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| issue date = 09/12/1980
| issue date = 09/12/1980
| title = LER 80-013/03L-0:on 800815,during Startup Testing,Boric Acid Concentration of 13.8% Was Reported in 1-CH-TK-1C & 2-SI-TK- 2.Caused by Pumping Boric Acid from Boron Evaporator Bottoms Tank to Boric Acid Storage Tank W/O Sampling
| title = LER 80-013/03L-0:on 800815,during Startup Testing,Boric Acid Concentration of 13.8% Was Reported in 1-CH-TK-1C & 2-SI-TK- 2.Caused by Pumping Boric Acid from Boron Evaporator Bottoms Tank to Boric Acid Storage Tank W/O Sampling
| author name = WILSON J L
| author name = Wilson J
| author affiliation = VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
| author affiliation = VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
Line 17: Line 17:


=Text=
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!RC ~ORM.366..
  !RC ~ORM.366..
7.'77)" e LICENSEE EVENT REPORT .S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CONTROL BLOCK: '-I _....._~-------'---L---'18 1 6 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)
7.'77)"
I V I A I s I p I s I 2 I G)I O I O I -I O I O I O I O I O , -I O I O 101 4 I 1 I 1 I 1 I 1 101 I I 0 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58 il2] 8 :ON'T TI] 8 l!:'.J© Io I s 10 I o I o I z I 8 I i 101 o I 811 1 s I 8 I o I© I o I 9 I i I z I 8 I o I G) 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE BO EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@
e         LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
I During startup testing, with Surry Unit No. 2 critical at 0% power, a boric acid concen-1 1JJJ J tration of 13.8% was reported in 1-CH-TK-lC and 2-Sl-TK-2.
                                                                                                                                                . S . NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CONTROL BLOCK:             '-I 1
This is less conservative l with respect to the requirements of T.S. 3.2.B.3 and T.S. 3.3.A.3 and is reportable per ~-T.S. 6.6.2.b.(2).
_....._~-------'---L---'18             6 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) il2] I V I A I s I p Is I2 IG)I O I O I - I O I O I O I O I O , - IO IO 101 4 I 1 I 1 I 1 I 1 101 I I 0 8    9       LICENSEE CODE                   14         15                       LICENSE NUMBER                           25       26       LICENSE TYPE     30   57 CAT 58
All *required flow _:paths remained operable and had the required capa-bility for reactor control. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.
:ON'T TI]
SYSTEM CODE ,s IH j@ 9 10 Q LER/RO CVENTYEAR
8
'0 REPORT I 8 j O j NUMBER 21 22 ACTION FUTURE TAKEN ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT CAUSE CAUSE CODE SUB CODE COMPONENT CODE L.:J@ ~@ I z I z I z I z I z I z I@ 11 12 13 18 SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT NO. CODE I O 1 1 1 3 I l .......-1 I O I 3 I 23 24 26 27 28 29 COMP. SUBCODE t.J 19 REPORT TYPE 30 VALVE SUBCODE ~@ 20 l.=l 31 SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS {22) AlJt~i'i~~~T NPRD-4 FORM-SUB.
:~:~~~      l!:'.J© Io I s 60              61 10     I o I o I z I 8 I i 101 oI DOCKET NUMBER              68    69 811     1s I8 I oI© I o I 9 I i I z I 8 I o IG)
PRIME CDMP. SUPPL! ER REVISION NO. 32 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER BO ~@Li@ ~@ ~ 0 1 °1 °r-61 l:J@ 33 34 35 .. 36 37 40 41 . ~ ~@ I z /9 I 91 91@ CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS @ 42 43 44 47 jThe cause is determined to be due to pumping the Boric Acid from Boron Evaporator Bottom9 LI:IIJ !Tank (l-BR-TK-5) to Boric Acid Storage Tank (1-CH-TK-lC) without sampling.
EVENT DATE               74       75     REPORT DATE         BO EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@
The correc-l tive action was to reinstruct the operators to use approved procedures._
I During startup testing, with Surry Unit No. 2 critical at 0% power, a boric acid concen-1 1JJJ           J tration of 13.8% was reported in 1-CH-TK-lC and 2-Sl-TK-2.                                                                       This is less conservative with respect to the requirements of T.S. 3.2.B.3 and T.S. 3.3.A.3 and is reportable per
ITTIJ . JTIJ Im 7 8 9 FACILITY STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS @ METHOD OF A 80 IE]~@ 8 9 10 12 13 I O I O I O l@)I.___ __ N_A __ ___. DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (3/ ~@ ... I _R_o_u_t_i_*
  ~-             l T.S. 6.6.2.b.(2).                           All *required flow _:paths remained operable and had the required capa-bility for reactor control.                                       Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.
n_e __ c_h_e_m_i_s_t_r_y_s_a_m_p_l_i_n_g
BO SYSTEM                   CAUSE             CAUSE                                                             COMP.          VALVE CODE                      CODE           SUB CODE               COMPONENT CODE
______ _.........
                                      ,s IH            j@            L.:J@           ~@ I z I z I z I z I z I z I@
ACTIVITY CONTENT Q\ RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OFNifTIVITY W@ lLJ(§) ...... 1 _______ .........
SUBCODE t.J SUBCODE
8 9 10 11 44 45 46 NA . _LOCATION OF RELEASE @ 80 44 45 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 0 NUM5ER O Q.. TZPE DESCRIPTION 2ITI I I I I~@ 8 9 11 12 1 ... 3 ________________________________________
                                                                                                                                                                      ~@
80 PERSONNEL INJURIES Q NUMBER DESCRIPTION6  
9              10              11               12             13                                   18           19            20 SEQUENTIAL                             OCCURRENCE             REPORT                    REVISION Q      LER/RO CVENTYEAR                                                REPORT NO.                                   CODE               TYPE                      NO.
~lololol@)
