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| {{#Wiki_filter:ESFASInstrumentation B3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLE SAFETYANALYSES, LCO,andAPPLICABILITY c.SteamLineIsolation | | {{#Wiki_filter:ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY c.Steam Line Isolation-Containment Pressure-Hi h Hi h{continued) |
| -Containment Pressure-HihHih{continued) | | Containment Pressure-High High must be OPERABLE in MODES I, 2, and 3, because there is sufficient energy in the primary and secondary side to pressurize the containment following a pipe break.This would cause a significant incr ease in the containment pressure, thus allowing detection and closure of the MSIVs.'he steam line isolation Function must be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3 unless both MSIVs are closed and de-activated.. |
| Containment Pressure-HighHighmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3,becausethereissufficient energyintheprimaryandsecondary sidetopressurize thecontainment following apipebreak.Thiswouldcauseasignificant increaseinthecontainment | | In MODES 4, 5, and 6 the steam line isolation Function is not required to be OPERABLE because there is not enough energy in the primary and secondary sides to pressurize the containment to the Containment Pressure-High High setpoint.d.Steam Line Isolation-Hi h Steam Flow Coincident With Safet In'ection and Coincident With T,-Low This Function provides closure of the MSIV~~tap>c-during an SLB or inadvertent openjgg of G atmospheric relief or safety valv~o maintain at least one unfaulted SG as a heat sink for the reactor, and to limit the mass and energy release to containment. |
| : pressure, thusallowingdetection andclosureoftheMSIVs.'he steamlineisolation FunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODES2and3unlessbothMSIVsareclosedandde-activated..
| | ~sp~gc4 AOomoQLc Value<~a~4 ow n~~hi~e~~P c)~pr ivy W~~X ou4~~~g~()oaz py'g)~R~%~~, R~~~~~+im e.)t~fo g-rp g~c-~a+~(0 (4P4 14~(Kf)~~~t~4~~s~~~le zi+~<8~~4%m~Qg~'g 4ic~Q(~cL>>4~+'p~~~~~~~~K ((p, o~~Ah~ca~h Q@oA''i+<~tg~col LkpA.ug~g, u3 ChLCM~~~i~~~i'll~~<~/~~~~~Q~~~~~~~'~M~~~~ |
| InMODES4,5,and6thesteamlineisolation FunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEbecausethereisnotenoughenergyintheprimaryandsecondary sidestopressurize thecontainment totheContainment Pressure-HighHighsetpoint.
| | p~<~~~~~+~~~~~~~c&0.4t.a 4~4m(~e+LbOK@sic'Lo~~pm<z~~~~~~X 4~~~~pme~mg.~v~~a~i4~~P~4.,~~~%XI 4.L~~~A\~rC,'Q+4 O~~a~(continued) |
| d.SteamLineIsolation | | R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.3-82 Revision 6 9806i00267 |
| -HihSteamFlowCoincident WithSafetIn'ectionandCoincident WithT,-LowThisFunctionprovidesclosureoftheMSIV~~tap>c-duringanSLBorinadvertent openjggofGatmospheric relieforsafetyvalv~omaintainatleastoneunfaulted SGasaheatsinkforthereactor,andtolimitthemassandenergyreleasetocontainment. | | 'F80604 PDR ADOCK 05000244 P'DR rg J ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY d.Steam Line Isolation-Hi h Steam Flow Coincident With Safet In ection and Coincident Wi'th T-Low (continued) e.This Function must be OPERABLE in MODES I, 2, and 3 when a secondary side break or stuck open valve could result in rapid depressurization of the steam lines.The Steam Line Isolation Function is required to be, OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3 unless both MSIVs are closed and de-activated. |
