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{{#Wiki_filter:GROUP BFOIA/PA NO: 2012-0235 RECORDS BEING RELEASED IN PARTThe following types of information are being withheld:
Ex. 1 : Records properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 12,958Ex. 2:F-1 Records regarding personnel rules and/or human capital administration Ex. 3T:- Information about the design, manufacture, or utilization of nuclear weapons[EInformation about the protection or security of reactors and nuclear materials E]Contractor proposals not incorporated into a final contract with the NRCE-OtherEx. 4:7 Proprietary information provided by a submitter to the NRCM_!Other Information that would decrease compliance and/or program effectiveness Ex. 5:[ODraft documents or other pre-decisional deliberative documents (D.P. Privilege)
D Records prepared by counsel in anticipation of litigation (A.W.P. Privilege) 7 Privileged communications between counsel and a client (A.C. Privilege)
D-1 OtherEx. 6:] Agency employee P11, including SSN, contact information, birthdates, etc.[,Third party P11, including names, phone numbers, or other personal information Ex. 7(A):f- Copies of ongoing investigation case files, exhibits, notes, ROI's, etc.Eli Records that reference or are related to a separate ongoing investigation(s)
Ex. 7(C): E-1 Special Agent or other law enforcement PIILI PII of third parties referenced in records compiled for law enforcement purposesEx. 7(D):D--
Witnesses' and Allegers' PII in law enforcement records--LConfidential Informant or law enforcement information provided by other entityEx. 7(E): [--1Law Enforcement Technique/Procedure used for criminal investigations
[--Technique or procedure used for security or prevention of criminal activityEx. 7(F): rlni'formation that could aid.a terrorist or compromise securityOther/Comments:
Smith, ChrisFrom: Kirkland, JohnSent: Tuesday, May 31, 2011 10:49 AMTo: Clark, Jeff; Azua, RayCc: Smith, Chris; Melfi, Jim
==Subject:==
FW: River LevelFrom: GUINN, DONNA K rmailto:dauinndoopd.com Sent: Tuesday, May 31, 2011 10:42 AMTo: Kirkland, John; Wingebach, JacobCc: ACKER, RICHARD D; MATZKE, ERICK P; COOPER, MIKE
==Subject:==
FW: River LevelFYIDonna Guinn, PMPSupervisor
-Regulatory Compliance dquinn@oppd.com (402) 533-7337[I(b)(6) ' '':-fax (402) 533-7291From: NELLENBACH, TIMOTHY RSent: Monday, May 30, 2011-1:41 PMTo: NuclearBusinessUnit Cc, REINHART, JEFFREY A; BANNISTER, DAVID J; GATES, GARY; HANSEN, ]ON T; DOGHMAN, MOHAMAD I; MINKS,ADRIAN 3; BURKE, TIMOTHY 3; EASTERLIN, EDWARD E
==Subject:==
FW: River LevelHello,As you all know we are experiencing some of the highest river levels in the station's history.
The current level is 1001feet 11 inches. It is impossible to predict how high the river will get because we don't know how much rain will fall;however, we do know that the Army Corps of Engineers is planning to increase outflows from Gavins Point dam tounprecedented levels over the next several weeks. We are preparing for the worst case, and we will be ready tohandle It.We are currently implementing the following station procedures to deal with the high river level:-AOP-01, Acts of Nature, Section 1 for Flooding-PE-RR-AE-1001, Flood Barrier and Sandbag Staging and Installation We have also been reviewing our emergency plan procedures (EPIP-TSC-2, Catastrophic Flood Protection) in the eventthat they are needed to help mitigate the effects of the high river level.Items that we have either completed or started up to this point are:-Staged equipment at our sandpile to fill sandbags.
-Filled more than 8,000 sandbags.
-Sandbagged the necessary items in the Intake Structure and stored additional sandbags there in the event theyare needed.-Staged sandbags in the Auxiliary Building.
-Staged sandbags near the Main Station transformer, TI, for use to protect the Turbine Building and other assetsin the Protected Area.1 Staged our metal flood barriers.
-Sandbagged the Security Building doors.Commenced sandbagging in the Switchyard.
Had additional sand delivered to the site.-Making preparations to build a berm around our new demineralized water equipment near the Old Warehouse I sincerely appreciate the efforts by all station Personnel in aettina the above activities accomplished.
We stillhave a lot of work to do, and we will all need to pitch in during the next several weeks.Going forward please do the following:
" The available parking has been reduced.
Please be patient and do not park in standing water. Use the available dry spaces. If we run out of spaces additional parking and/or shuttle service will be provided to get the necessary people to work.0 Work with your supervision to make yourself available for sandbagging or other mitigation efforts." Do not despair.
We will continue to be successful In protecting FCS so that we can return to poweroperation.
From a Nuclear Safety Culture perspective the below principles come to mind as they relate to ourcurrent situation.
Principle 1: Everyone is personally responsible for nuclear safety. (People and their professional capabilities, values, and experiences are regarded as the nuclear organization's most valuable assets. We will continue tosuccessfully mitigate the effects of the high water because we have great people that can get the jobdone. We also have solid station procedures and the full backing of OPPD to get any necessary resources.
Principle 4: Conservative Decision Making (Decision making practices reflect the ability to distinguish between"allowable" choices and "prudent" choices.)
We will not startup the reactor until we know and understand the trends on river level.Principle 5: Nuclear Power is special and unique (Produces decay heat.) Our nuclear fuel is in a safecondition and will remain in a safe condition regardless of how high the river level gets. Our fuel iscurrently covered by more than 23 feet of water in both the Spent Fuel Pool and the Reactor Vessel. Oursafety systems are fully able to remove decay heat and will continue to do so.If you have questions or concerns, don't hesitate to contact your supervisor or manager.Thank you.Tim Nellenbach Plant ManagerFort Calhoun Nuclear StationOmaha Public Power DistrictPhone: (402) 533-6625This e-mail contains Omaha Public Power District's confidential and proprietary information and is for use onlyby the intended recipient.
Unless explicitly stated otherwise, this e-mail is not a contract offer, amendment, noracceptance.
If you are not the intended recipient you are notified that disclosing,
: copying, distributing or takingany action in reliance on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited.
2 Smith, ChrisFrom: Wingebach, JacobSent: Wednesday, June 01, 2011 8:51 AMTo: Clark, JeffCc: Melfi, Jim; Azua, Ray; Smith, Chris
==Subject:==
FW: Update on Flood Protection ActionsFrom: GUINN, DONNA K [mallto:dguinnoopDd.com]
Sent: Wednesday, June 01, 2011 8:15 AMTo: Kirldand, John; Wingebach, Jacob
==Subject:==
FW: Update on Flood Protection ActionsFYIDonna Guinn, PMPSupervisor
-Regulatory Compliance dauinn@oppd.com (402) 533-7337fox (402) 533-7291From: REINHART, JEFFREY ASent: Tuesday, May 31, 2011 6:52 PMTo: NudearBusinessUnit Cc: HANSON, JEFFREY J; JONES, MICHAEL R; OPPD SENIOR MANAGEMENT
==Subject:==
Update on Flood Protection ActionsAll-Yesterday, Tim Nellenbach provided a detailed message regarding what we are doing to protect the plant fromrising river levels. I wanted to provide an update on developments since then.Currently the river level is 1002.3 ft. and rising slowly. The plant is in a safe condition, with fuel reloaded intothe core and greater than 23 ft. of water covering the fuel in the refueling cavity, and in the spent fuel pool.Our direction is to reinstall the upper guide structure, and then suspend reactor reassembly activities until wehave reliable information that the river level trend will remain below 1004 ft. and stay on a lowering trend. It ispossible that we will not meet these conditions until later this summer. We will not start up the reactor until itis safe to do so. Meanwhile, our safety systems remain available to remove decay heat, and our procedures and flood protection equipment will keep the plant protected.
Currently, we are tracking the release rates from Gavins Point and other upstream dams and correlating therelease rates to the expected rise in river level. Based on current best estimate predictions, river level will likelyrise another 2.5 feet to 4.5 feet over the next two weeks due to the planned higher discharges from theMissouri River dams. This is only an estimate, Per AOP-1 we will implement the Emergency Plan prior to riverlevel exceeding 1004 feet. The decision on specifically when we will implement the Emergency Plan will bemade by the Shift Manager based on river level, the rate of rise and predicted/actual precipitation levels. Wewill ensure that the Emergency plan is implemented before 1004 ft.In parallel with our actions to protect the plant from a nuclear safety perspective, we have also established aproject team, led by John Brandeau, to ensure we take appropriate actions to protect OPPD assets that couldbe damaged by flood waters. Those assets include materials, equipment and buildings such as outage trailers, material stored on-site, the old Warehouse, the new Warehouse, the Administration
: Building, and the TrainingCenter. By establishing a separate team for non-nuclear safety-related
: concerns, we enable the Operations Shift Manager and Plant Management to keep their primary focus on nuclear safety. The initial focus of theproject team is to ensure we have an accurate and prioritized picture of the assets that need to be moved tohigher ground or protected as river levels rise. We are also taking inventory of OPPD equipment available toFort Calhoun Station, and ordering additional equipment as necessary to protect our OPPD assets. Our CEO,Gary Gates, and the OPPD senior management team remains committed to provide additional support to theFCS staff as we go forward,We will keep you informed of new developments on a daily basis. Thanks for all of your support and concern.JeffJeff ReinhartSite Vice President, Fort Calhoun StationOmaha Public Power District402-533-6611 (office)402-533-7296 (fax)2 Robles, JesseFrom: Robles, JesseSent: Friday, June 03, 2011 1:44 PM
==Subject:==
IOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Friday, June 3, 2011NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS OFFiCiAL USE ONLY***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR NRC INTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION..,
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE OF NRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):
NoneManagement Requests:
NoneFollow-up/Other Tasks: Five (5)[Note -The information In this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help lOEBstaff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff]1) COOPER (INCL. FORT CALHOUN)
-PROJECTED RISE IN MISSOURI RIVER LEVELS OVER NEXTTWO WEEKS (UPDATE)The following summary details potential impacts to NRC facilities due elevated Missouri River levels. MissouriRiver Flooding.
For Ft Calhoun at 1008 feet MSL, the transformers will be impacted resulting in the plantexperiencing a loss of offsite power. The licensee's operational plan is to remain shutdown until the river crestsand then recedes to below 1004 feet MSL with a decreasing trend. If the river level reaches 1004 ft and isexpected to exceed 1006 ft, the licensee will transfer from the 4160 volt power to the Emergency DieselGenerators.
Forward to TRG Lead for Flood Protection/Missiles (Edward Smith) and EP (Eric Schrader):
assigqned to Russ Haskell.The US Army Corps of Engineers has indicated they will commence with staged water releases from upstreamdams to manage rising Missouri River levels. Releases will be on the order of 80,000 to 150,000 cubic-feetlsecond (ft3/sec) between now and 6/15/2011.
Releases of this magnitude could result in water levels atCooper Nuclear Station reaching the 899' 5" elevation (NOUE is 899') by 6/15/2011.
Station ALERT(SHUTDOWN) is 902'. The Army Corps of Engineers and National Weather Service are being consulted withregularly.
Forward to TRG Lead fgr Flood Protection/Missiles (Edward Smith) and EP (Eric Schrader):
assigned to Russ Haskell.Outside of Scope....................................
~ ~......
.o'trsID OF 5-,P"Outside of Scope Azua, RayFrom:Sent:To:Cc:SubjectAttachments:
Importance:
Howell, LindaSaturday, June 04, 2011 12:23 PMBorchardt, Bill; Virgilio, Martin; Weber, Michael;
: Collins, Elmo; Howell, Art; Wiggins, Jim;Satorius, Mark; Pederson, Cynthia; Boland, Anne; McDermott, Brian; Moore, Scott; Carpenter, Cynthia; Morris, Scott; Thaggard, Mark; Bush-Goddard, Stephanie; Weil, Jenny; Markley,Michael;
: Glitter, Joseph; Lewis, RobertKennedy, Kriss; Pruett, Troy; Vegel, Anton; Caniano, Roy; Campbell, Vivian; Dricks, Victor;Uselding, Lara; Erickson, Randy; Maier, Bill; Browder, Rachel; Clark, Jeff; Azua, Ray; Gaddy,Vincent;
: Marshall, Jane; Gott, William; HOO Hoc; Hay, Michael; Lynch, James; Dickson, BillyMissouri River Flooding
-Status of Potential Impacts on NRC Facilities and Agreement StateLicensees OFFICIAL U3E ONLY -SENZITIVE INTERN.L INFOR.ATION Missouri River Flooding Potential Impact at NRC Facilities 6-4.docxHighAttached is a status report on the current and projected impacts at NRC-licensed facilities and materials licensees located in impacted Agreement States. Updated information is highlighted.
We have removed thesection on research and test reactors since there have been no impacts on these facilities and none isexpected.
Should that change, the reported will be updated appropriately.
We anticipate publishing the next update to this report on Monday morning and will likely resume daily updatesnext week.Please noted that the report is now marked OFFICIAL USE ONLY. This is due to the level of detailedinformation concerning licensee actions.
Please do not distribute outside NRC without letting us know. Wewant to ensure that information concerning planned actions that go beyond information in public records andplans is appropriately protected/controlled.
HOOS, should you receive a request for status information from DHS today, you may forward the sameinformation provided on June.2-3.
Please contact me if you receive a request for update on Sunday to assurethat we have the current status.If any recipient of this report believes others should be added to distribution, please let me know and thedistribution list will be expanded accordingly.
V/R,LindaI?~LA nrFICIAL
_USE ONL- .
I FORMATION Missouri River FloodingPotential Impact at NRC Facilities June 4, 2011(Updated information is highlighted)
Due to greater than normal snow levels in the upper Missouri River Basin, the associated snowpack runoff and record level rainfall, the Missouri River Mainstern Reservoir System isexperiencing flooding challenges.
Rainfall in the northern areas of the Basin in the past fewweeks has equaled what typically falls during an entire year, and snowpack runoff is expected tobe 140% of the normal volume. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has noted thatthis spring's flooding will be the most severe the region has seen since the reservoir system wasconstructed in the 1950's and 1960's. This has prompted USACE to release record volumes ofwater from each of the six major dams that make up the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir System. Based on information provided by USACE, the current modeling and release plan callfor achieving a 150,000 cubic feet per second release rate for five of the six dams by mid-Juneand continuing at that level through mid-July, and possibly into August, in order to maintainreservoir storage capacity.
Missouri River levels are projected to crest as noted below and mayremain at those levels through mid-July or into August.A summary of potential impacts is provided below for NRC facilities located in areas that are ormay be impacted by flooding.
Region IV is coordinating with Agreement States in the floodimpacted areas to verify the status of materials licensees.
-,Cooper Nuclear StationPlant Elevation:
903 feet mean sea level (MSL)Current river level: -895.7 feet MSL (5:45 am, CD T, June 4)Predicted max river level: 899.5 feet MSL predicted by mid-June (source is USACE)Potential Impacts on Plant Equipment:
There are no expected equipment impacts based onprojected river levels. The licensee will commence a plant shutdown before the river levelreaches 902 feet MSL at Cooper. At 898 feet MSL the flooding procedure directs licenseepersonnel to place sandbags on exterior cloors.PTý()(b()(F)
The licensee has entered its flooding procedure and is conducting enhanced monitoring of theriver levels and traveling screens.
The licensee is also preparing barriers to protect buildings and structures from flooding.
The licensee would declare a Notice of Unusual Event (NOUE) at899 feet MSL. The licensee would declare an Alert at 902 feet MSL and initiate plant shutdown.
Potential Impact on Evacuation Routes: A portion of the normal plant access road is nowclosed as a result of flooding.
The licensee has identified alternate routes that would allowOFriCIAL USE ~
IIhIAL US 0Nff -9lENSITI ITE l I P3IIIIRMA I '-access to and from the plant by personnel and diesel fuel delivery.
The licensee is preparing tobuildup this access point to protect it from flooding.
There is currently no impact on evacuation routes.Fort Calhoun StationPlant Elevation:
1004 feet mean sea level (MSL)Current river level: -1003 feet MSL (5:15 am, CDT, June 4)Predicted max river level: 1006.4 feet MSL predicted by mid-June (source is USACE)Potential Impacts on Plant Equipment:
I(b)(4)X(b)(7)(F)
I(b)(4),(b)(7)(F)
I1ýV+b) -h- licensee would normallycommence plant shutdown when the river level reacieis 1004 feet MSL at the Fort CalhounStation.
: However, the licensee was nearing the end of a refueling outage. Currently the plant isshutdown with the core reloaded and flooded up to 23 feet above the vessel flange. Thelicensee's operational plan is to remain in this configuration-until the river crests and thenrecedes to below 1004 feet MSL with a decreasing trend (b)(4),(b)(7)(F)
(b)(4),(b)(7)(F)
TThe licensee has entered its flooding procedure and is conducting enhanced monitoring of theriver levels. The licensee is leaning forward in completing actions prescribed in its floodingprocedure and planned to have actions completed in advance of river levels reaching the triggerpoints identified in the flooding procedure.
The licensee has procured and is placing a 2000 foot long Aqua Berm (water-filled temporary levee) which is 6 feet tall and 16 feet wide at the base. This temporary berm will be installed atthe perimeter of the protected area and is expected to protect up to a 1009 feet MSL level. Thelicensee is building earthen berms around the 161 KV and 345 KV switchyards and is planningto build them to a height to provide protection similar to the Aqua Berm. Additional berms andsandbags are being built or installed around the Training Center, Administration Building andthe South Security Building.
These are intended to protect facilities important to site staff andcommunications equipment.
All offsite power sources (161 KV and 345 KV) are available and both primary emergency dieselgenerators (EDG) are operable and available.
The licensee is staging two additional fuel oiltanks within the Aqua Berm. These tanks will provide an additional two weeks of fuel (the fueltanks presently onsite have a two week fuel capacity, resulting in a four week supply of fuel).The licensee is developing plans to replenish fuel oil if there is an anticipated need to run theEDGs greater than a four week period of time.hohteakvn.Teinsal p to 4-(b)(4,(b)()(F)
The licensee is alsoevaluating a process for refueling the tanks through the tank vents. The licensee also plans toerrICIAL USE ONLY-SENSfTWIVEPILINAL INFRviIVA(IW
* stage an additional spare generator with an associated fuel tank and step-up transformer withinthe Aqua Berm.The licensee is staging additional equipment and supplies within the Aqua Berm including, dewatering pumps, sandbagging equipment and supplies, gasoline
: supplies, food and water.The licensee has procured satellite phones which will be distributed to key staff as backupcommunication devices.The licensee has ordered six boats for use onsite, if needed, since some parking areas arealready under water. Offslte parking arrangements are in place for site staff, and the staff willbe shuttled to and from the plant. The licensee is working with the National Guard to arrangefor additional backup transportation provisions.
The licensee will declare a NOUE at 1004 feet MSL The licensee's Emergency Plan would notcall for an Alert declaration until the river level reaches 1009 feet MSL. The licensee would notplan to activate its emergency response facilities if a NOUE is declared.
The licensee Ispresently planning to manage onsite activities through an Incident Command System structure using a model Included in the OPPD Pandemic Plan as a template.
At the current time, thelicensee's Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is not expected to be challenged by flooding.
The Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center are located within the AquaBerm.Potential Impact on Evacuation Routes: The licensee has indicated that the only section ofroadway that is projected to be impacted by rising river levels is a small section of Route 75 tothe north of the town of Fort Calhoun (the actual river level at which this would occur is beingresearched at this time). The residents of Fort Calhoun have evacuation routes to the west andsouth that are expected to remain available.
Evacuation routes for the town of Blair and othercommunities to the north are expected to remain available to the north and west.Outside of ScopeNRC Region IVRegion IV staff continues to monitor the flooding conditions along the Missouri River and thepotential impacts on Region IV plants and materials licensees located along the river. RegionIV is monitoring potential impacts on evacuation routes and is coordinating with the power plantlicensees, states and FEMA. Region IV has coordinated with the National Weather Service andUSACE to confirm projected river levels.OFFIIAL USE OrL E9TV NEItA nUM~U O!FFICLA.
USEOLRegion IV plans to augment the resident Inspector staff at Fort Calhoun Station on Monday,June 6. Region IV is establishing a schedule for daily conference calls with Fort CalhounStation managers to monitor the licensee's preparations and potential impacts on the plant.Region IV plans to initiate
: routine, periodic calls with FEMA Region VII, the states and localresponse organizations early next week.NSIR has coordinated with FEMA Headquarters to ensure that they are aware of the potential impacts from river flooding at Fort Calhoun Station and Cooper Nuclear Station.--OrOrtUS~WL
~ -SMSITWE IENTER N AL INTO-RMAIILJN
: Elliott, RobertFrom: Elliott, RobertSent: Monday, June 06, 2011 10:55 AMTo: Anderson, Shaun; Bucholtz, Kristy; Grover, Ravinder; Hamm, Matthew;
: Hemphill, Khadijah;
: Richards, Karen; Schulten, Carl; Singletary, Melana; Waig, Gerald
==Subject:==
FW: Notes from Decision Makers' Conference Call -- NOUE Declaration at Ft Calhoun Due toRiver Water Level 0800 CDT 6 June 2011FYI... Status at Fort Calhoun....
From: Brown, Frederick Sent: Monday, June 06, 2011 10:51 AMTo: Ashley, MaryAnn; Cartwright, William;
: Elliott, Robert; Franovich, Rani; McHale, John; Shoop, Undine
==Subject:==
FW: Notes from Decision Makers' Conference Call -- NOUE Declaration at Ft Calhoun Due to River Water Level0800 CDT 6 June 2011FYIFrom: Thorp, JohnSent: Monday, June 06, 2011 10:02 AMTo: Leeds, Eric; Boger, Bruce; Grobe, Jack; Collins, Elmo; Skeen, DavidCc: Brown, Frederick; Pruett, Troy; Howe, Allen; Ruland, William;
: Glitter, Joseph; Nelson, Robert; Cheok, Michael;McGinty, Tim; NRR_DIRS_IOEB Distribution; Kobetz, Timothy;
: Kirkland, John
==Subject:==
Notes from Decision Makers' Conference Call -- NOUE Declaration at Ft Calhoun Due to River Water Level 0800CDT 6 June 2011All,I just sat in on the blast dial conference call with the Senior Resident at Ft Calhouo, John Kirkland, to listen toJohn's status briefing and participate in the discussion among decision makers Bruce Boger and Elmo Collinson the licensee's declaration of a Notification of Unusual Event for high river water level at 0800 CDT.Other attendees on the call included NSIR Jane Marshall, and the HOO.At 0920 EDT the decision was reached to remain in normal mode, with continued enhanced oversight andfollow-up with the licensee by NRC staff, which has been in progress in anticipation of the rising river waterlevel.* The river water level as of the time of the call is 1003 feet, 2 inches. The plant is in Cold Shutdown, and does not plan to start up until the river water level (trend) is abated, and will not start up while theyare in an Unusual Event (or higher) condition.
" The level at which an NOUE must be declared under the licensee's procedures (HU-1, EAL 5, NaturalPhenomena Affecting the Protected Area) is 1004 feet." According to the Army Corps of Engineers, the river water level at the site should reach 1006 feet 6inches in approximately 10 days.* The next decision making call will be held when river water level reaches 1006 feet. (This is the level atwhich there is a potential for offsite power to be threatened.)
" At 1009 feet, the licensee's procedures call for declaration of an Alert, and this is the level at which aShutdown is required if the plant were operating.
Licensee actions thus far:* Over past week, Ft Calhoun has been preparing for the rising river level, and has put in placesandbagging and flood gates to protect the site up to 1007 feet river level." The licensee has materials staged to support protection up to 1014 feet, and they have procured andby end of day today will have installed an "aqua-berm" (design is similar to a large inner tube filled withwater) to protect the entire protected area (with exception of the intake structure) up to 1012 feet ofriver level.* The licensee is procuring another aqua-berm to allow protection of the Training Building and thesimulator facility in that building.
During the days/weeks leading up to today's call, Region IV has been engaged and interacting with thelicensee, FEMA, and state and local authorities, and the Region IV staff will continue with enhanced oversight and engagement with the licensee for this event, which has come about due to a combination of snow melt andheavy rains upriver, and attendant water releases from the associated dams.Access to the site is thus far unaffected.
Due to some of the employee parking lot already covered by water,the licensee is bussing in most employees, with essential employees in shift crews (and NRC residents) stillable to drive in and use available
: parking, until parking on site is no longer available.
Egress and evacuation routes remain available to the site. The Senior Resident Inspector and the Resident Inspector plan to makephotos of the conditions at the site, currently only on their local network drives, available to NRC staff via aSharePoint link, when they are able to.Please let me know if I've made any errors of fact or if I've omitted anything; I'll be happy to re-issue this statuse-mail with any corrections.
John ThorpNRR Daytime Emergency Officer301-415-8508 Daytime EO ClL (6) ((Personal Cell: (b)._)John ThorpChief, Operating Experience BranchNRR/DIRS/IOEB Tracking:
2 Recipient
: Anderson, ShaunBucholtz, KrIstyGrover, RavinderHamm, MatthewHemphill, KhadijahRichards, KarenSchulten, CadSingletary, MelanaWaig, GeraldReadRead: 6/6/2011 10:59 AMRead: 6/7/2011 7:40 AMRead: 6/6/2011 10:55 AMRead: 6/6/2011 10:55 AMRead: 6/6/2011 10:56 AMRead: 6/6/2011 12:22 PMRead: 6/6/2011 10:55 AM3ý I Robles, JesseFrom: Bemardo, Robert,Sent: Monday, June 06, 011 3:03 PM
==Subject:==
IOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Monday, June 6, 2011NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS
***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR NRC INTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION*'
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE OF NRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):
NoneManagement Requests:
NoneFollow-uplOther Tasks: Nine (9)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help IOEBstaff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff]1) FORT CALHOUN -PROJECTED RISE IN MISSOURI RIVER LEVELS OVER NEXT TWO WEEKSA Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) was declared for the site.-The river water level as of the time of the call is 1003 feet, 2 inches. The plant is in Cold Shutdown, and doesnot plan to start up until the river water level (trend) is abated, and will not start up while they are in an UnusualEvent (or higher) condition.
-The level at which an NOUE must be declared under the licensee's procedures (HU-1, EAL 5, NaturalPhenomena Affecting the Protected Area) is 1004 feet.-According to the Army Corps of Engineers, the river water level at the site should reach 1006 feet 6 inches inapproximately 10 days.'The next decision making call will be held when river water level reaches 1006 feet. (This is the level at whichthere is a potential for offsite power to be threatened.)
-At 1009 feet, the licensee's procedures call for declaration of an Alert, and this is the level at which aShutdown is required if the plant were operating.
Licensee actions thus far:'Over past week, Ft Calhoun has been preparing for the rising river level, and has put in place sandbagging and flood gates to protect the site up to 1007 feet river level.'The licensee has materials staged to support protection up to 1014 feet, and they have procured and by endof day today will have installed an "aqua-berm" (design is similar to a large inner tube filled with water) toprotect the entire protected area (with exception of the intake structure) up to 1012 feet of river level.'The licensee is procuring another aqua-berm to allow protection of the Training Building and the simulator facility in that building.
During, the days/weeks leading up to today's call, Region IV has been engaged and interacting with thelicensee, FEMA, and state and local authorities, and the Region IV staff will continue with enhanced oversight and engagement with the licensee for this event, which has come about due to a combination of snow melt andheavy rains upriver, and attendant water releases from the associated dams.
Access to the site is thus far unaffected.
Due to some of the employee parking lot already covered by water,the licensee is bussing in most employees, with essential employees in shift crews (and NRC residents) stillable to drive in and use available
: parking, until parking on site is no longer available.
Egress and evacuation routes remain available to the site. The Senior Resident Inspector and the Resident Inspector plan to makephotos of the conditions at the site, currently only on their local network drives, available to NRC staff via aSharePoint link, when they are able to. Forward to TRG Lead for Flood Protection/Missiles (Edward Smith)and EP (Eric Schrader);
Assigned to Jesse Robles.2 QUTS~te or ScoPEOutside of Scope3 DLrFr`6(I6 0F :5coPFAttendees at Screening Meeting:Bob BernardoJesse RoblesAdakou FoliRebecca SigmonSteve PannierJay Patel -(NRO)Mary Wegner- (RES) -by phone4............................................-..-.-..--..-----
'-.--...-.-------...-~'.....'-.~--...~-..-......
I I Robles, JesseFrom: Thorp, John (WSent: Tuesday, June 07, 2011 10:23 AMTo: NRRDIRS_IOEB Distribution
==Subject:==
FW: Missouri River Flooding
-Status of NRC and Agreement State Licensees
-0FFfehAL-I SEOLY -SENai iN TFuAL iNFORM/A I IUIAttachments; Missouri River Flooding Potential Impact at NRC Facilities 6-7.docxImportance:
HighFYI, more plant specific info on the Missouri river flooding situation at Ft Calhoun and Cooper Stations.
(Mark, Note the 'sensitive internal information" nature of this document.
I don't recommend putting a lot of thisinformation, especially that which causes it to be sensitive internal info, into the Daily Screening
: Summary, butOK to discuss at the screening meeting and for use by our ET Briefer.
A lot of what's in here has already beendocumented in the screening summary of yesterday, that used my EO summary report as an input.)Thanks,JohnFrom: Pruett, Troy \lVSent: Tuesday, June'0'7, 2011 9:55 AMTo: Brown, Frederick; Thorp, John
==Subject:==
FW: Missouri River Flooding
-Status of NRC and Agreement State Licensecs-L UNLY -SENSIT1VI INTZRNAL IMMA-T-TfeN Importance:
HighFYI. Second report periodically provided by R4 with much more specific plant information on river level and impact.From: Howell, Linda \ t-4Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2011 9:47 AMTo: Borchardt, Bill; Virgilio, Martin; Weber, Michael;
: Collins, Elmo; Howell, Art; Wiggins, Jim; Satorius, Mark; Pederson, Cynthia; Boland, Anne; McDermott, Brian; Morris, Scott; Thaggard, Mark; Carpenter, Cynthia; Lewis, Robert; Bush-Goddard, Stephanie; Weil, Jenny; Markley, Michael;
: Glitter, Joseph; Evans, Michele;
: Williams, KevinCc: Kennedy, Kriss; Pruett, Troy; Vegel, Anton; Caniano, Roy; Campbell, Vivian; Dricks, Victor; Uselding, Lara; Erickson, Randy; Maier, Bill; Browder, Rachel; Clark, Jeff; Azua, Ray; Gaddy, Vincent;
: Marshall, Jane; Gott, William; MOO Hoc; Hay,Michael;
: Elkmann, Paul; Dickson, Billy; R4RCB
==Subject:==
Missouri River Flooding
-Status of NRC and Agreement State Licensees OFFCAUSNL-ENSITIVEIN1ERA Importance:
HighAttached is the June 7 update on the Missouri River flooding.
Ft. Calhoun Station remains in a NOUE and theagency remains in NORMAL mode. Please note that the attached document is marked OFFICIAL USE ONLYdue to the level of detailed information concerning licensee actions.
Please do not distribute outside NRCwithout letting us know.Please let me know if you wish to have additional staff/managers added to this distribution list.
Missouri River FloodingPotential Impact at NRC Facilities June 7, 2011(Updated information is highlighted)
Due to greater than normal snow levels in the upper Missouri River Basin, the associated snowpack runoff and record level rainfall, the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir System isexperiencing flooding challenges.
Rainfall in the northern areas of the Basin in the past fewweeks has equaled what typically falls during an entire year, and snowpack runoff is expected tobe 140% of the normal volume. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has noted thatthis spring's flooding will be the most severe the region has seen since the reservoir system wasconstructed in the 1950's and 1960's. This has prompted USACE to release record volumes ofwater from each of the six major dams that make up the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir System. Based on information provided by USACE, the current modeling and release plan callfor achieving a 150,000 cubic feet per second release rate for five of the six dams by mid-Juneand continuing at that level through mid-July, and possibly into August, in order to maintainreservoir storage capacity.
Missouri River levels are projected to crest as noted below and mayremain at those levels through mid-July or into August.A summary of potential impacts is provided below for NRC facilities located in areas that are ormay be impacted by flooding.
Region IV is coordinating with Agreement States in the floodimpacted areas to verify the status of materials licensees.
INFORMATIQIN nrricTAL II~T ~Cy -~Fm;Tlvfl
!T~!TFiflNAi.
1NFflRM.A.TIflf~
111111, -131..... ° .... v..utside of Scope I .Fort Calhoun StationPlant Elevation:
1004 feet mean sea level (MSL)Current river level: -1003.8 feet MSL (6:00 am, CDT)Predicted max river level: 1006.5 feet MSL predicted by mid-June (source is USACE)Potential Impacts on Plant Equipment:
At 1008 feet MSL, the transformers will be impactedresulting in the plant experiencing a loss of offsite power. Barring any actions by the licensee, the raw water pumps will also be lost at this river level. The licensee would normallycommence plant shutdown when the river level reaches 1004 feet MSL at the Fort CalhounStation.
: However, the licensee was nearing the end of a refueling outage. Currently the plant isshutdown with the core reloaded and flooded up to 23 feet above the vessel flange. Thelicensee's operational plan is to remain in this configuration until the river crests and thenrecedes to below 1004 feet MSL with a decreasing trend. If the river level reaches 1004 ft and isexpected to exceed 1006 ft, the licensee will transfer from the 4160 volt power to theEmergency Diesel Generators.
The licensee has entered its flooding procedure and is conducting enhanced monitoring of theriver levels. The licensee is leaning forward in completing actions prescribed in its floodingprocedure and planned to have actions completed in advance of river levels reaching the triggerpoints identified In the flooding procedure.
With a few exceptions, actions to protect vitalstructures to 1007 feet MSL have been completed.
The exceptions involve actions that are "onhold" until needed for personnel safety reasons.
These actions will be completed when the riverlevel reaches 1006 feet MSL.Installation of a 2000 foot long Aqua Berm around the perimeter of the power block (withexception of the intake structure) is complete, This temporary water-filled berm is 8 feet tall and16 feet wide at the base. This berm will provide protection for up to 6 feet of water (equates to1010 feet MSL). The majority of the switchyard is protected by an earthen berm to a level ofapproximately 1011 feet MSL. This does not include the 161 KV structures which are currently being protected by sandbag berms to a level of approximately 1009 feet MSL. The licensee isworking to enhance protection of the 161 KV structure through a combination of earthen andsandbag berms. The intake structure is currently protected to a level of approximately 1007.5feet, and with additional
: actions, can be protected to a level of 1014. The ISFSI is built at alevel of 1009 feet, no additional protective measures have been taken at this time.Additional berms and sandbags are being built or installed around the Training Center,Administration Building and the South Security Building.
These are intended to protect facilities important to site staff, the simulator and communications equipment.
Once actions to protectvital structures are fully completed, the licensee plans to install Aqua Berms around these USEt UNLY =- :i3iIL N TFRAL ;NFGRFM1.T.,ON
...............
~...
O.-FrICIAL USE ONL.Y IvL facilities.
The licensee is brining additional overhead power lines to these facilities as a backupto underground power supplies.
All offsite power sources (161 KV and 345 KV) are available and both primary emergency dieselgenerators (EDG) are operable and available.
The licensee is staging two additional fuel oiltanks Within the Aqua Berm. These tanks will provide an additional two weeks of fuel (the fueltanks presently onsite have a two week fuel capacity, resulting in a four week supply of fuel).The licensee is developing plans to replenish fuel oil If there is an anticipated need to run theEDGs greater than a four week period of time. Refueling hookups for the fuel tanks are locatedat an elevation above the anticipated flood level (-1006 feet MSL). The licensee is alsoevaluating a process for refueling the tanks through the tank vents. The licensee also plans tostage an additional spare generator with an associated fuel tank and step-up transformer withinthe Aqua Berm.The licensee is staging additional equipment and supplies within the Aqua Berm including, dewatering pumps, sandbagging equipment and supplies, gasoline
: supplies, food and water.The licensee has procured satellite phones which will be distributed to key staff as backupcommunication devices.The licensee has ordered six boats for use onsite, if needed, since some parking areas arealready under water. Offsite parking arrangements are in place for site staff, and the staff willbe shuttled to and from the plant. The licensee is working with the National Guard to arrangefor additional backup transportation provisions.
The licensee's procedures and Emergency Plan call for the declaration of a NOUE at 1004 feetMSL. At 0800 CDT on June 6, the licensee declared a NOUE, in advance of the river levelreaching 1004 feet MSL. The licensee's Emergency Plan would not call for an Alert declaration until the river level reaches 1009 feet MSL. A response mode decision making conference callwas held following the NOUE declaration with Region IV, NRR and NSIR managers present.The agency currently remains in NORMAL mode, This response mode decision will be re-visited if river levels approach 1006 feet MSL or if the licensee's protective actions arechallenged or fail and systems are at risk of flooding.
The licensee is presently planning to manage onsite activities through an Incident CommandSystem structure using a model included in the OPPD Pandemic Plan as a template.
At thecurrent time, the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is not expected to bechallenged by flooding.
The Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center arelocated within the Aqua Berm.Potential Impact on Evacuation Routes: Currently, there are no impacts on evacuation routes. The licensee has indicated that the only section of roadway that is projected to beimpacted by rising river levels is a small section of Route 75 to the north of the town of FortCalhoun (the actual river level at which this would occur is being researched at this time). Theresidents of Fort Calhoun have evacuation routes to the west and south that are expected toremain available.
Evacuation routes for the town of Blair and other communities to the north areexpected to remain available to the north and west.-r:ILL~ LJ ,.~NS',T;VE i'TE i iLN IryiNFFviA-TtON 1OFRCAL USE ONL SENSIT I NFORMATION Materials Licensees Rill and RIV are coordinating with affected Agreement States to monitor potential impacts onmaterials licensees.
There are currently no known impacts on NRC or Agreement Statematerials licensees.
The Agreement States have provisions in place to maintain contact withtheir licensees as conditions change. Region III and Region IV will continue to coordinate withaffected NRC licensees and the affected Agreement States to monitor potential impacts onmaterials licensees and update this section of the report as appropriate.
NRC Region IVRegion IV staff continues to monitor the flooding conditions along the Missouri River and thepotential impacts on Region IV plants and materials licensees located along the river. RegionIV is monitoring potential impacts on evacuation routes and is coordinating with the power plantlicensees, states and FEMA. Region IV has coordinated with the National Weather Service andUSACE to confirm projected river levels.Region IV has augmented the resident inspector staff to provide 24 hour coverage at FortCalhoun Station.
Region IV is conducting daily conference calls with Fort Calhoun Stationmanagers to monitor the licensee's preparations and potential impacts on the plant. Region IVhas conducted an initial coordination call with FEMA Region VII and plans to establish coordination calls with FEMA Region VII, states and local response organizations early nextweek.NSIR has coordinated with FEMA Headquarters to ensure that they are aware of the potential impacts from river flooding at Fort Calhoun Station and Cooper Nuclear Station.jrFi~..IML uSE CNL~ SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFflRMATION Robles, JesseFrom: King, Mark N MSent: Tuesday, June 07, 2011 2:08 PM
==Subject:==
lOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Tuesday, June 7, 2011NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS OFFICIAL USE- ONL,(***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE!
PROPRIETARY OR NRC INTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION***
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE OF NRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):
NoneManagement Requests:
NoneFollow-uplOther Tasks: Five (5)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help 10E8staff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff]1) EN 46929 -FORT CALHOUN -UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO RIVER LEVELSee EN Text. Send to TRG Lead for EP (Eric Schrader) and Missiles/Flood Protection (Ed Smith). Assigned toJesse Robles.2) PNO-IV-11-003
-FORT CALHOUN STATION -PNO REGARDING DECLARATION OF A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO HIGH RIVER LEVELSee PNO Text. Send to TRG Lead for EP (Eric Schrader) and Missiles/Flood Protection (Ed Smith). Assignedto Jesse Robles.3) FORT CALHOUN -ALERT DECLARED DUE TO FIRE IN SWITCHGEAR ROOM, NRC IN MONITORING MODEFrom the HOO: At about 0940 CDT on 6/7/11, Ft. Calhoun declared an Alert emergency condition based on afire in a switchgear room (not the flooding).
The unit remains in cold shutdown.
The agency entered Monitoring Mode at 1056 EDT to respond to this event. We will follow with more information after we get the report fromthe licensee.
Continue to follow. Pass to TRG Lead for Electrical Power (Roy Mathew),
EP (Eric Schrader),
Fire Protection (Brian Metzger).
Assigned to Jesse Robles.*utside of Scopei OUTS 1t& oF sweeCAttendees at Screening Meeting:Bob BernardoJesse RoblesMark KingSteve PannierJay Patel -(NRO).I OcrS b saýcMary Wegner- (RES) -by phone3
: Elliott, RobertFrom: Brown, Frederick ISent Wednesday, June 08, 2011 11:20 AMTo: Elliott, Robert; Franovich, Rani; Kobetz, Timothy; McHale, John; Shoop, Undine; Thorp, JohnCc: Pruett, Troy; Kennedy, Kriss; Croteau, Rick: Holahan, Patricia;
: Andersen, James; Cartwright, William; Ashley, MaryAnn; Westreich, Barry; Bahadur, Sher, Blount, Tom; Cheok, Michael;Evans, Michele;
: Ferrell, Kimberly;
: Galloway, Melanie;
: Glitter, Joseph; Giwines, Mary; Hiland,Patrick; Holian, Brian; Howe, Allen; Lee, Samson; Lubinski, John; McGinty, Tim; Nelson,Robert; Ruland, William; Skeen, David; Thomas, Brian
==Subject:==
FW: REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE We got this as a cc:, but if you have inspector qualified or nearly qualified folks available to support Region IV,you can probably contact the BCs listed below.We should also be thinking about support for the Browns Ferry 95003 (likely the late summer/early fall timeframe) and potentially also a Ft. Calhoun 95003 (depending on the final conclusion about the RPS coilsfinding).
Undine, I assume that you are already talking with Gene Guthrie about the safety culture piece for BF. Pleaselet me/Troy/Jim know how the status of the NEI guidance fits into this picture.Thanks,FredFrom: Kennedy, KrissSent: Wednesday, Junk, 2011 10:41 AMTo: Miller, Chris; Roberts, Darrell;
: Croteau, Rick; Munday, Joel; West, Steven; Reynolds, StevenCc: Vegel, Anton; Clark, Jeff; Gaddy, Vincent; Brown, Frederick; Pruett, Troy
==Subject:==
REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE Esteemed Colleagues, Region IV has an emergent ne es to support inspection activities at Fort Calhoun Station andpotential inspection activities at outside of Scope S-FOrt Calhoun ..On June 6, Fort Calhoun declared a NUE due to rising river level on the Missouri River. We have established 24 hour site coverage to assess licensee preparations (extensive) for the flooding and monitor the impact offlooding on the plant.In order to support round the clock site coverage, I am requesting any support you can provide between nowand mid-August.
Your BCs can contact Jeff Clark directly at 817-860-8147 to discuss specific needs andtimeframes.
Dutside of Scope,3 .0 "
Thanks for your consideration of this request.Kriss2I I Robles, Jessen 1iFrom: K Ing, Marl<Sent: Tuesday, Juhe 14, 2011 2:27 PM
==Subject:==
IOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Tuesday, June 14, 2011NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS OFFAU Q***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR NR ENAL USE ONLY INFORMATION**
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSID OF1PFRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROMI ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):
NoneManagement Requests:
NoneFollow-up/Other Tasks: Fifteen (15)I&#xfd; I
: 4) COOPER AND FORT CALHOUN -PROJECTED RISE IN MISSOURI RIVER LEVELS OVER NEXT TWOWEEKS (UPDATE)*-* (6/14/2011)
*** The recent breech in a Missouri River levee located at Hamburg, Iowa (see photos) has.resulted in a one (1) foot drop in river level at the Cooper Nuclear Station (currently 896' 1"). This will notimpact State Route 136 which is an evacuation route for the station.
Sections of Interstate 1-29 close toHamburg, Iowa may be closed due to this breech condition.
River levels at the Fort Calhoun Station haverisen 1 inch since breech (currently at 1005' 7"). (Station remains in a NOUE condition due to flooding).
Forward to TRG Lead for Flood Protection/Missiles (Edward Smith) and EP (Eric Schrader);
assigned to RussHaskell.)utside of ScopeV,7) LER 2852011003R01
-FORT CALHOUN:
INADEQUATE FLOODING PROTECTION DUE TOINEFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT See LER update. During identification and evaluation of flood barriers in response to the NRC issued whitefinding (See OpE COMM item, this issue is being reviewed under IFR 2011-01),
several unsealed through-wall penetrations were identified on the intake structure to be below the licensing basis flood elevation.
During anextreme flooding event, water inflow could have affected the operability of both trains of safety related rawwater pumps (ultimate heat sink). This revision adds several other penetrations that were discovered as aresult of the review in the intake structure, auxiliary
: building, and chemistry and radiation protection buildings.
EN 46590, EN 46594, EN 46716, EN 46690, EN 46741. Pass tq TRG Lead for Flood Protection (Ed Smith),and .SW/UHS (Gerard Purciarello).
Assigned to Jesse Robles.2 OLrr$~De?
oF' 6coP~3.I
&JSIC-0P Scope5) LER 2852011003R01
-FORT CALHOUN:
INADEQUATE FLOODING PROTECTION DUE TOINEFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT
: 6) LER 2852011502R00
-FORT CALHOUN:
INADEQUATELY COMPENSATED UNATTENDED OPENING OUS 06OV2 5C0pe'NOutside of Scope1IAttendees at Screening Meeting:Bob Bernardo
-by phoneRuss HaskellSteve PannierAdakou FoliJesse RoblesMark KingRyan Craffey -(NRO)Mary Wegner- (RES) -by phoneMark KingSenior Reactor Systems EngineerNRR/ADRO/DIRS/IOEB Operating Experience Branch301-415-1150 Mark. Kinq~cinrc.gov 5
Azua, ,Ray"From: Clark, JeffSent: Tuesday, June 14, 2011 8:24 AMTo: Kennedy, Krss; Howell, Linda; Alexander, Ryan; Alferink, Beth; Azua, Ray
==Subject:==
FW: Daily Status at Fort CalhounFYIFrom: BERCK, ALLEN rmallto:aberck@oppd.coml Sent: Tuesday, June 14, 2011 7:22 AMTo: 'pott.ema@pottcounty.com';
Bill Pook; Dan; Eric Plautz; Clark, Jeff; Jeff Theulen; Jon Schwarz; Kathy Stodola;Kirkland, John; Larry Oliver; Laurel Ryan; Paul Johnson; Whitney ShipleyCc: GEBERS, STEVEN W; DEANGELIS, PETER A; HANKINS, RHONDA R; MOELLER, CHRISTOPHER J; RELLER, MARK H;SILKE, DEENA L
==Subject:==
Daily Status at Fort CalhounFort Calhoun Flooding Status1. Reactor Status: Shutdown2. Reactor is covered with > 23-ft of cooling water3. Offsite power and Emergency Diesel Generators are available.
Both vital buses are energized at this time.4. Spent Fuel Pooling cooling is in service and protected.
: 5. Shutdown cooling is in service and protected
: 6. Current river level is 1005' 6".7. Current Blair gauge level is 31.53-ft with the current projection at 31.8-ft at about 19:00 onJune 18, 2011.8. The site has implemented procedures to protect power supplies and vital equipment.
Water isonsite, and flood barriers are protecting vital equipment.
: 9. No release of radioactivity has occurred.
: 10. Fort Calhoun has declared a Notification of Unusual Even at 08:00 6/6/11.11. Backup evacuation route onsite is inundated however the primary route onsite is passable andnot expected to be affected.
: 12. Power was removed from siren 257 and 260 in Pottawattamie Co. IA, which is just on the edgeof the 10-mile EPZ south east of the plant. Siren 75, 76 in Desoto National Wildlife Refugehave no power. Currently the refuge is closed due to flooding.
Siren 142 in Harrison Co. hasno power which is north of Loveland IA -9.5 miles from the plant. Siren 1 east of FortCalhoun on county road 34 between Fort Calhoun and Boyer Chute Recreational Area iswithout power. This area is closed due to flooding.
13.At this time no known major evacuation routes are affected.
Interstate 29 in both directions:
from Exit 55 North 25th Street to Exit 75 (Missouri Valley):
1-680 road closed to trafficbecause of flooding
-follow the detour signs. Interstate 680 in both directions:
from beforeExit 1 130th Street to Exit 62: 1-29; Old Mormon Bridge Road --- road closed because offlooding.
All in Pottawattamie Co, IA.Requested Information from states and counties:
: 1. When offsite evaluation routes are affected please contact emergency planning.
: 2. When the Blair Water plant is affected please contact emergency planning.
/1
: 3. Authprized power outages that affect or could affect siren operability, please contactemergency planning.
The river flow rate has been relatively constant at Blair NE, however the river level continues to rise.The Corp of Engineers is releasing at Gavins Point dam at 145,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) and isexpected to increase to 150,000 cfs today.Emergency Planning Contacts at FCS:Steve nharr.'Pager: F6J e XWork Phone: 402-533-7308 Cell Phone:Allen B rck:Pager: 7(b)(6) "- -VWork PEone: 402-636-2836 Cell phone:1-)6
.Allen D. BerckSupervisor
-Emergency PlanningFort Calhoun StationOmaha Public Power Districtphone: 402-533-6064 pager: 1(b)(6)email: aberckeoppd.com This e-mail contains Omaha Public Power District's confidential and proprietary information and is for use onlyby the intended recipient.
Unless explicitly stated otherwise, this e-mail is not a contract offer, amendment, noracceptance, If you are not the intended recipient you are notified that disclosing,
: copying, distributing or takingany action in reliance on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited.
2 Robles, Jesse.1From:Sent:
==Subject:==
King, Mark \Wednesday, June 15, 2011 1:59 PMIOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Wednesday, June 15, 2011NOTE: THIS SUM M ARY IS ERNALJ SEOL***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR N ERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION**'
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSID -G~RC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION F M ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):
NoneManagement Requests:
NoneFollow-uplOther Tasks: Eleven (11)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help lOEBstaff communicate and. track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff.]4) COOPER AND FORT CALHOUN -PROJECTED RISE IN MISSOURI RIVER LEVELS OVER NEXT TWOWtEKS (UPDATE)... (6/15/2011)
-See daily Flooding Report. Forward to update to TRG Lead for Flood Protection/Missiles (Edward Smith) and EP (Eric Schrader):
assicined to Russ Haskell.f;/
017&#xb6;3,vg OF scclpeOutside of Scope2 Outside of Scope3 I-7 Outside of ScopeAttendees at Screening Meeting:Bob BemardoRuss HaskellRebecca SigmonAdakou FoliJesse RoblesMark KingRyan Craffey -(NRO)Mary Wegner- (RES) -by phone4 or--eflCLLUfl N Et iz iIR A~ Q1IN-Missouri River FloodingPotential Impact at NRC Facilities June 16, 2011(Updated information is highlighted)
Due to greater than normal snow levels in the upper Missouri River Basin, the associated snowpack runoff and record level rainfall, the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir System isexperiencing flooding challenges.
Rainfall in the northern areas of the Basin in the past fewweeks has equaled what typically falls during an entire year, and snowpack runoff is expected tobe 140% of the normal volume. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has noted thatthis spring's flooding will be the most severe the region has seen since the reservoir system wasconstructed in the 1950's and 1960's. From Gavin's Point Dam near Yankton, South Dakota toRulo, Nebraska, the Missouri is expected to reach the highest levels seen since 1952. This hasprompted USACE to release record volumes of water from each of the six major dams thatmake up the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir System. Based on information provided byUSACE, five of the six dams are at or near the planned maximum release rate of 150,000 cubicfeet per second. These release rates will continue at that level through mid-July, and possiblyinto August, in order to maintain reservoir storage capacity.
The Missouri River levels areprojected to crest as noted below and may remain at those levels through mid-July or intoAugust. USACE has noted that flood crest stages on the Missouri River at Blair, Nebraska mayexceed levels projected
: earlier, but currently the predicted crest at Fort Calhoun Station remainsthe same.A summary of potential impacts is provided below for NRC facilities located in areas that are ormay be impacted by flooding.
Region IV is coordinating with Agreement States in the floodimpacted areas to verify the status of materials licensees.
Outside of ScopeOV~FICIAI Y I IOtlV -
,ff3,M U-j" w..c; -UAWOutside of ScopeFort Calhoun StationPlant Elevation:
1004 feet mean sea level (MSL)Current river level: 1005 feet 6 inches MSL (-7:00 am, CDT, source is licenseemeasurement)
Predicted max river level: 1006.4 feet MSL predicted by mid-June (source is USACE)Potential Impacts on Plant Equipment: j(b)(4),(b}(7}(F)
I(b)(4),(b)(7)F)
/The licensee would normallycommence plant shutdown when the river level reaches 1004 feet MSL at the Fort CalhounStation.
: However, the licensee was nearing the end of a refueling outage when river levelswere predicted to reach this level. Currently the plant is shutdown with the core reloaded andflooded up to 23 feet above the vessel flange. The licensee's operational plan is to remain inthis configuration until the river crests and then recedes to below 1004 feet MSL with adecreasing trend. The licensee's abnormal operating Procedure for acts of nature (AOP-! hasbeen modified.f b)(4}'{b)(7)(F}
I5 k (b)(4),(b)(7)(F)I
, (b)(4),(b)(7)(F)
[The modified AOP-1 now calls for transfer to the Emergency DieselGenerators if loss of offsite power is imminent.
The licensee has entered its flooding procedure and is conducting enhanced monitoring of theriver levels. The licensee is leaning forward in completing actions prescribed in its floodingprocedure and planned to have actions completed in advance of river levels reaching the trigger OFFICiAttS!-/OtY SBN64PWE'INTERNAL
-points identified in the flooding procedure.
With a few exceptions, actions to protect vitalstructures to 1007 feet MSL have been completed.
The exceptions involve actions that are "onhold" until needed for personnel safety reasons.
These actions will be completed when the riverlevel reaches 1006 feet MSL.Installation of a 2000 foot long Aqua Berm around the perimeter of the power block (withexception of the intake structure) is complete.
This temporary water-filled berm is 8 feet tall and16 feet wide at the base. This berm will provide protection for up to 6 feet of water (equates to1010 feet MSL). The majority of the switchyard is protected by an earthen berm to a level ofapproximately 1011 feet MSL. This does not include the 161 KV structures which are currently being protected by sandbag and earthen berms to a level of approximately 1009 feet MSL. Theintake structure is currently protected to a level of approximately 1007.5 feet, and with additional
: actions, can be protected to a level of 1014. The ISFSI is built at a level of 1009 feet, noadditional protective measures have been taken at this time.Additional berms and sandbags have been installed around the Training Center, Administration Building and the South Security Building.
These are intended to protect facilities important tosite staff, the simulator and communications equipment.
The licensee has completed installation of additional Aqua Berms for some of these facilities and is working to completeprotective measures for all three buildings.
The licensee has installed additional overheadpower lines to these facilities as a backup to underground power supplies.
The licensee haserected additional protective "walls" around transformers to protect them from water.Some water intrusion and leakage under the Aqua Berm has been noted in areas where theground surface is not level and in areas where there are conduits and storm drains. Thelicensee is managing the leakage using portable dewatering pumps.All offsite power sources (161 KV and 345 KV) are available and both primary EDGs areoperable and available.
The licensee is staging two additional fuel oil tanks within the AquaBerm. These tanks will provide an additional two weeks of fuel (the fuel tanks presently onsitehave a two week fuel capacity, resulting in a four week supply of fuel). The licensee isdeveloping plans to replenish fuel oil if there is an anticipated need to run the EDGs greaterthan a four week period of time. ()4()7(F!b):(4).(b)(7)(F)
I~e licensee is also evaluating a processtor refueling the tanks through the tank vents. e icensee also plans to stage an additional spare generator with an associated fuel tank and step-up transformer within the Aqua Berm.The licensee is staging additional equipment and supplies within the Aqua Berm including dewatering pumps, sandbagging equipment and supplies, gasoline
: supplies, food and water.The licensee has procured satellite phones which have been distributed to key staff as backupcommunication devices.The licensee has ordered six boats for use onsite, if needed, since parking areas are alre.adyunder water. Offsite parking arrangements are in place for site staff, and the staff will beshuttled to and from the plant. The licensee is working with the National Guard to arrange foradditional backup transportation provisions.
...... +R~~t; USEONL--SMSTWENTRNL.+FORM~..
--
O-GFICIAL USU XLY -SENSFRWE.Jt'TERNAL 1-8-FffleATI3
.The licensee's procedures and Emergency Plan call for the declaration of a NOUE at 1004 feetMSL. At 0800 CDT on June 6, the licensee declared a NOUE, in advance of the river levelreaching 1004 feet MSL. The licensee's Emergency Plan would not call for an Alert declaration until the river level reaches 1009 feet MSL. A response mode decision making conference callwas held following the NOUE declaration with Region IV, NRR and NSIR managers present.The agency currently remains in NORMAL mode. This response mode decision will be re-visited if river levels approach 1006 feet MSL or if the licensee's protective actions arechallenged or fail and systems are at risk of flooding.
The licensee is presently managing onsite activities through an Incident Command Systemstructure using a model included in the OPPD Pandemic Plan as a template.
At the currenttime, the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is not expected to be challenged byflooding.
The Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center are located within theAqua Berm.Potential Impact on Evacuation Routes and Sirens: Currently, there are no impacts onmajor evacuation routes. The licensee has indicated that a small section of Route 75 to thenorth of the town of Fort Calhoun (the actual river level at which this would occur is beingresearched at this time) may become impacted by rising water. The residents of Fort Calhounhave evacuation routes to the west and south that are expected to remain available.
Evacuation routes for the town of Blair and other communities to the north are expected toremain available to the north and west. Some areas of Interstate 29 and Interstate 680 havebeen closed with detours established by the state. A portion of this section of highway runsalong the southeast border of the emergency planning zone, but the proposed detours would beaccessible.
Power was removed from sirens 257 and 260 in Pottawattamie County, Iowa, which is just onthe edge of the emergency planning zone to the southeast of the plant. Sirens 75 and 76 in theDesoto National Wildlife Refuge have no power, but the Refuge is currently closed due toflooding.
Siren 142 in Harrison County, -9.5 miles from the plant, is also without power. Siren1, east of Fort Calhoun, is without power but the area is closed due to flooding.
Outside of Scope/NRC Re-aion IVRegion IV staff continues to monitor the flooding conditions along the Missouri River and thepotential impacts on Region IV plants and materials licensees located along the river. RegionOrr~I,~ L.~E I~lL ~C4tIIV MA- t~~ANfeRMAT40bl
-SENSWT.YE INTERNALFi RNtIrION.
-'.IV is monitoring potential impacts on evacuation routes and is coordinating with the power plantlicensees, states and FEMA. Region IV has coordinated with the National Weather Service(NWS) and USACE to confirm projected river levels.Region IV has augmented the resident inspector staff to provide 24 hour coverage at FortCalhoun Station.
Region IV is conducting daily conference calls with Fort Calhoun Stationmanagers to monitor the licensee's preparations and potential impacts on the plant. Region IVhas conducted an initial coordination call with FEMA Region VII and plans to establish coordination calls with FEMA Region VII, states and local response organizations next week.A conference call will be conducted later today with the states, FEMA Region VII, CooperNuclear Station, Fort Calhoun Station, the NWS and USACE to review weather and river levelpredictions.
USACE is expected to update the stakeholders on any changes to predicted rivercrest and results of their validations of river flow, breadth of the river and how these mightimpact the current river level predictions.
NSIR has coordinated with FEMA Headquarters to ensure that they are aware of the potential impacts from river flooding at Fort Calhoun Station and Cooper Nuclear Station.--OI"0AI:IJSt-ONL-Y
-'SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION~
Robles, JesseFrom: Haskell, Russell (Sent: Friday, June 17, 2011 2:26 PM
==Subject:==
IOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Friday, June 17, 2011Follow Up Flag: Follow upFlag Status: Completed NOTE: THIS SUMMAR.'**MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETA3,X-c1R NRC INTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION***
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OJJT SDE OF NRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):
NoneManagement Requests:
NoneFollow-uplOther Tasks: Three (3)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help IOEBstaff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff.]1) EN 46965 -FORT CALHOUN -ADDITIONAL PENETRATION IDENTIFIED FOR MITIGATION DURINGWALKDOWN(Additional Information)
Penetration of concern was due to the (motor-driven) 1A Fire Pump pressure reliefdischarge line traveling up through Intake structure which houses the Raw Water pumps. Penetration has beensealed. Residents following up. Forward to TRG Leads for Flood Protection/Missiles, SSW/UHX.
FireProtection:
assiQned to Russ Haskell.*1 Outside of Scope/Attendees at Screening Meeting:Russ HaskellDave GarmonAdakou FoliJohn ThompsonJoe Giantelli Mary Wegner (RES) -phoneRyan Craffey (NRO).4,-.3 Azua, RayFrom:Sent:To:Cc:
==Subject:==
Attachments:
Clark, JeffFriday, June 17,2011 7:51 AMKennedy, Kriss; Howell, LindaAzua, RayFYI: Briefing/Talking Points for FCSTalking Points 6-17-1 1,docKriss/Linda, Attached are the updated briefing notes from Sunday, and the talking points I used yesterday for the NSIRbrief. The only "iffy' item is the licensee's priorities for today: this comes from our notes from yesterday.
Weget updated an this about 9:00 am. I will send you another e-mail when we get that info.Jeff Briefing Notes from (Sun) 6/12/2011
{updated for 6/17(2011)
(changes noted in RED)1. River level and forecast for river crest -RCB2. Plant conditions (b)(4),(b)(7)(F)
: 3. Licensee priorities
: 1) Monitoring of flood barriers and pumps, 2) complete temp modifications foralternate power to various loads, 3) forensics of the 1 B4A bus, followed by RCAand extent of cause 4) exploring alternate sources of water in case Blair citywater is lost (installing reverse osmosis water treatment equipment).
: 4. NRC concernsUo R9~ euiai aonrge, SO a@8u Ram 0 iuR a 6iOR r EOFio +9 AVi :'o)-,19 (COMProccor Aree) and 20 (ElectricAl PorotAtion-86 RcomR Bacamont),
lookogopost the Wakeft cwtructur roll up door, 9W8ct!one regarding f19ood99t06 toe6WKthgoar rcOAm, mobility around Gito for omorgonray
: rocponco, and corptinuod Continued operation of 1B4 electrical equipment until cause and extent ofcondition fully known; operation of barriers and pumping stations against inleakage; industrial and personal safety.5. Impacts on evacuation routes or ERO activation No changes.
1-680 between exit 1 in Nebraska to 1-29 in Iowa, and 1-29 betweenexits 55 and 71 in Iowa. This impacts the posted evacuation routes. Detoursigns are in place.6. Update on cause of electrical fault on June 7 and repair activities Sargent & Lundy came in Friday to begin an investigation.
: However, thelicensee and they determined they could not perform an adequate analysis.
Thelicensee contracted ESI (same company that did FMEA for the RPS M2contactor).
They were onsite Wednesday.
They indicated they would likely needto bring in an expert from St. Louis. The licensee still has not determined thecause of the loss of the 1 B3A bus. The licensee provided a list of the otherSquare D breakers that were installed (new) in 2009. Both the 1 B4A breaker(faultedtfire) and the 1 B3A breaker that had improper operation were amongthese replacements.
The licensee also reported that operators smelled an acridodor in the West Switchgear Room for the two days prior to the fault/fire.
Other notes: There is a pretty elaborate walkway between the training and adminbuildings-They have provided a walkway to the "king tut" barriers so it is dryfrom the bus drop off to the security building.
The understanding with the boats is that they are for emergency use only. This appears wise as there are quitestrong flow currents developing.
Briefing Notes from (Thu) 6116/2011 (Questions from NSIR, responses noted in RED)1. What is the design basis elevation for flooding at Ft. Calhoun Station?The DB level is 1014 feet MSL. Nuclear safety is maintained below 1014 feet,although certain plant equipment, such as non-safety equipment and offsitepower would be lost at lower levels (offsite power likely to be lost at about 1009feet). Aquadam in protected area is not Installed for nuclear safety, but for"economic" reasons (protect licensee property).
: 2. Has the licensee considered a "what if' scenario?
Yes. The licensee is considering things they can do beyond design basis. If theycan still supply power (i.e. vital busses not lost, or power can be supplied directlyto equipment) the extra 1500 kw diesel onsite can provide when EDGs lost.Ultimate defense is supplying water inventory to both the reactor vessel and theSFP. The licensee is currently reviewing alternate paths to gain access to thecontainment (at 1011 they would begin impacting normal access through theauxiliary building) for this operation.
Access to the SFP is not a problem asaccess points are available at higher levels. Inventory methods would use B.5.bpumps.3. What happens if river level were near the top of Aquadam, then it was breachedor failed?As stated in #2, the Aquadam is not installed to ensure nuclear safety. It wouldmake things a lot easier onsite if it remained intact (to 1009 or 1010), but otherfeatures, such as the floodgates installed in the intake and auxiliary buildingdoorways, are designed to protect to 1014 feet.4. If the entire site were flooded, no AC power, how much time would they have torestore before boiling occurred in the reactor cavity and the SFP?(b)(4).(b)(7)(F)
: 5. How would FCS gain access to the containment and SFP buildings to add water?What pumps and what water sources?(b)(4).As discussed in #2. access to the SFP does not aear to be a oroblemb IW7)I 7K( )(4),(b)(7)(F)
.
Additional questions were asked regarding security.
Mike Hay briefed that asecurity inspector was onsite last week and reviewed the licensee's
: problems, challenges, and compensatory measures.
He stated we did not have any currentconcerns.
Scott Morris asked if there were any other problems we had not discussed.
Imentioned the difficulty getting around site, the personal safety hazards, and theincreased monitoring required.
I stated (as you and I discussed) the licensee iscontinually monitoring these things. They have taken additional steps to haveadditional people staged, modify entryways, and conduct safety briefings.
Azua, RayFrom: Clark, JeffSent: Saturday, June 18, 2011 7:39 AMTo: Kennedy, Kriss; Howell, LindaCc: Azua, Ray
==Subject:==
FW: Daily event status at Fort CalhounFYI---Original Message----
From: BERCK, ALLEN [mailto:aberckQoppd.com1 Sent: Saturday, June 18, 2011 7:10 AMTo: Bill Pook; Dan; Eric Plautz; Clark, Jeff, Jeff Theulen; Jon Schwarz;
: Kirkland, John; Larry Oliver; LaurelRyan; Paul Johnson; Whitney Shipley;
'Rasmusson, Melanie';
pott.ema(cDoottcounty.com Cc: GEBERS, STEVEN W; DEANGELIS, PETER A; HANKINS, RHONDA R; MOELLER, CHRISTOPHER J;RELLER, MARK H; SILKE, DEENA L; BERCK, ALLEN
==Subject:==
Daily event status at Fort CalhounFort Calhoun Flooding Status (changes from yesterday's report are in bold)1. Reactor Status: Shutdown2. Reactor is covered with > 23-ft of cooling water3. Offsite power and Emergency Diesel Generators are available.
Both vital buses are energized at this time.4. Spent Fuel Pooling cooling is in service and protected.
: 5. Shutdown cooling is in service and protected
: 6. Current river level is 1005' 8" -a rise of 2" in the last 24 hours.7. Current Blair gauge level is 31.8 ft. Although no appreciable rise is forecasted (by the NWS/USACE) withinthe next 5 days, river conditions continue to change and rain is forecasted in the watershed area. Additionally, heavy rain was received in the area over night. The USACE also advised us that we should be prepared for a3-6 inch rise in river level over the next week. We are continuously monitoring river conditions.
: 8. The site has implemented procedures to protect power supplies and vital equipment.
Water is onsite, andflood barriers are protecting vital equipment.
: 9. No release of radioactivity has occurred.
: 10. Fort Calhoun has declared a Notification of Unusual Event at 08:00 6/6/11.11. Backup evacuation route onsite is inundated however the primary route onsite is passable and notexpected to be affected.
: 12. Power was removed from siren 257 and 260 in Pottawattamie Co. IA, which is just on the edge of the 10-mile EPZ south east of the plant. Siren 75, 76 in Desoto National Wildlife Refuge have no power. Currently therefuge is closed due to flooding.
Siren 142 in Harrison Co. has no power which is north of Loveland IA -9.5miles from the plant. Siren 1 east of Fort Calhoun on county road 34 between Fort Calhoun and Boyer ChuteRecreational Area is without power. This area is closed due to flooding.
: 13. At this time no known-major evacuation routes are affected without contingency actions planned.
Interstate 29 in both directions:
from Exit 55 North 25th Street to Exit 75 (Missouri Valley):
1-680 road closed to trafficbecause of flooding
-- follow the detour signs for the evacuation route to Bellevue.
Interstate 680 in bothdirections:
from before Exit 1 130th Street to Exit 62: 1-29; Old Mormon Bridge Road -- road closed because offlooding.
All in Pottawattamie Co, IA.14. On 6/14, Washington County issued evacuation to approximately 75 residents northeast of Blair east ofcounty road 33 to the Burt County line.Requested Information from states and counties:
: 1. When offsite evaluation routes are affected please contact emergency planning.
: 2. When the Blair Water plant is affected please contact emergency planning.
: 3. Authorized power outages that affect or could affect siren operability, please contact emergency planning.
The river flow rate and level have been relatively constant at Blair NE. The Corp of Engineers is releasing Gavin's Point dam at 150,000 cubic feet per second (cfs).Emergency Planning Contacts at FCS:Steve Gebers:PageJ(b)(6) e.<'<Work Phone: 402-533-7308 Cell Phone (b)(6)Allen Berck-Pager: b)(6) eWork P`one: 402-63 628Cell phone:[b)(6)
'Allen D. BerckSupervisor
-Emergency PlanningFort Calhoun StationOmaha Public Power Districtphone: 402-533-6064 pager: 1 ,email: aberck a.oppd.com This e-mail contains Omaha Public Power District's confidential and proprietary information and is for use onlyby the intended recipient.
Unless explicitly stated otherwise, this e-mail is not a contract offer, amendment, noracceptance.
If you are not the intended recipient you are notified that disclosing,
: copying, distributing or takingany action in reliance on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited.
2 Robles, JesseFrom: King, Mark ( (/ "Sent: Tuesday, June '1, 2011 2:25 PM
==Subject:==
lOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Tuesday, June 21, 2011NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS*"*MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR &#xfd;NTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION**'
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSID NRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION F ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):
NoneManagement Requests:
NoneFollow-uplOther Tasks: Thirteen (13)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help lOEBstaff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff]Outside of Scope0VLJ--~
Outside of Scope3) PNO-IV-11-003A
-FORT CALHOUN -PNO-IV-11-003A
-(UPDATE)
FORT CALHOUN STATIONDECLARATION OF A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO HIGH RIVER LEVELSee PNO text: Forward to TRQ Leads for Flood Protection/Missiles (Edward Smith), EP (Eric Schrader);
assianed to Russ Haakell.
QUTh~G $'
D ripr6 bW -5 PeOutside of Scope OL-rjP6 OF SCOPE Al ....uuisiae of ScopeAttendees at Screening Meeting:Russ HaskellBob BernardoAdakou FoilMark KingMary Wegner (RES) -by phoneAl Issa -(NRO)5 Azua, RayFrom: Clark, JeffSent: Tuesday, June 21, 2011 8:59 AMTo: Kennedy, Kriss; Howell, LindaCc: Azua, Ray; Alexander, Ryan; Alferink, Beth; Kirkland, John
==Subject:==
FYI: Daily Update -FCS Flooding
<6/21>Kriss/Linda, Current river level is 1006 feet 1 inch. The area had severe thunderstorms last night, and was in a tornadowatch. No appreciable damage to the site. Big Bend Reservoir received over 5 inches of rain last night.Licensee continues to monitor flooding and in leakage.
They are bringing in several experts for the switchyard berm and the PA Aquadam, regarding undercutting and sand boils.The licensee received 15 new pumps (various sizes) for pumping stations.
They are doing some thinkingahead and staging pumps at higher elevations in the event of Aquadam failure.John and I had a meeting with Tim Nellenbach (Plant Mgr) and Susan Baughn (Licensing Mgr) yesterday afternoon regarding communications.
This was at their request.
They felt the observations and discussions we were having with FCS staff (such as incident commander, pumping crews, and operators) was not filtering up to them. Tim indicated there were examples (e.g. the boat accidents and tornado missiles) where he wasfinding out about our issues some time after the fact. I believe this is indicative of their interiorcommunications.
John and I plan to meet briefly with them each weekday afternoon to go over the items wehave raised to their staff. T-. "7-(b)(4),(b)(7)(F)
Licensee priorities:
maintain flooding protection by pumping and walkdowns; get experts in for erosion andsand boil reviews; extend elevated walkways; pour additional aqua-blocks in switchyard to reduce in leakagJeffV.,1i Robles, JesseFrom: King, MarkSent: Wednesday, June 22, 2011 2:10 PM
==Subject:==
1OEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Wednesday, June 22, 2011NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS-*MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY 0O C INTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION**
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSID NRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION F ORIGINATOR" Issues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):
NoneManagement Requests:
NoneFollow-up/Other Tasks: Seven (7)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help IlEBstaff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff.]Outside of Scope3) FORT CALHOUN -PROJECTED RISE IN MISSOURI RIVER LEVELS OVER NEXT TWO WEEKS(UPDATE)***6/22/2011***
The river level at Fort Calhoun Station is currently 1006 ft 5 inches (6/22); FCS remains in aNOUE due to flooding.
The Army Corps of Engineers has communicated its intent to increase the release rateof the upstream Gavin's Point dam to 160k cubic-feet/sec (currently 150K cfs). This move is due to recent rain activity in the Northern Missouri River basin. Increases are expected to be in place by Thursday (6/23).Increases in release rates typically influence site river levels within 2 days. FCS river levels are anticipated torise over the next several days due to these events. Forward update to TRG Leads for FloodProtection/Missiles (Edward Smith), EP (Eric Schrader):
assigned to Russ Haskell.2 0jiI3';D OP~ SCOP/Attendees at Screening Meeting:Russ HaskellBob BernardoAdakou FoliMark KingJesse RoblesMary Wegner (RES) -by phoneAl Issa -(NRO)3 Robles, JesseA1From:Sent:
==Subject:==
Haskell, Russell t\% ') t .Monday, June 27, 2011 3:26 PMlOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Monday, June 27, 2011NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS --MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR NRC-INTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION...
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE.GF`FRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION
!eRORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):
NoneManagement Requests:
NoneFollow-up/Other Tasks: Twelve (12)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help lOEBstaff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff,]I Outside of Scope12) PNO-IV-I 1-003B (UPDATE)
-FORT CALHOUN -Fort Calhoun Station Declaration of aNotification of Unusual Event Due to High River LevelSee PNO text (ML1 11770003).
Forward update to TRG Leads for Flood Protection/Mis&sect;iles (Edward Smith),EP (Eric Schrader):
assiqned to Russ Haskell.New Reactors Items: NoneResearch (RES) Items; None Clrrslw o scop eOOutside of ScopeAttendees at Screening Meeting:Russ HaskellDave GarmonAdakou FoliJohn ThompsonJoe Giantelli Mary Wegner (RES) -phoneRyan Craffey (NRO)3 Robles, JesseFrom: Haskell, Russell Sent: Tuesday, June 2A, 2011 3"12 PM.To: Smith, Edward; Schrader, Eric
==Subject:==
iOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Tuesday, June 28, 2011NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS-OFF-C1 AL USEONLY***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR11RC INTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION'*
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE`OF NRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FR6M ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):
NoneManagement Requests:
NoneFollow-uplOther Tasks: Two (2)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help lOEBstaff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff]1) PNO-IV-11-003C
-FORT CALHOUN -PNO-IV-1 1-003C (UPDATE)
-FORT CALHOUN STATIONDECLARATION OF A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO HIGH RIVER LEVELSee PNO text: (ML1 11780547).
Forward update PNO to TRG Leads for Flood Protection (Edward Smith), EP(Eric Schrader):
assigned to Russ Haskell.Outside of ScopeVil O~yt5PC-OF ScOP&Outside of ScopeAttendees at Screening Meeting:Russ HaskellJoe Giantelli Dave Garmon (phone)Jesse RoblesMary Wegner (RES) (phone)Ryan Craffey (NRO)John Thompson2 UIL&#xfd; i rSEGt-Y-SENSIIWE-INThRNAL4N9FORMATION--
Missouri River FloodingPotential Impact at NRC Facilities June 28, 2011(Updated
.Information is:highlighted.
Older information that has not changed has been removedand can be reviewed-in prior reports.)
Due to greater than-normal snow levels in the upper Missouri River Basin, the associated snowpack runoff and record level rainfall, the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir System isexperiencing flooding challenges.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has noted thatthis spring's flooding will be the most severe the region has seen since the reservoir system wasconstructed in the 1950's and 1960's. From Gavins Point Dam near Yankton, South Dakota toRulo, Nebraska, the Missouri is expected to reach the highest levels seen since 1952. This hasprompted USACE to release record volumes of water from each of the six major dams thatmake up the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir System. The release rates from these damshave remained steady over the past few days at the current maximum predicted levels withsome minor adjustments to balance the system. USACE has reported that these release ratesare expected to continue until August and that no additional releases are planned at this time.Region IV will continue to work with USACE to assure that any updates to the USACEpredictions are incorporated in this reportIn Nebraska, some decrease in water levels occurred from Brownsville to Kansas City along theMissouri River due to breeches in levees and outflow into flood plains.A slight chance of thunderstorms is predicted for Nebraska.
A summary of potential impacts is provided below for NRC facilities located in areas that are ormay be impacted by flooding.
Region IV is coordinating with Agreement States in the floodimpacted areas to verify the status of materials licensees.
Outside of ScopeOF'IIALUS~
Y-SN~JIyE1IE~rAL
,Nt~flMTI, OnLuOLY -SENSIIWE INTERNALiNP6RMAXT.O....,
I IIII"I "Outside of Scopet NLY -SENS1TTVE INTERNAL iWRUATION
-Q&#xfd;&#xfd;.DNLY.--SENSRWE INTERNAMPM1071!
ON-Fort Calhoun StationPlant Elevation:
1004 feet mean sea level (MSL)Design Basis for Flooding:
1014 feet MSLCurrent river level: 1006 feet 5 inches MSL (-7:00 am, CDT, source is licenseemeasurement)
Predicted max river level: 1006 -1008 feet MSL (source is USACE)Current Plant Conditions:
The plant is shutdown with the reactor cavity flooded such thatmore than 23 feet of water is covering the fuel. Both shutdown cooling and spent fuel poolcooling are in service.
The vital buses are being supplied by the 345 kV power source; the 161kV power source and both diesel generators are available.
Only one 480 volt bus remains de-energized (1 B4A, the faulted bus).Fort Calhoun Station declared a Notice of Unusual Event (NOUE) on June 6 in advance of riverlevel reaching 1004 feet MSL, The site remains in a NOUE.Potential Impacts on Plant Equipment:
The licensee is implementing its flooding procedure and is conducting enhanced monitoring of the river levels. Procedure actions to protect vitalstructures have been completed for river levels in excess of what is currently observed at thesite.On June 26, 2011, at approximately 1:25 a.m. CDT, the 2000 foot long Aquadam that had beenproviding supplemental protection to structures and equipment within the power block failed asa result of site activities.
As a result, floodwaters have reached an elevation of 1006 feet 4inches MSL around the auxiliary and containment buildings.
Those buildings are protected bydesign to a floodwater elevation of 1014 feet MSL. The licensee is currently focusing oncontrolling floodwaters to protect vital equipment and systems by placing additional sandbagsand barriers where needed and pumping water to protect structures and systems whereneeded.The Aquadam vendor was onsite on June 26 to perform physical inspections of the deflatedAquadam.
The initial assessment and vendor recommendation is that a new Aquadam beinstalled.
A team consisting of site personnel and vendor representatives is developing a planfor replacement of the Aquadam.
A new unit has been ordered and is expected to arrive onsiteon July 5. The licensee currently estimates that the new unit will be installed on orabout July'S.The majority of the switchyard is protected by an earthen berm to a level of approximately 1009-1010 feet MSL. Some equipment associated with the 161 kV offsite power is being protected bysandbags and earthen berms to a level of approximately 1009 feet MSL.OFFIGAIA USE- O*SUSTLELNrEN 4fq&#xfd; cr;~ALU~l M -SENSITMV INTERNAL INFORMAION~--
'The ISFSI is built at a level of 1009 feet,MSL, no additional protective measures have beentaken at this time.Aquadams have been installed around the Training Center, Administration Building and theSouth Security Building.
These are intended to protect facilities where site staff are working, thesimulator and communications equipment.
The licensee has installed additional overhead powerlines to these facilities as a backup to underground power supplies.
Existing diesel fuel tanks have been topped and two additional fuel oil tanks are staged withinthe Aqua Berm. With the addition of these tanks, the licensee estimates there is sufficient fuelonsite to run the EDGs for approximately 17 days. The licensee is developing plans toreplenish fuel oil if there is an anticipated need to run the EDGs for a greater period of time.An additional spare generator with an associated fuel tank and step-up transformer has beenstaged within the Aqua Berm.The licensee has procured satellite phones which have been distributed to key staff as backupcommunication devices.In accordance with the licensee's Emergency Plan, an Alert would be declared if the river levelreaches 1009 feet MSL. At the current time, the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility(EOF) is not expected to be challenged by flooding.
The Technical Support Center andOperations Support Center are located within the Aqua Berm.)utside of ScopeNRC Region IVFollowing the failure of the Aquadam, a response mode decision call was conducted early onJune 26 with Region IV, NRR and NSIR. A decision was made to enter Monitoring Mode withRegion IV in the lead. Region IV has activated its Incident Response Center and a responseteam is currently monitoring licensee activities with the onsite team of inspectors and throughroutine briefings with licensee managers.
Region IV staff continues to monitor the flooding conditions along the Missouri River and thepotential impacts on Region IV plants and materials licensees located along the river. RegionIV is monitoring potential impacts on evacuation routes and is coordinating with the power plantlicensees, states and FEMA. Region IV has coordinated with the National Weather Service(NWS) and USACE to confirm projected river levels._FF!IiAI I SF LY -SEN UVTI'JE.IfERNAL IFORMlA I L, E,&AL4.QNLY
-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION
.Region IV will continue to provide 24 hour coverage with resident inspectors and supplemental inspection staff at Fort Calhoun Station.Region IV has conducted coordination calls with FEMA Region VII and the states and localresponse organizations.
Collectively, the stakeholders have established "triggers" which wouldprompt scheduling future conference calls-J',tAcalIwas,
-conducted
,Wth m -etLm stakeholders this rioa..lmgRsIpticipated liN di c rence 6c spOonsaoredl b UStACE andprovid.6d ah.,ud~t,.eon Sthe s do op uea S~nadFr ~ hoi Station,.
-NOFUiC0L1USE ONLY- SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMA.TPON-.,4
*t~tf3SE-9NLY
-SENSITIVE INTERNAbINFORMA-TION.
Missouri River FloodingPotential Impact at NRC Facilities June 30, 2011(Updated onri. high0lighted..
;Ofder inform.ation, thatas, 6 d al i mtha haed* 0 h ...i g .... j-g.....and ca~n b~ ~evrev ed, n prior reportS.)
Due to greater than normal snow levels in the upper Missouri River Basin, the associated snowpack runoff and record level rainfall, the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir System isexperiencing flooding challenges.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has noted thatthis spring's flooding will be the most severe the region has seen since the reservoir system wasconstructed in the 1950's and 1960's. From Gavins Point Dam near Yankton, South Dakota toRule, Nebraska, the Missouri is expected to reach the highest levels seen since 1952. This hasprompted USACE to release record volumes of water from each of the six major dams thatmake up the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir System. The release rates from these damshave remained steady over the past few days at the current maximum predicted levels withsome minor adjustments to balance the system. The release rate at Gavins Point dam remainsat 160,000 cubic feet per second. USACE has reported that these release rates are expectedto continue until August and that no additional increase in release rates are planned at this time.Region IV will continue to work with USACE to assure that any updates to the USACEpredictions are incorporated in this reportThe next substantial precipitation in the Missouri River Basin is forecast for July 1, 2011.A summary of potential impacts is provided below for NRC facilities located in areas that are ormay be impacted by flooding.
Region IV is coordinating with Agreement States in the floodimpacted areas to verify the status of materials licensees.
Outside of Scope,OFkG!Ab4E ONL- SFNSIIVE INTERNAL-INFORMATTO"-
-Of ICIAL USE ONLY -SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMKR-N----
[ [1 II 1I I I II I I l '" " I I lOutside of Scope.OLT'iUAL USE ONLV -SENSITIVE iii ~RiiAL ~WruKM~
OFFICI3L'MINtY
&#xb6;SEN'S5IVE-4?4NERNALNN Fort Calhoun StationPlant Elevation:
1004 feet mean sea level (MSL)Design Basis for Flooding:
1014 feet MSLCurrent river level: 1006 feet'Alinches MSL (-7:00 am, CDT, source is licenseemeasurement)
Predicted max river level: 1006 -1005 feet MSL (source is USACE)Current Plant Conditions:
The plant is shutdown with the reactor cavity flooded such thatmore than 23 feet of water is covering the fuel. Both shutdown cooling and spent fuel poolcooling are in service.
The vital buses are being supplied by the 345 kV power source; the 161kV power source and both diesel generators are available.
Only one 480 volt bus remains de-energized (1 B4A, the faulted bus).Fort Calhoun Station declared a Notice of Unusual Event (NOUE) on June 6 in advance of riverlevel reaching 1004 feet MSL. The site remains in a NOUE.Potential Impacts on Plant Equipment:
The licensee is implementing its flooding procedure and is conducting enhanced monitoring of the river levels. Procedure actions to protect vitalstructures have been completed for river levels in excess of what is currently observed at thesite.On June 26, 2011, at approximately 1:25 a.m. CDT, the 2000 foot long Aquadam that had beenproviding supplemental protection to structures and equipment within the power block failed asa result of site activities.
As a result, floodwaters have reached an elevation of 1006 feet 4inches MSL around the auxiliary and containment buildings.
Those buildings are protected bydesign to a floodwater elevation of 1014 feet MSL. The licensee is currently focusing oncontrolling floodwaters to protect vital equipment and systems by placing additional sandbagsand barriers where needed and pumping water to protect structures and systems whereneeded.The Aquadam vendor was onsite on June 26 to perform physical inspections of the deflatedAquadam.
The initial assessment and vendor recommendation is that a new Aquadam beinstalled.
A team consisting of site personnel and vendor representatives is developing a planfor replacement of the Aquadam.
A new unit has been ordered and is expected to arrive onsiteon July 5, Installation of the new unit will begin next week.The majority of the switchyard is protected by an earthen berm to a level of approximately 1009-1010 feet MSL. Some equipment associated with the 161 kV offsite power is being protected bysandbags and earthen berms to a level of approximately 1009 feet MSL. TheV c.pretelearrier oM .......', .., ". ; .-QFre!AL USE GWL-%SWN-RN6"tA.QL.
LIMPICIAT ITCIlllIY-SENSIT4VB4NERNAMNF The ISFSI is built at a level of 1009 feet,MSL, no additional protective measures have beentaken at this time.The failure oItfhhe Apua:m resuItedin loss d rd e {W cooing ser servi.ngthe~ ~ ~~p. swthga room. The Ii.enspie hacooI' ~ugtadd onal unftsto-assureadequate
". cd *o felebtfiCa
'&#xfd; o Unii" &deg;- '010supphesAtorear.b1h systems.Aquadams have been installed around the Training Center, Administration Building and theSouth Security Building.
These are intended to protect facilities where site staff are working, thesimulator and communications equipment.
The licensee has installed additional overhead powerlines to these facilities as a backup to underground power supplies.
Existing diesel fuel tanks have been topped and two additional fuel oil tanks are staged withinthe Aqua Berm. With the addition of these tanks, the licensee estimates there is sufficient fuelonsite to run the EDGs for approximately 17 days. The license' "ontinues to sample fuel andmonitor for water content because-bth existjng'fuel tanks are &#xfd;nderground and extensions have been added to fillin-gconnectors to ke6p them abovew. "wr. The licensee is developing plans to replenish fuel oil if there is an anticipated need to run the EDGs for a greater period oftime. An additional spare generator with an associated fuel tank and step-up transformer hasbeen staged within the Aqua Berm.In accordance with the licensee's Emergency Plan, an Alert would be declared if the river levelreaches 1009 feet MSL. At the current time, the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility(EOF) is not expected to be challenged by flooding.
The Technical Support Center andOperations Support Center are located within the Aqua Berm.Outside of ScopeNRC Region IVFollowing the failureo..f.the.Aquadam,
.on June.26,a decision was&#xfd; made.to enter the Monitoring Mod.e of the agency Plan ,with ,.Region IV in V At 1.:501 (CDT) onJu. e 201, .theiNl r .etpredi
,to Normal Mode and deacthato d the Region IV IncidentRepn~:Cetr~I'heis sbqodn6.
ddtioris areS Are..being a~~ed -n~t~~qb W00qLff VIA' Pimes'bnh "Itob fptvpr~t~ting'pt~f st~tties.
ysti np0en p.nI &#xfd;M, iVcniRw~
rht, h--IFICIAI "SE ONLY -SENSITIVE 4TERNAL INFORMAQN-t..
"FrlaMi UWIrQNLY
-SENS94VE INTERNALANFORMATION licensee's response and the plant with additional inspectors at the sitewho.are''providing round-the-clock
.coverage.
Region IV staff continues to monitor the flooding conditions along the Missouri River and thepotential impacts on Region IV plants and materials licensees located along the river. RegionIV is monitoring potential impacts on evacuation routes and is coordinating with the power plantlicensees, states and FEMA. Region IV has coordinated with the National Weather Service(NWS) and is participating daily in USACE conference briefings to confirm projected river levels.Region IV has conducted coordination calls with FEMA Region VII and the states and localresponse organizations.
Collectively, the stakeholders have established "triggers" which wouldprompt scheduling future conference calls'-9EtL UU_ SNLY SfNSFTq'E INTE*RN~LIIr4F RMAT:oN rRobles, JesseFrom: Giantelli, Joseph 1I Sent: Friday, July 01, 2011 2:42 PM
==Subject:==
IOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Friday, July 01, 2011NOTE: THIS SUMMARY I Y.***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR NRC I AL USE ONLY INFORMATION'*
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE OF ITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM GINATORIssues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):
NoneManagement Requests:
NoneFollow-up/Other Tasks: Five (5)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help lOEBstaff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff]3) PNO-IV-1 I -003D -FORT CALHOUN -PNO-IV-1 1 -003D (UPDATE)
-FORT CALHOUN STATIONDECLARATION OF A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO HIGH RIVER LEVELSee PNO text: PNO-IV-11-003D (ML111810950)
Forward to TRG Leads for Flood Prot ection (Edward Smith):EP (Eric Schrader).
assigned to Russ Haskell.
J. .errISiAL USE ONL'Y SE~fISHTW1 RELAED WIRMr-fl1A:16I UNITED STATENUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV612 EAST LAMAR BLVD. SUITE 400ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4125 July 1, 20117;z-, ML111822555
------------------------------
MEMORANDUM TO:THRU:FROM:Elmo E. CollinsRegional Administrator Anton Ve9el, DirectorDivision of Reactor SafetyDavid P. LovelessSenior Reactor AnalystIRNFlWA
==SUBJECT:==
PROPOSED ADEQUATE PROTECTION BACKFIT EXCEPTION O~~~flCIAL~~~
AJEOL f-11I~I M~AE IfRAL WM
, OFFICIAL USE ONLY -SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION PROPOSED ADEQUATE PROTECTION BACKFIT EXCEPTION AT FORT CALHOUNRequlatorv Authority 10 CFR 50.109, Backfitting,"
describes the methods available to the Commission to require thatlicensees modify or add structures, components, or design of a facility.
Section (a)(4)(ii) statesthat a backfit analysis is not required where the staff finds and declares with an appropriately documented evaluation, that regulatory action is necessary to ensure that the facility providesadequate protection to the health and safety of the public.Management Directive 8.4, 'Management of Facility-Specific Backfitting and Information Collection, states that the Regional Administrator has the authority to develop, update andmaintain the backtit procedures and administrative controls for nuclear power plants.PG 0901.6, 'Facility-Specific Backfit and Information Collection Procedure,"
states that NRCstaff positions may be Identified as potential backfits by the staff. When the staff invokes abackfit exception, the RA must provide a documented evaluation that Includes a statement ofthe objectives, reasons for the modification, and the basis for the backfit exception.
Additionally, 10 CFR 50.54(f) permits the Commission to request a licensee submit under oathor affirmation, to enable the Commission to determine whether or not the license should bemodified, suspended, or revoked.
If this information is not sought to verify licensee compliance with the current licensing basis for that facility, the NRC must prepare the reason for eachinformation request.(b)(4),(b)(5),(b)(7)(F) Enclosure 1
OFIC. 1i -SONLY -SEGMRITY-RELATED.INFORMATION orrIGAl-U66 ONLY- REUN;*T R66%TMoNRrMATION.'
[ b)(4). (b) (5), (b)(7)(F)
*L.
OF-ICI49ft WUL1MV S3eMMURI1RAEbWE M~FORMPMO (b)(4),Cb)(6),(b)(7)(F) Enclosure 1
(b) (4). (b)(5). (b) (7)(F)
-OFrIMAHWIu ora'W SEcUnRFRAERML1D F~OPSATRON (b)(4),(b)(5),(b)(7)(F)
O0FF -ALUSE-OWtr-SECOURflY-REIATLI INPDftNTIOF4--
-I.-Enclosure 2.... m mUFIlUAL U.L W4L~ ~IXLJJII7 IILLATL13 tT~FUflMATIU!~
-OFFICIALUSE ONLY -SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION-
-....(b)(4),(b)(5),(b)(7)(F)
II&#xa3;GAAJ~i.'ONLY
-SECUtRifY-=RftATED-INFORMATION al 111-NOIIWWI IJIi&w.z~~I-L f~~- i -~nI.I.In
..,OFFI~Itf.USE ONLY -SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION 0U,,I.II.--1-OFFIC"IL U.E 'tY"-SEeURITY-RELATED INFORMATION
-
Robles, JesseFrom:Sent:
==Subject:==
Bernardo, Robert &#xfd; I1'Wednesday, July 27, 2011 2:25 PMlOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Wednesday, July 27, 2011NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS OFFICIAL-
-ONLX-***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR NRC INRNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION***
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE OF WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM GINATORIssues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):
NoneManagement Requests:
NoneFollow-up/Other Tasks: Seven (7)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help lOEBstaff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff.]Outside of ScopeV73) PNO.IV-1 1-003E -(UPDATE)
FORT CALHOUN STATION DECLARATION OF A NOTIFICATION OFUNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO HIGH RIVER LEVELSee PNO Text. Based on an assessment that conditions in and around the facility have remained stable, theNRC has made the decision to suspend the augmented 24 hour a-day coverage at the plant beginning on July30, 2011. The resident inspectors will continue to provide 7 day coverage onsite. Forward to TRG Leads forFlood Protection (Ed Smith) and EP (Eric Schrader).
Assigned to Rebecca Siomon.I Outside of Scope2
/Outside of ScopeAttendees at Screening Meeting:Bob Bernardo
/Rebecca SigmonSteve PannierJohn ThompsonRyan Craffey (NRO)Chris Lamb (NSIR)Mary Wegner (RES) -by phone/3 Robles, JesseFrom: King, Mark 1i)(/ tLSent: Tuesday, August 23, 2011 2:01 PM
==Subject:==
IQEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Tuesday, August 23, 2011NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS OFfIC .Y***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR RNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION"**
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE O.tiRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM.ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):
NoneManagement Requests:
NoneFollow-uplOther Tasks: Three (3)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary Is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help lOEBstaff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff.]tside of Scope2) EN 46893 -FORT CALHOUN -POTENTIAL FLOODING PATH DISCOVERED (RETRACTED)
See EN text: (8/2212011; 1142 EDT) Following additional review of the reported condition, it has beendetermined that the Raw Water pumps are adequately protected during flooding conditions and that the openpenetrations would not impact the ability of the Raw Water pumps to perform their design accident mitigation functions.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Haire).
Forward retraction toTRG Leads for Flood Protection/Missiles (Edward Smith), SSW/UHS (Gerard Purciarello):
assigned to RussHaskell.
CKMID6 4)F aC4Lk5Outside of ScopeI1) EN 46893 -FORT CALHOUN -POTENTIAL FLOODING PATH DISCOVERED (RETRACTED) uutside of scopeAttendees at Screening Meeting:Bob BernardoJesse RoblesMark KingRuss HaskellRyan Craffey (NRO)Mary Wegner (RES) -by phone2 Robles, JesseFrom: King, MarkSent: Tuesday, August 30, 2011 3:16 PM
==Subject:==
IOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Tuesday, August 30, 2011NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS OFFIC1A'Lq
***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR NRC IJERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION-DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE OF N ITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM5R1GINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):
None -[Note: NRO COMM assignments are provided in the link listed inthe New Reactor Items section]Management Requests:
NoneFollow-up/Other Tasks: Four (4)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help IOEBstaff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff.]1) EN 46929 -FORT CALHOUN -UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO RIVER LEVEL (NOUETERMINATED)
See EN Text. Send to TRG Leads for EP (Eric Schrader) and Missiles/Flood Protection (Ed Smith). Assignedto Russ Haskell.I oLmT5II'c OFz2) EN 46929 -FORT CALHOUN -UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO RIVER LEVEL (NOUETERMINATED)
: 3) EN 47202 -FORT CALHOUN -TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER UNAVAILABLE FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE (COMPENSATORY ACTIONS IN PLACE)Outside of ScopelAttendees at Screening Meeting:Mark KingBob BernardoRuss HaskellSteve PannierLarry Criscione (RES)Ryan Craffey (NRO)Al Issa (NRO)Doug Copeland (NRO)Bob Beall (NRO)2
,b6r(--<,Pr aF --q--ee6F'Jay Patel (NRO)Dave Harmon (R-II/DCI/CIB3)
-by phoneJonathan Kent (R-II/DCP/CPB4)
-by phoneDenise Edwards (R-II/DCP/CPBI)
-by phoneChelsea Smith-Standberry (R-II/DCI/CIB1)
-by phone3 Robles, JesseFrom:Sent:
==Subject:==
K~ing, Mark &#xfd;&#xfd;vWednesday, August 31, 2011 2:01 PM1OEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Wednesday, August 31, 2011NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS QFFICIAL USF Ht -*`*MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVEI PROPRIETARY OR N USE ONLY INFORMATION***
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSID J3P1FRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION F ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):
NoneManagement Requests:
NoneFollow-up/Other Tasks: Seven (7)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help lOEBstaff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff.]4) PNO-IV-11-003F-FORT CALHOUN -PNO-IV-11-003F
-DECLARATION OF A NOTIFICATION OFUNUSUAL EVENT -(UPDATE)See PNO text: Forward to TRG Leads for Flood Protection (Ed Smith) and EP (Eric Schrader).
Assigned toRuss Haskell.I comieas:
r 'c-pc2 4OT;fr 4-P F cOutside of ScoOeAttendees at Screening Meeting:Mark KingBob BernardoRuss HaskellSteve PannierLarry Criscione (RES) -by phoneRyan Craffey (NRO)3 Al II, A;l 16l From: Mizuno, GearySent: Monday, September 26, 2011 4:37 PMTo: Albert, Michelle;
: Benowitz, Howard
==Subject:==
RE: LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx (b)(5)GearyFrom. Albert, MichelleSent: Monday, September 26, 2011 2:49 PMTo: Mizuno, Geary; Benowitz, Howard
==Subject:==
FW: LOVELESS Dam Backflt.docx 1 ~ I ~a-JFYI -This is the technical document that prompted the creation of the backfit panel regarding Fort Calhoun.From: Blount, TomSent: Monday, September 26, 2011 2:45 PMTo: Albert, MichelleCc: Loveless, David ' : -k-
==Subject:==
FW: LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx Michelle
-As requested....
Tom B.From: Mehrhoff, VivianSent: Monday, September 26, 2011 1:42 PMTo: Blount, Tom
==Subject:==
LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx V/IA9
.:Albert, MichelleFrom:Sent:"r^% -Mizuno, Geary 06cMonday, September 26, 2011 4:37 PMAlhf~rt RP~nnwit7
==Subject:==
RE: LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx (b)(5)GearyIlkCleo,From: Albert, Michelle 2kSent: Monday, September 26, 2011 2:49 PMTo: Mizuno, Geary- Benowitz, Howard
==Subject:==
FW: LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx JFYI -This is the technical document that prompted the creation of the backfit panel regarding Fort Calhoun.From: Blount, TomSent: Monday, September 26, 2011 2:45 PMTo: Albert, MichelleCc: Loveless, David
==Subject:==
FW: LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx Michelle
-As requested....
Tom B.817-860-8146 From: Mehrhoff, VivianSent: Monday, September 26, 2011 1:42 PMTo: Blount, Tom
==Subject:==
LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx y/
i4bert Michelle,'-,f F.,Outside of ScopeATTORNEY-CLIENTIAT'ORNEY WORK-PRODUCT DOCUMENT
-NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
*From: Harrison, DeborahSent: Friday, September 23, 2011 6:25 PMTo: Jones, Bradley
==Subject:==
Dam Backfit Panel Charter Letter for Your Concurrence This is an updated letter for you to concur on for Mr. Tom Biount and he asked that you provide yourconcurrence by next Wednesday, September 28, 2011. Thank you.
-Albert, Michelle 4From:Sent:To:Cc:
==Subject:==
.
Attachments:
Blount, Tom'V-\'Monday, September 26, 2011 2:45 PMAlbert, MichelleLoveless, DavidFW: LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx Michelle
-As requested....
Tom R.I(b)(6) ,From: Mehrhoff, Vivian~....................
Sent: Monday, September 26, 2011 1:42 PMTo: Blount, Tom
==Subject:==
LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx 1
, ,ert, MichelleFrom:To:Cc:
==Subject:==
Blount, Tom'--ls.
: Tuesday, September 27, 2011 4:30 PMAlbert, MichelleJones, Bradley;
: Biggins, James; Mizuno, Geary; Williamson, Edward; Spencer, MaryRE: RIV Ft Calhoun Backflt Panel Charter -OGC/RMR CommentsThanks Michelle
-We will incorporate your comments, and coordinate with Ed's Division as yourecommended.
Thanks for the quick turnaround.
Tom-ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED INFORMATION, ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT, AND/OR PREDECISIONAL INFORMATION
-DO NOT DISCLOSE WITHOUT COMMISSION APPROVAL
**From: Harrison, Deborah "Sent: Friday, September 23, 2011 6:25 PMTo: Jones, Bradley
==Subject:==
Dam Backflt Panel Charter Letter for Your Concurrence
,! 1This is an updated letter for you to concur on for Mr. Tom Blount and he asked that you provide yourconcurrence by next Wednesday, September 28, 2011. Thank you.I ORRinnina Jam~ AFrom:SentTo:Cc:SubjectBlount Tom'rbn "Wednesday, September 28, 2011 9:10 AMWilliamson, EdwardJones, Bradley;
: Biggins, James; Mizuno, Geary; Spencer, Mary; Albert, MichelleRE: RIV Ft. Calhoun Backfit Panel Charter -OGCIRMR Comments\/Thanks Ed....(b)(5)JOffZTaure'9Iy--Attomey-Client Privileged
/ Attorney Work Product Rule(b)(5)
(b)(6)ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED INFORMATION, ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT, AND/OR PREDECISIONAL INFORMATION
-DO NOT DISCLOSE WITHOUT COMMISSION APPROVALf-AFrom: Harrison, Sent: Friday, September 23, 2011 6:25 PM ..To: Jones, Bradley
==Subject:==
Dam Backfit Panel Charter Letter for Your Concurrence This is an updated letter for you to concur on for Mr. Tom Blount and he asked that you provide yourconcurrence by next Wednesday, September 28, 2011. Thank you.2 Jones, Bradley,From: Markley, MichaelSent: Thursday, September 29, 2011 12:16 PMTo: Jones, BradleyCc: Lyon, Fred; Hall, Randy; Mizuno, Geary; Harrison, Donnie; Murphy, Martin; Khanna, Meena;Blount, Tom; Wilkins, Lynnea
==Subject:==
RE: Ft. CalhounBradley,Thank you. These insights will be very helpful as this issue/review progresses.
MikeFrom: ]ones, Bradley \Sent: Thursday, September 29, 2011 11:56 AMTo: Markley, MichaelCc: Lyon, Fred; Hall, Randy; Mizuno, Geary; Harrison, Donnie; Murphy, Martin; Khanna, Meena; Blount, Tom
==Subject:==
Ft. Calhoun~-y,~Outside of ScopeFrom: Markley, MichaelSent: Thursday, September 29, 2011 11:02 AMTo: Wilkins, LynneaCc: Lyon, Fred; Hall, Randy; Mizuno, Geary; Harrison, Donnie; Murphy, Martin; Khanna, Meena; Blount, Tom
==Subject:==
FW: Ft Calhoun Upstream Dam failure Backfit PanelI vnn@.#Outside of ScopeRIV is considering an adequate protection backfit for Fort Calhoun.
Please see the attached.
Please consult Geary Mizuno who is the OGC legal expert and Fred Lyon and Randy Hall who are the DORLsubject matter experts.
The cognizant technical division for this is EMCB. Please handle expeditiously.
Belowis the applicable guidance.
MID 8.4: http://www.intemal.
nrc.,ov/ADM/DAS/ca.q/Management Directives/rmd8.4.
pdfThe NRR Office Instruction is LIC-202, http://nrrlO.nrc.qov/nrr-office/webapps/O/docs/ML092010045.pdf DORL Handbook Links: http://nrrl0.
nrc.,qov/nrr-office/DORLHandbook/Backfds.html MikeBradley W. Jones Jones, BradleyFrom: Mizuno, GearySent: Thursday, September 29, 2011 11:48 AMTo: Albert, MichelleCc: Jones, Bradley
==Subject:==
FW: Ft Calhoun Upstream Dam failure Backfit PanelAttachments:
FW: LOVELESS Dam Backflt.docx; Emailing:
Dam Backfit Panel Charter.docx "0COutside of ScopeFrom: Markley, MichaelSent: Thursday, September 29, 2011 11:02 AMTo: Wilkins, LynneaoCc: Lyon, Fred; Hall, Randy; Mizuno, Geary; Harrison, Donnie; Murphy, Martin; Khanna, Meena; Blount, Tom
==Subject:==
FW: Ft Calhoun Upstream Dam failure Backfit PanelLynnea,RIV is considering an adequate protection backfit for Fort Calhoun.
Please see the attached.
Please consult Geary Mizuno who is the OGC legal expert and Fred Lyon and Randy Hall who are the DORLsubject matter experts.
The cognizant technical division for this is EMCB. Please handle expeditiously.
Belowis the applicable guidance.
MD 8.4: http://www.intemal.nrc..ov/ADM/DAS/cag/Manacgement Directives/md8.4.pdf The NRR Office Instruction is LIC-202, http://nrrl0.
nrc.gov/nrr-office/webapips/0l/docs/ML092010045.pdf DORL Handbook Links: http://nrrl0.
nrc.qov/nrr-office/DORLHandbooklBackfits.
htmlMikeFrom: Blount, Tom, .Sent: Thursday, September 29, 2011 9:27 AMTo- Markley, Michael; M Marti, na.inCc: Howe, Allen; Lund, Louise; Hiland, Patrick;
: Loveless, David; Vegel, Anton
==Subject:==
Ft Calhoun Upstream Dam failure Backflt PanelMike / Marty- we are putting together a "Backfit Panel" to consider a proposed "Adequate Protection BackfitException" analysis done by one of our SRA's, Dave Loveless.
We are seeking a NRR panel member. I seemto recall some discussion that Meena Khanna was on the Oconee panel (?). In any case we are seeking anNRR representative for the panel. I have included information I have at this time; hopefully this will assist inyour decision making. Included is the Charter, which I am seeking your concurrence on, assuming theinclusion of your named representative.
Any questions, please call me....Thanks in advance for your support....
Tom Bfount1D.
Smith, ChrisFrom,Sent:To:Cc:
==Subject:==
Kirkland, JohnWednesday, October 12, 2011 11:04 AMClark, JeffWingebach, Jacob; Smith, Chris; Willoughby, Leonard; Farnhollz, ThomasManholeOutside of ScopeJohn KirklandSenior Resident Inspector, Fort Calhoun Station9610 Power LaneBlair, NE 68008402-426-9612 402-426-9613 (fax)I
,!ir, Christopher
__,Irem: Haire, MarkSent: Wednesday, October 12, 2011 5:33 PMTo: Wilkins, Lynnea; Mensah, Tanya; Smith, Edward; LI, Yong; Uribe, Juan; Holian, Brian;Rosenberg, Stacey; Goel, Vijay; DLRCalendar Resource; Hoang, Dan; Hair. Christopher; Wilson, George; Markley, Michael; Murphy, MartinSubject SECURITY RELATED INFORMATION ATTACHED:
RE: Continuation:
Internal PRB Meeting:G20110492/G20110506
-Fort Calhoun/Cooper Petitions Re: Flooding (ME6622 & ME6681)SECURITY RELATED INFORMATION ATTACHEDThanks.On our last call I mentioned that RIV had been looking internally at the flooding danger at FCS with regard to upstreamdam failures.
Attached is the Memo to the RIV RA from one of our SRA's regarding an analysis of flooding riskassociated with FCS dam failure (the memo is in ADAMS, and is Security-Related Info).MFCS ProposedAdequate Protect...
SECURITY RELATED INFORMATION ATTACHEDM41,f'X //114P1From: Wilkins, Lynnea\.Sent: Wednesday, October 12, 2011 12:55 PMTo: Mensah, Tanya; Smith, Edward;ULl, Yong; Uribe, Juan; Haire, Mark; Holian, Brian; Rosenberg, Stacey; Goel, Vijay;DLRCalendar Resource; Hoang, Dan; Hair, Christopher; Wilson, George; Markley, Michael; Murphy, Martin
==Subject:==
RE: Continuation:
Internal PRB MeeUng: G20110492/G20110506
-Fort Calhoun/Cooper Petitions Re: Flooding(ME6622 & ME6681)All,Please see the attached for tomorrow's meeting.
I've update the Internal PRB notes based on our lastmeeting.
I've also attached a "thumbnail" of Mr. Saporito's concerns as expressed in the teleconference (MLI 1256A036).
ThanksLynnea<< File: Cooper Internal PRB Notes -G20110506.doc
>> << File: Fort Calhoun Internal PRB Notes -G20110492
.doc >><< File: Saporito Concerns From Transcript-August 29.docx >>----- Original Appointment--
From: Mensah, TanyaSent: Friday, September 2.,, 2011 4:22 PM
-To: Mensah, Tanya; Wilkins, Lynnea; Smith, Edward; Li, Yong; Uribe, Juan; Haire, Mark; Holian, Brian; Rosenberg, Stacey; Goel, Vijay; DLRCalendar Resource; Hoang, Dan; Hair, Christopher; Wilson, George; Markley, Michael; Murphy,Martin
==Subject:==
Continuation:
Internal PRB Meeting:
G20110492/G20110506
-Fort Calhoun/Cooper Petitions Re: Flooding(ME6622 & ME6681)When: Thursday, October 13, 2011 2:45 PM-3:30 PM (GMT-05:00)
Eastern Time (US & Canada).Where: HQ-OWFN-11B02-12p When: Thursday, October 13, 2011 2:45 PM-3:30 PM (GMT-05:00)
Eastern Time (US & Canada).Where: HQ-OWFN-11B02-12p Note: The GMT offset above does not reflect daylight saving time adjustments.
Purpose:
The PRB will continue its internal discussion to make the initial recommendation to accept/reject thepetition for review. Due to the schedules of the Various PRB members and advisors (i.e, training, travel, AL),the earliest time to permit PRB participation from is 10/13/11.
Handouts:
Will be provided by Lynnea via separate email.Dial-In:
Will Be ProvidedTanya Mensah, 2.206 Coordinator 301-415-3610 2
Robles, JesseFrom: Robles, JesseSent: Friday, October 21-l, 2011 2:D7 PM
==Subject:==
IOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Friday, October 21, 2011NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS OFFICIAL USE ONLY***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR NRC INTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION***
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE OF NRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):
One (1)V
: 3) EN 47359 -FORT CALHOUN -FLOOD BARRIER PENETRATIONS NOT WATER TIGHTSee EN Text. Pass to TRG Lead for AFW (Stanley Gardocki) and Electrical Power lRoy Mathew).
Assigned toJesse Robles.Outside of Scope2 OU--16OF 6CaeNOTE: H{ItS SUMMARY I6S OFFICIAL USE 0tEY4-.S** *VM Y C O N TAP rVitFt, &#xfd;M TA R Y 0 R N R C IN I -RN A L U 1 1 N LY ',ii N FG R M A T WN *- *DO-NOT-FORWARD ANY FORTIONS OUTSIDE or ,-C WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERM+ISION FR.M-ORIGINA-OR Attendees at Screening Meeting:Jesse RoblesEric ThomasRebecca SigmonBob Bernardo (by phone)Jay Patel (NRO -by phone)Mary Wegner (RES -by phone)3 Smith, ChrisFrom: Kirkland, JohnSent: Friday, October 21, 2011 10:26 AMTo: Clark, JeffCc: Smith, Chris; Azua, Ray
