Information Notice 1988-84, Defective Motor Shaft Keys in Limitorque Motor Actuators: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:4.UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
{{#Wiki_filter:4.


COMMISSION
UNITED STATES


===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 October 20, 1988 NRC INFORMATION


NOTICE NO. 88-84: DEFECTIVE
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 October 20, 1988 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-84:   DEFECTIVE MOTOR SHAFT KEYS IN LIMITORQUE


===MOTOR SHAFT KEYS IN LIMITORQUE===
MOTOR ACTUATORS
MOTOR ACTUATORS


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
:
:
All holders of operating
    All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
 
licenses or construction


permits for nuclear power reactors.
reactors.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
: This information
:
    This information notice is being provided to alert recipients to potential


notice is being provided to alert recipients
problems from defective motor shaft keys installed in certain Limitorque


to potential problems from defective
actuators. It is expected that recipients will review the information for


motor shaft keys installed
applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to


in certain Limitorque
avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information


actuators.
notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or


It is expected that recipients
written response is required.


will review the information
==Description of Circumstances==
:
    On October 15, 1987, the NRC received a report from Houston Lighting and Power


for applicability
Company concerning sheared motor shaft-to-pinion keys found in a Limitorque


to their facilities
actuator at its South Texas Project, Unit 2, nuclear plant. A similar key


and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
'failure also occurred in April 1987. The sheared key from one of the valves.


However, suggestions
was sent to a metallurgical laboratory which found that the properties of the


contained
-.  material were not consistent with those of American Iron and Steel Institute


in this information
(AISI) type 1018 steel. AISI type 1018 steel is the material designated by


notice do not constitute
Limitorque for these particular keys as specified in Limitorque design documents.


NRC requirements;
In August 1987, three additional keys had been removed from similar actuators
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description


of Circumstances:
and sent to the laboratory for analysis. One of the removed keys was split
On October 15, 1987, the NRC received a report from Houston Lighting and Power Company concerning


sheared motor shaft-to-pinion
and the other two showed signs of deformation. Laboratory analysis of these


keys found in a Limitorque
keys revealed that the properties of the key material were not consistent with


actuator at its South Texas Project, Unit 2, nuclear plant. A similar key'failure also occurred in April 1987. The sheared key from one of the valves.was sent to a metallurgical
those of AISI type 1018 steel. The metallurgical analysis revealed that the


laboratory
keys had failed longitudinally along manganese sulfide inclusions and that the


which found that the properties
key material was probably an AISI type 1118 or 1119 resulphurized steel. Addi- tionally, on March 16, 1983, Westinghouse had submitted a 10 CFR Part 21 report


of the-.material were not consistent
to the NRC concerning its discovery of sheared keys on six actuators. These


with those of American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI) type 1018 steel. AISI type 1018 steel is the material designated
keys were also analyzed and found to be made of other than AISI type 1018 steel.


by Limitorque
Discussion:
    During an NRC inspection at Limitorque in May 1988, inspectors found that at


for these particular
the time of the manufacture of the South Texas actuators, keys were purchased


keys as specified
<0            At101t40018


in Limitorque
IN 88-84 October 20, 1988 from a commercial vendor without certificates of conformance for the material


design documents.
type or properties. No checks were performed at Limitorque to verify that the


In August 1987, three additional
proper key material was received. Keys purchased today are still bought as


keys had been removed from similar actuators and sent to the laboratory
commercial grade; however, certified material test reports (CMTRs) are received


for analysis.
from the vendor. Limitorque also performs hardness and dimensional checks of


One of the removed keys was split and the other two showed signs of deformation.
the keys upon receipt from the vendor.


Laboratory
In a letter to the NRC dated May 19, 1988, Limitorque provided additional in- formation on this issue. Limitorque stated that the current material control


analysis of these keys revealed that the properties
procedures for key procurement were fully implemented in September 1983. At


of the key material were not consistent
that time, the existing key inventory was scrapped and completely replaced with


with those of AISI type 1018 steel. The metallurgical
keys purchased under the new controls. It is estimated that all actuators from


analysis revealed that the keys had failed longitudinally
serial number 362735 onward were supplied with keys procured under the upgraded


along manganese
material controls. Additionally, Limitorque determined that only the following


sulfide inclusions
actuator-motor combinations could potentially experience similar key failures


and that the key material was probably an AISI type 1118 or 1119 resulphurized
due to improper material.


steel. Addi-tionally, on March 16, 1983, Westinghouse
Unit Size                                Motor Size


had submitted
SMB-000                                  None


a 10 CFR Part 21 report to the NRC concerning
SMB-OO                                    25-ft.lb    1800 rpm


its discovery
SMB-0                                    25-ft.lb    1800 rpm


of sheared keys on six actuators.
25-ft.ThY -3600 rpm--
                                                    40-ft.lb    1800 rpm


These keys were also analyzed and found to be made of other than AISI type 1018 steel.Discussion:
SMB-1                                    60-ft.lb    1800 rpm
During an NRC inspection


at Limitorque
60-ft.lb    3600 rpm


in May 1988, inspectors
SMB-2                                    80-ft.lb    3600 rpm


found that at the time of the manufacture
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.


of the South Texas actuators, keys were purchased<0 At101t40018 IN 88-84 October 20, 1988 from a commercial
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical


vendor without certificates
contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional


of conformance
office.


for the material type or properties.
Division of Operational Events Assessment


No checks were performed
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
at Limitorque
 
to verify that the proper key material was received.