                '0      REPORT NUMBER I  8 O j        j                              I O
NA B 9 11 '-12--------""'-=---------------------------------8~0 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY '4J' TYPE DESCRIPTION o..::.:;)
1 1
NA 8 9 1~0:----------------------------------------------'BO PUBLICITY  
1 3
@ Q NRC USE ONLY lr~~Efa,DESCRIPTION 4.5 8NAO 09 220 3 7 I ';';, ili..J~---------~-------*--------'
I     l .......-1         I O
II I I I II II I II B 9 10 68 69 (804) 357-3184 J. L. Wilson 80 ;, I\IAMI= n.: DRl=DAPl=P  
I3 I             ~            l.=l        ~
-***-*. PHONE:-------------
21            22              23             24             26       27                 28         29           30           31         32 ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD                   HOURS   {22)         AlJt~i'i~~~T         NPRD-4 FORM-SUB.
0 0.
PRIME CDMP.
e e ATTACHMENT I (PAGE 1 OF 1) SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO: 50-281 REPORT NO: 80-013/03L-0 EVENT DATE: 08-15-80 TITLE OF REPORT: EXCESSIVE BORIC ACID CONCENTRATION IN BORON INJECTION TANK 1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT: 2. During startup testing with Surry Unit No. 2 critical at 0% power, a Boric Acid concentration of 13.8% was reported in 1-CH-TK-lC and 2-SI-TK-2.
SUPPL! ER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
The allowable Technical Specification Range is 11.5-13%.
                ~@Li@
PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES/STATUS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEMS: 1-CH-TK-lC and 2-SI-TK-2 provide boric acid for reactor control for Unit No. 2. All required flow paths remained operable.
33          34
Adequate capability for reactor control was available at all times. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.  
                                                    ~@
: 3. CAUSE OF THE EVENT: The cause of the event is determined to be operator error. The contents of the Boron Evaporator Bottoms Tank (l-BR-TK-5) were pumped into Boric Acid Storage Tank 1-CH-TK-lC without sampling . .. 4. U1MEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION: The reactor was taken subcritical and the tanks were diluted to bring the concentration of boric acid within specifications.
35 ..
Operators were ted to use approved procedures.
                                                                              ~
5
36            37 0
* SCHEDULED CORRECTIVE . ACTION: None required.  
1 °1 °r-61 l:J@ 40       41     .
                                                                                                                                                ~
42
                                                                                                                                                                  ~@
43 I z /9 I 91 91@
44            47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS                                       @
jThe cause is determined to be due to pumping the Boric Acid from Boron Evaporator Bottom9 LI:IIJ         !Tank (l-BR-TK-5) to Boric Acid Storage Tank (1-CH-TK-lC) without sampling.                                                                                   The correc-tive action was to reinstruct the operators to use approved procedures._
ITTIJ .l JTIJ Im8 7             9                                                                                                                                                                             80 A
FACILITY STATUS               % POWER                                 OTHER STATUS     @       METHOD OF DISCOVERY                                  DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (3/
IE]~@ I O I O I O l@)I._____N_A_ ____.                                                                                   I
                                                                                                          ~@ ..._R_o_u_t_i_*n_e__c_h_e_m_i_s_t_r_y_s_a_m_p_l_i_n_g_______.........
8    9                10                  12          13                                44    45              46                                                                  80 ACTIVITY       CONTENT                                                         Q\
RELEASED OF RELEASE                                 AMOUNT OFNifTIVITY           ~                                                  . _LOCATION OF RELEASE      @
~            W@ lLJ(§) 1                  . . . _______. . . . .                                                                 NA 8     9             10           11                                                   44           45                                                                           80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES                                         ~
0 NUM5ER O Q.. TZPE                     DESCRIPTION         ~
2ITI I I I I~@
8     9                 11       12               1...
3_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _                                                80 PERSONNEL INJURIES                         Q NUMBER               DESCRIPTION6
~lololol@)
B     9                 11 NA
                                          '-12--------""'-=---------------------------------8~0 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY                     '4J' TYPE         DESCRIPTION                         o..::.:;)
NA
~~@    8 9               1~0:----------------------------------------------'BO
~
PUBLICITY lr~~Efa,DESCRIPTION 45
                                                  .                           8NAO 09 220           3 Q7        ~
NRC USE ONLY I ';';,
~B ili..J~---------~-------*--------'
9          10                                                                                                                                  68 69 II I I I II II I II 80 ~;,
J. L. Wilson                                                                            (804) 357-3184                     0 I\IAMI=   n.: DRl=DAPl=P -***-*.
PHONE:-------------                               0.
 
