ML070780098

IR 05000424-07-007, 05000425-07-007, on 01/29/2007 - 02/16/2007, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, Identification and Resolution of Problems

ML070780098
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	03/16/2007
From:	Scott Shaeffer NRC/RGN-II/DRS/PSB2
To:	Tynan T Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
FOIA/PA-2010-0209 IR-07-007
Download: ML070780098 (21)

See also: IR 05000424/2007007

Text

March 16, 2007

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

ATTN: Mr. T. E. Tynan

Vice President - Vogtle

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant

7821 River Road

Waynesboro, GA 30830

SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC PROBLEM

IDENTIFICATION & RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2007007

AND 05000425/2007007

Dear Mr. Tynan:

On February 16, 2007, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an

inspection at your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection

report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on February 16, 2007, with you

and other members of your staff during the exit meeting.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to the

identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commissions rules and

regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected

procedures and records, conducted plant observations, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the sample selected for review, no findings of significance were identified. The team

concluded that problems were properly identified, evaluated, and resolved within the problem

identification and resolution programs. However, minor examples of issues not being entered

into the corrective action program or entered into programs outside of the corrective action

program, narrowly focused condition report effectiveness reviews, corrective actions that were

ineffectively tracked or were not implemented in a timely manner, and weaknesses in the

trending of issues entered into the corrective action program were identified. It was recognized

that management has placed additional attention on the corrective action program and has

initiated actions to improve performance in this area since late 2006.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its

enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document

Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system

2

(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html

(the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 2

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425

License Nos.: NPF-68, NPF-81

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000424/2007007 and 05000425/2007007

Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: (See page 3)

_________________________

OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRS

SIGNATURE SMS ATS1 via email SMS for JER6 via email

NAME S. Shaeffer A. Sabisch G. McCoy J. Rivera-Ortiz

DATE 03/ /07 03/16/07 03/15/07 03/16/07 03/15/07

3

cc w/encls: Resident Manager

J. T. Gasser Oglethorpe Power Corporation

Executive Vice President Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear Plant

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution

Electronic Mail Distribution

Arthur H. Domby, Esq.

L. M. Stinson, Vice President, Fleet Troutman Sanders

Operations Support Electronic Mail Distribution

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Electronic Mail Distribution Senior Engineer - Power Supply

Municipal Electric Authority

N. J. Stringfellow of Georgia

Manager-Licensing Electronic Mail Distribution

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Electronic Mail Distribution Reece McAlister

Executive Secretary

Bentina C. Terry Georgia Public Service Commission

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. 244 Washington Street, SW

Bin B-022 Atlanta, GA 30334

P. O. Box 1295

Birmingham, AL 35201-1295 Distribution w/encls: (See page 4)

Director, Consumers' Utility Counsel

Division

Governor's Office of Consumer Affairs

2 M. L. King, Jr. Drive

Plaza Level East; Suite 356

Atlanta, GA 30334-4600

Office of the County Commissioner

Burke County Commission

Waynesboro, GA 30830

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Manager, Radioactive Materials Program

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Attorney General

Law Department

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Laurence Bergen

Oglethorpe Power Corporation

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Letter to T. E. Tynan from Scott M. Shaeffer dated March 16, 2007

SUBJECT: VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION

& RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2007007 AND

05000425/2007007

Distribution w/encls:

B. Singal, NRR

C. Evans, RII EICS

L. Slack, RII EICS

RIDSNRRDIRS

OE Mail

PUBLIC

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos: 50-424, 50-425

License Nos: NPF-68, NPF-81

Report No: 05000424/2007007, 05000425/2007007

Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Facility: Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location: Waynesboro, GA

Dates: January 29 - February 2, 2007

February 12 - 16, 2007

Inspectors: A. Sabisch, Senior Resident Inspector, Catawba Nuclear Station

G. McCoy, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle

J. Rivera-Ortiz, Reactor Inspector

Approved by: S. Shaeffer, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 2

Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000424/2007-007, 05000425/2007-007; 1/29/2007-2/16/2007; Vogtle Electric Generating

Plant, Units 1 and 2; Identification and Resolution of Problems.

The inspection was conducted by two senior resident inspectors and a reactor inspector. The

NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is

described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.

