IR 05000244/2011007

R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant - NRC Evaluation of Changes, Tests, or Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications Team Inspection Report 05000244/2011007

ML11335A263
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	12/01/2011
From:	Doerflein L T Engineering Region 1 Branch 2
To:	Joseph Pacher Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, Ginna
Doerflein L T
References
IR-11-007
Download: ML11335A263 (20)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGU LATORY COMMISSION REGION I 475 ALLENDALE ROAD KING OF PRUSSIA. PA 19406.1415 December 1, 2011 Mr. Joseph Pacher, Vice President R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, LLC Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC 1503 Lake Road Ontario, New York 14519

SUBJECT: R.E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC EVALUATION OF CHANGES, TESTS, OR EXPERIMENTS AND PERMANENT PLANT MODIFICATIONS TEAM I NSPECTION REPORT O5OOO244I2O1 1OO7

Dear Mr. Pacher:

On October 20,2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at the R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 20,2011, with you and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.In conducting the inspection, the team reviewed selected procedures, calculations and records, observed activities, and interviewed station personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.

ln accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS).ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,*'x l0 'l O(qr-'rl^-<-o l .- h*"nX Lawrence T. Doerflein, Chief /Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-244 License No. DPR-18

Enclosure:

I nspection Report 050002441 201 I 007

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Information cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ December 1,2011 Mr. Joseph Pacher, Vice President R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, LLC Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC 1503 Lake Road Ontario, New York 14519

SUBJECT: R.E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC EVALUATION OF CHANGES, TESTS, OR EXPERIMENTS AND PERMANENT PLANT MODIFICATIONS TEAM I NSPECTION REPORT O5OOO244I2O1 1OO7 Dear M

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

lR 05000244120110071 1010312011-101201201 1; R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Ginna);Engineering Specialist Plant Modifications Inspection.

This report covers a two week on-site inspection period of the evaluations of changes, tests, or experiments and permanent plant modifications.

The inspection was conducted by three region based engineering inspectors.

The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.No findings were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones:

Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity 1R17 Evaluations of Chanqes. Tests. or Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications (tP 71111.17).1 Evaluations of Chanqes. Tests. or Exoeriments (28 samples)a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed five safety evaluations to determine whether the changes to the facility or procedures, as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), had been reviewed and documented in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 requirements.

In addition, the team evaluated whether Constellation had been required to obtain NRC approval prior to implementing the changes. The team interviewed plant staff and reviewed supporting information including calculations, analyses, design change documentation, procedures, the UFSAR, the Technical Specifications (TS), and plant drawings to assess the adequacy of the safety evaluations.

The team compared the safety evaluations and supporting documents to the guidance and methods provided in Nuclear Energy lnstitute (NEl) 96-07, "Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations," as endorsed by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.187, "Guidance for lmplementation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments," to determine the adequacy of the safety evaluations.

The team also reviewed a sample of twenty{hree 10 CFR 50.59 screenings for which Constellation had concluded that no safety evaluation was required.

These reviews were performed to assess whether Constellation's threshold for performing safety evaluations was consistent with 10 CFR 50.59. The sample included design changes, calculations, and procedure changes.The team reviewed the safety evaluations that Constellation had performed and approved during the time period covered by this inspection (i.e., since the last modifications inspection)not previously reviewed by NRC inspectors.

The screenings and 10 CFR 50.59 applicability determinations were selected based on the safety significance, risk significance, and complexity of the change to the facility.In addition, the team compared Constellation's administrative procedures used to control the screening, preparation, review, and approval of safety evaluations to the guidance in NEI 96-07 to determine whether those procedures adequately implemented the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. The safety evaluations and screenings reviewed by the team are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findinos No findings were identified.