==Subject:==
Flood Penetrations Conduits in the affected pull boxes are supposed to have a water proof sealant in them. It was described tome as a "liquid asphalt that hardens.!
They are injected into the conduit from ports on the conduit, located afew inches from the end of the conduit.
Then the end of the conduit is sealed with a more "beeswax" typematerial, that hardens and keeps the asphalt type material inside of the conduit.When they inspecte them before, they saw the beeswax and assumed that the entire pnetration wasinstalled correctly.
1(b)(5)John KIrlandSenior Resident Inspector, Fort Calhoun Station9610 Power LaneBlair, NE 68008402-426-9612 402-426-9613 (fax)I
: Ailbert, MichelleFrom: Albert, Michelle Sent: Friday, October 28, 2011 11:23 AMTo: Williamson, Edward; Spencer, MaryCc: Jones, Bradley;
: Biggins, James L. i
==Subject:==
FW: FCS Backfit PanelAttachments:
G0901-6 Facility-Specific Backfit.doc A j?1P 0iIFYIFrom: Albert, Michelleu'L-Sent: Friday, October 28, 2011 10:56 AMTo: Jones, Bradley;
: Biggins, James; Mizuno, Geary; Benowitz, Howard
==Subject:==
FW: FCS Backfit PanelFYIFrom: Blount, Tom &deg;e e -Sent: Friday, October 21, 2011 1:19 PMTo: Kellar, Ray; Farnholtz, Thomas; Clark, Jeff; Albert, Michelle; Wilson, GeorgeCc: Fuller, Karla; Mehrhoff, Vivian; Loveless, David
==Subject:==
FCS Backfit PanelHello everyone
-I wanted to provide an update on our efforts to put together the "Backfit Panel" for the FtCalhoun Upstream Dam Failure Issue. You may be aware Elmo Collins (R-IV RA) authorized the PanelCharter this past week (10/19).
During his review, Elmo took a more "global" perspective of other activities associated with the "Flooding" issues that the agency is currently engaged in, and had questions regarding impact/influence of other agency activities.
With the ongoing efforts regarding the Fukushima Near-Term taskforce and the soon to be issued Generic Issue, GI-204 for Flooding, taking action that has the potential forunintended consequences affecting a larger agency effort would not be appropriate.
After some dialogue withvarious folks, including Ben Beasley (RES), Dave Skeen (NRR) and George Wilson (NRR), I'm convinced wecan proceed, while ensuring communications/coordination with the other programs, and I advised Elmo of the.same, which supported his decision to go forward with the panel.At this juncture I think we need an initial meeting, with the primary purpose of aligning on what our outcome willneed to be, and defining a path to get there. With that in mind I will try to find a time that supports everyone's calendar.
(ACTION:
Vivian, please arrange conference call with phone,# and passcode).
The ADAMS accession
# for the Charter and the Dave L. analysis is:MLI 1293A 19P -CharterEML111822555fc-Analysis
'. ,The link to Management Directive 8.4 "Management of Facility-specific Backfitting and Information Collection" is http://www.internal.nrc.-qov/ADM/DAS/cacq/Mana-qement Directives/md8.4.pdf I have also attached the Regional Policy Guide for Facility
-Specific backfits to this e-mail for yourawareness.
Thank you for your willingness to support this panel. I look forward to our productive efforts as we move this tocompletion.
Tom Bf1ountDep. DRS R-JVl~b) 6 L.UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV612 EASTLAMAR BLVD, SU M 400ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4125 PG 0901.6 -October 31, 2008FACILITY-SPECIFIC BACKFIT AND INFORMATION COLLECTION PROCEDURE EFFECTIVE:
Immediately SUPERSEDES PG 0901.5CONTACT:
Regional CounselDISTRIBUTION:
StandardAPPROVAL:
IRA/Elmo Collins, Regional Administrator REVISION:
THIS PG HAS BEEN REVISED TO REQUIRE INTERIM TRAINING UNTILPERMANENT FORMAL TRAINING IS DEVELOPED AND TO CHANGE THE REGIONALBACKFIT PROGRAM ASSESSMENTS FROM ANNUALLY TO TRIENNIALLY.
ALSO, THEREVISION CONTAINS MINOR EDITORIAL CHANGES AND REVISIONS ARE IN BOLD.A. Purposelbiscussion This policy guide provides guidance for implementing NRC's backfit and information collection regulations, and M.D. 8.4, Management of Facility-specific Backfldting andInformation Collection, relating to power reactors and certain materials facilities.
Neither generic backfitting, nor test, research, nor training reactors are covered by thispolicy guide. M.D. 8.4 is the principal reference for this Regional Office PolicyGuide (ROPG).
==Enclosures:==
: 1. Backfit Examples2. Backfit Review Panel3. RIV Backfit Status Logcc/w
==Enclosures:==
RIV Coordinator, DEDO (MS:16E15)
C. Carpenter, DESUNSI Review Completed:
KDF_ ADAMS: c Yes X No Initials:
KDF_o Publicly Available o Non-Publicly Available o Sensitive 7 Non-Sensitive NAME: R: %ROPG\PG 0901.6Facil
-Specifc Backfit and Information Collection Procedure.doc KDFuller WBJones ATHoweil DDChamberlain RJCaniano IRA/ IRA/ IRAJ /RA/ IRA10/27/08 10/27108 10/28/08 10/28108 10/29/08CACasto EECollPns
/RA/ /RA/10/30108 10/31/081 OFF(CIAL RECORD COPYT=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax PG 0901.6-2-Backfitting is the process by which NRC decides whether to impose new or revised regulatory requirements or staff positions on NRC-licensed nuclear power reactors or certain materials facilities.
Backfitting for nuclear power reactors is defined in 10 C.F.R. 50.109 as the modification of oraddition to systems, structures, components, or design of a facility; or the design approval ormanufacturing license for a facility; or the procedures or organization required to design,construct, or operate a facility.
Any of the aforementioned may result from a new or amendedprovision in the Commission rules or the imposition of a regulatory staff position interpreting theCommission rules that is either new or different from a previously applicable staff position.
Thebackf-tting definitions in 10 C.F.R. Parts 70, 72, and 76 are slightly different.
NRC staff positions may be identified as potential backfits either by the staff or a stakeholder (e.g., a licensee).
In the case of a licensee claimed backfit, the licensee must submit the backfitclaim in writing to the Regional Administrator (RA) for disposition.
Generally, there are three types of backfits.
They are (1) compliance, (2) adequate protection' (including defining and redefining the level of adequate protection),
and (3) a cost-justified substantial increase in safety. See M.D. 8.4, Figure 1. Enclosure 1 provides examples ofbackfit situations.
The first two types of backfits (i.e., a backfit to bring a facility into compliance with the license, rules, Commission orders, or written commitments by the licensee, or oneimposed to ensure that the facility provides adequate protection of public health and safety orcommon defense and security) are termed as exceptions, and do not require findings ofsubstantial safety improvements.
Economic costs may not be considered in defining or refiningwhat is an adequate level of protection or in ensuring that an adequate level of protection isachieved or maintained or requiring compliance with regulations that ensure adequateprotection.
Neither of these two types of backfits requires a backfit analysis.
The third, costjustified
: backfit, does require a backfit analysis.
B. Action1. The Backfit ProcessWhen the staff invokes a backfit exception, the RA must provide a documented evaluation that includes a statement of the objectives, reasons for themodification, and the basis for the backfit exception.
The documented evaluation should be issued with the backfit except when an immediately effective agencyaction is necessary because the safety or security implications are urgent, andfull documentation cannot be completed.
in those cases, the documentation mayfollow the backfrt imposition.
For more guidance on preparing the documented evaluation, see M.D. Handbook 8.4, Part II, pps. 9-13.This refers to adequate protection of public health and safety or common defense andsecurity.,
PG 0901.6-3-For backfits other than the compliance or adequate protection varieties (i.e., acost-justified substantial increase in safety),
the staff must perform a backfitanalysis2 and may be required to prepare a re-aulatory analysis3 to show thatcertain improvements in safety or security are justified on the basis of theassociated costs. Often only one analysis is performed to meet both the backfitand regulatory analysis requirements.
For more guidance on backflt andregulatory
: analyses, see Handbook 8.4, Part I1, pps. 15-17 and Exhibit 2,Guidance for Performing a Combined Backfit and Regulatory Analysis.
The RA shall review and approve any documented evaluations, backfit analyses, and/or regulatory analyses developed as a part of the backfit process.Additionally, the RA will determine if a staff position is a backfit (whether staff orlicensee identified),
whether the proposed backfit should be imposed on thelicensee, and any appeals to the region of backfit decisions.
In order to makethese determinations, the RA may elect to use a panel as described inEnclosure
: 2. The RA will consult and coordinate with the applicable programoffices (NRR, NMSS, or NSIR [for all security-related backfits]),
OGC, and OE,as appropriate, in making these determinations.
After the RA has approved thesupporting regulatory
: analysis, and/or backfit analysis, and after thisdocumentation has been forwarded for information to the EDO, the cognizant Division Director will issue the backfit determination along with the supporting evaluation or analyses to the licensee.
The licensee may choose to implement or appeal any backfit.Implementation is normally accomplished on a schedule negotiated between thelicensee and the NRC. The staff should consult OE and OGC for establishing the schedule.
2The backfit rules require a demonstration that "there is a substantial increase in theoverall protection of the public health and safety or the common defense and security to bederived from the backfit and that the direct and indirect costs of implementation for that facilityare justified in view of this increased protection."
See 10 C.F.R. 50.109(a)(3) and Handbook8.4, Part II, p. 14.
a regulatory analysis helps to ensure that NRC decisions are based onadequate information concerning the need for and consequences of proposed actions;appropriate alternative approaches are identified and analyzed; and no clearly preferable alternative is available to the proposed action.
PG 0901.6-4-2. Backfit Appeal ProcessThere are two types of backfit appeal processes:
: a. Appeal to the Region to modify or withdraw a proposed backfit for which aregulatory analysis has been prepared and transmitted to the licensee; orb. Appeal to the Region to reverse a denial of a prior licensee claim that astaff position, not identified by the NRC as a backfit, is one, or that abackfit which staff believes falls within one of the exceptions from therequirement for a regulatory
: analysis, does not.For all appeals, licensees should address the appeal to the RA with a copy to theEDO. (A copy of all security related appeals will be provided to the Director ofNSIR and will be coordinated with NSIR as appropriate.)
The RA will report tothe EDO within 90 days after receipt of the appeal, the plan for resolving theissue. The licensee should also be promptly and periodically informed in writingregarding the status of the issue. The RA will decide the appeal and inform thelicensee in writing with a copy to the EDO. If dissatisfied with the RA's decision, the licensee may appeal to the EDO, unless resolution is achieved at a lowermanagement level. If after losing an appeal, the licensee does not agree toimplement the backfit, it may be imposed by order. See Handbook 8.4, Part II,pp. 23-24.In the first type of appeal, the staff should reconsider the supporting regulatory
: analysis, and other information that is relevant and material to the proposedbackfit.
In the second type of appeal, the appeal should take into account thestaff's evaluation, the licensee's
: response, and other information that is relevantand material.
Backfit claims and resultant staff determinations that arere-evaluated in response to an appeal, and that are again determined by theNRC not to be backfits, or are exempt from the requirement for a regulatory
: analysis, are not to be treated further in the context of this procedure.
: 3. Record Keeping and Reporting The Regional Counsel (RC) will administratively manage each proposed facility-specific backfit by maintaining records related to it, including
: requests, positions, statements, panel minutes, and summary reports.
The RC will provide theserecords to the RA's secretary for inclusion in ADAMS with recommendations coordinated with the staff concerning whether the documents should be placed in PG 0901.6-5-the public or non-public section.
Additionally, the RC will keep a RIV backfitstatus log for tracking purposes.
6 Enclosure 3 is a copy of the log.4. TrainingThe Office of Human Resources is developing backfit training modules andrefresher courses for the staff, some of which may be available online. TheDivision Directors will ensure that regional inspection staff and any otherpersonnel who may be involved in backfit issues take the initial or refresher backflt training annually once it is developed.
In the interim, all technical staff will be required to perform a read and sign of this policy guideannually that will be tracked as a Regional Administrator action item.5. Information Collection (See Handbook 8.4. Part I11, pps. 26-28.)The RA will authorize requests for information from power reactor licensees inaccordance with 10 CFR 50.54(f)
(and from certain material licensees under70.22(d),
72.62(d),
and 76.70(e)).
Requests under 10 C.F.R. 50.54(f) must bejustified by a supporting analysis which finds that the burden to be imposed isjustified in view of the potential safety significance of the issue to be addressed inthe requested information.
The division requesting the information (e.g., DRS,DRP, or DNMS) will prepare the supporting analysis for the RA's review. Referto Handbook 8.4, Part Ill, pps. 26-28, for guidance on preparing the supporting analysis and exceptions to providing a supporting analysis.
: 6. AuditsDRS will conduct an assessment triennially of the implementation of theregional backfit program in the same year as the update to this policy guide.7.
==References:==
See pps. 12-13 of M.D. 8.4.4 Classified and safeguards information should not be placed in ADAMS, and proprietary and sensitive information should be excluded from the public domain in ADAMS.5The time needed to complete an initial backfit issue or backfit appeal may varydepending on the complexity of the backfit claim. As a guideline,
: however, the following timeline is suggested:
* Inform EDO and licensee of an initial backfit determination within 90 calendar days afterreceipt of the claim and resolve the issue within 180 calendar days after receipt of theclaim.* Keep the licensee informed of the backfit or backfit appeal status no less than quarterly.
* Inform the EDO of the plan for resolving an appeal by the 80t' calendar day afterreceiving the appeal, and resolve the backfit appeal within 180 calendar days.
PG 0901.6 LIC-202, Procedures for Managing Plant-Specific Backfits and 50.54(f)Information Requests* NMSS Policy and Procedure Letter (P&P) 1-84, May 2004 PG 0901.6BACKFIT EXAMPLES1. The Region considered whether the NRC staff imposition of a 10 C.F.R. 50.73reportability requirement of a licensee-identified Technical Specification 6.12 violation onthe Wolf Creek plant was a backfit.
The issue involved the reporting of high radiation area control violations by use of the licensee event report requirements of 10 C.F.R.50.73. A regional panel determined that it was a plant-specific (Wolf-Creek) backfit..
Itwas a compliance
: backflt, since it would have been a backfit to bring Wolf Creek intocompliance with 10 C.F.R. 50.73, an NRC regulation.
The matter was also referred toNRR and it determined that future violations of T.S. 6.12 shall be reported in accordance with 10 C.F.R. 50.73.2. NRC issued a 10 C.F.R. 50.59 violation to TXU Electric (Comanche Peak) June 11,1997, associated with NRC Inspection Report 50-445;446/97-12, for failure to performwritten safety evaluations to provide the basis for concluding that four changes todrawings contained in the safety analysis report did not involve unreviewed safetyquestions.
The licensee requested the NRC to perform a backfit analysis to evaluate theapparent change in staff position from that given in NRC Inspection Report 50-445;446/93-32 dated October 13, 1993 to that expressed in NRC Inspection Report 50-445;446/97-12.
The 1993 report stated in reference to an issue unrelated to the subjectfour changes:This temporary modification should have been identified as a "trivial" type change. Thatis, a change having "no potential safety impact (e.g., affecting safe shutdown or thesafety of operations)."
In each of the four examples of the violation, the licensee invoked Category 7 "trivial" change (minor changes which had no potential safety impact) from its procedure, "10CFR 50.59 Review Guide," Revision 4, to disposition the associated design changenotices as not requiring safety evaluations.
In the 1993 inspection report, the inspectors provided statements that appeared to accept the licensee's guidance on this issue. Thestaff found during the backfit analysis that because the statements in the 1993inspection report were misleading, the reversal of the previous
: position, which acceptedthe licensee's interpretation of "trivial"
: changes, constituted a change in the staff'sposition and a compliance
: backfit, because the change was necessary to assurecompliance with the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 50.59.3. A Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) was issued to the Oconee Nuclear Stationon September 8, 2000. The licensee requested the NOED as a result of its inability tocomply with Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.1.9.a which provides for annual verification of voltage and frequency response of the KeoweeHydro Units (KHUs). Specifically, the licensee could not meet upper voltage andfrequency limits that had been incorporated into the TS by the staff when Oconee TSs-1I-ENCLOSURE 1
PG 0901.6were converted to Improved Technical Specifications (ITSs). In the background sectionof the NOED, the staff discussed the September 4, 1998, approved amendment (Nos.232, 232 and 231) for Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3. Under this amendment, the relevantportion of the SR (then referenced as SR 3.7.1.11) was that the annual test verifies eachKHU can attain rated speed and voltage within 23 seconds of an emergency start signal.No limits existed on speed or votage. During the conversion of the Oconee TSs toITSs (December 16, 1998), limits were incorporated on the upper and lowerfrequency and voltage, and the present SR 3.8.1.9.a limits (which the licensee couldnot meet) were adopted.
An NRC staff member claimed that the inclusion of limits onthe upper and lower frequency and voltage in the TS was a backfit.
The regiondetermined that it was a backfit, because the staff modified the licensee's surveillance, procedure by incorporating new limits where none had previously existed.
It appears tohave been a compliance bacMdt because the modification was made for consistency with the ITS Writer's Guide and ITS convention program.
(This backfit issue laterbecame moot due to the submission of a request for an amendment.)
: 4. [NOTE: Although not a facility-specific
: backfit, the following is an example of anadequate protection backflt.J The NRC addressed the issues of reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head penetration leakage and the potential for degradation of the low-alloy steel head by boric acidcorrosion through a 2003 order and a 2004 revised order. The orders required PWRlicensees to determine the degradation susceptibility category of their reactor and toimplement specific inspections of the RPV head and associated penetration nozzles.The staff believed that the orders were not appropriate regulatory tools for long-term regulation in this area. Therefore, it pursued rulemaking activities to incorporate theinspection requirements of the orders into 10 C.F.R. 50.55a. Although a strictcodification of the requirements in the orders would not be a backfit, because the staffexpected that the requirements may be modified as a result of the rulemaking, it treatedthe rulemaking as a backfit necessary for adequate
-protection of public health andsafety.-2""ENCLOSURE 1
PG 0901.6BACKFIT REVIEW PANELA. Purpose:To define a review panel to consider potential items relative to the backfit rules.B. Discussion:
ROPG 0901.6, "FACILITY-SPECIFIC BACKFIT AND INFORMATION COLLECTION PROCEDURE,"
defines the procedures to be followed for consideration and processing of NRC-imposed changes having a potential for falling under the provisions of M.D. 8.4,MANAGEMENT OF FACILITY-SPECIFIC BACKFITTING AND INFORMATION COLLECTION.
The decision to prepare a Regulatory Analysis is assigned by thisROPG to the appropriate Division Director.
As an aid to the Division Directors, and to assure consistent application of the backfitrule within the region, a panel is hereby commissioned to consider potential backfit itemsand to recommend the need for a Regulatory Analysis if judged necessary to complywith the above requirements.
The panel will be composed of the following or their designated alternate:
Division Director (of the relevant division appropriate to the issue, e.g., DRP,DRS, or DNMS): Panel ChairmanEnforcement OfficerBranch Chief, DNMS (Primary Materials Contact), Branch Chief, DRP (Primary Reactor Contact)Branch Chief, DRS (Primary Reactor Contact)C. Action:1. The above panel will meet when convened by the Chairman.
: 2. Items to be considered by the panel will be identified by the Chairman/Division Director assigned to the panel.3. Copies of applicable documentation will be distributed by the Chairman to eachpanel member in advance of a meeting to consider potential backfit items.4. Minutes of each panel meeting will be kept by the Chairman to reflect the itemsconsidered and the panel recommendations.
D. Backfit Appeal Panel Composition The backfit appeal panel will function similarly to the initial backfit panel. The backfitappeal panel should consist of the Regional Counsel as Chairman and the two technical Division Directors who did not participate in the initial panel (i.e., DNMS, DRP, or DRS)as members for independence purposes.
Also, one member of the appeal panel should ENCLOSURE 2
PG 0901.6be a technical expert from an organization outside of the region (e.g., NRR, NMSS,RES, EDO, OGC, NSIR, etc.). The appeal panel chairman will provide minutes anddecision documents from the appeal panel to the RA's secretary for inclusion in ADAMSand include the decision in the regional backflt status table.-2-ENCLOSURE 2
PG 0901.6ENCLOSURE 3, ML032940098 (redacted) and ML 032940104 (redacted)
RIV BACKFIT STATUSDATE LICENSEE ISSUE STATUS4/99 River Bend Station (RBS) Change to the calculated loss-of-coolant CLOSEDaccident offsite doses at RBS(b)(5)3/99 Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Appendix R Compliance Issue10/97 Comanche Peak (CP) Failure to perform safety evaluation for CLOSED-3i27100 configuration changes in FSAR7/92 Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Security Issue in re X-ray devices CLOSED -unnecessary backfit12/90 Wolf Creek (WC) Part 50.73 reportabilily issue in re Sec. 6 of CLOSEDTech Specs5/89 Wolf Creek (WC) Emergency action levels employed at WC CLOSED -no backflt5/89 Wolf Creek (WC) Security Compensation measures beyond CLOSED -no backfitwhat was required imposed by NRC4/88 ARKANSAS Nuclear One (ANO) Safeguards related matter at ANO CLOSED -no backfit3/88 Wolf Creek (WVC) Safeguards related matter at WC CLOSED- no backfit PG 0901.6ENCLOSURE 3, ML032940098 (redacted) and ML 032940104 (redacted)
RIVBACKFIT STATUSDATE LICENSEE ISSUE STATUS1/87 Wolf Creek (WC) Change in interpretation of 73.71 CLOSED -no backfit7/86 Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) Safeguards related issue at FCS CLOSED -no backfit5/13/98 South Texas Project 10 C.F.R. 50.59-Unreviewed safety question CLOSED-8/4/00 (Due to neww/o NRC review & approval rule & minor significance, backfit consideration canceled) 217101 Callaway-AMEREN/UE SDP-ALARA-Occupational Radiation Safety CLOSED-no backfit 5/41019/28/01 ANO Manual actions & 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. R, CLOSED-no backfit 4/15/02III.G.2 Boyer, RachelFrom: Collins, ElmoSent: Tuesday, November 01, 2011 11:10 AMTo: Borchardt, BillCc: Virgilio
-Disabled 5-4-2012 per 574504, Martin; Leeds, Eric
==Subject:==
FW: FYI -Fort Calhoun Station updateBillHere is the e-mail sent to Commission TAs to update on status of Ft CalhounElmoFrom: Castleman, PatrickSent: Tuesday, November 01, 2011 10:58 AMTo: Franke, Mark; Hipschman, Thomas; Marshall, Michael; Gilles, Nanette; Orders, William; Franovich, MikeCc: Collins, Elmo; Bowman, Gregory; Brock, Kathryn
==Subject:==
RE: FYI -Fort Calhoun Station updateThanks, Mark.From: Franke, MarkSent: Tuesday, November 01, 2011 10:57 AMTo: Hipschman, Thomas; Marshall, Michael; Castleman, Patrick; Gilles, Nanette; Orders, William; Franovich, MikeCc: Collins, Elmo; Bowman, Gregory; Brock, Kathryn
==Subject:==
FYI -Fort Calhoun Station updateGood Morning -The following is as update on Fort Calhoun Station, which has been shutdown since April for a refueling outage. The outage was extended due to flooding along the Missouri River. Fort Calhoun Station is currently in Column 4 of the Reactor Oversight Program response matrix.On September 2, 2011, Region IV issued a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) to Fort Calhoun regarding post-flooding recovery actions needed prior to restart, including tests and inspections.
* Fort Calhoun is beginning a review and assessment in preparation for NRC supplemental inspections (IP 95003) associated with their Column 4 status.* Region IV is implementing Manual Chapter (MC) 0351 to address Performance Indicator and BaselineInspection program impacts due to the plant's extended shutdown period.* Based on several additional performance issues identified during recent NRC inspections, Region IV isworking with NRR to consider MC 0350.* Region IV formed a back-fit panel to consider what actions are appropriate to address an Army Corpsof Engineers report regarding the impact of dam failures on the Missouri River system.Please give me a call if you have any questions.
Thanks,S*-"----.--~-
-.----.-
-~.
Mark(b)~(6) blckberry) p~2 BBoyer RachelFrom:. Wiggins, JimSent: Monday, December 05, 2011 3:49 PMTo: Borchardt.
BillCc: Virgilio
-Disabled 5-4-2012 per 574504, MartinSubject.
ACTION: NEED TO SPEAK TO YOU THIS WEEK ABOUT FT. CALHOUNWant to discuss the fact that RIV and NRR are recommending entry into the 0350 process for Ft Calhoun.
Bytomorrow, Ill have a brief write-up on the rationale.
For now, suffice it to say that I'm unaware we've seen aset of performance results like we're seeing at Ft Calhoun since the start ".0.2%L-Calhoun is firmly in -.3Column 4 with potentially 3 Degraded Cornerstones (IE, MS and Secuitt(b)(
: 5) L RlV staff indicates thatIt's not clear that the licensee has Its arms around the problems and wha11Ufwn mnowd to address them.Going to 0350 will be a way to make the licensee face the Issues,,..
though likely it would result in the restartdate for the facility being later than what the licensee Is telling Itself (March) and more like what the Regionthinks is realistic (June).I tend to agree with the Region and NRR.More to come.Don't know if you or Marty have had any discussions on this with the Chairman or the Commissioners.
I Uibe, JuanFrom: Wang, WejunSent: Thursday, Decohnber 15, 2011 1:42 PMTo: Xi, Zuhan; Candelano, Luissette; Uribe, Juan
==Subject:==
FW: Fort Calhoun FloodingThis is one of the earliest e-mail communication regarding the Fort Calhoun site flooding.
7114"nFrom: Wang, WeUun ISent: Tuesday, Septenflt&#xfd;.06, 2011 12:37 PMTo: Williams, Megan; Wilson, GeorgeCc: Manoly, Kamal; Cook, Christopher
==Subject:==
RE: Fort Calhoun FloodingMegan:I am not sure whether we have regulatory authority to ask the licensee to monitor cracks -Kamal may knowmore.Regarding the soil types and properties, you may want to get the soil profile and soil properties to see if thereare clayey soil and cemented sandy soil because the clayey soil may cause additional long term settlement if itbecame saturated from unsaturated state for a while, and the cemented sandy soil may greatly reduce itsstrength when becomes saturated (non-cemented sand does not have this issue, saturation only reduce theeffective stress and it should be considered during design).By the way, usually cracking is an indication of differential settlement.
If the cracks continue increasing, thenlocal foundation failure is possible.
Please let me know if you have any questions.
Thanks.From: Williams, Megan (AtSent: Tuesday, Septembrr 0, 2011 1i:53'AMTo: Wang, Weijun; Wilson, GeorgeCc: Manoly, Kamal; Cook, Christopher
==Subject:==
RE: Fort Calhoun FloodingThank you, Weijun. This is most helpful.We are seeing many cracks in concrete walls in the turbine building (below grade), which have been leakingwater since the flood started.
I am trying to find out the Structures Monitoring Program owner, to see if theyhad a baseline inspection documentation (they should have completed for license renewal -2004) indicating what cracks were evident before the flood, and their size, etc.)(5)R1, MeganFrom: Wang, WeiJunSent: Tuesday, September 06, 2011 9:56 AMTo: Williams, Megan; Wilson, GeorgeCc: lanoly, Kamal; Cook, Christopher
: Subject, RE: Fort Calhoun FloodingMegan:Without knowing much details, I'd like to suggest the follows:1. Get documents to see how the hydraulic loading was considered during the original structure andfoundation design. If the actual flood level is higher than the original design, then the additional lateralpressure and uplift force may cause some damage to the foundation walls and foundation floorconcrete slabs, and also may have negative impact on the stability of foundation soils.2. Regardless the flood levels considered in the original design, you may still need to inspect the structure and foundation to see if there is any damages caused by flooding, such as cracks and settlement.
TheGPR is a good method to detect voids and the licensee should also perform additional NDT testing toinspect the integrity of the foundation walls and floor concrete slabs or mats, should cracks bediscovered.
: 3. Pay attention to settlements, both in vertical and horizontal directions.
Flood normally will reduce thestrength of foundation soil, especially if the water did not dissipate for a longer period of time. Forcertain type of soils and drainage conditions, as well as the actual foundation condition after the flood,the additional settlement caused by flood may continue for certain period of time, and therefore thesettlement monitoring should be kept for a longer time until no detectible settlement increase isobserved.
The above just for your reference.
Please let me know if you have questions.
Thanks.(301)415-1175 From: Williams, MeganSent: Tuesday, September 06, 2011 9:44 AM .&ATo: Wilson, GeorgeCc: Manoly, Kamal; Wang, Weijun; Cook, Christopher
==Subject:==
RE: Fort Calhoun FloodingGood morning,I am at Fort Calhoun this week, and trying to get some details from the contractors on their approach toevaluating subgrade conditions at the site, now that most of the water has receded.In reviewing the USAR, certain structures had hydraulic loading designs based on different flood levels (Class Iversus Class I1, and several references to 2.7.1.2 for design peak flood elevation, which itself references 2
multiple different flood elevations within its paragraphs).
Is it possible to get documentation that we haveregarding this hydraulic loading design?I am trying to get information on the GPR they are using to look for voids. Are there any other specificquestions or things you all can think of that I should look at while on site?Thank you,Megan WilliamsRIVFrom: Wilson, GeorgeSent: Tuesday, August 23, 2011 5:53 AMTo: Williams, MeganCc: Manoly, Kamal; Wang, WeiJun; Cook, Christopher
==Subject:==
RE: Fort Calhoun FloodingMegan use Kamal Manoly as your reference person he will get assistance from Weijun Wang in NROFrom: Williams, MeganSent: Friday, August 19, 2011 12:28 PMTo: Wilson, George
==Subject:==
Fort Calhoun FloodingHey, Mr. Wilson,I left you a voicemail, and understand you are out of the office until next week, but I thought I would also sendyou an email, since I will be out of the office next week on inspection.
We are beginning to engage in reviewing the licensee's efforts for restart at the plant after extensive floodingthis spring/summer.
You probably know a large portion of the plant is still under water, but they have engageda consultant to start assessing geotechnical conditions around the site. I am looking for resources that canhelp us know what to look for in these assessments
-do we have any history of plants in the agencyrecovering from this sort of water conditions?
Do you know of any references that would tell us what kinds oftests of studies should be completed to assess the condition of the soils, etc.?I appreciate
-any guidance you have-in-this area.M nl,Megan Williams3 Uribe, JuanFrom:Sent:To:
==Subject:==
Attachments:
Wang, Weijun &#xfd; 0 C.Thursday, December 15, 2011 1:44 PMXl, Zuhan; Candelario, Luissette; Uribe, JuanFW: Fort Calhoun FloodingPicture 001.jpg; Picture 002.jpg; Picture 003.jpg; Picture 004.jpg; Picture 005.jpg; Picture006.jpg; Picture 007.jpg; FCS settled column.jpg FYI.WCO"uFrom: Williams, Megan (1VSent: Wednesday, SeptetlArO7, 2011 4:48 PMTo: Wang, Weijun; Wilson, GeorgeCc. Manoly, Kamal; Cook, Christopher
==Subject:==
RE: Fort Calhoun FloodingW'tez &#xfd;&#xfd;-Good afternoon.
I wanted to let you know about developments today.We met with HDR (geotechnical investigation sub to the licensee) to discuss their approach, tasks to date, etc.They are in the process of getting us a good amount of requested information, such as ori inal desiandocuments, etc. They have yet to characterize the current condition of the soil; (b)(5)(b)(5) I -1As they remove mud/sit from the site with bobcats, an exterior walkway slab showed settlement in one comer,and also a large void where the concrete completely gave way. (see attached),
There is also a column thathas settled, and it is taking the adjacent masonry walls with it (stepped cracking)
-you may have seen thisphoto before.Again, I will pass along information as I receive it, but if you think of anything I should be asking for or lookingat, I appreciate any guidance you can provide.R/,meganFrom: Williams, Megan '(ZWSent: Tuesday, Septembe" r 06, 2011 10:53 AMTo: Wang, Weijun; Wilson, GeorgeCc. Manoly, Kamal; Cook, Christopher
==Subject:==
RE: Fort Calhoun FloodingCf ..~. d., ~ 4Thank you, Weijun. This is most helpful.We are seeing many cracks in concrete walls in the turbine building (below grade), which have been leakingwater since the flood started, I am trying to find out the Structures Monitoring Program owner, to see if theyhad a baseline inspection documentation (they should have completed for license renewal -2004) indicating what cracks were evident before the flood, and their size, etc.I R/,MeganFrom: Wang, WeljunSent: Tuesday, September 06, 2011 9:56 AMTo: Williams, Megan; Wilson, GeorgeCc: Manoly, Kamal; Cook, Christopher Subject-RE: Fort Calhoun FloodingMegan:Without knowing much details, I'd like to suggest the follows:1. Get documents to see how the hydraulic loading was considered during the original structure andfoundation design. If the actual flood level is higher than the original design, then the additional lateralpressure and uplift force may cause some damage to the foundation walls and foundation floorconcrete slabs, and also may have negative impact on the stability of foundation soils.2. Regardless the flood levels considered in the original design, you may still need to inspect the structure and foundation to see if there is any damages caused by flooding, such as cracks and settlement.
TheGPR is a good method to detect voids and the licensee should also perform additional NDT testing toinspect the integrity of the foundation walls and floor concrete slabs or mats, should cracks bediscovered.
: 3. Pay attention to settlements, both in vertical and horizontal directions.
Flood normally will reduce thestrength of foundation soil, especially if the water did not dissipate for a longer period of time. Forcertain type of soils and drainage conditions, as well as the actual foundation condition after the flood,the additional settlement caused by flood may continue for certain period of time, and therefore thesettlement monitoring should be kept for a longer time until no detectible settlement increase isobserved.
The above just for your reference.
Please let me know if you have questions.
Thanks.(301)415-1175 From: Williams, MeganSent: Tuesday, September 06, 2011 9:44 AMTo, Wilson, George.Cc: Manoly, Kamal; Wang, Weijun; Cook, Christopher
!.*L.. .. 1 ( -LA)
==Subject:==
RE: Fort Calhoun FloodingGood morning,2 I am at Fort Calhoun this week, and trying to get some details from the contractors on their approach toevaluating subgrade conditions at the site, now that most of the water has receded.In reviewing the USAR, certain structures had hydraulic loading designs based on different flood levels (Class Iversus Class 11, and several references to 2.7.1.2 for design peak flood elevation, which itself references multiple different flood elevations within its paragraphs).
Is it possible to get documentation that we haveregarding this hydraulic loading design?I am trying to get information on the GPR they are using to look for voids. Are there any other specificquestions or things you all can think of that I should look at while on site?Thank you,Megan WilliamsRIVFrom: Wilson, GeorgeSent: Tuesday, August Z3, 2011 5:53 AMTo: Williams, MeganCc: Manoly, Kamal; Wang, Weijun; Cook, Christopher
(-
==Subject:==
RE: Fort Calhoun FloodingMegan use Kamal-Manoly as your reference person he will get assistance from Weijun Wang in NROFrom: Williams, MeganSent: Friday, August 19, 2011 12:28 PMTo: Wilson, GeorgeSubject-Fort Calhoun Flooding~J)Hey, Mr. Wilson,I left you a voicemail, and understand you are out of the office until next week, but I thought I would also sendyou an email, since I will be out of the office next week on inspection.
We are beginning to engage in reviewing the licensee's efforts for restart at the plant after extensive floodingthis spring/summer.
You probably know a large portion of the plant is still under water, but they have engageda-consultant to-start assessing-geotechricat conditions around the-site.
-am looking -for resources-that canhelp us know what to look for in these assessments
-do we have any history of plants in the agencyrecovering from this sort of water conditions?
Do you know of any references that would tell us what kinds oftests of studies should be completed to assess the condition of the soils, etc.?I appreciate any guidance you have in this area.r/,Megan Williams3 1/5112 Brief to Sr. Mngmnt on FCS Geotechnical workOutside of ScopeCite 3 failures on site:1. Increased groundwater flow into turbine sump pump2. Pavement failure and sinkhole development in utility corridor between service buildingand intake structure
: 3. Column settlement in maintenance shopTurbine Building Sump pump:Subsurface piping of soil material due to the sump operation and seepage/flow into the drainagesystem pipe is occurring; voids are significant and interconnected.
Voids, soft zones, andassociated groundwater and piping flow paths will continue to enlarge and extend out from thesystem unless the flow of water is stopped.
The most significant and closely connected voidsare on the west wall, adjacent to the auxiliary building.
Eleven of the voids occur at or below thebottom elevation of the pile caps.,Outside of ScopeAdditionally, two other CPFMs, 3a (Undermining and settlement of shallowfoundation/slab/surfaces (due to pumping) and undermined buried utilities (due to pumping),
both from subsurface erosion/piping, associated with this KDI have the potential to keepaffecting structures other than the Turbine Bldg: TSC, FP, Raw Water line, BBREs, Maint shop,U/G cable system, Waste disposal piping, Blair Water system, demin water, TB S. SY, FOT&P,PA drives, San Sewer, and Condensate Storage Tank buried utilities.
Th'e fact that the initial condition (broken pipes) has been occurring for many years, makes thehypothesis that the voids could extend beyond the turbine bldg more plausible.
Recommendations:
block the drainage system pipes; then 1) abandon the system and replacew/ above-stab system or trench cut for new system; or 2) replace existing system. Either willneed to address the voids created.
HDR is currently researching and interviewing expertgrouting companies for possible solutions.
Outside of ScopeA4Iz, Outside of ScopeIt Mizuno,_Gea:y From:Sent:To:Cc:
==Subject:==
Mizunio, Geary-O&#xfd;C.
: Thursday, January 19, 2012 9:01 AMSpencer, MaryWilliamson, Edward; Biggins, James; Jones, BradleyFW: Ft Calhoun Status...
and my suggestions for covering the on-going issues thereMary:(b)(5)Geary-From: King, Mark &#xfd;,y "Sent: Wednesday, January 18, 2012 11:32 AMTo: Tomrn, JohnCc: Cartwdght, William;
: Chemoff, Harold
==Subject:==
Ft Calhoun Status...
and my suggestions for covering the on-going issues thereJohn.(b)(5)1............ ...... L ........... ...........
........
(b)(5)2 (b)(5)FYI, for your consideration.
MarkMark KingSenior Reactor Systems EngineerNRR/ADRO/DIRS/IOEB Operating Experience Branch301-415-1150 NRC- One Mbsdan -One Team3--.---
From: Mizuno, GearySent: Monday, January 30, 2012 9:53 AMTo: Spencer, MaryCc: Biggins, James
==Subject:==
FW: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged in for review-Commission Paper -FW: AO Report for OGC SecondReview and NLOMary.-!Geary From: Martin, Circe On Behalf Of RidsOgcMalUCenter ResourceSent: Friday, January 27, 2012 4:08 PMTo: Rothschild, Trip; Jones, Bradley;
: Mayberry, Theresa; Lora, Kimberly; Mizuno, Geary
==Subject:==
OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged in for review-Commission Paper -FW: AO Report for OGC Second Reviewand NLOFrom: Pope, Tia'&#xfd;\Sent: Friday, January 27, 2012 3:43 PMTo: RidsOgcMailCenter ResourceCc: Mizuno, Geary; Bush-Goddard, Stephanie
==Subject:==
AO Report for OGC Second Review and NLO/
MizunD, GearyFrom:Sent:To:Cc:
==Subject:==
Mizuno, Geary 0(2.C,Thursday, February 02, 2012 11:05 AMChidakel, SusanBiggins, James; Jones, BradleyRE: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged in for review-Commission Paper -FW: AO Report forOGC Second Review and NLD &(b)(5)I -From: Chidakel, SusanSent: Thursday, February 02, 2012 10:56 AMTo: Mizuno, GearyCc: Biggins, JamesSubject-RE: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged in for review-Commission Paper --- FW: AO Report for OGC SecondReview and NLOkJ(b)(5)1-1From: Tomon, JohnSent: Wednesday, February 01, 2012 4:58 PMTo: Chidakel, SusanCc Bush-Goddard, Stephanie; Lewis, Doris; Biggins, James; Mizuno, Geary
==Subject:==
RE: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged in for review-Commission Paper -- FW: AO Report for OGC SecondReview and NLOSusan(b)(5)-I ~Thanks so much!V/rJohn J. Tomon, CHPHealth Physicist RES/DSA/HEB (301) 251-79D4 (Office)1(b)(6) (cell)CSB-3C23 Mail Stop CSB- C3AO7M., cl_From: Chidakel, Susan UJV"Sent: Wednesday, February 01, 2012 8:12 AMTo: Tomon, JohnCc, Bush-Goddard, Stephanie; Lewis, Doris
==Subject:==
RE: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged in for review-Commlsslun Paper -- FW: AO Report for OGC SecondReview and NLO1
*1*From: Tomon, JohnSent: Wednesday, February 01, 2012 7:57 AMTo: Chidakel, SusanCc: Bush-Goddard, Stephanie; Lewis, Doris
==Subject:==
RE: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged In for review-Commission Paper -FW: AO Report for OGC SecondReview and NLOSusaniF "',Jt~ ;Thanks so much!V/rJohn J. Tomon, CHIPHealth Physicist RES/DSA/HEB (301) 251-7904 (Office)()6 ctell)top CSB- C3AO7MFrom: Chidakel, Susan,'-"'
Sent Wednesday, February 01, 2012 7:47 AMTo: Tomon, JohnCc: Mizuno, Geary
==Subject:==
RE: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged in for review-Commission Paper --- FW: AO Report for OGC SecondReview and NLO/'.71''. rA..(b)(5)-}From: Tomon, John "."Sent: Tuesday, January 31, 2012 4:59 PMTo: Mizuno, Geary; Pope, TiaCc: Spencer, Mary; Chidakel, Susan; Biggins, James; Bush-Godddrd, Stephanie; Lewis, Doris
==Subject:==
RE: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged in for review-Commission Paper -- FW: AO Report foi OGC SecondReview and NLO2
-GearyGood afternoon!
I incorporated the changes that Mary Spencerand you provided into the document in ADAMS. I havbeen in training this week and I am checking and answering my e-mails either before or after the training is finished forthe day. I have received e-mails from Susan regarding some of the medical issues in the draft report and I tried tocarbon copy you on my responses to her. I will continue to converse with regarding her concerns with the medicalissues and hope to have her concerns adequately addressed as soon as possible.
F'JlI.,,&sect; Thanks and have a great day!VirJohn J. Tomon, CHPHealth Physicist RES/DSA/HEB (301) 251-7904 (Office)1(b)(6) Icell)CSB-3C23 Mail Stop CSB- C3AO7MX4Lz 0From: Mizuno, GearySent: Tuesday, January 31, 2012 10:20 AMTo: Tomon, John; Pope, TliaCc Spencer, Mary; Chldakel, Susan; Biggins, James
==Subject:==
FW: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged in for review-Commission Paper -FW: AO Report for OGC SecondReview and NLOJohn:(b)(5)IfAl~- '.~ri .GearyFrom: Spencer, MarySent: Monday, January 30, 2012 3:35 PMTo: Mlzuno, Geary
==Subject:==
RE: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged In for review-Commission Paper -- FW: AO Report for DGC SecondReview and NLO ( , ISGeary, &71"C'110 Mary-OffiP. e-n' torney-Client Privilege/Attorney Work Product3 Robles, JesseFrom:Sent:
==Subject:==
King, Mark VMonday, Fe a 3, 2012 3:02 PMIOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Monday, February 13, 2012NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS e L "*`*MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR NRC INT RNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION***
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE OF NR.WI HOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM OR GINATORFollow-uplOther Tasks: Twelve (12)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help IOEBstaff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff.]Outside of ScopeTA2) EN 47658 -FORT CALHOUN -UNANALYZED CONDITION
-GUIDANCE NOT ADEQUATE TOMITIGATE A DESIGN BASIS FLOODDuring review of the flood protection procedures, inspectors identified deficiencies in the guidance to mitigate adesign basis flood event where river level would reach 1014 feet mean sea level. Pass to TRG Lead forFlooding/Missiles (Ed Smith). Assigned to Jesse Robles.IiL~L~
O Tbt4D OF -cO4 ntT~tP& eFP sczP7-1Outside of Scope2) EN 47658 -FORT CALHOUN -UNANALYZED CONDITION
-GUIDANCE NOT ADEQUATE TOMITIGATE A DESIGN BASIS FLOODOutside of Scope3 Domim OF SCOPCAttendees at Screening Meeting;Jesse Robles -by phoneBob Bemardo-by phoneMark KingDoug Bollock, NROMary Wegner, RES -by phone4 Robles, Jesse _ nFrom: King, Mark (/I[Sent: Thursday, FiUrua ry16, 2012 2:37 PM
==Subject:==
IOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary.
for Thursday, February 16, 2012NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR N TERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION***
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSID QFIRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FB ORIGINATOR Atside of ScopeV
: 6) LER 2852011003R02
-FORT CALHOUN:
INADEQUATE FLOODING PROTECTION DUE TOINEFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT.
See LER update. Pass to TRG Lead for Flood Protection (Ed Smith), and SW/UHS (Gerard Purciarello).
Assigned to Jesse Robles.7) LER 2852011003R03
-FORT CALHOUN:
INADEQUATE FLOODING PROTECTION DUE TOINEFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT.
See LER update. Pass to TRG Lead for Flood Protection (Ed Smith), and SW/UHS (Gerard Purciarello).
Assigned to Jesse Robles.Outside of Scope2 outside6 oF ScoPOutside of Scope svrs4C ti- ~Outside of ScopeAttendees at Screening Meeting:Jesse RoblesBob Bernardo
[Dave Goatnrflo M-arv K039 oCWtoougBoll(
?.I PVOfltMeh'di Fe1slaBV
.5 Ft C;Ihoun oversight
-February 14, 2012Recap history* 2010 -'yellow' finding for Inadequate strategies and procedures to protect the site up to1014' (ricenslng basis)* 2010 -White' finding for inadequate control of SGI* April 2011 -FCS shuts down for refueling outage* June 2011 -ACE projects water levels at FCS up to 1007' (3 ft above site grade level)* June 2011 -NOUE with water approaching 1004'* June 2011 -Alert for fire In safety-related switchgear room* July 2011 -water reaches about 1006' 11l* July 2011 -public meeting on restart plan commitments
" August 2011 -NRC finalized a 'white' finding for inadequate actions to evaluate and fix aRPS coil -it was ultimately found failed in unsafe condition,
" August 2011 -CAL issued containing restart commitments (flood related)* September 2011 -FCS oversight move to Column IV (a repetitive degradedcornerstone)
-facility considered safe to operate -licensee plans to complete theirpreparations for 95003 inspection after startup" September 2011 -water <1004'" September 2011(b)(5)*-,~* December 2011 -MC 0350 oversight applied.
MC 0350 aimed to handle situations where multiplelsignificant examples of frontline equipment degradation andlor asignificant operational event have substantially reduced safety margins or havethe potential to Indicate a substantial reduction in safety margins.-r.,r Ft Calhoun Oversight
-CGnsitive rre-61onulFbr1,0 February 14, 2012Analysis:
The August 2011 CAL addressed actions to Inspect, test, and resolve system, structure orcomponent issues resulting from the site grade level being underwater for 60+ days.Column IV of action matrix addresses site-wide performance Issues, but the facility isconsidered safe to operate.
The site's original strategy to do their 95003 preps after startupwas viable, but in essence meant that their site-wide assessment of identifying andaddressing the causes of the she-wide performance issue was not going to happen untilafter startup.In MC 0350, this strategy is no longer viable.MC 0350 aimed to handle situations where multiple/significant examples of frontline equipment degradation and/or a significant operational event have substantially reducedsafety margins or have the potential to indicate a substantial reduction in safety margins.Both exist at Ft. Calhoun.Also, MC 0350 gives the flexibility to formulate inspection/assessment mechanisms for longperiods of shutdown where performance indicators are not valid and the baseline inspection program cannot be completed.
The icensee has two significant cause evaluations underway:
: 1) Corrective Action Program'broke' and 2) Lack of Organizational Effectiveness (need to confirm the problemstatements).
#1 and #2 combined with multiple/significant examples of frontline safety equipment degradation dictate the need to 3) determine, before plant restart, the causes (called keyattributes in IP 95003), extent of causes, and extent of the degradation of structures,
: systems, and components; and, how the issues have or will be addressed.
NRC will use the results of #3 are needed to inform the restart checklist.
Ultimately we planto revise the CAL that is in place to include items from restart check list.NRC is Interacting with site leadership to understand how actions will accomplish
#3.5)Consider the oversight/governance employed to ensure Board Is meaningfully apprised ofrelevant site performance issues.
Fi Calhoun Oversight
-_senlive re- ec aionaiFebruary 14,2012Key Points for OPPD Board of Directors Good morning.
My name is Bill Borchardt.
I am the Executive Director for Operations for theNuclear Regulatory Commission.
With me is Elmo Collins, whom some of you have met, the Regional Administrator for NRCRegion IV.Thank you for taking the time to talk to us about NRC's assessment of the safety performance of Ft. Calhoun Station.The purpose of our requesting this meeting Is to ensure, by communicating at all levels of theOPPO organization that the Issues are understood and the commitment and resources toresolve the issues are being applied.Most recently on December, 13, 2011, we communicated to you that we had placed Ft. CalhounStation Into a special category of NRC's inspection and assessment processes, described In ourInspection Manual Chapter 0350, and one that Is designed to provide for Increased verification of safety for situations where a nuclear power plant is shutdown for an extended period of timefor performance issues stemming from a significant operational event.Specifically, Ft. Calhoun Station was shutdown in April 2011 for a refueling outage. The stationremained shut down when high levels of Missouri River water covered the site grade level for anextended period of time, and remains shutdown today.On June 7, a fire had occurred in safety-related electrical switchgear that impacted both trains ofsafety-related equipments.
Subsequently, Ft. Calhoun Station review and NRC inspection determined that cause for the fire traced its roots back to a design modification that had beenperformed about two years ago, This modification introduced an unreliable configuration andthe potential for high electrical resistance connections on 12 safety-related breakers.
Preliminary evaluations show that this configuration combined with poor maintenance practices caused the failure and that this event and configuration were risk significant.
To put this special category of NRC oversight into perspective, NRC has not needed to use It foralmost a decade.Accordingly, we are meeting with you to ensure that you have full recognition of the issues thatneed to be resolved, their significance, and that you understand the substantial level of supportand commitment that will be needed from the Board of Directors to resolve these problems.
FtCalhoun Oversight
-SenmttuLm-ErfDecisional-February 14, 2012Ft Calhoun Station performance has reached the point that a thorough, comprehensive reviewof site equipment performance and organizational effectiveness must be completed before plantrestart is warranted.
The most relevant Items for safety from this review will need to be resolved prior to plant restart.These items will be included in a modified NRC Confirmatory Action Letter and form what wecall the 'restart" checklist, NRC will inspect these items before plant restart.The results of the equipment and organizational reviews will also Inform your long-term, Integrated performance Improvement plan/business plan.Where Is Ft. Calhoun today? This comprehensive review has not been done and an integrated plan Is currently being developed, putting us at the very front end of developing the restartchecklist.
Accordingly, NRC will continue to meet with station managers to understand the scope of theintegrated plans and the results of the review when completed and incorporate the appropriate items into the *restarr checklist.
The NRC emphasizes that:# These problems did not emerge quickly and will not be quickly resolved.
A significant amount of work has yet to be completed to determine the extent of problems, and extentof causes of problems.
As a result, there is a high amount of uncertainty surrounding the level of effort/resources that will be needed to accomplish the needed actions.* The site is still In discovery.
Expect more performance Insights and more items needingcorrective action to be identified.
* It is Imperative that site reviews and actions be thorough,
: probing, and challenging.
Thepreliminary results from the flooding Inspection indicate that site preparation and actionsfell short in that it took NRC inspection to uncover a potential unanalyzed condition illustrating that the site still needs to consider the full range equipment and actions toprotect the facility to its licensing basis 1014 feet.@ Your ultimate goal needs to be to establish a long term, sustainable high level of safetyperformance at Ft. Calhoun Station.We welcome your comments and we will elaborate on any of our comments as needed.
Narrative
-Commission Meeting Ft. Calhoun Station -February 22, 2012Thank you Bill. Mr. Chairman, NRC Commissioners, good morning.Slide 4This morning I plan to briefly recap the sequence of events and regulatory actions with respectto Ft. Calhoun Station that have preceded this meeting and summarize Ft. Calhoun Station's safety performance.
Slide 5 -there were several important actions preceding the CAL that are important In 2010, NRC finalized a finding of 'yellow" significance for an inadequate strategy for protecting the facility to the licensing basis of 1014 feet.In 2011 the licensee was doing the review and corrective action necessary for NRC to conductthe 95002 Inspection.
Twice the inspection was scheduled, and twice the licensee reported thattheir self-assessments showed that they were not yet ready. Finally the 95002 Inspection wasscheduled for June 2012.In May 2012 however, the licensee and the NRC learned that release rates from the upstreamdams in the Missouri River system were going to reach unprecedented levels, raising the waterat Ft. Calhoun Station.On June 6, the licensee declared an Unusual Event as waters reached the grade level of 1004feet Note that on June 7, the licensee declared an alert for a fire In safety-related 480 voltswitchgear.
Later that day the licensee secured from the alert.In advance of the rising waters, the licensee took substantial actions to protect the facility, including a number of actions that had been formulated in response to the "yellow" floodprotection findingRegion IV also responded, providing 24/7 onslte coverage, with inspector assistance from theother three regions during the emergency response period.With the station and NRC in emergency
: response, and with Missouri River levels rising to abovesite grade, NRC deferred the 95002 Inspection.
By this time, the site had already entered intothe 50 calendar quarter with a degraded cornerstone.
The Missouri River reached a peak level of 1006' 11' in July 2012.
rin late July and August, the licensee formulated a plan to recover the site from the high waterlevels. This plan was submitted to NRC and key items from this plan were formalized ascommitments in a confirmatory action letter In August 2012.During the same period of time, NRC finalized another white finding associated with the reactorprotection system. Combined with the previous "yellow*
: finding, In September 2012 the NRCassessed Ft. Calhoun Station's safety performance as needing the highest level of oversight called for by the reactor oversight
: process, Column IV. Accordingly, Region IV added a branchto the Division of Reactor Projects to provide specific oversight for Ft. Calhoun Station.Once the Missouri River receded and the licensee exited emergency response modes, NRCinitiated an onsite review of the June 7 fire. NRC found performance deficiencies during thisinspection, and while NRC's inspection report is in final draft and the final significance has yet tobe determined, NRC has concluded that this fire was a significant operational event.Beginning in October, with the facility shutdown for over 6 months, NRC's normal Pis losingtheir efficacy and an inability to meaningfully complete the baseline inspecion
: program, NRCevaluated Ft. Calhoun station performance, and existing guidance to determine the appropriate level of NRC inspection and engagement Already in Column IV, Manuel Chapters 0350 and0351 were considered.
In December 2012, Region IV determined, In consultation with the Director of the Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation and the Executive Director for Operations, that Manual Chapter0350 entry criteria were met and that this level of regulatory oversight and engagement wasappropriate to provide added verification of safety of the facility prior to plant restart.
This NRCdecision was communicated in a December 13, 2012 letter to the licensee.
Of))r Murphy, MartinFrom: Murphy, MartinSent: Friday, March 09, 2012 2:52 PMTo: Uribe, Juan
==Subject:==
RE: Emailing:
Fort Calhoun Station Timeline of Events.docx This is great.I have to read the GL and response before I would want to talk---Original Message--
From: Uribe, JuanSent: Friday, March 09, 2012 2:44 PMTo: Murphy, Martin
==Subject:==
RE: Emailing:
Fort Calhoun Station Timeline of Events.docx As stated in the USAR, the 1009.3' msl (not 1009.5'msl) is the probable maximum flood (pmf) resulting fromthe runoff from a maximum probable rain storm over the area below Gavins Point dam, which is the first damupstream of FCS. Failure of Fort Randall dam (2nd upstream)
OR Oahe dam (4th upstream) has beenanalyzed by USACE and determined to be 1014' msl. Keep in mind FCS does not consider credible the failureof either dam.The 2003' msl data did not include dam failures.
The licensee was using the 1 000yr flood to correlate withprobable maximum flood, which is 1009.3 in the original design basis and determined the elevation to be theaforementioned 1010.5' msl.Consequently, they updated their external flood analysis in 2005 to reflect these analyses but to myknowledge, did nothing else. This is based on the premise that there is no actual requirement for them toupdate their FSAR on 3rd party info. The region, in terms of regulatory space, could not pursue a violation down this road and therefore ended up citing the failure of adequate procedures since 1967. It could be arguedthat if the licensee found this study as part on a license renewal effort, it was information sought on their behalfand therefore could fall under 50.71(e).
But the Region analyzed this and determined it wasn't the way to go.Hope this helps, keep in mind we can also talk to George Gerond today and he has the best insights into thisissue.----- Original Message---
From: Murphy, MartinSent: Friday, March 09, 2012 2:22 PMTo: Uribe, Juan
==Subject:==
RE: Emailing:
Fort Calhoun Station Timeline of Events.docx What is the FEMA information?
The last section states that there is a TS level of 1009.5. The design basis is 1014. Is this correct?
The 2003data was at 1010.5 -this exceeds the TS limit. What did they do?----- Original Message-From: Uribe, JuanSent: Friday, March 09, 2012 1:42 PMTo: Murphy, Martin
==Subject:==
FW: Emailing:
Fort Calhoun Station Timeline of Events.docx
./1 w/ comments from RIV inspector
---Original Message--
,From: George, Gerond jL \Sent: Friday, March 09, 2012 1:38 PMTo: Uribe, Juan
==Subject:==
Emailing:
Fort Calhoun Station Timeline of Events.docx With changesGerond A. GeorgeNRC Region IVR1 7 *7nn r~Rq"q, erondqeo
,pe&#xa2;Qnrc.gov 2
Fort Calhoun Station Timeline of Events1967" As part of licensing, FCS gets estimate of 1009'msl design basis flood level from USACE" It is determined that a dam failure is an incredibte event.* However, DB flood concurrent with dam failure is required by NRC" This is the 1014' msl DB flood level specified in USAR." This is the level that the procedures in place at FCS fail to adequately protect." This is the basis for the yellow finding and violation in 2010.1993* NRC issues GL 88-20. Specifically, supplement 4 asks licensees to look for externalevents and verify the inherent risk of these events to the site. It requests a systematic individual plant examination for severe accidents initiated by external events (IPEEE).* FCS obtains info from USACE as part of IPEEE to answer GL.
in GR 2002* USACE levels provided include dam failure and are stated to be 1029' msl.* FCS determines that, as stated in USAR, dam failure in NOT credible scenario andtherefore DB flood levels remain at 1014' msl.* IPEEE talke-about theuses 1993 flood data provided by USACE to determine eventfrequencies and risk* FIS ..I. A " SAR _an..g- in Janm-'r 2"082002-2003
__As part of LR efforts, FCS evaluates the FEMA information and 1993 USACEanalysis performed in 1993 to verify adequacy.
" A need to evaluate this information in entered into the CA Program.90ummmtedCondition Report-nC&#xfd;R 2002-1296 documents discrepancies between theUSAR flood levels, the FEMA. and USACE information.
* Licensee determined that design basis remained unchanged from this evaluation
* Licensee Identifies more recent information from USACE and documents it In separateCondition ReportGR 2003-2664
.A. need to c'Waluat.
thic info...t..n.in..ntgr.d into the CA pro..a FCS submits USARchanae in January 2008.---.--- Formatte
: tdent: Left 0.5', No bllets ornumbering 2004" Latest info is titled 2004 study 'Upper Mississippi River System Flow Frequency Study"* As action from CR 2003-2664, FCS PRA group evaluated the new information andcompleted new external flood analysis in August 2005." New flood elevations were 3' higher for each flooding frequency.
* When 2003 data was extrapolated to 1000 year flood frequency, it was found to be1010.5' msl. This was higher than original probable maximum flood and TS value of1009.5 msl.Sito it protGctod to 101A', mel.* ThUeofor;,
the site AS Still p~eterld.Result of the 2005 evaluation results in an action tochange the IPEEE and probatistic risk assessment.
No action was developed toevaluate the design basis,* Licensee did NOT develop corrective action plan to evaluate potential change to DB andoperating procedures.
* 2005 external flood analysis was NOT mentioned in USAR change done in January2008.
Robles, JesseFrom:Sent:
==Subject:==
King, Mark I &#xfd;LMonday, Aprl 3A2012 2:41 PMIOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Monday, April 30, 2012NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS"*'MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR INTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION**'
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSID NRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION F M ORIGINATOR Follow-up/Other Tasks: Eighteen (18)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help IOEBstaff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff.]Outside of ScopeI)6) LER 2852012001 ROO -FORT CALHOUN:
INADEQUATE FLOODING PROTECTION PROCEDURE.
See LER text. This issue was screened in as IFR 2011-01 earlier.
Pass to TRG Lead for Flood Protection (EdSmith) and SW/UHS (Gerard Purciarello).
Assigned to Jesse Robles.Outside of ScopeI Os-ryf-nre OF, sccp65edoos so Bpisino2 Cu-rstce oP' coiDutside of ScopeAttendees at Screening Meeting:Mark King -by phoneJesse Robles-by phoneBob Bernardo-by phoneEric Thomas- by phoneRuss HaskellJohn ThompsonMehdi Reisi-Fard (RES)- by phoneDoug Bollock (NRO) -by phone3 11-17Biggins, James ( /From: Mizuno, GearyO.-'L CSent: Thursday, May 10, 2012 2:20 PMTo: Matharu, Gurcharan Cc: Scott, Catherine;
: Safford, Carrie; Benowitz, Howard; Biggins, James; Jones, Bradley
==Subject:==
RE: Fort CalhounU(b)(5),-, ...... '10...GearyFrom: Matharu, Gurcharan Sent: Thursday, May 10, 2012 7:21 AMTo: Mizuno, Geary
==Subject:==
RE: Fort CalhounOK thanks,It seems that the licensee gave us 'inadequate information when the application to change the wording as per STSwas submitted.
SinghFrom: Mizuno, GearySent: Wednesday, May 09, 2012 5:33 PMTo: Matharu, Gurcharan
==Subject:==
RE: Fort Calhoun/-I(b)(5)From: Matharu, Gurcharan
\'"Sent: Wednesday, May 09, 2012 5:18 PMTo: Mizuno, Geary
==Subject:==
Fort CalhounGeary,Fort Calhoun is currently shutdown and have been liberally removing BOTH their EDGs out of service as they claimthat the TS allows operation of RHR with offsite power alone when the RCS is below 300F.The attached SE made subtle changes in their TS that allows them to operate in this manner.What would it take for us to retract this change?SinghI2S NRR -@DECommunity Page I of 51earc.h I How to Subscribe ILoin'Conlmnual Leprivng Through K'nowledge Briaring3une 19, 2012OE Homr > Forum > All Communications Information Security ReminderInformation Security Reminder:
OpE COMMs contain preliminary Information In the Interest of timely internal communication of operating experience.
OpE COMMs may be pre-decisional and may contain sensitive Information.
They are not intended for distribution outside the agency.Page: 13qsse Robles (2/6/2012 9:Z6.56 am)o,,,..dtn 1.? 1 :05:39 emTFORT CALHOUN -NOUE DECLARED DUE TO HIGH RIVER LEVELS AND ALERT DECLARED DUE TO FIREIN SWITCHGEAR ROOM ISSUES -SITE PLACED UNDER IMC 0350 OVERSIGHT SummaryOn June 6, 2011, while shutdown for a refueling outage, elevated river levels prompted Fort Calhoun to declarea Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE). On June 7 while still in the NOUE, an Alert was declared due toevidence of a possible fire in a switchgear room. Due to the previous significant performance issues in additionto these events, Fort Calhoun Station was placed under IMC 0350 -"Oversight of Reactor Facilities In aShutdown Condition Due to Significant Performance and/or Operational Concerns."
The switchgear room fireissue was subsequently determined to be a finding of high safety significance (a RED finding).
Event Description See Public Webpaqe on Special NRC Oversight at Fort Calhoun Station and FCS Oversight SharePoint Website.Outside of ScopeFort Calhoun Station (FCS) had entered a scheduled refueling outage on April 9, 2011. When indications ofimminent flooding were received, the site entered Abnormal Operating Procedure 1 (AOP-1),
Acts of Nature, onMay 22, 2011 and commenced preparation for the rising river level. The site began sandbagging procedures andinstallation of flood gates to protect the site up to 1007 feet river level. Site staff staged materials to supportflood protection up to 1014 feet, and installed an AquaDam/aqua-berm (design is similar to a large inner tubefilled with water, see AquaDam website) to protect the entire protected area (with exception of the Intakestructure) up to 1012 feet of river level. A NOUE was declared on June 6, 2011 due to the river level expectedto exceed the 1004 feet NOUE threshold (see EN 46929, and PNO-]V- 1]-003).http://nrrIO.nrc.gov/fonnm/tbrumtopic.cfm?selectedForuMI Outsiade of p;cope1 6/19/7012 NRR -@OECommunity IPage 2 of 5Fort Calhoun Arnal Picture of FloodingThe NRC Operating Experience Branch'gave a presentation at an International conference regarding the FortCalhoun flooding event response which includes more photographs of the site and Includes lessons learned andother insights.
See slides.Fire EventOn June 7, 2011, while the plant was In Mode 5 and the site was in a NOUE due to the high river level, firealarms were received In the control room and the Halon system discharged for the Bus 184A switchgear room.A safety related 480 volt AC load center supply breaker had failed. The fire brigade responded to the alarm andfound the room filled with smoke, but no active fire, During the event, both trains of class 1E Direct Current(DC) grounded due to extensive damage inside cubicle 1B4A, which resulted In numerous control room alarmsthat are fed from the DC circuits.
At 0930 CDT electrical buses were de-energized to aid In mitigating damage.This resulted in both trains of spent fuel pool cooling to be de-energized.
At 0940 CDT the site declared an Alertdue to a fire affecting the operability of plant safety systems required to establish of maintain safe shutdown(see EN 46932 and PNO-IV-11-004).
During the event, the local fire department responded to the site, At 1147CDT, power was restored to one train of spent fuel pool cooling.
The spent fuel pool temperature roseapproximately 3 degrees Fahrenheit while cooling was out of service.
Shutdown cooling was not affected andremained in service during the event. The site exited the Alert at 1313 CDT after confirming that the fire wasextinguished and the area was ventilated to restore access. At 1056 EDT, the NRC entered the Monitoring Modeas a result of the event, and exited at 1439 EDT after SFP cooling was restored (see P_-O.N1V-.Q
.), An fl8.3 evaluation was performed for this event, and a Special Inspection Team was dispatched to the site.UPDATE: On April 10, 2012 press release IV-12-012 was issued: NRC ISSUES FORT CALHOUN STATIONINSPECTION FINDING OF HIGH SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE (Red Finding].
See Enforcement Action notification (EA12-023).Failure of the Aqua BermOutside of Scopehttp://nrr I 0.nrc.gov/forum/forumtopic.cfm.?selectcdForum!
Outside of Scope6119/2012 NRR o SECommunityo Page 3 of 5Outside of ScopeL.Cause of the Breaker FailureThe original 1B4A supply breaker (model General Electric (GE) AK-50) had been replaced with a Square Dbreaker in 2009 due to aging Issues and a lack of available spare parts (a total of twelve breakers were replacedat that time). These were not a direct replacement for the GE breaker; therefore a cradle assembly was used tomatch up the Square D equipment with the GE switchgear.
The cradle consists of finger clusters that engage thebus bars at the back of the GE swltchgear, and had stabs on the circuit breaker side of the cradle to accept thebreaker finger clusters.
The circuit breaker cradle fingers were longer than the original AK-50 breakers, andthey engaged the bus bar in a contact area of hardened grease and copper oxide build-up, This caused a highresistance connection at the stab to finger Interface.
The high resistance connection overheated the fingercluster resulting in bus grounding and phase-to-phase shorting.
Other contributing causes to failure of the breaker Included-9 An acrid odor that existed for three days preceding the bus fire was not adequately communicated toengineering, maintenance, or management.
FCS engineering had limited knowledge of GE AKD-5 switchgear resulting in overreliance on vendorknowledge and skill.* An FCS modification procedure lacks requirements to Identify and compare critical design characteristics of equipment being modified.
Additionally, this procedure has weak requirements for the use of operating experience criteria.
* Maintenance procedures that govern 480 V bus cleaning are Inadequate.
Also, access to the bus side ofthe GE AKD-5 switchgear is difficult limiting the selection of Inspection/testing methods.* As-left resistance readings from the line to load side of the switchgear following circuit breakerreplacement were not confirmed.
See 1-ER 285201 lO08R0l for more information on the failure of supply breaker 1B4A.Previous Performance Issues and Transition into IMC 0350http://nrr I O.nrc.gov/forum/forumtopic.cfm?selectedForumr Outside of Scope1 6/19012 NRR -@OECommunity Page 4 of 5Fort Calhoun Station's has had several performance issues In recent years that have resulted in increased NRCoversight.
These issues are described below." On October 6, 2010, the NRC issued a Yellow Finding (substantial safety significance) to Fort CalhounStation due to Inadequate flood protection strategies.
This finding Is the subject of OpE Issue forResolution (IFR) 2011-001 and associated ODE COMM." On July 18, 2011, The NRC Issued a White Findinq (low to moderate safety significance) to Fort Calhounfor the failure to preclude shading coils from repetitively becoming loose material In the M2 reactor tripcontactor.
The loose parts In the trip contactor can become an obstruction and cause the failure of thecontactor.
This issue was Included in the OpE COMM Contribution of Corrective Action ProgramDeficiencies to GMeater-than-Green Inspection Findinas and IFR 2011- 01 due to the repetitive nature ofthe condition.
* Fort Calhoun Station transitloned to Column IV of the Reactor Oversight Process CROP) Action Matrix inSeptember 2011 due to the Mitigating Systems cornerstone being degraded for more than fourconsecutive quarters (due to the Yellow Finding),
with an additional input to the action matrix (due to theWhite Finding).
See the Mid-Cycle Performance Review.Restart of the facility has been delayed by performance concerns Involving electrical fire and inadequate trainseparation, in addition to flood recovery.
Following the plant shutdown, additional performance issues wereIdentified that required additional NRC oversight, including:
v Incomplete high energy line break and environmental qualification analyses.
" The breaker failure and fire described above." Inadequate communications with state and local officials following the declaration of an ALERT following the fire event.The NRC issued Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 4-11-003 (ML1.12490164) on September 2, 2011 to confirmthe actions FCS planned to take In Its submitted Post-Flooding Recovery Action Plan (ML112430102).
Due to these past performance issues in addition to the flood and fire events, Fort Calhoun was placed in IC0350, "Oversight of Reactor Facilities in a Shutdown Condition Due to Significant Performance and/orOperational Concerns" (see Notification of Chanqe to Regulatory Oversight of Fort Calhoun Station(ML1 13470721) and Fort Calhoun IMC 0350 Charter (ML120120661.)),
Operating Experience Flooding IssuesIN 87-49 -Deficiencies in Outside Containment Flooding Protection IN 94-27 -Facility Operating Concerns Resulting from Local Area Floodinginspection Procedure 71111.06
-Flood Protection Measures-Breaker IssuesOutside of Scopehtip://nrrIO.nrc.gov/forum/forumtopic.ctm?selecledForumutsieo pe 6/19/2012 L
NRR -@OECoemunily Page 5 of 5Outside of Scope3'Fr questions or concerns related to this OpE COMM, contact Jesse Robles (jesse.roblesienre.mov),
Os 1-415-2940.
Outside of Scope,-IPage: 1http://nrrl O.nrc.gov/forumnforumtopic.cfm?selectedFonm
&deg; Outside of Scopet! 6/19/2012
.-j Boyer, RachelFrom: Collins, ElmoSent: Tuesday, November 01, 2011 8:59 AMTo: Rnrrhnr~l RillCc: I(b)(5)
==Subject:==
Ft CalhounBill(b)(5)(C --(.~ y~ *~~1I NRl -@OECommunity Page I of 51N-Search I How to Subscribe I IgginCon0nual Leariomng Through Ktnowledge BharinJune 19, 2012OE Home > Forum > All Communications Information Security ReminderInformation Security Reminder:
OpE COMMs contain preliminary Information in the interest of timely internal communication of operating experience.
OpE COMMs may be pre-decisional and may contain sensitive Information.
They are not Intended for distribution outside the agency.Page: 1Jesse Robles (2/6/2012 9:26:56 am)Rov.,w.'iond,/I9,'2t912 11:05:3)9 amFORT CALHOUN -NOUE DECLARED DUE TO HIGH RIVER LEVELS AND ALERT DECLARED DUE TO FIREIN SWITCHGEAR ROOM ISSUES -SITE PLACED UNDER IMC 0350 OVERSIGHT SummaryOn June 6, 2011, while shutdown for a refueling outage, elevated river levels prompted Fort Calhoun to declarea Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE). On June 7 while still in the NOUE, an Alert was declared due toevidence of a possible fire In a switchgear room. Due to the previous significant performance issues in additionto these events, Fort Calhoun Station was placed under IMC 0350 -"Oversight of Reactor Facilities in aShutdown Condition Due to Significant Performance and/or Operational Concerns."
The switchgear room fireIssue was subsequently determined to be a finding of high safety significance (a RED finding).
Event Description See Public WebPaqe on Special NRC Oversight at Fort Calhoun Station and FCS Oversiqht SharePoint Website.Outside of ScopeFFort Calhoun Station (FCS) had entered a scheduled refueling outage on April 9, 2011. When Indications ofimminent flooding were received, the site entered Abnormal Operating Procedure 1 (AOP-1),
Acts of Nature, onMay 22, 2011 and commenced preparation for the rising river level. The site began sandbagging procedures andInstallation of flood gates to protect the site up to 1007 feet river level. Site staff staged materials to supportflood protection up to 1014 feet, and Installed an AquaDam/aqua-berm (design is similar to a large inner tubefilled with water, see ApuaDarn website) to protect the entire protected area (with exception of the intakestructure) up to 1012 feet of river level. A NOUE was declared on June 6, 2011 due to the river level expectedto exceed the 1004 feet NOLJE threshold (see EN 46929, and PNO-]V-11-003),
http://nrr IO.nrc.gov/forum/ftrumtopic.ciim?selectedFonumi uutsicie ot bcope 6 921 6/19/2012 NRR. -OECommunityPae2o Page 2 of 5Fort Calhoun Arial Picture of floodingThe NRC Operating Experience Branch gave a presentation at an international conference regarding the FortCalhoun flooding event response which includes more photographs of the site and Includes lessons learned andother insights.
See slides.Fire EventOn June 7, 2011, while the plant was In Mode 5 and the site was In a NOUE due to the high river level, firealarms were received In the control room and the Halon system discharged for the Bus 1B4A switchgear room.A safety related 480 volt AC load center supply breaker had failed. The fire brigade responded to the alarm andfound the room filled with smoke, but no active fire. During the event, both trains of class 1E Direct Current(DC) grounded due to extensive damage inside cubicle 1B4A, which resulted In numerous control room alarmsthat are fed from the DC circuits.
At 0930 CDT electrical buses were de-energized to aid In mitigating damage.This resulted in both trains of spent fuel pool cooling to be de-energized.
At 0940 CDT the site declared an Alertdue to a fire affecting the operability of plant safety systems required to establish of maintain safe shutdown(see EN 46932 and PNO-IV-11-004).
During the event, the local fire department responded to the site. At 1147CDT, power was restored to one train of spent fuel pool cooling.
The spent fuel pool temperature roseapproximately 3 degrees Fahrenheit while cooling was out of service.
Shutdown cooling was not affected andremained in service during the event. The site exited the Alert at 1313 CDT after confirming that the fire wasextinguished and the area was ventilated to restore access. At 1056 EDT, the NRC entered the Monitoring Modeas a result of the event, and exited at 1439 EDT after SFP cooling was restored (see PNO.IV-II-.Q.4A).
An MD8.3 evaluation was performed for this event, and a Soecial InsoectionTeam was dispatched to the site.UPDATE: On April 10, 2012 press release IV-.2-01t2 was issued: NRC ISSUES FORT CALHOUN STATIONINSPECTION FINDING OF HIGH SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
[Red Finding].
See Enforcement Action notification (EAFailure of the Aqua BermSOutside of Scopehttp://nrrf0.nrc.gov/forum/forumtopic.cfm?selectedForum1 rai1__ 6/19/2012 NRR -@S ECommunity Page 3 of 5Outside of ScopeThe original 154A supply breaker (model General Electric (GE) AK-50) had been replaced with a Square 0breaker In 2009 due to aging Issues and a lack of available spare parts (a total of twelve breakers were replacedat that time), These were not a direct replacement for the GE breaker; therefore a cradle assembly was used tomatch up the Square D equipment with the GE switchgear.
The cradle consists of finger clusters that engage thebus bars at the back of the GE swltchgear, and had stabs on the circuit breaker side of the cradle to accept thebreaker finger clusters.
The circuit breaker cradle fingers were longer than the original AK-50 breakers, andthey engaged the bus bar in a contact area of hardened grease and copper oxide build-up.
This caused a highresistance connection at the stab to finger Interface.
The high resistance connection overheated the fingercluster resulting In bus grounding and phase-to-phase shorting.
Other contributing causes to failure of the breaker Included:
@ An acrid odor that existed for three days preceding the bus fire was not adequately communicated toengineering, maintenance, or management.
* FCS engineering had limited knowledge of GE AKD-5 switchgear resulting in overreliance on vendorknowledge and skill,@ An FCS modification procedure lacks requirements to identify and compare critical design characteristics of equipment being modified.
Additionally, this procedure has weak requirements for the use of operating experience criteria.
v Maintenance procedures that govern 480 V bus cleaning are Inadequate.
Also, access to the bus side ofthe GE AKD-5 switchgear Is difficult limiting the selection of Inspection/testing methods.* As-left resistance readings from the line to load side of the switchgear following circuit breakerreplacement were not confirmed.
See LER 285201 1008R01 for more information on the failure of supply breaker 154A.Previous Performance Issues and Transition Into INC 0350'p/n ng/omouoicme e oum ofhttp://nrrlO'.nrc'govlforum/forumtopic'cfm~seiectedForum]Otsd ofScpe' 6/19/2012 NRR -@OECommunity Page 4 of" 5Fort Calhoun Station's has had several performance Issues in recent years that have resulted in increased NRCoversight.
These issues are described below.* On October 6, 2010, the NRC issued a Yellow Finding (substantial safety significance) to Fort CalhounStation due to Inadequate flood protection strategies.
This finding Is the subject of OpE Issue forResolution (IFR) 2011-001 and associated OpE COMM." On July 18, 2011, The NRC Issued a White Finding (low to moderate safety significance) to Fort Calhounfor the failure to preclude shading coils from repetitively.
becoming loose material In the M2 reactor tripcontactor.
The loose parts In the trip contactor can become an obstruction and cause the failure of thecontactor.
This Issue was Included In the OpE COMM Contribution of Corrective Action ProgramDeficiencies to Greater-than-Green Inspection Findings and ]FR 2011- 010 due to the repetitive nature ofthe condition.
" Fort Calhoun Station transitloned to Column IV of the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) Action Matrix inSeptember 2011 due to the Mitigating Systems cornerstone being degraded for more than fourconsecutive quarters (due to the Yellow Finding),
with an additional input to the action matrix (due to theWhite finding).
See the Mid-Cycle Performance Review.Restart of the facility has been delayed by performance concerns Involving electrical fire and inadequate trainseparation, in addition to flood recovery.
Following the plant shutdown, additional performance Issues wereidentified that required additional NRC oversight, Including:
" Incomplete high energy line break and environmental qualification
: analyses,
" The breaker failure and fire described above." Inadequate communications with state and local officials following the declaration of an ALERT following the fire event.The NRC Issued Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 4-11-003 (MLt 1242Q164) on September 2, 2011 to confirmthe actions FCS planned to take in its submitted Post-Flooding Recovery Action Plan (ML1 12430102).
Due to these past performance Issues in addition to the flood and fire events, Fort Calhoun was placed in Imc0350, "Oversight of Reactor Facilities in a Shutdown Condition Due to Significant Performance and/orOperational Concerns" (see Notification of Changg to Regulatory Oversight of Fort Calhoun Station(ML1 13470721) and Fort Calhoun JMg 0350 Charter (ML120120661.)).
Operating Experience Flooding IssuesIN 87-49 -Deficiencies in Outside Containment Flooding Protection IN 94-27 -Facility Operating Concerns Resulting from Local Area Flooding Procedure 71111.06
-Flood Protection MeasuresOutside of Scopehttp://mrrl 0.nrn.gov/forum/forumtopic.cfm?selectedForurnl utside o P 6cope1 6/19/2012 NRR -@OECopneunily Page 5 of 5Outside of Scope[For questlons or concerns related to this OpE COMM, contact 3esso Robles (lesse.robles@nrc.gov),
1-.1415-2940, Outside of ScopeJ '- )Page: 1.. .. .. "'%, ,http://nffO.nrc.gov/fonm/forumtopic.cfm?selectedFor Outside of Scopei 6/19/2012 NRR -@OECommunity Page j of 3mmContinual Learning Through Knowledge Sharin"Search I How to Subscribe I 191_1n June 20, 2012QE Home > Forum > New ReactorsInformation Security ReminderInformation Security Reminder:
OpE COMWs contain preliminary information in the interest of timely internal communication of operating experience.
OpE COMMs may be pre-decislonal and may contain sensitive information.
They are not intended for distribution outside the agency.Page: 1Jay Patel (5/2/2011 12:29:43 pm)Revised on 4/19/2012 1:23:41 pmINADEQUATE DESIGN CHANGE IMPLEMENTATION INVOLVING ABANDONED IN PLACE EQUIPMENT Summary:This COMM intends to raise awareness of underlying issues associated with two recent events caused byinadequate design change Implementation Involving abandoned in place equipment.
The two events highlight the Importance of properly performing and implementing design change packages associated with abandoned inplace systems, structures, and components (SSCs)...
Discussion:
outside of ScopeThe second event, reported by the Fort Calhoun Station on February 27, 2011, identified unsealed through wallpenetrations in the intake structure that were below the licensing basis flood elevation.
These penetrations hadbeen installed during the original installation of the plant security system and were abandoned when thesecurity system was replaced In 1985. The penetrations for the new security system were sealed, however, thehttp://nrrl 0.nrc.gov/forumlforumtopic.cfm?selectedForum=03&forumld=NEWREACTORS&topicld=3381 6/20/2012 NRR -@OECommunity Page 2 of 3old penetrations were abandoned in place and never sealed, thus making the intake structure vulnerable towater inflow during an extreme flooding event. The unsealed penetrations could have Jeopardized the ability ofthe raw water pumps (located In the intake structure) to perform their design basis function during an accident.
A configuration change was later developed and permanent seals were installed In the subject conduitpenetrations.
The cause of the event pertinent to this COMM was an inadequate design change process that did not requireabandoned in place penetrations below the flood line to be sealed thus invalidating design assumptions andplacing the plant In an unanalyzed condition.
Construction Experience Insights:
The following valuable Insights can help avoid latent problems during the design and construction of nuclearfacilities similar to the ones caused by these two events:1. Engineering changes made to one system should not adversely affect other safety systems or Invalidate design assumptions.
Refer to IP 35007, Section A3.04.01, Item D for guidance.
: 2. The applicant/licensee work control process and inspection program should verify that the as-builtconfiguration in the field is consistent with design requirements.
Refer to Criterion V and X of 10 CFR 50,Appendix B. In addition, IP 65001.A, Section 02.01 and IP 37051, Section 02.01 provide specific relatedguidance for the construction of 10 CFR Part 52 plants and 10 CFR Part 50 plants respectively.
Existing Reactors Insiahts:
To avoid latent problems associated with inadequate design changes or abandoned in place equipment reviewsfor existing facilities, various Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) inspection procedures such as: IP 71111.18"Plant Modifications,"
IP 71111.21 "Component Design Bases Inspection,"
or IP 71152 "Problem Identification and Resolution" are in place to provide the necessary guidance.
Inspectors should be aware of the type ofissues described in this COMM and look to Identify them during their plant walkdowns and follow-up asnecessary during their normal Inspection reviews,Selected Related Information:
Outside of Scopehttp://nrr]O.nrc.gov/forum/forumtopic
.cfm?selectedForum=03&forumId=NE WREACTORS&topicld=33 81 6/120/2012 NRR -@OECommunity Page 3 of 3Outside of Scope*****Update 10/21/11*****
: 8) FORT CALHOUN -FLOOD BARRIER PENETRATIONS NOT WATER TIGHT (EN 47359). During follow-up inspections of flood barrier penetrations, it was determined some of the water tight conduit fittings were notfilled with the material required to make them water tight.*****Update 11/08/11*****
Outside of ScopePage: 1http://nrrl O.nrc.gov/forumlforumtopic.cfm?selectedForum=03&forumld=NEWREACTORS&topicld=3381 6/20/2012 SECTION 2.0.'&#xfd;dITE HIS'TORY F FSC N AND (LOND' kiNAN,a ,.',,'.'
Page 2-1Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition*
Rev. 22.0 SITE HISTORY, DESCRIPTION, AND BASELINE CONDITION 2.1 Geologic SettingThe surficial geology of the FCS site consists primarily of Missouri River alluvium deposited duringthe Holocene Epoch after Late Pleistocene, Wisconsin glaciation (Miller, 1964.). Because it is thoughtthat the Missouri River did not occupy its current position during the Wisconsin glaciation (Miller,1964), a sequence of erosion of the Missouri River channel and deposition of the present Holocenealluvium is the sequence that has developed the current site stratigraphy.
Post Wisconsin glacial event(Late Pleistocene) to Holocene alluvium overlies the Wintersel.
Member of the Dennis Formation Limestone of the Pennsylvanian Kansas City Group at the site. Glacial and alluvial deposits ofQuaternary Age (less than 1.6 million years) are less than 100 fl:tbiok at'the site but vayE,:rom 300 toless than 100 ft thick within a 5-mile radius of the site (Burchette, et4aL,1975).
Limestoine of theKansas City Group is described as dark gray to light gray, very thpily bedded to massive, argillaceous, fossiliferous, and containing some pyrite crystals and mica (Burcheitte, dal,, 1975). Bedrocki.
otexposed at the site. A more specific description of soil and bedrock conditioins at the site is pr'esented in Section 2.4, Geotechnical Baseline Condition.
Regional geologic structure includes a gentle dip of bedrock bedcg&i:'othe west (Me ee, 2003).Faults within a 100-mile radius of the site are limited to basem. structures such as the Nemaha FaultZone, do not offset Pennsylvanian strata, and are not recognizd..:as active (McBee, 2003).2.1.1 Historical Seismicity HDR conducted an inventory of reef" U-.istorical sts ttccurred at a magnitude of2.0 or greater within 100 miles of F location of eaem;,ts magnitude, and its distancefrom the site are shown 2-1.
of the istorical seismicity was conducted using the Advanced ic System (ANSS) at http://www.ncedc.org/anss/catalog-search.htp4l.o;he ANSS is a wo!de earthquake catalog created by merging the master earthquake catalogs ot.the contributing ANSA Ginber network and can be queried by geographic location.
Table 2-1 -Historical SJ icity Within 100 Miles of Fort Calhoun StationLatitude
: Longitude Distance from(decimal
,i-'i, (decimal Magnitude Site-d.. degrees)
(kilometers) 4 1. 0,:,, -97.00 5.0 991902 ..,. 42 ., -97.60 4.5 1401935 -96.20 4.7 1361981 .:4.-iJ-20
-97.630 2.7 1321995 ,40.51 -94.95 3.1 1451997 41.79 -97.18 3.4 1002004 40.63 -95.55..
3.5 .1062009 40.41 -95.86 3.6 1242010 41.35 -97.01 3.3 83Source: U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). October 26, 2009. "2008 National Seismic Hazard Maps -Fault Parameters."
Earthquake Hazards Program.
Retrieved September 20, 2011.http://geohazards.usgs.gov/cfusion/hazfaultssearch/hf_searchmain.cfm.
Page 2-2Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.1.2. Regional Seismicity and FaultingFCS is located within the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) as delineated by the U.S.Geological Survey (USGS) (Crone and Wheeler, 2000). The CEUS experiences minimal seismicactivity with the exception of specific zones such as the New Madrid Seismic Zone and Mears FaultZone not located in proximity to FCS (Petersen et al., 2008). In conjunction with many local and stateagencies, USGS maintains a database of Quaternary faults for the U.S. (USGS, October 26, 2009).These include known faults that are estimated to have undergone movemenitin the past 1.6 millionyears (within the Quaternary Period),
or since late Cenozoic A" fil1ass Bifaulli.
Active faultsgenerally include Holocene Age faults that have undergone mo1- i.ent in the past- 5,000 years. Forthis study, the database was searched for all fault classification&#xfd;.s B, C, and D). 'Th.USGS faultclassifications are as follows:* Class A -Geologic evidence demonstrates the existence of a Qwufatiary fault (within the@past1.6 million years) of tectonic origin." Class B -Geologic evidence demonstrates the existence
.Q~fQuaternary deformation, but either1) the fault might not extend deeply enough to be a ,lOi~e t rce of signi earthquakes, or2) the currently available geologic evidence is toostrofig to dently assign the feature toClass C but not strong enough to assign it to Class A.* Class C -Geologic evidence is insufficient to demonstrate.
ijthe existence of tectonic
: faulting, or2) Quaternary slip or deformation associated with the feai.ie." Class D -Geologic evidence demonrq..te thai the feat&'#his not a teot onic fault or feature; this.category includes features such as j_`i#Is landslides, erd&bnal or fluvial scarps, or other landforms resembling fault scarps but of "o , -able non-tectoirigim.
,Y.No Class A or B fault.exis8..4within a 4DI0.Ile radius of FC&#xfd;S! losest Class A or B fault is theCheraw fault,wi
'0- the so itwest i southeastern Colorado.
The closest fault systemis the Ord ed&1r*ient, 9,ximateiy 15"miles west of FCS. This fault system is a Class C associated w~it 'h aic procesi,#pd was determined by Machette et al. (1998) asnot Quaternary movem'en:-e USGS-d "ase contains no Class D faults within a400diil&#xfd; radius of FCS. %2.1.3 ic HazardAssessmeni ic hazard is ba b p the earthquake characteristics and the causative faultassociated wit"h hqua haractestis include magnitude of maximum earthquake, distane hfrom rthqua' e T :/distance from the "tothe c4 e" fault, fault length, and activity of the fault. The effects of sitesoil conditions and the h' of faulting are accounted for in the attenuation relationships.
The probabilistic strong gro0nd-motion values were developed from USGS gridded databases, developed by Frankel, et al. (1996 and 2002), and with most recently developed Next Generation Attenuation (NGA) relationships by Petersen, et al. (2008). These values were queried from USGS-maintained databases located at http://gldims.cr.usgs.gov/website/nshmp2008/viewer.htm andhttps://geohazards.usgs.gov/deaggint/2008/.
The results of this analysis are presented in Attachment 1,Deaggregation Plots. Attachment I illustrates the regional probabilistic strong ground motion for the10 percent probability of exceedance in 50 years, 2 percent probability of exceedance in 50 years,2 percent probability of exceedance in 100 years, and 2 percent probability of exceedance in 200 years.Estimated peak ground acceleration (PGA) is summarized in Table 2-2.
Page 2-3Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2Table 2-2 -Peak Ground Acceleration as Percentacie for Various Return PeriodsEarthquake Return Approximate Probability of Peak GroundPeriod (years) Exceedance in 50 years (%) AccelerationA 500 10 0.0142 g2500 2 0.0431 g5000 1 0.0669 g10,000 0.5 , 0.1020 gA Peak ground acceleration is measured by the acceleration due _t..gravity W .: .4Source: USGS. July 21, 2011. "2008 Interactive Deaggregatio e(Beta)"
Ge.giqgHazards Science Center. Retrieved September 20, 2011. https://geoha r .usgs.gov/deagg""2008/.
I2.1.4 Site Geologic HazardsSeveral geologic hazards have been identified at the FCS site and discussed inprevious design reportsby Dames & Moore (1968) and Gibbs, Hill, Durham, and Richardson (1967). These hazards includethe existence of karst features associated with dissolution.
of the Winterset Member of the DennisFormation Limestone, liquefaction of the loose poorly- gaded sands identified at the'-ite, bank slopestability adjacent to the Missouri River, and scour:and erosion of near-surface soils.2.1.4.1 Karsti; .::.-Dames & Moore (1968) identifiedit least two sigin.4ant karst features in the Winterset Member of the Dennis Forinfiom;I.imestone that pwently have developed along existingfractures.
The features to be as mu .ftwide, 16 ft deep, and 45 ft longand consist of'inMj1ler 1.5- to 3-t#bid and a lower zonetof decomposed limestone anddetri~tt 0 ..f te locati.oh o, ese features Is shown in Figure 2- I, Geotechnical Area'Aihd Cross-Sec
, 'octions.
views of the geologic setting are presented 61iF, ires 2-2 and 2-3. Sect2 J4 , shows where these karst features intersect the i ,urface secuw" at FCS for th-.@optaiment, Auxilary
: Building, Turbine Building, and Intake'S fo' *h pti* e'.Axi'iar 3-We was designed to pene any overlying layer of limestone that covers the karstfeaf:tand to found the pile on'-soaund rock at the bottom of these features.
The potential Jnflueni*'O Ahese karst features.on foundation stability is considered minimal.
It is likely thataddition Cfeaturesq AS -,across the site, but the overlying alluvial cover of a minimum of6 1 ft offers-bu, er to of these features on any structure.
Further dissolution oflimestone is an i' process given that the limestone is in contact with groundwater.
Themost aggressive ition of limestone by groundwater occurs in the vadose zone (Mylroie, 1984). The fact that the karst features at the FCS site are covered by approximately 60 ft ofalluvial material and are in contact with groundwater that has experienced some subsurface residence time didates that the rate of karst feature development (limestone dissolution) is low.In addition, the karst features encountered in the 1967 Dames & Moore drilling program wereprimarily filled with decomposed limestone and detritus.
The volume of space needed to allowsignificant collapse of overlying soils is not present.
Therefore, within the expected service lifeof FCS, the process of limestone dissolution is not significant.
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03i110 900so110 .90. "VOZI RONVAE ItV0M 2101v 001M 4111 ELEVATION 2-10-10YE9710k SCALE -A~ WAM101 WjA0 lsSection B-BFort Calhoun Station0411Seo 2D'IPlant and Fadjity Geoloclinical and SItructural AssesITeilI Page 2-7Site History, Desciption, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2A further understanding of the karst features at the FCS site would require drilling andinstallation of sampling wells to sample water near the limestone and soil contact in order toassess the chemical characteristics of the groundwater at this interface.
This effort is notconsidered necessary as part of this Assessment Report because the plant has functioned without evidence of foundation subsidence due to karst feature collapse and resulting collapseof overlying soil prior lo and during the 2011 flood.2.1.4.1 Liquefaction of Non-Cohesive SoilsLiquefaction studies have been performed by others for the FCS site using post-construction conditions.
The assumptions used in performing the liquefaction anaoyses and results of thosestudies have not been reviewed by HDR, but it is believd.tdhat the largely non-cohesive, saturated soil materials at the site would be subject to liqdfikti..qijgiven sufficient seismicloading.
The pertinent question for this study is whether thie %ntial exists that I floodchanged the saturation and soil density sufficiently to increie ."~ faction potentfl4der;te maximum credible earthquake (MCE). Ongoing site explorationO~'-iftquantify the co-nitron 0the site soils where drilling is accessible.
2.1.4.2 Bank Slope Stability The site has slopes along the Missouri Rjive"that could e i ,stability problems due toriver-level increase and then rapid drawdowpi, resultin&-.n-exces'vy..pore pressures in theslopes of the river bank that, are adjao'ent to6anii of I s strucl. M The mostly non-cohesive nature of the soils will fallow dratn.And dissipion of pore pressure withoutsignificant effects on channe Once river Ile''s have re.ed, inspection of theMissouri River banks site will provd' ,,yt.J.sessment of this potential slopestability hazard. In addition, f1eiechnometers were. 01 tio monitor bank slope stability.ScOur and EtosionT ii+lundation of the sitehi.the potential to-scour and erode the existing grade and remove*;dii material from around aid4Oneath structures that are founded near the ground surface.
The-cohesive nature of the sit6&#xfd;ils indicates scour potential given sufficient water velocityR. apacity to carry 2.2 G' :" hology and Physiqgt&#xfd;phic SettingFCS is located i$ihkbeastern W hngton County, Nebraska, approximately 4 miles southeast ofBlair, Nebraska.
in es-iin-the Central Lowland portion of the Interior Plains Physiographic
: Province, as shown Gn,&#xfd;.SS, 2003). More specifically, the site is classified as par of theDissected Till Plains, a s ti~sion of the aforementioned
: province, a region covered by Pleistocene glacial events that depositetill during glacial advance as well as during glacial retreat.
The till hassince been partially covered with eolian (wind-deposited) loess deposits and dissected by erosioncadsed by the Missouri River and its-ttibutaries.
-...
M In n e s 0 1 aa uot haCENTRALLOWLANDWESTERN LAKE* .. ..GREAT PLAINSHIGH PLAINSN e b r a s k a00.1.,.CENTRAL L9.#ANTILL P'LAINSM i s 0 U r iKCENTRALLOWLANDOSAGE PLAINS0 30 60=MilesIOZARK PLATEAUSSPRINGFIELD-SALEM PLATEAUSOmaha Public Power =imirictIPhysiographic Setting of InteriorPlains RegionFort Calhoun StationPlant and Facility Geotechnical and Structural Assessment Page 2-9Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2Washington County is also recognized as having two distinct physiographic divisions:
: 1) uplandsformed in loess and glacial till; and 2) floodplains along the Elkhorn and Missouri rivers(U.S. Department of Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Service [USDA NRCS], 2004). -In addition, the floodplains of the Missouri River are subdivided into the low bottom, which consists ofa frequently flooded zone of meander scars and oxbow cutoffs, and the flood basin, which lies betweenthe low bottom and the uplands.
The flood basin is less frequently flooded than the low bottom.2.2.1 Site SoilsThe soils of the site are mapped by USDA NRCS (2004) as belonging to the following:
" Haynie silt loam (coarse silty alluvium),
0 to 2 percent slopes, well drained, adjacent to theMissouri River* Wathena fine sandy loam (sandy alluvium),
0 to 2 percent slopes, moderately well drained* Onawa silty clay (clayey-loamy alluvium),
0 to 2 percent slopes, somewhat poorly drained" Albaton silty clay (clayey alluvium),
0 to 2 percent slopes, poorly drained" Onawa silty clay loam (clayey alluvium),
0 to 2 percent slopes, somewhat poorly drained" Judson silty clay loam (colluvium),
2 to 5 percent slopes (colluvium),
well drained* Ida silt loam (loess),
5 to 11 percent slopes, well drainedThe site soils in the low bottom are derived from the Missouri River alluvial material.
Soils of theflood basin are primarily derived from alluvial material but also include some colluvium and washfrom the uplands, and soils of the uplands located along the south and southwest limits of the site arederived entirely from glacial till and loess.2.2.2 Geomorphic FeaturesThe notable geomorphic features of the site include the Missouri River channel, the meander scars andoxbow cutoffs of"the Miss0uiu-River floodplain, and the rolling hills consisting of glacial till withvarying thickness of colian loess~deposits.
2.3 Hydrologic BaselineFCS is situated directly along the Missouri River at River Mile (RM) 646, as shown in Figure 2-5.FCS is ncit protected by a levee and is therefore subject to flooding during extreme flood events. Theaverage elevation of the FCS site is approximately 1004 ft. Table 2-3 presents data from USACE fromits November 2003-report, "Upper:Mississippi River System Flow Frequency Study, Hydrology andIlydraulics, Appefidix F, Missotpwifitver."
According to these data, el. 1004 ft correlates to a floodrecurrence interval of slightly..Pypr 25 years or an annual probability of flooding of 0.040. This differsfrom USAR-2.7, Hydrology, Where a stage of 1004.2 ft is reported as being a 0. 1 percent annualchance event (1000-year recu-rrence interval)
(OPPD, April 29, 2011). USAR 2-7 acknowledges thatmultiple flow frequency studies have been performed by USACE subsequent to the development of thedesign peak flood stage.
-+-.41I-'ptiC, ..V. Idt AZ JUVFeetNW91IMMM 1 '.C*Location of FCS along Missouri RiverFort Calhoun StationDATEOImaha P ob,~Pwer DisiriclAug 2011FIGUREPlant and Facility Geotechnical and Structural Assessment FIR2-5I l .
Page 2-11Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2Table 2-3 -Missouri River Flood Recurrence Intervals at RM 646 (FCS)Recurrence Interval Probability Discharge Stage(years) (cfs) (ft)2 0.500 62,000 996.45 0.200 82,600 999.410 0.100 117,000 1003.025 0.040 127,000 1003.950 0.020 142-,,900 1005.1100 0.010 168,700 1006.5200 0.005 197,200 ..1008.0500 0.002 238,800 1009.3Source: USACE. November 2003. "Upper Mississippi River System Flow Frequency Study, Hydrology andHydraulics, Appendix F, Missouri River."Data on historic floods and the 2011 flood are discussed below as are potential Missouri River floodimpacts and damages at FCS.2.3.1 Historic Missouri River FloodingFCS went online in 1973 along the Missouri River At RM 646. Before FCS was constructed, the sitelikely experienced flooding in 1881 and 1883, and the site definitely experienced flooding in 1943 and1952. Sincc it was constructed, FCS has experienced flood events in 1984, 1993, 1997, 2007, 2010,and 2011. Data on these historic floods on the Missouri River are presented in Table 2-4.Discharge and water surface elevations at USGS stream gage locations at Sioux City, Iowa, and atDecatur, Blair, and Omaha, Nebraska, are provided in Table 2-4. In addition, water surface elevations at FCS, which were estimated using stage information at Decatur, Blair, and Omaha, are included.
Using the stage-discharge relationships.defined in the"Upper Mississippi River System FlowFrequency Study" (USACE, November 2003), a discharge of approximately 130,000 cfs results in astage of 1004.0 fR at RM 646. As shown in Table 2-3, this is approximately a 25-year flood event.Again, this differs from the probability associated with el. 1004 ft as reported in USAR-2-7 (OPPD,April 29, 201.i). Although FCS has experienced flood events in 1984, 1993, 1997, 2007, 2010, and2011, the data"'.sh6w that the Missouri"River water surface elevation exceeded the average site elevation of 1004 ft only once since construction, that being in 2011. The data also show that the water surfacewas within I ft of reaching the average site elevation during 1984 and 1993.
Page 2-12Site History, Description, and Baseline Condifion Rev. 2Table 2.4- Historic Flood Events on the Missouri River at Fort Calhoun Station, RM 646USGS Gage Historic Flood EventsALocation on Datu 1881' 1883 1943 195211984 1993 1997 2007 2010 2011DatumL2ctI 2the Missouri
'RiverSioux Cityc 1056.98 Discharge 212,000 441,000 104,000 72,000 100,000 42,100 86,600 192,000.(cfs)...
WSEL (ft) 1095.69 1101.29 1087.88 1084.28 1082.48 1075.58 1082.48 1092.23Decatur 1010.00 Discharge 76,400 100,000 46,800 80,600 191,000(cfs) ]I ..WSEL(ft) 105350 1042.20 1042.00 1035.40 1041.40 1050,24Blair 977.58 Discharge
,.______
_(cfs)WSEL(ft)
.1005.08 1004.98 1002.48 998.08 1004.48 1010.31FCS WSEL (ft) >1004 1 >1004 ' >:1004 >1004 1003.3 1003,3 10007 996.6 1002.7 1006.85Omaha 948.24 Discharge 200,000 396,000 1 15,000 110,000 86,100 103,000 216,000WSEL 98846 97724 978 54 974.64 974.74 97584 98453Instantaneous peaks/stages ftom USGS.B. 1881 discharge of 370,000 cfs estimated at St. Joseph, Missouri.
Information from this table was used to estirnate stage at FCS.C. Sioux City gage datum was 20 ft higher in 1943 and 1952,.WSEL water surface elevation.
Page 2-13Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2A stage recorder located at the FCS Intake Structure documented water surface elevations duringthe 2011 flood event. These data indicate that the maximum stage occurred on June 25, 2011, atel. 1006.85 ft. In addition, the staff gage on the landward side of the FCS Intake Structure (observed on July 12, 2011) showed a high water mark at around cl. 1007.1 ft.2.3.2 2011 Missouri River Basin FloodMassive flooding in the Missouri River basin, shown in Figure 2-6, occurred in 2011 because of acombination of above-normal snowpack in the plains in the Northern U.S., above-normal snowpack inthe mountains above Fort Peck Dam on the Missouri River, and excessive upstream spring rains ineastern Montana and North and South Dakota. USACE's forecast on November 1, 2011, estimated that in 2011, runoff into the Missouri River above Sioux City would be nearly 61 MAF. This is thehighest amount since 1898, eclipsing the previous high runoff of 49 MAF.At the end of February 2011, the plains snowpack contained as much as 6 to 8 inches (in.) ofequivalent water across parts of Montana, North Dakota, and Soulh Dakota. At the end of March, themountain snowpack above Foil Peck Dam was close to the 30-year historic average.
: However, byMay 2,2011, the total snowpack was 141 percent of the 30-year historic average.
During May 201 I.the snowmelt combined with 10 to 15 in. of precipitation centered in Southern Montana and 6 to 10 in.of precipitation across the remainder of the watershed above Sioux City to produce record runoffamounts.USACE began releasing record discharges from Gavins Point Dam in late May 2011. The release wasincreased to 160,000 cfs by June 26, 2011, and remained at this level until mid-August.
Beginning onAugust 19, 2011, USACE began reducing releases daily in 5,000 cfs increments, reaching 90,000 cfson August 30, 2011. Further reductions began on September.
18, 201 1,..reaching 40,000 cfs onOctober 2, 20 11. USACE has indicated that the 40,000 cfs release will be maintained until at leastmid-December, When winter weather conditions set in and the risk of ice jams increases.
Fort PeckMissouriRMver0 200 400Missouri River Basini i Fort Calhoun Station.... .v .. g. , V. ,.ODmna Public Pc.e, Dslrin Plant and Facility Geolechnical and Structural Assessment Page 2-15Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.3.3 Missouri River Flood Impact at FCSBecause FCS is located along the Missouri River (see Figure 2-5), as the releases at Gavins Point Damwere increased, floodwater encroached on the FCS site. Figure 2-7 presents the water surfaceelevations as surveyed on site at RM 646 and the flow rate as predicted by USACE and interpolated toRM 646 by HDR. As discussed previously, the peak water surface elevation at FCS occurred onJune 25, 2011, at an elevation of 1006.85 ft.Ft. Calhoun-River Mile 6461008.01007.5 __" 200.000E 1007.0 ..... ....1 006.53006.0 180,000)0 043004.0 AO 1003.5 A~ d.0M 1003.0 01002.5 0o ..O]40001002.0300100 o .......120,0001000.0 ._ '. .: -. .1000.0 0 "100.000',., .,, ,..Id .zj ~0 Surveyed Elevations at intake at RM 646 A USACE FlowFigure 2-7 -Flow and Water Surface Elevations (June through August)for Fort Calhoun Station, RM 646The I I years in which flooding occurred on the Missouri River at Omaha from 1928 to 2011 arecompared visually in Figure 2-6. Each plot starts on January 1 and finishes on December 3 I. TheOmaha gage has the longest and most complete period of record of Missouri River discharges of anygage near FCS. Though this gage is 30 miles downstream from FCS, the data are applicable to theFCS site in the context of comparing flood durations.
The rating curves used to estimate the MissouriRiver stage for a given discharge have adjusted significantly over the past 70 years. For example,using USACE's "Missouri River Stage Trends" technical report (2010) as a reference, at the Omahagage since 1940, the rating curve adjustment range is on the order of plus or minus 2 ft for river stageat discharges of 100,000 cfs. The FCS site initially becomes flooded at an elevation of 1004 ft, andapplying this same 4-ft range in stage at FCS (1006 to 1002 ft) translates to a discharge of 180,000 to130,000 cfs (see Figure 2-7). This discharge range is bracketed in Figure 2-8 to define the range of Page 2-16Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2flows that flooded the site in 2011. Of the five flood events at the FCS site (1929, 1943, 1949, 1952,and 2011), the firstfour all receded from the site within 7 to 14 days. The 2011 event covered The FCSsite for almost 75 days.450,0001929400,000 19431949350,000 -1952..... 1950300,000Z :1993250,000 1993.C -1997E 200.000 200702010M Historically
-Range of,150,000 dliSc.a' tcue -2011, ,I initiul site flooding at FCSU)V, 100,00W&#xa3; % '-. ..- -%',-_ , -50,0004010 .100 0 250 300 350D. (IStarting on )an 1)Figure 2-8 -Comparlisn of Discharges on the Missouri River at Omahain Years w Nern Flooding Occurred (1928 to 2011)As a result..
flood flows, additional c~annel degradation and bank erosion have occurred in thevicinity.of FCS... A detailed evaluati~ilof changes in the stage-discharge rating curves applicable to theMissouri Rivetie ar FCS is beingp~ddkmed at this time. USGS surveyed the river in the vicinity ofFCS in fall 2008 and again on Ju1y25, 2011. The survey in 2008 was performed in National GeodeticVertical Datum of 1929 (NGVD 29), and the survey in 2011 was performed in North AmericanVertical Datum of 1988 (NAVD 88) and converted to NGVD 29. Figure 2-9 shows the locations ofthe surveyed hydraulic cross sections, and Figure 2-1 0 shows a comparison of the channel bathymetry throughout the surveyed reach between 2008 and 2011 at Stations 4+10 and 6+65. Figures 2-11,2-12, and 2-13 provide comparisons of the remaining surveyed hydraulic.cross sections.
It is clear that thechannel has degraded by 10 ft or more across most of the channel.
This is true in all the cross sectionsfrom station 4* 10 to 21 ]+44.
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--+ 0- --:-'-.2 0 .00'. -..... .... ....9.. ..100 0ARE LOOKING UPSTREAM I .* -Stations 18.91 Oct 20114(PLANT NORTH)..-~Fort ClonStation FGR' .n PbIc : w IOr ;ri I01141I ulc vvlOsrc Plant and Facility Geotechnical  13[ and Structural Assessment Page 2-22Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2On July 12, 2011, personnel from HDR visited FCS to observe and investigate the impact offloodwater on FCS. Photos I and 2 are images of floodwater at FCS. Flow paths and velocities through FCS as observed are shown in Figure 2-14. A figure depicting the high water elevations assurveyed is provided in Figure 2-15.T* T ...J ... .......PhOoA -Floodwater at FCS,;,Looking North from the Administration Buildingtoward the Old Warehouse Site History, Description, and Baselihe Condition Page 2-23Rev. 2..iPhoto 2 -FIoOdOwater at FCS, Looking East toward the Containment 1.C*jI,-1Be~in'-*1t.'%-4 ft'high-560 cfs-200 cft-400 cfs-160 cfs,4 fps lGapaS"2 fps"I4; 4~,tollWIatWEC" I7S .'*AAIT0 200 400r~Feelr~iSurface WaterFlow PathOnulha Public Power DrSrictFlow Paths on July 12, 2011Fort Calhoun StationAug 2011FIGUREN1Plant and Facility Geotechnical and Structural Assessment fm2-14I A
* ' .-.., A:1007 331007.12* ' 1007.05 1007 1007.35 1007.321007.02 1007T27100714 1007.26 1007. 351007..007.14,"'
Z " 1007.25 1.007.57 A1007.15' ,007.38 '1o07.007 121007.52&#xfd; 100.710-0 .0 73-~1006.99 A07,.39 :". ..~a 1007.42 00.08(.r1007.284 '11007.07'0
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* z, ? u " .,. ..-.O .Fe,' e. l = -. uu o ." tn * -.&#xfd;. * -,:A ' .. .: " ....*0 6 3 ' ' ,Surveyed High Water Line DAT] Survey Point =z- z- .Fort Calhoun Station Sep 2011High.Wat.r.M.r Lne ... -Surveyed by Lamp Rynerson
& Ass. 9/112011 FIGURE* igh ater ark ine Dmaha Publir Power Dlilrlrto iPlant and Facility Geotechnical 2-15N, and Structural Assessment Page 2-26Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.3.4 Potential Flood Damages at FCSThe FCS site was inundated by floodwater for nearly 3 months (see Figure 2-7, Flow and WaterSurface Elevations (June through August) for Fort Calhoun Station, RM 646) by approximately 3 ft ofwater as a result of 2011 flooding.
Buildings and property at FCS have been subject to a variety offorces as a result of Missouri River floodwater.
Hydrostatic and buoyancy forces due to inundation.
hydrodynamic forces due to moving water, scour and erosion around building foundations, and to alesser extent, wave forces and forces imparted by the impact of moving debris such as large trees, aredescribed as follows (FEMA, 2008).2.3.4.1 Hydrostatic ForcesA hydrostatic load is imparted to the walls and foundation of a structure when floodwater builds up along a structure.
A hydrostatic force acts laterally or vertically (if the structure issubmerged).
Hydrostatic forces can become strong enough to cause deflection when there is asubstantial difference in water elevation on opposite sides of the structure.
2.3.4.2 Buoyancy ForcesAs floodwater rises, a structure can experience a'buoyant force that has to be Counteracted bythe weight of the structure and any anchorage forces.2.3.4.3 Hydrodynamic ForcesWater flowing around a structure during a flood event imparts a load on the affected structure.
The load is the combination of the force imposed by the moving floodwater hitting the frontalarea of the structure, the drag-forces imparted along'.ih:.wAlIs of the structure, and the negativepressure acting Op..the downstream, side of the structure.
The negative pressure is located in thewake .zone created by flow separation as the floodwater moves past the structures.
If astructure is not rigid, there is also a lift force imparted on the structure by the movingfloodwater.
.-.2.3.4.4 Scour and ErosionHih- velocities from water flowing across a flooded area can cause soil erosion if the soil ormateiWal.at the ground surface does not have a greater resistive force than the shear stressimpartedit the ground surfaceby the floodwater.
Local scour is also possible at or alongstructure foundations.
As.floodwater impacts a structure, the water is forced downward andaround the structure.