Identification and Resolution of Problems Summary

No findings of significance were identified. The licensee was generally effective in identifying

problems at a low threshold and entering them into the corrective action program. The licensee

properly prioritized issues entered into the corrective action program (CAP) and routinely

performed evaluations that were technically accurate and of sufficient depth to address the

issue documented in the condition reports (CRs). Station management has recently been

providing increased focus and attention on the quality of root cause and apparent cause

determinations based on the results of internal self assessments. Improvements were noted in

the documents produced over the past quarter. Operating experience was found to be used

both proactively and reactively by personnel involved in the corrective action program. The

licensees programmatic self-assessments and audits were generally effective in identifying

weaknesses in the corrective action program. Weaknesses in the performance of required

effectiveness reviews by the department(s) responsible for specific CRs were identified by the

inspectors which have the potential to allow similar events to occur at the station by not

ensuring corrective action deficiencies are identified and corrected. The inspectors concluded

that the workers at Vogtle felt free to report safety concerns.

Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

a. Assessment of the Corrective Action Program Effectiveness

(1) Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed procedures associated with the CAP which described the

administrative process for identifying, evaluating and resolving problems via CRs. The

inspectors reviewed selected CRs from the approximately 26,250 that had been issued

between January 2005 and December 2006. The inspectors also reviewed NRC reports

that documented NRC inspections over the last two years to assess how the licensee

addressed findings documented in these reports. Corrective action documents

associated with Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were also reviewed to ensure the

actions contained in the LERs were appropriate, comprehensive in nature, and had been

implemented.

The inspectors conducted a detailed review of Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW),

Component Cooling Water (CCW), Chemical Volume & Control System (CVCS), and the

Diesel Generators (DGs), to verify that problems were being properly identified,

appropriately characterized, and processed in accordance with the licensees

established CAP procedures. These systems were selected based on risk insights from

the licensees probabilistic risk analysis. For these systems and associated

components, the inspectors reviewed CRs, system health reports, the maintenance

work history, and open Work Orders (WOs). The inspectors conducted plant walkdowns

of these systems to assess the material condition and to determine if any identified

deficiencies had not been entered into the CAP. The inspectors reviewed selected

industry and NRC operating experience items associated with plant systems and

components to verify that these were appropriately evaluated for applicability and that

issues identified were entered into the CAP.

The inspectors reviewed licensee audits and self-assessments, including those which

focused on problem identification and resolution programs and processes, to verify that

findings were entered into the CAP and to verify that these audits and assessments

were consistent with the NRCs assessment of the licensees CAP. The inspectors

attended selected daily Management Review Meetings and Corrective Action Program

Coordinator (CAPCO) CR screening meetings to observe management and oversight

functions of the CAP. The inspectors attended a Corrective Action Review Board

(CARB) meeting and reviewed the 2006 CARB meeting minutes to assess how effective

the oversight provided by the CARB has been.

The inspectors also held discussions with various personnel to evaluate their threshold

for identifying issues and entering them into the CAP. Documents reviewed are listed in

the Attachment.

Enclosure

4

(2) Assessment

Effectiveness of Problems Identification. The inspectors determined that the licensee

was generally effective at identifying problems and entering them into the CAP. The

threshold for initiating CRs was low and employees were encouraged to initiate CRs for

plant issues. Equipment performance issues were being identified and entered into the

CAP for monitoring, follow-up, and resolution. Some minor issues, identified during the

system walkdowns, had not been captured in the CAP including small oil leaks, minor

boric acid buildup on components, housekeeping issues, and unofficial markings on

plant components. Over the past few years, station management has enhanced their

expectations related to the identification and reporting of equipment issues and

communicated these expectations to plant personnel. Improved performance in this

area was noted over the two-year inspection period based on a review of the CR

database and interviews with station personnel and the Vogtle resident inspectors.

Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues. The inspectors determined that

the licensee had adequately prioritized issues entered into the CAP. Generally, the

licensee performed evaluations that were technically accurate and of sufficient depth to

ensure the issue was understood and appropriate corrective actions developed to

prevent recurrence.

The station conducts trending on condition reports based on event codes assigned

during the daily CAPCO meeting and generates quarterly trend reports. For

consistency, a limited number of department CAPCOs were used to assign the event

codes. The identification of trends was based on an automated screening process.

When a threshold was reached, the resulting graphs and tables were sent to individual

departments to review and they, in turn, provided issue summaries for inclusion into the

quarterly CAP trend report. While these reports receive wide-spread distribution,

internal and external assessments of the CAP have determined that they have been less

than effective in providing station management with the tools necessary to focus

attention on specific performance weaknesses. This was confirmed by the team through

interviews and reviewing past trend reports. As a result of these licensee assessments,

enhancements in the process for identification of trends and development of

management reports were being developed by the station. Interviews with department

CAPCOs revealed that informal knowledge trending was routinely performed when a

CAPCO recognizes an issue as having occurred previously. Trend CRs have been

initiated based on this informal process. Cause codes assigned to CRs following

completion of Root Cause and Corrective Action Analysis (RCCA), Apparent Cause

Determination (ACD), or Basic Cause Determination (BCD) have not been used for

trending purposes due to the perceived limited population size. However, due to

identified weaknesses in the stations trending program, this data was being evaluated

for inclusion in a semi-annual consolidated Plant Performance Report which was under

development.