.2.2.1 a..2.2

b.2 Permanent Plant Modifications (11 samples)Containment Sprav and Safetv Iniection Full Flow Recirculation Line lnstallation Inspection Scope The team reviewed a modification, engineering change package (ECP) 2009-0275, that installed larger recirculation lines in the discharge piping of the containment spray and safety injection systems, which discharge to the refueling water storage tank. The modification also replaced and relocated the containment spray pump discharge check valves (two valves; one per pump)and added four high point vents in the containment spray and safety injection system discharge piping. Constellation installed the containment spray and safety injection larger recirculation lines (six-inch and three-inch, respectively)to accommodate revised full flow pump testing requirements, as per the 2004 Edition of the ASME Operation and Maintenance Code. The check valves were replaced to address operational and testing challenges with the existing check valves;and the high point vents were added to address various issues associated with gas accumulation concerns in the containment spray and safety injection systems.The team reviewed the modification to verify that the design bases, licensing bases and performance capability of the containment spray and safety injection systems had not been degraded by the modification.

The team interviewed engineering staff and reviewed technical evaluations associated with the modification to confirm the system would function and in accordance with the design assumptions.

The team reviewed drawings and procedures to ensure that they were properly updated. The associated post-modification test (PMT) results were reviewed to ensure appropriate acceptance criteria had been met. The team also reviewed condition reports to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification.

ln addition, the 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this modification was reviewed as described in section 1R17.1 of this report. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Findinos No findings were identified.

Chanoe Action Time for Apoendix R - Pull Stoppinq Turbine-Driven Auxiliarv Feedwater Pump from 1 Minute to 4 Minutes lnspection Scope The team reviewed a modification, procedure change request (PCR) 10-00549, which changed (increased)the action time for pull stopping the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump from one minute to four minutes (during postulated control room fire scenarios).

Although the action to perform this activity could reasonably be achieved within one minute, the associated technical evaluation determined that the action could be completed within four minutes without adverse consequences.

The Enclosure 3 need to pull stop the TDAFW pump is related to preventing TDAFW pump damage in the event that certain control room fires cause the condensate storage tank to drain as a result of postulated component failures.The team reviewed the modification to verify that the design and licensing bases for postulated 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R events had not been degraded by the modification.

The team interviewed engineering staff and reviewed evaluations to confirm the details and assumptions in the modification.

The team walked down the accessible portions of the TDAFW pump to assess the material condition of the system.Although the team identified that the associated screening determination was not performed for this modification, the team reviewed the associated condition report that Constellation initiated (for not performing the screening determination)and the controlling process (Appendix R evaluation)that acceptably evaluated the change. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findinss No findings were identified.

.2.3 lnstallation

of Orifice within the Turbine-Driven Auxiliarv Feedwater Pump Lube Oil Requlatinq Valve Sensino Line a. Insoection Scope The team reviewed a modification (ECP-2009-0146)associated with an equivalency change for an orifice in the TDAFW pump lube oil regulating valve sensing line.Constellation had identified the orifice missing when a walkdown of the lube oil system was conducted during troubleshooting of the TDAFW pump (orifice was likely removed during prior maintenance but not re-installed).

The purpose of the orifice is to prevent the TDAFW pump lube oil regulating valve from hunting by dampening the oil surges caused by the positive displacement lube oil pumps. After performing an equivalent change technical evaluation, Constellation manufactured and installed the orifice.The team reviewed the modification to verify that the design bases, licensing bases and performance capability of the TDAFW pump lube oil system had not been degraded by the modification.

Specifically, the team verified that design specifications and material properties were equivalent or improved.

The team interviewed design engineers and reviewed evaluations, post-modification test results, and associated maintenance work orders to verify that the orifice installation was appropriately implemented.

The 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this modification was reviewed as described in section 1R17.1 of this report. Finally, the team walked down the TDAFW pump lube oil system with the system engineer to verify the maintenance activities were properly completed.

The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findinqs No findings were identified.

4.2.4 Chanqe Control Room Emerqencv Air Treatment Svstem Fans Restart Acceptance Band

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed a procedure modification (PCR-11-03976)associated with the control room emergency air treatment system (CREATS) fan 'A'and fan 'B'timers, 2/Sl-CRAX and 2/Sl-CRBX, respectively.