The resulting increase in velocity and turbulence characteristics can resultin localized scour. The magnitude of scour and erosion depends on flood velocity, depth, soilcharacteristics, ground characteristics, flow direction in relation to the structure, and structure type and dimensions.
2.3.4.5 WavesWith a substantial wind fetch, structures can experience additional hydrodynamic loading bythe impact of waves against the structure walls and foundations.
Page 2-27Site History, Descdption, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.3.4.6 Debris ImpactFloodwater carries debris ranging from large branches and trees to storage tanks and mobilehomes. Debris that impacts a structure imparts a load on the structure that depends on theweight of the debris object, the velocity of the floodwater, the location on the structure whereimpact occurs, and the duration of the impact.2.4 Geotechnical Baseline2.4.1 In-Situ Soil Characteristics Dames & Moore conducted a site subsurface investigation in 1967. A total of t89-borings were drilledduring this field investigation to assess the properties of the site soih; and..'bedrock, as Show inFigure 2-16. Dames & Moore published the results of their 1 967 field.work in a 1968 report titled"Foundation
: Studies, Fort Calhoun Station Number One, Near Fort Cahotun, Nebraska,"
in which theydrew the following general conclusions regarding the subsurface soil chara.cteristics:
r The surficial soils consist of loose fine sands with varying amounts of silt to-approximately 10 ft.* Depths from 10 ft to approximately 30 to 35 ft generally consist of loose to compact (dense) finesand.* A 5- to 10-ft layer of compact (dense) fine sand lies below the loosa.to dense fine sand.* Below the dense layer is a less compact (dense&#xfd;)layer of poorly graded..towell-graded sand withthin layers of silty clay and some gravel.Based on laboritory-determined relative densities, the relative densityofihe subsurface soils rangedfrom 47 to 82 percent.
The field investigation involved stiidard penetration tests (SPTs) and therecording of N values for the soils. ThenN value, reported in blows.per foot, is the number of blowsrequired to drive .the sampler for the last 1 ft of the sampling interval.
There is no indication as towhether the values are normalized N60 values.(corrected to 60 percent of the theoretical energy SPT safety hamnier) or are uncorrected values, so the values are assumed to be In addition, a standardSPT sampler-nd the Dames & Moore Type U soil samplcr wereused torecord N values. and a 300-pound hammer ait ,a24-in.
fall and a 140-pound hammer at a 30-in.fall\ wer-used to impart the energy todrive the samplers.
The net effect on N values is notdocumen&dIL N values are depicted infigure 2-2, Section A-A, and Figure 2-3, Section B-B.These findii'n&#xfd;.igeneralized to represent overall site conditions, but localized variations arepresented in and 2-3. Thfe locations of the section lines and the approximate plan viewlocation of the kbbxvnkarst features are presented in Figure 2-], Geotechnica]
Areas and Cross-Section Locations.
Much of the upper 10 to 15 ft of in-situ material was actually logged as low-plasticity silt with varyingamounts of sand. N values from this zone were generally lower than 10. The zone below this,described by Dames & Moore (1968) as loose to dense fine sand 30 to 35 ft thick, is shown as poorlygraded sand (SP) in Figuit s 2-2 and 2-3. This zone appears -t be consistent across the FCS site;however, the zone of dense fine sand is not as consistent as the Dames & Moore report implies.N values in borings B-27 and B-I 08 range from 79 to 125 at depths ranging from 35 1o 50 ft fromexisting (at the time of the exploration) ground surface, while borings B-29 and B-28 show N valuesof 14 to 48 for a comparable depth range less than 100 ft away from borings B-27 and B- 108.
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, o -7U. ,. !w ' -..and Structural.Assessment
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i w ] " ,,3.'/ ' .' : " '1 M -O I l .LL .Il Cv N ,, "P ., .i "' l ,,L 0 , 12 ..250. ", / ," ' -- LO '- ... ...........
.... ... ". / --.Z ....L.O ,: F ..ee ...t AV"O...W"'';
.. ...... .. -", ' ". ..' .. ..... i -M -'&deg; " :/ ' " " .D! TFMo W el Lo ato Omah NMI Powe ,L ..: .Districtinsrti n " ..., ,.P l n a n F a ilt G e t c h i a *2. --,4 m"' ..:.. , .". 9 ,I., ..m.... ... ., .w ,,,/ , ; ..l r.k .and S t u tu a A s..... & 1 .1 Page 2-29Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2The zone of less dense, poorly graded to well-graded fine sand with varying amounts of sill and somegravel is generally consistent across the site and makes up the 15 to 20 ft of alluvial material on top ofbedrock.Limited laboratory testing was completed for soil samples and includes particle size analyses.
Particlesize analyses showed predominantly fine sands with minor fractions of silt and medium-grained sand.2.4.2 Rock Mass Characteristics According to the Dames & Moore (1968), bedrock was encounteredvat depthsranging from 58 to 67 fiand varied from el. 931 to 935 ft. The rock encountered was idejitified as the Wintersei Member of theDennis Formation Limestone of the Pennsylvanian Kansas Tb6ebedrock at the site wasdescribed as having an upper zone 4to 8 ft thick and consisting 6f.mifassive, gray, thidkly bedded,medium- to fine-grained oolitic limestone.
Below this zone was a .i~oe of light gray, thinly tomoderately bedded, fine-grained limestone (referred to as aphaniticin-the Dames & MooTe report)having 0.5- to 2-in.-thick shale layers. Karst features were found ifn thislIdwer "aphanitic" layer. asbriefly discussed in Section 2.1.4.1, Karst, above, but also included part ofih6 overlying ooliticlimestone as recorded in borings B- 104 and B- 104B. Figure 2-2;-Section A-A,.and Figure 2-3,Section B-B, present representative subsurface depth and thickness iof the site bedrock.
The locations of the section lines and the approximate plan view locition of the',ki'&wn karst featureisare presented inFigure 2-1, Geotechnical Areas and Cross-Section Locations.
The rock mass was logged as "unweathered"'-("fresh"
.S. Bu Reclamation Engineering Geology Field Manual) and and rock Ola'ty designati (RQD) values ranged from97 to 100 percent with few exceptions reted to solution, res (kapt TSpecific findings were asfollows:
-* A zone of mg, derate .,y to jtensely weiered limestone in ' nng B-1 16 was logged at the bottomof the oolitic.&#xfd;limnestone-6 into the undlierlying fine-grained limestone, and an RQD value of40 percehrt was recorded withiii.tihs zone. Thiswas a solution feature that had not yet, throughchemiical dissolution of the lirn.etone, developed into a void and a zone of completely decomposed lhmstone.
* iA~i,*ge solution feature was inter eied by borings B-104, B-104A, and B-104B from depths of (el. 932.3 to 916.2 ft);f had an upper 2 to 3 fl of void and the remaining lowerorti'i&#xfd;W with decomposed liH4 ,ne.* Borings?2jthrough B-72H wpr&drilled to define the extent of a large solution feature thatranged in deplifraom 65.6 to 7.1.~it (el. 932.1 to 920.0 ft)." Borings B-30 through B-30Q-were drilled to define the extent of a solution feature that ranged indepth from 67 to 8-.ft 7 to 913.7 ft).' .. ...i.&#xfd; "L ,?* Borings B-103 and B-103A encountered a more limited but possibly connected zone of dissolution that ranged from el. 93t.5 to 936 ft.* A zone of increased weathering, RQD values ranging from 42 to 55 percent, and a 1.5-ft void wereencountered in boring B-141 from depths of 70 to 77 ft (el. 926 to 919 ft). -." Boring B-108 drilled through a cavity from depths of 65.7 to 75.0 ft (el. 928.8 to 919.5 ft).These noted solution features were recognized by Dames & Moore as following predominant fracturesets that were reportedly mapped at a local quarry. The orientation of these fracture sets is reportedly N5OE and N58W.
Page 2-30Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2The potential for the enlargement of solution features (karst) in the bedrock portion of the foundation to be a foundation failure mechanism due to flooding events is minimal.
The pile design for theContainment, Auxiliary
: Building, Turbine Building, and Intake Structure called for pile installation past any weathered zone to the bottom of any known or encountered solution feature.
In addition, thelimestone bedrock is covered by a minimum of 61 ft of soil cover, so acidicatmospheric water is notlikely to reach the karst features.
The only plausible mechanisms for continued karst development are1) a connection to the river bottom that allows chemically aggressive (acidic and not saturated withrespect to calcium) water into a karst feature, and 2) a scenario in which the overlying soils do not alterthe chemistry of the groundwater so that it maintains the potential to dissolve the limestone.
Thesemechanisms take significant time relative to the operating life of the FCS structures and are notsignificantly related to a plausible failure mechanism.
====2.4.3 Groundwater====
Prior to construction.
groundwater was described by Gibbs, Hill, Durham, and Richardson (1967) asgenerally within 2 ft of the surface at the site and sloping gently to.:tbe east toward the Missouri River.Groundwater elevations and river elevations prior to the 2011 flood event and after the onset of theflood event are presented in Table 2-5. An increase in groundwater elevation.on the order of 10 ft hasbeen recorded as a result of the 2011 flood. The data do not-include.
groundwater elevations at thepeak flood elevation of 1006.85 ft because groundwater measuretients were not recorded during peakflood levels, Groundwater and river elevations forDecember 10 ,2010, and June 4, 2011, are shown inFigure 2-2, Section A-A, in order to present the general response of groundwater elevations relative tothe increased river elevations, The effect of pore pressure changes due to ..a water level elevation across the site of approximately 1006.85 ft compared to the pre-flood.,rot."dwater elevatib6n.-.of approi-ciately 990 ft must be evaluated with respect to each structure,
-.'. -Table 2-5 -Groudndwater and River Level Elevations Date .12/1012010 31/22/2011 6/4/2011 9/1/2011River,Elevaton 993.994 995.33 1002.86 1002.18SMonJibing Well ID 'Groundwater Elevation (ft _-:MW-]A 990.7.6 1 989.15 998.7 999.55.MW-IB 990o.14..
989.12 998.7 999.54IMqW-2A 991.18 : 990.12 998.55 998,9)SW-2B 991 .23' .990.14 998.74 999.2MW-3A 990,933' 990.82 998.25 998.77MW-3B 990,i07 1 990.77 998.15 998.68MW-4A .991.5 990.85 999.75 1000.4__ ..MW-4B _991.48 990.73 999.63 1000.23MW-5A 991.88 99.18 1000,15 1000.67MW.5B 991 R1 991 14 1000 12) 1000 6..-~- IMW-6MW-7MW-9MW-10MW-lI991.71 992.08 1000.45 1001.13991.32 990.89 -999.26 &sect;99.98990.82 989.28 998.68 999.49991.16 999.53 998.98 999.83991.21 989.93 998.88 999.48A -River elevations include FCS data and interpolated stages between Omaha and Blair and between Omahaand Decatur, Nebraska.
Page 2-31Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition
-Rev. 22.4.4 Ground Improvement Methods2.4.4.1 Pile Installation According to OPPD records, a total of 951 piles were installed under the footprint of theContainment, Auxiliary
: Building, Turbine Building, Intake Structure, Service Building, andCirculating Water System. Each pile was installed to bedrock (Winterset Member of theDennis Formation Limestone),
and some were installed through voids in the limestone to acompetent rock bottom. Figure Section A-A, and Figt-e 2-3, SectiqoB-:b, show thegeneral location and depth of the pile installation.
Piles iWere installed-from existing groundelevation, and excavation progressed around the piles to.target elevations.
.ijia] cutting andcapping of the piles was completed when target excavatiolaevel was reach~di:
Figure 2-1, Geotechnical Areas and Cross-Section Locations-shows the area of pileinstallation.
Pile as-built records showing actual installati6n depthls-haave not been located forthis study', so the design proposed in the Dames & Moore 1968 report was used as the basis forpile installation depth....,..,,..-
~ ~. 4 ...., , ..2.4.4.2 Soil Densification Using The design criteria for the Containment, Atpio4iary
: Buifging, anciake Structure required anaverage relative density of 85 perc entand 9,' nimmu_ ative d.is ..'Of 70 percent for thefoundation soils. As documentedl:b.Gibbs
& Hil 'report titIt "Summary ofVibroflotation,"
dated January 27,1 972, the procJRf vibroflotaiion was used to densify soilsbetween the foundation piles in the areas under th&?ontainmment and the Intake Structure.
Vibroflotation involves inserting a vibrating probe irto'fb&iround while introducing gravelinto the void that is created around the probe. This process densifies the surrounding soil,forms a vertical column of dense gravel, and increases the overall strength of the in-situmaterial.
o..61lowing the vibroflotatior-densification prricc~ss, a total of 83 SPT borings were completed by-.:,.--,e contractor to assess the effdeti~veness of densifying the fine-grained sand and fine-grained
.:"iltysand.
The Gibbs & Hill 1 ipor states that a 96.6 percent confidence level was attained thatthei Verage relative density was'riot less than 85 percent.
SPT data from these test boringsinditaed that the soil densifi.t4,on was moderately successful when compared to the SPT Nvalues frobm1967 exploratoi.:borings at the site. SPT values recorded after the vibroflotation for successfullsoil densification generally ranged from 12 to 91 blows per foot, which indicated that relative densities ranging from 70 to I 10 percent were achieved in these soils. However,some zones of riati&e.nsity ranging from 35 to 68 percent remained after the vibroflotation.
as noted in verification borings V-42, V-46, V-68, V-70, V-7 1, and V-76. Therefore, existingsoil density conditions should be noted as having average relative density not less than85 percent but as also having notable zones of relative density significantly lower than theaverage and lower than the minimum relative density requiremeni of 70 percent.
A plan viewshowing the post-vibroflotation verification borings is not in the construction records.
Page 2-32Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.4.5 Excavation and BackfillBased on the Dames & Moore 1968 report titled "Foundation Conditions,"
preliminary excavation depths for each structure were targeted to the folloiing elevations:
* Intake Structure-el. 963 ft* Auxiliary Building
-el. 981 ft* Containment
-el. 983 ft* Turbine Building
-el. 987 ft" Turbine Generator Mat -el. 982 ftAs-built drawings record excavation depths that vary somewhat torn the premioigly Iisted targetexcavation elevations, as follows:* Intake Structure (sluice intake) -el. 966.7 ft; approximate Intake Structure foundation
-.el. 963 ft(Intake Structure Building Panels and Intake Details, Drawing Number 11405-A-281)
" Auxiliary Building
-el. 965.5 ftI (Auxiliary Building
: Sections, Drawing Number 11405-S-64)
* Containment
-approximateel.
975.5 ft (Primary Plant. ection A-A, Drawving Number GHDR1 1405-A-13)
The properties of fill material have been documente4.:by boring7.ath!t were completed afterconstruction.
Borings were completed by Geolechn.igl Servic.,
Inc. forth-.foundation assessments for the Maintenance Building Addition (1977), Security Building (I 977), and the New SecurityBuilding (1987). Fill material is composed of silty clay, clI ey silt, pofly graded sand with silt, andsandy silt. SPT N values range from5 to,20 within the fill~iiaterial.
Documentation of the fillmaterial, placement densities, thickness,arnd extent adjacet1 to6strutures built within excavated areasis not available for analysis.
2.5 Structural Baseline" The straf",Iiral baseline was estabil4.h41for Priority
..and Priority 2 structures based on the review ofexisting documentation, including condition reports"des'ign basis documents, the original designdrawmigs,.'and structural assessments...The condition reports and structural assessments together arereferred'to.1Ispre-flood structural repo~ts,.
A list of OPPD documents used in establishing the structural baseline fobfeach structure is provided
'asAttachment
: 2. Dimensions presented in the structural ba eln .it issio. .,are'.:2.
gene `,ibaseline dsussaonTare generally expressed in decimal feet. The term "structure" may refer to aspecific building; such as the Turbife'eBuilding, or may refer to a group of independent non-building structures, such as the Turbine:Btiiding South Switchyard.
The location of each structure is shown inFigure 2-17, Site Plan:Overview.
Met Tower1"sele.,l 0 rl&#xfd;,rx,Switch Yard345 Bldg(vv),345 Btdg(E)Ll:)Lao.t ."'%.4-BldgS4!* ~.jI q 1j7.A.II* ; jSewer. Lt.~.*.,
oo0 175 350 f!%ii Feetaa9C'NFencePriority 1r' Priority 2r" Protected Area Boundaries Onaha Public Power DisiriciSite Plan OverviewFort Calhoun StationPlant and Facility Geotechnical and Structural Assessment Sep 2011FIGURE2-17 Page 2-34Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.5.1 Intake Structure 2.5.1.1 Location, Description, and FunctionThe Intake Structure is a Class I structure located adjacent to the Missouri River and directlyeast of the Service Building.
The major functions of the Intake Structure are to provide waterfrom the Missouri River that is required for component cooling and fire fighting at FCS, and toprovide the structural support and environmental protection necessalyto ensure the functional integrity of the Critical Quality Element (CQE) systems and compon4-idnder all operational and environmental conditions.
Specifically, the Intake Structure must!,.plrqNpriately protectagainst the effects of projectiles that may result from equipment failioes and:fom events andconditions outside the nuclear power unit.From the bottom of the foundation mat at el. 960.8 ft to el. 1014.5 ft, the Intake Structure consists of large, heavy, reinforced-concrete-box-type construction With internal bracingprovided by the dividing walls that form the water passages.
This in a massive rigidstructure set mostly below grade, which is inherentlyresistant to scismic.and tornado activity, Without special provisions, the Intake Structure-is designed to accommodat&:fltod levels up toel. 1004.5 ft without water entering the structure.
For higher flood levels up to the maximumprobable flood of el. 1009.3 ft, protection is provided by steel floodbarriers equipped withseals that provide protection to el. 1009.5 ft. These flood barriers istored adjacent to theopenings that they protect and areput-in place whei:he river level-Teaches certain elevations.
When the water level of the Missouri River exceed&the elevation-of the operating floor(1007.5 ft), it is necessary to close the sluice gates..ioprevent water from flowing in around thetops of the traveling screens and flooding the lnlake"trcture.
2.5.1.2 Foundation
..The intake Structure is amu.ti-floored stru.tuere below operating floor el. 1007.5 ft. From the..bottom of the foundation matrat el. 960.8 fti6"l. 101 4.5 ft, the Intake Structure consists of* ..arge, heavy, reinforced-concfete~box-type construction.
A mat foundation on steel pipe pilesdriVen to bedrock supports the intake Structure.
2.5.1'1 Structural FrameFrom el.'10t14.5 ft to the roof el. 1035.6 ft, the Intake Structure is a braced-steel frame clad withAr-lite sandwich panels supported from a system of horizontal steel girts. The roof is a multi-layer built-up roof supported by metal decking spanning between open-web steel joists. Thestructural steel frame supports equipment necessary for building operation, including anoverhead bridge crane on steel crane girders.2.5.1.4 Building Envelope-The structure is clad with concrete sandwich panels supported from a system of horizontal steelgirts and the primary structural frame members.
The panels forn a parapet at the top of thebuilding wall at roof level. The roof is a multi-layer built-up roof supported by metal deckingspanning between open-web steel joists.
Page 2-35Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.5.1.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting There are structural condition
: reports, prepared by OPPD, with drawings marked, available from the years 1996, 1999, 2002, and 2009. These reports document minor structural phenomena such as minor cracks in walls and ceilings, cracks that radiate from corners insquare concrete
: openings, and minor spalling.
2.5.2 Auxiliary Building2.5.2.1 Location, Description, and FunctionThe Auxiliary Building is a Class I structure located adjaent to and west.of.
he TurbineBuilding, with the Technical Support Center attached t6ofhemnorth*all.
The.Auxiliary Buildinghas an irregular shape in plan, with maximum ground floor 'dh.en~ions of 224 by 243 ft andenvelopes the Containment on the east, north, and west sid&e"'Ti Auxiliary Buildinghas multiple flat roofs at different elevations, and all are lower' tan"e of of the Containiien't.
Ground floor elevation is 1007 ft with a maximumr.ofdelevation of M083Aft.
The building hasone full floor level below grade at 989 ft and a~partial floor~level at 971 ft.2.5.2.2 Foundation
,. -,The foundation of the Auxiliary Building d8fihsts of rei.. ed concrete matsupported by steel pipe piles. The-.iles are spaced-."
' 'roximatel,9 to69 ft on center and drivento bedrock that ranges in elevati6o om 931 to 935 ft. The dra gs show that the foundation walls below grade are 3 ft thi6.k, dbvered with wateiproofing dnd'keyed at the top and bottomjoints with water stops.2.5.2.3 iStructural FrameT-,eAuxiliary Building tconsists of reinforced concrete moment frame on the exterior elevations with architectural resin precast-concrete panels as infill between the moment frames. InteriorJ-Wwalls are reinforced concrete qMnging in thickness from 8 to 48 in., with shield walls at selectdopr openings.
The:flors and roof deck consist-of 6-in. deck with a 2-in. concrete topping.
The 8 in. of-1 .(. ....' & .concrete&are composite to the tejifforced concrete beams, the dimensions of which are based onthe spanalid-floor loading...
2.5.2.4 Building EnvelopeThe exterior concrete moment frame is exposed and has a rubbed concrete surface.
The resinprecast concrete panels have an architectural finish and form the primary weather barrier.There is no detail available for the roof material...
Page 2-36Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition
-Rev. 22.5.2.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Structural assessments of the Auxiliary Building were conducted by OPPD in 1996, 1999,2004, and 2008. Based on the documents
: reviewed, the inspections indicate mostly fine cracksand peeling paint of concrete elements such as walls, floors, and ceilings.
All reports indicated that there was no significant structural deterioration of elements inspected.
====2.5.3 Containment====
2.5.3.1 Location, Description, and FunctionThe Containment is a Class I structure located west of thq. Turbine BuXildiq;an.d enveloped onthree sides by the Auxiliary Building.
The Containmentis cylindrical with-a nominal outsidediameter of 120 ft and a nominal top of dome height of 140.fti.
.Ground floor elevation rangesfrom 1007 to 1013 ft with a lower level of 976.5 ft. The eaveele'vation at the domed roof eaveis 1119 ft. The grade around the building, based on the design documents, is 1004 ft.The Containment houses a substantial amount of mechanical and electrical~equipment, andthere are a number of mechanical piping and electrical penetrations through the Containment.
2.5.3.2 Foundation The primary foundation mat of the Containment consists of 10 t6.i21;t 917 reinforced concretesupported by 20-in.-diameter stee1q"pe piles placed in a radial pa tei.iand spaced at about 10 ftaround the perimeter, with spaci"ig decreasing to about 5 ft near:,the center of the structure.
Theprimary mat is topped with a3-flZ..o 4-fi-6-in.-thick
'einforced c'Oncrete mat.2.5.3.3 Structural FrameThe Teinforced concrete
-shell of the Containment is shown to be keyed into the mat foundation at&.tbe base. The shell has ianqinal waltIhickness of about 8 ft at the base and 12 ft at the.e-_ve-to-dome transition.
Mififmum thickness.is about 3 ft 10.5 in. The shell is post-tensioned
"..With access to the cables by rfen of a removable stainless steel panel at the roof eave and asmall access gallery located b~lo' el. 979 ft and under the primary base mat foundation.
2.5'3-.4 Building EnvelopeThe exterior concrete of the Containment is rubbed concrete with a 22-ft-wide band ofarchitectural steel panels at the eave. The available drawings do not show the type of roofingmembrane.
2.5.3.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Structural assessments of the Auxiliary Building were conducted in 2009 and 2010. Theinspections reports indicated no significant structural deterioration of the elementsinspected.
Page 2-37Site History, Description, and Ba&sect;'eline Condition Rev. 22.5.4 Rad Waste Building2.5.4.1 Location, Description, and FunctionThe Rad Waste Building is a single-story building with internal mezzanine levels, drive-intruck bay, and depressed area to store waste drums. It is located next to and west of theAuxiliary Building and power block area. The design drawings indicate that the building was.constructed after 1987. The building plan dimensions are shown as.73 ft by 175 ft. The floorslab finish elevation ranges from 1002 to 1007 ft. The flat roof higb.point is shown to be at el.1045 ft.2.5.4.2 Foundation The design drawings available indicate thai the Rad Waste Building is on a reinf6rced concretefloating mat foundation with a ground-floor elevation of 1007 ft and the lowest top/co.ncrete elevation at 1002 ft in the drum storage area. A foundation curb extends up to el. I 01i"fA, andthe drawings indicate that openings below 1010 ft are flood protected.
The thickness of the matwas not provided in the available documentation.
2.5.4.3 Structural FrameThe drawings indicate that the Rad Waste Building is a-pre-engineered steel-braced frame withprecast aggregate concrete panels to match sthe:existing,-Auxiliary&#xfd;'BUiling.
The roof structure consists of metal deck spanning between steel joists.-The metal deck appears to be designed asa diaphragm.
Lateral loads from--wind or earthquake--are carriedtoo the foundation by the roofdeck diaphragm and are transferi&#xfd;eI to the foundati&#xa3;d through th steel columns.2.5.4.4 Building-Envelope Exterior walls are shownito-be precast aggregate concrete panels that form the main weatherbarriET with a masonry bio.tW&.all internal biner. There is no detail for the roofing material.
,2.5.4.5 Pre-Flood Structural,Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were-not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.5 Techhidal Support Center2.5.5.1 Location, Description, and FunctionThe Technical Support Center is a single-story administrative building located within the powerblock area immediately north of the Auxiliary Building and west of the Maintenance Shop.The original structure was designed in 1980, and there have been subsequent revisions accerding...p.a vailable documentation..
..The original building plan dimensions are shown as 54 ft by 78 ft, and an addition to thebuilding was constructed in 1988 with nominal dimension of 40 ft by 68 ft to the east and 14 ftby 78 ft to the south. The grade floor elevation is 1005 ft, and the rooftop is at el. 1020 ft.
Page 2-38Site History, Decripion, Baseline Cohdition
''Rev. 22.5.5.2 Foundation The original Technical Support Center foundation is a reinforced concrete mat foundation,
.which varies in thickness from 2 to 4 ft. The original mat foundation was constructed with top-of-concrete el. 1004 ft and either concrete fill or false floor built up to el. 1005 ft. The 1988addition slab-on-grade elevation was 1005 ft. The building addition has spread footingsbearing approximately 4 ft below grade.2.5.5.3 Structural FrameThe original construction consists of cast-in-place concrete'walls to roof. The addition wasconstructed of concrete masonry units. Walls extend ffob.the top of the foundation to the topof the parapet wall.The floor slab is located at grade level and is constructed of reififorced concrete.
Interior non-bearing walls are supported from thickened-slab sections.
2.5.5.4 Building Envelope
,The roof is constructed of reinforced concrete-on metal deck~supported from steel joists andsteel beams. Tapered insulation is located above the roo.f.-9lab..
Exterior walls are typically constructed of 12,in.-wide.reinforced concrete masonry units, withrigid insulation on the exterior side.of.the masonry,&#xfd;U:-part of theibuilding
: addition, exteriorwalls are shown to have a masoiiveneer finish. .2.5.5.5 Pre-Flood Strucdi Ieporting Pre-flood-structuralrfeports were nOt-available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.6 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation 2.5.6.1 Location, Description, and FunctionThp.ldependent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) consists of spent fuel modules placedinrd6e 34-ft-thick reinforced concrete shield walls and ceiling, and an associated small Electrical Equip de.nt..Building, situated
.to the northwest of the power block, adjacent to the NewWarehouse.
The storage modules are concrete-box structures and are 9 ft 8 in. wide by 20 ft 8 in. long and18 ft 6 in. tall, placed on a concrete mat foundation.
The ISFSI footprint is 42 ft by 211 ft inplan, and the Electrical Equipment Building is 13 ft 4 in. by 17 ft 4 in. in plan with an I I ft2 in. cave height above grade.2.5.6.2 .Foundation The ISFSI foundation is a reinforced concrete mat foundation that is 2 ft thick. The Electrical Equipment Building foundation is shown as a I-ft-thick concrete mat/depressed slab with afloor elevation nominally 3.0 ft below grade, with concrete walls extending up to grade level.
Page 2-39Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.5.653 Structural FrameInformation on the structural frame was not available for the ISFSI storage modules, which aresupported by the concrete mat foundation.
The Electrical Equipment Building has reinforced masonry block wails extending from the topof the foundation walls at grade to the underside of the roof slab, I I ft 2 in. above the top ofgrade wall.The roof structure consists of a concrete slab on metal d masonry walls,sloped 0.5 in. per foot from the center of the structure ave in dimension of thestructure.
2.5.6.4 Building EnvelopeThe ISFSJ building envelope is as discussed in Section 2.2.5.6.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not avai labI eMdocumen 2,5.7 Seourity Building I(b)(4)'(b)(7)(F) 2.5,8 Turbine Building2.5.8.1 Location, Description, and FiThe Turbine Building was desi 96Whe uc Build oted as a majorappurtenant facility.
It is siuc connec-ed Service ding to the east, adjacent toa contained exterior transfo itchyard (tran T I A2, TI A3, and TI A4) tothe south, adjacent to the A uiding to th acent to the Maintenance Sho;to the e il c room that is'approximately 90 ft in height aboved approximate across in column to main column. The buildingrint is 122 ft by 227 imensio twin turbines on separate pedestal-type undations.
Floor and imp levationms e as follows:e 1 : 1004. 5 Rl+/* ent: 990.0 ft*Me VlSTop of cra3.9 Rt (+66,5 ft +/- above floor)2.5.6.2 Founda onThe top of the basement floor is at el. 990.0 it. The top of the pile caps is el. 989.4 ft. Thetypical cap for each major building column is 6.0 ft thick and is supported by a cluster of steelpipe piles. Main equipment such as the turbine/generator is also supported on mat/capfoundations and pipe piles of similar diameter and depth as the building piles.P Page 2-41Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.5,8.3 Structural FrameThe Turbine Building structure is a structural steel moment-resisting engineered frame withtapered steel sections and is approximately 90 ft tall with three interior floors, Buildingcolumns are supported on reinforced-concrete wall piers. The top of the wall pier is at el.1007.5 ft. Wall piers extend down to pile caps in the basement and are approximately 17,5 ft inheight,2.5.8.4 Building EnvelopeThe building envelope consists of exterior walls suppo tl athed withinsulated resin panels, Panels arc fire-rated from grad ox, ove grade inheight. The building roof is constructed with similar m sUP open-websteel joists spanning between main building frames. The t of the rod centerine ridge, which runs north-south, is el, 1095.4 ft at top of st of steel atwest ends (low points) is el. 1092.9 ft. I2.5,8.5 Pre-Flood Structural ReportPeriodic inspections of the Turbine Buildwas instituted in 1997 to perform visualTurbine Building, OPPD inspected the stIngin chedul years.ion and cturin 01 0,Xp proccdure co.n tion of the)7, and 2010.In the 1997 rport, no superstru s ic eel and e ado items) were listedas a concern.
Several cracks i isture seepa ere note he poured reinforced concrete walls (below grad e cracks were to be of significant structural deterioration.
A crack in the corbel at the mr, el. 1000.0 ft, of theHe eid TB- ted an Enginee ssistance Request for repair.report mdi a revi initiated to determine the repair process for theI item above. I that h ration is only surficial.
Thcrm was no reportedence of other signific tural det ion,004 report does not indi ny significant findings of structural deterioration.
epo does not .di ny significant findings of structural deterioration but listssev or minor rep as repainting or re-application of protective coating,The 2010 es cate any significant findings of structural deterioration butmentions tb aulking on the Turbine Building is aging.2,5.9 Security Barrlcaom f(b)(4),(b)(7)(F)
I Ballistic Resistant Enclosures Page 2-42Rev. 2Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition (b)(4),(b)(7)(F)
.1 Location, nn, an oTurbine Building South hyard is I ed south of the Turbine Building and consistsveral transformers, trans n structures, and an underground duct bank.TheT fo s for the co nts of the Turbine Building South Switchyard are as follows:-Transfi approximately 12 ft by 25 ft in plan dimension.
-The foun for TI is a l-ft-6-in.-thick mat, 14 ft by 34 ft, supported on piles.-T/Mat foundation is el. 1005,5 ft." Dead End/16] Structure
-Two-column frame is approximately 27 ft in height with interconnecting cross beam.-There are two foundations for each octagonal column. The piers have a 5 ft 0 in. by5 ft 0 in, by 3 fl 0 in. height. Top of pier is el. 1004.0 ft.-T/Foundation cap is el, 1001.0 ft. Each cap is 4 fl 0 in. thick, 7 ft 0 in. by 20 ft 0 in. inplan dimensions, supported by piles, Page 2-43Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2" Underground Duct Bank-Underground duct bank is 7 ft 0 in. wide, running east-west just south of main TurbineBuilding.
-Duct details are shown in Drawing 11405-E-315.
" Trench System-Main collector trench runs east-west with branches between electrical units TI A-2,TIA-3, and TIA-4; locations are shown in Drawing 11405&#xfd;.E-314.
-Grounding grid is established circling all transformers ill sfchyaxd.
-The conduit trench is a cast-in-place U-shaped trexihtWith removable covers. Trenchwalls have drain holes throughout.
The west enWs a drain.pipe through the slab withburied perforated pipe labeled as "to storm sewer~iianhole.-
* Transformers TIA-I and TIA-2-The foundations for TIA-1 and TIA-2 area l-ft-6-4n)thikmat, 5 ft by 8 ft, supported on piles.-T/Mat foundation is el. 1005.5 ft.* Transformers TIA-3 and TIA-4-The foundations for TI A-3 and TI A-4 are a I -f-6-in.
thick mat, 8 ft by 13 ft, supported on piles.-T/Mat foundation is el. 1005.5 ft.* Transformer TIC-3B1-The foundation for TIC-3IB is an 8-in.-thick mat, 4 ft by..6 ft 8 in., supported on piles.-T/Mat foundation is'e;,!.004.8 ft." Enclosure Wall-The structures are enclosed by an 8-in.-thick cast-in-place concrete wall cast ininsulated wall forms up to el. 1005,.0 ft.2.5.10.3 Structural Frame."_.
"
End/] 61 Structure 0" 1ctrcists of two bents, approximately 27 ft in height, withiriterc6inecting cross beam.2.5.10.4
:Building A building envelope is.not applicable to this structure.
2.5.10.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.11 Condensate Storage Tank2.5.11.1
: Location, Description, and FunctionThe I 50,000-gallon plate-steel Condensate Storage Tank is located east of the power block andsouth of the Intake Structure.
The tank is nominally 30 ft tall by 30 ft in diameter.
Page 2-44Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2Tank drawings indicate that the design is in accordance with all the applicable paragraphs ofthe American Water Works Association standard D100-65 for welded steel standpipe-type tank. Tank design shall be for atmospheric pressure plus a full tank of water.2.5.11.2 Foundation The tank foundation is a 2-ft-minimum-thickness concrete mat supported on 13 IOBP42 steelpiles driven to bedrock at approximate el. 934 ft. The top-of-concrete elevation is 1005 ft 6 in.This concrete slab is approximately 41 ft in diameter, resulting in a~w.alkway around the tank.This slab is cast within a steel sheet pile system that is driven into thietbfnk to el. 944 ft9 in., which is approximately 10 ft above bedrock.2.5.11.3 Structural FrameA structural frame is not applicable to this structure.
2.5.11.4 Building EnvelopeA building envelope is not applicable to this structure.
2.5.11.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.12 Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit2.5.12.1
: Location, Description.
and FunctionThe Dexnineralized Water System provides demineralized water to the Containment and Building and:makeup water to the Turbine Building and Service Building, supplying watc" to various loads. The demineralized water is produced with a reverse osmosis (RO) unitin t.e Old Warehouse as bot iaerated and ri'bn-aerated watcr supplies.
The non-aerated waterSupply is stored in the primai~y-storage tank.The Demineralized Water Storage Tank is adjacent to the Missouri River at the southeast corner:of the power block.The Dnemineralized Water Storage Tank is a 33-fit-inside-diameter storage tank that extendsapproximately 31 ft above grade. This tank is located to the north of the Old Warehouse and tothe west of the PA.The Pump House is a small pre-engineered metal building adjacent to the Demineralized WaterStorage Tank.The RO Unit resides in the northern section of the Old Warehouse.
The Old Warehouse i-s apre-engineered metal building supported on a cast-in-place slab and perimeter stem wall oncontinuous footings that extend below frost depth.
Page 2-45Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.5.12.2 Foundation The Demineralized Water Storage Tank is. supported around its perimeter on a continuous cast-in-place concrete ring wall that is 1 ft 2 in. wide by 2 ft tall. The interior of the tank bears on alayer of sand on top of a geotextile filter fabric, which in turn is on top of a free-draining crushed limestone aggregate.
The crushed limestone aggregate is drained by three 1.5-in.-diameter foundation drains spaced equally around the concrete ring wall.The Pump House is supported on a 6-in slab on grade.The entire tank footprint, including the concrete ring waflland the interior crushed rock alongwith the Pump House slab, is supported on a rammed piers soil improvement system.There is no foundation documentation available for the Oiidarehouse 2.5.12.3 Structural Frame -:The Demineralized Water Storage Tank is fabricated of stainless steel to meet the requirements of the API Standard 650.The Pump House is a pre-engineered metal building consisting of rigid steel moment frames.The building is clad with corrugated metal roofing and wall panels.The Old Warehouse is a pre-engineered metal buil4dijg consisting of rigid steel moment frames.The structure is braced to the frame&#xfd;.'
wjth tension only cable bracing.
Thebuilding is clad with corrugated etal roofing and 1 panels.,: ._,o.., ro fn an ... el...2.5.12.4 Building Envelope
'',.A building envelope is not-applicable to'this structure.
.2.5.12.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting-,
Pre-flood structural reports werie ot available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.13 Tower2.5.13.1
: Location, Description, and FunctionThe Met Tower is a 360-;ft -tall triangular guyed structure designed for 100-mile-per-hour windand radial ice on all fixtures of 1.0 in. The tower is located approximately 2800 ft north of thepower block. Thereis a small masonry structure adjacent to the Met Tower for instrumentation storage and protection.
The onsile meteorological monitoring system provides observations of wind speed, winddirection, precipitation, barometric
: pressure, temperature, and temperature change with height.The system is operated continuously.
The Met Tower is an essential part of the meteorological data collection system, allowing sensors to be placed at varying heights above ground so thatobservations can be acquired at elevations important to facility operations.
Page 2-46Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2The Met Tower incorporates an inside climbable ladder with a safety climbing device and hasFederal Aviation Administration (FAA) marking and lighting and a lightning and transient voltage protection system. Meteorological instruments are mounted at various levels on thetower, with sonic instruments mounted on booms extending laterally from the tower.2.5.13.2 Foundation The base footing for the Met Tower is 7-fi-0-in.-
by 7-ft-0-in.-
by 4-ft-6-in.-thick reinforced
: concrete, The tower is guyed at several locations along its height, with the guys extending in atriangular pattern at 120 degrees to one another.
The guy wires are collected at points 145 and290 ft from the tower base and anchored to concrete deadmen at grade level. The deadnien arereinforced concrete 4 ft 0in. by 8 ft 0 in. by 3 ft thick Wvith4 ft 0 in. of concrete fill above thefooting at the three 145-ft guy anchor locations and 6-ft-On-.i.rby'8-ft-0-in.-
by 4-ft-0-in.-thick reinforced concrete%
vWi4 ft 0 in. of concrete fill above the footing at the three 2904ft guyanchor locations.
2.5.13.3 Structural FrameThe Met Tower is constructed of a bolted tubular steel frame with a nominal plan dimension of3 ft 0 in. between the three vertical frame members.
The tower has the same cross section forthe entire height, with guys fastened to the frame at various, intervals of the structure height toprovide vertical stability to the structure.
2.5.13.4 Building Envelope (Instrumentation Shelter)An instrumentation shelter is located adjacent to theabase of~the.ower.
This building isnominally I I ft 4 in. by l ft 4in.,:constructed of 8- filph lly reinforced concrete masonryunit walls,9ft 2 in. high, supported by a reinforced co iir rte base slab with thickened footingsalongftbeperimeter.
,The roof is constructed of precast concrete planks spanning between theexterior walls.2..5.13.5 Pre-Flood Structu6ral Reporting
'Pre-;flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.14 Original Steam Generator Storage Building2.5.14.1
: Location, Description, and FunctionThe OSGS houses the. original steam generator, designed by Bechtel in 2007. The OSGS islocated to the west of the plant, north of the main plant entry drive.2.5.14.2 Foundation The foundation is a reinforced concrete rmat which is shown in the drawings to be placed in twophases with a horizontal construction or cold joint between the separate concrete placements.
The top of the mat slab is shown in the documents as cl. 1022 ft. Dowels are shown extending up from the top of slab into the wall above, No documentation is available for the plan layout.dimensions, or details above the top of slab.
Page 2-47Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.5.14.3 Structural FrameInformation on the structural frame was not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.14.4 Building EnvelopeInformation on the building envelope was not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.14.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.15 Switchyard 2.5.15 1 Location, Description, and FunctionThe Switchyard comprises the 161 kilovolt (kV) switchyard and 345 kV switchyard.
There arethree enclosed buildings in the Switchyard.
: However, there is no documentation that details theaboveground superstructure for these three buildings.
There are numerous stands for equipment (e.g., switches, bus supports) as welU.as equipment that is directly supported by a reinforced con'6rete foundation, but there is no documentation that details any of the aboveground superstructure:
161 kV Control and Switchgear Building-Built in 1990, located west of 345 kV switchyard
-One-story enclosure, approximately 30 ft by,70-ft overall plan dimension
-Floor.and important elevations:'0045'ft
+/-Basement:
N8tVapphicable Floor: 1005.6 ..* 345 kV East Control Building-Built in 1968, located east of 161 kV switchyard
-One-story enclosure, approximately 32 ft by 40 ft ovcrall plan dimension
-Floor and important elevations:
Grade: 1004.5 ft +/-Basement:
Not applicable Floor: 1.007.5 ft345 kV West Control Building-'Built in 1998, located east of 161 kV switchyard
-One-story enclosure, approximately 35 ft by 85 ft overall plan dimension
-Floor and important elevations:
Grade: 1004.5 ft +/-Basement:
Not applicable Floor: 1005.75 ft Page 2-48Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.5.15.2 Foundations There are three enclosed buildings in the Switchyard.
The following succinctly summarizes thefoundations provided for these three buildings as well as the numerous stands for equipment (e.g., switches, bus supports) and equipment that is directly supported on a reinforced concretefoundation:
* Building Foundations
-161 kV Building Foundation Pcrimeter wall footing, 3 ft 0 in. wide, approximately 5 ft below grade and top ofwall to bottom of footing is 6 ft 0 in.Floor slab is at el. 1005.6 ft, constructed of 5-in. reinforced concrete supported on6 in. of compacted sand over compacted soil-345 kV East Control Building Foundation Perimeter wall trench footing, 8 in. wide and 6 ft 6 in. from top of wall to bottom offootingFloor slab is at el. 1007.5 ft, constructed of 4-in. reinforced concrete supported on4 in. of Styrofoam above topof 6 in. of compacted soil-345 kV.West Control Building Foundation Perimeter wall footing, 4 ft 0 in-wide and 5;ft 6 in. from top of wall to bottom offootingFloor slab at el. 1005.75 ft, constructed.of-5-in.
reinf6rced concrete supported on6 in. of compacted rock over compacted soil0 Equipment Foundations
-161kV Transformer Foundations T- ]'Transformer foundations Built in 19683 ft 0 in. thick by'9 ft 0 in by 9 ft 0 in. mat supported by 11 14-in.-diameter reinforced-concrete pilesT-2 Transformer foundations Built in 19902 fA 0 in. thick by 0 Oft 0 in. by 18 ft 0 in. mat supported by I I 18-in.-diameter reinforced-concrete piles161kV Breaker Foundations Built in 19686 fl 6 in. by 26 ft 0 in. mat supported by six 2-ft-0-in.-diameter piers with 42-in.bells, 4 ft 6 in. deepBreakers I and 2 foundations Built in 19931 ft 6 in. thick by 9 ft 0 in. by 9 ft 0 in. mat supported by four shallowreinforced-concrete piers, approximately 1 8 in. in diameter, 5 fi 0 in. deep Page 2-49Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2Breaker Station Service Emergency R foundations Built in 199016 in. thick by.5 ft 0 in. by 10 ft 0 in. mat supported by four 6-in. reinforced-concrete pilesBreaker Station Service Normal Y foundations Built in 199016 in. thick by 5 ft 0 in. by 6 ft 0 in. mat supported by four 6-in. reinforced-concrete piles 3 ft 0 in. in overall lengthBreaker Station E and F foundations Built in 1990I ft 6 in. thick by 9 ft 0 in. by 9 ft 0 in. mat supported, fO"ur. 12-in. reinforced-concrete pilesTypical 161 kV circuit breaker foundations Built in 19902 ft 0 in. thick by 6 ft 6 in. by 8 ft 0 in. mat supported by opposite-end ratwalls18 in. thick and 4 ft 0 in. deep161kV Equipment Foundations Line Terminal Structure foundations-Built in 19687 ft 0 in. thick by 7 ft 0 in. bl.16 ft 0 in. mat su 'oitejd by ten reinforced-concrete piles.Switch Structure foundations Built in 19682-ft-0-in.-diameter,;pier with 42-in.bell, 6 ft 0 in..in overall lengthBus Support and Pot; Tr'ans. foundations Built.in 19683-ft-.O-in.-diameier:ipi&,.7 ft 0 in. in overall length9 ft 6 in. arid 10{ft 6 in. Q.V. Bus Support Stand foundations Built in 1990:.....
2-ft-6-in.-diieter pier, 19 ft 0 in. in overall length17 ft 6 in. and 18 !2in. S.W. Bus Support Stand foundations Buili in 1990 <-" 3/42-ft-6-in.-diame1te4)ier, 25 ft 0 in. in overall length9 ft 0 in. N, NI Svwil MStand foundations Built in 1990.":'2-ft-6-in.-djiameter pier, 19 ft 0 in. in overall length17 ft 0 in. H Switch Stand foundations Built-in 1.9902-ft-6"-in.-diameter pier, 25 ft 0 in. in overall lengthL.A. and CCVT K, U Stand foundations Built in 19902-ft-0-in.-diameter pier, 12 ft 0 in. in overali lengthPothead G foundations Built in 19902-ft-0-in.-diameter pier, 6 ft 0 in. in overall length Page 2-50Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2CVT foundation Built in 1993Single 2-ft-0-in.-diameter by 12-ft-0-in.-deep reinforced concrete pierBus Support Stand foundation Built in 1993Single 2-ft-6-in.-diameter by 25-fl-0-in.-deep reinforced concrete pierDead End Tower L foundations Built in 19906-ft-.0-in.-diameter pier, 40 ft 0 in. in overall length345kV Breaker Foundations 345 kV Power Circuit Breaker foundation Built in 1968Two parts: four 2-ft-0-in.-diameter piers, 7 ft 0 in. in overall length;1 -ft-6-in.-thick mat supported by four I -ft-0-in.-diameter piers, 5 ft 0 in. inoverall lengthTop-of-mat el. 1006.75 ftCB-6 Breaker foundation Built in 19682 ft 0 in. thick by 6 ft 0 in. by-]8 ft 0 in matSupported by four shallow reinforced-concrete piersCir Switcher foundation Built in 1968Single 5-ft-0-in.-diameter by 8-ft-6-in.-deep reinforced concrete pierTop-of-pier el.1005.75 ftSwitch Structure fodntlations
;Built in 19682-ft-0-in.--diameter pier with 42-in. bell, 6 ft 6 in. in overall lengthCCVTBuilt in 1968Single 2-ft-0-in.-diameter by 7-ft-0-in.-deep reinforced-concrete pierPot Trans and Cap.0Pot Device foundations Built in 19682-ft-0-in.-diameteiper with 42-in. bell, 6 ft 6 in. in overall lengthCB-2, -4 and -5 BreIer foundations Built in 1993I 2 ft 0 in. thick by 6 ft 0 in. by 18 ft 0 in. mat supported by four shallowreinforced-concrete piers345kV Foundations 345 kV T3 and T4 Transformer foundations Built in 19983 ft 6 in. thick by 16 ft 0 in. by 28 ft 0 in. mat supported by I1 16-in. reinforced auger-casi concrete piles, 50 ft in overall length345 kV FCS Spare GSU Transformer foundation Built in 20023 ft 6 in. thick by 14 ft 0 in. by 34 ft 0 in. mat supported by ten I 6-in. reinforced-concrete piles Page 2-51Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2Line Terminal Structure foundations Built in 19686 ft 0 in. thick by 14 ft 0 in. by 30 ft 0 in. mat supported by 13 unknown-diameter reinforced-concrete piles345 kV Shunt Reactor foundation Built in 19683 ft 0 in. thick by 9 ft 0 in. by 12 ft 0 in. mat supported by four 14-in. reinforced.-
concrete piles345 kV Station Service foundations Built in 19688 in. thick by 4 ft by 9 ft mat supported by four I -ft-0-in.
reinforced concretepiles2.5.15.3 Structural FrameInformation on the structural frame was not available in ther''eferenced documentation.
2.5.15.4 Building EnvelopeA building envelope is not applicable to this si cture.2.5.15.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.16 Transmission Towers2.5.16.1
: Location, Description, and FunctionThe Transmission Towers' are defined as a system of structures supporting lines 70 and 76 from.the plant dead end to the _tibstation dead-.end.west of the plant, and lines 66, 146, 148, and 165.beyond the substation to the&#xfd;-.est within fence.There is no documentation avaitible for the structures above grade, and partial documentation is:available for the foundations-su.porting the structures.
2.5.16.2 Foundation There are foundation drawings dated May 26, 2004, that indicate an augered pier foundation forline 76, and a drawing that indicates varying configurations of pile-supported pile capfoundations identified for the 345 kV line, but the pile foundations are not correlated to the linenumbers available in other documents.
The pier foundations are 5 ft 6 in. in diameter to 6 ft 6 in. in diameter, with design depths up to35 ft 6 in. The piers are designed as reinforced concrete piers with 'varying anchor boltarrangements for different transmission tower structures.
The pile foundations are shown as 6-, 7-, 8-. 9-, or I 0-pile foundations with pile caps ofreinforced concrete varying in thickness from 3 ft 0 in. to 3 ft 3 in. Reinforced concrete piers Page 2-52Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2are supported by the pile caps that extend above grade and have a structural steel column stubextending out of the pier.2.5.16.3 Structural FrameInformation on the structural frame was not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.16.4 Building EnvelopeA building envelope is not applicable to this structure.
2.5.16.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-Ilood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.17 New Warehouse 2.5.17.1 Building
: Location, Description, and FunctionThe New Warehouse is located adjacent to the river and north.,of the power block. Drawingsindicate it was built in 1987. The current building is approximately 322 ft by 126 ft in overallplan with a parking area to the north. The floor slab is sho~wntt6obe 4 to 6 in. thick, depending on the location, with thickened concrete undcr interiorCMU partition walls. Exterior grade isshown as being approximately 1003.71f1, and the finish'floor is shown at 1007.70 ft. There is afull building expansion joint loct ed between colurn grid lines.G and H; the expansion joint islocated approximately 40 pqereo'bf the building length as measured from the east wall line. Acast-in-place concrete manliflMH-17 is shown betf"tb61uin grid lines L.3 and M in theeast-west direction and betweei.:nd 2.3 in the nortf h"otirection 2.5.17.2 Foundation, Reinforced concrete spread footings are located under columns with continuous reinforced concrete footings at the wall-prireter.
Details indicate the use of both reinforced concrete andreinforced masonry foundatiori'alls.
The soil under the building was over-excavated down to9$04 ft, and engineered fill wasg1aced to finish grade.2.5.17.3.
Structural Frame.;,..
.: .'The structural frame on the'building indicates the use of steel columns.
Further details werenot available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.17.4 Building EnvelopeComplete information on the building envelope was not available in referenced documentation.
Details on the foundation drawings indicate precast panels may form the building walls.2.5.17.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.
Page 2-53Rev, 2Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition 2.5.18 Service Building2.5.18.1 Building
: Location, Description, and FunctionThe Service Building is to the east of and adjoins the Turbine building.
Drawings indicate itwas built in 1967. The current building is approximately 50 ft by 224 ft in overall plandimension.
The structure is a two-story ridged steel frame constructed on deep foundations.
The roof is metal deck with insulation and three-ply roofing.
Grade is shown to be 1004 ft; theground-floor level is approximately 3.5 ft above grade at el. 1007.5 ft and the second is atel. 1019.5 ft.2.5.18.2 Foundation The foundation is shown as deep pile foundation with reinforced pile caps placed to 10 ft belowthe top-of-foundation elevation at 1006.5 ft. Reinforced grade beams span between pile capsand support reinforced concrete slab with a thickness ranging from 6 to 12 in. Exterior columnsand walls are on continuous grade beams.2.5.18.3 Structural FrameThe structural frame is a rigid steel moment:'frme.
2.5.18.4 Building EnvelopeThe roof is shown as a metal deck with insulation and three-ply roofing.
lnformaiion on thewalls was not available in the-referenced documentation.
2.5.18.5 Pre7-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structura repotts:were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.19:C.GARP Building.2.5.19.1 Building Location p!DQ.escription, and FunctionThe:Chemistry/Radiation Protjtbion (CARP) Building was originally built in 1988 and adjoinsthe Auxiliary Building and T.e.ohical Support Center to the south and the Maintenance Building-to the cast. The weslt.all forms an exterior wall with an asphalt paved areaimmediatelywest of the-biiil"Iding.
A cafeteria composing the full east-west length of theCARP Buildingv,*as.addld-d1ater and is separated from the CARP Building by a two-hour firerated masonry i31odiyafi.
The current CARP Building is approximately L-shaped, 112 ft 6 in.(north-south) by 24-ft 8 in. (east-west) in overall plan dimension, surrounding the Technical Support Center to the southeast, which is approximately 60 ft (north-south) by 125 fA (east-west). Exterior grade is shown as elevation 1004 ft with the first-floor level at 1007 ft.2.5.19.2 Foundation Interior and exterior building columns are supported on shallow spread-fooling foundations.
Exterior columns and walls are on continuous wall footings, constructed in a manner similar tothat of the interior building columns.
I Page 2-54Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.5,19.3 Structural FrameThe CARP Building is a single-story steel framed structure, with a partial mezzanine level inthe southern half. Typical structural bays are approximately 25 fl by 25 ft.2.5.19.4 Building EnvelopeDetails for walls are varied but generally consist of concrete masonry construction.
The roof issingle-ply membrane over rigid insulation.
2.5,19.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.20 Maintenance Shop2.5.20.1 Building
: Location, Description, and FunctionThe Maintenance Shop was originally built in 1978 and adjoins the Service and TurbineBuildings to the south in the PA. Thc current~building is approximately 120 fl~ty 150 ft inoverall plan dimension.
The original building was a rectangular-shaped structure withdimensions of 60 ft (north-south) by 150 ft (east-west)..
The structure consisted of apre-engineered metal building with a mezzanine level. The main-floor level is at el. 1007.5 ft,which is approximately 3 ft above exterior grade. A rectangular-shaped addition was made tothe northern portion of the Maintenance Shop in 1987. The approximate size of the additionwas 60 ft (north-south).by
!5.0 ft:(east-west).
Theaddition structure consisted of a pre-engineered metal building witt.aparlial mezzanine The Maintenance Shop is borderedon the north and east by concrete paved areas.2.5.20.2 Foundation lifterior and exterior building columns are supported on shallow spread footings, and exteriorcolumns and walls are on continuous wall footings.
2.;.20.3 Structural FrameThe structural frame is a single.-story steel framed structure with an added mezzanine level inthe souther-'nhalf.
Typical _dpysware approximately 20 ft by 20 ft.4 -'-,:.:Q
..-2.5.20.4 Buiding EnvelopeThe building envelope is shown to be an insulated wall system with metal siding on girls forsupporting both and interior and exterior wall system. The roof is shown as a standing seammetal roof on purlins with ball type insulation held in place by a finished interior wall panelthat was not identified from the information available..
"2.5.20.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting There are two reported incidence of column settlements (Column TE- 15) within theMaintenance Shop building.
The first report, CR-2010-4755, occurred before the 2011 Flood Page 2-55Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2and notes that Column TE-l 5 had settled approximately one plus (1+) inches. The secondreport, CR-2011-5895, occurred in July 2011, and notes that Column TE-15 had settledadditionally.
The settlement was reported to be a sudden, dramatic settlement, approximately one plus (I +) inches, with accompanying cracking noises and following dust. A follow-up investigation by Ground Penetrating Radar Systems, Inc., in August 2011, using groundpenetrating radar (GPR), discovered that there was a possible void beneath the adjacent.
column; however, the exact thickness of the void was not determined but reported as a minor.2.5.21 Maintenance Fabrication Shop2.5.21.1 Building
: Location, Description, and FunctionThe Maintenance Fabrication Shop is located to the west of the CARP and 'afete~da building.
Documents indicate the Maintenance Fabrication Shop was builti fn 1987. The building isshown to be approximately 20 ft by 36 ft in overall plan dimension.and is 12 ft in height with alow slope roof. ":".2.5.21.2 Foundation Exterior building columns are supported on reinforced concrete shallow foundations (spreadfootings) placed 3.5 ft below grade and integ..al with a continuous reinforced concretefoundation wall on spread footings.
The floor slab is 8 in. thick reinforced concrete andapproximately 2 in. above grade.2.5.21.3 Structural FrameThe structural framing is a open-spanirigid fraimne steel structure with braced bayson the exteribor walls..2.5.21 .4 Building EnvelopeThe building envelope is shownt.-o consist ofa double-sided insulated wall panel and roof.panels.
The material skin on thle.,building panel is not identifiable.
Openings include one 8 ft.by.8 ft overhead door and two man doors.2.521i-.5 Pre-Flood Structura'l Reporting Pre-flood'slructural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.22 Maintenance Storage Building2.5.22.1 Building
: Location, Description, and FunctionInformation on the building was not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.22.2 Foundation Information on the foundation was not available in the referenced documentation.
Page 2-56Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.5.22.3 Structural FrameInformation on the structural frame was not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.22.4 Building EnvelopeInformation on the building envelope was not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.22.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documenitiation.
2.5.23 Old Warehouse 2.5.23.1 Building
: Location, Description, and FunctionThe Old Warehouse is located approximately 160 ft west of ihc power block. The currentbuilding is approximately 300 fA by 60 ft inI overall plan. The floor slab is about 4 in. thichbased on areas where the floor had core samples taken.2.5.23.2 Foundation Information on the foundation was not available in the referenced do urnentation.
............
.........
.-....
2.5.23.3 Structural FrameInformation on the structure-was'not available in. the ieferenced documentation.
2.5.23.4 BuiidingiEnvelope Information on the building envelope was not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.23.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Plre-,flood structural reports wete.,ot available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.24 Training Center2.5.24.1 Building
: Location, Description, and FunctionThe Training Centeris a single-story administrative building located southwest of the powerblock area and next to the plant access road. The original structure was built after 1987 basedon the design documents.
The preconstruction building plan dimensions provided in the referenced documentation indicate plan dimension of 10 ft by 370 ft. The preconstruction finished floor elevation is1008.5 ft with the cafeteria and auditorium depressed to 1007 ft. The original site grade withinthe building area ranges from el. 1000 to 1003 ft.
Page 2-57Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.5.24.2 Foundation The Training Center foundation was original recommended to be reinforced concrete spreadfooting placed at a minimum depth necessary for frost protection.
2.5.24.3 Structural FrameThe preconstruction referenced documentation indicates that the building has a steel frame withprecast wall panels. No information is provided on the roofstructure, 2.5.24.4 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.25 Administration Building2.5.25.1 Building
: Location, Description, and FunctionThe Administration Building was built in 1989 and is located southwest of the PA. It is atwo-story, steel framed structure,
] 72 ft by 308 ft overall.plan-dimension.
The Administration Building is bordered on the north by parking lots, on the south by wastewater treatment
: lagoons, on the east by chemical stabilization lagoons and marsh&#xfd;, iand on the west by theTraining Center. Floor and important elevations are as follows:,,,.
* Grade: 1007 ft +/-* No basement* First floor: 1007.0 ft ".There..als0iS aloading-dock on ofii-'silde.
with slightly lower elevation of 1004 ft with lowretaiiing;walls.
2.5.25.2 Foundation Interior building columns are supported on individual spread footings constructed on top of a2-fi4hick layer of new engineered fill above native soils. Exterior columns and walls are onconiinuous.wall
: footings, constructed in a manner similar to that of the interior buildingcolumns.The site is on the west bank0 of the Missouri river flood plain approximately 600 ft from theriverbank.
Bedrock was reported at 60 to 75 ft below existing grade before development.
Theentire building site has been raised 3 ft to 5 ft to place the floor elevations above flood plain.The site was preloaded with 7 ft of fill to compress softer layers of soils and reduce long-term settlements.
2.5.25.3 Structural frameThe structural framing is a two-story steel framed structure.
Interior columns are located on agrid, typically 34 ft by 34 ft.
Page 2-58Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.5.25.4 Building EnvelopeInformation on the building envelope was not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.25.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.26 Hazardous Material Storage Building2.5.26.1 Building
: Location, Description, and FunctionThe Hazardous Material Storage Building (Hazmal Shed) is located adjacent to and west of theOld Warehouse.
Documents indicate this structure was built in 1987. The building is shown tobe approximately 20 ft by 36 ft in overall plan dimension and is 12 ft in height with a low sloperoof.2.5.26.2 Foundation Exterior building columns are supported on reinforced concrete shallow foundations (spreadfootings) placed 3.5 fi below grade and integral with a continuous reinforced concretefoundation wall on spread footings.
The flo.or slab is 8-in.-thick.reinforced concrete andshown approximately 2 in. above the .adjacent.grade elevation.
2.5.26.3 Structural FrameThe structural framing is a singl.erory, open-span, nsgidtaifie'gteel structure with braced bayson the exterior walls. -,2.5.26.4-Building EnvelopeThe building envelope is shown to consist of a. double-sided insulated wall panel and roofpanels The material that forms the building panel is not identifiable on the documents.
-Openings include one 8 ft by 8 ft overhead door and two man doors.2 5.26 5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.27 Maintenance Garage2.5.27.1 Building
: Location, Description, and FunctionThe Maintenance Garage is located approximately 250 ft west of the southern end of the OldWarehouse.
According to the documentation-available, the Maintenance Garage was built in2005, and documents indicate the foundation was originally built for the Head AssemblyFacility (HAF) used for the steam generator project.
Page 2-59Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.5.27.2 Foundation The reinforced concrete foundation is shown to be a 2-ft-thick reinforced mat foundation withthe top-of-concrete place approximately at grade with thickened haunches at the perimeter extending 2 ft 6 in. below grade.2.5.27.3 Structural FrameThe information available indicates the structure is a steel semicircular bent frame. Details onthe member shape and space were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.27.4 Building EnvelopeThe building envelope is identified on the documentation as a fabric cover over the steel frame.2.5.27.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in thereferenced documentation.
2.5.28 Tertiary Building2.5.28.1 Building
: Location, Description, and FunctionThe Tertiary Building (Boat Storage),was 6&#xfd;it- in 1984.originally.as.a neutralization building asindicated in the geotechnical repot. The building ihown to be;.pproximately 24 ft by 20 ft inplan. The structure is a one-story prefabricated batffing on shallow foundations with areinforced concrete floating Tslb placed at 1001. ] shgrgdeshown as 1000.5 ft. Thebuilding covers a submerged taiikltbat sits on a reinffiercMl'.cncrete mat placed approximately 12 ft below grade.2.5.28.2 Foundation
.The foundation consists of reinforced grade walls extending approximately 4 ft below grade.2.5,28.3 Structural FrameThe steel structural frame consists of a prefabricated steel braced frame.2.5.28.4
'Building EnvelopeInformation on the"-bi;iiding envelope was not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.28.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.
Page 2-60Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition
.Rev. 22.5.29 Spare Transformer Pads2.5.29.1 Building
: Location, Description, and FunctionThe Spare Transformer Pads are located just off the main plant entrance road and south of theSwitch Yard. Drawings indicate that one pad was buill in 2002 and another in 2005. One padconsists of reinforced concrete cap supported on ten l-ft-6-in.
reinforced concrete piles, whichare placed to 73 ft below grade, and is located between the second pad and the Maintenance Garage. The second pad is a 1 -ft-thick reinforced concrete mat 50 ft by 52 ft in plan with ahauched perimeter thickness of 2 ft and a top-of-concrete elevation of 1006 ft.2.5.29.2 Foundation See Section 2.5.29.1.
2.5.29.3 Structural FrameA structural frame is not applicable to this structure.
2.5.29.4 Building EnvelopeA building envelope is not applicable to this.structure.
2.5.29.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports wy re not available in thetreferenced documentation.
2.5.30 Shooting Range2.5.30.1 Building
: Location, Description, and FunctionThe Shooting range is located 400 ft north of the PA and approximately 750 ft west of the riverand separated from the rivert a wooded patch of land. The land area for the firing range isapproximately 100 ft wide by 150:ft deep. A shelter on the southern end of the range spans thefull, 100-ft width of the range. The shooting range is surrounded by a berm on three sides and,thb entire area of the range from. .rest-of-berm to crest-of-berm is approximately 225 ft by200 ft.2.5.30.2 Fotundation A foundation is not applicable to this structure.
2.5.30.3 Structural FrameA structural frame is not applicable to this structure.
2.5.30.4 Building EnvelopeA building envelope is not applicable to this structure.
Page 2-61Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.5.30.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.6 Civil BaselineCivil infrastructure provides functional support for Priority I and Priority 2 structures at FCS.Underground utilities, electrical lines, and structures are essential components of facility operation.
Many of these components were part of original plant construction and have'been modified when andwhere necessary, including for plant upgrades as well as repairs.
As a resultnumerious plant drawingsshow underground utilities at the site. Drawing 25036-C-008 (File 60559) isja:aepmposite plan ofexisting (as of 2006) buried utilities, primarily those north of the.main FCS aMcess .,rad. This drawingand other existing available drawings were reviewed to identify&hie~xiSiig civil inifastructure relatingto Priority I structures at FCS prior to the beginning of the flood. The 'following aspectswere targetedfor each component:
U Underground Piping-Materials of Construction
-Range of Sizes-Bedding Type" Underground Electrical
"-Type of Burial-Range of Sizes ..-Bedding Type (if applicable)
In addition to these underground componr'e~ts, the civil FCS includes someaboveground structures,.including the CameraTowers and High Mast Lighting,
: fencing, the MetTower, and the Transmission Towers.Data obtained are discussed and/or referenced throughout this civil baseline description.
Targetedaspects that were not found during the,%cOurse of thedita review are noted as unknown.
Drawingsshowing civil infrastructure are identified herein for reference purposes.
2.6.1 Underground Piping Utilities'l:."'-.:
OPPD's ProaAirBasis Document (Pgb) 28, "Buried Piping and Components Program,"
wasdeveloped to esi'alrlish and maintaj.fiCa program that will detect, monitor and mitigate corrosion inplant buried piping and components."
PBD-28 outlines program objectives, including the following:
* Identifying susceptible buried piping* Examining piping components
* Evaluating components to determine degradation
* Establishing pjping/cromponent replacemeni CriterTa
:* Reducing system degradation Page 2-62Rev. 2Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition In 2010, as part of PBD-28, Enercon delivered to OPPD the "Forl Calhoun Buried Pipe ProgramBPWORKSTM Document" (PBD-28, Attachment D). The Enercon BPWORKSTM document details"the risk ranking of buried pipe segments a, the Fort Calhoun Station using EPRI's BPWORKSrM software in support of the (Nuclear Energy Institute)
NEI Initiative."
The intent of the EnerconBPWORKSTM document was to develop priorities for future inspection as part of the FCS program formitigating issues with buried piping.Underground piping utilities are located throughout the FCS site. A general description of each of themajor underground systems is provided in Table 2-6.Table 2-6 -Underground Piping Utilities
'Buried Piping System Piping MaterialA Range of Sizes BeddingType.
Drawing...B P S P Siz Reference Auxiliary Feedwater Carbon steel 4 in., 10 in. Unknown UnknownAuxiliary Steam Carbon steel 3 in. Unknown-UnknownAuxiliary Steam Fuel Oil Carbon steel I in., 1.5 in. U nknown Unknown93-590-2-199.
Up to 8 ,ft 6.-in;.by 11405-S-299 Circulating Water Cast-in-place tunnel .pto8, 6 in'. Pile .11 405-S-300
_"_"-__ , I 1405-S-301 Compressed Air Carbon steel 3 in. ..Unknown UnknownCondensate Carbon steel .i,.2 in.-' A.Uxiknown UnknownCarbon stedl'-l'.
3 iE... Unknown UnknownDemineralized.
Water PVC. " _ 8%ai. .Unknown UnknownDuctile and qkA iron 6 to:1-2in'
.Unknown E-4182Fire Protection Asbestos cement 6 to 12 in.; Unknown 1405-M-313 11405-M-312 Fuel Oil Carbon steel 3 in. Unknown 11405-M-314 Instruxment Air Copper 1.5 in. Unknown UnknownEhrhart Griffin& Associates, PVC 6 to 8 in. Unknown Sheets-.__.:-_"_.___:_.___._
__ C- I through C-7FRP w 1.5 in. I304 staialis steel 2 in. Unknown11 405-M-312 Carbon:steel 1.5 in. Unknown.Copper 0.75 to 2 in. UnknownI 1405-M-3]
211405-M-313 Raw Water Carbon steel 6 in., 20 in. Concrete encased I1405-M-313 I 1405-M-314 11405-M-315 Ductile and cast ironPVC4 in.4 to 6 in.4 to 15 in.222I 1405-S-402 VCPSanitary and Storm SewerCMP (Storm only) 8 in.-HDPE (Storm only) 15 in. + 21 1405-M-312 1 1405-M-331 E-4014E-40967753-03-A-20 SKE-09-05-01I RCP (Storm only)12 to 24 in.2L/
Page 2-63Site'History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2Table 2-6 -Underground Piping Utilities I Te8  DrawingBuried Piping System Piping MaterialA Range of Sizes Bedding Type Reference Copper 3 in. 2Service Water Carbon steel 0.75 to 3 in. 2 -l405-M-3t2 Vents and Drains Carbon steel 6 in. Unknown 1l1405-M-312 1 1405-M-313 Waste Disposal 304 stainless steel 2 in. Concrete encased_)1405-M-314 A PVC = polyvinyl chlorideFRP fiberglass reinforced plasticVCP = vitrified clay pipeCMP = corrugated metal pipe"CHDPE = corrugated high density polyethylene RCP reinforced concrete pipe ......__.-Bedding types for underground piping utilities are listed below, and the sources are given in parentheses:..
I. Pipe placed on 3 in. of sand fill and backfilled with 3 in. of sand, followed'by' common fill up to gradeand compacted to 95 percent of maximum density:
gradation is unknown.
(Drawing H1405-M-312; American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) standard.for compaction is not known.)2. Pipe placed on compacted subgrade in 24-in.-wide-trench, back-filled-with I ft Select Fill Type A CoarseStone (0.75 in. minimurn size), common fill up to fiiMniedgiad(
Pda&#xfd;ed in 12-in. loose lifts andcompacted to 95 percent of maximum density; rAation is unliown.
(Drawig E-4093 Sheet 2; ASTMstandard for compaction is not known.) _ _._,_,__.._,_.........
During development of the Enercon BP.WPORKSTM docurmerlt, soil sam'les were taken from sixlocations throughout the FCS site to de te= me the soil o be entered into the BPWORKSTMsoftware.
The assumptions associatedd!,ith using a represe `tativesample were not considered indeveloping the civil baseline descriptiofisobelow.
Rather, bedding specifications and/or details forburied utilities were researched for inclu~ionjn the baseline descriptions.
Specifications and/or detailsthat were foudaare listed under Bedding Tpe-in Table 2-6, above- Bedding Type is listed as"Unknown".'for systems that did not have trenching or bedding details included in available documentation.
Underground systems identified as Priofity I systems are discussed below.2.6.1.1T Circulating WaterSjtem is directed
: dom the Intake Structure to the Turbine Building and from theTurbine Buid.g to the rireithrough cast-in-place concrete tunnels that are up to 8 ft 6 in. by8 ft 6 in. in sizi;',Pipinig and instrumentation diagrams (P&ID) as well as a general flowdiagram are show.ninDrawings I 1405-M-257 (File 44336) and 93-590-2-199 (File 2512),respectively.
In November 2010, the Enercon BPWORKSTM document identified theCirculating Water System for inspection subsequent to priority inspections.
Page 2-64Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.6.1.2 Demineralized Water SystemDernineralized water piping is routed to the Service Building from a new water treatment system near the Old Warehouse.
Blair Water provided HDR with information about this pipingsystem. However, the Enercon BPWORKSTM document identifies the piping as 3-in. steel and8-in. PVC. In November 2010, five segments of demineralized water piping were identified aspriority segments for investigation and one segment for subsequent investigation.
2.6.1.3 Fire Protection System PipingThe fire protection system piping is a buried loop around the main buildings, intended toprovide water for fire suppression.
Original construction of the loop' was 6-.to 12-in. asbestos-cement piping. Eight yard hydrants are located around the site along with multiple isolation valves. In addition to external fire protection, there are connections from the loop to interiorfire protection piping for the following FCS structures:
* Intake Structure
* Rad Waste Building* Security Building" Turbine Building" New Warehouse
* Service Building* Maintenance Shop* Maintenance Fabrication Shop" Old Warehouse Since originalconstruction of FCS, several sections of asbestos-cement piping have beenreplacedwith ductile iron piping. Not all locations of replaced piping could be determined from lhe-information
-available.
Drawing E-4182 notes that 20 ft of asbestos cement piping(also.known in the industry as.transite piping) were replaced with ductile iron pipe, locatedapproximately from I 170N/2212W to I 190N/2212W (using coordinates shown in DrawingE-4]82).
The Maintenance Shop and the Chemical/Radiation Protection (CARP) Buildingwere constructed over a section of abandoned fire main. This section of fire protection systemlocated approximately 35Rft south of the north wall of the CARP and extending fiom75 ftwes.i of the CARP to approximately 10 ft east of the Maintenance Shop, was abandoned in place; a-new section was c6dnstructed between the New Warehouse and the CARP Building, with addiiiorial sections extending to the north side of the New Warehouse.
In November2010, the Enercon BPWORKSTM document identified the fire protection piping as a priority forinspection.
2.6.1.4 Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and PipingThree diesel generator fuel-oil tanks and associated piping are on site within the PA._-Tanik FO-I is located south of the Auxiliary Building.
Two 2-in. steel pipes connect the. tank to thefuel pump located within the building.
Tank FO-1 0 is located between the Intake Structure andthe Service Building.
Piping for FO-10 is not shown in the drawings available.
FO-27 is anaboveground tank located adjacent to the west wall of the Intake Structure.
The EnerconBPWORKSTM document identifies this piping as 3-in. steel. Additionally, FO-32 (security Page 2-65Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2back-up tank, located south of the New Warehouse) and FO-43 (aboveground gas tank, locatedat the northeast corner of the PA) are within the PA but not listed as Priority I structures.
In November 2010, the Enercon BPWORKSTM document identified 35 segments of fuel-oilwater piping as priority segments for investigation.
2.6.1.5 Potable WaterIn 1993, approximately 4800 ft of 8-in. PVC water main was installed to provide a newconnection between the City of Blair Water System and the main FCS buildings.
In addition, approximately 1000 ft of 6-in. water service line off the 8-in. main were installed to serve thesouthern area of FCS, including the Administration Building.
The priinary.fumction of the newwater main is to serve the reverse osmosis water treatmeht.sys~tem for demineralized waterproduction.
The new water main is shown in detail in the 1993 drawings by Ehrhart Griffin &Associates titled "OPPD FCS Water Plant Tie-In to Blair W6ier System."2.6.1.6 Raw WaterRaw water piping is routed between the Intake Struciture and the Auxiliary Building throughtwo steel pipelines.
Both pipes have a 20-in. diameter.
Near Auxiliary Building penetrations, the piping is routed through 28-in.-diameter sleeves; sleeve material is unknown.
To the westof the Intake Structure, a 6-in.-diameter raw-water line extends off of the main line to water-treatment equipment located in the Service Building.
In November 2010, the EnerconBPWORKSTm document identified 21 segments of raw waterpiping as priority segments fOr investigation and sVen. segments for subsequent investigation.
2.6.1.7 WasteDisposal.
Waste disposal pipinig:.is shbwn in Sheet 11405-M-313.
The 2-in. stainless-steel pipeline isrouted between the Turbiin&#xfd;'ei ilding and 6te discharge tunnel of the Intake Structure.
InNovember 2010, the EnercdiilPWORKSTM document identified I I segments for investigation subsequent to priority investigidions.
2.6.2 Underground Electrical Utilities.
Underground electrical lines are loqa Mt1hroughout the FCS site. Electrical utilities are buried asdirect buried cable, 'buned concrete duct bank, or prefabricated trench. Ageneral description of each of t]ei-.mjor underground electrical systems is provided in Table 2-7.
Page 2-66Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2Table 2-7 -Underground Electrical Utilities Underground Electrical Materia..
I Conduit Size" Bedding Drawing Reference Utility Type9364-C-0106 See Files 46459, 46463,Underground Cable Trench Precast concrete W: 60 to 84 S4-(Trenwa) trench D: 22 to 38 in. 2.6.i.] 49 , 476 7,2.6.2.1 49669-70, 49717,49750-544 in. D-4353, Sheet I(6 ft by 6ft) 11405-E-319 Main Underground Cable Concrete encased Unknown 13007.01-EE-3F Bank 8 to ]6 i'n. 1405-M-3 12E-409611405-S-41]
Duct Bank (Abandoned)
Concrete encased Unknown Unknown I 1405,S,-41 0PVC Conduit PVC 4.to5,in.
Unknown CE-79-213.8 kV Distribution Duct Concrete encased ' Varies- Unknown 'D-4353, SheetBank _ _ _ __ _.-.. .D irectThree 1/0 15kV Direct Buried Cable NA Diet D-4353, Sheet I......._.... BuryThree 1/0 #2-15kV EMP AL Cable* A Direct I 1405-S-3 19(Abandoned)
C b e......_
Bury I1405-S-319 2989 & Communications
-(Abandoned)
Unknown U .knowAn Unknown I 1405-E-3 192/C #6 (Abandoned)
Unknown Unknown Unknown 1 1405-S-4 10C-333Underground Power Line Cable Unknown Unknown Ehrhart Griffin &:..___ "-Associates Sheets C-3Thr. 500 MCM AL 600V "sAl.umintm Unknown Unknown I 1405-E-3 194-(Abandoned)
" : ""Direct480VDirect Buried Cable Cable NA 11405-M-312
...._ ,'_._Bury 4-in. VCP (Abandoned)
VCP 4 in. Unknown 11405-S-402 CE-79-1Telephone Cable Unknown Unknown Unknown Ehrhart Griffin &Associates Sheets C-3Underground Electric Unknown Unknown Unknown F-4001 SH.]One 32SM Fiber Cable Fiber cable Unknown Unknown CE-79-1ISFSI Cable Trench Precast concrete Unknown Unknown 59058-EE-6A
& -6BtrenchA -PVC = polyvinyl chlorideVCP = vitrified clay pipe0
* NA = Not applicable Page 2-67Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev: 2For four of the major systems listed in Table 2-7, additional details were available and are provided asfollows.2.6.2.1 Underground Cable TrenchThe Underground Cable Trench is a Trenwa, Inc., trench system that contains the site cablingfor FCS.. The Underground Cable Trench (Trenwa) is a precast concrete cable trench thatfollows the PA perimeter.
The Trenwa varies between 60 and 84 in. wide and is between22 and 38 in. deep, depending on location.
Drain holes to subgrade are interspersed along theTrenwa alignment.
In areas with poor drainage soil, the Trenwa was recoininended to beinstalled over a perforated drain pipe below the Trenwa. However, the ,actual installation method could not be determined because the available drawings were nature. TheTrenwa is covered with precast lids. Al traffic crossings, lids are in place to allowvehicular traffic to cross the Trenwa. The Trenwa section is inbdified for these locations; suchmodifications include a thicker base and uni-strut inserts aftboth legs. Trenwa bedding attypical road crossings was specified to be compacted subgrade and blckfill, with a 95 percentminimum dry density per American Society for Testing and MateriiBs (ASTM) Dl 557.Trenwa bedding is compacted subgrade soil. Per the drawing notes, engineered bedding wasnot specified except at particular locations.
Soil compaction beneath the Trenwa was to beequal to the undisturbed average soil, with minimum compaction of 4000 pounds per squarefoot (psf). Pedestrian crossings and drain-pipe crossings includeda-minimum bedding of 3 in.of crushed rock underlain with geotettile fabric. Dr4aA.ings 88-185-1 and 9364-C-0012, files47643 and 46463, respectively, inblade notes and det~ils for Trenwa bedding and subgrade.
2.6.2.2 Main Underground.C.able BankThe Main Underground Cable Bakis aligned inside and outside of the PA through 6-.t-by-6-fl concrete-encased duct bank. Six eledin.ca, manholes (MH-l through MH-5 and MH-31) alongthealignment of the Main Undergroundi Cazble Bank are labeled in Sheet I 1405-E-319.
Oneadditional manhole on the Main Underg"roid Cable Bank alignment is located north of MH-1,.just east of the Control Building..
2.6-2-3 13.8 kV Power Distribution Mei ?-.voltage (13.8 kV) poWer is distributed throughout the site through buried duct bankand condu&#xfd;it.
Drawing D-4353shows a plan of the power distribution, focusing on the areasclosest to the PA. A 13.8 kV'Switchgear at the north end of the Old Warehouse distributes power through a concrete-encased duct bank that extends east and PVC conduits that extend tothe north and south.2.6.2.4 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation The ISFSI, located northwest of the New Warehouse, includes underground trenching andconduit for electrical power, temperature, and instrumentation systems between the ISFSI, theElectrical Equipment Building at the southeast corner of the ISFSI and the New Warehouse.
Drawing 59058-EE-6A shows the ISFSI cable trench and raceway plan. The cable trench issimilar to the Underground Cable Trench discussed in Section 2.6.2. 1. Additional buriedconduit is located on the north, west, and south sides of the ISFSI for the High Mast Lighting.
Page 2-68Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.6.3 Underground Structures 2.6.3.1 Lift Stations and Sewage LagoonsFour lift stations are located on site and are shown in drawing E-4093: SD-10, SD- 1I, SD-16,and the Administration Buildine Lifi Station.
Lift station SD-10, located south ofthe SecurityBuilding near the Missouri River, has been abandoned in place. Lift station SD-1 6 is locatedjust north of SD- 10.Lift station SD-II is located inside of the PA near the Nlew Warel6tise.
A 4-in.-diameler PVCforce main conveys sanitary flow from SD-l I around the Oid Warehouseto the sewagelagoons located south of the Administration Building.
The:Administr'atioin:,B5uilding LiftStation conveys flow to the Sanitary Lagoon Intake/Splitter StrucMte located-south of theAdministration Building.
The sewage lagoons, shown in Drawing 579J-M-2, provide treatment for the domesticwastewater generated on site. The new lagoon is a two-cell lagoon with a berm elevation of1007.00, high water elevation of 1004.00, and bottom elevation (at deepest point) of 996.50.Drawings 579J-M-1,
-2, -3, and -4 show additional details of the sewage lagoon and associated structures.
2.6.3.2 Septic TankAn underground septic tank, shown in DraWing E-4093.,
is locatednear the south end of the OldWarehouse.
Additional drawings and details were.not available for use in establishing the civilbaseline for the post-flood assessment.
2.6,3.3 Sanitary and Storm Sewer ManholesNumerous sanitary anfd storm sewer maaiholes are located throughout the FCS site. Fivesanitiary sewer manholes'are;iocated within-the PA. Drawing E-4093, Sheet 1, shows thelocation of known manholes-a.nd.,other strtiettres throughout the site. Drawing E-4093,Sheet 2, which was to contain various details for sanitary and storm sewers and manholes, wasnot available for use in establishing the civil baseline for the post-flood assessment.
Drawing25036-C-008.
Buried Utilities Composite Plan, shows additional components of the sanitaryand storm systems.
A storm drainage catch basin (noted as "New" in Drawing 25036-C-008) islocated at the far north end of the PA. No other existing catch basins were identified in theavailable drawings.
Page 2-69Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. i2.6.4 Aboveground Structures Civil infrastructure located aboveground at the FCS site includes the following:
" Camera towers and high mast lighting are located throughout the site. These arecomponents of the site security system and, due to security requirements, are not shown inany drawings.
" Fencing is located throughout the site as part of the overall security system. Fenced areasinclude the PA, the Original Steam Generator Storage Bv;ildiqrpt.$GS),
the Switchyard, and the perimeter of the site. Other fencing might existat.FCS, but it was not immediately identified in available drawings or other information.
* Weather Tower ME- 1, known as the Met Tower, is shown in Drawing F-4000. The MetTower is a 1 10-meter weather tower, located approximately 2600 ft north of the PA.Direct-buried fiber optic cable is routed from MH-30 at the northeast comer of the PA,along the east road to an access road to the weather buil~diijjI&#xfd;oted at the base of the MetTower. Power and communication cabling is routed in trenchi'uth of the Met Towertoward the northeast corner of the Switchyard w.Iaeye.iit transitiofi' Ito-aboveground cabling.The building near the base of the Met Tower is'a;12-f4tb.y-]2-ft concrete block building forhousing tower instrumentation.
." Transmission towers for 161 kV and 345 kW power are.!ocaed throughout the site. Thetowers support 161 kV and 345 kV power transmission ca1I1gbetween the TurbineBuilding and Switchyard and into the electrical distribution g.-d, These are shown inFigure 2-18, Sheets I through 3. The towers Hie foundations shown inDrawing E-4600..., ,: .
N. -11 2p 14'A Iv,ev MarP-7T S #i 1551&#xfd;61 kV.'P'STS #18.4161 kV,&#xfd;..-..STo16.S N25&#xfd;STS #18-3 r-~11 kv,'a0LI.U)UU-U,11; m"400Fe]elL~~J ..-~- ___________
-6D.0,.30~ND Owner Controlled Property Boundary.l"414" 11Transmission TowersFort Calhoun StationPlant and Facility Geotechnical and Structural Assessment DAT ESep 2011FIGURE2-18i a Met Tower~t.rrL11 IPRH1O 27L 09 08 STS #10345kV Tower 161 kVSTS #14,'161 kVSTS #11-1161 kV0.,.".161 kV 345kVTower 161 kVa.kV 161 kV-H3kV,~345kV.Tower
-.161 kV 16kV.. 7Tower 1S .. ... .. ,,.......11Owner Controlled Property BoundaryIOmawha Power OrsiriclTransmission TowersFort Calhoun StationPlant and Facility Geotechnical and Structural Assessment 2j5161 kV9~MaD7161 kVPa.161 kV2-q.L3 -I-1/4400A* n rD" (= Owner Controlled P Borpet BoundaryOmawha Pubim Puwe: OisinrTransmission TowersFort Calhoun StationPlant and Facility Geotechnical and Structural Assessment Sep 2011FIGURE2-18hq-l& S & A Section 5.7ii Priority 1 Structures Security BuildingPage 5.7-1Rev. 2 Priodty I Structures Security BuildingPage 5.7-2Rev. 2G~ 'NiF /
Priority I Structures Security BuildingPage 5.7-3Rev. 2(b)(4),(b)(7)(F) 5.7.4.1 Potential Failure Modes Ruled Out Prior to the Completion of the DetailedAssessment The ruled-out CPFMs reside in the Not Significant/High Confidence category and for claritywill not be shown in the Potential for Failure/Confidence matrix.
Priority 1 Structures Security BuildingPage 5.7-4Rev. 2/- .... Triggering Mechanism 2 -Surface ErosionCPFM 2a -Undermining shallow foundation/slab/surfaces Reason for ruling out:* It was evident from HDR's site inspection that no surface erosion occurred in the vicinity ofthe Security Building.
Triggering Mechanism 5 -Hydrodynamic LoadingCPFM 5a -Overturning CPFM 5b -SlidingCPFM 5c -Wall failure in flexureCPFM 5d -Wall failure in shearCPFM 5e -Damage by debrisCPFM 5f -Excess deflection Reason for ruling out:The Security Building was protected froifloodwater flowed over the site in the ATriggering Mechanism 6 -Buoyancy, jCPFM 6b -Cracked slab, lossCPFM 6c -Displaced struc enReasons for ruling out:* Altbai *1fi force of theForcIsuplgeu,Lters migi' occurred on the Securityetural support of the slabs was not observed at theefifd~f the Foding to the Syuplift of 1007 ft, whichRev 6).nent, the building is designed for a hydrostatic maximum flood level (SDBD-STRUC-504
's inspection of thea to recede below thrces was at its hiEity Building was completed shortly after the floodwaters hadximum elevation.
Therefore, distress related to buoyancy or,otential prior to the inspection, and signs of distress wouldT he Icbuoyanc'floodinginnFilding footings does not allow a net uplift pressure due toConditions in conjunction with maximum gross uplift forces fromaximum flood elevation did not cause observable distress.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.7-5Security Building Rev. 2Triggering Mechanism 7 -Soil Collapse (first time wetting)CPFM 7a -Cracked slab, differential settlement of shallow foundation, loss of structural supportCPFM 7b -Displaced structure/broken connections CPFM 7c -General site settlement Reasons for ruling out:* Due to the elevation of the Security Building slab (100 a I roximity of thebuilding to the river, this was not the first time wetti its uilding.* The peak flood elevation prior to 2011 was docum n 1993 ft, which wouldindicate that soils below and surrounding the buildi s e.Triggering Mechanism 10 -Machine/Vibration-Induc factionCPFM I0a -Cracked slab, differential settlement of dation, losssupportCPFM 1Ob -Displaced structure/broken connec,Reason for ruling out:The Security Building has not been su ed to ma 'brations t could induceliquefaction of soils. Therefore, machi r vib ndu faction failures are notpossible.
Triggering Mechanism 11 f Soil Stren ue to St iquefaction or UpwardSeepageCPFM -racked sla ntial settleme foundation, loss of structural n for rilina utcosidlobservations the maluodiints indicate no structure movement.
ofeefoe,baries.uTheefor
, smutlelsuements benTetdbyte21hlodwscnieredore, dation that can be a d to this CPFM did not occur.Tr Mchanism 1 rec-Corrosion
.ctural elementsReason for ut,TeSecurity ng has not been subjected to corrosive circumstances that would beconsidered beyd d the normal conditions.
The building was kept dry by the use of HESCObarriers.
Therefore, structural elements being wetted by the 2011 flood was considered inthe original designa of the facility.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.7-6Security Building Rev. 2Triggering Mechanism 14 -Frost EffectsCPFM 14a -Heaving,
: crushing, or displacement Reasons for ruling out:* The Security Building's foundation system is below frost level, and the interior of thebuilding is a heated structure.
The building will not be subjected to freeze/thaw cycles.Therefore, frost effects have been discredited.
* Flooding did not change the frost and foundation condi s. has alwaysbeen subjected to freezing temperatures with moist t ed5.7.4.2 Detailed Assessment of Credible Potent ilureThe following CPFMs arte te only CPFMs carred forws giled asse remo theSecurity Building as a result of the 2011 o This detatt Ls pro iTriggering Mechanism 3 -Subsurface Erosion/Pip.ig CPFM 3a -Undermining and settlement of sbdto/ e (due topumping)During the flood, continual pumping was red in t s o tem rot and in theknownity Buildug tbecause l large amount aterhn da.ndetrmine fesit beforHss iteTrgeingsMecthon.s n n =The _sobs stress indicators and other data that would increase orepotentia alati with this CPFM for the Security Building.
dvrs (Deg rdto ,loowa`"
Favorable (Degradation/Direct
.Impact More ,Floodwater Impact Less Likely)elocations for an extend rod. Security Building are noted to have granular fillPronSecurnity p discovered No current signs of settlement or structure Ssoft spots Jb earby pavement, distress.
whic coldsub'surface erosion.Data Gaps:*The extent omf surface erosion and potential adverse impacts on the Security Building are notknown due to a lack of geophysical and geotechnical data&During the infiltration of the Trenwa system, observations of the water flow into the system todetermine if soil was being deposited was not completed because it occurred before HDR's siteinspection.
Priority I Structures Page 5.7-7Security Building Rev. 2Conclusion Significance Potentialfor Degradation/Direct Floodwater ImpactSubsurface erosion is expected to have occurred at the site due to groundwater pumping inTrenwas and manholes in or adjacent to the Security Building.
If 1surface erosion issignificant, it could materially and negatively impact the int n function of thestructure.
It is believed that if subsurface erosion were o g ctures, signswould be visible during the inspections.
Because no si distres en observed atthis time, it is believed that the potential for degradatio W.Implication The occurrence of this CPFM on a large scale could neg capacityfootings supporting the building.
This could lead to excessive fou movement, ever,settlements are expected to occur at a slow rate a It in sud building collapse.
Should foundation movement be detected, ould be ted to keepthe building functional.
The settlements s ot nega act the i or intendedfunction of the Security Building.
Theref e impli otential gradation forthis CPFM is low.Confidence The extent of subsurface e d its potential t on ilding is not known due tothe lack of data gathered on ce conditions.
s not enough information onthe sub at ti nd the pupi ould have caused undermining r CPFM 3a, as discussed the poten for degradation is low because signs of distressnot observed.
It is unlik s degradation would have caused enough erosion to impact.'ty or intended the structure.
The combined consideration of the potential fo ion and the s of that degradation to a structure of this type puts it in the"Cnot category.
] tacurrently collected are not sufficient to rule out thisCPFM.. re, the icei the above assessment is low, which means more data orcontinued ng pections might be necessary to draw a conclusion.
Triggering Mechanism 3 -Subsurface Erosion/Piping CPFM 3d -Undermining and settlement of shallow foundation/slab (due to riverdrawdown)
Floodwater elevations, at the time of HDR's inspection, were above finished floor elevations, and river levels were being lowered at a relatively slow pace. RPver elevations were still wellabove normal levels.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.7-8Security Building Rev. 2The Triggering Mechanism and CPFM could then occur as follows:
the drop in elevation ofthe river is expected to occur at a higher rate than the drop in elevation of the groundwater.
This will result in an increased groundwater gradient.
This increase could allow for subsurface erosion to occur.The following table describes observed distress indicators and other data that would increase ordecrease the potential for degradation associated with this CPFM for the Security Building.
Adverse (Degradation/Direct Floodwater FavaImpact More Likely)The Security Building is in close proximity to the No di aser. sElevated saturated soils and elevated flood levels Surveyprovide a water source. A potential path for the buildwater and soil migration can extend under thestructure to the river, causing erosion.Date Gaps: 'M--W'.Effects of rapid drawdown may still initiate due to ,els. Tee conditions andwelkhow they ma fetti PMaentwl neophysic technical datainteviiiy offt theeuity Buidin are nthisl!Conclusion Sigfnificance" Potential for Degradatio/
ioodwater IRiverceded ized at a leve onding to the nominal normalriverof Oct 011. The potential for degradation from drawdown iso10 e it has n bserve ctober 4, 2011. Rapid drawdown has beened, and continu drawdo t expected to occur at a rate that would causeerining.
Therefore, ntial de n for this CPFM is low.ence of this CPFM large scale could negatively impact the capacity of thefooti rting the buil is could lead to gradual foundation movement.
However,settlem expected r at a slow rate and not result in sudden, total building collapse.
Should fo mo e detected, appropriate repairs could be implemented to keepthe building e settlements should not negatively impact the integrity or intendedfunction of the uilding.
Therefore, the implication of the potential degradation forthis CPFM is low.Confidence The extent of current subsurface erosion and its potential impact on the building is not knowndue to the lack of data on subsurface conditions.
Unknown river drawdown rates in the futurecould also add to current subsurface erosion.
River levels are such that this CPFM might nothave occurred yet. Therefore, the confidence for this CPFM is low.
Priority 1 Structures Security BuildingPage 5.7-9Rev. 2SummaryFor CPFM 3d, as discussed above, the potential for degradation is low because river drawdownis controlled and is not expected to occur at a rate to initiate this CPFM. It is unlikely thisdegradation would have caused enough erosion to impact the integrity or intended function ofthe structure.
The combined consideration of the potential for degradation and the implications of that degradation to a structure of this type puts it in the "not significant" category.
It isunknown whether this CPFM has occurred or whether it will occt& the future because thedata at hand are not sufficient to rule out this CPFM. he , e in the aboveassessment is low, which means more data or continued, rin ctions might benecessary to draw a conclusion.
IihTriggering Mechanism 12 -Rapid DrawdownCPFM 12a -River bank slope failure and undermini srtructures CPFM 12b -Lateral spreading The Triggering Mechanism and CPFMs couthan pore water pressure in the soil can dis,dropping river level. The sloped bank oftsaturated soil. At some point there is insu*saturated soils. At that point, the expislope failures associated with ra dhowever, deeper failures canFloodwater e tions, at the I-DR'and riv g low aboE t) inrThe sa-r provjbthe riv ops fasteris elev ye theI pressure upport for thede to support theen failure.
Generally, d and shallow in nature;fVe s overnare , ively ocs finished floor elevations, Ltively slow pace. River elevations were still wellof the river is expected to occur at a higher rateThis will result in an increased groundwater erbank slope failure and/or lateral spreading.
!it. This increasese locthe time of Revision 0, th&#xfd;4 ft). Field observation
.dropped.
level had dropped to a nominal normal level (roughly-river bank area has not been performed since the riverThetable descerved distress indicators and other data that would increase ortion associated with these CPFMs for the Security Building.
Priority 1 Structures Security BuildingPage 5.7-10Rev. 2Adverse (Degradation/Direct Floodwater Favorable (Degradation/Direct Impact More Likely) -Floodwater Impact Less Likely)The Security Building is in close proximity to the No distress was observed at the time of HDR'sriver. site inspection.
Elevated saturated soils and elevated flood levelsprovide a water source. A potential path forwater and soil migration can extend under thestructure to the river, causing adverse effectsattributed to river drawdown.
Survey data to date do not identify movement ofthe building.
Data Gaps:* Observations of the riverbank following drawdown to* Geophysical investigation data to address observed cons* Inclinometer readings that will provide an indication of s.Conclusion Significance Potential for Degradation/Direct FloodwaRiver stage level has receded and sriver level at 40,000 cfs as of Octolow because it has not been obsecontrolled, and continued riverthese CPFMs. Since it is benot likely, these CPFMs ar,to the noxrninal normalon from drawdown isown has beenthat would initiatef the structure exists but isson a T le could negatively impact the capacity of theThis co ! to gradual foundation movement but shouldor inten nction of the Security Building.
Therefore, s dation for these CPFMs is high.Revision 0, conditions required to trigger CPFMs 12a and 12bervations and other investigation data required to evaluate thiside, and an evaluation cannot be made. Therefore, confidence forThe data at hand are not sufficient to rule out these CPFMs or to lead to a conclusion thatphysical modification to ensure that river bank slope failure and lateral spreading will notoccur. Therefore, the confidence in the above assessment is low, which means more data arenecessary to draw a conclusion.
SummaryFor CPFMs 12a and 12b, as discussed above, the potential for degradation is low because riverdrawdown is controlled and is not expected to occur at a rate necessary to initiate these CPFMs.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.7-11Security Building Rev.. 2If the degradation were to occur, the implications to the structure would likely be low. Thecombined consideration of the potential for degradation and the implications of thatdegradation to a structure of this type puts it in the "not significant" category.
It is unknownwhether these CPFMs have occurred or if they will occur in the future because the data at handare not sufficient to rule out these CPFMs. Therefore, the confidence in the above assessment is low, which means more data or continued monitoring and inspections might be necessary todraw a conclusion.
5.7.5 Results and Conclusions The CPFMs evaluated for the Security Building are presented rating for the estimated significance and the level of confidenw Low Confidence
[(insufficient Data)=* 12a:z7 ot5.7.6 Recomr Cliofollow5 evailwhich shows the&#xfd;n ceRta)Continued monitoring ended to include a continuation of the elevation surveys of thepreviously identified targ n this structure and surrounding site. The purpose is to monitor for signsof structure distress and movement or changes in soil conditions around the structure.
The results ofthis monitoring will be used to increase the confidence in the assessment results.
Elevation surveysshould be performed weekly for 4 weeks and biweekly until December 31, 2011. At the time of thewriting of this version of the Assessment Report, groundwater levels had not yet stabilized to nominalnormal levels. Therefore, it is possible that new distress indicators could still develop.
If new distressindicators are observed before December 31, 2011, appropriate HDR personnel should be notifiedimmediately to determine if an immediate inspection or assessment should be conducted.
Observation of new distress indicators might result in a modification of the recommendations for this structure.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.7-12Security Building Rev. 25.7.7 Updates Since Revision 0Revision 0 of this Assessment Report was submitted to OPPD on October 14, 2011. Revision 0presented the results of preliminary assessments for each Priority I Structure.
These assessments wereincomplete in Revision 0 because the forensic investigation and/or monitoring for most of thePriority I Structures was not completed by the submittal date. This revision of this Assessment Reportincludes the results of additional forensic investigation and monitoring to date for this structure asdescribed below.5.7.7.1 Additional Data Available The following additional data were available for the S Bil ions 1 and 2 ofthis Assessment Report:* Additional groundwater monitoring well and river s from OP* Field observations of the river bank (see Section 5.25).* Results of geophysical investigation by Geotec , Inc. (se ent 6).* Results of geotechnical investigation by Th Inc.(see ent 6).* Data obtained from inclinometers by Thi ec ttac* Results of continued survey by Lamp son and (see A ent 6).5.7.7.2 Additional AnalysisThe following analysis of addit h con s of the soy Building:
tGroutdwater monito e rog n d river stage #PPD.Da T ne e holes water have returned to nominal normal levels.osrvatio bankNo significance distresi th e 2011 r was observed.
sults of geophysical inv, tion by Geotechnoiogy, Inc.
and S tests performed around the outside perimeter of thelo ck identified oonalies that could be gravel, soft clay, loose sand,torpossoResults ofI investigation by Thiele Geotech, Inc.Six test boingd Cere drilled, with continuous sampling of the soil encountered, to groundtruth the Geotechnology, Inc. seismic investigation resultas part of the KDI #2 forensicinvestigation.
Test bore holes were located to penetrate the deep anomalies identified in theseismic investigation.
The test boring data did not show any piping voids or very soft/very loose conditions that might be indicative of subsurface erosion/piping or related materialloss or movement.
All of the SPT and CPT test results conducted for this Assessment Report were comparedto similar data from numerous other geotechnical investigations that have been conducted Priority 1 Structures Security BuildingPage 5.7-13Rev. 2on the FCS site in previous years. This comparison did not identify substantial changes tothe soil strength and stiffness over that time period. SPT and CPT test results were notperformed in the top 10 feet to protect existing utilities.
Data from inclinometers to date, compared to the original baseline measurements, have notexceeded the accuracy range of the inclinometers.
Therefore, deformation at the monitored locations since the installation of the instrumentation has not occurred.
Results of continued survey by Lamp Rynearson and cia4Survey data to date compared to the original basel eys Iaccuracy range of the surveying equipment.
There efolocations, since the survey baseline was shot, has noSeveral CPFMs were identified in Revision
: 0. Since Rev*available that have clarified the significance and confiden orpresents each of the previously identified CPFMs and the new intesignificance and confidence based on the new dwdfilTriggering Mechanism 3 -Subsurface CPFM 3a -Undermining and settlempumping)t of wat ltratedusing su,ions of o ourDuring the flood, continual pureSecurity Building because a 1 9have been carried with thefrom these areas it was possiunderr jaround and in thents. Soil deposits couldIf enough soil was removedadation and slabs would berred at the site due to groundwater pumping in Trenwas andrity Building.
If subsurface erosion was significant, it couldacted the integrity or intended function of the structure.
It ishad occurred below the structures, signs would have beenwould be apparent from survey data. Because no signs ofthis time, it is believed that the potential for degradation is low.The occurrence of this CPFM on a large scale could negatively impact the capacity of thefootings supporting the building.
This could lead to excessive foundation movement.
However,settlements are expected to occur at a slow rate and not result in sudden, total building collapse.
Should foundation movement be detected, appropriate repairs could be implemented to keepthe building functional.
The settlements should not negatively impact the integrity or intendedfunction of the Security Building.
Therefore, the implication of the potential degradation forthis CPFM is low.
PCority 1 Structures Security BuildingPage 5.7-14Rev. 2'Confidence The extent of subsurface erosion and its potential impact on the building was not known at thetime of Revision 0 due to the lack of data gathered on subsurface conditions.
Subsequent fieldinspections and a review of surveyed data indicate no structure movement.
Since the structure has been monitored and no signs of movement have been detected, the confidence in theassessment of degradation for this CPFM has increased.
If further structure monitoring revealsno further issues, the confidence of the assessment for this CPFM&Eomes high.SummaryFor CPFM 3a, as discussed above, the potential for degswere not observed.
It is unlikely this degradation woulthe integrity or intended function of the structure.
The coTfor degradation and the implications of that degradation t&#xfd;"not significant" category.
The data collected since Revi&#xfd;CPFM assuming the previously recommended monit Ethe confidence in the above assessment is high,Mare necessary to draw a conclusion.
The daCPFM, which includes the geophysical, ge ical, anrequired.
Triggering Mechanism 3 -ECPFM 3d -Undermining drawdown)A At the time o vision I ofnorma .994wh" dfoundaisfa'b (due to rivertoiurred gradua'[&#xfd;se did not allow fcsment Repo ,vel had dropped to a nominalobservations o e river bank area were performed
.els. The drop in elevation of the river to its currenta I increase in the groundwater gradient.
Thisero e observed on site.)odwater Impactficancefor DegradationrDih river eRiver lvlow becauscontrolled, anundermining.
,el hased !. stabilized at a level corresponding to the nominal normalctober 4, 2011. The potential for degradation from drawdown isserved as of October 4, 2011. Rapid drawdown has beenriver drawdown
,is not expected to occur at a rate that would cause, the potential for degradation is low.Implication The occurrence of this CPFM on a large scale could negatively impact the capacity of thefootings supporting the building.
This could lead to gradual foundation movement.
However,settlements are expected to occur at a slow rate and not result in sudden, total building collapse.
Should foundation movement be detected, appropriate repairs could be implemented to. keep -the building functional.
The settlements should not negatively impact the integrity or intended Priority 1 Structures Page 5.7-15Security Building Rev. 2i :function of the Security Building.
Therefore, the implication of the potential degradation forthis CPFM is low.Confidence The extent of subsurface erosion and its potential impact on the building was not known at thetime of Revision 0, due to the lack of data gathered on subsurface conditions.
Subsequent fieldinspections and a review of surveyed data indicate no structure mj ment. The groundwater elevation measured in the monitoring wells closely follow e ye the flood waterreceded.
The data indicate that groundwater elevation w t the river levelnear the beginning of October 2011 and receded to the evel by tober 14, 2011.Therefore, the differential head created by the river dra. Ww o facilitate subsurface erosion.
Since the structure has been monit signs ment andthe monitoring well data did not indicate sufficient differe d which co esubsurface
: erosion, the confidence in the assessment of or this CPFincreasing.
If further structure monitoring reveals no further iss confidence assessment for this CPFM is high.SummaryFor CPFM 3d, as discussed above, the po 1 for de w becaus river drawdownhas been controlled thus far and is not ex to c a r ate this CPFM in thefuture. It is unlikely this degrada ou e enoug o impact the integrity r intenFeld o vtion of thecombin siderati ea potentie fordegradation and the implicat nr eat degradat w graef this type put it in the "notsignificant" category.
It is that this CPF d due to a review of surveyPoaetial for Derdatio/irc Flodatr macRetag monivell ded fia s at n a v cevels. The currentoriver rierlevelat 4,0 a ofr Octobe 4, 21.Te potentwial fotocr dgation tefutrom e.donilow bhetb e a s osment is high, which means no additional data,kiin the previot oring, are necessary to draw a conclusion.
Theprviously thought t uired this CPFM, which includes the geophysical, Otechnical, and inclinom are no lrer required.
* ring Mechanism 12 -i dDrawdown 12a -. River bank, s ailure and undermining surrounding structures 2b-Lateral pAtte i vision....
e Assessment Report, the river level had dropped to a nominalnorma Field observation of the river bank area was performed sincethe rierlve.
The drop in elevation of the river to its current level occurredgrdal eutn r' minimal increase in the groundwater gradient.
This increase did notallow for subsurface erosion to occur.Sienificance Potential for Degradation/Direct Floodwater ImpactRiver stage level has receded and stabilized at a level corresponding to the nominal normalriver level at 40,000 cfs as of October 4, 2011. The potential for degradation from drawdown islow because it has not been observed as of October 4., 2011. Rapid drawdown has been Priority I Structures Security BuildingPage 5.7-16Rev. 2controlled, and continued river drawdown is not expected to occur at a rate that would initiatethese CPFMs. Since it is believed that a potential for degradation of the structure exists but isnot likely, these CPFMs are considered low.//Implication The occurrence of this CPFM on a large scale could negatively impact the capacity of thefootings supporting the building.
This could lead to gradual foun on movement but shouldnot negatively impact the integrity or intended function of Se g. Therefore, the implication of the potential degradation for this CPF w.' %Confidence The groundwater monitoring well data and river level datdue to river drawdown had generally dissipated by about,of the river bank on October 20, 2011, did not identify decould be attributed to slope failure or lateral spreadin.
lateral spreading occurred due to the 2011 floodsigns of movement have been detected, the cSummary Ahat exces ressureshhe Ri ver BVslope failure rmonitored and nolherefor'PFM is'For CPFMs 12a and 12b, as discidrawdown has been controlled tlCPFM in the future. It is unlikiwould impact the integrity the potential for degradation puats it*ia trevia obse:as abo e p 1 for d is low because rivernd ntot ted to 0 a rate to initiate thisis degradatio uld e sed adverse effects thated function o c e combined consideration ofmplications o ation to a structure of this typeIt is believed is CPFM has not occurred due to arv d current river levels. The current river elevations
,ate M will not occur in the future. Therefore, the-nt is hI ch means no additional data, other than thering, are n ary to draw a conclusion:
The data previously is CPFM, which includes the geophysical, geotechnical, andSuired.udwater elence in the aboveiously recommended ght to be required to ruleaometer data, are no lonI Priority 1 Structures Security BuildingPage 5.7-17Rev. 25.7.7.1 Revised ResultsThe CPFMs evaluated for the Security Building are presented in the following matrix, whichshows the rating for the estimated significance and the level of confidence in the evaluation.
CPFMs 3a, 3d, 12a, and 12b for the Security Building are not associated with any Key DistressIndicators.
Results of survey data, ground well monitoring data, riverbank assessments, andfield observations do not indicate signs of structure movement or other adverse effects thatcould be attributed to these CPFMs. The data currently collected sufficient to rule out theseCPFMs due to the 2011 flood. Therefore, assuming that n identified through the monitoring program for the Security Build usse 5.7.6 andcontinuing until December 31, 2011), these CPFMs ar W to th of the matrixrepresenting "No Further Action Recommended Relat eLow Confidence (Insufficient Data)nceCPFI-3dCPFM 12aCPFM 12b0zI5.7.7.2 CUIn the assessment e FCS Structures, the first step was to develop a list of all Triggering Mechanisms and PFMs that could have occurred due to the prolonged inundation of the FCSsite during the 2011 Missouri River flood and could have negatively impacted these structures.
The next step was to use data from various investigations, including systematic observation ofthe structures over time, either to eliminate the Triggering Mechanisms and PFMs from the listor to recommend further investigation and/or physical modifications to remove them from thelist for any particular structure.
Because all CPFMs for the Security Building other thanCPFMs 3a, 3d, 12a, and 12b had been ruled out prior to Revision 1, and because CPFMs 3a,3d, 12a, and 12b have been ruled out as a result of the Revision I findings, no Triggering Mechanisms and their associated PFMs remain credible for the Security Building.
Therefore, Priorit&#xfd;SecuriI 1 Structures ty BuildingPage 5.7-18Rev. 2HDR has concluded that the 2011 Missouri River flood did not impact the geotechnical andstructural integrity of the Security Building because the potential for failure of this structure due to the flood is not significant.}}

