plant, spreadsheet. The

published frequency of a tornado greater than 200 miles per hour striking the Grand Gulf

Nuclear Station was 1.25E-06/year.

Using hand calculations that were corroborated by several wind loading calculators on the

web, the analyst determined that it would take a wind speed of 400 miles per hour with

negligible local friction to cause a loading equal to the licensees design parameter of 3

pounds per square inch-differential. The inspectors compared the results of the licensees

calculations with the acceptance criteria of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section

III Appendix F-1323.1(a) to determine that, under all conditions, the subject dampers would

have survived a differential pressure of 1.9 pounds per square inch-differential. The analyst

calculated that it would take a wind speed of at least 274 miles per hour to cause a loading of

1.9 pounds per square inch-differential.

A wind speed of 274 miles per hour would be greater than the highest wind ever officially

recorded and is significantly above the 200 miles per hour wind used to calculate the

frequency of an EF-5 tornado striking the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. Using a qualitative

assessment of this data along with a hand extrapolation of the hazard curve, the analyst

determined that the frequency of a tornado striking the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station with

maximum wind speed of 274 miles per hour is less than 1.0E-07/year. Because the frequency

of the initiating event alone is below 1.0E-07, this finding is of very low safety significance

(Green).

Cross-Cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned to

this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee

performance.

Enforcement:

Violation: Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III,

Design Control, requires Measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory

requirements and the design basis, for those structures, systems, and components to which

this appendix applies are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and

instructions. Contrary to this requirement, from initial licensing to November 2020, failed to

assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, for those structures,

systems, and components to which this appendix applies are correctly translated into

specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, Grand Gulf failed to

correctly translate the design basis for tornado depressurization conditions into specifications

for the standby service water system ventilation inlet and exhaust dampers.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with

Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

The disposition of this finding and associated violation closes URI: 05000416/2020012-04.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

8

On September 1, 2022, the inspectors presented the design basis assurance (programs)

inspection and unresolved item follow-up inspection results to Mr. B. Kapellas, Site Vice

President and other members of the licensee staff.

On September 8, 2022, the inspectors presented the design basis assurance (programs)

inspection and unresolved item follow-up inspection results to Mr. B. Kapellas, Site Vice

President and other members of the licensee staff.

9

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.21N.02 Calculations CC-Q1111-91037 Henry Pratt Valve Analysis 11

GGNS-NE-10-00075 GGNS EPU Containment System Response 2

GGNS-NE-12-00021 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station MELLLA+ 1

Containment System Response

M-242.0-Q1E22F004-8.0-1- Design and Seismic Analysis Report for 12 Inch A

0 Class 900 Flex Wedge Gate Valve With SB-3-

150 Actuator

MC-Q1111-91132 Minimum Stem Thrust Required for Motor 16

Operated Gate and Globe Valves

MC-Q1111-93035 Calculation of Degraded Voltage Actuator 15

Capability Torque, Using Motor Torque Derated

for Temperature Effect, for Select Generic Letter 89-10 Motor Operated Gate and Globe Valves

With AC Motor Actuators

MC-Q1111-97019 Design Torque Capability of the Actuator 1

Assemblies Installed on GGNS Generic Letter 89-10 Motor Operated Butterfly Valves

MC-Q1E12-94002 Calculation of the Maximum Expected 3

Differential Pressure for Valves in the Residual

Heat Removal System

MC-Q1E21-04019 LPCS flow calc with min flow line open 0

MC-Q1E21-93042 Calculation of the Maximum Expected 0

Differential Pressure for Valves in the Low

Pressure Core Spray System

MC-Q1E22-93043 Calculation of the Maximum Expected 0

Differential Pressure for Valves in the High

Pressure Core Spray System

MC-Q1E30-90054 Calculation of the Maximum Expected 5

Differential Pressure for Valves in the

Suppression Pool Makeup System

MC-Q1E51-93044 Calculation of the Maximum Expected 1

Differential Pressure for Valves in the Reactor

10

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Core Isolation Cooling System