The inspectors determined that the station conducted an adequate number of formal

cause determinations based on the overall number and significance of issues entered

into the CAP. The cause determinations were consistent with established CAP

Enclosure

5

procedures based on the number of Severity Level 1 (one), Severity Level 2 (46), and

Severity Level 3 (392) CRs initiated between January 2005 and December 2006. The

processes used ranged from the most formal tool, the RCCA, to less rigorous methods

such as an ACD or a BCD. In 2006, the station performed approximately 325 cause

determinations.

While most of the cause determinations reviewed were detailed and thorough, a few

examples of weak or less than fully effective causal analyses were identified resulting in

similar events occurring after the initial event had been evaluated. The following are

examples noted by the inspectors.

• CRs 2005100664 and 2006101010 both described a jacket water pressure

instrument on the 2A diesel generator, 2PI-19172, which indicated outside of normal

operable range. In each case, the licensee used other alternative indications in

order to demonstrate the operability of the system. Also, in each case the licensee

wrote a work order to check the calibration of the instrument. Each time the

instrument calibration was checked, the calibration was found to be satisfactory, and

the work order and the condition reports closed with no further action taken.

Discussions with the system engineer indicated that this instrument had a tendency

to drift in and out of tolerance, and that it was intended to have the instrument

replaced. There is no open work order or formal tracking document which commits

to the replacement of 2PI-19172.

• CR 2005107840 documented a Train B CCW pump trip during the implementation of

a design change in 2B Safety Features Sequencer System, which involved

manipulation of conductors associated with CCW-2 pump. The cause of the pump

trip was not specifically determined in the CR; however, based on NRC inspectors

discussions with plant staff, it was attributed to inadequate evaluation of clearances.

The licensee generated corrective actions to review, in part, scheduled plant

modifications to prevent recurrence of this event. As part of the completion of two

corrective actions, the licensee took credit for corrective actions completed for CR

2005102185, which documented a previous event where a cable was found

energized during work in an Auxiliary Feed Water Turbine Control Panel. The cause

of the previous event was attributed to inadequate tag-out preparation and

inadequate evaluation of cables that had to be de-energized. Even though the

corrective actions for the previous event were completed at the time of the CCW

pump trip, they were less than fully effective to correct deficiencies in the design

change process regarding the evaluation of clearances that could impact personnel

safety and plant operating equipment.

The station generates a monthly CAP performance indicator overview containing

statistics on overdue action items, action item extensions, CR age, and an overall CAP

composite program assessment which was provided to station management to ensure

the appropriate level of attention was maintained on the CAP. In general, the licensee

identified and implemented corrective actions in a timely manner; however, in the

following instance, the licensee had been slow in completing corrective actions and the

reasons were not documented in the CR.

Enclosure

6

• CR 2005102333 was written to evaluate information provided by Westinghouse

which indicated there may be non-conservatism in the P-14 nominal trip setpoint.

Once identified and verified, the licensee followed the guidance of NRC

Administrative Letter (AL) 98-10 and established the administrative controls

necessary to change the P-14 setpoint to the proper level. This change was on both

units. It is also an expectation of AL 98-10 that, following the imposition of

administrative controls, an amendment to the TS, with appropriate justification and

schedule, will be submitted in a timely fashion. The issue of instrument setpoints in

technical specifications was a topic of discussion between the industry and the NRC

in TSTF-493. Discussions with the licensee indicated that they were withholding this

change pending resolution of these discussions. The inspectors discussed this issue

with NRC staff and it was determined that this topic was expected to be resolved by

the end of 2007 and it was reasonable for the licensee to wait for the resolution to

develop the change to their technical specifications.

Effectiveness of Corrective Actions. The team found, generally, that corrective actions

developed and implemented for problems were appropriate in scope and commensurate

with the safety significance of the issues.

The fleet CAP (NMP-GM-002) required that effectiveness reviews be performed on all

Severity Level 1 and 2 CRs and selected Severity Level 3 CRs. Effectiveness reviews

were intended to determine if corrective actions taken were effective by ensuring the

causes identified in the CR have been corrected, there has been no recurrence of the

same or similar event, and the corrective actions had been adequately challenged. A

review of all Severity Level 1 and 2 CRs issued over the period reviewed identified that

this was not being implemented consistently with approximately 35% of the affected

CRs missing effectiveness reviews as an action item. Following discussions with the

licensee, this deficiency was entered into the CAP and an immediate corrective action

was developed to initiate action items to conduct effectiveness reviews on the affected

CRs.