| ~sp~gc4AOomoQLcValue<~a~4own~~hi~e~~Pc)~privyW~~Xou4~~~g~()oazpy'g)~R~%~~,R~~~~~+ime.)t~fog-rpg~c-~a+~(0(4P414~(Kf)~~~t~4~~s~~~lezi+~<8~~4%m~Qg~'g4ic~Q(~cL>>4~+'p~~~~~~~~K((p,o~~Ah~ca~hQ@oA''i+<~tg~colLkpA.ug~g, u3ChLCM~~~i~~~i'll~~<~/~~~~~Q~~~~~~~'~M~~~~ | | This Function is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4, 5, and 6 because there is insufficient energy in the secondary side of the plant to have an accident.Steam Line Isolation-Hi h Hi h Steam Flow Coincident With Safet In'ection This Function provides closure of the IVs durin a team line brea or>na rtent openin an SG atmos er relic safe valv o ma)ntain at east one un aulted SG as a eat sink for the reactor, and to limit the mass and energy release to containment Two steam line flow channels per steam line are required to be OPERABLE for this Function.These are combined in a one-out-of-two logic to indicate high-high steam flow in one steam line.FT-464 and FT-465 are the two channels required for steam line A.FT-474 and FT-475 are the two channels required for steam line B.Each steam line is considered a separate function for the purpose of this LCO.The steam flow transmitters provide control inputs, but the control function cannot initiate events that the Function acts to mitigate.Therefore, additional channels are not required to address control protection in act'icsu Kk(n~~u~m i~+~~(D~r Ww'g~(>0 W'l4 o~s,~uv.~~~v s m~~~M%+iv~.g~nn~E~~,~g~~M~3tgmo3.+m Mmg.~m~uv-i.'~~~ |
| p~<~~~~~+~~~~~~~c&0.4t.a4~4m(~e+LbOK@sic'Lo~~pm<z~~~~~~X4~~~~pme~mg.~v~~a~i4~~P~4.,~~~%XI4.L~~~A\~rC,'Q+4O~~a~(continued) | | M~g ('<, o~~~.v.~~'E Qg~Q Lc W~~'~.h.~~4~~$~~~~Mt~4x&~~p~q~~j Z~u.~~~~~Q.7 ll<~)~~7$W pg'tg.S~~Q~~{o~k~~q~~~-'~~~(continued) p~~~-0 R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.3-84 Revision 6 0'%la E.nS<'*fj" 4}} |
| R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-82Revision69806i00267 | |
| 'F80604PDRADOCK05000244P'DR rgJ ESFASInstrumentation B3.3.2BASESAPPLICABLE SAFETYANALYSES, LCO,andAPPLICABILITY d.SteamLineIsolation | |
| -HihSteamFlowCoincident WithSafetInectionandCoincident Wi'thT-Low(continued) e.ThisFunctionmustbeOPERABLEinMODESI,2,and3whenasecondary sidebreakorstuckopenvalvecouldresultinrapiddepressurization ofthesteamlines.TheSteamLineIsolation Functionisrequiredtobe,OPERABLEinMODES2and3unlessbothMSIVsareclosedandde-activated. | |
| ThisFunctionisnotrequiredtobeOPERABLEinMODES4,5,and6becausethereisinsufficient energyinthesecondary sideoftheplanttohaveanaccident.
| |
| SteamLineIsolation
| |
| -HihHihSteamFlowCoincident WithSafetIn'ectionThisFunctionprovidesclosureoftheIVsdurinateamlinebreaor>nartentopeninanSGatmoserrelicsafevalvoma)ntainateastoneunaultedSGasaeatsinkforthereactor,andtolimitthemassandenergyreleasetocontainment TwosteamlineflowchannelspersteamlinearerequiredtobeOPERABLEforthisFunction. | |
| Thesearecombinedinaone-out-of-two logictoindicatehigh-highsteamflowinonesteamline.FT-464andFT-465arethetwochannelsrequiredforsteamlineA.FT-474andFT-475arethetwochannelsrequiredforsteamlineB.Eachsteamlineisconsidered aseparatefunctionforthepurposeofthisLCO.Thesteamflowtransmitters providecontrolinputs,butthecontrolfunctioncannotinitiateeventsthattheFunctionactstomitigate.
