ML20087L910

Transcript of Rebuttal Testimony of G Bockhold Which Addresses Number of Assertions Made in Prefiled Testimony of AL Mosbaugh.Related Correspondence.W/Certificate of Svc & Svc List

ML20087L910
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	08/21/1995
From:	Bockhold G SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO.
To:
References
CON-#395-17032 93-671-01-OLA-3, 93-671-1-OLA-3, OLA-3, NUDOCS 9508290051
Download: ML20087L910 (148)

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DOCKETED August 21, (15#5C M CORRESPONDENCE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA '95 AUG 23 P3 :09 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O N ;YE D W_

Before the Atomic Safety and Licensina Board (!OCKEl SERVICE In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-424-OLA-3

) 50-425-OLA-3 GEORGIA POWER COMPANY )

et al. ) Re: License Amendment

) (Transfer to Southern Nuclear )

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, )

Units 1 and 2) ) ASLBP No. 93-671-01-OLA-3 REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF GEORGE BOCKHOLD JR.

1 REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF GEORGE BOCKHOLD JR.

2 Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND POSITION.

3 A. My name is George Bockhold, Jr. I am employed by Southern 4 Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., as General Manager, Nuclear 5 Technical Services.

6 Q. HAVE YOU TESTIFIED PREVIOUSLY IN THIS PROCEEDING?

7 A. Yes. I have testified previously on two occasions. I 8 presented prefiled testimony on April 19, 1995, on diesel 9 generator reporting issues, and prefiled testimony on June 2, 10 1995, on diesel generator air quality statements. My 11 professional qualifications were appended to my prior, 12 prefiled testimony on diesel generator reporting issues and 13 were admitted into evidence as GPC Exhibit II-20.

14 Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY NOW BEING 15 PROVIDED?

16 A. The purpose of this rebuttal testimony is to address a number 17 of assertions made in the Prefiled Testimony of Allen L.

18 Mosbaugh, as well as in his cross-examination. Specifically, 19 I address two meetings in January, 1990, which he 20 mischaracterizes as targeted at him for raising safety 21 concerns and several statements which he attributes to me; the 22 actions which I took when I became aware that a Plant Review 23 Board (PRB) alternate member felt intimidated by me (page 7);

24 the handling of Mr. Mosbaugh's Quality Concern regarding the

0 1 FAVA microfiltration system (page 8); Mr. Mosbaugh's 2 assignment after Mr. Greene's return to his Assistant General 3 Manager - Plant Support position (page 12); statements which 4 I made to the PRB in the drafting of the August 30, 1990 5 letter to the NRC (page 15); whether outage schedule was given 6 priority over, or detracted from, Georgia Power's root cause 7 evaluation of the diesel generator failures on March 20, 1990 8 (page 16); the completeness of the Safety System Performance 9 Indicator (SSPI) data provided to the NRC in early April,1990 10 prior to restart of Vogtle Unit 1 (page 21); my knowledge of 11 a maximum number of " successful starts" on April 9, 1990 (page 12 22); and why an " air blow" was not performed on the diesel air 13 lines to check air quality (page 24). Finally, I address Mr.

14 Mosbaugh's speculation that Mr. Cash's typed list of starts 15 was a back-up slide (transparency) for the April 19, 1990 NRC 16 presentation.

17 Meetinas and conversations with Mr. Mosbauch 18 Q. MR. MOSBAUGH TESTIFIES, ON PAGES 8 AND 65 OF HIS RETYPED 19 PREFILED TESTIMONY, THAT ON JANUARY 19, 1990, SHORTLY AFTER HE 20 SUBMITTED AN ALLEGATION TO THE NRC, YOU HELD A MEETING WITH 21 HIM AND MR. KITCHENS RELATING TO "BACKSTABBING." WHAT WAS 22 THAT MEETING ABOUT.

23 A. Mr. Mosbaugh's testimony relates to a meeting I held with Mr.

24 Kitchens and Mr. Mosbaugh in January to address improving 25 teamwork and cooperation between the Operations and the Plant 1 Support organizations that they headed. We had a problem in 2 teamwork between Mr. Mosbaugh and Mr. Skip Kitchens, and j 3 between the operations and the Plant Support organizations, 4 and we needed to rec tify the situation.

1 5 The lack of cooperation between these two organizations 6 had been a concern for some time. It was one of the main 7 items that the plant staff needed to work on. The situation 8 was a problem, in part, because Mr. Mosbaugh was not working 9 hard enough at bringing the Vogtle organizations together, to 10 develop cooperation and synergy between the departments. He 11 was not asking people how he could help them, how he could 12 support them, how he could resolve problems. Mr. Kitchens was l

13 also responsible for allowing the rift between the two  !

1 14 organizations to remain without taking action. l 15 Mr. McCoy spoke to me around the end of 1989 or beginning 16 of 1990 about improving teamwork at the plant. He was 17 concerned that the plant organization was not improving and  !

l 18 wanted this problem resolved.

)

19 Prompted by Mr. McCoy's and my concern, I had a meeting l

20 in January, 1990, between Mr. Mosbaugh, Mr. Kitchens, and me l 21 to discuss making the organization work together and to tell 22 both Mr. Kitchens and Mr. Mosbaugh that they needed to work i

23 harder on such cooperation. This was a management improvement 24 meeting --

a team building session. I did not single out 25 either one of them. We discussed everybody's cooperation, and 26 I asked both of them to talk about what they thought their

1 personal faults were in management style and how they might ,

2 improve upon them, to discuss their perceptions, and to "let 3 their hair down." I believe I listed my personality faults 4 first. My objective was to encourage Mr. Kitchens and Mr.

5 Mosbaugh to work better together and to make the Vogtle 6 organization more effective.

7 Q. WHAT CONNECTION WAS THERE BETWEEN THIS MEETING AND ANY l

8 SUBMISSION BY MR. MOSBAUGH OF ALLEGATIONS TO THE NRC?

9 A. None, there was no connection between this meeting and Mr.

10 Mosbaugh's submission of allegations to the NRC. At the time  ;

11 I did not know or suspect that Mr. Mosbaugh had sent any ,

12 allegation to the NRC. I don't believe I even knew there was )

13 any NRC Office of Investigations ("OI") investigation,until -

i 14 the end of January, when or very shortly before OI arrived on 15 site. Moreover, Mr. Mosbaugh did not submit a Quality Concern *

, 16 regarding the FAVA microfiltration system until after a Plant

! 17 Review Board vote on February 8, 1990.

18 Q. DID YOU " CONFRONT" MR. MOSBAUGH ABOUT THE SOURCE OF THE

, 19 DILUTION VALVE ALLEGATION ON JANUARY 29, 1990, WHEN OI CAME TO 20 THE SITE, AS MR. MOSBAUGH ASSERTS ON PAGE 9 OF HIS RETYPED 21 PREFILED TESTIMONY?

22 A. No. I did speak with a number of persons on my staff to try 23 to understand what was being investigated. I learned from 24 people that had been interviewed that there was probably an .

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1 allegation that Skip Kitchens had opened a dilution valve. I 2 did not know who had made such an allegation. There was some 3 speculation that the OI investigation had been initiated by f 4 somebody within the NRC. I may have discussed such matters i

5 with Mr. Mosbaugh, but I did not in that time-frame think that i 6 Mr. Mosbaugh was involved with OI at all.

7 Q. DO YOU RECALL STATING TO MR. MOSBAUGH THAT YOU HAD 8 PROFESSIONAL TRAINING IN THE NAVY SAYING "YES, SIR" AND 9 TELLING HIM "IF YOU CAN'T CONFORM AND ACCEPT, YOU NEED TO GET 10 OUT," AS MR. MOSBAUGH ALLEGES ON PAGES 9 AND 65 OF HIS RETYPED 11 PREFILED TESTIMONY?

12 A. No. I don't remember making such statements, particularly 13 with respect to any allegations that had been made to the NRC, 1

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14 as Mr. Mosbaugh's testimony appears to suggest. I have 15 reviewed the notes Mr. Mosbaugh prepared relating to the >

16 meeting at which he alleges that I made this statement. These 17 notes indicate that it was a meeting on February 7, 1990 to 18 discuss a Plant Vogtle reorganization and associated down-19 sizing. Periodically, I held meetings with all my managers to 20 discuss personnel needs and requirements in every department.

21 This meeting had nothing whatsoever to do with any allegation 22 made to the NRC, any NRC inspection or investigation, or any 23 safety concern.

24 Mr. Mosbaugh's notes indicate that I made the specific 25 remarks which he attributes to me. While I do not remember 1 making the remarks,.I may well have made some such remarks in 2 this context of organizational change. I did not enjoy 3 discussing the elimination of jobs, but recognized that it was 4 a business necessity -- as did my superiors -- as the Plant 5 moved further away from the period of start-up and a large 6 support staff to a smaller support organization. If Mr.

7 Mosbaugh suggested that he didn't like the reorganization a philosophy or particular eliminations, I may well have told 9 him that he needed to learn to accept upper management's 10 directions.

11 Q. DO YOU RECALL STATING THAT, GIVEN THE VALUE OF GENERATION, 12 SOMETIMES IT'S BETTER TO TAKE THE VIOLATION, AS MR. MOSBAUGH 13 ALLEGES ON PAGE 65 OF HIS RETYPED PREFILED TESTIMONY?

14 A. I don't remember making such a statement. This would be 15 inconsistent with my approach to plant operations. Such an 16 approach would also be inconsistent with the operating l 17 policies voiced by my superiors.

18 Alleaed Intimidation of a PRB Alternate 19 Q. MR. MOSBAUGH TESTIFIES, AT PAGE 9 OF HIS RETYPED PREFILED 20 TESTIMONY, THAT YOUR ATTENDANCE AT PRB MEETINGS INTIMIDATED AT 21 LEAST ONE MEMBER. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS ON THIS TESTIMONY?

22 A. Yes. It was reported to me at one time that Gus Williams, who 23 served as an alternate member on the PRB, felt intimidated by 24 my actions at a PRB meeting. As soon as I heard that, I took

f 4 1 steps to correct this situation. I met with the main PRB

. 2 members and discussed with them at some length the need for 3 every PRB member to be able to stand up and discuss nis 4 concerns and vote his conscience. I also told them to make

, 5 sure their alternates understood this responsibility and were l 6 able to vote freely, and that if any alternates were not I 7 capable of providing candid advice and recommendations, they 8 would need to chose other alternates. I also made Mr. McCoy 9 aware of the concern. )

10 Mr. Mosbaugh apparently submitted the allegation of PRB 11 members to the NRC in the Summer of 1990, before the August, 12 1990, Operational Safety Inspection. The OSI inspection 13 report documents my March 1, 1990, efforts to assure that my 14 presence at PRB meetings did not influence them and that 15 alternates should be selected who would feel comfortable with

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16 this responsibility. I also addressed the difference between 17 professional differences of opinion (which I believed was the i 18 case with the FAVA system in this instance) and safety and i

19 quality concerns (which are different methods to raise issues 20 of concern separate from PRB discussions). Section 2.7 of the 21 OSI Inspection Report which addresses this issue is attached 22 hereto as Exhibit Q.

23 l

i 1 Handlina of Mr. Mosbauch's FAVA Concern  ;

l 2 Q. MR. MOSBAUGH STATES AT PAGE 11 OF HIS RETYPED PREFILED l 3 TESTIMONY THAT YOU TOOK HIS QUALITY CONCERN (CONCERNING THE 4 FAVA MICROFILTRATION SYSTEM) AWAY FROM THE QUALITY CONCERN 9 COORDINATOR. HOW WAS MR. MOSBAUGH'S CONCERN HANDLED?

6 A. I told Bill Lyon that he had gone far enough with his review 7 of Mr. Mosbaugh's quality concern, because the issues exceeded 8 Mr. Lyon technical expertise and I was obtaining additional 9 technical expertise to handle it. Also, Mr. Lyon had come to 10 me and expressed concern that he was being asked to resolve a 11 quality concern that was submitted by his immediate 12 supervisor, Mr. Mosbaugh, who would prepare his annual 13 performance review. In essence, he was being placed in a 14 position to resolve a concern where the majority of plant 15 managers on the PRB had already voted to activate the FAVA 16 system, but his immediate supervisor opposed the use of the 17 system. I discussed these matters with Mr. McCoy, and we 18 decided not to allow the system to be placed into operation 19 until we had further reviewed Mr. Mosbaugh's concern. We also 20 decided to assign the matter to Paul Rushton, who at the time

21 was Manager of Engineering and Licensing, and who was 22 independent of the PRB's decision. Mr. Rushton also was in a 23 position where he could readily obtain additional engineering 24 support from the corporate office, including Southern Company 25 Services. We also involved the NRC, who I understand reviewed 26 Mr. Mosbaugh's Quality concern file. A copy of my March 15, 9

].

1 i-1 1990, memorandum to Allen (attached hereto as Exhibit R)

! 2 states that I planned to allow the FAVA system into operation j 3 after obtaining any further comments from him, .Vogtle l

! 4 management and the NRC, and spelled out specific cautionary 5 measures for its temporary operation (a permanent system from j 6 another vendor was already scheduled for a May, 1990 i

! 7 delivery). While we were unable to satisfy Mr. Mosbaugh, we i  !

8 did obtain the NRC's concurrence before we put the FAVA system 9 back into service. I now know, although I didn't at the time, j 10 that Mr. Mosbaugh did not view Mr. Rushton and Mr. Mark Ajluni I

11 (who analyzed one aspect of the concern) to be independent ,

i 12 because of other factors which were documented by Mr. Lyon in ,

l 13 a June 20, 1990 memorandum to his file, attached hereto as I

14 Exhibit S, stating in part:

15 Allen also commented about the inadequacy of an earlier study.

i 16 He did not feel comfortable with it because of the lack of 17 independence. According to Allen the original A[lternate]

18 R[adwaste] B[uilding) study was performed by Paul Rushton and i 19 Mark Ajulina (sic). Both Paul'and Mark were aided by George 20 in their placement in SONOPCO. Their friendship goes way back l 21 and they will basically cater to Bockhold's needs. Another j 22 problem is that neither Paul or Mark have the knowledge or j 23 experience needed for Rad Waste. He did feel that Lue (sic)

! 24 Long was an expert in this field, but, his assessment of the j 25 ARB is tainted because it's based on Rushton's old study.

] 26 Later in the summer, when Mr. Mosbaugh indicated that his

{ 27 concerns were still unresolved, we asked Lee Glenn of the 28 Corporate Concerns program to review the concerns, again to 29 provide another independent review of Mr. Mosbaugh's concerns.

l 30 Mr. Glenn reported up to the President of Georgia Power, who  ;

i 31 was Mr. Dahlberg at the time, and outside of the nuclear l

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2

1 management chain. We asked Mr. Glenn to work with Mr.

2 Mosbaugh to resolve his concerns.

3 On June 21, 1990, Mr. Glenn and I together met with Mr.

J 4 Mosbaugh and explained this independent review effort. I told 5 Mr. Mosbaugh that we wanted him to basically work full-time on 6 this concern, giving it his highest priority of writing down 7 and identifying his concerns. I explained that Mr. Glenn 8 would work with Allen to understand the concerns and, then, 9 would attempt to address each one. Mr. Glenn would be the 10 primary concern contact person, I explained, instead of Mr.

11 Lyon which would give some independence to the process. Mr.

12 Glenn explained that Mr. Lyon efforts to that point, including i 13 supplemental information, would be reviewed and that the NRC 14 Resident Inspector, Mr. John Rogge, would be contacted to 15 determine whether the NRC wanted to participate in the review 16 of the concerns.

17 On June 22, 1990, at a meeting which I did not attend, ,

l 18 Mr. Mosbaugh was told by Mr. Glenn that Mr. Glenn served as an 19 independent, third party reviewer of Mr. Mosbaugh's concerns, 20 outside of the plant chain of command and even outside the h

21 nuclear organization. A transcript of the relevant portion of 22 their conversation is attached as Exhibit T.

23 I followed up on Mr. Glenn's efforts to assure that 24 issues potentially adverse to safety were being pursued. On 25 July 2, 1990, I asked Mr. Mosbaugh about where he stood with 26 identification of his concerns. He told me that Mr. Glenn was 1 coming to the plant the next day, and that he was planning to l

2 provide him any additional technical concerns. I requested 3 that Mr. Mosbaugh develop a schedule for completing the 4 submission of his concerns and the assignments which he had 9 assumed while reporting directly to me; I explained that we 6 were still working on Manager-In-Training and related 7 assignments.

8 Mr. Glenn worked on Mr. Mosbaugh's concerns, until Mr.

9 Mosbaugh decided in early July that he wished to pursue the 10 remaining issues only with the NRC. On July 3, 1990, Mr.

11 Mosbaugh indicated a reluctance or hesitancy in identifying j 12 his additional concerns to Mr. Glenn; on July 6, therefore, I 13 directed him to notify the NRC of any concerns which he was 14 withholding. I had already discussed with the NRC Residents 15 the fact that he had concerns which he would only discuss with 16 them, attached hereto as Exhibit U. In response, Mr. Mosbaugh 17 wrote me a memorandum on July 13, 1990 in which he stated his 18 conclusion that " internal processes" were not effective and 19 that, henceforth, he would take his concerns to the NRC. "I 20 think it appropriate that I continue to take direction from 21 the NRC as how to best resolve my safety concerns," Mr.

22 Mosbaugh wrote. Mr. Mosbaugh's memorandum has been admitted 23 into the record as Intervenor's Exhibit II-179.

24 Mr. Mosbauch's Assianments After Mr. Greene's Return 25 Q. MR. MOSBAUGH STATES, ON PAGE 38 OF HIS RETYPED PREFILED I

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- _ _ _ _____--___-_-________--__-_-_________-_________I

1 TESTIMONY, THAT DURING A FEBRUARY 23, 1990 MEETING TO DISCUSS 2 HIS ANNUAL REVIEW, YOU TOLD HIM THAT IT MADE NO SENSE SENDING 3 HIM TO SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR (SRO) TRAINING. DO YOU RECALL 4 THIS CONVERSATION?

5 A. Yes. Mr. Mosbaugh had previously mentioned to me that he 6 planned to retire shortly. During his annual review, we 7 discussed his plans, and he again told me he intended to 8 retire early. I told him that if this were the case, sending 9 him to SRO school might not make sense. SRO school involved 10 a considerable investment of time and money, and I was 11 concerned we might lose this investment if he went to SRO 12 school and then retired shortly thereafter. I subsequently 13 raised this matter with Mr. McCoy.

14 Several months later Mr. Mosbaugh exprer. sed interest in 15 SRO school as his first preference for positions. Thereafter 16 his first preference was granted when he gave Mr. McCoy 17 assurances that he would stay with Georgia Power for several 18 years after completing the SRO training.

19 Q. MR. MOSBAUGH ALSO TESTIFIES ON PAGE 38 OF HIS PREFILED 20 TESTIMONY THAT HE RECEIVED A LETTER FROM YOU ON MAY 10, 1990, 21 REMOVING HIM FROM THE PRB. WOULD YOU PLEASE EXPLAIN THAT 22 ACTION. l 23 A. I had reconfigured the PRB in 1989 so that it consisted of the l 24 line managers, because from a management perspective these 25 were the individuals I wanted involved. My selection of i

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1 individuals was consistent with plant procedures as well as 2 our commitments to the NRC. I had made Mr. Mosbaugh the Vice 3 Chairman and a member of the PRB during Mr. Greene's absence 4 because Mr. Mosbaugh was acting as such a line manager, i.e.,

5 he was the acting Assistant General Manager -- Plant Support.

6 When Tom Greene returned to duty from SRO school and 7 reassumed his position as Assistant General Manager -- Plant 8 Support, I had him assume the Vice Chairman position on the 9 PRB, because he was now in this senior line management 10 position. I never considered creating any special PRB ,

11 position so that Mr. Mosbaugh could remain on the Board after 12 Mr. Greene's return. My decision was based solely on 13 maintaining what I considered as the proper composition of the 14 PRB.

15 Q. MR. MOSBAUGH ALSO TESTIFIES THAT YOU RELIEVED HIM IN ALL l 16 CAPACITIES FROM HIS JOB AND DID NOT RETURN HIM TO THE 17 ENGINEERING MANAGER POSITION HE HAD HELD IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO 18 BEING MADE ACTING ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER -- PLANT SUPPORT.

19 WHY DIDN'T YOU MAKE MR. MOSBAUGH THE ENGINEERING MANAGER WHEN a

20 MR. GREENE RETURNED?

21 A. Shortly before Mr. Greene returned to duty, near the end of 22 April, 1990, I asked Mr. Mosbaugh what job he wanted. On or

. 1 23 about April 30, 1990, Mr. Mosbaugh gave me a handwritten 24 memorandum listing his job preferences, with SRO training at 25 the top. He stated in his memorandum that he did not prefer 26 to move backwards in scope of responsibility or level. A copy f

1 of this memorandum is attached as Exhibit V.

i 2 After Mr. Greene returned from SRO school, I assigned Mr.

3 Mosbaugh to work on several special projects while we going l 4 through the selection process for the next session of SRO  ;

5 training. I wanted to finish the SRO selection process before 6 I made decisions about new jobs. These projects that I 7 assigned to Mr. Mosbaugh during this period were important to 8 me. In addition, I solicited his selection of specific tasks l

9 which had been identified as nagging problems; this was an 10 opportunity for Mr. Mosbaugh to show his leadership in 11 resolving problems, it was not a "make-work" position. I

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12 thought at the time that giving Mr. Mosbaugh these assignments 13 while final decisions on SRO school were being made was 14 consistent with his wishes, as expressed in his April 30, 1990 15 memorandum, not to move backward in level. Also, the l l

16 Engineering Support Manager position was already held by Mr. I 1

17 Michael Horton. ]

I 18 Draftina the August 30. 1990 Letter 19 Q. ON PAGE 60 OF HIS RETYPED PREFILED TESTIMONY, MR. MOSBAUGH 20 STATES THAT ON TAPE 184 YOU TOLD THE PLANT REVIEW BOARD TO l

'T 21 LEAVE PARTS OF THE AUGUST 30, 1990 LETTER TO THE NRC THE WAY 2 ?. THEY WERE WRITTEN IN BIRMINGHAM. WHAT DID YOU TELL THE PRB?? l 23 A. What I said during that meeting, on pages 3 and 10 of Tape 184 4

24 (Intervenor's Exhibit II-68), was in the context of drafting 25 the August 30, 1990 letter to the NRC. My statement in 1990

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1 4

1

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} 1 was the following:

2 You know, the standard English context of writing a 3 good letter is you put the purpose in paragraph 4 one, then you put the facts, and then you put the 5 summary in the last paragraph. That's you know, 6 101 standard best way to write a letter. And yeah, 7 we can restart, rewrite this letter from scratch if 8 you want. But I don't believe that has anything to 9 do upon the goodness or badness of this letter, or 10 whether it's factually correct or not. . . That was 11 my side comment, and if Birmingham likes this 12 letter written this way, I don't -- that's what we 13 should do.

14 Q. WHAT DID YOU MEAN BY THESE REMARKS?

15 A. I meant that I didn't think that we should rewrite the letter l 16 just to improve the style. I felt we should make any changes  !

i 17 needed to make the letter accurate and materially complete, 18 but I wasn't interested in rewriting the entire letter just 19 because someone didn't like its organization or thought they 20 could improve its writing style.

21 Q. DID YOU MAKE ANY OTHER COMMENTS ABOUT STYLE? l l

22 A. Yes, I stated:

23 I mean, English-wise, it's better to mix up the 24 words, than (sic) to be technically correct. Say 25 you're an engineer and you use the same term over 26 again. Good thing you're an engineer and not an  ;

27 English major . . .  !

28 Eag Staff Exhibit 19; Intervenor Exhibit II-68, Tr. 3.

l 29 Q. WHAT DID YOU MEAN BY THIS STATEMENT?  !