Revision as of 02:20, 4 July 2018

FOIA/PA-2012-0235 - Resp 1 - Partial. Group B, Records Being Released in Part
ML13273A325
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Issue date: 09/19/2013
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GROUP BFOIA/PA NO: 2012-0235 RECORDS BEING RELEASED IN PARTThe following types of information are being withheld:

Ex. 1 : Records properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 12,958Ex. 2:F-1 Records regarding personnel rules and/or human capital administration Ex. 3T:- Information about the design, manufacture, or utilization of nuclear weapons[EInformation about the protection or security of reactors and nuclear materials E]Contractor proposals not incorporated into a final contract with the NRCE-OtherEx. 4:7 Proprietary information provided by a submitter to the NRCM_!Other Information that would decrease compliance and/or program effectiveness Ex. 5:[ODraft documents or other pre-decisional deliberative documents (D.P. Privilege)

D Records prepared by counsel in anticipation of litigation (A.W.P. Privilege) 7 Privileged communications between counsel and a client (A.C. Privilege)

D-1 OtherEx. 6:] Agency employee P11, including SSN, contact information, birthdates, etc.[,Third party P11, including names, phone numbers, or other personal information Ex. 7(A):f- Copies of ongoing investigation case files, exhibits, notes, ROI's, etc.Eli Records that reference or are related to a separate ongoing investigation(s)

Ex. 7(C): E-1 Special Agent or other law enforcement PIILI PII of third parties referenced in records compiled for law enforcement purposesEx. 7(D):D--

Witnesses' and Allegers' PII in law enforcement records--LConfidential Informant or law enforcement information provided by other entityEx. 7(E): [--1Law Enforcement Technique/Procedure used for criminal investigations

[--Technique or procedure used for security or prevention of criminal activityEx. 7(F): rlni'formation that could aid.a terrorist or compromise securityOther/Comments:

Smith, ChrisFrom: Kirkland, JohnSent: Tuesday, May 31, 2011 10:49 AMTo: Clark, Jeff; Azua, RayCc: Smith, Chris; Melfi, Jim

Subject:

FW: River LevelFrom: GUINN, DONNA K rmailto:dauinndoopd.com Sent: Tuesday, May 31, 2011 10:42 AMTo: Kirkland, John; Wingebach, JacobCc: ACKER, RICHARD D; MATZKE, ERICK P; COOPER, MIKE

Subject:

FW: River LevelFYIDonna Guinn, PMPSupervisor

-Regulatory Compliance dquinn@oppd.com (402) 533-7337[I(b)(6) ' :-fax (402) 533-7291From: NELLENBACH, TIMOTHY RSent: Monday, May 30, 2011-1:41 PMTo: NuclearBusinessUnit Cc, REINHART, JEFFREY A; BANNISTER, DAVID J; GATES, GARY; HANSEN, ]ON T; DOGHMAN, MOHAMAD I; MINKS,ADRIAN 3; BURKE, TIMOTHY 3; EASTERLIN, EDWARD E

Subject:

FW: River LevelHello,As you all know we are experiencing some of the highest river levels in the station's history.