The CREATS provides a protected environment from which operators can control the plant following an uncontrolled release of radioactivity.

The modification changed the reset acceptance band of the CREATS fan timers in procedure STP-O-R-2.2, "Diesel Generator Load and Safeguard Sequence Test." During performance of the test, the CREATS fans stop upon initiation of a safety injection signal and are restarted in a nominal 50 seconds following their safeguards bus re-energization as part of the bus load shedding and emergency diesel generator (EDG)load sequencing.

The acceptance band was changed from 42.75 - 67.25 seconds to 46.0 - 54.0 seconds, and the monitored initiation point for the timers was changed from the safety injection signal to the re-energization of the associated safeguards bus. The eight-second band around the nominal 50 seconds allows for normal drift of the Agastat time delay relays. Constellation implemented this procedure change to ensure the CREATS fans restarted within the times calculated in the UFSAR Chapter 15 transient analysis and that the monitored initiation point was set appropriately for those accidents where a loss-of-offsite power is assumed.The team reviewed the procedure change to verify that the design bases, licensing bases and performance capability of CREATS had not been degraded by the change.The team reviewed the calculation and associated analysis to verify the assumptions used in the procedure change were valid, The team interviewed engineering staff to verify the intent and adequacy of the modification.

In addition, the 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this modification was reviewed as described in section 1 R17.1 of this report. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findinqs No findings were identified.

.2.5 Emerqencv

Diesel Generator Coolinq Svstem Modification

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed a modification (ECP-2008-0040)that installed two air operated valves (AOV) in each emergency diesel generator (EDG) service water supply line to isolate the flow to the lube oil coolers and jacket water heat exchangers when the EDGs are not operating.

The AOVs (4598G, 4598H, 4599G, and 4599H) open upon an EDG start signal to allow service water to enter the associated coolers and heat exchangers.

Constellation implemented this modification to address fouling issues in the coolers and heat exchangers associated with the constant supply of service water.Enclosure 5 The team reviewed the modification to verify that the design bases, licensing bases and performance capability of the EDG cooling water system had not been degraded by modification.

The team interviewed design engineers, and reviewed evaluations, surveillance and post-modification test results, and associated maintenance work orders to verify that the AOV installation was appropriately implemented and would function in accordance with design assumptions.

The team verified the appropriate changes were made to alarm response procedures, system drawings, and the UFSAR. The 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation associated with this modification was reviewed as described in section 1 R17.1 of this report. Finally, the team walked down the accessible portions of the modification to ensure the system configuration was in accordance with design instructions.

The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findinqs No findings were identified.

.2.6 Replacement

of the Turbine-Driven Auxiliarv Feedwater Steam Admission Valves

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed a modification (ECP-10-000072)that replaced the TDAFW pump steam admission valves 3504A and 3505A. The modification included replacing the Limitorque SB-O-25 actuators with SM8-0-25 actuators, and replacing the flex wedge gate valves with parallel slide gate valves. Constellation implemented this modification io address leakage issues that were attributing to accelerated corrosion of the TDAFW pump governor control valve stem.The team reviewed the modification to verify that the design bases, licensing bases and performance capability of the TDAFW steam admission valves had not been degraded by the modification.

The team verified that the design specifications of the new valves and actuators were equivalent or improved.

The team interviewed design engineers and reviewed calculations, evaluations, purchase specifications, vendor verification and validation reports, and post-modification testing results to verify that the valve replacement modification was appropriately implemented.

In addition, the team reviewed corrective action documents to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification.

The 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this modification was reviewed as described in section 1R17.1 of this report. Finally, the team walked down the TDAFW pump steam admission valves to assess the material condition and standby configuration.

The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment' b. Findinos No findings were identified.