In addition, a review of completed effectiveness reviews determined that many of the

reviews were narrowly focused and only looked for the recurrence of the identical issue

or problem that had resulted in the original CR being initiated which does not meet the

expectations contained in NMP-GM-002-001. The following are examples noted by the

inspectors.

• CR 2005103989 documents the June 2, 2005, event in which both trains of the Unit

2 solid state protection system were placed in input error inhibit which rendered the

High Flux Alarm at Shutdown circuit inoperable when it was required by TS. While

the corrective actions developed were comprehensive, the effectiveness review

stated that the actions prevented the same or similar event based on the fact that

...between the two units, there have been five instances of entering Mode 5 without

rendering the High Flux Alarm at Shutdown circuit inoperable. The root cause

identified contributors as the operators can-do mindset and the willingness to use

procedures that did not cover the activity being performed; however, the actions

taken to address these human performance issues were not assessed in the

Enclosure

7

effectiveness review.

• CR 2005102333 documents the Hi-Hi steam generator water level setpoint

calculation error that was identified in 2005. The root cause analysis identified

weaknesses in TS setpoint basis control; however, this was not assessed as part of

the effectiveness review.

• CR 2005102460 documents damage to the Unit 1 steam generator manways during

the 2005 refueling outage. The root cause analysis identified inadequate pre-job

briefings, procedure quality, lack of physical barriers to protect the seating surface,

and insufficient oversight of the work as causal factors; however, the effectiveness

review only states that ...during the subsequent refueling outage no similar issue

was encountered or documented with respect to steam generator manway removal,

inspection and installation.

(3) Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

b. Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience (OE)

(1) Inspection Scope

The team interviewed station personnel, attended selected daily Management Review

Meetings and CAPCO CR screening meetings, and evaluated CAP documentation to

determine if OE was being used effectively. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the

licensees evaluation of selected Southern Nuclear Operating Company and industry

operating experience information, including CRs from Farley and Hatch, INPO OE, NRC

Regulatory Information Summaries (RIS) and Information Notices (IN), and generic

vendor notifications to verify that issues applicable to Vogtle were appropriately

addressed. Procedure NMP-GM-008, Operating Experience Program, was reviewed to

verify that the requirements delineated in the program were being implemented at the

station. NMP-GM-002-GL03, Cause Determination Guideline, was reviewed to verify

that guidance was provided for reviewing internal and external operating experience

when evaluating issues in the corrective action program, with more detailed guidance

provided when conducting broadness reviews on more significant issues. Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

(2) Assessment

The inspectors determined that OE was regularly used proactively to prevent events

from occurring and to address events or near-misses. Station personnel routinely used

an automated screening tool which filters OE reports received from INPO on a daily

basis and sends relevant information to individuals, using specific filter criteria, as an e-

mail attachment. OE was regularly included in System Health Reports and CRs

associated with station events as part of the causal investigations and corrective action

development process.

Enclosure

8

Industry OE was processed at either the corporate or plant level depending on the

source and type of the document. Relevant information was then forwarded to the

applicable department for further action or informational purposes. Any documents

requiring action were entered into the CAP for tracking and closure.

The inspectors did note that the Vendor Technical Information Program within the

licensees OE program may warrant additional focus. Information was readily distributed

to the three stations from the corporate program administrator once processed in

Birmingham. However, the conduit to extract relevant information when reviewing plant

issues that may subsequently occur was not well-defined or used by station personnel.

(3) Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

c. Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits

(1) Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed completed self assessments and audits conducted by station

and corporate organizations to assess the thoroughness of the actions items that

resulted from these activities and these action items were appropriately prioritized and

entered into the CAP. The inspectors verified that the self assessments and audits were

consistent with the NRCs assessment of the CAP and supporting programs.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

(2) Assessment

The inspectors determined that the scopes of assessments and audits conducted over

the review period were adequate and were self-critical in nature. Corrective actions

were incorporated into the CAP and were being tracked to completion. Updates on the

status of these action items were provided to station management at department and

site-level CARB meetings. The inspectors determined that the licensee had adequately

prioritized issues identified by these assessments and audits in the CAP.