The current level is 1001feet 11 inches. It is impossible to predict how high the river will get because we don't know how much rain will fall;however, we do know that the Army Corps of Engineers is planning to increase outflows from Gavins Point dam tounprecedented levels over the next several weeks. We are preparing for the worst case, and we will be ready tohandle It.We are currently implementing the following station procedures to deal with the high river level:-AOP-01, Acts of Nature, Section 1 for Flooding-PE-RR-AE-1001, Flood Barrier and Sandbag Staging and Installation We have also been reviewing our emergency plan procedures (EPIP-TSC-2, Catastrophic Flood Protection) in the eventthat they are needed to help mitigate the effects of the high river level.Items that we have either completed or started up to this point are:-Staged equipment at our sandpile to fill sandbags.

-Filled more than 8,000 sandbags.

-Sandbagged the necessary items in the Intake Structure and stored additional sandbags there in the event theyare needed.-Staged sandbags in the Auxiliary Building.

-Staged sandbags near the Main Station transformer, TI, for use to protect the Turbine Building and other assetsin the Protected Area.1 Staged our metal flood barriers.

-Sandbagged the Security Building doors.Commenced sandbagging in the Switchyard.

Had additional sand delivered to the site.-Making preparations to build a berm around our new demineralized water equipment near the Old Warehouse I sincerely appreciate the efforts by all station Personnel in aettina the above activities accomplished.

We stillhave a lot of work to do, and we will all need to pitch in during the next several weeks.Going forward please do the following:

" The available parking has been reduced.

Please be patient and do not park in standing water. Use the available dry spaces. If we run out of spaces additional parking and/or shuttle service will be provided to get the necessary people to work.0 Work with your supervision to make yourself available for sandbagging or other mitigation efforts." Do not despair.

We will continue to be successful In protecting FCS so that we can return to poweroperation.

From a Nuclear Safety Culture perspective the below principles come to mind as they relate to ourcurrent situation.

Principle 1: Everyone is personally responsible for nuclear safety. (People and their professional capabilities, values, and experiences are regarded as the nuclear organization's most valuable assets. We will continue tosuccessfully mitigate the effects of the high water because we have great people that can get the jobdone. We also have solid station procedures and the full backing of OPPD to get any necessary resources.

Principle 4: Conservative Decision Making (Decision making practices reflect the ability to distinguish between"allowable" choices and "prudent" choices.)

We will not startup the reactor until we know and understand the trends on river level.Principle 5: Nuclear Power is special and unique (Produces decay heat.) Our nuclear fuel is in a safecondition and will remain in a safe condition regardless of how high the river level gets. Our fuel iscurrently covered by more than 23 feet of water in both the Spent Fuel Pool and the Reactor Vessel. Oursafety systems are fully able to remove decay heat and will continue to do so.If you have questions or concerns, don't hesitate to contact your supervisor or manager.Thank you.Tim Nellenbach Plant ManagerFort Calhoun Nuclear StationOmaha Public Power DistrictPhone: (402) 533-6625This e-mail contains Omaha Public Power District's confidential and proprietary information and is for use onlyby the intended recipient.

Unless explicitly stated otherwise, this e-mail is not a contract offer, amendment, noracceptance.

If you are not the intended recipient you are notified that disclosing,

copying, distributing or takingany action in reliance on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited.

2 Smith, ChrisFrom: Wingebach, JacobSent: Wednesday, June 01, 2011 8:51 AMTo: Clark, JeffCc: Melfi, Jim; Azua, Ray; Smith, Chris

Subject:

FW: Update on Flood Protection ActionsFrom: GUINN, DONNA K [mallto:dguinnoopDd.com]

Sent: Wednesday, June 01, 2011 8:15 AMTo: Kirldand, John; Wingebach, Jacob

Subject:

FW: Update on Flood Protection ActionsFYIDonna Guinn, PMPSupervisor

-Regulatory Compliance dauinn@oppd.com (402) 533-7337fox (402) 533-7291From: REINHART, JEFFREY ASent: Tuesday, May 31, 2011 6:52 PMTo: NudearBusinessUnit Cc: HANSON, JEFFREY J; JONES, MICHAEL R; OPPD SENIOR MANAGEMENT

Subject:

Update on Flood Protection ActionsAll-Yesterday, Tim Nellenbach provided a detailed message regarding what we are doing to protect the plant fromrising river levels. I wanted to provide an update on developments since then.Currently the river level is 1002.3 ft. and rising slowly. The plant is in a safe condition, with fuel reloaded intothe core and greater than 23 ft. of water covering the fuel in the refueling cavity, and in the spent fuel pool.Our direction is to reinstall the upper guide structure, and then suspend reactor reassembly activities until wehave reliable information that the river level trend will remain below 1004 ft. and stay on a lowering trend. It ispossible that we will not meet these conditions until later this summer. We will not start up the reactor until itis safe to do so. Meanwhile, our safety systems remain available to remove decay heat, and our procedures and flood protection equipment will keep the plant protected.

Currently, we are tracking the release rates from Gavins Point and other upstream dams and correlating therelease rates to the expected rise in river level. Based on current best estimate predictions, river level will likelyrise another 2.5 feet to 4.5 feet over the next two weeks due to the planned higher discharges from theMissouri River dams. This is only an estimate, Per AOP-1 we will implement the Emergency Plan prior to riverlevel exceeding 1004 feet. The decision on specifically when we will implement the Emergency Plan will bemade by the Shift Manager based on river level, the rate of rise and predicted/actual precipitation levels. Wewill ensure that the Emergency plan is implemented before 1004 ft.In parallel with our actions to protect the plant from a nuclear safety perspective, we have also established aproject team, led by John Brandeau, to ensure we take appropriate actions to protect OPPD assets that couldbe damaged by flood waters. Those assets include materials, equipment and buildings such as outage trailers, material stored on-site, the old Warehouse, the new Warehouse, the Administration

Building, and the TrainingCenter. By establishing a separate team for non-nuclear safety-related
concerns, we enable the Operations Shift Manager and Plant Management to keep their primary focus on nuclear safety. The initial focus of theproject team is to ensure we have an accurate and prioritized picture of the assets that need to be moved tohigher ground or protected as river levels rise. We are also taking inventory of OPPD equipment available toFort Calhoun Station, and ordering additional equipment as necessary to protect our OPPD assets. Our CEO,Gary Gates, and the OPPD senior management team remains committed to provide additional support to theFCS staff as we go forward,We will keep you informed of new developments on a daily basis. Thanks for all of your support and concern.JeffJeff ReinhartSite Vice President, Fort Calhoun StationOmaha Public Power District402-533-6611 (office)402-533-7296 (fax)2 Robles, JesseFrom: Robles, JesseSent: Friday, June 03, 2011 1:44 PM

Subject:

IOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Friday, June 3, 2011NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS OFFiCiAL USE ONLY***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/

PROPRIETARY OR NRC INTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION..,

DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE OF NRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):

NoneManagement Requests:

NoneFollow-up/Other Tasks: Five (5)[Note -The information In this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help lOEBstaff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff]1) COOPER (INCL. FORT CALHOUN)

-PROJECTED RISE IN MISSOURI RIVER LEVELS OVER NEXTTWO WEEKS (UPDATE)The following summary details potential impacts to NRC facilities due elevated Missouri River levels. MissouriRiver Flooding.

For Ft Calhoun at 1008 feet MSL, the transformers will be impacted resulting in the plantexperiencing a loss of offsite power. The licensee's operational plan is to remain shutdown until the river crestsand then recedes to below 1004 feet MSL with a decreasing trend. If the river level reaches 1004 ft and isexpected to exceed 1006 ft, the licensee will transfer from the 4160 volt power to the Emergency DieselGenerators.

Forward to TRG Lead for Flood Protection/Missiles (Edward Smith) and EP (Eric Schrader):

assigqned to Russ Haskell.The US Army Corps of Engineers has indicated they will commence with staged water releases from upstreamdams to manage rising Missouri River levels. Releases will be on the order of 80,000 to 150,000 cubic-feetlsecond (ft3/sec) between now and 6/15/2011.

Releases of this magnitude could result in water levels atCooper Nuclear Station reaching the 899' 5" elevation (NOUE is 899') by 6/15/2011.

Station ALERT(SHUTDOWN) is 902'. The Army Corps of Engineers and National Weather Service are being consulted withregularly.

Forward to TRG Lead fgr Flood Protection/Missiles (Edward Smith) and EP (Eric Schrader):

assigned to Russ Haskell.Outside of Scope....................................

~ ~......

.o'trsID OF 5-,P"Outside of Scope Azua, RayFrom:Sent:To:Cc:SubjectAttachments:

Importance:

Howell, LindaSaturday, June 04, 2011 12:23 PMBorchardt, Bill; Virgilio, Martin; Weber, Michael;

Collins, Elmo; Howell, Art; Wiggins, Jim;Satorius, Mark; Pederson, Cynthia; Boland, Anne; McDermott, Brian; Moore, Scott; Carpenter, Cynthia; Morris, Scott; Thaggard, Mark; Bush-Goddard, Stephanie; Weil, Jenny; Markley,Michael;
Glitter, Joseph; Lewis, RobertKennedy, Kriss; Pruett, Troy; Vegel, Anton; Caniano, Roy; Campbell, Vivian; Dricks, Victor;Uselding, Lara; Erickson, Randy; Maier, Bill; Browder, Rachel; Clark, Jeff; Azua, Ray; Gaddy,Vincent;
Marshall, Jane; Gott, William; HOO Hoc; Hay, Michael; Lynch, James; Dickson, BillyMissouri River Flooding

-Status of Potential Impacts on NRC Facilities and Agreement StateLicensees OFFICIAL U3E ONLY -SENZITIVE INTERN.L INFOR.ATION Missouri River Flooding Potential Impact at NRC Facilities 6-4.docxHighAttached is a status report on the current and projected impacts at NRC-licensed facilities and materials licensees located in impacted Agreement States. Updated information is highlighted.

We have removed thesection on research and test reactors since there have been no impacts on these facilities and none isexpected.

Should that change, the reported will be updated appropriately.

We anticipate publishing the next update to this report on Monday morning and will likely resume daily updatesnext week.Please noted that the report is now marked OFFICIAL USE ONLY. This is due to the level of detailedinformation concerning licensee actions.

Please do not distribute outside NRC without letting us know. Wewant to ensure that information concerning planned actions that go beyond information in public records andplans is appropriately protected/controlled.

HOOS, should you receive a request for status information from DHS today, you may forward the sameinformation provided on June.2-3.

Please contact me if you receive a request for update on Sunday to assurethat we have the current status.If any recipient of this report believes others should be added to distribution, please let me know and thedistribution list will be expanded accordingly.

V/R,LindaI?~LA nrFICIAL

_USE ONL- .

I FORMATION Missouri River FloodingPotential Impact at NRC Facilities June 4, 2011(Updated information is highlighted)

Due to greater than normal snow levels in the upper Missouri River Basin, the associated snowpack runoff and record level rainfall, the Missouri River Mainstern Reservoir System isexperiencing flooding challenges.

Rainfall in the northern areas of the Basin in the past fewweeks has equaled what typically falls during an entire year, and snowpack runoff is expected tobe 140% of the normal volume. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has noted thatthis spring's flooding will be the most severe the region has seen since the reservoir system wasconstructed in the 1950's and 1960's. This has prompted USACE to release record volumes ofwater from each of the six major dams that make up the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir System. Based on information provided by USACE, the current modeling and release plan callfor achieving a 150,000 cubic feet per second release rate for five of the six dams by mid-Juneand continuing at that level through mid-July, and possibly into August, in order to maintainreservoir storage capacity.

Missouri River levels are projected to crest as noted below and mayremain at those levels through mid-July or into August.A summary of potential impacts is provided below for NRC facilities located in areas that are ormay be impacted by flooding.

Region IV is coordinating with Agreement States in the floodimpacted areas to verify the status of materials licensees.

-,Cooper Nuclear StationPlant Elevation:

903 feet mean sea level (MSL)Current river level: -895.7 feet MSL (5:45 am, CD T, June 4)Predicted max river level: 899.5 feet MSL predicted by mid-June (source is USACE)Potential Impacts on Plant Equipment:

There are no expected equipment impacts based onprojected river levels. The licensee will commence a plant shutdown before the river levelreaches 902 feet MSL at Cooper. At 898 feet MSL the flooding procedure directs licenseepersonnel to place sandbags on exterior cloors.PTý()(b()(F)

The licensee has entered its flooding procedure and is conducting enhanced monitoring of theriver levels and traveling screens.

The licensee is also preparing barriers to protect buildings and structures from flooding.

The licensee would declare a Notice of Unusual Event (NOUE) at899 feet MSL. The licensee would declare an Alert at 902 feet MSL and initiate plant shutdown.

Potential Impact on Evacuation Routes: A portion of the normal plant access road is nowclosed as a result of flooding.

The licensee has identified alternate routes that would allowOFriCIAL USE ~

IIhIAL US 0Nff -9lENSITI ITE l I P3IIIIRMA I '-access to and from the plant by personnel and diesel fuel delivery.

The licensee is preparing tobuildup this access point to protect it from flooding.

There is currently no impact on evacuation routes.Fort Calhoun StationPlant Elevation:

1004 feet mean sea level (MSL)Current river level: -1003 feet MSL (5:15 am, CDT, June 4)Predicted max river level: 1006.4 feet MSL predicted by mid-June (source is USACE)Potential Impacts on Plant Equipment:

I(b)(4)X(b)(7)(F)

I(b)(4),(b)(7)(F)

I1ýV+b) -h- licensee would normallycommence plant shutdown when the river level reacieis 1004 feet MSL at the Fort CalhounStation.

However, the licensee was nearing the end of a refueling outage. Currently the plant isshutdown with the core reloaded and flooded up to 23 feet above the vessel flange. Thelicensee's operational plan is to remain in this configuration-until the river crests and thenrecedes to below 1004 feet MSL with a decreasing trend (b)(4),(b)(7)(F)

(b)(4),(b)(7)(F)

TThe licensee has entered its flooding procedure and is conducting enhanced monitoring of theriver levels. The licensee is leaning forward in completing actions prescribed in its floodingprocedure and planned to have actions completed in advance of river levels reaching the triggerpoints identified in the flooding procedure.

The licensee has procured and is placing a 2000 foot long Aqua Berm (water-filled temporary levee) which is 6 feet tall and 16 feet wide at the base. This temporary berm will be installed atthe perimeter of the protected area and is expected to protect up to a 1009 feet MSL level. Thelicensee is building earthen berms around the 161 KV and 345 KV switchyards and is planningto build them to a height to provide protection similar to the Aqua Berm. Additional berms andsandbags are being built or installed around the Training Center, Administration Building andthe South Security Building.

These are intended to protect facilities important to site staff andcommunications equipment.

All offsite power sources (161 KV and 345 KV) are available and both primary emergency dieselgenerators (EDG) are operable and available.

The licensee is staging two additional fuel oiltanks within the Aqua Berm. These tanks will provide an additional two weeks of fuel (the fueltanks presently onsite have a two week fuel capacity, resulting in a four week supply of fuel).The licensee is developing plans to replenish fuel oil if there is an anticipated need to run theEDGs greater than a four week period of time.hohteakvn.Teinsal p to 4-(b)(4,(b)()(F)

The licensee is alsoevaluating a process for refueling the tanks through the tank vents. The licensee also plans toerrICIAL USE ONLY-SENSfTWIVEPILINAL INFRviIVA(IW

  • stage an additional spare generator with an associated fuel tank and step-up transformer withinthe Aqua Berm.The licensee is staging additional equipment and supplies within the Aqua Berm including, dewatering pumps, sandbagging equipment and supplies, gasoline
supplies, food and water.The licensee has procured satellite phones which will be distributed to key staff as backupcommunication devices.The licensee has ordered six boats for use onsite, if needed, since some parking areas arealready under water. Offslte parking arrangements are in place for site staff, and the staff willbe shuttled to and from the plant. The licensee is working with the National Guard to arrangefor additional backup transportation provisions.

The licensee will declare a NOUE at 1004 feet MSL The licensee's Emergency Plan would notcall for an Alert declaration until the river level reaches 1009 feet MSL. The licensee would notplan to activate its emergency response facilities if a NOUE is declared.

The licensee Ispresently planning to manage onsite activities through an Incident Command System structure using a model Included in the OPPD Pandemic Plan as a template.

At the current time, thelicensee's Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is not expected to be challenged by flooding.

The Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center are located within the AquaBerm.Potential Impact on Evacuation Routes: The licensee has indicated that the only section ofroadway that is projected to be impacted by rising river levels is a small section of Route 75 tothe north of the town of Fort Calhoun (the actual river level at which this would occur is beingresearched at this time). The residents of Fort Calhoun have evacuation routes to the west andsouth that are expected to remain available.

Evacuation routes for the town of Blair and othercommunities to the north are expected to remain available to the north and west.Outside of ScopeNRC Region IVRegion IV staff continues to monitor the flooding conditions along the Missouri River and thepotential impacts on Region IV plants and materials licensees located along the river. RegionIV is monitoring potential impacts on evacuation routes and is coordinating with the power plantlicensees, states and FEMA. Region IV has coordinated with the National Weather Service andUSACE to confirm projected river levels.OFFIIAL USE OrL E9TV NEItA nUM~U O!FFICLA.

USEOLRegion IV plans to augment the resident Inspector staff at Fort Calhoun Station on Monday,June 6. Region IV is establishing a schedule for daily conference calls with Fort CalhounStation managers to monitor the licensee's preparations and potential impacts on the plant.Region IV plans to initiate

routine, periodic calls with FEMA Region VII, the states and localresponse organizations early next week.NSIR has coordinated with FEMA Headquarters to ensure that they are aware of the potential impacts from river flooding at Fort Calhoun Station and Cooper Nuclear Station.--OrOrtUS~WL

~ -SMSITWE IENTER N AL INTO-RMAIILJN

Elliott, RobertFrom: Elliott, RobertSent: Monday, June 06, 2011 10:55 AMTo: Anderson, Shaun; Bucholtz, Kristy; Grover, Ravinder; Hamm, Matthew;
Hemphill, Khadijah;
Richards, Karen; Schulten, Carl; Singletary, Melana; Waig, Gerald

Subject:

FW: Notes from Decision Makers' Conference Call -- NOUE Declaration at Ft Calhoun Due toRiver Water Level 0800 CDT 6 June 2011FYI... Status at Fort Calhoun....

From: Brown, Frederick Sent: Monday, June 06, 2011 10:51 AMTo: Ashley, MaryAnn; Cartwright, William;

Elliott, Robert; Franovich, Rani; McHale, John; Shoop, Undine

Subject:

FW: Notes from Decision Makers' Conference Call -- NOUE Declaration at Ft Calhoun Due to River Water Level0800 CDT 6 June 2011FYIFrom: Thorp, JohnSent: Monday, June 06, 2011 10:02 AMTo: Leeds, Eric; Boger, Bruce; Grobe, Jack; Collins, Elmo; Skeen, DavidCc: Brown, Frederick; Pruett, Troy; Howe, Allen; Ruland, William;

Glitter, Joseph; Nelson, Robert; Cheok, Michael;McGinty, Tim; NRR_DIRS_IOEB Distribution; Kobetz, Timothy;
Kirkland, John

Subject:

Notes from Decision Makers' Conference Call -- NOUE Declaration at Ft Calhoun Due to River Water Level 0800CDT 6 June 2011All,I just sat in on the blast dial conference call with the Senior Resident at Ft Calhouo, John Kirkland, to listen toJohn's status briefing and participate in the discussion among decision makers Bruce Boger and Elmo Collinson the licensee's declaration of a Notification of Unusual Event for high river water level at 0800 CDT.Other attendees on the call included NSIR Jane Marshall, and the HOO.At 0920 EDT the decision was reached to remain in normal mode, with continued enhanced oversight andfollow-up with the licensee by NRC staff, which has been in progress in anticipation of the rising river waterlevel.* The river water level as of the time of the call is 1003 feet, 2 inches. The plant is in Cold Shutdown, and does not plan to start up until the river water level (trend) is abated, and will not start up while theyare in an Unusual Event (or higher) condition.

" The level at which an NOUE must be declared under the licensee's procedures (HU-1, EAL 5, NaturalPhenomena Affecting the Protected Area) is 1004 feet." According to the Army Corps of Engineers, the river water level at the site should reach 1006 feet 6inches in approximately 10 days.* The next decision making call will be held when river water level reaches 1006 feet. (This is the level atwhich there is a potential for offsite power to be threatened.)

" At 1009 feet, the licensee's procedures call for declaration of an Alert, and this is the level at which aShutdown is required if the plant were operating.

Licensee actions thus far:* Over past week, Ft Calhoun has been preparing for the rising river level, and has put in placesandbagging and flood gates to protect the site up to 1007 feet river level." The licensee has materials staged to support protection up to 1014 feet, and they have procured andby end of day today will have installed an "aqua-berm" (design is similar to a large inner tube filled withwater) to protect the entire protected area (with exception of the intake structure) up to 1012 feet ofriver level.* The licensee is procuring another aqua-berm to allow protection of the Training Building and thesimulator facility in that building.

During the days/weeks leading up to today's call, Region IV has been engaged and interacting with thelicensee, FEMA, and state and local authorities, and the Region IV staff will continue with enhanced oversight and engagement with the licensee for this event, which has come about due to a combination of snow melt andheavy rains upriver, and attendant water releases from the associated dams.Access to the site is thus far unaffected.

Due to some of the employee parking lot already covered by water,the licensee is bussing in most employees, with essential employees in shift crews (and NRC residents) stillable to drive in and use available

parking, until parking on site is no longer available.

Egress and evacuation routes remain available to the site. The Senior Resident Inspector and the Resident Inspector plan to makephotos of the conditions at the site, currently only on their local network drives, available to NRC staff via aSharePoint link, when they are able to.Please let me know if I've made any errors of fact or if I've omitted anything; I'll be happy to re-issue this statuse-mail with any corrections.

John ThorpNRR Daytime Emergency Officer301-415-8508 Daytime EO ClL (6) ((Personal Cell: (b)._)John ThorpChief, Operating Experience BranchNRR/DIRS/IOEB Tracking:

2 Recipient

Anderson, ShaunBucholtz, KrIstyGrover, RavinderHamm, MatthewHemphill, KhadijahRichards, KarenSchulten, CadSingletary, MelanaWaig, GeraldReadRead: 6/6/2011 10:59 AMRead: 6/7/2011 7:40 AMRead: 6/6/2011 10:55 AMRead: 6/6/2011 10:55 AMRead: 6/6/2011 10:56 AMRead: 6/6/2011 12:22 PMRead: 6/6/2011 10:55 AM3ý I Robles, JesseFrom: Bemardo, Robert,Sent: Monday, June 06, 011 3:03 PM

Subject:

IOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Monday, June 6, 2011NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS

      • MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/

PROPRIETARY OR NRC INTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION*'

DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE OF NRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):

NoneManagement Requests:

NoneFollow-uplOther Tasks: Nine (9)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help IOEBstaff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff]1) FORT CALHOUN -PROJECTED RISE IN MISSOURI RIVER LEVELS OVER NEXT TWO WEEKSA Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) was declared for the site.-The river water level as of the time of the call is 1003 feet, 2 inches. The plant is in Cold Shutdown, and doesnot plan to start up until the river water level (trend) is abated, and will not start up while they are in an UnusualEvent (or higher) condition.

-The level at which an NOUE must be declared under the licensee's procedures (HU-1, EAL 5, NaturalPhenomena Affecting the Protected Area) is 1004 feet.-According to the Army Corps of Engineers, the river water level at the site should reach 1006 feet 6 inches inapproximately 10 days.'The next decision making call will be held when river water level reaches 1006 feet. (This is the level at whichthere is a potential for offsite power to be threatened.)

-At 1009 feet, the licensee's procedures call for declaration of an Alert, and this is the level at which aShutdown is required if the plant were operating.

Licensee actions thus far:'Over past week, Ft Calhoun has been preparing for the rising river level, and has put in place sandbagging and flood gates to protect the site up to 1007 feet river level.'The licensee has materials staged to support protection up to 1014 feet, and they have procured and by endof day today will have installed an "aqua-berm" (design is similar to a large inner tube filled with water) toprotect the entire protected area (with exception of the intake structure) up to 1012 feet of river level.'The licensee is procuring another aqua-berm to allow protection of the Training Building and the simulator facility in that building.

During, the days/weeks leading up to today's call, Region IV has been engaged and interacting with thelicensee, FEMA, and state and local authorities, and the Region IV staff will continue with enhanced oversight and engagement with the licensee for this event, which has come about due to a combination of snow melt andheavy rains upriver, and attendant water releases from the associated dams.

Access to the site is thus far unaffected.

Due to some of the employee parking lot already covered by water,the licensee is bussing in most employees, with essential employees in shift crews (and NRC residents) stillable to drive in and use available

parking, until parking on site is no longer available.

Egress and evacuation routes remain available to the site. The Senior Resident Inspector and the Resident Inspector plan to makephotos of the conditions at the site, currently only on their local network drives, available to NRC staff via aSharePoint link, when they are able to. Forward to TRG Lead for Flood Protection/Missiles (Edward Smith)and EP (Eric Schrader);

Assigned to Jesse Robles.2 QUTS~te or ScoPEOutside of Scope3 DLrFr`6(I6 0F :5coPFAttendees at Screening Meeting:Bob BernardoJesse RoblesAdakou FoliRebecca SigmonSteve PannierJay Patel -(NRO)Mary Wegner- (RES) -by phone4............................................-..-.-..--..-----

'-.--...-.-------...-~'.....'-.~--...~-..-......

I I Robles, JesseFrom: Thorp, John (WSent: Tuesday, June 07, 2011 10:23 AMTo: NRRDIRS_IOEB Distribution

Subject:

FW: Missouri River Flooding

-Status of NRC and Agreement State Licensees

-0FFfehAL-I SEOLY -SENai iN TFuAL iNFORM/A I IUIAttachments; Missouri River Flooding Potential Impact at NRC Facilities 6-7.docxImportance:

HighFYI, more plant specific info on the Missouri river flooding situation at Ft Calhoun and Cooper Stations.

(Mark, Note the 'sensitive internal information" nature of this document.

I don't recommend putting a lot of thisinformation, especially that which causes it to be sensitive internal info, into the Daily Screening

Summary, butOK to discuss at the screening meeting and for use by our ET Briefer.

A lot of what's in here has already beendocumented in the screening summary of yesterday, that used my EO summary report as an input.)Thanks,JohnFrom: Pruett, Troy \lVSent: Tuesday, June'0'7, 2011 9:55 AMTo: Brown, Frederick; Thorp, John

Subject:

FW: Missouri River Flooding

-Status of NRC and Agreement State Licensecs-L UNLY -SENSIT1VI INTZRNAL IMMA-T-TfeN Importance:

HighFYI. Second report periodically provided by R4 with much more specific plant information on river level and impact.From: Howell, Linda \ t-4Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2011 9:47 AMTo: Borchardt, Bill; Virgilio, Martin; Weber, Michael;

Collins, Elmo; Howell, Art; Wiggins, Jim; Satorius, Mark; Pederson, Cynthia; Boland, Anne; McDermott, Brian; Morris, Scott; Thaggard, Mark; Carpenter, Cynthia; Lewis, Robert; Bush-Goddard, Stephanie; Weil, Jenny; Markley, Michael;
Glitter, Joseph; Evans, Michele;
Williams, KevinCc: Kennedy, Kriss; Pruett, Troy; Vegel, Anton; Caniano, Roy; Campbell, Vivian; Dricks, Victor; Uselding, Lara; Erickson, Randy; Maier, Bill; Browder, Rachel; Clark, Jeff; Azua, Ray; Gaddy, Vincent;
Marshall, Jane; Gott, William; MOO Hoc; Hay,Michael;
Elkmann, Paul; Dickson, Billy; R4RCB

Subject:

Missouri River Flooding

-Status of NRC and Agreement State Licensees OFFCAUSNL-ENSITIVEIN1ERA Importance:

HighAttached is the June 7 update on the Missouri River flooding.

Ft. Calhoun Station remains in a NOUE and theagency remains in NORMAL mode. Please note that the attached document is marked OFFICIAL USE ONLYdue to the level of detailed information concerning licensee actions.

Please do not distribute outside NRCwithout letting us know.Please let me know if you wish to have additional staff/managers added to this distribution list.

Missouri River FloodingPotential Impact at NRC Facilities June 7, 2011(Updated information is highlighted)

Due to greater than normal snow levels in the upper Missouri River Basin, the associated snowpack runoff and record level rainfall, the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir System isexperiencing flooding challenges.

Rainfall in the northern areas of the Basin in the past fewweeks has equaled what typically falls during an entire year, and snowpack runoff is expected tobe 140% of the normal volume. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has noted thatthis spring's flooding will be the most severe the region has seen since the reservoir system wasconstructed in the 1950's and 1960's. This has prompted USACE to release record volumes ofwater from each of the six major dams that make up the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir System. Based on information provided by USACE, the current modeling and release plan callfor achieving a 150,000 cubic feet per second release rate for five of the six dams by mid-Juneand continuing at that level through mid-July, and possibly into August, in order to maintainreservoir storage capacity.

Missouri River levels are projected to crest as noted below and mayremain at those levels through mid-July or into August.A summary of potential impacts is provided below for NRC facilities located in areas that are ormay be impacted by flooding.

Region IV is coordinating with Agreement States in the floodimpacted areas to verify the status of materials licensees.

INFORMATIQIN nrricTAL II~T ~Cy -~Fm;Tlvfl

!T~!TFiflNAi.

1NFflRM.A.TIflf~

111111, -131..... ° .... v..utside of Scope I .Fort Calhoun StationPlant Elevation:

1004 feet mean sea level (MSL)Current river level: -1003.8 feet MSL (6:00 am, CDT)Predicted max river level: 1006.5 feet MSL predicted by mid-June (source is USACE)Potential Impacts on Plant Equipment:

At 1008 feet MSL, the transformers will be impactedresulting in the plant experiencing a loss of offsite power. Barring any actions by the licensee, the raw water pumps will also be lost at this river level. The licensee would normallycommence plant shutdown when the river level reaches 1004 feet MSL at the Fort CalhounStation.

However, the licensee was nearing the end of a refueling outage. Currently the plant isshutdown with the core reloaded and flooded up to 23 feet above the vessel flange. Thelicensee's operational plan is to remain in this configuration until the river crests and thenrecedes to below 1004 feet MSL with a decreasing trend. If the river level reaches 1004 ft and isexpected to exceed 1006 ft, the licensee will transfer from the 4160 volt power to theEmergency Diesel Generators.

The licensee has entered its flooding procedure and is conducting enhanced monitoring of theriver levels. The licensee is leaning forward in completing actions prescribed in its floodingprocedure and planned to have actions completed in advance of river levels reaching the triggerpoints identified In the flooding procedure.

With a few exceptions, actions to protect vitalstructures to 1007 feet MSL have been completed.

The exceptions involve actions that are "onhold" until needed for personnel safety reasons.

These actions will be completed when the riverlevel reaches 1006 feet MSL.Installation of a 2000 foot long Aqua Berm around the perimeter of the power block (withexception of the intake structure) is complete, This temporary water-filled berm is 8 feet tall and16 feet wide at the base. This berm will provide protection for up to 6 feet of water (equates to1010 feet MSL). The majority of the switchyard is protected by an earthen berm to a level ofapproximately 1011 feet MSL. This does not include the 161 KV structures which are currently being protected by sandbag berms to a level of approximately 1009 feet MSL. The licensee isworking to enhance protection of the 161 KV structure through a combination of earthen andsandbag berms. The intake structure is currently protected to a level of approximately 1007.5feet, and with additional

actions, can be protected to a level of 1014. The ISFSI is built at alevel of 1009 feet, no additional protective measures have been taken at this time.Additional berms and sandbags are being built or installed around the Training Center,Administration Building and the South Security Building.

These are intended to protect facilities important to site staff, the simulator and communications equipment.

Once actions to protectvital structures are fully completed, the licensee plans to install Aqua Berms around these USEt UNLY =- :i3iIL N TFRAL ;NFGRFM1.T.,ON

...............

~...

O.-FrICIAL USE ONL.Y IvL facilities.

The licensee is brining additional overhead power lines to these facilities as a backupto underground power supplies.

All offsite power sources (161 KV and 345 KV) are available and both primary emergency dieselgenerators (EDG) are operable and available.

The licensee is staging two additional fuel oiltanks Within the Aqua Berm. These tanks will provide an additional two weeks of fuel (the fueltanks presently onsite have a two week fuel capacity, resulting in a four week supply of fuel).The licensee is developing plans to replenish fuel oil If there is an anticipated need to run theEDGs greater than a four week period of time. Refueling hookups for the fuel tanks are locatedat an elevation above the anticipated flood level (-1006 feet MSL). The licensee is alsoevaluating a process for refueling the tanks through the tank vents. The licensee also plans tostage an additional spare generator with an associated fuel tank and step-up transformer withinthe Aqua Berm.The licensee is staging additional equipment and supplies within the Aqua Berm including, dewatering pumps, sandbagging equipment and supplies, gasoline

supplies, food and water.The licensee has procured satellite phones which will be distributed to key staff as backupcommunication devices.The licensee has ordered six boats for use onsite, if needed, since some parking areas arealready under water. Offsite parking arrangements are in place for site staff, and the staff willbe shuttled to and from the plant. The licensee is working with the National Guard to arrangefor additional backup transportation provisions.

The licensee's procedures and Emergency Plan call for the declaration of a NOUE at 1004 feetMSL. At 0800 CDT on June 6, the licensee declared a NOUE, in advance of the river levelreaching 1004 feet MSL. The licensee's Emergency Plan would not call for an Alert declaration until the river level reaches 1009 feet MSL. A response mode decision making conference callwas held following the NOUE declaration with Region IV, NRR and NSIR managers present.The agency currently remains in NORMAL mode, This response mode decision will be re-visited if river levels approach 1006 feet MSL or if the licensee's protective actions arechallenged or fail and systems are at risk of flooding.

The licensee is presently planning to manage onsite activities through an Incident CommandSystem structure using a model included in the OPPD Pandemic Plan as a template.

At thecurrent time, the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is not expected to bechallenged by flooding.

The Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center arelocated within the Aqua Berm.Potential Impact on Evacuation Routes: Currently, there are no impacts on evacuation routes. The licensee has indicated that the only section of roadway that is projected to beimpacted by rising river levels is a small section of Route 75 to the north of the town of FortCalhoun (the actual river level at which this would occur is being researched at this time). Theresidents of Fort Calhoun have evacuation routes to the west and south that are expected toremain available.

Evacuation routes for the town of Blair and other communities to the north areexpected to remain available to the north and west.-r:ILL~ LJ ,.~NS',T;VE i'TE i iLN IryiNFFviA-TtON 1OFRCAL USE ONL SENSIT I NFORMATION Materials Licensees Rill and RIV are coordinating with affected Agreement States to monitor potential impacts onmaterials licensees.

There are currently no known impacts on NRC or Agreement Statematerials licensees.

The Agreement States have provisions in place to maintain contact withtheir licensees as conditions change. Region III and Region IV will continue to coordinate withaffected NRC licensees and the affected Agreement States to monitor potential impacts onmaterials licensees and update this section of the report as appropriate.

NRC Region IVRegion IV staff continues to monitor the flooding conditions along the Missouri River and thepotential impacts on Region IV plants and materials licensees located along the river. RegionIV is monitoring potential impacts on evacuation routes and is coordinating with the power plantlicensees, states and FEMA. Region IV has coordinated with the National Weather Service andUSACE to confirm projected river levels.Region IV has augmented the resident inspector staff to provide 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> coverage at FortCalhoun Station.

Region IV is conducting daily conference calls with Fort Calhoun Stationmanagers to monitor the licensee's preparations and potential impacts on the plant. Region IVhas conducted an initial coordination call with FEMA Region VII and plans to establish coordination calls with FEMA Region VII, states and local response organizations early nextweek.NSIR has coordinated with FEMA Headquarters to ensure that they are aware of the potential impacts from river flooding at Fort Calhoun Station and Cooper Nuclear Station.jrFi~..IML uSE CNL~ SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFflRMATION Robles, JesseFrom: King, Mark N MSent: Tuesday, June 07, 2011 2:08 PM

Subject:

lOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Tuesday, June 7, 2011NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS OFFICIAL USE- ONL,(***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE!

PROPRIETARY OR NRC INTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION***

DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE OF NRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):

NoneManagement Requests:

NoneFollow-uplOther Tasks: Five (5)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help 10E8staff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff]1) EN 46929 -FORT CALHOUN -UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO RIVER LEVELSee EN Text. Send to TRG Lead for EP (Eric Schrader) and Missiles/Flood Protection (Ed Smith). Assigned toJesse Robles.2) PNO-IV-11-003

-FORT CALHOUN STATION -PNO REGARDING DECLARATION OF A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO HIGH RIVER LEVELSee PNO Text. Send to TRG Lead for EP (Eric Schrader) and Missiles/Flood Protection (Ed Smith). Assignedto Jesse Robles.3) FORT CALHOUN -ALERT DECLARED DUE TO FIRE IN SWITCHGEAR ROOM, NRC IN MONITORING MODEFrom the HOO: At about 0940 CDT on 6/7/11, Ft. Calhoun declared an Alert emergency condition based on afire in a switchgear room (not the flooding).

The unit remains in cold shutdown.

The agency entered Monitoring Mode at 1056 EDT to respond to this event. We will follow with more information after we get the report fromthe licensee.

Continue to follow. Pass to TRG Lead for Electrical Power (Roy Mathew),

EP (Eric Schrader),

Fire Protection (Brian Metzger).

Assigned to Jesse Robles.*utside of Scopei OUTS 1t& oF sweeCAttendees at Screening Meeting:Bob BernardoJesse RoblesMark KingSteve PannierJay Patel -(NRO).I OcrS b saýcMary Wegner- (RES) -by phone3

Elliott, RobertFrom: Brown, Frederick ISent Wednesday, June 08, 2011 11:20 AMTo: Elliott, Robert; Franovich, Rani; Kobetz, Timothy; McHale, John; Shoop, Undine; Thorp, JohnCc: Pruett, Troy; Kennedy, Kriss; Croteau, Rick: Holahan, Patricia;
Andersen, James; Cartwright, William; Ashley, MaryAnn; Westreich, Barry; Bahadur, Sher, Blount, Tom; Cheok, Michael;Evans, Michele;
Ferrell, Kimberly;
Galloway, Melanie;
Glitter, Joseph; Giwines, Mary; Hiland,Patrick; Holian, Brian; Howe, Allen; Lee, Samson; Lubinski, John; McGinty, Tim; Nelson,Robert; Ruland, William; Skeen, David; Thomas, Brian

Subject:

FW: REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE We got this as a cc:, but if you have inspector qualified or nearly qualified folks available to support Region IV,you can probably contact the BCs listed below.We should also be thinking about support for the Browns Ferry 95003 (likely the late summer/early fall timeframe) and potentially also a Ft. Calhoun 95003 (depending on the final conclusion about the RPS coilsfinding).

Undine, I assume that you are already talking with Gene Guthrie about the safety culture piece for BF. Pleaselet me/Troy/Jim know how the status of the NEI guidance fits into this picture.Thanks,FredFrom: Kennedy, KrissSent: Wednesday, Junk, 2011 10:41 AMTo: Miller, Chris; Roberts, Darrell;

Croteau, Rick; Munday, Joel; West, Steven; Reynolds, StevenCc: Vegel, Anton; Clark, Jeff; Gaddy, Vincent; Brown, Frederick; Pruett, Troy

Subject:

REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE Esteemed Colleagues, Region IV has an emergent ne es to support inspection activities at Fort Calhoun Station andpotential inspection activities at outside of Scope S-FOrt Calhoun ..On June 6, Fort Calhoun declared a NUE due to rising river level on the Missouri River. We have established 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> site coverage to assess licensee preparations (extensive) for the flooding and monitor the impact offlooding on the plant.In order to support round the clock site coverage, I am requesting any support you can provide between nowand mid-August.

Your BCs can contact Jeff Clark directly at 817-860-8147 to discuss specific needs andtimeframes.

Dutside of Scope,3 .0 "

Thanks for your consideration of this request.Kriss2I I Robles, Jessen 1iFrom: K Ing, Marl<Sent: Tuesday, Juhe 14, 2011 2:27 PM

Subject:

IOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Tuesday, June 14, 2011NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS OFFAU Q***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/

PROPRIETARY OR NR ENAL USE ONLY INFORMATION**

DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSID OF1PFRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROMI ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):

NoneManagement Requests:

NoneFollow-up/Other Tasks: Fifteen (15)Iý I

4) COOPER AND FORT CALHOUN -PROJECTED RISE IN MISSOURI RIVER LEVELS OVER NEXT TWOWEEKS (UPDATE)*-* (6/14/2011)
      • The recent breech in a Missouri River levee located at Hamburg, Iowa (see photos) has.resulted in a one (1) foot drop in river level at the Cooper Nuclear Station (currently 896' 1"). This will notimpact State Route 136 which is an evacuation route for the station.

Sections of Interstate 1-29 close toHamburg, Iowa may be closed due to this breech condition.

River levels at the Fort Calhoun Station haverisen 1 inch since breech (currently at 1005' 7"). (Station remains in a NOUE condition due to flooding).

Forward to TRG Lead for Flood Protection/Missiles (Edward Smith) and EP (Eric Schrader);

assigned to RussHaskell.)utside of ScopeV,7) LER 2852011003R01

-FORT CALHOUN:

INADEQUATE FLOODING PROTECTION DUE TOINEFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT See LER update. During identification and evaluation of flood barriers in response to the NRC issued whitefinding (See OpE COMM item, this issue is being reviewed under IFR 2011-01),

several unsealed through-wall penetrations were identified on the intake structure to be below the licensing basis flood elevation.

During anextreme flooding event, water inflow could have affected the operability of both trains of safety related rawwater pumps (ultimate heat sink). This revision adds several other penetrations that were discovered as aresult of the review in the intake structure, auxiliary

building, and chemistry and radiation protection buildings.

EN 46590, EN 46594, EN 46716, EN 46690, EN 46741. Pass tq TRG Lead for Flood Protection (Ed Smith),and .SW/UHS (Gerard Purciarello).

Assigned to Jesse Robles.2 OLrr$~De?

oF' 6coP~3.I

&JSIC-0P Scope5) LER 2852011003R01

-FORT CALHOUN:

INADEQUATE FLOODING PROTECTION DUE TOINEFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT

6) LER 2852011502R00

-FORT CALHOUN:

INADEQUATELY COMPENSATED UNATTENDED OPENING OUS 06OV2 5C0pe'NOutside of Scope1IAttendees at Screening Meeting:Bob Bernardo

-by phoneRuss HaskellSteve PannierAdakou FoliJesse RoblesMark KingRyan Craffey -(NRO)Mary Wegner- (RES) -by phoneMark KingSenior Reactor Systems EngineerNRR/ADRO/DIRS/IOEB Operating Experience Branch301-415-1150 Mark. Kinq~cinrc.gov 5

Azua, ,Ray"From: Clark, JeffSent: Tuesday, June 14, 2011 8:24 AMTo: Kennedy, Krss; Howell, Linda; Alexander, Ryan; Alferink, Beth; Azua, Ray

Subject:

FW: Daily Status at Fort CalhounFYIFrom: BERCK, ALLEN rmallto:aberck@oppd.coml Sent: Tuesday, June 14, 2011 7:22 AMTo: 'pott.ema@pottcounty.com';

Bill Pook; Dan; Eric Plautz; Clark, Jeff; Jeff Theulen; Jon Schwarz; Kathy Stodola;Kirkland, John; Larry Oliver; Laurel Ryan; Paul Johnson; Whitney ShipleyCc: GEBERS, STEVEN W; DEANGELIS, PETER A; HANKINS, RHONDA R; MOELLER, CHRISTOPHER J; RELLER, MARK H;SILKE, DEENA L

Subject:

Daily Status at Fort CalhounFort Calhoun Flooding Status1. Reactor Status: Shutdown2. Reactor is covered with > 23-ft of cooling water3. Offsite power and Emergency Diesel Generators are available.

Both vital buses are energized at this time.4. Spent Fuel Pooling cooling is in service and protected.

5. Shutdown cooling is in service and protected
6. Current river level is 1005' 6".7. Current Blair gauge level is 31.53-ft with the current projection at 31.8-ft at about 19:00 onJune 18, 2011.8. The site has implemented procedures to protect power supplies and vital equipment.

Water isonsite, and flood barriers are protecting vital equipment.

9. No release of radioactivity has occurred.
10. Fort Calhoun has declared a Notification of Unusual Even at 08:00 6/6/11.11. Backup evacuation route onsite is inundated however the primary route onsite is passable andnot expected to be affected.
12. Power was removed from siren 257 and 260 in Pottawattamie Co. IA, which is just on the edgeof the 10-mile EPZ south east of the plant. Siren 75, 76 in Desoto National Wildlife Refugehave no power. Currently the refuge is closed due to flooding.

Siren 142 in Harrison Co. hasno power which is north of Loveland IA -9.5 miles from the plant. Siren 1 east of FortCalhoun on county road 34 between Fort Calhoun and Boyer Chute Recreational Area iswithout power. This area is closed due to flooding.

13.At this time no known major evacuation routes are affected.

Interstate 29 in both directions:

from Exit 55 North 25th Street to Exit 75 (Missouri Valley):

1-680 road closed to trafficbecause of flooding

-follow the detour signs. Interstate 680 in both directions:

from beforeExit 1 130th Street to Exit 62: 1-29; Old Mormon Bridge Road --- road closed because offlooding.

All in Pottawattamie Co, IA.Requested Information from states and counties:

1. When offsite evaluation routes are affected please contact emergency planning.
2. When the Blair Water plant is affected please contact emergency planning.

/1

3. Authprized power outages that affect or could affect siren operability, please contactemergency planning.

The river flow rate has been relatively constant at Blair NE, however the river level continues to rise.The Corp of Engineers is releasing at Gavins Point dam at 145,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) and isexpected to increase to 150,000 cfs today.Emergency Planning Contacts at FCS:Steve nharr.'Pager: F6J e XWork Phone: 402-533-7308 Cell Phone:Allen B rck:Pager: 7(b)(6) "- -VWork PEone: 402-636-2836 Cell phone:1-)6

.Allen D. BerckSupervisor

-Emergency PlanningFort Calhoun StationOmaha Public Power Districtphone: 402-533-6064 pager: 1(b)(6)email: aberckeoppd.com This e-mail contains Omaha Public Power District's confidential and proprietary information and is for use onlyby the intended recipient.

Unless explicitly stated otherwise, this e-mail is not a contract offer, amendment, noracceptance, If you are not the intended recipient you are notified that disclosing,

copying, distributing or takingany action in reliance on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited.

2 Robles, Jesse.1From:Sent:

Subject:

King, Mark \Wednesday, June 15, 2011 1:59 PMIOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Wednesday, June 15, 2011NOTE: THIS SUM M ARY IS ERNALJ SEOL***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/

PROPRIETARY OR N ERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION**'

DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSID -G~RC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION F M ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):

NoneManagement Requests:

NoneFollow-uplOther Tasks: Eleven (11)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help lOEBstaff communicate and. track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff.]4) COOPER AND FORT CALHOUN -PROJECTED RISE IN MISSOURI RIVER LEVELS OVER NEXT TWOWtEKS (UPDATE)... (6/15/2011)

-See daily Flooding Report. Forward to update to TRG Lead for Flood Protection/Missiles (Edward Smith) and EP (Eric Schrader):

assicined to Russ Haskell.f;/

017¶3,vg OF scclpeOutside of Scope2 Outside of Scope3 I-7 Outside of ScopeAttendees at Screening Meeting:Bob BemardoRuss HaskellRebecca SigmonAdakou FoliJesse RoblesMark KingRyan Craffey -(NRO)Mary Wegner- (RES) -by phone4 or--eflCLLUfl N Et iz iIR A~ Q1IN-Missouri River FloodingPotential Impact at NRC Facilities June 16, 2011(Updated information is highlighted)

Due to greater than normal snow levels in the upper Missouri River Basin, the associated snowpack runoff and record level rainfall, the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir System isexperiencing flooding challenges.

Rainfall in the northern areas of the Basin in the past fewweeks has equaled what typically falls during an entire year, and snowpack runoff is expected tobe 140% of the normal volume. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has noted thatthis spring's flooding will be the most severe the region has seen since the reservoir system wasconstructed in the 1950's and 1960's. From Gavin's Point Dam near Yankton, South Dakota toRulo, Nebraska, the Missouri is expected to reach the highest levels seen since 1952. This hasprompted USACE to release record volumes of water from each of the six major dams thatmake up the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir System. Based on information provided byUSACE, five of the six dams are at or near the planned maximum release rate of 150,000 cubicfeet per second. These release rates will continue at that level through mid-July, and possiblyinto August, in order to maintain reservoir storage capacity.

The Missouri River levels areprojected to crest as noted below and may remain at those levels through mid-July or intoAugust. USACE has noted that flood crest stages on the Missouri River at Blair, Nebraska mayexceed levels projected

earlier, but currently the predicted crest at Fort Calhoun Station remainsthe same.A summary of potential impacts is provided below for NRC facilities located in areas that are ormay be impacted by flooding.

Region IV is coordinating with Agreement States in the floodimpacted areas to verify the status of materials licensees.

Outside of ScopeOV~FICIAI Y I IOtlV -

,ff3,M U-j" w..c; -UAWOutside of ScopeFort Calhoun StationPlant Elevation:

1004 feet mean sea level (MSL)Current river level: 1005 feet 6 inches MSL (-7:00 am, CDT, source is licenseemeasurement)

Predicted max river level: 1006.4 feet MSL predicted by mid-June (source is USACE)Potential Impacts on Plant Equipment: j(b)(4),(b}(7}(F)

I(b)(4),(b)(7)F)

/The licensee would normallycommence plant shutdown when the river level reaches 1004 feet MSL at the Fort CalhounStation.

However, the licensee was nearing the end of a refueling outage when river levelswere predicted to reach this level. Currently the plant is shutdown with the core reloaded andflooded up to 23 feet above the vessel flange. The licensee's operational plan is to remain inthis configuration until the river crests and then recedes to below 1004 feet MSL with adecreasing trend. The licensee's abnormal operating Procedure for acts of nature (AOP-! hasbeen modified.f b)(4}'{b)(7)(F}

I5 k (b)(4),(b)(7)(F)I

, (b)(4),(b)(7)(F)

[The modified AOP-1 now calls for transfer to the Emergency DieselGenerators if loss of offsite power is imminent.

The licensee has entered its flooding procedure and is conducting enhanced monitoring of theriver levels. The licensee is leaning forward in completing actions prescribed in its floodingprocedure and planned to have actions completed in advance of river levels reaching the trigger OFFICiAttS!-/OtY SBN64PWE'INTERNAL

-points identified in the flooding procedure.

With a few exceptions, actions to protect vitalstructures to 1007 feet MSL have been completed.

The exceptions involve actions that are "onhold" until needed for personnel safety reasons.

These actions will be completed when the riverlevel reaches 1006 feet MSL.Installation of a 2000 foot long Aqua Berm around the perimeter of the power block (withexception of the intake structure) is complete.

This temporary water-filled berm is 8 feet tall and16 feet wide at the base. This berm will provide protection for up to 6 feet of water (equates to1010 feet MSL). The majority of the switchyard is protected by an earthen berm to a level ofapproximately 1011 feet MSL. This does not include the 161 KV structures which are currently being protected by sandbag and earthen berms to a level of approximately 1009 feet MSL. Theintake structure is currently protected to a level of approximately 1007.5 feet, and with additional

actions, can be protected to a level of 1014. The ISFSI is built at a level of 1009 feet, noadditional protective measures have been taken at this time.Additional berms and sandbags have been installed around the Training Center, Administration Building and the South Security Building.

These are intended to protect facilities important tosite staff, the simulator and communications equipment.

The licensee has completed installation of additional Aqua Berms for some of these facilities and is working to completeprotective measures for all three buildings.

The licensee has installed additional overheadpower lines to these facilities as a backup to underground power supplies.

The licensee haserected additional protective "walls" around transformers to protect them from water.Some water intrusion and leakage under the Aqua Berm has been noted in areas where theground surface is not level and in areas where there are conduits and storm drains. Thelicensee is managing the leakage using portable dewatering pumps.All offsite power sources (161 KV and 345 KV) are available and both primary EDGs areoperable and available.

The licensee is staging two additional fuel oil tanks within the AquaBerm. These tanks will provide an additional two weeks of fuel (the fuel tanks presently onsitehave a two week fuel capacity, resulting in a four week supply of fuel). The licensee isdeveloping plans to replenish fuel oil if there is an anticipated need to run the EDGs greaterthan a four week period of time. ()4()7(F!b):(4).(b)(7)(F)

I~e licensee is also evaluating a processtor refueling the tanks through the tank vents. e icensee also plans to stage an additional spare generator with an associated fuel tank and step-up transformer within the Aqua Berm.The licensee is staging additional equipment and supplies within the Aqua Berm including dewatering pumps, sandbagging equipment and supplies, gasoline

supplies, food and water.The licensee has procured satellite phones which have been distributed to key staff as backupcommunication devices.The licensee has ordered six boats for use onsite, if needed, since parking areas are alre.adyunder water. Offsite parking arrangements are in place for site staff, and the staff will beshuttled to and from the plant. The licensee is working with the National Guard to arrange foradditional backup transportation provisions.

...... +R~~t; USEONL--SMSTWENTRNL.+FORM~..

--

O-GFICIAL USU XLY -SENSFRWE.Jt'TERNAL 1-8-FffleATI3

.The licensee's procedures and Emergency Plan call for the declaration of a NOUE at 1004 feetMSL. At 0800 CDT on June 6, the licensee declared a NOUE, in advance of the river levelreaching 1004 feet MSL. The licensee's Emergency Plan would not call for an Alert declaration until the river level reaches 1009 feet MSL. A response mode decision making conference callwas held following the NOUE declaration with Region IV, NRR and NSIR managers present.The agency currently remains in NORMAL mode. This response mode decision will be re-visited if river levels approach 1006 feet MSL or if the licensee's protective actions arechallenged or fail and systems are at risk of flooding.

The licensee is presently managing onsite activities through an Incident Command Systemstructure using a model included in the OPPD Pandemic Plan as a template.

At the currenttime, the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is not expected to be challenged byflooding.

The Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center are located within theAqua Berm.Potential Impact on Evacuation Routes and Sirens: Currently, there are no impacts onmajor evacuation routes. The licensee has indicated that a small section of Route 75 to thenorth of the town of Fort Calhoun (the actual river level at which this would occur is beingresearched at this time) may become impacted by rising water. The residents of Fort Calhounhave evacuation routes to the west and south that are expected to remain available.

Evacuation routes for the town of Blair and other communities to the north are expected toremain available to the north and west. Some areas of Interstate 29 and Interstate 680 havebeen closed with detours established by the state. A portion of this section of highway runsalong the southeast border of the emergency planning zone, but the proposed detours would beaccessible.

Power was removed from sirens 257 and 260 in Pottawattamie County, Iowa, which is just onthe edge of the emergency planning zone to the southeast of the plant. Sirens 75 and 76 in theDesoto National Wildlife Refuge have no power, but the Refuge is currently closed due toflooding.

Siren 142 in Harrison County, -9.5 miles from the plant, is also without power. Siren1, east of Fort Calhoun, is without power but the area is closed due to flooding.

Outside of Scope/NRC Re-aion IVRegion IV staff continues to monitor the flooding conditions along the Missouri River and thepotential impacts on Region IV plants and materials licensees located along the river. RegionOrr~I,~ L.~E I~lL ~C4tIIV MA- t~~ANfeRMAT40bl

-SENSWT.YE INTERNALFi RNtIrION.

-'.IV is monitoring potential impacts on evacuation routes and is coordinating with the power plantlicensees, states and FEMA. Region IV has coordinated with the National Weather Service(NWS) and USACE to confirm projected river levels.Region IV has augmented the resident inspector staff to provide 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> coverage at FortCalhoun Station.

Region IV is conducting daily conference calls with Fort Calhoun Stationmanagers to monitor the licensee's preparations and potential impacts on the plant. Region IVhas conducted an initial coordination call with FEMA Region VII and plans to establish coordination calls with FEMA Region VII, states and local response organizations next week.A conference call will be conducted later today with the states, FEMA Region VII, CooperNuclear Station, Fort Calhoun Station, the NWS and USACE to review weather and river levelpredictions.

USACE is expected to update the stakeholders on any changes to predicted rivercrest and results of their validations of river flow, breadth of the river and how these mightimpact the current river level predictions.

NSIR has coordinated with FEMA Headquarters to ensure that they are aware of the potential impacts from river flooding at Fort Calhoun Station and Cooper Nuclear Station.--OI"0AI:IJSt-ONL-Y

-'SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION~

Robles, JesseFrom: Haskell, Russell (Sent: Friday, June 17, 2011 2:26 PM

Subject:

IOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Friday, June 17, 2011Follow Up Flag: Follow upFlag Status: Completed NOTE: THIS SUMMAR.'**MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/

PROPRIETA3,X-c1R NRC INTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION***

DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OJJT SDE OF NRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):

NoneManagement Requests:

NoneFollow-uplOther Tasks: Three (3)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help IOEBstaff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff.]1) EN 46965 -FORT CALHOUN -ADDITIONAL PENETRATION IDENTIFIED FOR MITIGATION DURINGWALKDOWN(Additional Information)

Penetration of concern was due to the (motor-driven) 1A Fire Pump pressure reliefdischarge line traveling up through Intake structure which houses the Raw Water pumps. Penetration has beensealed. Residents following up. Forward to TRG Leads for Flood Protection/Missiles, SSW/UHX.

FireProtection:

assiQned to Russ Haskell.*1 Outside of Scope/Attendees at Screening Meeting:Russ HaskellDave GarmonAdakou FoliJohn ThompsonJoe Giantelli Mary Wegner (RES) -phoneRyan Craffey (NRO).4,-.3 Azua, RayFrom:Sent:To:Cc:

Subject:

Attachments:

Clark, JeffFriday, June 17,2011 7:51 AMKennedy, Kriss; Howell, LindaAzua, RayFYI: Briefing/Talking Points for FCSTalking Points 6-17-1 1,docKriss/Linda, Attached are the updated briefing notes from Sunday, and the talking points I used yesterday for the NSIRbrief. The only "iffy' item is the licensee's priorities for today: this comes from our notes from yesterday.

Weget updated an this about 9:00 am. I will send you another e-mail when we get that info.Jeff Briefing Notes from (Sun) 6/12/2011

{updated for 6/17(2011)

(changes noted in RED)1. River level and forecast for river crest -RCB2. Plant conditions (b)(4),(b)(7)(F)

3. Licensee priorities
1) Monitoring of flood barriers and pumps, 2) complete temp modifications foralternate power to various loads, 3) forensics of the 1 B4A bus, followed by RCAand extent of cause 4) exploring alternate sources of water in case Blair citywater is lost (installing reverse osmosis water treatment equipment).
4. NRC concernsUo R9~ euiai aonrge, SO a@8u Ram 0 iuR a 6iOR r EOFio +9 AVi :'o)-,19 (COMProccor Aree) and 20 (ElectricAl PorotAtion-86 RcomR Bacamont),

lookogopost the Wakeft cwtructur roll up door, 9W8ct!one regarding f19ood99t06 toe6WKthgoar rcOAm, mobility around Gito for omorgonray

rocponco, and corptinuod Continued operation of 1B4 electrical equipment until cause and extent ofcondition fully known; operation of barriers and pumping stations against inleakage; industrial and personal safety.5. Impacts on evacuation routes or ERO activation No changes.

1-680 between exit 1 in Nebraska to 1-29 in Iowa, and 1-29 betweenexits 55 and 71 in Iowa. This impacts the posted evacuation routes. Detoursigns are in place.6. Update on cause of electrical fault on June 7 and repair activities Sargent & Lundy came in Friday to begin an investigation.

However, thelicensee and they determined they could not perform an adequate analysis.

Thelicensee contracted ESI (same company that did FMEA for the RPS M2contactor).

They were onsite Wednesday.

They indicated they would likely needto bring in an expert from St. Louis. The licensee still has not determined thecause of the loss of the 1 B3A bus. The licensee provided a list of the otherSquare D breakers that were installed (new) in 2009. Both the 1 B4A breaker(faultedtfire) and the 1 B3A breaker that had improper operation were amongthese replacements.

The licensee also reported that operators smelled an acridodor in the West Switchgear Room for the two days prior to the fault/fire.

Other notes: There is a pretty elaborate walkway between the training and adminbuildings-They have provided a walkway to the "king tut" barriers so it is dryfrom the bus drop off to the security building.

The understanding with the boats is that they are for emergency use only. This appears wise as there are quitestrong flow currents developing.

Briefing Notes from (Thu) 6116/2011 (Questions from NSIR, responses noted in RED)1. What is the design basis elevation for flooding at Ft. Calhoun Station?The DB level is 1014 feet MSL. Nuclear safety is maintained below 1014 feet,although certain plant equipment, such as non-safety equipment and offsitepower would be lost at lower levels (offsite power likely to be lost at about 1009feet). Aquadam in protected area is not Installed for nuclear safety, but for"economic" reasons (protect licensee property).

2. Has the licensee considered a "what if' scenario?

Yes. The licensee is considering things they can do beyond design basis. If theycan still supply power (i.e. vital busses not lost, or power can be supplied directlyto equipment) the extra 1500 kw diesel onsite can provide when EDGs lost.Ultimate defense is supplying water inventory to both the reactor vessel and theSFP. The licensee is currently reviewing alternate paths to gain access to thecontainment (at 1011 they would begin impacting normal access through theauxiliary building) for this operation.

Access to the SFP is not a problem asaccess points are available at higher levels. Inventory methods would use B.5.bpumps.3. What happens if river level were near the top of Aquadam, then it was breachedor failed?As stated in #2, the Aquadam is not installed to ensure nuclear safety. It wouldmake things a lot easier onsite if it remained intact (to 1009 or 1010), but otherfeatures, such as the floodgates installed in the intake and auxiliary buildingdoorways, are designed to protect to 1014 feet.4. If the entire site were flooded, no AC power, how much time would they have torestore before boiling occurred in the reactor cavity and the SFP?(b)(4).(b)(7)(F)

5. How would FCS gain access to the containment and SFP buildings to add water?What pumps and what water sources?(b)(4).As discussed in #2. access to the SFP does not aear to be a oroblemb IW7)I 7K( )(4),(b)(7)(F)

.

Additional questions were asked regarding security.

Mike Hay briefed that asecurity inspector was onsite last week and reviewed the licensee's

problems, challenges, and compensatory measures.

He stated we did not have any currentconcerns.

Scott Morris asked if there were any other problems we had not discussed.

Imentioned the difficulty getting around site, the personal safety hazards, and theincreased monitoring required.

I stated (as you and I discussed) the licensee iscontinually monitoring these things. They have taken additional steps to haveadditional people staged, modify entryways, and conduct safety briefings.

Azua, RayFrom: Clark, JeffSent: Saturday, June 18, 2011 7:39 AMTo: Kennedy, Kriss; Howell, LindaCc: Azua, Ray

Subject:

FW: Daily event status at Fort CalhounFYI---Original Message----

From: BERCK, ALLEN [mailto:aberckQoppd.com1 Sent: Saturday, June 18, 2011 7:10 AMTo: Bill Pook; Dan; Eric Plautz; Clark, Jeff, Jeff Theulen; Jon Schwarz;

Kirkland, John; Larry Oliver; LaurelRyan; Paul Johnson; Whitney Shipley;

'Rasmusson, Melanie';

pott.ema(cDoottcounty.com Cc: GEBERS, STEVEN W; DEANGELIS, PETER A; HANKINS, RHONDA R; MOELLER, CHRISTOPHER J;RELLER, MARK H; SILKE, DEENA L; BERCK, ALLEN

Subject:

Daily event status at Fort CalhounFort Calhoun Flooding Status (changes from yesterday's report are in bold)1. Reactor Status: Shutdown2. Reactor is covered with > 23-ft of cooling water3. Offsite power and Emergency Diesel Generators are available.

Both vital buses are energized at this time.4. Spent Fuel Pooling cooling is in service and protected.

5. Shutdown cooling is in service and protected
6. Current river level is 1005' 8" -a rise of 2" in the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.7. Current Blair gauge level is 31.8 ft. Although no appreciable rise is forecasted (by the NWS/USACE) withinthe next 5 days, river conditions continue to change and rain is forecasted in the watershed area. Additionally, heavy rain was received in the area over night. The USACE also advised us that we should be prepared for a3-6 inch rise in river level over the next week. We are continuously monitoring river conditions.
8. The site has implemented procedures to protect power supplies and vital equipment.

Water is onsite, andflood barriers are protecting vital equipment.

9. No release of radioactivity has occurred.
10. Fort Calhoun has declared a Notification of Unusual Event at 08:00 6/6/11.11. Backup evacuation route onsite is inundated however the primary route onsite is passable and notexpected to be affected.
12. Power was removed from siren 257 and 260 in Pottawattamie Co. IA, which is just on the edge of the 10-mile EPZ south east of the plant. Siren 75, 76 in Desoto National Wildlife Refuge have no power. Currently therefuge is closed due to flooding.

Siren 142 in Harrison Co. has no power which is north of Loveland IA -9.5miles from the plant. Siren 1 east of Fort Calhoun on county road 34 between Fort Calhoun and Boyer ChuteRecreational Area is without power. This area is closed due to flooding.

13. At this time no known-major evacuation routes are affected without contingency actions planned.

Interstate 29 in both directions:

from Exit 55 North 25th Street to Exit 75 (Missouri Valley):

1-680 road closed to trafficbecause of flooding

-- follow the detour signs for the evacuation route to Bellevue.

Interstate 680 in bothdirections:

from before Exit 1 130th Street to Exit 62: 1-29; Old Mormon Bridge Road -- road closed because offlooding.

All in Pottawattamie Co, IA.14. On 6/14, Washington County issued evacuation to approximately 75 residents northeast of Blair east ofcounty road 33 to the Burt County line.Requested Information from states and counties:

1. When offsite evaluation routes are affected please contact emergency planning.
2. When the Blair Water plant is affected please contact emergency planning.
3. Authorized power outages that affect or could affect siren operability, please contact emergency planning.

The river flow rate and level have been relatively constant at Blair NE. The Corp of Engineers is releasing Gavin's Point dam at 150,000 cubic feet per second (cfs).Emergency Planning Contacts at FCS:Steve Gebers:PageJ(b)(6) e.<'<Work Phone: 402-533-7308 Cell Phone (b)(6)Allen Berck-Pager: b)(6) eWork P`one: 402-63 628Cell phone:[b)(6)

'Allen D. BerckSupervisor

-Emergency PlanningFort Calhoun StationOmaha Public Power Districtphone: 402-533-6064 pager: 1 ,email: aberck a.oppd.com This e-mail contains Omaha Public Power District's confidential and proprietary information and is for use onlyby the intended recipient.

Unless explicitly stated otherwise, this e-mail is not a contract offer, amendment, noracceptance.

If you are not the intended recipient you are notified that disclosing,

copying, distributing or takingany action in reliance on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited.

2 Robles, JesseFrom: King, Mark ( (/ "Sent: Tuesday, June '1, 2011 2:25 PM

Subject:

lOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Tuesday, June 21, 2011NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS*"*MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/

PROPRIETARY OR ýNTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION**'

DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSID NRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION F ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):

NoneManagement Requests:

NoneFollow-uplOther Tasks: Thirteen (13)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help lOEBstaff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff]Outside of Scope0VLJ--~

Outside of Scope3) PNO-IV-11-003A

-FORT CALHOUN -PNO-IV-11-003A

-(UPDATE)

FORT CALHOUN STATIONDECLARATION OF A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO HIGH RIVER LEVELSee PNO text: Forward to TRQ Leads for Flood Protection/Missiles (Edward Smith), EP (Eric Schrader);

assianed to Russ Haakell.

QUTh~G $'

D ripr6 bW -5 PeOutside of Scope OL-rjP6 OF SCOPE Al ....uuisiae of ScopeAttendees at Screening Meeting:Russ HaskellBob BernardoAdakou FoilMark KingMary Wegner (RES) -by phoneAl Issa -(NRO)5 Azua, RayFrom: Clark, JeffSent: Tuesday, June 21, 2011 8:59 AMTo: Kennedy, Kriss; Howell, LindaCc: Azua, Ray; Alexander, Ryan; Alferink, Beth; Kirkland, John

Subject:

FYI: Daily Update -FCS Flooding

<6/21>Kriss/Linda, Current river level is 1006 feet 1 inch. The area had severe thunderstorms last night, and was in a tornadowatch. No appreciable damage to the site. Big Bend Reservoir received over 5 inches of rain last night.Licensee continues to monitor flooding and in leakage.

They are bringing in several experts for the switchyard berm and the PA Aquadam, regarding undercutting and sand boils.The licensee received 15 new pumps (various sizes) for pumping stations.

They are doing some thinkingahead and staging pumps at higher elevations in the event of Aquadam failure.John and I had a meeting with Tim Nellenbach (Plant Mgr) and Susan Baughn (Licensing Mgr) yesterday afternoon regarding communications.

This was at their request.

They felt the observations and discussions we were having with FCS staff (such as incident commander, pumping crews, and operators) was not filtering up to them. Tim indicated there were examples (e.g. the boat accidents and tornado missiles) where he wasfinding out about our issues some time after the fact. I believe this is indicative of their interiorcommunications.

John and I plan to meet briefly with them each weekday afternoon to go over the items wehave raised to their staff. T-. "7-(b)(4),(b)(7)(F)

Licensee priorities:

maintain flooding protection by pumping and walkdowns; get experts in for erosion andsand boil reviews; extend elevated walkways; pour additional aqua-blocks in switchyard to reduce in leakagJeffV.,1i Robles, JesseFrom: King, MarkSent: Wednesday, June 22, 2011 2:10 PM

Subject:

1OEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Wednesday, June 22, 2011NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS-*MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/

PROPRIETARY 0O C INTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION**

DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSID NRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION F ORIGINATOR" Issues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):

NoneManagement Requests:

NoneFollow-up/Other Tasks: Seven (7)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help IlEBstaff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff.]Outside of Scope3) FORT CALHOUN -PROJECTED RISE IN MISSOURI RIVER LEVELS OVER NEXT TWO WEEKS(UPDATE)***6/22/2011***

The river level at Fort Calhoun Station is currently 1006 ft 5 inches (6/22); FCS remains in aNOUE due to flooding.

The Army Corps of Engineers has communicated its intent to increase the release rateof the upstream Gavin's Point dam to 160k cubic-feet/sec (currently 150K cfs). This move is due to recent rain activity in the Northern Missouri River basin. Increases are expected to be in place by Thursday (6/23).Increases in release rates typically influence site river levels within 2 days. FCS river levels are anticipated torise over the next several days due to these events. Forward update to TRG Leads for FloodProtection/Missiles (Edward Smith), EP (Eric Schrader):

assigned to Russ Haskell.2 0jiI3';D OP~ SCOP/Attendees at Screening Meeting:Russ HaskellBob BernardoAdakou FoliMark KingJesse RoblesMary Wegner (RES) -by phoneAl Issa -(NRO)3 Robles, JesseA1From:Sent:

Subject:

Haskell, Russell t\% ') t .Monday, June 27, 2011 3:26 PMlOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Monday, June 27, 2011NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS --MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/

PROPRIETARY OR NRC-INTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION...

DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE.GF`FRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION

!eRORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):

NoneManagement Requests:

NoneFollow-up/Other Tasks: Twelve (12)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help lOEBstaff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff,]I Outside of Scope12) PNO-IV-I 1-003B (UPDATE)

-FORT CALHOUN -Fort Calhoun Station Declaration of aNotification of Unusual Event Due to High River LevelSee PNO text (ML1 11770003).

Forward update to TRG Leads for Flood Protection/Mis§iles (Edward Smith),EP (Eric Schrader):

assiqned to Russ Haskell.New Reactors Items: NoneResearch (RES) Items; None Clrrslw o scop eOOutside of ScopeAttendees at Screening Meeting:Russ HaskellDave GarmonAdakou FoliJohn ThompsonJoe Giantelli Mary Wegner (RES) -phoneRyan Craffey (NRO)3 Robles, JesseFrom: Haskell, Russell Sent: Tuesday, June 2A, 2011 3"12 PM.To: Smith, Edward; Schrader, Eric

Subject:

iOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Tuesday, June 28, 2011NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS-OFF-C1 AL USEONLY***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/

PROPRIETARY OR11RC INTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION'*

DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE`OF NRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FR6M ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):

NoneManagement Requests:

NoneFollow-uplOther Tasks: Two (2)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help lOEBstaff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff]1) PNO-IV-11-003C

-FORT CALHOUN -PNO-IV-1 1-003C (UPDATE)

-FORT CALHOUN STATIONDECLARATION OF A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO HIGH RIVER LEVELSee PNO text: (ML1 11780547).

Forward update PNO to TRG Leads for Flood Protection (Edward Smith), EP(Eric Schrader):

assigned to Russ Haskell.Outside of ScopeVil O~yt5PC-OF ScOP&Outside of ScopeAttendees at Screening Meeting:Russ HaskellJoe Giantelli Dave Garmon (phone)Jesse RoblesMary Wegner (RES) (phone)Ryan Craffey (NRO)John Thompson2 UILý i rSEGt-Y-SENSIIWE-INThRNAL4N9FORMATION--

Missouri River FloodingPotential Impact at NRC Facilities June 28, 2011(Updated

.Information is:highlighted.

Older information that has not changed has been removedand can be reviewed-in prior reports.)

Due to greater than-normal snow levels in the upper Missouri River Basin, the associated snowpack runoff and record level rainfall, the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir System isexperiencing flooding challenges.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has noted thatthis spring's flooding will be the most severe the region has seen since the reservoir system wasconstructed in the 1950's and 1960's. From Gavins Point Dam near Yankton, South Dakota toRulo, Nebraska, the Missouri is expected to reach the highest levels seen since 1952. This hasprompted USACE to release record volumes of water from each of the six major dams thatmake up the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir System. The release rates from these damshave remained steady over the past few days at the current maximum predicted levels withsome minor adjustments to balance the system. USACE has reported that these release ratesare expected to continue until August and that no additional releases are planned at this time.Region IV will continue to work with USACE to assure that any updates to the USACEpredictions are incorporated in this reportIn Nebraska, some decrease in water levels occurred from Brownsville to Kansas City along theMissouri River due to breeches in levees and outflow into flood plains.A slight chance of thunderstorms is predicted for Nebraska.

A summary of potential impacts is provided below for NRC facilities located in areas that are ormay be impacted by flooding.

Region IV is coordinating with Agreement States in the floodimpacted areas to verify the status of materials licensees.

Outside of ScopeOF'IIALUS~

Y-SN~JIyE1IE~rAL

,Nt~flMTI, OnLuOLY -SENSIIWE INTERNALiNP6RMAXT.O....,

I IIII"I "Outside of Scopet NLY -SENS1TTVE INTERNAL iWRUATION

-Qýý.DNLY.--SENSRWE INTERNAMPM1071!

ON-Fort Calhoun StationPlant Elevation:

1004 feet mean sea level (MSL)Design Basis for Flooding:

1014 feet MSLCurrent river level: 1006 feet 5 inches MSL (-7:00 am, CDT, source is licenseemeasurement)

Predicted max river level: 1006 -1008 feet MSL (source is USACE)Current Plant Conditions:

The plant is shutdown with the reactor cavity flooded such thatmore than 23 feet of water is covering the fuel. Both shutdown cooling and spent fuel poolcooling are in service.

The vital buses are being supplied by the 345 kV power source; the 161kV power source and both diesel generators are available.

Only one 480 volt bus remains de-energized (1 B4A, the faulted bus).Fort Calhoun Station declared a Notice of Unusual Event (NOUE) on June 6 in advance of riverlevel reaching 1004 feet MSL, The site remains in a NOUE.Potential Impacts on Plant Equipment:

The licensee is implementing its flooding procedure and is conducting enhanced monitoring of the river levels. Procedure actions to protect vitalstructures have been completed for river levels in excess of what is currently observed at thesite.On June 26, 2011, at approximately 1:25 a.m. CDT, the 2000 foot long Aquadam that had beenproviding supplemental protection to structures and equipment within the power block failed asa result of site activities.

As a result, floodwaters have reached an elevation of 1006 feet 4inches MSL around the auxiliary and containment buildings.

Those buildings are protected bydesign to a floodwater elevation of 1014 feet MSL. The licensee is currently focusing oncontrolling floodwaters to protect vital equipment and systems by placing additional sandbagsand barriers where needed and pumping water to protect structures and systems whereneeded.The Aquadam vendor was onsite on June 26 to perform physical inspections of the deflatedAquadam.

The initial assessment and vendor recommendation is that a new Aquadam beinstalled.

A team consisting of site personnel and vendor representatives is developing a planfor replacement of the Aquadam.

A new unit has been ordered and is expected to arrive onsiteon July 5. The licensee currently estimates that the new unit will be installed on orabout July'S.The majority of the switchyard is protected by an earthen berm to a level of approximately 1009-1010 feet MSL. Some equipment associated with the 161 kV offsite power is being protected bysandbags and earthen berms to a level of approximately 1009 feet MSL.OFFIGAIA USE- O*SUSTLELNrEN 4fqý cr;~ALU~l M -SENSITMV INTERNAL INFORMAION~--

'The ISFSI is built at a level of 1009 feet,MSL, no additional protective measures have beentaken at this time.Aquadams have been installed around the Training Center, Administration Building and theSouth Security Building.

These are intended to protect facilities where site staff are working, thesimulator and communications equipment.

The licensee has installed additional overhead powerlines to these facilities as a backup to underground power supplies.

Existing diesel fuel tanks have been topped and two additional fuel oil tanks are staged withinthe Aqua Berm. With the addition of these tanks, the licensee estimates there is sufficient fuelonsite to run the EDGs for approximately 17 days. The licensee is developing plans toreplenish fuel oil if there is an anticipated need to run the EDGs for a greater period of time.An additional spare generator with an associated fuel tank and step-up transformer has beenstaged within the Aqua Berm.The licensee has procured satellite phones which have been distributed to key staff as backupcommunication devices.In accordance with the licensee's Emergency Plan, an Alert would be declared if the river levelreaches 1009 feet MSL. At the current time, the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility(EOF) is not expected to be challenged by flooding.

The Technical Support Center andOperations Support Center are located within the Aqua Berm.)utside of ScopeNRC Region IVFollowing the failure of the Aquadam, a response mode decision call was conducted early onJune 26 with Region IV, NRR and NSIR. A decision was made to enter Monitoring Mode withRegion IV in the lead. Region IV has activated its Incident Response Center and a responseteam is currently monitoring licensee activities with the onsite team of inspectors and throughroutine briefings with licensee managers.

Region IV staff continues to monitor the flooding conditions along the Missouri River and thepotential impacts on Region IV plants and materials licensees located along the river. RegionIV is monitoring potential impacts on evacuation routes and is coordinating with the power plantlicensees, states and FEMA. Region IV has coordinated with the National Weather Service(NWS) and USACE to confirm projected river levels._FF!IiAI I SF LY -SEN UVTI'JE.IfERNAL IFORMlA I L, E,&AL4.QNLY

-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION

.Region IV will continue to provide 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> coverage with resident inspectors and supplemental inspection staff at Fort Calhoun Station.Region IV has conducted coordination calls with FEMA Region VII and the states and localresponse organizations.

Collectively, the stakeholders have established "triggers" which wouldprompt scheduling future conference calls-J',tAcalIwas,

-conducted

,Wth m -etLm stakeholders this rioa..lmgRsIpticipated liN di c rence 6c spOonsaoredl b UStACE andprovid.6d ah.,ud~t,.eon Sthe s do op uea S~nadFr ~ hoi Station,.

-NOFUiC0L1USE ONLY- SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMA.TPON-.,4

  • t~tf3SE-9NLY

-SENSITIVE INTERNAbINFORMA-TION.

Missouri River FloodingPotential Impact at NRC Facilities June 30, 2011(Updated onri. high0lighted..

Ofder inform.ation, thatas, 6 d al i mtha haed* 0 h ...i g .... j-g.....and ca~n b~ ~evrev ed, n prior reportS.)

Due to greater than normal snow levels in the upper Missouri River Basin, the associated snowpack runoff and record level rainfall, the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir System isexperiencing flooding challenges.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has noted thatthis spring's flooding will be the most severe the region has seen since the reservoir system wasconstructed in the 1950's and 1960's. From Gavins Point Dam near Yankton, South Dakota toRule, Nebraska, the Missouri is expected to reach the highest levels seen since 1952. This hasprompted USACE to release record volumes of water from each of the six major dams thatmake up the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir System. The release rates from these damshave remained steady over the past few days at the current maximum predicted levels withsome minor adjustments to balance the system. The release rate at Gavins Point dam remainsat 160,000 cubic feet per second. USACE has reported that these release rates are expectedto continue until August and that no additional increase in release rates are planned at this time.Region IV will continue to work with USACE to assure that any updates to the USACEpredictions are incorporated in this reportThe next substantial precipitation in the Missouri River Basin is forecast for July 1, 2011.A summary of potential impacts is provided below for NRC facilities located in areas that are ormay be impacted by flooding.