Keys purchased
===Technical Contact:===


today are still bought as commercial
===Jeffrey B. Jacobson, NRR===
                    (301) 492-0996 Attachment:  List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


grade; however, certified
,0 A -%If


material test reports (CMTRs) are received from the vendor. Limitorque
Attachment


also performs hardness and dimensional
IN 88-84 October 20, 1988 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED


checks of the keys upon receipt from the vendor.In a letter to the NRC dated May 19, 1988, Limitorque
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES


provided additional
Information                                  Date of


in-formation
Notice No.    Subject                        Issuance  Issued to


on this issue. Limitorque
88-83          Inadequate Testing of Relay    10/19/88  All holders of OLs


stated that the current material control procedures
Contacts in Safety-Related              or CPs for nuclear


for key procurement
Logic Systems                            power reactors.


were fully implemented
88-82          Torus Shells with Corrosion    10/14/88  All holders of OLs
 
in September
 
1983. At that time, the existing key inventory
 
was scrapped and completely
 
replaced with keys purchased
 
under the new controls.
 
It is estimated
 
that all actuators
 
from serial number 362735 onward were supplied with keys procured under the upgraded material controls.
 
Additionally, Limitorque
 
determined
 
that only the following actuator-motor
 
combinations
 
could potentially
 
experience
 
similar key failures due to improper material.Unit Size Motor Size SMB-000 None SMB-OO 25-ft.lb 1800 rpm SMB-0 25-ft.lb 1800 rpm 25-ft.ThY
 
-3600 rpm--40-ft.lb 1800 rpm SMB-1 60-ft.lb 1800 rpm 60-ft.lb 3600 rpm SMB-2 80-ft.lb 3600 rpm No specific action or written response is required by this information
 
notice.If you have any questions
 
about this matter, please contact the technical contact listed below or the Regional Administrator
 
of the appropriate
 
regional office.Division of Operational
 
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Technical
and Degraded Coatings in                or CPs for BWRs.


Contact: Jeffrey B. Jacobson, NRR (301) 492-0996 Attachment:
BWR Containments
List of Recently Issued NRC Information


Notices
88-81          Failure of Amp Window          10/7/88  All holders of OLs


, 0 A -%If Attachment
Indent Kynar Splices                    or CPs for nuclear


IN 88-84 October 20, 1988 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
and Thomas and Betts                    power, test, and


NOTICES Information
Nylon Wire Caps During                  research reactors.


Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 88-83 88-82 88-81 88-80 88-79 Inadequate
Environmental Quali- fication Testing


Testing of Relay Contacts in Safety-Related
88-80          Unexpected Piping Movement      10/7/88  All holders of OLs


Logic Systems Torus Shells with Corrosion and Degraded Coatings in BWR Containments
Attributed to Thermal                    or CPs for PWRs.


Failure of Amp Window Indent Kynar Splices and Thomas and Betts Nylon Wire Caps During Environmental
Stratification


Quali-fication Testing Unexpected
88-79          Misuse of Flashing Lights      10/7/88  All holders of OLs


Piping Movement Attributed
for High Radiation Area                  or CPs for nuclear


to Thermal Stratification
Controls                                  power reactors.


Misuse of Flashing Lights for High Radiation
88-69, Supp 1 Movable Contact Finger          9/29/88  All holders of OLs


Area Controls 10/19/88 10/14/88 10/7/88 10/7/88 10/7/88 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for BWRs.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power, test, and research reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for PWRs.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.88-69, Supp 1 Movable Contact Finger Binding in HFA Relays Manufactured
Binding in HFA Relays                    or CPs for nuclear


by General Electric (GE)9/29/88 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.88-78 88-77 88-76 Implementation
Manufactured by General                   power reactors.


of Revised NRC-Administered
Electric (GE)
          88-78          Implementation of Revised     9/22/88  All holders of OLs


Requali-fication Examinations
NRC-Administered Requali-                 or CPs for nuclear


Inadvertent
fication Examinations                    power reactors.


Reactor Vessel Overfill Recent Discovery
88-77          Inadvertent Reactor           9/22/88  All holders of OLs


of a Phenomenon
Vessel Overfill                          or CPs for BWRs.


not Previously
88-76          Recent Discovery of a          9/19/88  All holders of OLs


Considered
Phenomenon not Previously                or CPs for nuclear


in the Design of Secondary
Considered in the Design                 power reactors.