(3) Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

d. Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment

(1) Inspection Scope

The inspectors interviewed members of the plant staff to develop a general perspective

of the safety-conscious work environment and to determine if any conditions existed that

would cause employees to be reluctant to raise safety concerns. The inspectors

reviewed the licensees Employee Concerns Program (ECP) which provides an alternate

Enclosure

9

method to the CAP for employees to raise concerns and remain anonymous if so

desired. The inspectors interviewed both the ECP Corporate Program Manager and the

Plant Hatch ECP Coordinator (due to the unavailability of the Vogtle ECP Coordinator),

and reviewed ECP documents to verify that concerns were being identified, properly

reviewed and resolved. ECP documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

(2) Assessment

Based on the interviews held with plant staff, reviews of CRs and selected Employee

Concern packages, ECP metrics, and an assessment of the implementation of the

licensees ECP, the inspectors concluded that personnel were willing to promptly identify

and report problems using available administrative programs.

(3) Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Follow-up

.1 (Closed) LER 05000425/2006-003; Unit 2 Reactor Coolant Pump #4 Tripped Resulting

in an Automatic Reactor Trip. On August 27, 2006, the Unit 2 reactor tripped

automatically from 100 percent power following the unexpected trip of the Loop #4

reactor coolant pump (RCP) and subsequent Reactor Protection System actuation on

low reactor coolant system flow. The plant response following the reactor trip was as

designed with no equipment or operational concerns identified. The cause of the event

was attributed to deficiencies in a design change package that added surge protection to

several large frame motors at Vogtle including the RCP motors. The package

deficiencies included specifying the incorrect type of cable for the RCP motors, failure to

provide detailed instructions for the installation of the modification in each type of motor,

and not containing cable spacing criteria in the design change package for any of the

cable / motor combinations. Prior to restarting Unit 2, the RCPs that had received the

surge protection modification were inspected and the modification was verified to be

properly installed. The Unit 1 RCPs affected by this modification were inspected during

the fall 2006 refueling outage. This issue was previously identified as FIN

05000425/2006004. This LER was in the licensees CAP as CR 2006109233. The

inspectors reviewed the LER, the condition report, and associated action items. No

additional findings of significance were identified.

.2 (Closed) LER 05000424, 425/2005-002; Inaccurate Steam Generator Water Level

Setpoint due to Design Calculation Errors: On April 4, 2005, the licensee was informed

by the Nuclear Steam Supply System vendor that the steam generator high-high water

level protection setpoints (P-14) were inadequate to ensure main feedwater isolation

during a design basis event. In accordance with the guidance of NRC Administrative

Letter (AL) 98-10, Dispositioning of Technical Specifications That Are Insufficient to

Assure Plant Safety, the licensee immediately initiated administrative controls to reduce

the steam generator high-high water level protection setpoints to the level necessary to

ensure plant protection during a design basis event. A modification was developed and

Enclosure

10

installed which changed the applicable setpoints on both units. The industry and the

NRC are addressing issues associated with setpoints and allowable value calculation

methodologies as specified in ISA S67.04. A technical specification change will be

submitted to the NRC when this issue has been addressed. The inspectors reviewed

the LER, the associated condition reports, and action items. No findings of significance

were identified.

.3 (Closed) LER 05000425/2005-003; Reactor Coolant System Leakage Leads to

Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications: On December 9, 2005, Unit 2 was

placed in Mode 3 due to pressure boundary leakage from the Reactor Coolant System

(RCS) loop side of the 3/4-inch bypass line around valve 2VH-8701B, the residual heat

removal (RHR) train A suction isolation valve. Based on the information known at that

time, the cause of the leakage was attributed to a lack of fusion when the weld was

installed in October 2002. The weld defect was found to be a circumferential linear flaw,

approximately 1/4 to 1/2 inch long located approximately 1/8 inch from the toe of the weld.

The defective weld was ground out, replaced and examined. The unit was returned to

full power operation on December 18, 2005. This LER was in the licensees CAP as CR

2005111460. The inspectors reviewed the LER, the condition report and associated

action items. No findings of significance were identified.

.4 (Closed) LER 05000425/2005-002; Instrument Setpoint Drift Leads to Operation of the

Unit in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications: On February 26, 2005, the

licensee identified that the output of the reactor coolant system loop 2 overtemperature

delta-T (OTDT) instrument channel 2T-421 was drifting. The instrument was repaired

and returned to service. On February 28, 2005, the instrument drifted again.

Troubleshooting identified that the cause was a component failure which had existed on

February 26, but had not been identified during troubleshooting post-maintenance

testing. The failure to promptly identify and repair this instrument was cited as non-cited

violation 05000425/2005003-01, Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Actions to

Preclude Repetitive Failure of Unit 2 Channel 2 OTDT Instrument. Licensee evaluation

determined that this channels signal had drifted outside of the Technical Specifications

allowable value longer than allowed by the action requirements. The inspectors

reviewed the LER, the associated condition reports, and action items. No additional

findings of significance were identified.

