ML20100B048: Difference between revisions

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         , February 1984 when Joint Intervenors filed their first motion to reopen with a quality assurance contention and asked for six months in which to support it.
         , February 1984 when Joint Intervenors filed their first motion to reopen with a quality assurance contention and asked for six months in which to support it.
Equall-/ egregious is the withholding by Joint Intervenors from both the staff and Appeal Board of information whicts it now alleges impunes LP&L's character and competence. In May 1984 (almost six months ago), Gary Groesch, lead representative of Joint Intervenors, notified the NRC that he had information allegedly relating to the " completeness and/or truthful-ness. . ." of items in LP&L's April 27, 1984 letter to the NRC.      See Letter, Darrell G. Eisenhut to Gary Groesch, August 17, 1984 attached as LP&L Exhibit 1. Mr. Groesch failed to provide that information to either the NRC Staff or to the Appeal Board, despite an express written request that he "promptly provide to the staff any information (that he might) have perrsining to the safety of the Waterford Unit 3 facility".      Id. ac 2.
Equall-/ egregious is the withholding by Joint Intervenors from both the staff and Appeal Board of information whicts it now alleges impunes LP&L's character and competence. In May 1984 (almost six months ago), Gary Groesch, lead representative of Joint Intervenors, notified the NRC that he had information allegedly relating to the " completeness and/or truthful-ness. . ." of items in LP&L's {{letter dated|date=April 27, 1984|text=April 27, 1984 letter}} to the NRC.      See Letter, Darrell G. Eisenhut to Gary Groesch, August 17, 1984 attached as LP&L Exhibit 1. Mr. Groesch failed to provide that information to either the NRC Staff or to the Appeal Board, despite an express written request that he "promptly provide to the staff any information (that he might) have perrsining to the safety of the Waterford Unit 3 facility".      Id. ac 2.
Now, six months after Mr. Groesch indicated that he had the information, Joint Intervenors seek to reopen the record and introduce a contention on management competence in part because they allege that "LP&L made inaccu-rate and misleading statements in its April 27, 1984, letter to the NRC."
Now, six months after Mr. Groesch indicated that he had the information, Joint Intervenors seek to reopen the record and introduce a contention on management competence in part because they allege that "LP&L made inaccu-rate and misleading statements in its {{letter dated|date=April 27, 1984|text=April 27, 1984, letter}} to the NRC."
Motion to Reopen at 21. Item B(3). This conduct is unconscionable, and the "new" information irexcusably untimely.
Motion to Reopen at 21. Item B(3). This conduct is unconscionable, and the "new" information irexcusably untimely.
* There are other examples of pointed refusals to reveal information until this late date. Attempts to meet with GAP over the summer about 9
* There are other examples of pointed refusals to reveal information until this late date. Attempts to meet with GAP over the summer about 9
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icancewasignored.J_6) Intervenors, as parties to this proceeding, have an ongoing obligation to conduct themselves in a fair'and professional manner.
icancewasignored.J_6) Intervenors, as parties to this proceeding, have an ongoing obligation to conduct themselves in a fair'and professional manner.
See 10 C.F.R. 2.713(a).                                                                                              It is unacceptable for Joint Intervenors to withhold information that they allege to be of potential safety signifi-cance from the Appeal Board and the parties in order to wait for a more tactically opportune time to reveal it.                                                                                              Zealous advocacy does not include the withholding of relevant factual information. Consumers Power Company (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-458, 7 NRC 155, 172, n. 64 (1978).
See 10 C.F.R. 2.713(a).                                                                                              It is unacceptable for Joint Intervenors to withhold information that they allege to be of potential safety signifi-cance from the Appeal Board and the parties in order to wait for a more tactically opportune time to reveal it.                                                                                              Zealous advocacy does not include the withholding of relevant factual information. Consumers Power Company (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-458, 7 NRC 155, 172, n. 64 (1978).
Another significant example of untimeliness centers on the use of the NRC's June 13, 1984 letter as a basis for allegations. That letter identified issues requiring resolution for licensing, and Joint Intervenors have adopted them in one form or another, as allegations in the motion.J7/                                                                                                                                <
Another significant example of untimeliness centers on the use of the NRC's {{letter dated|date=June 13, 1984|text=June 13, 1984 letter}} as a basis for allegations. That letter identified issues requiring resolution for licensing, and Joint Intervenors have adopted them in one form or another, as allegations in the motion.J7/                                                                                                                                <
These issues were known by Joint Intervenors at that time, and there is no conceivable reason why they waited nearly five months, until the plant was ready for licensing, to bring them forward.1,8)                                                                                          8 The other exhibits submitted by Joint Intervenors in support of their motion were also untimely. The majority of these documents are more 15/                                                  Letter, Saul Levine to Billie Garde, August 24, 1984 (LP&L Exhibit 77.
These issues were known by Joint Intervenors at that time, and there is no conceivable reason why they waited nearly five months, until the plant was ready for licensing, to bring them forward.1,8)                                                                                          8 The other exhibits submitted by Joint Intervenors in support of their motion were also untimely. The majority of these documents are more 15/                                                  Letter, Saul Levine to Billie Garde, August 24, 1984 (LP&L Exhibit 77.
16/                                                  Letter, Darrell G. Eisenhut to Lynne Bernabei, Atigust 15, 1984 (LP&L Ehibit 3).
16/                                                  Letter, Darrell G. Eisenhut to Lynne Bernabei, Atigust 15, 1984 (LP&L Ehibit 3).
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;      report issued. Based on the small number of minor rework items required up to that time, LP&L believed that the completion of any required inspection and reworks could be accomplished in short order.
;      report issued. Based on the small number of minor rework items required up to that time, LP&L believed that the completion of any required inspection and reworks could be accomplished in short order.
In short, LP&L's statements were not misleading. The statements reflected LP&L's best understanding of the situation at the time they were made, and they were accompanied by qualifications reflecting regulatory uncertainties. The statements were mischaracterized and taken out of context by Joint Intervenors. The allegations concerning financial state-ments have been shown to be inaccurate and unsupported, and cannot serve as a basis for Joint Intervenors' proposed management competence contention.
In short, LP&L's statements were not misleading. The statements reflected LP&L's best understanding of the situation at the time they were made, and they were accompanied by qualifications reflecting regulatory uncertainties. The statements were mischaracterized and taken out of context by Joint Intervenors. The allegations concerning financial state-ments have been shown to be inaccurate and unsupported, and cannot serve as a basis for Joint Intervenors' proposed management competence contention.
(c) April 27 Letter In their motion at 21-23, Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L made inaccurate and misleading statements in its April 27, 1984 letter respond-ing to various issues identified by the NRC. As a result of additional, 4      more extensive investigations conducted by LP&L subsequent to its April 27 letter yielded additional information not previously available. As discussed fully in the Affidavit, Response to Items B(3)(a)-B(3)(e),
(c) April 27 Letter In their motion at 21-23, Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L made inaccurate and misleading statements in its {{letter dated|date=April 27, 1984|text=April 27, 1984 letter}} respond-ing to various issues identified by the NRC. As a result of additional, 4      more extensive investigations conducted by LP&L subsequent to its April 27 letter yielded additional information not previously available. As discussed fully in the Affidavit, Response to Items B(3)(a)-B(3)(e),
however, any inconsistencies between the April 27 letter and subsequently developed information were unintentional. The speciousness of the allegation that the April 27 letter reflects adversely on the character and I      competence of LP&L is revealed by setting forth the context in which the April 27, 1984 was written.
however, any inconsistencies between the April 27 letter and subsequently developed information were unintentional. The speciousness of the allegation that the April 27 letter reflects adversely on the character and I      competence of LP&L is revealed by setting forth the context in which the April 27, 1984 was written.
26
26
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April 27, 1984 (JI Exhibit 54). The response represented the best informa-tion available to LP&L at that time, given the severe time constraints and
April 27, 1984 (JI Exhibit 54). The response represented the best informa-tion available to LP&L at that time, given the severe time constraints and
         . considering the lack of specifics about the allegations.
         . considering the lack of specifics about the allegations.
The NRC's formal follow-up came in its June 13, 1984 letter (JI Exhibit 9) which identified 23 issues for resolution by LP&L. LP&L's
The NRC's formal follow-up came in its {{letter dated|date=June 13, 1984|text=June 13, 1984 letter}} (JI Exhibit 9) which identified 23 issues for resolution by LP&L. LP&L's
                                                                                         ,4 responses to that letter were based on an extensive, far reaching, and detailed program of investigation which yielded formally serified informa-tion which was not available when LP&L responded on an expedited basis to the April 2, 1984 letter. See Affidavit, Response to Item C(3). To the extent that the latter information appeared to be inconsistent with the April 27 letter, it has been presented and discussed in detail in LP&L's responses to NRC's June 13 letter. Thus the statements made in the April 27 letter do not raise a significant safety issue, and do not support Joint Intervenors' proposed management character and competence contention.
                                                                                         ,4 responses to that letter were based on an extensive, far reaching, and detailed program of investigation which yielded formally serified informa-tion which was not available when LP&L responded on an expedited basis to the {{letter dated|date=April 2, 1984|text=April 2, 1984 letter}}. See Affidavit, Response to Item C(3). To the extent that the latter information appeared to be inconsistent with the April 27 letter, it has been presented and discussed in detail in LP&L's responses to NRC's June 13 letter. Thus the statements made in the April 27 letter do not raise a significant safety issue, and do not support Joint Intervenors' proposed management character and competence contention.
(d) CAT Report Joint Intervenors allege, based on the May 14, 1984 NRC inspection report (JI Exhibit 23 known as the " CAT Report"), that LP&L has historically failed to correct noncompliances and prevent their recurrence, Motion to Reopen at 26, and that LP&L therefore lacks character and compe-c anc e . -
(d) CAT Report Joint Intervenors allege, based on the May 14, 1984 NRC inspection report (JI Exhibit 23 known as the " CAT Report"), that LP&L has historically failed to correct noncompliances and prevent their recurrence, Motion to Reopen at 26, and that LP&L therefore lacks character and compe-c anc e . -
t 27
t 27
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39-40. Neither of these allegations is substantiated.      In fact, LP&L's efforts over the past year to respond to all NRC concerns clearly illus-trates management's dedication to resolve all plant concerns and their character and competence to operate Waterford 3.
39-40. Neither of these allegations is substantiated.      In fact, LP&L's efforts over the past year to respond to all NRC concerns clearly illus-trates management's dedication to resolve all plant concerns and their character and competence to operate Waterford 3.
As discussed in the Affidavit, Response to Items C and D(1)-D(4),
As discussed in the Affidavit, Response to Items C and D(1)-D(4),
LP&L has addressed and responded to concerns raised by the NRC Inquiry Team and the'NRC Construction Assessment Team (CAT).      In response to the concerns raised in NRC's June 13, 1984 letter, LP&L took immediate steps to mobilize a massive work force, headed by a special management team with personal oversight by the President of LP&L chis working group was eventually to devote over 1000 man-months of effort in resolving the 23 issues. In addition, Applicant arranged for an outside Task Force of highly qualified experts to provide an independent review and assessment of the adequacy of the resolution of the NRC issues. Each issue response included identification of the cause, safety implications, corrective action (as necessary) and assessment of the generic implications of the issue.
LP&L has addressed and responded to concerns raised by the NRC Inquiry Team and the'NRC Construction Assessment Team (CAT).      In response to the concerns raised in NRC's {{letter dated|date=June 13, 1984|text=June 13, 1984 letter}}, LP&L took immediate steps to mobilize a massive work force, headed by a special management team with personal oversight by the President of LP&L chis working group was eventually to devote over 1000 man-months of effort in resolving the 23 issues. In addition, Applicant arranged for an outside Task Force of highly qualified experts to provide an independent review and assessment of the adequacy of the resolution of the NRC issues. Each issue response included identification of the cause, safety implications, corrective action (as necessary) and assessment of the generic implications of the issue.
LP&L has aggressively addressed safety issues brought to its attention by the NRC in the three recent inspection efforts. Contrary to Joint Intervenots' allegation, the extensive investment in manpower and resources l        co resolve and independently verify the resolutions of the NRC's concerns, attest to the strong character and competence of Applicant to safely operate Waterford 3.
LP&L has aggressively addressed safety issues brought to its attention by the NRC in the three recent inspection efforts. Contrary to Joint Intervenots' allegation, the extensive investment in manpower and resources l        co resolve and independently verify the resolutions of the NRC's concerns, attest to the strong character and competence of Applicant to safely operate Waterford 3.
In Section E, Motion to Reopen at 39-44, Joint Intervenors make allegations about Applicant's handling of the basemat issue to bolster their proposed contention on L?&L character and competence. To the extent f
In Section E, Motion to Reopen at 39-44, Joint Intervenors make allegations about Applicant's handling of the basemat issue to bolster their proposed contention on L?&L character and competence. To the extent f
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In light of Joint Intervenors' earlier conduct in this proceeding, Applicant questions the extent to which their participation will assist in developing a sound record. Joint Intervenors have to date refused to share information or concerns with the NRC despite explicit requests. See Section III.A., supra. On August 15, 1984, Darrell Eisenhut, Director of the Division of Licensing, wrote to Lynn Bernabei, General Counsel of GAP, stating that GAP had indicated to the staff that it had technical information relating to situations at Waterford 3 of potential safety significance, but that despite a request to Billie Garde of GAP to share the information with the NRC, the staff had not yet received the information. Mr. Eisenhut again asked GAP that if they were aware of potential safety problems at Waterford 3 to provide them to the NRC-
In light of Joint Intervenors' earlier conduct in this proceeding, Applicant questions the extent to which their participation will assist in developing a sound record. Joint Intervenors have to date refused to share information or concerns with the NRC despite explicit requests. See Section III.A., supra. On August 15, 1984, Darrell Eisenhut, Director of the Division of Licensing, wrote to Lynn Bernabei, General Counsel of GAP, stating that GAP had indicated to the staff that it had technical information relating to situations at Waterford 3 of potential safety significance, but that despite a request to Billie Garde of GAP to share the information with the NRC, the staff had not yet received the information. Mr. Eisenhut again asked GAP that if they were aware of potential safety problems at Waterford 3 to provide them to the NRC-
       "promptly" so that the staff could assess their safety significance. See LP&L Exhibit 2. To Applicant's knowledge, this request was never ansvered.
       "promptly" so that the staff could assess their safety significance. See LP&L Exhibit 2. To Applicant's knowledge, this request was never ansvered.
In addition, a member of the independent task force appointed by LP&L to independently assess the adequacy of LP&L's response to the 23 issues raised in the NRC's June 13, 1984 letter was unable, despite repeated requests to meet with Billie Garde, to obtain GAP's viewpoint on tha 23 issues. See LP&L Exhibit 3.      Finally, Darrell Eisenhut wrote to Gary Groesch, representative for Joint Intervenors, on August 17, 1984, after 36
In addition, a member of the independent task force appointed by LP&L to independently assess the adequacy of LP&L's response to the 23 issues raised in the NRC's {{letter dated|date=June 13, 1984|text=June 13, 1984 letter}} was unable, despite repeated requests to meet with Billie Garde, to obtain GAP's viewpoint on tha 23 issues. See LP&L Exhibit 3.      Finally, Darrell Eisenhut wrote to Gary Groesch, representative for Joint Intervenors, on August 17, 1984, after 36


O 8
O 8
Mr. Groesch notified the NRC in May, 1984 that he had information relative to the " completeness and/or truthfulness" of the items in LP&L's April 27, 1984 letter to the NRC. Mr. Eisenhut urged Mr. Groesh to promptly provide any information that he had pertaining to safety at Waterford so that the staff could consider this information. See LP&L Exhibit 1.                                                                Mr. Groesch failed to respond, although Joint Intervenors have now come forward with such information in support of their motion to reopen. - Motion to Reopen, Items B(3)(a)-(e) at 21-26. lit also appears that Joint Intervenors have withheld from the Appeal Board other information which they considered to be important to plant safety. The information submitted by Joint Intervenors in the form of anonymous affidavits to support their motion were in the hands of Joint Intervenors' counsel for almost a year and a half before they deemed it appropriate to bring them and their accompanying allegations before the Board. Joint Intervenors failed to submit.these affidavits in conjunction with their February 20, 1984 motion to open a new
Mr. Groesch notified the NRC in May, 1984 that he had information relative to the " completeness and/or truthfulness" of the items in LP&L's {{letter dated|date=April 27, 1984|text=April 27, 1984 letter}} to the NRC. Mr. Eisenhut urged Mr. Groesh to promptly provide any information that he had pertaining to safety at Waterford so that the staff could consider this information. See LP&L Exhibit 1.                                                                Mr. Groesch failed to respond, although Joint Intervenors have now come forward with such information in support of their motion to reopen. - Motion to Reopen, Items B(3)(a)-(e) at 21-26. lit also appears that Joint Intervenors have withheld from the Appeal Board other information which they considered to be important to plant safety. The information submitted by Joint Intervenors in the form of anonymous affidavits to support their motion were in the hands of Joint Intervenors' counsel for almost a year and a half before they deemed it appropriate to bring them and their accompanying allegations before the Board. Joint Intervenors failed to submit.these affidavits in conjunction with their February 20, 1984 motion to open a new
)
)
quality assurance contention; and when this Board allowed them more time to i
quality assurance contention; and when this Board allowed them more time to i
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e During the time frame of revision 0, early 1975, the Ebasco program was considered a state-of-the-art program for the governed activities.
e During the time frame of revision 0, early 1975, the Ebasco program was considered a state-of-the-art program for the governed activities.
These procedures have been maintained current with changing industry practices and accomplish their intended scope and purpose. The entire Ebasco QA Program, of which JI Exhibit 2 is only a part, has been accepted by the NEC on a continuing basis since July 1975 and is known as the "Ebasco Quality Assurance Program Topical Report," ETR-1001,-and is currently up to revision 11, accepted by the NRC in a letter dated May 17, 1982.
These procedures have been maintained current with changing industry practices and accomplish their intended scope and purpose. The entire Ebasco QA Program, of which JI Exhibit 2 is only a part, has been accepted by the NEC on a continuing basis since July 1975 and is known as the "Ebasco Quality Assurance Program Topical Report," ETR-1001,-and is currently up to revision 11, accepted by the NRC in a {{letter dated|date=May 17, 1982|text=letter dated May 17, 1982}}.
JI Exhibit 1 is a 1979 management report commissioned by LP&L from the Management Analysis Company.(MAC). Nothing in that report suggests that the LP&L QA Organization (including the Ebasco program) did not have the authority or organizational freedom to discharge its quality responsibilities.
JI Exhibit 1 is a 1979 management report commissioned by LP&L from the Management Analysis Company.(MAC). Nothing in that report suggests that the LP&L QA Organization (including the Ebasco program) did not have the authority or organizational freedom to discharge its quality responsibilities.
Item A(1)(a)(iii), Motion at 4.
Item A(1)(a)(iii), Motion at 4.
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===Response===
===Response===
The issue of the qualifications of QA/QC personnel has been extensively addressed in LP&L's response to Issues 1, 10 and 20 of the NRC's June 13, 1984 letter (JI ExhibitL 9). See the' responses to Items C and D(5) which discuss this issue as raised in JI Exhibits 9 and 10.      JI Exhibit 8 contains no reference to QA/QC personnel qualifications.
The issue of the qualifications of QA/QC personnel has been extensively addressed in LP&L's response to Issues 1, 10 and 20 of the NRC's {{letter dated|date=June 13, 1984|text=June 13, 1984 letter}} (JI ExhibitL 9). See the' responses to Items C and D(5) which discuss this issue as raised in JI Exhibits 9 and 10.      JI Exhibit 8 contains no reference to QA/QC personnel qualifications.
Item A(1)(d), Motion at 5 It is alleged that:
Item A(1)(d), Motion at 5 It is alleged that:
LP&L failed to assure that special processes such as welding are properly controlled and performed by qualified personnel working tod qualified procedures. See Exhibits 1 and 8.
LP&L failed to assure that special processes such as welding are properly controlled and performed by qualified personnel working tod qualified procedures. See Exhibits 1 and 8.
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===Response===
===Response===
The allegation is incorrect. Joint Intervenors reference JI Exhibit 9, the' June 13, 1984 letter from the NRC. Apparently, Joint Intervenors are referring to Issue 4 in that letter to support their allegation.
The allegation is incorrect. Joint Intervenors reference JI Exhibit 9, the' {{letter dated|date=June 13, 1984|text=June 13, 1984 letter}} from the NRC. Apparently, Joint Intervenors are referring to Issue 4 in that letter to support their allegation.
This matter is also raised by Joint Intervenors in, and refuted by LP&L in response to, allegation D(3).
This matter is also raised by Joint Intervenors in, and refuted by LP&L in response to, allegation D(3).
JI Exhibit 40 was not legible; however it appears that reference is made to NCR W3-306. This NCR was opened on 1/20/77 and described a problem with transport of concrete resulting in aggregate separation.
JI Exhibit 40 was not legible; however it appears that reference is made to NCR W3-306. This NCR was opened on 1/20/77 and described a problem with transport of concrete resulting in aggregate separation.
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Item A(10)(b), Motion at 13.
Item A(10)(b), Motion at 13.
It is alleged that:
It is alleged that:
LP&L failed properly to describe and resolve the problems identified in NCR's as noted in the June 13, 1984 letter written by the NRC Staff to LP&L management. See Exhibit 9.
LP&L failed properly to describe and resolve the problems identified in NCR's as noted in the {{letter dated|date=June 13, 1984|text=June 13, 1984 letter}} written by the NRC Staff to LP&L management. See Exhibit 9.


===Response===
===Response===
The issue of handling of NCR's has been extensively addressed and resolved in LP&L's response to Issue 6 of the NRC's June 13, 1984 letter (LP&L Exhibit 8). See the response to Items C and D(4) which discuss this issue as raised in JI Exhibit 9.
The issue of handling of NCR's has been extensively addressed and resolved in LP&L's response to Issue 6 of the NRC's {{letter dated|date=June 13, 1984|text=June 13, 1984 letter}} (LP&L Exhibit 8). See the response to Items C and D(4) which discuss this issue as raised in JI Exhibit 9.
Item A(10)(c), Motion at 13.
Item A(10)(c), Motion at 13.
It is alleged that:
It is alleged that:
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===Response===
===Response===
The issue of upgrading lower tier documents to NCRs has been extensively addressed and resolved in LP&L's response to Issue 4 of the NRC's June 13, 1984 letter (LP&L Exhibit 9).      See the response to Items
The issue of upgrading lower tier documents to NCRs has been extensively addressed and resolved in LP&L's response to Issue 4 of the NRC's {{letter dated|date=June 13, 1984|text=June 13, 1984 letter}} (LP&L Exhibit 9).      See the response to Items
   ,      C and 3(4) which discuss this issue as raised in JI Exhibit 9.
   ,      C and 3(4) which discuss this issue as raised in JI Exhibit 9.
1
1
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;                            1984. Additionally, LP&L provided a discussion of the potential for delays due to testing difficulties, regulatory delays or intervention as well as a statement on the potential costs of such delays. The r                            information provided in the Form 10-K document was consistent with the 1983 Annual Report submitted on February 23, 1984.
;                            1984. Additionally, LP&L provided a discussion of the potential for delays due to testing difficulties, regulatory delays or intervention as well as a statement on the potential costs of such delays. The r                            information provided in the Form 10-K document was consistent with the 1983 Annual Report submitted on February 23, 1984.
Joint Intervenors contend that the form 10-K was misleading because of the findings of the February 1984 CAT inspection and because of the                                        '
Joint Intervenors contend that the form 10-K was misleading because of the findings of the February 1984 CAT inspection and because of the                                        '
cpening of an OI investigation inquiry. They also state in their Motion i                            at 18 that the April 2, 1984 letter to James Cain showed that LP&L "was rejecting all indications from the NRC on a projected fuel load date".
cpening of an OI investigation inquiry. They also state in their Motion i                            at 18 that the {{letter dated|date=April 2, 1984|text=April 2, 1984 letter}} to James Cain showed that LP&L "was rejecting all indications from the NRC on a projected fuel load date".
Joint Intervenors are incorrect.
Joint Intervenors are incorrect.
I The Form 10-K was filed one week af ter completion of the Construction Appraisal Team (CAT) inspection which had started in February. LP&L, based upon the NRC connents at the exit meeting, anticipated being able to complete by the end of April any reinspection and/or rework required as a result of the CAT inspection. The investigation by the NRC Office of Investigation (OI) referenced in the motion at 18 was not considered
I The Form 10-K was filed one week af ter completion of the Construction Appraisal Team (CAT) inspection which had started in February. LP&L, based upon the NRC connents at the exit meeting, anticipated being able to complete by the end of April any reinspection and/or rework required as a result of the CAT inspection. The investigation by the NRC Office of Investigation (OI) referenced in the motion at 18 was not considered
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statements remained as discussed in that context.
statements remained as discussed in that context.
The Intervenors' conclude in their motion at 19 that the statements made in the prospectus were incorrect because LP&L knew that the NRC would require extensive reinspection prior to granting a license to load fuel based upon the argument that this information was provided at the June 8, 1984, meeting. It would not have been possible for LP&L to have reflected the June 8 meetins; in its June 5th prospectus filing.
The Intervenors' conclude in their motion at 19 that the statements made in the prospectus were incorrect because LP&L knew that the NRC would require extensive reinspection prior to granting a license to load fuel based upon the argument that this information was provided at the June 8, 1984, meeting. It would not have been possible for LP&L to have reflected the June 8 meetins; in its June 5th prospectus filing.
: 5.      Amendment to Registration Statement In the July 24, 1984 Amendment to its Registration Statement, LP&L acknowledged the potential for licensing and intervention delays, noting in particular the NRC's June 13, 1984 letter. LP&L stated that resolution of the issues would be required prior to licensing, that LP&L had submitted a program plan for resolution of the issues and discussions with the NRC Staff on the issues were continuing. LP&L also noted that an independent consultant had been engaged to conduct a program of ultrasonic testing of the basemat for the purpose of providing final assurances to the NRC concerning the structural integrity of the foundation. Additionally, the ongoing resolution of the CAT items was mentioned. LP&L stated that its assessment was that license issuance prior to late August or September was not likely and discussed the potential impacts of delays. See LP&L Exhibit 11.
: 5.      Amendment to Registration Statement In the July 24, 1984 Amendment to its Registration Statement, LP&L acknowledged the potential for licensing and intervention delays, noting in particular the NRC's {{letter dated|date=June 13, 1984|text=June 13, 1984 letter}}. LP&L stated that resolution of the issues would be required prior to licensing, that LP&L had submitted a program plan for resolution of the issues and discussions with the NRC Staff on the issues were continuing. LP&L also noted that an independent consultant had been engaged to conduct a program of ultrasonic testing of the basemat for the purpose of providing final assurances to the NRC concerning the structural integrity of the foundation. Additionally, the ongoing resolution of the CAT items was mentioned. LP&L stated that its assessment was that license issuance prior to late August or September was not likely and discussed the potential impacts of delays. See LP&L Exhibit 11.
LP&L presented a number of facts in this Amendment concerning events and/or actions which had taken place. The potential of a late August or September fuel load was based upon an assessment of the work effort required to complete the resolution of the 23 issues and NRC review of the submittals.
LP&L presented a number of facts in this Amendment concerning events and/or actions which had taken place. The potential of a late August or September fuel load was based upon an assessment of the work effort required to complete the resolution of the 23 issues and NRC review of the submittals.
Joint Intervenors claim that this filing was misleading in two respects.
Joint Intervenors claim that this filing was misleading in two respects.
First, they assert that LP&L only submitted a " preliminary plan" in
First, they assert that LP&L only submitted a " preliminary plan" in
, response to the June 13, 1984 letter, and that the NRC "had clearly stated" by July 24, 1984 that the preliminary plan was inadequate.
, response to the {{letter dated|date=June 13, 1984|text=June 13, 1984 letter}}, and that the NRC "had clearly stated" by July 24, 1984 that the preliminary plan was inadequate.
Second, they argue that an August 7, 1984 NRC filing before the Appeal Board requiring further efforts by LP&L concerning the basemat showed that the amendments' statements about the basemat were misleading.
Second, they argue that an August 7, 1984 NRC filing before the Appeal Board requiring further efforts by LP&L concerning the basemat showed that the amendments' statements about the basemat were misleading.
As with the May 25, 1984 prospectus, Joint Intervenors failed to point out that the July 24 Amendment was preliminary in nature and that the first page clearly stated that the amendment "has not yet become effective" and that "[ilnformation contained herein is subject to completion or amendment". Nor have the Joint Intervenors shown that the
As with the May 25, 1984 prospectus, Joint Intervenors failed to point out that the July 24 Amendment was preliminary in nature and that the first page clearly stated that the amendment "has not yet become effective" and that "[ilnformation contained herein is subject to completion or amendment". Nor have the Joint Intervenors shown that the
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However, the NRC did not reject the overall program plan as
However, the NRC did not reject the overall program plan as
                     " inadequate".
                     " inadequate".
Intervenors also contend incorrectly in their motion at 20 that the NRC Staff cold LP&L that it had failed to provide the kind of detailed program plan, with an independent reviewer, which the staff had required by its June 13, 1984 letter. The discussion in the transcript referenced by Joint Intervenors (JI Exhibit 10 at 15) does not make a statement about LP&L failing to provide the program. The statements, which were apparently being summarized, provide a suggestion by Darrell Eisenhut that LP&L provide a more detailed program as a means of determining whether the Staff was in full accord with the details of LP&L's resolution and the process being employed. Also, the date of the meeting covered by this transcript was August 17, 1984, and the filing that is being questioned by the Joint Intervenors was filed over three weeks prior to that, on July. 24, 1984. Finally, the NRC did not require an independent reviewer as stated in the motion at 20. LP&L voluntarily engaged a special task force that would provide an independent review and report results to the President of LP&L and to Darrell Eisenhut concurrently.
Intervenors also contend incorrectly in their motion at 20 that the NRC Staff cold LP&L that it had failed to provide the kind of detailed program plan, with an independent reviewer, which the staff had required by its {{letter dated|date=June 13, 1984|text=June 13, 1984 letter}}. The discussion in the transcript referenced by Joint Intervenors (JI Exhibit 10 at 15) does not make a statement about LP&L failing to provide the program. The statements, which were apparently being summarized, provide a suggestion by Darrell Eisenhut that LP&L provide a more detailed program as a means of determining whether the Staff was in full accord with the details of LP&L's resolution and the process being employed. Also, the date of the meeting covered by this transcript was August 17, 1984, and the filing that is being questioned by the Joint Intervenors was filed over three weeks prior to that, on July. 24, 1984. Finally, the NRC did not require an independent reviewer as stated in the motion at 20. LP&L voluntarily engaged a special task force that would provide an independent review and report results to the President of LP&L and to Darrell Eisenhut concurrently.
The Intervenors' argument concerning representations about the basemac is also unfounded. Joint Intervenors mischaracterized this filing as a statement by LP&L that testing would provide final assurance to the NRC about the structural integrity of the plant's concrete foundation. The filing contains a valid statement that the purpose of the investigation and testing was to provide finsi assurance. The statement was not intended, nor did it attempt to imply, that the results could be preordained.
The Intervenors' argument concerning representations about the basemac is also unfounded. Joint Intervenors mischaracterized this filing as a statement by LP&L that testing would provide final assurance to the NRC about the structural integrity of the plant's concrete foundation. The filing contains a valid statement that the purpose of the investigation and testing was to provide finsi assurance. The statement was not intended, nor did it attempt to imply, that the results could be preordained.
: 6. July Memorandum Joint Intervenors question the sufficiency of a July 30, 1984 Memorandum to the Financial Community.
: 6. July Memorandum Joint Intervenors question the sufficiency of a July 30, 1984 Memorandum to the Financial Community.
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: 7.      July 1984 Report Joint Intervenors conclude their assessment of LP&L financial statements with a discussion of the July 1984 report to the Middle South Utilities Stockholders. This report contains a short condensation of statements made at the Middle South Utilities Stockholders' meeting, which was held on May 18, 1984. The report contained a statement that a large number of allegations involving faulty plant construction had been investigated and answered successfully without corrective work being required at the plant.
: 7.      July 1984 Report Joint Intervenors conclude their assessment of LP&L financial statements with a discussion of the July 1984 report to the Middle South Utilities Stockholders. This report contains a short condensation of statements made at the Middle South Utilities Stockholders' meeting, which was held on May 18, 1984. The report contained a statement that a large number of allegations involving faulty plant construction had been investigated and answered successfully without corrective work being required at the plant.
Joint Intervenors claim in their motion at 21 that the statement was inaccurate because of the NRC's Task Force and CAT reports and because of the corrective action associated with the June 13 letter. However, it was a fact that by May 18, l'84J  no significant physical work had been required on Waterford 3 as a result of the investigation of such allegations. Further, the statement must be viewed in context of the information sva11able to LP&L in the middle of May. The NRC review team had not at that time reported its results and would not do so for another three weeks and the only allegations of which LP&L was aware were those contained in the April 2nd letter from Darrell Eisenhut and several allegations that had surfaced in the interview program voluntarily established by LP&L earlier in the year.      The report did not imply as Joint Intervenors contend, that no corrective
Joint Intervenors claim in their motion at 21 that the statement was inaccurate because of the NRC's Task Force and CAT reports and because of the corrective action associated with the June 13 letter. However, it was a fact that by May 18, l'84J  no significant physical work had been required on Waterford 3 as a result of the investigation of such allegations. Further, the statement must be viewed in context of the information sva11able to LP&L in the middle of May. The NRC review team had not at that time reported its results and would not do so for another three weeks and the only allegations of which LP&L was aware were those contained in the April 2nd letter from Darrell Eisenhut and several allegations that had surfaced in the interview program voluntarily established by LP&L earlier in the year.      The report did not imply as Joint Intervenors contend, that no corrective
* work was required as a result of the CAT inspection. The statement was clearly identified as relating to rework associated with allegations, not to the CAT inspection. However, even in the case of the CAT' inspection .the reinspection and corrective actions required did not involve extensive physical rework in the plant. As for the June 13, 1984 letter, this.followed the May 18th statement which was simply being summarized in the July Memorandum. However, corrective action as a result of the June 13, 1984 letter issues has not involved extensive
* work was required as a result of the CAT inspection. The statement was clearly identified as relating to rework associated with allegations, not to the CAT inspection. However, even in the case of the CAT' inspection .the reinspection and corrective actions required did not involve extensive physical rework in the plant. As for the {{letter dated|date=June 13, 1984|text=June 13, 1984 letter}}, this.followed the May 18th statement which was simply being summarized in the July Memorandum. However, corrective action as a result of the {{letter dated|date=June 13, 1984|text=June 13, 1984 letter}} issues has not involved extensive
* physical rework in the plant.
* physical rework in the plant.
By focusing on only a few sentences in each filing, the Joint Intervenors imply that the statements made in the SEC filings are unqualified. This is untrue, the SEC filings have included statements which properly reflect the. uncertainties in the licensing process and the potential impact.of delays in the licensing of Waterford 3 on the construction costs of the project.
By focusing on only a few sentences in each filing, the Joint Intervenors imply that the statements made in the SEC filings are unqualified. This is untrue, the SEC filings have included statements which properly reflect the. uncertainties in the licensing process and the potential impact.of delays in the licensing of Waterford 3 on the construction costs of the project.
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In sum, none of the statements cited by Joint Intervenors made in financial statements were misleading. In all cases, LP&L~provided statements that reflected the best information available to LP&L at the time that the statements were prepared.
In sum, none of the statements cited by Joint Intervenors made in financial statements were misleading. In all cases, LP&L~provided statements that reflected the best information available to LP&L at the time that the statements were prepared.
Item B(3), Motion at 21 - 26.
Item B(3), Motion at 21 - 26.
In Iten B(3), the Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L made inaccurate and misleading statements in its April 27, 1984 letter responding to various issues identified by the NRC.
In Iten B(3), the Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L made inaccurate and misleading statements in its {{letter dated|date=April 27, 1984|text=April 27, 1984 letter}} responding to various issues identified by the NRC.
On April 2, 1984, the NRC had asked LP&L to respond to 39 issues which reflected allegations the NRC had received primarily ever the previous                    ,
On April 2, 1984, the NRC had asked LP&L to respond to 39 issues which reflected allegations the NRC had received primarily ever the previous                    ,
several months (JI Exhibit 53). The specifics of the allegations, for the most part, were not communicated to LP&L. The NRC, in recognition of LP&L's schedule then in effect, requested an expeditious response from LP&L. LP&L's response of April 27, 1984 (JI Exhibic 54) represented the best information available to it under the circumstances, considering the lack of specifics about the allegations, and the corresponding need to respond to some allegations on a programmatic basis.
several months (JI Exhibit 53). The specifics of the allegations, for the most part, were not communicated to LP&L. The NRC, in recognition of LP&L's schedule then in effect, requested an expeditious response from LP&L. LP&L's response of April 27, 1984 (JI Exhibic 54) represented the best information available to it under the circumstances, considering the lack of specifics about the allegations, and the corresponding need to respond to some allegations on a programmatic basis.
* r-The NRC's formal follow-up came in the form of its June 13, 1984 letter (JI Exhibit 9) which set forth 23 issues for resolution. LP&L's responses to that letter have been based on an extensive, far reaching, and detailed program of investigation which yielded formally verified information which was not available when LP&L responded to the earlier April 2, 1984 letter. See the response to Item C. To the extent that the later information may have been inconsistent with the earlier appraisals, the detailed presentation in LP&L's responses to the 23 issues in the June 13 letter has set the record straight. Thus, any necessary updates or corrections to the statements identified in Joint Intervenors' Item B(3) have been submitted to the NRC Staff.
* r-The NRC's formal follow-up came in the form of its {{letter dated|date=June 13, 1984|text=June 13, 1984 letter}} (JI Exhibit 9) which set forth 23 issues for resolution. LP&L's responses to that letter have been based on an extensive, far reaching, and detailed program of investigation which yielded formally verified information which was not available when LP&L responded to the earlier {{letter dated|date=April 2, 1984|text=April 2, 1984 letter}}. See the response to Item C. To the extent that the later information may have been inconsistent with the earlier appraisals, the detailed presentation in LP&L's responses to the 23 issues in the June 13 letter has set the record straight. Thus, any necessary updates or corrections to the statements identified in Joint Intervenors' Item B(3) have been submitted to the NRC Staff.
(a) Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L responded incorrectly to Item 1 of the NRC's April 2, 1984 letter which states:
(a) Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L responded incorrectly to Item 1 of the NRC's {{letter dated|date=April 2, 1984|text=April 2, 1984 letter}} which states:
: 1. It has been alleged that Civil structural and piping QC inspectors were not certified in accordance with the appropriate requirements.
: 1. It has been alleged that Civil structural and piping QC inspectors were not certified in accordance with the appropriate requirements.
To respond to this issue LP&L reviewed Ebasco and contractor procedures for certification of personnel for compliance with the appropriate requirements. The response provided was based on the Quality Assurance Program, including the programs of the contractors and subcontractors, having acceptable procedures for certification of QC inspectors. On the basis of this review and a review of associated non-conformance reports, LP&L concluded in its April 27 response that the inspectors were qualified and that deficiencies that may have existed had been corrected.
To respond to this issue LP&L reviewed Ebasco and contractor procedures for certification of personnel for compliance with the appropriate requirements. The response provided was based on the Quality Assurance Program, including the programs of the contractors and subcontractors, having acceptable procedures for certification of QC inspectors. On the basis of this review and a review of associated non-conformance reports, LP&L concluded in its April 27 response that the inspectors were qualified and that deficiencies that may have existed had been corrected.
In later responding to Issue 1, 10 and 20 of the NRC's June 13, 1984 letter, LP&L's review went far beyond its previous programmatic efforts.
In later responding to Issue 1, 10 and 20 of the NRC's {{letter dated|date=June 13, 1984|text=June 13, 1984 letter}}, LP&L's review went far beyond its previous programmatic efforts.
It performed a 100% evaluation of all QC and QA personnel qualification and training records, including background investigations to verify the accuracy of the QA/QC personnel qualifications (education and work experience). The evaluation of qualifications was effectively governed by current NRC Staff interpretations of qualification requirements which are more restrictive than the interpretations which were the norm at the time the original qualification decisions were made. This retrospective review results in a highly conservative evaluation of the QC inspector qualifications. The results of this evaluation are described in LP&L's response to NRC Item 1. (LP&L Exhibit 12).
It performed a 100% evaluation of all QC and QA personnel qualification and training records, including background investigations to verify the accuracy of the QA/QC personnel qualifications (education and work experience). The evaluation of qualifications was effectively governed by current NRC Staff interpretations of qualification requirements which are more restrictive than the interpretations which were the norm at the time the original qualification decisions were made. This retrospective review results in a highly conservative evaluation of the QC inspector qualifications. The results of this evaluation are described in LP&L's response to NRC Item 1. (LP&L Exhibit 12).
The apparent conflict between the response provided by LP&L in its letter of April 27, 1984 (JI Exhibit 54) and the conditions identified by the NRC letter of June 13,1984 (JI Exhibit 9) was r2bstantially caused by a difference in the basis and criteria of the reviews. LP&L's response on April 27, 1984 was based on a review of contractors programs for compliance to applicable requirements. The conditions identified by the L-_______
The apparent conflict between the response provided by LP&L in its letter of April 27, 1984 (JI Exhibit 54) and the conditions identified by the NRC letter of June 13,1984 (JI Exhibit 9) was r2bstantially caused by a difference in the basis and criteria of the reviews. LP&L's response on April 27, 1984 was based on a review of contractors programs for compliance to applicable requirements. The conditions identified by the L-_______