Region IV is coordinating with Agreement States in the floodimpacted areas to verify the status of materials licensees.

Outside of Scope,OFkG!Ab4E ONL- SFNSIIVE INTERNAL-INFORMATTO"-

-Of ICIAL USE ONLY -SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMKR-N----

[ [1 II 1I I I II I I l '" " I I lOutside of Scope.OLT'iUAL USE ONLV -SENSITIVE iii ~RiiAL ~WruKM~

OFFICI3L'MINtY

¶SEN'S5IVE-4?4NERNALNN Fort Calhoun StationPlant Elevation:

1004 feet mean sea level (MSL)Design Basis for Flooding:

1014 feet MSLCurrent river level: 1006 feet'Alinches MSL (-7:00 am, CDT, source is licenseemeasurement)

Predicted max river level: 1006 -1005 feet MSL (source is USACE)Current Plant Conditions:

The plant is shutdown with the reactor cavity flooded such thatmore than 23 feet of water is covering the fuel. Both shutdown cooling and spent fuel poolcooling are in service.

The vital buses are being supplied by the 345 kV power source; the 161kV power source and both diesel generators are available.

Only one 480 volt bus remains de-energized (1 B4A, the faulted bus).Fort Calhoun Station declared a Notice of Unusual Event (NOUE) on June 6 in advance of riverlevel reaching 1004 feet MSL. The site remains in a NOUE.Potential Impacts on Plant Equipment:

The licensee is implementing its flooding procedure and is conducting enhanced monitoring of the river levels. Procedure actions to protect vitalstructures have been completed for river levels in excess of what is currently observed at thesite.On June 26, 2011, at approximately 1:25 a.m. CDT, the 2000 foot long Aquadam that had beenproviding supplemental protection to structures and equipment within the power block failed asa result of site activities.

As a result, floodwaters have reached an elevation of 1006 feet 4inches MSL around the auxiliary and containment buildings.

Those buildings are protected bydesign to a floodwater elevation of 1014 feet MSL. The licensee is currently focusing oncontrolling floodwaters to protect vital equipment and systems by placing additional sandbagsand barriers where needed and pumping water to protect structures and systems whereneeded.The Aquadam vendor was onsite on June 26 to perform physical inspections of the deflatedAquadam.

The initial assessment and vendor recommendation is that a new Aquadam beinstalled.

A team consisting of site personnel and vendor representatives is developing a planfor replacement of the Aquadam.

A new unit has been ordered and is expected to arrive onsiteon July 5, Installation of the new unit will begin next week.The majority of the switchyard is protected by an earthen berm to a level of approximately 1009-1010 feet MSL. Some equipment associated with the 161 kV offsite power is being protected bysandbags and earthen berms to a level of approximately 1009 feet MSL. TheV c.pretelearrier oM .......', .., ". ; .-QFre!AL USE GWL-%SWN-RN6"tA.QL.

LIMPICIAT ITCIlllIY-SENSIT4VB4NERNAMNF The ISFSI is built at a level of 1009 feet,MSL, no additional protective measures have beentaken at this time.The failure oItfhhe Apua:m resuItedin loss d rd e {W cooing ser servi.ngthe~ ~ ~~p. swthga room. The Ii.enspie hacooI' ~ugtadd onal unftsto-assureadequate

". cd *o felebtfiCa

'ý o Unii" °- '010supphesAtorear.b1h systems.Aquadams have been installed around the Training Center, Administration Building and theSouth Security Building.

These are intended to protect facilities where site staff are working, thesimulator and communications equipment.

The licensee has installed additional overhead powerlines to these facilities as a backup to underground power supplies.

Existing diesel fuel tanks have been topped and two additional fuel oil tanks are staged withinthe Aqua Berm. With the addition of these tanks, the licensee estimates there is sufficient fuelonsite to run the EDGs for approximately 17 days. The license' "ontinues to sample fuel andmonitor for water content because-bth existjng'fuel tanks are ýnderground and extensions have been added to fillin-gconnectors to ke6p them abovew. "wr. The licensee is developing plans to replenish fuel oil if there is an anticipated need to run the EDGs for a greater period oftime. An additional spare generator with an associated fuel tank and step-up transformer hasbeen staged within the Aqua Berm.In accordance with the licensee's Emergency Plan, an Alert would be declared if the river levelreaches 1009 feet MSL. At the current time, the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility(EOF) is not expected to be challenged by flooding.

The Technical Support Center andOperations Support Center are located within the Aqua Berm.Outside of ScopeNRC Region IVFollowing the failureo..f.the.Aquadam,

.on June.26,a decision wasý made.to enter the Monitoring Mod.e of the agency Plan ,with ,.Region IV in V At 1.:501 (CDT) onJu. e 201, .theiNl r .etpredi

,to Normal Mode and deacthato d the Region IV IncidentRepn~:Cetr~I'heis sbqodn6.

ddtioris areS Are..being a~~ed -n~t~~qb W00qLff VIA' Pimes'bnh "Itob fptvpr~t~ting'pt~f st~tties.

ysti np0en p.nI ýM, iVcniRw~

rht, h--IFICIAI "SE ONLY -SENSITIVE 4TERNAL INFORMAQN-t..

"FrlaMi UWIrQNLY

-SENS94VE INTERNALANFORMATION licensee's response and the plant with additional inspectors at the sitewho.areproviding round-the-clock

.coverage.

Region IV staff continues to monitor the flooding conditions along the Missouri River and thepotential impacts on Region IV plants and materials licensees located along the river. RegionIV is monitoring potential impacts on evacuation routes and is coordinating with the power plantlicensees, states and FEMA. Region IV has coordinated with the National Weather Service(NWS) and is participating daily in USACE conference briefings to confirm projected river levels.Region IV has conducted coordination calls with FEMA Region VII and the states and localresponse organizations.

Collectively, the stakeholders have established "triggers" which wouldprompt scheduling future conference calls'-9EtL UU_ SNLY SfNSFTq'E INTE*RN~LIIr4F RMAT:oN rRobles, JesseFrom: Giantelli, Joseph 1I Sent: Friday, July 01, 2011 2:42 PM

Subject:

IOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Friday, July 01, 2011NOTE: THIS SUMMARY I Y.***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/

PROPRIETARY OR NRC I AL USE ONLY INFORMATION'*

DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE OF ITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM GINATORIssues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):

NoneManagement Requests:

NoneFollow-up/Other Tasks: Five (5)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help lOEBstaff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff]3) PNO-IV-1 I -003D -FORT CALHOUN -PNO-IV-1 1 -003D (UPDATE)

-FORT CALHOUN STATIONDECLARATION OF A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO HIGH RIVER LEVELSee PNO text: PNO-IV-11-003D (ML111810950)

Forward to TRG Leads for Flood Prot ection (Edward Smith):EP (Eric Schrader).

assigned to Russ Haskell.

J. .errISiAL USE ONL'Y SE~fISHTW1 RELAED WIRMr-fl1A:16I UNITED STATENUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV612 EAST LAMAR BLVD. SUITE 400ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4125 July 1, 20117;z-, ML111822555

MEMORANDUM TO:THRU:FROM:Elmo E. CollinsRegional Administrator Anton Ve9el, DirectorDivision of Reactor SafetyDavid P. LovelessSenior Reactor AnalystIRNFlWA

SUBJECT:

PROPOSED ADEQUATE PROTECTION BACKFIT EXCEPTION O~~~flCIAL~~~

AJEOL f-11I~I M~AE IfRAL WM

, OFFICIAL USE ONLY -SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION PROPOSED ADEQUATE PROTECTION BACKFIT EXCEPTION AT FORT CALHOUNRequlatorv Authority 10 CFR 50.109, Backfitting,"

describes the methods available to the Commission to require thatlicensees modify or add structures, components, or design of a facility.

Section (a)(4)(ii) statesthat a backfit analysis is not required where the staff finds and declares with an appropriately documented evaluation, that regulatory action is necessary to ensure that the facility providesadequate protection to the health and safety of the public.Management Directive 8.4, 'Management of Facility-Specific Backfitting and Information Collection, states that the Regional Administrator has the authority to develop, update andmaintain the backtit procedures and administrative controls for nuclear power plants.PG 0901.6, 'Facility-Specific Backfit and Information Collection Procedure,"

states that NRCstaff positions may be Identified as potential backfits by the staff. When the staff invokes abackfit exception, the RA must provide a documented evaluation that Includes a statement ofthe objectives, reasons for the modification, and the basis for the backfit exception.

Additionally, 10 CFR 50.54(f) permits the Commission to request a licensee submit under oathor affirmation, to enable the Commission to determine whether or not the license should bemodified, suspended, or revoked.

If this information is not sought to verify licensee compliance with the current licensing basis for that facility, the NRC must prepare the reason for eachinformation request.(b)(4),(b)(5),(b)(7)(F) Enclosure 1

OFIC. 1i -SONLY -SEGMRITY-RELATED.INFORMATION orrIGAl-U66 ONLY- REUN;*T R66%TMoNRrMATION.'

[ b)(4). (b) (5), (b)(7)(F)

  • L.

OF-ICI49ft WUL1MV S3eMMURI1RAEbWE M~FORMPMO (b)(4),Cb)(6),(b)(7)(F) Enclosure 1

(b) (4). (b)(5). (b) (7)(F)

-OFrIMAHWIu ora'W SEcUnRFRAERML1D F~OPSATRON (b)(4),(b)(5),(b)(7)(F)

O0FF -ALUSE-OWtr-SECOURflY-REIATLI INPDftNTIOF4--

-I.-Enclosure 2.... m mUFIlUAL U.L W4L~ ~IXLJJII7 IILLATL13 tT~FUflMATIU!~

-OFFICIALUSE ONLY -SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION-

-....(b)(4),(b)(5),(b)(7)(F)

II£GAAJ~i.'ONLY

-SECUtRifY-=RftATED-INFORMATION al 111-NOIIWWI IJIi&w.z~~I-L f~~- i -~nI.I.In

..,OFFI~Itf.USE ONLY -SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION 0U,,I.II.--1-OFFIC"IL U.E 'tY"-SEeURITY-RELATED INFORMATION

-

Robles, JesseFrom:Sent:

Subject:

Bernardo, Robert ý I1'Wednesday, July 27, 2011 2:25 PMlOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Wednesday, July 27, 2011NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS OFFICIAL-

-ONLX-***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/

PROPRIETARY OR NRC INRNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION***

DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE OF WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM GINATORIssues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):

NoneManagement Requests:

NoneFollow-up/Other Tasks: Seven (7)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help lOEBstaff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff.]Outside of ScopeV73) PNO.IV-1 1-003E -(UPDATE)

FORT CALHOUN STATION DECLARATION OF A NOTIFICATION OFUNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO HIGH RIVER LEVELSee PNO Text. Based on an assessment that conditions in and around the facility have remained stable, theNRC has made the decision to suspend the augmented 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a-day coverage at the plant beginning on July30, 2011. The resident inspectors will continue to provide 7 day coverage onsite. Forward to TRG Leads forFlood Protection (Ed Smith) and EP (Eric Schrader).

Assigned to Rebecca Siomon.I Outside of Scope2

/Outside of ScopeAttendees at Screening Meeting:Bob Bernardo

/Rebecca SigmonSteve PannierJohn ThompsonRyan Craffey (NRO)Chris Lamb (NSIR)Mary Wegner (RES) -by phone/3 Robles, JesseFrom: King, Mark 1i)(/ tLSent: Tuesday, August 23, 2011 2:01 PM

Subject:

IQEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Tuesday, August 23, 2011NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS OFfIC .Y***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/

PROPRIETARY OR RNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION"**

DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE O.tiRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM.ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):

NoneManagement Requests:

NoneFollow-uplOther Tasks: Three (3)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary Is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help lOEBstaff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff.]tside of Scope2) EN 46893 -FORT CALHOUN -POTENTIAL FLOODING PATH DISCOVERED (RETRACTED)

See EN text: (8/2212011; 1142 EDT) Following additional review of the reported condition, it has beendetermined that the Raw Water pumps are adequately protected during flooding conditions and that the openpenetrations would not impact the ability of the Raw Water pumps to perform their design accident mitigation functions.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R4DO (Haire).

Forward retraction toTRG Leads for Flood Protection/Missiles (Edward Smith), SSW/UHS (Gerard Purciarello):

assigned to RussHaskell.

CKMID6 4)F aC4Lk5Outside of ScopeI1) EN 46893 -FORT CALHOUN -POTENTIAL FLOODING PATH DISCOVERED (RETRACTED) uutside of scopeAttendees at Screening Meeting:Bob BernardoJesse RoblesMark KingRuss HaskellRyan Craffey (NRO)Mary Wegner (RES) -by phone2 Robles, JesseFrom: King, MarkSent: Tuesday, August 30, 2011 3:16 PM

Subject:

IOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Tuesday, August 30, 2011NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS OFFIC1A'Lq

      • MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/

PROPRIETARY OR NRC IJERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION-DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE OF N ITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM5R1GINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):

None -[Note: NRO COMM assignments are provided in the link listed inthe New Reactor Items section]Management Requests:

NoneFollow-up/Other Tasks: Four (4)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help IOEBstaff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff.]1) EN 46929 -FORT CALHOUN -UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO RIVER LEVEL (NOUETERMINATED)

See EN Text. Send to TRG Leads for EP (Eric Schrader) and Missiles/Flood Protection (Ed Smith). Assignedto Russ Haskell.I oLmT5II'c OFz2) EN 46929 -FORT CALHOUN -UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO RIVER LEVEL (NOUETERMINATED)

3) EN 47202 -FORT CALHOUN -TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER UNAVAILABLE FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE (COMPENSATORY ACTIONS IN PLACE)Outside of ScopelAttendees at Screening Meeting:Mark KingBob BernardoRuss HaskellSteve PannierLarry Criscione (RES)Ryan Craffey (NRO)Al Issa (NRO)Doug Copeland (NRO)Bob Beall (NRO)2

,b6r(--<,Pr aF --q--ee6F'Jay Patel (NRO)Dave Harmon (R-II/DCI/CIB3)

-by phoneJonathan Kent (R-II/DCP/CPB4)

-by phoneDenise Edwards (R-II/DCP/CPBI)

-by phoneChelsea Smith-Standberry (R-II/DCI/CIB1)

-by phone3 Robles, JesseFrom:Sent:

Subject:

K~ing, Mark ýývWednesday, August 31, 2011 2:01 PM1OEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Wednesday, August 31, 2011NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS QFFICIAL USF Ht -*`*MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVEI PROPRIETARY OR N USE ONLY INFORMATION***

DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSID J3P1FRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION F ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):

NoneManagement Requests:

NoneFollow-up/Other Tasks: Seven (7)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help lOEBstaff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff.]4) PNO-IV-11-003F-FORT CALHOUN -PNO-IV-11-003F

-DECLARATION OF A NOTIFICATION OFUNUSUAL EVENT -(UPDATE)See PNO text: Forward to TRG Leads for Flood Protection (Ed Smith) and EP (Eric Schrader).

Assigned toRuss Haskell.I comieas:

r 'c-pc2 4OT;fr 4-P F cOutside of ScoOeAttendees at Screening Meeting:Mark KingBob BernardoRuss HaskellSteve PannierLarry Criscione (RES) -by phoneRyan Craffey (NRO)3 Al II, A;l 16l From: Mizuno, GearySent: Monday, September 26, 2011 4:37 PMTo: Albert, Michelle;

Benowitz, Howard

Subject:

RE: LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx (b)(5)GearyFrom. Albert, MichelleSent: Monday, September 26, 2011 2:49 PMTo: Mizuno, Geary; Benowitz, Howard

Subject:

FW: LOVELESS Dam Backflt.docx 1 ~ I ~a-JFYI -This is the technical document that prompted the creation of the backfit panel regarding Fort Calhoun.From: Blount, TomSent: Monday, September 26, 2011 2:45 PMTo: Albert, MichelleCc: Loveless, David ' : -k-

Subject:

FW: LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx Michelle

-As requested....

Tom B.From: Mehrhoff, VivianSent: Monday, September 26, 2011 1:42 PMTo: Blount, Tom

Subject:

LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx V/IA9

.:Albert, MichelleFrom:Sent:"r^% -Mizuno, Geary 06cMonday, September 26, 2011 4:37 PMAlhf~rt RP~nnwit7

Subject:

RE: LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx (b)(5)GearyIlkCleo,From: Albert, Michelle 2kSent: Monday, September 26, 2011 2:49 PMTo: Mizuno, Geary- Benowitz, Howard

Subject:

FW: LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx JFYI -This is the technical document that prompted the creation of the backfit panel regarding Fort Calhoun.From: Blount, TomSent: Monday, September 26, 2011 2:45 PMTo: Albert, MichelleCc: Loveless, David

Subject:

FW: LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx Michelle

-As requested....

Tom B.817-860-8146 From: Mehrhoff, VivianSent: Monday, September 26, 2011 1:42 PMTo: Blount, Tom

Subject:

LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx y/

i4bert Michelle,'-,f F.,Outside of ScopeATTORNEY-CLIENTIAT'ORNEY WORK-PRODUCT DOCUMENT

-NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

  • From: Harrison, DeborahSent: Friday, September 23, 2011 6:25 PMTo: Jones, Bradley

Subject:

Dam Backfit Panel Charter Letter for Your Concurrence This is an updated letter for you to concur on for Mr. Tom Biount and he asked that you provide yourconcurrence by next Wednesday, September 28, 2011. Thank you.

-Albert, Michelle 4From:Sent:To:Cc:

Subject:

.

Attachments:

Blount, Tom'V-\'Monday, September 26, 2011 2:45 PMAlbert, MichelleLoveless, DavidFW: LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx Michelle

-As requested....

Tom R.I(b)(6) ,From: Mehrhoff, Vivian~....................

Sent: Monday, September 26, 2011 1:42 PMTo: Blount, Tom

Subject:

LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx 1

, ,ert, MichelleFrom:To:Cc:

Subject:

Blount, Tom'--ls.

Tuesday, September 27, 2011 4:30 PMAlbert, MichelleJones, Bradley;
Biggins, James; Mizuno, Geary; Williamson, Edward; Spencer, MaryRE: RIV Ft Calhoun Backflt Panel Charter -OGC/RMR CommentsThanks Michelle

-We will incorporate your comments, and coordinate with Ed's Division as yourecommended.

Thanks for the quick turnaround.

Tom-ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED INFORMATION, ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT, AND/OR PREDECISIONAL INFORMATION

-DO NOT DISCLOSE WITHOUT COMMISSION APPROVAL

    • From: Harrison, Deborah "Sent: Friday, September 23, 2011 6:25 PMTo: Jones, Bradley

Subject:

Dam Backflt Panel Charter Letter for Your Concurrence

,! 1This is an updated letter for you to concur on for Mr. Tom Blount and he asked that you provide yourconcurrence by next Wednesday, September 28, 2011. Thank you.I ORRinnina Jam~ AFrom:SentTo:Cc:SubjectBlount Tom'rbn "Wednesday, September 28, 2011 9:10 AMWilliamson, EdwardJones, Bradley;

Biggins, James; Mizuno, Geary; Spencer, Mary; Albert, MichelleRE: RIV Ft. Calhoun Backfit Panel Charter -OGCIRMR Comments\/Thanks Ed....(b)(5)JOffZTaure'9Iy--Attomey-Client Privileged

/ Attorney Work Product Rule(b)(5)

(b)(6)ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED INFORMATION, ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT, AND/OR PREDECISIONAL INFORMATION

-DO NOT DISCLOSE WITHOUT COMMISSION APPROVALf-AFrom: Harrison, Sent: Friday, September 23, 2011 6:25 PM ..To: Jones, Bradley

Subject:

Dam Backfit Panel Charter Letter for Your Concurrence This is an updated letter for you to concur on for Mr. Tom Blount and he asked that you provide yourconcurrence by next Wednesday, September 28, 2011. Thank you.2 Jones, Bradley,From: Markley, MichaelSent: Thursday, September 29, 2011 12:16 PMTo: Jones, BradleyCc: Lyon, Fred; Hall, Randy; Mizuno, Geary; Harrison, Donnie; Murphy, Martin; Khanna, Meena;Blount, Tom; Wilkins, Lynnea

Subject:

RE: Ft. CalhounBradley,Thank you. These insights will be very helpful as this issue/review progresses.

MikeFrom: ]ones, Bradley \Sent: Thursday, September 29, 2011 11:56 AMTo: Markley, MichaelCc: Lyon, Fred; Hall, Randy; Mizuno, Geary; Harrison, Donnie; Murphy, Martin; Khanna, Meena; Blount, Tom

Subject:

Ft. Calhoun~-y,~Outside of ScopeFrom: Markley, MichaelSent: Thursday, September 29, 2011 11:02 AMTo: Wilkins, LynneaCc: Lyon, Fred; Hall, Randy; Mizuno, Geary; Harrison, Donnie; Murphy, Martin; Khanna, Meena; Blount, Tom

Subject:

FW: Ft Calhoun Upstream Dam failure Backfit PanelI vnn@.#Outside of ScopeRIV is considering an adequate protection backfit for Fort Calhoun.

Please see the attached.

Please consult Geary Mizuno who is the OGC legal expert and Fred Lyon and Randy Hall who are the DORLsubject matter experts.

The cognizant technical division for this is EMCB. Please handle expeditiously.

Belowis the applicable guidance.

MID 8.4: http://www.intemal.

nrc.,ov/ADM/DAS/ca.q/Management Directives/rmd8.4.

pdfThe NRR Office Instruction is LIC-202, http://nrrlO.nrc.qov/nrr-office/webapps/O/docs/ML092010045.pdf DORL Handbook Links: http://nrrl0.

nrc.,qov/nrr-office/DORLHandbook/Backfds.html MikeBradley W. Jones Jones, BradleyFrom: Mizuno, GearySent: Thursday, September 29, 2011 11:48 AMTo: Albert, MichelleCc: Jones, Bradley

Subject:

FW: Ft Calhoun Upstream Dam failure Backfit PanelAttachments:

FW: LOVELESS Dam Backflt.docx; Emailing:

Dam Backfit Panel Charter.docx "0COutside of ScopeFrom: Markley, MichaelSent: Thursday, September 29, 2011 11:02 AMTo: Wilkins, LynneaoCc: Lyon, Fred; Hall, Randy; Mizuno, Geary; Harrison, Donnie; Murphy, Martin; Khanna, Meena; Blount, Tom

Subject:

FW: Ft Calhoun Upstream Dam failure Backfit PanelLynnea,RIV is considering an adequate protection backfit for Fort Calhoun.

Please see the attached.

Please consult Geary Mizuno who is the OGC legal expert and Fred Lyon and Randy Hall who are the DORLsubject matter experts.

The cognizant technical division for this is EMCB. Please handle expeditiously.

Belowis the applicable guidance.

MD 8.4: http://www.intemal.nrc..ov/ADM/DAS/cag/Manacgement Directives/md8.4.pdf The NRR Office Instruction is LIC-202, http://nrrl0.

nrc.gov/nrr-office/webapips/0l/docs/ML092010045.pdf DORL Handbook Links: http://nrrl0.

nrc.qov/nrr-office/DORLHandbooklBackfits.

htmlMikeFrom: Blount, Tom, .Sent: Thursday, September 29, 2011 9:27 AMTo- Markley, Michael; M Marti, na.inCc: Howe, Allen; Lund, Louise; Hiland, Patrick;

Loveless, David; Vegel, Anton

Subject:

Ft Calhoun Upstream Dam failure Backflt PanelMike / Marty- we are putting together a "Backfit Panel" to consider a proposed "Adequate Protection BackfitException" analysis done by one of our SRA's, Dave Loveless.

We are seeking a NRR panel member. I seemto recall some discussion that Meena Khanna was on the Oconee panel (?). In any case we are seeking anNRR representative for the panel. I have included information I have at this time; hopefully this will assist inyour decision making. Included is the Charter, which I am seeking your concurrence on, assuming theinclusion of your named representative.

Any questions, please call me....Thanks in advance for your support....

Tom Bfount1D.

Smith, ChrisFrom,Sent:To:Cc:

Subject:

Kirkland, JohnWednesday, October 12, 2011 11:04 AMClark, JeffWingebach, Jacob; Smith, Chris; Willoughby, Leonard; Farnhollz, ThomasManholeOutside of ScopeJohn KirklandSenior Resident Inspector, Fort Calhoun Station9610 Power LaneBlair, NE 68008402-426-9612 402-426-9613 (fax)I

,!ir, Christopher

__,Irem: Haire, MarkSent: Wednesday, October 12, 2011 5:33 PMTo: Wilkins, Lynnea; Mensah, Tanya; Smith, Edward; LI, Yong; Uribe, Juan; Holian, Brian;Rosenberg, Stacey; Goel, Vijay; DLRCalendar Resource; Hoang, Dan; Hair. Christopher; Wilson, George; Markley, Michael; Murphy, MartinSubject SECURITY RELATED INFORMATION ATTACHED:

RE: Continuation:

Internal PRB Meeting:G20110492/G20110506

-Fort Calhoun/Cooper Petitions Re: Flooding (ME6622 & ME6681)SECURITY RELATED INFORMATION ATTACHEDThanks.On our last call I mentioned that RIV had been looking internally at the flooding danger at FCS with regard to upstreamdam failures.

Attached is the Memo to the RIV RA from one of our SRA's regarding an analysis of flooding riskassociated with FCS dam failure (the memo is in ADAMS, and is Security-Related Info).MFCS ProposedAdequate Protect...

SECURITY RELATED INFORMATION ATTACHEDM41,f'X //114P1From: Wilkins, Lynnea\.Sent: Wednesday, October 12, 2011 12:55 PMTo: Mensah, Tanya; Smith, Edward;ULl, Yong; Uribe, Juan; Haire, Mark; Holian, Brian; Rosenberg, Stacey; Goel, Vijay;DLRCalendar Resource; Hoang, Dan; Hair, Christopher; Wilson, George; Markley, Michael; Murphy, Martin

Subject:

RE: Continuation:

Internal PRB MeeUng: G20110492/G20110506

-Fort Calhoun/Cooper Petitions Re: Flooding(ME6622 & ME6681)All,Please see the attached for tomorrow's meeting.

I've update the Internal PRB notes based on our lastmeeting.

I've also attached a "thumbnail" of Mr. Saporito's concerns as expressed in the teleconference (MLI 1256A036).

ThanksLynnea<< File: Cooper Internal PRB Notes -G20110506.doc

>> << File: Fort Calhoun Internal PRB Notes -G20110492

.doc >><< File: Saporito Concerns From Transcript-August 29.docx >>----- Original Appointment--

From: Mensah, TanyaSent: Friday, September 2.,, 2011 4:22 PM

-To: Mensah, Tanya; Wilkins, Lynnea; Smith, Edward; Li, Yong; Uribe, Juan; Haire, Mark; Holian, Brian; Rosenberg, Stacey; Goel, Vijay; DLRCalendar Resource; Hoang, Dan; Hair, Christopher; Wilson, George; Markley, Michael; Murphy,Martin

Subject:

Continuation:

Internal PRB Meeting:

G20110492/G20110506

-Fort Calhoun/Cooper Petitions Re: Flooding(ME6622 & ME6681)When: Thursday, October 13, 2011 2:45 PM-3:30 PM (GMT-05:00)

Eastern Time (US & Canada).Where: HQ-OWFN-11B02-12p When: Thursday, October 13, 2011 2:45 PM-3:30 PM (GMT-05:00)

Eastern Time (US & Canada).Where: HQ-OWFN-11B02-12p Note: The GMT offset above does not reflect daylight saving time adjustments.

Purpose:

The PRB will continue its internal discussion to make the initial recommendation to accept/reject thepetition for review. Due to the schedules of the Various PRB members and advisors (i.e, training, travel, AL),the earliest time to permit PRB participation from is 10/13/11.

Handouts:

Will be provided by Lynnea via separate email.Dial-In:

Will Be ProvidedTanya Mensah, 2.206 Coordinator 301-415-3610 2

Robles, JesseFrom: Robles, JesseSent: Friday, October 21-l, 2011 2:D7 PM

Subject:

IOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Friday, October 21, 2011NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS OFFICIAL USE ONLY***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/

PROPRIETARY OR NRC INTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION***

DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE OF NRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): NoneOpE Forum Postings (COMMS):

One (1)V

3) EN 47359 -FORT CALHOUN -FLOOD BARRIER PENETRATIONS NOT WATER TIGHTSee EN Text. Pass to TRG Lead for AFW (Stanley Gardocki) and Electrical Power lRoy Mathew).

Assigned toJesse Robles.Outside of Scope2 OU--16OF 6CaeNOTE: H{ItS SUMMARY I6S OFFICIAL USE 0tEY4-.S** *VM Y C O N TAP rVitFt, ýM TA R Y 0 R N R C IN I -RN A L U 1 1 N LY ',ii N FG R M A T WN *- *DO-NOT-FORWARD ANY FORTIONS OUTSIDE or ,-C WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERM+ISION FR.M-ORIGINA-OR Attendees at Screening Meeting:Jesse RoblesEric ThomasRebecca SigmonBob Bernardo (by phone)Jay Patel (NRO -by phone)Mary Wegner (RES -by phone)3 Smith, ChrisFrom: Kirkland, JohnSent: Friday, October 21, 2011 10:26 AMTo: Clark, JeffCc: Smith, Chris; Azua, Ray

Subject:

Flood Penetrations Conduits in the affected pull boxes are supposed to have a water proof sealant in them. It was described tome as a "liquid asphalt that hardens.!

They are injected into the conduit from ports on the conduit, located afew inches from the end of the conduit.

Then the end of the conduit is sealed with a more "beeswax" typematerial, that hardens and keeps the asphalt type material inside of the conduit.When they inspecte them before, they saw the beeswax and assumed that the entire pnetration wasinstalled correctly.

1(b)(5)John KIrlandSenior Resident Inspector, Fort Calhoun Station9610 Power LaneBlair, NE 68008402-426-9612 402-426-9613 (fax)I

Ailbert, MichelleFrom: Albert, Michelle Sent: Friday, October 28, 2011 11:23 AMTo: Williamson, Edward; Spencer, MaryCc: Jones, Bradley;
Biggins, James L. i

Subject:

FW: FCS Backfit PanelAttachments:

G0901-6 Facility-Specific Backfit.doc A j?1P 0iIFYIFrom: Albert, Michelleu'L-Sent: Friday, October 28, 2011 10:56 AMTo: Jones, Bradley;

Biggins, James; Mizuno, Geary; Benowitz, Howard

Subject:

FW: FCS Backfit PanelFYIFrom: Blount, Tom °e e -Sent: Friday, October 21, 2011 1:19 PMTo: Kellar, Ray; Farnholtz, Thomas; Clark, Jeff; Albert, Michelle; Wilson, GeorgeCc: Fuller, Karla; Mehrhoff, Vivian; Loveless, David

Subject:

FCS Backfit PanelHello everyone

-I wanted to provide an update on our efforts to put together the "Backfit Panel" for the FtCalhoun Upstream Dam Failure Issue. You may be aware Elmo Collins (R-IV RA) authorized the PanelCharter this past week (10/19).

During his review, Elmo took a more "global" perspective of other activities associated with the "Flooding" issues that the agency is currently engaged in, and had questions regarding impact/influence of other agency activities.

With the ongoing efforts regarding the Fukushima Near-Term taskforce and the soon to be issued Generic Issue, GI-204 for Flooding, taking action that has the potential forunintended consequences affecting a larger agency effort would not be appropriate.

After some dialogue withvarious folks, including Ben Beasley (RES), Dave Skeen (NRR) and George Wilson (NRR), I'm convinced wecan proceed, while ensuring communications/coordination with the other programs, and I advised Elmo of the.same, which supported his decision to go forward with the panel.At this juncture I think we need an initial meeting, with the primary purpose of aligning on what our outcome willneed to be, and defining a path to get there. With that in mind I will try to find a time that supports everyone's calendar.

(ACTION:

Vivian, please arrange conference call with phone,# and passcode).

The ADAMS accession

  1. for the Charter and the Dave L. analysis is:MLI 1293A 19P -CharterEML111822555fc-Analysis

'. ,The link to Management Directive 8.4 "Management of Facility-specific Backfitting and Information Collection" is http://www.internal.nrc.-qov/ADM/DAS/cacq/Mana-qement Directives/md8.4.pdf I have also attached the Regional Policy Guide for Facility

-Specific backfits to this e-mail for yourawareness.

Thank you for your willingness to support this panel. I look forward to our productive efforts as we move this tocompletion.

Tom Bf1ountDep. DRS R-JVl~b) 6 L.UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV612 EASTLAMAR BLVD, SU M 400ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4125 PG 0901.6 -October 31, 2008FACILITY-SPECIFIC BACKFIT AND INFORMATION COLLECTION PROCEDURE EFFECTIVE:

Immediately SUPERSEDES PG 0901.5CONTACT:

Regional CounselDISTRIBUTION:

StandardAPPROVAL:

IRA/Elmo Collins, Regional Administrator REVISION:

THIS PG HAS BEEN REVISED TO REQUIRE INTERIM TRAINING UNTILPERMANENT FORMAL TRAINING IS DEVELOPED AND TO CHANGE THE REGIONALBACKFIT PROGRAM ASSESSMENTS FROM ANNUALLY TO TRIENNIALLY.

ALSO, THEREVISION CONTAINS MINOR EDITORIAL CHANGES AND REVISIONS ARE IN BOLD.A. Purposelbiscussion This policy guide provides guidance for implementing NRC's backfit and information collection regulations, and M.D. 8.4, Management of Facility-specific Backfldting andInformation Collection, relating to power reactors and certain materials facilities.

Neither generic backfitting, nor test, research, nor training reactors are covered by thispolicy guide. M.D. 8.4 is the principal reference for this Regional Office PolicyGuide (ROPG).

Enclosures:

1. Backfit Examples2. Backfit Review Panel3. RIV Backfit Status Logcc/w

Enclosures:

RIV Coordinator, DEDO (MS:16E15)

C. Carpenter, DESUNSI Review Completed:

KDF_ ADAMS: c Yes X No Initials:

KDF_o Publicly Available o Non-Publicly Available o Sensitive 7 Non-Sensitive NAME: R: %ROPG\PG 0901.6Facil

-Specifc Backfit and Information Collection Procedure.doc KDFuller WBJones ATHoweil DDChamberlain RJCaniano IRA/ IRA/ IRAJ /RA/ IRA10/27/08 10/27108 10/28/08 10/28108 10/29/08CACasto EECollPns

/RA/ /RA/10/30108 10/31/081 OFF(CIAL RECORD COPYT=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax PG 0901.6-2-Backfitting is the process by which NRC decides whether to impose new or revised regulatory requirements or staff positions on NRC-licensed nuclear power reactors or certain materials facilities.

Backfitting for nuclear power reactors is defined in 10 C.F.R. 50.109 as the modification of oraddition to systems, structures, components, or design of a facility; or the design approval ormanufacturing license for a facility; or the procedures or organization required to design,construct, or operate a facility.

Any of the aforementioned may result from a new or amendedprovision in the Commission rules or the imposition of a regulatory staff position interpreting theCommission rules that is either new or different from a previously applicable staff position.

Thebackf-tting definitions in 10 C.F.R. Parts 70, 72, and 76 are slightly different.

NRC staff positions may be identified as potential backfits either by the staff or a stakeholder (e.g., a licensee).

In the case of a licensee claimed backfit, the licensee must submit the backfitclaim in writing to the Regional Administrator (RA) for disposition.

Generally, there are three types of backfits.

They are (1) compliance, (2) adequate protection' (including defining and redefining the level of adequate protection),

and (3) a cost-justified substantial increase in safety. See M.D. 8.4, Figure 1. Enclosure 1 provides examples ofbackfit situations.

The first two types of backfits (i.e., a backfit to bring a facility into compliance with the license, rules, Commission orders, or written commitments by the licensee, or oneimposed to ensure that the facility provides adequate protection of public health and safety orcommon defense and security) are termed as exceptions, and do not require findings ofsubstantial safety improvements.

Economic costs may not be considered in defining or refiningwhat is an adequate level of protection or in ensuring that an adequate level of protection isachieved or maintained or requiring compliance with regulations that ensure adequateprotection.

Neither of these two types of backfits requires a backfit analysis.

The third, costjustified

backfit, does require a backfit analysis.

B. Action1. The Backfit ProcessWhen the staff invokes a backfit exception, the RA must provide a documented evaluation that includes a statement of the objectives, reasons for themodification, and the basis for the backfit exception.

The documented evaluation should be issued with the backfit except when an immediately effective agencyaction is necessary because the safety or security implications are urgent, andfull documentation cannot be completed.

in those cases, the documentation mayfollow the backfrt imposition.

For more guidance on preparing the documented evaluation, see M.D. Handbook 8.4, Part II, pps. 9-13.This refers to adequate protection of public health and safety or common defense andsecurity.,

PG 0901.6-3-For backfits other than the compliance or adequate protection varieties (i.e., acost-justified substantial increase in safety),

the staff must perform a backfitanalysis2 and may be required to prepare a re-aulatory analysis3 to show thatcertain improvements in safety or security are justified on the basis of theassociated costs. Often only one analysis is performed to meet both the backfitand regulatory analysis requirements.

For more guidance on backflt andregulatory

analyses, see Handbook 8.4, Part I1, pps. 15-17 and Exhibit 2,Guidance for Performing a Combined Backfit and Regulatory Analysis.

The RA shall review and approve any documented evaluations, backfit analyses, and/or regulatory analyses developed as a part of the backfit process.Additionally, the RA will determine if a staff position is a backfit (whether staff orlicensee identified),

whether the proposed backfit should be imposed on thelicensee, and any appeals to the region of backfit decisions.

In order to makethese determinations, the RA may elect to use a panel as described inEnclosure

2. The RA will consult and coordinate with the applicable programoffices (NRR, NMSS, or NSIR [for all security-related backfits]),

OGC, and OE,as appropriate, in making these determinations.

After the RA has approved thesupporting regulatory

analysis, and/or backfit analysis, and after thisdocumentation has been forwarded for information to the EDO, the cognizant Division Director will issue the backfit determination along with the supporting evaluation or analyses to the licensee.

The licensee may choose to implement or appeal any backfit.Implementation is normally accomplished on a schedule negotiated between thelicensee and the NRC. The staff should consult OE and OGC for establishing the schedule.

2The backfit rules require a demonstration that "there is a substantial increase in theoverall protection of the public health and safety or the common defense and security to bederived from the backfit and that the direct and indirect costs of implementation for that facilityare justified in view of this increased protection."

See 10 C.F.R. 50.109(a)(3) and Handbook8.4, Part II, p. 14.

a regulatory analysis helps to ensure that NRC decisions are based onadequate information concerning the need for and consequences of proposed actions;appropriate alternative approaches are identified and analyzed; and no clearly preferable alternative is available to the proposed action.

PG 0901.6-4-2. Backfit Appeal ProcessThere are two types of backfit appeal processes:

a. Appeal to the Region to modify or withdraw a proposed backfit for which aregulatory analysis has been prepared and transmitted to the licensee; orb. Appeal to the Region to reverse a denial of a prior licensee claim that astaff position, not identified by the NRC as a backfit, is one, or that abackfit which staff believes falls within one of the exceptions from therequirement for a regulatory
analysis, does not.For all appeals, licensees should address the appeal to the RA with a copy to theEDO. (A copy of all security related appeals will be provided to the Director ofNSIR and will be coordinated with NSIR as appropriate.)

The RA will report tothe EDO within 90 days after receipt of the appeal, the plan for resolving theissue. The licensee should also be promptly and periodically informed in writingregarding the status of the issue. The RA will decide the appeal and inform thelicensee in writing with a copy to the EDO. If dissatisfied with the RA's decision, the licensee may appeal to the EDO, unless resolution is achieved at a lowermanagement level. If after losing an appeal, the licensee does not agree toimplement the backfit, it may be imposed by order. See Handbook 8.4, Part II,pp. 23-24.In the first type of appeal, the staff should reconsider the supporting regulatory

analysis, and other information that is relevant and material to the proposedbackfit.

In the second type of appeal, the appeal should take into account thestaff's evaluation, the licensee's

response, and other information that is relevantand material.

Backfit claims and resultant staff determinations that arere-evaluated in response to an appeal, and that are again determined by theNRC not to be backfits, or are exempt from the requirement for a regulatory

analysis, are not to be treated further in the context of this procedure.
3. Record Keeping and Reporting The Regional Counsel (RC) will administratively manage each proposed facility-specific backfit by maintaining records related to it, including
requests, positions, statements, panel minutes, and summary reports.

The RC will provide theserecords to the RA's secretary for inclusion in ADAMS with recommendations coordinated with the staff concerning whether the documents should be placed in PG 0901.6-5-the public or non-public section.

Additionally, the RC will keep a RIV backfitstatus log for tracking purposes.

6 Enclosure 3 is a copy of the log.4. TrainingThe Office of Human Resources is developing backfit training modules andrefresher courses for the staff, some of which may be available online. TheDivision Directors will ensure that regional inspection staff and any otherpersonnel who may be involved in backfit issues take the initial or refresher backflt training annually once it is developed.

In the interim, all technical staff will be required to perform a read and sign of this policy guideannually that will be tracked as a Regional Administrator action item.5. Information Collection (See Handbook 8.4. Part I11, pps. 26-28.)The RA will authorize requests for information from power reactor licensees inaccordance with 10 CFR 50.54(f)

(and from certain material licensees under70.22(d),

72.62(d),

and 76.70(e)).

Requests under 10 C.F.R. 50.54(f) must bejustified by a supporting analysis which finds that the burden to be imposed isjustified in view of the potential safety significance of the issue to be addressed inthe requested information.

The division requesting the information (e.g., DRS,DRP, or DNMS) will prepare the supporting analysis for the RA's review. Referto Handbook 8.4, Part Ill, pps. 26-28, for guidance on preparing the supporting analysis and exceptions to providing a supporting analysis.

6. AuditsDRS will conduct an assessment triennially of the implementation of theregional backfit program in the same year as the update to this policy guide.7.

References:

See pps. 12-13 of M.D. 8.4.4 Classified and safeguards information should not be placed in ADAMS, and proprietary and sensitive information should be excluded from the public domain in ADAMS.5The time needed to complete an initial backfit issue or backfit appeal may varydepending on the complexity of the backfit claim. As a guideline,

however, the following timeline is suggested:
  • Inform EDO and licensee of an initial backfit determination within 90 calendar days afterreceipt of the claim and resolve the issue within 180 calendar days after receipt of theclaim.* Keep the licensee informed of the backfit or backfit appeal status no less than quarterly.
  • Inform the EDO of the plan for resolving an appeal by the 80t' calendar day afterreceiving the appeal, and resolve the backfit appeal within 180 calendar days.

PG 0901.6 LIC-202, Procedures for Managing Plant-Specific Backfits and 50.54(f)Information Requests* NMSS Policy and Procedure Letter (P&P) 1-84, May 2004 PG 0901.6BACKFIT EXAMPLES1. The Region considered whether the NRC staff imposition of a 10 C.F.R. 50.73reportability requirement of a licensee-identified Technical Specification 6.12 violation onthe Wolf Creek plant was a backfit.

The issue involved the reporting of high radiation area control violations by use of the licensee event report requirements of 10 C.F.R.50.73. A regional panel determined that it was a plant-specific (Wolf-Creek) backfit..

Itwas a compliance

backflt, since it would have been a backfit to bring Wolf Creek intocompliance with 10 C.F.R. 50.73, an NRC regulation.

The matter was also referred toNRR and it determined that future violations of T.S. 6.12 shall be reported in accordance with 10 C.F.R. 50.73.2. NRC issued a 10 C.F.R. 50.59 violation to TXU Electric (Comanche Peak) June 11,1997, associated with NRC Inspection Report 50-445;446/97-12, for failure to performwritten safety evaluations to provide the basis for concluding that four changes todrawings contained in the safety analysis report did not involve unreviewed safetyquestions.

The licensee requested the NRC to perform a backfit analysis to evaluate theapparent change in staff position from that given in NRC Inspection Report 50-445;446/93-32 dated October 13, 1993 to that expressed in NRC Inspection Report 50-445;446/97-12.

The 1993 report stated in reference to an issue unrelated to the subjectfour changes:This temporary modification should have been identified as a "trivial" type change. Thatis, a change having "no potential safety impact (e.g., affecting safe shutdown or thesafety of operations)."

In each of the four examples of the violation, the licensee invoked Category 7 "trivial" change (minor changes which had no potential safety impact) from its procedure, "10CFR 50.59 Review Guide," Revision 4, to disposition the associated design changenotices as not requiring safety evaluations.

In the 1993 inspection report, the inspectors provided statements that appeared to accept the licensee's guidance on this issue. Thestaff found during the backfit analysis that because the statements in the 1993inspection report were misleading, the reversal of the previous

position, which acceptedthe licensee's interpretation of "trivial"
changes, constituted a change in the staff'sposition and a compliance
backfit, because the change was necessary to assurecompliance with the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 50.59.3. A Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) was issued to the Oconee Nuclear Stationon September 8, 2000. The licensee requested the NOED as a result of its inability tocomply with Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.1.9.a which provides for annual verification of voltage and frequency response of the KeoweeHydro Units (KHUs). Specifically, the licensee could not meet upper voltage andfrequency limits that had been incorporated into the TS by the staff when Oconee TSs-1I-ENCLOSURE 1

PG 0901.6were converted to Improved Technical Specifications (ITSs). In the background sectionof the NOED, the staff discussed the September 4, 1998, approved amendment (Nos.232, 232 and 231) for Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3. Under this amendment, the relevantportion of the SR (then referenced as SR 3.7.1.11) was that the annual test verifies eachKHU can attain rated speed and voltage within 23 seconds of an emergency start signal.No limits existed on speed or votage. During the conversion of the Oconee TSs toITSs (December 16, 1998), limits were incorporated on the upper and lowerfrequency and voltage, and the present SR 3.8.1.9.a limits (which the licensee couldnot meet) were adopted.

An NRC staff member claimed that the inclusion of limits onthe upper and lower frequency and voltage in the TS was a backfit.

The regiondetermined that it was a backfit, because the staff modified the licensee's surveillance, procedure by incorporating new limits where none had previously existed.

It appears tohave been a compliance bacMdt because the modification was made for consistency with the ITS Writer's Guide and ITS convention program.

(This backfit issue laterbecame moot due to the submission of a request for an amendment.)

4. [NOTE: Although not a facility-specific
backfit, the following is an example of anadequate protection backflt.J The NRC addressed the issues of reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head penetration leakage and the potential for degradation of the low-alloy steel head by boric acidcorrosion through a 2003 order and a 2004 revised order. The orders required PWRlicensees to determine the degradation susceptibility category of their reactor and toimplement specific inspections of the RPV head and associated penetration nozzles.The staff believed that the orders were not appropriate regulatory tools for long-term regulation in this area. Therefore, it pursued rulemaking activities to incorporate theinspection requirements of the orders into 10 C.F.R. 50.55a. Although a strictcodification of the requirements in the orders would not be a backfit, because the staffexpected that the requirements may be modified as a result of the rulemaking, it treatedthe rulemaking as a backfit necessary for adequate

-protection of public health andsafety.-2""ENCLOSURE 1

PG 0901.6BACKFIT REVIEW PANELA. Purpose:To define a review panel to consider potential items relative to the backfit rules.B. Discussion:

ROPG 0901.6, "FACILITY-SPECIFIC BACKFIT AND INFORMATION COLLECTION PROCEDURE,"

defines the procedures to be followed for consideration and processing of NRC-imposed changes having a potential for falling under the provisions of M.D. 8.4,MANAGEMENT OF FACILITY-SPECIFIC BACKFITTING AND INFORMATION COLLECTION.

The decision to prepare a Regulatory Analysis is assigned by thisROPG to the appropriate Division Director.

As an aid to the Division Directors, and to assure consistent application of the backfitrule within the region, a panel is hereby commissioned to consider potential backfit itemsand to recommend the need for a Regulatory Analysis if judged necessary to complywith the above requirements.

The panel will be composed of the following or their designated alternate:

Division Director (of the relevant division appropriate to the issue, e.g., DRP,DRS, or DNMS): Panel ChairmanEnforcement OfficerBranch Chief, DNMS (Primary Materials Contact), Branch Chief, DRP (Primary Reactor Contact)Branch Chief, DRS (Primary Reactor Contact)C. Action:1. The above panel will meet when convened by the Chairman.

2. Items to be considered by the panel will be identified by the Chairman/Division Director assigned to the panel.3. Copies of applicable documentation will be distributed by the Chairman to eachpanel member in advance of a meeting to consider potential backfit items.4. Minutes of each panel meeting will be kept by the Chairman to reflect the itemsconsidered and the panel recommendations.

D. Backfit Appeal Panel Composition The backfit appeal panel will function similarly to the initial backfit panel. The backfitappeal panel should consist of the Regional Counsel as Chairman and the two technical Division Directors who did not participate in the initial panel (i.e., DNMS, DRP, or DRS)as members for independence purposes.

Also, one member of the appeal panel should ENCLOSURE 2

PG 0901.6be a technical expert from an organization outside of the region (e.g., NRR, NMSS,RES, EDO, OGC, NSIR, etc.). The appeal panel chairman will provide minutes anddecision documents from the appeal panel to the RA's secretary for inclusion in ADAMSand include the decision in the regional backflt status table.-2-ENCLOSURE 2

PG 0901.6ENCLOSURE 3, ML032940098 (redacted) and ML 032940104 (redacted)

RIV BACKFIT STATUSDATE LICENSEE ISSUE STATUS4/99 River Bend Station (RBS) Change to the calculated loss-of-coolant CLOSEDaccident offsite doses at RBS(b)(5)3/99 Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Appendix R Compliance Issue10/97 Comanche Peak (CP) Failure to perform safety evaluation for CLOSED-3i27100 configuration changes in FSAR7/92 Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Security Issue in re X-ray devices CLOSED -unnecessary backfit12/90 Wolf Creek (WC) Part 50.73 reportabilily issue in re Sec. 6 of CLOSEDTech Specs5/89 Wolf Creek (WC) Emergency action levels employed at WC CLOSED -no backflt5/89 Wolf Creek (WC) Security Compensation measures beyond CLOSED -no backfitwhat was required imposed by NRC4/88 ARKANSAS Nuclear One (ANO) Safeguards related matter at ANO CLOSED -no backfit3/88 Wolf Creek (WVC) Safeguards related matter at WC CLOSED- no backfit PG 0901.6ENCLOSURE 3, ML032940098 (redacted) and ML 032940104 (redacted)

RIVBACKFIT STATUSDATE LICENSEE ISSUE STATUS1/87 Wolf Creek (WC) Change in interpretation of 73.71 CLOSED -no backfit7/86 Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) Safeguards related issue at FCS CLOSED -no backfit5/13/98 South Texas Project 10 C.F.R. 50.59-Unreviewed safety question CLOSED-8/4/00 (Due to neww/o NRC review & approval rule & minor significance, backfit consideration canceled) 217101 Callaway-AMEREN/UE SDP-ALARA-Occupational Radiation Safety CLOSED-no backfit 5/41019/28/01 ANO Manual actions & 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. R, CLOSED-no backfit 4/15/02III.G.2 Boyer, RachelFrom: Collins, ElmoSent: Tuesday, November 01, 2011 11:10 AMTo: Borchardt, BillCc: Virgilio

-Disabled 5-4-2012 per 574504, Martin; Leeds, Eric

Subject:

FW: FYI -Fort Calhoun Station updateBillHere is the e-mail sent to Commission TAs to update on status of Ft CalhounElmoFrom: Castleman, PatrickSent: Tuesday, November 01, 2011 10:58 AMTo: Franke, Mark; Hipschman, Thomas; Marshall, Michael; Gilles, Nanette; Orders, William; Franovich, MikeCc: Collins, Elmo; Bowman, Gregory; Brock, Kathryn

Subject:

RE: FYI -Fort Calhoun Station updateThanks, Mark.From: Franke, MarkSent: Tuesday, November 01, 2011 10:57 AMTo: Hipschman, Thomas; Marshall, Michael; Castleman, Patrick; Gilles, Nanette; Orders, William; Franovich, MikeCc: Collins, Elmo; Bowman, Gregory; Brock, Kathryn

Subject:

FYI -Fort Calhoun Station updateGood Morning -The following is as update on Fort Calhoun Station, which has been shutdown since April for a refueling outage. The outage was extended due to flooding along the Missouri River. Fort Calhoun Station is currently in Column 4 of the Reactor Oversight Program response matrix.On September 2, 2011, Region IV issued a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) to Fort Calhoun regarding post-flooding recovery actions needed prior to restart, including tests and inspections.

  • Fort Calhoun is beginning a review and assessment in preparation for NRC supplemental inspections (IP 95003) associated with their Column 4 status.* Region IV is implementing Manual Chapter (MC) 0351 to address Performance Indicator and BaselineInspection program impacts due to the plant's extended shutdown period.* Based on several additional performance issues identified during recent NRC inspections, Region IV isworking with NRR to consider MC 0350.* Region IV formed a back-fit panel to consider what actions are appropriate to address an Army Corpsof Engineers report regarding the impact of dam failures on the Missouri River system.Please give me a call if you have any questions.

Thanks,S*-"----.--~-

-.----.-

-~.

Mark(b)~(6) blckberry) p~2 BBoyer RachelFrom:. Wiggins, JimSent: Monday, December 05, 2011 3:49 PMTo: Borchardt.

BillCc: Virgilio

-Disabled 5-4-2012 per 574504, MartinSubject.

ACTION: NEED TO SPEAK TO YOU THIS WEEK ABOUT FT. CALHOUNWant to discuss the fact that RIV and NRR are recommending entry into the 0350 process for Ft Calhoun.

Bytomorrow, Ill have a brief write-up on the rationale.

For now, suffice it to say that I'm unaware we've seen aset of performance results like we're seeing at Ft Calhoun since the start ".0.2%L-Calhoun is firmly in -.3Column 4 with potentially 3 Degraded Cornerstones (IE, MS and Secuitt(b)(

5) L RlV staff indicates thatIt's not clear that the licensee has Its arms around the problems and wha11Ufwn mnowd to address them.Going to 0350 will be a way to make the licensee face the Issues,,..

though likely it would result in the restartdate for the facility being later than what the licensee Is telling Itself (March) and more like what the Regionthinks is realistic (June).I tend to agree with the Region and NRR.More to come.Don't know if you or Marty have had any discussions on this with the Chairman or the Commissioners.

I Uibe, JuanFrom: Wang, WejunSent: Thursday, Decohnber 15, 2011 1:42 PMTo: Xi, Zuhan; Candelano, Luissette; Uribe, Juan

Subject:

FW: Fort Calhoun FloodingThis is one of the earliest e-mail communication regarding the Fort Calhoun site flooding.

7114"nFrom: Wang, WeUun ISent: Tuesday, Septenfltý.06, 2011 12:37 PMTo: Williams, Megan; Wilson, GeorgeCc: Manoly, Kamal; Cook, Christopher

Subject:

RE: Fort Calhoun FloodingMegan:I am not sure whether we have regulatory authority to ask the licensee to monitor cracks -Kamal may knowmore.Regarding the soil types and properties, you may want to get the soil profile and soil properties to see if thereare clayey soil and cemented sandy soil because the clayey soil may cause additional long term settlement if itbecame saturated from unsaturated state for a while, and the cemented sandy soil may greatly reduce itsstrength when becomes saturated (non-cemented sand does not have this issue, saturation only reduce theeffective stress and it should be considered during design).By the way, usually cracking is an indication of differential settlement.

If the cracks continue increasing, thenlocal foundation failure is possible.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Thanks.From: Williams, Megan (AtSent: Tuesday, Septembrr 0, 2011 1i:53'AMTo: Wang, Weijun; Wilson, GeorgeCc: Manoly, Kamal; Cook, Christopher

Subject:

RE: Fort Calhoun FloodingThank you, Weijun. This is most helpful.We are seeing many cracks in concrete walls in the turbine building (below grade), which have been leakingwater since the flood started.

I am trying to find out the Structures Monitoring Program owner, to see if theyhad a baseline inspection documentation (they should have completed for license renewal -2004) indicating what cracks were evident before the flood, and their size, etc.)(5)R1, MeganFrom: Wang, WeiJunSent: Tuesday, September 06, 2011 9:56 AMTo: Williams, Megan; Wilson, GeorgeCc: lanoly, Kamal; Cook, Christopher

Subject, RE: Fort Calhoun FloodingMegan:Without knowing much details, I'd like to suggest the follows:1. Get documents to see how the hydraulic loading was considered during the original structure andfoundation design. If the actual flood level is higher than the original design, then the additional lateralpressure and uplift force may cause some damage to the foundation walls and foundation floorconcrete slabs, and also may have negative impact on the stability of foundation soils.2. Regardless the flood levels considered in the original design, you may still need to inspect the structure and foundation to see if there is any damages caused by flooding, such as cracks and settlement.

TheGPR is a good method to detect voids and the licensee should also perform additional NDT testing toinspect the integrity of the foundation walls and floor concrete slabs or mats, should cracks bediscovered.

3. Pay attention to settlements, both in vertical and horizontal directions.

Flood normally will reduce thestrength of foundation soil, especially if the water did not dissipate for a longer period of time. Forcertain type of soils and drainage conditions, as well as the actual foundation condition after the flood,the additional settlement caused by flood may continue for certain period of time, and therefore thesettlement monitoring should be kept for a longer time until no detectible settlement increase isobserved.

The above just for your reference.

Please let me know if you have questions.

Thanks.(301)415-1175 From: Williams, MeganSent: Tuesday, September 06, 2011 9:44 AM .&ATo: Wilson, GeorgeCc: Manoly, Kamal; Wang, Weijun; Cook, Christopher

Subject:

RE: Fort Calhoun FloodingGood morning,I am at Fort Calhoun this week, and trying to get some details from the contractors on their approach toevaluating subgrade conditions at the site, now that most of the water has receded.In reviewing the USAR, certain structures had hydraulic loading designs based on different flood levels (Class Iversus Class I1, and several references to 2.7.1.2 for design peak flood elevation, which itself references 2

multiple different flood elevations within its paragraphs).

Is it possible to get documentation that we haveregarding this hydraulic loading design?I am trying to get information on the GPR they are using to look for voids. Are there any other specificquestions or things you all can think of that I should look at while on site?Thank you,Megan WilliamsRIVFrom: Wilson, GeorgeSent: Tuesday, August 23, 2011 5:53 AMTo: Williams, MeganCc: Manoly, Kamal; Wang, WeiJun; Cook, Christopher

Subject:

RE: Fort Calhoun FloodingMegan use Kamal Manoly as your reference person he will get assistance from Weijun Wang in NROFrom: Williams, MeganSent: Friday, August 19, 2011 12:28 PMTo: Wilson, George

Subject:

Fort Calhoun FloodingHey, Mr. Wilson,I left you a voicemail, and understand you are out of the office until next week, but I thought I would also sendyou an email, since I will be out of the office next week on inspection.

We are beginning to engage in reviewing the licensee's efforts for restart at the plant after extensive floodingthis spring/summer.

You probably know a large portion of the plant is still under water, but they have engageda consultant to start assessing geotechnical conditions around the site. I am looking for resources that canhelp us know what to look for in these assessments

-do we have any history of plants in the agencyrecovering from this sort of water conditions?

Do you know of any references that would tell us what kinds oftests of studies should be completed to assess the condition of the soils, etc.?I appreciate

-any guidance you have-in-this area.M nl,Megan Williams3 Uribe, JuanFrom:Sent:To:

Subject:

Attachments:

Wang, Weijun ý 0 C.Thursday, December 15, 2011 1:44 PMXl, Zuhan; Candelario, Luissette; Uribe, JuanFW: Fort Calhoun FloodingPicture 001.jpg; Picture 002.jpg; Picture 003.jpg; Picture 004.jpg; Picture 005.jpg; Picture006.jpg; Picture 007.jpg; FCS settled column.jpg FYI.WCO"uFrom: Williams, Megan (1VSent: Wednesday, SeptetlArO7, 2011 4:48 PMTo: Wang, Weijun; Wilson, GeorgeCc. Manoly, Kamal; Cook, Christopher

Subject:

RE: Fort Calhoun FloodingW'tez ýý-Good afternoon.

I wanted to let you know about developments today.We met with HDR (geotechnical investigation sub to the licensee) to discuss their approach, tasks to date, etc.They are in the process of getting us a good amount of requested information, such as ori inal desiandocuments, etc. They have yet to characterize the current condition of the soil; (b)(5)(b)(5) I -1As they remove mud/sit from the site with bobcats, an exterior walkway slab showed settlement in one comer,and also a large void where the concrete completely gave way. (see attached),

There is also a column thathas settled, and it is taking the adjacent masonry walls with it (stepped cracking)

-you may have seen thisphoto before.Again, I will pass along information as I receive it, but if you think of anything I should be asking for or lookingat, I appreciate any guidance you can provide.R/,meganFrom: Williams, Megan '(ZWSent: Tuesday, Septembe" r 06, 2011 10:53 AMTo: Wang, Weijun; Wilson, GeorgeCc. Manoly, Kamal; Cook, Christopher

Subject:

RE: Fort Calhoun FloodingCf ..~. d., ~ 4Thank you, Weijun. This is most helpful.We are seeing many cracks in concrete walls in the turbine building (below grade), which have been leakingwater since the flood started, I am trying to find out the Structures Monitoring Program owner, to see if theyhad a baseline inspection documentation (they should have completed for license renewal -2004) indicating what cracks were evident before the flood, and their size, etc.I R/,MeganFrom: Wang, WeljunSent: Tuesday, September 06, 2011 9:56 AMTo: Williams, Megan; Wilson, GeorgeCc: Manoly, Kamal; Cook, Christopher Subject-RE: Fort Calhoun FloodingMegan:Without knowing much details, I'd like to suggest the follows:1. Get documents to see how the hydraulic loading was considered during the original structure andfoundation design. If the actual flood level is higher than the original design, then the additional lateralpressure and uplift force may cause some damage to the foundation walls and foundation floorconcrete slabs, and also may have negative impact on the stability of foundation soils.2. Regardless the flood levels considered in the original design, you may still need to inspect the structure and foundation to see if there is any damages caused by flooding, such as cracks and settlement.

TheGPR is a good method to detect voids and the licensee should also perform additional NDT testing toinspect the integrity of the foundation walls and floor concrete slabs or mats, should cracks bediscovered.

3. Pay attention to settlements, both in vertical and horizontal directions.

Flood normally will reduce thestrength of foundation soil, especially if the water did not dissipate for a longer period of time. Forcertain type of soils and drainage conditions, as well as the actual foundation condition after the flood,the additional settlement caused by flood may continue for certain period of time, and therefore thesettlement monitoring should be kept for a longer time until no detectible settlement increase isobserved.

The above just for your reference.

Please let me know if you have questions.

Thanks.(301)415-1175 From: Williams, MeganSent: Tuesday, September 06, 2011 9:44 AMTo, Wilson, George.Cc: Manoly, Kamal; Wang, Weijun; Cook, Christopher

!.*L.. .. 1 ( -LA)

Subject:

RE: Fort Calhoun FloodingGood morning,2 I am at Fort Calhoun this week, and trying to get some details from the contractors on their approach toevaluating subgrade conditions at the site, now that most of the water has receded.In reviewing the USAR, certain structures had hydraulic loading designs based on different flood levels (Class Iversus Class 11, and several references to 2.7.1.2 for design peak flood elevation, which itself references multiple different flood elevations within its paragraphs).

Is it possible to get documentation that we haveregarding this hydraulic loading design?I am trying to get information on the GPR they are using to look for voids. Are there any other specificquestions or things you all can think of that I should look at while on site?Thank you,Megan WilliamsRIVFrom: Wilson, GeorgeSent: Tuesday, August Z3, 2011 5:53 AMTo: Williams, MeganCc: Manoly, Kamal; Wang, Weijun; Cook, Christopher

(-

Subject:

RE: Fort Calhoun FloodingMegan use Kamal-Manoly as your reference person he will get assistance from Weijun Wang in NROFrom: Williams, MeganSent: Friday, August 19, 2011 12:28 PMTo: Wilson, GeorgeSubject-Fort Calhoun Flooding~J)Hey, Mr. Wilson,I left you a voicemail, and understand you are out of the office until next week, but I thought I would also sendyou an email, since I will be out of the office next week on inspection.

We are beginning to engage in reviewing the licensee's efforts for restart at the plant after extensive floodingthis spring/summer.

You probably know a large portion of the plant is still under water, but they have engageda-consultant to-start assessing-geotechricat conditions around the-site.

-am looking -for resources-that canhelp us know what to look for in these assessments

-do we have any history of plants in the agencyrecovering from this sort of water conditions?

Do you know of any references that would tell us what kinds oftests of studies should be completed to assess the condition of the soils, etc.?I appreciate any guidance you have in this area.r/,Megan Williams3 1/5112 Brief to Sr. Mngmnt on FCS Geotechnical workOutside of ScopeCite 3 failures on site:1. Increased groundwater flow into turbine sump pump2. Pavement failure and sinkhole development in utility corridor between service buildingand intake structure

3. Column settlement in maintenance shopTurbine Building Sump pump:Subsurface piping of soil material due to the sump operation and seepage/flow into the drainagesystem pipe is occurring; voids are significant and interconnected.

Voids, soft zones, andassociated groundwater and piping flow paths will continue to enlarge and extend out from thesystem unless the flow of water is stopped.

The most significant and closely connected voidsare on the west wall, adjacent to the auxiliary building.

Eleven of the voids occur at or below thebottom elevation of the pile caps.,Outside of ScopeAdditionally, two other CPFMs, 3a (Undermining and settlement of shallowfoundation/slab/surfaces (due to pumping) and undermined buried utilities (due to pumping),

both from subsurface erosion/piping, associated with this KDI have the potential to keepaffecting structures other than the Turbine Bldg: TSC, FP, Raw Water line, BBREs, Maint shop,U/G cable system, Waste disposal piping, Blair Water system, demin water, TB S. SY, FOT&P,PA drives, San Sewer, and Condensate Storage Tank buried utilities.

Th'e fact that the initial condition (broken pipes) has been occurring for many years, makes thehypothesis that the voids could extend beyond the turbine bldg more plausible.

Recommendations:

block the drainage system pipes; then 1) abandon the system and replacew/ above-stab system or trench cut for new system; or 2) replace existing system. Either willneed to address the voids created.

HDR is currently researching and interviewing expertgrouting companies for possible solutions.

Outside of ScopeA4Iz, Outside of ScopeIt Mizuno,_Gea:y From:Sent:To:Cc:

Subject:

Mizunio, Geary-OýC.

Thursday, January 19, 2012 9:01 AMSpencer, MaryWilliamson, Edward; Biggins, James; Jones, BradleyFW: Ft Calhoun Status...

and my suggestions for covering the on-going issues thereMary:(b)(5)Geary-From: King, Mark ý,y "Sent: Wednesday, January 18, 2012 11:32 AMTo: Tomrn, JohnCc: Cartwdght, William;

Chemoff, Harold

Subject:

Ft Calhoun Status...

and my suggestions for covering the on-going issues thereJohn.(b)(5)1............ ...... L ........... ...........

........

(b)(5)2 (b)(5)FYI, for your consideration.

MarkMark KingSenior Reactor Systems EngineerNRR/ADRO/DIRS/IOEB Operating Experience Branch301-415-1150 NRC- One Mbsdan -One Team3--.---

From: Mizuno, GearySent: Monday, January 30, 2012 9:53 AMTo: Spencer, MaryCc: Biggins, James

Subject:

FW: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged in for review-Commission Paper -FW: AO Report for OGC SecondReview and NLOMary.-!Geary From: Martin, Circe On Behalf Of RidsOgcMalUCenter ResourceSent: Friday, January 27, 2012 4:08 PMTo: Rothschild, Trip; Jones, Bradley;

Mayberry, Theresa; Lora, Kimberly; Mizuno, Geary

Subject:

OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged in for review-Commission Paper -FW: AO Report for OGC Second Reviewand NLOFrom: Pope, Tia'ý\Sent: Friday, January 27, 2012 3:43 PMTo: RidsOgcMailCenter ResourceCc: Mizuno, Geary; Bush-Goddard, Stephanie

Subject:

AO Report for OGC Second Review and NLO/

MizunD, GearyFrom:Sent:To:Cc:

Subject:

Mizuno, Geary 0(2.C,Thursday, February 02, 2012 11:05 AMChidakel, SusanBiggins, James; Jones, BradleyRE: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged in for review-Commission Paper -FW: AO Report forOGC Second Review and NLD &(b)(5)I -From: Chidakel, SusanSent: Thursday, February 02, 2012 10:56 AMTo: Mizuno, GearyCc: Biggins, JamesSubject-RE: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged in for review-Commission Paper --- FW: AO Report for OGC SecondReview and NLOkJ(b)(5)1-1From: Tomon, JohnSent: Wednesday, February 01, 2012 4:58 PMTo: Chidakel, SusanCc Bush-Goddard, Stephanie; Lewis, Doris; Biggins, James; Mizuno, Geary

Subject:

RE: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged in for review-Commission Paper -- FW: AO Report for OGC SecondReview and NLOSusan(b)(5)-I ~Thanks so much!V/rJohn J. Tomon, CHPHealth Physicist RES/DSA/HEB (301) 251-79D4 (Office)1(b)(6) (cell)CSB-3C23 Mail Stop CSB- C3AO7M., cl_From: Chidakel, Susan UJV"Sent: Wednesday, February 01, 2012 8:12 AMTo: Tomon, JohnCc, Bush-Goddard, Stephanie; Lewis, Doris

Subject:

RE: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged in for review-Commlsslun Paper -- FW: AO Report for OGC SecondReview and NLO1

  • 1*From: Tomon, JohnSent: Wednesday, February 01, 2012 7:57 AMTo: Chidakel, SusanCc: Bush-Goddard, Stephanie; Lewis, Doris

Subject:

RE: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged In for review-Commission Paper -FW: AO Report for OGC SecondReview and NLOSusaniF "',Jt~ ;Thanks so much!V/rJohn J. Tomon, CHIPHealth Physicist RES/DSA/HEB (301) 251-7904 (Office)()6 ctell)top CSB- C3AO7MFrom: Chidakel, Susan,'-"'

Sent Wednesday, February 01, 2012 7:47 AMTo: Tomon, JohnCc: Mizuno, Geary

Subject:

RE: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged in for review-Commission Paper --- FW: AO Report for OGC SecondReview and NLO/'.71. rA..(b)(5)-}From: Tomon, John "."Sent: Tuesday, January 31, 2012 4:59 PMTo: Mizuno, Geary; Pope, TiaCc: Spencer, Mary; Chidakel, Susan; Biggins, James; Bush-Godddrd, Stephanie; Lewis, Doris

Subject:

RE: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged in for review-Commission Paper -- FW: AO Report foi OGC SecondReview and NLO2

-GearyGood afternoon!

I incorporated the changes that Mary Spencerand you provided into the document in ADAMS. I havbeen in training this week and I am checking and answering my e-mails either before or after the training is finished forthe day. I have received e-mails from Susan regarding some of the medical issues in the draft report and I tried tocarbon copy you on my responses to her. I will continue to converse with regarding her concerns with the medicalissues and hope to have her concerns adequately addressed as soon as possible.

F'JlI.,,§ Thanks and have a great day!VirJohn J. Tomon, CHPHealth Physicist RES/DSA/HEB (301) 251-7904 (Office)1(b)(6) Icell)CSB-3C23 Mail Stop CSB- C3AO7MX4Lz 0From: Mizuno, GearySent: Tuesday, January 31, 2012 10:20 AMTo: Tomon, John; Pope, TliaCc Spencer, Mary; Chldakel, Susan; Biggins, James

Subject:

FW: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged in for review-Commission Paper -FW: AO Report for OGC SecondReview and NLOJohn:(b)(5)IfAl~- '.~ri .GearyFrom: Spencer, MarySent: Monday, January 30, 2012 3:35 PMTo: Mlzuno, Geary

Subject:

RE: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged In for review-Commission Paper -- FW: AO Report for DGC SecondReview and NLO ( , ISGeary, &71"C'110 Mary-OffiP. e-n' torney-Client Privilege/Attorney Work Product3 Robles, JesseFrom:Sent:

Subject:

King, Mark VMonday, Fe a 3, 2012 3:02 PMIOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Monday, February 13, 2012NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS e L "*`*MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/

PROPRIETARY OR NRC INT RNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION***

DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE OF NR.WI HOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM OR GINATORFollow-uplOther Tasks: Twelve (12)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help IOEBstaff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff.]Outside of ScopeTA2) EN 47658 -FORT CALHOUN -UNANALYZED CONDITION

-GUIDANCE NOT ADEQUATE TOMITIGATE A DESIGN BASIS FLOODDuring review of the flood protection procedures, inspectors identified deficiencies in the guidance to mitigate adesign basis flood event where river level would reach 1014 feet mean sea level. Pass to TRG Lead forFlooding/Missiles (Ed Smith). Assigned to Jesse Robles.IiL~L~

O Tbt4D OF -cO4 ntT~tP& eFP sczP7-1Outside of Scope2) EN 47658 -FORT CALHOUN -UNANALYZED CONDITION

-GUIDANCE NOT ADEQUATE TOMITIGATE A DESIGN BASIS FLOODOutside of Scope3 Domim OF SCOPCAttendees at Screening Meeting;Jesse Robles -by phoneBob Bemardo-by phoneMark KingDoug Bollock, NROMary Wegner, RES -by phone4 Robles, Jesse _ nFrom: King, Mark (/I[Sent: Thursday, FiUrua ry16, 2012 2:37 PM

Subject:

IOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary.

for Thursday, February 16, 2012NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/

PROPRIETARY OR N TERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION***

DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSID QFIRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FB ORIGINATOR Atside of ScopeV

6) LER 2852011003R02

-FORT CALHOUN:

INADEQUATE FLOODING PROTECTION DUE TOINEFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT.

See LER update. Pass to TRG Lead for Flood Protection (Ed Smith), and SW/UHS (Gerard Purciarello).

Assigned to Jesse Robles.7) LER 2852011003R03

-FORT CALHOUN:

INADEQUATE FLOODING PROTECTION DUE TOINEFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT.

See LER update. Pass to TRG Lead for Flood Protection (Ed Smith), and SW/UHS (Gerard Purciarello).

Assigned to Jesse Robles.Outside of Scope2 outside6 oF ScoPOutside of Scope svrs4C ti- ~Outside of ScopeAttendees at Screening Meeting:Jesse RoblesBob Bernardo

[Dave Goatnrflo M-arv K039 oCWtoougBoll(

?.I PVOfltMeh'di Fe1slaBV

.5 Ft C;Ihoun oversight

-February 14, 2012Recap history* 2010 -'yellow' finding for Inadequate strategies and procedures to protect the site up to1014' (ricenslng basis)* 2010 -White' finding for inadequate control of SGI* April 2011 -FCS shuts down for refueling outage* June 2011 -ACE projects water levels at FCS up to 1007' (3 ft above site grade level)* June 2011 -NOUE with water approaching 1004'* June 2011 -Alert for fire In safety-related switchgear room* July 2011 -water reaches about 1006' 11l* July 2011 -public meeting on restart plan commitments

" August 2011 -NRC finalized a 'white' finding for inadequate actions to evaluate and fix aRPS coil -it was ultimately found failed in unsafe condition,

" August 2011 -CAL issued containing restart commitments (flood related)* September 2011 -FCS oversight move to Column IV (a repetitive degradedcornerstone)

-facility considered safe to operate -licensee plans to complete theirpreparations for 95003 inspection after startup" September 2011 -water <1004'" September 2011(b)(5)*-,~* December 2011 -MC 0350 oversight applied.

MC 0350 aimed to handle situations where multiplelsignificant examples of frontline equipment degradation andlor asignificant operational event have substantially reduced safety margins or havethe potential to Indicate a substantial reduction in safety margins.-r.,r Ft Calhoun Oversight

-CGnsitive rre-61onulFbr1,0 February 14, 2012Analysis:

The August 2011 CAL addressed actions to Inspect, test, and resolve system, structure orcomponent issues resulting from the site grade level being underwater for 60+ days.Column IV of action matrix addresses site-wide performance Issues, but the facility isconsidered safe to operate.

The site's original strategy to do their 95003 preps after startupwas viable, but in essence meant that their site-wide assessment of identifying andaddressing the causes of the she-wide performance issue was not going to happen untilafter startup.In MC 0350, this strategy is no longer viable.MC 0350 aimed to handle situations where multiple/significant examples of frontline equipment degradation and/or a significant operational event have substantially reducedsafety margins or have the potential to indicate a substantial reduction in safety margins.Both exist at Ft. Calhoun.Also, MC 0350 gives the flexibility to formulate inspection/assessment mechanisms for longperiods of shutdown where performance indicators are not valid and the baseline inspection program cannot be completed.

The icensee has two significant cause evaluations underway:

1) Corrective Action Program'broke' and 2) Lack of Organizational Effectiveness (need to confirm the problemstatements).
  1. 1 and #2 combined with multiple/significant examples of frontline safety equipment degradation dictate the need to 3) determine, before plant restart, the causes (called keyattributes in IP 95003), extent of causes, and extent of the degradation of structures,
systems, and components; and, how the issues have or will be addressed.

NRC will use the results of #3 are needed to inform the restart checklist.

Ultimately we planto revise the CAL that is in place to include items from restart check list.NRC is Interacting with site leadership to understand how actions will accomplish

  1. 3.5)Consider the oversight/governance employed to ensure Board Is meaningfully apprised ofrelevant site performance issues.

Fi Calhoun Oversight

-_senlive re- ec aionaiFebruary 14,2012Key Points for OPPD Board of Directors Good morning.

My name is Bill Borchardt.

I am the Executive Director for Operations for theNuclear Regulatory Commission.

With me is Elmo Collins, whom some of you have met, the Regional Administrator for NRCRegion IV.Thank you for taking the time to talk to us about NRC's assessment of the safety performance of Ft. Calhoun Station.The purpose of our requesting this meeting Is to ensure, by communicating at all levels of theOPPO organization that the Issues are understood and the commitment and resources toresolve the issues are being applied.Most recently on December, 13, 2011, we communicated to you that we had placed Ft. CalhounStation Into a special category of NRC's inspection and assessment processes, described In ourInspection Manual Chapter 0350, and one that Is designed to provide for Increased verification of safety for situations where a nuclear power plant is shutdown for an extended period of timefor performance issues stemming from a significant operational event.Specifically, Ft. Calhoun Station was shutdown in April 2011 for a refueling outage. The stationremained shut down when high levels of Missouri River water covered the site grade level for anextended period of time, and remains shutdown today.On June 7, a fire had occurred in safety-related electrical switchgear that impacted both trains ofsafety-related equipments.

Subsequently, Ft. Calhoun Station review and NRC inspection determined that cause for the fire traced its roots back to a design modification that had beenperformed about two years ago, This modification introduced an unreliable configuration andthe potential for high electrical resistance connections on 12 safety-related breakers.

Preliminary evaluations show that this configuration combined with poor maintenance practices caused the failure and that this event and configuration were risk significant.

To put this special category of NRC oversight into perspective, NRC has not needed to use It foralmost a decade.Accordingly, we are meeting with you to ensure that you have full recognition of the issues thatneed to be resolved, their significance, and that you understand the substantial level of supportand commitment that will be needed from the Board of Directors to resolve these problems.

FtCalhoun Oversight

-SenmttuLm-ErfDecisional-February 14, 2012Ft Calhoun Station performance has reached the point that a thorough, comprehensive reviewof site equipment performance and organizational effectiveness must be completed before plantrestart is warranted.

The most relevant Items for safety from this review will need to be resolved prior to plant restart.These items will be included in a modified NRC Confirmatory Action Letter and form what wecall the 'restart" checklist, NRC will inspect these items before plant restart.The results of the equipment and organizational reviews will also Inform your long-term, Integrated performance Improvement plan/business plan.Where Is Ft. Calhoun today? This comprehensive review has not been done and an integrated plan Is currently being developed, putting us at the very front end of developing the restartchecklist.

Accordingly, NRC will continue to meet with station managers to understand the scope of theintegrated plans and the results of the review when completed and incorporate the appropriate items into the *restarr checklist.

The NRC emphasizes that:# These problems did not emerge quickly and will not be quickly resolved.

A significant amount of work has yet to be completed to determine the extent of problems, and extentof causes of problems.

As a result, there is a high amount of uncertainty surrounding the level of effort/resources that will be needed to accomplish the needed actions.* The site is still In discovery.

Expect more performance Insights and more items needingcorrective action to be identified.

  • It is Imperative that site reviews and actions be thorough,
probing, and challenging.

Thepreliminary results from the flooding Inspection indicate that site preparation and actionsfell short in that it took NRC inspection to uncover a potential unanalyzed condition illustrating that the site still needs to consider the full range equipment and actions toprotect the facility to its licensing basis 1014 feet.@ Your ultimate goal needs to be to establish a long term, sustainable high level of safetyperformance at Ft. Calhoun Station.We welcome your comments and we will elaborate on any of our comments as needed.

Narrative

-Commission Meeting Ft. Calhoun Station -February 22, 2012Thank you Bill. Mr. Chairman, NRC Commissioners, good morning.Slide 4This morning I plan to briefly recap the sequence of events and regulatory actions with respectto Ft. Calhoun Station that have preceded this meeting and summarize Ft. Calhoun Station's safety performance.

Slide 5 -there were several important actions preceding the CAL that are important In 2010, NRC finalized a finding of 'yellow" significance for an inadequate strategy for protecting the facility to the licensing basis of 1014 feet.In 2011 the licensee was doing the review and corrective action necessary for NRC to conductthe 95002 Inspection.

Twice the inspection was scheduled, and twice the licensee reported thattheir self-assessments showed that they were not yet ready. Finally the 95002 Inspection wasscheduled for June 2012.In May 2012 however, the licensee and the NRC learned that release rates from the upstreamdams in the Missouri River system were going to reach unprecedented levels, raising the waterat Ft. Calhoun Station.On June 6, the licensee declared an Unusual Event as waters reached the grade level of 1004feet Note that on June 7, the licensee declared an alert for a fire In safety-related 480 voltswitchgear.

Later that day the licensee secured from the alert.In advance of the rising waters, the licensee took substantial actions to protect the facility, including a number of actions that had been formulated in response to the "yellow" floodprotection findingRegion IV also responded, providing 24/7 onslte coverage, with inspector assistance from theother three regions during the emergency response period.With the station and NRC in emergency

response, and with Missouri River levels rising to abovesite grade, NRC deferred the 95002 Inspection.

By this time, the site had already entered intothe 50 calendar quarter with a degraded cornerstone.

The Missouri River reached a peak level of 1006' 11' in July 2012.

rin late July and August, the licensee formulated a plan to recover the site from the high waterlevels. This plan was submitted to NRC and key items from this plan were formalized ascommitments in a confirmatory action letter In August 2012.During the same period of time, NRC finalized another white finding associated with the reactorprotection system. Combined with the previous "yellow*

finding, In September 2012 the NRCassessed Ft. Calhoun Station's safety performance as needing the highest level of oversight called for by the reactor oversight
process, Column IV. Accordingly, Region IV added a branchto the Division of Reactor Projects to provide specific oversight for Ft. Calhoun Station.Once the Missouri River receded and the licensee exited emergency response modes, NRCinitiated an onsite review of the June 7 fire. NRC found performance deficiencies during thisinspection, and while NRC's inspection report is in final draft and the final significance has yet tobe determined, NRC has concluded that this fire was a significant operational event.Beginning in October, with the facility shutdown for over 6 months, NRC's normal Pis losingtheir efficacy and an inability to meaningfully complete the baseline inspecion
program, NRCevaluated Ft. Calhoun station performance, and existing guidance to determine the appropriate level of NRC inspection and engagement Already in Column IV, Manuel Chapters 0350 and0351 were considered.

In December 2012, Region IV determined, In consultation with the Director of the Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation and the Executive Director for Operations, that Manual Chapter0350 entry criteria were met and that this level of regulatory oversight and engagement wasappropriate to provide added verification of safety of the facility prior to plant restart.

This NRCdecision was communicated in a December 13, 2012 letter to the licensee.

Of))r Murphy, MartinFrom: Murphy, MartinSent: Friday, March 09, 2012 2:52 PMTo: Uribe, Juan

Subject:

RE: Emailing:

Fort Calhoun Station Timeline of Events.docx This is great.I have to read the GL and response before I would want to talk---Original Message--

From: Uribe, JuanSent: Friday, March 09, 2012 2:44 PMTo: Murphy, Martin

Subject:

RE: Emailing:

Fort Calhoun Station Timeline of Events.docx As stated in the USAR, the 1009.3' msl (not 1009.5'msl) is the probable maximum flood (pmf) resulting fromthe runoff from a maximum probable rain storm over the area below Gavins Point dam, which is the first damupstream of FCS. Failure of Fort Randall dam (2nd upstream)

OR Oahe dam (4th upstream) has beenanalyzed by USACE and determined to be 1014' msl. Keep in mind FCS does not consider credible the failureof either dam.The 2003' msl data did not include dam failures.