Containment
of Secondary Containment


Pressure Control 9/22/88 9/22/88 9/19/88 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for BWRs.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.OL = Operating
Pressure Control


License CP = Construction
OL = Operating License


Permit}}
CP = Construction Permit}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 03:53, 24 November 2019

Defective Motor Shaft Keys in Limitorque Motor Actuators
ML031150062
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date: 10/20/1988
From: Rossi C
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-88-084, NUDOCS 8810140018
Download: ML031150062 (3)


4.

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 October 20, 1988 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-84: DEFECTIVE MOTOR SHAFT KEYS IN LIMITORQUE

MOTOR ACTUATORS

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

This information notice is being provided to alert recipients to potential

problems from defective motor shaft keys installed in certain Limitorque

actuators. It is expected that recipients will review the information for

applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to

avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information

notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or

written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

On October 15, 1987, the NRC received a report from Houston Lighting and Power

Company concerning sheared motor shaft-to-pinion keys found in a Limitorque

actuator at its South Texas Project, Unit 2, nuclear plant. A similar key

'failure also occurred in April 1987. The sheared key from one of the valves.

was sent to a metallurgical laboratory which found that the properties of the

-. material were not consistent with those of American Iron and Steel Institute

(AISI) type 1018 steel. AISI type 1018 steel is the material designated by

Limitorque for these particular keys as specified in Limitorque design documents.

In August 1987, three additional keys had been removed from similar actuators

and sent to the laboratory for analysis. One of the removed keys was split

and the other two showed signs of deformation. Laboratory analysis of these

keys revealed that the properties of the key material were not consistent with

those of AISI type 1018 steel. The metallurgical analysis revealed that the

keys had failed longitudinally along manganese sulfide inclusions and that the

key material was probably an AISI type 1118 or 1119 resulphurized steel. Addi- tionally, on March 16, 1983, Westinghouse had submitted a 10 CFR Part 21 report

to the NRC concerning its discovery of sheared keys on six actuators. These

keys were also analyzed and found to be made of other than AISI type 1018 steel.

Discussion:

During an NRC inspection at Limitorque in May 1988, inspectors found that at

the time of the manufacture of the South Texas actuators, keys were purchased

<0 At101t40018

IN 88-84 October 20, 1988 from a commercial vendor without certificates of conformance for the material

type or properties. No checks were performed at Limitorque to verify that the

proper key material was received. Keys purchased today are still bought as

commercial grade; however, certified material test reports (CMTRs) are received

from the vendor. Limitorque also performs hardness and dimensional checks of

the keys upon receipt from the vendor.

In a letter to the NRC dated May 19, 1988, Limitorque provided additional in- formation on this issue. Limitorque stated that the current material control

procedures for key procurement were fully implemented in September 1983. At

that time, the existing key inventory was scrapped and completely replaced with

keys purchased under the new controls. It is estimated that all actuators from

serial number 362735 onward were supplied with keys procured under the upgraded

material controls. Additionally, Limitorque determined that only the following

actuator-motor combinations could potentially experience similar key failures

due to improper material.

Unit Size Motor Size

SMB-000 None

SMB-OO 25-ft.lb 1800 rpm

SMB-0 25-ft.lb 1800 rpm

25-ft.ThY -3600 rpm--

40-ft.lb 1800 rpm

SMB-1 60-ft.lb 1800 rpm

60-ft.lb 3600 rpm

SMB-2 80-ft.lb 3600 rpm

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Jeffrey B. Jacobson, NRR

(301) 492-0996 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

,0 A -%If

Attachment

IN 88-84 October 20, 1988 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

88-83 Inadequate Testing of Relay 10/19/88 All holders of OLs

Contacts in Safety-Related or CPs for nuclear

Logic Systems power reactors.

88-82 Torus Shells with Corrosion 10/14/88 All holders of OLs

and Degraded Coatings in or CPs for BWRs.

BWR Containments

88-81 Failure of Amp Window 10/7/88 All holders of OLs

Indent Kynar Splices or CPs for nuclear

and Thomas and Betts power, test, and

Nylon Wire Caps During research reactors.

Environmental Quali- fication Testing

88-80 Unexpected Piping Movement 10/7/88 All holders of OLs

Attributed to Thermal or CPs for PWRs.

Stratification

88-79 Misuse of Flashing Lights 10/7/88 All holders of OLs

for High Radiation Area or CPs for nuclear

Controls power reactors.

88-69, Supp 1 Movable Contact Finger 9/29/88 All holders of OLs

Binding in HFA Relays or CPs for nuclear

Manufactured by General power reactors.

Electric (GE)

88-78 Implementation of Revised 9/22/88 All holders of OLs

NRC-Administered Requali- or CPs for nuclear

fication Examinations power reactors.

88-77 Inadvertent Reactor 9/22/88 All holders of OLs

Vessel Overfill or CPs for BWRs.

88-76 Recent Discovery of a 9/19/88 All holders of OLs

Phenomenon not Previously or CPs for nuclear

Considered in the Design power reactors.

of Secondary Containment

Pressure Control

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit