ML15049A456

Weir Valves and Controls, USA - Part 21 Report Regarding Tricentric Triple Offset Valve

ML15049A456
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	02/11/2015
From:	Butters A C Weir Valves & Controls USA
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
50811
Download: ML15049A456 (7)

Text

02/111/2015U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Overadons Center Event Reportpamfp' IPart 21 (PAR) Event# 50811Rep Org: WEIR VALVES & CONTROLS USA, INC. Notification Date I Time: 02/11/2015 14:52 (EST)Supplier: WEIR VALVES & CONTROLS USA, INC. Event Date / Time: 02/10/2015 (EST)Last Modification: 02/11/2015Region: 1 Docket #:City: IPSWICH Agreement State: YesCounty: License #:State: MANRC Notified by: ARTHUR C. BUTTERS Notifications: RAY POWELL R1 DOHQ Ops Officer: JEFF HERRERA PART 21 GROUP EMAILEmergency Class: NON EMERGENCY10 CFR Section:21.21 (d)(3)(i) DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCEPART 21 REPORT -WEIR VALVES AND CONTROLS SPLINE ADAPTER VIBRATED LOOSEThis report was received from Weir Valves & Controls via email:During a walk down it was discovered that one of the spline adapters had slipped down the shaft of a TRICENTRICvalve supplied by Weir Valves & Controls, USA. This condition could have allowed the valve disc/stem to movefrom its normally open position to a partially closed or fully closed position. Weir Valve and Controls determinedthat the valve is designed with a single set screw tightened against the stem key and is susceptible to HumanPerformance Factors if it is not properly tightened against the shaft.Name of Manufacturer:Weir Valves and Controls, USAAffected Component:TRICENTRIC Triple Offset ValveAffected Plant(s):Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Weir Valves & Controls USA Inc. ExcellentEngineeringSolutions29 Old Right Road Tel: +1 978 744 5690lpswich, MA 01938-1119 Fax: +1978 741 3626USA www.weirpowerndustrial.comFebruary 10, 2015NRC's Document Control DeskU.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, DC 20555-0001RE: Peach Bottom HV-2-10-23453C Spline Adapters Vibrated Loose -11/24/14

Dear Sir or Madam;During a walk down of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Cross Tie Lines at Peach BottomAtomic Power Station (PBAPS),

it was discovered that one of the spline adapters had slippeddown the shaft of a TRICENTRICO Valve supplied by Weir Valves & Controls, USA. After thisdiscovery, a review of all RHR and High Pressure Service Water (HPSW) TRICENTRIC TripleOffset valves was conducted, and one additional valve was discovered to have a loose splineadapter.Based on these valves needing to maintain a safety-related position of open, the spline adapterwas evaluated to determine whether it was still engaged with the actuator. Based on theinspection, it was determined that the splines were not engaged. Weir Valves and Controlsreviewed the torque curves for the unit, and determined that reasonable assurance cannot beprovided for the valve maintaining open position as the expected hydrodynamic load and thefriction loads were similar. Therefore, PBAPS and Weir Valves and Controls have determinedthat this instance needs to be reported under 1OCFR Part 21.In the application at PBAPS, this condition could have allowed the valve disc / stem to movefrom its normally open position to a partially or fully closed position. The deficient valve is anormally open, maintenance block valve for a newly installed RHR cross-tie motor operatedvalve that was installed to support Extended Power Uprate (EPU) operations. When thiscondition was discovered, the 'A' subsystem RHR motor operated cross-tie valve was closedand therefore, this discovered condition did not have any effect on RHR operation. The valve isoriented with a horizontal stem and the system was subject to normal flow induced vibration.During a design basis loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) condition which involves opening theRHR cross-tie valve, an adverse impact on containment cooling could have occurred. Extent-of-Condition reviews at PBAPS identified a second similar butterfly valve in the HPSW system.The HPSW system could have been similarly affected during a design basis LOCA event. TheHPSW manual valve has a vertical stem and was out-of-service when this condition wasidentified. Since one unit of both orientations was present and the vertical stem was not inoperation, it would appear neither vibration nor position were the root-cause for the loose splineadapters. Weir Valve and Controls reviewed the design of the unit. The valve is designed with asingle set screw tightened against the stem key. This is a relatively standard configuration forgear and motor operators; however the issue with this arrangement is susceptible to HumanPerformance Factors if it is not properly tightened against the shaft.