NRC were based on reviews of the certification packages of individual inspectors. These reviews were based on the educational and experience requirements stated in ANSI N45.2.6. The review did not take into account the position of ANSI N45.2.6-73 that the experience and education factors were not absolute and that other factors, such as demonstrated capability and proficiency testing, may be used as a basis for certification. Since the basis and criteria of the respective reviews were different, the results were different. No falsification was involved.
NRC were based on reviews of the certification packages of individual inspectors. These reviews were based on the educational and experience requirements stated in ANSI N45.2.6. The review did not take into account the position of ANSI N45.2.6-73 that the experience and education factors were not absolute and that other factors, such as demonstrated capability and proficiency testing, may be used as a basis for certification. Since the basis and criteria of the respective reviews were different, the results were different. No falsification was involved.
(b) Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L responded incorrectly to Item 6 of the NRC's April 2, 1984 letter which states
(b) Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L responded incorrectly to Item 6 of the NRC's {{letter dated|date=April 2, 1984|text=April 2, 1984 letter}} which states
: 6. It has been alleged that basemat concrete was not placed in accordance with the ACI Codes.
: 6. It has been alleged that basemat concrete was not placed in accordance with the ACI Codes.
Joint Intervenors cite Exhibits 41 and 23. The contention is without merit and the referenced exhibits do not support the contention. LP&L's answer of April 27 to Issue 6 was and is correct.
Joint Intervenors cite Exhibits 41 and 23. The contention is without merit and the referenced exhibits do not support the contention. LP&L's answer of April 27 to Issue 6 was and is correct.
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                                               ~
                                               ~
deficiencies had independently been identified during the 100% review without benefit of the missing DR's, many were minor in nature, and others were easily corrected.
deficiencies had independently been identified during the 100% review without benefit of the missing DR's, many were minor in nature, and others were easily corrected.
(d) Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L responded incorrectly to Item 11 of the NRC's April 2, 1984 letter which states:
(d) Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L responded incorrectly to Item 11 of the NRC's {{letter dated|date=April 2, 1984|text=April 2, 1984 letter}} which states:
: 11. It has been alleged that the extra supports for instrumentation cabinets covered by av FCR that were mouated on gratings inside contair. ment were fabricated with materials for which there 's no heat numbers traceability by uncertified welders and examined by uncertified inspectors.
: 11. It has been alleged that the extra supports for instrumentation cabinets covered by av FCR that were mouated on gratings inside contair. ment were fabricated with materials for which there 's no heat numbers traceability by uncertified welders and examined by uncertified inspectors.
LP&L responded in the April 27 submittal that this allegation was partially valid. Joint Intervenors contend that LP&L In responding to the NRC's June 13, 1984 letter, admitted that Item 11 was " valid in its entirety." This is a serious mischaracterization of LP&L's position.
LP&L responded in the April 27 submittal that this allegation was partially valid. Joint Intervenors contend that LP&L In responding to the NRC's {{letter dated|date=June 13, 1984|text=June 13, 1984 letter}}, admitted that Item 11 was " valid in its entirety." This is a serious mischaracterization of LP&L's position.
With respect to material traceability, the April 27 response stated traceability existed. Later review confirmed that, with the exception of two clip angles which were evaluated as not required, traceability indeed existed.
With respect to material traceability, the April 27 response stated traceability existed. Later review confirmed that, with the exception of two clip angles which were evaluated as not required, traceability indeed existed.
e_________-_-_____-__-__-_-__--___-___-_-_---_-_-_----__________--_____-______--_---__-___
e_________-_-_____-__-__-_-__--___-___-_-_---_-_-_----__________--_____-______--_---__-___
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been closed in accordance with LP&L's response to Issue 9 in the NRC's June 13 letter.                                                                                                ,
been closed in accordance with LP&L's response to Issue 9 in the NRC's June 13 letter.                                                                                                ,
(e) Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L responded incorrectly to Item                                              '
(e) Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L responded incorrectly to Item                                              '
21(b) of the NRC's April 2, 1984 letter which states that it had been                          --
21(b) of the NRC's {{letter dated|date=April 2, 1984|text=April 2, 1984 letter}} which states that it had been                          --
alleged that:
alleged that:
21b. Welders and QC weld inspectors were not adequately                                    4 qualified.                                            ,                        '    4 With respect to the qualifications of welders, LP&L responded in JI Exhibit 54 that the allegations were invalid. This response was                        ,
21b. Welders and QC weld inspectors were not adequately                                    4 qualified.                                            ,                        '    4 With respect to the qualifications of welders, LP&L responded in JI Exhibit 54 that the allegations were invalid. This response was                        ,
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: 1. Issue 16 Issae 16 of JI Exhibit 9, refers to LP&L's voluntary establishment of a program to identify quality concerns through interviews of site personnel. The program, begun in January, 1984, was a new, voluntary effort of a type not previously undertaken by LP&L. It was not an NRC requirement, nor was it part of a prior commitment.
: 1. Issue 16 Issae 16 of JI Exhibit 9, refers to LP&L's voluntary establishment of a program to identify quality concerns through interviews of site personnel. The program, begun in January, 1984, was a new, voluntary effort of a type not previously undertaken by LP&L. It was not an NRC requirement, nor was it part of a prior commitment.
Given the voluntary nature of this program, Issue 16 provides no basis for the Joint Intervenors allegation. On the contrary, the program demonstrates LP&L management commitment to quality construction and operation. As shown by the LP&L response to Issue 16 (LP&L Exhibit 14), the interview program has evolved considerably into a useful management tool providing very useful support of LP&L's quality assurance efforts.
Given the voluntary nature of this program, Issue 16 provides no basis for the Joint Intervenors allegation. On the contrary, the program demonstrates LP&L management commitment to quality construction and operation. As shown by the LP&L response to Issue 16 (LP&L Exhibit 14), the interview program has evolved considerably into a useful management tool providing very useful support of LP&L's quality assurance efforts.
: 2. Issue 23 Issue 23 of JI Exhibit 9 involves a concern with inadequate documentation on the part of Mercury Company of Norwood as first identified by LP&L QA, and LP&L's corrective action response thereto. This matter has been thoroughly addressed and resolved in LP&L's responses to the NRC's June 13, 1984 letter.
: 2. Issue 23 Issue 23 of JI Exhibit 9 involves a concern with inadequate documentation on the part of Mercury Company of Norwood as first identified by LP&L QA, and LP&L's corrective action response thereto. This matter has been thoroughly addressed and resolved in LP&L's responses to the NRC's {{letter dated|date=June 13, 1984|text=June 13, 1984 letter}}.
In the Spring of 1982 LP&L QA identified incomplete Mercury documentation packages on the first four systems completed by Mercury. The matter was promptly reported to the NRC and a corrective action program initiated to cover not only Mercury
In the Spring of 1982 LP&L QA identified incomplete Mercury documentation packages on the first four systems completed by Mercury. The matter was promptly reported to the NRC and a corrective action program initiated to cover not only Mercury
                                   - deficiencies.but to ensure that similar problems did not exist with other subcontractors. Contrary to.the Joint Intervenors' statement, LP&L did not include a commitment to audit the entire QA program as                                                                                                                          5 part of-the corrective action to.the Notice of Violation. In Issue 23 the NRC did raise a question concerning-LP&L audits, and this matter was fully addressed in the response to Issue 23. . (LP&L Exhibit 5..Part C).
                                   - deficiencies.but to ensure that similar problems did not exist with other subcontractors. Contrary to.the Joint Intervenors' statement, LP&L did not include a commitment to audit the entire QA program as                                                                                                                          5 part of-the corrective action to.the Notice of Violation. In Issue 23 the NRC did raise a question concerning-LP&L audits, and this matter was fully addressed in the response to Issue 23. . (LP&L Exhibit 5..Part C).
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                         .The Inte'rvenors'have directed attention to three NRC inspection efforts:
                         .The Inte'rvenors'have directed attention to three NRC inspection efforts:
                                                             ~
                                                             ~
             .            1) the Inquiry Team, 2)            the Construction Assessment Team, and 3)            the NRC's June 13, 1984 letter. The following discussion demonstrates a serious and appropriate response by LP&L management to the respective inspection findings.
             .            1) the Inquiry Team, 2)            the Construction Assessment Team, and 3)            the NRC's {{letter dated|date=June 13, 1984|text=June 13, 1984 letter}}. The following discussion demonstrates a serious and appropriate response by LP&L management to the respective inspection findings.
1.'  Inquiry Team The NRC. Inquiry Team inspection addressed QA Program activities at Waterford 3 arising from a series of local newspaper articles. The inspection was. conducted on April 2-13, April May 4,-and May 14-25, 1984, and documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/84-34 dated July
1.'  Inquiry Team The NRC. Inquiry Team inspection addressed QA Program activities at Waterford 3 arising from a series of local newspaper articles. The inspection was. conducted on April 2-13, April May 4,-and May 14-25, 1984, and documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/84-34 dated July
                         '20,.1984.
                         '20,.1984.
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                         .and, "The staff review ... shows that generally'the LP&L QA program for design control was being implemented successfully" (page 2). -See JI Exhibit 5.
                         .and, "The staff review ... shows that generally'the LP&L QA program for design control was being implemented successfully" (page 2). -See JI Exhibit 5.
The NRC' Inquiry Team Inspection Report covered inspections in five areas.- Three of these areas were closed by the NRC in the Inspection Report. The remaining two areas were expressly held for closure until completion of the NRC Waterford Task Force review effort due to                                  ,
The NRC' Inquiry Team Inspection Report covered inspections in five areas.- Three of these areas were closed by the NRC in the Inspection Report. The remaining two areas were expressly held for closure until completion of the NRC Waterford Task Force review effort due to                                  ,
similarity of the items to issues in the June 13, 1984 letter from D.
similarity of the items to issues in the {{letter dated|date=June 13, 1984|text=June 13, 1984 letter}} from D.
Eisenhut to J. Cain. LP&L has addressed all unresolved items ~ identified by the Inquiry Team. LP&L has also completed and submitted responses to the. issues from the-June 13, 1984 letters related to the two issues..
Eisenhut to J. Cain. LP&L has addressed all unresolved items ~ identified by the Inquiry Team. LP&L has also completed and submitted responses to the. issues from the-{{letter dated|date=June 13, 1984|text=June 13, 1984 letter}}s related to the two issues..
: 2. Construction Assessment Team The Construction Assessment Team (CAT) issued 1ts findings on May 14,                              '
: 2. Construction Assessment Team The Construction Assessment Team (CAT) issued 1ts findings on May 14,                              '
                         -1984.          LP&L had been actively pursuing resolution of the findings prior                  +
                         -1984.          LP&L had been actively pursuing resolution of the findings prior                  +
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This plan was submitted to the NRC Staff for review and comment and modified as appropriate to' assure LP&L and NRC concerns would be adequately resolved. The day the Inspection Report was received, LP&L met with cognizant NRC personnel to discuss the status of the corrective action plan efforts and the schedule for completion of the remaining efforts. Initially, daily contact was maintained with the NRC to assure adequacy of response depth and scope, and regular contact maintained thereafter. Within six weeks, after expending approximately 330 man-months,_most of the CAT issues had been addressed. LP&L has been fully responsive to the CAT findings, submitting the balance of the responses in a timely fashion.
This plan was submitted to the NRC Staff for review and comment and modified as appropriate to' assure LP&L and NRC concerns would be adequately resolved. The day the Inspection Report was received, LP&L met with cognizant NRC personnel to discuss the status of the corrective action plan efforts and the schedule for completion of the remaining efforts. Initially, daily contact was maintained with the NRC to assure adequacy of response depth and scope, and regular contact maintained thereafter. Within six weeks, after expending approximately 330 man-months,_most of the CAT issues had been addressed. LP&L has been fully responsive to the CAT findings, submitting the balance of the responses in a timely fashion.
: 3. June 13, 1984 NRC Letter In a letter dated June 13, 1984, the NRC identified 23 issues for resolution.
: 3. June 13, 1984 NRC Letter In a {{letter dated|date=June 13, 1984|text=letter dated June 13, 1984}}, the NRC identified 23 issues for resolution.
LP&L management took inmediate decisive steps,gof extraordinary depth and scope, to investigate and resolve the 23 issues. LP&L immediately mobilized a large workforce that was eventually to devote over 1000 man-months of effort in resolving the 23 issues. Concurrently, by June 20, 1984, an external Tcsk Force of respected nuclear experts had been assembled to independently assess the adequacy of the issue resolutions, validate the information provided in the responses and assess their safety significance. The Task Force, operating independently of LP&L, reports directly to the President of LP&L and simultaneously submits its reports to the NRC.
LP&L management took inmediate decisive steps,gof extraordinary depth and scope, to investigate and resolve the 23 issues. LP&L immediately mobilized a large workforce that was eventually to devote over 1000 man-months of effort in resolving the 23 issues. Concurrently, by June 20, 1984, an external Tcsk Force of respected nuclear experts had been assembled to independently assess the adequacy of the issue resolutions, validate the information provided in the responses and assess their safety significance. The Task Force, operating independently of LP&L, reports directly to the President of LP&L and simultaneously submits its reports to the NRC.
A top LP&L management team was promptly established and dedicated solely to. resolution of the issues and administration of the program. The team reported directly to the Senior Vice-President Nuclear Operations, with personal oversight by the President and Chief Executive Officer of LP&L.
A top LP&L management team was promptly established and dedicated solely to. resolution of the issues and administration of the program. The team reported directly to the Senior Vice-President Nuclear Operations, with personal oversight by the President and Chief Executive Officer of LP&L.
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l
l
: 4. Issues 6 and 13 The Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L's proposed resolution of Issues 6 and 13, dealing with the dispositioning and accountability of Non-Conformance Reports (NCRs), is inadequate. As with the previous section of this contention, the Joint Intervenors appear concerned over the adoption of standard sampling techniques, although no specific objection has been raised.
: 4. Issues 6 and 13 The Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L's proposed resolution of Issues 6 and 13, dealing with the dispositioning and accountability of Non-Conformance Reports (NCRs), is inadequate. As with the previous section of this contention, the Joint Intervenors appear concerned over the adoption of standard sampling techniques, although no specific objection has been raised.
As described in the response to Issue 6 of the NRC's June 13, 1984 letter (LP&L Exhibit 8), LP&L reviewed approximately 98% of the site NCR numbers issued by Ebasco during the construction of Waterford 3.      The review consisted of several phases including a detailed review of over 650 NCRs (including all NCRs referenced by the Staff). As a minimum, each Ebasco NCR reviewed was re-evaluated to determine if: (1) the NCR was reviewed for safety significance (reportability under 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR21), (2) the disposition addressed the described discrepancy, and (3) the NCR had received the appropriate signatures. While limited deficiencies were identified, none was safety significant.
As described in the response to Issue 6 of the NRC's {{letter dated|date=June 13, 1984|text=June 13, 1984 letter}} (LP&L Exhibit 8), LP&L reviewed approximately 98% of the site NCR numbers issued by Ebasco during the construction of Waterford 3.      The review consisted of several phases including a detailed review of over 650 NCRs (including all NCRs referenced by the Staff). As a minimum, each Ebasco NCR reviewed was re-evaluated to determine if: (1) the NCR was reviewed for safety significance (reportability under 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR21), (2) the disposition addressed the described discrepancy, and (3) the NCR had received the appropriate signatures. While limited deficiencies were identified, none was safety significant.
Of the approximately 3700 dispositioned Mercury NCRs, about 1700 had previously been upgraded to Ebasco NCRs and were therefore subjected to routine Ebasco NCR review. The remaining Mercury NCRs were subject to several types of sample reviews as described in LP&L Exhibit 8.
Of the approximately 3700 dispositioned Mercury NCRs, about 1700 had previously been upgraded to Ebasco NCRs and were therefore subjected to routine Ebasco NCR review. The remaining Mercury NCRs were subject to several types of sample reviews as described in LP&L Exhibit 8.
These reviews were above the normal programmatic requirements for review of contractor deficiency reports and provided a confidence level of 95%
These reviews were above the normal programmatic requirements for review of contractor deficiency reports and provided a confidence level of 95%
Line 2,162: Line 2,162:
Dr. Ma's statements contained in JI Exhibit 60 at Attachment II, P. 2.
Dr. Ma's statements contained in JI Exhibit 60 at Attachment II, P. 2.
In fact, in the same document at pp 2-3 Dr. Ma reviewed the problems as evaluated by the staff consultant, Robert E. Philleo. Mr. Philleo's evaluation was provided to the Board on June 14, 1984 in the NRC staff's motion for an additional extension of time. Mr. Philleo's conclusion as stated by Dr. Ma's was "in short, the quality control problems were not significant enough to invalidate the original reinforced concrete basemat analysis and design". Id. It is therefore apparent, contrary to Joint Intervenors' assertion, that QA programs have been " factored" into evaluations of the basemat.
In fact, in the same document at pp 2-3 Dr. Ma reviewed the problems as evaluated by the staff consultant, Robert E. Philleo. Mr. Philleo's evaluation was provided to the Board on June 14, 1984 in the NRC staff's motion for an additional extension of time. Mr. Philleo's conclusion as stated by Dr. Ma's was "in short, the quality control problems were not significant enough to invalidate the original reinforced concrete basemat analysis and design". Id. It is therefore apparent, contrary to Joint Intervenors' assertion, that QA programs have been " factored" into evaluations of the basemat.
Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L has failed to maintain proper backfill records and lacked documentation of qualification of J.A. Jones inspectors as outlined in the NRC staff's letter of June 13, 1984 (Motion p. 42). As part of LP&L's extensive program to respond to the NRC's June 13, 1984 letter, LP&L has addressed both issues. With regard to backfill, LP&L has provided the staff with sufficient documentation on backfill records, along with a detailed review and analysis, to ensure that the backfill will perform its function with respect to structural design capability under seismic loads.              (LP&L Exhibit 19).          In responding to the NRC staff's concerns regarding the qualification of inspectors, (LP&L Exhibit 17), LP&L reviewed the qualifications of J.A. Jones inspectors who performed inspection on the basemat and soils. LP&L has shown that, for inspections performed by those individuals who were not verified to be qualified, other inspections were performed by qualified Ebasco inspectors.              This provided an independent confirmation by qualified inspectors of the adequacy of the construction activities.
Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L has failed to maintain proper backfill records and lacked documentation of qualification of J.A. Jones inspectors as outlined in the NRC staff's letter of June 13, 1984 (Motion p. 42). As part of LP&L's extensive program to respond to the NRC's {{letter dated|date=June 13, 1984|text=June 13, 1984 letter}}, LP&L has addressed both issues. With regard to backfill, LP&L has provided the staff with sufficient documentation on backfill records, along with a detailed review and analysis, to ensure that the backfill will perform its function with respect to structural design capability under seismic loads.              (LP&L Exhibit 19).          In responding to the NRC staff's concerns regarding the qualification of inspectors, (LP&L Exhibit 17), LP&L reviewed the qualifications of J.A. Jones inspectors who performed inspection on the basemat and soils. LP&L has shown that, for inspections performed by those individuals who were not verified to be qualified, other inspections were performed by qualified Ebasco inspectors.              This provided an independent confirmation by qualified inspectors of the adequacy of the construction activities.
Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L has misrepresented to the NRC its review of concrete records in that its re' view did nct identify the problems found by an Ebasco QA review team in 1983 (Motion p. 42).              This does not constitute misrepresentation by LP&L. See the discussion of the " missing concrete records" in response to allegation Item B(3)(c) .
Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L has misrepresented to the NRC its review of concrete records in that its re' view did nct identify the problems found by an Ebasco QA review team in 1983 (Motion p. 42).              This does not constitute misrepresentation by LP&L. See the discussion of the " missing concrete records" in response to allegation Item B(3)(c) .
Joint Intervenors allege that there are contradictions between information provided by LP&L's consultant for the non-destructive examination (NDE) of the basemat and the information contained in the BNL reports (Motion p. 43). LP&L's consultant, Muenow and Associates, characterizes the basemat cracks as variable in depth, with ranges from less than one foot in depth, to as low as the reinforcement mat on the
Joint Intervenors allege that there are contradictions between information provided by LP&L's consultant for the non-destructive examination (NDE) of the basemat and the information contained in the BNL reports (Motion p. 43). LP&L's consultant, Muenow and Associates, characterizes the basemat cracks as variable in depth, with ranges from less than one foot in depth, to as low as the reinforcement mat on the
Line 5,184: Line 5,184:
l        at Waterford 3 and to operate at up to 5% of full power to conduct low power testing. Upon obtaining a 5% power operating license, the Company will proceed with arrangements for NRC reviews toward obtaining l          the full power license consistent with the start.up and power ascension schedule. Nuclear generating units
l        at Waterford 3 and to operate at up to 5% of full power to conduct low power testing. Upon obtaining a 5% power operating license, the Company will proceed with arrangements for NRC reviews toward obtaining l          the full power license consistent with the start.up and power ascension schedule. Nuclear generating units
;          under construction have been expenencing delays,during this period not only as a result of the testing process i          but also as a result of regulatory delays and opposition before regulators, or otherwise, of anti. nuclear groups.
;          under construction have been expenencing delays,during this period not only as a result of the testing process i          but also as a result of regulatory delays and opposition before regulators, or otherwise, of anti. nuclear groups.
By letter dated June 13,1984, the NRC notined the Company that certain issues, including issues relating j          to the quali6 cations of certain quality control inspectors at Waterford 3, must be resolved prior to the issuance i          of the initial license. The Company has submitted a program plan to the NRC for the resolution of these issues and discussions with the NRC staff are continuing. In addition, the Company has engaged an independent consultant to conduct a program of ultrasonic testing of the Waterford 3 basemat. This program is for the purpose of providing final assurances to the NRC relative to the structural integrity of the plant's
By {{letter dated|date=June 13, 1984|text=letter dated June 13,1984}}, the NRC notined the Company that certain issues, including issues relating j          to the quali6 cations of certain quality control inspectors at Waterford 3, must be resolved prior to the issuance i          of the initial license. The Company has submitted a program plan to the NRC for the resolution of these issues and discussions with the NRC staff are continuing. In addition, the Company has engaged an independent consultant to conduct a program of ultrasonic testing of the Waterford 3 basemat. This program is for the purpose of providing final assurances to the NRC relative to the structural integrity of the plant's
:          concrete foundation. Finally, certain additional issues resulting from a recent NRC construction assessment team review of Waterford 3 are being resolved as part of the normal licensing process. The Company's assessment of recent discussions with the NRC staffconcerning the resolution of these issues is that the issuance
:          concrete foundation. Finally, certain additional issues resulting from a recent NRC construction assessment team review of Waterford 3 are being resolved as part of the normal licensing process. The Company's assessment of recent discussions with the NRC staffconcerning the resolution of these issues is that the issuance
,          of an operating license should not be exnected before possibly late August or September 1984. A September i          fuel loading will allow commercial operation in the Arst quarter of 1985. As construction costs are currently
,          of an operating license should not be exnected before possibly late August or September 1984. A September i          fuel loading will allow commercial operation in the Arst quarter of 1985. As construction costs are currently
Line 6,506: Line 6,506:
'                                perception that other matters (CAT. Task Force) required priority attention.
'                                perception that other matters (CAT. Task Force) required priority attention.
The exit interview program continues, and since May 22, 1984, five                            *
The exit interview program continues, and since May 22, 1984, five                            *
                         ,      concerns requiring responses have been identified.                      Reflecting t.te NRC staff's expression of concern in the June 13,1984 letter and LP&L's l                                own reanalysis, LP&L compiled a listing of these concerns in mo=oranda
                         ,      concerns requiring responses have been identified.                      Reflecting t.te NRC staff's expression of concern in the {{letter dated|date=June 13, 1984|text=June 13,1984 letter}} and LP&L's l                                own reanalysis, LP&L compiled a listing of these concerns in mo=oranda
!                                W3K84-1517 dated July 2, 1984 and W3K84-1453 dau.d July 3, L984 .LP&L has requested the Quality Team (see                              et II, below)      to obcain responses to these concerns.
!                                W3K84-1517 dated July 2, 1984 and W3K84-1453 dau.d July 3, L984 .LP&L has requested the Quality Team (see                              et II, below)      to obcain responses to these concerns.
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i 16-6

Latest revision as of 05:07, 24 September 2022

Response to Joint Intervenors 841108 Motion to Reopen Record & Admit Contentions Alleging QA Failures,Applicant Lack of Character & Competence to Operate Plant & Inadequate Review. Certificate of Svc Encl
ML20100B048
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 11/30/1984
From: Churchill B
LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE
To:
NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP)
Shared Package
ML20100B028 List:
References
CON-#484-399 OL, NUDOCS 8412040173
Download: ML20100B048 (415)
v • d • e


Text

{{#Wiki_filter:( y 5 Y DCCKETED November 30 (1984 

                                                                             'O$ DEC ~3 (10 55 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA            CTFICEcp NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION                            /

00CFE TJ!t. 

                                                                                        $    m
Wicy Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board
                                                                             --~...__     ,,

In the Matter of ) 

                                                       )

LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-382 OL 

                                                       )                                          f (Waterford Steam Electric Station,        )

Unit 3) APPLICANT'S ANSWER TO JOINT INTERVENORS' MOTION TO - REOPEN THE RECORD AND ADMIT THREE NEW CONTENTIONS On November 7, 1984, Joint Intervenors filed a motion to reopen the record in this proceeding to admit for litigatior. three contentions alleg-ing quality assurance failures, alleging Applicant's lack of character and competence to operate the Waterford 3 plant, and alleging inadequate staff review (" Motion to Reopen"). This motion constitutes the fifth attempt by . Joint Intervenors to reopen the record in this proceeding, and their second attempt to admit a new quality assurance contention.1/ 1/ See Motion to Open Quality Assurance Contention, dated February 20, 1984; Amended and Supplemental Motion to Reopen Contention 22, dated December 12, 1983; Motion to Reopen Contention, dated November 7, 1983; and Motion to Reopen Contention, dated July 22, 1983. 8412040173 041203 PDR ADOCK 05000382 G PDR

h ., s j The motion to reopen is an eleventh-hour potpourri of many alle-gations, often unsupported and repetitive, accompanied by 62 exhibits constituting many hundreds of pages of written material. Its' size not-idthstanding, th~e motion must be dismissed because 'it, falls far short of meeting the Commissions' standards for reopening a closed record, as well as those for late-filed contentions. It fails to raise a significant safety issue worthy of reopening a record long since closed, and it is dramatically and unabashedly untimely. First and foremost, however, the Appeal Board must dismiss the motion because it lacks jurisdiction to reopen the record on the basis of the issues raised by Joint Intervanors' three new contentions. i I. BACKGROUND The record in these proceedings was closed February 11, 1983. In the operating licence proceedings below, the Licensing Board issued a Partial Initial Decision in 1982, LBP-82-100, 16 NRC 1550, as modified, LBP-82-112, 16 NRC 1901, a second Partial Initial Decision, on May 26, 1983 LBP-83-27, 17 NRC 949. One month later, Joint Intervenors filed their l first of several motions to reopen that record. Since the record has been closed, this Appeal Board has affirmed both partial Initial Decisions, ALAB-753, 18 NRC 1321 (1983) and ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076 (1983), and has t . t dismissed three of Joint Intervenors' motions to reopen. A fourth motion to reopen is still under review. A motion filed on February 28, 1984, by Joint Intervenors. sought to-introduce a new quality assurance contention, but the motion so completely failed to comply in any respect with the Commission's requirements for 2 k

6 reopening that it was dismissed on the same day by the Appeal Board with permission to correct the deficiencies before any responsive pleadings were filed.2/ Memorandum and Order, February 28, 1984 (unpublished). After more than a month had passed, and on the very date the-filing was due, Joint Intervenors filed a request for a six-month extension of time. The exten-sion of time was unsupported by good cause, and was denied by the Board in its Memorandum and Order dated April 11, 1984 (unpublished). In that Order, the Appeal Board stated that in the event that Joint Intervenors trere able to substantiate their quality assurance concerns in six months they could, if the plant was licensed, seek relief from the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation by filing a petition under 10 CFR $2.206, or if a license had not issued and "if in the interim this adjudication has been reopened ori other grounds," the Joint Intervenors could file a " properly supported motion to reopen" (emphasis added). While Waterford has not yet received its license, neither has the record been reopened. Nevertheless, seven months later, Joint Intervenors have filed the instant motion to reopen the record. Joint Intervenors' notion not only again seeks to open a new contention on quality assurance, but also seeks to open a contention on management competence and a con-tantion on NRC's involvement in the licensing process. l 2,/ Since no responsive pleadings were filed, LP&L did not at that time argue, and the Appeal Board did not consider, whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the motion. i 3 N w

4 4 II. JURISDICTION The Appeal Board is without jurisdiction to grant Joint Intervenors' . instant motion to reopen the record in this proceeding. As a general matter, Appeal Boards lose jurisdiction over motions to reopen on new matters'once they have reviewed and affirmed the initial decisions of the Licensing Boards below. See Public Service Company of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 and 2), ALAB-530, 9 NRC 261, 262 (1979); Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-513, 8 NRC 694, 695 (1978). In this proceed-ing, the Licensing Board issued two Partial Initial Decisions. The first, concerning certain emergency planning and synergism contentions, was affirmed by the Appeal on Board June 29, 1983, in ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076.3/ The record was closed on February 11, 1983 prior to the Licensing Board completed its deliberations with its second Partial Initial Decision, concerning the narrow discrete issue of Waterford's emergency planning brochure, which authorized the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to issue an operating license to Applicant. The Appeal Board affirmed this decision sua sponte on December 9, 1983 ALAB-753, 18 NRC 1321.4/ With its review of the Licensing Board's initial decisions complete, the Appeal Board no longer has jurisdiction to entertain the motion to open 1 the three new contentions proposed by Joint Intervenors. The sole issue that remains before the Board is the basement crack issue which was first raised by a motion to reopen in July, 1983, before the Board had terminated 3/ The Commission declined to review ALAB-732 and the decision became final agency action on September 7,1983. See Memorandum from the Commis-sion to the Board and Parties, September 14, 1983. 4/ The time within which the Commission may act to review ALAB-753 has been extended until further order of Commission. Order of June 1, 1984. 4 Nt i

r_ b its review of the second Partial Initial Decision.5/ Where the Appeal Board has relinquished jurisdiction over a cause, except for limited purposes, and where the appellate process has otherwise has been completed, the board cannot admit new contentions unrelated to those. purposes. Florida Power and Light Company (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 2), ALAB-579, 11 NRC 223, 226 (1980). This Appeal Board has already dismissed a motion to reopen the record in this preceding due to lack of jurisdiction.6/ See ALAB-753, 18 NRC at 1329. The Appeal Board had before it at that time the motion to reopen on the basement issue, and the Board stated that it would have lacked juris-diction over that issue as well if the basement motion had not been filed prior to the time the Appeal Board had completed its review of the Licens-ing Board's second Partial Initial Decision. Id. at 1330, n.14. Accordingly, now that the Appeal Board has completed its review of the second Partial Initial Decision, it lacks jurisdiction over the three new contentions proposed by Joint Intervenors. "[0]nce an appeal board has wholly terminated its review of an initial decision ... its jurisdiction over the proceeding comes to an end." Virginia Electric and Power Company (North Anna Nuclear power Station Units 1 and 2) ALAB-551, 9 NRC 704, 708 (1979). Here, a Licensing Board has heard and decided all of the issues put before it. The Appeal Board has affirmed both of the Licensing Board's decisions in their entirety. All but the Licensing Board's decision on the narrow issue of the emergency planning brochure have become final agency 5/ See Joint Intervenors' Motion to Reopen Contention, July 22, 1983. 6/ Joint Intervenors' second motion to re-open (dated November 7, 1983) sought to reopen the synergism contention. 5 (

I e action.7/ The only matter over which this Board has retained jurisdiction the reopen on is the basement issue. The Joint Intervenors seek to reopen the record and introduce three new contentions (concerning an alleged breakdown in quality assurance, the integrity of LP&L management, and failure of the staff to live up to its statutory obligations).8_/ None of these contentions bears a reasonable relationship to the cracked basement issue.9/ Therefo , the motion must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. III. STANDARDS FOR REOPENING THE RECORD This Appeal Board is intimately familiar with the three-pronged standard the proponent of a reopening motion must satisfy. The motion must be timely, it must address a significant safety (or environmental) issue, and the motion must demonstrate that a different result would have been reached had the newly proffered material been considered initially. Louisiana Power & Light Company (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-753, 18 NRC 1321, 1322 (1983). Joint Intervenors' Motion to Reopen falls far short of meeting these standards. 7/ Even if the Commission should, at some point, remand that issue, the remand would be limited in scope and would not convert or restore to the Appeal Board the justification to broaden the issues before it to embrace

new discrete matters. Id. at 708.

8/ Motion to Reopen at 3. 9/ The basement is discussed in Joint Intervenors Motion to Reopen, but the discussion covers only how Applicant's activities related to review of the basement allegedly adds support to Joint Intervenors' proposed QA and management integrity contentions. See Motion to Reopen at 39-44. As-sertions, if any. by Joint Intervenors in the Motion to Reopen related to the basement which are unrelated to the three contentions they seek to raise should properly be addressed in their filings on the pending basement motion. 6 C___________

k 4 A. Timeliness. 

                                           "For a reopening motion to be timely presented, the novant must show that the issue sought to be raised could not have been raised earli-er." Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-775, 19 NRC 1361, 1366 (1984). This test places a
                               " heavy burden" on the novant. Kansas cas & Electric Company (Wolf Creek Generating Station No. 1), ALAB-462, 7 NRC 320 (1978). Joint Intervenors                       !

have not only failed to meet this standard, their submission clearly indicates that in several cases they possessed and withheld information which could have been presented almost one and one-half years ago. It is not insignificant that the information was combined with a plethora of other stale allegations--some based on documents going back as far as 1975--and then not filed until a matter of days af ter Applicant announced that Waterford 3 was physically complete and ready for fuel loading.j0/ A r 

    ,                         motion to reopen the record at this point in time, almost two years after the record was closed, with its potential for delay in plant operation, comes when the utility is at its maximum financisi vulnerability.                        Such cciduct makes a mockery of the Coumission's administrative hearing process and should not be tolerated.11/

3 i 10/ On October 31, 1984 Applicant notified the NRC staff that the plant was complete and ready for fuel loading. This was submitted in conjunction with Applicant's request for authority to 1 cad fuel and perfera pre-criticality testing. The letter was transmitted to the Appeal Board, with a copy to Joint Intervenors, on November 2,1984. 11,/ The eleventh-hour appearance with a flurry of allegations would appear to be consistent with the recent pattern of conduct employed by CAP, Joint Intervenors' attorneys, in other proceedings. Just two days before the October 4, 1984 Commission meeting to vote on the issuance a full power license in the Calloway proceeding, well after the record had been closed 7 k

The focal point of Joint Intervenors' quality assurance contention are.three anonymous affidavits attached to their motion as Exhibits 8, 12, and 27 (hereinafter, all references to exhibits attached to Joint-Intervenors' notion shall be sited as "JI Exhibit ").12/ These affidavits are cited in the Motion to Roopen as support for some 22 separate allegations. In addition, some of the affidavits raise additional concerns not specifically mentioned in the body of the motion. These affidavits were signed in September and early October of 1984, but the Legal Director for CAP (Government Accountability Project, representing Joint Intervenors) has attested that he drafted the three affidavits in July,1983 after previous interviews with the affiants.13/ Affidavit of Thomas M. Devine, November 5th, 1984 (attached to Joint Intervenors' Motion for Protective Order, November 6, 1984). It is therefore clear that GAP possessed the information for almost's year and one-half before it filed the instant motion that serves as the basis for their quality assurance contention.14/ (cont.) and after the administrative appellate review process had been completed, GAP filed a large number of allegations with the NRC. In Diablo Canyon, GAP appeared as new counsel for the intervenors in a last minute motion to reopen the record on the basis of 139 construction QC allegations. This occurred after the hearings had been completed and after the Appeal Board had denied a similar motion. See Pacific Gas & Electric

  • Company ALAB-775, supra 12/ The Applicant received versions of the affidavits which were edited to conceal the identity of affiants. The Appeal Board received unedited copies of the affidavits.

13/ Mr. Devine's affidavit does not state when tKe interview took place. 14/ Information withheld for tactical or other purposes for a year, six months, or even one month, would be equally objectionable. 8 L

Absolutely no reason is offered by Joint Intervenors to justify the witholding of that information until this late date. This is troublesome in light of the fact that GAP had this information in its possession in 

   .                           ~                                                        ,
       , February 1984 when Joint Intervenors filed their first motion to reopen with a quality assurance contention and asked for six months in which to support it.

Equall-/ egregious is the withholding by Joint Intervenors from both the staff and Appeal Board of information whicts it now alleges impunes LP&L's character and competence. In May 1984 (almost six months ago), Gary Groesch, lead representative of Joint Intervenors, notified the NRC that he had information allegedly relating to the " completeness and/or truthful-ness. . ." of items in LP&L's April 27, 1984 letter to the NRC. See Letter, Darrell G. Eisenhut to Gary Groesch, August 17, 1984 attached as LP&L Exhibit 1. Mr. Groesch failed to provide that information to either the NRC Staff or to the Appeal Board, despite an express written request that he "promptly provide to the staff any information (that he might) have perrsining to the safety of the Waterford Unit 3 facility". Id. ac 2. Now, six months after Mr. Groesch indicated that he had the information, Joint Intervenors seek to reopen the record and introduce a contention on management competence in part because they allege that "LP&L made inaccu-rate and misleading statements in its April 27, 1984, letter to the NRC." Motion to Reopen at 21. Item B(3). This conduct is unconscionable, and the "new" information irexcusably untimely.

  • There are other examples of pointed refusals to reveal information until this late date. Attempts to meet with GAP over the summer about 9

L

i their concerns were rebuffed.J5/ and an NRC request of GAP to provide any information that they had relating to Waterford of potential safety signif-. icancewasignored.J_6) Intervenors, as parties to this proceeding, have an ongoing obligation to conduct themselves in a fair'and professional manner. See 10 C.F.R. 2.713(a). It is unacceptable for Joint Intervenors to withhold information that they allege to be of potential safety signifi-cance from the Appeal Board and the parties in order to wait for a more tactically opportune time to reveal it. Zealous advocacy does not include the withholding of relevant factual information. Consumers Power Company (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-458, 7 NRC 155, 172, n. 64 (1978). Another significant example of untimeliness centers on the use of the NRC's June 13, 1984 letter as a basis for allegations. That letter identified issues requiring resolution for licensing, and Joint Intervenors have adopted them in one form or another, as allegations in the motion.J7/ < These issues were known by Joint Intervenors at that time, and there is no conceivable reason why they waited nearly five months, until the plant was ready for licensing, to bring them forward.1,8) 8 The other exhibits submitted by Joint Intervenors in support of their motion were also untimely. The majority of these documents are more 15/ Letter, Saul Levine to Billie Garde, August 24, 1984 (LP&L Exhibit 77. 16/ Letter, Darrell G. Eisenhut to Lynne Bernabei, Atigust 15, 1984 (LP&L Ehibit 3). 17/ See Motion to Reopen Items A(1)(c), A(8)(c), A(10)(a) A(10)(c). AT10)(fEB(3)(a), B(3)(d), B(3)(e), C, D(1), D(2), D(3), and D(4). J8/ Joint intervenors were aware of the substance of the issues even earlier, on June 8, 1984, when they were announced at a public NRC meeting. 1 A representative of GAP was present at that meeting. See transcript of June 8 1984 meeting, Joint Intervenors' Exhibit 49 at 47-50. 10 t_____. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _

o than two years old and almost twenty-five of them are over five years old. No reason is given by Joint Intervenors to demonstrate why the issues allegedly raised by these old documents "could not have been raised earlier," Pacific Electric Company, ALA3-775, supra. - It is significant that Joint Intervenors have not even attempted to defend the timeliness of any of the exhibits upon which their allegations are based. Their arguments, Motion to Reopen at 46-48, 59, tacitly concede that the individual allegations are untimely; Joint Intervenors certainly have not even attempted to meet the requirement of showing that any individual allegation eculd not have been raised earlier. The only justifications relied on by Joint Intervenors to support untinely issues they now seek to raise are two obscure theories for their late filings, both of which are unsupported by law and both which would essentially nullify the Commission's timeliness requirement. First, Joint Intervenors attempt to justify their proposed manage-ment character and competence contention by asserting that they are "alleg-ing a pattern of failings which only within the last year have become evident," Motion to Reopen at first page 46, and that they filed their motion "only after they became convinced that LP&L does not possess the necessary character and integrity to run Waterford 3 and the NRC Staff has not been effective in ensuring that LP&L develops that capacity prior to issuance of a licence." Hotion to Reopen at second page 47. This rational is totally inconsistent with the timeliness standards ! for reopening a record. The period in which a motion to reopen can be l l filed in a timely manner does not center on the point in time when a party 1 l becomes " convinced" that he has a basis for his motion. The test for timeliness of a motion to reopen is objective -- the operative factor is 11

the age of the information. If Joint Intervenors theory was accepted, it would effectively eviscerate the timeliness requirement -- a motion would become timely whenever an intervenor chose to decide that some sort of 

                                     " pattern" had emerged.19/

Joint Intervenors second theory is even less justifiable. They assert that they " relied on the NRC staff's intensive inspection and reform efforts... " that they did not move to reopen until the staff " appeared to falter" and that their '; prior reliance on the NRC staff's effort consti-tutes ' good cause' for late filing." Motion to Reopen at 47. This justification for late filing is fatuous, and contrary to law. It would allow intervenors to move to reopen a hearing at any point in time simply by stating that they had been inactive up to the time of filing because they were relying on the NRC to represent their interests. As with their earlier " pattern of failings" theory, this justification also eviscerates the Commission's timeliness requirement. Joint Intervenors have inexplicably cited Puget Sound & Light Company (Skagit Nuclear Power Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-559, 10 NRC 162, 165 (1979) in support of their assertion that prior reliance on the NRC staff's efforts is good cause for late filing. That case is completely antagonistic to Joint Intervenors' assertion. In Puget Sound, the Appeal Board was faced with a late petition for leave to intervene filed by three 19/ Joint Intervenors have failed to establish or even identify the specific " failings" which they allege constitute the " pattern" they ha"e suddenly discovered, or to explain why any such individual " failings" could not have been identified and raised earlier. 12

Indian tribes in the Skagit construction permit proceeding. Joint Inter-venors have adopted the rationale put forward by the tribes for their late intervention. Contrary to what Joint Intervenors claim, the Appeal Board flatly rejected the tribes' explanation. The Board, quoting from its earlier opinion on the tribes' lateness excuse (ALAB-522, 10 NRC 1 at 9,

10) stated:
                ... it is not enough for the tribes to simply assert that they were lulled into a false sense of security by the appraisals of impact given them by Interior or reflected in the FES prepared by the NRC staff.

10 NRC at 165. The Board went on to reject the tribes' petition for late intervention, adding that to do otherwise "would pose a clear and unacceptable threat to the integrity of the entire adjudicatory process." The Appeal Board concluded with a warning about admitting a late party on the basis of reliance on others: More specifically, persons potentially affected by the licensing action under scrutiny would be encouraged simply.co sit back and observe the course of the proceeding from the sidelines unless and until they became persuaded that their interest was not being . adequately represented by the existing parties and thus that their own active (if belated) involvement was required. Id. at 173. This warning applies equally to Joint Intervenors' justification for lateness in this proceeding. It is expected that "an individual interested in the outcome of a particular proceeding will act to protect his interest within the established time limits." Id. Having failed to do so, Joint Intervenors cannot now justify the lateness of their motion on the basis that they have relied on the NRC. Joint Intervanors' motion totally falls to meet the Commission's standards for timeliness. The three anonymous affidavits that anchor Joint Intervanors' motion were prepared almost a year and a-half before they were 13 u

1 l l filed and the allegations raised in the affidavits and other information in possession of the Joint Intervenors were withheld despite subsequent requests from Applicant and the NRC. Most of the other allegations are based'on documents that date from last summer back to 1975, yet Joint Intervenors make no showing as to why their concerns could not have been raised earlier. Joint Intervenors' asserted justifications for late filing are totally unacceptable. The motion clearly must be denied. E. Significant Safety Issues That Night Have Caused a Different Result Had the Newly Proffered Material Been C,onsidered Initially. In order to reopen the record, Joint Intervenors must demonstrate that they have revised a significant safety issue that might have caused a different result had their information been considered initially. The Commission has stated that the proponent of a motion to reopen the record must present "significant new evidence ... that materially affects the decision," not " bare allegations or simple submissions of new contentions." Pacific Cas & Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-81-5, 13 NRC 361, 362-363 (1981). The Appeal Board has inter-preted this requirement to mean that the information supporting a motion to reopen must exceed the particularity required by the basis and specificity requirements applicable to contentions (10 C.F.R. 2.714(b). The material must "be tantamount to evidence" and must possess the attributes set set forth in 10 C.F.R. 2.743(c) defining admissible evidence for adjudicatory proceedings. Pacific Cas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon) Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-775, 19 NRC 1361, 1366-67 (1984). "[T]he new evidence supporting the motion must be " relevant, material, and reliable." Id. 14 m

c Joint Intervenors have failed to carry their " heavy burden" in establishing the safety significance of the issues raised in their motion. Joint Intervenors' proposed quality assurance contention is based on p . . numerous allegations that are without factual support, are factually wrong, j are based on a misreading of their own exhibits, or are derived from old issues that have been previously identified and resolved. Joint Intervenors proposed management character and competence contention is based on allegations that are either unsupported by evidence or inaccurate. Joint Intervenors third proposed contention is ill-defined and is in any case supported only by naked allegations that are incompetent as evidence of safety significance. Having failed to raise an issue of safety

significance, their motion must be denied.

l

1. Contention on Quality Assurance.

Joint Intervenors proposed quality assurance contention encompasses twelve general allegations broken down into numerous sub-allegations. In order to raire a significant safety issue, Joint Intervenors' " supporting information must be more than mere allegations;" it must be " tantamount to l l evidence." Id. Therefore, Joint Intervenors must support each of their sub-allegations with relevant, reliable, and factually accurate informa-tion. They havn failed to do so. In addition, Joint Intervenors must establish that their allegations raise significant safety problems. Their scattergun attack, listing numerous alleged problems with less regards to substaace and evident 11ry support than to sheer volume, is insufficient to i i support the opening of a new quality assurance contention. As the Appeal Board stated in Pacific Cas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nucioar Power Plant Units 1 and 2), ALAB-756, 18 NRC 1341 (1983), with regard to reopening the record to introduce a new quality assurance contention: 15

Although a program of construction quality. assurance is specifically designed to catch construction errors, it-is unreasonable to expect the program to uncover all errors. In short, perfection in plant construction and the facility construction quality assurance p'rogram'is not a precondition for a license under either the Atomic Energy Act or the Commission's regulations. What is required instead is reasonable assurance that the plant, as built, can and will be operated without endangering the public health and safety. In order for new evidence to raise a "significant safety issue" for purposes of 

               . reopening the record, it must establish either that uncorrected construction errors endanger safe plant operation, or that there has been a breakdown of the quality assurance program sufficient to raise legitimate doubt as to the plant's capability of being operated safely. See Union Electric Co. (Callaway Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-740, 18 NRC 343, 346 (1983).

Id. at 1345. Joint Intervenors have totally failed to meet these stan-dards. Applicant's specific responses to numerous individual allegations and sub-allegations are presented in affidavit form in the attached "Re-sponses to Specific Allegations in Joint Intervenors' Motion to Roopen the Record" (hereinafter referred to as " Affidavit"). As discussed therein, Joint Intervenors' quality assurance allegations are either totally without 

     . factual support, are factually wrong, are based on a misreading of the cited exhibits, or derive from old issues that have been previously iden-tified and resolved.

Joint Intervenors rely on three anonymous affidavits to support a substantial number of their QA allegations. (See JI Exhibits 8, 12, and' 27). Their anonymity renders them incompetent to be considered as evidence 16 u

in support of Joint Intervenars' allegations. In order to show that new evidence would materially affect the outcome of the decisions below, it t must be " relevant, material, and reliable." Pacific Gas and Electric Company, ALAB-775, supra,-19 NRC at 1366-67. LP&L has not been able to adequately address whether or not the affidavits and the information they contain meet these standards (particularly the reliability standard) without the name of affiants.20/ As the Appeal Board stated in Pacific ' Gas and Electric Company, in denying a motion to reopen: Also embodied in the reliability requirement of 10 C.F.R. 2.743(c) is the motion that evidence presented in affidavit form must be given by competent individuals with knowledge of the facts or experts in the disciplines appropriate to the issues raised. Because the competence (or even the existence) of unidentified individuals is impossible to determine, statements of anonymous persons--so called anonymous affidavits--cannot be considered as evidence in support of a motion (emphasis added). l Id. at 1367, n. 18. Therefore, any allegations that rely entirely on the i anonymous allegations are unsupported by competent evidence and must be 1 l dismissed.21/ The other allegations made by Joint Intervenors that partially rely on the affidavits must be wholly supported by the other I evidence offered by Joint Intervenors or they must also fa11.22/  ! 3 i  ! I i 20/ The provision of unedited versions of the affidavits to the Appeal l Board does not cure the problem with anonymity. Neither LP&L nor the staff are able to adequately determine or make arguments about the competency of

the affiants, or the reliability and significance of the affiants' alle-l gations.

i' 21/ The following allegations rely entirely on the anonymous affidavits:  : Items A(1)(g) A(1)(m), A(2)(d), A(2)(e), A(;)(f), A(4)(e), A(6)(b), ' A(6)(c). A(7)(a), A(7)(d), A(7)(e), A(7)(f), A(8)(d) A(8)(e), A(9)(a), i j A(9)(b), A(9)(c). ) 22/ The following allegations partially rely on the anonymous affida- ' 2 vits: Items A(1)(c) A(1)(d), A(1)(n) A(1)(o), A(1)(p). f

17 t.
      -   _ _ _        . _ _ _ _ . - . _ , , , - , . - - - - -                    -~-,,-,-..__.,_--~m._,_,--,.--,-                        ,

r l s i l Many of Joint Intervenors' allegations are clearly unsupported by the exhibits that Joint Intervenors have cited for factual support.23/ For example Item A(3)(c), Motion to reopen at 8, alleges that LP&L lacked a records index as required by ANSI N.45.2.9 and LP&L PSAR. This allegation is allegedly supported by JI Exhibits 25 and 26, but these exhibits contain no reference to a lack of a records index that may be required by the PSAR or ANSI N45.2.9. In fact, LP&L has such a records index. See Affidavit, Response to Item A(3)(c). Also, Item A(4)(c) . Motion to Reopen at 9, alleges that LP&L failed, even after notification, to ensure administrative procedures were instituted to cover the interface between on-site Waterford 3 staff and the off-site support group. The only factual support offered by Joint Intervenors is a reference to JI Exhibit

1. An examination of this exhibit revealed no reference to the specific allegation stated in the motion. See Affidavit, Response to Item A(4)(c).

There are numerous other examples, all of which are discussed in Attachment

1. Allegations that are unsupported by the exhibits have no factual basis. They therefore do not constitute evidence sufficient to support Joint Intervenors' attempt to open a new contention.

Not only are many of Joint Intervenors allegations unsupported, some of Joint Intervenors Q/A allegations are actually contradicted by the 23/ Joint Intervenors have rarely identified the specific passages in their lengthy exhibits which they claim supports their allegations. Where lengthy exhibits have been cited, LP&L Applicant has carefully read through the materials and has responded to relevant passages when found. Given the large amount of irrelevant material contained in their exhibits, the burden is on Joint Intervenors, not the Board or other parties, to " separate the wheat from the staff and to represent the material in an organized and persuasive manner". Pacific Gas and Electric Company, ALAB-775, supra 19 NRC at 1368, n. 22. 18

documents set forth as factual support. Joint Intervenors Item A(3)(b), Motion to Reopen at 8, claims that LP&L lacked oversight of procurement activities, including subcontractor documentation. Joint Intervenors reference only JI Exhibit 29 as support. That exhibit is a letter from an LP&L Vice President to Ebasco instructing that a procurement under consideration be rejected. It therefore refutes rather than supports the allegation. See Affidavit, Response to Item A(3)(b). Another example is Item A(1)(a)(iii), Motion to Reopen at 4, where Joint Intervenors alleged that Construction had effective control over both the day-to-day operations of the QA department and the major policy decisions. However, JI Exhibit 4, the only document cited for support of the allegation, explicitly defines and describes the authority and independence of the LP&L Q/A Organization, and clearly indicates how the LP&L QA program established and maintained independence of its Q/A Organization. See Affidavit, Response to Item A(1)(a)(iii). Obviously these allegations, and the other allegations described in the Affidavit which are contradicted by the exhibits Joint Intervenors have cited for support, are groundless and fail to raise a significant safety issue. As discussed in more detail in the Affidavit, many of the alle-gations are simply factually wrong. For example, Joint Intervenors' Item A(1)(o), Motion to Reopen at 6, claims that LP&L provided no QC coverage for work done on the night shift. This claim is allegedly supported by JI Exhibits 1, 8, and 22. In fact, as the records of both Mercury and Ebasco demonstrate, both organizations provided QC coverage to monitor safe-ty-related work activities performed by construction forces on the night shift. JI Exhibits 1 and 22 have nothing to do with QC coverage, and JI 19

Exhibit 8 is nothing more than a demonstrably false allegation by an anonymous affiant. See Affidavit, Response to Item A(1)(o). Joint Intervenors' Item A(3)(d), Motion to Reopen at 8, alleging that LP&L maintained a confidential records system'to conceal embarrassing documents that discussed quality assurance, is also wrong (in addition to being completely unsupported by the exhibits). LP&L has never maintained a confidential records system outside of the formal records system. JI Exhibits 15 and 30, cited by Joint Intervenors as support for their allega-tion, are records which were either simply not secret (and were maintained in the formal system) or were labelled confidential but nonetheless were maintained in the LP&L system and remain available for NRC review. See Affidavit, Response to Item A(3)(d). Allegations of this type lack the requisite accuracy to support Joint Intervenors contentions. It is apparent that Joint Intervenors scattergun approach has prevented them from thoroughly reviewing issues which they allege to be supported by their exhibits. Many allegations are repetitive of earlier allegations rade in their motion.24/ In many cases, Joint Intervenors have mischaracterized the contents of the exhibits cited in support of their allegations. For example, Item A(2)(c), Motion to Reopen at 7, contains an allegation that LP&L failed to ensure the identification and correction of a significant errors in design drawings including incorrect design numbers, lack of current revisions, and mislabeling of components. JI Exhibit 25 is 24/ Compare: Item A(3)(b), Motion to Reopen at 8, with Item AT3)(f)(Id.); Item A(b)(c)(Id. at 10) with Item A(7)(c)(Id. at 11); Item A(1)(0)(Id. at 6) with Item A(8)(a)(Id. at 11); Item A(3)(c)(Id. at 8) with Item A(11)(a)(Id. at 14). 20

r-cited as the basis for this claim. JI Exhibit 25 references clerical 

      -errors in spelling and cross references which were discussed in JI Exhibit 25 and ultimately dispositioned. Contrary to Joint Intervenors' con-tention, such errors are unrelated to the substantive content of the drawings and have no safety significance. See Affidavit, Response to Items A(2)(c) and A(3)(g). Joint Intervenors must do more than simply assert that a problem is "significant" in order to establish that it raises a significant safety issue. It is unacceptable for Joint Intervenors to claim that a significant issue has been raised without attempting to explore the substance of their own assertion.

In many cases, Joint Intervenors have simply combed through NRC and LP&L documents and based allegations on issues which have been identified in the past by NRC or Applicant. In all such cases, the issues have been addressed and, if warranted, corrective action has been taken. Joint Intervenors have failed to mention this aspect of such allegations. Through implementation of their respective QA/QC and-inspection programs, both NRC and LP&L have and will continue to find and resolve problems of various degrees of significance throughout the lifetime of the plant. This , is part of the regulatory process. It is neither the role not the respon-sibility of the Appeal Board to police the resolution of issues discussed in the normal course by the NRC or Applicant. It is misleading and insufficient for Joint Intervenors to lacch on to exampics of such findings and to imply that the issues have not been resolved by failing to mention their disposition. For example, Item A(1)(1), Motion to Reopen at 6, alleges that Ebasco project personnel and auditors were not adequately trained, citing JI Exhibits 18, 19, 20. All of these exhibits relate to audit findings in the 1976-77 timeframe. In 21

o each case, the audit findings were addressed, closed out and action taken when needed. These problems were identified and dispositioned over six years ago. See Affidavit, Response to Item A(1)(1). By failing to address the resciutien of the issues which had been identified by Applicant, or NRC inspections, Joint Intervenors have fallen far short of meeting their burden to demonstrate that the issues have safety significance and would have resultad in a different result in the procsedings below. Each of Joint Intervenors allegations are addressed in more detail in the Affidavit. As discussed above, the allegations relating to Joint Intervenors QA contention are incompetent to support reopening the record because they either are unsupported by evidence, are factually wrong, are based on a misreading of cited exnibits, or derive from old issues that have been previously identified and resolved. Many suffer from more than one of these defects. Joint Intervenors have failed to demonstrate that they have raised a significant safety issue which would have caused a different result at the hearings below had the material been conside .1 inicia11y. Accordingly their motion to reopen the record to introduce this contention must be dismissed.