30 A. Someone had commented that we used the word " confusion" twice j 31 in the same paragraph. I responded and, with my statement,

4 1 meant that if one were an English major, it might be 2 preferable to avoid using the same word twice; but since we 3 were engineers, we should not elevate style over accuracy. In 4 other words, English majors are expected to use synonyms to I 5 avoid repeating words, while engineers are expected to be '

6 technically correct and the use of the same word multiple 7 times is fully acceptable. I was not suggesting that 8 something less than accuracy was acceptable in this .

9 correspondence. '

10 Alleaed Push to Restart Plant Voatie 11 Q. ON PAGE 27 OF MR. MOSBAUGH'S RETYPED PREFILED TESTIMONY, HE i 12 ASSERTS THAT GEORGIA POWER MANAGEMENT AND OUTAGE PERSONNEL 13 PUSHED THE SCHEDULE TO RESTART PLANT VOGTLE. AS A RESULT, HE ,

14 ALLEGES, ROOT CAUSE TESTING AND ANALYSIS DID NOT GET SUPPORT .

15 BECAUSE OUTAGE ACTIVITIES WERE GIVEN TOP PRIORITY. IS THIS 16 ACCURATE?

17 A. No, it is not. At the time of the Site Area Emergency Unit i 18 was in an outage. As would be expected after this event, 19 outage personnel, factoring in appropriate diesel generator 20 testing and analysis activities, developed a " recovery" or 21 " restart" schedule. I did not " push" the restart schedule at 22 the expense of root cause testing and analysis. What I wanted 23 was a purposeful review and specific, thought-out plan to 24 address the many activities which had to be addressed in a 25 logical, orderly manner. This sort of schedule is exactly the l'

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1 kind of effort which is expected in such a situation -- the 2 absence of a recovery schedule would have been imprudent.

3 With respect to diesel generator testing, the personnel 4 who were working on the diesels had all of the resources 5 necessary or desired at their disposal to determine the root 6 cause of the March 20, 1990, diesel failures. This included 7 vendor representative support, corporate technical support, 8 and whatever overtime efforts they considered prudent. Mr.

9 Mosbaugh simply is incorrect in asserting, on page 28 of his 10 testimony, that schedule pressure affected the determination 11 of the root cause of the March 1990 event and the corrective 12 actions taken. Had more time been required to address the 13 diesel generator issues, we would have spent it. But the on-14 site technical review went as far as it logically and 1

15 reasonably could have gone: the component (jacket water l 16 temperature sensors) which failed had been identified; the 17 component had been recalibrated, re-installed or replaced, and I

18 tested; and special test starts had reproduced alarm 19 conditions which were very similar to those experienced on 20 March 20. Although the identification of the specific failure 21 mechanism would have to await the disassembly and inspection 22 and testing of Calcon sensors at the independent Wyle test 23 lab, there was no reasonable basis for not returning Unit 1 to 24 operation based on the knowledge which we had at the time.

25 In support of Mr. Mosbaugh's idea that Georgia Power did i 26 not have a legitimate, good-faith probable cause of the diesel i

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1 generator trips, Mr. Mosbaugh argues on page 27 of his retyped 2 prefiled testimony that as of April 7, 1990 - more than two 3 weeks after the Site Area Emergency - that "it was pure  !

4 speculation" that two of three jacket water temperature l 5 (Calcon) sensors would have "misoperated" on March 20, 1990.

6 What he ignores is the testing and analysis between March 20 7 and April 7. For example, on April 5, 1990, in a conversation 8 with the IIT in which Mr. Mosbaugh and other Vogtle 9 representatives participated, I explained that, based on some 10 Instrumentation and Control manipulations, only a slight 11 downward shift of sensor trip setpoint resulted from an 12 increasing rate of temperature rise in the sensed water media.

13 IIT Document 200, pages 14-18, attached hereto as Exhibit W.

14 At the same time, the actual jacket water temperature changes, 15 over time, were being monitored to determine if a " hot spot" 16 of hot water could have been sensed. Mr. Mosbaugh observed, 17 and commented to the NRC, that actual temperatures in the 18 jacket water were fairly homogeneous, with a variation of only 19 seven to ten degrees (page 19); the " slug of water" theory did 20 not seem credible (page 27). As he stated:

21 We are not seeing substantial shifts of the temperature probe 22 with rates of change in temperature and then it's tripping in 23 the 190 type temperature range, and our observations that the 24 system is barely (sic) homogeneous and that the hot spots are 25 in the 170 degrees range, we think those are sufficiently far 26 apart that right now it doesn't look like the slug of water 27 theory is what is causing any tripping (IIT 200 at 27.)

28 Because the site had already conducted " simulated trip" 29 testing on high jacket water temperature sensors which I L

1 reproduced the annunciations of the second 1A diesel trip on 2 March 20, we informed the IIT that we proposed to have an 3 independent lab test the quarantined sensors which had been on 4 the 1A diesel when the event occurred. Lewis Ward, in the 5 Birmingham corporate office, would have the lead and the IIT 6 could contact him directly (page 30). The IIT team leader 7 felt that this testing approach " sounded good" to him, and the 8 NRC Region II representative stated that the Region was " fully 9 onboard" with this approach (pages 33-34). The next day, 10 April 6th, the NRC, after discussing the 1A diesel jacket 11 water testing and scheduled functional test (F3_q IIT Document 12 203 at pages 24-25, 31 attached hereto as Exhibit X) , observed 13 that the specific failure mode of the switches was not due to 14 the rate of temperature change during calibration, that some 15 particulates in the sensors could impact their operation and l 16 that setpoint drift was a possibility (page 31). "How the 17 sensors are calibrated" might also lead an understanding of

< 18 the causal mechanism, the IIT team leader suggested; Georgia 19 Power was to determine the specific test program for seeking l

20 this mechanism. (IIT Document 203 at pages 32-33.)  !

21 Mr. Mosbaugh, then, is overly selective in stating that 22 " actual jacket water temperatures and the sensor 'as found' l 23 calibration checks did not support this speculation."

24 Mosbaugh Prefiled at 27. By April 7, actual jacket water 25 temperature measurements had demonstrated that the March 20 26 trip was not associated with true high temperatures. And we l

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I had much more information than the calibration checks, which I

2 were made using Georgia Power's existina calibration 3 procedures. By April 7 the $as found' calibration checks 4 didn't point to the probable cause of the event as much as 5 other observations made on the 1A switches such as reflected

6 in Mark Briney's April 3rd memo (GPC Exhibit II- 76, Bockhold i

7 Exhibit L) and the alarm annunciations replicated during l 8 diesel trip testing when the engine was started with two >

9 sensors purposefully venting (Egg IIT Document 205, page 6-8,

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10 attached hereto as Exhibit Y). Through our efforts, we had 11 narrowed the focus to a particular component, and we thought

! 12 the Wyle testing would pin down a specific causal mechanism.

2 13 We had recalibrated all the sensors, returned the diesel

14 generators to operable status, and shown that we were ready to 15 return Unit 1 to operation.

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1 I

I 16 safety system Performance Indicator Data a

i 17 Q. ON PAGES 100-101 OF MR. MOSBAUGH'S RETYPED PREFILED TESTIMONY,

! 18 HE STATES THAT THE SAFETY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE INDICATOR i

19 4

("SSPI") DATA FOR THE VOGTLE DIESELS WAS OMITTED FROM THE  !

l l 20 DOCUMENT PRESENTED TO THE IIT ON APRIL 2, 1990. HE ALSO SAYS 21 ON PAGE 103 THAT YOU WERE AWARE OF THE 1990 SSPI DATA AT THAT 22 TIME. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT ON THIS TESTIMONY?

23 A. Yes, I do not remember whether Gus Williams, who collected the 24 SSPI data, showed me the 1990 SSPI data, told me about the 25 data, or simply indicated that it was not useful. Therefore,

1 I do not recall whether I, Mr. Williams or others omitted the 2 1990 data. However, if I had been aware of that specific 3 data, I do not believe I would have felt it appropriate to 4 present that data to the NRC. First, it would have only 5 covered two months in 1990. Two months of data would not have 6 been meaningful, and there would not have been any 7 corresponding industry average for this period to compare it

, 8 against. If I had tried to use the specific data, probably 9 the most appropriate way to have presented it would have been 10 to prepare a rolling 12-month average. Again, however, we 11 would not have had comparative industry data for the same 12 period. Second, my purpose in presenting the S8PI data 13 for 1987-1989 was to show that, historically, the Vogtle I 14 diesels had been fairly reliable when compared to industry 15 experience. The 1987-1989 data were sufficient for that 4

16 purpose.

17 Third, the SSPI data is a general measure of overall 18 diesel reliability, and not informative of the specific 19 problems which have affected reliability. Additional review 20 of the data behind the indicator would be necessary for that 21 insight. By April 2, the NRC had been on the Vogtle site for 22 more than a week after the Site Area Emergency and knew about 23 the specific 1990 diesel generator activities, including ,

l 24 problems observed in starting or running the engines. A two-25 month calculated indicator would be of little relative meaning 26 as compared to this more specific, detailed information.

i 1 Further, by April 2 the reliability problems associated J 2 with the diesels was viewed as specific to the Calcon sensors.

3 I expressed this when, on April 2, the IIT team leader's 4 questioned " ...is there anybody here that can describe the 5 (sensor) history and what it sort of tends to suggest about 6 reliability or what might have gone wrong with these sensors?"

7 I responded:

8 Well the way we summarize it was, you know, we have problems, 9 have had problems associated with these sensors during initial 10 startup phases of the engine and during overhaul times, and we )

11 have not had problems in between overhaul periods of time. You 12 know, we've had reliable starts on the engines in between 13 those periods of time. So that's a general summary. (S_qa, IIT 14 Document 168-2, pages 14-15). Bockhold M, GPC Exhibit II-77.

15 The team leader stated that he was "getting the 16 impression that the jacket water temperature switches are not 17 that reliable and I'm surprised you haven't seen that in some ,

1 18 of your monthly (surveillance) testing." I repeated my 19 observation of the timing of sensor problems and the 20 reliability between overhaul periods:

21 . . . when we've come out of overhauls basically associated 22 with engine runs around overhauls, we've had problems and 23 we've replaced switches and we've gotten good switches in that 24 have run until the next overhaul . . . (IIT Document 168-2,

25 page 18)

26 Several days later, on April 4, I once again acknowledged 27 that we had trouble during overhaul times, but during normal 28 plant operation and in between overhaul times, the switches 29 have been reliable. (Sag, IIT Document No. 168-1, page 60, 30 Bockhold O, GPC Exhibit II-79). Consequently, the NRC was t

31 aware of sensor problems outside of operational periods (i.e. ,

J 1 1

l 1 while the diesels were in overhaul) .

)

2 Inowledae of a Specific Count Mn=her l i

3 Q. ON PAGE 44 OF HIS RETYPED, PREFILED TESTIMONY, AND ON AUGUST i 4 8, 1995 (T. 10407-8) MR. MOSBAUGH STATES THAT, BASED ON A {

5 DISCUSSION IN WHICH YOU. PARTICIPATED ON APRIL 2, YOU KNEW OR' i 6 SHOULD HAVE KNOWN ON APRIL 9 THAT THE MAXIMUM " SUCCESSFUL" 7 START COUNT WHICH YOU COULD CLAIM FOR DG1A WAS 12. HOW DO YOU l 8 RESPOND TO THIS POSITION?

i 9 A. Mr. Mosbaugh is wrong. His basis is one of his tape i 1

10 recordings which does not reflect the entire relevant l 11 conversations The NRC had an official court reporter attend 12 the meeting which Mr. Mosbaugh taped, and IIT Document 168-2 13 (Bockhold Exhibit M, GPC Exhibit II-77, dated April 2, 1990) 14 reflects the transcription of the entire meeting.

15 Intervenor's Exhibit II-45 (Tape 27, Segment #3) corresponds 16 to IIT Document 168-2, page 47, line 12 through page 48, line i 17 3. A comparison of the two demonstrates that, contrary to i

! 18 Mr. Mosbaugh's version of events, Mr. Stokes first suggested i

19 he was "not sure precisely" of the number. He then confirmed 4

20 that the diesel had been successfully started "maybe eight 21 times" while the Cooper vendor representative, Mr. Owyoung, 22 was there. In addition, Mr. Owyoung stated that he knew of

) 23 "at least six times" when "we" witnessed the diesel testing.

24 Mr. Mosbaugh incorrectly identifies Mr. Holmes as the person ,

j 25 making this statement (Compare IIT Document 168-2, page 47,

. l 1

1 lines 19-20 with Intervenor Exhibit II-45). Moreover, Mr.

l 2 Mosbaugh's transcript is materially incomplete. My knowledge l 3 of the number of 1A diesel starts after replacement of the 4 sensors at the time is reflected on pages 43 and 44 of the IIT 5 Document, when Mr. Owyoung and Mr. Stokes answered my question l 6 of "how many starts did we do on the A diesel after" the  !

i 7 sensors were changed out. Both confirmed a number of l 8 successful starts on the order of a dozen, successful starts j 9 on April 2 (i.e., "about a dozen" - Mr. Owyoung and 14, 15 10 "something like that - Mr. Stokes"). In addition I was aware 11 that the 1A diesel was started several times after April 2.

12 For example, as reflected in IIT Document 203, pages 23-25 13 (Exhibit X), I discussed with the IIT members a planned jacket l 1

14 water test start and a functional test start on the 1A diesel 15 for April 6. On April 7, the IIT team discussed with us a 16 total of three (3) jacket water test starts (IIT Document 205, 17 pages 3-4, Exhibit Y). Given these additional start 18 activities, I reasonably believed the " successful start" 19 count of 18 for the 1A diesel.

20 Air Blow of the Diesel Generator Air Lines 21 Q. WHO MADE THE DECISION TO NOT " AIR BLOW" THE DIESEL AIR LINES?

22 A. I do not specifically recall. I do know that, at the time the 23 suggestion to air blow the air lines was made on April 4, both 24 of the Unit i diesels had been declared operable, and our 25 focus was on the Calcon sensors as the probable cause of the

• j l

1 March 20th diesel generator trip.

2 Q. MR. MOSBAUGH TESTIFIED THAT IN YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH MR.

i 3 McCOY AND OTHERS ON APRIL 4, YOU HAD ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 4 ABOUT WHAT THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE DIESEL TRIP WAS, BUT DIDN'T 5 WANT TO SHARE IT AND THAT YOU MOVED THE CONVERSATION 6 ELSEWHERE, AWAY FROM THE AIR BLOW SUGGESTION. TR. 9601-03. j

, 7 DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS ON HIS TESTIMONY?

i 8 A. Yes, this is nonsense. I am aware that Mr. Mosbaugh makes  !

9 these " inferences" based upon a small portion of one of his l 10 tape recordings (Tape 34, Intervenor Exhibit 110A). The 11 conversation on April 4, 1990 occurred prior to the 1

12 development of a specific plan to inspect and test the Calcon 13 sensors which were in quarantine. In the portion of the

! 14 transcript submitted by Intervenor, Mr. Kochery and Mr. Burr i

] 15 indicated that if debris was in the sensors and that affected I

l 16 the sensors operation, it would be readily observable. Mr.  ;

1 17 Mosbaugh suggested an " air blow" of the lines, apparently to i

! \

18 eliminate air quality particles as a potential cause. )

19 Mr. Mosbaugh is incorrect in his inference that I ,

1 20 " moved the conversation elsewhere" to avoid discussing the l 21 proposed air blow. As the further tape-recorded conversation 22 reveals, different people were proposing different test 23 methodologies to pursue various root cause theories and I was 24 concerned about the organization of the various planned

4 1 activities and our resources, I said:

2 The problem is we have different types of people 3 doing different types of tests and . . . and . . . their 4 perception of the correct test methodology of what they 5 are used to and what their experience is different. Ana 6 we have been doing a lot of this in parallel to bring the 7 engines to an operable state. And now we have these 8 quarantine switches that we want to go ahead and do a 9 very rigorous . . . all of us want to do a very rigorous 10 test methodology. And we can't do it with the same 11 people we got still working on the diesels. Well, we can ,

12 but it all will be four days from now . . . . And that's 13 the organization I need to talk you [ Ken McCoy] about.

14 Tape 34 (Tr. 11-14), Bockhold Exhibit Z. "The organization" 15 which I needed to talk to Mr. McCoy about was the structuring 16 of the activities, including the assignment of the right 17 people to develop the test methodology. This was not an 18 avoidance of Mr. Mosbaugh's suggestion; Mr. Mosbaugh could 19 have directed that the " air blow" be included in the testing i

20 activities. j 21 Later, on April lith, the test methodology on the ,

22 quarantined sensors was developed and provided to the NRC 23 (S_qg , IIT Document 209, Bockhold Ex. AA, GPC Exhibit II- ).

24 Before April lith, the air receiver of one of the engines had 25 been visually inspected and it was reported that the air 26 filter on the airline supply was "like new" when changed out.

27 Therefore, although I do not recall a specific decision not to 28 perform an " air blow," additional information indicated that 29 particulates were not being introduced through the air lines 30 into the sensors.

l 31 MR. CASH'S TYPED LIST l 32 Q. MR. MOSBAUGH SUGGESTS THAT THE " CASH LIST" WAS MADE INTO A l

1 SLIDE (TRANSPARENCY) OR USED AS A BACK-UP SLIDE FOR THE 2 PRESENTATION ON APRIL 9. (TR. 10400). WAS IT?

3 A. No, not to my knowledge. The transparencies made for the 4 presentation were retrieved by my former secretary, Gloria 5 Walker, when I was temporarily assigned to a position at EPRI 6 in Palo Alto, California. Those files did not include the 7 " Cash list" or transparencies of the " Cash list."

. I UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, ) Docket Nos. 50-424-OLA-3 glal. ) 50-425-OLA-3

) ,

(Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, ) Re: License Amendment t Units 1 and 2) ) (Transfer to Southern

) Nuclear)

)

) ASLBP No. 93-671-01-OLA-3 SERVICE LIST Administrative Judge Stewart D. Ebneter*

Peter B. Bloch, Chairman Regional Administrator Atomic Safety and Licensing Board USNRC, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 2900 .

Washington, D.C. 20555 101 Marietta Street, N.W.

Atlanta, GA 30303 ,

Administrative Judge i James H. Carpenter Office of the Secretary

• l Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory I j 933 Green Point Drive Commission l Washington, D.C. 20555 Oyster Point Sunset Beach, NC 28468 Attn: Docketing and i Services Branch l l

Administrative Judge Charles Barth, Esq. l James H. Carpenter Mitzi Young, Esq. l l Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of General Counsel

' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20555 One White Flint North Stop 15B18 Rockville, MD 20555 l Administrative Judge l

) Thomas D. Murphy Director, Environmental

• 1 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Protection Division ]

i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Depart. of Natural Resources 1

Washington, D.C. 20555 205 Butler Street l Suite 1252 Michael D. Kohn, Esq. Atlanta, GA 30334 Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto, P.C. 1 517 Florida Avenue, N.W. Office of Commission Appellate

• l Washington, D.C 20001 Adjudication One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensine Board

)

In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-424-OLA-3

) 50-425-OLA-3 GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, )

etal. ) Re: License Amendment

) (Transfer to Southern (Vogtle Electric Generating ) Nuclear)

Plant, Units 1 and 2) )

) ASLBP No. 93-671-01-OLA-3 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of Rebuttal Testimony of George Bockhold, Jr., dated August 21,1995 were served on all those listed on the attached service list by hand delivery or, where indicated with an asterisk, by express mail this 21st day of August,1995.

ohn Lamberski

GPC EXHIBIT II-BOCKHOLD EX. R Interoffice Correspondence GeorgiaPower A DATE: March 15, 1990 RE: FAVA Microfiltration System Log: NOV-00424 FROM: George Bockhold, Jr.

TO: W. F. Kitchens '

A. L. Mosbaugh Today, I received concurrence from the NRC (Ken Brockman) via telecon to place the FAVA system in operation. The hold tag isolating the system may be released after Operations verifies the following:

1. Procedures for operating FAVA require an operator to be in attendance for the entire duration of system operation.

2. All hoses going to and from the system have been checked and meet requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.143.

3. The cover over the unit is securely fastened when FAVA is in operation to ensure that if a spraying leak develops, it will be contained in the concrete vault.

The NRC asked us to consider the design of the ARB walls and whether or not a design modification should be made to reduce the potential of wall leakage in the eveat that a hose leak developed and sprayed the walls? Engineering is assigned this action item and a REA to Corporate may be appropriate.

, I GB/gww xc: C. K. McCoy $

NORMS $ g s* m:1m A

h l

9 O

GPC EXHIBIT II-

5

' BOCKHOLD EX. Q i E '* d FE8PI 15/Po/II W A Nte*11W- 2 ' M w unw4

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weert3DSTATM epUcLEAn nSOULATOnY ooMhel3 BION i o . . .

I s 101asaalt??A STREET. tim.

j ATLAwfA.eaonesA sessa .

\***** .

NOV 0 1 1991 Docket Nos. 50-424, 50-425 j -

4 License Nos. NPF-68. NPF-81 I

Georgia power Company ATTN

! Mr. W.G. Nairston. !!!

4 Senior Vice President -

Nuclear Operations -

! p. O. Box 1295 i

Birmingham, AL 38201 .

Gentlemen

SUBJECT:

i V0GTLE SPECIAL TEAN INSPECTION REPORT N05. 50-424.425/90-1g SUPPLENENT 1 i

j

! This refers August to the17, 6 through inspection 1990. conducted by a Special Inspection Team on inspection was transmitted to you on JanuaryPrevious 11. 1991. correspondence assoc l

i Inspection Summary of that document, the results of the allegation followuAs dis j

part, the results of that followup team. team would be the subject in of sep i

j activities authorized for your Vogtle facility.The inspection included a review of At the conclusion of the j

t identified in the enclosed inspection report. inspection, these findi j

Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the report.

these areas Within

and represen,tative recorthe inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedure activities in progress. ds. interviews with personnel, and observation of

) weaknesses in operational polices and practices.The inspection t ,

l

' inspection summary of the enclosed inspection report.These are identified in the '

The reqvfrements.

NRC inspection findings indicate that certain activities appeared to violate i s

i The apparent violation associated with failure to provide I

' accurate information to the NRC during the inspection is under consideration for escalated enforcement action.

issue is not being issued at this time, and a response to this subject

required.

i However, please be advised that the number and characterisation of

! violations described in the enclosed Inspection Report associated with this i subject may change as a result of further NRC review.

j matter.'. We will contact you at a later date to arrange a conference to discuss this issue.

I j The additional violation described in this report, refer the Notice of Violation.  !

I

8 l ,

, cw sair1 is/FO/lI U1Hu"Mu*2 *D33 WOWd 4 .

I

. Geoesia Power Company 2

] g ggg

! You are required to respond to this letter and Notice and should follou the

! instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when prepartrig your response to the violations. In your response, you should document the specific actions

, taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence. After reviewing your response . to this Notice, including your proposed corrective

actions and the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether I further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC l regulatory requirements.

) In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and its enclosures i will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. ,

, The responses directed by this letter and the enclosed Notice are not subject l to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required j by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980. Pub. L. No. g6.511.

I Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.  !

l i Sincerely.

)

! Ellis W. Merschoff ting Director l Division of React Projects i

Enclosures:

i 1. Notice of Violation i 2. NRC Inspection Report

!60-424,425/90-19 j Supplement 1

! cc w/encls:

! R. P. Mcdonald

' Executive Vice President-Nuclear Operations

! Georgia Power Company

! P. O. Box 1295 Sirmingham, AL 35201

! C'. K. McCoy l Vice President-Nuclear

Georgia Power Company i P. O. 1295 '

l Birmingham, AL 35201

-- l

\

\

l W. B. Shipe.an b

I General Manager, Nuclear Operations i l Georgia Power Company 1 P. O. 1600 Waynesboro, GA 30830 t

l (cc w/ enc 1s cont'd - see page 3) l

_ - _ - - . _ _ - _ - . _ - _ - _ - - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' ' ^ ' '

E 8

l P w sa:FI IE/PO/11 wm m-Peng yogg

). .

! - Seergia Power Company 3 N OV 0 1 8 91 1 .

~

cc w/encis: (Continued) l j J. A. Railey .

Manager-Licensing .