6.2.7 Potential Fire Effects on Condenser Makeup and Reiect Valves a. Inspection Scooe The team reviewed a modification (ECP-2008-0018)to the controls for the condenser makeup and reject valves. This modification was related to implementation of the performance-based fire protection program under National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 (NFPA 805), Adverse impacts of fire induced damage on input circuits to the hotwell level controller could cau$e loss of inventory in the condensate storage tank (CST). The purpose of the modification was to ensure adequate CST inventory would be available to conduct safe shutdown activities in the post-fire operating environment.

The team reviewed the modification to verify that the design bases, licensing bases and performance capability of the post-fire safe shutdown systems had not been degraded by the modification.

The team reviewed technical evaluations associated with the modification to determine what malfunctions fire induced damage to the hotwell level controller inputs would cause. The team verified that the circuit analyses had been performed in accordance with NEI 00-01, "Guidance for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown

Analysis.

" ln addition, the 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this modification was reviewed as described in section 1 R17.1 of this report. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findinos No findings were identified.

.2.8 Sump'B'Strainer

Foreiqn Material Exclusion Covers a. lnspection Scope The team reviewed a modification (ECP-2008-0097)that installed covers to protect the containment sump 'B' perforated strainer surface area from mechanical damage and foreign material intrusion during outage work activities.

When the strainers are required to be functional, the covers are secured to the top of the corresponding strainer modules. During an outage, the strainer covers are repositioned to the face side of the strainer modules to protect the strainer surface. Existing procedures were revised to ensure the covers are removed when the sump is required to be operable.The team reviewed the modification to verify that the design bases, licensing bases and performance capability of the containment sump had not been degraded by the installation of the protective covers. The team reviewed calculations and technical evaluations to verify that the covers would not impact the strainers, and that the strainer would function in accordance with design assumptions.

The team reviewed the PMT results, which included a visual inspection of the covers and fasteners, to ensure that appropriate criteria had been specified and met. In addition, the 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this modification was reviewed as described in section 1R17.1 of this report. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

7 b. Findinos No findings were identified.

.2.9 Installation

of New Dioital Safetv lniection Accumulator Pressure Indicators and Accumulator Low Pressure Setpoint Chanqe a. lnspection Scope The team reviewed a modification (ECP-2009-0030)that installed digital indicators for the safety injection accumulator pressure channels in the main control room panels. The digital indication has improved accuracy over the previous analog indicators, reducing the instrument uncertainty and allowing a wider operating band for accumulator pressure.

The modification also changed the low pressure alarm setpoint to provide an alarm function prior to exceeding the operability limits, which was a challenge with the existing configuration due to the narrow operating band and relatively large uncertainly of the installed indicators.

The team reviewed the modification to verify that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the safety injection accumulator pressure instrumentation had not been degraded by the modification.

The team reviewed technical evaluations, instrument uncertainty calculations, and manufacturer data sheets for the new indicators to verify that operating characteristics were properly incorporated into the design of the modification.

The team reviewed post-modification test criteria and results to ensure that appropriate criteria had been specified and met. In addition, the 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this modification was reviewed as described in section 1R17.1 of this report. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findinqs No findings were identified.

.2.10 MOV-856 Evaluation

to Determine Acceptable Sprinq Pack Displacement a. lnspection Scope The team reviewed a modification (ECP-2009-0122)that changed the testing method for the refueling water storage tank suction motor-operated valve (MOV), MOV-856, for the residual heat removal pumps. The modification changed test parameters to use torque switch spring pack deflection rather than stem thrust for setting the torque switch trip points during the 2009 refueling outage. The torque switch low trip setting ensures that the valve will close against the expected differential pressure, and the high torque switch trip setting ensures that the motor stall torque and the valve weak link strength will not be exceeded.

The valve is required to close during the switchover to the recirculation phase of accident mitigation.

I The team reviewed the modification to verify that the design bases, licensing bases and performance capabilities of the emergency core cooling systems were not adversely affected by the modification.