.5 (Closed) LER 05000424, 425/2006-002; Three Technical Specification Instruments

Were Determined to be in a Condition Which Was Prohibited by Technical

Specifications: During the week of June 6, 2005, the licensee identified a potential

problem with certain Rosemount transmitters. If the transmitter was installed improperly,

there was a chance that a neck seal was damaged which may allow moisture to enter

the casing and inhibit the safe operation of the transmitter during accident conditions.

The licensee identified a transmitter with a potentially damaged neck seal in December,

2005. The licensee did not immediately search for additional damaged transmitters. In

July, 2006 the licensee identified additional transmitters in risk-significant applications

with potentially damaged seals. The failure to promptly identify and correct this issue

was previously identified as NCV 5000424/2006004-01. The inspectors reviewed the

LER, the associated condition reports, and action items. No additional findings of

Enclosure

11

significance were identified.

4OA6 Management Meetings

On February 16, 2007, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Tom

Tynan, Vice President - Vogtle, and other members of his staff who acknowledged the

findings. The inspectors asked the licensee if any of the material examined during the

inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

Enclosure

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

J. Acree; Operations Shift Supervisor

W. Atkins; Nuclear Supply Chain

T. Beckworth; Plant Hatch Employee Concerns Coordinator

L. Blair, Performance Analysis Specialist

W. Copeland; Performance Analysis Supervisor

C. Duncan; Systems Engineering

C. Eckert, Work Controls

M. Hickox; NSCW System Engineer

P. Hurst; Concerns Program Manager

T. Mattson; Performance Analysis

A. Rickman, Vogtle SEE-IN Coordinator

M. Sharma; Performance Analysis Specialist

R, Shepherd, Nuclear Network Coordinator

K. Stokes; DG System Engineer

T. Tynan, Vice President - Vogtle

NRC Personnel

S. Shaeffer, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 2

LIST OF ITEMS CLOSED

05000425/2006-003 LER Unit 2 Reactor Coolant Pump #4 Tripped Resulting in an

Automatic Reactor Trip (Section 4OA3.1)

05000424, 425/2005-002 LER Inaccurate Steam Generator Water Level Setpoint due to

Design Calculation Errors (Section 4OA3.2)

05000425/2005-003 LER Reactor Coolant System Leakage Leads to Shutdown

Required by Technical Specifications(Section 4OA3.3)

05000425/2005-002 LER Instrument Setpoint Drift Leads to Operation of the Unit in

a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications (Section

4OA3.4)

05000424, 425/2006-002 LER Three Technical Specification Instruments Were

Determined to be in a Condition Which Was Prohibited by

Technical Specifications (Section 4OA3.5)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Procedures

NMP-GM-002; Corrective Action Program; Version 5.0

NMP-GM-002-001; Corrective Action Program Instructions; Version 1.0

NMP-GM-008; Operating Experience Program; Version 2.0

Attachment

A-2

NMP-GM-008; Operating Experience Program (Draft); Version 3.0

NMP-GM-002-GL03; Cause Determination Guideline, Version 6.0

NMP-GM-002-GL05; Corrective Action Program, Data Configuration Guideline Rev. 8.0

NMP-ES-001; Equipment Reliability Process Description, Version 5.0

NMP-ES-005; Scoping and Importance Determination for Equipment Reliability, Version 5.0

13503-1; Unit 1 Reactor Control Solid-State Protection System, Rev. 19.2

13503-2; Unit 2 Reactor Control Solid-State Protection System, Rev. 18.1

80200C; Performance Assessment Monitoring, Rev. 01

00163-C; NRC Performance Indicator and Monthly Operating Report Preparation and Submittal;

Rev. 11.1

1009-C; Operator Aids, Rev. 12.1

13105-1; Safety Injection System; Rev. 45

13105-2; Safety Injection System; Rev. 43

12006-C; Unit Cooldown to Cold Shutdown, Rev. 73

91001-C; Emergency Classification and Implementing Instructions; Rev. 25

91501-C; Recovery; Rev. 16

Operating Experience Documents

NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-24; Revised Review and Transmittal Process for

Accident Sequence Precursor Analyses

NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2007-01; Clarification of NRC Guidance for Maintaining a

Standard Emergency Action Level Scheme

NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-22; Lesson Learned from Recent 10CFR Part 72 Dry

Cask Storage Campaign

NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-25; Requirements for the Distribution and Possession of

Tritium Exit Signs

NRC Information Notice 06-28; Siren System Failures due to Erroneous Siren System Signal