The licensee was using the 1 000yr flood to correlate withprobable maximum flood, which is 1009.3 in the original design basis and determined the elevation to be theaforementioned 1010.5' msl.Consequently, they updated their external flood analysis in 2005 to reflect these analyses but to myknowledge, did nothing else. This is based on the premise that there is no actual requirement for them toupdate their FSAR on 3rd party info. The region, in terms of regulatory space, could not pursue a violation down this road and therefore ended up citing the failure of adequate procedures since 1967. It could be arguedthat if the licensee found this study as part on a license renewal effort, it was information sought on their behalfand therefore could fall under 50.71(e).

But the Region analyzed this and determined it wasn't the way to go.Hope this helps, keep in mind we can also talk to George Gerond today and he has the best insights into thisissue.----- Original Message---

From: Murphy, MartinSent: Friday, March 09, 2012 2:22 PMTo: Uribe, Juan

Subject:

RE: Emailing:

Fort Calhoun Station Timeline of Events.docx What is the FEMA information?

The last section states that there is a TS level of 1009.5. The design basis is 1014. Is this correct?

The 2003data was at 1010.5 -this exceeds the TS limit. What did they do?----- Original Message-From: Uribe, JuanSent: Friday, March 09, 2012 1:42 PMTo: Murphy, Martin

Subject:

FW: Emailing:

Fort Calhoun Station Timeline of Events.docx

./1 w/ comments from RIV inspector

---Original Message--

,From: George, Gerond jL \Sent: Friday, March 09, 2012 1:38 PMTo: Uribe, Juan

Subject:

Emailing:

Fort Calhoun Station Timeline of Events.docx With changesGerond A. GeorgeNRC Region IVR1 7 *7nn r~Rq"q, erondqeo

,pe¢Qnrc.gov 2

Fort Calhoun Station Timeline of Events1967" As part of licensing, FCS gets estimate of 1009'msl design basis flood level from USACE" It is determined that a dam failure is an incredibte event.* However, DB flood concurrent with dam failure is required by NRC" This is the 1014' msl DB flood level specified in USAR." This is the level that the procedures in place at FCS fail to adequately protect." This is the basis for the yellow finding and violation in 2010.1993* NRC issues GL 88-20. Specifically, supplement 4 asks licensees to look for externalevents and verify the inherent risk of these events to the site. It requests a systematic individual plant examination for severe accidents initiated by external events (IPEEE).* FCS obtains info from USACE as part of IPEEE to answer GL.

in GR 2002* USACE levels provided include dam failure and are stated to be 1029' msl.* FCS determines that, as stated in USAR, dam failure in NOT credible scenario andtherefore DB flood levels remain at 1014' msl.* IPEEE talke-about theuses 1993 flood data provided by USACE to determine eventfrequencies and risk* FIS ..I. A " SAR _an..g- in Janm-'r 2"082002-2003

__As part of LR efforts, FCS evaluates the FEMA information and 1993 USACEanalysis performed in 1993 to verify adequacy.

" A need to evaluate this information in entered into the CA Program.90ummmtedCondition Report-nCýR 2002-1296 documents discrepancies between theUSAR flood levels, the FEMA. and USACE information.

  • Licensee determined that design basis remained unchanged from this evaluation
  • Licensee Identifies more recent information from USACE and documents it In separateCondition ReportGR 2003-2664

.A. need to c'Waluat.

thic info...t..n.in..ntgr.d into the CA pro..a FCS submits USARchanae in January 2008.---.--- Formatte

tdent: Left 0.5', No bllets ornumbering 2004" Latest info is titled 2004 study 'Upper Mississippi River System Flow Frequency Study"* As action from CR 2003-2664, FCS PRA group evaluated the new information andcompleted new external flood analysis in August 2005." New flood elevations were 3' higher for each flooding frequency.
  • When 2003 data was extrapolated to 1000 year flood frequency, it was found to be1010.5' msl. This was higher than original probable maximum flood and TS value of1009.5 msl.Sito it protGctod to 101A', mel.* ThUeofor;,

the site AS Still p~eterld.Result of the 2005 evaluation results in an action tochange the IPEEE and probatistic risk assessment.

No action was developed toevaluate the design basis,* Licensee did NOT develop corrective action plan to evaluate potential change to DB andoperating procedures.

  • 2005 external flood analysis was NOT mentioned in USAR change done in January2008.

Robles, JesseFrom:Sent:

Subject:

King, Mark I ýLMonday, Aprl 3A2012 2:41 PMIOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Monday, April 30, 2012NOTE: THIS SUMMARY IS"*'MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/

PROPRIETARY OR INTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION**'

DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSID NRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION F M ORIGINATOR Follow-up/Other Tasks: Eighteen (18)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help IOEBstaff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff.]Outside of ScopeI)6) LER 2852012001 ROO -FORT CALHOUN:

INADEQUATE FLOODING PROTECTION PROCEDURE.

See LER text. This issue was screened in as IFR 2011-01 earlier.

Pass to TRG Lead for Flood Protection (EdSmith) and SW/UHS (Gerard Purciarello).

Assigned to Jesse Robles.Outside of ScopeI Os-ryf-nre OF, sccp65edoos so Bpisino2 Cu-rstce oP' coiDutside of ScopeAttendees at Screening Meeting:Mark King -by phoneJesse Robles-by phoneBob Bernardo-by phoneEric Thomas- by phoneRuss HaskellJohn ThompsonMehdi Reisi-Fard (RES)- by phoneDoug Bollock (NRO) -by phone3 11-17Biggins, James ( /From: Mizuno, GearyO.-'L CSent: Thursday, May 10, 2012 2:20 PMTo: Matharu, Gurcharan Cc: Scott, Catherine;

Safford, Carrie; Benowitz, Howard; Biggins, James; Jones, Bradley

Subject:

RE: Fort CalhounU(b)(5),-, ...... '10...GearyFrom: Matharu, Gurcharan Sent: Thursday, May 10, 2012 7:21 AMTo: Mizuno, Geary

Subject:

RE: Fort CalhounOK thanks,It seems that the licensee gave us 'inadequate information when the application to change the wording as per STSwas submitted.

SinghFrom: Mizuno, GearySent: Wednesday, May 09, 2012 5:33 PMTo: Matharu, Gurcharan

Subject:

RE: Fort Calhoun/-I(b)(5)From: Matharu, Gurcharan

\'"Sent: Wednesday, May 09, 2012 5:18 PMTo: Mizuno, Geary

Subject:

Fort CalhounGeary,Fort Calhoun is currently shutdown and have been liberally removing BOTH their EDGs out of service as they claimthat the TS allows operation of RHR with offsite power alone when the RCS is below 300F.The attached SE made subtle changes in their TS that allows them to operate in this manner.What would it take for us to retract this change?SinghI2S NRR -@DECommunity Page I of 51earc.h I How to Subscribe ILoin'Conlmnual Leprivng Through K'nowledge Briaring3une 19, 2012OE Homr > Forum > All Communications Information Security ReminderInformation Security Reminder:

OpE COMMs contain preliminary Information In the Interest of timely internal communication of operating experience.

OpE COMMs may be pre-decisional and may contain sensitive Information.

They are not intended for distribution outside the agency.Page: 13qsse Robles (2/6/2012 9:Z6.56 am)o,,,..dtn 1.? 1 :05:39 emTFORT CALHOUN -NOUE DECLARED DUE TO HIGH RIVER LEVELS AND ALERT DECLARED DUE TO FIREIN SWITCHGEAR ROOM ISSUES -SITE PLACED UNDER IMC 0350 OVERSIGHT SummaryOn June 6, 2011, while shutdown for a refueling outage, elevated river levels prompted Fort Calhoun to declarea Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE). On June 7 while still in the NOUE, an Alert was declared due toevidence of a possible fire in a switchgear room. Due to the previous significant performance issues in additionto these events, Fort Calhoun Station was placed under IMC 0350 -"Oversight of Reactor Facilities In aShutdown Condition Due to Significant Performance and/or Operational Concerns."

The switchgear room fireissue was subsequently determined to be a finding of high safety significance (a RED finding).

Event Description See Public Webpaqe on Special NRC Oversight at Fort Calhoun Station and FCS Oversight SharePoint Website.Outside of ScopeFort Calhoun Station (FCS) had entered a scheduled refueling outage on April 9, 2011. When indications ofimminent flooding were received, the site entered Abnormal Operating Procedure 1 (AOP-1),

Acts of Nature, onMay 22, 2011 and commenced preparation for the rising river level. The site began sandbagging procedures andinstallation of flood gates to protect the site up to 1007 feet river level. Site staff staged materials to supportflood protection up to 1014 feet, and installed an AquaDam/aqua-berm (design is similar to a large inner tubefilled with water, see AquaDam website) to protect the entire protected area (with exception of the Intakestructure) up to 1012 feet of river level. A NOUE was declared on June 6, 2011 due to the river level expectedto exceed the 1004 feet NOUE threshold (see EN 46929, and PNO-]V- 1]-003).http://nrrIO.nrc.gov/fonnm/tbrumtopic.cfm?selectedForuMI Outsiade of p;cope1 6/19/7012 NRR -@OECommunity IPage 2 of 5Fort Calhoun Arnal Picture of FloodingThe NRC Operating Experience Branch'gave a presentation at an International conference regarding the FortCalhoun flooding event response which includes more photographs of the site and Includes lessons learned andother insights.

See slides.Fire EventOn June 7, 2011, while the plant was In Mode 5 and the site was in a NOUE due to the high river level, firealarms were received In the control room and the Halon system discharged for the Bus 184A switchgear room.A safety related 480 volt AC load center supply breaker had failed. The fire brigade responded to the alarm andfound the room filled with smoke, but no active fire, During the event, both trains of class 1E Direct Current(DC) grounded due to extensive damage inside cubicle 1B4A, which resulted In numerous control room alarmsthat are fed from the DC circuits.

At 0930 CDT electrical buses were de-energized to aid In mitigating damage.This resulted in both trains of spent fuel pool cooling to be de-energized.

At 0940 CDT the site declared an Alertdue to a fire affecting the operability of plant safety systems required to establish of maintain safe shutdown(see EN 46932 and PNO-IV-11-004).

During the event, the local fire department responded to the site, At 1147CDT, power was restored to one train of spent fuel pool cooling.

The spent fuel pool temperature roseapproximately 3 degrees Fahrenheit while cooling was out of service.

Shutdown cooling was not affected andremained in service during the event. The site exited the Alert at 1313 CDT after confirming that the fire wasextinguished and the area was ventilated to restore access. At 1056 EDT, the NRC entered the Monitoring Modeas a result of the event, and exited at 1439 EDT after SFP cooling was restored (see P_-O.N1V-.Q

.), An fl8.3 evaluation was performed for this event, and a Special Inspection Team was dispatched to the site.UPDATE: On April 10, 2012 press release IV-12-012 was issued: NRC ISSUES FORT CALHOUN STATIONINSPECTION FINDING OF HIGH SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE (Red Finding].

See Enforcement Action notification (EA12-023).Failure of the Aqua BermOutside of Scopehttp://nrr I 0.nrc.gov/forum/forumtopic.cfm.?selectcdForum!

Outside of Scope6119/2012 NRR o SECommunityo Page 3 of 5Outside of ScopeL.Cause of the Breaker FailureThe original 1B4A supply breaker (model General Electric (GE) AK-50) had been replaced with a Square Dbreaker in 2009 due to aging Issues and a lack of available spare parts (a total of twelve breakers were replacedat that time). These were not a direct replacement for the GE breaker; therefore a cradle assembly was used tomatch up the Square D equipment with the GE switchgear.

The cradle consists of finger clusters that engage thebus bars at the back of the GE swltchgear, and had stabs on the circuit breaker side of the cradle to accept thebreaker finger clusters.

The circuit breaker cradle fingers were longer than the original AK-50 breakers, andthey engaged the bus bar in a contact area of hardened grease and copper oxide build-up, This caused a highresistance connection at the stab to finger Interface.

The high resistance connection overheated the fingercluster resulting in bus grounding and phase-to-phase shorting.

Other contributing causes to failure of the breaker Included-9 An acrid odor that existed for three days preceding the bus fire was not adequately communicated toengineering, maintenance, or management.

FCS engineering had limited knowledge of GE AKD-5 switchgear resulting in overreliance on vendorknowledge and skill.* An FCS modification procedure lacks requirements to Identify and compare critical design characteristics of equipment being modified.

Additionally, this procedure has weak requirements for the use of operating experience criteria.

  • Maintenance procedures that govern 480 V bus cleaning are Inadequate.

Also, access to the bus side ofthe GE AKD-5 switchgear is difficult limiting the selection of Inspection/testing methods.* As-left resistance readings from the line to load side of the switchgear following circuit breakerreplacement were not confirmed.

See 1-ER 285201 lO08R0l for more information on the failure of supply breaker 1B4A.Previous Performance Issues and Transition into IMC 0350http://nrr I O.nrc.gov/forum/forumtopic.cfm?selectedForumr Outside of Scope1 6/19012 NRR -@OECommunity Page 4 of 5Fort Calhoun Station's has had several performance issues In recent years that have resulted in increased NRCoversight.

These issues are described below." On October 6, 2010, the NRC issued a Yellow Finding (substantial safety significance) to Fort CalhounStation due to Inadequate flood protection strategies.

This finding Is the subject of OpE Issue forResolution (IFR) 2011-001 and associated ODE COMM." On July 18, 2011, The NRC Issued a White Findinq (low to moderate safety significance) to Fort Calhounfor the failure to preclude shading coils from repetitively becoming loose material In the M2 reactor tripcontactor.

The loose parts In the trip contactor can become an obstruction and cause the failure of thecontactor.

This issue was Included in the OpE COMM Contribution of Corrective Action ProgramDeficiencies to GMeater-than-Green Inspection Findinas and IFR 2011- 01 due to the repetitive nature ofthe condition.

  • Fort Calhoun Station transitloned to Column IV of the Reactor Oversight Process CROP) Action Matrix inSeptember 2011 due to the Mitigating Systems cornerstone being degraded for more than fourconsecutive quarters (due to the Yellow Finding),

with an additional input to the action matrix (due to theWhite Finding).

See the Mid-Cycle Performance Review.Restart of the facility has been delayed by performance concerns Involving electrical fire and inadequate trainseparation, in addition to flood recovery.

Following the plant shutdown, additional performance issues wereIdentified that required additional NRC oversight, including:

v Incomplete high energy line break and environmental qualification analyses.

" The breaker failure and fire described above." Inadequate communications with state and local officials following the declaration of an ALERT following the fire event.The NRC issued Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 4-11-003 (ML1.12490164) on September 2, 2011 to confirmthe actions FCS planned to take In Its submitted Post-Flooding Recovery Action Plan (ML112430102).

Due to these past performance issues in addition to the flood and fire events, Fort Calhoun was placed in IC0350, "Oversight of Reactor Facilities in a Shutdown Condition Due to Significant Performance and/orOperational Concerns" (see Notification of Chanqe to Regulatory Oversight of Fort Calhoun Station(ML1 13470721) and Fort Calhoun IMC 0350 Charter (ML120120661.)),

Operating Experience Flooding IssuesIN 87-49 -Deficiencies in Outside Containment Flooding Protection IN 94-27 -Facility Operating Concerns Resulting from Local Area Floodinginspection Procedure 71111.06

-Flood Protection Measures-Breaker IssuesOutside of Scopehtip://nrrIO.nrc.gov/forum/forumtopic.ctm?selecledForumutsieo pe 6/19/2012 L

NRR -@OECoemunily Page 5 of 5Outside of Scope3'Fr questions or concerns related to this OpE COMM, contact Jesse Robles (jesse.roblesienre.mov),

Os 1-415-2940.

Outside of Scope,-IPage: 1http://nrrl O.nrc.gov/forumnforumtopic.cfm?selectedFonm

° Outside of Scopet! 6/19/2012

.-j Boyer, RachelFrom: Collins, ElmoSent: Tuesday, November 01, 2011 8:59 AMTo: Rnrrhnr~l RillCc: I(b)(5)

Subject:

Ft CalhounBill(b)(5)(C --(.~ y~ *~~1I NRl -@OECommunity Page I of 51N-Search I How to Subscribe I IgginCon0nual Leariomng Through Ktnowledge BharinJune 19, 2012OE Home > Forum > All Communications Information Security ReminderInformation Security Reminder:

OpE COMMs contain preliminary Information in the interest of timely internal communication of operating experience.

OpE COMMs may be pre-decisional and may contain sensitive Information.

They are not Intended for distribution outside the agency.Page: 1Jesse Robles (2/6/2012 9:26:56 am)Rov.,w.'iond,/I9,'2t912 11:05:3)9 amFORT CALHOUN -NOUE DECLARED DUE TO HIGH RIVER LEVELS AND ALERT DECLARED DUE TO FIREIN SWITCHGEAR ROOM ISSUES -SITE PLACED UNDER IMC 0350 OVERSIGHT SummaryOn June 6, 2011, while shutdown for a refueling outage, elevated river levels prompted Fort Calhoun to declarea Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE). On June 7 while still in the NOUE, an Alert was declared due toevidence of a possible fire In a switchgear room. Due to the previous significant performance issues in additionto these events, Fort Calhoun Station was placed under IMC 0350 -"Oversight of Reactor Facilities in aShutdown Condition Due to Significant Performance and/or Operational Concerns."

The switchgear room fireIssue was subsequently determined to be a finding of high safety significance (a RED finding).

Event Description See Public WebPaqe on Special NRC Oversight at Fort Calhoun Station and FCS Oversiqht SharePoint Website.Outside of ScopeFFort Calhoun Station (FCS) had entered a scheduled refueling outage on April 9, 2011. When Indications ofimminent flooding were received, the site entered Abnormal Operating Procedure 1 (AOP-1),

Acts of Nature, onMay 22, 2011 and commenced preparation for the rising river level. The site began sandbagging procedures andInstallation of flood gates to protect the site up to 1007 feet river level. Site staff staged materials to supportflood protection up to 1014 feet, and Installed an AquaDam/aqua-berm (design is similar to a large inner tubefilled with water, see ApuaDarn website) to protect the entire protected area (with exception of the intakestructure) up to 1012 feet of river level. A NOUE was declared on June 6, 2011 due to the river level expectedto exceed the 1004 feet NOLJE threshold (see EN 46929, and PNO-]V-11-003),

http://nrr IO.nrc.gov/forum/ftrumtopic.ciim?selectedFonumi uutsicie ot bcope 6 921 6/19/2012 NRR. -OECommunityPae2o Page 2 of 5Fort Calhoun Arial Picture of floodingThe NRC Operating Experience Branch gave a presentation at an international conference regarding the FortCalhoun flooding event response which includes more photographs of the site and Includes lessons learned andother insights.

See slides.Fire EventOn June 7, 2011, while the plant was In Mode 5 and the site was In a NOUE due to the high river level, firealarms were received In the control room and the Halon system discharged for the Bus 1B4A switchgear room.A safety related 480 volt AC load center supply breaker had failed. The fire brigade responded to the alarm andfound the room filled with smoke, but no active fire. During the event, both trains of class 1E Direct Current(DC) grounded due to extensive damage inside cubicle 1B4A, which resulted In numerous control room alarmsthat are fed from the DC circuits.

At 0930 CDT electrical buses were de-energized to aid In mitigating damage.This resulted in both trains of spent fuel pool cooling to be de-energized.

At 0940 CDT the site declared an Alertdue to a fire affecting the operability of plant safety systems required to establish of maintain safe shutdown(see EN 46932 and PNO-IV-11-004).

During the event, the local fire department responded to the site. At 1147CDT, power was restored to one train of spent fuel pool cooling.

The spent fuel pool temperature roseapproximately 3 degrees Fahrenheit while cooling was out of service.

Shutdown cooling was not affected andremained in service during the event. The site exited the Alert at 1313 CDT after confirming that the fire wasextinguished and the area was ventilated to restore access. At 1056 EDT, the NRC entered the Monitoring Modeas a result of the event, and exited at 1439 EDT after SFP cooling was restored (see PNO.IV-II-.Q.4A).

An MD8.3 evaluation was performed for this event, and a Soecial InsoectionTeam was dispatched to the site.UPDATE: On April 10, 2012 press release IV-.2-01t2 was issued: NRC ISSUES FORT CALHOUN STATIONINSPECTION FINDING OF HIGH SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

[Red Finding].

See Enforcement Action notification (EAFailure of the Aqua BermSOutside of Scopehttp://nrrf0.nrc.gov/forum/forumtopic.cfm?selectedForum1 rai1__ 6/19/2012 NRR -@S ECommunity Page 3 of 5Outside of ScopeThe original 154A supply breaker (model General Electric (GE) AK-50) had been replaced with a Square 0breaker In 2009 due to aging Issues and a lack of available spare parts (a total of twelve breakers were replacedat that time), These were not a direct replacement for the GE breaker; therefore a cradle assembly was used tomatch up the Square D equipment with the GE switchgear.

The cradle consists of finger clusters that engage thebus bars at the back of the GE swltchgear, and had stabs on the circuit breaker side of the cradle to accept thebreaker finger clusters.

The circuit breaker cradle fingers were longer than the original AK-50 breakers, andthey engaged the bus bar in a contact area of hardened grease and copper oxide build-up.

This caused a highresistance connection at the stab to finger Interface.

The high resistance connection overheated the fingercluster resulting In bus grounding and phase-to-phase shorting.

Other contributing causes to failure of the breaker Included:

@ An acrid odor that existed for three days preceding the bus fire was not adequately communicated toengineering, maintenance, or management.

  • FCS engineering had limited knowledge of GE AKD-5 switchgear resulting in overreliance on vendorknowledge and skill,@ An FCS modification procedure lacks requirements to identify and compare critical design characteristics of equipment being modified.

Additionally, this procedure has weak requirements for the use of operating experience criteria.

v Maintenance procedures that govern 480 V bus cleaning are Inadequate.

Also, access to the bus side ofthe GE AKD-5 switchgear Is difficult limiting the selection of Inspection/testing methods.* As-left resistance readings from the line to load side of the switchgear following circuit breakerreplacement were not confirmed.

See LER 285201 1008R01 for more information on the failure of supply breaker 154A.Previous Performance Issues and Transition Into INC 0350'p/n ng/omouoicme e oum ofhttp://nrrlO'.nrc'govlforum/forumtopic'cfm~seiectedForum]Otsd ofScpe' 6/19/2012 NRR -@OECommunity Page 4 of" 5Fort Calhoun Station's has had several performance Issues in recent years that have resulted in increased NRCoversight.

These issues are described below.* On October 6, 2010, the NRC issued a Yellow Finding (substantial safety significance) to Fort CalhounStation due to Inadequate flood protection strategies.

This finding Is the subject of OpE Issue forResolution (IFR) 2011-001 and associated OpE COMM." On July 18, 2011, The NRC Issued a White Finding (low to moderate safety significance) to Fort Calhounfor the failure to preclude shading coils from repetitively.

becoming loose material In the M2 reactor tripcontactor.

The loose parts In the trip contactor can become an obstruction and cause the failure of thecontactor.

This Issue was Included In the OpE COMM Contribution of Corrective Action ProgramDeficiencies to Greater-than-Green Inspection Findings and ]FR 2011- 010 due to the repetitive nature ofthe condition.

" Fort Calhoun Station transitloned to Column IV of the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) Action Matrix inSeptember 2011 due to the Mitigating Systems cornerstone being degraded for more than fourconsecutive quarters (due to the Yellow Finding),

with an additional input to the action matrix (due to theWhite finding).

See the Mid-Cycle Performance Review.Restart of the facility has been delayed by performance concerns Involving electrical fire and inadequate trainseparation, in addition to flood recovery.

Following the plant shutdown, additional performance Issues wereidentified that required additional NRC oversight, Including:

" Incomplete high energy line break and environmental qualification

analyses,

" The breaker failure and fire described above." Inadequate communications with state and local officials following the declaration of an ALERT following the fire event.The NRC Issued Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 4-11-003 (MLt 1242Q164) on September 2, 2011 to confirmthe actions FCS planned to take in its submitted Post-Flooding Recovery Action Plan (ML1 12430102).

Due to these past performance Issues in addition to the flood and fire events, Fort Calhoun was placed in Imc0350, "Oversight of Reactor Facilities in a Shutdown Condition Due to Significant Performance and/orOperational Concerns" (see Notification of Changg to Regulatory Oversight of Fort Calhoun Station(ML1 13470721) and Fort Calhoun JMg 0350 Charter (ML120120661.)).

Operating Experience Flooding IssuesIN 87-49 -Deficiencies in Outside Containment Flooding Protection IN 94-27 -Facility Operating Concerns Resulting from Local Area Flooding Procedure 71111.06

-Flood Protection MeasuresOutside of Scopehttp://mrrl 0.nrn.gov/forum/forumtopic.cfm?selectedForurnl utside o P 6cope1 6/19/2012 NRR -@OECopneunily Page 5 of 5Outside of Scope[For questlons or concerns related to this OpE COMM, contact 3esso Robles (lesse.robles@nrc.gov),

1-.1415-2940, Outside of ScopeJ '- )Page: 1.. .. .. "'%, ,http://nffO.nrc.gov/fonm/forumtopic.cfm?selectedFor Outside of Scopei 6/19/2012 NRR -@OECommunity Page j of 3mmContinual Learning Through Knowledge Sharin"Search I How to Subscribe I 191_1n June 20, 2012QE Home > Forum > New ReactorsInformation Security ReminderInformation Security Reminder:

OpE COMWs contain preliminary information in the interest of timely internal communication of operating experience.

OpE COMMs may be pre-decislonal and may contain sensitive information.

They are not intended for distribution outside the agency.Page: 1Jay Patel (5/2/2011 12:29:43 pm)Revised on 4/19/2012 1:23:41 pmINADEQUATE DESIGN CHANGE IMPLEMENTATION INVOLVING ABANDONED IN PLACE EQUIPMENT Summary:This COMM intends to raise awareness of underlying issues associated with two recent events caused byinadequate design change Implementation Involving abandoned in place equipment.

The two events highlight the Importance of properly performing and implementing design change packages associated with abandoned inplace systems, structures, and components (SSCs)...

Discussion:

outside of ScopeThe second event, reported by the Fort Calhoun Station on February 27, 2011, identified unsealed through wallpenetrations in the intake structure that were below the licensing basis flood elevation.

These penetrations hadbeen installed during the original installation of the plant security system and were abandoned when thesecurity system was replaced In 1985. The penetrations for the new security system were sealed, however, thehttp://nrrl 0.nrc.gov/forumlforumtopic.cfm?selectedForum=03&forumld=NEWREACTORS&topicld=3381 6/20/2012 NRR -@OECommunity Page 2 of 3old penetrations were abandoned in place and never sealed, thus making the intake structure vulnerable towater inflow during an extreme flooding event. The unsealed penetrations could have Jeopardized the ability ofthe raw water pumps (located In the intake structure) to perform their design basis function during an accident.

A configuration change was later developed and permanent seals were installed In the subject conduitpenetrations.

The cause of the event pertinent to this COMM was an inadequate design change process that did not requireabandoned in place penetrations below the flood line to be sealed thus invalidating design assumptions andplacing the plant In an unanalyzed condition.

Construction Experience Insights:

The following valuable Insights can help avoid latent problems during the design and construction of nuclearfacilities similar to the ones caused by these two events:1. Engineering changes made to one system should not adversely affect other safety systems or Invalidate design assumptions.

Refer to IP 35007, Section A3.04.01, Item D for guidance.

2. The applicant/licensee work control process and inspection program should verify that the as-builtconfiguration in the field is consistent with design requirements.

Refer to Criterion V and X of 10 CFR 50,Appendix B. In addition, IP 65001.A, Section 02.01 and IP 37051, Section 02.01 provide specific relatedguidance for the construction of 10 CFR Part 52 plants and 10 CFR Part 50 plants respectively.

Existing Reactors Insiahts:

To avoid latent problems associated with inadequate design changes or abandoned in place equipment reviewsfor existing facilities, various Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) inspection procedures such as: IP 71111.18"Plant Modifications,"

IP 71111.21 "Component Design Bases Inspection,"

or IP 71152 "Problem Identification and Resolution" are in place to provide the necessary guidance.

Inspectors should be aware of the type ofissues described in this COMM and look to Identify them during their plant walkdowns and follow-up asnecessary during their normal Inspection reviews,Selected Related Information:

Outside of Scopehttp://nrr]O.nrc.gov/forum/forumtopic

.cfm?selectedForum=03&forumId=NE WREACTORS&topicld=33 81 6/120/2012 NRR -@OECommunity Page 3 of 3Outside of Scope*****Update 10/21/11*****

8) FORT CALHOUN -FLOOD BARRIER PENETRATIONS NOT WATER TIGHT (EN 47359). During follow-up inspections of flood barrier penetrations, it was determined some of the water tight conduit fittings were notfilled with the material required to make them water tight.*****Update 11/08/11*****

Outside of ScopePage: 1http://nrrl O.nrc.gov/forumlforumtopic.cfm?selectedForum=03&forumld=NEWREACTORS&topicld=3381 6/20/2012 SECTION 2.0.'ýdITE HIS'TORY F FSC N AND (LOND' kiNAN,a ,.',,'.'

Page 2-1Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition*

Rev. 22.0 SITE HISTORY, DESCRIPTION, AND BASELINE CONDITION 2.1 Geologic SettingThe surficial geology of the FCS site consists primarily of Missouri River alluvium deposited duringthe Holocene Epoch after Late Pleistocene, Wisconsin glaciation (Miller, 1964.). Because it is thoughtthat the Missouri River did not occupy its current position during the Wisconsin glaciation (Miller,1964), a sequence of erosion of the Missouri River channel and deposition of the present Holocenealluvium is the sequence that has developed the current site stratigraphy.

Post Wisconsin glacial event(Late Pleistocene) to Holocene alluvium overlies the Wintersel.

Member of the Dennis Formation Limestone of the Pennsylvanian Kansas City Group at the site. Glacial and alluvial deposits ofQuaternary Age (less than 1.6 million years) are less than 100 fl:tbiok at'the site but vayE,:rom 300 toless than 100 ft thick within a 5-mile radius of the site (Burchette, et4aL,1975).

Limestoine of theKansas City Group is described as dark gray to light gray, very thpily bedded to massive, argillaceous, fossiliferous, and containing some pyrite crystals and mica (Burcheitte, dal,, 1975). Bedrocki.

otexposed at the site. A more specific description of soil and bedrock conditioins at the site is pr'esented in Section 2.4, Geotechnical Baseline Condition.

Regional geologic structure includes a gentle dip of bedrock bedcg&i:'othe west (Me ee, 2003).Faults within a 100-mile radius of the site are limited to basem. structures such as the Nemaha FaultZone, do not offset Pennsylvanian strata, and are not recognizd..:as active (McBee, 2003).2.1.1 Historical Seismicity HDR conducted an inventory of reef" U-.istorical sts ttccurred at a magnitude of2.0 or greater within 100 miles of F location of eaem;,ts magnitude, and its distancefrom the site are shown 2-1.

of the istorical seismicity was conducted using the Advanced ic System (ANSS) at http://www.ncedc.org/anss/catalog-search.htp4l.o;he ANSS is a wo!de earthquake catalog created by merging the master earthquake catalogs ot.the contributing ANSA Ginber network and can be queried by geographic location.

Table 2-1 -Historical SJ icity Within 100 Miles of Fort Calhoun StationLatitude

Longitude Distance from(decimal

,i-'i, (decimal Magnitude Site-d.. degrees)

(kilometers) 4 1. 0,:,, -97.00 5.0 991902 ..,. 42 ., -97.60 4.5 1401935 -96.20 4.7 1361981 .:4.-iJ-20

-97.630 2.7 1321995 ,40.51 -94.95 3.1 1451997 41.79 -97.18 3.4 1002004 40.63 -95.55..

3.5 .1062009 40.41 -95.86 3.6 1242010 41.35 -97.01 3.3 83Source: U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). October 26, 2009. "2008 National Seismic Hazard Maps -Fault Parameters."

Earthquake Hazards Program.

Retrieved September 20, 2011.http://geohazards.usgs.gov/cfusion/hazfaultssearch/hf_searchmain.cfm.

Page 2-2Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.1.2. Regional Seismicity and FaultingFCS is located within the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) as delineated by the U.S.Geological Survey (USGS) (Crone and Wheeler, 2000). The CEUS experiences minimal seismicactivity with the exception of specific zones such as the New Madrid Seismic Zone and Mears FaultZone not located in proximity to FCS (Petersen et al., 2008). In conjunction with many local and stateagencies, USGS maintains a database of Quaternary faults for the U.S. (USGS, October 26, 2009).These include known faults that are estimated to have undergone movemenitin the past 1.6 millionyears (within the Quaternary Period),

or since late Cenozoic A" fil1ass Bifaulli.

Active faultsgenerally include Holocene Age faults that have undergone mo1- i.ent in the past- 5,000 years. Forthis study, the database was searched for all fault classificationý.s B, C, and D). 'Th.USGS faultclassifications are as follows:* Class A -Geologic evidence demonstrates the existence of a Qwufatiary fault (within the@past1.6 million years) of tectonic origin." Class B -Geologic evidence demonstrates the existence

.Q~fQuaternary deformation, but either1) the fault might not extend deeply enough to be a ,lOi~e t rce of signi earthquakes, or2) the currently available geologic evidence is toostrofig to dently assign the feature toClass C but not strong enough to assign it to Class A.* Class C -Geologic evidence is insufficient to demonstrate.

ijthe existence of tectonic

faulting, or2) Quaternary slip or deformation associated with the feai.ie." Class D -Geologic evidence demonrq..te thai the feat&'#his not a teot onic fault or feature; this.category includes features such as j_`i#Is landslides, erd&bnal or fluvial scarps, or other landforms resembling fault scarps but of "o , -able non-tectoirigim.

,Y.No Class A or B fault.exis8..4within a 4DI0.Ile radius of FCýS! losest Class A or B fault is theCheraw fault,wi

'0- the so itwest i southeastern Colorado.

The closest fault systemis the Ord ed&1r*ient, 9,ximateiy 15"miles west of FCS. This fault system is a Class C associated w~it 'h aic procesi,#pd was determined by Machette et al. (1998) asnot Quaternary movem'en:-e USGS-d "ase contains no Class D faults within a400diilý radius of FCS. %2.1.3 ic HazardAssessmeni ic hazard is ba b p the earthquake characteristics and the causative faultassociated wit"h hqua haractestis include magnitude of maximum earthquake, distane hfrom rthqua' e T :/distance from the "tothe c4 e" fault, fault length, and activity of the fault. The effects of sitesoil conditions and the h' of faulting are accounted for in the attenuation relationships.

The probabilistic strong gro0nd-motion values were developed from USGS gridded databases, developed by Frankel, et al. (1996 and 2002), and with most recently developed Next Generation Attenuation (NGA) relationships by Petersen, et al. (2008). These values were queried from USGS-maintained databases located at http://gldims.cr.usgs.gov/website/nshmp2008/viewer.htm andhttps://geohazards.usgs.gov/deaggint/2008/.

The results of this analysis are presented in Attachment 1,Deaggregation Plots. Attachment I illustrates the regional probabilistic strong ground motion for the10 percent probability of exceedance in 50 years, 2 percent probability of exceedance in 50 years,2 percent probability of exceedance in 100 years, and 2 percent probability of exceedance in 200 years.Estimated peak ground acceleration (PGA) is summarized in Table 2-2.

Page 2-3Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2Table 2-2 -Peak Ground Acceleration as Percentacie for Various Return PeriodsEarthquake Return Approximate Probability of Peak GroundPeriod (years) Exceedance in 50 years (%) AccelerationA 500 10 0.0142 g2500 2 0.0431 g5000 1 0.0669 g10,000 0.5 , 0.1020 gA Peak ground acceleration is measured by the acceleration due _t..gravity W .: .4Source: USGS. July 21, 2011. "2008 Interactive Deaggregatio e(Beta)"

Ge.giqgHazards Science Center. Retrieved September 20, 2011. https://geoha r .usgs.gov/deagg""2008/.

I2.1.4 Site Geologic HazardsSeveral geologic hazards have been identified at the FCS site and discussed inprevious design reportsby Dames & Moore (1968) and Gibbs, Hill, Durham, and Richardson (1967). These hazards includethe existence of karst features associated with dissolution.

of the Winterset Member of the DennisFormation Limestone, liquefaction of the loose poorly- gaded sands identified at the'-ite, bank slopestability adjacent to the Missouri River, and scour:and erosion of near-surface soils.2.1.4.1 Karsti; .::.-Dames & Moore (1968) identifiedit least two sigin.4ant karst features in the Winterset Member of the Dennis Forinfiom;I.imestone that pwently have developed along existingfractures.

The features to be as mu .ftwide, 16 ft deep, and 45 ft longand consist of'inMj1ler 1.5- to 3-t#bid and a lower zonetof decomposed limestone anddetri~tt 0 ..f te locati.oh o, ese features Is shown in Figure 2- I, Geotechnical Area'Aihd Cross-Sec

, 'octions.

views of the geologic setting are presented 61iF, ires 2-2 and 2-3. Sect2 J4 , shows where these karst features intersect the i ,urface secuw" at FCS for th-.@optaiment, Auxilary

Building, Turbine Building, and Intake'S fo' *h pti* e'.Axi'iar 3-We was designed to pene any overlying layer of limestone that covers the karstfeaf:tand to found the pile on'-soaund rock at the bottom of these features.

The potential Jnflueni*'O Ahese karst features.on foundation stability is considered minimal.

It is likely thataddition Cfeaturesq AS -,across the site, but the overlying alluvial cover of a minimum of6 1 ft offers-bu, er to of these features on any structure.

Further dissolution oflimestone is an i' process given that the limestone is in contact with groundwater.

Themost aggressive ition of limestone by groundwater occurs in the vadose zone (Mylroie, 1984). The fact that the karst features at the FCS site are covered by approximately 60 ft ofalluvial material and are in contact with groundwater that has experienced some subsurface residence time didates that the rate of karst feature development (limestone dissolution) is low.In addition, the karst features encountered in the 1967 Dames & Moore drilling program wereprimarily filled with decomposed limestone and detritus.

The volume of space needed to allowsignificant collapse of overlying soils is not present.

Therefore, within the expected service lifeof FCS, the process of limestone dissolution is not significant.

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03i110 900so110 .90. "VOZI RONVAE ItV0M 2101v 001M 4111 ELEVATION 2-10-10YE9710k SCALE -A~ WAM101 WjA0 lsSection B-BFort Calhoun Station0411Seo 2D'IPlant and Fadjity Geoloclinical and SItructural AssesITeilI Page 2-7Site History, Desciption, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2A further understanding of the karst features at the FCS site would require drilling andinstallation of sampling wells to sample water near the limestone and soil contact in order toassess the chemical characteristics of the groundwater at this interface.

This effort is notconsidered necessary as part of this Assessment Report because the plant has functioned without evidence of foundation subsidence due to karst feature collapse and resulting collapseof overlying soil prior lo and during the 2011 flood.2.1.4.1 Liquefaction of Non-Cohesive SoilsLiquefaction studies have been performed by others for the FCS site using post-construction conditions.

The assumptions used in performing the liquefaction anaoyses and results of thosestudies have not been reviewed by HDR, but it is believd.tdhat the largely non-cohesive, saturated soil materials at the site would be subject to liqdfikti..qijgiven sufficient seismicloading.

The pertinent question for this study is whether thie %ntial exists that I floodchanged the saturation and soil density sufficiently to increie ."~ faction potentfl4der;te maximum credible earthquake (MCE). Ongoing site explorationO~'-iftquantify the co-nitron 0the site soils where drilling is accessible.

2.1.4.2 Bank Slope Stability The site has slopes along the Missouri Rjive"that could e i ,stability problems due toriver-level increase and then rapid drawdowpi, resultin&-.n-exces'vy..pore pressures in theslopes of the river bank that, are adjao'ent to6anii of I s strucl. M The mostly non-cohesive nature of the soils will fallow dratn.And dissipion of pore pressure withoutsignificant effects on channe Once river Iles have re.ed, inspection of theMissouri River banks site will provd' ,,yt.J.sessment of this potential slopestability hazard. In addition, f1eiechnometers were. 01 tio monitor bank slope stability.ScOur and EtosionT ii+lundation of the sitehi.the potential to-scour and erode the existing grade and remove*;dii material from around aid4Oneath structures that are founded near the ground surface.

The-cohesive nature of the sit6ýils indicates scour potential given sufficient water velocityR. apacity to carry 2.2 G' :" hology and Physiqgtýphic SettingFCS is located i$ihkbeastern W hngton County, Nebraska, approximately 4 miles southeast ofBlair, Nebraska.

in es-iin-the Central Lowland portion of the Interior Plains Physiographic

Province, as shown Gn,ý.SS, 2003). More specifically, the site is classified as par of theDissected Till Plains, a s ti~sion of the aforementioned
province, a region covered by Pleistocene glacial events that depositetill during glacial advance as well as during glacial retreat.

The till hassince been partially covered with eolian (wind-deposited) loess deposits and dissected by erosioncadsed by the Missouri River and its-ttibutaries.

-...

M In n e s 0 1 aa uot haCENTRALLOWLANDWESTERN LAKE* .. ..GREAT PLAINSHIGH PLAINSN e b r a s k a00.1.,.CENTRAL L9.#ANTILL P'LAINSM i s 0 U r iKCENTRALLOWLANDOSAGE PLAINS0 30 60=MilesIOZARK PLATEAUSSPRINGFIELD-SALEM PLATEAUSOmaha Public Power =imirictIPhysiographic Setting of InteriorPlains RegionFort Calhoun StationPlant and Facility Geotechnical and Structural Assessment Page 2-9Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2Washington County is also recognized as having two distinct physiographic divisions:

1) uplandsformed in loess and glacial till; and 2) floodplains along the Elkhorn and Missouri rivers(U.S. Department of Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Service [USDA NRCS], 2004). -In addition, the floodplains of the Missouri River are subdivided into the low bottom, which consists ofa frequently flooded zone of meander scars and oxbow cutoffs, and the flood basin, which lies betweenthe low bottom and the uplands.

The flood basin is less frequently flooded than the low bottom.2.2.1 Site SoilsThe soils of the site are mapped by USDA NRCS (2004) as belonging to the following:

" Haynie silt loam (coarse silty alluvium),

0 to 2 percent slopes, well drained, adjacent to theMissouri River* Wathena fine sandy loam (sandy alluvium),

0 to 2 percent slopes, moderately well drained* Onawa silty clay (clayey-loamy alluvium),

0 to 2 percent slopes, somewhat poorly drained" Albaton silty clay (clayey alluvium),

0 to 2 percent slopes, poorly drained" Onawa silty clay loam (clayey alluvium),

0 to 2 percent slopes, somewhat poorly drained" Judson silty clay loam (colluvium),

2 to 5 percent slopes (colluvium),

well drained* Ida silt loam (loess),

5 to 11 percent slopes, well drainedThe site soils in the low bottom are derived from the Missouri River alluvial material.

Soils of theflood basin are primarily derived from alluvial material but also include some colluvium and washfrom the uplands, and soils of the uplands located along the south and southwest limits of the site arederived entirely from glacial till and loess.2.2.2 Geomorphic FeaturesThe notable geomorphic features of the site include the Missouri River channel, the meander scars andoxbow cutoffs of"the Miss0uiu-River floodplain, and the rolling hills consisting of glacial till withvarying thickness of colian loess~deposits.

2.3 Hydrologic BaselineFCS is situated directly along the Missouri River at River Mile (RM) 646, as shown in Figure 2-5.FCS is ncit protected by a levee and is therefore subject to flooding during extreme flood events. Theaverage elevation of the FCS site is approximately 1004 ft. Table 2-3 presents data from USACE fromits November 2003-report, "Upper:Mississippi River System Flow Frequency Study, Hydrology andIlydraulics, Appefidix F, Missotpwifitver."

According to these data, el. 1004 ft correlates to a floodrecurrence interval of slightly..Pypr 25 years or an annual probability of flooding of 0.040. This differsfrom USAR-2.7, Hydrology, Where a stage of 1004.2 ft is reported as being a 0. 1 percent annualchance event (1000-year recu-rrence interval)

(OPPD, April 29, 2011). USAR 2-7 acknowledges thatmultiple flow frequency studies have been performed by USACE subsequent to the development of thedesign peak flood stage.

-+-.41I-'ptiC, ..V. Idt AZ JUVFeetNW91IMMM 1 '.C*Location of FCS along Missouri RiverFort Calhoun StationDATEOImaha P ob,~Pwer DisiriclAug 2011FIGUREPlant and Facility Geotechnical and Structural Assessment FIR2-5I l .

Page 2-11Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2Table 2-3 -Missouri River Flood Recurrence Intervals at RM 646 (FCS)Recurrence Interval Probability Discharge Stage(years) (cfs) (ft)2 0.500 62,000 996.45 0.200 82,600 999.410 0.100 117,000 1003.025 0.040 127,000 1003.950 0.020 142-,,900 1005.1100 0.010 168,700 1006.5200 0.005 197,200 ..1008.0500 0.002 238,800 1009.3Source: USACE. November 2003. "Upper Mississippi River System Flow Frequency Study, Hydrology andHydraulics, Appendix F, Missouri River."Data on historic floods and the 2011 flood are discussed below as are potential Missouri River floodimpacts and damages at FCS.2.3.1 Historic Missouri River FloodingFCS went online in 1973 along the Missouri River At RM 646. Before FCS was constructed, the sitelikely experienced flooding in 1881 and 1883, and the site definitely experienced flooding in 1943 and1952. Sincc it was constructed, FCS has experienced flood events in 1984, 1993, 1997, 2007, 2010,and 2011. Data on these historic floods on the Missouri River are presented in Table 2-4.Discharge and water surface elevations at USGS stream gage locations at Sioux City, Iowa, and atDecatur, Blair, and Omaha, Nebraska, are provided in Table 2-4. In addition, water surface elevations at FCS, which were estimated using stage information at Decatur, Blair, and Omaha, are included.

Using the stage-discharge relationships.defined in the"Upper Mississippi River System FlowFrequency Study" (USACE, November 2003), a discharge of approximately 130,000 cfs results in astage of 1004.0 fR at RM 646. As shown in Table 2-3, this is approximately a 25-year flood event.Again, this differs from the probability associated with el. 1004 ft as reported in USAR-2-7 (OPPD,April 29, 201.i). Although FCS has experienced flood events in 1984, 1993, 1997, 2007, 2010, and2011, the data"'.sh6w that the Missouri"River water surface elevation exceeded the average site elevation of 1004 ft only once since construction, that being in 2011. The data also show that the water surfacewas within I ft of reaching the average site elevation during 1984 and 1993.

Page 2-12Site History, Description, and Baseline Condifion Rev. 2Table 2.4- Historic Flood Events on the Missouri River at Fort Calhoun Station, RM 646USGS Gage Historic Flood EventsALocation on Datu 1881' 1883 1943 195211984 1993 1997 2007 2010 2011DatumL2ctI 2the Missouri

'RiverSioux Cityc 1056.98 Discharge 212,000 441,000 104,000 72,000 100,000 42,100 86,600 192,000.(cfs)...

WSEL (ft) 1095.69 1101.29 1087.88 1084.28 1082.48 1075.58 1082.48 1092.23Decatur 1010.00 Discharge 76,400 100,000 46,800 80,600 191,000(cfs) ]I ..WSEL(ft) 105350 1042.20 1042.00 1035.40 1041.40 1050,24Blair 977.58 Discharge

,.______

_(cfs)WSEL(ft)

.1005.08 1004.98 1002.48 998.08 1004.48 1010.31FCS WSEL (ft) >1004 1 >1004 ' >:1004 >1004 1003.3 1003,3 10007 996.6 1002.7 1006.85Omaha 948.24 Discharge 200,000 396,000 1 15,000 110,000 86,100 103,000 216,000WSEL 98846 97724 978 54 974.64 974.74 97584 98453Instantaneous peaks/stages ftom USGS.B. 1881 discharge of 370,000 cfs estimated at St. Joseph, Missouri.

Information from this table was used to estirnate stage at FCS.C. Sioux City gage datum was 20 ft higher in 1943 and 1952,.WSEL water surface elevation.

Page 2-13Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2A stage recorder located at the FCS Intake Structure documented water surface elevations duringthe 2011 flood event. These data indicate that the maximum stage occurred on June 25, 2011, atel. 1006.85 ft. In addition, the staff gage on the landward side of the FCS Intake Structure (observed on July 12, 2011) showed a high water mark at around cl. 1007.1 ft.2.3.2 2011 Missouri River Basin FloodMassive flooding in the Missouri River basin, shown in Figure 2-6, occurred in 2011 because of acombination of above-normal snowpack in the plains in the Northern U.S., above-normal snowpack inthe mountains above Fort Peck Dam on the Missouri River, and excessive upstream spring rains ineastern Montana and North and South Dakota. USACE's forecast on November 1, 2011, estimated that in 2011, runoff into the Missouri River above Sioux City would be nearly 61 MAF. This is thehighest amount since 1898, eclipsing the previous high runoff of 49 MAF.At the end of February 2011, the plains snowpack contained as much as 6 to 8 inches (in.) ofequivalent water across parts of Montana, North Dakota, and Soulh Dakota. At the end of March, themountain snowpack above Foil Peck Dam was close to the 30-year historic average.

However, byMay 2,2011, the total snowpack was 141 percent of the 30-year historic average.

During May 201 I.the snowmelt combined with 10 to 15 in. of precipitation centered in Southern Montana and 6 to 10 in.of precipitation across the remainder of the watershed above Sioux City to produce record runoffamounts.USACE began releasing record discharges from Gavins Point Dam in late May 2011. The release wasincreased to 160,000 cfs by June 26, 2011, and remained at this level until mid-August.

Beginning onAugust 19, 2011, USACE began reducing releases daily in 5,000 cfs increments, reaching 90,000 cfson August 30, 2011. Further reductions began on September.

18, 201 1,..reaching 40,000 cfs onOctober 2, 20 11. USACE has indicated that the 40,000 cfs release will be maintained until at leastmid-December, When winter weather conditions set in and the risk of ice jams increases.

Fort PeckMissouriRMver0 200 400Missouri River Basini i Fort Calhoun Station.... .v .. g. , V. ,.ODmna Public Pc.e, Dslrin Plant and Facility Geolechnical and Structural Assessment Page 2-15Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.3.3 Missouri River Flood Impact at FCSBecause FCS is located along the Missouri River (see Figure 2-5), as the releases at Gavins Point Damwere increased, floodwater encroached on the FCS site. Figure 2-7 presents the water surfaceelevations as surveyed on site at RM 646 and the flow rate as predicted by USACE and interpolated toRM 646 by HDR. As discussed previously, the peak water surface elevation at FCS occurred onJune 25, 2011, at an elevation of 1006.85 ft.Ft. Calhoun-River Mile 6461008.01007.5 __" 200.000E 1007.0 ..... ....1 006.53006.0 180,000)0 043004.0 AO 1003.5 A~ d.0M 1003.0 01002.5 0o ..O]40001002.0300100 o .......120,0001000.0 ._ '. .: -. .1000.0 0 "100.000',., .,, ,..Id .zj ~0 Surveyed Elevations at intake at RM 646 A USACE FlowFigure 2-7 -Flow and Water Surface Elevations (June through August)for Fort Calhoun Station, RM 646The I I years in which flooding occurred on the Missouri River at Omaha from 1928 to 2011 arecompared visually in Figure 2-6. Each plot starts on January 1 and finishes on December 3 I. TheOmaha gage has the longest and most complete period of record of Missouri River discharges of anygage near FCS. Though this gage is 30 miles downstream from FCS, the data are applicable to theFCS site in the context of comparing flood durations.

The rating curves used to estimate the MissouriRiver stage for a given discharge have adjusted significantly over the past 70 years. For example,using USACE's "Missouri River Stage Trends" technical report (2010) as a reference, at the Omahagage since 1940, the rating curve adjustment range is on the order of plus or minus 2 ft for river stageat discharges of 100,000 cfs. The FCS site initially becomes flooded at an elevation of 1004 ft, andapplying this same 4-ft range in stage at FCS (1006 to 1002 ft) translates to a discharge of 180,000 to130,000 cfs (see Figure 2-7). This discharge range is bracketed in Figure 2-8 to define the range of Page 2-16Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2flows that flooded the site in 2011. Of the five flood events at the FCS site (1929, 1943, 1949, 1952,and 2011), the firstfour all receded from the site within 7 to 14 days. The 2011 event covered The FCSsite for almost 75 days.450,0001929400,000 19431949350,000 -1952..... 1950300,000Z :1993250,000 1993.C -1997E 200.000 200702010M Historically

-Range of,150,000 dliSc.a' tcue -2011, ,I initiul site flooding at FCSU)V, 100,00W£ % '-. ..- -%',-_ , -50,0004010 .100 0 250 300 350D. (IStarting on )an 1)Figure 2-8 -Comparlisn of Discharges on the Missouri River at Omahain Years w Nern Flooding Occurred (1928 to 2011)As a result..

flood flows, additional c~annel degradation and bank erosion have occurred in thevicinity.of FCS... A detailed evaluati~ilof changes in the stage-discharge rating curves applicable to theMissouri Rivetie ar FCS is beingp~ddkmed at this time. USGS surveyed the river in the vicinity ofFCS in fall 2008 and again on Ju1y25, 2011. The survey in 2008 was performed in National GeodeticVertical Datum of 1929 (NGVD 29), and the survey in 2011 was performed in North AmericanVertical Datum of 1988 (NAVD 88) and converted to NGVD 29. Figure 2-9 shows the locations ofthe surveyed hydraulic cross sections, and Figure 2-1 0 shows a comparison of the channel bathymetry throughout the surveyed reach between 2008 and 2011 at Stations 4+10 and 6+65. Figures 2-11,2-12, and 2-13 provide comparisons of the remaining surveyed hydraulic.cross sections.

It is clear that thechannel has degraded by 10 ft or more across most of the channel.

This is true in all the cross sectionsfrom station 4* 10 to 21 ]+44.

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--+ 0- --:-'-.2 0 .00'. -..... .... ....9.. ..100 0ARE LOOKING UPSTREAM I .* -Stations 18.91 Oct 20114(PLANT NORTH)..-~Fort ClonStation FGR' .n PbIc : w IOr ;ri I01141I ulc vvlOsrc Plant and Facility Geotechnical 13[ and Structural Assessment Page 2-22Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2On July 12, 2011, personnel from HDR visited FCS to observe and investigate the impact offloodwater on FCS. Photos I and 2 are images of floodwater at FCS. Flow paths and velocities through FCS as observed are shown in Figure 2-14. A figure depicting the high water elevations assurveyed is provided in Figure 2-15.T* T ...J ... .......PhOoA -Floodwater at FCS,;,Looking North from the Administration Buildingtoward the Old Warehouse Site History, Description, and Baselihe Condition Page 2-23Rev. 2..iPhoto 2 -FIoOdOwater at FCS, Looking East toward the Containment 1.C*jI,-1Be~in'-*1t.'%-4 ft'high-560 cfs-200 cft-400 cfs-160 cfs,4 fps lGapaS"2 fps"I4; 4~,tollWIatWEC" I7S .'*AAIT0 200 400r~Feelr~iSurface WaterFlow PathOnulha Public Power DrSrictFlow Paths on July 12, 2011Fort Calhoun StationAug 2011FIGUREN1Plant and Facility Geotechnical and Structural Assessment fm2-14I A

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& Ass. 9/112011 FIGURE* igh ater ark ine Dmaha Publir Power Dlilrlrto iPlant and Facility Geotechnical 2-15N, and Structural Assessment Page 2-26Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.3.4 Potential Flood Damages at FCSThe FCS site was inundated by floodwater for nearly 3 months (see Figure 2-7, Flow and WaterSurface Elevations (June through August) for Fort Calhoun Station, RM 646) by approximately 3 ft ofwater as a result of 2011 flooding.

Buildings and property at FCS have been subject to a variety offorces as a result of Missouri River floodwater.

Hydrostatic and buoyancy forces due to inundation.

hydrodynamic forces due to moving water, scour and erosion around building foundations, and to alesser extent, wave forces and forces imparted by the impact of moving debris such as large trees, aredescribed as follows (FEMA, 2008).2.3.4.1 Hydrostatic ForcesA hydrostatic load is imparted to the walls and foundation of a structure when floodwater builds up along a structure.

A hydrostatic force acts laterally or vertically (if the structure issubmerged).

Hydrostatic forces can become strong enough to cause deflection when there is asubstantial difference in water elevation on opposite sides of the structure.

2.3.4.2 Buoyancy ForcesAs floodwater rises, a structure can experience a'buoyant force that has to be Counteracted bythe weight of the structure and any anchorage forces.2.3.4.3 Hydrodynamic ForcesWater flowing around a structure during a flood event imparts a load on the affected structure.

The load is the combination of the force imposed by the moving floodwater hitting the frontalarea of the structure, the drag-forces imparted along'.ih:.wAlIs of the structure, and the negativepressure acting Op..the downstream, side of the structure.

The negative pressure is located in thewake .zone created by flow separation as the floodwater moves past the structures.

If astructure is not rigid, there is also a lift force imparted on the structure by the movingfloodwater.

.-.2.3.4.4 Scour and ErosionHih- velocities from water flowing across a flooded area can cause soil erosion if the soil ormateiWal.at the ground surface does not have a greater resistive force than the shear stressimpartedit the ground surfaceby the floodwater.

Local scour is also possible at or alongstructure foundations.

As.floodwater impacts a structure, the water is forced downward andaround the structure.

The resulting increase in velocity and turbulence characteristics can resultin localized scour. The magnitude of scour and erosion depends on flood velocity, depth, soilcharacteristics, ground characteristics, flow direction in relation to the structure, and structure type and dimensions.

2.3.4.5 WavesWith a substantial wind fetch, structures can experience additional hydrodynamic loading bythe impact of waves against the structure walls and foundations.

Page 2-27Site History, Descdption, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.3.4.6 Debris ImpactFloodwater carries debris ranging from large branches and trees to storage tanks and mobilehomes. Debris that impacts a structure imparts a load on the structure that depends on theweight of the debris object, the velocity of the floodwater, the location on the structure whereimpact occurs, and the duration of the impact.2.4 Geotechnical Baseline2.4.1 In-Situ Soil Characteristics Dames & Moore conducted a site subsurface investigation in 1967. A total of t89-borings were drilledduring this field investigation to assess the properties of the site soih; and..'bedrock, as Show inFigure 2-16. Dames & Moore published the results of their 1 967 field.work in a 1968 report titled"Foundation

Studies, Fort Calhoun Station Number One, Near Fort Cahotun, Nebraska,"

in which theydrew the following general conclusions regarding the subsurface soil chara.cteristics:

r The surficial soils consist of loose fine sands with varying amounts of silt to-approximately 10 ft.* Depths from 10 ft to approximately 30 to 35 ft generally consist of loose to compact (dense) finesand.* A 5- to 10-ft layer of compact (dense) fine sand lies below the loosa.to dense fine sand.* Below the dense layer is a less compact (denseý)layer of poorly graded..towell-graded sand withthin layers of silty clay and some gravel.Based on laboritory-determined relative densities, the relative densityofihe subsurface soils rangedfrom 47 to 82 percent.

The field investigation involved stiidard penetration tests (SPTs) and therecording of N values for the soils. ThenN value, reported in blows.per foot, is the number of blowsrequired to drive .the sampler for the last 1 ft of the sampling interval.

There is no indication as towhether the values are normalized N60 values.(corrected to 60 percent of the theoretical energy SPT safety hamnier) or are uncorrected values, so the values are assumed to be In addition, a standardSPT sampler-nd the Dames & Moore Type U soil samplcr wereused torecord N values. and a 300-pound hammer ait ,a24-in.

fall and a 140-pound hammer at a 30-in.fall\ wer-used to impart the energy todrive the samplers.

The net effect on N values is notdocumen&dIL N values are depicted infigure 2-2, Section A-A, and Figure 2-3, Section B-B.These findii'ný.igeneralized to represent overall site conditions, but localized variations arepresented in and 2-3. Thfe locations of the section lines and the approximate plan viewlocation of the kbbxvnkarst features are presented in Figure 2-], Geotechnica]

Areas and Cross-Section Locations.

Much of the upper 10 to 15 ft of in-situ material was actually logged as low-plasticity silt with varyingamounts of sand. N values from this zone were generally lower than 10. The zone below this,described by Dames & Moore (1968) as loose to dense fine sand 30 to 35 ft thick, is shown as poorlygraded sand (SP) in Figuit s 2-2 and 2-3. This zone appears -t be consistent across the FCS site;however, the zone of dense fine sand is not as consistent as the Dames & Moore report implies.N values in borings B-27 and B-I 08 range from 79 to 125 at depths ranging from 35 1o 50 ft fromexisting (at the time of the exploration) ground surface, while borings B-29 and B-28 show N valuesof 14 to 48 for a comparable depth range less than 100 ft away from borings B-27 and B- 108.

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.. ...... .. -", ' ". ..' .. ..... i -M -'° " :/ ' " " .D! TFMo W el Lo ato Omah NMI Powe ,L ..: .Districtinsrti n " ..., ,.P l n a n F a ilt G e t c h i a *2. --,4 m"' ..:.. , .". 9 ,I., ..m.... ... ., .w ,,,/ , ; ..l r.k .and S t u tu a A s..... & 1 .1 Page 2-29Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2The zone of less dense, poorly graded to well-graded fine sand with varying amounts of sill and somegravel is generally consistent across the site and makes up the 15 to 20 ft of alluvial material on top ofbedrock.Limited laboratory testing was completed for soil samples and includes particle size analyses.

Particlesize analyses showed predominantly fine sands with minor fractions of silt and medium-grained sand.2.4.2 Rock Mass Characteristics According to the Dames & Moore (1968), bedrock was encounteredvat depthsranging from 58 to 67 fiand varied from el. 931 to 935 ft. The rock encountered was idejitified as the Wintersei Member of theDennis Formation Limestone of the Pennsylvanian Kansas Tb6ebedrock at the site wasdescribed as having an upper zone 4to 8 ft thick and consisting 6f.mifassive, gray, thidkly bedded,medium- to fine-grained oolitic limestone.

Below this zone was a .i~oe of light gray, thinly tomoderately bedded, fine-grained limestone (referred to as aphaniticin-the Dames & MooTe report)having 0.5- to 2-in.-thick shale layers. Karst features were found ifn thislIdwer "aphanitic" layer. asbriefly discussed in Section 2.1.4.1, Karst, above, but also included part ofih6 overlying ooliticlimestone as recorded in borings B- 104 and B- 104B. Figure 2-2;-Section A-A,.and Figure 2-3,Section B-B, present representative subsurface depth and thickness iof the site bedrock.

The locations of the section lines and the approximate plan view locition of the',ki'&wn karst featureisare presented inFigure 2-1, Geotechnical Areas and Cross-Section Locations.

The rock mass was logged as "unweathered"'-("fresh"

.S. Bu Reclamation Engineering Geology Field Manual) and and rock Ola'ty designati (RQD) values ranged from97 to 100 percent with few exceptions reted to solution, res (kapt TSpecific findings were asfollows:

-* A zone of mg, derate .,y to jtensely weiered limestone in ' nng B-1 16 was logged at the bottomof the oolitic.ýlimnestone-6 into the undlierlying fine-grained limestone, and an RQD value of40 percehrt was recorded withiii.tihs zone. Thiswas a solution feature that had not yet, throughchemiical dissolution of the lirn.etone, developed into a void and a zone of completely decomposed lhmstone.

  • iA~i,*ge solution feature was inter eied by borings B-104, B-104A, and B-104B from depths of (el. 932.3 to 916.2 ft);f had an upper 2 to 3 fl of void and the remaining lowerorti'iýW with decomposed liH4 ,ne.* Borings?2jthrough B-72H wpr&drilled to define the extent of a large solution feature thatranged in deplifraom 65.6 to 7.1.~it (el. 932.1 to 920.0 ft)." Borings B-30 through B-30Q-were drilled to define the extent of a solution feature that ranged indepth from 67 to 8-.ft 7 to 913.7 ft).' .. ...i.ý "L ,?* Borings B-103 and B-103A encountered a more limited but possibly connected zone of dissolution that ranged from el. 93t.5 to 936 ft.* A zone of increased weathering, RQD values ranging from 42 to 55 percent, and a 1.5-ft void wereencountered in boring B-141 from depths of 70 to 77 ft (el. 926 to 919 ft). -." Boring B-108 drilled through a cavity from depths of 65.7 to 75.0 ft (el. 928.8 to 919.5 ft).These noted solution features were recognized by Dames & Moore as following predominant fracturesets that were reportedly mapped at a local quarry. The orientation of these fracture sets is reportedly N5OE and N58W.

Page 2-30Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2The potential for the enlargement of solution features (karst) in the bedrock portion of the foundation to be a foundation failure mechanism due to flooding events is minimal.

The pile design for theContainment, Auxiliary

Building, Turbine Building, and Intake Structure called for pile installation past any weathered zone to the bottom of any known or encountered solution feature.

In addition, thelimestone bedrock is covered by a minimum of 61 ft of soil cover, so acidicatmospheric water is notlikely to reach the karst features.

The only plausible mechanisms for continued karst development are1) a connection to the river bottom that allows chemically aggressive (acidic and not saturated withrespect to calcium) water into a karst feature, and 2) a scenario in which the overlying soils do not alterthe chemistry of the groundwater so that it maintains the potential to dissolve the limestone.

Thesemechanisms take significant time relative to the operating life of the FCS structures and are notsignificantly related to a plausible failure mechanism.

2.4.3 Groundwater

Prior to construction.

groundwater was described by Gibbs, Hill, Durham, and Richardson (1967) asgenerally within 2 ft of the surface at the site and sloping gently to.:tbe east toward the Missouri River.Groundwater elevations and river elevations prior to the 2011 flood event and after the onset of theflood event are presented in Table 2-5. An increase in groundwater elevation.on the order of 10 ft hasbeen recorded as a result of the 2011 flood. The data do not-include.

groundwater elevations at thepeak flood elevation of 1006.85 ft because groundwater measuretients were not recorded during peakflood levels, Groundwater and river elevations forDecember 10 ,2010, and June 4, 2011, are shown inFigure 2-2, Section A-A, in order to present the general response of groundwater elevations relative tothe increased river elevations, The effect of pore pressure changes due to ..a water level elevation across the site of approximately 1006.85 ft compared to the pre-flood.,rot."dwater elevatib6n.-.of approi-ciately 990 ft must be evaluated with respect to each structure,

-.'. -Table 2-5 -Groudndwater and River Level Elevations Date .12/1012010 31/22/2011 6/4/2011 9/1/2011River,Elevaton 993.994 995.33 1002.86 1002.18SMonJibing Well ID 'Groundwater Elevation (ft _-:MW-]A 990.7.6 1 989.15 998.7 999.55.MW-IB 990o.14..

989.12 998.7 999.54IMqW-2A 991.18 : 990.12 998.55 998,9)SW-2B 991 .23' .990.14 998.74 999.2MW-3A 990,933' 990.82 998.25 998.77MW-3B 990,i07 1 990.77 998.15 998.68MW-4A .991.5 990.85 999.75 1000.4__ ..MW-4B _991.48 990.73 999.63 1000.23MW-5A 991.88 99.18 1000,15 1000.67MW.5B 991 R1 991 14 1000 12) 1000 6..-~- IMW-6MW-7MW-9MW-10MW-lI991.71 992.08 1000.45 1001.13991.32 990.89 -999.26 §99.98990.82 989.28 998.68 999.49991.16 999.53 998.98 999.83991.21 989.93 998.88 999.48A -River elevations include FCS data and interpolated stages between Omaha and Blair and between Omahaand Decatur, Nebraska.

Page 2-31Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition

-Rev. 22.4.4 Ground Improvement Methods2.4.4.1 Pile Installation According to OPPD records, a total of 951 piles were installed under the footprint of theContainment, Auxiliary

Building, Turbine Building, Intake Structure, Service Building, andCirculating Water System. Each pile was installed to bedrock (Winterset Member of theDennis Formation Limestone),

and some were installed through voids in the limestone to acompetent rock bottom. Figure Section A-A, and Figt-e 2-3, SectiqoB-:b, show thegeneral location and depth of the pile installation.

Piles iWere installed-from existing groundelevation, and excavation progressed around the piles to.target elevations.

.ijia] cutting andcapping of the piles was completed when target excavatiolaevel was reach~di:

Figure 2-1, Geotechnical Areas and Cross-Section Locations-shows the area of pileinstallation.

Pile as-built records showing actual installati6n depthls-haave not been located forthis study', so the design proposed in the Dames & Moore 1968 report was used as the basis forpile installation depth....,..,,..-

~ ~. 4 ...., , ..2.4.4.2 Soil Densification Using The design criteria for the Containment, Atpio4iary

Buifging, anciake Structure required anaverage relative density of 85 perc entand 9,' nimmu_ ative d.is ..'Of 70 percent for thefoundation soils. As documentedl:b.Gibbs

& Hil 'report titIt "Summary ofVibroflotation,"

dated January 27,1 972, the procJRf vibroflotaiion was used to densify soilsbetween the foundation piles in the areas under th&?ontainmment and the Intake Structure.

Vibroflotation involves inserting a vibrating probe irto'fb&iround while introducing gravelinto the void that is created around the probe. This process densifies the surrounding soil,forms a vertical column of dense gravel, and increases the overall strength of the in-situmaterial.

o..61lowing the vibroflotatior-densification prricc~ss, a total of 83 SPT borings were completed by-.:,.--,e contractor to assess the effdeti~veness of densifying the fine-grained sand and fine-grained

.:"iltysand.

The Gibbs & Hill 1 ipor states that a 96.6 percent confidence level was attained thatthei Verage relative density was'riot less than 85 percent.

SPT data from these test boringsinditaed that the soil densifi.t4,on was moderately successful when compared to the SPT Nvalues frobm1967 exploratoi.:borings at the site. SPT values recorded after the vibroflotation for successfullsoil densification generally ranged from 12 to 91 blows per foot, which indicated that relative densities ranging from 70 to I 10 percent were achieved in these soils. However,some zones of riati&e.nsity ranging from 35 to 68 percent remained after the vibroflotation.

as noted in verification borings V-42, V-46, V-68, V-70, V-7 1, and V-76. Therefore, existingsoil density conditions should be noted as having average relative density not less than85 percent but as also having notable zones of relative density significantly lower than theaverage and lower than the minimum relative density requiremeni of 70 percent.

A plan viewshowing the post-vibroflotation verification borings is not in the construction records.

Page 2-32Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.4.5 Excavation and BackfillBased on the Dames & Moore 1968 report titled "Foundation Conditions,"

preliminary excavation depths for each structure were targeted to the folloiing elevations:

  • Intake Structure-el. 963 ft* Auxiliary Building

-el. 981 ft* Containment

-el. 983 ft* Turbine Building

-el. 987 ft" Turbine Generator Mat -el. 982 ftAs-built drawings record excavation depths that vary somewhat torn the premioigly Iisted targetexcavation elevations, as follows:* Intake Structure (sluice intake) -el. 966.7 ft; approximate Intake Structure foundation

-.el. 963 ft(Intake Structure Building Panels and Intake Details, Drawing Number 11405-A-281)

" Auxiliary Building

-el. 965.5 ftI (Auxiliary Building

Sections, Drawing Number 11405-S-64)
  • Containment

-approximateel.

975.5 ft (Primary Plant. ection A-A, Drawving Number GHDR1 1405-A-13)

The properties of fill material have been documente4.:by boring7.ath!t were completed afterconstruction.

Borings were completed by Geolechn.igl Servic.,

Inc. forth-.foundation assessments for the Maintenance Building Addition (1977), Security Building (I 977), and the New SecurityBuilding (1987). Fill material is composed of silty clay, clI ey silt, pofly graded sand with silt, andsandy silt. SPT N values range from5 to,20 within the fill~iiaterial.

Documentation of the fillmaterial, placement densities, thickness,arnd extent adjacet1 to6strutures built within excavated areasis not available for analysis.

2.5 Structural Baseline" The straf",Iiral baseline was estabil4.h41for Priority

..and Priority 2 structures based on the review ofexisting documentation, including condition reports"des'ign basis documents, the original designdrawmigs,.'and structural assessments...The condition reports and structural assessments together arereferred'to.1Ispre-flood structural repo~ts,.

A list of OPPD documents used in establishing the structural baseline fobfeach structure is provided

'asAttachment

2. Dimensions presented in the structural ba eln .it issio. .,are'.:2.

gene `,ibaseline dsussaonTare generally expressed in decimal feet. The term "structure" may refer to aspecific building; such as the Turbife'eBuilding, or may refer to a group of independent non-building structures, such as the Turbine:Btiiding South Switchyard.

The location of each structure is shown inFigure 2-17, Site Plan:Overview.

Met Tower1"sele.,l 0 rlý,rx,Switch Yard345 Bldg(vv),345 Btdg(E)Ll:)Lao.t ."'%.4-BldgS4!* ~.jI q 1j7.A.II* ; jSewer. Lt.~.*.,

oo0 175 350 f!%ii Feetaa9C'NFencePriority 1r' Priority 2r" Protected Area Boundaries Onaha Public Power DisiriciSite Plan OverviewFort Calhoun StationPlant and Facility Geotechnical and Structural Assessment Sep 2011FIGURE2-17 Page 2-34Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.5.1 Intake Structure 2.5.1.1 Location, Description, and FunctionThe Intake Structure is a Class I structure located adjacent to the Missouri River and directlyeast of the Service Building.

The major functions of the Intake Structure are to provide waterfrom the Missouri River that is required for component cooling and fire fighting at FCS, and toprovide the structural support and environmental protection necessalyto ensure the functional integrity of the Critical Quality Element (CQE) systems and compon4-idnder all operational and environmental conditions.

Specifically, the Intake Structure must!,.plrqNpriately protectagainst the effects of projectiles that may result from equipment failioes and:fom events andconditions outside the nuclear power unit.From the bottom of the foundation mat at el. 960.8 ft to el. 1014.5 ft, the Intake Structure consists of large, heavy, reinforced-concrete-box-type construction With internal bracingprovided by the dividing walls that form the water passages.

This in a massive rigidstructure set mostly below grade, which is inherentlyresistant to scismic.and tornado activity, Without special provisions, the Intake Structure-is designed to accommodat&:fltod levels up toel. 1004.5 ft without water entering the structure.

For higher flood levels up to the maximumprobable flood of el. 1009.3 ft, protection is provided by steel floodbarriers equipped withseals that provide protection to el. 1009.5 ft. These flood barriers istored adjacent to theopenings that they protect and areput-in place whei:he river level-Teaches certain elevations.

When the water level of the Missouri River exceed&the elevation-of the operating floor(1007.5 ft), it is necessary to close the sluice gates..ioprevent water from flowing in around thetops of the traveling screens and flooding the lnlake"trcture.

2.5.1.2 Foundation

..The intake Structure is amu.ti-floored stru.tuere below operating floor el. 1007.5 ft. From the..bottom of the foundation matrat el. 960.8 fti6"l. 101 4.5 ft, the Intake Structure consists of* ..arge, heavy, reinforced-concfete~box-type construction.

A mat foundation on steel pipe pilesdriVen to bedrock supports the intake Structure.

2.5.1'1 Structural FrameFrom el.'10t14.5 ft to the roof el. 1035.6 ft, the Intake Structure is a braced-steel frame clad withAr-lite sandwich panels supported from a system of horizontal steel girts. The roof is a multi-layer built-up roof supported by metal decking spanning between open-web steel joists. Thestructural steel frame supports equipment necessary for building operation, including anoverhead bridge crane on steel crane girders.2.5.1.4 Building Envelope-The structure is clad with concrete sandwich panels supported from a system of horizontal steelgirts and the primary structural frame members.

The panels forn a parapet at the top of thebuilding wall at roof level. The roof is a multi-layer built-up roof supported by metal deckingspanning between open-web steel joists.

Page 2-35Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.5.1.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting There are structural condition

reports, prepared by OPPD, with drawings marked, available from the years 1996, 1999, 2002, and 2009. These reports document minor structural phenomena such as minor cracks in walls and ceilings, cracks that radiate from corners insquare concrete
openings, and minor spalling.

2.5.2 Auxiliary Building2.5.2.1 Location, Description, and FunctionThe Auxiliary Building is a Class I structure located adjaent to and west.of.

he TurbineBuilding, with the Technical Support Center attached t6ofhemnorth*all.

The.Auxiliary Buildinghas an irregular shape in plan, with maximum ground floor 'dh.en~ions of 224 by 243 ft andenvelopes the Containment on the east, north, and west sid&e"'Ti Auxiliary Buildinghas multiple flat roofs at different elevations, and all are lower' tan"e of of the Containiien't.

Ground floor elevation is 1007 ft with a maximumr.ofdelevation of M083Aft.

The building hasone full floor level below grade at 989 ft and a~partial floor~level at 971 ft.2.5.2.2 Foundation

,. -,The foundation of the Auxiliary Building d8fihsts of rei.. ed concrete matsupported by steel pipe piles. The-.iles are spaced-."

' 'roximatel,9 to69 ft on center and drivento bedrock that ranges in elevati6o om 931 to 935 ft. The dra gs show that the foundation walls below grade are 3 ft thi6.k, dbvered with wateiproofing dnd'keyed at the top and bottomjoints with water stops.2.5.2.3 iStructural FrameT-,eAuxiliary Building tconsists of reinforced concrete moment frame on the exterior elevations with architectural resin precast-concrete panels as infill between the moment frames. InteriorJ-Wwalls are reinforced concrete qMnging in thickness from 8 to 48 in., with shield walls at selectdopr openings.

The:flors and roof deck consist-of 6-in. deck with a 2-in. concrete topping.

The 8 in. of-1 .(. ....' & .concrete&are composite to the tejifforced concrete beams, the dimensions of which are based onthe spanalid-floor loading...

2.5.2.4 Building EnvelopeThe exterior concrete moment frame is exposed and has a rubbed concrete surface.

The resinprecast concrete panels have an architectural finish and form the primary weather barrier.There is no detail available for the roof material...

Page 2-36Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition

-Rev. 22.5.2.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Structural assessments of the Auxiliary Building were conducted by OPPD in 1996, 1999,2004, and 2008. Based on the documents

reviewed, the inspections indicate mostly fine cracksand peeling paint of concrete elements such as walls, floors, and ceilings.

All reports indicated that there was no significant structural deterioration of elements inspected.

2.5.3 Containment

2.5.3.1 Location, Description, and FunctionThe Containment is a Class I structure located west of thq. Turbine BuXildiq;an.d enveloped onthree sides by the Auxiliary Building.

The Containmentis cylindrical with-a nominal outsidediameter of 120 ft and a nominal top of dome height of 140.fti.

.Ground floor elevation rangesfrom 1007 to 1013 ft with a lower level of 976.5 ft. The eaveele'vation at the domed roof eaveis 1119 ft. The grade around the building, based on the design documents, is 1004 ft.The Containment houses a substantial amount of mechanical and electrical~equipment, andthere are a number of mechanical piping and electrical penetrations through the Containment.

2.5.3.2 Foundation The primary foundation mat of the Containment consists of 10 t6.i21;t 917 reinforced concretesupported by 20-in.-diameter stee1q"pe piles placed in a radial pa tei.iand spaced at about 10 ftaround the perimeter, with spaci"ig decreasing to about 5 ft near:,the center of the structure.

Theprimary mat is topped with a3-flZ..o 4-fi-6-in.-thick

'einforced c'Oncrete mat.2.5.3.3 Structural FrameThe Teinforced concrete

-shell of the Containment is shown to be keyed into the mat foundation at&.tbe base. The shell has ianqinal waltIhickness of about 8 ft at the base and 12 ft at the.e-_ve-to-dome transition.

Mififmum thickness.is about 3 ft 10.5 in. The shell is post-tensioned

"..With access to the cables by rfen of a removable stainless steel panel at the roof eave and asmall access gallery located b~lo' el. 979 ft and under the primary base mat foundation.

2.5'3-.4 Building EnvelopeThe exterior concrete of the Containment is rubbed concrete with a 22-ft-wide band ofarchitectural steel panels at the eave. The available drawings do not show the type of roofingmembrane.

2.5.3.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Structural assessments of the Auxiliary Building were conducted in 2009 and 2010. Theinspections reports indicated no significant structural deterioration of the elementsinspected.

Page 2-37Site History, Description, and Ba§'eline Condition Rev. 22.5.4 Rad Waste Building2.5.4.1 Location, Description, and FunctionThe Rad Waste Building is a single-story building with internal mezzanine levels, drive-intruck bay, and depressed area to store waste drums. It is located next to and west of theAuxiliary Building and power block area. The design drawings indicate that the building was.constructed after 1987. The building plan dimensions are shown as.73 ft by 175 ft. The floorslab finish elevation ranges from 1002 to 1007 ft. The flat roof higb.point is shown to be at el.1045 ft.2.5.4.2 Foundation The design drawings available indicate thai the Rad Waste Building is on a reinf6rced concretefloating mat foundation with a ground-floor elevation of 1007 ft and the lowest top/co.ncrete elevation at 1002 ft in the drum storage area. A foundation curb extends up to el. I 01i"fA, andthe drawings indicate that openings below 1010 ft are flood protected.

The thickness of the matwas not provided in the available documentation.

2.5.4.3 Structural FrameThe drawings indicate that the Rad Waste Building is a-pre-engineered steel-braced frame withprecast aggregate concrete panels to match sthe:existing,-Auxiliaryý'BUiling.

The roof structure consists of metal deck spanning between steel joists.-The metal deck appears to be designed asa diaphragm.

Lateral loads from--wind or earthquake--are carriedtoo the foundation by the roofdeck diaphragm and are transferiýeI to the foundati£d through th steel columns.2.5.4.4 Building-Envelope Exterior walls are shownito-be precast aggregate concrete panels that form the main weatherbarriET with a masonry bio.tW&.all internal biner. There is no detail for the roofing material.

,2.5.4.5 Pre-Flood Structural,Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were-not available in the referenced documentation.

2.5.5 Techhidal Support Center2.5.5.1 Location, Description, and FunctionThe Technical Support Center is a single-story administrative building located within the powerblock area immediately north of the Auxiliary Building and west of the Maintenance Shop.The original structure was designed in 1980, and there have been subsequent revisions accerding...p.a vailable documentation..

..The original building plan dimensions are shown as 54 ft by 78 ft, and an addition to thebuilding was constructed in 1988 with nominal dimension of 40 ft by 68 ft to the east and 14 ftby 78 ft to the south. The grade floor elevation is 1005 ft, and the rooftop is at el. 1020 ft.

Page 2-38Site History, Decripion, Baseline Cohdition

Rev. 22.5.5.2 Foundation The original Technical Support Center foundation is a reinforced concrete mat foundation,

.which varies in thickness from 2 to 4 ft. The original mat foundation was constructed with top-of-concrete el. 1004 ft and either concrete fill or false floor built up to el. 1005 ft. The 1988addition slab-on-grade elevation was 1005 ft. The building addition has spread footingsbearing approximately 4 ft below grade.2.5.5.3 Structural FrameThe original construction consists of cast-in-place concrete'walls to roof. The addition wasconstructed of concrete masonry units. Walls extend ffob.the top of the foundation to the topof the parapet wall.The floor slab is located at grade level and is constructed of reififorced concrete.

Interior non-bearing walls are supported from thickened-slab sections.

2.5.5.4 Building Envelope

,The roof is constructed of reinforced concrete-on metal deck~supported from steel joists andsteel beams. Tapered insulation is located above the roo.f.-9lab..

Exterior walls are typically constructed of 12,in.-wide.reinforced concrete masonry units, withrigid insulation on the exterior side.of.the masonry,ýU:-part of theibuilding

addition, exteriorwalls are shown to have a masoiiveneer finish. .2.5.5.5 Pre-Flood Strucdi Ieporting Pre-flood-structuralrfeports were nOt-available in the referenced documentation.

2.5.6 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation 2.5.6.1 Location, Description, and FunctionThp.ldependent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) consists of spent fuel modules placedinrd6e 34-ft-thick reinforced concrete shield walls and ceiling, and an associated small Electrical Equip de.nt..Building, situated

.to the northwest of the power block, adjacent to the NewWarehouse.

The storage modules are concrete-box structures and are 9 ft 8 in. wide by 20 ft 8 in. long and18 ft 6 in. tall, placed on a concrete mat foundation.

The ISFSI footprint is 42 ft by 211 ft inplan, and the Electrical Equipment Building is 13 ft 4 in. by 17 ft 4 in. in plan with an I I ft2 in. cave height above grade.2.5.6.2 .Foundation The ISFSI foundation is a reinforced concrete mat foundation that is 2 ft thick. The Electrical Equipment Building foundation is shown as a I-ft-thick concrete mat/depressed slab with afloor elevation nominally 3.0 ft below grade, with concrete walls extending up to grade level.