2. Joint Intervenors' Management Competence Contention Joint Intervanors' second proposed contention is that LP&L lacks the necessary character and competence to operate Waterford 3. Motion to Reopen at 15. In support of their contention, Joint Intervenors recite allegations in several areas encompassing alleged improprieties dating back to 1981. As discussed below, none of these allegations raise a significant safety issue and none supports the conclusion that LP&L lacks the requisite character and competence.

22

(a) OI Investigation Joint Intervenors argue that the existence of an investig& tion by the NRC's Office of Investigation (OI) is evidence in support of their contention that LP&L "does not have the necessary character and compe-tence." Motion to Reopen at 15-16. This speculative and amorphous argument cannot support Joint Intervenors' efforts to reopen the record. The OI's investigation is by its very nature indeterminate. It is conducted solely for the purpose of 

   .determing whether or nst a substantive problem exists. Indeed, at page 6 of the meeting transcript cited by Joint Intervenors in support of its argument (JI Exhibit 46), the Director of OI stated that OI "[had] not reached any conclusions or recommendations or anything of that nature at this point." Until a finding is made, the veracity of the allegations that instigated the investigation cannot be presumed. At this point in time, the specific nature of the allegations and the persons who may be involved are unknown to LP&L, and Joint Intervenors have failed to provide further enlightenment.

Without the names of the persons under investigation, without , knowing the substance of the investigations detail, and without even knowing if the allegations have any merit,- it is impossible for either the intervenors, LP&L or the Board to come up with.the substantive evidence needed to support this allegation. Joint Intervenors naked assertion that LP&L management is involved does not rise to the level-of reliable evidence and therefore cannot serve as a basis for their management competence contention. 23

Joint Intervenors' statement that LP&L " admitted that management is potentially involved or targeted in the allegations being investigated, and verified to some degree, by OI investigators" is flatly wrong. Motion at 16, citing JI Exhibit 46 at 8-9, 32. LP&L sought the meeting with NRC officials to determine if there were any individuals under investigation who were involved in LPiL's then-current program to respond to NRC's outstanding issues, so that such a situation could be avoided. LP&L did not then and does not n9w have any reason to believe that any of its management is under investigation. A reading of the transcript of the July 13 meeting demonstrates the singular commitment, sin:erity and involvement of top LP&L management. The president of LP&L provided his personal assurance chat LP&L would cooperate fully both in assuring the integrity of the program for responding to NRC issues and in the ongoing OI fnvestigation. JI Exhibit 46 at 7-9, 23. Contrary to Joint Intervenors' assertion, the type of high level management efforts evidenced by the July 13 meeting is a persuasive demonstration that LP&L management does indeed possess the necessary character, integrity and competence to successfully and safely operate the Waterford 3 plant. , (b) Financial Reports Joint Intervenors' motion next asserts that LP&L lacks character and competence because ic allegedly made a number of " misstatements and mis-leading statements" in financial documents filed with the SEC. This allegation is also with merit. The allegation centers on statements pertaining to the licensing status of Waterford 3. As discussed in detail in the Affidavit,-Response to Item B.2, none of the statements identified by Joint Intervenors was untrue or misleading at the time it was made. j Joint Intervenors have either mischaracterized the statements, quoted them i i 24 l 

                                   .~.. ._-         __ _._ _ _ _ . _ . . . _ _ _

   'out of context or have relied on the hindsight of subsequent events to assert inaccuracies in the statements. In addition, contrary to the implication of Joint Intervenors, the financial documents included statements that reflected the uncertainty in the regulatory process.

As an example, Joint Intervenors state in their motion at 18 that a May 25, 1984 LP&L prospectus stated that LP&L " anticipated that Waterford 3 would be granted a license to load fuel and operate up to five percent power in late May, 1984". Joint Intervenors claim that tFis statement was inaccurate because the NRC Staff had already informed LP&L that as a result of a Special Task Force inspection at Waterford, it would require LP&L to resolve prior to fuel loading those allegations which had been confirmed and were considered of potential safety significance" (citing a Transcript of a June 8, 1984 NRC meeting, JI Exhibit 49). Joint Intervenors also state that a May 14, 1984 NRC inspection report also showed that the state-ment was misleading. Motion to Reopen at 18. Joint Intervenors have seriously mischaracterized the statement in the prospectus. The statement in the prospectus was that it was anticipat-ed that Waterford 3 would be complete and ready for fuel loading by the and of May, not, as Joint Intervenors contend, that Waterford 3 would be granted a license. In fact, the prospectus contained (as did the other SEC filings) qualifying language reflecting the possibility of delay due to regulatory uncertainty. Also, Joint Intervenors' allegation that LP&L knew that fuel loading would be delayed before the filing as a result of the meeting on June 8 could not possibly be true. The meeting took place after the filing. LP&L did not know at the time of the filing what the NRC Task Force had concluded. As for the May 14 inspection report, LP&L had already 25

f developed an action plan for response to the inspection items before receiving the formal report from the NRC, and had completed a large number 4 of those task items, and was close to completion on the remainder when the

report issued. Based on the small number of minor rework items required up to that time, LP&L believed that the completion of any required inspection and reworks could be accomplished in short order.

In short, LP&L's statements were not misleading. The statements reflected LP&L's best understanding of the situation at the time they were made, and they were accompanied by qualifications reflecting regulatory uncertainties. The statements were mischaracterized and taken out of context by Joint Intervenors. The allegations concerning financial state-ments have been shown to be inaccurate and unsupported, and cannot serve as a basis for Joint Intervenors' proposed management competence contention. (c) April 27 Letter In their motion at 21-23, Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L made inaccurate and misleading statements in its April 27, 1984 letter respond-ing to various issues identified by the NRC. As a result of additional, 4 more extensive investigations conducted by LP&L subsequent to its April 27 letter yielded additional information not previously available. As discussed fully in the Affidavit, Response to Items B(3)(a)-B(3)(e), however, any inconsistencies between the April 27 letter and subsequently developed information were unintentional. The speciousness of the allegation that the April 27 letter reflects adversely on the character and I competence of LP&L is revealed by setting forth the context in which the April 27, 1984 was written. 26

On April 2, 1984,:the NRC staff asked LP&L to respond to 39 issues which reflected allegations the NRC had received primarily over the previ-ous several months. See JI Exhibit 53. The letter, which for the most part did not contain specifics of the allegations, requested an expeditious response in light of LP&L's schedule then in effect. LP&L responded on. April 27, 1984 (JI Exhibit 54). The response represented the best informa-tion available to LP&L at that time, given the severe time constraints and 

        . considering the lack of specifics about the allegations.

The NRC's formal follow-up came in its June 13, 1984 letter (JI Exhibit 9) which identified 23 issues for resolution by LP&L. LP&L's 

                                                                                        ,4 responses to that letter were based on an extensive, far reaching, and detailed program of investigation which yielded formally serified informa-tion which was not available when LP&L responded on an expedited basis to the April 2, 1984 letter. See Affidavit, Response to Item C(3). To the extent that the latter information appeared to be inconsistent with the April 27 letter, it has been presented and discussed in detail in LP&L's responses to NRC's June 13 letter. Thus the statements made in the April 27 letter do not raise a significant safety issue, and do not support Joint Intervenors' proposed management character and competence contention.

(d) CAT Report Joint Intervenors allege, based on the May 14, 1984 NRC inspection report (JI Exhibit 23 known as the " CAT Report"), that LP&L has historically failed to correct noncompliances and prevent their recurrence, Motion to Reopen at 26, and that LP&L therefore lacks character and compe-c anc e . - t 27

This allegation is wrong. The five instances identified in the CAT report in which commitments made to the NRC were initially implemented and subsequently altered have been corrected. LP&L management's response to this concern was prompt and thorough. LP&L's review established that the underlying problem was limited and correctable. Far from' undermining management character and competence, this response reflects the proper management attitude for operating Waterford 3. The response to this allegation has been described in more detail in the Affidavit, Response to Items B(4)(a)-B(4)(e) . This allegation does not raise a significant safety issue and does not support Joint Intervenors' contention. (e) Waterford 3 Staffing Joint Intervenors allege in their motion at 23-29 that LP&L failed to upgrade its staff after repeated warnings by the NRC. Again, this allegation is incorrect. LP&L commenced a major recruiting effort in 1981 (the year in which the exhibits cited by Joint Intervenors were written) and significantly increased its staffing levels. The NRC staff has tracked and acknowledged the improvement in LP&L's staffing in several SER Supple-ments, and in those supplements the NRC concluded that the staffing levels and staff qualifications were adequate for operation of Waterford 3. See Affidavit, Response to Item B(5). Joint Inturvenors have offered nothing more recent than 1981 as evidence in support of their allegation. Their allegation is unfounded and offers nothing in support of Joint Intervenors' concention. (f) Competence of Ebasco Site Management Joint Intervenors allege in their Motion at 29 that LP&L failed to ensure that Ebasco site management was " competent, trustworthy, and ded-icated to quality principles." 28

This allegation is totally unsupported by evidence. Joint Intervenors presented no exhibits in support of this allegation. . They rely solely on a paraphrasing of portions of a 1981 NRC inspection report relating to a single individual while he was employed at a project other than Waterford. Significantly, Joint Intervenors have made no allegations about that individual's performance at Waterford 3. As discussed in the Affidavit, Response to Item B(6), Joint Intervenors have seriously mischaracterized and misrepresented the situation with respect to that individual. The fact of central importance in the context of this motion is that the allegations in the inspection report have not been substanti-ated. Joint Intervenors cannot reopen the record on the basis of stale overstated, and unsubstantiated allegations against an individual. Bare allegations do not justify reopening the record. Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-81-5,13 NRC 361, 362-363 (1981) (g) Other Issues The organization of Joint Intervenors' motion becomes somewhat obscure after Section B. Section C, which purports to deal with Joint Intervenors third contention, aimed at the NRC staff, is almost entirely devoted to criticizing Applicant. This Section, as well as Sections D and E appears to relate to Joint Intervenors proposed contention on management ! character and competence. They argue in Sections C and D of their motion that LP&L's attitude and strategy is responding to NRC concerns has.been questionable. Motion tc Reopen at 32-39. They also claim in Section E that LP&L's handling of the basemat issue raises questions about LP&L's ability and willingness to comply with NRC directives, Motion to Reopen at 29

39-40. Neither of these allegations is substantiated. In fact, LP&L's efforts over the past year to respond to all NRC concerns clearly illus-trates management's dedication to resolve all plant concerns and their character and competence to operate Waterford 3. As discussed in the Affidavit, Response to Items C and D(1)-D(4), LP&L has addressed and responded to concerns raised by the NRC Inquiry Team and the'NRC Construction Assessment Team (CAT). In response to the concerns raised in NRC's June 13, 1984 letter, LP&L took immediate steps to mobilize a massive work force, headed by a special management team with personal oversight by the President of LP&L chis working group was eventually to devote over 1000 man-months of effort in resolving the 23 issues. In addition, Applicant arranged for an outside Task Force of highly qualified experts to provide an independent review and assessment of the adequacy of the resolution of the NRC issues. Each issue response included identification of the cause, safety implications, corrective action (as necessary) and assessment of the generic implications of the issue. LP&L has aggressively addressed safety issues brought to its attention by the NRC in the three recent inspection efforts. Contrary to Joint Intervenots' allegation, the extensive investment in manpower and resources l co resolve and independently verify the resolutions of the NRC's concerns, attest to the strong character and competence of Applicant to safely operate Waterford 3. In Section E, Motion to Reopen at 39-44, Joint Intervenors make allegations about Applicant's handling of the basemat issue to bolster their proposed contention on L?&L character and competence. To the extent f 30

that Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L's treatment of the basemat issue represents a management failure (in Joint Intervenors' view) or raised QA concerns, the allegation is baseless. In fact, as discussed in the Affidavit, Response to Item E, the actions taken by Applicant in responding to the basemat issue demonstrate a responsible and extensive effect by Applicant to cooperate with the NRC in resolution of the issue. An occasional comment on the structural adequacy of the basemat crops up in Section E.. Any attempt to identify substantive concerns about the basemat should be brought in conjunction with the Appeal Board's consideration of Joint Intervenors motion to reopen the record on that issue 25/.

3. Joint Intervenors' Contention on NRC Performance Joint Intervenors' third proposed contention, Motion to Reopen at 32, alleges that the NRC staff's regulatory activities have been inadequate. They do not, however, provide any basis for the allegation. A reading of Section II.C of the motion, pages 32-36, the sole portion of the motion put forth in support of this contention, yields nothing whatsoever in the way of criticisms of the staff's efforts. To the contrary, that section describes the staff's extensive programs for inspection and review of the Waterford project in almost laudatory tones; the section starts by stating that the "NRC Staff has engaged in an unprecedented inspection effort at the Waterford 3 plant..."

25/ Since they have already moved to reopen the record twice on the basemat issue, it is presumed that Joint Intervenors have had ample oppor-tunity to air the concerns in that context. Any further basemat considerations ought to be directed to those proceedings. They bear no relationship to Joint Intervenors three proposed contentions. 31

l l The staff's inspection and review effort has in fact been extraordi-narily thorough and far reaching. While we cannot comment on whether it has been " unprecedented", the staff's review has been so extensive that the allegations in Joint Intervenors' third contention are peculiarly inappro-priate in the context of this proceeding. No' basis having been offered, Joint Intervenors' third contention cannot support a reopening of the record and should be rejected. Joint Intervenors have offered criticism of the staff in other sections of their motion, but not in support of chair third proposed contention. These were presented in support of Joint Intervenors argument that they have met the standards for reopening the record to admit late contentions. Motion at 48-50, 51-58. These criticisms, however, are nothing more than a series of unsupported complaints _that Joint Intervenors disagree with how the staff has handled particular issues, that the staff has not formally stated ahead of. time how particular issues are to be resolved, or that Joint Intervenors lack documentation with which to_ review the staff's work. Asserted dissatisfaction with the staff's review is an insufficient basis to support a contention, let alone reopen a closed record. If such were not the case, any intervenor at any time could step forward and derand a hearing whenever it chose to determine that it disagreed with the staff. It is not an intervenor's prerogative or right to demand a hearing for the purpose of second guessing or criticizing the staff. I'te Commission's rules do not provide the right for an intervenor to set itself up as an oversight organization to perform an additional review. This may be the purpose of the GAP organization, Joint Intervenors' new attorneys, but it is not a part of the NRC's statutory review or hearing process. 32

e. 

  - o' It is expected that an intervenor in opposition to the granting of a license would naturally disagree with-the staff, for a hearing on an operating license rarely, if ever, occurs if the staff has not determined that the requisite safety standards have been met and the plant warrants licensing. The standards for reopening a record require "significant new
          ' evidence" supporting a significant safety issue, Pacific Gas and Electric Co.,         CLI-81-5, supra., not mere dissatisfaction with the staff's po-sitions.

4 + IV. STANDARDS FOR LATE-FILED CONTENTIONS 9 Joint Intervenors correctly admit that, in addition to the standards , for a motion to reopen, in order to succeed in reopening a closed record for hearing an entirely new contention, they must also meet the Com-mission's standards for late filed contentions. See Motion to Reopen at 45; Louisiana Power & Light Company (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit j 3), Memorandum and Order, February 28,1984 (unpublished)(denying Joint Intervenors' motion to reopen the record to introduce a new quality assur-ance contention); 10 C.F.R. $2.714(a)(1) . Having failed to meet the standards for reopening the record, however, it is of little relevance to inquire into the standards for admitting late-filed contentions. Neverthe-less, as will be shown below, Joint Intervenors have failed-to meet these P 

          -standards as well.

The five factors to be considered by the Appeal Board are set out in 10 C.F.R. $2.714(a). The burden is on the movant to satisfy these stan-dards. Duke Power Company (Perkins Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, ana 3), ALAB-615, 12 NRC 350.352 (1980). 33

4 d In failing to carry their burden for filling late-filed contentions. Joint Intervenors have failed to show good cause for late filing, they have other means available to protect their interests, there is reason to believe that Joint Intervenors will contribute little, if anything to the development of a sound record, and the proposed new contentions will unnecessarily broaden the issues and delay this proceeding. 

              ~

A. Good Cause for Failure to File on Time. For the reasons discussed in Section III. A. , supra. , in conjunction with the criteria for reopening the record, Joint Intervenors have totally failed to establish good cause for late filing. Their assertion that they are alleging "a pattern of failings which only within the last year have become evident", Motion to Reopen at 46, is contrary to law, is unsupport-ed, and if accepted, would effectively negate the timeliness requirement for late-filed contentions just as it would eviscerate the timeliness requirement for motions to reopen. Similarly, their assertion that the contentions were filed late due to reliance on NRC efforts, Motion to Reopen at 47, is ill-founded. Joint Intervenors cannot be permitted to stand on the sidelines (apparently with undisclosed information) and then submit late-filed contentions whenever they decide that the NRC is no longer protecting their interests. Failure to show good cause for late filing means that Joint Intervenors must shoulder a heavier burden with respect to the other four factors. Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2) ALAB-384, 5 NRC 612, 615 (1977); Project Management Corporation (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), ALAB-354, 4 NRC 383, 389 (1976). B. Availability of Other Means Whereby Petitioner's Interest Will Be Protected. 34

h Joint Intervenors' claim that their-interests cannot be protected through'the NRC's inspection efforts because the Staff has barred public participation in the enforcement process and because Joint Intervenors have been prevented from " scrutinizing the Staff's efforts and providing needed public input." Motion to Reopen at 49,.50. As discussed in Section III.B.3, supra., Joint Intervenors protectable interests do not include the right to set themselves up as an NRC oversight organization. Joint Intervenors assert that the only opportunity to ensure that the public interest is protected is through the licensing process. Id. Joint Intervenors' argument is erroneous. They have stated that the NRC staff is unable to protect the public interest, but they make no showing to justify this assertion. In any event, the fact that the Joint Intervenors do not believe that the NRC will adequately protect their interests is irrelevant to this second factor for late-filed contentions. "(T]he question is not whether other parties will adequately protect the interest of the petitioner, but whether there are other means available whereby the petitioner can protect its interest." Long Island Lighting Co. (Jamesport Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-292_, 2 NRC 631, 632 (1975). The Joint Intervenors have failed to carry their burden on this factor. They can petition the Commission directly or through 10 C.F.R. $2.206. If and when a license issues, Joint Intervenors are free to air their disagreement with the way 

 -       the NRC handled the Applicant's license in federal court.      If Joint Intervenors want their allegations resolved, the Staff has a method i         available whereby it can pursue these allegations on a confidential basis.

, If Joint Intervenors disagree with the way that the staff has handled or resolved its investigations, the appropriate avenue for redress is either 35

c. the Commission or the courts. The Appeal Board is not and was never meant to be an investigatory tribunal See Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1), CLI-82-20, 16 NRC 109 

     -(1982). Joint Intervenors have failed to show that they have other no other means available to protect their interests.

C. The Extent to Which Joint Intervenors' Participation May Reasonably be Expected to Assist in Developing in a Sound Record. In light of Joint Intervenors' earlier conduct in this proceeding, Applicant questions the extent to which their participation will assist in developing a sound record. Joint Intervenors have to date refused to share information or concerns with the NRC despite explicit requests. See Section III.A., supra. On August 15, 1984, Darrell Eisenhut, Director of the Division of Licensing, wrote to Lynn Bernabei, General Counsel of GAP, stating that GAP had indicated to the staff that it had technical information relating to situations at Waterford 3 of potential safety significance, but that despite a request to Billie Garde of GAP to share the information with the NRC, the staff had not yet received the information. Mr. Eisenhut again asked GAP that if they were aware of potential safety problems at Waterford 3 to provide them to the NRC- 

      "promptly" so that the staff could assess their safety significance. See LP&L Exhibit 2. To Applicant's knowledge, this request was never ansvered.

In addition, a member of the independent task force appointed by LP&L to independently assess the adequacy of LP&L's response to the 23 issues raised in the NRC's June 13, 1984 letter was unable, despite repeated requests to meet with Billie Garde, to obtain GAP's viewpoint on tha 23 issues. See LP&L Exhibit 3. Finally, Darrell Eisenhut wrote to Gary Groesch, representative for Joint Intervenors, on August 17, 1984, after 36

O 8 Mr. Groesch notified the NRC in May, 1984 that he had information relative to the " completeness and/or truthfulness" of the items in LP&L's April 27, 1984 letter to the NRC. Mr. Eisenhut urged Mr. Groesh to promptly provide any information that he had pertaining to safety at Waterford so that the staff could consider this information. See LP&L Exhibit 1. Mr. Groesch failed to respond, although Joint Intervenors have now come forward with such information in support of their motion to reopen. - Motion to Reopen, Items B(3)(a)-(e) at 21-26. lit also appears that Joint Intervenors have withheld from the Appeal Board other information which they considered to be important to plant safety. The information submitted by Joint Intervenors in the form of anonymous affidavits to support their motion were in the hands of Joint Intervenors' counsel for almost a year and a half before they deemed it appropriate to bring them and their accompanying allegations before the Board. Joint Intervenors failed to submit.these affidavits in conjunction with their February 20, 1984 motion to open a new ) quality assurance contention; and when this Board allowed them more time to i substantiate their motion, they chose instead to ask for a six-month i extension. See Motion to Open Quality Assurance Contention, February 20, , 1984; Memorandum and Order of February 28, 1984; Joint Intervenors' i Motion for Extension of Time, March 28, 1984. Moreover, the quality of the enormous' number of allegations presented with their motion shows far more I regard to overwhelming the Appeal Board with volume than to providing a s ! credible basis, see Section III.B., supra, and does not indicate a proclivity for sound, responsible participation in a hearing. In short, Joint Intervenors have in the past been secretive and dilatory. It is doubtful that they can be expected to meaningfully 4 37 

       --   ,   ,,3,- , .  ,.y -y--.-+-,-y , - - , - - - .r-<r, r- ,--m+,-,r.my,-,r.r,,,,..---,. , - . + , - - - g-c..--r.,m,,,.-,,,,v.       ,or, . ..-f r..%,...sr- -, - , - -   r,-,.-,, , 2ww

I 

   -se 4

contribute any further to the record. This factor. weighs heavily against admission of their late-filed contentions. D. The Extent to Which Joint. Intervenors Interests Will-Be Represented By Other Parties This particular factor does not fit well into a situation, such as this where the. record has been closed. As discussed in Sections III.B.2(g) and 3, supra., both Applicant the NRC staff expended unusual efforts in assuring the resolution of outstanding issues for the protection of the 

         .public health and safety. To the extent that Joint Intervenors desire oversight authority over the NRC process, that is not a protectable interest available to them.

E. The Extent Which the Petitioner's Participation Will Broaden the Issues or Delay the Proceeding Joint Intervenors have omitted any discussion of the extent to which the reopening of the record would broaden the issues or delay the proceeding. Indeed,'it would be difficult for Joint Intervenors to say much in their favor concerning the potential for delay in view of the fact that they waited until the plant was ready to load fuel before they filed their voluminous motion, loaded with old information. , The record in this proceeding has been closed for over a year. If the record were to be reopened, there is no way of knowing how long it would take to complete discovery, hold a hearing, and obtain a decision. In addition, Joint Intervenors would open three new contentions totally unrelated to the issues heard by the Licensing Board below, which would substantially broaden the issues that have been considered in these proceedings. The delay factor is " extremely important." Detroit Edison 

         -Company (Greenwood Energy Center, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-476, 7 NRC 754, 762 38

e' J (1978). Under the circumstances presented here, thic factor weighs very heavily against reopening the record to admit the three new contentions The factors to be considered before admitting late-filed contentions weigh conclusively against admittance. Joint Intervenors have failed to demonstrate good cause for late-filing, the contentions would greatly 

                                                                                   }

broaden the issues before the Appeal Board and delay the proceeding, there i is reason to believe that the Joint Intervenors will not contribute toward establishment of a sound record, Joint Intervenors legitimate interests are being well represented, and Joint Intervenors have failed to prove that there are not other means available to protect their interests. Their motion to reopen the record to admit three new contentions must be denied. l 

                                                                                   }

V. CONCLUSION Because the Appeal Board has concluded its review of the Licensing Board's Initial Decisions, it has no jurisdiction to reopen the record to entertain the proposed three new contentions. In addition, Joint Intervenors have failed it their attempt to satisfy either the Commission's requirements for reopening the record or the requirements for late-filed contentions. The motion to reopen is untimely in the extreme, which untimeliness is exacerbated by Joint Intervenors failure to bring forth the information in their possession upon which their allegations are based, despite repeated requests by the NRC and Applicant. Further, Joint Intervenors have failed 39

2 to demonstrate that they raised any significant safety issues which would have caused a different result in the Licensing Board proceedings below. For all of.the foregoing reasons, Applicant resectfully submits that Joint Intervenors' Motions to Reopen must be denied. Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE 1800 M Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 By: -t / BruYW. 'Ch6TEhill, P.C. Dean D. Aulick, P.C. Alan D. Wasserman Counsel for Louisiana Power & Light (202) 822-1053 Dated: November 30, 1984 40

[ 

  .;                                                                                                  e e

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR kEGULATORY COMMISSION h., [' Before the-Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board - In the Matter of ) -3 Al0 :56 LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) 3 l ) DocketNo.50-38[0kdugghhyjj' 3 RANCH i (Waterford Steam Electric Station. ) i Unit 3) ) 

                                                                                                                                      ~

AFFIDAVIT OF DALE E. DOBSON s-.. The undersigned, being duly sworn, deposes and says: My name is Dale E. Dobson. I as Project Manager - Nuclear for Louisiana Power & Light Company. In this position I as responsible for engineering, construction and records management; interagency coordination and contracting a activities. The responses to Items A(3)(b), B(6), C, D in the attached " Responses to Specific Allegations in the Joint Intervenors' Motion to Reopen the Record" have been prepared by me or under my supervision. They are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. Dated: November 30, 1984 4 State of Louisiana --- Parish of St. Charles MWD b - Dale E. Dobson > Sworn to and subscribed before me this 30th day of November, 1984 i e 4 [ Notary Public 

       , - . - -    - - - . , - - ,           .--  ,,-ry ..-    ,-,,..,y,,,,,,,.,,------.-rmw,           ,,,, - e -..,-.--,..,--y--,,-,-,..-,-,ww.w...--~,...                <-w,

o re - t a NSES - FSAR - Ikilt 3 Dale E. Dobson ProjectManagement Responsible for providing overall direction and'edministation of the Project Mar ===nt Grotp during construction and operatica of the plant. Responsible for supervising personnel assigned to the Waterford 3 Project Management Group. 4 I!DUCATIGUL BACKGROG D PROFESSIONAL LEVEL EXPERIEtKZ Ik11versity of Iowa State U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (last tan B.S. in Civil Engineering (1953) years) L University of Iowa State - Jul 68 to Jul 72 M.S. in Civil Engineering (1963) Deputy District Engineet, x4r East District, responcible for supervising Nunerous military schools through the engineering and construction divisions U.S. Army War College (1953-79) involved in the 1968-70 major construction activities in Korea as well as being the Area Engineer for all Deptu.L t of Defense construction in Japan. 

                                                     - Jul 72 to Jul 73 i                                                       Battalion Ccenander, exercised normal

! ocamander/ manager functions for an 1100-l man heavy construction battalion in com-i pleting a major annonition storage and

overhaul depot.
                                                     - Aug 73 to Mar 76 Faculty, Armed Forces, filled the roll of staff advisor specializing in engineer roles at the tri-service college which tas ocmbined ccubat operations planning staff officer level.

i 

                                                     - Mar 76 to Oct 77
                                       ,               Deputy Division Engineer, principal assistant to man in charge of the 275-man Huntsville Division.
                                                     - Oct 77 to Nov 79 Divisi'no Engineer, exercised normal
Comander/ Manager functions for the

- expanding 350-man USA corps of l Engineers' Huntsville Division and all associated contractors. Responsi-ble directly to the USA Chief of Engin-l eers. Responsible for planning, fiscal l L

f-- w- e (cont'd) a e' EDUCATIORL BACEBOUND PROFESSIONAL LEVEL EXPERIENCE and personnel management, engineering and construction management, interagenef coordination and castracting activities. Washington Public Power Supply System 

                                                                                                                  - Nov 79 to Aug 80 A variety of staff roles at PPPSS
,                                                                                                                    Projects 1, 2, and 3
                                                                                                                  - Aug 80 to Aug 83 Project Manager with Owner responsibility for engineering and construction manage-

] ment of a 1250 PWe nuclear power plant. Tmiaf ana Power & Light CTpany 

;                                                                                                                 - Sep 1983 to Present Project Manager, generally the sane responsibilities as with WPPSS but with a different focus due to the
advanced status of engineering and construction.

l 2 i 4 

          - - - -     , , - -,- ,:. _ ,,   ,.n.,   ,n.--. - , , , , , , , - , , - ~ , , ,_,n___---.n.,_-_,,______                              , , , , , , , - , . ,   , , , , , , - , , , _ -

m q 3 UNITED STATE.S OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board COCKETEn , In the Matter of ) '2dC - 

                                                       )                                -

LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-382 OL '84 g g (Waterford Steam Electric Station. ) Unit 3) ) [0 5E EEQg 3 j'gr AFFIDAVIT OF FREDERICK J. DRUMMOND d  ; The undersigned, being duly sworn, deposes and says: ., , g , 

                                                                                            ' ':h e               {

My name is Frederick J. Drummond. I am Nuclear Services"Mansger'"for "~. , Louisiana Power & Light Company. In this position I am responsible for supporting the Nuclear Operations Organization in the following capacities: Licensing; Training Evaluation and Assurance; Cost and Budgeting; Technical Support (radiation control, fuel management and chemistry); and Special Projects such as Plant Simulator Procurement, and Availability Improvement Program, and Administrative Support. The responses to Items A(1)(g), A(1)(n), A(2)(b) A(2)(c). A(3)(c), A(3)(1), A(4)(c). A(5)(a), A(10)(h),; A(II)(a) A(ll)(b), A(ll)(c), and B(5) in the attached " Responses to Specific Allegations in the Joint Intervenors' Motion to Reopen the Record" have been prepared by me or under my direct j supervision. They are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and i belief. Dated: November 30, 1984 m l State of Louisiana ( Parish of St. Charles Ma l Frederfck'J. Drummond Sworn to and subscribed before me l this 30th day of November, 1984 l 

                              /             4 A                6 Notary Public            j/

I i 

           .                           Fr:darick J. Drummond
        *~

2712 S:ndtro Del'E2to Harvey, L:uicitna 70058 304-361-4763 PERSONAL Born: May 7,.1943 Marital Status: Married, three-children H2cith: Excellent EDUCATION Auburn University (U.S. Navy, NESEP)(Enlisted) - B.S. Chemistry / Commission in USN, June 1969 , U.S. Navy (Commissioned) - U.S.N. Basic Of ficers Nuclear Power School, December 1969 U.S. Navy (Commissioned) - U.S.N. Officers Nuclear Power School Prototype SIC, July 1970 EMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCES October 11, 1983 to Present Nuclear Services Manager, employed by Louisiana Power & Light, reporting to the Senior Vice President of Nuclear Operations, provides direction and administration of the 

    'g Waterford 3 Nuclear Services Group in support
     ;                                                of all functional groups of the Nuclear
   ?                                             "

Operations Department in the following areas: 

                                                       . Licensing
                                                       . Technical Services including Health Physics, Chemistry and Nuc. lear Engineering
                                                       . Cost Control / Change Management
                                                       . Emergency Planning
                                                       . Training Evaluation & Assurance t
                                                       . Special Projects including such projects as the plant simulator Availability l

l Improvement, Computer liaison, etc. 

                                                       . Administration Support activities l
 ,     Szptember 28, 1981 to October 11, 1983         Project Support Manager-Nuclear, employed by Louisiana Power & Light, reporting to the Vice-President Nuclear Operations, g

provides direction and administration of j the Waterford 3 Project Support Group to l support all functicnal groups of the Nuclear l Operations Department in the following areas: l . Licensing 

                                                       . Technical Services including Health Physics, Chemistry and Nuclear Engineering i

l 

                                                                                                                                          ~       .         _

h-

  • 4
                                                                     . Onsite Safety Review including Independent Safety Engineering, and Opera *:denal Assessment
                                                                     . Operational Engineering including Mechanical, Electrical, Civil I&C/ Computer, and Operations Liaison                                                  .
                                                                     . Construction Engineering including.

Mechanical / Civil, Electrical, and I&C October 1, 1979 to September 28, 1981 Waterford 3 Project Manager, employed by Louisiana Power & Light, reporting to the Project Director, provides direction and administration of the Waterford 3 construction project and project personnel to ensure effective economic management and accomplish-ment of the project within the budget, i schedule, licensing, and technical require-ments specified for the project. March 1, 1979 to October 1, 1979 Waterford 3 Project Engineer - Engineering Supervisor, employed by Louisiana Power & Light, supervised project engineering . 4 personnel and provided technical direction

to and interfaced with the AE and NSSS firac -

i 

        ,                                                            in the capacity of LP&L's primary technical j                                                 {           representative responsible for coordinating

, {# - and ensuring the technical adequacy of the AE - prepared design of Waterford 3. 

                                                        ~

! August 1977 to March 1979 Utflity Engineer / Engineer, employed by Louisiana Power & Light, promoted to Utility Engineer and assigned to the Waterford 3 staff as the " Technical Support Engineer". Responsibilities include management and supervision of Chemical & Environmental Engineering, Health Physics Engineering,

Uuclear Engineering and Support Activities j Engineering. Promoted to Engineer ~in February 1978.

Associate Engiteer, employed by Louisiana November 1975 to July 1977 Power & Light, assigned for training at Little Gypsy SES - worked with the Results i Department primarily in the water chemistry area. July 1976 assigned to the Nuclear Project Group. Actively involved in all aspects of the Nuclear Project. I i 

  -       ...........-,_._-_..._.._._,__..,_,.m_.__,      _ . _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ . _ . , _ _ . . - . _ , . - _ . _ - , _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _
                                                                                                                                            .       _ , ~ _

                                                    ~

bnunty1975toNovember1975 Plant Manager, employed by Zonolite, Divisicm of W.R. Grade & Co., New Orleans, Louisiana, complete responsibility for overall. operation of plant including personnel management, safety program, plant maintenance, trans-portation, product planning and shipment. D:cc:.ber 1973 to December 1974 Assistant Plant Mana g , employed by Zonolite,. Division of W.R. Grade & Co., Enoree, South Carolina, in training for Plant Manager of the Vermiculite Expanding Facility. In this Capacity was responsible to-the Plant Manager for all production planning, maintenance, operations, and finished product shipment coordination. July 1969 to November 1973 United States Navv (Commissioned) - Advanced to Lieutenant, employed by United States Navy; Reactor Control Assistant, Electrical Assistant, Main Propulsion Assistant, Radiological Control Officer, Refueling Officer - After completing Officers Nuclear Power School in 1970, I held at varying lengths of time all of the above positions on the USS Abraham 

                                     ;  Lincoln SSBN 602(B) . Accumulated one year, l  3                                   ,

nine months operational experience and one i w year, three months shipyard reactor refueling

- overhaul experience. Qualified as a Com-
missioned Member of the Submarine Force, completed 3 Polaris Patrols, completed one shipyard reactor refueling overhaul, achieved i the rank of Lieutenant, and received the Navy Achievement Medal. Also qualified for the following " Watch Officer" billets

, Engineering Officer of the Watch. Officer of the Deck, Inport Duty Officer July 1961 to June 1969 United States Navy (Enlisted) - Advanced to TM-1, employed by the United Strtes Navy, enlisted in the USN and attended v arious service schools for designation as a l Torpedoman's Mate and Submariner. In 1962 l became a crew member of the USS Abraham-i Lincoln SSBN 602(B). Responsible for the I operation and maintenance of submarine

weapons' system. Qualified as an enlisted member of the submarine force, completed 5 Polaris Patrols, and developed electrical and electronic skills,. In 1965 was selected for the Navy Enlisted Scientific Education P ro. gram. . Attended Auburn Un.iversity Auburn. Alabama until 1969, received B.S. degree. in Chemistry and a Commission as'an Ensign. 9 

  ,e--

l, I I 4 l I I l i i_

s* . i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 00uErg; 

                                        ~

USMC 

                            ~ Before the Atomic Saf'ety and Licensiing' Appeal Board In the Matter of                            )                          DEC -3 A10 :57
                                                          )

LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-392F00 0F SECreiAn 

                                                          )                    UCCl4LIING & SEfivscy'-

(Waterford Steam Electric Station. ) BRANCH Unit 3) ) l AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS F. CERRETS ... ,, , ,, The undersigned, being duly sworn, deposes and says: My name is Thomas F. Garrets. I am Corporate Quality Assurance Manager for Louisiana Power & Light Company. 'In this position I am responsible for planning, organizing, and administering the Quality Assurance Program. The responses to Items A(1)(a)(ii). A(1)(a)(iii), A(1)(b). A(1)(c). A(1)(h), A(1)(j), A(1)(k), A(1)(p) A(3)(e) A(3)(f), A(10)(a), A(10)(b), 4 A(10)(c), A(10)(f), A(il)(d), A(12)(a). A(12)(b), A(12)(c), B(4), B(4)(a)-(e), j and Exhibit 27 Paragraph 18 in the attached " Responses to Specific Allegations in the Joint Intervonors' Motion to Reopen the Record" have been prepared by me i or under my direct supervision. They are true and correct to the best of my i knowledge and belief. l- Dated: November 30, 19d4 l State of Louisiana - 7 - , Parish of St. Charles d b M M N 6b k ly' Thomas F. Gerrets Sworn to and subscribed before me this 30th day of November, 1984 

                /                -

Notary Public-1 4 t

11/28/84 J Thomas F. Gerrets - Statement of Professional Qualifications Education: B.S. Degree, Mechanical Engineering, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana' (September 1963 - May 1967). Registration: Registered Mechanical Engineer since 1971 (Louisiana Registration No.12967) . , i Registered Quality Engineer since 1977 (California Registration No.1U 3717). Professional Affiliations: l Member, American Society for Quality Control. Experience: Corporate Quality Assurance Manager, Louisiana Power & Light Company (March 1979 to Present) . Responsibilities include: (a) Planning , j organizing, and administering the LP&L Quality Assurance Programs for the

construction and aperating phases. (b) Developing, reviewing, approving, l and maintaining administrative control of the LP&L Quality Assurance Manual and QA Procedures. (c) Assuring effective implementation of the Quality Assurance Program through a comprehensive system of reviews and audits.

(d) Verifying satisfactory performance of quality assurance functions at Waterford 3. (e) Serving as a member of the Waterford 3 Safety Review Committee. i Project Quality Assurance Engineer, Louisiana Power & Light Company, Waterford 3 SES (April 1975 - March 1979). Responsible for: (a) l coordinating the LP&L and contractor quality assurance efforts at the Waterford 3 site. (b) Establishing and implementing an audit and surveillance program for site construction activities to verify compliance 1 

      'A 11/28/84 1

with applicable requirements. (c) Identifying quality assurance problems affecting site construction. (d) Initiating , recommending or providing solutions, and verifying implementation of solutions , to site quality assurance problems. (e) Serving as utility representative on ASME Nuclear 

         . Survey Teams.

Quality Assurance Engineer, Louisiana Power & Light Company (April 1972 - April 1975). Responsible for: (a) Developing and maintaining LP&L's , Preoperational Quality Assurance documents. (b) Conducting audits of the major contractors and other vendors as deemed necessary by the Quality Assurance Manager in order to verify compliance with applicable requirements and guidance. (c) Auditing those groups within LP&L who perform safety-related activities for the Waterford 3 Project. (d) Serving as utility representative on ASME Nuclear Survey Teams. Quality Assurance Engineer, Louisiana Power & Light Company (November 1971 - April 1972). Developed Quality Control Program for fossil fuel generating station construction program. } Associate Engineer, Louisiana Power & Light Company (June 1971 - November 1971). Assigned to Little Gypsy SES for power plant orientation. Captain , USAF (Mechanical Engineer) Cape Kennedy, Florida (June 1967 - June 1971). Responsible for: (a) Performing Field Test Management, Direction , and Control for the Titan III Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) mechanical systems. (b) Monitoring SRM contractor checkout, maintenance, processing, and testing of SRM mechanical systems from arrival of components through launch. (c) Evaluating technical readiness and status of the SRM mechanical systems for all prelaunch and launch activities. (d) Acting as/or assigning appropriate Test Controllers for tests and activities associated with the processing and checkout of the SRM mechanical systems for launch. (e) Exercising approval authority for locally generated operational and mechanical maintenance procedural changes within contractual limitations. (f) Analyzing ground and launch test data and assisting in evaluation of SRM system performance. (g) Assuring adherence to technical and operational SRM system interfaces as established in specifications, drawings , and procedures. (h) Directing SRM mechanical system activities of the contractor within the scope of contractual coverage or recommending appropriate. contract changes as required to exercise Field Test Management. l 2 J

3 

 .i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA              g ,;7 - g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION              USNRC Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Apne41 Board e um -; A10 :57                         .

In the Matter of ) 

                                                   )                0FFILE OF SECRtiAn e LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY              )     Docket No.050'382GOLSERVICf.
                                                   )                       BRANCH (Waterford Steam Electric Station.          )

Unit 3) ) A!?FIDAVIT 0F KENNETH W. COOK . 2 The undersigned, being duly sworn, deposes and says: My name is Kenneth W. Cook. I am Nuclear Support & Licensing Manager for Louisiana Power & Light Company. In this position I am responsible for all licensing activities for Waterford 3 and for providing technical support for the plant staff in the areas of Radiation Control, Nuclear Engineering, Fuels Management, Chemistry and Radiochemistry. The responses to Items A(1)(a) Paragraph 3, A(6)(a), A(9)(a), A(9)(b), B(2), and E in the attached " Responses to Specific Allegations in the Joint Intervenors' Motion to Reopen the Record" have been prepared by me or under my direct supervision. They are true and correct to the best of my knowledge. and belief. i . Dated: November 30, 1984 State of Louisiana .* Parish of St. Charles ~._ 

                                                          .g.n.y       N/      #

Kenneth W. Cook Sworn to me and subscribed before me this 30th day of November, 1984 9 Notary Public /

T Resume of KENNETH W. COOK EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND i' University of Wyoming B.S. in Mechanical Engineering (with honors) - Nuclear Option (1964) University of. California, Berkeley M.S. in Mechanical Engineering (1968) General Electric Advanced Engineering Courses (1968) Numerous General Electric Sponsored Management & Engineering Courses & Seminars PROFESSIONAL LICENSE Registered Professional Nuclear Engineer - California PROFESSIONAL LEVEL EXPERIENCE Phillips Petroleum Co. (1963) Nuclear Engineer General Electric Co. Engineer (1964-1975) Mechanical Design 1964 Development Engineering-1965 Proposal Engineering 1966 Safety and Licensing 1967-1975 Senior Engineer (1975-1977)

Safety and Licensing Senior Licensing Engineer (1977-1980)

BWR Ceneric Licensing 1977-1979 BWR Operational Licensing 1979-1980 Washington Public Power Supply System Senior Licensing Engineer (1980-81) Licensing Project Manager (1981-82) Louisiana Power & Light Company Nuclear Support & Licensing Manager (1983-Present) 4 

       - . _ . . . . - - ~ . . . -   ,,, ,       ,,__,__._r      , - - , . _ _ - , . y,,e_,.,. , - , -,. -_,w,,,.p___m,.,m.,nr,m._,..,,m       _,     ,.g.,.m.,,..,.-   ,y y

e 4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA '00t KETr i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION USNRC Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Boark - - 04 DEC -3 A10 :57 In the Matter of ) 

                                                   >                        0FFILE OF SECRETARY LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY            )    Docket No. 50-382 GECXf.TmG & SERVid.
                                                   )                               BRANCH (Waterford Steam Electric Station,         )
  • Unit 3) ) .  ;

i AFFIDAVIT OF NEIL S. CARNS The undersigned, being duly sworn, deposes.and says: My.name is Neil S. Carns. I am Assistant to the Project Manager - Nuclear for Louisiana Power & Light Company. In this position I am responsible for providing staff assistance to the Project Manager in fulfilling responsibili-2 ties for Waterford 3 construction, design control, cost and scheduling, spare '; parts procurement, procedure and document review, document control and managing contract support for retrofit and maintenance activities. i The responses to Items A(9)(c) a'nd Exhibit 8 Paragraph 19 in the attached , " Responses to Specific Allegations in the Jo. int Intervenors' Motion to Reopen the Record" have been prepared by me or under my direct supervision. They are i- true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. Dated: November 30, 1984 State of Louisiana Parish of St. Charles 

                                                                         /

hN.S. Carns 

                                                                        /hu l

l l Sworn to and subscribed before me this 30th day of November, 1984 Notary Public / 

                                                                                                       .)

3 NEIL S. CARNS - 25 Rosedown Drive 

                                                       -    Destrehan, LA 70047 Home:   504-764-9302
  • Work: 504-464-3335 OBJECTIVE Obtain a senior, challenging management position'in the nuclear utility industiry or related' power and energy fields.

SUMMARY

OF QUALIFICATIONS ~ Extensive background and experience in engineering management. Twenty-three years association with naval and commercial nuclear plants, including completion of vast majority of requirements specified in ANSI /ANS 3.1 for all senior management positions fo.r nuclear generating plants. . EDUCATION Bachelor of Science in Engineering, U.S. Naval Academy (19 out of 787). Master of Public Administration, University of Washington s , (4.0,GPA). Completed numerous courses in all facets of nuclear

power systems at the U.S. Naval Nuclear Power School, Navy Shore

] based operational prototypes BETTIS Atomic Laboratory, and at Naval Sea Systems Command Headquarters in Washington D.C. In addition, completed several Naval War College Courses and have taught two political science courses under the auspices of the University of' South Carolina. 7 EXPERIENCE Completion Manager, Lodisiana Power and Light, Waterford-3 SES - September 1983 to Present. Reported to Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations and was re-i sponsible for a Startup Organization that consisted of about 150 engineers and 350 technicians. Provided management that was in-strumental in making the Startup Organization a dynamic and ef- ! fective force in completing the preoperational test program. By-3 all standards dhe Startup Organization was highly successful in completing.its tasks under budget and dissolving itself ahead of schedule. As completion manager have provided liasion between l plant and project staffs in establishing the contractor maintenance organization for long term plant support. .In addition, provided management talent to rssolve licensing probl;ms where mature judge-ment and decision making ability were keenly needed. Operations Manager, Washington Public Power Supply System, Satsop Nuclear Project - August 1982 to September 1983. Responsibleifor training and qualification for 57 operators, procedure writing, 'and - acting as the Assistant Plant Manager for review and approval of ! procedures. Also, act for the Plant Manager in his absence. i s - t h 

               -,m....--,-   - - , - , . . , , _ . ,

s EXPERIENCE (Con'd) l Principal Engineer Washington Public Power Supply System, , Satsop Nuclear Project - August 1981 to August 1982 . Participated in Flant Management Training Program designed to 2 fulfill the requirements of ANS 3.1 for eventual assignment as a senior manager / engineer on operating plant ~ staff: ^ Assignments to all project departments including construction, design engineering, quality assurance, licensing, and technical for.a period of six months. 1 Operational training for six months at Northern States Power, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. Assigned to Quality Assurance and participated in audits and inspections through-out all facets of the plant's operations, including an ex-tensive refueling outage and return to power.

Military, twenty years in the Navy's Nuclear Power Program and attained the rank of Captain. Operated, maintained, and super-vised seven different reactor plants. As a junior officer, was the responsible ship's officer for the original installation.

? startup, and testing of all reactor control and instrumentation equipment for a new construction reactor plant. As the Executive Officer of a nuclear missile submarine was not only second in . command but was primarily responsible for the qualification and , training of the nuclear operators. This organization was formally recognized as being the most outstanding in the U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Served as Commanding Officer on two missile nuclear submarines; the + second tour wastawarded for outstanding performance in the first. In both cases of command, below average organizations were turned i into winners with formal recognition for outstanding performance including the best in the Atlantic Fleet for my last command, the USS James Monroe. 5 PERSONAL Married, three children, excellent health, age 45. i l I-1 1TTT**9te=Fv em 14 wv y-w- ,-gpr- +--w +e--w-t-wwzg-w---4--we.- ew = ug e-yw+g-ygwe+g w-v- m-+-Fee vgye y-ce-%-e--%meu-m++g-y ea a rer w w r,e-.=-Wee m e-e- 

                                                                                                                                                                  -                           m- w , s- + gw--e-wer-r+-r wwe-     4"',m w+-e-e-

      -e
 'e; s

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n u,ETE0 USNRC Before.the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board 

                                                                                                                                                                                               ~

In the Matter of ) '84 EC -3 A10 :57 

                                                                                                            )                                                                                      ,

LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-382 0IsECRiiAid 

                                                                                                            )                                                              y[TmG & SERVICf; (Waterford Steam Electric Station.                                                                )                                                                            MAO Unit 3)                                                                                          )

t AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID B. LESTER The undersigned, being duly sworn, deposes and says: My name is David B. Lester. I am a Consultant for Louisiana Power & Light Company and perform management consulting services for LP&L. Through October 1983, I was employed by LP&L in various management positions, including Project Manager and Plant Manager of Waterford 3. In my positions with LP&L, my responsibilities included plant construction and startup activities. A statement of my professional qualifications is attached. The responses to Items A(1)(a)(i), A(1)(e), A(1)(f), A(1)(1), A(2)(a), A(3)(a), A(3)(d), A(3)(h), A(4)(a), A(4)(d), A(5)(c) A(10)(d) - and A(10)(g) in the attached " Responses to Specific Allegations in the Joint Intervenors' ' Motion to Reopen the Record" have been prepared by me or under my direct j supervision. They are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. Dated: November 30, 1984 State of Louisiana #/ Parish of St. Charles ' MMf_A T l (,# avid-1I. Lester Sworn to and subscribed before me this 30th day of November, 1984 l V ' 

                /                                            ,

l Notary Public  ! I I 1 

                                                                                                                   . __ _.-___ _ ~,.._--.- __- _ , ___ _ __-- _,- _ . _._.._.__,- __. .~         -

o' .o PROFESSIONAL RESUME OF DAVID B. LESTER EDUCATION Bachelor of Science degree in Nuclear Science and Engineering, U.S. Naval Academy, 1964 TRAINING Post Graduate courses in Nuclear Engineering and Mathematics, Tulane University

SUMMARY

Nineteen years of engineering and management experience in design, licensing, construction management, startup, and operation of nuclear power plants, thirteen years of which were in key management positions on a commercial nuclear power project for the owner. EXPERIENCE U.S. Navy (1964-1970). Polaris and Attack Submarines. Precommissioning and follow-on operations in a nuclear attack submarine. Louisiana Power & Light Company (1971-1983) ' October 1970 - March 1971. Participated in the startup of Ninemile Point Unit 4, a 750 MWe supercritical gas-fired unit. April 1971 - November 1973. Assigned to the Waterford 3 project. Waterford 3 is a 1104 MWe nuclear unit with a Combustion Engineering NSSS and a Westinghouse turbine generator. Ebasco Services Inc. provided architect / engineering and construction management services. Joined the project as the only full time LP&L employee other than a quality assurance man. Represented the company in essentially all NRC(AEC) matters during the Construction Permit process.

  • Participated in all project matters.

December 1973 - June 1975. Project Manager of the St. Rosalie project, a new two unit nuclear generating station project, for LP&L. United Engineers and Constructors provided architect / engineering services. Managed the evaluation, selection and contracting processes for the site, NSSS vendor and architect / engineer. Completed the Construction Permit Application by June, 1975, at which time the St. Rosalie project was cancelled. Managed the cancellation process, including legal activities, for LP&L.

o i Louisiana Power & Light Company- (1971-1983) (continued) , July 1975 - February 1979. Rejc ?.ned the Waterford 3 project. Performed the functions of " Project Engineer" or " Assistant Project Manager." Participated in all Waterford 3 matters other than plant' operating staff functions. March 1979 - September 1979. Project Manager of Waterford 3. Reported to the Vice President-Power Production (fossil & nuclear). Responsible for the design, licensing, procurement, construction and startup of the unit. The Waterford 3 plant operating staff reported through another manager. October 1979 - November 1982. Plant Manager of Waterford 3. Responsible for startup and operation of the unit. December 1982 - October 1983. Assistant to the Vice President-Nuclear Operations. Independent Consultant Services Inc. (November 1983 - present) Independent consultant, primarily in the nuclear energy field. i i l l l I

ff UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0-[,]F i Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board In the' Matter of ) -3 N0 :57 

                                                      )

LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) S 

                                                      )

Docket No. 50-382 h [7l]g g vIA (Waterford Steam Electric Station, BRANCH 

                                                      )

Unit 3) ) 

                                                                                                ^

AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL K. YATES ' The undersigned, being duly sworn, deposes and says: My name is Michael K. Yates. I am Project Manager for Ebasco Services Inc. for the Waterford 3 project. In this position I am responsible for all Ebasco efforts on the Waterford 3 Project, including engineering, procurement, and construction. The responses to Items A(1)(d), A(1)(1), A(1)(m)(Paragraphs 1 -and 2), A(1)(o), A(2)(d), A(2)(e), A(2)(f), A(3)(g), A(4)(b), A(4)(e) A(5)(b), A(6)(b), A(6)(c), A(7)(a), A(7)(b), A(7)(c), A(7)(d), A(7)(e), A(7)(f), A(8)(a), A(8)(b), A(8)(c), A(8)(d), A(8)(e), A(10)(e), B(3)(a), B(3)(b), B(3)(c), B(3)(d), B(3)(e), Exhibit 8 Paragraph 8 Exhibit 27 Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18 (last sentence) in the attached , 

          " Responses to Specific Allegations in the Joint Intervenors' Motion to Reopen the Record" have been prepared by me or under my direct supervision. They are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Dated: November 30, 1984 State of Louisiana ' f, e Parish of St. Charles Air { V. Ehldar MichaelK.Yjtes , Sworn to and subscribed before me this 30th day of November, 1984 Notary Public / L

m , a r 11/84 RESUME MICHAEL K YATES PROJECT MANAGER EXPERIENCE

SUMMARY

Professional Engineer with over eight years of experience managing engineering and construction efforts on major utility generating projects. Responsibilities included management of engineering, construction, procurement, with responsibility for the technical, schedule and cost performance of the Project team. In this capacity reviewed and approved schedules, budgets, client correspondence, and scope changes. Supervised the Project Engineering function and staff for all New York Projects and for the Ebasco Nuclear and Fossil 

       . Reference Plant work. Duties included reviewing Project schedule status, technical problem areas, and Departmental administrative functions.          Reviewed c.nd approved General Arrangement Criteria and Drawings and GA changes. Provided liaison with the client on all engineering matters and represented Engineering at Client Meetings. Ensured that the appropriate schedule, workday and capital cost evaluations were done for changes to the design. Provided interdiscipline coordination to see that data was ' transmitted in a timely manner and that interdiscipline problems were resolved.

REPRESENTATIVE EBASCO EXPERIENCE Client Proj ect Size Fuel Carolina Power & Light Shearon Harris Nuclear 900 MWe ea. Nuclear (PWR) Company Power Plant Nos. 1,2,3 

                                  &4 l        Florida Power & Light     St. Lucie Nos.1 & 2         890 MWe ea. Nuclear (PWR)

Company Houston Light & Power Limestone Unit Nos. 750 MWe ea. Lignite Company 1&2 l Louisiana Power & Light Waterford Steam Electric 1165 MWe Nuclear (PWR) Company Station No. 3 Washington Public Power WPPSS Unit Nos. 3 & 5 1300 MWe ea. Nuclear (PWR)

Supply System i

l 4

e L 

                                                                                                                                      ]

l EMPLOYMENT HISTORY l Ebasco Services Incorporated, New York, NY; 1976-Present

  • Project Manager,1981-Present
  • Assistant Chief Project Engineer, 1980-1981
  • Project Engineer, 1976-1980 General Atomic Company, San Diego, CA; 1965-1976
  • Senior Staff Engineer, 1972-1976
  • Group Leader, 1971-1972
  • Staff Associate, 1965-1971 EDUCATION University of California, Berkeley, Doctor of Philosophy in Nuclear Engineering-1966 University of Illinois, Urbana, Bachelor of Science in Engineering Physics-1962 PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS Professional Engineer in the States of California, New York, North Carolina and Washington American Nuclear Society - Member American Association for the Advancement of Science - Member L

RESPONSES TO JOINT INTERVENORS SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS Responses to Allegations in Section A Item A(1)(a)(1), Motion at 4. It is alleged that: Cost and scheduling decisions took priority over and influenced decision on quality assurance. See July 31, 1979, MAC. Construction Monitoring Memo, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 1; Ebasco Services QA Program Manual, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 2; and Preoperational QA Manual, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 3.

Response

The allegation is not true. Cost and scheduling decisions do not take priority over quality assurance activities. The Quality Assurance organizations are separated from cost, scheduling, and construction activities in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. Nothing in the three exhibits (JI Exhibits 1, 2 and 3) quoted by the Joint Intervenors indicates to the contrary. In fact, most of JI Exhibit 1, the draft MAC report, deals with observations and suggestions about how LP&L should strengthen its control over cost and scheduling activities. . JI Exhibit 2 is a part of an early revision of the Ebasco QA Manual. Section QA-I-2 of the manual (not included in JI Exhibit 2) is entitled 

        " Organization and Responsibilities". That section discusses the organizational independence of the QA organization, and shows that Ebasco correctly placed the responsibility Mr quality squarely on the Ebasco organizational elements which were responsible for the given activities.

Similarly, independence of the Ebasco QA organization is characterized in JI Exhibit 3, Chapter QC-1, page 1, which states that the Ebasco QA program 

              ... provides for an independent department which does not have responsibility for meeting construction schedules or project costs. They monitor the work of those responsible for fabrication and installation for compliance with the intent of the design criteria and perform audits in all areas of activities.

On page 2 QC-1 goes on to state: The Director of Materials Engineering and Quality Compliance has the Authority to enforce the requirements of the Ebasco Quality Program. In this regard, he has the unqualified support of Corporate Management. His decisions may not be overridden by personnel in any division or department, except with the written consent of the same Corporate Management.

Although the Ebasco QA Msnual has undergone revisions since JI Exhibits 2 and 3, the principles regarding responsibilities and independence described herein have not changed. Item A(1)(a)(11), Motion at 4. It is alleged that: The QA manager and organization did not have the aut.hority or organizational treedom to do their job. See Exhibits 1 and 2.

Response

The allegation is incorrect. There is no information contained in the referenced JI Exhibits 1 and 2 to support or substantiate the allegation. To the contrary, LP&L has always ensured the independence, authority, and organizational freedom of its Quality Assurance organization as well as that of its contractors and suppliers. This fact is well documented throughout the Waterford SES 3 PSAR, FSAR, Construction QA Manual. Preoperational QA Manual, and Nuclear Operations QA Manual. JI Exhibit 2 appears to be Revision 0 of the Ebasco Services Incorporated " Nuclear Quality Assurance Program Manual" and consists of the following sections dated 3/14/75: SECTION TITLE Current Rev. QA-II-1 Instructions, Procedures and Dwgs. 2 (3/4/81) QA-II-2 Drawing Control 2 (3/4/81) 

                            -QA-II-3                                            Procurement Document Control                                                   0 (3/14/75)

QA-II-4 Purchasing 1 (4/16/76) QA-II-5 Supplier Surveillance 2 (3/4/81) QA-II-6 Nonconformance 2 (6/18/82) QA-II-7 Corrective Action 2 (6/18/82) QA-II-8 Control of Special Process 2 (3/4/81) QA-II-9 Quality Assurance Audits 4 (6/18/82) JI Exhibit 2 says nothing at all about the allegation. At face value, JI Exhibit 2 is only part of the QA Program used by the Ebasco - New York engineering offices for the design and procurement aspects of the construction of Waterford 3. The authority and organization of the Ebasco QA program is contained in Section QA-I-2 of the Ebasco QA Manual, which Joint Intervenors did not include in their exhibit. That chapter describes the organizational structure, functional responsibilities, lines of authority, and lines of internal and external communications of the Ebasco QA Program. It clearly establishes that the Ebasco QA Manager and organization had the authority and organizational freedom to discharge its QA functions and responsibilities in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, l Appendix B. l

e During the time frame of revision 0, early 1975, the Ebasco program was considered a state-of-the-art program for the governed activities. These procedures have been maintained current with changing industry practices and accomplish their intended scope and purpose. The entire Ebasco QA Program, of which JI Exhibit 2 is only a part, has been accepted by the NEC on a continuing basis since July 1975 and is known as the "Ebasco Quality Assurance Program Topical Report," ETR-1001,-and is currently up to revision 11, accepted by the NRC in a letter dated May 17, 1982. JI Exhibit 1 is a 1979 management report commissioned by LP&L from the Management Analysis Company.(MAC). Nothing in that report suggests that the LP&L QA Organization (including the Ebasco program) did not have the authority or organizational freedom to discharge its quality responsibilities. Item A(1)(a)(iii), Motion at 4. It is alleged that: Construction had effective control over both the day-to-day operations of the QA Department and the major policy decisions. See LP&L Preoperational Manual, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 4.

Response

The allegation is incorrect. The independence of the QA Organization has been discussed in the response to Item A(1)(a)(ii) above. Further, JI Exhibit 4 directly contradicts the allegations in this Item A(1)(a)(iii) regarding the authority and independence of the QA Organization. JI Exhibit 4 is actually Draft 3 of Revision I to the "LP&L Preoperational Quality Assurance Manual" along with various comments and their resolution by LP&L Quality Assurance personnel. Part of Exhibit 4 is a " Matrix of LP&L Quality Assurance Program." Pages 1 and 2 of this matrix delineate the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion I and the corresponding requirements of ANSI N45.2-1971 which provide the requirements for organization and the independence of persons and organizations performing quality assurance functions. These pages clearly show where the regulatory requirements were satisfied by the "LP&L Preoperational Quality Assurance Manual." Also included as part of Exhibit 4 is a copy of the USNRC's Standard Review Plan for Section 17.1 of the Safety Analysis Report. Again this document clearly indicates how and where the LP&L QA Program established and maintained independence of its Quality Assurance i Organization. Furthermore, in the section of JI Exhibit 4 (QR 1.0) ' I

m which' deals with organization, the authority, responsibility and independence of the-LP&L Quality Assurance Organization is explicitly defined and described. J ' In reviewing JI Exhibit 4, itLis evident that the LP&L QA Organization had (and still has) direct access to management levels which assure accomplishment of quality-affecting activities. The LP&L QA Organization had1 (and still has) sufficient authority and organizational freedom to perform their QA/QC functions. effectively and without reservation. 

                                                                      ~

Item A(1)(b), Motion at 4. It is alleged that: LP&L, throughout the construction of Waterford 3, has failed to maintain adequate staff for its QA program, even after warnings from its own internal audits of the harm caused the program by inadequate staffing. See Exhibit 1; Waterford 3 Task-Force Inspection Report No. 50-382/84-34 (July 20, 1984), attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 5; Inspection Report, and Notice of-Violation, Report No. 50-382/82-14 (December 6, 1982), attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 6; Memo from A.E. Henderson Jr. to D.L. Aswell (February 16, 1978), Re: Request for Addition to' Quality Assurance Group General Office, Associate Engineer, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 7.

Response

The allegation is not correct, nor do the exhibits offered by the Joint Intervenors support the allegation. LP&L has consistently increased. its QA' staffing levels throughout the construction of Waterford 3. The present staffing and qualification levels, as reviewed by the NRC, are adequate'for operation of Waterford 3 (Sea response to item B(5)]. JI Exhibit 1, a 1979 draft report-from Management Analysis Company-(MAC) requested by LP&L management, suggests that while "...the QA group overall is strong..." additional QA manpower should be added to cover upcoming construction activities. 34 - In 1981, LP&L commenced a. major recruiting program and hcs accompliched-dramatic increases in staffing. The NRC effectively closed this issue in JI Exhibit 5. In reviewing the same ground covered by the allegation, the NRC staff concluded that LP&L QA staffing increased "from necessity" (not as a result of'MAC's recommendations), and closed their inspection (see JI Exhibit 6, page 12, paragraph C). 1 5 r

h. JI Exhibit 6, a 1982 NRC Inspection Report, addresses in part two 1981 NRC inspections relative to QA staffing. Contrary to the Joint Intervenors' allegation, JI Exhibit 6, to the extent it deals with staffing references the " growth in the authorized [ operational] QA organization and an apparent commitment to hire experienced individuals" (page 7) and the " prompt and extensive actions" by LP&L management including the increased construction QA staff (page 12). JI Exhibit 7. a 1978 internal LP&L memorandum, recommended-increased site and general office QA staffing by 1980. Far from ignoring the 

  -      memorandum, LP&L implemented the recommended increases.

Item A(1)(c), Motion at 5. It is alleged that: LP&L, throughout the construction of Waterford 3 nuclear plant, has failed to ensure QA and quality control ("QC") personnel are properly trained and qualified to perform their jobs. See Affidavit A, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 8; June 13, 1984 Letter from Darrell Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing; NRR, NRC, to J.M. Cain, President of LP&L, attached and. incorporated herein as Exhibit 9; August 17, 1984 Transcript of Public Meeting, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 10.

Response

The issue of the qualifications of QA/QC personnel has been extensively addressed in LP&L's response to Issues 1, 10 and 20 of the NRC's June 13, 1984 letter (JI ExhibitL 9). See the' responses to Items C and D(5) which discuss this issue as raised in JI Exhibits 9 and 10. JI Exhibit 8 contains no reference to QA/QC personnel qualifications. Item A(1)(d), Motion at 5 It is alleged that: LP&L failed to assure that special processes such as welding are properly controlled and performed by qualified personnel working tod qualified procedures. See Exhibits 1 and 8.

Response

The allegation that unqualified personnel are used for welding is incorrect. See the response to Item A(7)(a) with respect to qualification of welders and the claims of the unknown alleger in ' paragraphs 1 and 2 of JI Exhibit 8. There is nothing in JI Exhibit 1 concerning welder qualifications. s m

r - i r The allegation that LP&L failed to assure that special processes such as welding are. properly controlled is also incorrect. Welding activities at Waterford 3 for both safety class and non-safety class installations were performed in accordance with Code qualified welding procedures and Code qualified welders. There are no economic or schedule advantages to do otherwise. Control of welding operations is maintained via the welding procedures, the " traveller package" (process control sheets), and the pre-process, in-process, and final inspections and non-destruc*.1ve examination, if 

        , required by Code.

The documentation generated becomes a part of the historial records and it was subjected to LP&L QA sudit. Nothing in JI Exhibit I suggests that welding is improperly performed or controlled. See the response to Items A(7)(e) and A(7)(f) with respect to the allegations of the unidentified alleger in paragraphs 9 and 10 of JI Exhibit 8. Item A(1)(e), Motion at 5. It is alleged that: LP&L gave priority to management objectives which were not related to quality assurance principles over mandated QA and NRC requirements. See " Management by Objectives," attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 11.

Response

The allegation is not correct. LP&L gave priority to mandated QA and NRC requirements whether utilizing Management by Objectives (MBO) or other management tools, and the referenced JI Exhibit 11 does not support the contrary proposition. MBO is one technique to assist managers in accomplishing their goals; the approach does not dictate the goals to adopt. The implication of the allegation is that the principle of management by objectives is somehow inimical to quality and contrary to QA and NRC requirements. This is not correct. MBO techniques can be applied to quality objectives as well as other goals. While not formalized at LP&L,b20 techniques, among other management techniques, quito properly have been used at LP&L. A clear example of appropriate HBO use at LP&L is the present Nuclear Operations Executive Directive System whereby the Senior Vice President-Nuclear Operations sets guidance and policy for day-to-day objectives (including quality matters) of the Nuclear s

r-Operations Department. MBO is also used in the industry. For instance, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations recognizes the value of MBO by including goals and objectives as a specific evaluatian criterion for nuclear utilities. j JI Exhibit 11 does not support Joint Intervenors' allegation. This exhibit is a draft document concerning MBO techniques. As it happens, the draft MBO policy was not fully implemented by LP&L due to personnel administration policies. In any event, JI Exhibit 11 reflects on its face that MBO techniques can be used to advance QA and NRC requirements. Included in the exhibit is a sample program for licensed operator replacement training, illustrating application of MBO techniques.- Far from ignoring QA and NRC requirements, the draft program is explicit in including such references in the program (e.g. 10CFR55, ANS 3.1, ANS 3.4/ ANSI N546). Item A(1)(f), Motion at 5. It is alleged that: LP&L delegated all QA responsibilities to the QA Department instead of ensuring that QA be applied to all design, construction, and procurement activities affecting quality. See Exhibit 3 at Figure QC-2.4. Response: , The allegation is incorrect. JI Exhibit 3, which is the Ebasco Services Quality Assurance Manual (1975), provides that quality assurance is to be applied to all design, construction, and procurement activities affecting quality. See JI Exhibit 2, Chapters QC-1 and QC-2. Figure QC-2.4, cited by Joint Intervenors, is simply an organization chart of Ebasco's Nuclear Department Organization showing, among other things, the QA organization under the Chief Quality Assurance Engineer. How quality assurance was applied to all required activities affecting quality was the subject of the entire manual, including Parts QC-1 and QC-2. This holds true for the current Ebasco QA Manual, although the manual is configured somewhat differently. Item A(1)(g), Motion at 5. It is alleged that LP&L took retaliatory action against QA personnel who persisted in adhering strictly to QA rules and procedures. See Affidavit B, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 12. 

                                                                                      )

Response

The charge is not correct and the implication by the anonymous alleger in JI Exhibit 12 to the contrary is not correct. Louisiana Power & Light Company (LP&L) has not terminated any LP&L QA engineer associated with the Waterford 3 project for expressing quality concerns. LP&L has to its knowledge terminated four LP&L employees who were QA engineers at the time of their termination. The reasons for these terminations are clearly documented in LP&L personnel records and are the following: PERSON DOCUMENTED REASON FOR TERMINATION A Failed to pass required background / security investigation as stated in offer of employment dated 5/17/82. B Excessive absenteeism due to physical problem. C Failed to pass physical exam. D Unable to report to work. In addition to the above listed terminations, another individual was terminated from LP&L, who at one point in his career with LP&L worked as a QA engineer, but who at the time of termination was employed in the Nuclear Project Support Group. At the time of his termination he had not worked in the QA Department for over 3h years. The following is the documented reason for termination: PERSON DOCUMENTED REASON FOR TERMINATION E LP&L Disability Committee decision. (NOTE: This individual was unable to perform the duties of his job.) Based on the aforementioned, this contention is invalid. Item A(1)(h), Motion at 5. It is alleged that LP&L effectively abdicated all of its QA responsibilities to Ebasco Services, the Architect / Engineer for Waterford 3, and exercised minimal oversight of early design and construction work. LP&L's failure to oversee Ebasco's QA program was revealed when during Ebasco's turnover of systems to LP&L, it was unable to provide required QA documentation of its work. See Exhibits 3 and 6.

Response

LP&L did not " abdicate" its QA responsibilities to Ebasco Services. QR 1.0 of LP&L's QA Manual describes the organizations within LP&L which have been assigned QA Program responsibilities. (See LP&L Exhibit 4). These responsibilities have been performed by LP6L during design and construction of Waterford 3. As stated in Appendix B to 10CFR50, Criterion I, LP&L is allowed to delegate the authority to establish and execute the QA Program to , others. This is what was done in the case of Ebasco Services, with LP&L at all times retaining responsibility, control and audit authority over the overall QA Program. The delegation of QA program execution responsibility to the architect-engineer (in this case Ebasco) is an accepted procedure widely used in the nuclear industry. The NRC has conducted audits of the organizational interfaces established by LP&L for the Waterford 3 project and did not identi?, ignificant problems in this area. LP&L conducted audits of Ebasco Services during the design and construction phases. LP&L Project Group was involved in design decisions during the design phase. During construction LP&L maintained an on-site QA Group which was involved with site construction activities on a daily basis. JI Exhibit 3 in no way supports the allegation. It is simply an old version of part of the QA Manual used by Ebasco, N.Y. for design and procurement activities. JI Exhibit 6, an NRC inspection report from nearly two years ago, does not support the allegation that LP&L abdicated its QA responsibilities to Ebasco. To the contrTry, JI Exhibit 6 explains that it was LP&L QA which identified the shortcomings in the system turnover packages, intensified and broadened the audit of these systems, and subsequently rejected the four systems submitted by Ebasco for turnover. This is hardly an abdication of QA responsibilities to Ebasco. In any event, the issues raised in the inspection report were identified, acted upon by LP&L and the NRC, and resolved. Item A(1)(i), Motion at 5. m-~~ j

It is alleged that: LP&L failed to ensure that Combustion Engineering-Chattanooga, which supplied the Nuclear Steam Supply System for Waterford, established and implemented a QA program which met NRC requirements from 1971 through 1976. See December 7, 1976 Memo from Project Manager Mawhinney, to R.K. Stampley Re: Quality Assurance, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 13; Memo from R. Hastings to A. Henderson Jr. (Dacember 28, 1976) concerning problems encountered during a records audit at CE-Chattanooga, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 14; Memo from Galligan to Stampley (December 17, 1976), Re: CE's Need to Meet QA requirements, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 15; May 31, 1977, Letter from Project Manager Mawhinney to Stampley (May 31, 1977) Re: CE Quality Assurance Claim, attached and incorporated herein es Exhibit 16; Memo from R. Hastings: Comments on CE Quality Assurance Claim (June 8, 1977), attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 17. Item A(2)(a), Motion at 7. [ Combined with A (1) (1)] It is alleged that: Combustion Engineering's ("CE") work lacked a design control program. See Exhibits 15 and 16; December 10, 1976 Letter, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 24.

Response

These allegations are not correct. Combustion Engineering (CE) has maintained a QA program (including a design control program) through the life of the Waterford project. While there were limited deficiencies requiring correction, audits of CE by LP&L, Ebasco and the NRC have confirmed that the CE QA program was adequate and met overall NRC requirements. Additionally, the Independent Design Verification Program undertaken by LP&L and reviewed by the NRC in Supplement 6 to the Waterford 3 SER (which included the CE QA design control processes), " concluded that the QA program, including QA procedures and specific design control procedures ... were adequate and responsive to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, and the commitments in the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report" (SSER 6, pg. 1-10). 

      !L6 exhibits cited by the Joint Intervenors (JI Exhibits 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 24) support, rather than detract from, this position or have no bearing on the allegation. The cited exhibits document, in small part, a contractual dispute over extra costs incurred by CE in implementing the (at that time) new quality assurance requirements.                                  The exhibita refer repeatedly to details of the existing CF QA prcgrams -

effectively disproving the Joint Intervenors' allegation. J1 Exhibit 13 points out the "... substantial effort put forth by CE in developing a

and implementing programs which meet (" Grey Book"] requirements." The tone of JI Exhibit 14 reflects a QA auditor's frustration in dealing with a vendor which, as a result of the unsettled contract dispute, is not being cooperative. However, the notes from the auditor's exit interview, as well as the formal audit report, are more restrained and to tha point, and included only minor findings relating to records storage requirements. JI Exhibit 15 (the CE letter portion) is supportive of the fact that CE had expended significant efforts in upgrading its programs to the Waterford PSAR requirements. JI Exhibit 16 discusses "... CE's claims for compensation for additional quality requirements ..." implemented by CE. In JI Exhibit 17, the author notes that CE's contractual commitments and audits by LP&L QA provide 

                              " sufficient assurance as to the adequacy of CE's quality assurance commitments." JI Exhibit 24 has no bearing on the CE QA program.

These same exhibits were a small portion of documents reviewed by the NRC Waterford 3 Task Force in JI Exhibit 5. While referring to limited problems encountered in the December, 1976 audit of CE, the NRC recognized this issue as a " contract dispute" and concluded that"... there is reasonable assurance that LP&L's QA program meets the intent and guidance of the QA program commitments. included in Amendment 44 to the SAR". Item A(1)(j), Motion at 6. It is alleged that: LP&L's QA organization had conflicting lines of authority. The off-site and on-site groups often duplicated each other's work. See Exhibit 1. Responset The allegation is misleading and inaccurate. LP&L's QA organization did not have conflicting lines of authority, nor does the JI Exhibit 1 support the contrary in any respect. The Joint Intervenors are apparently referring to LP&L memorandum dated August 29, 1979 which includes the sentence "The tendency is for Cesir's Group to spend their time duplicating QA Group work." The group referred to was organizationally separate from QA and has no l bearing on this allegation. In any case, the concern with quality by a group outside of QA can only be considered a desirable attribute. 

                                                                                             ._.____m_.___.__ __________._________.___________._______._____.________.__._._.__._______.________.___.___._______.._____________.______._.______._________._.____________.__M

7 Item A(1)(k), Motion at 6. It is alleged that: QA programs at Waterford were sometimes contradictory. Corporate and site QA practices varied significantly. See Memo Re: Evaluation of Ebasco Audit Responses (March 1, 1978), attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 18.

Response

The allegation is not correct. If the Joint Intervenors are inferring that the QA program at Ebasco-New York was different from the QA Program at the Waterford site, LP&L concurs. However, the programs were not contradictory, but complimentary due to the dual role of Ebasco--that of the Architect / Engineer (A/E) and that of the Construction Manager (CM). Ebasco's organization, responsibilities, and authority for these tasks, performed under LP&L's direction, were clearly established in the Waterford 3 PSAR, Section 1.8 (Amendment No. 17 dated July 1972) and further defined in Amendments No. 44 and 45 (January 1974 and January 18, 1974), respectively. JI Exhibit 18 appears to be hand written notes dated 3/1/78'concerning an LP&L Quality Assurance evaluation of Ebasco's response to two QA Audits by LP&L. We see nothing in the notes to indicate that corporate and site QA programs were contradictory or inconsistent. The gist of the notes appears to be that LP&L found that some of Ebasco's responses to specific QA Audit Unresolved Item Reports (UIRs) were not satisfactory. Subsequent to the date of the evaluation in Exhibit 18, all of the UIRs, together with the Ebasco responses, were re-audited in accordance with approved procedures by LP&L QA as follows. a) UIR 77-2/4, re-audited 3/13-16/78, closed 3/16/78 b) UIR 77-2/6, re-audited 3/13-16/78 and 10/78, closed 10/12/78 c) UIR 77-2/7, re-audited 3/13-16/78, closed 3/16/78 d) UIR 77-1/3, re-audited 3/13-16/78, closed 3/16/78 e) UIR 77-1/5, re-audited 3/13-16/78, and 10/78, closed 10/12/78 f) UIR 77-1/6, re-audited 3/13-16/78, and 10/78, closed 10/12/78 This is an example of the QA Program functioning properly, as it was designed to do. All items were properly addressed and closed. um___---___--- 1

r Item A(1)(1), Motion at 6. It'is alleged'that:' j0 Ebasco project. purchasing personnel and auditors were not adequately trained. See Exhibit 18; Memo from R. Hastings to D. Aswell (September 

                              '15, 1977)' Re: Open Audit Items, attached and' incorporated herein as Exhibit 19; September 30, 1976, Audit Report,' attached and incorporated
i. herein as Ex.11 bit 20.

, Response: 4 

                              -JI Exhibits 18, 19 and 20 relate to LP&L audit findings in the 1976-77
timeframe. In each case, the audit findings were properly addressed and closed out in accordance with established procedures, and l

appropriate corrective action was taken. 4 I With respect to the training of Ebasco project purchasing personnel, I LP&L Audit Report 76-3 (JI Exhibit 20) states that there was no record 1 of training for a single. individual which had.only recently been hired, ) Ebasco's Senior Buyer. The corrective action was to give appropriate l- and adequate training. This was performed, and the finding was closed out on November 30, 1977. Review of the three exhibits reveals no basis for the allegation that Ebasco auditors were not adequately trained. One of its reports, LP&L Audit Report No 77-1, identifies conditions within the training

procedure which require revision. The changes to the procedure were clarifications and definitions. None of the findings stated or implied i- that auditors were not adequately trained.

Item A(1)(m), Motion at 6. It is alleged that LP&L failed to hire qualified workers to do welding and instrumentation j work. In some cases, individuals with no experience in the nuclear field, including bartenders and cab drivers, were brought in to do maintenance work in the reactor building and given no formal training. See Exhibit 8.

Response

The allegation is without merit. Hiring practices and training programs were in place at Waterford 3 for hiring personnel to do welding, instrumentation and m<.'.ntenance work based on qualifications commensurate with their level of intended work and regulatory 1 requirements. The discussions which follow deal with each of the craft areas in turn. i _13

1. Welding The subject of welder qualifications is covered in the response to Items A(1)(d) and A(7)(a).
2. Instrumentation Union craftsmen were hired to do instrumentation work at Waterford
3. Their work was inspected and audited by site QC and QA. Findings in the course of such inspections and audits were resolved in the ordinary closure process. Furthermore, training was provided both by the union and on site. Union craftsmen doing instt mentation work go through an apprentice training program which encompasses such work. Further, onsite training of instrumentation workers is extensive. The workers are trained in specific work procedures by their foremen and other supervisors.

This training is provided in weekly meetings and is further supplemented with specific instructions at the time a work package is assigned to a craftsman. For example, Ebasco formally trained its instrumentation supervisors, general foreman, and foreman in Procedure CP-732. " Instrumentation Installation." These men then instructed their work crews in this process. JI Exhibit 8 is insufficient to justify the allegation. The anonymous affiant states at paragraph 3 that he knows of a plumber who was hired as an instrumentation worker and who lacked formal - nuclear training. Without further identification of the individual, the contention is far too vague to permit detailed response. Two general comments can be made. First, affiant suggests that plumbers would be unqualified to do instrumentation work. In fact, plumbing experience could well be quite good training for instrumentation work. Secondly, as discussed above, training of such craft workers is systematic and extensive.

3. Maintenance LP&L employees hired as maintenance workers for Waterford 3 were given formal training in their area of work. Contractors were hired based on prior experience. Additionally, work review by supervisors and the testing program provided confirmation of work adequacy. Individuals were trained as necessary to Startup Administration Procedure - 20, " Training and Qualification of Startup Personnel", and specific approved procedures that related to their work. The individuals were supervised and their work was reviewed by qualified supervisors. The work was functionally tested as part of the testing program. Individuals whose performance was not satisfactory, as recognized by their supervisors, were given additional training or terminated.

7 In JI Exhibit 8 the affiant implies at paragraph 4 that an individual who was previously a bartender or cab driver would have no qualifications enabling employment at a nuclear plant. This is incorrect. Many maintenance jobs do not require prior experience. In cases where prior experience is required, newly hired maintenance workers were evaluated to determine that their experience was commensurate with the job requirements. Further, training as described above was provided to new maintenance employees as required. Item A(1)(n), Motion at 6. It is alleged that: Alcohol and drug abuse was common at the Waterford site. See Exhibit 8; March 18, 1981, PNO-RIV-8109, Re: Use of Controlled Substances, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 21.

Response

The allegation is not correct. Alcohol and drug abuse was not common at Waterford 3. The two exhibits cited do not support the allegation that " alcohol and drug abuse was common at the Waterford site." JI Exhibit 21 is NRC documentation of a drug investigation at the site g which terminated in the arrest of eight construction workers by the St. Charles Parish Sheriff's Department. The undercover investigation was conducted over a period of four months with the full knowledge and cooperation of LP&L management. Such cooperation was consistent with LP&L's policies prohibiting the use of alcohol and drugs at Waterford. The allegations by the unidentified alleger in paragraph 5 of JI Exhibit 8 is vague and nonspecif f ; hearsay. Th'e information, which does not include times, places, or names, is insufficient to support a conclusion of " common" alcohol and drug abuse. LP&L has maintained policies against the use of alcohol and drugs during the construction of Waterford 3. Following'the investigation , discussed above, LP&L strengthened its policies against alcohol and drug abuse and instituted the policy, " Illegal Items on Company' Property, Facilities and Job Sites". This policy continues in force and provides the authorization for searches of company or, personal property for contraband. Contraband discovered in the ponnession of an individual may constitute grounds for severe disciplinary action as - well as prosecution by local law enforcement agencies.- Employees found to be involved with narcotics outside working hours also are subject to disciplinary action. , s / 

                                                     ~
                                                               *                  -__)

                                     'In addition to this policy LP&L has instituted preventative measures to ensure early detection of potential problems in the area of alcohol and drug abuse. These measures include the following:
1. Personnel Screening Program
a. Background Investigations
b. Psychological Evaluations and Interviews
2. Employee Assistance Program
3. Drug / Alcohol Abuse Awareness Seminars
4. Work Rules; Minimum On-Duty Performance Requirements
5. Signs posted on Louisiana Power & Light Company facilities
6. Searches (Contraband / Narcotic)
a. Work Location
b. Vehicles *
c. Area Access Points (Primary Access Point, Etc.)
7. Urinalysis Testing
8. Continued Observation Program The policy " Illegal Items on Company Property, Facilities and Job Sites" is applicable to LP&L employees as well as contract employees.

Contract employees are made aware of this policy and are expected to adhere to it. Construction employees were made aware of LP&L's position regarding the possession and/or use of drugs and alcohol through .he issuance of the Project Work Rules. Ebasco, the primary contractor and construction manager for the Waterford 3 project, was responsible for the administration of the Project Work Rules and \ overs 11 project policy enforcement for construction personnel. The Project Work Rules not only indicated that the possession and/or use of drugs and alcohol was prohibited, but also made construction employees aware of potential disciplinary action via the following statement: Persons discharged for possession and/or use of narcotics (including marijuana), non-prescribed tranquilizers or pep pills or alcohol on company premises will not be allowed to return to this project to work for any employer in any capacity. Violators of this rule will also be prosecuted to the fullest extent the law allows. 4

During the project, Ebasco enforced these work rules using a multi-tier approach. Upon entry to the construction site, all construction employees ~were observed by both Security personnel and Timekeepers who were given instructions to be alert for abnormal behavior which could be the result of being under the influence of drugs and alcohol. Timekeepers performing random attendance checks were alert for similar signs. In addition, the normal supervisory observation occurred throughout the work period. As with Ebasco, so also has LP&L enforced its drug and alcohol policy at Waterford 3. This has been done in part through disciplinary action up to and including discharge of site personnel for drug possession. Further, unannounced searches, cooperation with police, and company investigations have been undertaken. It, of course, can always be argued that such enforcement action could be more frequent or more extensive. Further, LP&L does not claim perfection in its enforcement activities. Where problems.in enforcement or areas for improvement I are identified, corrective action is taken. LF&L believes that, based on Ebasco and LP&L site policies and on the continuous observation by supervisory personnel, drug and alcohol abuse is not and was not common at Waterford 3. Item A(1)(o), Motion at 6. It is alleged that: ! LP&L provided no QC coverage for work done on the night shif t for most l of the construction of Waterford 3. See Exhibits 1 and 8; August 29, , ( 1979 Memo from: D. Lester to D. Aswell (August 29, 1979) Re: MAC Recommendations, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 22.. t

Response

The allegation is false. QC coverage was provided, night or day, when-required. t LP&L conducted a survey with reference to the anonymous alleger's l allegation in paragraph 14 of Exhibit 8 to determine the extent of QC night shift coverage provided by Mercury Company of Norwood and Ebasco Services. A review of employee sign-in/out gate' registers was conducted. An average of 4 workdays each month were sampled. The. survey showed that Mercury provided QC coverage on the days sampled i and during each month of 1982. The extent of this coverage was contingent upon Mercury's work schedule. During early 1982 records indicate Mercury assigned 1 to 3 inspectors to night shift when the work schedule was minimal and as many as 14 to 24 inspectors during the last quarter of 1982 as Mercury progressed to meet LP&L system turnover needs. t

Ebasco provided QC coverage in the days sampled and during each month o.f 1982. The extent of this coverage was contingent upon Ebasco's work schedule. During early 1982, records indicate Ebasco assigned 1 to 2 inspectors to night shift when Ebasco had minimal construction responsibilities and 2 to 4 inspectors during the last quarter of 1982 _ when LP&L assigned Ebasco more construction responsibilities in order to support LP&L durin6 system turnover. In summary, records indicate that both organizations provided QC coverage to monitor safety-related work activities performed by construction forces on night shift. JI Exhibits 1 and 22 cited by the Joint Intervenors have no bearing on QC coverage. Item A(1)(p), Motion at 6. It is alleged that: 

      -LP&L failed to trend problems so that oftentimes it did not identify pervasive, widespread or genetic deficiencies in its QA program. See Exhibit 12; Letter from R. DeYoung to M. Leddick (May 14, 1984) Re: CAT Inspection Report No. 50-382/84-07, attached and incorporate.' herein as Exhibit 23.

Response

The allegation is incorrect, and JI Exhibits 12 and 23 provide no basis for it. Throughout the design, construction and testing phases, LP&L and its contractors utilized a three phase approach to identify, trend and correct potentially pervasive, widespread or generic problems (conditions adverse to quality). First, LP&L required all contractors associated with safety-related activities to develop and implement approved Quality Assurance programs. These programs contained documented corrective action procedures. LP&L delegated to Ebasco (Waterford 3 Construction Manager) the responsibility for trend analysis of Nonconforming Condition Reports. Ebasco procedure QA-D.3 was the procedure implemented for this activity. In accordance with this procedure, a j trend analysis program has been in effect since March 29, 1974. This l procedure was assessed by the NRC twice during 1984. The Construction Appraisal Team' Inspection (JI Exhibit 23, page VIII) found that the requirement to take corrective action to preclude repetition of [- nonconforming conditions had been removed from Ebasco procedures for a three month period. As a result, trending codes had been left off four NCRs. However, CAT went on to say that these nonconformances did i become part of the data base for Ebasco quarterly trend analysis, and l l A

that'the' trend analysis would look at the four nonconformances to preclude recurrence if the. problems. identified in the NCRs were found 

                                ~
        'to be repetitive (JI Exhibit 23, page VIII-3). CAT concluded that the lack of the procedural requirement for a three-month period did not appear to be of atfir concern. Subsequently the Staff _ Safety Evaluation _raport, NUREG-0787, Supplement 7, page 85, stated the. trend analysis; program was " adequate and' performing its intended function".
  • Further, LP&L has improved its trending program where appropriate. In the response to. Issue 23 of the NRC's letter of June 13, 1984 (LP&L
Exhibit 5), LP&L discussed:its audit program with respect to Mercury Company of Norwood. While LP&L QA had identified the problem with Mercury documentation, LP&L's response to Issue 23_noted that improved trending of. audit. findings may have led to a..more timely identification oflthe problem. Such improved trending techniques have been initiated for the operations phase of Waterford 3.~

In addition, a computerized master tracking system'(MTS) was developed that listed all NCRs and applicable trending codes. The MTS was used to' track deficiencies and was also used for trending purposes. The trend codes for nonconformances trended by Ebasco were entered into LP&L's Master Tracking System on a daily basis. Computer printouts were available on a daily basis and used as needed by-both LP&L and 

        .Ebasco. Jbasco's Quality Assurance Supervisor generated a quarterly

! evaluation report which was distributed to site management. This report was.the site input to the Ebasco Home Office computerized program. As an example of the effectiveness of the system, Ebasco and LP&L startup management used the system to identify and_ subsequently reduce the number of hardware and documentation exceptions noted during_ system turnover. This reduction led to a more comprehensive and effective testing program. ! Secondly, management structure and responsibilities included provisions for inter and intra communications in order-to escalate known hardware ! and programmatic deficiencies. Due to organizational interface between ! QA, Ebasco and the LP&L Startup Group, substantial changes occurred in [ 1982 concerning safety-related system statusing which ultimately improved the identification of unfinished work items and documentatio'n. [ In addition management consistently held scheduled and unscheduled meetings to discuss, evaluate and resolve safety issues. Finally, management established required groups and committees - Joint 7- Test Group (JTG), Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC), Safaty l- Review Committee-(SRC), and the Independent Safety Evaluation Group, (ISEG) at an early date. These groups and committees, because of their-independence and level of membership, caused resolution of several potentially adverse condi: ions. For example, JTG chused major changes 

        'in the testing program (both technical and administrative). PORC, because of its program and procedure reviews, has enhanced 1.P&L's l'

f l ,

overall effort to properly prepare for fuel loading and power operations. SRC/ISEG, having been established and procedurally. implemented at an early date, have had additional time to review, evaluate and transmit information to applicable managers concerning regulatory and industry information dealing with major safety issues. This approach overall has been successful in identifying and correcting potentia 1' generic safety issues. Item A(2)(a), Motion at 7. It is alleged that: < Combustion Engineering's ("CE") work lacked a design control program. See Exhibits 15 and 16; December 10, 1976 Letter, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 24.

Response

This allegation is not correet. See the response to Item A(1)(1) above. Item A(2)(b), Motion at 7. It is alleged that:

LP&L's Office Support Group failed to perform reviews of Ebasco's drawings. See Memo from J. Padolino to R. Teal (October 5, 1979) Re

Errors on Manufacturers' Drawings, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 25; Letter from Aswell to Stampley, Re: _ Errors on Controlled Drawings, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 26.

Response

The allegation is misleading. During the construction phase, LP&L committed to a design control program with the following characteristics: 

                "LP&L shall delegate to a specific A-E and to a

' specific NSSS Vendor the responsibility for the detailed design effort for each LP&L nuclear generating station. This effort shall include design verification. 

 -- ,       -    ,,e.m. , .~--,-y . . . , , - -   ,.      ,x<.        -                + 4   ,

s LP&L Nuclear Project personnel shall verify the review or approval of safety-related specifications and drawings and changes thereto prepared by the A-E and NSSS. Vendor." (LP&L Construction QA Mcnual, Section'QR 3.0, Rev. 2) Ebasco performed and documented an internal interdisciplinary review of design including drawings in accordance with established guidelines for design verification prior to transmittal to LP&L. The LP&L Offsite Support Group performed and documented the verification required above and,Lin fact, exceeded the commitment through non-required reviews performed in the normal course of business. JI Exhibits 25 and 26 not only do not support the allegation, but contradict it. These exhibits document the findings of one such non-required LP&L review of Ebasco drawings. See the responses to Items A(3)(g) and A(5)(b). Item A(2)(c), Motion at 7. It is alleged that: LP&L failed to ensure identification and correction of significant errors in the design drawings, including incorrect design numbers, lack of current revisions, mislabeling of components, controlled drawings which had not been properly reviewed and approved. See Exhibit 25.

Response

The allegation is incorrect. As noted in the response to Items A(2)(b), LP&L had in effect an effective design control program to ensure review of design drawings. JI Exhibit 25 does not support the allegation. The exhibit does not pertain to " errors in the design drawings", but rather to information affixed to the drawings to facilitate distribution and review of the drawings by project personnel. See the responses to items A(3)(g) and A(5)(b). Item A(2)(d), Motion at 7. It is alleged that: Whip restraints and temporary hangers were installed first and then drawings were done to conform to the installation of the pipe supporet and-restraints. See Exhibit 8. J 

            ,m.  -            -- -           - . , - , n g    7 , - ,c--                ,c,- -   y
V 1-
  . Response:

The allegarion,. based'on the statement of the anonymous alleFqr at _ paragraph 7 of JI Exhibit 8, is misleading and inaccurate. Whip 

        > restraints and temporary hangers were installed at Waterford 3, with
         ' drawings as appropriate, in accordance with accepted industry practice
        -and regulatory requirements.

Two types of temporary hangers were employed at Waterford 3. Temporary 

        . construction hangers -the most common type, are used as erection aids in. piping placement and installation. Their purpose is to hold the pipe in the correct position so that permanent hangers can be installed. The other type, temporary testing hangers,are used to provide additional support as needed during testing situations, e.g.,

, when vibrational

  • problems were encountered. These were controlled by procedures ASP-IV-89 and 91.

While sketches are made for temporary testing hangers, these are not made for temporary construction hangers, and they are not developed, either before or after installation, as they would serve no useful purpose. The installation of whip' restraints and temporary testing hangers is preceded by the issuance of design drawings. .Except for temporary 7 construction hangers, field installation proceeded with a work package which included a design drawing. In accordance with approved procedures (e.g., ASP-IV-37) the i responsible field engineer or design engineering personne1'were allowed 

        'in appropriate circumstances to redline changes directly on the installation copy of the design drawing. Another approved means employed to revise whip restraint design in order to eliminate interferences and facilitate installation without immediate drawing changes involved the issuance of field change requests and design change notices.

l The difference in drawing requirements between construction and testing-temporary hangers, redline activities, or other design change mechanisms may have been misconstrued by the alleger to mean that drawings were developed only after installation. Item A(2)(e), Motion at 7. 

  .It.-is~ alleged that:
                                                     ~

Wo'rkers at Waterford 3 found that design drawings were not accurate. For example, installation of instrumentation in accordance with _ approved drawings interfaced [ sic] with installation of hangers according to approved design drawings. Ibid. I

Response

This allegation, based on the statement of the anonymous alleger at paragraph 8 of JI Exhibit 8, is misleading and incorrect. Waterford 3 design drawings are accurate within reasonable and acceptable tolerances. There is nothing in JI Exhibit 8 to indicate otherwise. The discovery of an impediment or interference in the field which prevents precise adherence to the approved design drawings is an expected occurrence in any large construction project. Changes necessary to, overcome an installation interference are made according to established procedures. The procedures provide an approved mechanism to make the required changes and to ensure accurate updating of design drawings and approval by Design Engineering. Item A(2)(f), Motion at 7. It is alleged that: Installation of Hilti bolts often violated or ignored design requirements. Although the design drawings required the installation of four Hilti bolts on the baseplates, often only two Hilti bolts were used. Also, Hilti bolts were welded to the bottom of the baseplates even though approved procedures and drawings did not permit such welding. See Exhibit 8; Affidavit C, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 27.

Response

The allegations concerning Hilti bolt installations that often violated or ignored design requirements in the motion and related allegations in the affidavits are unfounded. Hilti expansion bolts were used at Waterford 3 to install anchor plates to existing concrete structures in accordance with design specifications and with approved installation procedures. Whenever deviations were identified from the design requirements, (such as the l required number of bolts) engineering approval was obtained. l The concerns expressed in the motion and the affidavit (JI Exhibit 8, Paragraph 12) about the use of two as opposed to four Hilti bolts implies that baseplates attached with only 2 Hilti bolts violated design requirements. This is incorrect. There are numerous instances in which safety and nonsafety instrumentation supports and some nonsafety small bore piping supports have approved designs that have anchor plates with two bolts. Another condition where a two-bolt . design is used is when an anchor plate overlaps and is welded to an I embedded plate. l i i

The principle upon which a Hilti expansion bolt functions is that of a pre-tensioned bolt. It is torqued (tightened) to twice its design working load when it is installed. This is torque tested by QC. . personnel and properly documented. The torque causes wedges at the shank of the bolt to bear into the sides of the hole in the concrete, Janchoring the bolt. The cross section size is based upon the intended application. Thereafter, the load capacity of the bolt is directly proportional to the embedded depth, therefore, if sufficient embedment was not provided,_the bolt would slip when torqued. Thus, if Hilti - bolts were used that were significantly shorter than required (JI , Exhibit 8, Paragraph 11), they would not be.able to withstand the l torque used for installation and testing and would slip. They should thus be readily detected and replaced. Similarly, the allegation that bolt holes were the wrong diameter and were packed with rods (JI Exhibit 27, Paragraph 16) (which appears as heresay) does not appear to be technically logical. If the bolt hole was oversized and packed, the bolt would slip.when torqued, 

  -because the wedges at the shank of.the bolt would have little or no bearing to hold the bolt at its embedded depth. It is therefore not believed that such conditions would have gone uncorrected. Procedures required that oversized holes be regrouted to develop the full strength of the original concrete.

Similarly, it would be extremely unlikely that Hilti bolts would be welded to the back of the baseplates (JI Exhibit 8, paragraph 13). These are express and readily followed procedures for Hilti installation. The approach suggested by alleger would be at least as difficult or more difficult than the approved procedure. Further, i while isolated instances of this practice in theory could have occurred without subsequent detection, the condition could not have been 

  -widespread or it would have been detected through QC processes and plant supervisor observation.

[ At JI Exhibit 27, Paragrapns 14 and 15 one of the anonymous allegers l states that he cut down a Hilti bolt to fit into.a hole too short'for i the specific hilti bolt length. Each contractor had approved l procedures that would permit a new hole of the proper depth to be drilled if the original hole hit rebar. Whenever holes were moved, an IR and CEIR would be required and an approved change issued. In order to install a " cut" Hilti bolt, a section of the bolt would have to be removed and the ends welded together. The Hilti bolt material is AISI 11L41 or 11L44 whose chemical composition requires special welding procedures. If welding was performed on the Hilti bolt itself with standard site procedures, the material would be expected to embrittle !- and fail when the specified torque was applied. The one such identified case that occurred was documented by nonconformance report NCR-W3-7159. This nonconformance concerned a Hilti bolt which was cut, shortened, welded, and installed without authorization. During the l torque test this bolt failed. Under Engineering directed corrective i enraen-,, - 

                                                                                       ,,-e, , ,

m 

                    . action was taken to replace the bolt and to perform ultrasonic tests on 30% of the Hilti bolts installed by the crew that caused the nonconformance.- The results show that the embedment conforms to.the specification and'no discontinuities ~were found in the bolts. The' affidavit may be referring to this NCR.

The allegation that substitution of Hilti bolts with shorter bolts was covered up by filing off the letters on_the bolt head and substituting letters indicating a shorter bolt,(JI Exhibit 8, Paragraph 26) ic also-l untenable. The tapered head of Hilti bolts makes-filing readily visible. When upon inspection bolt markings were missing or illegible ultrasonic tests were required to be performed on the bolts to verify the correct embedment depth and assure that there were no discontinuities in the bolts. Such bolts have been tested and confirmed to be acceptable. In a few isolated cases, corrective action under engineering direction was performed. In short, Joint Intervenors' Hilti-bolt allegations are inaccurate and misleading because: (1) All Hilti bolts are torque installed and independently torque inspected, except for bolts in inaccessible areas in which the acceptance of those bolts has engineering approval. (2) A production sample of Hilti bolts installed were tansion tested. (3) Ultrasonic tests were performed on expansion bolts on which the markings were not readily on QC inspection. In conclusion, abuses such as those described in the motion, if indeed they occurred, must have been isolated or they would have been detected and repaired as a result of above testing methods. It should be noted that the Hilti expansion anchors are conservatively designed and have considerable reserve capacity. In accordance with NRC IE Bulletin 79-02, they are designed for a nominal safety factor of 4 in tension. Therefore an isolated defective bolt installation will not endanger the structural integrity of the system and for this reason such postulated situations are acceptable. Item A(3)(a), Motion at 8. 7 It is alleged that: i Incomplete or missing Ebasco procurement documentation. See Exhibit 1; Memo from Haas to Lester (July 11,'1980) Re: Processing of Procurement Documents, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 28. ' . Response: 

;                   There is no basis for this allegation. The exhibits cited by the Joint Intervenors (JI Exhibits 1 and 28) do not support the contention.
                   'JI Exhibit 28 makes no mention of Ebasco procurement practices and has no bearing on the Joint Intervenors' allegation. As for JI Exhibit 1, the only apparent connection to the Joint Intervenors' allegation undercuts the allegation. An August 14, 1979 memorandum included in the exhibit, while noting inefficiencies in the procurement certification process on the part of Ebasco, clearly demonstrates that i

Ebasco was aware of the need for proper certification. Indeed, as reflected in the memorandum, Ebasco recognized its duties to the point of placing vendor shipments on hold pending resolution of certification problems. Item A(3)(b), Motion at 8. Lack of LP&L oversight of procurement activities, including. subcontractor documentation. See Letter from Aswell to Stampley (July 14, 1977), attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 29.

Response

The allegation is incorrect. The exhibit cited by the Intervenors refutes rather than supports the allegation. JI Exhibit 29 is a letter from the LP&L Vice President-Power Production to the Ebasco Site Manager instructing that a procurement under consideration be rejected. See response to Item A(3)(f) for additional discussion of procurement activities. Item A(3)(c), Motion at 8. It is alleged that: Lack of records index as committed to in LP&L's PSAR and as required by ANSI N. 45.2.9. See Exhibits'25 and 26.

Response

The allegation is incorrect. LP&L has a records index in accordance with the PSAR and ANSI N45.2.9. This index is titled the Record Type List. This index is periodically audited and updated as required. JI Exhibits 25 and 26 contain no reference to a records index that may be required by the PSAR or ANSI N45.2.9. For a discussion of JI I Exhibits 25 and 26, see the responses to Items A(3)(g) and A(5)(b). l Item A(3)(d), Motion at 8. It is alleged that: Maintenance of a confidential or secret records system outside the system of controlled documents which includes sensitive or embarrassing documents about problems of LP&L's QA system. See Exhibit 15; Memo from Maurin to Aswell (July 14, 1980) Re: Waterford 3 Document Control, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 30. l l l l L ,

f 

   ' Response:

LP&L has never' maintained a confidential or secret records system outside the formal records system.. As in any other business, LP&L treats as confidential certain types of documents such as contract - negotiation or dispute matters, and personnel matters. Such documents are maintained in the formal LP&L record system as confidential documents, but remain available for NRC review. This approach is entirely appropriate.- The exhibits cited by the Joint Intervenors for this contention (JI Exhibits 15 and 30) do not support-the allegation.. JI Exhibit 15 is a confusing collection of old miscellaneous documents. The internal Ebasco memorandum in the exhibit simply states a chronology of events related to Ebasco direction to Combustion Engineering. This document was maintained in the LP&L record system and was not treated as " sensitive" or " secret". The pages from the CE letter in JI Exhibit 15, which had relatively wide distribution, cannot . be related to the allegation at all, and the PSAR pages clearly are not 

          " sensitive" or " secret."

JI Exhibit 30 relates to the shift in management of the LP&L document control function from a developmental mode (for which the LP&L project team was responsible) to an implementation mode (assigned to the LP&L Plant Staff at the time). While this document is labelled 

          " confidential" it was nonetheless retained in the LP&L record system.

Furthermore, it is clear from the content of the exhibit, that any 

          " sensitivity" related only to the development of LP&L personnel administration policy with regard to management of the function.

Item A(3)(e), Motion at 8. 4 It is alleged that: QA training of Ebasco procurement officials was seriously deficient. See Exhibit 21; LP&L Non-Conformance Item Summary Sheet, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 31.

Response

There is no evidence in the cited exhibits that supports the contention that QA training of Ebasco procurement officials was " seriously deficient". JI Exhibit 31 contains a nonconformance (item 76-3/2), identified by LP&L QA during an audit of Ebasco N.Y., which states that there was no record of training for a single individual, the Senior Buyer. The Senior Buyer was given the requisite training, and the item was subsequently closed during a re-audit by LP&L QA following a review of the applicable documentation. l

See also the response to Item A(1)(1). Item A(3)(f), Motion at 8. It is alleged that: LP&L failed to establish a program of any sort to review subcontractor procurement documentation. See Exhibits 24 and 29.

Response

The allegation is not correct. LP&L has an established program for review of procurement documentation, including subcontractor procurement documentation. LP&L, during the construction phase, delegated to Ebasco Services the authority to purchase, with LP&L l approval and or as LP&L's Agent, the bulk of the material, equipment and services including the award of subcontracts for the plant. (LP&L QA Manual-QR7.0, page 1). Combustion Engineering was delegated the same authority for the Nuclear Steam Supply System. Proposed changes to the Combustion Engineering contract were routed to Ebasco. These two major contractors were required to have procurement programs, including procedures for review of subcontractor documentation, which satisfied requirements in Appendix B to 10CFR50. LP&L QA audited these procurement programs on a scheduled basis as required. LP&L also reviewed proposed contracts. In the LP&L review, the Ebasco recommendation was evaluated by the appropriate discipline engineer and a management decision was then made concerning proposed contracts. The LP&L review was considered effective and satisfied the company's contractual needs. LP&L's method of procurement processing was independently reviewed by Decision Management Co., Inc. for the Louisiana Public Service 4 Commission. This review confirmed the adequacy of the LP&L Procurement System and concluded as follows: i 

            "...DMC, Inc concludes that Water'ord 3 procurement was above the industry norm, and that LP&L
management actions were reasonable and prudent."
            "LP&L followed a fixed procurement procedure for the balance of the project. This essentially consisted of Ebasco's preparation of bidders lists, bid documents, bid analyses and recommendations, and the final contract. LP&L reviewed the bidders list and

b i' -. bid documents.and authorized, with changes where necessary, the bid documents for use. It also reviewed the bid analyses and recommendations and approved the contract award. All authorizations were by an LP&L Vice President or the Waterford.3

~ Project Manager. Indeed, LP&L was actively involved 1Ln procurement at the executive level. LP&L showed
                                . flexibility when it was called for and at all times

- exercised care in insuring its control over i . contractors." JI Exhibits 24 and 29 do not support the allegation. JI Exhibit 24 [ does not appear to have any relation to the allegation. The allegation is contradicted by JI Exhibit 29 which is an example of one aspect of * 

                   . review of Ebasco procurement by LP&L.

! Item A(3)(g), Motion at 8. It is alleged that: 4 LP&L failed to ensure that documents, such as design drawings, were controlled. Therefore, LP&L could not retrieve or maintain these documents as accurate revisions. See Exhibits 25 and 26.

Response

i l The allegation is incorrect. The exhibits fail to support the allegation that LP&L did not , adequately ensure the control of documents such as design drawings.- JI Exhibits 25 and 26 are 1979 documents which deal with discrepancies found by LP&L QA on EMDRAC (Ebasco Manufacturers' Documents Records and

Control) appliques (stickers) which are placed on drawings received by the project to facilitate distribution and review by project personnel

, and with discrepancies in vendor drawings cross references. The discrepancies were minor, and would not have resulted in an inability to retrieve or maintain the documents. L ~ For example, letter LPL-12822 (JI Exhibit 26) identifies 94 l_ discrepancies. All these items are on non-safety, non-seismic piping. A breakdown of these discrepancies into categories reveals the

following:

spelling errors 72 ! missing drawing title 1 l incorrect revision date 1 incorrect cross reference drawing 20 94 i i 

   ~ ~-
            -enw.,     .-nn..-.y---     ,..,v,-awm--,m,-+--,nm,.,.---my,.w,we--.,wnv_g,<,.,,.,-m..,,,
                                                                                                                   ,,,,,,,a- y  ,

pv .m--r,- n- . - -. -yq ,mw- w

7 

           .All 72 spelling errors concerned the spelling of " Extraction Steam".

The EMDRAC applique title blocks had "Extration Steam".' One drawing had a missing ~ title on_the EMDRAC applique used to make. 

           ; distribution.of the drawing. There is a drawing title on the drawing which was provided by the piping contractor Tompkins-Beckwith.

One drawing had a review date of "5/7/78". .It should have been "5/7/79" since the drawing was originated and approved by Tompkins-Beckwith in March / April, 1979. The 20 drawings with incorrect cross references referenced "1564G022" l instead of "4294G022". The "G022" portion of the-number is the part j that uniquely identifies the reference drawing. The "1564" or "4294" 

            'is merely a prefix used for accounting purposes. Therefore, in the 20 cases. cited, the-correct "G022" was referenced.

JI Exhibit 25 referenced a memorandum in which 121 EMDRAC applique

discrepancies were identified by LP&L QA. Over 100 of these discrepancies turned out not to be discrepancies in that the information on the appliques was correctly transcribed from.the drawing title blocks. Of the remaining items, most were errors in transcribing information from the drawing title blocks to the EMDRAC appliques. The design information conveyed on the drawings is not affected by this activity, or by-any errors that may have resulted.

Subsequent to the issuance of Letter LPL 12822 (JI Exhibit 25), LP&L 

                             ~

conducted an audit of the Ebasco, hT office (Audit Report 79-2). The concerns addressed in these exhibits were written up es audit item 79-2/1. Corrective action was taken, and upon a reaudit of 9/18/80, audit item 79-2/1 was closed. 

           - Based upon the nature of the discrepancies identified and the corrective action implemented in 1980 to the LP&L audit, .this item is not indicative of a failure to adequately control documents.

Item A(3)(h), Motion at 8. It is alleged that: LP&L resisted efforts to establish a records management system using a suitable computer. See Memo from R. Hastings to D. Lester (September-6, 1978) concerning Records Management Task Force, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 32; Memo from R. Hastings to D. Lester (September 7, 1978) Re: Records Management Task Force, attached and 

           -incorporated herein as Exhibit 33; Memo from R. Hastings to D. Lester (September 8, 1978) Re: Records Management Task Force, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 34.

p. c .. Response:: 

           .The; allegation is incorrect. . . LP&L has been in the forefront: of nuclear computer applications (for instance,;the plant computer is described in "SER_ Chapter 1 as one of the unique features of_Waterford 3). Far'from resisting efforts to establish a records management system using a suitable-computer as Joint Intervenors assert, _the JI Exhibits 32,'33 and 34 demonstrate LP&L's active participation-in a. task. force investigating. potential suppliers of records management hardware and software. In' fact, the computer system recommended by the author of   ~
                                            ~
            .theLexhibits was thereafter installed and utilized by.LP&L. It is also worthwhile :to note that, contrary to the implication of Joint Intervenors, at the time covered by this allegation construction-records were maintained by Ebasco as described in response to Item A(4)(a), and not by LP&L.

Iteg A(3)(i) Mo tion at 8. It.is alleged that: LP&L failed to provide Systems Coordination Incorporated (" SCI") with adequate. support to establish a Master. Tracking _ System ("MTS") for documents at Waterford 3. SCI left the job because it did not .want its reputation to be damaged by LP&L management's inability to establish an MTS. ~ See letter from SCI Vice-President Porter to -Project Manager-EDrummond (April 16, 1980) attached and incorporated as Exhibit 35.

Response

This_ allegation is not correct. An SCI Master Tracking System was installed at Waterford 3 in 1980 with assistance from SCI. The system is in use=today. The performance of the SCI Master Tracking System at Waterford 3, if anything, can be said to have enhanced SCI's reputation not detracted from it. In early 1980, with LP&L's authority, Ebasco proceeded to obtain a tracking system for Waterford 3. Ebasco determined that the system provided by SCI was the one best suited for Waterford 3. and SCI' began to install the system at Waterford. Due to-problems encountered in obtaining hardware,_the installation took longer than expected. In April of 1980, Mr. Porter, Vice-President of SCI, sent a letter (JI Exhibit 35) to LP&L complaining about the problems and suggesting that . if the problems were not corrected SCI wculd pull out. LP&L responded immediately by contacting Mr. Porter. After a number of discussions, the system was installed under an arrangement where Ebasco leased the program from SCI and utilized SCI consultants to train Ebasco personnel to operate the= system. a.

Item A(4)(a), Motion at 9. It is alleged that: LP&L_ failed to ensure approved procedures were instituted for the central records department. See Exhibits 30 and 35; Memo from D. Aswell to L. Maurin July 7, 198) Re: Waterford 3 Document Control, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 36. Item A(4)(d), Motion at 9. (Combined with A(4)(a)] It is alleged'that: Records management personnel worked without procedures for most of the construction of Waterford 3. See Exhibit 1. , Pesponse: The allegation is not correct. Procedures were instituted for the Central Records Department. Further, records management personnel worked with approved procedures for the construction phase of Waterford 3. Ebasco was principally responsible for in-process management of construction records. LP&L's principal records mant.gement function was to accommodate receipt and management of construction records upon completion of construction. In early 1980 LP&L began receiving records from Ebasco. Prior to this time LP&L also maintained limited types of permanent records. Both Ebasco and LP&L had approved procedures for their respective records management duties. These included Ebasco procedure QAI-l and LP&L procedures PMP-002, 004, 007 and 008 and QP-17. The exhibits cited by the Joint Intervenors bear no relationship to the allegation. JI Exhibit 1 makes no reference to records management procedures. JI Exhibits 30 and 36 deal strictly with administrative supervisory considerations, making no mention of procedures. JI Exhibit 35 refers to a computerized r>ystem independent of the document-control system. !~

Item A(4)(b), Motion at 9. It is alleged that: LP&L lacked adequate procedures for Class A backfills, completed after concrete pours. See Memo from J. Ehasz to J. Booth (August 11, 1977) Re: Repair of Class "A" Backfill, atta'ched and incorporated herein as Exhibit 37; Comments on Ebasco Fill Material, Damage to Class "A" Backfill, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 38. - -

Response

The contention is incorrect. LP&L had adequate procedures for 3 [ installing Class A backfill, Such work was done in accordance with J.A.-Jones Procedure W-WP-12 (Rev. O issued April 2, 1976).' JI Exhibits 37 and 38 concern repair to a portion of backfill caused by a construction water line break. JI Exhibit 37 documents instructions given to Construction in order to make this repair. 

          .These instructions were subsequently documented in NCR 558 Revision A.

Engineering direction on the method and type of repairs via an NCR disposition is an acceptable means of ensuring that unique situations such as this occurrence are properly corrected and documented. The use of an approved procedure is not necessarily required. 

                                                              ~

JI Exhibit 38' describes the late reporting of a nonconforming condition and an initial lack of QA review of the repair instructions. Ebasco QA had identified and rectified those concerns as documented in NCR 558 Revision A dated 8/26/77. Item A(4)(c), Motion at 9. It is alleged that: LP&L failed, even after notification, to ensure administrative procedures were instituted to cover the interface between on-site Waterford 3 staff and the Office Site [ sic] Support Group. See

Exhibit 1.

f

Response

The allegation is not correct. Further, an examination of Exhibit I revealed no reference to the specific allegation stated in the motion. ( I l 4 

                           ,            - .--  , e,- , ,   ,-   ,w- a,--r   --- - ,-        , - - - ,-- , - - - - - - - -

            -During the course of Waterford.3 construction, LP&L instituted interface. procedures.between the onsite and offsite groups. In the early stages of the Waterford 3 project, the number of LP&L personnel involved was small, and administrative procedures to define their interface was not necessary. In 1981 however, staffing levels
             -increased significantly and the offsite support group manager initiated two related studies of the Waterford organizational structure to recommend a Site /Offsite Staff interface procedures:

(1) Project /Offsite Support Group Administrative Control Program, prepared by EDS Nuclear Inc., dated June 24, 1981, 105 pages plus charts and, (2) Offsite Support Group Functional Definition, prepared by TERA Corporation, dated August 18, 1981, 146 , sages. Following a review of the studies' and recommendations, the offsite support group manager in concert with the onsite managers, selected and instituted interface procedures. These are designated Nuclear Administrative Procedures (NAPS), Nuclear Administrative Instructions, (NAIs), and Special Operations Procedures (S0s). The activities and interfaces of the current offsite support organization (Nuclear Services Group) are defined and controlled by the Nuclear Services Charter and by manuals containing-Nuclear Services Procedures, Nuclear Services Instructions and Nuclear Operations Administrative Procedures. Item A(4)(d), Motion at 9. It is alleged that: Records management personnel worked without procedures for most of the construction of Waterford 3. See Exhibit 1.

Response

i ( See the response to Item A(4)(a) above. l Item A(4)(e), Motion at 9. It is alleged that: From 1980 to 1981, 300 or more " temporary" pipe supports were installed i but never replaced with permanent hangers. [These temporary supports ! may leave the permanent plant structure too rigid because they were installed with channel steel which does not permit thermal expansion.

See Exhibit 8].

l I e

Response

The allegation, based on the statement of the anonymous alleger at 

     . paragraph 6 of JI Exhibit 8, is incorrect.

Contrary to the unknown alleger's statement at paragraph 6 of JI Exhibit 8, temporary supports installed for construction purposes have been removed. The Ebasco Piping Verification Program required the identification of any remaining construction temporaries to ensure that only permanent supports remain in place for operation. Such - verification was implemented through procedure ASP-IV-82. In one instance, which may be a contributing factor in the alleger's misunderstanding, certain supports installed in the Turbine Building on nonsafety systems were converted with appropriate documentation and in accordance with good engineering practice from a temporary designation to a permanent designation. Item A(5)(a) Motion at 10. It is alleged that: LP&L has failed to control delegations of responsibility to contractors and subcontractors including CE and Systems Coordination, Inc., which LP&L retained to set up and manage a Master Tracking System at Waterford. See Exhibit 35.

Response

This allegation is not correct. LP&L has controlled delegation of responsibility for its contractors and subcontractors. JI Exhibit 35 does not support a contrary conclusion. This subject was most recently revier2d in a study of LP&L's performance in 1984 by Decision Management Company, Inc. for the Louisiana Public Service Commission. DMC's conclusions with respect to LP&L's contract administration were as follows: CONCLUSIONS: Decision Management Company,-Inc. reviewed Waterford 3 contract administration in light of criteria defined in Section S-1. Based upon this analysis we have determined the following: ! a. LP&L's management of Ebasco's activities was above the industry norm. 4

b. Ebasco's contract management methods and organization were similar-to those used by the industry as a whole. LP&L's involvement in the contract management process was above the industry's norm.
c. LP&L's and Ebasco's management of defaults, back-charges and claims was reasonable and effective,
d. LP&L maintained control over its interest in all contracts throughout the duration of the project.

Based upon the above_ considerations, Decision Management Company concludes that LP&L has had sufficient managerial expertise to properly monitor Waterford 3 contracts. We find that LP&L has exercised extreme care and control over contract administration. We believe that through these efforts LP&L has limited schedule delays and construction cost overruns. This aggressive attitude of LP&L should be commended and could actually be used as a model by other utilities in their contract administration efforts. JI Exhibit 35 references an SCI /LP&L contract dispute which was successfully resolved. See response to allegation A(3)(1). JI Exhibit 35 has no connection with CE and affords no basis for the allegation regarding CE. Item A(5)(b), Motion at 10. It is alleged that: Specifications for prints lacked detail, were incomplete, and failed to include the relevant functional and legal requirements. See Exhibits 25 and 26. .

Response

The allegations are incorrect, and are not supported by JI Exhibits 25 and 26. JI Exhibits 25 and 26 are concerned with the internal distribution information that is affixed to the drawings received from manufacturers of equipment supplied at Waterford No. 3. The requirements imposed on these manufacturers' drawings are clearly delineated in the specifications. These specifications are part of the purchase order contracts the manufacturers sign. JI Exhibits 25 and 26 do not deal with the drawing content, but rather with discrepancies noted on the drawing appliques which are used to distribute the drawings to the project. All the discrepancies noted were minor in nature and in no way affect the design information presented on the drawings. See the response to Item A(3)(g).

Item A(5)(c), Motion at 10. It is alleged that: LP&L failed to ensure Ebasco program procured spare parts of adequate quality with proper certification and traceability documentation. See Exhibits 1, 24, 29, 32 and 33.

Response

The allegation is not correct. Ebasco was responsible for procurement of construction spare parts. Ebasco ha'd adequate programs and procedures (ASP III-3 and ASP III-4) in effect to procure spare parts including processing for quality and proper certification and traceability. The.Ebasco procurement program was regularly reviewed and audited by LP&L and the NRC. No significant deficiencies were identified. Those findings that were made were addressed and resolved through the normal closure process. JI Exhibit I bears out LP&L's responsible action in this regard. The August 14, 1979, LP&L memorandum included in Exhibit 1 clearly notes that LP&L promptly took steps to confirm the adequacy of the Ebasco spare parts program. Indued, as therein noted, Ebasco placed vendor shipments on hold pending resolution of certification problems. JI Exhibits 24, 29, 32 and 33 have no bearing on the subject of the allegation. Item A(6)(a), Motion at 10. It is alleged that: LP&L failed to establish a consistent system component numbering system. See November 30, 1978, Memo from R. Hastings to Armington (November 30, 1978) Re: Records Numbering System for Plant Equipment, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 39.

Response

This allegation is not correct and is not supported by the referenced exhibit. LP&L has established a consistent component numbering system. As stated in LP&L Letter No. 10203, (JI Exhibit 39), such a system is appropriate for the startup and operation phases of Waterford 3. For the startup testing phase, a.Startup Administration Procedure (SAP-38) entitled " Unique Identification System", was issued on 5-26-80 to identify each plant component. Subsequently, PE-2-007 (Unique Identification Numbering System Procedure) became effective on 5-12-83, superseding SAP-38 and is presently in use and applicable for the operations phase. Both SAP-38 and PE-2-007 reflect the numbering system recommended in JI Exhibit 39.

Item A(6)(b), Motion at 10. It is alleged that: LP&L, failed to ensure that safety-related hangers were fabricated from the correct steel and included all the required parts and components. See Exhibit 8.

Response

Contrary to the allegation, established procedures have been followed to assure that " safety-related hangers were fabricated from the correct steel" and that the hangers " included all the required parts and components." The quality requirement for hanger material is that the structural steel must meet specified ASTM specifications. There has been no question about whether the materials used in the hangers at Waterford 3 have met the appropriate specifications, nor does JI Exhibit 8, the only cited basis for this allegation, make such an assertion. What the anonymous alleger alleges (JI Exhibit 8, paragraph 22) is that he has seen hangers without " heat numbers" necessary to " trace the metal back to its sources." This may well be true, but it is of no significance. There is no NRC, LP&L or Ebasco requirement that the hanger material be stamped with heat numbers or that it be traceable back to its sources. The hangers supplied by Bergen-Patterson, were furnished with certificates of compliance to the specification requirements which lists all the material specifications add's' for various hanger parts and components. In paragraph 6 of JI Exhibit 8, the unknown alleger alleges that temporary hangers installed with " channel steel" remain as part of t permanent plant structure. In fact, all such temporary hangers havs been removed or, in a few isolated instances where it was more practical, qualified for permanent use after documented evaluation and approval by Engineering. See the response to Item A(4)(e). The allegation that LP&L failed to ensure that safety-related hangers included "all the required parts and components" is also false. Proper installation of hangers has been verified by numerous inspections. Nothing in JI Exhibit 8 supports this allegation.

Item A(6)(c), Motion at 10. It is alleged that: Weld rod traceability records are not trustworthy, in part because the weld rod room was not open at night. Ibid. [See Exhibit 8.]

Response

Contrary to the allegations of the anonymous alleger in paragraphs 23 and 24 of JI Erhibit 8, weld rod trac 1 ability is strictly maintained and the records are trustworthy. The procedure for storage, issuance and control of welding materials (rods, electrodes, etc.) for all welding done on site is specified in ASP-IV-18 (Administrative Site Procedure). In order for a welder to receive welding rods from the rod room, he had to have a properly processed " Filler Metal Requisition". The component or structure upon which welding was to be performed, together _with the yeld numbers and the drawing number, was specified on the requisition. The above were important elements for establishing traceability. In - addition, the welding rods to be issued were listed on the form, as well as the welder's name and identification number. The form was signed by a designated craft supervisor and reviewed and approved, previously, by an Ebasco Welding Engineer or currently, by a Quality Control Engineer. A list of the only authorized signatures for generation and approval of requisitions was furnished to the rod room attendant. The " heat number" (an identification number for a specific 

         " batch" of material) was entered onto the requisition by the rod room attendant. This was another key element in establishing traceability.

The requisition was a serialized three part form. One copy accompanied the welder into the plant where the QC inspector verified the above information and recorded the information required on the " weld traveller package" (a process control sheet). Both, the traveller package and the requisition were stored in permanent files. The above system established the weld rod traceability. The Ebasco weld rod room (warehouse) was "open" whenever there were welding activities in the plant. An authorized attendant was available to issue welding materials and to receive returned materials on days, nights, and weekends. At night and on weekends, with reduced shift size, the rod room was locked in order to prevent entrance of unauthorized persons. However, the attendant could be summoned via a door bell which was located adjacent to a conspicuous sign. Contractors other than Ebasco scheduled a full-time rod room attendant for all shifts when welding was to be performed. L...

c The procedure / system was subjected to many surveys, surveillances and audits over the years by many qualified and responsible groups, and the method was found to be adequate and the documentation acceptable. 

       . Item A(7)(a), Motion at 10.

It is alleged that: 

            .LP&L's failure to ensure welders were certified and qualified to do the work they performed. LP&L permitted pipefitters to substitute as welders in order not to slow down production. See JI Exhibit 8.

Response

Safety related welding at the Waterford 3 site was performed by . F properly qualified and certified welders. Welders are certified only ! if they pass ASME code tests which demonstrate their proficiency for ! the type of welding they will be performing. The allegation that welding was improperly performed if the' welder was a pipefitter is incorrect (JI Exhibit 8, paragraphs 2 and 24). Welders 

                                                          ~

that weld pipe at Waterford 3 belong to the pipefitters union. Some of the pipe fitters are skilled at velding while.others are not. Only i- those pipefitters that are able to pass the welding qualification tests are permitted to perform welding. (In response to Concern No. 22 in NRC letter dated 6/13/84, qualification of Mercury welders, which includes pipe fitters, was reviewed. The welders were found to be qualified). See LP&L Exhibit 6. As noted in JI Exhibit 8, Paragraph 1, many welders were tested at an offsite facility by Waterford 3 contractors using their own qualified welding procedures with the qualification tests being performed / controlled by their personnel adhering to the same, strict standards that are applied to on-site testing. The advantage to off-site testing is that the facility can accommodate a larger number of welders at one time and is, in some ways, more efficient than the smaller site facility. The practice is acceptable to ASME, Section IX of the Code - governing the qualification of welders. The welders qualification test results and related pertinent information become a part of the permanent records and were subjected to LP&L QA audits. Contrary to affiant's suggestion, testing standards were stringent (See Example Response to Items A(7)(e) and (f). L

_ __ . . _ _ -...-_.m ._ . _ . --__ _ . . _ __ . - _ When required by Code, the welds at Waterford 3 are non-destructively examined (radiography, etc.) by an independent contractor other-than the one performing the welds. The Code acceptance criteria for welds is at such a high level that or.ly skilled, qualified welders are icapable of successfully meeting.these criteria. If a weld does not 

              . meet the-acceptance, criteria, it must be repaired which is expensive
.              and disrupts the schedule.

We note, contrary to Joint'Intervenors suggestion, that use of 

             . unqualified velders would tend to slow production, not increase it.

Item A(7)(b),' Motion at 11. Ituis alleged that: LP&L failed to maintain adequate welding procedures, for, inter alia, Class ! installations, as documented in a July 1979 MAC Report.. See Exhibit 1.

Response

The allegation is incorrect. See the responses to -Item A(1)(d) . . A(7)(e), and A(7)(f). Nothing in JI Exhibit 1. suggests a failure to maintain adequate welding procedures. 

        - Item A(7)(c), Motion at 11.

It is alleged that: LP&L failed to control weld rods in the field. See Exhibit 8.

Response

The allegation is incorrect. See the response to Item A(6)(c). Item A(7)(d), Motion at 11. 

        'It is alleged that:

Weld rod traceability records were not trustworthy, in part because the weld rod room was not open at night. . Ibid. [See Exhibit 8.] _.-vv-,,- 

                                                                      ..#  ._,--m.-...  ,~gm.._,, _ _ _ . ,  ,,,__.__,..y-. ,._ , , , _ __,_.,_ . _

h 5 i Response:- The allegation is incorre'ct. -See the response to Itta A(6)(c).- Item A(7)(a) and -(f), Motion at 11. I It is alleged that:' it Half'of the stainless steel welding was not " purged" of~ atmospheric 4 ' contamination for two million feet of tubing for the containment 

                 . instrumentation lines. Tiny pockets of " sugaring" formed on the weld

! surface. This contamination can lead to cracking of the welds'in the

future._ Ibid. [See Exhibit 8.]

!by Mercury welders often made two " passes" on welds'without pausing to s allow the first pass to cool down. Management pressured the welders to speed up on their work. Ibid. [See Exhibit 8.]

Response

The assertion that " half of the stainless steel: welding was not 

                   ' purged' of atmospheric contamination on some_two million feet.of tubing for instrumentation lines from the containment" is incorrect.

At.the outset,.it should be noted that the total installed quantity of' stainless steel tubing is approximately 121,000 feet, far.less than the alleged "two million" feet. Of this, only about.15,000 feet of' stainless steel' tubing is installed in the containment-building.' LP&L is confident that " sugaring" has not occurred, certainly not to any extent that would be of significance. There is nothing in the anonymous alleger's affidavit to suggest that sugaring did occur,'other than his-unsupported statement (JI Exhibit 8, paragraph 9). Not being_ a welder (JI Exhibit 8, p.2), he exhibits no basis for knowing whether or not sugaring occurred. Had LP&L~ discerned sugaring, it would have redone the veld, though it would not be required for an effective joint. No sugaring of the tubing welds was ever found. Part of the anonymous alleger's confusion (JI Exhibit 8, paragraph 9) may stem from the fact that the contractor responsible for the-installation of most of the stainless steel tubing (Mercury Company) initia11y'" purged" the tubes (i.e. filled them with inert argon gas in-order to exclude atmospheric air) prior to welding the socket weld joint. Later, the practice was discontinued because it was unnecessary. Procedures for control of welding, which are in; compliance with Code requirements, do not require that tubing be purged for this type of velding application. The reason is that, unlike butt 

                                                                                          ~n e
's welds, the geometry of the socket veld. joint (a male-female arrangement between the tube and a larger bore fitting) doirs not expose the molten metal during welding to the air inside the tube. Thus,, protection is not required. Further, proper welding,of thfse sockets weld, joints required highly skilled welders. Each welder chosen for ihip york had + -
                                                          ~

to demonstrate his ability by qualificacion using actual job-iize -

  • IA, materials, i.e. tube diameter and wall thickness. Any indication of 'I ,

burn-through (melting through the tube wall) and subsequent oxidation " sugaring"-was grounds for disqualification. For work in the field, welders were supplied with small-welding torches which were easier to manipulate than the larger standard torches used for most other welding applications. They were also supplied with special portable welding machines havins'very stable welding current output. This tpe y of special equipmene minimizes the possibility that e the instrument tubes welds have the " sugared" condition. , The anonymous alleger states in Paragraph 10 of J1 Exhibit 8 that the - quality of welding was compromised by the welders failin'g to allow the " weld to cool down between passes and implying that the second pass may not have been welded. , . . 

                                               ,                    a, The allegation is incorrect. The welds have not been compromised.                                                                                                           -

There is no specifi: requirement that a welder must " pause". The only related requirement in the welding procedure is that the interpass temperature (the temperature of the metal before applying the second pass) shall not exceed 350*F. Experience has shown that a thin-walled tube inserted into a larger mass coupling (an arrangement known as a socket-weld) requires only a few seconds to cool'below 350*F. Neither the Code nor the welding procedure specify the number of weld ( passes. The weld size requirement for the application was 1/8 inch. , , For stainless steel tube to coupling socket welds, it does not matter if there is one pass or two passes. ;The weld size is verified during final inspection. Item A(S)(a), Motion at 11. ~ 

                                                    -s It is alleged that:

LP&L failed to provide QC coverage for the night shift work which'left certain work and processes without proper inspection dnd monitoring. ' See Exhibit 1. 

                                                             .                                                          ~.'               *
                                                            ,*                               _                        /,',

Response: , f 4 s, y , The allegation is not true. See the response to Item f).(o) . 

                                                                                                                                       /
                                                                                                                                                          ~

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    ' Item'A(8)(b), Motion at 12.

U Itfis alleged that: LP&L' failed to generate and maintain proper documentation for concrete tests. backfill compaction tests and compressive strength tests. See i Handwritten Concrete Compression Tests, attached and incorporated 

            'herein as Exhibit 40..
  ,  Response:
          -The allegation is incorrect. LP&L has adequate documentation for 4

concrete tests, backfill compaction tests ~and compressive strength 

             -tests.-_These documents, comprising many thousands of pages, are maintained in the QA Records Vault.
j. There is no basis in JI Exhibit 40 for the allegation that proper

!_ documentation was not generated and controlled. The exhibit is barely ' legible, but it references NCR W3-306 and appears to deal only with-whether a particular set of concrete compressive strength tests was . } dispositioned properly, and not,with generation and maintenance of documentation. The disposition of NCR 306A (which superceded NCR 306), was proper as detailed in the response to Item A(8)(c). 

          ~
     ' Item A(8)(c), Motion at 12.

i It is alleged that: 

                                                     ~

Ebasco ignored concrete tests which failed to meet-acceptance criteria on the-ground that the concrete would pass the " final' test." In some cases. Ebasco accepted concrete work even_though it failed.co meet the' , final test. Ibid. [See Exhibit 40]; Statetent of R. Philleo, 

            ' Consulting Engineer, Enclosure 1 to June 21, 1984 NRC Staff Motion, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 41.

Response

             .This allegation is inaccurate and misleading.
             'Ebasco.did not ignore concrete tests which' failed to. meet acceptance
            -criteria. Further, Ebasco did not accept concrete work that failed te
             -meet the final test criteria, which provided for acceptance of certain
             -individual tests falling below design strength. Concrete tests were well concrolled and properly handled as is discussed in LP&L's response to Issue 20 in the NRC's lettar of June 13, 1984 (LP&L Exhibit 7).

JI Exhibits 40 and 41 do not support the allegation. JI Exhibit 40 refers to NCR-W3-306 dated January 20,1977 (subsequently superseded on February 3,1977 by NCR W3-306A) . Neither this NCR nor its disposition-support Joint Intervenor's allegation. This NCR documents an instance 

     .of_ transporting concrete with vibrators, in noncompliance with specification criteria, during placement of a floor slab in the. Reactor:

Auxiliary-Building'(RAB). Ebasco QC recovered a sample of the affected. concrete _to-determine whether this concrete achieved required design strength.. In testing the affected concrete, design strength was achieved at an age of 46 days after having failed to reach it at age 28 

     . days. On the basis of the successful 46 day test, the work was.

accepted. The NCR disposition was therefore correct and does not-constitute ignoring test results.- JI Exhibit 41 does not deal with the allegation. The statement of R. Philleo, JI Exhibit 41,-addresses the construction of-the basemat. It discusses his review of the inspection records, especially LP&L Stop Work Order No. 1,_which followed placement of the first three basemat 

     -blocks. He concludes that the documented instances of specification violations are not of a nature which would impair the structural integrity,of'the basemat. Further, he states, " strength of the concrete is well documented. It exceeds the design strength by_a larger margin than required by American Concrete Institute standards" (JI Exh'ibit 41, page 7). This Exhibit is further discussed in the response to allegation No. B(3)(b).

5 Item A(8)(d), Motion at 12. It is alleged that: QC inspectors did nct check safety-related work such as the main steam valves even though QA documentation verified that they completed these inspections. See Exhibit 8.

Response

The allegation is false. It appears that it is based upon the L unverified " belief" of the unknown alleger (JI Exhibit 8, paragraph L 15). When an item such as a valve is received on site, the particular characteristics of the item are evaluated to determine if any special maintenance requirements apply. Examples of these are periodic ' lubrication, shaft rotation, storage in a controlled environment, etc. If conditions are identified that require-special maintenance, a written instruction is issued to define what care and maintenance is to be. performed and how often. In the case of valves, Care and Maintenance _ Instructions were developed'when valves had items such as motors cr hydraulic operators. These instructions were used to assure

_the quality of the item was maintained and specified the QC verification required. Valves not addressed on specific Care and Maintenance Instructions were stored, handled and installed in accordance with project specification requirements.

During turnover of contractor records, the documentation of these maintenance activities were reviewed by QA. Deficiencies found were-documented,1 evaluated and dispositioned. During this review process, QA did not. find evidence that inspection of the Main Steam Isolation Valves had been performed as required by the'CMI program. We presume that the allegation may be alluding to this situation. Nonconformance report 4512 was written and the valves were reinspected with no deficiencies found. This is not a case of QA verifying the performance of non-existing QC Inspections. To the contrary,-it is an example of the QA program functioning properly, discovering and correcting the 

                      . absence of QC records.-                                         ,

In addition, each valve installed in the plant has been individually stroked and ve .fied to be properly installed and operable in accordance with prerequisite test requirements and procedures. Item A(8)(e), Motion at 12. It-is alJeged that: Many QC inspectors did not thoroughly inspect safety-related work, including not monitoring fit-ups on Mercury instrumentation as it was performed. Ibid. (See Exhibit 8.]

Response

The allegation that QC inspectors did not monitor fit-ups on Mercury instrumentation as it was performed is incorrect. QA/QC procedures required a hold-point for QC inspection at the fitup stage of the instrumentation line socket (connecting) weld process. Mercury welding documentation was reviewed by Mercury Quality Assurance and, at contract close out, by Ebasco Quality Assurance. When documented evidence was not found for fit-up inspection of tubing welds, nonconformance' documentation was initiated. Corrective action included either replacing the welds or performing a radiographic examination to determine if the fit-up was proper. 

                      -There is further evidence of the adequacy of fit-ups for the instrumentation line socket welds. Welding of the Mercury instrumentation lines has been shown to have been of high quality. A recent reinspection of instrumentation and tubing installations required for safe shutdown covered approximately 4800 tubing welds.                        ~

Of these, only twelve welds were found not to meet specifications. The twelve welds were undersized and were reworked to code requirements, but, if left uncorrected, the welds would have performed their design function. None indicated inadequate fit-ups. The welds on the supports for this instrumentation were inspected and two undersized welds were 4 f

1 l l identified.. As in the cases of undersized tubing welds the undersized welds on tha.instruman'..cion supports would have performed their design function if'left uncorrected. The allegation of the unidentified alleger in paragraph 17 of JI Exhibit 8 that welders faked fit-ups gaps is dubious at best. Setting up the proper fit-up gap (between the and of the tube and the shoulder within the- socket connector) is a simple procedure which can be accomplished in less than a minute. It would be a far more cumbersome and time consuming process to omit the fit-up gap and then attempt to fool the QC inspector by faking the scribe lines on the as-welded configuration. Moreover, the absence of a fit-up would, in most cases, be immediately apparent during the inspection of completed weld, which all welds receive. .The purpose of the fit-up gap is so that the tube has room to 

      . expand into the socket connector'during the heatup experienced during
      -welding. . Without an adequate gap, the weld would likely crack, leading to immediate detection and repair. Once the weld has been satisfactorily completed, there is no further reason for the gap; if the weld is acceptable, the lack of a gap would have no safety significance.

Item A(9)(a), Motion at 12. It is alleged that: LP&L failed to establish and follow procedures to ensure that electrical equipment was not damaged by flooding resulting from the cold hydrostatic test run in the summer of 1981. Ibid- [See Exhibit 8.] Item A(9)(b), Motion at 12. [ Combined with A(9)(a)] It is alleged that: l  : Unqualified personnel responsible for maintenance of the plant in 1981 l opened up valves which flooded room containing sensitive electrical l equipment. The equipment, which was soaked, may not have been retested , and reinspected for possible damage. Ibid. (See Exhibit 8.] l

Response

The allegation is untrue. l t

r The allegations reference damage from alleged flooding from (a) a cold hydrostatic test run in the summer of 1981 and (b) the inappropriate  ! opening of valves in 1981 as a result of unqualified-personnel actions. However, the only support offered in the statement of the unidentified alleger at paragraph 18 of JI Exhibit 8 which makes no reference to a cold hydrostatic test and refers only to flooding allegedly caused by "new hires" in.1982 (Not 1981). Not withstanding these ambiguities and contradictions, we can state that in the 1981-1982 time period, thete were two incidents of flooding which occurred in October of 1981. One originated in the Turbine Building, a non-safety-related area and caused no damage to safety-related equipment. The other flooding incident originated in the Reactor Auxiliary Building. This incident occurred when a level control valve failed open due to loss of air pressure during the performance of pneumatic testing. It was not caused by unqualified "new hires" opening the valve. The flooding damaged the emergency diesel generator "A" control panel and high voltage panels. These panels were completely replaced with new panels from the vendor at a cost in excess of $500,000. This incident and its resolution was identified, tracked and resolved to the satisfaction of the NRC. The NRC inspector specifically reviewed and found acceptable the documentation package for the new panels and their installation. The incident is described in NCR W3-3124 and corrective action is described in the final report for SCD-38. NRC review closure is in NRC Inspection Report 83-03. Item A(9)(c), Motion at 12. It is alleged that: Repairs to valves were not performed according to controlled

procedures. Ibid. [See Exhibit 8.]

1

Response

f This allegation, and the allegations by the unidentified alleger in l paragraphs 15, 20 and 21 of JI Exhibit 8, are untrue. During Waterford 3 SES construction, the period covered by the allegation, Ebasco and its subcontractors were responsible for the care and maintenance of plant equipment (including valves) from the time the equipment was installed until it was turned over to LP&L Startup. To assure that equipment was kept in proper condition, Ebasco issued Care and Maintenance Instructions (CMI's) to be used by Ebasco and the ! responsible subcontractors. Thirty-five of these instructions or l 

                -q

[ . I I procedures have been prepared, approved and issued for care and  ; maintenance of valves. Thompkins & Beckwith, the subcontractor < 

                            . responsible for installation and maintenance of a majority of the

, safety-related valves-installed in the plant, also had its own implementing procedures to supplement the Ebasco CMIs. . The Ebasco and subcontr,. cor procedures were utilized for safety-related valve , -maintenance or repair. As a general rule, repair of safety-related valves was not required during the construction phase because such valves were not required to be operated until the startup and operations phases. Also, generally,- such safety-related valves are not stroked during construction because stroking a valve in a dusty environment can damage packing, shafts, and tria. Valves which were operated during the construction phase would i  : 'be part of such non-safety systems as potable water and makeup water. The necessary precautions for repair of such valves, appropriately, was minimal. When systems are turned over from construction to startup, there are , more stringent procedural requirements for care and maintenance for all quality-related equipment. Work is controlled, including the specification of procedures to be used. There are approximately 20 plant procedures associated with valve maintenance and repair. One of . the most significant parts of the Waterford 3 Construction and Startup

program is the testing required of all plant equipment and systems-before being declared operational. Valves are functionally checked
. using prerequisite test procedures and then operationally checked during the comprehensive preoperational testing program. These tests include flushes of all fluid piping and valves to remove any undesirable residual material, such as loose rust, and also include

, checks to assure system cleanliness. Problems encountered with plant equipment are formally documented and repairs are made under controlled {. conditions with approved procedures. Finally, the equipment is l ratested to assure the repair is satisfactory. Results of testing and [ ratesting are documented in the test procedure results records. 4 The overall program described above has been audited numerous times by various cognizant organizations such as the NRC and LP&L Quality Assurance. Even though there have been minor deficiencies identified L from time to time, the prc3 ram has been found to be adequate and 

                            ' effective.

Item A(10)(a), Motion at 13. f It is alleged that: LP&L failed to identify through NCR's serious nonconforming conditions, i as, for example, deficiencies in concrete testing. See Exhibits 9 and u40. 4 .

Response

The allegation is incorrect. Joint Intervenors reference JI Exhibit 9, the' June 13, 1984 letter from the NRC. Apparently, Joint Intervenors are referring to Issue 4 in that letter to support their allegation. This matter is also raised by Joint Intervenors in, and refuted by LP&L in response to, allegation D(3). JI Exhibit 40 was not legible; however it appears that reference is made to NCR W3-306. This NCR was opened on 1/20/77 and described a problem with transport of concrete resulting in aggregate separation. Originally the NCR was closed on the basis that the condition identified was not a nonconformance'and had been adequately dispositioned on a deficiency notice. Subsequently the NCR was reopened as NCR W3-306A on 2/3/77 and dispositioned as an NCR. Consequently, this exhibit does not support-Joint Intervenors 

       . allegation regarding the use of NCRs.

Item A(10)(b), Motion at 13. It is alleged that: LP&L failed properly to describe and resolve the problems identified in NCR's as noted in the June 13, 1984 letter written by the NRC Staff to LP&L management. See Exhibit 9.

Response

The issue of handling of NCR's has been extensively addressed and resolved in LP&L's response to Issue 6 of the NRC's June 13, 1984 letter (LP&L Exhibit 8). See the response to Items C and D(4) which discuss this issue as raised in JI Exhibit 9. Item A(10)(c), Motion at 13. It is alleged that: LP&L failed to upgrade lower-tier documents to NCR's to ensure , corrective action was determined at the proper management level, the 

       .NCR's were trended, and LP&L determined that generic implications.and root causes of 'he problems identified on the NCR's.       Ibid.      [See Exhibit 9.]

Response

The issue of upgrading lower tier documents to NCRs has been extensively addressed and resolved in LP&L's response to Issue 4 of the NRC's June 13, 1984 letter (LP&L Exhibit 9). See the response to Items 

 ,      C and 3(4) which discuss this issue as raised in JI Exhibit 9.

1

Item A(10)(d), Motion at 13. It is alleged that: LP&L failed, and in some cases intentionally refused, to report significant safety problems to the NRC, including CE's lack of a QA program identified in an internal audit and LP&L's own failure to audit its' and Ebasce's compliance with reporting requirements pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21 and 10 CFR 50.55(e). See Exhibits 14 and 15. Response: i The' allegation is not correct.- LP&L has followed longstanding programs-to identify significant safety problems to the NRC under 10CFR21/50.55(e). Exhibits 14 and 15 do not support the Joint Intervenors' allegaticn. The exhibits have nothing to do with LP&L audits of reporting under 10CFR21/50.55(e). In' fact, LP&L did audit Ebasco's reporting responsibilities and was in tuvi audited by Middle South Services. (e.g. LP&L audit 83-22.) The exhibits relate to a CE/LP&L dispute, no aspect of which was a reportable event. The dispute and related exhibits are more fully discussed in the response to item A(1)(1). Item A(10)(a), Motion at 13. It is alleged that: LP&L failed to trend nonconformance or to ensure Ebasco trended nonconformances to identify patterns of violations ~to facilitate systematic management responses. See Exhibit 9.

Response

This is the same allegation as in Item A(1)(p). See the response to that item. i Item A(10)(F), Motior at 13. l L It is alleged that: LP&L failed to employ reasoned engineering judgement prior to dispositioning NCR's "use-es-is " See Exhibit 9; Nonconformance Report No. 48, attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 43. I l

Response

This allegation is a special case of the general allegation that NCRs were improperly dispositioned. As such this allegation has been thoroughly evaluated under response No. 6 to the June 13, 1984 Eisenhut letter-(LP&L-Exhibit 8). The extensive review of NCRs conducted to respond to concern 6 has failed-to disclose a situation requiring 

         -reporting under 10CFR50.55(e) that had not been previously reported.

The NRC addressed this particular type situation in resolving two allegations in Supplement 7 to the SER. The NRC closed out the matters as follows: Allegation A-232- "It was alleged that Ebasco NCR W3-4352 was improperly dispositioned in order to meet ASME Code requirements and ANSI standards and dispositioned "use-as-is". The NRC staff reviewed the disposition of the NCR and concluded that the corrective action taken for closure was appropriate." Allegation A-234 "It was alleged that many Mercury NCRs were improperly dispositioned and never received Ebasco NCR numbers. While conducting its general review of Mercury NCRs and the NCRs identified in the allegations under A-237, the NRC staff sampled between 125 and 150 of these NCRs to determine if there were Mercury NCRs which should have been elevated to Ebasco NCRs and were not. In conducting its review, the staff found that Ebasco had issued NCR W3-7317 (October 26, 1983) to disposition the violation of Mercury Procedure SP-664 in that when a Mercury NCR was dispositioned "uss-as-is," the Mercury QA Supervisor elevated the applicable NCR to Ebasco. The NRC staff found that this NCR was closed on December 1, 1983, after a 100 percent review of Mercury NCRs had been conducted. During this review, Ebasco found that 437 Mercury NCRs had been dispositioned "use-as-is" and had not been reviewed by Ebasco. An Ebasco team composed of QA and construction engineering personnel reviewed these and either concurred [ in or rejected the dispositions. The disposition of 36 NCRs was l rejected by Ebasco and. these were subsequently elevated to Ebasco NCRs. l- The NRC staff reviewed them and a portion of other Mercury NCRs to determine if there were any marked "use-as-is" which'were not captured by Ebasco's review team and co determine fcr those dispositioned "use-as-is" whether they had been elevated to Ebasco NCRs. The staff's findings were that the review conducted by Ebasco appeared to have been adequate in that there were no NCRs out of the sample examined dispositioned "use-as-is" which had not been reviewed by Ebasco and l that none were found which were dispositioned "use-as-is," which should i have been elevated to Ebasco NCRs and had not been. This concern has ( neither safety significance nor generic implications." l l l l l During LP&L's review of Mercury NCRs, as part of concern No. 6 to the June 13, 1984 Eisenhut letter, eleven additional NCRs dispositioned "use-as-is" were identified. These NCRs were reviewed by Ebasco QA and Instrumentation and Control Construction Engineering personnel. The review indicated that the "use-as-is" disposition was justified. These NCRs have been included as a supplement to NCR W3-7317 discussed in A-234 above. NCR NY-48 (1-25-77) (JI Exhibit 43) was a New York office NCR that documented an out-of-specification chemical analysis on what was thought to be SA-376 TP 304 material. The Cameron company, who was supplying this material, had been given prior permission on Oct. 12, 1976 to substitute SA-376 TP 316 for SA-376 TP 304 (reference Ebasco letter LW3-2076-76). Therefore the disposition to the NCR correctly stated that the material could be accepted as long as it met the requirements for SA-376 TP 316 material, and included a corrected natorial test report indicating the material was actually SA-376 TP 316 and not SA-376 TP 304 In conclusion this allegation is partially valid to the extent that 36 Mercury NCRs dispositioned use-as-is were upgraded to Ebasco NCRs, and some Ebasco NCRs were found to be improperly dispositioned. However no Mercury or Ebasco NCR dispositioned "use-as-is" was found to be reportable under 10CFR50.55(e) that had not been previously reported. Iten A(10)(g), Motion at 13. It is alleged that: LP&L failed to respond to the 1979 MAC Audit, to other recommendations of the Nuclear Records Management Task Force or to the longstanding deficiencies in the components numbering systems. The result was that the problems which audits identified were never corrected. The deficiencies which were identified in the MAC Report but continued included problems with mechanical installation of hanger scubber embed and Class 1 installations; welding of Class 2 installations; and cable pulling. See Exhibits 1 and 5. Response: . Joint Intervenors' characterizations of the MAC report and LP&L's corrective actions are inaccurate and misleading. In the areas referenced by Joint Intervenors (mechanical installation of hanger snubber embed and Class 1 installations; welding of Class 2 installations; and cable pulling), contrary to Joint Intervenors' o 4 

                -  r   -..w .- . , ,- - , , - , , , - - .  -
                                                               ~-% . , . - , . , ~ - _ - -
                                                                                                - . ,  ,r. ~ -

f 4 suggestion, the MAC report (Exhibit 1).did not identify hardware c deficiencies requiring correction. Rather, MAC recommended LP&L staffing increases for monitoring purposes. The question of staffing,

and the NRC's subsequent closure of this issue through JI Exhibit 5, j are addressed in.the responses to Item A(1)(b) and B(5).

4 

                   -The Joint Intervenors' contentions with respect to the Nuclear Records
Management Task Force and the components numbering system are incorrect and unsupported by.the exhibits. .Similar incorrect and unsupported t contentions are addressed in Items A(3)(h) and A(6)(a), respectively. ,

Item A(10)(h), Motion at 14. It is alleged that: 4 LP&L's main concern was usually cost and not the quality of the work. . In October, 1979, LP&L management determined it would not correct I certain design errors because it was not " cost beneficial." One renuit

was that errors continued to occur on the drawings, including inaccurate drawing numbers, inaccurate revision numbers and mislabeled components. See Exhibits 25 and 26.

Response

The allegation that "LP&L's main concern was usually cost and not the 1 , quality of the work" is untrue. See the response to Item A(1)(a)(1), i i ! JI Exhibits 25 and 26 provide no basis for this charge, or for the allegations that LP&L refused to correct design errors because it was not " cost beneficial" or that errors on drawings " continued to occur". JI Exhibits 25 and 26 do not support this allegation. These' exhibits reference clerical errors, not design errors. Clerical errors'of this-type may or may not be corrected based on good business judgement. In either event such errors have no safety significance.- The errors were 1 misspellings and incorrect cross references and had no impact on the i design or quality of the drawings. As reflected in JI Exhibit 25, the t assessment in JI Exhibit 26 of the errors, given their clerical nature, i is overstated. See the response to Items A(3)(g) and A(5)(b). Item A(11)(a), Motion at 14. It is alleged that: 

;                  _LP&L      (failed] to develop a records index or a legible microfiche system. See Exhibit 19.

t-1 

                                 --         .     -               =-     _ =     . ..             - -

Response

The allegation, as a basis for questioning LP&L's QA program, is without merit. JI Exhibit 19 provides no reference to a records index or microfiche. system, and the exhibit, therefore, does not support the allegation. The same allegation concerning the records index was made in Item A(3)(c). See the response to that item. As for a. microfiche system, LP&L elected not to develop such a system for the storage and retrieval of records due to the fact that a more dependable and accurate system was available. LP&L elected to implement a " state of the art" computerized records retrieval system with 16mm roll microfilm as the storage medium for records. Although more costly, this type of system provides for faster and more accurate retrieval of information. In addition the duplication of archival quality microfilm greatly minimizes the problem of lost documentation. This system, in fact, was recommended by the author of JI Exhibit 19. Item A(11)(b), Motien at 14. It is alleged that: LP&L (failed] to hire adequate staff to implement a permanent records system. See Exhibits 1 and 30; Coordination of Data Collection and Numbering (October 5, 1979), attached and incorporated herein as Exhibit 44.

Response

. The allegation is incorrect. JI Exhibits 1, 30 and 44 do not address the staffing for a permanent records system and provide no support for this allegation. LP&L has hired adequate staff to implement a permanent records system. The permanent records system at Waterford III was implemented in late 1979 following completion of construction of the permanent LP&L records facility.

The method of implementation was one of a phased records turnover process from Ebasco. This effort started with a staff of approximately 10 people. In line with the phased turnover approach, the staff gradually increased as more records were processed from Ebasco. This increase in staff, as records responsibility was increased, continued through the present time. The Records and Administration Department now consists of a Manager, 5 Supervisors, and a staff of approximately
         $6 clerical personnel.

l

c Item A(11)(c), Motion at 14. It is alleged that: LP&L (failed] to develop adequate procedures for the central records vault even though as early as 1977 Ebasco acknowledged the need for significant corrective action in this area. See Exhibit 1.

Response

The allegation is incorrect. LP&L has developed adequate procedures for the central records vault. LP&L did not develop central records vault procedures in 1977 because a LP&L central records vault did not exist at the time. The records responsibility rested with Ebasco in 1977 while LP&L was evaluating methods for the orderly transfer of records to LP&L. When the permanent records facility was completed in late 1979, LP&L began accepting records for the record vault. At that time appropriate procedures (UNT-4-006 and UNT-4-003) were developed to control records activities. LP&L has continued to revise and develop new procedures for the proper control of records and documents. (PMP-007, PMP-004, PMP-002 and PMP-008). JI Exhibit 1 does not address central records vault procedures and therefore does not support this allegation. Item A(11)(d), Motion at 14. It is alleged that: LP&L [ failed), despite notice of deficiencies in the 1979 MAC Report, to ensure that Ebasco vendor QA records and Ebasco and other contractor site records were maintained and organized in a controlled and auditable system. Ibid. (See Exhibit 1.]

Response

The allegation is incorrect, and Joint Intervenors have cited no basis for their vague, nonspecific charge. LP&L has maintained Ebasco records and other contractor site records in a controlled and auditable system as required by Appendix B to 10CFR50. There was no " notice of deficiency" in JI Exhibit 1, and in any event, the exhibit provides no basis for the allegation that LP&L did not thereafter adequately maintain records at the site. 1 Back in 1979, the MAC report (JI Exhibit 1, Paragraph 10) suggested that the records maintenance system at the site could be improved. LP&L has taken significant steps to assure an orderly and audicable system. Beginning in 1978, (before the MAC report was issued) Ebasco had begun action to increase the staff of the QA records Review Group on site. The formation and staffing levels of the LP&L permanent records organisati,on is described in response to A(1)(b). LP&L's record system consists of three major parts. These are:

1. Contractor (or vendor) generated records
2. Ebasco review and storage of records
3. LP&L review and transfer of records Documentation generated during construction was completed and reviewed by each contractor. It was then turned over to Ebasco QA for review and acceptance. Upon acceptance by Ebasco, the documentation was placed in the Ebasco QA vault for storage. LP&L then reviewed and accepted the documentation. If a problem was identified at any step of the process, the problem was resolved before further processing.

The records that have completed all steps in the above described process are now being microfilmed by LP&L Records Management Group for maintenance and retrievability purposes. L&L has developed a computerized records retrieval system, established a well staffed permanent records organization and developed and implemented procedures for control of records and documents as discussed in response to allegations A(11)(a), A(11)(b) and A(11)(c). LP&L's QA records and the system by which these records are maintained have been extensively audited by the NRC throughout the construction phase and specifically over the last nine months. .The results of the NRC's efforts have been positive. Item A(12)(a), Motion at 15. It is alleged that: LP&L failed over the construction of Waterford 3 to do audits of its own work. See Exhibit 6 at 7-8.

Response

The allegation is incorrect. Planned, systematic audits of safety-related activities at Waterford 3 have been conducted in accordance with the requirements of LP&L's QA program and 10CFR50, Appendix B. JI Exhibit 6, the only basis cited for the allegation, expresses an NRC observation in 1982 which has since been resolved as discussed below. During the construction phase of Waterford 3, a multi-level audit program was used to monitor safety-related activities. At the icwest level, the individual contractor performed internal audits of his QA Program. Next, Ebasco Services QA audited the individual contractor's program to the applicable criteria of 10CFR50, Appendix B and ANSI N45.2. Finally, LP&L Construction QA performed audits of Ebasco and other safety-related contractors based upon the status and safety importance of the activities to be audited. During the construction phase, in excess of 300 LP&L Construction QA audits have been performed per LP&L QA Procedure QP-18.3. In addition, in excess of 170 unscheduled LP&L Construction OA surveillances have been performed per LP&L QA Procedure QP-18.8. In addition. LP&L Construction QA performed audits of Ebasco Services QA to ensure compliance to the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix B, ANSI N45.2, and ANSI N45.2.12. These audits and surveillances are on file at Waterford 3 as QA records. During the startup phase of Waterford 3, a separate LP&L QA group was organized to overview startup activities. The LP&L Startup QA Group reported directly to the LP&L QA Manager. One of the responsibilities of LP&L Startup QA was to conduct audits and surveillances of testing performed by the LP&L Startup Group per LP&L Quality Assurance Procedure QP-2.14. These audits and surveillances are on file at Waterford 3 as QA records. Finally, during the startup and operational phases of Waterford 3, the LP&L Nuclear Operations QA Group is charged with the responsibility of performing planned and systematic audits of safety-related activities pertaining to plant operation activities. This responsibility and authority is delineated in the LP&L Nuclear Operations QA Manual. Since its first audit is February 1982, the LP&L Nuclear Operations QA Croup has conducted in excess of 72 audits of LP&L safety-related activities per LP&L QA Procedure QASP-18.10. These audits are on file at Waterford 3 as QA records. The allegation references concerns raised by the NRC in Inspection Report 50-382/82-14 about LP&L Nuclear Operations QA staffing and initial audit activities. This inspection took place from May 16 th July 15, 1982. The NRC concerns have been resolved based on the most recent performance report issued by the NRC concerning LP&L Nuclear 4 J Operations QA. 'On January 4, 1984 NRC Region IV Regional Administrator John T. Collins. issued the latest Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) Board Report for Waterford 3. This SALP Report covered the evaluation period from July 1, 1982 through June.30, 1983. The following excerpt is taken from the Appendix page 14 and 15 of that report: Quality Assurance - Operations i'

1. - Analysis This area has been routinely observed by the NRC resident inspectors during the course of the evaluation period. No violations or construction
deficiency reports were identified.

. 2. Conclusion The LP&L operations QA organization has evolved into an effective, credible organization. Audits , appear thorough, technically sound and timely. There-is consistent evidence of prior planning and assigreent of priorities. While a lot of work remains, it appears people are made available when needed and there is every expectation that this organization will continue to perform as it is now. The licensee is considered to be Performance Category 1 in this area.

3. Board Recommendations
a. Recommended NRC Actions Reduce inspection effort in areas covered by

. operations QA audits.

b. Recommended LP&L Actions i

Continue support of operations QA organisations. Item A(12)(b), Motion at 15. 1 It is alleged thatt  ; LP&L failed to maintain proper QA documentation even for safety-related i work which prevented effective audits of that work. Id. , at 7. (See 

                                                                                                                     ~~

Exhibit 6 at 7-8.] 4 I e -w rr w- .. -- 

                   ..'wm.-      , . . , , - - , - - , . - - , , . . .      ---------,-,,-,,,-,.m.-nm..~%   . . - - ,           . . . . - , - , . ~ . . . , . , , . . - - , . . , , , . . - - - - , - - .

Response

The allegation is incorrect. See the response to Item A(12)(a) which describes the LP&L QA auditing program and activities. Nothing in JI Exhibit 6 suggests that effective audits were prevented by a lack of QA documentation. Item A(12)(c), Motion at 15. It is alleged that: LP&L failed to ensure audits were conducted in accordance with written procedures and check lists. Ibid. (See Exhibit 6 at 7.]

Response

See the response to Item A(12)(a) above which describes the LP&L QA auditing program and activities. Nothing in JI Exhibit 6 suggests that LP&L QA audits were not conducted in accordance with written procedures and check lists. s Responses to Allegations in Section B 

  . Ices B(2), Motion at 16 - 21.

The Joint Intervenors claim that LP&L. lacks character and~ competence i because it allegedly has made a number of misstatements and misleading l statements in financial documents filed with'the Securities and Exchange Commission.("SEC").abou't the status and schedule of completion of the Waterford Project. The allegation is without merit.- LP&L has made a conscientious and diligent effort to assure that ths information provided by it in financial disclosure documents represents the best information then available on the status and progress of the Waterford 3' Proj ect. LP&L had honestly attempted to provide the most accurate characterization of the situation based upon the knowledge then at hand without either minimizing the potential for delay or being overly pessimistic and assuming worst case cenditions. As will-be discussed below, none of the statements identified by Joint Intervenors were untrue or misleading at the time they were made. Joint Intervenors have either mischaracterized the statements, quoted them out of context, or-have relied on subsequent events to attempt to demonstrate the inaccuracy of the statements. In addition, contrary to the implication in the motion, LP&L included statements in the financial documents reflecting the uncertainty in the regulatory process.

1. 1983 Annual Report The 1983 Annual Report of LP&L was issued February 23, 1984. It was i stated in the Annual Report that at yearend 1983 construction activity at Waterford 3-was essentially complete,-that subject to the timely-issuance of a license by the NRC, fuel was scheduled to be loaded in the 2nd quarter of 1984, and that commercial operation was anticipated by the end of 1984. A statement was also included referencing the NRC's most recently published comprehensive report on 7 licensee performance on Waterford 3 which was generally favorable to LP&L. This report, the Systematic Assessment of Licensing Performance
      -(SALP) Report, by the NRC staff gave LP&L an acceptable performance rating based upon the previous year's inspection experience. No areas i

were ideatified in the SALP report which were considered to be major , problem areas of a nature likely to affect the plant licensing schedule.

With the ccustruction of the plant essentially complete and with the i

favorable SALP report, LP&L reasonably believed that fuel load could be achieved by the second quarter of 1984. Joint Intervenors argue in their Motion at 17 that the statements made in the Annual Report were misleading because cracks were found in the basemat in 1983, because the NRC had fined LP&L in 1982'for QA problems, and because the NRC had been investigating allegations since August 1983 involving falsification of documents and QA failures. Joint l Intervenors' arguments are unfounded. I 

             .                        =                                    .             ..     . ..         .               -   - - .

The issues raised by Joint Intervenors were considered by LP&L but were not expected to impact-. schedule. LP&L believed at the time the annual report was issued, and still believes based on evaluations conducted by NRC, Ebasco, and an independent consulting firm, that the basemat-cracking is not structurally significant. TheLAppeal Board had denied Joint Intervenors' notion to reopen the record on that issue (ALAB-753), and LP&L had replied to Joint Intervenors'-second basemat motion and concluded that the original conclusions concerning the basemat were still valid. Therefore, LP&L expected closure of this issue would occur shortly thereafter and not impact licensing nor did LP&L believe the . NRC's 1983 investigation would Lapace the schedule. LP&L had provided i responses to the NRC Staff for all of.the allegations under investigation, and had no indication that the resolution of these issues would~not shortly be forthcoming. The issue of a fine levied against 

                           -LP&L during the previous year is not material to the statements made in the annual report. The fine and the associated activities had been documented and resolved prior to the issuance of the Annual report, and prior to the SALP period. The SALP report, not the                                               i fine, represented the most current NRC view of LP&L's performance.                                           I I                            2. Form 10-K The Form 10-K cited by Joint Intervenors was filed with the SEC on March 30, 1984. LP&L stated in this document that, assuming the NRC issued an operating license in April 1984 as expected, LP&L estimated that the unit would be placed in commercial operation in the fourth quarter of
1984. Additionally, LP&L provided a discussion of the potential for delays due to testing difficulties, regulatory delays or intervention as well as a statement on the potential costs of such delays. The r information provided in the Form 10-K document was consistent with the 1983 Annual Report submitted on February 23, 1984.

Joint Intervenors contend that the form 10-K was misleading because of the findings of the February 1984 CAT inspection and because of the ' cpening of an OI investigation inquiry. They also state in their Motion i at 18 that the April 2, 1984 letter to James Cain showed that LP&L "was rejecting all indications from the NRC on a projected fuel load date". Joint Intervenors are incorrect. I The Form 10-K was filed one week af ter completion of the Construction Appraisal Team (CAT) inspection which had started in February. LP&L, based upon the NRC connents at the exit meeting, anticipated being able to complete by the end of April any reinspection and/or rework required as a result of the CAT inspection. The investigation by the NRC Office of Investigation (OI) referenced in the motion at 18 was not considered

to have a material impact on schedule because closure of an OI 4
                                                                               - __ _..__._ _ _ _ _ _._                                  , _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . , - _ _ _ _      . _ _ . _ . - _ . ~ . . _ _

investigation is not a licensing prerequisite. The reference to the letter written to LP&L President James Cain on April 2, is misplaced because the letter was received by LP&L after the date of filing of the Form 10-K. Prior to the issuance of the letter, LP&L had not been informed as to the details'oflall'gations'and e had received.only limited information on the areas being investigated by the NRC. At the time th'a 10K was filed, LP&L had no information indicating that resolution of allegation issues would be prerequisite to licensing. i

3. Pre 1Luinary Prospectus Joint Intervenors state in their motion at 18 that LP&L's May 25, 1984 2

prospectus " stated that LP&L anticipated that Waterford 3 would be

granted a license to load fuel and operate up to five percent power in late May, 1984". Joint Intervenors seriously mischaracterized the E

statement in this document. The statement made in the filing was that it was anticipated that Waterford 3 would be complete and ready for fuel loading by the end of May, 1984. The statement did not predict an operating license for fuel loading would be granted by the end of May. In fact, the filing contained (as did other SEC filings) qualifying , language concerning the uncertainty about when the NRC would actually i grant a license. In addition, Joint Intervenors neglect to point out that the document was a preliminary prospectus and as such was clearly subject to amendment. See LP&L Exhibit 10. l The basis for the statement in the filing was that LP&L had developed an action plan for response to the CAT inspection items prior ! to receiving the formal CAT report from the NRC (based upon information

provided by the NRC in the CAT exit meeting) and had completed a large number of those task items and was close to completion on the remainder F when the report was issued. At that time, it appeared that the
reinspection efforts were nearing completion and that, based upon the small number of minor rework items required up to that time, that completion of any required inspections and reworks could be accomplished l in short order.

l

4. June Prospectus 4

l On June 5, 1984 (mistakenly stated as June 7, 1984 in the Intervenors' i motion), LP&L issued a prospectus for the sale of preferred stock which l stated that the company believed that Waterford 3 was ready for fuel loading. The prospectus also discussed the events which would follow "should a 5% power operating license be granted in the second quarter of ! 1984...." The uncertainties in the licensing schedule and potential ! costs of delays were also discussed. i i I i l j,

The situation had not changed significantly since the last filing described above (May 25, 1984 bond prospectus) and LP&L bases for the , statements remained as discussed in that context. The Intervenors' conclude in their motion at 19 that the statements made in the prospectus were incorrect because LP&L knew that the NRC would require extensive reinspection prior to granting a license to load fuel based upon the argument that this information was provided at the June 8, 1984, meeting. It would not have been possible for LP&L to have reflected the June 8 meetins; in its June 5th prospectus filing.

5. Amendment to Registration Statement In the July 24, 1984 Amendment to its Registration Statement, LP&L acknowledged the potential for licensing and intervention delays, noting in particular the NRC's June 13, 1984 letter. LP&L stated that resolution of the issues would be required prior to licensing, that LP&L had submitted a program plan for resolution of the issues and discussions with the NRC Staff on the issues were continuing. LP&L also noted that an independent consultant had been engaged to conduct a program of ultrasonic testing of the basemat for the purpose of providing final assurances to the NRC concerning the structural integrity of the foundation. Additionally, the ongoing resolution of the CAT items was mentioned. LP&L stated that its assessment was that license issuance prior to late August or September was not likely and discussed the potential impacts of delays. See LP&L Exhibit 11.

LP&L presented a number of facts in this Amendment concerning events and/or actions which had taken place. The potential of a late August or September fuel load was based upon an assessment of the work effort required to complete the resolution of the 23 issues and NRC review of the submittals. Joint Intervenors claim that this filing was misleading in two respects. First, they assert that LP&L only submitted a " preliminary plan" in , response to the June 13, 1984 letter, and that the NRC "had clearly stated" by July 24, 1984 that the preliminary plan was inadequate. Second, they argue that an August 7, 1984 NRC filing before the Appeal Board requiring further efforts by LP&L concerning the basemat showed that the amendments' statements about the basemat were misleading. As with the May 25, 1984 prospectus, Joint Intervenors failed to point out that the July 24 Amendment was preliminary in nature and that the first page clearly stated that the amendment "has not yet become effective" and that "[ilnformation contained herein is subject to completion or amendment". Nor have the Joint Intervenors shown that the

  • Amendment contains any misleading statements even if it was considered to be " final".

Intervenors imply that it was misleading not to use the term 

                   " preliminary" in the Amendment when the submittal to the NRC had used the term " preliminary program plan". As indicated in the submittal to the NRC, the " preliminary" designation was intended to-indicate willingness on the part of LP&L to modify the plan based upon comments received from the NRC, the independent Task Force and the Safety Review Committee Subcommittee and was preliminary only in that sense. In addition, it is aisleading for Joint Intervenors to claim that the NRC had clearly stated, prior to the date of the SEC filing, that the program plan submitted to LP&L was inadequate. The staff had comments on the plan and the plan was modified to reflect those comments.

However, the NRC did not reject the overall program plan as 

                   " inadequate".

Intervenors also contend incorrectly in their motion at 20 that the NRC Staff cold LP&L that it had failed to provide the kind of detailed program plan, with an independent reviewer, which the staff had required by its June 13, 1984 letter. The discussion in the transcript referenced by Joint Intervenors (JI Exhibit 10 at 15) does not make a statement about LP&L failing to provide the program. The statements, which were apparently being summarized, provide a suggestion by Darrell Eisenhut that LP&L provide a more detailed program as a means of determining whether the Staff was in full accord with the details of LP&L's resolution and the process being employed. Also, the date of the meeting covered by this transcript was August 17, 1984, and the filing that is being questioned by the Joint Intervenors was filed over three weeks prior to that, on July. 24, 1984. Finally, the NRC did not require an independent reviewer as stated in the motion at 20. LP&L voluntarily engaged a special task force that would provide an independent review and report results to the President of LP&L and to Darrell Eisenhut concurrently. The Intervenors' argument concerning representations about the basemac is also unfounded. Joint Intervenors mischaracterized this filing as a statement by LP&L that testing would provide final assurance to the NRC about the structural integrity of the plant's concrete foundation. The filing contains a valid statement that the purpose of the investigation and testing was to provide finsi assurance. The statement was not intended, nor did it attempt to imply, that the results could be preordained.

6. July Memorandum Joint Intervenors question the sufficiency of a July 30, 1984 Memorandum to the Financial Community.

In the Memorandum, Middle South Utilities (MSU - LP&L's parent company) stated that commercial operation had been rescheduled to the first quarter of 1985 in order to allow for additional time to respond to NRC concerns. MSU stated that LP&L believed that Waterford 3 was ready for fuel load and estimated that it could satisfy NRC concerns and fully address all pending matters in time to license the plant sceetime during September. MSU further stated that LP&L had submitted a program plan to the NRC for resolution of the issues and that "[d]iscussions with the NRC staff are continuing". See JI Exhibit 51A. At the time the statement was made, a September fuel load was in accordance with a schedule prepared to implement the program plan. Joint Intervenors contend the memorandum is misleading because the NRC at that time had indicated that it had not accepted the LP&L program and was requiring a more specific proposal. Again, this allegation is unfounded. Contrary to Joint Intervenors' assertion, the NRC did not reject LP&L's program plan as inadequate. Most of the items in the program plan had been accepted, and as indicated in the Memorandum, the remaining items were the subject of ongoing discussions with the NRC.

7. July 1984 Report Joint Intervenors conclude their assessment of LP&L financial statements with a discussion of the July 1984 report to the Middle South Utilities Stockholders. This report contains a short condensation of statements made at the Middle South Utilities Stockholders' meeting, which was held on May 18, 1984. The report contained a statement that a large number of allegations involving faulty plant construction had been investigated and answered successfully without corrective work being required at the plant.

Joint Intervenors claim in their motion at 21 that the statement was inaccurate because of the NRC's Task Force and CAT reports and because of the corrective action associated with the June 13 letter. However, it was a fact that by May 18, l'84J no significant physical work had been required on Waterford 3 as a result of the investigation of such allegations. Further, the statement must be viewed in context of the information sva11able to LP&L in the middle of May. The NRC review team had not at that time reported its results and would not do so for another three weeks and the only allegations of which LP&L was aware were those contained in the April 2nd letter from Darrell Eisenhut and several allegations that had surfaced in the interview program voluntarily established by LP&L earlier in the year. The report did not imply as Joint Intervenors contend, that no corrective

  • work was required as a result of the CAT inspection. The statement was clearly identified as relating to rework associated with allegations, not to the CAT inspection. However, even in the case of the CAT' inspection .the reinspection and corrective actions required did not involve extensive physical rework in the plant. As for the June 13, 1984 letter, this.followed the May 18th statement which was simply being summarized in the July Memorandum. However, corrective action as a result of the June 13, 1984 letter issues has not involved extensive
  • physical rework in the plant.

By focusing on only a few sentences in each filing, the Joint Intervenors imply that the statements made in the SEC filings are unqualified. This is untrue, the SEC filings have included statements which properly reflect the. uncertainties in the licensing process and the potential impact.of delays in the licensing of Waterford 3 on the construction costs of the project. These statements reflected LP&L's acknowledgement that the schedule for completion and licensing of the Waterford 3 project could not be ascertained with a high degree of accuracy due to the uncertainties of the actions to be taken by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and intervention groups opposing a license. See JI Exhibit 47 at 3; JI Exhibit 48 at 6; LP&L Exhibit 10. JI Exhibit 50 at 5; LP&L Exhibit 11; JI Exhibit Sla at 1. In sum, none of the statements cited by Joint Intervenors made in financial statements were misleading. In all cases, LP&L~provided statements that reflected the best information available to LP&L at the time that the statements were prepared. Item B(3), Motion at 21 - 26. In Iten B(3), the Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L made inaccurate and misleading statements in its April 27, 1984 letter responding to various issues identified by the NRC. On April 2, 1984, the NRC had asked LP&L to respond to 39 issues which reflected allegations the NRC had received primarily ever the previous , several months (JI Exhibit 53). The specifics of the allegations, for the most part, were not communicated to LP&L. The NRC, in recognition of LP&L's schedule then in effect, requested an expeditious response from LP&L. LP&L's response of April 27, 1984 (JI Exhibic 54) represented the best information available to it under the circumstances, considering the lack of specifics about the allegations, and the corresponding need to respond to some allegations on a programmatic basis.

  • r-The NRC's formal follow-up came in the form of its June 13, 1984 letter (JI Exhibit 9) which set forth 23 issues for resolution. LP&L's responses to that letter have been based on an extensive, far reaching, and detailed program of investigation which yielded formally verified information which was not available when LP&L responded to the earlier April 2, 1984 letter. See the response to Item C. To the extent that the later information may have been inconsistent with the earlier appraisals, the detailed presentation in LP&L's responses to the 23 issues in the June 13 letter has set the record straight. Thus, any necessary updates or corrections to the statements identified in Joint Intervenors' Item B(3) have been submitted to the NRC Staff.

(a) Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L responded incorrectly to Item 1 of the NRC's April 2, 1984 letter which states:

1. It has been alleged that Civil structural and piping QC inspectors were not certified in accordance with the appropriate requirements.

To respond to this issue LP&L reviewed Ebasco and contractor procedures for certification of personnel for compliance with the appropriate requirements. The response provided was based on the Quality Assurance Program, including the programs of the contractors and subcontractors, having acceptable procedures for certification of QC inspectors. On the basis of this review and a review of associated non-conformance reports, LP&L concluded in its April 27 response that the inspectors were qualified and that deficiencies that may have existed had been corrected. In later responding to Issue 1, 10 and 20 of the NRC's June 13, 1984 letter, LP&L's review went far beyond its previous programmatic efforts. It performed a 100% evaluation of all QC and QA personnel qualification and training records, including background investigations to verify the accuracy of the QA/QC personnel qualifications (education and work experience). The evaluation of qualifications was effectively governed by current NRC Staff interpretations of qualification requirements which are more restrictive than the interpretations which were the norm at the time the original qualification decisions were made. This retrospective review results in a highly conservative evaluation of the QC inspector qualifications. The results of this evaluation are described in LP&L's response to NRC Item 1. (LP&L Exhibit 12). The apparent conflict between the response provided by LP&L in its letter of April 27, 1984 (JI Exhibit 54) and the conditions identified by the NRC letter of June 13,1984 (JI Exhibit 9) was r2bstantially caused by a difference in the basis and criteria of the reviews. LP&L's response on April 27, 1984 was based on a review of contractors programs for compliance to applicable requirements. The conditions identified by the L-_______

NRC were based on reviews of the certification packages of individual inspectors. These reviews were based on the educational and experience requirements stated in ANSI N45.2.6. The review did not take into account the position of ANSI N45.2.6-73 that the experience and education factors were not absolute and that other factors, such as demonstrated capability and proficiency testing, may be used as a basis for certification. Since the basis and criteria of the respective reviews were different, the results were different. No falsification was involved. (b) Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L responded incorrectly to Item 6 of the NRC's April 2, 1984 letter which states

6. It has been alleged that basemat concrete was not placed in accordance with the ACI Codes.

Joint Intervenors cite Exhibits 41 and 23. The contention is without merit and the referenced exhibits do not support the contention. LP&L's answer of April 27 to Issue 6 was and is correct. In its answer of April 27, LPSL stated that the finished basemat placements are in compliance with ACI Codes. The answer also expressly states that while deficiencies had been noted in surveillances and audits, these had been satisfactorily resolved such that the completed placements " met or exceeded requirements." JI Exhibit 41, a report by Robert Philleo, is not inconsistent with LP&L's response and in fact supports it. The deficiencies referenced by Philleo in his report had been previously identified and resolved by LP&L, and Philleo concurs in the LP&L resolution. This supports LP&L's April 27 statement. Philleo concluded, in agreement with LP&L's answer to Allegation 6, as follows: 

 "The construction of the basemat was adequate to ensure the safety of the structure.      .... Strength of the concrete is well documented. It exceeds the design strength by a larger margin than required by American Concrete Institute Standards."

The CAT Inspection Team, as reported in JI Exhibit 23. found inspection and test record deficiencies for two placements. However, the missing records were readily reconstructed from other documentation. On that basis, LP&L concluded, consistent with its response of April 27, that the problem was one of records management rather than specification compliance at the time of concrete placement. Again, these facts conform with LP&L's April 27 response. (c) Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L responded incorrectly to Item 7 of the NRC's April 2. 1984 letter which states:

7. It has been alleged that a complete (100%) review of all concrete placement packages was not performed thoroughly in that all NCR's, Nasty Grams, EDN's and letters were not included in the review.

The LP&L letter of April 27, 1984 to the NRC responded that a " thorough review of concrete placement packages was performed." At that time, LP&L was unaware of 70 Deficiency keports (DRs) which had been overlooked in its review of the concrete placement packages. Deficiency Reports are not part of the initial concrete records package, but are documents used to denote deficiencies found during the record review process. The omission was unintentional. On July 11, 1983, LP&L project management group directed Ebasco to perform a 10 percent review of the concrete placement packages. The review began in August of 1983, and was expanded in September to a 100% review. This 100% records review effort was corpleted on January 30, 1984. Since the omission was inadvertent, it cannot be said to cast doubt on LP&L's forthrightness with the NRC. To the contrary, the voluntary undertaking of the 100% review was voluntary, taking r.o credit for previous reviews, demonstra.es LP&L's commitment to quality. Moreover, the DR's that were mislocated have been evaluated by Ebasco and LP&L, and the identified discrepancies have been dispositioned. Most of 

                                             ~

deficiencies had independently been identified during the 100% review without benefit of the missing DR's, many were minor in nature, and others were easily corrected. (d) Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L responded incorrectly to Item 11 of the NRC's April 2, 1984 letter which states:

11. It has been alleged that the extra supports for instrumentation cabinets covered by av FCR that were mouated on gratings inside contair. ment were fabricated with materials for which there 's no heat numbers traceability by uncertified welders and examined by uncertified inspectors.

LP&L responded in the April 27 submittal that this allegation was partially valid. Joint Intervenors contend that LP&L In responding to the NRC's June 13, 1984 letter, admitted that Item 11 was " valid in its entirety." This is a serious mischaracterization of LP&L's position. With respect to material traceability, the April 27 response stated traceability existed. Later review confirmed that, with the exception of two clip angles which were evaluated as not required, traceability indeed existed. e_________-_-_____-__-__-_-__--___-___-_-_---_-_-_----__________--_____-______--_---__-___

7-t 

                                             \                                                                       .

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                                                                                                              ~~

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                                           .+
                                                                                    .r                             -
                                              ~
                                                     .                            n                       s The April responsa also stated that welders and inspectors for the                                                   h referenced cabinet supports were qualified. This statement was based,on the information then available, which the drafters of the response-                                              .,

understood included complete documentation for the supports. It developed, on further review, that documentation was nob complete. ',This fact, as addressed in LP&L's response to Issue 9 of th) June 13. letter (LP&L Exhibit 13), did not cause LP&L to determine that the referenced personnel were unqualified. Rather, contrary to Joint Intervenor's f. s allegation, LP&L concluded that, lacking full documentation, 1,F&L could , not conclusively establish the qualifications for all personnel who worked on the cabinet support welds. It was on this basis--lack of documentation, rather than confirmed lack of qualification--which led - [ LP&L to undertake the reinspection of cabinet adppo'et welds described in- 

                                                                     ~

LP&L's response to Issue 9. No rework was required .ti a result of this ' reinspection. m , Joint Intervenors suggest that LP&L should have referenced Ncn W3-7549 in the April submittal and apparently that tho-NCR waa' in some way inconsistent with the April response. In fact, the NCR raised essentially the same concern as Item 11, and disposition of the NCR at the time was the same as in the April submittal. Subsequently, this NCR ,k was supplemented in light of the incomplete documentation and it has now ~ ' been closed in accordance with LP&L's response to Issue 9 in the NRC's June 13 letter. , (e) Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L responded incorrectly to Item ' 21(b) of the NRC's April 2, 1984 letter which states that it had been -- alleged that: 21b. Welders and QC weld inspectors were not adequately 4 qualified. , ' 4 With respect to the qualifications of welders, LP&L responded in JI Exhibit 54 that the allegations were invalid. This response was , correct, and nothing cited by Joint Intervenors in this allegation ,.. suggests otherwise. Joint Intervenors reference Mercury welding. As reported in the response to Issue 22 of the June 13 1cteer, LP&L l conducted a 100% review of the qualifications of Mercury welders. This review showed that, with only one exception, which was properly dispositioned in an NCR, the welders were qualified. (LP&L Exhibit 6). See also the response to Item A(7)(a). . s T 4

The allegation also refers to QC weld inspectors. These inspectors were encompassed within the response to Item B(3)(a) above. 

    ' Item B(4), Motion atl26 - 27.

Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L has failed to comply with NRC regulations, and has failed to correct noncompliances and prevent recurrence. In support of their allegation, Joint Intervenors cite two issues from JI Exhibit 9 the June 13, 1984 NRC letter: 1) Issue 16 - Surveys and exit interviews of QA personnel, and 2) Issue 23 - QA programs breakdown between Ebasco and Mercury. Joint Intervenors' allegation is incorrect. Overall, LP&L has maintained a Quality Assurance Program enforcing compliance with NRC regulations and providing for correction of noncompliances and prevention of recurrence. Reflective of the adequacy of the QA Program is the high quality of installed systems as confirmed by repeated LP&L and NRC inspections. The Joint Intervenors, by merely citing two issues previously raised by the NRC and since responded to by LP&L, provide no additional support to the contrary.

1. Issue 16 Issae 16 of JI Exhibit 9, refers to LP&L's voluntary establishment of a program to identify quality concerns through interviews of site personnel. The program, begun in January, 1984, was a new, voluntary effort of a type not previously undertaken by LP&L. It was not an NRC requirement, nor was it part of a prior commitment.

Given the voluntary nature of this program, Issue 16 provides no basis for the Joint Intervenors allegation. On the contrary, the program demonstrates LP&L management commitment to quality construction and operation. As shown by the LP&L response to Issue 16 (LP&L Exhibit 14), the interview program has evolved considerably into a useful management tool providing very useful support of LP&L's quality assurance efforts.

2. Issue 23 Issue 23 of JI Exhibit 9 involves a concern with inadequate documentation on the part of Mercury Company of Norwood as first identified by LP&L QA, and LP&L's corrective action response thereto. This matter has been thoroughly addressed and resolved in LP&L's responses to the NRC's June 13, 1984 letter.

In the Spring of 1982 LP&L QA identified incomplete Mercury documentation packages on the first four systems completed by Mercury. The matter was promptly reported to the NRC and a corrective action program initiated to cover not only Mercury 

                                  - deficiencies.but to ensure that similar problems did not exist with other subcontractors. Contrary to.the Joint Intervenors' statement, LP&L did not include a commitment to audit the entire QA program as                                                                                                                           5 part of-the corrective action to.the Notice of Violation. In Issue 23 the NRC did raise a question concerning-LP&L audits, and this matter was fully addressed in the response to Issue 23. . (LP&L Exhibit 5..Part C).

In December, 1982,~with respect to the Mercury deficiencies identified by LP&Li the NRC issued Enforcement Action 82-109 stating that "[w]hile we recognize that the quality assurance programs did not totally breakdown, there was a breakdown in the subtier programs ! of your contractor and subcontractor." Furthermore, the-NRC noted that the penalty was mitigated: "(che] bases for this mitigation . are the corrective-action you'have initiated...and ycur role in ! - identifying and reporting the breakdown of quality assurance Im programs to the NRC." In response to the Enforcement Action, LP&L committed to, and ccrried out, extensive corrective actions as thoroughly documented in LP&L Exhibit 5. For instance, a major 

                                   -corrective action was the implementation by LP&L of a Task Force to 4
                                 - review' quality records and verify adequacy of safety installations j                                    for a number of subcontractors. The NRC Inquiry Team, charged.in part with reviewing LP&L's corrective actions on Mercury, concluded
                                                                ~

in their report that the " Task Force verification effort and I findings did contribute'to the overall LP&L and NRC assessment of the acceptability of the contractor work and~ effectiveness of LP&L's QA' Program" (JI !1 Nibit 5 at II-3). While the corrective action taken, as discussed above, has been very. extensive, LP&L also has previously stated that it could have been even more thorough. LP&L's review in response to Issue 23 .- demonstrates that overall effective corrective action was taken-and fperformance of the work within the scope of Mercury's contract significantly improved with respect to.the quality of hardware ~ , installation. A recent reinspection of a large portion of Mercury's. work has confirmed its acceptability for support of an operating 4 [ nuclear plant. LP&L's performance over the full range of the Mercury matter together with the responses to the NRC's June 13, p 1984 letter referenced by the Joint Intervenors, demonstrates LP&L's , competence to address and enrrect deficiencies. [- , - Item B(4)(a)-B(4)(e), Motion at 27-28. E Joint Intervenors allege that the Construction Appraisal Team Inspection, NRC Inspection Report No. 50-382/84-07, (" CAT Report") issued'on May 14, 1984, found that LP&L failed to correct problems despite j- ice commitments to do so . i r 73- 

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The Construction Appraisal Team (CAT) identified five instances in which LP&L had initially implemented coomitments made to the NRC only to find that the implementation had been subsequently altered. This was of concern to the NRC, and it was likewise of concern to the Company. LP&L Management response to this concern has been prompt and thorough. Far from undermining management character and competence, this response reflects the proper management attitude for operating Waterford 3. LP&L's review established that the underlying problem was limited and correctable, and it has been corrected. To address tne specific CAT concern, the LP&L Quality Assurance Manager directed the Nuclear Operations QA Department to review the Notice of Violations (NOVs) identified by the NRC from the beginning of construction to the present. These NOVs were reviewed for adequacy and timeliness of the LP&L response, corrective actions, and continued compliance to commitments. This review demonstrated that in all instances, other than those cited by CAT, and one additional case, concitments were adequately implecented and continued corrective actions vers accomplished. In the issues identified in CAT, plus the additional NOV, the procedural revisions and the immediate required corrective actions, as committed, had been implemented. However, continued compliance to the commitments (i.e. ensuring that the commitments, once implemented, were not changed in the future) had not been accomplished, and the tracking mechanism in place at the time did not provide sufficient detail for verification of continued compliance. As corrective action, LP&L reimplemented the specific commitments. Further, the tracking mechanis=, LP&L procedure QASP 18.12, has been revised to assure that compliance with continuing commitments is verified through audit. In addition to addressing the specific issue identified by the NRC, LF6L addressed the generic implication of the concern. The Senior Vice President-Nuclear Operations established a task force to evaluate the total commitments program (including federal, state or lecal agencies) ' to ensure regulatory commitments were satisfactorily addressed and remained in effect. The task force made several recommendations and these are being implemented. We note that, while there was a commitment followup problem as described i above, the overall CAT appraisal of the five construction areas referenced by Joint Intervenors reflects LP&L management's dedication to quality. CAT conclusions for these areas are as follows: Items B(4)(a), B(4)(b) and B(4)(e): HVAC Ducting and seismic restraints, piping runs, and mechanical equipment were generally found to be constructed in accordance with design requirements (JI Exhibit 23, page A-2). l

r-Item B(4)(c): Electrical and instrumentation construction activities were found to be generally acceptable (JI Exhibit 23, page A-1). Item B(4)(d): Welding and nondestructive examination activities were generally found to 5s conducted in accordance with applicable codes and specifications (JI Exhibit 23, page A-2). In summary, LP&L has taken extensive and effective measures to assure that' commitments to NRC for corrective actions have been thoroughly. implemented and to assure that such commitments in the future will be timely and effectively accomplished. Item B(5), Motion at 28-29. Joint Intervenors alleged that LP&L failed to take necessary action to upgrade its staff after warnings by the NRC and the ACRS. The allegation relies upon NRC and ACRS reports in 1981. The allegation that LP&L failed to take action to increase its staff is incorrect, and neither JI Exhibits 57 cr 58 support the allegation. To the centrary,'in 1981 the year when both of Joint Interveaors' cited exhibits were written, LP&L commencel a major recruiting program to increase staffing levels. This effort has been highly successful. LP&L presently is fully prepared with respect to staffing to commence commercial operation. Both ACRS and the NRC staff, referenced by Joint Intervenors, agree in this assessment. In 1982, the ACRS fnformed the 

      !GtC (LP&L Exhibit 15) that LP6L was ready for Waterford 3 operation.

The NRC staff also has tracked and acknowledged the improvement in LP&L's staffing in SER Supplerents 2 (January 1982), 3 (April 1982), 5 (June 1983) and 6 (June 1984) . In these supplements the NRC staff concludes that the organization, staffing levels and staff qualifications are adequate for operation at Waterford 3.

Item B(6), Motion at 29-32. Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L failed to ensure that Ebasco site management was " competent, trustworthy, and dedicated to quality principles" (Motion, page 29). It is not correct that LP&L has " failed to ensure that Ebasco site management was competent, trustworthy, and dedicated to quality . principals." LP&L has always demanded of Ebanco -- and Ebasco has demanded of itself.-- that Ebasco management be highly competent and committed to quality. For example, in JI Exhibit 1 -- not cited by them in support of this allegation -- a 1979 management assessment by an outside organization (MAC) noted in paragraph 6 that "[i]t is beneficial to LP&L at this time that Ebasco has been able to staff with several very competent individuals ..." Joint Intervenors presented no exhibita in support of this allegation. Their sole basis for the allegation is what, on information and belief, are some highly colored paraphrasing of portions of a 1981 NRC inspection report from the Zimmer pr: Ject related to Robert Marshall. Joint Intervenors present ns allegations or refer to no documentation. criticizing Mr. Marshall's conduct or performance during his tenure at Watt ford 3. On information and belief, Joint Intervenors have significantly , mischaracterized and misrepresented the situation with respect to Mr. Marshall at Zimmer; the NRC did not find that Mr. Marshall had 

           " contributed to the QA breakdown at ... Zimmer;" and it cannot be fairly said, as implied by Joint Intervenors, that Mr. Marshall's alleged failings led to the fine imposed against the applicant at the Zimmer project (Motion, page 29).

On information and belief, the allegations against Mr. Marshall, as reported'in Inspection Report 50-358/81-13, were but a very small part

  • of the Zimmer allegations in the NRC report; the notice of violation was

, denied by the applicant; and the allegations have not been substantiated._ The NRC found in that inspection report', at page-137, [ that "[t]here was no indication that any of the harassment / intimidation j activities by construction personnel were condoned by [ project i management]." Mr. Marshall was on temporary assignment as the Ebasco Site-Manager at Waterford from June 1983 to May 1984. The footnote at the botten of 

     . page 29 of the motion which states Mr. Marshall was removed, "after NRC l           complaints abcut [him] circulated at Waterford," is false. His task was to complete the construction phase of the work. This had essentially been accomplished at the end of his tenure. Ebasco requested that he be released to assume his role as Vice President, Nuclear and Defense for Ebasco Constructors in Lyndhurst, New Jersey. LP&L regretted his departure, but responded positively to the request.

l l

yc , Responses to Allegations in Section C Item C',' Motion at 32'- 36. Joint Intervenors allege in Item C, in sum, that LP&L " failed to take the NRC Staff seriously" in resolving NRC findings (See Motion, page 35). This is patently false. 

                       .The Inte'rvenors'have directed attention to three NRC inspection efforts:
                                                           ~
            .             1) the Inquiry Team, 2)             the Construction Assessment Team, and 3)            the NRC's June 13, 1984 letter. The following discussion demonstrates a serious and appropriate response by LP&L management to the respective inspection findings.

1.' Inquiry Team The NRC. Inquiry Team inspection addressed QA Program activities at Waterford 3 arising from a series of local newspaper articles. The inspection was. conducted on April 2-13, April May 4,-and May 14-25, 1984, and documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/84-34 dated July 

                       '20,.1984.

Joint Intervenors' allegation misleadingly characterized the Inquiry 

                       ' Team as " generally unsatisfied with LP&L's response". (Motion, page 33).

To the contrary, Appendix A of the Inspection Report states that "... the' LP&L QA construction program for turnover of systems appeared generally adequate ..."(page-1); "NRC found that LP&L's verification program ... was generally adequate in achieving its purpose"(page 2); 

                       .and, "The staff review ... shows that generally'the LP&L QA program for design control was being implemented successfully" (page 2). -See JI Exhibit 5.

The NRC' Inquiry Team Inspection Report covered inspections in five areas.- Three of these areas were closed by the NRC in the Inspection Report. The remaining two areas were expressly held for closure until completion of the NRC Waterford Task Force review effort due to , similarity of the items to issues in the June 13, 1984 letter from D. Eisenhut to J. Cain. LP&L has addressed all unresolved items ~ identified by the Inquiry Team. LP&L has also completed and submitted responses to the. issues from the-June 13, 1984 letters related to the two issues..

2. Construction Assessment Team The Construction Assessment Team (CAT) issued 1ts findings on May 14, '
                       -1984.          LP&L had been actively pursuing resolution of the findings prior                  +

to the issuance of the report. While the inspection team was on site, it became apparent that certain areas would be questioned by the NRC in the Inspection Report. LP&L initiated efforts to address these concerns 

                       -and in several cases provided additional information tc the review team before the inspection was completed. Additionally, the review team provided a detailed verbal account of their findings se the eait meeting 4                      7 held on March 23, 1984. LP&L immediately initiated development and 4                         implementation of an action plan to resolve each issue.
                                                                         - , - , .   , ,.- .-            - , - . ,    ,,,-_.-a,--..--_..---.                             .-.-.- . . . - . - - -

This plan was submitted to the NRC Staff for review and comment and modified as appropriate to' assure LP&L and NRC concerns would be adequately resolved. The day the Inspection Report was received, LP&L met with cognizant NRC personnel to discuss the status of the corrective action plan efforts and the schedule for completion of the remaining efforts. Initially, daily contact was maintained with the NRC to assure adequacy of response depth and scope, and regular contact maintained thereafter. Within six weeks, after expending approximately 330 man-months,_most of the CAT issues had been addressed. LP&L has been fully responsive to the CAT findings, submitting the balance of the responses in a timely fashion.

3. June 13, 1984 NRC Letter In a letter dated June 13, 1984, the NRC identified 23 issues for resolution.

LP&L management took inmediate decisive steps,gof extraordinary depth and scope, to investigate and resolve the 23 issues. LP&L immediately mobilized a large workforce that was eventually to devote over 1000 man-months of effort in resolving the 23 issues. Concurrently, by June 20, 1984, an external Tcsk Force of respected nuclear experts had been assembled to independently assess the adequacy of the issue resolutions, validate the information provided in the responses and assess their safety significance. The Task Force, operating independently of LP&L, reports directly to the President of LP&L and simultaneously submits its reports to the NRC. A top LP&L management team was promptly established and dedicated solely to. resolution of the issues and administration of the program. The team reported directly to the Senior Vice-President Nuclear Operations, with personal oversight by the President and Chief Executive Officer of LP&L. A special Safety Review Committee subcommittee was also created to provide.an extra level of resolution review. Perhaps most indicative of the serious intent of management to fully resolve the 23 issues was the pledge by LP&L's President to make no further request for a fuel load / low power license or a full power license until he was personally 

   . satisfied that all safety issues necessary for issuance of the particular license had been adequately resolved. Further, as indicated by the over 1000 man-month effort referenced above, LP&L ensured the presence of adequate resources to address the issues to the necessary depth.

By June 28, as documented in a letter to the NRC, a preliminary evaluation and program plan for the 23 issues was completed. This plan was periodically modified as appropriate. On August 10, 1984 the first issue responses were transmitted to the NRC. Subsequent submittals have addressed each of the remaining issues, including an assessment of their collective significance. Each issue response included identification of the cause, safety implications, corrective action (as necessary) and j assessment of the generic implications of the issue. i b - l 3 i l i l Because the detailed findings (SSER 7) of the NRC Task Force had not yet l been issued, LP&L requested a meeting with'the NRC to obtain feedback on progress to date. The Joint Intervenors motion has characterized the NRC Staff attitude at that meeting, held August 17, as considering LP&L's efforts inadequate. (Motion, page 35). Clearly, from the 

             ' hearing record (JI Exhibit.10), the meeting was.one of mutually beneficial exchange. .As noted by the NRC Assistant Director for Safety Assessment (DOL), " Speaking for the staff, I think generally we are very                           l encouraged.by what we.have heard today" (JI Exhibit 10 at 165). As aL result of the meeting, LP&L incorporated NFC suggestf ons fr a revicien te the pregrec plcr det</ fogust 20.

LP&L has aggressively addressed safety issues brought to its attention by:the NRC staff in the three recent inspection efforts. Given the extensive investnent in manpower and resources to resolve the NRC's cc r e err.s , the allegaticr that LP6L failed to take the NFC staff serictsir f r ticily siticut frutittfor. r 1 l

Responses to Allegations in Section D Item D, Motion at 36 - 39. Joint Intervenors contend that LP&L's proposals for responding to the 23 issues contained in the NRC letter of June 13, 1984 failed to satisfy minimal NRC standards. LP&L's responses to the 23 issues (and specifically 1, 4, 5, 6, 10, 13 and 20 as raised in this allegat' ion) have been extensive and thorough. The approaches developed to resolve the issues were sufficient to encompass the concerns raised by the NRC Staff. Moreover, the approaches were developed in cooperatien with the Staff. Actual preparation of the responses involved over 1000 man-months of effort. For most of the 23 issues LP&L responded precisely in the manner requested by the Staff in their June 13 letter, or provided greater information than the NRC requested. In limited cases LP&L adopted a modified approach which was developed in consultation with the Staff. The August 17 meeting, which was-freely quoted by_the Joint Irtervenors in this allegation, was indicative of LP&L's concern to maintain open communication with the Staff in resolving the 23 issues. This meeting was requested by LP&L to obtain feedback from the Staff on the adequacy of tra cpproaches taken for the issues and the adequacy of the responses 

      ' submitted to that date. The hearing record clearly demonstrates the mutual benefit for LP&L and the Staff of this meeting and the record also reficcts the Staff's general satisfaction with LP&L's efforts. As stated by the NRC Assistant Director for Safety Assessment (DOL),
        " Speaking for the Staff, I think generally we are very encouraged by what we have heard today." (JI Exhibit 10 at 165).

The Intervenors focus on several specific issues raised in the June 13 NRC letter. Joint Intervenors' comments reflect misunderstandings and mischaracterizations arising from the August 17 meeting betwedn LP&L and the NRC. Each of.the specific issues identified by Joint Intervenors is addressed below.

1. Issue 5 The Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L's proposed resolution of Issue 5, I dealing with conditional certification of Combustion Engineering (CE)

! equipment, was inadequate. This position is primarily based upon misunderstandings by the Joint Intervenors of what constituted Issue 5. The problem identified in Issue 5 was a deficiency in handling conditional certifications for CE supplied equipment. It was not, as 

      -stated in the contention, a lack of visual inspection of safety-related equipment by site inspectors. Nor did the identified problem involve review of the qualifications of welders doing shop welds on vendor i        supplied equipment or the qualification of vendor inspectors.

. The specific problem identified by Issue 5 was addressed through a l l 1 l

I l l l l review of all CE Conditional Certifications of Equipment. The generic implications were addressed by reviews of the site's material receiving and control system, Ebasco-NY_ safety-related purchase orders, site 1 safety-related deliver-and-erect contracts, and Ebasco-NY l 

   ~Non-Conformance Reports.
                 ~

The details.of this effort are_ included in the ' response to Issue 5 submitted to the NRC (LP&L Exhibit 16). 

              ~

The Joint Intervenors' claim, that records of equipment receipt do not demonstrate visual inspection of equipment, is incorrect. Documentation of receipt inspection, including visual inspection, is retained. Receiving, storage and handling of safety-related equipment is governed by QC procedures in compliance with Ebasco and LP&L QA manuals, ANSI + N45.2 and daughter standards, and FSAR commitments and include documented QA inspection plans. The Joint Intervenors' claim, that VQAR (Vendor Quality Assurance Report) records have never been submitted to a technical review of welder or vendor inspector qualifications, is misleading. Vendor welders and inspectors are confirmed as qualified before initiating any work leading to a VQAR. Formal QA programs are utilized to assure that prior to a vendor being placed on the approved vendor list, the vendor must demonstrate that it has a program in compliance with Appendix B to 10CFR50. Said programs include qualification of welders and inspectors. Each vendor supplying safety-related equipmert is then audited by QA. The inspection checklists have been subject ta unannounced NRC audits.

2. Issues 1, 10, and 20 The Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L's proposed resolution of Issues 1, 10 and 20 dealing with qualifications of inspection and testing personnel, is inadequate. This position is primarily based on the Joint Intervenors' mischaracterization of LP&L's approach for resolution.

As shown by LP&L's response to Issues 1, 10 and 20 (LP&L Exhibits 12, 17 and 7), LP&L has undertaken an extensive verification program to review 100% of the site QA/QC personnel who may have performed safety-related functions at Waterford 3. Contrary to the Joint Intervenors' i interpretation, LP&L's approach involves verification of the qualifications of inspectors by formal QA documentation using formal QA/QC procedures. Contrary to the contention, LP&L has not verified QC inspectors by contractor certification of their qualifications. QC i inspectors were verified against the criteria _of ANSI N45.2.6-1973 while ! Operational QC personnel were verified against the criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.58 Rev. 1 (ANSI N45.2.6-1978). In instances where an individual can not be qualified to the appropriate criteria, corrective action is initiated and formally tracked to completion in order to disposition potential deficiencies. 

         -Contrary to'the Joint Intervenors' suggestion, reinspection is not necessary in all cases in order to properly disposition a finding. For instance,:co-inspection or later inspection by an inspector shown to be qualified is acceptable. Disposition has been on a case by case basis and included reinspection (e.g..a 100% reinspection of Mercury instrument lines for instruments required for safe shutdown), analysis of previous inspections or proof tests . (NDE, hydrostatic ' tests),

statictical analysis, determination of the types of inspections or tests performed and training received, and engineering evaluation. Contrary to the Joint Intervenors' suggestion, in no esse was reinspection by an unqualified inspector used to disposition another unqualified inspector's deficiency. 

         -The Joint Intervenors' statement that "LP&L, at the August 17, 1984.

meeting with the NRC-staff in Bethesda, itself admitted that even using more lenient methods of qualifying inspectors, it could only qualify about 51 percent of inspectors whose credentials had up to that point - 

         .been examined" is misleading. As documented in the transcript of those proceedings (see JI Exhibit 10 at 73), at'that stage of the program 51 percent had been deemed qualified (in the case of inspectors, qualification was to ANSI N45.2.6-1973, not a more " lenient" standard),

cnd 47 percent were in categories B and C. - The B and C categories simply meant that at that early stage of review there was either inadequate documentation to perform an evaluation or the qualifications were questionable. Only 2 percent at that point were deemed unqualified.

3. Issue 4
         ~ Issue 4 deals with the upgrade of lower-tier documents. The Joint-
'Intervenors' allegation appears directed at LP&L's -decision to sample lower tier documents rather than review all' lower-tier documents as requested by the NRC in their June 13 letter. It is clear from the

. August 17 meeting record that LP&L specifically requested NRC concurrence with the proposed sampling approach. Subsequently, the NRC St,aff approved this approach. Such an approach, fully appropriate in the circumstances, was incorporated into the resolution of Issue 4, as summarized in the following discussion. 4 

         .The review conducted for lower tier documents was conducted by Ebasco and the results reviewed by a joint LP&L and Ebasco committee. The results are documented in LP&L's response to Issue 4 attached as LP&L 1 Exhibit 9. To address the NRC's concerns in Issue 4, all documents
;         expressly referenced by the NRC Staff were reviewed in detail. Further,
a. random sample of lower tier documents-and FCRs/DCNs was reviewed. The sample level was sufficient to provide a confidence level of 95% chat 1~

98% of the total population neither described conditions that have 

                                                ~

safety significance nor met the reportability criteria of 10CFR21 and/or 10CFR50.55(e). I 4 9 82-s+ i.+-..--r ,~ve ,w-,wt, *5-wm.,-w+,-,-.-rwns.-yv~ w+ - eg--- e w m.--cm.-=-.--w-en--ww+-rv-w"-----t- r*' F" - - *

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l

4. Issues 6 and 13 The Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L's proposed resolution of Issues 6 and 13, dealing with the dispositioning and accountability of Non-Conformance Reports (NCRs), is inadequate. As with the previous section of this contention, the Joint Intervenors appear concerned over the adoption of standard sampling techniques, although no specific objection has been raised.

As described in the response to Issue 6 of the NRC's June 13, 1984 letter (LP&L Exhibit 8), LP&L reviewed approximately 98% of the site NCR numbers issued by Ebasco during the construction of Waterford 3. The review consisted of several phases including a detailed review of over 650 NCRs (including all NCRs referenced by the Staff). As a minimum, each Ebasco NCR reviewed was re-evaluated to determine if: (1) the NCR was reviewed for safety significance (reportability under 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR21), (2) the disposition addressed the described discrepancy, and (3) the NCR had received the appropriate signatures. While limited deficiencies were identified, none was safety significant. Of the approximately 3700 dispositioned Mercury NCRs, about 1700 had previously been upgraded to Ebasco NCRs and were therefore subjected to routine Ebasco NCR review. The remaining Mercury NCRs were subject to several types of sample reviews as described in LP&L Exhibit 8. These reviews were above the normal programmatic requirements for review of contractor deficiency reports and provided a confidence level of 95% that 95% of the total population of Mercury NCRs do not contain unreported conditicas reportable under 10 CFR21 or 10CFR50.55(e). ' Similarly, a random sample of Ebasco Deficiency Reports (DRs) generated as a result of the review of Mercury and Tompkins-Beckwith records review was conducted for proper closure. In summary, the program conducted in response to Issue 6 was extensive and indepth. Software documentation discrepancies were discovered and corrected during the reviews described above, as they were during the review of the NCRs and DRs cited by the NRC, but no problems that would have affected the safety of the plant, had they gone uncorrected, were i identified. While Issue 6 dealt with the dispositioning of NCRs, Issue 13 dealt with LP&L's ability to account for missing, voided and administratively closed NCRs. In response to this concern, a detailed accountability l . review of all closed or voided Ebasco and Mercury NCRs, issued up to about the date of the review, was conducted. As described in the response to this Issue (LP&L Exhibit 18), all Ebasco and Mercury NCRs ' reviewed were accounted for. l i F L 3

pr- - Responses to Allegations in Section E Item E, Motion at 39 - 44. lThe allegations in this item related to the basemat cracks appear to be made in support of Joint Intervenors second contention that LP&L management lacks the requisite character.and competence to safely operate Waterford 3. Contrary-to such an assertion, actions taken in regard to the basemat issue demonstrate a responsible and extensive effect to cooperate with the NRC in' resolution of the basemat issue. Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L has failed to " follow mandated mapping and surveillance programs." (Motion, p.40). The allegation is false. Joint Intervenors offer no evidence or exhibits to substantiate their contention. In their review of the basemat issue, the staff has, at times, requested LP&L to survey the basemat for cracks and provide this information to the staff. LP&L has supplied the requested information in each case. Also, in ALAB-753, the Appeal Board noted that the staff woulo require LP&L to establish a surveillance program to assure the continued integrity of the foundation mat. LP&L has submitted such a program to the NRC staff for its review. Joint Intervenors contend that "the new cracks were brought to the attention of the NRC not by LP&L but by articles which appeared in Cambit" (Motion, p.40). The basemat cracks were identified in early May of 1983, and were documented on Nonconformance Report NCR-W3-6212 dated May 11, 1983. A May 17, 1983 phone call from Gambit to the NRC Resident 

                      -Inspector and the discussion of cracks in the May 21, 1983 issue of Gambit preceded LP&L's determination of reportability under the normal review process and any reporting which would have been required.
                      -Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L has " resisted all NRC efforts that it take corrective action beyond those already-in effect." (Motion, p. 40).

f- Joint Intervenors Exhibit 59 and 60 contain no support for this [ allegation. LP&L has maintained, and continues to maintain, that the l- cracks are of no structural safety significance, but has never resisted I NRC efforts to take corrective action. No corrective action has been proposed by the NRC other than the surveillance programs discussed above, which LP&L has developed for NRC Staff review and will perform as required following staff approval. In fact, LP&L has taken certain actions on its own. LP&L has constructed wells for monitoring ground water chemistry, developed crack maps for baselining surveys of potential crack propogation and developed procedures and bench marks for surveys of basemat differential settlements. j' Joint Intervenors allege that neither LP&L nor the NRC staff has factored into their evaluations " newly-found" QA problems" (Motion, p. 41). Joint Intervenors provide an example where the staff reviewer , reassessed the basemat adequacy based on new information brought to his l attention (Motion p. 41). Joint Intervenors base their allegation on l l f l- _ _ . _ _ - .. . - _ , _ . . __ . . . . - - - , . _ . . . . . - - - , _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . - . ~ ~ . . - .

f. Dr. Ma's statements contained in JI Exhibit 60 at Attachment II, P. 2. In fact, in the same document at pp 2-3 Dr. Ma reviewed the problems as evaluated by the staff consultant, Robert E. Philleo. Mr. Philleo's evaluation was provided to the Board on June 14, 1984 in the NRC staff's motion for an additional extension of time. Mr. Philleo's conclusion as stated by Dr. Ma's was "in short, the quality control problems were not significant enough to invalidate the original reinforced concrete basemat analysis and design". Id. It is therefore apparent, contrary to Joint Intervenors' assertion, that QA programs have been " factored" into evaluations of the basemat. Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L has failed to maintain proper backfill records and lacked documentation of qualification of J.A. Jones inspectors as outlined in the NRC staff's letter of June 13, 1984 (Motion p. 42). As part of LP&L's extensive program to respond to the NRC's June 13, 1984 letter, LP&L has addressed both issues. With regard to backfill, LP&L has provided the staff with sufficient documentation on backfill records, along with a detailed review and analysis, to ensure that the backfill will perform its function with respect to structural design capability under seismic loads. (LP&L Exhibit 19). In responding to the NRC staff's concerns regarding the qualification of inspectors, (LP&L Exhibit 17), LP&L reviewed the qualifications of J.A. Jones inspectors who performed inspection on the basemat and soils. LP&L has shown that, for inspections performed by those individuals who were not verified to be qualified, other inspections were performed by qualified Ebasco inspectors. This provided an independent confirmation by qualified inspectors of the adequacy of the construction activities. Joint Intervenors allege that LP&L has misrepresented to the NRC its review of concrete records in that its re' view did nct identify the problems found by an Ebasco QA review team in 1983 (Motion p. 42). This does not constitute misrepresentation by LP&L. See the discussion of the " missing concrete records" in response to allegation Item B(3)(c) . Joint Intervenors allege that there are contradictions between information provided by LP&L's consultant for the non-destructive examination (NDE) of the basemat and the information contained in the BNL reports (Motion p. 43). LP&L's consultant, Muenow and Associates, characterizes the basemat cracks as variable in depth, with ranges from less than one foot in depth, to as low as the reinforcement mat on the

l i l bottom of the basemat I . The bottom reinforcements starts at approximately 10 feet into the mat. BNL characterizes the cracks as varying in depth in an undulating manner from several feet (2' to 4') to as much as 9 to 10 feet in certain locations. There are no clear 

 -contradictions between BNL and Muenow and Associates as Joint Intervenors allege.

Joint Intervenors allege that "BNL has stated that Harstead has failed to do calculations in three important areas, concluding that the four 

         ~

areas require additional analysis: (i) dynamic coupling in the vertical direction between the 

                 . reactor building and the basemat.

(ii) dynamic effects of lateral soil / water loadings. (iii) artificial boundary constraints in finite elements models. 

      -(iv)       fineness of basemat mesh." (Motion, p. 44).
~ Joint.Intervenors reliance on Joint Intervenors Exhibit 62 at 7, 14 is misplaced. The items identified by Joint Intervenors were " questions" BNL had concerning the information provided by EBASCO, HEA, and LPL.

The items were not failures to do calculations. BNL concluded (JI Exhibit 62 at 14) that the design of the basemat was adequate, despite these questions, as indicated by the concluding' paragraph: Based upon our approximate calculations together with engineering judgement, we do not anticipate that the above questions will lead to major changes in calculated-stress levels. Thus, it is our opinion that the safety margins in the design of the basemat are adequate. . However, it is recommended that some detailed confirmatory calculations be performed in the near future to strengthen the above conclusions. t These additional questions by BNL and any future calculations to be performed cannot be construed as a " failure" by HEA to perform these calculations. NONDESTRUCTIVE TEST EVALUATION OF BASE CONCRETE AT WATERFORD No. 3, LOUISIANA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY. Report prepared by Muenow and . Associates Inc. dated October 1984, p. 2 (submitted to the Appeal Board  ; by LP&L on October 29, 1984). Responses To Affidavit Allegations Not Referenced In Joint Intervenors' Motion 

  ' Exhibit 8, Paragraph 8, Page 5 Affiant alleges that although-instrumentation lines are supposed to slope gently at a rate of around 1/16 or 1/32 inches per six' feet, field engineers for.Ebasco would issue instructions that craft should "put it in any way you can" and that the approach was to install first, and then " correct" the drawings.

The statements made in Exhibit 8 in regard to tube slope requirements and drawings are inaccurate and misleading. The allegation states that the instrument lines are supposed to slope gently at a rate of around 1/16 or 1/32 inch per six feet. The actual criteria, as stated in Ebasco design documents is specified to be 1/4 inch per foot (or 1 1/2" per six feet). The' allegation further states that craftsmen were instructed to "put it in any way you can". In fact, the craftsmen were instructed to install the tubing per the isometric drawings. These isometric drawings.did not give specific slope values; the engineering guidelines stated above provided overall guidance to installation of tubing including slope requirements. On the isometric drawing, there was an arrow that indicated the direction of the slope only. It was the QC inspector's job to verify that the craftsmen installed instrumentation lines with the proper slope. If the installation deviated from the requirements of the design criteria it would be documented. Procedures were in place to provide for an engineering review of these deviations on a case-by-case basis. Specific reviews were performed by Ebasco engineering to assure that any tube sloping deviations did not have a detrimental effect on the function of'the instrument. In the cases where deviations were unacceptable, rework was performed. Deviations were documented on the specific tubing isometric drawings. It should also be noted that alleger's statement that craftsmen would 

       -receive instruction from Ebasco field engineers is incorrect.

Craftsmen would take direction from craft supervision and not from l Ebasco engineering. In addition, prior to August 1982, Ebasco had no field engineers working in the organization of the contractor installing the instrumentation lines. . r 

    ,     -    _                       - -                                                ..                .                      .~- -.                ,

i ,  : Exhibit 8, Paragraph 19, Page 8. j It is alleged that clogged drains were a maintenance problem. During the construction-phase of Waterford 3, drains became clogged for i a variety of reasons. This is not unusual in a construction program. LP&L has been well aware of this and has taken appropriate action. The matter was not significant to safety. The drain systems, as defined in Section 9.33.1 of the FSAR, are not nuclear safety-related systems. Further, during the construction c phase, there was no known instance of damage to safety-related equipment stemming from the condition of the drain system. With respect to the cleaning of drains, while drains periodically were cleaned in the construction phase, LP&L determined to clean and flush 1 the drains systematically when construction was in its final stage. l This was done as a matter of economy and to best assure that, once unplugged and flushed, the drains would remain clean. Consistent with , that approach, in January 1984, with the assistance of an outside contractor (Culf South Hydro Blasting), the drains were unplugged and . cleaned. F f Exhib'it 27, Paragraphs 1 and 2, Pages 1 - 2 F ' Alleger suggests that a chronic porosity problem existed with respect to Atom Arc (Attomarc) rods. y Widespread porosity problems caused by. welding rods occurs only L infrequently. On occasion porosity exceeding the weld acceptance standards can be caused by welding rods from a specific batch (" heat / lot") of material. When these problems did occur, appropriate l correction action was initiated. LP&L maintains that the weld quality. has not been compromised. The presence of porosity in a weld is readily detected by radiographic means. While repairs are necessary'to-remove the porosity from the weld metal, the veld must meet the' Code p established radiographic acceptance criteria as well as all other l non-destructive examinations, and inspections. The radiography and L other NDE tests are performed by a contractor independent from the contractor that is responsible for the welds and their repair. Porosity problems with'a specific heat / lot occur occasionally throughout industry. The supplier of welding rods to Waterford 3 is on 

                 -th'e Purchasing Department's approved vendor list. The manufacturer's

( Quality Control program has been audited and approved by Ebasco QA. , l LP&L did not use an inferior brand of welding rod in the construction of Waterford 3. The supplier of the welding rod is one of the major 

                 -manufacturers of consumable welding materials in the nation both in

[_ terms of quantity and quality.

b

Those welding rods made together at the factory in one " batch" and of the same materials are assigned a control number call the " heat / lot 4
number" for the purposes of traceability. Infrequently, a heat / lot of material is distributed that can cause a porosity problem despite the manufacturer's quality control program. Because problems with welding rods occur so infrequently and because'there are other causes for porosity,-detection and identification of a specific heat / lot that is 2

causing a problem requires time for investigation by the-welding . - engineer. -When the cause can be linked to a specific heat / lot of. 2 - welding rod, the corrective action is to remove and to dispose the material to prevent further usage. Exhibit 27,-Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, Page 2-3 4 Affiant alleges that he was assigned to weld the main tie-ins to the stainless. steel floor drains in the Reactor. Auxiliary Building because i .it was impossible to maintain a satisfactory argon purge inside of the i pipes,1the welds were " sugared" and-could not pass an x-ray. He is

unsure of the safety significance.

The allegation does not have safety significance. The drain systems throughout the plant are classified as non-safety i related. Further, radiographic examination of the welds was not performed because it was not required. Sugaring of drain piping welds, should it occur, would not affect the

serviceability or reliability of the system.- In service, the drain lines are "open" and not subjected to pressure. " Sugaring" is caused-
                .by oxidation of the molten weld metal exposed-to atmospheric air.

Therefore, it is only a thin layer of metal at the weld on the inside -; surface of the pipe that may have become oxidized. . Absent high 

                  ' pressure, which is not present in drain lines, sugaring would not cause I                    the welds to fail.

i Exhibit 27, Paragraph 6, Page 3 Affiant states he had trouble with sugaring in instrumentation tubing in his'velder qualification test and he is concerned that such sugaring may occur in the field. , Affiant's concern is without merit. Absence of sugaring in instrumentation lines is addressed in response to items A(7)(e) and (f). i I i-

1 We note that welder qualification testing is stringent and that to i become p qualified welder, an individual must demonstra'te an ability to' weld without sugaring. )6uar individuals failed the test on this basis, . and were therefore not allowed to perform such welds. 

 \

Exhibit 27, Paragraphs 7 and 10, Page 4 - 5 It is alleged that weld repairs and peening may hsva damaged welds on j the large bore piping lines leading from the reactor vessel. 4 The allegation is incorrect. In paragraph 7 of Exhibit 27, the alleger j states that he was assigned to make weld repairs, removing slag.and j porosity, that may have damaged safety-related systems. I i Repairs to welds are not unusual construction activities and are ! permissible by Code, including multiple repairs such as the one cited I in the allegation. Such repairs are used to bring the welds into l specifications requirements. For welding of the type cited in the i Exhibit, after the weld is completed (including repairs as necessary) l' it is radiographed and ultrasonically tested to detect internal

defects, liquid penetrant tested for surface defects, post-weld heat

! treated to-reduce or remove the residual stresses and.to temper the-

- metallurgical structure, and hydrostatically tested to prove the soundness and the strength. All of these operations, tests, and examinations were applied to the 50-inch diameter pipe welds, which includes the first welds off the reactor vessel, and all were found to be acceptable by the contractor, his QC inspectors, Ebasco QC inspectors and the ANI. The operations, tests, and examinations were properly documented as required by Code and are.a part of the historical records.

4 j- Additionally, in paragraph 7 and 10 of Exhibit 27, the alleger-l; expresses concern as to whether the metal was damaged by peening and whether the combination of multiple repairs and peening may have caused the. molecular structure to weaken. The concerns are unfounded.' Frequently, when installing pipe and making the welds,-the opposite end of the pipe moves so that it will not align properly with the next segment of pipe to be installed. This movement is caused by the ' shrinkage forces set up as the molten weld metal solidifies. This is not unusual. During welding the movement is monitored as to direction j- and extent. If it appears to be moving out of acceptable tolerances, the condition is to be corrected. This is accomplished with a combination of welding and striking the metal, usually, using a pneumatic hammer. This operation is known as peening and is permissible by Code. l -,, _ . _ _ _ . , . _ . _ _ _ _ - - . _ . _ - _ _ - _ . _ _ - . . - - -. - -

Alternate welding and peening, properly done, stretches the metal but does not daeage it. Given.the size of pipe and wall thickness for the 

                                     ~

installation in question,' extended periods of alternate welding'and peening is not at all abnormal. Peening, welding and repairs by welding (sing 3e and multiple) all cause residual stresses. However, the residual stresses and any temporary metallurgical effects are 

      " corrected" when the weld is post-weld heat treated after these operations. In the case in question the peening, welding and the weld repairs because of the stringent procedures used would not be expected to cause any degradation of the weld and if they had, such would have been found in the subsequent extensive examination and testing process.

With respect to the welds on the large bore piping lines referenced by the alleger, the applicable procedure for peening was NISCO Proc. E.S. 3016-2. As discussed above, the referenced operations, tests and examinations confirm the soundness and strength of this weld metal. Exhibit 27, Paragraph 9, Page 4 - 5. It is alleged that welder qualification testing was insufficient. 4 The allegation is incorrect and misleading. Weld qualification testing met applicable codes and was sufficient for the purposes required. For work at Waterford 3, welders are qualified in accordance with the requirements of ASME, Section IX of the Code. This involves the welding of weld test coupons (sample welds) which demonstrate the abilities and skills of the velder to make the type of welds required for construction of the plant. Before starting to weld, the welders are indoctrinated as to the requirements of the welding procedure, the position in which the test welds are to be made, the inspection " hold points" to be observed as the welds are being made, etc. When the test weld has been satisfactorily completed (visually), there are two Code authorized methods for determining the final acceptability of the test welds. One is radiographic examination of the welds and the alternative is a mechanical bend test of strips removed from the weld test coupon. The strips are bent into the shape of a "U" which 

    -puts a tremendous strain on the weld. Flaws in the weld of a significant size can cause the bend test to fail. Some contractors favor one method over the other. Each method has been used at Waterford 3. Contrary to alleger's implication, weld inspection does not require both weld testing and X-raying. Selection of either i

approval is permitted under th* code, and use of a single approval provides no basis to believe that " unqualified welders" passed the test.

Contrary to the alleger's suggestion, the welding tests are not easy and re' quire considerable skill to pass. Many welders have failed the' tests (both those examined by radiograph and those examined via bend 

                                                                          ~

test) and, thus, were not employed at Waterford 3. Exhibit 27, Paragraphs 11-13, Page 5-6 It is alleged that repairs were made before tests were conducted in a manner that circumvented QC resulting in " undocumented and uncontrolled repairs that were not performed in according to procedures or professional Codes." An arc-strike on a 3 or 4 inch diameter pipe in f the south pump room, Class 1, safety related, was cited as an example. The allegation is incorrect. Apparently the alleger did not understand the specific requirements of the Code as related to repairs and associated inspection and documentation. To begin with, there are no ASME Code Class I lines (pipes) in the south pump room. Piping in this room is designated as Class 2 and Class 3. In making a weld, a welder is required to remove visible imperfections as the welding progresses. This is normal and is permissible by Code and is often referred to as "in-process repairs". This work is within the scope of the qualified welding procedure. No non-destructive examinations, documentation, or deficiency notices (DN) are required. A welder is supposed to " strike the arc" (i.e., to begin to weld with a welding rod) within the weld groove. Occasionally, an " arc strike" occurs on the base metal adjacent to the weld. The are strike is readily visible and does not require a non-destructive test for discovery. Good workmanship requires that these and other visible imperfections should be removed by grinding or filing so that the area blends smoothly with the adjacent material. The design provides a generous allowance by specifying a metal thickness which can accommodate these types of minor repairs. When the in-process work is completed, the weld receives a final visual examination by the QC inspector. The removal of the are strike cannot be concealed from the inspector, partly because the normal curvature of the pipe has been altered (i.e., flattened) slightly. The amount of metal removal can be readily measured and, if necessary, a metal thickness measurement test is called for. Such normal activities do not " lose time" or disrupt the production

  • schedule because other work, including welding, continues on the res't of t'he' pipe system.- Final visual acceptance by the QC inspector is documented in the weld traveller package (process control record).

Following the above, the welds are subjected to non-destructive examinations as specified by Code. The methods applied are governed by the system class, category or type of weld, and, in some cases, size of the veld or pipe diameter. The examinations are performed by another contractor specializing in this type of work. Unacceptable flaws or defects disclosed by non-destructive examination are repaired so that the weld will meet the Code acceptance criteria. This is accomplished under controlled conditions using qualified welding procedures and qualified welders. The repair to the weld and the final NDE acceptance are documented in the weld traveller package and satisfy Code requirements. Based on the above, affiant's allegation is without merit. Exhibit 27, Paragraph 17, Page 7 Alleger states he had doubts about the qualifications of QC inspectors.

Response

LP&L has undertaken a program to perform a 100% evaluation of QC personnel qualifications. This program is discussed in the response to Item B(3)(a). ! Exhibit 27, Paragraph 18a, Page 8 Alleger had questions about the consistency of Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) oversight of the work. He states there was never an unannounced NRC inspection or check during my time at the plant, although he had been told that could happen.

4 The allegation is not correct. The substantial majority -- over 120 -- of the NRC inspections have been uaannounced. Announced inspections typically involved matters , that required preparation, such as gathering documentation, in advance of an inspection. 1 Exhibit 27, Paragraph 18b, Page 8 It'is alleged th't ina some cases, management rescheduled the work so that particular NRC inspectors would be in charge who were not as strict. The allegation that work was rescheduled to avoid scrutiny by tougher NRC Inspectors is without foundation. Throughout most of the construction phase at Waterford 3, the NRC maintained a resident inspector's staff which had free access to the plant at any time. Other unannounced NRC Region IV inspections were conducted as well as anncunced audits and inspections. The nature of such activities do not corroborate even the possibility of rescheduling work to avoid the scrutiny of tougher NRC Inspectors. The premise of work being scheduled to suit the NRC inspector "in charge" is also contrary to the means by which work was performed. Work activities at Waterford were scheduled to fulfill project milestones with regard to specific sequence and/or production goals. This manner of scheduling left no room for resequencing other than as required to meet project milestones. [ . 

          *   #j$8*8cg'                                                            UNITED STATES
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                            ,                                 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
             ;*                   j                                              WASHINCTON. D. C. 20$55
               % ..'"...                                         *
  • August 17, 1984 LP&L EXHIBIT 1 -

mm u.. . Mr. Ga"ry Groesch ,*7 . m Joffit Intervenors , ' 2257 Bayou, Road fNew Orle(n's, LA 70119~, D' ear Mr. Groesch:/ In late May 1984, the NRC staff received an undated letter from you requesting infonnation about the thshl. force working on issues at Waterford. Specif-ically, you asked for.t'he rules and regulations under which the task force was formed, under which it operates, and how it will handle " material false statements." You also indicated that you had information relative to the LP&L response to the NRC staff of April. 27, 1984 . 

 ~                     On Parch *12,1984, the ' Executive Director for Operations directed Mr. John Collins, Mr. Harold Denton, and Mr. Richard DeYoung to take special actio'ns to promptly complete the outstanding _zegulatory actions on the Comanche Peak and Waterford facilities. A copy of that document has been previously placed in the public document room and is enclosed for your information. You should note that the program called for in Mr. Dircks' memo is for the coordination /

integration of issues that need to be resolved befo're a' licensing decision can be reached. The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation was assigned lead responsibility for this activity. The program plan for resolution included identification of all remaining issues and the responsible line organizations needed to complete the tasks. The responsible organizational units were assigned their delegated functions and NRR was directed to coordinate and integrate these efforts. With respect to the inspection issues, especially

  • allegations and some other specialized inspections, the Region, because of its limited resources, did not have sufficient staff to complete these assigned functions in a timely manner. As a result, additional staff from other Regions, from NRC headquartars, and from consultants were assigned to support the Region in completing those tasks.
                    . The authority for the EDO to direct that such efforts be undertaken is provided in 10 CFR Part 1.40(b). That section indicates that the EDO " Super-vises and coordinates policy development and operational activities . . ."

of the line and staff offices. In the NRC Manual, Chapter 0103 deals with the Organization and F;nctions of the EDO, A copy of that Manual Chapter is enclosed. In that cha)ter, the EDO is authorized and directed to, inter alia, (a) distribute buiness among the offices which report to thew TOTc3-023); (b) supervh- direct, coordinate, and approve the activities of the offices reporting to the EDO (0103-027); and (c) discharge such licensing, t l . 

                                                                                                                                               )

        .                                                                                 l Mr. Gary Groesch                                       August 17, 1984 regulatory, and administrative functions of the NRC, and to take such actions as are necessary to carry out the functions and execute the authorities assigned to-the E00 and offices reporting to the E00 (0103-03).

Based on the above, the E00 and all staff offices acted in accordance with their assigned responsibilities. In your letter, you indicated that it appeared that the staff was giving equal weight to safety and scheduling issues. The NRC's mandate is to assure that there is no undue risk to the public health and safety from the use of nuclear power. In carrying out that mandate, our principal concern is for safety. We do plan activities so that decisions can be made in a timely manner. As evidenced by recent events regarding Waterford, fuel loading (schedule) has been delayed because the staff needed and requested additional information before it could reach its decision relative to the safety of the plant. - You also indicated that you were concerned because the " experimental" nature of the effort would short circuit the " checks and balances" of established NRC procedures. The appropriate orgapi;ations have the responsibility for carrying out their assigned functions. The " experimental" nature of the team dealt with the massive additiona3 effort of regional, headquarters, and consultants being assigned to support the Region. Results of the team's efforts will be published and potential violations will be forwarded to the IE Enforcement Staff and Region IV for action as necessary. In your letter, you indicated that you have information relative to the 

          " completeness and/or the truthfulness . . ." of items in the April 27, 1984, response by LP&L to the NRC. I would urge you to promptly provide to the staff any information you may have pertaining to the safety of the Waterford Unit 3 facility. This-information will be considered by the staff in its deliberations relative to the LP&L request for an operating license.

Sincerely, Darre Eisenhut, irector

Division of Licensing,

Enclosures:

As stated 1 . J 

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( NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION - - - 

                                                                                                                           ~-             ~
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                          .t WASHINGTON,0. C 20555                                                   .

( / l.!AR 121984 i PEMORANDUM FOR: John T. Collins, Regional Administrator Region IV . . Earold R. Denton, Director .r; C3 f Off,1ce of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Richard C. DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement

EROM: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

COMPLETION OF OUTSTANDING REGULATORY ACTIONS ON COMANCHE PEAK AND WATERFORD Construction of the Comanche Peak and'Waterford facilities is nearing - i completion. There remain a number of issues that need to be resolved before 

                                                             ~

i the staff can make .its Ticensing decisions. The issues remaining for these plants are quite complex and span more than one Officc. In order to assure

the overall coordination / integration of these issues and to assure issues are. resolved on a schedule to satisfy-hearing and l'icensing decision needs.

I am directing NRR to manage all necessary NRC. actions leading to prompt licensing decisions. Darrell Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing, NRR l- is being assigned the lead responsibility for this activity. He will coordinate the efforts of NRR, IE, and Region IV, and will coordinate this

activity with OI and OELD. Prior to any of the affected Offices undertaking major activities (e.c., inspections) or making decisions on these plants, -

that activity should be concurred in by NRR. ! lle are presently in the process of assigning a dedicated senior manager to assist Mr. Eisenhut in the management of these activities. The first phase of this program will be the identification of issues needed to be resolved for each plant prior to hearing and licensing decisions. Once the. issues have been identified a Program Plan for resolution of each 

                 -item should be developed and implemented.              The Program Plan'should address

, the scope of the work needed, the identification of the responsible line l organization, and the schedule for completion. In principle, this effort I will therefore be similar to the effort undertaken regarding the allegation review on Diablo Canyon execpt that this effort should encompass all ' licensing, inspection, hearing, and allegation issues. e

l. .
                                ~                                                                                                                l

       + .                     .

2 Each affected Office will assign a full time senior ma' ager n to work with NhR to define, schedule and complete the i.ssues. I expect these managers to be identified by each of you within a few days. All affected offices should 

                                        ~

provide dedicated resources and give their full _ support to this effort, to assure that all existing issues are expeditiously handled and all new issues are promptly provided to fiRR so as not to delay the licensing decisions. In addition, copies of all information, docurtents, depositions, etc. should be promptTy provided to NRR to ensure a coordinated approach. I anticipate that the approach utilized here will be necessary for a number of upcoming OL projects, and am directing tiRR to take the lead for carrying out this activity. i s Willi - J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations cc: G. Cunningham, ELD E. Hayes, OI - 

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                                                                  *0VERALL !!ANAGEMENT 100RDINATION (NRR)                                                                                              -

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                                                         .                          . t                                              -                         -

n ELD Contact P l Review of Design ., .' Review of Construction Overall Review or - 

                                                                                                                                                                          ~

Issues , and Operation Issues QA Adequacy (CA7) (RRR) (Reg IV) (IE)* 

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(v U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC MANUAL - TRANSMITTAL NOTICE CHAPTER NRC-0103 ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS. OFFICE OF TFE EXECUTIVE DIhECTOR 

                                                                                                   'FOR OPERATIONS SUPERSEDED:                                                                         TRANSMITTED:

Number Date . Number Date TN 0100-51 Chapter NRC-0103 3/12/82 Chapter NRC-0103 9/2/82 Page Page Appendix Appendix REMARKS: 7 Thischapterisrevisedto. implement the Cct::: mission's 

            /          decision to delegate to the Executive Director for Operations g'-         the authority to issue subpoenas during,the course.of investi-gations or inspections, and-to redelegate that authority to Regional Administrators.                                                      (See para'5raphs -0214 and -0311 of this chapter.)

Please retain in your NRC Manual NRC Appendix 0103, dated November 2, 1981. i 

   '8                                                                                                                       g 9

I t _ , , . , - . _ , - . , ~ . _ , -, . - _ . - _ - , _ , - - . _ _ _ _ N

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC MANUAL . 

    .-           Volume:      0000 General Administration Part :      0100 Organization                                                                                        EDO s           _

CHAPTER 0103 ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS 0103-01 SUPERVISION The Executive Director for Operations (EDO) reports for sll matters to the Chairman; and is subject to the supervision and direction of the Chairman as provided in Reorganization Plan No.1 of 1980. The EDO shall be governed by the general policies of the Commission and by such regulatory decisions, findings and determinations as the Commission may by law be authorized to make. .The EDO, through the Chairman, .sna11 ensure th:.t the Commission is fully and currently informed about patters within its functions. . 0103-02 FUNCTIONS M b The Executive Director for Operations, subject to other provisions of this ( chapter, is specifically responsible for: - ' ~ 

 . .                   . 021 administrative functions of the Commission including resolving EEO and grievance matters and providing support services.

022 execution of the budget of the Commission. 023 distribution of business' among the. offices which report to the ED'O. 024 preparation for Commission consideration of: 1

a. the budget estimate for the Commission;
b. the proposed distribution of appropriated funds according to major programs and purposes; and
                                                                                                    .               ,                       ~-
c. proposals for the reorganization of the major offices which report,to the EDO.

025 consulting with the Chairman prior to the Chairman's initiation of the . appointments of the Directors of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Nuclear Regulatory Research and Inspection 

                - and Enforcement.

1 

        -/               026 appointing and removing after /, M tion with the Chaiman and I

without any further action by the Con.t ,ca J1 officers and employees of Approved . September 2,1982 

                                          . _ . . _ , _ _ . . _ . _ . . . . _ _ , - - . . _ . - _ .                                            )

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS NRC-0103-027 OFFICE'OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS 

                                                                                                                                      \

the offices reporting to the EDO except:-Directers of Nuclear Reactor Regula-tion , Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Nuclear Regulatory Research and Inspection and Enforcement. 027 supervising, directing, coordinating, and approving the activitieI of the offices reporting to the EDO. 028 developing and approving delegations of authority for offices reporting to the EDO. 029 responding to the requests of members of the Commission for access to infomation. 0210 ensuring that the Commission, through the Chairman, is fully and currently informed about matters within its functions. 0211 performing any other matter or function explicitly assigned by the Commission or the Chairman. Any matter or function no1; explicitly assigned j to the EDO is reserved to the Chairman unless otherwise delegated to the Co= mission- by the Reorganization Plan No.1 of 1980. 0212 executing contracts, agreements, or interagency actions subject to the limitations in 032, below. -r - - 0213 developing and promulgating rilies, as defined in subparagraph 4 - of Section 551 of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. S 551(4)), i subject to the limitations in 038, 039 and 0310. . The EDO shall notify the _/ Commission before submitting a final rule to the Federal Register. 0214 issuing subpoenas under Section 161c of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, where necessary or appropriate for the conduct of inspec-tions or investigations. 0103-03 AUTHORITIES The Executive Director for Operations shall be the chief operating and admin- - istrative officer of the Commission and, except as otherwise provide'd by law, - regulation, Commission action, or action by the Chairman, reports to and. is ~ supervised by the Chairman as provided in 0103-01' and is authorized and directed to discharge such licensing, regulatory, and administrative functions of the NRC, and to take such actions as are necessary to carry out the func-tions and execute the authorities assigned by this chapter, chapters of offices 

       - reporting to the EDO, or other official directives or communications.