Georgia Power Company -

t P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham. AL 35201 i

j O. Kirkland. Ill, Counsel Office of the consumer's .

i utility Council

Suite 225, 32 Peachtree Street NE

Atlanta, GA 30302 i i

1 Office of Planning and Budget I t Room 6158

270 Washington Street, SW

Atlanta, GA 30334 )

i Office of the County Commissioner d

Burke County Commission Waynesboro. GA 30830 i

Joe D. Tanner, Commissioner Department of Natural Resources 205 Butler Street. SE. Suite 1252 Atlanta, GA 30334 4

Thomas Hill, Manager Radioactive Materials Progran i

t Department of Natural Resources 878 Peachtree St.. NE., Room 600 l Atlanta, GA 30309 Attorney General i Law Department 132 Judicial Svilding

. Atlanta, GA 30334 Dan saith, Program Of rector i

of Power Production

i Oglethorpe Power Corporation 1 2100 East Exchange Place  !

' P. D. Sox 1349  !

Tucker, GA 30085-134g '

! Charfes A. Patrizia. Ese.

i Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker 12th Floor 1050 tonnectiest Avenue, W 4

Washington, D. C. 20036 I

zd sairs is poes: WANW71W-2 *D3g yogg

s i

^

ENCLOSURE 2  :

Report Nos.

50-424.425/90-19, Supplement 1

! Licensee: Georgia Power Company j P.O. Som 1295 i Birmingham, AL 31201 l

- 1 Docket Nos.: 50-424 and 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-64 and NPF-81 '

, Facility Name: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units I and 2 i

Inspection conducted: August 6-17, 1990 i

) Team Leader: Chris A. VanDenburgh, section Chief, Division of Reactor Inspections and

! Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Reactor l Regulation Team Members: Ron Aiello - Resident Inspector, Vogtle Norris Branch - Santor Resident Inspector, Watts Barr i Robert E. Carroll, Jr. - Project Engineer, DRP, Region II

! Larry Garner - Senior Resident Inspecter, Robinson 1

Neal K. Hunesuller - Licensing Examiner, MRR

Larry L. Robinson - Investigator. 01, Region II i .

Robert D. Starkey - Resident Inspector, vogtle

! Craig T. Tate - Investigator. 01, Region II Peter A. Taylor - Reactor Inspector, DR$ Region II

• McKenzie Thomas - Reactor Inspector, DRS, Region II John D 11cos, Jr. - Operations Engineer, NRR' l Subaitted by: tu de- .

1. Et.T TM4/

Pierce M. Skinner, Section Chief 35 Date 5t'gned l Region !!, Division of Reactor Projects i

Approved by:

A. R. Herdt, Chief. Branch 3 b 3 8/

Date 51gned

Region II, Division of Reactor Projects

i j .

.s

• a tritt isero/tI w.LNUMW-3 *D3M WOW 4 i

i .

19 I .

i, .

k x,

~

that GPC did not have a basis for their statements and misrepresented the air

! quality in the licensees written response to the CAL, was not confirmed.

i N 2.6 Resortab111tv of previous System Outanes i s

~

I

'ic,' allegation indicated that VERP faile.; to immediately notify the NRC as i

reeuf red by 10 CFR 50.72 when VEGP identified that both trains of the

! contaisnt fan coolers (CFCs) had been previously inoperable at the same time l en Unit Ib ,

Discussion The inspection team's review of plant records indicated that this condition i

occurred when EDG #1A was declared inoperable when tape (used when the EDG was l l being painted) was found on the EDG fuel rack. The tape kept the fuel injector 4

pisten from moving and injecting fuel into the EDG. With EDG #1A inoperable,

! the equipment associated with the Train A was also inoperable. In the process l of investigating the installation of the tape, VEGP identified that this

! condition existed during a period when the Train 8 containment fan coolers were i

also in a degraded condition for maintena'nce.

l During the performanca of Surveillance Procedure 14623-1. Train 8 containment fan cooler (CFC) 1-1501-A7-003 failed to start in slow speed. LC0 1-90-560 was initiated at 1:15 a.m. on June 19, 1990, and maintenance on the CFC was I

initiated. The CFC was returned to operable status on June 19, 1990, at i 2:15 p.m. Approximately 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> later [on June 19,1990, at 11:59 p.m. (LC0 1

1-90-562)], EDG #1A was determined to be inoperable because the tape had been i installed on the fuel rack. On July 17, 1990 VEGP issued LER 90-014 to

! identify the previously unrecognized violation of the LC0 in accordance with j 10 CFR 50.73.

( Conclusion l

' Based upon the fact that VEGP did hot become aware that both trains of CFCs were simultaneously inoperable until after the Train B CFC fan had been returned to service, the immediate notification reevirements of 10 CFR 50.72 3

were not applicable. The allegation that VEGP failed to immedistely notify the NRC upon dtscovery of the previously degraded condition of '5he CFCs was not I i

confirmed. 1 i

I 2.7 Intimidation of Plant Review Board Members {

i An allegation indicated that PR8 members were allegedly intimidated and l l pressured by the general manager in a PRS meeting. The meeting occurred in l l February 1990, to determine the acceptability of the safety analysis for the '

installation of the FAVA microfiltration syste,m. l 1

l

\

- \

\

l

~

1 I i

j I *d ES Pt is/ro/tI j way 3Ay.g.Dh W i . )!

i '

. 20 .

l

.l l l Discussion ,

As discussed in Section ,2.1 of this inspection report, sIeveral safety )

i evaluations were performed. for the installation of a temporary modification i which installed the FAVA microfiltration system. Discussions with PRB members i indicated that during the review of these safety evaluations, various PRR i members

• had empressed reservations on several occasions concerning the acceptability of the installation of the FAVA system.  ;

I Despite these reservations, the inspection team's review of the PRB Meeting i minutes associated with this temporary modification identified few instances of i the PRB members documenting their dissenting opinions. Specifically, PRB 8

j meeting 90-15 (dated February 8,1990) documented one PRS member s negative )

. vote and dissenting opinions regarding the acceptability of exempting the i temporary modification from regulatory reeutrements and the adequacy of the

! system's safety evaluation. PRB Neeting 90-28 (dated March 1,1990) indicated l l

that information and issues regarding the FAVA system's safety analysis were l j presented to the PRS and that the general manager solicited written comments and questions from other members for resolution. The only other esseple was j in PRB meeting 90-12 (dated March 6,1990) which identified a dissenting opinion related to the acceptability of voting on the FAVA system installation when the PRB member who raised the initial questions and concerns on the'

operation of the FAVA system was not present.

Discussions with the PR8 members indicated that during the various PRB meetings

! concerning the installation of the FAVA system, the PRB members felt i

intimidated and pressured by the presence of the general manager at the PRS

meeting. The sworn testimony confirmed that on one occasion an alternate i voting member felt intimidated and feared retribution or retallation because

! the general manager was present at the meettng and the PRB ' member knew the

general manager wanted to have the temporary modification approved. Hewever.

l the testimony also indicated that the PRB member did not alter his vote and l felt confortable with how he had voted. In addition, the PRB member was not aware of any occasions on which he or any other PRB member had succumbed to intimidation or feared retribution.

The inspection team verified that the general manager was informed following l this meeting that several PR8 members viewed his presence as intimidating. As l a- result, on March 1,1990, the general manager met with all PRS members to i reiterate the member's duties and responsibilities. He specifically told the i

esembers that his presence at PRS meetings must not influence them and that alternates should be selected who would feel comfortable with this responsi-

bility. He also addressed the difference between professional differences of l opinten and safety or quality concerns, and their respective methods for resolution.

1

i l Z *d ccert Ig'Fo/II j W A N w "l1 w - 3 9 3 W W O W d i =- .

l

. 1 E ..

• gg .

5, .

i Cantivlipa ,"

The inspection team concluded that in one case a PRS voting member felt

! intimidated and feared retribution because the general manager was present at F  !

the PtB meeting. However, this member stated that he did not changa_ his vote in response to this pressure and the general manager met with the PRB to alley l l

1 fears. Based on the testimony, the inspection team concluded that retribution did not occur. Nevertheless, this confirmed event and the absence of j

1 dissenting opinions in the PRB meeting minutes indicate that there was a

! potential for an adverse affect on.open discussions at the meeting. The i

11c9asee needs to ensure that PRS members freely and openly empress their l

i technical opinions and safety concerns. '

t 2.8 personnel Accountability As a result of several comments and questions by the licensed operators to the inspection team, the seas reviewed the method used to rate the performance of l the shift superintendents ($$) and unit shift supervisors.

1

! Discussion l

The operations manager stated that the $$ reported directly to the operations

manager and that he personally prepared their performance appraisals. The inspection identified that the $$ reported to the Unit Superintendent (US), and l that the U$ personally prepared the performance appraisals of the $$.

j personnel accountability system, first used in 1989, was a.

! The i pay-for performance methodology. Annual pay increases and a percentage of the Operations Department bonus were dependent on their ratings in accountability categories. Each accountability category was subdivided into performance i

I

categories. Most of the performance categories were based upon group performance. Once these are eliminated, any differential in pay will result i

from eight performance categories. Implementation of the plan in 1989 could l

result in up to an 58.000-a year difference in bonus pay to a $$. The l

performance categories and their relative weights are:

- Personnel safety 441%

l

- Regulatory compliance 10.25

- ESFAS actuation 12.2%

i - Reactor trips 10.2%

' - ledD performance 4.15

, .~ Special projects 8'2E l

- Personnel development 30.6%

l 7, -- Training 20.4% ,

! Therefore. $1 percent will be associated with personnel development and training and 32.6 percent will be associated' with the number of LERs. and violations (i.e.. regulatory compliance (10.2 percent) ESFAS actuation (12.2 l

percent)andreactortrips(10.2 percent)).

l l -

t

• GPC EXHIBIT II- +

' I BOCKHOLD EX. T W

l* 1  ;

• i i" 1 ,

i .

2 ,

3 4

6 4

7 d'A N A, S ) -

8 a  ;

J 9

10 Transcript of audiotape No. 179, 7 11 transcribed by Kara K..Lucas, Certified Court 12 Reporter and Notary Public.

l*

13 I

14 k, I 15  :

16 3 ,

! 17 '

18 2

l 19

- 20 1 21-

.! 22 l 23 BROWN REPORTING, INC.

l 24 1100 SPRING STREET, SUITE 750 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30309

• 25 (404) 876-8979.

L I

4

j. -

.. -. - . . . . . =. - . . . - . .- . ._

/

id i

18 s

i N- 1 been in contact with one another. I'm not sure i

j 2 about that. And that may be in that context

3 (inaudible). But I'm sure if your attorney is 4 telling you not to discuss those issues, he's 5 probably telling our attorney that you've been told j 6 not to discuss those issues.  ;

I 7 MOSBAUGH: I think that's true.

8 LEE GLENN

Which means the reason we 9 wouldn't do it the way we want to do it.

, 10 MOSBAUGH: Yeah.

i l 11 LEE GLENN: Our attorney's over here and i

12 then there and wherever else (inaudible).

N- 13 MOSBAUGH:

, I --

I had one other question j 14 about, you know, about your --

your coming down here j 15 in general. Can you --

can you.tell me the i 16 background, you know, on that? How did this --

how 17 did this all get initiated?

{ 18 LEE GLENN: I can tell you the part I'm l 19 aware of --

20 MOSBAUGH: Okay.

21 LEE GLENN: --

or (inaudible) the realm, 1

j 22 the legal realm of hearsay, what I've been told took i 23 place. Certainly we --

the DOL complaint came in 1 i i 24 and identified that --

that you felt like you'd been

[ N- 25 (inaudible) identified basic concerns (inaudible)

)

y 4.

. i 19

'- 1 conversation you had with George and John Rogge 2 Tuesday in which you indicated there were some --

3 there may be continuing and additional concerns 4 which you hadn't identified (inaudible). Is that 5 coming out? George -- it was my understanding --

6 talked to Ken McCoy about it. How do we want to 7 address it? I cannot tell you whether they talked 8 to Atlanta management before or after or somewhere 9 in the process. Bill Welders also talked 10 (inaudible) Chuck Whitney discussed with it, and I I

11 know Troutman Sanders hais discussed it probably with 12 an attorney at Troutman Sanders what the situation 1

l  %- 13 was and seeing (inaudible) George related. That 14 group ultimately made the decision it would be 15 appropriate to give an. independent third party to 16 someone outside of --

of --

certainly outside of the 4

17 plant chain of command, who Bill Lyon would be, and 18 even outside of SONOPCO. I'm not sure if that l 19 desire would be outside of (inaudible) or whatever 20 else may have (inaudible) have some concept of 5 21 what's going on. I received a call from (inaudible) 22 basically the (inaudible) situation. The DOL 23 complaint, the technical concerns, the possibility i 24 there were additional technical concerns s- 25 (inaudible).

GPC EXHIBIT II-BOCKHOLD EX. S e

June 20, 1990 )

I 4

This morning I was visited by Allen Mosbaugh. The following i summarizes our discussion.

t Allen first inquired into Legal Councils involvement. He

opened by stating, that in earlier times with the Quality l 1 Concern Program Legal Council was involved in the Steering  ;

i Committee, but this had been discontinued; why then were' l they lookiit? at his issue! I told Allen that Legal Council i j had not been totally removed and the option for their use is {

still.in the QCP procedure, that they periodically review i I

concerns. As an example I told him that although we have (

closed our investigation, that many cases were still being  ;

fought through the courts system and because of this Troutman - Sanders will periodically want a file. Also as

• with his case we both know that the NRC are involved and

{ '

it's normal for Troutman - Sanders to also get involved,  !

such may be the case with his.

He also wanted to know if there was any new developments i with his concern. I told him that the only things I was '

aware of was, his June menos and George Bockhold request  :

! for me to follow-up on his March 15, 1990 commitments, of '

I which I was currently in the process of doing. .

4 i i Allen stated that as far as he knew, no one ever wrote the i REA for an adequate safety evaluation on the ARB. I told i

him that this wasn't completely true. In discussions with l 1

Cliff Miller and John Quinn some study work has been done,  !

j but he was right and there was no REA. Allen said that he  ;

was surprised by this because George had committed to the i

NRC to perform the study. He said that Corporate took on '

i this responsibility. The NRC like himself were concerned i

! about the design of the ARB. I

/

j Allen also commented about the inadequacy of an earlier l j

study.

lack of He did not feel comfortable with it because of the independence. ,

According to Allen the original ARB i

study was performed by Paul Rushton and Mark Ajulina. Both i i Paul and Mark were aided by George in their placement in j SONOPCO. Their friendship goes way back and they will I basically cater to Bockholds needs. Another problem is that l neither Paul or Mark have the knowledge or experience needed l

] for Rad Waste. He did feel that Lue Long was an expert in >

! this field, but, his assessment of the ARB is tainted .

because it's based on Rushtons old study.  ;

l Allen concluded by saying that he feels that he's having no l l success in getting this i ssue resolved; it's as if they i

- (Bockhold) have committed to something and can't turn  ;

i around. '

i E

d 6 . L(2i c  :

i

- gw , -~ -,, . -,.r..,-_ --

- - - -. ..y - _ , , .

GPC EXHIBIT II-

! BocKHOLD EX. U l Int:r:ffl30 Cerrcspond:nce GeorgiaMmer A

'DATE: July 6, 1990 4

RE: Quality Concerns I t

j FROM: George Bockhold, Jr. i T0: A. L. Mosbaugh On July 3, 1990, you completed identifying your quality concerns  !

to Lee Glenn, but you stated that you had other concerns that you would only identify to the NRC. Georgia Power Company considers the safety of its nuclear plants as it's highest priority. If any individual has any legitimate concerns regarding safety, we require that this concern be immediately identified in order to permit appropriate and timely i

corrective action. If you choose not to report them to management or the Qurlity Concern Program, they must be reported to the NRC. Consistent with ais policy (which you acknowledged understanding of on Aug. 1 1984), we require that you immediately notify the NRC of any legitimate i

concern that you may not have identified to us.

r

' With NRC residents. I have discussed the fact that you have concerns that you are only willing to discuss with them. NRC residents have always been willing to immediately address legitimate safety concerns with any member of our staff. Please insnediately address your concerns to the NRC. I expect this assignment to receive your imtaediate and

, highest attention. Please let me know your progress, including your

completion of this task. i 1

.- (

GB:gww

, xc: C_ K. McCoy Ron Aiello Doug Starkey Lee Glenn 1

I -

I

GPC EXHIBIT II- l BOCKHOLD EX. V 450- To Gsory boc k oId

)

l 3nce Odok isu I was pc.m ,4r/ 40 h.ssi>Nad

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0 nl lde < N>A c Teoin; y 4 5 P w e-e. ,/f,4 j .Secue;+y .

w b:<. h job or depadone d .T }

l Now y.v a>h one woM pre fer. F;e.d , Ir 4 m+ say ay;n %d E /,

l n*+ pr efe< f. move bodwa>ds in se 4r S re-fous.D l '

l. or. Ievel. I b,I; eve h d I aan g-al: lie E by elJ:sn i(

/,e med any Vy Ut deb not rqari9

\ 0n / &ypr<.tnce a Vej 41 e .550, f

Qve, 4bd y., Asu<e so r. bee my copab.hhe> ;n l

cer1 ok pos: ens are obviov>1y

L ansl%e r way ond N l

Ehel.,Ne [.feww, wesI/ A my f> reference l ~ .x [w. ice j for si+e ueb>:

i

J. SRo Tr.:,;,3 l

2. EyMe<i., %4 3g P2 l

3. A L :< , 44f f

\

i

' 00369'

( [ 10 0 b

-C

,i GPC EXHIBIT II ~  ;

j BOClOIOLD EX. W OFFICIAL 'IRANSCRIFT OF PROCEEDINGS I l

i i

i I

gg Nucl.ar Regulatory Constission 5

l Tide: 1 1. phon. Concer.nc.: 111, License., Region II (CLOSED) l Docket No.  !

l l

l LOCATION: Bethesda, Maryland

[ DATE: Thursday,.\pril 5, 1990 PACES: 1 - 37 i

l 1

l 1 i i

l t

i N k M.

1612 K k. KW,Sune 300

-_=.=_ D.C 20006 (202) 5 3950 32 PROJECT 035290

1 1

1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1 1 2 NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION 3

4 4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 5 In the Matter of:  :

6 INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW  :

7 Telephone conference: IIT,  :  !

8 Licensee, Region II  :

! 9 (CLOSED)  :

10 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 11 12 Nuclear Regulatory Commission

]

13 Operations Center 14 7735 Old Georgetown Road l 15 Bethesda, Maryland 16 Thursday, April 5, 1990 l

17 ,

1 18 The above-entitled matter commenced at 10:03 I l

19 o' clock a.m., when were present: I 20 21 Alfred chaffee, IIT Leader 22 Ken Brochman, NRC Region II 23 Rick Kendall, NRC 24 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 25 Ken Burr, Vogtle 92 PROJECT 035281

4

" 2 1 Mike Horton, Vogtle 2 John Auftankampe, Vogtle 3 Paul Kochery, Vogtle

i 4 Alan Moeba 5 -

6

, 7 4

8 4

9 10 11 12 .

l 8

13 14 15

)

16 17 18 19 20 '

21 22 23

24 25 92 PROJECT 035282 1

. 3 1 PROCEEDINGS l

2 (10:03 a.m.] l 3 MR. CHAFFEE: Mr. Sheibani.

4 MR. SNEIBANI: My name is Mehdi, M-E-H-D-I, 5 Sheibani, S-N-E-I-B-A-N-I.

i

6 MR. CHAFFEE

Mr. Sheibani, just a couple minutes 1

7 here before we go into the diesel thing. This morning we 1

l 8 sat down in our group there -- Region II, did you just get  ;

I 9 on the line? I I  !

l 10 MR. BROCHMAN: This is Ken Brochman. j d

i l 11 MR. CHAFFEE: This is Al Chaffee. We have a number i

l 12 of people from the licensee. Why don't the licensee people,.

I 13 why don't you run through again who all is there so that Ken l

1 14 can hear that.

l i 15 MR. AUFTENKAMPE: This is John Auftankampe. There 16 may be some other people that come in as we go on with this, i

17 MR. CHAFFEE: Before we start talking about the i

j 18 diesels, I had an administrative thing which is really for i

19 Mehdi Sheibani. That is, we went through this morning a l 20 listing of the documents we have asked for and where we i

j 21 think we are in terms of getting them. We are going to look 22 at it a little more closely so that tomorrow in the 10:00 23 o' clock call we can also help focus on those documents that 24 we haven't yet received that we have the highest priority n

i 25 on.

92 PROJECT 035283

4 j 1 What we did this morning, one of the documents l t l 2 that we are eager to get our hands on is the printout, the

, 3 traces from the ERF database where you were going to provide 1

4 us with plots as a function of time for key parameters.

5 Last week, I believe it was on Thursday, we had provided you 6 a list that had been highlighted in red -- I think red dots 7 -- I don't know what it was -- a dozen parameters that we 8 wanted to get~the plots on. On Thursday you guys were going i

j 9 to try to get them to us on Friday.

l 10 It is my understanding and we may be wrong, but we 11 haven't yet received those. I just want to reemphasize that l

12 we are eager to get our hands on those. If you could talk I 13 to the people involved, and assuming that you have not yet

l l

i 14 sent them to us, escalate that to a highest priority in l i

i 15 terms of getting that to us. We would appreciate that.

i l 16 MR. HORTON: We do understand that you need those, i

17 and that has taken an incredible amount of effort to l

i 18 generate. We have had to dedicate a number of engineers and I

! 19 computer time to get those things printed out. They are 20 very slow to print out.

i

21 MR. CHAFFEE

I didn't realize that. I thank you 22 for telling me. We sometimes don't understand the impact

! 23 these requests make, and I appreciate your bearing with us. I i

4 24 We try not to be too pushy on them.

{

l 25 MR. HORTON: We generate those a sheet at a time, l i

. 92 PROJECT 035284

i 9

l l 1 and we also underestimated the volume of data here. There f

2 are probably several hundred sheets involved here.

]

l 3 MR. CHAFFEE: Right now what we are interested in, 4 I think it's only -- I want to say a dozen different 5 parameters, the ones that we would like to get the first 1

h 6 wave. Are you telling me that there's a large number of 7 sheets for just one parameter? Wait a second. Is this a 8 deal -- let's take.for example a breaker that trips open or

9 trips shut; do you get a separate sheet for each stage of 10 the breaker?

11 MR. HORTON: I don't know.

, 12 MR. CHAFFEE: What I am saying is, I understand l

13 what you are saying that it's a big effort. What we were

14 trying to do is, say that we think it is important for us to

! 15 get it. We are also trying to say that narrowing it down to

! 16 a small subset of all the parameters that are in that 17 database in the hope of being able to allow at least that i 18 portion of it to be done on a more quick time basis.

1 19 MR. HORTON: We are about one-half way done, and 20 we will send you what we have.

21 MR. CHAFFEE

Okay. Tomorrow, after having gone I

{

22 through the list here and what we have received, we will try

23 to focus you guys in on those documents that in terms of

( 24 time marches on that are of key interest to us, so we can i

25 help prioritize the effort where that is possible.

92 PROJECT 035285

\

1 6

1 Why don't we shift then to the diesel generator (

l j 2 work. To the best of my knowledge -- let me just ask you 3 guys. Where do you stand in terms of preparing for the test j 4 that you are working on?

i q

5 MR. HORTON: Assuming you are talking about the 1-

6 A temperature monitoring test; is that correct?

J

7 MR. CHAFFEE

That's correct.

1 8 MR. HORTON: The test was set up last night. As i

9 you are all probably aware, the first few hours involves f

j 10 standby mode, simply monitoring --

i

) 11 MR. CHAFFEE: We haven't seen the procedura yet.

i

12 MR. HORTON

-- the heater.

i 13 MR. CHAFFEE: We haven't gotten the procedura yet, i

} 14 MR. HORTON: Okay. At your request yesterday, we i

. 15 added a current monitoring on the jacket water heater, and l 16 we are monitoring that and one of the thermal walls that the 17 high temperature sensor sits in. So, you have two 18 parameters there. That was initiated this morning at f 19 approximately 7:00 o' clock Eastern time. It has been t

. 20 running for basically three hours.