e                                 e ATTACHMENT I (PAGE 1 OF 1)
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO:   50-281 REPORT NO:   80-013/03L-0 EVENT DATE: 08-15-80 TITLE OF REPORT:   EXCESSIVE BORIC ACID CONCENTRATION IN BORON INJECTION TANK
: 1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:
During startup testing with Surry Unit No. 2 critical at 0% power, a Boric Acid concentration of 13.8% was reported in 1-CH-TK-lC and 2-SI-TK-2. The allowable Technical Specification Range is 11.5-13%.
: 2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES/STATUS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEMS:
1-CH-TK-lC and 2-SI-TK-2 provide boric acid for reactor control for Unit No. 2. All required flow paths remained operable. Adequate capability for reactor control was available at all times. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.
: 3. CAUSE OF THE EVENT:
The cause of the event is determined to be operator error. The contents of the Boron Evaporator Bottoms Tank (l-BR-TK-5) were pumped into Boric Acid Storage Tank 1-CH-TK-lC without sampling .
: 4. U1MEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:
The reactor was taken subcritical and the tanks were diluted to bring the concentration of boric acid within specifications. Operators were reinstruc-ted to use approved procedures.
5*   SCHEDULED CORRECTIVE .ACTION:
None required.
: 6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:
: 6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:
Administrative controls have been established to minimize recurrence.
Administrative controls have been established to minimize recurrence.
7 . GENERIC IMPLICATIONS  
: 7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS :
: None}}
None}}

Latest revision as of 01:24, 3 February 2020

LER 80-013/03L-0:on 800815,during Startup Testing,Boric Acid Concentration of 13.8% Was Reported in 1-CH-TK-1C & 2-SI-TK- 2.Caused by Pumping Boric Acid from Boron Evaporator Bottoms Tank to Boric Acid Storage Tank W/O Sampling
ML18139A513
Person / Time
Site: Surry Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 09/12/1980
From: Joshua Wilson
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML18139A506 List:
References
LER-80-013-03L-03, LER-80-13-3L-3, NUDOCS 8009220398
Download: ML18139A513 (2)


Text


--*--*------

!RC ~ORM.366..