NRC Information Notice 06-26; Failure of Magnesium Rotors in Motor Operated Valve Actuators

NRC Information Notice 06-14, Supplement 1; Potentially Defective External Lead-Wire

Connections in Barton Pressure Transmitters

Part 21 Notice regarding Tyco Crosby Series JLT Spring Loaded Pressure Relief Valves

Westinghouse Technical Bulletin TB-05-4; Potential Tin Whiskers on Printed Circuit Board

Components

Self- Assessment Documents

Surveillance SNC-2007-001; Fleet QA Surveillance of the implantation and effectiveness of the

Corrective Action Program

QA Audit of the Corrective Action Program (CAP), V-CAP-2006-1

Operating Experience Point of Contact Effectiveness Review; December 13 - 15, 2006

Effectiveness Review for Action Item 2005203075

Condition Reports

2007101485, 2005100146, 2005100178, 2005101787, 2005102333, 2005102571,

2005103063, 2005103632, 2005103989, 2005105374, 2005105859, 2005106118,

2005106877, 2005108493, 2005109484, 2005109531, 2005109973, 2005110364,

2005111178, 2005111254, 2005111460, 2005111583, 2005111982, 2006100539,

2006100755, 2006100839, 2006100906, 2006101112, 2006101137, 2006102023,

Attachment

A-3

2006102295, 2006103134, 2006103594, 2006104417, 2006105424, 2006105426,

2006107236, 2006107383, 2006107603, 2006109187, 2006109233, 2006109869,

2006110322, 2006110981, 2006112318, 2006112454, 2006113261, 2007100013,

2007100130; 2005101787, 2005104571, 1006109233, 2006109187, 2005103989,

2006104417, 2006109233, 2007101722, 2006101127, 2005102333, 2005101325,

2005101343, 2005105374, 2005104189, 2005111542, 2006102910, 2006107580,

2006107603, 2006108450, 2006108514, 2006108517, 2006109187

Action Items

2005201207, 2005201208, 2005201209, 2005201210, 2005201211, 2005201639,

2005201690, 2005201861, 2005201862, 2005201866, 2005201868, 2006203971,

2006203972, 2006203973, 2006203974, 2006203975, 2006203976, 2006203976,

2006203977, 2006203977, 2006204070, 2006204183, 2006204187, 2006204188,

2006204189, 2006204228, 2006205227, 2006205228, 2006205229, 2006205230,

2006205232, 2006205234, 2006205235, 2007200355, 2005202666, 2005202667,

2005202668, 2005202669

Miscellaneous Documents

Vogtle Key Performance Indicator Report; December 2006

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Quarterly CAP Trend Report, August through October 2006

Valuing the CAP, Leadership in Action presented by T. Tynon on 3/17/06

MWOs 1060183801 and 1060183901

Design Change Package 2051624801

Training Handout, Current Events presented during Licensed Operator Requalification

Segment 20052, April - May 2005

Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW)

Condition Reports: 2006100553, 2006105837, 2006105921, 2006106438, 2006110938,

2005109036, 2005117274

Work Orders: 2062103601, 2061070801, 2054150601

Procedures: 83308-C; Testing of Safety-Related NSCW Sys. Coolers; Rev. 30.1

Miscellaneous Documents:

Vogtle Engineering Maintenance Rule Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports; Unit 1:

Reporting Periods 1/2005 through 11/2006

Vogtle Engineering Maintenance Rule Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports; Unit 2:

Reporting Periods 1/2005 through 11/2006

System Health Reports: 1st Quarter 2005 through 3rd Quarter 2006

Vogtle Key Performance Indicators, December 2006; MSPI - Cooling Water Systems, Unit 1

and Unit 2

Vogtle Maintenance Equipment Reliability Overall Report Card, July 2006

Chemical Volume and Control System (CVCS)

Condition Reports

2005108955, 2005103124, 2006108383, 2006107514, 2006105424, 2006105428,

2006100502, 2005104876, 2004003039, 2004003187, 2004003291, 2004003436,

2005110553, 2005101076, 2005105013, 2005109906, 2005110199, 2005111901,

2006105775, 005101693,2005102505, 2006105553, 2005107840

Attachment

A-4

Work Orders

2061290301, 1061046701, 2040097801, 2052151801, 2040242101, 1040333301,

2040324501, 2050374501,2052123701, 1060970401, 1051511401, 1051624401,1061046701

Procedures

13006-1; Chemical and Volume Control; Rev. 80

13006-2; Chemical and Volume Control; Rev. 66.