)

l 21 MR. CHAFFEE: Mehdi Sheibani, are you guys in the l

22 processing of taxing us the test procedure for this? I l 23 assume you must have it.

24

)

i MR. SHEIBANI: It was faxed to you about five 25 minutes ago.

i 92 PROJECT 035296

l 7  !

1 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. '

+

i 2 MR. HORTON: If you would like, Al, I could tell 3 you the results of the first three hours.

4 MR. CHAFFEE: Great.

5 NR. HORTON: The first three hours show a steady 6 state temperature of 163, and a frequency on the jacket  ;

7 water heater of approximately one hour and one-half with it 8 being on for most of that duration and only being off for [

9 between five and eight minutes each hour and one-half.

10 That's all we know to far.

11 MR. CHAFFEE: Basically, yoa haven't seen any i l

12 fluctuation in temperature? That 163 degrees is basically 13 constant?

14 MR. HORTON: Right.

15 MR. CHAFFEE: No variation at all?

16 MR. HORTON

Correct.

. 17 MR. CHAFFEE: That's interesting.

! 18 MR. KENDALL: The heater is only off for about i

j 19 eight minutes for every one and one-half hour span?

l

20 MR. HORTON: Correct.

21 MR. CHAFFEE: With it in that configuration you f

22 have the standard jacket warning pump operating; is that i 23 right?

i ,

24 MR. SHEIBANI: Correct.

1. 25 MR. CHAFFEE: Do you happen to know what the flow l 92 PROJEcy 033237

l l l'

8 1 rate of that pump is and what the volume of the jacket water l i 1 j 2 tamparature system is -- the jacket water cooling system is?

3 MR. HORTON: The flow is a little under 100 gym, ,

j 4 60 to 90 somewhere, and we don't have the total volume l l 5 handy. A rough estimate might be something like 1,500 for i

6 the total. We think it may be like 600 and the rest of the 1

7 system volume might bring that up to a rough total of 1,500.

8 That is just rough.

1 j 9 MR. CHAFFEE: That may mean that you are getting 10 turnaround of the system -- what would that be, once every i  !

l 11 six to ten minutas type of thing?

12 MR. BURR: Once every 15 minutes.

' 13 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. Is the piping from the tank 14 to the pump and stuff, is that six inch piping?

J j 15 MR. SHEIRANI: Which pump?

i i 16 MR. CHAFFEE: The standpipe. The pump takes the 17 suction on the standpipe, the piping of the standpipe to the 1 -

{ 18 pump. What size piping is that roughly?

19 MR. SKEIRANI: One and one-half inches.

20 MR. CHAFFEE: Just one and one-half inches. That 21 gives me a picture then. I take one and one-half inch pipe 1

l 22 --

1 23 MR. SHEIBANI: One and one-half suction and one g

24 and one-quarter inch.

25 MR. KENDALL: That is just for the keep warm pump, 92 PROJECT 035288

d i

. 9

! I right?

e

! 2 MR. CHAFFEE: I see. The regular pump for the 3 jacket water temperature system, what is the suction pipe

4 size in that?

i 5 MR. SHEIRANI: Ten inch suction and eight inch.

6 hER.CHAFFEE: That makes more sense to me. Do we

{ 7

• have a drawing that shows the jacket water?

8 MR. KENDALL: We have an eight and one-half by 11 i

9 one that is kind of difficult to road. We requested a big i

10 one yesterday and they are going to get it and send it out.

11 MR. CHAFFEE: It is a one line diagram, or do we

}

12 have one that shows a picture -- a pictorial picture.

I '

13 MR. KENDALL: It's a P&ID. It shows the f. low i l j 14 diagram.

15 MR. CHAFFEE: It shows the different type pipes?

4 16 MR. KENDALL: It shows it but it is very difficult i

i 17 to read. We are going to get one in that's more readable.

i

! 18 MR. CHAFFEE: You guys' don't have an equivalent to '

i i

l 19 an isometric for the jacket water system, do you?  !

i 1 20 NR. BURR: No, we do not.

4 21 MR. KENDALL: I want to make sure that I I I

22 understand all the points that are being monitored. You are j 23 just monitoring jacket water -- I guess we will call it i i

l 4 24 header temperature up --

25 MR. HORT9N: You guys are cutting in and out.

l 92 PROJECT l 035289 '

10 1 MR. CHAFFEE: Just a second. Can you hear me?

s 2 MR. HORTON: It sounds like an amplifier problem 3 on the bridge.

4 MR. KENDALL: Is this any better?

5 MR. HORTON: You are still fading in and out on a 6 cyclic basis. It's the bridge.

I 7 MR. CHAFFEE: Can you hear me? i l

8 MR. HORTON: I can hear you.  !

9 MR. KENDALL: I jus) wanted to make sure that I 10 understood all the points that are being monitored for this.

I 11 There is only two; there's the jacket --

12 MR. BURR: You are still fading in and out on us.

' 13 MR. KENDALL: I will try it again. I want to make

{

j 14 sure that I understand the points that are being monitored.

l 15 As I understand it, there's only two. One is the jacket 4

{ 16 water temperature at the top of the diesel where the two 17 lines meet for the return where the three temperature 18 switches are mounted.

19 MR. SHEIBANI: That's right.

j 20 MR. KENDALL: The other thing that is being i

21 monitored is heater current, so you know when the heater l 22 cuts on and cuts off.

i 23 MR. SHEIBANI: Correct.

, g 24 MR. KENDALL: There is no actual monitoring of 25 temperature in the tank.

92 PROJECT 035290

11 J

1 MR. CHAFFEE: I thought they said they were i I l 2 measuring the current for the heater and they put a thermal  :

1 3 couple and measured the temperature at a high point just 4 above the heater.

5 MR. BURR: No. We removed one of the temperature 6 switches and have a thermal couple in there, RTD, I should 7 say.

8 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, I understand. Basically we I

9 have a --

10 MR. KENDALL: Did you go back and calibrate the j 11 heater, or do you know if the heater is actually cutting on i I l 12 and cutting off, what those temperatures are? I guess the

13 heater is always on.

l 14 MR. BURR: It's always on, except for about five i

15 or eight minutes it's off. So, we are drawing a straight 16 line.

17 MR. CHAFFEE: It sounds like that heater is made l

18 basically just to be able to keep up with the ambient 19 losses.

20 MR. BURR: It looks like that.

21 MR. CHAFFEE: I guess basically it sounds like the 22 flow you got is just enough to keep things -- I am going to i

23 get this mental picture that the flows that exist in the

{

24 warmup system is intended to be sufficient to keep the water l 25 fairly evenly mixed and fairly evenly distributed in 92 PROJECT 035291

?

12 1 temperature throughout the jacket water system. 1

( i 2 MR. BURR: It appears that way. I i

3 MR. CHAFFEE

What that tends to suggest then is, j 4 when the diesel gets called upon to start up, unless somehow I

5 this warmup system is leaving some cold pockets someplace -- l l

6 MR. BURR: I believe we have one hot pocket in the i

, 7 heat exchanger. We are measuring a higher temperature j 8 there.

i, 9 MR. CHAFFEE: How did you discover that? Did you l, 10 put some different sensors --

l 11 MR. BURR: Surface thermometers, and we also have l i

12 some local sensor gages. We are reading about 170 degrees j I

' I 13 at that water heating tank. '

14 MR. CHAFFEE: In addition to these sensors that we 15 just talked about, you are basically using whatever sensors 16 you can find to get whatever measurements you can on this 17 system over this 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period?

j 18 MR. BURR: It's a survey, we just went out and 2 19 looked.

20 MR. CHAFFEE: Good move. We have 170 degrees in

21 the lube oil cooler area.

22 MR. KENDALL

Ken.

23 MR. BURR: Yes.

24 MR. KENDALL

Did you check all the other places 25 too, in the jacket water system?

92 PROJECT 035292

l 1 l I

i

~, l 13 l 1 MR. BURR: The lube oil jacket was the highest 2 temperature we could find.

l l

3 MR. KENDALL: What was the lowest temperature that 4 you could find? i 5' MR. CHAFFEE: Would you guys please state your

] 6 name before you speak. Let me ask a question.

1 I 7 MR. KENDALL: Where in the lowest temperature that j 8 you found?

j '

j 9 MR. BURR: I believe the lowest temperature we I

i 10 found was the one where the sensors are at.

4 ,

j 11 MR. CHAFFEE: Who just said that? l 1 12 MR. BURR: Burr. '

i j l 13 MR. KENDALL: The lowest temperatura you are l 1

14 seeing is up at the high point there, and that was 1637 l 3

15 MR. BURR

We are using surface thermometers, so I i

16 those are not that accurate.

I

17 MR. KENDALL

Understand.  ;

i

! 18 MR. CHAFFEE: Do you have an explanation for why l

. i 19 the temperature is higher, the lube oil cooler?

l 20 MR. BURR: We are probably not getting as much 1 1

21 flow through the lube oil heat exchanger. Of course, we 22 also have to heat the oil.

l 23 MR. CHAFFEE: That's what I was leading to. You l i

! i 24 do have a warmup system for the oil. Do you happen to know 25 whether or not that warmup system for the oil tries to keep 92 PROJECT i 035293

14 l 1 the oil at a temperature different than what the jacket

! l 2 water system heater is trying to do?

l 3 MR. BURR: It doesn't appear to be right now.

e

4 MR. CHAFFEE

You must have a heater also, right.

1 5 Does the heater trip set points; does it go off at the same

( .

l 6 value that the jacket water goes off, or is it a different

] 7 value?

4

8 MR. BURR

I have not made that survey, so I do 4

j 9 not know.

10 MR. CHAFFEE

That's interesting though, that the j 11 water in the lube oil is higher. That may be the hot 12 pocket. If the lube oil system actually shoots for an even I 13 higher temperature, that might where the hot water slug is 14 coming from. You guys probably ought to take a look at that 15 and see what the lube oil warmup system is trying to do.

16 Maybe it is creating the hot pocket. Maybe the thing that l

17 is creating this hot pocket is not this jacket water heater 18 but the lube oil system that is creating the hot pocket, 19 which then is induced in the jacket water system.

20 MR. BOCKHOLD: This is George Bockhold. I had to 21 come in late because of some discussions I had to have with 22 corporate, some information that Region II wanted. Let me 23 give you another piece of information.

, 24 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay.

25 MR. BOCKHOLD: Iast night I had my IEC folks take 92 PROJECT 035294

i

, 15

1 a brand new switch out of the varahouse, jacket water i I l 2 temperature switch.

t 3 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay.

j 4 MR. BOCKHOLD: I did a little experiment. We took 4

5 it as it was calibrated from Calcon, and really didn't do

]

( 6 anything w'ith its calibration. We put it in a temperature j 7 bath and we basically found out where it tripped. What we 8 used was, we used one degree per minute temperature rise and j 9 it first tripped at 196.8. We did a two degree per minute i

j 10 temperature rise, and it tripped at 195.4. Then we did a 11 three degree per minute temperature rise. It tripped at l i l 12 195.6. Then we did a four degree a minute temperature rise,.

l 1 13 and it tripped at 195.3. l l

14 Basically that test -- that was the fastest that l

15 we could do in a controlled fashion.

l l 16 MR. CHAFFEE: That test suggests that the rate of j l

j 17 temperature change has no impact on the switch.

j 18 MR. BOCKHOLD: On the switch. Then we took the f 19 switch and we put it in a 160 degree bath. After that got j 20 stable, we quickly picked it up to a 200 degree bath. It 21 took the switch three minutes and 54 seconds to trip.

22 MR. CHAFFEE: You put it at what temperature bath?

i 23 MR. BOCKHOLD: Can't tell, because we don't have

, 24 the ability to homogeneously change the mixture.

. 25 MR. CHAFFEE: I just didn't hear part of what you i

92 PROJECT  ;

i 035295

16  !

I said. You said you took it out and you did a step change in  !

! I l 2

2 temperature to it. What was the step change from to?  !

l 3 MR. DOCKHOLD: One-sixty to 200 degrees.

j 4 MR. CHAFFEE One-sixty to 200 degreen, and it i

l 5 took it three minutes and 54 seconds to trip?

1 .

6 MR. BOCKHOLD: Three minutes and 54 seconds. We

. 7 tried to keep the temperature bath at approximately 200 1

i j 8 degrees.

I

! 9 MR. CHAFFEE: And it took three minutes and 54 '

i 4

10 seconds to trip?

11 MR. BOCKHOLD: That information tends to say that i

12 the tests were running on a diesel will not show anything, I

! 13 but we are going to go ahead with it.

l

! 14 MR. CHAFFEE: Why would it take so long for it to l 15 trip? I guess the reason it took the three minutes and 54 l

16 seconds to trip is because --

l 17 MR. BOCKHOLD: The thermal well was at 160 l

, 18 degrees, and we took the thermal well and the switch and

! 19 moved it to the next. The last test, of course, was not a i

20 controlled experiment. The temperature rise was about four i

j 21 degrees a minute under a controlled type test.

22 MR. CHAFFEE: Then you took it from 160 degrees 23 and put it in a bath of 200 degrees, and it took three

, 24 minutes and 54 seconds for it to trip from the time you put l

I

25 it in the bath of 200 degrees? l l 92 PROJECT

' 035296 i

1 17 4

1 MR. BOCKHOLD: That's right. The thing that we j 2 were trying to verify was, we were trying to find out if the 3 set point went down significantly as we increased the rate

) 4 of rise of temperature.

i

• j 5 MR. CHAFFEE: Right, I understand that.

i

6 MR. BOCKHOLD

We were just trying to prove or I

I J 7 disprove what the Calcon man said about that. The last test

! l 8 was let's try to get a step change in temperature, and see j l

i 9 if the set point changed. You know, the last test was gee, j i l j 10 let's try something else because the fastest that we could '

i 11 go in a controlled fashion was four degrees a minute.

l i 12 MR, MOSBA: This is Alan Mosba. What that last .

l 13 test tells me is, we couldn't come up with a speci fic i

14 temperature at which the switch tripped. That tells me that f

15 because of the long time that it took-to trip, that it j 16 tripped a temperature fairly close to the 200 degree point.

I 17 If there had been a significant downward set point shift due

~

18 to a rapid increase in temperature, it would have tripped a i

19 whole lot sooner.

20 We were coming up on the equilibrium temperatura l l

i 21 of the new fluid that you immersed it in, and it took three 22 minutes and so many seconds to reach that. It means that

! 23 there was not a significant set point shift, even under a i

i 24 very rapid rate of change of temperature.

i l 25 MR. CHAFFEE: Right. What's true is that -- I

} 92 PROJECT l 035297 4

l 18 1 would assume that they built the RTD well and sensor such 2 that time constant for it coming up to temperature should be 3 fairly quick.

l.

4 4 MR. MOSBA: I would agres.

l 5 MR. CHAFFEE: I agree with you. When you put it i

6 in the 200 degree bath, was the temperature of it being l

7 monitored? Did you see any change in it? Did it stay l l

8 basically at the 200 degrees? l l

9 MR. MOSBA

George will have to answer that. 1 1

a .

10 MR. BOCKHOLD: The people who did that were on l l

11 night shift, so we would have to kind of talk to them about  ;

! 12 it. But I believe they were trying to maintain it

- i I

! 13 relatively constant at 200 degrees. We will check and see l

}

14 how big the bath was and what the thermal inertia of the 15 bath was that it didn't get drug down any.

i l 16 MR. CHAFFEE: I would like to know that. From i 17 what you have told us, it sounds like the rate of l 18 tesperature change really has very minor impact on the set i 19 point. I

l 20 MR. BOCKHOLD: I think that's what those tests I 4  !

21 show. l I

J 22 MR. CHAFFEE: If that's the case and if that goes 23 away -- also what we have been told just before you walked

, 24 in George, is that at least the temperature out by the 25 sensors seems to remain very steady and constant at 163 92 PROJECT 035298 l

I f* 19 l i 1 j 1 degrees for the first three hours of your test. The other l

i l 2 thing that we were told was that the high point in

. l 3 temperature seems to be adjacent to the lube oil cooler i .

1 4 which was, I guess, at 170 degrees. l

) 5 We were just pursuing a line of discussion saying, i'

6 well, why is it hotter there. Is it by chance a situation l 7 where a differential temperature that the sensor sees is

} 8 more becoming a function of what the lube oil warmup system

) 9 is doing. We were just getting into that kind of I

l 10 discussion.

l 11 MR. MOSBA: I think what we are seeing, given the i 12 temperature information that we have around the lube and the.

I l 13 flow rates that we and the cycle, the turnover time is, we 1

i 14 have a fairly homogeneous distribution of temperatures. The f

15 coolest point is the point coming out of the diesel where we l i 16 have incurred the ambient losses. The hottest point is the 17 temperature where we have another source, the heat source, 18 the lube oil.

19 But the total range of temperatures we have given 20 you is only seven degrees. Maybe around the lube the l 21 various fluid pockets and so forth have different i

22 temperatures, but that is probably all within 10 degrees. ,

. 23 MR. CHAFFEE: I guess the one thought that is i

(

24 running through my mind is that -- everything that you said 25 makes sense to me. The thing I think you might want to 1

92 PROJECT 035299

^

i j

20 1 think about considering is whether or not the lube oil 2 cooler system could cause the temperature of the jacket

]

3 water that is adjacent to the lube oil -- in the lube oil i

i 4 cooler, would the maximum temperature expected be this 670

} 5 degrees or does it have any kind of cyclic nature.

} 6 If it turns out that the 170 degree is the maximum i

' 7 temperature that exists in the jacket water system, then you ,

8 have just bounded it. In other words, that is the max l

9 temperature and the minimum is 163, and it all fits ,

10 together. On the other hand, if there is any cycling of l '

i i 11 temperature in that lube oil cooler you would want to know

! t j 12 about that.

l 13 MR. BOCKHOLD: Okay. I don't think there's an

! 14 issue there, but we will check and see what the on and off l 15 set points and reset points are on the lube oil heater, and l

{ 16 see what the span of operation is there and see if that l l l i 17 could have any effect. My inclination now given the data l l .

l

18 that I have is probably that is not a big -- it is still 19 bounded by this 10 degree variation. But, we will check i i

I j 20 that. l l

. 21 MR, CHAFFEE: We have it. I assume that when you g

22 are out doing your survey of all these temperatures around i l' 23 the system, you guys are keeping some sort of record of that l i

, 24 just for your own records?

25 MR. BOCKHOLD: I think that information will be in

) 92 PROJECT

035300

~

l

21 1 the test log or we will include it in the test log.

l 2 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, great. What we would like to 3 do is once that stuff is recorded, we would like to get a j 4 copy of it. We would like to have that.

! 5 MR. BOCKHOLD: Okay, i.

6 MR. KENDALL

Are the surface temperatures that l

7 you went around and checked, is that just a one time shot or j 8 are you going to do that again sometime within this 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 9 period.

I i 10 MR. BOCKHOLD: I think that if, after a couple of I

1 11 more hours of observation of this, that all we are seeing is 12 steady state. We have no more data to collect, and nothing 1

l I 13 is changing again. We may not go the full 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. There l

j 14 may be no purpose in that if everything is totally stable.

l 15 MR. CHAFFEE: Right, from the standpoint -- I

16 understand what you are saying. I don't disagree with that.

i I 17 The concept being that if you find that the temperature i

18 distribution in the jacket water system stays basically 19 constant as a function c a time, there is no sense in i

20 continuing to draw data.

J i 21 MR. BOCKHOLD: We have observed maybe an hour and i

^

22 one-half periodicity on the cycling of the jacket water 1

l 23 heater, and once we observed that for a couple of more 24 cycles and if we have no other issues like any other heaters

! 25 or whatever and see no impact from any of those, we will be i

4 92 PROJECT 035301

_= - .. -.- -

l l

[' 22 1 4 l 1 inclined to terminate the test and think that we have all 2 the data that can be obtained.

i 3 MR. CHAFFEE: I understand. I guess the only T

4 thing I would throw out again is this thing with the oil i

i

5 heating portion.

6 MR. BOCKHOLD: We will investigate that and l

j 7 resolve whether that has any impact.

8 MR. CHAFFEE: The reason we are going for all this 9 is what we are assuming is that the heat balance that exists a

10 in the system is made up of the cycling of these two l

i 11 heaters, the heater for the jacket water tank and the heater I

l 12 for the oil warmup system. Once you understand their .

} 13 cycling periodicity and the cycling of the pumps that are i

! 14 distributing the water, once you look at the periodicity 15 relationship of those and assure yourselves that you have 16 captured what can happen as those things go through the 17 periodic approach, I guess at that point you would have a 4

3 18 full picture of what is going on in terms of any transient 19 natures of hot spots associated with the diesel jacket water i

< 20 system as well as the lube oil system.

21 It sounds like you already have good data, that i

22 the jacket water itself near the sensors is fixed as a f 23 function of time, because you have had no variations. I j g 24 guess once you look at what the lube oil -- the only other i

25 thing that contacts this thing that can transmit heat I i I 1

92 PROJECT l i

035302 )

4 4

23 j 1 guess is the lube oil system. once you understand the 2 phenomena of that, then from that you will be able to 4

3 conclude whether or not you have taken enough data or not.

{

4 MR. BOCKHOLD: Right.

i l 5 NR. KENDALL: Did the surface temperatures taken 6 include different parts on the tank?

l 7 MR. BOCKHOLD: We agree. Anything else?

i i 8 MR. CHAFFEE

What Rick just asked was, in taking i

i 9 your temperature readings on different things did you take 1 ,

j 10 any temperature readings near the top of the tank, the hot 11 vater going up type of thing making sure that there's not an 12 accumulation of hot water jacket water that is in the top of i

j 13 the tank that maybe is -- later on again, when the thing 14 starts, could provide a slugt did you look at that?

15 MR. BOCKHOLD

I don't think we have taken any i 16 data. Let my folks explain the piping configuration where 1

l 17 the return water enters the tank and where we take the l

. 18 suction to the pump. I think that configuration may well i

19 dispel any stratification ideas in the tank. Who can speak

., 20 to that?

e l 21 MR. BURR: The water after it leaves the area 22 around the sensors that we have on top -- the trip sensors -

23 - it goes into the standby. The suction of the pump comes l

i 24 out the side of the heater.

25 MR. CHAFFEE: The concept that you are giving us 92 PROJECT 035303

24 1 is that you have relatively cold, 163 degree water is passed 2 by the sensors and goes into the top of the standpipe, and 3 then that water goes down. Is the heater near the bottom of j 4 the standpipe?

5 MR. BURR About the middle.

6 MR. CHAFFEE: About the middle. And then, the 7 pump that takes the suction off that standpipe that is, the

} 8 warmup pump, it is located about the middle of the tank?

9 MR. BURR: The suction actually comes out of the 10 side of the heater.

I 11 MR. KENDALL: My point for asking the question was i 1

12 is that it seems to me that you guys -- <

, 13 MR. BURR: We can't hear you.

J i 14 MR. KENDALL: The reason I asked the question was, 15 it seems to me that you guys want to make sure that you know

! l l 16 that this temperature thing from different temperatures in i

17 the system is or could definitely said is not a cause. From 18 what you have told us, I don't think that we can conclude 19 that you have done that.

20 MR. BURR: We will find out whether it is the 21 cause or not when we run the test. If we don't see a 22 temperature rise, all this is immaterial.

. 23 MR. KENDALL: You are saying that there is no g

24 point in taking surface temperatures at different points 25 within the system?

92 PROJECT 035304

I*

i i

l-l 25

1 MR. BURR: If we run the test and we find out that 2 there's no temperature rise, it don't make any difference.

j i 3 MR. CHAFFEE: But in fact you are taking some 4

4 measurements. You have already said you have gone down to  ;

5 5 the survey. )

1 6 MR. KENDALL: My point for asking the question

7 was, I just hope we are not in a situation later on where we l l 8 say something like did you take a temperature here, and we j 9 can't explain whether that would or would not have been a

} 10 contributor or not.

11 MR. BURR: If, after the test we find that we have 12 a problem, we will have to investigate and find out where l 13 that problem is.

14 MR. BOCKHOLD: Let me just summarize here. We got l

i j 15 the standpipe -- I understand that issue that you are 16 bringing up of any potential stratification in the I 17 standpipe. But the configuration is that the coolant water 4

i j 18 returning from the diese? ente *;s toward the top of the 19 standpipe and it flows down toward the heater, and the j 20 suction to the pump is in the vicinity of the heater.

21 That configuration should basically preclude 22 stratification. Ken's point is that if there is any 23 stratification when we run the final test, any slug of water j g 24 will show up in our temperature measurements. That is the i

j 25 whole bottom line of the testing that we are doing. We  !

l 92 PROJECT 035305

26 1 think that should show any affect.

2 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, I understand. Again, I guess i

3 we all agreed to the extent that you can as you have been 4 doing when you do your survey, you are trying to -- in fact,

! 5 it was good that you did that because that led you to this .

I 6 thing about the lube oil cooler having -- apparently at this 7 point it seems to be the hot spot. That is good, because 8 that will now lead you into trying to characterize what that 9 means in terms of is the 170 degrees is the hottest it could l 10 be or is perhaps the lube oil system cycles, could it be a

! 11 little hotter than that.

1 1

l 12 Again, what Rick is pointing out -- it sounds like i

' 13 you agree -- to the extent that you take surveys, you want a

14 to make sure your survey is comprehensive enough that you 1

, 15 capture any other potential hot spots that exist so that you l 16 can evaluate their significance and their possible variation l 17 as a function of time. I think we are all on the same 4 .

18 wavelength. I am glad to hear that you found this one with i 19 the lube oil cooler.

20 Again, when people are out there taking 21 measurements, as long as they keep in their mind where those 22 potential hot spots are and go out and take those readings 23 and look for those, I think they will be able to 24 qualitatively at least figure out what the worse case

, (

! 25 conditions might be. We agree that once you do the test, 92 PROJECT l 035306 L _____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -_

.. __ - - . . . _ - _ = . _ _ _ _ _ _ _

27 1 hopefully that will bear out whether or not it is a real 2 problem or not in terms of the diesel starting.

3 MR. MOSBA: We will find out with the test, but 4 right now the piece of information that George Bockhold gave ,

5 you that we are not seeing substantial shifts of the 6 temperature probe with rates of change in temperature and 7 then it's tripping in the 190 type temperature range, and 8 our observations that the system is barely homogeneous and 9 that the hot spots are in the 170 degree range, we think ,

r 10 those are sufficiently far apart that right now it doesn't 11 look like the slug of water theory is what is causing any 12 tripping.

I 13 Our tests will verify that, and that's where we 14 are.

15 MR. CHAFFEE: Who just talked?

l 16 MR. MOSBA: Alan Mosba again.

I 17 MR. CHAFFEE: Let's pause a second here. Let's J

i l

18 assume that what we are going to' find when this is all done 19 that the max temperature that those temperatures see on a 20 start is -- I don't know -- would we guess maybe 165 degrees i

! 21 or something like that?

) 22 MR. MOSBA: Probably no more than 170.

23 MR. CHAFFEE: Let's assume 170 then. Let's assume g

24 that the max you will see is 170. The next question we have 25 is, let's assume that at the vent that's the maximum 92 PROJECT l 035307 1

7 i l l

28 l 1 l l 1 temperature we saw was 170. The next question would be why l

! I l 2 did the trip occur? Let me ask another question. l i

3 At this point, my understanding is that your best ,

i i i 4 projection in terms of what caused the trip was the trip on l

l j 5 high jacket water temperature sensors, and that is because j 6 you were able to reproduce the annunciation that existed at 7 the time of the second trip by simulating a high jacket l 2

l 8 water temperature trip condition; is that right?

i 9 MR. BOCKKOLD: Yes. This is George again.

{ 10 MR. CHAFFEE: George, we were just trying to work l 1

11 through the thinking process. Let's assume that when all is l f 12 done here it turns out that the max temperature that these 1

13 sensors are going to see in the start and one of the fellows I

14 proposes to use 170 degrees because that's the max l

l 15 temperature that they seen in the lube oil cooler. The next i ,

l 16 discussion was, let's go back and figure out that if that's I 17 what it turns out to be, if it's only 170 degrees -- we said 18 the second trip at this point, ths belief is that the second l

1 19 trip of the diesel during the event was caused by high 20 jacket water temperature trip.

! 21 That is because you were able to reproduce the 22 annunciations that occurred on that second trip by 23 simulating a trip on high jacket water temperature. I guess l g 24 what is true at this point is -- I am not sure if everybody I 25 wants to say that the fact caused it, but it's the most 92 PROJECT 035308 l

l l

29 1

1 likely cause of the trip? l

! i 2 MR. BOCKHOLD: We said it is the most probable l l

3 cause.

l 4 MR. CHAFFEE: The next thing we say is, if the ,

! l

5 highest temperature that those sensors should have seen in l

\

l 6 the event was 170 degrees but they actually caused the trip.

1 j 7 The next question is, how do we account for that. What  ;

l

! 8 could have caused them to trip if they only saw a j

9 temperature of 170 degrees? i

] 10 I guess what is true in theory, they were set for l 1

11 something about 200 degrees and we need to come up with a i

! 12 rationale for this 30 degree difference between the set l

' 13 point and the actual temperature. The question is, how do l

14 we account for that, what could have happened? If it turns i

l 15 out that the rate of temperature change is not an 16 explanation for that difference, then what is there left l 17 that can be pursued in terms of trying to understand why I

j 18 these sensors caused the diesel to' trip.

I 19 MR. BOCKHOLD: What we have to do is, we have to 20 test the probes which are currently under quarantine. What i 21 I was going to say associated with this conversation and i

22 really with some of our other conversations that we have had 23 is, what we would propose is go get an independent lab -- I l

l ( 24 think we are looking at Wiley, but I don't think we decided 4

l 25 on that independent lab.

j 92 PROJECT 035309

~

i l

30 l 1 We collected all the quarantine pressure switches, i

2 we would get appropriate team of people, and if the NRC

] 3 wanted to be part of that team it would be fine, or if you 4 just want to look at the procedures that would be fine.

~

5 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay.

4 i 6 MR. BOCKHOLD: Let's take the quarantine switches i

j 7 and establish very detailed test programs and go and test 8 the switches and see if we could get the answer to your 9 question. Basically, that's where we are at. In fact, i 10 Louis Ward in our Birmingham Corporate office has been j 11 assigned the lead on that. Basically, we plan to move this i

12 offsite to have Birmingham take the lead on determining or .

i

13 working with you all on these temperature switches.

f 14 MR. CHAFFEE: Sounds good. Do you have a phone i

15 number for him?

} 16 MR. BOCKHOLD: It's 205-877-7802, Louis Ward.

17 MR. CHAFFEE: Did I get that number correct; 205-3

18 877-78027 j

i 19 MR. BOCKHOLD: That is correct.

j! 20 MR. CHAFFEE: Did you get any feeling from them in l 21 terms of what kind of timeframe this would all occur under?

1 22 MR. BOCKHOLD: No, I didn't get any feeling. I 23 believe that Louis got that assignment this morning, so he's 2

24 off to work on his new assignment.

25 MR. CHAFFEE: We should just contact him directly? ,

l O h07

_ _ . - - - . - . - _ - = _ - - - - - - . - . _ . - . . - . . .

31 1

1 MR. BOCKHOLD: Contact him directly. Ken Burr has i 2 been one of our lead engineers. He is the ssnior project 3 engineer, and he is working with our diesel testing. He 4 normally lives in Birmingham, so he will be getting back 1

! 5 there shortly and be working with Louis on this.

l l 6 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. Just a second. We have to 7 caucus here on this. Just a second, George.

8 (Short pause.)

i 9 MR. CHAFFEE: George, this is A1. Can you hear i

] 10 me?

i 11 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yes, go on, A1.

i 12 MR. CHAFFEE: Rick just brought up a good point.

l l

8 13 I think that you are probably aware of this. Catawba had l 14 some problems with the pressure sensor switches on their i 15 pressure valve diesel, and it was because of moisture 16 problems. I understand from our discussions that it is 17 probably not the case here.

{

l 18 I believe that some of the quarantined switches i

19 include some pressure switches. The thought that we had was

20 thkt it would probably be a good idea if in this test 21 program that they are doing if they took a look at the i

4 22 pressure switches at least to the point to verify that you i

{ 23 don't have that kind of problem that they had at Catawba.

i g

24 MR. BOCKHOLD: I spoke to a person at Catawba and, j 25 yes, I understand they had problems with pressure switches.

i

~

92 PROJECT i 035311 w--

. . -- .-. - . - - ... =. . .- . .

\

• i 32 1 Further, I understand that they had a clearance problem is i

2 what I thought the gentleman told me on their pressure j 3 switch and they changed to a difference clearance and I

j 4 actually a different model number and then they did not have )

l 4

5 any pressure switch problem. I 6 We did not get pressure switch problem indication.

. I 7 MR. CHAFFEE: I thought you got a low jacket water I

{

f 8 pressure annunciator the same time that you got the high 9 jacket water temperature. I

! 10 MR. BOCKHOLD: That was a turbo charger lube oil I

11 pressure annunciator. That was not -- they got main bearing

{

! 12 engine low lube oil pressure. )

, i 13 MR. BURR: They had a problem with the old model l 14 pressure switches. We have new models, the same as they l

15 have now.

16 MR. KENDALL: The model pressure switches i

{ 17 installed on the diesels during the time at your plant were l 18 not the same models that they had problems with at Catawba. ,

i l i 19 MR. BOCKHOLD: We have, and we have checked the i

{ 20 new models. l I

21 MR. CHAFFEE

When you say new models, is that a I

i 22 new calcon model or the new model is the calcon switch 23 versus a previously older versus another manufacturer's I

]

l g 24 switch that was previously used?

l

! 25 MR. BOCKHOLD: Calcon is what I believe.- '

) 92 PROJECT l 035312

1 33 l

l 1 MR. BURR: The number was -- I am just guessing i

2 now -- I think it was 4400 was the old number and the new i

l 3 one has a B on the and of it, 4400 B. We have the B model.

l 4 MR. CHAFFEE: Both made by Calcon?

! 5 MR. BOCKHOLD: That is correct.

t j 6 hER. CHAFFEE: I didn't know that either. They I

! 7 actually changed their models. That model change is just I

8 for the pressure switches and not for the temperature 9 sensors?

! 10 MR. BOCKHOLD: Correct. That is our knowledge. ,

4 1

1 11

~

MR. CHAFFEE

Where are we at. There's going to 1

4 12~ be a test program to try to figure out what is wrong with

13 these high jacket water temperature sensor switches. Is t

14 that program' going to only look at the jacket water i

15 temperature sensor, or is it also going to get into and 3

16 address the other sensors that are currently quarantined?

4 j 17 MR. BOCKHOLD: My plan was to basically give them i

18 all the switches and let Louis Ward and those folks and the I 19 laboratory work out the details of that. I am not quite l

l 20 prepared to answer that, and I think it would be appropriate i

! 21 for you to contact Louis or we could have Louis contact you.

22 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. Sounds good to me. Our first i

. 23 cut would be, we would like to see them do the testing on

24 all the quarantined switches so they can figure what went j 25 wrong with all the switches that are quarantined for which 92 PROJEC l 035313 C _ - -- - -- - _ _ _ - _.

34 1 there is something -- that there is believed to be something

(

2 wrong with them. I 3 Some of the quarantined switches I think perhaps ,

l 4 are switches that were taken off and nothing was wrong with 5 them, but they were just taken off as --

6 MR. BOCKHOLD: That were leaking a little bit but 7 would have normally been acceptable, but we were very 8 conservative and wanted to get the best switches we could 9 out there.

10 MR. CHAFFEE: I understand. There needs to be 11 another dialogue to talk about what switches are going to be 12 tested and so on and so forth. We will conduct that ,

i 13 dialogue with Louis Ward. That's going to go on to look 14 into the sensors. This is ongoing now, in terms of looking 15 into the impact of temperature variations in the system. Is 16 there any other rocks that haven't been looked into in terms l

I 17 of the diesel's operation during the event? I guess not.

l .

i 18 Region II, do you have any questions or comments?

19 MR. BROCHMAN: No. We are fully onboard and have 20 been talking with them with respect to diesel generator l

l 21 operability issues.

) 22 MR. CHAFFEE: I guess that's all we have. Thank l

23 you very much, George. The transcriber needs to get the 24 names of the people that were talking.

25 MR. BOCKH0LD: Before we hang up here A1, I went l

'"m:~

1

~

35 1 and checked with Herb. He has probably a roam of ERF I

2 pictures and I am going to have him Federal Express that up 3 to you tonight.

4 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, great.

5 MR. BOCKHOLD: We will also send it in the package 6 --this will either be the originals or copias, I don't know 7 which. You will get another submittal of them too. If they ,

8 are originals don't lose them, because the copies are not i

9 going to be very good.

10 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, understand. Is there anything 11 else that anybody has?

12 (No response.]

13 MR. CHAFFEE: Thank you very much. We will talk 14 to you again tomorrow at 10:00. Wait a second, one 15 question. If everything goes well, the procedure -- we 16 haven't seen it but we understand that you guys faxed it up l

17 and we will take a look at it. We will get comments back to 18 you as soon as we can. When are you planning on doing the 19 test? What is the timeframe for that?

20 MR. BOCKHOLD: About two hours from now.

21 MR. CHAFFEE: You are planning on doing it at 1:00 l l 22 o' clock?

i 23 MR. BOCKHOLD: Between 12:00 and 1:00. i

! ( 24 MR. CHAFFEE: Between 12:00 and 1:00, so an hour l 25 from now?

92 PgoJECT

! 035315 3

. I 36 1 MR. BOCKHOLD: That's right.

2 MR. CHAFFEE: We would appreciate it if we could 3 have gotten the procedure a little more than one hour just 4 before you planning on doing the test. We will take a look  ;

I 5 at it right now if we have it. If we haven't got it, we 6 will give you a call back. Again, we would ask you to wait 7 and give us a chance to look at it before you start it up.

8 MR. BOCKHOLD: Okay. Herb faxed it up to you 9 before this phone call ever started. In fact, I thought ha 10 faxed it up at 9:00.

11 MR. CHAFFEE: Our understanding was that there was l

12 nothing here and we were told that you guys were in the 8

13 process of faxing it as we got on the call.

14 MR. BOCKHOLD: I think he verified it's there, but 15 I will check on that.

16 MR. CHAFFEE: We will check. Sometimes these

! 17 things get shuffled. Again, we checked this' morning when we 18 came in and were told nothing was here. When we called down i

19 to verify it we talked to somebody down there and they said 20 they were just in the process of faxing it as we started the

. 21 call. We will go find it, and if we can find it we will 22 take a look at it and give you a call back with our i

23 comments. If we can't find it, we will call back and we

(

24 should talk to Mehdi Sheibani?

25 Let me ask you a question. In case we can't find l

92 PROJECT 035316

. 1 l

37 1 it, what Mehdi Sheibani's phone number?

i 2 MR. BOCKHOLD: He's on extension 3209.

3 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. We will give him a call here 4 as soon as we are able to determine whether or not there's a l

5 problem with us getting it or not. l 6 MR. BOCKHOLD: Okay. ]

l 7 MR. CHAFFEE: Thank you. Before you decida you

]

8 are all done, you are going to go back and assess the impact  ;

9 of the lube oil system and make sure that you have enough

i j 10 data to cover any variations in that, right?

11 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yes. We will do that from the data

! 12 and we will also look at the test points.

! 13 MR. CHAFFEE: You understand what I am saying. It i

l 14 would be unfortunate to decide just to do it for four hours 1

j 15 and then find out after you have gone and run the test that i 16 you really didn't have it all understood what sort of I

l 17 temperature changes are going on in that lube oil system.

t

18 MR. BOCKHOLD: We agree. We agree that it is i I

! 19 important to look at that.

)

l 20 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. Thank you.

I j 21 (Whereupon, at 10:56 a.m., the telephone ,

i j 22 conference concluded.)

l 23 24 25 4

i 92 PROJECT 035317

• 1 l

I REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE This is to certify that the attached proceed-ings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission is the matter of:

NAME OF FROCEEDING: Operations Interview DOCKET NUMBER: j PLACE OF PROCEEDING: Bethesda, Maryland were held as herein appears, and that this is j the original transcript thereof for the file of 1 the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission .

I taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court report-ing company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.

b JL JON NDLEY Official Reporter Ann Riley & Associates. Ltd.

l l

l l

i 4

I j- I l

a 92 PROJECT j 035318

d-6$ 103-G Ac>

GPC EXHIBIT 11_ .

BOCKHOLD EX. X OFFICIALTRANSCRIFr OF PROCwoINGS' g Nuclear Regulatory Comunission l

Tide: Telephone Conference IIT, Licensee, Region II (CLOSED)

Docket No. ,

4

! LOCATION: Bethesda, Maryland DATF.: Friday, April 6, 1990 pacts: 1 - 34 S

i i

i i

ANN RIIE& ASSOGATES, UD.

1612 KSt.KW, Suite 300

% D.C 20006

(202) 295-3950 92.P D EC7 035313

l e i . 1 l l I 1 UNITZD STATES OF AMERICA <

l l 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3' l 3 '

l l 4 - - - --- - - - - - - - - - - -X i 5 In the Matter of:  :

6 Telephone Conference: IIT,  :

7 I j Licensee, Region II  :

l j 8 (CLOSED)  :

9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 10 11 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 12 Operations Center

. 13 7735 Old Georgetown Road 14 Bethesda, Maryland 15 Friday, April 6, 1990 16 17 The above-entitled matter commenced at 10:12 18 o' clock a.m., when were present:

19 20 Alfred Chaffee, Incident Investigation Team Leader 21 Ken Brockman, NRC Region II 22 Rick Kendall, NRC 23 George Bockhold, Vogtle 24 Lewis Ward, Vogtle 25 92 PROJECT 035320

d j = 2 1

1 PROCEEDINGS i 2 (10:12 a.m.]

3 MR. CHAFFEE: It's April 6th, at 10 o' clock. This 4 is of IIT Vogtle.  ;

5 Now, what I want to do is talk about a little bit 6 about the diesel generator. I guess maybe the first thing 7 we should talk about is the following:

8 Rick has been trying to pull together, from all

9 the various information sources, what exactly the history is 10 in some of these sensors, and what he is finding is that 11 there is a lot of -- in fact, Rick, why don't you begin the 12 talk?

. 13 MR. KENDALL: Okay.

14 What I have tried to do is take the different 15 sources of information that we had that discusses the 16 history of the sensors, and there are basically four sources ,

i 17 of information. I 18 The first source are the notes from the blackboard 19 or dry board, whatever you call it, in the large conference 20 room, that Al wrote up during our meetings on the diesel.

21 The second source was the document that was given 22 to us, I guess, the day before we left. It was called 23 " Global Diesel Generator Sensor History: A Summary". And 24 the first page of that had some information concerning 25 diesel reliability and some other stuff on it.

92 PROJECT 035321

6 l

- 3 1

1 The third source was a telefax that you sent up 2 here, and it was a copy of a note from Mark Briney to George 3 Bockhold. It was dated April 3, 1990.

4 And the fourth source of information was a second 5 telefax that gave us sensor history for the other quarantine 6 sensors.

7 And when you look at all these pieces of 8 information, there is a lot of contradicting information l 9 just concerning when it was last calibrated, concerning what 10 maintenance work order was associated with it, differing 11 dates. It's impossible, from all these sources, to try to 12 put together a complete story.

. 13 So, what I did was I developed a matrix, and I put 14 in one example, on one of the temperature switches, of the 15 type of information that we would like, and we'd just like 16 to telefax you a copy of the matrix, and then have you fill 17 in the holes.

18 MR. BOCKHOLD: That would be good. And in 19 parallel with what you're doing, yesterday I talked to Mark 20 Briney about -- his letter to me is probably the most 21 detailed and most accurate information, and it takes him a 22 period of time to pull that information together, and on the 23 temperature switch items, he was going to work those as a 24 higher priority and pull that information together.

25 The differing dates you saw is the relationship to 92 PROJECT 035322

4 -

1 when the work order was closed, in comparison to when the 2 calibration itself was done. So, I'm sure that caused some i

3 confusion. And some of the other words there were the job 4 got changed and assigned to a different person for a period l 5 of time, and he started to use different words.

6 So, why don't you telecopy what you want us to l

7 fill in? We'll give it to Mark Briney, and Mark Briney will

8 fill that in and supply any information that way.

9 MR. KENDALL: Okay. That sounds great, and we j 10 realize it's going to take a couple of days, probably, to do i

11 it.

12 MR. BOCKHOLD: Okay?

13 MR. KENDALL: Fantastic.

14 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. Then let's go on to the 15 diesel generators themselves.

16 Maybe the first thing we should do is talk about 17 this dew point situation and what you guys believe with 18 regard to that, and then I guess -- I thought we'd go in and 19 talk a little bit about what you found on the testing and l

20 where you're going with the testing.

l 21 MR. BOCKHOLD: Okay. On the dew point situation, 4

22 yesterday afternoon it came to my attention that on the 29th 23 of March we had run a test, and the test on the dew point 24 was unsatisfactory. So, you know, we had some concern about 25 why the test on the A Diesel was unsatisfactory on the 29th, 92 PROJECT 035323

t

) .

5 1 1 and we're pulling in together a bunch of-information.

j 2 At this point -- and this is speculation on my i

j 3 part -- the evidence is tending to point to a bad

) 4 instrument, a bad dow-point sensor instrument, and we only j 5 have one onsite, and we're getting another one, and other l 6 than that,'you can speculate seven different dozen ways on J

) 7 this thing, but that's what the evidence is starting to

! 8 point to, because when we test air at similar conditions, it i

9 all appears to be higher right now. Okay? l 10 And it's at a significantly different condition, l

i 11 like our instrument air in the turbine building. The 1

1 12 instrument does appear to work correctly, but at the diesel 13 temperatura pressure dew point, the instrument may not be l l i j 14 working correctly. )

! 15 MR. KENDALL: This is a test instrument.

i 16 MR. BOCKHOLD: So, basically, what happened is we 17 got this information; put the jacket water test, basically, 18 on hold until we could determine what we had; and what we l

19 did in the meantime is that the appropriate procedure that

! 20 the vendors and our experts tell us to use if you have a 1

i 21 higher dew point in the diesel storage tanks is basically to 22 do a feed-and-bleed on the tank, and over a day or so, the l l 23 air will clean up to -- the dew point will clean up to the

, 24 required quality.

25 We started that. We checked the instrument lines 92 PROJECT

035324

. 6 1 at one of the low points on the A Diesel. We also checked 2 the receiver by blowing it down. We haven't really gotten , ,

3 any real water out of the receiver in blowing it down. The 4 comment was that we haven't seen any water coming out of the 5 bottom of the receiver, and there's a drain valve right --

6 there's a drain pipe right on the bottom. Further, the 4

7 diesel system engineer blew one of the drain points down on 8 -- and this is the A Diesel -- on the control air system, 9 and he didn't see any moisture come out of that line. i 10 And we've run some other tests. Like we ran one .

11 test quickly on the B Diesel. That showed bad. We're off 12 to run a test in a few minutes on one of Unit 2's diesels.

l 13 I expect that's going to show bad,.because right at this l 14 point, what I believe is that the instrument is bad.

15 In parallel with this, we're going to buy -- we're l 16 going to find another instrument, so we can do this test 17 with a different instrument and see what that tells us.

l i

18 In parallel with this,'when the Cooper people get I

19 in in the morning, which I guess is about 11 o' clock or so, l 20 we'll give them a call. Given the indication that we have j

21 on the air and the dew point that this instrument is 22 reading, we believe we can probably do the jacket-water test 23 without doing any danage to the control or instrument air i

24 system.