ExcellentEngineeringPeach Bottom Atomic Power Station was able to verify the position of the actuator Solutionsto the valve and reposition the spline adaptor in the valve. Peach Bottominstalled a gag to keep the spline adapter on the valves from becoming looseagain.Weir Valves and Controls will be taking immediate steps to preclude this issue from occurringagain. Steps will include:1) Training for shop floor personnel on valves that require a set screw2) Notice to our customers3) WVC Engineering to develop a solution to reduce the potential for HPI factor toimpede proper functioning of the valves.Please feel free to contact me with any questions or comments.Regards,Arthur C. ButtersDirector of Engineering; Nuclear 10 CFR PART 21 EVALUATION DOCUMENT PAGEEvaluation of Deviation or Potential Failure toComply i0eFeZ1 /L/I' 1 of 41A Identify the source~of the information on the deviation or potential failure to comply:Site Contacted Don Broschard about the fact that the Spline Adapters have been able to come loose and fall from the actuator. Inaddition Art Butters was contacted by the site.1B Describe the deviation or potential failure to comply that has been discovered:Current valve design allows the spline adapters in the actuator to fall out of actuator should the set screw loosen or lack of tighteneingduring installation process. See attached customer complaint #634.[1C If the issue concerns 0 a potential failure to comply, go to Section ID; U a deviation, go to Section 1EID Does the potential failure to comply represent a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or anyapplicable rule, regulation, order, or license of the NRC, including technical specification limits?If Yes or Uncertain, check N and complete Section 1 E.If No, check E] and complete Section 1 F.1 E(1) Does the deviation affect the functionality of items or services provided by Weir Valves & Controls USA?If Yes or Uncertain, check 0 and complete Section 1 E(2).If No, check EU and complete Section 1 F and Explain:IE(2) Does the deviation involve a basic component?If Yes or Uncertain, check [D and complete Section 1 E(3).If No, check U and complete Section 1F and Explain:IE(3) Has the basic component been delivered to a customer?If Yes or Uncertain, check M and complete Section 1 E(4).If No, check U] and complete Section 1F and Explain:IE(4) Does the basic component deviate from the requirements of the customer's procurement document?If Yes or Uncertain, check E] and complete Section 1G.If No, check U] and complete Section 1F and Explain:1F The deviation or potential failure to comply is not reportable in accordance to 10CFR21.Originator (signature) Originator (print) DateDesignated Responsible Officer (signature) Designated Responsible Officer (print) DateHave local Director, Quality Assurance retain this form on file for 5 yearsIG The deviatio or potential failure to comply warrants further evaluation in accordance with 10CFR21.' / Mark Woodbury 12/12114Onibinator (signature) relevantmOriginator (print) DateForwardt "formn with relevant information to the Designated Responsible Officer.1H I have reviewed Part I and determined that the deviation or potential failure to comply should be evaluatedbased on the basis below for reportability in accordance with 10CFR21. (Start of 60-day clock)_ / >, -- 12/17/14 Initial Due Date:Designated Rdsponsible Officer (signature) Date 1/26/15Within the 60-day clock started above, I will evaluate the deviation or potential failure to comply discovered inPart 1 to determine reportability in accordance with 10CFR21.Cognizant Technical Engineer'(signature) DateWVCI0CFREVAL 041213 10 CFR PART 21 EVALUATIONEvaluation of Deviation or Potential Failure toComnlvDOCUMENTPAGE2 of 4AM IUWI ILII.,A:u'j, I l WI ,U 1 AI, F DuFpplyII Ifailure to comply:Weir Valves and Controls2B 0 Confirm the information in Part 1. Note any discrepancies that need to be addressed:2C Provide A) Technical Justificaiton of Unit Acceptability; or B) Proposed Technical SolutionBased on a review of this VALVE, the design should be reconsidered. The typical methods of restraint for GOV and MOVTRICENTRICS0 Spline Adapters are to reduce the opening in the adapter plate, use of a set screw, or use of amechanical means above the shaft to keep the stem nut in position.In this case, a set screw was used, however Weir feels the set screw backed off (to be confirmed at the next outage.)Weir's OPEX has shown no other instances of this occuring when assembled with the correct components. Since theVALVES were not taken apart Weir can not confirm the proper parts were used nor if they were properly installed.However, based on the report that one of the lines was still blocked there should not have been signficant enoughvibration to cause a properly installed set screw to vibrate loose. Thefore, the conclusion is HPI leading to improperinstallation.Weir has long considered the set screw the least desirable of the three approaches, as it relies most heavily on HumanPerformance and is therefore the least repeatable method. However, a method to avoid the set screw in all configurationshas never been sucessfully developed.Based on OPEX, Weir believes this issue relates to poor Human Performance on this order.As such, Weir will resolve the issue at Peach Bottom, send a Operating Notice to Industry, and develop a method toeliminate the use of set screws.[D This issue is reportable pursuant to 1 OCFR21.El This issue is not reportable pursuant to 10CFR21.[] A decision on reportability cannot be made based on the available information.IA.Lý-Foý219/15DateCognizant Technical Engineer (signature)Review with the DRO within 5 days of completion______________________________________ 2/10/15Designated Responsible Officer (signature) DateThe DRO will finalize the reporting requirements and submit the reports to the NRC andany affected facilities within 30 days.WVc_1OCFR_EVAL 030412 4=10 CFR PART 21 EVALUATION DOCUMENT PAGEEvaluation of Deviation or Potential Failure toComply 10CFR121214.docx 3 of 43A Basis for decision:Based on the standard use of this in many installations, Weir Valves and Controls has determined that there is apossibility this Human Performance Issue could be repeated by a site unknowingly.Weir has a duty to ensure that sites have the proper steps to accomplish the design intent is known and being followed.Weir will also review the design to determine if a singular solution can be developed that would encompass all GearOperator and Motor to reduce or eliminate the potential for Human Performance Errors in the future.3B Number and location of all affected components:3C I have evaluated the information and technical assessment developed and0 This issue is reportable pursuant to 10CFR21.El This issue is not reportable pursuant to 10CFR21.[I A decision on reportability cannot be made based on the available information.Based on this determination, I will proceed with all proper notifications within the allowable timeframes.Designated Responsible Officer (signature) DateWVCIOCFREVAL 030412 iiinin 10 CFR PART 21 EVALUATION DOCUMENT PAGEM Evaluation of Deviation or Potential Failure to Comply 10CFR121214.docx 4 of 4Precursor Accountability CompletedNo. Responsible Due Acceptance Date InitialsInitial Dte Ital12345678910WVCjOCFREVAL 041213