The team reviewed calculations and technical evaluations to verify that the revised test method would ensure the safety function of the valve was not degraded.

In addition, the 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this modification was reviewed as described in section 1 R17.1 of this report. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findinqs No findings were identified.

.2.11 Protect Charqinq Pumps on Loss of Component

Coolino Water a. lnspection Scope The team reviewed a modification (ECP-2009-0232)that would automatically protect the charging pumps on a loss of component cooling water (CCW). The CCW system cools the non-regenerative heat exchanger in the letdown line from the reactor coolant system.A loss of CCW would result in high temperatures in the letdown flow, which could cause damage to the charging pumps and result in additional operational challenges.

Prior to the modification, procedures were in place to instruct operators to manually respond to this postulated transient.

The modification used existing temperature sensors downstream of the non-regenerative heat exchanger and the volume control tank (VCT)to generate a control signal to isolate the VCT and switch charging pump suction to the refueling water storage tank in the event of high temperatures at both locations.

The team reviewed the modification to verify that the design bases, licensing bases and performance capability of the chemical and volume control system would not be degraded by installation of the dual bistables, relays, additional wiring, and the new control function.

The team reviewed calculations and technical evaluations to ensure that adequate net positive suction head would remain available to the charging pumps at all times. The team reviewed the associated post-modification test to verify that appropriate criteria were specified and met. The team also verified that associated surveillance tests, operating procedures, and combustible loading had been updated.The 10 CFR 50.59 screening determination associated with this modification was reviewed as described in section 1 R17.1 of this report. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findinss No findings were identified.

I

4OA2 ldentification

and Resolution of Problems (lP 71152)a. Insoection Scope The team reviewed a sample of condition reports associated with 10 CFR 50.59 and plant modification issues to determine whether Constellation was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with these areas, and whether the planned and/or completed corrective actions were appropriate.

In addition, the team reviewed condition reports written on issues identified during the inspection to verify adequate problem identification and incorporation of the problem into the corrective action system. The condition reports reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findinqs No findings were identified.

4OAO Meetinqs.

includinq Exit The team presented the inspection results to Mr. J. Pacher, Vice President - Ginna, and other members of Constellation's staff at an exit meeting on October 20,2011. The team returned the proprietary information reviewed during the inspection and verified that this report does not contain proprietary information.

A-1 ATTACHMENT

=SUPPLEMENTAL

INFORMATION=

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Constellation

Personnel

E. Durkish, Design Engineer

J. Guider, Design Engineer

M. Harriman, Design Engineer

C. Holder, Design Engineer

J. Jackson, Senior Licensing

Engineer

M. Zweigle, Design Engineer Manager

LIST OF ITEMS

OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

None.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

REVIEWED 10

CFR 50.59 Evaluations

EVAL-2008-0002, lnstallation of Two AOVs in EDG Service Water Lines, dated

12110108

EVAL-2009-0001, Program to Raise the Maximum RCS Lithium Concentration, dated

9126109

EVAL-2010-0001, Changes to Procedure

RF-8.4, "Fuel and Core Component Movement in the Spent Fuel Pool" to Allow Fuel Assemblies to be Loaded into ISFSI DSCs, dated

6121110

EVAL-2O10-0002, Disable Rod Control System Auto Rod Withdrawal Function, dated

7112110

EVAL-2010-0003, Change Request Package TRM/074 - Redefine Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Requirements in Technical Requirements Manual Sections 3.7.7 and 3.9.4, dated

1018110 10

CFR 50.59 Screened-out Evaluations

ECP-2008-0071, EDG Lube Oil and Jacket Water Cooler Tube Bundle Replacement, Rev. 0

ECP-2009-0009, Replacement of Containment Recirculation Fan Cooler Inlet Louvers, dated

213108 ECP'2009-0080, Replace Tyco Potter Brumfeld Series KHAU Relays, Rev. 0

ECP-2009-0242, Minimum WallThickness Values for Steam Generator Primary Nozzles, Rev. 0