7.'77)"

e LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

. S . NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CONTROL BLOCK: '-I 1

_....._~-------'---L---'18 6 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) il2] I V I A I s I p Is I2 IG)I O I O I - I O I O I O I O I O , - IO IO 101 4 I 1 I 1 I 1 I 1 101 I I 0 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

ON'T TI]

8

~:~~~ l!:'.J© Io I s 60 61 10 I o I o I z I 8 I i 101 oI DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 811 1s I8 I oI© I o I 9 I i I z I 8 I o IG)

EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE BO EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@

I During startup testing, with Surry Unit No. 2 critical at 0% power, a boric acid concen-1 1JJJ J tration of 13.8% was reported in 1-CH-TK-lC and 2-Sl-TK-2. This is less conservative with respect to the requirements of T.S. 3.2.B.3 and T.S. 3.3.A.3 and is reportable per

~- l T.S. 6.6.2.b.(2). All *required flow _:paths remained operable and had the required capa-bility for reactor control. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

BO SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP. VALVE CODE CODE SUB CODE COMPONENT CODE

,s IH j@ L.:J@ ~@ I z I z I z I z I z I z I@

SUBCODE t.J SUBCODE

~@

9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20 SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION Q LER/RO CVENTYEAR REPORT NO. CODE TYPE NO.

'0 REPORT NUMBER I 8 O j j I O

1 1

1 3

I l .......-1 I O

I3 I ~ l.=l ~

21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS {22) AlJt~i'i~~~T NPRD-4 FORM-SUB.

PRIME CDMP.

SUPPL! ER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

~@Li@

33 34

~@

35 ..

~

36 37 0

1 °1 °r-61 l:J@ 40 41 .

~

42

~@

43 I z /9 I 91 91@

44 47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS @

jThe cause is determined to be due to pumping the Boric Acid from Boron Evaporator Bottom9 LI:IIJ !Tank (l-BR-TK-5) to Boric Acid Storage Tank (1-CH-TK-lC) without sampling. The correc-tive action was to reinstruct the operators to use approved procedures._

ITTIJ .l JTIJ Im8 7 9 80 A

FACILITY STATUS  % POWER OTHER STATUS @ METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (3/

IE]~@ I O I O I O l@)I._____N_A_ ____. I

~@ ..._R_o_u_t_i_*n_e__c_h_e_m_i_s_t_r_y_s_a_m_p_l_i_n_g_______.........

8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80 ACTIVITY CONTENT Q\

RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OFNifTIVITY ~ . _LOCATION OF RELEASE @

~ W@ lLJ(§) 1 . . . _______. . . . . NA 8 9 10 11 44 45 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES ~

0 NUM5ER O Q.. TZPE DESCRIPTION ~

2ITI I I I I~@

8 9 11 12 1...

3_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES Q NUMBER DESCRIPTION6

~lololol@)

B 9 11 NA

'-12--------""'-=---------------------------------8~0 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY '4J' TYPE DESCRIPTION o..::.:;)

NA

~~@ 8 9 1~0:----------------------------------------------'BO

~

PUBLICITY lr~~Efa,DESCRIPTION 45

. 8NAO 09 220 3 Q7 ~

NRC USE ONLY I ';';,

~B ili..J~---------~-------*--------'

9 10 68 69 II I I I II II I II 80 ~;,

J. L. Wilson (804) 357-3184 0 I\IAMI= n.: DRl=DAPl=P -***-*.

PHONE:------------- 0.

e e ATTACHMENT I (PAGE 1 OF 1)

SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO: 50-281 REPORT NO: 80-013/03L-0 EVENT DATE: 08-15-80 TITLE OF REPORT: EXCESSIVE BORIC ACID CONCENTRATION IN BORON INJECTION TANK

1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

During startup testing with Surry Unit No. 2 critical at 0% power, a Boric Acid concentration of 13.8% was reported in 1-CH-TK-lC and 2-SI-TK-2. The allowable Technical Specification Range is 11.5-13%.

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES/STATUS OF REDUNDANT SYSTEMS:

1-CH-TK-lC and 2-SI-TK-2 provide boric acid for reactor control for Unit No. 2. All required flow paths remained operable. Adequate capability for reactor control was available at all times. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE OF THE EVENT:

The cause of the event is determined to be operator error. The contents of the Boron Evaporator Bottoms Tank (l-BR-TK-5) were pumped into Boric Acid Storage Tank 1-CH-TK-lC without sampling .

4. U1MEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The reactor was taken subcritical and the tanks were diluted to bring the concentration of boric acid within specifications. Operators were reinstruc-ted to use approved procedures.

5* SCHEDULED CORRECTIVE .ACTION:

None required.

6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

Administrative controls have been established to minimize recurrence.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS :

None