| |
| Therefore, additional channelsarenotrequiredtoaddresscontrolprotection inact'icsuKk(n~~u~mi~+~~(D~rWw'g~(>0W'l4o~s,~uv.~~~vsm~~~M%+iv~.g~nn~E~~,~g~~M~3tgmo3.+mMmg.~m~uv-i.'~~~ | |
| M~g('<,o~~~.v.~~'EQg~QLcW~~'~.h.~~4~~$~~~~Mt~4x&~~p~q~~jZ~u.~~~~~Q.7ll<~)~~7$Wpg'tg.S~~Q~~{o~k~~q~~~-'~~~(continued) p~~~-0R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantB3.3-84Revision6 0'%laE.nS<'*fj"4}} | |
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[Table view] |
Text
ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY c.Steam Line Isolation-Containment Pressure-Hi h Hi h{continued)
Containment Pressure-High High must be OPERABLE in MODES I, 2, and 3, because there is sufficient energy in the primary and secondary side to pressurize the containment following a pipe break.This would cause a significant incr ease in the containment pressure, thus allowing detection and closure of the MSIVs.'he steam line isolation Function must be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3 unless both MSIVs are closed and de-activated..
In MODES 4, 5, and 6 the steam line isolation Function is not required to be OPERABLE because there is not enough energy in the primary and secondary sides to pressurize the containment to the Containment Pressure-High High setpoint.d.Steam Line Isolation-Hi h Steam Flow Coincident With Safet In'ection and Coincident With T,-Low This Function provides closure of the MSIV~~tap>c-during an SLB or inadvertent openjgg of G atmospheric relief or safety valv~o maintain at least one unfaulted SG as a heat sink for the reactor, and to limit the mass and energy release to containment.
~sp~gc4 AOomoQLc Value<~a~4 ow n~~hi~e~~P c)~pr ivy W~~X ou4~~~g~()oaz py'g)~R~%~~, R~~~~~+im e.)t~fo g-rp g~c-~a+~(0 (4P4 14~(Kf)~~~t~4~~s~~~le zi+~<8~~4%m~Qg~'g 4ic~Q(~cL>>4~+'p~~~~~~~~K ((p, o~~Ah~ca~h Q@oAi+<~tg~col LkpA.ug~g, u3 ChLCM~~~i~~~i'll~~<~/~~~~~Q~~~~~~~'~M~~~~
p~<~~~~~+~~~~~~~c&0.4t.a 4~4m(~e+LbOK@sic'Lo~~pm<z~~~~~~X 4~~~~pme~mg.~v~~a~i4~~P~4.,~~~%XI 4.L~~~A\~rC,'Q+4 O~~a~(continued)
R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.3-82 Revision 6 9806i00267
'F80604 PDR ADOCK 05000244 P'DR rg J ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY d.Steam Line Isolation-Hi h Steam Flow Coincident With Safet In ection and Coincident Wi'th T-Low (continued) e.This Function must be OPERABLE in MODES I, 2, and 3 when a secondary side break or stuck open valve could result in rapid depressurization of the steam lines.The Steam Line Isolation Function is required to be, OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3 unless both MSIVs are closed and de-activated.
This Function is not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4, 5, and 6 because there is insufficient energy in the secondary side of the plant to have an accident.Steam Line Isolation-Hi h Hi h Steam Flow Coincident With Safet In'ection This Function provides closure of the IVs durin a team line brea or>na rtent openin an SG atmos er relic safe valv o ma)ntain at east one un aulted SG as a eat sink for the reactor, and to limit the mass and energy release to containment Two steam line flow channels per steam line are required to be OPERABLE for this Function.These are combined in a one-out-of-two logic to indicate high-high steam flow in one steam line.FT-464 and FT-465 are the two channels required for steam line A.FT-474 and FT-475 are the two channels required for steam line B.Each steam line is considered a separate function for the purpose of this LCO.The steam flow transmitters provide control inputs, but the control function cannot initiate events that the Function acts to mitigate.Therefore, additional channels are not required to address control protection in act'icsu Kk(n~~u~m i~+~~(D~r Ww'g~(>0 W'l4 o~s,~uv.~~~v s m~~~M%+iv~.g~nn~E~~,~g~~M~3tgmo3.+m Mmg.~m~uv-i.'~~~
M~g ('<, o~~~.v.~~'E Qg~Q Lc W~~'~.h.~~4~~$~~~~Mt~4x&~~p~q~~j Z~u.~~~~~Q.7 ll<~)~~7$W pg'tg.S~~Q~~{o~k~~q~~~-'~~~(continued) p~~~-0 R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.3-84 Revision 6 0'%la E.nS<'*fj" 4