I l

l 25 We believe that even at an elevated dew point, i l 92 PROJECT 035325

- 7 i

! 1 this is a long-term problem and not an immediate problem for

]

i )

i 2 -- associated with the controls on the diesel. We believe '

3 the diesels are operable right now, for example, and wo 1

l

4 believe this is -- you wouldn't want to run like this for l

5 ' months, if you had an elevated dew point.

6 So, we want to verify our belief with the Cooper 1 7 people. If we do verify our belief with the Cooper people, 8 we will go ahead and run the jacket-water test.

9 MR. CHAFFEE: When do you expect to have the new a

10 instrument onsite to do the dew point?

i i 11 MR. BOCKHOLD: Don't know. Maintenance was off I

12 this morning to go find one from one of our fossil plants or. )

1 13 maybe even buy one in Augusta.

14 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay.

l 15 MR. BOCKHOLD: I'm not sure we can get exactly the 16 same instrument that we have. The one that we have has a i

) 17 radioactive source in it, and you have to be, you know, 18 appropriately licensed to have th'is~ instrument.

4 19 So, we'll get something that's equivalent, but it

20 probably won't be exactly the same instrument.

l 21 MR. CHAFFEE: But you'll get one that meets I

) 22 whatever the standards are for its readings being -- felt to i

23 be correct, one that's calibrated and that's -- I don't know 4

24 if there's any industry standards in that area for that type s

i 25 of test instrument or not.

1 i

92 PROJECT 035326 t

~

. I l

8 l

1 You will ensure that your test instrument is l 2 properly pedigreed.

3 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yes.

4 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay.

5 Well, okay. I guess as far as doing the test

~

6 before you have satisfied yourself, through a test, that the 7 dew point of the air is within spec or not, I guess you're 8 probably right that it wouldn't cause any damage to the 9 diesel. It obviously would be preferable that you get that 10 thing all resolved and clean up before you ran the diesel.

11 As far as that goes, George, I think what we'll do a

! 12 is, after the call, Region II and we will talk about Cox a i

j i 13 little bit and decide what our feelings are on that. I i

4 14 understand where you're coming from.

l 15 MR. BOCKHOLD: We've basically put the test on 16 hold until we could resolve the issues with dew point.

17 Okay?

18 And one of the parallel paths was that our i

j 19 engineers, our folks believe that the air quality that we 20 are actually seeing in the instrument controls and in the l 21 receiver, even if the dew point was a little bit high, would 1

22 not be of concern for operability of the diesel engines, 23 would not affect the control systems. We are verifying that i

, 24 with Cooper. If Cooper agrees with those opinions, we would i i

! 25 be prepared to go ahead and run the test.

92 PROJECT 035327 f

- + ~

9 i

l 1 In the meantime, in parallel, we are doing the 2 appropriate procedure with the air receiver and the air j 3 dryer that if the dew point is not correct, we'll go ahead l

4 and lower the dew point in the air tank. But we're not l

5 seeing the dew point in the air tank getting any better.

J 6 So, we're starting to believe, more and more, we have a bad l

l 7 instrument, and the instrument has somehow failed.

4

8 MR. CHAFFEE

I see. Okay. I understand.

i 9 (Pause.)

10 MR. CHAFFEE: George, Rick is going to talk to you

! 11 a little bit at Catawba.

1 l 12 MR. KENDALL: It's our understanding that Catawba l 1 13 is the only other plant with TDI diesels that has a l

l 14 refrigerant-type dryer, and there were some problems at l I i 15 Catawba with their dew point and moisture affecting their '

4 2

16 Calcon pressure switches, and we understand that you don't j 4

17 think you have a dow-point problem, and we understand that i i

18 you've also got a different model of pressure switch that 19 may not be subject to the same types of problems that they l

20 had at Catawba.  !

l 21 However, when we go back and look at this thing,  !

22 one of the tests that was run was on jacket-water pressure 1

1 23 disconnecting the sense line, and the diesel tripped after .

24 80 seconds, which was one of the timeframes during the l i

i 25 event, and just putting everything together, one of the l 92 PROJECT 035328

l* l i l l

10 1 things that we would like to either prove or disprove is 2 that the problems that Catawba had are not the same problems l

3 that you have or that you don't have the same problem that l 4 they had at Catawba.

l 5 MR. WARD: This is Lewis Ward.  ;

l 6 We talked to Catawba yesterday afternoon, after I

i 7 this question came up, and the problem that they had was 8 associated -- they also have a desiccant in their dryer 9 system. They attributed their problems to an incident where 10 the desiccant became saturated, and they got desiccant into I

f 11 their air system, and they saw some corrosion on carbon l 0 l

] 12 steel surfaces due to the desiccant.

l

' 13 MR. KENDALL: Okay. Appreciate that. We had some 14 bad information then.

l l 15 MR. CHAFFEE: So, Vogtle does not use desiccant?

16 MR. WARD: No. We just have a straight

{

j 17 refrigeration system.

l 18 MR. CHAFFEE: And Catawba has a refrigeration i

j 19 system and desiccant?

20 MR. WARD: That's what they told us, yes.

j 21 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. We were also told -- I think 22 I was told this -- that the model -- I'm not sure this is 23 right -- that the Calcon switches that you have at Vogtle 24 are a newer model than those that existed somewhere else i

25 where problems existed, and I think it was Catawba. Does i

92 PROJECT 035329

j l ,

j . 11

1 that make any sense?

2 MR. BOCKKOLD: The pressure switches that Catawba i 3 had a problem with and they changed to a newer model, we  !

! 4 changed to the same newer model.

i

, 5 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. Do you happen to know what 6 the new model -- you know, what the change was?

! 7 MR. BOCKHOLD: I believe the change was a 8 clearance change in the switch itself.

j 9 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay.

I 10 MR. BOCKKOLD: That comes from a brief 11 conversation that I had with the guy at Catawba -- Wally 12 Greene.

1 l i 13 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. The other thing you should be 14 aware of is -- we received from you the Part 21 on Calcon 1

15 switches dated April '88. We have also been told, but we j 16 haven't gotten the document yet, that there was a supplecent j 17 to that Part 21 that was dated May 12, '88. We'd like to i

18 get our hands on that, and I guess we'd also like to make 1

19 sure that you're aware of it. I would assume that you guys i

20 must have it in your records, as well.

1 21 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yes, we do have the Part 21. I 22 gave copies to Rick Kendall.

1

! 23 MR. CHAFFEE: I know we got a copy of the April i

l 24 '88 Part 21, but did you give us the supplement, also?

j (

! 25 There's a supplement to it that was dated May 12th of '88.

i 92 PROJECT 035330 i

!, 12 l

l 1 MR. BOCKHOLD: I gave you the April one. l

! 2 MR. CHAFFEE: Right. That's my point. Apparently j 3 there is not only the April '88 Part 21 but there's a j 4 supplement to that Part 21. It's the supplement to the Part 5 21 that I personally haven't seen. I wanted to make sure 6 you guys were aware of it, and we also want to see it.

1 7 MR. BOCKHOLD: We'll send it to you.

j

! 8 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay.

i l l 9 Okay. Let's see. ,

1 10 Question: On your testing that you've done so l 11 far, you've been collecting some data, and we had some 12 questions yesterday, and where we left off yesterday was --

i

' 13 well, maybe, at this point, I should just ask you. Can you I

14 run through where you are in collecting data -- I would

?

l 15 assume that you've continued collecting data over some 16 period of time -- and what you've found, and is there 17 anything new in that regard, lube oil and that sort of l

4 4

18 stuff? -

I 19 MR. WARD: What are you looking for?

l 3

20 MR. CHAFFEE: I want to get a mental picture of l 21 things like have you continued to see that the -- okay.

1 22 First, how long have you been taking data now? Have you i

23 continued taking data since you started the test? Has the i

24 temperature continued to remain steady at 163 degrees for

25 the sensor? Have you looked into the lube oil system to see i

i 92 PROJECT

035331

l

~

d i

13 1 how its temperature varies as a function of time? Have you

! 2 found any new hotter spot than the 170 degrees that existed 3 on the lube oil heat exchanger? Information like that.

i 4 MR. WARD: We have continued to take the readings E

5 since yesterday. That temperature has not varied more than i 6 probably a degree and a half.

} 7 We have monitored the lube oil heater. The lube

} 8 oil heater turns on and off at about a 50-minute cycle. And

! 9 if you look at lube oil temperature, the lube oil 10 temperature, in and out, averages about 155 degrees when it l

i 11 turns on. It turns off when you get an inlet temperature of 1

Then it stays off for 50 minutes.

12 about 167 degrees.

i l ' 13 Meanwhile, the temperature comes down to about 155 or so and l

l 14 repeats the same cycle.

l 15 MR. CHAFFEE: So, the cycle, as I understand it,

, 16 is when the temperature gets down to 155 degrees, the lube

! 17 oil heater comes on. It stays on for about how long?

4 i 18 MR. WARD: Fifty minutes.

i 19 MR. CHAFFEE: It stays on for 50 minutes. And i

j 20 that then heats up the temperature to 167 degrees, and at l 21 that point, it turns off, and it remains off for how long?

i 22 MR. WARD: Almost identical time -- 50 minutes.

23 MR. CHAFFEE: Fifty minutes. And then it repeats i 24 the cycle. So, the temperature cycles between 55 degrees i (

J 25 and 167 degrees.

92 PROJECT 035332

l f*

4 14

1 MR. WARD

Correct.

l 2 MR. CHAFFEE: And that temperature that you're [

l 3 measuring is the temperature at the inlet to the warmup pump 24 for the lube oil system which takes a suction close to the i

5 heater? ,

6 MR. WARD: Temperatures that we're reading are the 7 temperatures on the engine panel, which is called lube oil 8 in and lube oil out -- lube oil into the engine and lube oil 1 9 out of the engine.

! 10 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. How do those temperature l

11 readings relate to the temperature that the jacket-water l

i l 12 system sees when the system is in the warmup condition?

i l 8 13 MR. WARD: Jacket water is used to cool the lube i

i 14 oil.

I l 15 MR. CHAFFEE: Right. I understand that. But with l 16 the diesel secured and the warmup systems working -- you 17 know, what we said yesterday was the hottest place you saw -

i 18 -

19 MR. WARD: Was at the inlet to that heat 1

j 20 exchanger, which those two temperatures match up. You've 1

21 got two thermometers that are next to each other, and they l

22 read the same. The inlet jacket water and the lube oil 1

23 reads about 167.

24 MR. CHAFFEE: I see. Okay. So, where you're l 25 reading the lube oil heat exchanger inlet temperature and t

92 PROJECT 035333 1

l -

l t

15 1 the jacket-water temperature for -- where you were 2 monitoring that are the same location.

{

3 MR. WARD: Yes.

i' 4 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. I understand.

, 5 Okay. What that suggests, then, is if the max 6 temperature they saw was 167 degrees in the lube oil, it 1

7 sounds like the lube oil system and the jacket-water systems 8 were both designed to control their temperatures around the 9 same values.

l 10 MR. WARD: Yes. The inckat-water heater has not f 11 turned off at all since that once cycle we seen early in the

{ 12 test. It's been on continuously.

i 13 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. Well, this is unrelated to 14 the event, but I guess the one thought that has run through 15 our minds up here was do you have a problem with the

16 strength of that jacket-water heater, in the sense that it's 17 -- if you're in the middle of a very cold period of time, 4

10 you know, like in the winter or something, that it wouldn't 3

19 be able to provide the necessary heat to keep the jacket- j J g i 20 water system -- l i  !

3 21 MR. WARD: Diesel building is maintained at a  !

4 l

22 temperature, so they shouldn't change any. We maintain the j 23 diesel building at a temperature. It's not like the diesel  ;

t i

24 building gets colder in the wintertime. We've got heaters 1

25 in.

92 PROJECT 035334

16 1 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay.

2 So, I guess what you conclude from all of that is 3 that at least the initial conditions for the -- okay.

4 The next question is this: Based on all this data 5 you've taken, what do you believe and how confident are you 6 that what 'you believe is right, in terms of the temperature 7 distribution of the water that exists in the jacket-water 8 system and the lube-oil system, such that what's your 9 expectation that you're going to see when you do a start in 10 the diesel? 1 11 Have you got a feeling for that yet, from all the l

' 12 data you've taken?

' 13 MR. WARD: Be a few degrees rise, I, at this i 14 point, don't expect much.

15 MR. CHAFFEE: So, your impression is that the 16 temperature of the jacket-water system and the temperature 17 of the lube-oil system is pretty evenly distributed by the 18 warmup system such that there's not much variation in 19 temperature and that when the diesel starts, you should 20 think of it sort of as a homogeneously mixed -- mixture of 21 water from a temperature standpoint in both systems at the l l

22 time the diesel starts? l 23 MR. WARD: It appears like now. Won't know until 24 after we do the test.

4 I

[ 25 MR. CHAFFEE: So, you haven't found any hot or 92 PROJECT 035333 ,

i

t 17 ,

i 1 cold spots in these two systems relative to the average

2 temperature.

3 MR. WARD: No.

I; l 4 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. Have you taken enough -- you 5 know, looking around the system, taking temperatures on 6 pipes or whatever -- to be satisfied that you'd be very  ;

l 7 surprised to find a hot or a cold spot?

f 8 MR. WARD: Only place that I know right now of 4

9 where we'd find anything warmer is that lube-oil heat 10 exchanger.

l 11 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay.

12 MR. WARD: That goes up to 167.

l

] I 13 MR. CHAFFEE: So, basically, it's only about 4 14 degrees warmer than what the sensors are saying.

1 1

15 MR. WARD: Yes.

16 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. I have a question. When the

17 diesel is sitting there and it gets called upon to call a j 18 safety function, initially, I guess, as far as ultimately 19 removing heat from the diesel, that's done by this nuclear 20 service cooling water. I guess I have been told that, at  !

I i

21 least, when the diesel gets its initial start signal, 22 although the nuclear service cooling water system, whether 23 or not the pump is running or not, they don't actually get 24 flow to the heat exchanger because there is some sort of a I 25 temperature control that prevents that.

j f 92 PROJECT 035336 ,

~

i

. 18 1 The question I have is sort of some of the .

2 details. Does that start off, then, with the valves a

3 completely shut or are they partially by-passed? How long 4 does it take before those -- is there any kind of a timer j 5

• that insures that they don't open for a period of time or i

6 what temperatura do they have to begin to see before they l

7 begin to open. How long does it take them to open?

8 MR. BOCKHOLD: What I was told -- and Ken Burr, f ,

9 correct me if I as wrong -- is this is basically kind of 10 like a throttling by-pass valve. It is fully open at 170 J

j 11 degrees and fully shut at 152. Is that correct? So, with j 12 jacket water at 163 that valve is partially open, or i

' 13 l partially closed, at about halfway.

14 MR. CHAFFEE: What's the temperature of nuclear

15 service cooling water?

16 MR. BOCKHOLD: It will vary but anywhere, I guess, l 17 from 45 degrees to 85 degrees.

{ 18 MR. CKAFFEE: And at this point, right now, today, i

19 it's what?

5 20 MR. BOCKHOLD: Well, my pool is about 62 degrees, I

i 21 so I would say it's about that.

22 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. Then let's assume that if the 23 jacket water system is at 168 degrees, then that oil must be 24 flowing through that heat exchanger and right now it must be 25 being cooled, to some extent, by this nuclear service i

92 PROJECT 035337

l 1

. 19 i

{ 1 cooling water because it's colder, and there is some flow i

2 through there.

4 3 MR. BOCKHOLD: The jacket water has its own l i

l 4 nuclear service cooling water cooler. The low boil has its

! 5 own separate nuclear service belt.

J 6 What's your question?

l 7 ER. CHAFFEE: What I'm trying to understand is j l

8 what the heat balance is here. It sounds like what we've 9 got is the low boil is cooled by the jacket water, the  ;

2 l 10 jacket water is cooled by the nuclear service cooling water ,

I l-11 and it sounds like if this nuclear service cooling water i 12 system is running which it is right now, if the valve is

}

l 1 13 partially open it's going through and cooling off the water i

14 that's in the jacket water so one of the things that's 15 occurring right now in terms of heat loss that the jacket

{

16 water system is trying to make up for is the energy that's 17 being removed due to the nuclear service cooling water 18 system being partially cooling that heat exchanger. I just l

{ 19 vant to make sure my understanding is correct.

20 MR. BOCKHOLD: It's being mixed up in your head.

! 21 We've got -- in standby, we have a small jacket water pump

! 22 that pumps about 90 gallons a minute around the system but 23 it by-passes the nuclear service cooling water. The main

!I 24 shaft pump which pumps anywhere from, let's say, 1200 to

- I.

25 1800 gallons per minute, okay, it flows through a large 92 PROJECT 035330

~ r, -- ,,

20 1 nuclear service cooling water heat exchanger.

i 2 MR. CHAFFEE: Well probably the coldest point in

> 3 the jacket water system is the water that's in that heat

. 4 exchanger because it's probably at 62 degrees.

5 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yes.

6 MR. CHAFFEE: And that cold slug of water, then, 7 will first be introduced into the system when the diesel 8 starts and then that cold slug of water is going to find its l 9 way through until it hits these sensors -- unless it's 10 heated up as it goes through the engine -- it hits the 11 sensors once the diesel starts. So, I guess we would expect l

i 12 that we are probably going to see, when the diesel starts s

j i 13 up, a dip in temperature before it then goes back up. At 14 least, based on what we just talked about.

15 MR. BOCKHOLD: You might see a dip in temperature.

l l 16 MR. CHAFFEE: Might see one. Okay.

17 Are there any other dynamics of any other portions l -

18 of the jacket water system or the lube oil system where you 19 have something else going on, it's either hotter or colder.

I

20 I think it's important that people understand going into the 21 test what they might expect to see. Granted, at this point, 22 it sounds like we may see a cold slug go in. I guess what j 23 we said yesterday is perhaps it's not that significant 24 because your testing yesterday showed that the rate of i

25 tamperature change shouldn't have that much of an impact but 92 PROJECT 035339

4 21 1

1 it sounds like, from what you just said we shouldn't be 2 surprised to see the temperature of the jacket water

3 temperature probes dip-down fairly -- could be all the way

4 down to 62 degrees for a period of time, followed by an e

5 increase back up as the engine heats up.

, 6 MR. BOCKHOLD: I expect a decrease in temperature

! 7 because most'of the flow will be going around that heat l 8 exchanger.

i

! 9 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay.

i 10 MR. BOCKHOLD: You know, we are speculating.

i j 11 There is a potential for temperature to drop and then come l 12 back up. It really depends on how that three-way valve is i

! I 13 going to respond to temperature changes and how fast it is i

j 14 going to respond, and how fast the heat input from the

! 15 diesel, you know, heats up.

16 MR. CHAFFEE: Say that one more time, George.

i

! 17 MR. BOCKHOLD: The shaft-driven pump delivers some b -

l 18 by-pass flow around the cooler, some flow to the cooler.

4 l 19 Then it comes back together and mixes so that temperature is 20 going to go down. But then that cool water is going to come j 21 up and be right next to the cylinders in the diesel and it's 1

i 22 going to pick up heat from the diesel at that particular 23 point. Then it's going to come up to the temperature probes i 24 where we got it instrumented, okay? So, you know, my

! I j 25 reaction is probably the temperature will drop some and then 4

92 PROJECT f 035340

22 i

i come up but, you know, you have got a good bit of dynamics 2 here working where you have got a control valve working and l

3 you have heat input from the diesel cylinders working so we l

4 will see what happens.

5 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. Again, the only thing that  ;

l 6 I'm pointing out is I think it's important that people have J

7 it clear in their minds how all that integrated system 8 activity is going to occur in the start so that people can

.l l 9 be looking for expected parameter changes and recognize what 10 kinds of things they should be looking for in terms of

!l 11 something that's abnormal, to make sure that people are as i

12 prepared as possible to, you kA N , look for things going i 13 right or going wrong as the test occurs.

14 In addition, what's true is in thinking through i

15 some of these dynamics it would -- maybe you guys have done 16 all this, but to the extent you haven't in thinking through

! 17 the dynamics it then can make it clearer to you what sort of I

18 parameters you need to make sure are established so that the  !

l 1

! 19 test itself will be an effective test damonstrating that you i I 20 don't have any problems. J 21 For example, I understand that there will be a 1

1

22 couple of differences between this test and a true 23 simulation of what happened in the event because you are not 24 going to be loading onto the buss and having certain load

25 sequence. What we have been told and I don't necessarily 1

92 PROJECT

- 035341

- . - - - . . . .-. . - - - - - -- - .-- . . - - ~ - - - _ . .. . - - . -

23 1 disagree with is that that difference has no impact because i

2 it's not going to have any significant impact on the 3 portions of the system that are being tested. And I don't 4 disagree with that but I would think that to reach that 5 ' conclusion the people that are reaching that conclusion 6 would have to make sure they understood what all the 7 different phenomena that are going to be occurring to make 8 sure that those parameters that aren't going to be the same 9 would have no impact.

10 So, understanding the dynamics like you were just 11 describing of how this cold water or other things, you know, 12 how the water is going through the different components 13 leading to the sensor, in terms of seeing how the inner 14 system interaction is, will be important for them to 15 understand. If they have not fully done that, what we're

. 16 saying is they need to complete that process because you i

4 17 would be a little concerned, I would think, that if after l

l 18 you did the test and people were' studying the results and 19 stuff they found that oh, woops! Actually, it turns out t

l 20 that one of the things we didn't have established was one 21 that was critical to make sure that this was an effective

! 22 test and, therefore, we need to do the test again.

23 MR. BOCKHOLD: We understand what you're saying.

! 24 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay.

[ 25 We understand. I guess it sounds like you are i

l 92 PROJECT 035342 i

24 1 probably going to be doing that test sometime late today. Is I

2 that sort of your guess, George?

3 MR. BOCKHOLD: I hope to be able to do the test 4 this afternoon.

l 5 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay.

6 'egion R II, did you have any comment?

7 MR. BROCKMAN: I've got none from here in the 8 headquarters.

9 MR. MILLER: I understand they will start the 1

10 first test this afternoon. Assuming that test goes well, do 11 we have any testing beyond that.

12 MR. CHAFFEE: I'm sorry, Ken. Could you say that j

13 one more time.

1 14 MR. BROCKMAN: I understand the first test is to 15 start this afternoon. If things go well on that test, I am 16 interested in any hypothesized schedules for subsequent l

! 17 testing after that so that I can have my resources at the i

18 site appropriately marshalled.

i i 19 MR. BOCKHOLD: At this point, Ken, we have no more  ;

I 20 diesel tests that we plan to do unless something unusual 21 comes out of this test or we think of something in the i 22 meantime. The next test being, I believe, on the 23 temperature switches and Lewis Ward will be coordinating 24 that with a lab someplace and probably, Lewis, you might 25 speak to what schedule, if any schedule, you have been able l l

92 PROJECT

, 035343

)

. 1 l

1 25  !

1 to think about.

i 2 MR. BROCKMAN: George, you've got a function i 3 schedule after you put in the MWo.

4 MR. BOCKNOLD: Yes, b'tt I believe the IAT was not 5 interested in that.

6 MR. BROCKMAN: But I an.

7 MR. BOCKHOLD: That would occur immediately after 8 that.

9 MR. BROCKMAN: After what?

10 MR. BOCKHOLD: After the jacket water test.

11 MR. BROCKMAN: You won't have the MWO in that.

12 You can't do the functional until you've got those trips

' 13 taken care of with that MWO.

4 14 MR. BOCKHOLD: We have the MWO. It is 15 approximately four to six hours duration and we would then 16 go do the functional immediately after that.

'l 17 MR. BROCKMAN: So you would anticipate that that j 18 is probably an activity to be do'ne'this evening, then? l i

19 MR. BOCKHOLD: Probably, yes. We have already i 20 done that on the B Diesel.

21 MR. BROCKMAN

Okay.

22 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. George, on the one test that 23 you are going to be doing later today. The one thing that, 24 I guess, we are particularly interested that you focus on is 25 making sure that the dynamics of that nuclear cooling 92 PROJECT 035344

1.

t . 26 I service water system is well understood. We know in the 2 avant that that thing got cycled on later on and -- the same 3 thing. Just make sure that -- it would be very 4 disappointing to find out afterwards that somehow you had to 5 do it again because the parameters weren't exactly right.