Page 2-39Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.5.653 Structural FrameInformation on the structural frame was not available for the ISFSI storage modules, which aresupported by the concrete mat foundation.

The Electrical Equipment Building has reinforced masonry block wails extending from the topof the foundation walls at grade to the underside of the roof slab, I I ft 2 in. above the top ofgrade wall.The roof structure consists of a concrete slab on metal d masonry walls,sloped 0.5 in. per foot from the center of the structure ave in dimension of thestructure.

2.5.6.4 Building EnvelopeThe ISFSJ building envelope is as discussed in Section 2.2.5.6.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not avai labI eMdocumen 2,5.7 Seourity Building I(b)(4)'(b)(7)(F) 2.5,8 Turbine Building2.5.8.1 Location, Description, and FiThe Turbine Building was desi 96Whe uc Build oted as a majorappurtenant facility.

It is siuc connec-ed Service ding to the east, adjacent toa contained exterior transfo itchyard (tran T I A2, TI A3, and TI A4) tothe south, adjacent to the A uiding to th acent to the Maintenance Sho;to the e il c room that is'approximately 90 ft in height aboved approximate across in column to main column. The buildingrint is 122 ft by 227 imensio twin turbines on separate pedestal-type undations.

Floor and imp levationms e as follows:e 1 : 1004. 5 Rl+/* ent: 990.0 ft*Me VlSTop of cra3.9 Rt (+66,5 ft +/- above floor)2.5.6.2 Founda onThe top of the basement floor is at el. 990.0 it. The top of the pile caps is el. 989.4 ft. Thetypical cap for each major building column is 6.0 ft thick and is supported by a cluster of steelpipe piles. Main equipment such as the turbine/generator is also supported on mat/capfoundations and pipe piles of similar diameter and depth as the building piles.P Page 2-41Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.5,8.3 Structural FrameThe Turbine Building structure is a structural steel moment-resisting engineered frame withtapered steel sections and is approximately 90 ft tall with three interior floors, Buildingcolumns are supported on reinforced-concrete wall piers. The top of the wall pier is at el.1007.5 ft. Wall piers extend down to pile caps in the basement and are approximately 17,5 ft inheight,2.5.8.4 Building EnvelopeThe building envelope consists of exterior walls suppo tl athed withinsulated resin panels, Panels arc fire-rated from grad ox, ove grade inheight. The building roof is constructed with similar m sUP open-websteel joists spanning between main building frames. The t of the rod centerine ridge, which runs north-south, is el, 1095.4 ft at top of st of steel atwest ends (low points) is el. 1092.9 ft. I2.5,8.5 Pre-Flood Structural ReportPeriodic inspections of the Turbine Buildwas instituted in 1997 to perform visualTurbine Building, OPPD inspected the stIngin chedul years.ion and cturin 01 0,Xp proccdure co.n tion of the)7, and 2010.In the 1997 rport, no superstru s ic eel and e ado items) were listedas a concern.

Several cracks i isture seepa ere note he poured reinforced concrete walls (below grad e cracks were to be of significant structural deterioration.

A crack in the corbel at the mr, el. 1000.0 ft, of theHe eid TB- ted an Enginee ssistance Request for repair.report mdi a revi initiated to determine the repair process for theI item above. I that h ration is only surficial.

Thcrm was no reportedence of other signific tural det ion,004 report does not indi ny significant findings of structural deterioration.

epo does not .di ny significant findings of structural deterioration but listssev or minor rep as repainting or re-application of protective coating,The 2010 es cate any significant findings of structural deterioration butmentions tb aulking on the Turbine Building is aging.2,5.9 Security Barrlcaom f(b)(4),(b)(7)(F)

I Ballistic Resistant Enclosures Page 2-42Rev. 2Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition (b)(4),(b)(7)(F)

.1 Location, nn, an oTurbine Building South hyard is I ed south of the Turbine Building and consistsveral transformers, trans n structures, and an underground duct bank.TheT fo s for the co nts of the Turbine Building South Switchyard are as follows:-Transfi approximately 12 ft by 25 ft in plan dimension.

-The foun for TI is a l-ft-6-in.-thick mat, 14 ft by 34 ft, supported on piles.-T/Mat foundation is el. 1005,5 ft." Dead End/16] Structure

-Two-column frame is approximately 27 ft in height with interconnecting cross beam.-There are two foundations for each octagonal column. The piers have a 5 ft 0 in. by5 ft 0 in, by 3 fl 0 in. height. Top of pier is el. 1004.0 ft.-T/Foundation cap is el, 1001.0 ft. Each cap is 4 fl 0 in. thick, 7 ft 0 in. by 20 ft 0 in. inplan dimensions, supported by piles, Page 2-43Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2" Underground Duct Bank-Underground duct bank is 7 ft 0 in. wide, running east-west just south of main TurbineBuilding.

-Duct details are shown in Drawing 11405-E-315.

" Trench System-Main collector trench runs east-west with branches between electrical units TI A-2,TIA-3, and TIA-4; locations are shown in Drawing 11405ý.E-314.

-Grounding grid is established circling all transformers ill sfchyaxd.

-The conduit trench is a cast-in-place U-shaped trexihtWith removable covers. Trenchwalls have drain holes throughout.

The west enWs a drain.pipe through the slab withburied perforated pipe labeled as "to storm sewer~iianhole.-

  • Transformers TIA-I and TIA-2-The foundations for TIA-1 and TIA-2 area l-ft-6-4n)thikmat, 5 ft by 8 ft, supported on piles.-T/Mat foundation is el. 1005.5 ft.* Transformers TIA-3 and TIA-4-The foundations for TI A-3 and TI A-4 are a I -f-6-in.

thick mat, 8 ft by 13 ft, supported on piles.-T/Mat foundation is el. 1005.5 ft.* Transformer TIC-3B1-The foundation for TIC-3IB is an 8-in.-thick mat, 4 ft by..6 ft 8 in., supported on piles.-T/Mat foundation is'e;,!.004.8 ft." Enclosure Wall-The structures are enclosed by an 8-in.-thick cast-in-place concrete wall cast ininsulated wall forms up to el. 1005,.0 ft.2.5.10.3 Structural Frame."_.

"

End/] 61 Structure 0" 1ctrcists of two bents, approximately 27 ft in height, withiriterc6inecting cross beam.2.5.10.4

Building A building envelope is.not applicable to this structure.

2.5.10.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.

2.5.11 Condensate Storage Tank2.5.11.1

Location, Description, and FunctionThe I 50,000-gallon plate-steel Condensate Storage Tank is located east of the power block andsouth of the Intake Structure.

The tank is nominally 30 ft tall by 30 ft in diameter.

Page 2-44Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2Tank drawings indicate that the design is in accordance with all the applicable paragraphs ofthe American Water Works Association standard D100-65 for welded steel standpipe-type tank. Tank design shall be for atmospheric pressure plus a full tank of water.2.5.11.2 Foundation The tank foundation is a 2-ft-minimum-thickness concrete mat supported on 13 IOBP42 steelpiles driven to bedrock at approximate el. 934 ft. The top-of-concrete elevation is 1005 ft 6 in.This concrete slab is approximately 41 ft in diameter, resulting in a~w.alkway around the tank.This slab is cast within a steel sheet pile system that is driven into thietbfnk to el. 944 ft9 in., which is approximately 10 ft above bedrock.2.5.11.3 Structural FrameA structural frame is not applicable to this structure.

2.5.11.4 Building EnvelopeA building envelope is not applicable to this structure.

2.5.11.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.

2.5.12 Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit2.5.12.1

Location, Description.

and FunctionThe Dexnineralized Water System provides demineralized water to the Containment and Building and:makeup water to the Turbine Building and Service Building, supplying watc" to various loads. The demineralized water is produced with a reverse osmosis (RO) unitin t.e Old Warehouse as bot iaerated and ri'bn-aerated watcr supplies.

The non-aerated waterSupply is stored in the primai~y-storage tank.The Demineralized Water Storage Tank is adjacent to the Missouri River at the southeast corner:of the power block.The Dnemineralized Water Storage Tank is a 33-fit-inside-diameter storage tank that extendsapproximately 31 ft above grade. This tank is located to the north of the Old Warehouse and tothe west of the PA.The Pump House is a small pre-engineered metal building adjacent to the Demineralized WaterStorage Tank.The RO Unit resides in the northern section of the Old Warehouse.

The Old Warehouse i-s apre-engineered metal building supported on a cast-in-place slab and perimeter stem wall oncontinuous footings that extend below frost depth.

Page 2-45Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.5.12.2 Foundation The Demineralized Water Storage Tank is. supported around its perimeter on a continuous cast-in-place concrete ring wall that is 1 ft 2 in. wide by 2 ft tall. The interior of the tank bears on alayer of sand on top of a geotextile filter fabric, which in turn is on top of a free-draining crushed limestone aggregate.

The crushed limestone aggregate is drained by three 1.5-in.-diameter foundation drains spaced equally around the concrete ring wall.The Pump House is supported on a 6-in slab on grade.The entire tank footprint, including the concrete ring waflland the interior crushed rock alongwith the Pump House slab, is supported on a rammed piers soil improvement system.There is no foundation documentation available for the Oiidarehouse 2.5.12.3 Structural Frame -:The Demineralized Water Storage Tank is fabricated of stainless steel to meet the requirements of the API Standard 650.The Pump House is a pre-engineered metal building consisting of rigid steel moment frames.The building is clad with corrugated metal roofing and wall panels.The Old Warehouse is a pre-engineered metal buil4dijg consisting of rigid steel moment frames.The structure is braced to the frameý.'

wjth tension only cable bracing.

Thebuilding is clad with corrugated etal roofing and 1 panels.,: ._,o.., ro fn an ... el...2.5.12.4 Building Envelope

,.A building envelope is not-applicable to'this structure.

.2.5.12.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting-,

Pre-flood structural reports werie ot available in the referenced documentation.

2.5.13 Tower2.5.13.1

Location, Description, and FunctionThe Met Tower is a 360-;ft -tall triangular guyed structure designed for 100-mile-per-hour windand radial ice on all fixtures of 1.0 in. The tower is located approximately 2800 ft north of thepower block. Thereis a small masonry structure adjacent to the Met Tower for instrumentation storage and protection.

The onsile meteorological monitoring system provides observations of wind speed, winddirection, precipitation, barometric

pressure, temperature, and temperature change with height.The system is operated continuously.

The Met Tower is an essential part of the meteorological data collection system, allowing sensors to be placed at varying heights above ground so thatobservations can be acquired at elevations important to facility operations.

Page 2-46Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2The Met Tower incorporates an inside climbable ladder with a safety climbing device and hasFederal Aviation Administration (FAA) marking and lighting and a lightning and transient voltage protection system. Meteorological instruments are mounted at various levels on thetower, with sonic instruments mounted on booms extending laterally from the tower.2.5.13.2 Foundation The base footing for the Met Tower is 7-fi-0-in.-

by 7-ft-0-in.-

by 4-ft-6-in.-thick reinforced

concrete, The tower is guyed at several locations along its height, with the guys extending in atriangular pattern at 120 degrees to one another.

The guy wires are collected at points 145 and290 ft from the tower base and anchored to concrete deadmen at grade level. The deadnien arereinforced concrete 4 ft 0in. by 8 ft 0 in. by 3 ft thick Wvith4 ft 0 in. of concrete fill above thefooting at the three 145-ft guy anchor locations and 6-ft-On-.i.rby'8-ft-0-in.-

by 4-ft-0-in.-thick reinforced concrete%

vWi4 ft 0 in. of concrete fill above the footing at the three 2904ft guyanchor locations.

2.5.13.3 Structural FrameThe Met Tower is constructed of a bolted tubular steel frame with a nominal plan dimension of3 ft 0 in. between the three vertical frame members.

The tower has the same cross section forthe entire height, with guys fastened to the frame at various, intervals of the structure height toprovide vertical stability to the structure.

2.5.13.4 Building Envelope (Instrumentation Shelter)An instrumentation shelter is located adjacent to theabase of~the.ower.

This building isnominally I I ft 4 in. by l ft 4in.,:constructed of 8- filph lly reinforced concrete masonryunit walls,9ft 2 in. high, supported by a reinforced co iir rte base slab with thickened footingsalongftbeperimeter.

,The roof is constructed of precast concrete planks spanning between theexterior walls.2..5.13.5 Pre-Flood Structu6ral Reporting

'Pre-;flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.

2.5.14 Original Steam Generator Storage Building2.5.14.1

Location, Description, and FunctionThe OSGS houses the. original steam generator, designed by Bechtel in 2007. The OSGS islocated to the west of the plant, north of the main plant entry drive.2.5.14.2 Foundation The foundation is a reinforced concrete rmat which is shown in the drawings to be placed in twophases with a horizontal construction or cold joint between the separate concrete placements.

The top of the mat slab is shown in the documents as cl. 1022 ft. Dowels are shown extending up from the top of slab into the wall above, No documentation is available for the plan layout.dimensions, or details above the top of slab.

Page 2-47Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.5.14.3 Structural FrameInformation on the structural frame was not available in the referenced documentation.

2.5.14.4 Building EnvelopeInformation on the building envelope was not available in the referenced documentation.

2.5.14.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.

2.5.15 Switchyard 2.5.15 1 Location, Description, and FunctionThe Switchyard comprises the 161 kilovolt (kV) switchyard and 345 kV switchyard.

There arethree enclosed buildings in the Switchyard.

However, there is no documentation that details theaboveground superstructure for these three buildings.

There are numerous stands for equipment (e.g., switches, bus supports) as welU.as equipment that is directly supported by a reinforced con'6rete foundation, but there is no documentation that details any of the aboveground superstructure:

161 kV Control and Switchgear Building-Built in 1990, located west of 345 kV switchyard

-One-story enclosure, approximately 30 ft by,70-ft overall plan dimension

-Floor.and important elevations:'0045'ft

+/-Basement:

N8tVapphicable Floor: 1005.6 ..* 345 kV East Control Building-Built in 1968, located east of 161 kV switchyard

-One-story enclosure, approximately 32 ft by 40 ft ovcrall plan dimension

-Floor and important elevations:

Grade: 1004.5 ft +/-Basement:

Not applicable Floor: 1.007.5 ft345 kV West Control Building-'Built in 1998, located east of 161 kV switchyard

-One-story enclosure, approximately 35 ft by 85 ft overall plan dimension

-Floor and important elevations:

Grade: 1004.5 ft +/-Basement:

Not applicable Floor: 1005.75 ft Page 2-48Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.5.15.2 Foundations There are three enclosed buildings in the Switchyard.

The following succinctly summarizes thefoundations provided for these three buildings as well as the numerous stands for equipment (e.g., switches, bus supports) and equipment that is directly supported on a reinforced concretefoundation:

  • Building Foundations

-161 kV Building Foundation Pcrimeter wall footing, 3 ft 0 in. wide, approximately 5 ft below grade and top ofwall to bottom of footing is 6 ft 0 in.Floor slab is at el. 1005.6 ft, constructed of 5-in. reinforced concrete supported on6 in. of compacted sand over compacted soil-345 kV East Control Building Foundation Perimeter wall trench footing, 8 in. wide and 6 ft 6 in. from top of wall to bottom offootingFloor slab is at el. 1007.5 ft, constructed of 4-in. reinforced concrete supported on4 in. of Styrofoam above topof 6 in. of compacted soil-345 kV.West Control Building Foundation Perimeter wall footing, 4 ft 0 in-wide and 5;ft 6 in. from top of wall to bottom offootingFloor slab at el. 1005.75 ft, constructed.of-5-in.

reinf6rced concrete supported on6 in. of compacted rock over compacted soil0 Equipment Foundations

-161kV Transformer Foundations T- ]'Transformer foundations Built in 19683 ft 0 in. thick by'9 ft 0 in by 9 ft 0 in. mat supported by 11 14-in.-diameter reinforced-concrete pilesT-2 Transformer foundations Built in 19902 fA 0 in. thick by 0 Oft 0 in. by 18 ft 0 in. mat supported by I I 18-in.-diameter reinforced-concrete piles161kV Breaker Foundations Built in 19686 fl 6 in. by 26 ft 0 in. mat supported by six 2-ft-0-in.-diameter piers with 42-in.bells, 4 ft 6 in. deepBreakers I and 2 foundations Built in 19931 ft 6 in. thick by 9 ft 0 in. by 9 ft 0 in. mat supported by four shallowreinforced-concrete piers, approximately 1 8 in. in diameter, 5 fi 0 in. deep Page 2-49Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2Breaker Station Service Emergency R foundations Built in 199016 in. thick by.5 ft 0 in. by 10 ft 0 in. mat supported by four 6-in. reinforced-concrete pilesBreaker Station Service Normal Y foundations Built in 199016 in. thick by 5 ft 0 in. by 6 ft 0 in. mat supported by four 6-in. reinforced-concrete piles 3 ft 0 in. in overall lengthBreaker Station E and F foundations Built in 1990I ft 6 in. thick by 9 ft 0 in. by 9 ft 0 in. mat supported, fO"ur. 12-in. reinforced-concrete pilesTypical 161 kV circuit breaker foundations Built in 19902 ft 0 in. thick by 6 ft 6 in. by 8 ft 0 in. mat supported by opposite-end ratwalls18 in. thick and 4 ft 0 in. deep161kV Equipment Foundations Line Terminal Structure foundations-Built in 19687 ft 0 in. thick by 7 ft 0 in. bl.16 ft 0 in. mat su 'oitejd by ten reinforced-concrete piles.Switch Structure foundations Built in 19682-ft-0-in.-diameter,;pier with 42-in.bell, 6 ft 0 in..in overall lengthBus Support and Pot; Tr'ans. foundations Built.in 19683-ft-.O-in.-diameier:ipi&,.7 ft 0 in. in overall length9 ft 6 in. arid 10{ft 6 in. Q.V. Bus Support Stand foundations Built in 1990:.....

2-ft-6-in.-diieter pier, 19 ft 0 in. in overall length17 ft 6 in. and 18 !2in. S.W. Bus Support Stand foundations Buili in 1990 <-" 3/42-ft-6-in.-diame1te4)ier, 25 ft 0 in. in overall length9 ft 0 in. N, NI Svwil MStand foundations Built in 1990.":'2-ft-6-in.-djiameter pier, 19 ft 0 in. in overall length17 ft 0 in. H Switch Stand foundations Built-in 1.9902-ft-6"-in.-diameter pier, 25 ft 0 in. in overall lengthL.A. and CCVT K, U Stand foundations Built in 19902-ft-0-in.-diameter pier, 12 ft 0 in. in overali lengthPothead G foundations Built in 19902-ft-0-in.-diameter pier, 6 ft 0 in. in overall length Page 2-50Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2CVT foundation Built in 1993Single 2-ft-0-in.-diameter by 12-ft-0-in.-deep reinforced concrete pierBus Support Stand foundation Built in 1993Single 2-ft-6-in.-diameter by 25-fl-0-in.-deep reinforced concrete pierDead End Tower L foundations Built in 19906-ft-.0-in.-diameter pier, 40 ft 0 in. in overall length345kV Breaker Foundations 345 kV Power Circuit Breaker foundation Built in 1968Two parts: four 2-ft-0-in.-diameter piers, 7 ft 0 in. in overall length;1 -ft-6-in.-thick mat supported by four I -ft-0-in.-diameter piers, 5 ft 0 in. inoverall lengthTop-of-mat el. 1006.75 ftCB-6 Breaker foundation Built in 19682 ft 0 in. thick by 6 ft 0 in. by-]8 ft 0 in matSupported by four shallow reinforced-concrete piersCir Switcher foundation Built in 1968Single 5-ft-0-in.-diameter by 8-ft-6-in.-deep reinforced concrete pierTop-of-pier el.1005.75 ftSwitch Structure fodntlations

Built in 19682-ft-0-in.--diameter pier with 42-in. bell, 6 ft 6 in. in overall lengthCCVTBuilt in 1968Single 2-ft-0-in.-diameter by 7-ft-0-in.-deep reinforced-concrete pierPot Trans and Cap.0Pot Device foundations Built in 19682-ft-0-in.-diameteiper with 42-in. bell, 6 ft 6 in. in overall lengthCB-2, -4 and -5 BreIer foundations Built in 1993I 2 ft 0 in. thick by 6 ft 0 in. by 18 ft 0 in. mat supported by four shallowreinforced-concrete piers345kV Foundations 345 kV T3 and T4 Transformer foundations Built in 19983 ft 6 in. thick by 16 ft 0 in. by 28 ft 0 in. mat supported by I1 16-in. reinforced auger-casi concrete piles, 50 ft in overall length345 kV FCS Spare GSU Transformer foundation Built in 20023 ft 6 in. thick by 14 ft 0 in. by 34 ft 0 in. mat supported by ten I 6-in. reinforced-concrete piles Page 2-51Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2Line Terminal Structure foundations Built in 19686 ft 0 in. thick by 14 ft 0 in. by 30 ft 0 in. mat supported by 13 unknown-diameter reinforced-concrete piles345 kV Shunt Reactor foundation Built in 19683 ft 0 in. thick by 9 ft 0 in. by 12 ft 0 in. mat supported by four 14-in. reinforced.-

concrete piles345 kV Station Service foundations Built in 19688 in. thick by 4 ft by 9 ft mat supported by four I -ft-0-in.

reinforced concretepiles2.5.15.3 Structural FrameInformation on the structural frame was not available in thereferenced documentation.

2.5.15.4 Building EnvelopeA building envelope is not applicable to this si cture.2.5.15.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.

2.5.16 Transmission Towers2.5.16.1

Location, Description, and FunctionThe Transmission Towers' are defined as a system of structures supporting lines 70 and 76 from.the plant dead end to the _tibstation dead-.end.west of the plant, and lines 66, 146, 148, and 165.beyond the substation to theý-.est within fence.There is no documentation avaitible for the structures above grade, and partial documentation is:available for the foundations-su.porting the structures.

2.5.16.2 Foundation There are foundation drawings dated May 26, 2004, that indicate an augered pier foundation forline 76, and a drawing that indicates varying configurations of pile-supported pile capfoundations identified for the 345 kV line, but the pile foundations are not correlated to the linenumbers available in other documents.

The pier foundations are 5 ft 6 in. in diameter to 6 ft 6 in. in diameter, with design depths up to35 ft 6 in. The piers are designed as reinforced concrete piers with 'varying anchor boltarrangements for different transmission tower structures.

The pile foundations are shown as 6-, 7-, 8-. 9-, or I 0-pile foundations with pile caps ofreinforced concrete varying in thickness from 3 ft 0 in. to 3 ft 3 in. Reinforced concrete piers Page 2-52Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2are supported by the pile caps that extend above grade and have a structural steel column stubextending out of the pier.2.5.16.3 Structural FrameInformation on the structural frame was not available in the referenced documentation.

2.5.16.4 Building EnvelopeA building envelope is not applicable to this structure.

2.5.16.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-Ilood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.

2.5.17 New Warehouse 2.5.17.1 Building

Location, Description, and FunctionThe New Warehouse is located adjacent to the river and north.,of the power block. Drawingsindicate it was built in 1987. The current building is approximately 322 ft by 126 ft in overallplan with a parking area to the north. The floor slab is sho~wntt6obe 4 to 6 in. thick, depending on the location, with thickened concrete undcr interiorCMU partition walls. Exterior grade isshown as being approximately 1003.71f1, and the finish'floor is shown at 1007.70 ft. There is afull building expansion joint loct ed between colurn grid lines.G and H; the expansion joint islocated approximately 40 pqereo'bf the building length as measured from the east wall line. Acast-in-place concrete manliflMH-17 is shown betf"tb61uin grid lines L.3 and M in theeast-west direction and betweei.:nd 2.3 in the nortf h"otirection 2.5.17.2 Foundation, Reinforced concrete spread footings are located under columns with continuous reinforced concrete footings at the wall-prireter.

Details indicate the use of both reinforced concrete andreinforced masonry foundatiori'alls.

The soil under the building was over-excavated down to9$04 ft, and engineered fill wasg1aced to finish grade.2.5.17.3.

Structural Frame.;,..

.: .'The structural frame on the'building indicates the use of steel columns.

Further details werenot available in the referenced documentation.

2.5.17.4 Building EnvelopeComplete information on the building envelope was not available in referenced documentation.

Details on the foundation drawings indicate precast panels may form the building walls.2.5.17.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.

Page 2-53Rev, 2Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition 2.5.18 Service Building2.5.18.1 Building

Location, Description, and FunctionThe Service Building is to the east of and adjoins the Turbine building.

Drawings indicate itwas built in 1967. The current building is approximately 50 ft by 224 ft in overall plandimension.

The structure is a two-story ridged steel frame constructed on deep foundations.

The roof is metal deck with insulation and three-ply roofing.

Grade is shown to be 1004 ft; theground-floor level is approximately 3.5 ft above grade at el. 1007.5 ft and the second is atel. 1019.5 ft.2.5.18.2 Foundation The foundation is shown as deep pile foundation with reinforced pile caps placed to 10 ft belowthe top-of-foundation elevation at 1006.5 ft. Reinforced grade beams span between pile capsand support reinforced concrete slab with a thickness ranging from 6 to 12 in. Exterior columnsand walls are on continuous grade beams.2.5.18.3 Structural FrameThe structural frame is a rigid steel moment:'frme.

2.5.18.4 Building EnvelopeThe roof is shown as a metal deck with insulation and three-ply roofing.

lnformaiion on thewalls was not available in the-referenced documentation.

2.5.18.5 Pre7-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structura repotts:were not available in the referenced documentation.

2.5.19:C.GARP Building.2.5.19.1 Building Location p!DQ.escription, and FunctionThe:Chemistry/Radiation Protjtbion (CARP) Building was originally built in 1988 and adjoinsthe Auxiliary Building and T.e.ohical Support Center to the south and the Maintenance Building-to the cast. The weslt.all forms an exterior wall with an asphalt paved areaimmediatelywest of the-biiil"Iding.

A cafeteria composing the full east-west length of theCARP Buildingv,*as.addld-d1ater and is separated from the CARP Building by a two-hour firerated masonry i31odiyafi.

The current CARP Building is approximately L-shaped, 112 ft 6 in.(north-south) by 24-ft 8 in. (east-west) in overall plan dimension, surrounding the Technical Support Center to the southeast, which is approximately 60 ft (north-south) by 125 fA (east-west). Exterior grade is shown as elevation 1004 ft with the first-floor level at 1007 ft.2.5.19.2 Foundation Interior and exterior building columns are supported on shallow spread-fooling foundations.

Exterior columns and walls are on continuous wall footings, constructed in a manner similar tothat of the interior building columns.

I Page 2-54Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.5,19.3 Structural FrameThe CARP Building is a single-story steel framed structure, with a partial mezzanine level inthe southern half. Typical structural bays are approximately 25 fl by 25 ft.2.5.19.4 Building EnvelopeDetails for walls are varied but generally consist of concrete masonry construction.

The roof issingle-ply membrane over rigid insulation.

2.5,19.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.

2.5.20 Maintenance Shop2.5.20.1 Building

Location, Description, and FunctionThe Maintenance Shop was originally built in 1978 and adjoins the Service and TurbineBuildings to the south in the PA. Thc current~building is approximately 120 fl~ty 150 ft inoverall plan dimension.

The original building was a rectangular-shaped structure withdimensions of 60 ft (north-south) by 150 ft (east-west)..

The structure consisted of apre-engineered metal building with a mezzanine level. The main-floor level is at el. 1007.5 ft,which is approximately 3 ft above exterior grade. A rectangular-shaped addition was made tothe northern portion of the Maintenance Shop in 1987. The approximate size of the additionwas 60 ft (north-south).by

!5.0 ft:(east-west).

Theaddition structure consisted of a pre-engineered metal building witt.aparlial mezzanine The Maintenance Shop is borderedon the north and east by concrete paved areas.2.5.20.2 Foundation lifterior and exterior building columns are supported on shallow spread footings, and exteriorcolumns and walls are on continuous wall footings.

2.;.20.3 Structural FrameThe structural frame is a single.-story steel framed structure with an added mezzanine level inthe souther-'nhalf.

Typical _dpysware approximately 20 ft by 20 ft.4 -'-,:.:Q

..-2.5.20.4 Buiding EnvelopeThe building envelope is shown to be an insulated wall system with metal siding on girls forsupporting both and interior and exterior wall system. The roof is shown as a standing seammetal roof on purlins with ball type insulation held in place by a finished interior wall panelthat was not identified from the information available..

"2.5.20.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting There are two reported incidence of column settlements (Column TE- 15) within theMaintenance Shop building.

The first report, CR-2010-4755, occurred before the 2011 Flood Page 2-55Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2and notes that Column TE-l 5 had settled approximately one plus (1+) inches. The secondreport, CR-2011-5895, occurred in July 2011, and notes that Column TE-15 had settledadditionally.

The settlement was reported to be a sudden, dramatic settlement, approximately one plus (I +) inches, with accompanying cracking noises and following dust. A follow-up investigation by Ground Penetrating Radar Systems, Inc., in August 2011, using groundpenetrating radar (GPR), discovered that there was a possible void beneath the adjacent.

column; however, the exact thickness of the void was not determined but reported as a minor.2.5.21 Maintenance Fabrication Shop2.5.21.1 Building

Location, Description, and FunctionThe Maintenance Fabrication Shop is located to the west of the CARP and 'afete~da building.

Documents indicate the Maintenance Fabrication Shop was builti fn 1987. The building isshown to be approximately 20 ft by 36 ft in overall plan dimension.and is 12 ft in height with alow slope roof. ":".2.5.21.2 Foundation Exterior building columns are supported on reinforced concrete shallow foundations (spreadfootings) placed 3.5 ft below grade and integ..al with a continuous reinforced concretefoundation wall on spread footings.

The floor slab is 8 in. thick reinforced concrete andapproximately 2 in. above grade.2.5.21.3 Structural FrameThe structural framing is a open-spanirigid fraimne steel structure with braced bayson the exteribor walls..2.5.21 .4 Building EnvelopeThe building envelope is shownt.-o consist ofa double-sided insulated wall panel and roof.panels.

The material skin on thle.,building panel is not identifiable.

Openings include one 8 ft.by.8 ft overhead door and two man doors.2.521i-.5 Pre-Flood Structura'l Reporting Pre-flood'slructural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.

2.5.22 Maintenance Storage Building2.5.22.1 Building

Location, Description, and FunctionInformation on the building was not available in the referenced documentation.

2.5.22.2 Foundation Information on the foundation was not available in the referenced documentation.

Page 2-56Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.5.22.3 Structural FrameInformation on the structural frame was not available in the referenced documentation.

2.5.22.4 Building EnvelopeInformation on the building envelope was not available in the referenced documentation.

2.5.22.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documenitiation.

2.5.23 Old Warehouse 2.5.23.1 Building

Location, Description, and FunctionThe Old Warehouse is located approximately 160 ft west of ihc power block. The currentbuilding is approximately 300 fA by 60 ft inI overall plan. The floor slab is about 4 in. thichbased on areas where the floor had core samples taken.2.5.23.2 Foundation Information on the foundation was not available in the referenced do urnentation.

............

.........

.-....

2.5.23.3 Structural FrameInformation on the structure-was'not available in. the ieferenced documentation.

2.5.23.4 BuiidingiEnvelope Information on the building envelope was not available in the referenced documentation.

2.5.23.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Plre-,flood structural reports wete.,ot available in the referenced documentation.

2.5.24 Training Center2.5.24.1 Building

Location, Description, and FunctionThe Training Centeris a single-story administrative building located southwest of the powerblock area and next to the plant access road. The original structure was built after 1987 basedon the design documents.

The preconstruction building plan dimensions provided in the referenced documentation indicate plan dimension of 10 ft by 370 ft. The preconstruction finished floor elevation is1008.5 ft with the cafeteria and auditorium depressed to 1007 ft. The original site grade withinthe building area ranges from el. 1000 to 1003 ft.

Page 2-57Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.5.24.2 Foundation The Training Center foundation was original recommended to be reinforced concrete spreadfooting placed at a minimum depth necessary for frost protection.

2.5.24.3 Structural FrameThe preconstruction referenced documentation indicates that the building has a steel frame withprecast wall panels. No information is provided on the roofstructure, 2.5.24.4 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.

2.5.25 Administration Building2.5.25.1 Building

Location, Description, and FunctionThe Administration Building was built in 1989 and is located southwest of the PA. It is atwo-story, steel framed structure,

] 72 ft by 308 ft overall.plan-dimension.

The Administration Building is bordered on the north by parking lots, on the south by wastewater treatment

lagoons, on the east by chemical stabilization lagoons and marshý, iand on the west by theTraining Center. Floor and important elevations are as follows:,,,.
  • Grade: 1007 ft +/-* No basement* First floor: 1007.0 ft ".There..als0iS aloading-dock on ofii-'silde.

with slightly lower elevation of 1004 ft with lowretaiiing;walls.

2.5.25.2 Foundation Interior building columns are supported on individual spread footings constructed on top of a2-fi4hick layer of new engineered fill above native soils. Exterior columns and walls are onconiinuous.wall

footings, constructed in a manner similar to that of the interior buildingcolumns.The site is on the west bank0 of the Missouri river flood plain approximately 600 ft from theriverbank.

Bedrock was reported at 60 to 75 ft below existing grade before development.

Theentire building site has been raised 3 ft to 5 ft to place the floor elevations above flood plain.The site was preloaded with 7 ft of fill to compress softer layers of soils and reduce long-term settlements.

2.5.25.3 Structural frameThe structural framing is a two-story steel framed structure.

Interior columns are located on agrid, typically 34 ft by 34 ft.

Page 2-58Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.5.25.4 Building EnvelopeInformation on the building envelope was not available in the referenced documentation.

2.5.25.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.

2.5.26 Hazardous Material Storage Building2.5.26.1 Building

Location, Description, and FunctionThe Hazardous Material Storage Building (Hazmal Shed) is located adjacent to and west of theOld Warehouse.

Documents indicate this structure was built in 1987. The building is shown tobe approximately 20 ft by 36 ft in overall plan dimension and is 12 ft in height with a low sloperoof.2.5.26.2 Foundation Exterior building columns are supported on reinforced concrete shallow foundations (spreadfootings) placed 3.5 fi below grade and integral with a continuous reinforced concretefoundation wall on spread footings.

The flo.or slab is 8-in.-thick.reinforced concrete andshown approximately 2 in. above the .adjacent.grade elevation.

2.5.26.3 Structural FrameThe structural framing is a singl.erory, open-span, nsgidtaifie'gteel structure with braced bayson the exterior walls. -,2.5.26.4-Building EnvelopeThe building envelope is shown to consist of a. double-sided insulated wall panel and roofpanels The material that forms the building panel is not identifiable on the documents.

-Openings include one 8 ft by 8 ft overhead door and two man doors.2 5.26 5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.

2.5.27 Maintenance Garage2.5.27.1 Building

Location, Description, and FunctionThe Maintenance Garage is located approximately 250 ft west of the southern end of the OldWarehouse.

According to the documentation-available, the Maintenance Garage was built in2005, and documents indicate the foundation was originally built for the Head AssemblyFacility (HAF) used for the steam generator project.

Page 2-59Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.5.27.2 Foundation The reinforced concrete foundation is shown to be a 2-ft-thick reinforced mat foundation withthe top-of-concrete place approximately at grade with thickened haunches at the perimeter extending 2 ft 6 in. below grade.2.5.27.3 Structural FrameThe information available indicates the structure is a steel semicircular bent frame. Details onthe member shape and space were not available in the referenced documentation.

2.5.27.4 Building EnvelopeThe building envelope is identified on the documentation as a fabric cover over the steel frame.2.5.27.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in thereferenced documentation.

2.5.28 Tertiary Building2.5.28.1 Building

Location, Description, and FunctionThe Tertiary Building (Boat Storage),was 6ýit- in 1984.originally.as.a neutralization building asindicated in the geotechnical repot. The building ihown to be;.pproximately 24 ft by 20 ft inplan. The structure is a one-story prefabricated batffing on shallow foundations with areinforced concrete floating Tslb placed at 1001. ] shgrgdeshown as 1000.5 ft. Thebuilding covers a submerged taiikltbat sits on a reinffiercMl'.cncrete mat placed approximately 12 ft below grade.2.5.28.2 Foundation

.The foundation consists of reinforced grade walls extending approximately 4 ft below grade.2.5,28.3 Structural FrameThe steel structural frame consists of a prefabricated steel braced frame.2.5.28.4

'Building EnvelopeInformation on the"-bi;iiding envelope was not available in the referenced documentation.

2.5.28.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.

Page 2-60Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition

.Rev. 22.5.29 Spare Transformer Pads2.5.29.1 Building

Location, Description, and FunctionThe Spare Transformer Pads are located just off the main plant entrance road and south of theSwitch Yard. Drawings indicate that one pad was buill in 2002 and another in 2005. One padconsists of reinforced concrete cap supported on ten l-ft-6-in.

reinforced concrete piles, whichare placed to 73 ft below grade, and is located between the second pad and the Maintenance Garage. The second pad is a 1 -ft-thick reinforced concrete mat 50 ft by 52 ft in plan with ahauched perimeter thickness of 2 ft and a top-of-concrete elevation of 1006 ft.2.5.29.2 Foundation See Section 2.5.29.1.

2.5.29.3 Structural FrameA structural frame is not applicable to this structure.

2.5.29.4 Building EnvelopeA building envelope is not applicable to this.structure.

2.5.29.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports wy re not available in thetreferenced documentation.

2.5.30 Shooting Range2.5.30.1 Building

Location, Description, and FunctionThe Shooting range is located 400 ft north of the PA and approximately 750 ft west of the riverand separated from the rivert a wooded patch of land. The land area for the firing range isapproximately 100 ft wide by 150:ft deep. A shelter on the southern end of the range spans thefull, 100-ft width of the range. The shooting range is surrounded by a berm on three sides and,thb entire area of the range from. .rest-of-berm to crest-of-berm is approximately 225 ft by200 ft.2.5.30.2 Fotundation A foundation is not applicable to this structure.

2.5.30.3 Structural FrameA structural frame is not applicable to this structure.

2.5.30.4 Building EnvelopeA building envelope is not applicable to this structure.

Page 2-61Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.5.30.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.

2.6 Civil BaselineCivil infrastructure provides functional support for Priority I and Priority 2 structures at FCS.Underground utilities, electrical lines, and structures are essential components of facility operation.

Many of these components were part of original plant construction and have'been modified when andwhere necessary, including for plant upgrades as well as repairs.

As a resultnumerious plant drawingsshow underground utilities at the site. Drawing 25036-C-008 (File 60559) isja:aepmposite plan ofexisting (as of 2006) buried utilities, primarily those north of the.main FCS aMcess .,rad. This drawingand other existing available drawings were reviewed to identify&hie~xiSiig civil inifastructure relatingto Priority I structures at FCS prior to the beginning of the flood. The 'following aspectswere targetedfor each component:

U Underground Piping-Materials of Construction

-Range of Sizes-Bedding Type" Underground Electrical

"-Type of Burial-Range of Sizes ..-Bedding Type (if applicable)

In addition to these underground componr'e~ts, the civil FCS includes someaboveground structures,.including the CameraTowers and High Mast Lighting,

fencing, the MetTower, and the Transmission Towers.Data obtained are discussed and/or referenced throughout this civil baseline description.

Targetedaspects that were not found during the,%cOurse of thedita review are noted as unknown.

Drawingsshowing civil infrastructure are identified herein for reference purposes.

2.6.1 Underground Piping Utilities'l:."'-.:

OPPD's ProaAirBasis Document (Pgb) 28, "Buried Piping and Components Program,"

wasdeveloped to esi'alrlish and maintaj.fiCa program that will detect, monitor and mitigate corrosion inplant buried piping and components."

PBD-28 outlines program objectives, including the following:

  • Identifying susceptible buried piping* Examining piping components
  • Evaluating components to determine degradation
  • Establishing pjping/cromponent replacemeni CriterTa
  • Reducing system degradation Page 2-62Rev. 2Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition In 2010, as part of PBD-28, Enercon delivered to OPPD the "Forl Calhoun Buried Pipe ProgramBPWORKSTM Document" (PBD-28, Attachment D). The Enercon BPWORKSTM document details"the risk ranking of buried pipe segments a, the Fort Calhoun Station using EPRI's BPWORKSrM software in support of the (Nuclear Energy Institute)

NEI Initiative."

The intent of the EnerconBPWORKSTM document was to develop priorities for future inspection as part of the FCS program formitigating issues with buried piping.Underground piping utilities are located throughout the FCS site. A general description of each of themajor underground systems is provided in Table 2-6.Table 2-6 -Underground Piping Utilities

'Buried Piping System Piping MaterialA Range of Sizes BeddingType.

Drawing...B P S P Siz Reference Auxiliary Feedwater Carbon steel 4 in., 10 in. Unknown UnknownAuxiliary Steam Carbon steel 3 in. Unknown-UnknownAuxiliary Steam Fuel Oil Carbon steel I in., 1.5 in. U nknown Unknown93-590-2-199.

Up to 8 ,ft 6.-in;.by 11405-S-299 Circulating Water Cast-in-place tunnel .pto8, 6 in'. Pile .11 405-S-300

_"_"-__ , I 1405-S-301 Compressed Air Carbon steel 3 in. ..Unknown UnknownCondensate Carbon steel .i,.2 in.-' A.Uxiknown UnknownCarbon stedl'-l'.

3 iE... Unknown UnknownDemineralized.

Water PVC. " _ 8%ai. .Unknown UnknownDuctile and qkA iron 6 to:1-2in'

.Unknown E-4182Fire Protection Asbestos cement 6 to 12 in.; Unknown 1405-M-313 11405-M-312 Fuel Oil Carbon steel 3 in. Unknown 11405-M-314 Instruxment Air Copper 1.5 in. Unknown UnknownEhrhart Griffin& Associates, PVC 6 to 8 in. Unknown Sheets-.__.:-_"_.___:_.___._

__ C- I through C-7FRP w 1.5 in. I304 staialis steel 2 in. Unknown11 405-M-312 Carbon:steel 1.5 in. Unknown.Copper 0.75 to 2 in. UnknownI 1405-M-3]

211405-M-313 Raw Water Carbon steel 6 in., 20 in. Concrete encased I1405-M-313 I 1405-M-314 11405-M-315 Ductile and cast ironPVC4 in.4 to 6 in.4 to 15 in.222I 1405-S-402 VCPSanitary and Storm SewerCMP (Storm only) 8 in.-HDPE (Storm only) 15 in. + 21 1405-M-312 1 1405-M-331 E-4014E-40967753-03-A-20 SKE-09-05-01I RCP (Storm only)12 to 24 in.2L/

Page 2-63Site'History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2Table 2-6 -Underground Piping Utilities I Te8 DrawingBuried Piping System Piping MaterialA Range of Sizes Bedding Type Reference Copper 3 in. 2Service Water Carbon steel 0.75 to 3 in. 2 -l405-M-3t2 Vents and Drains Carbon steel 6 in. Unknown 1l1405-M-312 1 1405-M-313 Waste Disposal 304 stainless steel 2 in. Concrete encased_)1405-M-314 A PVC = polyvinyl chlorideFRP fiberglass reinforced plasticVCP = vitrified clay pipeCMP = corrugated metal pipe"CHDPE = corrugated high density polyethylene RCP reinforced concrete pipe ......__.-Bedding types for underground piping utilities are listed below, and the sources are given in parentheses:..

I. Pipe placed on 3 in. of sand fill and backfilled with 3 in. of sand, followed'by' common fill up to gradeand compacted to 95 percent of maximum density:

gradation is unknown.

(Drawing H1405-M-312; American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) standard.for compaction is not known.)2. Pipe placed on compacted subgrade in 24-in.-wide-trench, back-filled-with I ft Select Fill Type A CoarseStone (0.75 in. minimurn size), common fill up to fiiMniedgiad(

Pdaýed in 12-in. loose lifts andcompacted to 95 percent of maximum density; rAation is unliown.

(Drawig E-4093 Sheet 2; ASTMstandard for compaction is not known.) _ _._,_,__.._,_.........

During development of the Enercon BP.WPORKSTM docurmerlt, soil sam'les were taken from sixlocations throughout the FCS site to de te= me the soil o be entered into the BPWORKSTMsoftware.

The assumptions associatedd!,ith using a represe `tativesample were not considered indeveloping the civil baseline descriptiofisobelow.

Rather, bedding specifications and/or details forburied utilities were researched for inclu~ionjn the baseline descriptions.

Specifications and/or detailsthat were foudaare listed under Bedding Tpe-in Table 2-6, above- Bedding Type is listed as"Unknown".'for systems that did not have trenching or bedding details included in available documentation.

Underground systems identified as Priofity I systems are discussed below.2.6.1.1T Circulating WaterSjtem is directed

dom the Intake Structure to the Turbine Building and from theTurbine Buid.g to the rireithrough cast-in-place concrete tunnels that are up to 8 ft 6 in. by8 ft 6 in. in sizi;',Pipinig and instrumentation diagrams (P&ID) as well as a general flowdiagram are show.ninDrawings I 1405-M-257 (File 44336) and 93-590-2-199 (File 2512),respectively.

In November 2010, the Enercon BPWORKSTM document identified theCirculating Water System for inspection subsequent to priority inspections.

Page 2-64Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.6.1.2 Demineralized Water SystemDernineralized water piping is routed to the Service Building from a new water treatment system near the Old Warehouse.

Blair Water provided HDR with information about this pipingsystem. However, the Enercon BPWORKSTM document identifies the piping as 3-in. steel and8-in. PVC. In November 2010, five segments of demineralized water piping were identified aspriority segments for investigation and one segment for subsequent investigation.

2.6.1.3 Fire Protection System PipingThe fire protection system piping is a buried loop around the main buildings, intended toprovide water for fire suppression.

Original construction of the loop' was 6-.to 12-in. asbestos-cement piping. Eight yard hydrants are located around the site along with multiple isolation valves. In addition to external fire protection, there are connections from the loop to interiorfire protection piping for the following FCS structures:

  • Intake Structure
  • Rad Waste Building* Security Building" Turbine Building" New Warehouse
  • Service Building* Maintenance Shop* Maintenance Fabrication Shop" Old Warehouse Since originalconstruction of FCS, several sections of asbestos-cement piping have beenreplacedwith ductile iron piping. Not all locations of replaced piping could be determined from lhe-information

-available.

Drawing E-4182 notes that 20 ft of asbestos cement piping(also.known in the industry as.transite piping) were replaced with ductile iron pipe, locatedapproximately from I 170N/2212W to I 190N/2212W (using coordinates shown in DrawingE-4]82).

The Maintenance Shop and the Chemical/Radiation Protection (CARP) Buildingwere constructed over a section of abandoned fire main. This section of fire protection systemlocated approximately 35Rft south of the north wall of the CARP and extending fiom75 ftwes.i of the CARP to approximately 10 ft east of the Maintenance Shop, was abandoned in place; a-new section was c6dnstructed between the New Warehouse and the CARP Building, with addiiiorial sections extending to the north side of the New Warehouse.

In November2010, the Enercon BPWORKSTM document identified the fire protection piping as a priority forinspection.

2.6.1.4 Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and PipingThree diesel generator fuel-oil tanks and associated piping are on site within the PA._-Tanik FO-I is located south of the Auxiliary Building.

Two 2-in. steel pipes connect the. tank to thefuel pump located within the building.

Tank FO-1 0 is located between the Intake Structure andthe Service Building.

Piping for FO-10 is not shown in the drawings available.

FO-27 is anaboveground tank located adjacent to the west wall of the Intake Structure.

The EnerconBPWORKSTM document identifies this piping as 3-in. steel. Additionally, FO-32 (security Page 2-65Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2back-up tank, located south of the New Warehouse) and FO-43 (aboveground gas tank, locatedat the northeast corner of the PA) are within the PA but not listed as Priority I structures.

In November 2010, the Enercon BPWORKSTM document identified 35 segments of fuel-oilwater piping as priority segments for investigation.

2.6.1.5 Potable WaterIn 1993, approximately 4800 ft of 8-in. PVC water main was installed to provide a newconnection between the City of Blair Water System and the main FCS buildings.

In addition, approximately 1000 ft of 6-in. water service line off the 8-in. main were installed to serve thesouthern area of FCS, including the Administration Building.

The priinary.fumction of the newwater main is to serve the reverse osmosis water treatmeht.sys~tem for demineralized waterproduction.

The new water main is shown in detail in the 1993 drawings by Ehrhart Griffin &Associates titled "OPPD FCS Water Plant Tie-In to Blair W6ier System."2.6.1.6 Raw WaterRaw water piping is routed between the Intake Struciture and the Auxiliary Building throughtwo steel pipelines.

Both pipes have a 20-in. diameter.

Near Auxiliary Building penetrations, the piping is routed through 28-in.-diameter sleeves; sleeve material is unknown.

To the westof the Intake Structure, a 6-in.-diameter raw-water line extends off of the main line to water-treatment equipment located in the Service Building.

In November 2010, the EnerconBPWORKSTm document identified 21 segments of raw waterpiping as priority segments fOr investigation and sVen. segments for subsequent investigation.

2.6.1.7 WasteDisposal.

Waste disposal pipinig:.is shbwn in Sheet 11405-M-313.

The 2-in. stainless-steel pipeline isrouted between the Turbiiný'ei ilding and 6te discharge tunnel of the Intake Structure.

InNovember 2010, the EnercdiilPWORKSTM document identified I I segments for investigation subsequent to priority investigidions.

2.6.2 Underground Electrical Utilities.

Underground electrical lines are loqa Mt1hroughout the FCS site. Electrical utilities are buried asdirect buried cable, 'buned concrete duct bank, or prefabricated trench. Ageneral description of each of t]ei-.mjor underground electrical systems is provided in Table 2-7.

Page 2-66Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2Table 2-7 -Underground Electrical Utilities Underground Electrical Materia..

I Conduit Size" Bedding Drawing Reference Utility Type9364-C-0106 See Files 46459, 46463,Underground Cable Trench Precast concrete W: 60 to 84 S4-(Trenwa) trench D: 22 to 38 in. 2.6.i.] 49 , 476 7,2.6.2.1 49669-70, 49717,49750-544 in. D-4353, Sheet I(6 ft by 6ft) 11405-E-319 Main Underground Cable Concrete encased Unknown 13007.01-EE-3F Bank 8 to ]6 i'n. 1405-M-3 12E-409611405-S-41]

Duct Bank (Abandoned)

Concrete encased Unknown Unknown I 1405,S,-41 0PVC Conduit PVC 4.to5,in.

Unknown CE-79-213.8 kV Distribution Duct Concrete encased ' Varies- Unknown 'D-4353, SheetBank _ _ _ __ _.-.. .D irectThree 1/0 15kV Direct Buried Cable NA Diet D-4353, Sheet I......._.... BuryThree 1/0 #2-15kV EMP AL Cable* A Direct I 1405-S-3 19(Abandoned)

C b e......_

Bury I1405-S-319 2989 & Communications

-(Abandoned)

Unknown U .knowAn Unknown I 1405-E-3 192/C #6 (Abandoned)

Unknown Unknown Unknown 1 1405-S-4 10C-333Underground Power Line Cable Unknown Unknown Ehrhart Griffin &:..___ "-Associates Sheets C-3Thr. 500 MCM AL 600V "sAl.umintm Unknown Unknown I 1405-E-3 194-(Abandoned)

" : ""Direct480VDirect Buried Cable Cable NA 11405-M-312

...._ ,'_._Bury 4-in. VCP (Abandoned)

VCP 4 in. Unknown 11405-S-402 CE-79-1Telephone Cable Unknown Unknown Unknown Ehrhart Griffin &Associates Sheets C-3Underground Electric Unknown Unknown Unknown F-4001 SH.]One 32SM Fiber Cable Fiber cable Unknown Unknown CE-79-1ISFSI Cable Trench Precast concrete Unknown Unknown 59058-EE-6A

& -6BtrenchA -PVC = polyvinyl chlorideVCP = vitrified clay pipe0

  • NA = Not applicable Page 2-67Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev: 2For four of the major systems listed in Table 2-7, additional details were available and are provided asfollows.2.6.2.1 Underground Cable TrenchThe Underground Cable Trench is a Trenwa, Inc., trench system that contains the site cablingfor FCS.. The Underground Cable Trench (Trenwa) is a precast concrete cable trench thatfollows the PA perimeter.

The Trenwa varies between 60 and 84 in. wide and is between22 and 38 in. deep, depending on location.

Drain holes to subgrade are interspersed along theTrenwa alignment.

In areas with poor drainage soil, the Trenwa was recoininended to beinstalled over a perforated drain pipe below the Trenwa. However, the ,actual installation method could not be determined because the available drawings were nature. TheTrenwa is covered with precast lids. Al traffic crossings, lids are in place to allowvehicular traffic to cross the Trenwa. The Trenwa section is inbdified for these locations; suchmodifications include a thicker base and uni-strut inserts aftboth legs. Trenwa bedding attypical road crossings was specified to be compacted subgrade and blckfill, with a 95 percentminimum dry density per American Society for Testing and MateriiBs (ASTM) Dl 557.Trenwa bedding is compacted subgrade soil. Per the drawing notes, engineered bedding wasnot specified except at particular locations.

Soil compaction beneath the Trenwa was to beequal to the undisturbed average soil, with minimum compaction of 4000 pounds per squarefoot (psf). Pedestrian crossings and drain-pipe crossings includeda-minimum bedding of 3 in.of crushed rock underlain with geotettile fabric. Dr4aA.ings 88-185-1 and 9364-C-0012, files47643 and 46463, respectively, inblade notes and det~ils for Trenwa bedding and subgrade.

2.6.2.2 Main Underground.C.able BankThe Main Underground Cable Bakis aligned inside and outside of the PA through 6-.t-by-6-fl concrete-encased duct bank. Six eledin.ca, manholes (MH-l through MH-5 and MH-31) alongthealignment of the Main Undergroundi Cazble Bank are labeled in Sheet I 1405-E-319.

Oneadditional manhole on the Main Underg"roid Cable Bank alignment is located north of MH-1,.just east of the Control Building..

2.6-2-3 13.8 kV Power Distribution Mei ?-.voltage (13.8 kV) poWer is distributed throughout the site through buried duct bankand conduýit.

Drawing D-4353shows a plan of the power distribution, focusing on the areasclosest to the PA. A 13.8 kV'Switchgear at the north end of the Old Warehouse distributes power through a concrete-encased duct bank that extends east and PVC conduits that extend tothe north and south.2.6.2.4 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation The ISFSI, located northwest of the New Warehouse, includes underground trenching andconduit for electrical power, temperature, and instrumentation systems between the ISFSI, theElectrical Equipment Building at the southeast corner of the ISFSI and the New Warehouse.

Drawing 59058-EE-6A shows the ISFSI cable trench and raceway plan. The cable trench issimilar to the Underground Cable Trench discussed in Section 2.6.2. 1. Additional buriedconduit is located on the north, west, and south sides of the ISFSI for the High Mast Lighting.

Page 2-68Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 22.6.3 Underground Structures 2.6.3.1 Lift Stations and Sewage LagoonsFour lift stations are located on site and are shown in drawing E-4093: SD-10, SD- 1I, SD-16,and the Administration Buildine Lifi Station.

Lift station SD-10, located south ofthe SecurityBuilding near the Missouri River, has been abandoned in place. Lift station SD-1 6 is locatedjust north of SD- 10.Lift station SD-II is located inside of the PA near the Nlew Warel6tise.

A 4-in.-diameler PVCforce main conveys sanitary flow from SD-l I around the Oid Warehouseto the sewagelagoons located south of the Administration Building.

The:Administr'atioin:,B5uilding LiftStation conveys flow to the Sanitary Lagoon Intake/Splitter StrucMte located-south of theAdministration Building.

The sewage lagoons, shown in Drawing 579J-M-2, provide treatment for the domesticwastewater generated on site. The new lagoon is a two-cell lagoon with a berm elevation of1007.00, high water elevation of 1004.00, and bottom elevation (at deepest point) of 996.50.Drawings 579J-M-1,

-2, -3, and -4 show additional details of the sewage lagoon and associated structures.

2.6.3.2 Septic TankAn underground septic tank, shown in DraWing E-4093.,

is locatednear the south end of the OldWarehouse.

Additional drawings and details were.not available for use in establishing the civilbaseline for the post-flood assessment.

2.6,3.3 Sanitary and Storm Sewer ManholesNumerous sanitary anfd storm sewer maaiholes are located throughout the FCS site. Fivesanitiary sewer manholes'are;iocated within-the PA. Drawing E-4093, Sheet 1, shows thelocation of known manholes-a.nd.,other strtiettres throughout the site. Drawing E-4093,Sheet 2, which was to contain various details for sanitary and storm sewers and manholes, wasnot available for use in establishing the civil baseline for the post-flood assessment.

Drawing25036-C-008.

Buried Utilities Composite Plan, shows additional components of the sanitaryand storm systems.

A storm drainage catch basin (noted as "New" in Drawing 25036-C-008) islocated at the far north end of the PA. No other existing catch basins were identified in theavailable drawings.

Page 2-69Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. i2.6.4 Aboveground Structures Civil infrastructure located aboveground at the FCS site includes the following:

" Camera towers and high mast lighting are located throughout the site. These arecomponents of the site security system and, due to security requirements, are not shown inany drawings.

" Fencing is located throughout the site as part of the overall security system. Fenced areasinclude the PA, the Original Steam Generator Storage Bv;ildiqrpt.$GS),

the Switchyard, and the perimeter of the site. Other fencing might existat.FCS, but it was not immediately identified in available drawings or other information.

  • Weather Tower ME- 1, known as the Met Tower, is shown in Drawing F-4000. The MetTower is a 1 10-meter weather tower, located approximately 2600 ft north of the PA.Direct-buried fiber optic cable is routed from MH-30 at the northeast comer of the PA,along the east road to an access road to the weather buil~diijjIýoted at the base of the MetTower. Power and communication cabling is routed in trenchi'uth of the Met Towertoward the northeast corner of the Switchyard w.Iaeye.iit transitiofi' Ito-aboveground cabling.The building near the base of the Met Tower is'a;12-f4tb.y-]2-ft concrete block building forhousing tower instrumentation.

." Transmission towers for 161 kV and 345 kW power are.!ocaed throughout the site. Thetowers support 161 kV and 345 kV power transmission ca1I1gbetween the TurbineBuilding and Switchyard and into the electrical distribution g.-d, These are shown inFigure 2-18, Sheets I through 3. The towers Hie foundations shown inDrawing E-4600..., ,: .

N. -11 2p 14'A Iv,ev MarP-7T S #i 1551ý61 kV.'P'STS #18.4161 kV,ý..-..STo16.S N25ýSTS #18-3 r-~11 kv,'a0LI.U)UU-U,11; m"400Fe]elL~~J ..-~- ___________

-6D.0,.30~ND Owner Controlled Property Boundary.l"414" 11Transmission TowersFort Calhoun StationPlant and Facility Geotechnical and Structural Assessment DAT ESep 2011FIGURE2-18i a Met Tower~t.rrL11 IPRH1O 27L 09 08 STS #10345kV Tower 161 kVSTS #14,'161 kVSTS #11-1161 kV0.,.".161 kV 345kVTower 161 kVa.kV 161 kV-H3kV,~345kV.Tower

-.161 kV 16kV.. 7Tower 1S .. ... .. ,,.......11Owner Controlled Property BoundaryIOmawha Power OrsiriclTransmission TowersFort Calhoun StationPlant and Facility Geotechnical and Structural Assessment 2j5161 kV9~MaD7161 kVPa.161 kV2-q.L3 -I-1/4400A* n rD" (= Owner Controlled P Borpet BoundaryOmawha Pubim Puwe: OisinrTransmission TowersFort Calhoun StationPlant and Facility Geotechnical and Structural Assessment Sep 2011FIGURE2-18hq-l& S & A Section 5.7ii Priority 1 Structures Security BuildingPage 5.7-1Rev. 2 Priodty I Structures Security BuildingPage 5.7-2Rev. 2G~ 'NiF /

Priority I Structures Security BuildingPage 5.7-3Rev. 2(b)(4),(b)(7)(F) 5.7.4.1 Potential Failure Modes Ruled Out Prior to the Completion of the DetailedAssessment The ruled-out CPFMs reside in the Not Significant/High Confidence category and for claritywill not be shown in the Potential for Failure/Confidence matrix.

Priority 1 Structures Security BuildingPage 5.7-4Rev. 2/- .... Triggering Mechanism 2 -Surface ErosionCPFM 2a -Undermining shallow foundation/slab/surfaces Reason for ruling out:* It was evident from HDR's site inspection that no surface erosion occurred in the vicinity ofthe Security Building.

Triggering Mechanism 5 -Hydrodynamic LoadingCPFM 5a -Overturning CPFM 5b -SlidingCPFM 5c -Wall failure in flexureCPFM 5d -Wall failure in shearCPFM 5e -Damage by debrisCPFM 5f -Excess deflection Reason for ruling out:The Security Building was protected froifloodwater flowed over the site in the ATriggering Mechanism 6 -Buoyancy, jCPFM 6b -Cracked slab, lossCPFM 6c -Displaced struc enReasons for ruling out:* Altbai *1fi force of theForcIsuplgeu,Lters migi' occurred on the Securityetural support of the slabs was not observed at theefifd~f the Foding to the Syuplift of 1007 ft, whichRev 6).nent, the building is designed for a hydrostatic maximum flood level (SDBD-STRUC-504

's inspection of thea to recede below thrces was at its hiEity Building was completed shortly after the floodwaters hadximum elevation.

Therefore, distress related to buoyancy or,otential prior to the inspection, and signs of distress wouldT he Icbuoyanc'floodinginnFilding footings does not allow a net uplift pressure due toConditions in conjunction with maximum gross uplift forces fromaximum flood elevation did not cause observable distress.

Priority 1 Structures Page 5.7-5Security Building Rev. 2Triggering Mechanism 7 -Soil Collapse (first time wetting)CPFM 7a -Cracked slab, differential settlement of shallow foundation, loss of structural supportCPFM 7b -Displaced structure/broken connections CPFM 7c -General site settlement Reasons for ruling out:* Due to the elevation of the Security Building slab (100 a I roximity of thebuilding to the river, this was not the first time wetti its uilding.* The peak flood elevation prior to 2011 was docum n 1993 ft, which wouldindicate that soils below and surrounding the buildi s e.Triggering Mechanism 10 -Machine/Vibration-Induc factionCPFM I0a -Cracked slab, differential settlement of dation, losssupportCPFM 1Ob -Displaced structure/broken connec,Reason for ruling out:The Security Building has not been su ed to ma 'brations t could induceliquefaction of soils. Therefore, machi r vib ndu faction failures are notpossible.

Triggering Mechanism 11 f Soil Stren ue to St iquefaction or UpwardSeepageCPFM -racked sla ntial settleme foundation, loss of structural n for rilina utcosidlobservations the maluodiints indicate no structure movement.

ofeefoe,baries.uTheefor

, smutlelsuements benTetdbyte21hlodwscnieredore, dation that can be a d to this CPFM did not occur.Tr Mchanism 1 rec-Corrosion

.ctural elementsReason for ut,TeSecurity ng has not been subjected to corrosive circumstances that would beconsidered beyd d the normal conditions.

The building was kept dry by the use of HESCObarriers.

Therefore, structural elements being wetted by the 2011 flood was considered inthe original designa of the facility.

Priority 1 Structures Page 5.7-6Security Building Rev. 2Triggering Mechanism 14 -Frost EffectsCPFM 14a -Heaving,

crushing, or displacement Reasons for ruling out:* The Security Building's foundation system is below frost level, and the interior of thebuilding is a heated structure.

The building will not be subjected to freeze/thaw cycles.Therefore, frost effects have been discredited.

  • Flooding did not change the frost and foundation condi s. has alwaysbeen subjected to freezing temperatures with moist t ed5.7.4.2 Detailed Assessment of Credible Potent ilureThe following CPFMs arte te only CPFMs carred forws giled asse remo theSecurity Building as a result of the 2011 o This detatt Ls pro iTriggering Mechanism 3 -Subsurface Erosion/Pip.ig CPFM 3a -Undermining and settlement of sbdto/ e (due topumping)During the flood, continual pumping was red in t s o tem rot and in theknownity Buildug tbecause l large amount aterhn da.ndetrmine fesit beforHss iteTrgeingsMecthon.s n n =The _sobs stress indicators and other data that would increase orepotentia alati with this CPFM for the Security Building.

dvrs (Deg rdto ,loowa`"

Favorable (Degradation/Direct

.Impact More ,Floodwater Impact Less Likely)elocations for an extend rod. Security Building are noted to have granular fillPronSecurnity p discovered No current signs of settlement or structure Ssoft spots Jb earby pavement, distress.

whic coldsub'surface erosion.Data Gaps:*The extent omf surface erosion and potential adverse impacts on the Security Building are notknown due to a lack of geophysical and geotechnical data&During the infiltration of the Trenwa system, observations of the water flow into the system todetermine if soil was being deposited was not completed because it occurred before HDR's siteinspection.

Priority I Structures Page 5.7-7Security Building Rev. 2Conclusion Significance Potentialfor Degradation/Direct Floodwater ImpactSubsurface erosion is expected to have occurred at the site due to groundwater pumping inTrenwas and manholes in or adjacent to the Security Building.

If 1surface erosion issignificant, it could materially and negatively impact the int n function of thestructure.

It is believed that if subsurface erosion were o g ctures, signswould be visible during the inspections.

Because no si distres en observed atthis time, it is believed that the potential for degradatio W.Implication The occurrence of this CPFM on a large scale could neg capacityfootings supporting the building.

This could lead to excessive fou movement, ever,settlements are expected to occur at a slow rate a It in sud building collapse.

Should foundation movement be detected, ould be ted to keepthe building functional.

The settlements s ot nega act the i or intendedfunction of the Security Building.

Theref e impli otential gradation forthis CPFM is low.Confidence The extent of subsurface e d its potential t on ilding is not known due tothe lack of data gathered on ce conditions.

s not enough information onthe sub at ti nd the pupi ould have caused undermining r CPFM 3a, as discussed the poten for degradation is low because signs of distressnot observed.

It is unlik s degradation would have caused enough erosion to impact.'ty or intended the structure.

The combined consideration of the potential fo ion and the s of that degradation to a structure of this type puts it in the"Cnot category.

] tacurrently collected are not sufficient to rule out thisCPFM.. re, the icei the above assessment is low, which means more data orcontinued ng pections might be necessary to draw a conclusion.

Triggering Mechanism 3 -Subsurface Erosion/Piping CPFM 3d -Undermining and settlement of shallow foundation/slab (due to riverdrawdown)

Floodwater elevations, at the time of HDR's inspection, were above finished floor elevations, and river levels were being lowered at a relatively slow pace. RPver elevations were still wellabove normal levels.

Priority 1 Structures Page 5.7-8Security Building Rev. 2The Triggering Mechanism and CPFM could then occur as follows:

the drop in elevation ofthe river is expected to occur at a higher rate than the drop in elevation of the groundwater.

This will result in an increased groundwater gradient.

This increase could allow for subsurface erosion to occur.The following table describes observed distress indicators and other data that would increase ordecrease the potential for degradation associated with this CPFM for the Security Building.

Adverse (Degradation/Direct Floodwater FavaImpact More Likely)The Security Building is in close proximity to the No di aser. sElevated saturated soils and elevated flood levels Surveyprovide a water source. A potential path for the buildwater and soil migration can extend under thestructure to the river, causing erosion.Date Gaps: 'M--W'.Effects of rapid drawdown may still initiate due to ,els. Tee conditions andwelkhow they ma fetti PMaentwl neophysic technical datainteviiiy offt theeuity Buidin are nthisl!Conclusion Sigfnificance" Potential for Degradatio/

ioodwater IRiverceded ized at a leve onding to the nominal normalriverof Oct 011. The potential for degradation from drawdown iso10 e it has n bserve ctober 4, 2011. Rapid drawdown has beened, and continu drawdo t expected to occur at a rate that would causeerining.

Therefore, ntial de n for this CPFM is low.ence of this CPFM large scale could negatively impact the capacity of thefooti rting the buil is could lead to gradual foundation movement.

However,settlem expected r at a slow rate and not result in sudden, total building collapse.

Should fo mo e detected, appropriate repairs could be implemented to keepthe building e settlements should not negatively impact the integrity or intendedfunction of the uilding.

Therefore, the implication of the potential degradation forthis CPFM is low.Confidence The extent of current subsurface erosion and its potential impact on the building is not knowndue to the lack of data on subsurface conditions.

Unknown river drawdown rates in the futurecould also add to current subsurface erosion.

River levels are such that this CPFM might nothave occurred yet. Therefore, the confidence for this CPFM is low.

Priority 1 Structures Security BuildingPage 5.7-9Rev. 2SummaryFor CPFM 3d, as discussed above, the potential for degradation is low because river drawdownis controlled and is not expected to occur at a rate to initiate this CPFM. It is unlikely thisdegradation would have caused enough erosion to impact the integrity or intended function ofthe structure.

The combined consideration of the potential for degradation and the implications of that degradation to a structure of this type puts it in the "not significant" category.

It isunknown whether this CPFM has occurred or whether it will occt& the future because thedata at hand are not sufficient to rule out this CPFM. he , e in the aboveassessment is low, which means more data or continued, rin ctions might benecessary to draw a conclusion.

IihTriggering Mechanism 12 -Rapid DrawdownCPFM 12a -River bank slope failure and undermini srtructures CPFM 12b -Lateral spreading The Triggering Mechanism and CPFMs couthan pore water pressure in the soil can dis,dropping river level. The sloped bank oftsaturated soil. At some point there is insu*saturated soils. At that point, the expislope failures associated with ra dhowever, deeper failures canFloodwater e tions, at the I-DR'and riv g low aboE t) inrThe sa-r provjbthe riv ops fasteris elev ye theI pressure upport for thede to support theen failure.

Generally, d and shallow in nature;fVe s overnare , ively ocs finished floor elevations, Ltively slow pace. River elevations were still wellof the river is expected to occur at a higher rateThis will result in an increased groundwater erbank slope failure and/or lateral spreading.

!it. This increasese locthe time of Revision 0, thý4 ft). Field observation

.dropped.

level had dropped to a nominal normal level (roughly-river bank area has not been performed since the riverThetable descerved distress indicators and other data that would increase ortion associated with these CPFMs for the Security Building.

Priority 1 Structures Security BuildingPage 5.7-10Rev. 2Adverse (Degradation/Direct Floodwater Favorable (Degradation/Direct Impact More Likely) -Floodwater Impact Less Likely)The Security Building is in close proximity to the No distress was observed at the time of HDR'sriver. site inspection.

Elevated saturated soils and elevated flood levelsprovide a water source. A potential path forwater and soil migration can extend under thestructure to the river, causing adverse effectsattributed to river drawdown.

Survey data to date do not identify movement ofthe building.

Data Gaps:* Observations of the riverbank following drawdown to* Geophysical investigation data to address observed cons* Inclinometer readings that will provide an indication of s.Conclusion Significance Potential for Degradation/Direct FloodwaRiver stage level has receded and sriver level at 40,000 cfs as of Octolow because it has not been obsecontrolled, and continued riverthese CPFMs. Since it is benot likely, these CPFMs ar,to the noxrninal normalon from drawdown isown has beenthat would initiatef the structure exists but isson a T le could negatively impact the capacity of theThis co ! to gradual foundation movement but shouldor inten nction of the Security Building.

Therefore, s dation for these CPFMs is high.Revision 0, conditions required to trigger CPFMs 12a and 12bervations and other investigation data required to evaluate thiside, and an evaluation cannot be made. Therefore, confidence forThe data at hand are not sufficient to rule out these CPFMs or to lead to a conclusion thatphysical modification to ensure that river bank slope failure and lateral spreading will notoccur. Therefore, the confidence in the above assessment is low, which means more data arenecessary to draw a conclusion.

SummaryFor CPFMs 12a and 12b, as discussed above, the potential for degradation is low because riverdrawdown is controlled and is not expected to occur at a rate necessary to initiate these CPFMs.

Priority 1 Structures Page 5.7-11Security Building Rev.. 2If the degradation were to occur, the implications to the structure would likely be low. Thecombined consideration of the potential for degradation and the implications of thatdegradation to a structure of this type puts it in the "not significant" category.

It is unknownwhether these CPFMs have occurred or if they will occur in the future because the data at handare not sufficient to rule out these CPFMs. Therefore, the confidence in the above assessment is low, which means more data or continued monitoring and inspections might be necessary todraw a conclusion.

5.7.5 Results and Conclusions The CPFMs evaluated for the Security Building are presented rating for the estimated significance and the level of confidenw Low Confidence

[(insufficient Data)=* 12a:z7 ot5.7.6 Recomr Cliofollow5 evailwhich shows theýn ceRta)Continued monitoring ended to include a continuation of the elevation surveys of thepreviously identified targ n this structure and surrounding site. The purpose is to monitor for signsof structure distress and movement or changes in soil conditions around the structure.

The results ofthis monitoring will be used to increase the confidence in the assessment results.

Elevation surveysshould be performed weekly for 4 weeks and biweekly until December 31, 2011. At the time of thewriting of this version of the Assessment Report, groundwater levels had not yet stabilized to nominalnormal levels. Therefore, it is possible that new distress indicators could still develop.

If new distressindicators are observed before December 31, 2011, appropriate HDR personnel should be notifiedimmediately to determine if an immediate inspection or assessment should be conducted.

Observation of new distress indicators might result in a modification of the recommendations for this structure.

Priority 1 Structures Page 5.7-12Security Building Rev. 25.7.7 Updates Since Revision 0Revision 0 of this Assessment Report was submitted to OPPD on October 14, 2011. Revision 0presented the results of preliminary assessments for each Priority I Structure.

These assessments wereincomplete in Revision 0 because the forensic investigation and/or monitoring for most of thePriority I Structures was not completed by the submittal date. This revision of this Assessment Reportincludes the results of additional forensic investigation and monitoring to date for this structure asdescribed below.5.7.7.1 Additional Data Available The following additional data were available for the S Bil ions 1 and 2 ofthis Assessment Report:* Additional groundwater monitoring well and river s from OP* Field observations of the river bank (see Section 5.25).* Results of geophysical investigation by Geotec , Inc. (se ent 6).* Results of geotechnical investigation by Th Inc.(see ent 6).* Data obtained from inclinometers by Thi ec ttac* Results of continued survey by Lamp son and (see A ent 6).5.7.7.2 Additional AnalysisThe following analysis of addit h con s of the soy Building:

tGroutdwater monito e rog n d river stage #PPD.Da T ne e holes water have returned to nominal normal levels.osrvatio bankNo significance distresi th e 2011 r was observed.

sults of geophysical inv, tion by Geotechnoiogy, Inc.

and S tests performed around the outside perimeter of thelo ck identified oonalies that could be gravel, soft clay, loose sand,torpossoResults ofI investigation by Thiele Geotech, Inc.Six test boingd Cere drilled, with continuous sampling of the soil encountered, to groundtruth the Geotechnology, Inc. seismic investigation resultas part of the KDI #2 forensicinvestigation.

Test bore holes were located to penetrate the deep anomalies identified in theseismic investigation.

The test boring data did not show any piping voids or very soft/very loose conditions that might be indicative of subsurface erosion/piping or related materialloss or movement.

All of the SPT and CPT test results conducted for this Assessment Report were comparedto similar data from numerous other geotechnical investigations that have been conducted Priority 1 Structures Security BuildingPage 5.7-13Rev. 2on the FCS site in previous years. This comparison did not identify substantial changes tothe soil strength and stiffness over that time period. SPT and CPT test results were notperformed in the top 10 feet to protect existing utilities.

Data from inclinometers to date, compared to the original baseline measurements, have notexceeded the accuracy range of the inclinometers.

Therefore, deformation at the monitored locations since the installation of the instrumentation has not occurred.

Results of continued survey by Lamp Rynearson and cia4Survey data to date compared to the original basel eys Iaccuracy range of the surveying equipment.

There efolocations, since the survey baseline was shot, has noSeveral CPFMs were identified in Revision

0. Since Rev*available that have clarified the significance and confiden orpresents each of the previously identified CPFMs and the new intesignificance and confidence based on the new dwdfilTriggering Mechanism 3 -Subsurface CPFM 3a -Undermining and settlempumping)t of wat ltratedusing su,ions of o ourDuring the flood, continual pureSecurity Building because a 1 9have been carried with thefrom these areas it was possiunderr jaround and in thents. Soil deposits couldIf enough soil was removedadation and slabs would berred at the site due to groundwater pumping in Trenwas andrity Building.

If subsurface erosion was significant, it couldacted the integrity or intended function of the structure.

It ishad occurred below the structures, signs would have beenwould be apparent from survey data. Because no signs ofthis time, it is believed that the potential for degradation is low.The occurrence of this CPFM on a large scale could negatively impact the capacity of thefootings supporting the building.

This could lead to excessive foundation movement.

However,settlements are expected to occur at a slow rate and not result in sudden, total building collapse.

Should foundation movement be detected, appropriate repairs could be implemented to keepthe building functional.

The settlements should not negatively impact the integrity or intendedfunction of the Security Building.

Therefore, the implication of the potential degradation forthis CPFM is low.

PCority 1 Structures Security BuildingPage 5.7-14Rev. 2'Confidence The extent of subsurface erosion and its potential impact on the building was not known at thetime of Revision 0 due to the lack of data gathered on subsurface conditions.

Subsequent fieldinspections and a review of surveyed data indicate no structure movement.

Since the structure has been monitored and no signs of movement have been detected, the confidence in theassessment of degradation for this CPFM has increased.

If further structure monitoring revealsno further issues, the confidence of the assessment for this CPFM&Eomes high.SummaryFor CPFM 3a, as discussed above, the potential for degswere not observed.

It is unlikely this degradation woulthe integrity or intended function of the structure.

The coTfor degradation and the implications of that degradation tý"not significant" category.

The data collected since ReviýCPFM assuming the previously recommended monit Ethe confidence in the above assessment is high,Mare necessary to draw a conclusion.

The daCPFM, which includes the geophysical, ge ical, anrequired.

Triggering Mechanism 3 -ECPFM 3d -Undermining drawdown)A At the time o vision I ofnorma .994wh" dfoundaisfa'b (due to rivertoiurred gradua'[ýse did not allow fcsment Repo ,vel had dropped to a nominalobservations o e river bank area were performed

.els. The drop in elevation of the river to its currenta I increase in the groundwater gradient.

Thisero e observed on site.)odwater Impactficancefor DegradationrDih river eRiver lvlow becauscontrolled, anundermining.

,el hased !. stabilized at a level corresponding to the nominal normalctober 4, 2011. The potential for degradation from drawdown isserved as of October 4, 2011. Rapid drawdown has beenriver drawdown

,is not expected to occur at a rate that would cause, the potential for degradation is low.Implication The occurrence of this CPFM on a large scale could negatively impact the capacity of thefootings supporting the building.

This could lead to gradual foundation movement.

However,settlements are expected to occur at a slow rate and not result in sudden, total building collapse.

Should foundation movement be detected, appropriate repairs could be implemented to. keep -the building functional.

The settlements should not negatively impact the integrity or intended Priority 1 Structures Page 5.7-15Security Building Rev. 2i :function of the Security Building.

Therefore, the implication of the potential degradation forthis CPFM is low.Confidence The extent of subsurface erosion and its potential impact on the building was not known at thetime of Revision 0, due to the lack of data gathered on subsurface conditions.

Subsequent fieldinspections and a review of surveyed data indicate no structure mj ment. The groundwater elevation measured in the monitoring wells closely follow e ye the flood waterreceded.

The data indicate that groundwater elevation w t the river levelnear the beginning of October 2011 and receded to the evel by tober 14, 2011.Therefore, the differential head created by the river dra. Ww o facilitate subsurface erosion.

Since the structure has been monit signs ment andthe monitoring well data did not indicate sufficient differe d which co esubsurface

erosion, the confidence in the assessment of or this CPFincreasing.

If further structure monitoring reveals no further iss confidence assessment for this CPFM is high.SummaryFor CPFM 3d, as discussed above, the po 1 for de w becaus river drawdownhas been controlled thus far and is not ex to c a r ate this CPFM in thefuture. It is unlikely this degrada ou e enoug o impact the integrity r intenFeld o vtion of thecombin siderati ea potentie fordegradation and the implicat nr eat degradat w graef this type put it in the "notsignificant" category.

It is that this CPF d due to a review of surveyPoaetial for Derdatio/irc Flodatr macRetag monivell ded fia s at n a v cevels. The currentoriver rierlevelat 4,0 a ofr Octobe 4, 21.Te potentwial fotocr dgation tefutrom e.donilow bhetb e a s osment is high, which means no additional data,kiin the previot oring, are necessary to draw a conclusion.

Theprviously thought t uired this CPFM, which includes the geophysical, Otechnical, and inclinom are no lrer required.

  • ring Mechanism 12 -i dDrawdown 12a -. River bank, s ailure and undermining surrounding structures 2b-Lateral pAtte i vision....

e Assessment Report, the river level had dropped to a nominalnorma Field observation of the river bank area was performed sincethe rierlve.

The drop in elevation of the river to its current level occurredgrdal eutn r' minimal increase in the groundwater gradient.

This increase did notallow for subsurface erosion to occur.Sienificance Potential for Degradation/Direct Floodwater ImpactRiver stage level has receded and stabilized at a level corresponding to the nominal normalriver level at 40,000 cfs as of October 4, 2011. The potential for degradation from drawdown islow because it has not been observed as of October 4., 2011. Rapid drawdown has been Priority I Structures Security BuildingPage 5.7-16Rev. 2controlled, and continued river drawdown is not expected to occur at a rate that would initiatethese CPFMs. Since it is believed that a potential for degradation of the structure exists but isnot likely, these CPFMs are considered low.//Implication The occurrence of this CPFM on a large scale could negatively impact the capacity of thefootings supporting the building.

This could lead to gradual foun on movement but shouldnot negatively impact the integrity or intended function of Se g. Therefore, the implication of the potential degradation for this CPF w.' %Confidence The groundwater monitoring well data and river level datdue to river drawdown had generally dissipated by about,of the river bank on October 20, 2011, did not identify decould be attributed to slope failure or lateral spreadin.

lateral spreading occurred due to the 2011 floodsigns of movement have been detected, the cSummary Ahat exces ressureshhe Ri ver BVslope failure rmonitored and nolherefor'PFM is'For CPFMs 12a and 12b, as discidrawdown has been controlled tlCPFM in the future. It is unlikiwould impact the integrity the potential for degradation puats it*ia trevia obse:as abo e p 1 for d is low because rivernd ntot ted to 0 a rate to initiate thisis degradatio uld e sed adverse effects thated function o c e combined consideration ofmplications o ation to a structure of this typeIt is believed is CPFM has not occurred due to arv d current river levels. The current river elevations

,ate M will not occur in the future. Therefore, the-nt is hI ch means no additional data, other than thering, are n ary to draw a conclusion:

The data previously is CPFM, which includes the geophysical, geotechnical, andSuired.udwater elence in the aboveiously recommended ght to be required to ruleaometer data, are no lonI Priority 1 Structures Security BuildingPage 5.7-17Rev. 25.7.7.1 Revised ResultsThe CPFMs evaluated for the Security Building are presented in the following matrix, whichshows the rating for the estimated significance and the level of confidence in the evaluation.

CPFMs 3a, 3d, 12a, and 12b for the Security Building are not associated with any Key DistressIndicators.

Results of survey data, ground well monitoring data, riverbank assessments, andfield observations do not indicate signs of structure movement or other adverse effects thatcould be attributed to these CPFMs. The data currently collected sufficient to rule out theseCPFMs due to the 2011 flood. Therefore, assuming that n identified through the monitoring program for the Security Build usse 5.7.6 andcontinuing until December 31, 2011), these CPFMs ar W to th of the matrixrepresenting "No Further Action Recommended Relat eLow Confidence (Insufficient Data)nceCPFI-3dCPFM 12aCPFM 12b0zI5.7.7.2 CUIn the assessment e FCS Structures, the first step was to develop a list of all Triggering Mechanisms and PFMs that could have occurred due to the prolonged inundation of the FCSsite during the 2011 Missouri River flood and could have negatively impacted these structures.

The next step was to use data from various investigations, including systematic observation ofthe structures over time, either to eliminate the Triggering Mechanisms and PFMs from the listor to recommend further investigation and/or physical modifications to remove them from thelist for any particular structure.

Because all CPFMs for the Security Building other thanCPFMs 3a, 3d, 12a, and 12b had been ruled out prior to Revision 1, and because CPFMs 3a,3d, 12a, and 12b have been ruled out as a result of the Revision I findings, no Triggering Mechanisms and their associated PFMs remain credible for the Security Building.

Therefore, PrioritýSecuriI 1 Structures ty BuildingPage 5.7-18Rev. 2HDR has concluded that the 2011 Missouri River flood did not impact the geotechnical andstructural integrity of the Security Building because the potential for failure of this structure due to the flood is not significant.

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