ECP-2009-0441, Replacement of Copper Piping with Stainless Steel for the Service Water Supply and Return to the RHR Pump Room Coolers, Rev. 000

ECP-2009-0481, EDG SW AOV Control Switches for 4598G, 4598H, 4599G, and 4599H, dated

12116109

ECP-10-000033, Sump Pool Levelfor Small Breaks >2" Where the RCS Refills, dated

2110110 Attachment

ECP-10-000355, Calcium Silicate Insulation Jacket Banding in Containment, dated

1017110

ECP-10-000733, Replace'A'SFP

Pump Bearing Housing with an Equivalent Housing, dated

9122110

ECP-10-000935, Install Jumper in Cubicle Bus 16/17C, Rev. 0000

ECP-11-000236, Convert

ECP-10-000557

from a Temporary Change to a Permanent Plant Modification, dated 5151 1 1

PASPKG-2008-0674-013, Modify Procedures to Address Degrading Bus Voltage, dated

4117108

PASPKG-2009-0143-001 , Incorporate New

ACB 2008-0150

for MDAFW Lube Oil Discharge Pressure, dated 2l2lAg

PCR-2008-0591 , Revision to 0-6.1 1, Control of Mini-Purge Exhaust Valves While Depressurizing Containment, dated 3/8/08

PCR-2009-0661, Revision to

ES-1.1, SlTermination, dated

4114109

PCR-10-04095, Revision to

STP-O-12.2, Emergency Diesel Generator'B', Rev. 1

PCR-11-00165, Revision to

STP-O-16Q8, AFW Pump 'B' - Quarterly, dated

4119111

PCR-1

1-01435, Revision to E-1 , Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, dated

3125111

PCR-11-01957, Revision to

DA-EE-97-069, Battery Load Profiles, Rev. 1

PCR-11-03668, Revision to

STP-O-R-6.1, ILRT Penetration Valve Alignment, dated

5118111

PCR-1

1-04817, Revision to E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, dated

8110111

PCR-I1-04818, Revision to

ECA-0.0, Loss of allAC Power, dated

8110111

PCR-11-05534, Revision to

ECA-0.0, Loss of all AC Power, dated

1013111 Modification Packaqes

ECP-2008-0018, Potential Fire Effects on Condenser Makeup and RejectValves, Rev. 0

ECP-2008-0040, Installation of Two AOVs in Each EDG Service Water Line, Rev. 0

ECP-2008-0097, Sump'B'Strainer Foreign Material Exclusion Covers, Rev' 0

ECP-2009-0030, lnstallation of New Digital Safety Injection Accumulator Pressure Indicators and Accumulator Low Pressure Setpoint Change, Rev. 0000.01

ECP-2009-0122,

MOV-856 Evaluation to Determine Acceptable Spring Pack Displacement, Rev.0

ECP-2009-0146, Installation of Orifice within the TDAFW Pump Lube Oil Regulating Valve Sensing Line, Rev. 0

ECP-2009-0232, Protect Charging Pumps on Loss of Component Cooling Water, Rev. 0000

ECP-2009-0275, Containment Spray and Sl Full Flow Recirculation Line, Rev. 0000

ECP-10-000072, Replace TDAFW Steam Admission Valves 3504A and 35054 Including the Limitorque Actuators

OP/3504A and OP/3505A, Rev. 0

PCR-10-00549, Change Action Time for Appendix R - Pull Stopping TDAFW Pump from 1 Minute to 4 Minutes, dated

2115110

PCR-11-03976, Change CREATS Fans 'A' and 'B' Restart Acceptance Band, dated

5125111 Calculations.

Analvsis.