6 Okay. Why don't we go on ahead to Lewis Ward and 7 what his --

8 MR. WARD: Okay. On tl4e temperature switches, I 9 talked to Wyley Labs yesterday and, basically, briefed them 10 on what had happened at the plant and what some of the 11 concerns were. They were, obviously, willing to put 12 together a test program for us. Their apprnach would be to.

. 13 do a design review of the switches in a paper-type review 14 first. Do a failure-type analysis on materials in the 15 switches that would be most subject to either failure or 16 corrosion or degradation and then examine a new switch 17 destructively, or at least take it apart and look at the 18 inside and confirm that their engineering review was on the 19 right track and then design us a sequence for examining and 20 testing these switches to establish what had happened to 21 them or see what kind of drift or erratic operation we might 22 have seen out of these particular switches.

23 I am getting a proposal. They are faxing a 24 proposal to me this morning to do that. They had indicated 25 if we elected to go that sequence the first part of that, 92 PROJECT 035345

• 27 I the engineering review and the test sequence they could have 2 in about a three-week time frame.

3 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay.

4 MR. WARD: I did inform them that the NRC and 5 Calcon and several other people would be interested in 6 looking at the test plan ahead of time and probably 7 witnessing the test.

I 8 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. Just a second.

9 I think a couple of people just joined in this 10 line. For those people that did just join, we have another

. 11 conference call on this line at 11:00, so if you will just i

! 12 hold on for a second we will finish. This is Al Chaffee 1 I

4 13 with IAT. We will finish this dialogue we are having here l 14 and then go on to that. So if you would just be patient for 15 a few minutes.

16 Okay. I understand, Lewis.

! 17 Okay.

1 I

18 MR. WARD: Was that what you were looking for?

! 19 MR. CHAFFEE: Yes. I would have been nice if they 20 could have, here in the short term, just done some -- what 21 would you call them? Sort of a repeatability study, where 22 they just take one of these switches and run it through a 23 number of tests. Let me say it differently.

24 It would have been helpful if they could have, up J

25 front, before they did a lot of some of this other stuff, 92 PROJECT 035346 5

. . 28 l 1 simply take a switch or maybe two switches and simply do the

2 following type of testing, to give us some initial i 3 information

Do a test where they were to demonstrate how 4 repeatable the switch's performance was. You know, they 5 just took a switch and did like four or five occurrences l

1 '

6 where they did carefully-controlled temperature increases 7 and see where the switch tripped and see if it repeated i

l 8 itself with good reproduceability.

9 Do the kind of tests that George had his people 10 did onsite, where they varied the rate of temperature change

- 11 and see how the switch's set-point changes in regards to i '

12 that. And then maybe do a set of tests where they would try 13 to introduce through the air some particles of different 14 sizes and see if that had any impact on that switch.

,' 15 And if they could do that testing fairly quickly 16 here, like in the next week, then they could see what kind 4

. 17 of results they got with that and then follow that up with

18 some of this more exhaustive testing. The advantage of that

] 19 would be that we could get some quicker-term type of 20 information in terms of these switches, with the more 21 detailed analysis being done later.

22 (Pause.)

23 MR. CHAFFEE: Well, anyway, we're in the process 24 with the agency of contacting some group -- and we're not 25 sure who it's going to be -- to sort of follow on to all of 4

1 92 PROJECT 035347

~

. i 1

• l 29 1 this.

, I .

l 2 Again, what I just said, I recognize that what  !

i 3 Wyle is proposing is probably the long, exhaustive thing 4 that needs to be done to get to the bottom line on all this, i

5 and for what it's worth, what I'm saying is that if there is 1

6 some way that they can provide some short-term feedback in ,

l 7 terms of some information about these switches, in terms of l 8 their reliability, reproduceability of their results, and 4

l 9 some information in terms of their sensitivity to certain i

10 types of variations of the environment they were in, that 11 would be helpful, to try to get a feeling for how the 12 problems with these switches could have contributed to what i 13 happened here at Vogtle.

14 But again, it's not clear to me that we're going 15 to have all these answers before the IIT report is issued.

16 But to the extent we can, the IIT report will be being 17 published, I think, sometime around May 7th. So, again, 18 what our interest sort of is is to try to see what 19 information we can get before that, to have it in the 20 report, but I recognize that some of this stuff isn't going 21 to be worked out until after the report is published, and it 22 will and up being, probably, something generic that will be 23 handled over the longer term.

24 So, do you understand what I'm saying? If there 25 is a way to get some information --

92 PROJECT 035348

30 1 MR. BROCKMAN: They are willing to do whatever we 2 want them to do. If you want to release some of these 3 quarantined switches -- and I'd send it to them this weekend 4 or this coming Monday -~ they'll be happy to take them.

5 MR. CHAFFEE: What I'm proposing, what I just 6 talked about is propose that they do just some switches off

7 the shelves, because at this point, what I want to try to i

8 make sure we put to bed is to what extent are they just 9 dealing with a switch problem?

10 In other words, if you can take a switch off the 11 shelf and just, you know, run it through its paces, 12 repetitively, the same test and you get good 1 i 13 reproduceability, that tells you at least one thing. It

! 14 tells you that its characteristics don't change just as a i

15 matter of sitting there in the bath.

16 And then if you do a couple of tests like they did 17 at the site, where they varied the temperature over a bigger 18 range than what they were able t'o do at the site, then you 1

l 19 put to bed the fact of how sensitive the switch is to the 20 rate of temperature change.

21 If you then do a couple of tests with a switch off

22 the shelf where you go through and maybe introduce some 23 varying size particles and get a feeling for to what extent 24 that can cause a problem in a switch, then what you've done 25 is you've then sort of tested the environment for a good I

92 PROJECT 035349

I

. 31 4 1 switch that you got from the manufacturer in terms of sort I

. I

) 2 of the parameters that it will work with, and then at that I 3 point, once that's done, then you can do that with -- in 4 conjunction with the other study that they wanted to do to i 5 set yourself up for them going out and looking at what the 6 specific failure mode was on the switches that are 7 quarantined.

8 But at least it puts to bed some of the folklore

! 9 that exists. I mean, you know, some people have told us 10 that the rate of temperature change impacts the set-point on 11 the switch. The results that George had done at the site

12 tends to repudiate that.

i.

i 13 We've also been told that if you get some

)

j 14 particulate in there, perhaps that cauld impact the switch.

i i

15 Well, it would be nice to know if that, in fact, is true or

{

i 16 not.

l 17 It would also be nice to know -- we've also had

] .

18 situations where the licensees celibrated the switch, only 19 to find a day later it's not calibrated. Well, it would be il 20 nice to know whether or not that is because the switch is

) 21 just poor repeatability, that it can drift all over the d '

22 place on its own, or in fact, it's something of above and l 23 beyond that. It would be nice to put to bed the fact that a 1

.24 switch does have good repeatability and, therefore, that if j

! 25 the calibration is changing, it must be due to something  !

! i 1 92 PROJECT l

, 035350 i

1 4

. 32 i

< 1 occurring to that switch from the time it's calibrated until 2 the time it's installed. Another thing might be to see --

3 you know, maybe somehow try to see if there is some way 4

4 handling could cause problems.

i 5 So, there's some type of tests that Wyle could do

6 that could be done, you know, sort of leading into some of l

l 7 these detailed material analyses that they want to do, but

] 8 there's some of the type of tests that they could do, you 9 know, perhaps in the short term, to try to quantify the j 10 problems we're dealing with.

I j 11 At this point, from what we saw at the site, you e

! 12 know, we're up here having the suspicion that perhaps a lot.

t 13 of the big problem is just the fact that it turns out that l

4 14 the bottom of that sensor -- you can rotate the bottom of 15 the sensor, and if you can rotate the bottom of the sensor, 16 it has exactly the same equivalent effect as if you were i

4 17 doing a reset in the calibration. By that, I mean one

{ 18 rotation of the sensor bottom is' equivalent to 100 degrees i

19 change in calibration set-point, which is identical to an i

! 20 action being done at the top.

j 21 So, you know, sort of almost like a rehearsal of 1 22 how the things are calibrated might much more quickly lead i

23 to what's going on in terms of these sensors than some of 24 the more exhaustive things that may still need to be done. ,

1 i

25 If they find that reproduceability is really bad, 92 PROJECT 035351

e e

- e 33 1 then that's when you get into looking at the materials and 2 things of that nature.

3 MR. BROCKMAN: Okay. I will approach them with 1

'4 that today. I 5

• MR. CHAFFEE: You have the drift of what I'm

~

6 talking about.

7 MR. BROCKMAN: Okay.

8 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. We need to have a fax number 9 to send this stuff down that Rick has for the matrices of 10 switch data.

11 MR. WARD: I will call Cherie and give her the fax

, 12 number.

l 13 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay.

14 Again, Lewis, if all this stuff I just said -- if  ;

I 15 you guys don't agree with that -- this has to be your test 16 program, not my test program, and I've only thrown out ideas l 17 of things that I think you should consider.

I j 18 You guys, in conjunction with your own

.i 19 organization, need to think through in your own minds what I

20 sort of test program you need, and I appreciate the fact 21 that, where you can, it would be the concept of trying to I

22 make it responsive to the IIT, and I think you can do that, I I

23 but still, you know, you need to use your own technical ,

1 i 24 expertise in terms of deciding what sort of testing is I I

l 25 appropriate, in discussions with Wyle.  ;

l 92 PROJECT 035352 l

t l 34 l

l l 1 MR. WARD: Okay. What's your extension number,

! 2 Al?  ;

, 3 MR. CHAFFEE: It's 492-7229.

i 4 MR. WARD: Okay.

j 5 All right. I understand what you're driving at, a

6 and I'll a'pply my expertise, but I do want to run it back by 7 you before we go charging off.

i j 8 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. And I'd like you, when you do 9 that, to talk to Rick Kendall. He is the one on the team 10 who has the lead on the diesel, and his number is 492-7318.

11 MR. WARD

Okay. Sure will.

12 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay.

I 13 Thanks. That's all we had, unless somebody else 14 has any comments.

15 MR. BOCKHOLD: No comments from the site.

16 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. Thank you.

17 MR. WARD: Thank you.

18 (Whereupon, at 11:02 asm., the teleconference was 19 concluded.)

20 21 22 23 24 i

25 92 PROJECT 035353

V a

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE j This is to certify that the attached procesd-ings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1 in the matter of:

NAME OF PROCEEDING: Telephone Conference DOCKET NUMBER:

a PLACE OF PROCEEDING: Bethesda, Maryland i

were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and thereafter reduced to typewriting

by me or under the direction of the court report-ing company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceecings.

1 im 99

i c/

JON MUNDLEY Official Reporter l Ann Riley &* Associates. Ltd.

1 1

1 i

1 f

a

(

92 PROJECT 035334 I

a .

r - aor- e -7.

CPC DUilBIT II.

BOCKHOLD EX.I OFFICIALTRANSCRIFT OF PROCRn)INGS l

MQ Nuclear Regulatory Commission i

Tide: rneid.nt Inv.stig.tton re Telephone Conference Call with Licensee and Region II Docket No. . .

i

)

, LOCAR N Bethesda, Maryland i

i

dam Saturday, April 7. 1990 PME1. 19 2

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1 0

i ANN RILEY& ASSOCIATES, LTD.

1612 KSt.N.W. Suise 300 W D.C 20006 92 PROJECT (20 0 295-3990 03 sass

i d

1

1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONNISSION 3

a 4 INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM 5 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL 6 WITH LICENSEE.AND REGION II 7

i 8 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co mission i

9 7735 Old Georgetown Road 10 Bethesda, Maryland i 11 12 Saturday, April 7, 1990

• j 13 10:00 a.m. ,

j 14 4

15 I 16 I 17 i

l 18 i

Y 19 20

i 21 1

l 22 23 s

i 24 25 92 PROJECT 035356

l l I

2 PARTICIPANTS:

l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Alfred E. Chaffee, Incident Investigation Team

,' Imeder

Rick,Kendall, NRC vogtle j George Bockhold Ken Brochman Ken Burr Louis Ward i

4 i

4 i

i l

1 l i

1 1

1

}

1 92 PROJECT 035357

1 I

3 1 PROCEEDINGS l

l 2

l (10:00 a.m.)

3 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, let's go ahead. My name is Al l

l 4 Chaffee. Ken, why don't you go ahead and take us through j 5 the test and what you guys saw, i .

l 6 MR. BURR: This is Ken Burr. When we started the 7 engine, it took about 40 seconds after we started and it 8 gradually ran down in temperature from 163 to approximately 9 155 and one-half. We contribute that to the water that is i

j 10 in the jacket water cooler. That valve appears to be

11 approximately one-half way open, so it's sucking up that l 12 cold water in there and driving it down.

' 13 MR.'CHAFFEE: The valve that you are talking about that is one-half way open, is that the valve, that three way

+

14 15 valve that either directs or doesn't direct jacket water l

l 16 through the cooler, or are you talking about a valve that is 17 in the nuclear cooling service water system that somehow i

18 directs or redirects nuclear cooiing service water to the

] 19 cooler?

J

20 MR. BURR

I'm talking about the three-way valve 21 that directs the jacket water.

j 22 MR. KENDALL: It's a temperature control valve, j 23 right?

j g

24 MR. BURR: Right.

j 25 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, I understand. Did you see 92 PROJECT

035358

I*

l 4

l 1 anything else? After it went down to 155 degrees, is that

I j 2 where it was when you then tripped the diesel or did it 3 start going back up?

l i

4 MR. BURR: It stayed within a few degrees of that.

5 It came up a degree or so on the other starts, but it i

6 roughly stayed down in that area. '

i L 1

7 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. How about the second start, 1 i

{

8 did you see the same thing?

i 9 KR. BURR: No. Water was already mixed in it. It

{

l 1 10 stayed in about that area.

] 11 MR. CHAFFEE: It stayed about in that area.

i.

. 12 MR. CHAFFEE: The second start it stayed around i

j 13 155 degrees both before and during the start?

j 14 MR. BURR: Right.

i j 15 MR. CHAFFEE: It seems to me if I remember i 16 correctly after that, then you went on and started the i.

! 17 diesel one more time and ran it for a period of time?

} .

) 18 MR. BURR: We did not see any more temperature 19 changes, just a few degree changes but nothing drastic.

20 MR. CHAFFEE: I guess what that tends to suggest I

21 then is, unless there is something else that occurred during J

22 the event, would it be correct to conclude that the jacket 23 water temperature sensors probably did not see a real a

24 temperature higher than 163 degrees?

25 MR. BURR: Correct.

92 PROJECT 035359

i. . . . - - - _ . - - _ _ _ _ _ _ __ -_ _-_

_- . _ - _ - - - . . . .- .-...-- ~ ._. _ _

i 5 i

1 MR. CHAFFEE: In~ light of that information --

i I 2 based on that information, what does that then cause you to i 1'

3 think in terms of what happened during the event in terms of i i

j 4 the trip --in terms of what caused them or what occurred?

i .

5 MR. BURR: I show an intermittent problem with two 3 6 sensors.

j 7 MR. CHAFFEE: Did you have any failures of the i

i 8 jacket water temperature sensors that were such that they i"

9 would have been in a trip condition for temperatures lower i

_ 1 j 10 than 163 degrees?

j 11 MR. BURR: I don't think we found any on

) 12 recalibration that were that low. We found one that was 186

! 1 i i 13 degrees A1, remember?

i

14 MR. CHAFFEE

Yes.

15 MR. BURR: We replaced both of those, and both of l

3 I 16 those are in quarantine. The other one calibrated okay and

! 17 is still on the engine.

1 18 MR. CHAFFEE: What do you think, Rick? With this 19 information, it's beginning to sound to me like the jacket 20 water temperature sensors didn't have anything to do with i

l 21 it. I guess that can't be true, because they had the --

1

] .22 when we were talking to the Cooper fellow -- is he there, by 23 chance?

i

24 George, is the Cooper guy back on site?

! 25 MR. BOCKHOLD: They are not.

92 PROJECT 5

033360

h 6

1 MR. CHAFFEE: If I think back to what they told us 2 about -- remember they did that little test as part of the 3 test program -- I can't remember all of it. It's something ,

4 about they simulated a jacket water temperature sensor trip 5 and did something else and tried to reproduce the 6 annunciations they had after the second trip.

7 MR. BOCKHOLD: Ken Burr, help me if I am saying 8 something not quite right. What I believe is that we had 9 the jacket water trips in -- okay -- when we started the 10 engine or simulated an engine start --

11 MR. BURR: Started it with two sensors vented.

12 MR. BOCKHOLD: We started the engine with two -

13 sensors vented. I think we even did this on a B-diesel.

14 That would go ahead and give the annunciation that we saw on 15 the second start of the A-engine.

16 MR. CHAFFEE: You mean, the second start and trip 17 of the A-engine?

l ,

18 MR. BOCKHOLD: Correct.

i' 19 MR. CHAFFEE: That annunciation was what?

20 MR. BOCKHOLD: Was jacket high water temperature 3

21 trip, turbine lube oil trip -- what was the other one? Hold 4

22 on, and I will look it up.

i l 23 (Pause.]

1 24 MR. BOCKHOLD: Low jacket water pressure. The 25 three annunciations were a low turbo lube oil pressure, low 1

92 PROJECTl 035361 i

4 7

l 1 jacket water pressure, and high jacket water temperature.

i j 2 MR. CHAFFEE: In that testing did'they try doing j 3 it the other way around, simulating a low jacket water j 4 pressure and see what kind of indications they got with l 1

1 5 that?

- 1 i 6 MR. BURR Yes, we did. l j 7 MR. CHAFFEE: What did you get?

! 8 MR. BURR: I would have to go back and look at it

9 again, it's been a while since we did that.

j 10 MR. BOCKHOLD: Let as ask Ken. You did not get j 11 the same indication -- no, he got a different indication.

l l 12 It was not the same indication as the second trip.

i

! 13 MR. CHAFFEE: George, if I heard what you just i

i 14 said, when you simulated the low jacket water pressure, you i

j 15 did not get the same annunciations - you don't believe that i

i 16 you got the same annunciations as you got when you simulated i

i 17 high jacket water temperature trip.

j 18 MR. BOCKHOLD: Correct'.

19 MR. CHAFFEE: Based on that, do you remember what j 20 you did get when you simulated low jacket water pressure?

]

i 21 Did you only get the low jacket water pressure trip signal?

22 MR. BOCKHOLD: I believe so that was it, yes.

l 1

23 I MR. CHAFFEE: That was the only one that was in?

i j 24 MR. BOCKHOLD: I would have to go back and make 25 sure, but as I remember that's all we got. 9g [

6fHI#

1 YsEn11

j 8

1 MR. CHAFFEE: I guess if that's the case, it g 2 certainly says it was jacket water. It seems to indicate i 3 that it was jack'et water temperature. I have to admit, it 4 surprises me.that the jacket water temperature sensors could j 5 be that had if they only saw 163 degree water that two of 6 them would trip. I guess it's possible.

1 j 7 MR. BOCKHOLD: With the alarms that we had, it 8 reproduced the alarms exactly.

9 MR. CHAFFEE: I guess the other thing that

10 surprises me though is what I have been told is that the 4

11 jacket water temperature trip signals are emergency trip

! 12 signals, and they remain in when you do an emergency start.

i 13 If you were have hypothesized that the first and second trip .

I 14 -- let's say the second trip was due to high jacket water 15 temperature, it is unclear to me why suddenly it is not a )

16 problem for the emergency start.

l j l

?

17 There doesn't seem to be any clear pattern in this 18 whole thing in my mind.

I 19 MR. BURR: It's an intermittent problem.

20 MR. CHAFFEE: Is it your belief that it caused the f

21 first two trips and obviously -- is that your --

22 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yes, that's our --what we would say i

, 23 is the probably cause.

l 24

, l MR. CHAFFEE: Somehow it fixed itself before the 25 third start?

92 PROJECT 035362 r

I*

4 9

1 MR. BOCKHOLD: An intermittent problem.

1 2 MR. CHAFFEE: I guess what is true is, we did see '

l 3 that one high jacket water temperature sensor that they had  !

i 1 j 4 a problem in later testing once they pulsed it with pressure l

5 it fixed itself; wasn't that right?

i 6 MR. BOCKHOLD: Correct.

7 MR. CHAFFEE: Let me ask this question, maybe this

]

i 8 is part of it. When they went to do the emergency start the i

9 third time, is there some way that doing the emergency start j 10 could have had the effect of having a pulse pressured to the 11 jacket water temperature sensors that might have fixed one l 12 of them without people realizing that could account for why- '

I i i 13 you didn't get -- I guess the other thing that is true is, l 14 not just one fixed it but two fixed themselves, didn't they?

i j 15 When they did the emergency start they didn't get l l

l 16 a high jacket water temperature sensor malfunction either,

. t 17 did they?

18 MR. BOCKHOLD: That is correct.

19 MR. CHAFFEE: The two that went bad, both of then 20 fixed themselves somehow for that third start one could 21 hypothesize.

22 MR. BOCKHOLD: That's correct.

i 23 MR. CHAFFEE: So, I wonder if there is something i

24 about the emergency start method that perhaps pulsed both of f 25 them? Hall, I don't know. After you did that testing, are 92 PROJECT

035363

i 4

10

) 1 you now working on your MOD, ne do you have the MOD in?

I i 2 MR. BURR We put the MOD in. We have done an 3 engine start without an air roll and a complete UV test i

4 again, to demonstrate that the MOD works in a complete 5 emergency mode. We tested the A-diesel with the MOD in an j

6 actual condition that it would see in a blackout.

) 7 MR. CHAFFEE: I guess at this point as far as 8 getting to the root cause of what is going on with that -

i 4

i 9 diesel during this particular test, the best hope is to hope i

i 10 that when they go out and investigate these quarantined i

j 11 switches that they will be able to reproduce, the fact that 12 they intermittently failed such that they would trip with a -

1 13 temperature of down around 163 degrees.

f 14 of course, that would mean that they would have i

j 15 basically been in a trip condition at the time when the

16 diesels started. Is jacket water temperature one of those i

17 things that gets bypassed for a period of time?

18 MR. BURR: It is just bypassed for the first 60 l

l 19 seconds.

20 MR. CHAFFEE: What it tends to suggest then is l

21 that two of those particular sensors, temperature sensors,

) 22 must have been in trip for the entire period up until the

23 emergency start. Maybe they just would not reset. That

, g 24 tends to suggest that they were in the trip condition once 25 they were placed in the -- wait a second, that doesn't make j 92 PROJECT 035364

l 11 I

. 1 sense.

l 2 They had to have worked properly previously or

. 3 when you did your previous testing you would have -- did you 4 guys have an records when you did your testing in l

i l 5 maintenance of these jacket water temperature sensors giving 1 -

! 6 you any kind of sensor malfunction?

i

! 7 MR. BOCKHOLD: In the data request that you asked 8 for associated with the switches, we have provided the data.

9 I can read through that because I just happen to have it on 10 my desk if you want.

l t

j 11 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay.

l 12 MR. BOCKHOLD: You want me to do that now, or -

l t 13 what?

! 14 MR. CHAFFEE: Yeah. Basically what I am curious

! 15 about is -- I guess I have this feeling that there must have l 16 been a prior occasion when the particular jacket water

! 17 sensor probes that tripped in the event must have been found l .

! 18 to have worked properly on some previous test with all the 4

i l 19 testing you did.

I i 20 MR. BOCKHOLD: We ran the diesel b?: '% the event i

! 21 in accordance with the surveillance and declat.3 it j

22 operable. We had done some prior starts on it and that type

23 of stuff.

g 24 MR. CHAFFEE: My question is on that start that j 25 was done before the event where everything properly, is it 92 PROJECT i 035365 I

i j 12 1 clear that the people would have recognized and did or did l 2 not -- they must have documented that they had no high i 3 jacket water temperature sensor malfunction alarms.