NPE-E12F004A,B,C Supplement to the Powell Seismic Calculation S- 2

67773

NPE- Supplement to the Powell Seismic Calculation S- 3

E12F026A,B/F049/E21F011 67776

NPE-E12F042A,B/E21F005 Supplement to the Powell Seismic Calculation D- 5

67770

NPE-E22F015 Supplement to the Anchor Darling Seismic 3

Calculation 1815-1

NPE-E51F063/F064 Supplement to the Powell Seismic Calculation D- 5

67761

PC-Q1E22-00002 PPM Thrust Calculation for Motor Operated 0

Valve Q1E22F004

PC-Q1M41-02233 Calculation of the Maximum Differential Pressure 2

for Air Operated Valve 1M41F035 for GGNS

AOV Program

Corrective Action Condition Report(CR-GGN-) 2014-06703, 2022-06459, 2019-0573, 2020-

Documents 02283, 2021-01483, 2021-00599, 2022-00760

Corrective Action Condition Report(CR-GGN-) 2022-08215, 2022-08218, 2022-08221, 2022-

Documents 08226, 2022-08227, 2022-08229, 2022-08244,

Resulting from 2022-08597, 2022-08644, 2022-08681, 2022-

Inspection 08682, 2022-08597

Drawings E-1161-013 B21 Automatic Depressurization System 10

Safety/Relief Valves

E-1183-003 E22 High Pressure Core Spray System Pump 7

Injection Shut Off Valve F004-C Unit 1

M-1086 P&I Diagram, High Pressure Core Spray System 35

Unit 1

M-KA97/0285-01- 12-900 LB Flex Wedge Gate Valve, Weld Ends, A

Q1E22F004-1.2-001 Carbon Steel, High Pull-Out Thrust

Requirements, for Limitorque SB-3-150 Actuator

SFD-1086 System Flow Diagram, High Pressure Core 4

Spray System

Engineering 51117 Flex M41 Vent Child EC 1 - Div 1 Valve and 0

11

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Changes Tubing Modifications

84/3107 Replacement of the Main Steam Safety Relief 0

Valve Solenoids.

EC 78006 1E51F064 LLRT Failure Engr Input CR-GGN- 05/31/2018

2018-06132 and 05845

EC 91464 GGN Appendix J Program Scope Reduction 0

Evaluation EC

ER 97-0282 ER 97/0282-02, Revision 0 0

SCN 97/0009A to MS-25.0, Revision 11

SCN 97/0006A to ES-18, Revision 1

ER-GG-1997-0279-000 MOV Torque Margin Improvement for 0

Q1P44F067, Q1P44F054, Q1P44F042

MCP 92-1059 Replacement of SMB-000-5/H2BC Actuator 0

Assemblies on Motor Operated Valves

Q1P41F001A, Q1P41F001B, Q1P41F005A, and

Q1P41F005B with SMB-00-10/H3BC Actuator

Assemblies

Engineering GGNS-92-0035 Evaluation of Safety Related Gate Valves for 3

Evaluations Susceptibility to Thermal Binding and Bonnet

Pressurization

Miscellaneous 460000412 Henry Pratt Company Nuclear Class Butterfly 06/23/05

Valves

460002941 GH Bettis Operating and Maintenance 05/09/1995

Instructions Disassembly and Assembly,

T3XX-SRX, T3XX-SRX-M3, T3XX-SRX-M3HW,

T4XX-SRX, T4XX-SRX-M3, and T4XX-SRX-

M3HW

EQDP-EQ27.1 Seitz Type 1166 Control Valves, and Type 6A39 3

Solenoids

ES-18 Motor Operated Valve - Wiring and Limit Switch 5

Control

GGNS-E-100.0 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Environmental 10

Parameters for GGNS

GGNS-EP-10-00001 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station JOG MOV Periodic 0

12

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Verification

GGNS-MS-25.0 Mechanical Standard for Motor Operated Valve 19

Torque and Limit Switches

GGNS-MS-56.0 Mechanical Standard for Program Air Operated 1

Valves

GGNS-SDC-E21 System Design Criteria Low Pressure Core 2

Spray

GNRO-2021/00014 Inservice Testing Program Relief Request VRR- 06/01/2021

GGNS-2021-1

SEP-GGNS-IST-1 GGNS Inservice Testing Basis Document 8

SEP-GGNS-IST-2 GGNS Inservice Testing Plan 10

SEP-MOV-GGN-001 GGNS MOV Torque Switch Setpoint 1

Methodology

Procedures 01-S-07-43 Control of Loose Items, Temporary Electrical 7

Power, and Access to Equipment

CEP-APJ-001 Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing 7

(10CFR50 Appendix J) Program Plan

EN-DC-304 MOV Thrust / Torque Setpoint Calculations 4

EN-DC-311 MOV Periodic Verification 7

EN-DC-312 Motor Operated Valve (MOV) Test Data Review 9

EN-DC-331 MOV Program 8

EN-LI-108 Event Notification and Reporting 21

PC-Q1M41-07014 Calculation of the Required Operating 1

Thrust/Torque, Actuator Output Capability, and

Available Actuator Capability Margin for Air

Operated Valve 1M41F034/F035

Work Orders Work Order (WO-GGN-) 00042100, 00072001, 00112295, 00150130,

00252759, 00252585, 00278961, 00317907,

00316562, 00348281, 00440583, 00440898,

00454435, 00455126, 00528777, 00529534,

52567149, 52567288, 52619778, 52625484,

52648937, 52694825, 52707023, 52703222,

52703475, 52704867, 52707196, 52711011,

52747632, 52762558, 52798141, 52814606,

13

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

52831672, 52839483, 52839706, 52842249,

52849745, 52850392, 52858527, 52870462,

52876375, 52903814, 52907030, 52907031,

52925992, 52945246, 52935613, 52936488,

52936496, 52936861, 52936866, 52940666,

52941071, 52978087, 52982530, 52985700,

52986599, 52990981, 52993728, 52994677,

52999346, 53002185, 00167219, 00317902,

00423196, 00594499, 00352085, 52947772,

00284155, 00394896, 00398999, 00501196

92701 Calculations MC-Q1Y47-20001 Evaluation of Standby Service Water Pump 1

House Safety Related Dampers for Tornadic

Conditions

MC-Q1Y47-20001 Evaluation of Standby Service Water Pump 2

House Safety Related Dampers for Tornadic

Conditions

XC-Q1Y41-92007 SSW Pump House Room Temperature for a 0

LOCA and for SSW Pump House Cooling

Inoperable

Corrective Action Condition Report(CR-GGN-) 2017-09728, 2017-09746, 2017-09755, 2020-

Documents 10908

Drawings J-1258-001 Outside Air Fans, SSW Pump House Ventilation 4

System

J-1258-002 SSW Pump House Ventilation System Motor 5

Operated Dampers

J-1258-004 SSW Pump House "A" Standby Outside Air Fan 3

J-1258-005 SSW Pump House "A" Standby Motor Operated 3

Dampers

J-1258-006 SSW Pump House Ventilation System Motor 1

Operated Dampers

Engineering GGNS-NE-16-00004 Time Critical Operator Actions for Grand Gulf 5

Evaluations Nuclear Station

Miscellaneous 9645-M-619.0 Technical Specification for Miscellaneous Fans 13

for Mississippi Power & Light Company, Grand

14

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Gulf Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2

E100.0 Engineering Standard Environmental Parameters 10

for GGNS

Procedures 04-1-01-Y47-1 Standby Service Water Ventilation System 104

04-1-02-1H13-P870 Alarm Response Instruction Panel No: 1H13- 161

P870

15