and Evaluations

10.26, UFSAR Chapter 15 Transient Analysis Calculation Sheet, Rev. 1

CALC-2010-0014, Pipe Stress and Pipe Support Analysis for Pipe Segment

MS-120 Due to Replacement of Valves, 3505A, 3504A, 35058, and 35048, Rev. 000

DA-ME-98-038, MOV Thrust Limit Calculation for

MOV 35044, Rev. 4

DA-ME-98-039, MOV Thrust Limit Calculation for

MOV 3505A, Rev. 4 Attachment

DA-ME-98-138, Emergency Diesel Generator Lube Oil and Jacket Water Heat Exchanger Plugging Limits and Thermal Performance at Limiting Service Water Flows, Rev. 1

DA-ME-98-139, Emergency Diesel Generator Lube Oil and Jacket Water Heat Exchanger Service Water Differential Pressure Limits, Rev. 002

DA-NS-08-050, Ginna Fuel Handling Accident Offsite and Control Room Doses, Rev. 0

PCR-2004-0070, Canister Sipping Accident, Rev. 000 Condition Reoorts 2008-003157

2011-001415

2011-005212

2011-007299" 2009-003680

2011-001419

2011-006287

2011-007335.

2009-007495

2011-002467

2011-006290

2011-007343" 2009-007785

2011-002650

2011-006854.

2011-007359.

2009-009310

2011-002943

2011-006953.

2011-007360.

2010-005086

2011-003552

2011-007065.

2011-007361-

2010-005722

2011-003917

2011-007287*

2011-007364.

(* denotes NRC identified during this inspection)

Drawinqs 33013-1231, Main Steam, Rev.40 33013-1248, Auxiliary Cooling - Spent Fuel Pool Cooling, Rev. 38 33013-1250, Station Service Cooling Water Safety Related, Sh. 1, Rev. 56 33013-1261, Containment Spray, Rev. 42 33013-1262, Safety Injection and Accumulators, Sh. 1, Rev. 27 33013-1262, Safety Injection and Accumulators, Sh. 2, Rev. 7 33013-1896, InstrumentAirTurbine Bldg. and Screenhouse, Rev. 17 33013-2285, Motor Driven and TDAFW Pumps Lube Oil Skid, Rev. 18 MD22614, Nozzle Check Valve 6" - 300,

ERV-Z, Butt Weld Ends, Rev. B Procedures

A-601.10, Time Critical Action Management Program, Rev. 00001 A-601.9, EOP/AOP Support Documentation Control, Rev. 00604

AP-Elec.2, Safeguards Busses Low Voltage or System Abnormal Frequency, Rev. 0306

AP-RCS.4, Shutdown LOCA. Rev. 02010

AR-J-24, Emergency Diesel Gen 1A Panel, Rev. 01600

AR-J-32, Emergency Diesel Gen 1B Panel, Rev. 14

CH-120, Primary System Analysis Schedule and Limits, Rev. 00500

CNG-CA-1.01-1000, Corrective Action Program, Rev. 00401

CNG-CM-1.01-1003, Design Engineering and Configuration Control, Rev. 00401

CNG-CM-1.01-2001, Preparation and Control of CNG Calculations, Rev. 0000

CNG-NL-1.01-1011, 10

CFR 50.59/10 CFR72.48 Applicability Determinations, Screenings and Evaluations, Rev. 00200

CNG-PR-1.01-101

1, Station-Specific

Procedure

Process, Rev. 00500 E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Rev. 04001 Attachment

E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Rev. 03600 and Rev. 04000 E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Rev. 41

ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power, Rev. 03700

ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, Rev. 24

ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of Both Steam Generators, Rev. 30

ECA-3.1, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant - Subcooled Recovery Desired, Rev. 20

ECA-3.2, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant - Saturated Recovery Desired, Rev. 30

ECA-3.3, SGTR without Pressurizer Pressure Control, Rev. 29

ES-0.1, ReactorTrip Response, Rev. 24

ES-1.2, Post-LOCA

Cooldown and Depressurization, Rev. 0360

ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, Rev. 04200

RE-100, Preparation, Review, and Approvalof Fuel Movement Sequence Sheets and Document Closeout, Rev.01200