125039-C; Valve Packing Removal, Installation, and Adjustment; Rev. 13.1

Miscellaneous Documents

Operator Shift Briefing items SB 2005-11, and SB 2006-41

Repetitive Tasks: 200600000911, 200600000912, and LUB70032

Vogtle Engineering Maintenance Rule Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports; Units 1:

Reporting Periods 1/2005 through 11/2006

Vogtle Engineering Maintenance Rule Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports; Units 2:

Reporting Periods 1/2005 through 11/2006

System Health Reports: 1st Quarter 2005 through 3rd Quarter 2006

Component Cooling Water (CCW)

Condition Reports:

2006112223, 2005106222, 2005105036, 2005106072, 2006100717, 2006104873,

2006105632, 2006107212, 2005104851, 2006108358, 2005106861, 2005103178,

2005106256, 2005103892, 2005105267, 2005108970, 2005103977, 2006110904,

2006111950, 2006112182, 2005106581

Work Orders

1051942901, 2020292301, 1052097701, 2061437201, 1051922301, 1061975601,

1062142901, 2052492401

Procedures

29401-C; Work Order Functional Tests; Rev. 24.1

35311-C; Chemical Control of Closed Cooling Water Systems; Rev. 39.2

35312-C; Chemical Control of Turbine Plant Closed Cooling Water Systems; Rev. 13

Miscellaneous Documents

Vogtle Engineering Maintenance Rule Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports; Unit 1:

Reporting Periods 1/2005 through 11/2006

Vogtle Engineering Maintenance Rule Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports; Unit 2:

Reporting Periods 1/2005 through 11/2006

System Health Reports: 1st Quarter 2005 through 3rd Quarter 2006

Check valve IST results per procedure 14803-1, CCW Pumps and Check Valve IST and

Response Time Tests, Rev. 22.1 (10/5/06)

Attachment

A-5

Diesel Generators

Condition Reports

2005100352, 2005100529, 2005100605, 2005100633, 2005100641, 2005100653,

2005100664, 2005102314, 2005102891, 2005104123, 2005106203, 2005106349,

2005106877, 2005109047, 2005110566, 2005111137, 2005111317, 2006100471,

2006100549, 2006100761, 2006100854, 2006100874, 2006100951, 2006101010,

2006101683, 2006102448, 2006104013, 2006104225, 2006104800, 2006109696,

2006110219, 2006111878, 2006111947, 2006112175, 2006112568, 2006113255, 2006113283

Work Orders

1054160201, 1054160901, 1060689401, 1061157901, 1061964101, 1062066201,

1062106201, 1062158301, 2052155401, 2052331801, 2052331901, 2052443501,

2052443601, 2052543601, 2052550801, 2052551001, 2053733901, 2060097301,

2060167901, 2060201801, 2060202101, 2060319001, 2060462001, 2060497001,

2060786101, 2060994301, 2061267901, 2091294001, 2061660901, 2061860201, 2062211401

Miscellaneous Documents

Vogtle Engineering Maintenance Rule Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports; Unit 1:

Reporting Periods 1/2005 through 11/2006

Vogtle Engineering Maintenance Rule Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Reports; Unit 2:

Reporting Periods 1/2005 through 11/2006

System Health Reports: 1st Quarter 2005 through 3rd Quarter 2006

Vogtle Key Performance Indicators, December 2006; MSPI - Emergency AC Power System,

Unit 1 and Unit 2

Vogtle Maintenance Equipment Reliability Overall Report Card, July 2006

Condition Reports/Action Items Generated for NRC-Identified Issues

2007101098; Damaged insulation on piping in the 1A and 1B NSCW cooling towers

2007101099; Debris and equipment found in the 1A NSCW cooling tower electrical tunnel

2007101100; Insulation around NSCW slow fill line check valve 21202U4A09 is missing and

needs to be replaced

2007101487; Effectiveness reviews were not identified as action items in a number of Severity

Level 2 CRs are required by NMP-GM-002, CAP

2007101712; Questions arose concerning the timeliness of picking up quality concerns from

boxes in the plant

2007101734; Scaffolding issues identified by the NRC during a plant walkdown

2005204105; Missing action item to perform effectiveness review for CR 2005109484

2006200614; Missing action item to perform effectiveness review for CR 2005111254

2007101202; Boron residue at the body to bonnet area of valve 1-1208-U4-4293

2007101203; Boron residue at the tail pipes downstream of valves 1-1208-X-4950 and 1-1208-

U-4600

2007101206; Insulation at flow transmitter 2FT0183 not secured and apparent boron residue on

insulation above the flow transmitter

2007101713; Deficiencies identified in the CR 2005107840 closure package

Attachment