4 MR. BOCKHOLD: The documentation that we typically

]

5 have on it,is just that the diesel ran satisfactorily.

i 6 MR. CHAFFEE: It sure seems strange that the i

j 7 sensor probes would have been in a non-trip condition on a i

! 8 start and after the diesel is secured they -- okay, I don't i

9 know. There's no way that after -- after you guys secured 10 the diesel, did anybody bother to see if the temperature of

)

J 11 the jacket water area changed any after that -- that

12 wouldn't make sense either.

l l 13 MR. BOCKHOLD: What we have is probable cause was l

14 associated with intermittent failures of the jacket water 15 switches.

i l 16 MR. CHAFFEE: I guess that's as good a answer as i

! 17 any. Do you anything, Rick? '

18 MR. KENDALL

No.

I 19 MR. CHAFFEE: I guess on Monday you guys are going

20 to be going up and talking to Region II?

i

{ 21 MR. BOCKHOLD: That's correct.

22 MR. CHAFFEE

It sounds like at this point, as far

23 as any further troubleshooting of this, it's going to focus l ,

24 on the quarantined sensors.

25 MR. BOCKHOLD: That's correct.

l 92 PROJECT

, 035366

I .

1 i

13 l

1 MR. CHAFFEE: Louis, how are you doing on coming i

2 up with some tests for the switches in general and

3 eventually more specifically the guarantine switches? {

4 MR. WARD: I spent most of the afternoon yesterday 1

4 2

5 with Rick Kendall and Harvey Wyckoff -- I have a real good

! 6 feeling of what I believe the concern is or what the 7 immediate interest is or was at that time on the switches, i

l j 8 the reliability of those type of switches in general. For l t

9 the short term, we would be looking at taking a couple of j 10 new switches from stock and doing a reliability test on them i

11 and then leading into the failure evaluation of the ones l 12 that are in quarantine. -

8

! 13 They expressed an interest in handling that Step 1 14 if you want to call it that, the reliability demonstration 15 on the new switches. That information is available for the 16 IIT report, and the quarantine would be a longer term 17 evaluation.

18 MR. CHAFFEE: I understand. Again, obviously, the i 19 first priority is to find out what went wrong with those {

20 switches. That priority takes precedent over whether it is 21 found out before or after the IIT report is issued.

j 22 obviously, if the story of these switches including what l 23 1 caused them to fail during the event could be found before j 24 the report goes out, that would be our -- that would  ;

25 obviously be what we would like to happen. I 1

92 PROJECT 035367 l

. ~ - - . ..

j 14 1 MR. BOCKHOLD: You would like to see us --

2 MR. CHAFFEE: We would like to know what caused i

3 the trips to fail and know how reliable the switches are 4 before the IIT report is issued, but that is a secondary 5 priority to making sure you find out. As far as a timeframe 6 goes, if there was an ideal world, we would probably like to 7 have all the answers to this thing probably by April 21st.

j 8 I don't know what it takes to get there. I guess 9 the first priority is to find out what went wrong. Again, 10 our preference would be to find out before the report is

, 11 issued. Currently, the report is scheduled to be made 12 available to people around May 7th. -

4 i

13 MR. BOCKHOLD: Okay.

14 MR. CHAFFEE: If there is any way when you guys  !

15 start scoping this thing out that you could get the  !

4 16 reliability stuff done and get a plan of attack to go in and  !

l 17 look at these quarantine switch -- the ideal goal would be 1

18 to shoot for having this thing all resolved by April 21st.

' I 19 Recognize that you shouldn't do that if it results in not i 20 being able to do the job right. I 21 MR. WARD: I think to properly evaluate the 22 switches that are in quarantine by two weeks from today, I l

4 23 frankly think we would have to rush headlong into doing g 24 that.

25 MR. CHAFFEE: We will rely on your judgments, 92 PROJECT 035368

I l

[' 15 1 technical judgment on how you pull this together and just

! 2 ask you to do your best. If you can't do that, do it to the 1

i j 3 time clock you can do.

i 1

{

4 MR. WARD: Okay.

5 MR. CHAFFEE: Realize that the IIT report will l

1 6 provide, if it has that root cause in there, an excellent

7 mechanism to get the word to the industry in terms of what

! 8 went wrong with that diesel. To the extent that it isn't i

l 9 known, it will have to come out in some other form. It is

10 not just -- there is a benefit to the industry if you can i

~

11 get it done in time for the cause to appear in the report.

j 12 It will cause the word to get spread better.

l l

13 But, on the other hand, if you can't there's other i

l 14 ways of getting it out. There are other types of ways it l 15 can come out.

l 16 MR. WARD: I think there are plenty of data

} 17 channels that we can get it to the rest of the industry.

l 18 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. Rick, if the two of you will i

j 19 kaap in contact. If possible, we would like you guys to try i

i 20 to get it done before the report gets out so that we can j 21 have it in there. It would be nice to know that, if l

22 possible, what you are pursuing is the cause for what 1

23 happened to that diesel -- if it was to turn out that you 24 guys were able to conclusively show that the sensors did not i 25 cause the trip then, of course, we would need to scratch our i

• I i 92 PROJECT i 035369 I r

~

16 1 heads and try to figure out what else might have occurred in 2 this diesel that could have caused it.

3 That would mean that there is something else that 4 is roaming around and it can manifest itself at some later 5 time under some conditions similar to that.

6 MR. WARD: I understand and we will push ahead 7 with all due speed.

8 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. Is there anything else that 9 we should talk about?

10 MR. BOCKHOLD: I can't think of anything else.

11 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. Thanks George. I guess on 12 Monday you guys -- I suspect you will be up in the Regional-i 13 Office. I will be tapped in, just listening to you guys and 14 the dialogue. I guess we are going to schedule our phone 15 call with the site at 9:00 o' clock, and all we intend to 16 talk about there is administrative things, documents and 17 stuff.

1 18 I guess for that call I am not sure who will be

, 19 there from your side for that call. I don't envision it 20 lasting very long. Will it be Skip Kitchans, or who do you 21 think will be the senior person we will be talking to on 22 Monday morning?

23 MR. BOCKHOLD: Skip will be there, but if it is l ,

24 just administrative stuff we could allow Mehdi to do it.

i 25 MR. CHAFFEE: That's fine with me.

1 92 PROJECT 035370 i

17 1 MR. BOCKHOLD: Fine. Maybe we will tell Skip that  ;

2 he doesn't have to come.

3 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. All we will be talking about 4 then will be documents we need and possible -- like what 5 Warren wanted, to have a discussion with some people and 6 that type of stuff. As far as the diesel discussion goes, I l

7 don't anticipate that we will have any of that at the 9:00 l 8 o' clock call because I think what we will do is, we will 9 just listen to what you guys tell Region II during your 10 10:00 o' clock meeting with them.

11 What we will do on Tuesday, we will go back to the 12 10:00 o' clock calls again. I guess what will happen is, it-13 will tend to be more of administrative in nature unless 14 something else comes up on the diesel.

15 MR. BOCKHOLD: What we would have is, we would i

16 have from a site -- we would have Louis Ward will take the 17 lead from corporate on those calls from now on.

! 18 MR. CHAFFEE: I guess the other thing that would i I l 19 help us --

t 20 MR. WARD: Are you all still there?

21 MR. CHAFFEE: Yes, we are. Let me ask Rick a l j j 22 question. Rick, would it be helpful for us to have the i

i 23 Cooper guy if we could contact him, have him run us through

, 24 that logic diagram as to why those high jacket water l

! 25 temperature sensors give the various indications so that we 92 PROJgcy ,

4 035372

18 1 an expound on that if necessary? I can't figure that out.

2 MR. KENDALL: It would be good to have his number 3 so that we can contact him.

4 MR. CHAFFEE: Can we have that Cooper 5 representa,tive's phone number so we can contact him? We 6 need to have him take us back through the logic as to why --

7 let me rephrase that. I assume he's the one we need to 8 talk to, because I'm not sure.

9 MR. BOCKHOLD: Mr. Shelton from Cooper is in 10 Hawaii.

11 MR. CHAFFEE: Maybe we can fly out there and talk 12 to him. Do you have any idea when he is going to be back?' l l

13 MR. BOCKHOLD: If Agine in a week, but he left l 14 this weekend.

15 MR. CHAFFEE: Is there anybody on site who can 16 explain that logic to us?

i 17 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yes.

l -

18 MR. KENDALL

Ken Burr and Ken Stokes.

19 MR. CHAFFEE: Can you guys do it?

i 20 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yes.

l  ;

)

j 21 MR. CHAFFEE: We need to get the drawings and 4

22 stuff. Would you be interested in doing that? When would i 23 you like to do that?

] l l 24 MR. BOCKHOLD: How about Tuesday. Let Ken Burr do 1

25 it when he's back in Birmingham.

92 PROJECT

035372 i

4 19 A

1 MR. CHAFFEE Sounds good to me.

We will do that 1

2 on Tuesday.

3 MR. WARD: You want to continue having this call l

l 4 at 10:00 Eastern? I heard you say 9:00.

5 MR. CHAFFEE

Nine on Monday and 10:00 o' clock 6 thereafter.

}

7 MR. WARD: Okay.

8 MR.' CHAFFEE: Thanks everybody. Have a nice t

?

9 weeketid.

10 (Whereupon, at 10:23 a.m., the telephone 1

l 11 conference concluded.]

l 12 i

13 1

14 i

15 16 17 18 i

19

. 20 I

l 21 1

22 23 l

1 g 24 l

25 92 PROJECT 035373

~ ._ _ _ . . . . . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ __ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _. . _ . _

s I

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE l

This is to certify that the attached proceed-ings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

. in the matter of:

e ephone Conference M NAME OF PROCEEDING:

DOCKET NUMBER,2 PLACE OF PROCEEDING: Bethesda, Maryland were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by as and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court report-ing company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.

, i .

! L/

5 Mary Rosenberg  !

Official Reporter

! Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd. l l <

I i

l l

i 1

92 PROJECT 035374

i l GPC EXHIBIT II-ii BOCKHOLD EX. Z l

I l

1 TAPE 34

2 April 4, 1990 3 Tr. 11-14 4

I 4 BOCKHOLD: The switches in the field were calibrated j 5 using a water both inside a thermal well with people lightly i

G tapping on it and watching very closely with the supervision of i

7 Cooper engineers right there with our IEC techs.

s MALE VOICE: This last time (inaudible).

9 BOCKNOLD: Not this last time. This is what we actually to have in on the diesel (inaudible).

11 MALE VOICE: Nov.

I

. 12 noCunoLD: Nov. What we did on that one switch in the 13 lab we did some with the I&C folks.

14 MALE VOICE: Yeah. But, what I'm saying is the

15 arrangement that we had yesterday in the oil bath was a difforent 16 arrangement than we had the other day. Oil both is oil bath and I 17 should state that RTD is RTD. But I think what you need to do is

. la lock in and say "this is the way we are going to do it and this is 4

! 19 the equipment we are going to use."

} .

i 20 DOCKMoLD: I agram with you. The problem is we have l

! 21 differant types of peepic doing ditforent types of tests and . . .

f 22 and . . . their perception of the correct test methodology of what j 23 they are used to and what their estperience is is dif forent. And we i 24 have been doing a lot of this in perellel to bring the enginee to l 25 an operable state. And now we have these quarantine switches that l 26 we want to go ahead and do a very rigorous . . . all of us want to l 27 do a very rigorous test methodology. And we can't do it with the i

o 1 sees people we got still working on the diesels. Well, we can but 2 it all will be four days from now. (Inaudible.)

3 McCor: Ist me go back . . .

O DOCKNO14: And that's the organization I need to talk you 5 about.

6 McC0Y: Let me go back and get this thing in. One of the 7 itees that we have already done is that --

is revise the a calibration procedures. Wasn't that what . . .  ? For these 9 switches?

10 soCKHOLD: These switches that are on the engines they've 11 had close supervision of Cooper engineers while they were l 12 calibrated.

! 13 McC0Y: Been revised and --

l 14 BOCKHOLD: No, we did not revise our procedures. We j 15 basically did it in a very consistent fashion and part of this 16 overall thing is we will revise . . .

17 McCOY: We will revise.

j 18 BOCKHOLD: Will revise the final procedure that we use.

t 19 Because there is some controversy over whether the way the Cooper 4

1 20 people did it is the best way or is there a better way. And we l 21 believe there is even a better way than the way Cooper people had

22 us do it. The way Cooper people had us do it was very consistent.

! 23 The thing that was inconsistent was how much air do you i

24 (inaudible) upon the switch when you tap it lightly. But, the i 25 Cooper people did it the way they would do it if they were -

26 calibrating those switches for this engine and any other engine.

i 27 We had our IEC shop originally calibrate these switches without l

4

i* i j 1

% . . ]

1 l

l

]

1 giving that piece to Cooper. Okay. Cooper were the people that 2 physically tore it down and put back and supplied the technical 3 expertime. But Cooper watched the calibration of switch in the 4 plant. Basically, when those switches were calibrated the Cooper i 5 people closely supervised the technicians that were doing it, and

. 6 it was done very consistently. And very consistently according to 7 the way Cooper does their calibrating. It was signed off in s accordance with our standard procedure. And our standard procedure t

9 basically says raise and lower the temperature three times and i

10 verify it at (inaudible) which responds correctly.

l

11 We have a special procedure on how to calibrate these i

i 12 things, how famt to raise and lower the temperature, that kind of 1

i 13 stuff.

i j 14 McC0Y: That ought to address the issue of (inaudible).

15 BOCKNOLD: Yeah, that's really a long[er?) term action.

! 16 We believe we've got good switches in the plant now. They were i

j 17 done consistently the way Cooper engineers say that's the way they i

is should be done.

19 MALE VOICE: These things a couple days ago, you know, 20 before the (inaudible) these were two jacket waters. Did they 21 supervise that?

22 BOCKHOLD: Yes. Since the event all of the testing and i 23 changeout was supervised by Cooper people.

l i

l i

i

ig M F-;1 '90 09:!J ID:SCtCFC0" CGTLE TEL to:a-10M"~ -~I2 :M6 Foi

• 1 GPC Exhibit 11 Beckhok! Ex. AA D '['d39 ~ )

1

! GEORGIA PolfEE CONFANY Inverness Building 40 1 I F.C. Roz 1295 .

Birmingham. Alabama 35242 l 1

i i l TELECOPY COVER SHEET  ;

l SONOPCO-V0GTLE - 4TE FLOOR j Telecepter: (205)-877-7885 i Verfiy  : (105)-877-7897 I

I DATE: April 11. 1990 NUMBER OT PAGES: 6 l (Excluding Cover Page) 1 l a

! RECIPIINT: Please notify us if you have probinas receiving this calsoopy. l J

FROM:

To j l NAME: Kenneth S. Burr NAME: Al Chaffee EITENSICN: (205) 877-7836 EITENSION:

LOCATION: Birmingham AL tocArgog: ifRC i

TELECOPIER is (301) 492-8187 Verify: (301) 492-8802 SElfDER: Should this document be returned to you after it has been sent!

~

X YH M i

I COMMENTS: D1 ease review and erovide coments to Lewis Ward (205) 877-7802 or Ken Burr (205) 877-7836.

4 M =F-u M 3: : :t:secece cwtz EL :c::-I ? ?u =~ds For r 4 1 i l i

i i i l I

DA INSTRUMENT TEST OWLINE Phase I. Jacket Water Temnerature Switch Reliability Evaluation A. Perform a reliability evaluation of two new temperature switches

i. (Calcon Model A3500), used for Jacket Water High Temperature switches on the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) emergency ,

i diesel generators. The purpose of the evaluation is to determine 4 switch setpoint repeatability due to several factors which are i outlined in the following test sequences. Additional tests, '

j based on results of these tests, may be added by approval of the GPC test monitor.

i B. Test Sequence:

1. Record serial and model numbers, and other pertinent data j from the instruments, prior to performing any disassembly or

removing the sensor from its thernowell.

I 2. Remove the sensor from the thermowell and determine the

! as-found condition of the spacer-tube (how loose, whether or l not lock-tite on threads, etc.). If the spacer-tube was not 1 l

i tight, mark the as-received position, then tighten the tube.

3. Connect air supply and test instrumentation to the switch to  :

l

simulate installed configuration (approximately 60 psig clean, dry air through 1/4 in. tubing and 0.028 in. orifice).

Connect test instrumentation to provide continuous recording of air pressure at sensor after the orifice, bath temperature (2 channels -- one in a well, and one in the bath) and time.

! 4 Perform a calibration of the' switch in its thermowell using l the attached calibration procedure. Set the switch 9 200 i

28F. This calibration is to remain in effect for the subsequent tests.

l l 5. Perform setpoint tests to measure setpoint and reset 4

sensitivity to the following parameters. The attached test procedure Could be used to determine the trip and reset points.

a. With the sensor installed in the thernowell, check the 4

trip and reset point under the following conditions: (60 psig air supply, slow rate of temperature change (e.g. 3 10F/ minute)). Remove the sensor from the thermowell and insert it directly in the bath, and repeat the trip and j reset test. Repeat the above cycle 2 additional times to

check for changes in trip and reset points. S l b. With the sensor installed in its thernovell under varying l

rates of temperature change (approximately 2,4, 6, 10, 15

-vv , -

e jo ap-n so OE

n misocPco-om.s Tn.rc:1-IM -E W *** =~*4 "M '

i I

and 200F/ minute, with 60 psig air supply pressure).

4 c. With the sensor installed in its themowell, with a slow

{ rate of temperature change (- 10F/ min.), with various air j supply pressures (55 and 65 psig).

I d. With the sensor installed in its thernowell, with slow 1' rate of temperature change (- 10F/ min.),60 psig air pressure, determine the effect of vibration vs. static j conditions on the setpoint.

! e. With the sensor installed in its thermowell, with a slow I i rate of temperature change (~ l'F/ min.),60 psig air l pressure, determine the effect of a change in ambient air temperature of approximately 200F on the setpoint. l 1 ,

1 f. With the sensor installed in its thermowell and the bath i l temperature near, but just below the switch setpoint,  !

! detemine the switch response to a rapid reduction in j temperature (approximately 100F in 1 minute).

! g. Determine the effect of tightness of the setscrew used to attach the sensor in the thermowell on trip / reset point.

! 6. Determine the effect of spacer-tube looseness by returning

the tube to the position noted in step B.2. If the tube is

! not loose, then loosen it until it can be easily moved by l light finger pressure. Install the switch in its thermowell

! and recalibrate it using the attached procedure. Check the

! trip and reset points (at 10F/ minute, 60 psig air) with the l sensor inserted in the thermowell and with the sensor

inserted directly in the bath, as performed in B.S.a above.

j Perform each test a minimum of 3 times.

! Phase II.

i

! Testing will consist of analysis work on 7 temperature switches to determine the cause of failure. The test method will be determined after the Phase I work is complete.

CALCON REPRESENTATIVE California Control Company (CALCON) cary W relitt

. 1334 Callens Road l Ventura, CA 93003 i (805)650-1597 i Mr. Gary Hazelitt was on site (VEGP) and did some initial testing and l instructed site personnel on proper calibration methods. He is a good i source for information on these switches.

sePROJECT 082888 i

I -4h 1 *C ;-IO"-5-~- 2  :~n F04

o t,;

s-n E0 OE: i I::sc:cFC:ssLE 4 ATTACHMENT I TEST PROCEDURE FOR SETTING HIGH TEMPERATURE JACKET WATER TRIP SWITCHES (CALCON - P/N F-573-330) l

1. Install temperature sensor in bath (See Temp. Bath requirements).

4 2. Hook-up Air Supply (60 psig thru .028 orifice and test gauge) to sensor "IN" port.

! 3. Heat-up Bath to temperature at which sensors are to be set and stabilize.

i l 4. Set temperature switch to trip by slowly turning split ring clockwise 1 while watching pressure gauge. While adjusting or checking trip temperature setting, lightly tap continuously on the side of the

sensor. This simulates engine vibration and will give a more accurate setting. When switch begins to trip, the pressure gauge will drip.

The temperature sensor is considered tripped when gauge drops to 20

psi.

i i 5. Cool temp. bath and note that temp. sensor resets (40 psi on gauge) by i' 100F below setpoint. Pressure gauge must reset to within 1 psi of supply pressure by 200F below setpoint.

! 6. Reheat bath (always starting 200F belowsetpoint) and check trip setting. Readjust as required to desired setting. A 20F tolerance is acceptable.

4

7. Recheck settings until setting within tolerance is achieved two j consecutive times, j

d 4

I

.- y

c6 FM '

.:FF-11 *iO Oi:~6 ID:ict& cod Ci3TLE T to:1-IM-C-3 i

4

ATTACMENT 1. PAGE 2 i .

TEMPERATURE BATH REQUIREMENTS i

1. To test temperature switches accurately, a bath must have heating, l cooling and circulating abilities.

2. Two Temp. switche thermowells are required submerged 3" into the water.

3. Install Temp. Sensor in one well and a thermometer in the other. (Seal thermometer in well at the top to suppress heat loss. Thermometer should not touch sides or bottom of well).

)

4 A 60 psi supply pressure thru a 0.028 i .001 orifice thru a test gauge to the sensor is required.

t I

i I

i f

M NCT 08e888

MP-11 '90 09:26 ID:50tOPCO-UOGTLE TEL to:1.~n.t!5-9-"-To25 u?S6 P06

TEMPERATi nsas:

Treae eo .ae. -

ALCON semsans %; = ;- -

l pN EU MATIC F-5 73- 330 SECTION A RANGE 0 -400 4 i

DESCRIPTION

• This line of tanperature sensors

' is designed around Colcon's unique solid phase thamel expension cells. Model variations consist of rising tempwoture trip (N.C.), folling tenperature trip (N.O.) ,

and extended element units. Optional cedmium plated )

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. carbon steel or stoinless steel wells are effered in the I j

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{ stonderd length units. Minimum well thickans is 0.053".  !

" Extended element sensors have 304 stoinless stul l [W i '

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wells with 0.119" well thickness. Being small in diameter, the sensing element stock permits instellotion l l i .

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{ i . In smell diometer wells. The stroke vs. tempwoture ratio is lineer over the full 0 -400*F temperature range i

{l E i and the element is sized to give en ocevrete 100*F j .. setting change for each full turn of the ediusting device.

4 This type of expension element hos more inherent occurocy ond lineerity then the bi metal disk type, and it connot suffer rupture end loss of fluid such as moy occur in the filled bellows elements. Actual element l hysteresis is opproximately 2 to 3'F, although service j ond installotion factes such as wells, host tronsfer i fluids, rote of temperature chenge, etc. will impose other time and temperature gradients. The trip point may be offected by supply air pressure changes (approx. 0.3*F /A psi). Units must be instolled in a thermo.well and if the unit is positioned within i 45' of verticol, Dow 710 heat transfer fluid moy be used. This material has a gel time of opprox. l l imotely 18 months et 400*F ond oppreciobly longer at lower temperoivres. This material must not be l ollowed to horden in the well and other hoot transfer grooses should not be used.

i APPLIC Afl0N These temperature sensors j may be used os o detector in any medio system i compatible with the temperature ronge of the sensor and the materici and pressure limitotions of the j wells. Extended element sensors are useful in i.ea. so.

g *n imana seso. m.

! reaching the center region of pipe fluid flows. Y $" E l' Typical uses are on engines, ses compressors, and in the process industry as high and low limit trans-ducers. Data is ovolloble relating to pressure and .a aasm c sm us 1.37 Assu c

E velocity rotings. Special wells for vety high pres. asem s mass us 1.at Amu s sure service con be supplied.

Auswra mesas us 2.se Aass u 0l i ORDERING INFORMATION Use the table , 3,,,, u, 3.. a 3l j

j on the right and the outline details on the back of this sheet. Unless otherwise specified, sensors

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=6 us kl Cd i will be shipped factory set and tested et 300'F l (stotic temperature conditions) with on opplied l assown as6a va 2.es Asmam i 35 psi supply air. Upon request, special temp- ,,, ,,, y, ,,, , l l oreture settings will be mode of no odditional cost. , ,,, y, , , , .

j A smell viel of Dow 710 host tronafw fluid is sup- ,,, ,,,, y, , ,,, m,l l

1 olied with each sensor. Wl l

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