RF-8.4, Fuel and Core Component Movement in the Spent Fuel Pool, Rev. 06003 S-1 6. 1 6C, Safety Injection Pump'C' lsolation/Restoration, Rev. 01 800 S-16A, Safety Injection System Alignment, Rev. 07400 S-9, SFP Cooling System Operation, Rev. 00401 S-9S, Standby SFP Cooling System Installation, Fill and Vent Including Fire Water to SFP Backup Cooling, Rev. 02602

STP-O-12.1, Emergency Diesel Generator'A', Rev. 01002

STP-O-R-2.2, Diesel Generator Load and Safeguard Sequence Test, Rev. 00701

STP-O-R-6.1, Integrated Leakage Rate Test Penetration Valving Alignment, Rev. 00102 Work Orders c20806759

C20807213

c90462753 c20806760

C20807214

c91344678 Miscellaneous

GNA-2008-656, Training for Normally Closed AOVs Added to the EDG SW Line to the Jacket Water and Lube Oil Coolers, dated

12103108

GNA-2009-334, Training for lnstallation of Orifice LLO15 Upstream of V-5490P and Downstream of V-5490Q, dated

5128109 NUREG/CR-6604, RADTMD:A Simplified Modelfor Radionuclide Transport and Removal and Dose Estimates, April 1998 R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant - Amendment

RE: Containment Operability During Refueling Operations (TAC No. ME0203), dated

8112109 Regulatory Guide 1 .183, Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors, July 2000 Rockbestos/Suprenant

146-3433 Firewall lll Specification Sheet, 2003 Edition Self-Assessment

SA-2010-000168, Readiness for NRC Inspection - 71111.17, Evaluation of Changes, Tests, or Experiments and Permanent Modifications (Triennial), dated

917111

STD-MCE-09-08, Evaluation of the Effects of Elevated pH and Lithium Chemistry on Stress Corrosion Cracking of Primary System Materials for Ginna, dated 9/9/09 Attachment Technical Requirements Manual, Revs. 40 and 45 Technical Specifications Update Final Safety Analysis Report, Rev.22 Completed Surveillance and Modification Acceotance Tests

STP-O-3-COMP-A, Containment Spray Pump 'A' Comprehensive Test, performed

6/3/11

STP-O-3-COMP-B, Containment Spray Pump 'B' Comprehensive Test, performed

29111

STP-O-23.18A, LLRT of Containment Spray Header'A' Pen 105, performed

5/30/11 and

612111

STP-O-23.188, LLRT of Containment Spray Header'B' Pen 109, performed

27111

STP-O-3QA, Containment Spray Pump'A' Quarterly Test, performed

131 1 1

STP-O-3QB, Containment Spray Pump'A' Quarterly Test, performed

717111 M-64.1.2, MOVATS Testing of Motor Operated Valves for 3504A and 3505A, performed

515111 and

516111

PT-16Q-T, Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Pump - Quarterly, performed

28109,10/3/09

and 12t1t09

STP-O-16-COMP-TLU, AFW Turbine Pump - Comprehensive Test Limited Use, performed

619111

STP-O-2.5.7, EDG AOVs - Quarterly, performed

513111,

5116111,

611111,7122111,7126111

and

8129111 Attachment

ADAMS ASME AOV ccw CFR CREATS CST DRS ECP EDG IP MOV NEI NFPA NRC PARS PCR PMT TDAFW TS UFSAR VCT A-6

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agencyruide

Documents

Access and Management

System American Society of Mechanical

Engineers Air Operated Valve Component

Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulations

Control Room Emergency

Air Treatment

System Condensate

Storage Tank Division of Reactor Safety Engineering

Change Package Emergency

Diesel Generator lnspection

Procedure Motor-Operated

Valve Nuclear Energy Institute National Fire Protection

Association

Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

Publicly Available

Records Procedure

Change Request Post-Modification

Test Turbine-Driven

Auxiliary

Feedwater Tech nical Specifications

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Volume ControlTank

Attachment