Limitations placed on the authority of the EDO include the following: 031 all significant questions of policy shall be pre::ented to the Commis-sion for resolution. With respect to such questions, all major views of the affected offices shall be presented to the Commission. 032 contracts , agreements , or interagency actions required by law

3 (including authorization statutes attached as NRC Appendix 0103, Part I, when /

issued) or regulation to be approved by the Commission shall be submitted to l Approved: September 2,1982 . lI 

                                                                        --,~ - ,,

                      ' ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS                                               .

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS NRC-0103-033 - l 

             *,_                                                                                                -1
                                ..                                                                                 i

(- the Commission for approval. The EDO will provide the Commission 5-day notice of cancellations by the EDO of contracts previously approved by the Commission. The EDO shall submit to the Chairman for approval, all contracts for S750,000 or more. .. 

      .                         033 those non-delegable functions described in Section 161n of the Atomic.

Energy Act of 1954, as amended (NRC Appendix 0103, Part II). 034 approval of- employment of an individual by the NRC prior 'to com- 

                      - pletion of the security investigation and reports required by Sec.145.b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, is limited to situations in which an . individual will be precluded fro.m access to Restricted Data or National Security Information through administrative procedures, and only upon receipt

' of an affirmative recommendation from the Director of the Division of Security and a clear showing of need by the requesting organization. This authority may not be redelegated. 035 any report required by the head of NRC by the Special Counsel pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 1206(b)(3)(A) (relating to alleged violations of law in - 1 a Federal agency)' shall be submitted by the Executive Director for Opera-tions , through the Chairman, to the Commission for review and signature 

  "                    of the Chairman. Any reports submit,ted to NRC by the Special Counsel pur-suant to 5 U.S.C.1206(c)(3) shall be submitted by the EDO, through the Chairman, to the Commission for .r.d. view and certification by the Chaiman 7         regarding those matters set forth in 5 U.S.C.1206(c)(3)(A) and (B). Autho-rity to act for the head of NRC pursuant to 5 U.S.C.1206 may be redele-
          .(           gated,to the Deputy EDO but may not be further delegated.

036 with respect to export cases, the " Executive Director for Opera 

.f

L tions will comply with the directive of the Commission contained 'in NRC Appendix 0103, Part III. 037 correspondence to State and. Federal Officials which involve major new policy questions and all correspondence to the President, and Chair- . persons of the _ Oversight Committees, shall be submitted to the Chairman for signature. Correspondence involving significant matters of policy shall be

submitted to the Commission for consideration.

038 all rulemaking shall be subject to general policy guidance from the 4 Commission. 039 the EDO's delegated authority under paragraph -0213 of this chapter does not extend to the promulgation of proposed or final rules involving significant questions of policy. 

                           . 0310 the EDO's delegated authority under paragraph -0213 of this chapter does not extend to the promulgation of proposed and final rules'in the following
                      -areas: 10 CFR Parts 0, 2, 8, 9 Subpart C,and 110.

0311 the function delegated to the Executive Director for Operations under paragraph -0214 of this chapter. may be redelegated only to the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement and to the Regional 

                       -Adminis trators . The issuance of any subpoena will require the concurrence Approved:    September 2,19S'2 3

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS NRC-0103-04 OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS of the Office of the Executive Legal Director and consultation with the Office of Invcstigations. 0103-04 REDELEGATION OF AUTHORITY BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS The Executive Director for Operations may, except where expressly prohibited herein, redelegate to others authority delegated by this or other official direc-tive or communication, except that such redelegations and any stipulations on 

     ~

further redelegations must .be in writing. A copy is to be filed with the Secre-tary of the Commission, and is to be reflected in the NRC Management Direc-tive System. 0103-05 DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIREC-TOR FOR OPERATIONS The Deputy Executive Director for Operations is authorized to act _ in the stead of the Executive Director during the latter's absence, and is authorized to take- such action as is necessary to perform any other functions assigned by the Executive Director. 0103-06 DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIREC-TOR FOR REGIONAL OPERATIONS AND GENERIC REQUIREMENTS The Deputy Executive Director for ReNonal Operations and Generic Require- . ments is authorized and directed to assist and act for the Executive Director ,; for Operations '(EDO) in perfoming the folhwing' functions: providing day-to-day guidance, direction, and coordination to the Regional Administrators; establishing and directing the implementation of procedures for controlling and tracking - generic communications with, and generic requirements placed on, licensees; serving as chairman of a committee to review generic requirements; overseeing and implementing procedures to reduce and control the backlog of licensing actions; performing other functions explicitly assigned by the EDO; and taking such action as may be necessary to carry out the functions assigne'd by this chapter or other official directives or communications. 0103-07 ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL ASSIGNMENTS The Office of the Executive Director for Operations includes the Deputy - Executive Director for Operations (DEDO), the Deputy Executive Director for Regional Operations and Generic Requirements (DEDROGR), and the Admin-istrative and Correspondence Branch. (NRC Appendix 0103 ,contains further delegations of authority to the Executive Director for Operations.) Approved: September 2,1932 

   ' '            ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OFFICE OF THE EXECOTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS NRC Appendix 0103 PARTI AUTHORIZATION STATUTES T=                                   *

(None effective as .of October 1,1980) 

      .e
                                                               ~

[ i' i; i e 4 1 Approved : November 2.1981. i

m..mc.... n. a n.., t ., v . . m 

                             ' OFFICE OF THE EXEC?TIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS NRC Accendix 0103 PART Il Section 161n. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,. as amended, (the Act) pro-vides the : Commission with general authority to delegate its functions under the Act to other offices - of the Commission ~ except with respect : to certain
   -i determinations , findings , certifications and actions required of or made by -

the Commission pursuant to Sections 51, 57b. , 61, 108, 123,14Sb ,' 14Sf, and 

       ,                       161a. These sections are described below:

Section 51: The Act defines "special nuclear material."- However, Sec. 51. authorizes the Commission to determine that material not ' included in that definition is to be considered special nuclear material as well. To define such other materials as "special nuclear material," the Commission must make certain 

                             . determinations to which the President must expressly assent in writing. The Commission may not delegate authority to render the determination required by this section to any officer below the Commission level.

Section 57b: Section 57b: (1) authorizes the production of special nuclear material outside the United States when approved by the Commission and (2) authorizes , with the approval of the Commission , the distribution of special nuclear material outside of the"~ United States and the licensing of such ' material . 

           ,                  in each case certain findings and det rminations must be made by the Commis-e sion. The authority to render these cannot be delegated to any officer below i

the Commission level. - 1 

    ' ^

Section 61: This section is comparable to Sec. 54, discussed above, but deals with " source material" rather than "special nuclear material." The Commission may not delegate the authority to render the required determination to any officer below the Commission level. - Section 108: Section 108 authorizes the Commission to (1) suspend a license and/or (2) recapture special nuclear materials and/or (3) enter and operate or order the operation of a licensed facility when the Congress declares that a state of war or national emergency exists. In the exercise of any of these authorities , certain findings concerning the common defense and security must be made. The authority to render such findings may not be , delegated to any officer below the Commission level. Section - 123 : Section 123 as substantially modified by Public. Law 95-242 pro- - h1 bits entering into cooperation with other nations absent certain actions by the ' Commission, the Congress and the President. Commission actions fune-tions, approvals, etc. , under this section may not be delegated to any officer below the Commission level. Section 145b: Section 145b deals with security matters and establishes restrictions on (1) employment of personnel by the Commission and (2) grant-ing such personnel access to Restricted Data without having performed certain investigations relating to their character, associations and loyalty in the 3 Approved : November 2,19S1 i 

                     . . . ,       , ,   .    .    - . ~ , . - . ,_-- ,        ,,- .- - - - . . - _ , ~ . , -          - . . _ _ , . .     , . . ~ . .  -m~.m ..,,-,+-n. _ .

                                                                             --. .                                 =                                          .

ORGANIZATkON AND FUNCTIONS NRC Accendix 0103 OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS i case of employing personnel, certain prerequisite deter =inations are required of the Commission. Authority to render such determinations may be delegated to an officer below the Commission level. In the case of granting employees access to Restricted Data absent the necessary investigations, the required determination (i.e., that this will not endanger the common . defense and secu-rity) may not be delegated to an officer below the Commission level. 4 Section 145f: This section provides that the Commission will certify positions in the Commission which are of a high degree of importance or sensitivity thereby requiring an FBI investigation of persons to fill such positions. The Commission may not delegate the authority to render the required .certifica-tions to an officer below the Commission level. Section 161a: This section authorizes the Commission to establish advisory boards. The establishment of such boards based upon the authority of this section may not be delegated to any officer below the Commission level. 1 <- p. i i i f i l l Approved : November 2,1981 4 ! . - _ , _ . . . _ . _ _ - _ _ _ _ . . ~ . _ . _ , - . , _ , , . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . - . . . _ _ . . . _ _ , _ _ _ . _ _ . - _ . - _ . _ . . . _ . _ _ - - . _ _ . _ _ . . -

ORGAN!ZAT8ON AND- FUNCTIONS OFFICE OF THE EXECUTNE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS NRC Appendix 0103 

             ~

PART III MEMORANDUM FOR: William J. Dircks , Acting Exec. Dir. for Operations j FROM: Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary

SUBJECT:

DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY IN EXPORT-RELATED AREAS This memorandum revises and replaces my memorandum dated February 13, 1980 on the above subject. The Commission has delegated to the EDO the authority to act for the Commis-sion in all export-related matters except the following which will be reviewed by the Commissioners (the Commission has also approved the related amend-ments to 10 CFR 110.40(b) with respect to the matters in paragraph A): A. NRC export license, applications as follows: 

                                                                                      -r -                                                      ,
1. Production and utilization , facilities; -
2. One effective kilogram or more of high-enriched uranium and U.-233
        /_                          and plutonium (except for plutonium comprised of 80% or more of

(, Pu-238); , 

  . .                        3.       1,000 kilograms or more of heavy w'ater or nuclear grade graphite;
4. NRC-licensed export cases involving reprocessing, enri:. ament, or heavy water activities;
5. Any other proposed export of source or special nuclear material for nuclear use it. the export would be to a country to which the l

Commissioners have ne previously authorized such an export pur-suant to the Nuclear F in-Proliferation Act; e 6. Any proposed export of components to a facility for which there is i a facility export license application pending or expected before the Commission; j- . ' - 7. Any other license application determined by the staff or a majority of the Commissioners to warrant review by the Commission. B. Exoort-related matters not under NRC's licensing authority, as follows: 1: All 10 CFR Part 810 cases which involve assistance to reprocessing, i enrichment or heavy water production activities and any other exceptional cases as determined by the staff or a majority of the Commissioners to warrant review by the Commission. l l 5 Approved : November 2,1981 

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I 

      ' '                                                  ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS NRC Accendix 0103 OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
2. All Department of Commerce-licensed exports destined for reprocess-ing, enrichment or heavy water production facilities and any other exceptional cases as determined by the staff or a majority of the Commissioners to warrant review by the Commission.
3. Au proposed DOE retransfer. cases (MB-10's) which involve repro-cessing or which meet the criteria for Commission review' as speci-fied in paragraph A above. .
4. All proposed agreements for cooperation.

All other subsequent arrangements involving physical security , storage or disposition of irradiated fuel elements, application of safeguards,- or other arrangements which the President finds to be important from the standpoint of preventing proliferation. ff's In addition, with respect only to those new cases which fan under the sta expanded delegation of authority = as contained in this memorandum, the Commission has directed the following: Information copies of au such cases win be provided' to OPE, OELD and 1. NMSS. .

2. Any case which the staff is disposed to disapprove win be referred to the Commission for final idecision.
                                                          ~
                                                                                             )

j 3. The staff will submit to the. Commission a monthly report indicating what actions have been taken. 7 If the staff requires guidance involving, or relating to substantive decision-making in exercising its delegated functions, such guidance shan be given by the Commission. cc: Commissioners Commission Staff Offices 4 

 -            =

These cases win primarily consist of major source or LE and Part 810 cases. T 9 ? 6 t Annroved: November 2,1981 4

LPTxL EX'I6IT d 2 NF-iAT1CN - WN6m Q Q ""* ~** mom., August 24, 1984 . Ms. Billie Garde Government Accountability Project Institute for Policy Studies t 1901 Que Street, N.W. i Washington, D. C. 20009

Dear Ms. Garde:

As you know I as a member of the Task Force appointed by Mr. J. Cain of LP&L to provide him with an independent assessment of the adequacy of the LP&L responses to the 23 issues affecting the Waterford 3 plant that were identified by the NRC. In discussions among me=bers of the Task Force, we decided that it would be useful for us to understand the GAP and your viewpoint on these matters because of the interest you have expressed. In the past month or more I have tried to contact you many times without success, partly because your work kept you in Dallas for a long period. I was pleased to have the possibility of seeing you in Dallas while I was there for other reasons, and I also tried to contact you there. 1 am very sorry that circumstences prevented us from having a discussion. I a= still interested in meeting with you if it can be arranged. I would appreciate tour contacting me at 301-258-2495. My address is: 910 Clopper Road Gaithersburg, MD 20878 I look forward to hearing from you. Sincerely, omt 

                                            /Saul Levine Vice President and Group Executive Consulting Group, NUS SL/en cc: NUS-W3-A707

( l 1 l ... _. . _ _ _ _ . .

LP&L EXHILIT 3 E "% UNITED STATES g g {] P ' 

                  ,              NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
                                                                                                                              " - -- w w ' s k,'Yhg/
      ***e

_P_ROMPT OfSTRIBUTION ~- AUG 151984 SENIOR VICE PRESiOENT. NUCLEAR OPERATIONS NUCLEAR SERVICE MANAGE 3 Lynne Bernabei, General Counsel Government Accountability Project NUCLEAR SUPPORT & UCENSING MANAGER bl/O' Institute for Public Studies PLANT MANAGER 1901 Q Street, NW Washington, DC 20009 PROJECT MANAGER Dear Ms. Bernabei! QUALITY ASSURANCE MANAGER l ! Thank you for your comments of July 25, 1984, on Louisiana Power & Light's ! proposed program plan set forth in their letter of June 28, 1984. While at the present time the staff has not found the need for an independent third party review on this plant, the staff will consider your comments in its evaluation of the applicant's responses to the twenty-three identified areas of concern. We noted that your letter contains no new technical information even though GAP has previously indicated to the staff that you have. technical information relating to situations at Wailerford 3 of potential safety significance. We have spoken with Ms. Billie Garde of GAP and requested any information GAP has relative to potential safety concerns at the Waterford facility, but, to date, we have not received any such information. If you are indeed aware of potential safety problems at the Waterford 3 facility, we again request that you provide it to the NRC promptly so that we might assess its significance. i i Sincerely, 

                                                                                      .                  1
                                                                                                                         }-
                                                                .         . 1%e                                       :

i Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l REC'? DIED 

                                                              . . -g NUCLEAR RECORDS D57R18UTf0N OSRS SUPERVISOR AUG 21 1984 UCENSING UBRARY'                                                                                              ))

  ~        :

Waterford 3 Mr. R. S. Leddick Vice President - Nuclear Operations Louisiana Power & Light Company 142 Delaronde Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70174 W. Malcolm Stevenson, Esq. Regional Administrator - Region IV Monroe & Leman U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

     -1432 Whitney Building                                    611 Ryan Plaza Drive New Orleans, Louisiana 70130                            Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76012 Mr. E. Blake Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge                     Carole H. Burstein, Esq.
     -1800 M Street, NW                                        445 Walnut Street Washington, DC 20036                                    New Orleans, Louisiana 70118 Mr. Gary L. Groesch 2257 Bayou Road New Orleans, Louisiana 70119 Mr. F. J. Drummond Project Manager - Nuclear Louisiana Power and Light Company 142 Delarende Street New Orleans,, Louisiana 70174 .

Mr. K. W. Cook Nuclear Support and Licensing Manager Louisiana Power & Light Company 142 Delaronde Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70174 Luke Fontana, Esq. 824 Esplanade Avenue New Orleans, Louisiana 70116 Stephen M. Irving, Esq. 535 North 6th Street Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70802 - Resident Inspector /Waterford NPS P. O. Box 822 Killona, Louisiana 70066 l Mr. Jack Fager , Middle South Services, Inc. i P. 0. Box 61000 0 New Orleans, Louisiana 70161 Chairman ! Louisiana Public Service Comission l One American Place, Suite 1630 l- Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804 i 

                                                                        .                                 LP&L EXHIBIT 4                                        -
                                         '                                                                      (EXCERPTS)

QUALITY 

                                                                        'sa-mmer arummmmmmmmmes ASSURA m                                                                                   ~
   '                                                                                                         No. QR 1.0 Rev. 3*                                       i ORGANIZATION                                      Effeetive                                       i gpg M

Date 12/08/83 l Page 1 of 12 1.1 General l 1 In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion I, thin . Quality Requirement (QR) describes the LP&L organization and k'ay positions responsible for implementing the LP&L Quality Assurance Program for Waterford-3 SES during the construction phase. This QR further delineated the authority and responsibilities of individuals and organizations performing d quality-related activities. 1.2 LP&L Ouality Assurance Organization i Figure 1-1, the LP&L Corporate Quality Assurance Organization chart illustraces the line of authority and areas of responsibility for the c:ajor organi:aciens which are involved in the assurance of quality and/or safety-related l activities. . l Organizational responsibilities for implementation of the LP&L Quality j Assurance Program are described in the following sections. l 

                                                                                                                                                        ~

1.2.1 LP&L Management . - 1.2.2 LP&L Nuclear Services Group . 1.2.3 LP&L Project Manager 1.2.4 LP&L Quality Assurance Group I 1.2.5 LP&L Quality Assurance Comittee 1.2.6 Major Contractors e I t l . l . This requirement revised in its entirety. i 

          -. ..            --  - . . - -   . . _ . - . . -   - , .  -   -.. - , ,,_ -...,,..---.-----. -.           n..._ - - ,-----.---,..- _ ,. -

QUALITY ASSURANCE  ! No. QR L.0 l Rev. 3  ; MtOCLE SOUTH UDUEES SYSTEM Date 12/08/83 Page 8 of 12 1.2.5 LP&L Quality Assurance Committee The Quality Assurance Committee (QAC). is chaired by the LP&L Corporate i Quality Assurance Manager and is composed of the LP&L Nuclear Services Manager, engineers from the LP&L Power Production Department and the Engineering Department, and a Quality Assurance Engineer from Middle South I Services. The QAC has engineering specialists within LP&L and nuclear specialists from Middle South Services available for consultation. The Quality Assurance Committee shall be responsible for:

a. Resolving disputes arising from differen es of opinion between QA/QC 6

personnel and other organizations. , ,

b. Reviewing the LP&L Quality Assurance Program, policies and activities.
        .                           c.       Following-up committee recommended action to assure compliance.                                                                        f 9
d. Annual reviews of the LP&L Quality Assurance Program, policies and ,

I activities pertaining to construction. t l l The Quality Assurance Committee advises the Senior Vice President - Nuclear - l i

  • l j, Operation on natters relating to quality problems. -

[ *The responsibilities of the Quality Assurance Committee shall and when Waterford-3 SES begins commercial operation. i l i 1.2.6 Maior contractors l The major contractors involved in implementing the LP&L Quality Assurance Program are: i 

    ,                             s.         The Architect-Engineer (A-E).

i  ! I I 

                   .     .                     QUALITY                    ASSURANCE                                                                   {

M P No. QR 1.0  ! Rev. 3 

             ' ~ "" {A                                        ORCANIZATION                             Effactive l
           @g,                                                                                         Date 12/08/83                                 l Page 9 of 12 1
b. The Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) Vendor. l 1
c. The Construction Manager and/or Constructor.

l The A-E shall be responsible for designing the Balance-of-Plant structures, -- .. systems, and components, for procuring equipment for delivery to the site and for coordinating the COP and NSSS. Level II quality assurance responsibilities associated with this scope of work shall be delegated to the A-E. , i l The NSSS Vendor's scope of responsibility shall include the design, procurement, fabrication and construction- (if applicable) of the NSSS and the l 

 ,             initial fuel supply. The Level I and Level II quality assurance activities associated with etis scope of work shall be delegated to the NSSS Vendor.

The NSSS Vendor shall supply sufficient interface information to the A-E so l l that the A-E can effectively coordinate the Balance of Plant (BOP) an. NSSS. I The scope of responsibility for the Construction Manager and/or Constructor i shall include the receipt, storage, handling, construction and erection of the total plant exclusive of the construction, if applicable, within the NSSS Vendor's scope of responsibility. Level I and Level II quality assurance activities associated with this scope of work shall be provided by the 1 l Ccustruction Manager and/or Constructor. ( I l The major contractors are named in Section 1.4 of the LP&L FSAA. In accordance with QR 18.0 and applicable Quality Assurance Section 1 

                              .__.__._,_,_--yr    _ ~ . , - . . , . _ _ ,     . ._.--- ____._..--,-- ,  _. .- , _ _._._-        -...-,-.m. ._.~

QUALITY ASSURANCu . 

                                                                                                                                   ]

No. QR 1.0 j Rev. 3 2 MioOLE SOUTH ORGANIZATION Effective UWaES SYSTW Date 12/08/83 Page 10 of 12 Procedures, the LP&L Nuclear Quality Assurance Group shall audit the QA activities ot' th". major contractors to determine whether or not individuals and organizational units performing QA functions within the major l contractors' organizations have sufficient authority and organizational freedom to effectively implement QA programs within their organizations. By contractural agreement, LP&L shall require that the major contractors evaluate, approve and audit their suppliers and subcontractors to assure that their suppliers and subcontractors have implemented QA programs which meet applicable requirements of Appendix 3 to 10CFR50.

  • The Major Contractors' QA programs, and changes thereto, shall be reviewed and concurred with by the LP&L Corporate Quality Assurance Mana6er. The LP&L Nuclear Quality Assurance Group shall perform periodic audits.of the Major I i

Contractors to assure that they maintain QA programs which meet the l requirements of Appendix B to 10CFR50. Audits shall be perfor=ed as  ; I described in QR 18.0 and applicable procedures. j l I s 

                                                                                                                               .i l

l I i e l t r- , . - , - . - 

                                                                                - - , . , , - -   -   ,       --.,.,,,,,e,,, -
                                                                                                                                         -,v.-

i f LP&L EXHIBIT 5 WNmm

RESPONSE

ITEM NO.: 23 TITLE: QA Program Breakdoun Between Ebasco and Mercury DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN: The staff retiew included evaluation of'the implementation of the QA programs of LP&L, Ebasco, and Mercury. The staff performed a follow-up on the previous 1982 NRC review that resulted in NRC enforcement action and a civil penalty. The most recent staff review indicated that LP&L, Ebasco, and Mercury did not followup on the correceive action commitments cade to the NRC. Additionally, LP&L, Ebasco, and Mercury failed to audit the entire QA 

    . programs.as required (LP&L only perfor=ed one-third of their scheduled p-   audits for a five year period). The audits that were conducted identified some problems, however, the required corrective actions were not completed.

Management audits, performed by outside consultants, identified problems and concerns that LP&L also failed to take corrective action on. The results cf the NRC task force effort indicate that an overall breakdown of the QA program occurred. Most problems identified by the NRC had been previously identified by the QA programs of LP&L, Ebasco and Mercury. But the failure to determine root cause and the lack of corrective action allowed the problem to persist. l LP&L shall provide an assessment of the overall QA program and determine the cause of the breakdown, together with corrective action to prevent recurrence. This overall assessment is necessary to provide assurance that the QA program can function adequately when the plant proceeds into operations. ! 23-1 .

l I DISCUSSION: Issue #23. stands apart from the other NRC concerns with Mercury Company of Norwood in addressing, primarily, the circumstances surrounding the 1982 NRC enforcement action and civil penalty. To paraphrase the NRC concern, issue #23 centers on whether or noc the cause of the Mercury problems that led to Enforcement Action 82-109 was identified, corrective action implemented, and recurrence prevented. The central issue is derived from the following specific NRC concerns:

1. LP&L failed to determine the root cause of the Mercury problems (Section II.A);
2. LP&L/Ebasco/ Mercury did not followup on corrective action commitments (Section II.3);
3. LP&L/Ebasco/ Mercury failed to audit the entire QA program (Sec' tion II.C);

4 The audits that were done identified problems but corrective actions were not implemented (Section II.D);

5. Management audits identified problems on which LP&L failed to take corrective action (Section II.D);

~~,

6. The failure to determine root cause of the Mercury problem, and the lack of corrective action, allowed the problem to persist into an overall QA breakdown (Section II.B); -
7. On the assumption that an overs 11 QA breakdown occurred, the NRC concludes that an assessmeut of the overall QA program is recessary, including a determination of the breakdown cause and corrective action to prevent recurrence (Section IV). -

Based on the present review, LP&L has concluded that an overall QA program breakdown has not occurred at Waterford 3. The discussion which follows is not intended to minimize the seriousness of the concerns regarding Mercury. Nor is LP&L maintaining that there were no areas needing improvement in the QA program--such areas will be addressed under the " collective significance" assessment of the 23 NRC concerns. While, in retrospect, there may have been more effective means to resolve the Mercury situation, what deserves emphasis is that a situation such as existed vich Mercury has not recurred and further= ore, under the present management philosophy and implementation of quality sssurance, adequate assurance exists that such a situation would be unlikely to recur. 23-2 .

I. Background - Identification of the Mercury Problem During the spring of 1982 the first major piping and instrumentation safety-related systems were approaching construction completion. The first four such systems submitted by Ebasco for turnover were reviewed and rejected as a {esult of the LP&L Construction QA audits of system turnover packages. The following excerpt from NRC Inspection Report 50-382/82-14 dated December 6, 1982 characterizes the results of the Construction QA audits: 

                            "LP&L learned that, although Ebasco QA had represented the systems as being ready for turnover and had included statements that the quality records had been reviewed, LP&L found that Ebasco QA had.not actually compared the records with the as-built systems and that, in fact..the records did not actually represent a true status of the systems at that time. In addition, the turnover packages contained statements by contractors and Ebasco QA indicating that portions of the turnover packages were incomplete and not QA/QC acceptable."

During subsequent review LP&L reported potential significant construction deficiencies related to inadequate instrumentation and , control system installation and turnover documentation for the four (' systems in question. In July, 1982 LP&L reported to the NRC through Significant Construction Deficiency (SCD) 57 that a significant construction deficiency existed and outlined corrective actions. On

December 6, 1982 the NRC, via Enforcement Action 82-109, provided ,

i formal notification of a Level III Violation and civil penalty with regard to the turnover package deficiencies. The Enforcement Action

noted, in part, that "(w)hile we recognize that the quality assurance program did not totally breakdown, there was a breakdown in the j subtier programs of your contractor and subcontractor." The NRC
further noted that the penalty was mitigated
"[t}he bases for this mitigation are the corrective action you have initiated (the extensive

} revision of your system turnover process) and your role in identifying and reporting the breakdown of quality assurance programs to the NRC." 2 1 i It is worthy of note that the four subject systems were the first safety-related instrumentation system documentation packages submitted by Mercury for turnover acceptance. Prior to the time of submittal of the documentation packages each of the instrumentation installations was still in an "in-process" status (i.e. not accepted by the Mercury QA organization). 23-3 .

II. Current NRC Concerns A. Source of the Mercury Problems Consistent with the Notice of Violation LP&L acknowledged (LP&L letter W3I83-0001 dated January 4, 1983) that a partial Quality Program breakdown occurred at Waterford 3 at the subtier levels 

                 , involving contractor / subcontractor organizations.

In the present concern, the NRC has stated that there was a 

                    "... failure to determine root cause..." of the Mercury situation.

However, during a meeting with the NRC in November, 1982 (as documented in NRC letter from J.T. Collins to L.V. Maurin dated December 6, 1982) LP&L identified the principal cause of the breakdown as "... insufficient participation by LP&L in the implementation of quality assurance programs. LP&L failed to exercise adequate oversight and control over contractors to when implementation of quality assurance prograns had been delegated, and dedicated only mininal LP&L resources to quality assurance , programs." i This root.cause finding was further refined in the LPSL response ] to the Notica of Violation (W3I83-0001 dated January 4, 1983): ' " Deficiencies noted in* Inspection Report 50-382/82-14, were due to' insufficient overview and support activities. (i.'s.,

( training) necessary to assure' compliance to specified
  .\                      quality requirements.

Specifically.. areas which contributed to the noted violation are as follows: ,

s. Training - training of craf tsmen, QC Inspectors i

and reviewers was apparently insufficient to provide adequate guidance / direction to assure quality results within the principal contractor i organization and two ' subcontractor organizations. +

b. Staffing - staffing of personnel was inadequate, and as a result, personnel were extended beyond 5

their capability to adequately address quality 

         ' '4' inspections and reviews within the principal

^ contractor organitation and two subcontractor organizations.

c. Walkdowns of completed systems were inadequate as a result of Items a and b."

These root cause findings were factored into the Mercury corrective actions described in the following section. !i t 23-4 - - - 

  .    ~          .           ... ~                         -                                                     ~                 .               - - . _ .      . .-     - -~     .

F [

3. Corrective Actions As to corrective actions, the NRC notes that "[t}he most recent '

staff review indicated that LP&L, Ebasco, and Mercury did not , followup on the corrective action ec==1t=ents made to the NRC." However, LP&L is confident that corrective action commitments in respect to Mercury and the Notice of Violation were implemented in an effective manner to produce quality hardware installations. During walkdcwns conducted by LP&L and Ebasco in preparation for 4 turnover of certain Mercury-installed systems in the Spring of 1982, numerous installation deficiencies were identified to l Mercury. -Despite repeated walkdowns with Mercury and meetings ' with Mercury management, problems continued to exist to the - extent that none of'the Mercury systems were acceptable for turnover. Consequently, on June 23, 1982, with the Mercury bulk construction approximately 90% complete, project management ordered Mercury to cease installation of safety.related syste=s - equivalent to a Stop Work Order (SWO), which will be referred to as such in the j following discussion. 4 Based on LP&L's conclusions relative to the significance of the l partial QA breakdown in the Ebasco/ Mercury organizations, and

taking into account the root cause determination, an extenstve ,l l corrective action plan was initiated and executed. This plan met
  • or exceeded the corrective action commitments made in response to
;    k                            the Notice of Violation. A sumekry of the immediate (June, 1982)

, corrective actions initiated in conjunction with the ,SWO follows: 4 

                     ~-"~~'a.                               Development and implementation ~of a retraining program

' involving Mercury personnel including craft, foremen, field engineers QC inspectors and supervision.

b. System by system walkdowns on the basis of the startup

, schedule of all safety class installations for the purpose of identifying hardware deficiencies for evaluation and rework, plus updating the as-built drawings. This effort was initially a joint LP&L, Mercury and Ebasco effort using retrained personnel.

c. Implementation of extensive organizational changes
within Mercury, including assignment of Ebasco Management personnel and engineers to Mar,cury,
d. A dramatic increase in the number of Mercury QC ,

Inspectors and QA Engineers. (Questions as to the '; qualifications of Mercury Inspectors are addressed in the response to NRC Issue #1.) 23-5 1 3

E

a. Mobilization of an Ebasco QA Management Team to support and oversee the Mercury Program.
f. Other corrective actions taken not specifically related to Mercury, included the increase in LP&L and Ebasco QA Staff, formation of Ebasco QA surveillance and quality analysis groups, and enlargement of the scope and size of the Ebasco QA records review group.

Attachments 1 and 3 provide detailed discussions of these i immediate corrective actions and subsequent corrective actions taken as the Mercury problen became well defined. It is important to point out that prudence dictated that Mercury be retained as the N stamp holder of instrumentation systems to preserve the documentation and installed system ASME Code integrity until another stamp holder could take over the work in a phased manner. Because Mercury continued to be unable to support the project schedule, and due to management concern with respect to the effort required for future quality installation, the Mercury work scope was gradually reduced through June, 1983 when Mercury was relieved of P3-P8 tubing work and all seismic support work including review. Mercury was directed, at that time, to only complete and code stamp P2 instrumentation

  • installation. Ebasco, meanwhile, had obtained an ASME Code Insta11er's Stamp, allowing them to complete subsequent Code

(~ . work. Following the completion of Mercury's initial retraining program Mercury was released to resume safety related installations. However, only personnel success 'ully completing the retraining . ' program were selected for safety related work.

  • Throughout the period subsequent to the SWO until Mercury was fully demobilized in November of 1983, LP&L and Ebasco maf.ntained an exhaustive management and QA overview relative to Mercury's overall performance. This scrutiny resulted in the following:

l

a. Continuation of management and organization changes within Mercury. .
b. A continuous reduction *in Mercury's work scope. Refer to Attachment I for details,
c. An improvement in new system installation quality and documentation for work activities initiated after the June, 1982 SWO. Refer to Acta hment 2 for details.
d. Imposition of program changes, both administrative and quality related, on Mercury by LP&L and Ebasco. Refer to Attachment 3 for details.
e. Decisions on the part of LP&L and Ebasco to remove Mercury from the quality records. review program. Refer to Attachment 5 for a discussion of the Ebasco QA records review process and statistics.

g----y-- -p r<+-+- --.-+m--ym---- 9---e-- - ,-4-- w- r-y s =e=v---3---,-r-+--3-- y g- g-- m-* +g- p+- 4-y---m -*y---* - - -ea,--+-

c. As a result of.the continued oversight of LP&L and Ebasco the corrective action commitments made in response to the Notice of Violation were completed. The specific commitments and their resolutions are discussed in Attachment 3. The issue #23 concern states that "... failure to determine root cause and the lack of corrective action allowed the problems to persist." As previously noted, root cause was identified and corrective action implemented. LP&L believes that the partial QA Program breakdown did not persist; programmatic corrective action to prevent recurrence of the construction deficiencies in any subsequent work activity was prompt and decisive. Thteinitialrejectionofthefourmajorpipingandinstrumenta-tion safety-related systems by LP&L and the resulting corrective action is indicative of a working quality management system. The four rejected systems were not unique. Many other Mercury systems were nearing completion in July, 1982. Although deficiencies were identified in subsequent Mercury system packages, the deficiencies were due to similar reasons as the 

       ~

first four on work completed prior to initiation of corrective action. Having identified serious problems with four Mercury systems it was expected that some degree of the same types of problems would exist in other Mercury systems that were substantially-completed at the time of the SWO. However, with the initiation of corrective actions those problems were

  • identified and reworked after the SWO at the Ebasco/ Mercury level k- resulting in generally acceptable turnover packages to LP&L.

In initiating corrective action on all Mercury systems, manpower availability was taken into account. Ebasco proposed, and LP&L agreed to, an orderly approach on a system by system basis rather

than addressing all Mercury systems at once. This systematic

) approach was thorough but also extended the time required to ciose SCD-57 and NRC Inspection Report 50-384/82-14 into the Spring of 1984 It is possible that this approach may have given l the appearance of a continuing Mercury problem to the NRC [ Inspectors. i i In actuality, Non-Conformance Reports (NCRs) continued to be l written for some time on Mercury. work completed prior to Ju'ly, 1982. Attachments 2, 3 and 3F provide details and a graphic presentation of the Mercury NCRs' Referring to Attachment 3F, [ the prominent peaks in the number of NCRs at 11/82 and 3/83 are a j manifestation of the continuing walkdowns of old (i.e. work completed prior to July, 1982) Mercury work as opposed to an indication of a continuing probles. t- ! A sampling of construction packages was taken to provide ? evidence that the majority of NCRs written on Mercury systems were related to work completed prior to July, 1982. The results f of this review are contained in Attachment 2, providing further confirmation that the partial breakdown with Mercury did not i 23-7 . l

4 4 

'                                       persist; actually, because of the corrective actions taken, the quality of Mercury work improved.                          It must be emphasized that the timing of the NCRs is not significant except that it could give

, the appearance of-a continuing problem. Corrective actions + proceeded, and were completed, in an orderly fashion on a schedule consistent with the startup schedule of Waterford 3. I The final phase of corrective action is. of course, verification of installation adequacy. Although addressed in part in various ' attachments to this response, the bases for Mercury installation verification are collected together in Attachment 5. Based upon i the multiple levels of satis fhetory review and corrective actions taken, LP&L now has a high degree of confidence that Mercury i ' installations will perform in accordance with design i-requirements. This is being further confir=ed by the reinspections in progress in res' onse p to NRC Issue #1 In summary, the root cause of the Mercury problem was identified and' corrective action was implemented both to correct Mercury work prior to July, 1982 and to prevent recurrence. Once the Mercury problem was identified, and corrective action begun, the i i problems did not persist to the degree that existed prior to the-SWO. In fact, the Mercury quality performance improved. Deficiencies in work prior to July, 1982 were identified and i reworked on a system by_ system basis resulting in an extension of the corrective accion duration. y C. Audit of Mercury Installations i The NRC has raised the question that: -- 

                                                  "...LP&L, Ebasco, and Mercury failed to audit the yntire QA i

program as required (LP&L only performed one-third of their i scheduled audits for a five year period). The audits that were conducted identified some problems, however, the required corrective actions were not completed." LP&L committed to perform a documented schedule of audits based

- upon the status and safety importance of the activities to be audited. The audits were to be' initiated early enough to assess and assure effective control of quality. LP&L maintained a  ;

monthly audit schedule and revised it as necessary to assure that i the coverage and schedule reflected current activities and delays in construction scheduling. In the case of Mercury, during the life of the Mercury contract (approximately 4 years) LP&L scheduled 4 i Audits were often deferred from month to month (e.g. due to slippage in construction schedule; higher priority auditsi QA support of NRC inspection audits; etc.). As an example, upon completion of one audit scheduled in each of four consecutive months, the appearance of a.23* completion race of - scheduled audits would be given. The audit schedule was a guide to grovide LP&L QA management overview of construction activities. , ___ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _._ _ _ .~._ _.. _ ___ ___ _ _ __ _

twenty-eight audits of the contractor. Twenty-four of.the audits (85% of those scheduled) were completed. Although not a commitment in the QA program, thirteen unscheduled surveillances of the Mercury program were also conducted. LP&L delegated the routine auditing of the Mercury QA program to Ebasco Services. The Ebasco QA program was structured with an audit schedule based upon a yearly audit of applicable'10CTR50, Appendix B criteria. 

          . _over the course of the contract, Ebasco went beyond the minimum requirement in performing 114 audits of Mercury. Surve111ances which supplemented the audit program worn also performed on Mercury activities.

The Mercury program commitments were to perform a minimum of one Internal Audit on each auditable section of the QA manual each

calendar year. Marcury performed seventy-four audies during the life of their contract. In preparation of this response, the
,            Mercury audit schedule was reviewed and shown to be deficient in
not completing audits of all QA Manual sections in 1981, prior to i' the SWO. Following the SWO Mercury met their commitments to the j

t and of their contract. 5 Additional detail as to the audic activities of LP&L/Ebasco/ Mercury

j. -

is provided in Attachment #4 

     , ,     All audits conducte5 by LP&L and Ebasco of Mercury activities, I

( including audits performed by Mercury, were reviewed for completion of required corrective action. This review was

performed by LP&L QA in conjunction with the preparation for this

! response. The review revealed that corrective actions required j- to close. identified audit. findings were completed. 1 , During the review of the Mercury Audit File the LP&L reviewer had , difficulty determining if findings were closed because files were l not organised for ease of followup. It appears that this file i I organisation led to the NRC reviewer's assertion that "[t]he audits that were conducted identified some problems, however, the j requir J corrective actions were not completed." The file has j since been re-organised to contain audit packages together with t the supporting information, and is available for NRC review. ? . l LP&L management questioned if pre-June, 1982 audits could have identified the overall Mercury probles prior to the SWO. The l early audits identified many of the individual Mercury problems. However, in retrospect, the collective implication of these audie findings on Mercury was not systematically assessed and therefore the root cause and generic significance were not adequately addressed in corrective actions. Ident111 cation of this i approach, whereby the individual probles/ solution was addressed l rather than overall significance, is a major lesson learned from ( the Mercury situation. I l [ 23-9 . - - i l'

D. Management Assessments by Outside Consultants Issue #23 states that "(m}anagement audits, performed by outside consultants, identified problems and concerns that LP&L also failed to take corrective action on." It appears that the management audits referred to by the NRC concern are in actuality management assessment evaluations requested by the executive management of LP&L to provide an independent assessment of nuclear project performance during the early years (1977-1980) of construction. These assessments were evaluated by the appropriate LP&L management and actions taken where it was deemed appropriate. Of the concerns noted during these assessments, the majority dealt with organization and staffing matters that were later implemented. LP&L has previously stated before the ACRS in May, 1982 that management was slow to respond to some of the assessment results. LP&L management, in recognizing the value of independent management audits, contracted Management Analysis Company (MAC) in 1982 to assist in auditing the Waterford 3 plant training program. Audit findings were p'romptly presented to management and addressed in a timely fashion. As a result of the audit, the plant training program was improved. 9 (; . . 1, I 

                                                                                   @\

( 0 

 \

23-10 . -

1 s III. Lessons Learned While the corrective actions required because of Mercury's poor performance were adequate to resolve the quality problems and prevent . recurrence, in retrospect. LP&L management would proceed differently 4 today. The listing which follows summarizes the lessons learned from , p the Mercury experience (both pre- and post-SWO). They will be further addressed in the " collective significance" submittal for the 23 NRC concerns.

1. Delegation to a contracter of the routine QA auditing overview of a subcontr, actor without adequate utility involvement inhibits the timely recognition by the utility of quality problems. . ,
2. More emphasis should'be placed bn a QA management overview .

designed to distinguish generic problem' trends and root causes of audit findings from isolated occurrences.

3. Staffing levels 'should have been higher.

These lessons learned were mainly addressed during the Mercury , corrective actions. For instance,'LPAL/Ebasco/Morcury QA organizations were increased and LP&L took an active QA role in the review of contractor /sub-contractor programs. Presently, the QA Program reflects lessons l~ earned,from the construction phase in the inclusion of requirements for evaluation of root cause and generic

  • J' -

significance of audit findings, and the implementatioa of a trending J j program to identify and correct adverse quality trends, These 1 , subjects are expanded upon in the " collective significance" submittal. - " w 

                                         ~

+ s 23-Lt - , t ? ( 

         . . . -----,.~,,,,..._,.m...---                  .,---,..w-..-,.,,,-w..-w,       ,y--.-,7.-   , - . , - . - .,..-,.,,-p,   ,.,n-,,,v-------,---,-wv.,---y.,-v,-

IV. Conclusions This issua concentrates on the implementation and adequacy of the 

   ~

corrective action commitments made by LP&L to the NRC in response to Enforcement Action 82-109. c There were aspects of the documentation and historical development, which may have been difficult to follow. As noted in Section II.C the manner in which the Mercury audit file was organized did not clearly reflect the completion of audit corrective actions. The management 

                               ; decision to address the Mercury work prior to July, 1982 on a system
j. by-system basis rather than as a whole could give the appearance of a l -persisting problem with Mercury due to the continuing number of "CRs written, the majority of which were actually written against pre-July, 1982 Mercury work.

_As demonstrated in this responsa, however, LP&L is confident that corrective action commitments resulting from Enforcement Action 82-109 

        .                    "were effectively implemented to assure quality hardware installation.

, The Mercury problem, which gave rise to the Enforcement Action, did i not persist nor has it recurred. An overall QA program breakdown has

not occurred.

LP&L has established a comprehensive program for quality assurance 

                              'during tha operating phase of Waterford 3. The QA Program, which includes
  • provisions for requisite staffing and program audits,'is described in Chapter 17.2 of the Waterford FSAR and the LP&L Quality j $( ,

Assurance Manual. Control of all quality related work, a key element of the QA Program, includes use of Conditien Identification and Work j Authorization (CIWA) procedures. These precedures-apply whether work , is conducted by LP&L employees or vendors. Procedure implementation was initiated'several months ago, along with appropriate training, i to ensure worker and supervisor familiarity and capability to* maintain the tight quality control required in an operating environment. Due l to the tighter quality controls and the direct LP&L authorization. - -i ! review and closure of CIWA items, there is reasonable assurance that ! a partial QA program breakdown of the Ebasco/ Mercury type should not ! occur during plant operations. A more detailed description of how the ' QA program and procedures function and reflect lessons learned during the construction phase and from resolution of the twenty-three NRC issues will be found in the " collective significance" response. .. 1 1 i I i t , 23-12 - - - L

CAUSE: - l The essence of NRC issue #23 is that, relative to the Mercury problems previously identified by LP&L, there may have been a failure to decernine

  • root cause and implement corrective actions thereby allowing the problem to  ;

persist resulting in an overall QA breakdown. This review concludes that an overall QA breakdown did not occur. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS: With respect to the Hercury deficiencies, this issue has been treaced generically. From the initiation of corrective actions following the SWO the generic implications for other contractors were taken into account. For instance, as noted in Attachment 3, the LP&L Task Force' charged with physical verification walkdowns of pre-June, 1932 work covered installacious by 15 contractors other than Mercury. The Quality Assurance Installation Review Group software review was directed at all site contractors. Given the quality controls existing in the operations phase QA Program the, potential'for recurrence of a Mercury type partial QA breakdown has been minimized. Generic implications with respect to the current LP&L QA Program will be appraised in the LP&L response regarding the collective significance of the 23 NRC issues. ] SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: In view of the adequate corrective actions initiated in response to the Notice of Vfolation as summarized in this submittal there is no current ( safety signficance associated with Iss'e.f23. u CORRECTIVE ACTION: i I There is no further corrective action outstanding for this issue. The - L Mercury corrective actions were extensive and effective in preventing the continuation of the partial QA program breakdown. Corrective actions for other identified Mercury concerns (e.g. issues 1, 6) are documented in the responses to those concerns. Several significant lessons learned from the subject of issue #23 have been factored into the post-SWO corrective cetions and are reflected in the present QA Program. The current status of the LP&L QA Program will be further discussed in the " collective significance" submittal. ATTACHMENTS , ! 1. Chronology of Organizational / Management and Scoping Changes for Instrumentation Activities

2. Analysis of Mercury Tubing, Tube Track and Support Installation Records l 3. Corrective Action Status l

4 Audit of Mercury Installations i S. Verification of the Acceptability of Mercury Installations ( 23-13 - - - 

                                                                      . _ _ _    _ . _ . ~          __ . . _ _ . _ . _

ATTACHMENT 1 Chronology of Organizational / Management and Scoping Changes for Instrumentation Activities I. General The following Sections II-III contain a summary description of the organizational and management changes implemented in the Ebasco and Mercury Organizations as a result of the deficiencies identified in SCD 57 and

Enforcement Action 82-109. Section IV discusses the reduction in Mercury work-scope following June, 1982.

II. . Chronology-June 1982: Ebasco notifies Mercury of the documentation discrepancies associated with systems 59, 60A, B, & C. . Mercury is ordered to cease safety related activities. Agreement is reached to assign Ebasco personne1 within the Mercury organization, reporting to Mercury. Three (3) Ebasco Craf t Supervisors a.re assigned.co Mercury. (- July 1982: As a result of meetings and discussions amongst LP&L, Ebasco, and Mercury, it is determined that the overall problem is a result of poor communication and inappropriate management action in Mercury's organization. Mercury

agrees to replace their key personnel, but they are unable to provide

+ replacements. Ebasco provides personnel for the key positions of Project - Manager and Construction Superintendent. In order that Mercury could retain legal control of their obligations (financial) Mercury establishes 

                          .a new position of Project Administrator to handle personnel and billings.

The most significant organization change is implemented at this time. The Joint Walkdown Teams (initially 5 teams) are established consisting of an individual from the following: Mercury Engineering Mercury QC, Ebasco Engineering, LP&L (or Ebasco) QA, and LP&L Start-up. , August 1982: . It is agreed that the personnel supplied by Ebasco to the Mercury i- organisation are temporary, in that, if and when Mercury could supply qualified personnel, then the Ebasco personnel would be returned. To facilitate this move, Mercury establishes the position of General Superintendent (filled by Ebasco personnel) while the position of Construction Superintendent is reassigned to a Mercury employee. LP&L Start-up develops a reasonable level of confidence in the walkdewn effort resulting in the removal of their members from the Joint Walkdown Team. 23-14 . - - c'-,-.., . , - _._y.,,r..., ,,,._,,r__._..,g.,_.,_,,m,. _ , . , , - _,_,_.%-,._.,_y.,m.,_.,_.,,,_,,, m, ..,_, _ . . .

f September 1982: QA/QC reorganizes,below the QA/QC Site Manager. Supervisors are assigned to assist in Field Inspection, Records, and Administration. By this time  ; Mercury has added (from Ebasco) 3 Construction Supervisors, 12 Engineer / ' Designers, and 3 Schedulers. Additionally, Mercury hires 37 QA/QC personnel and 9 engineering personnel. October 1982: At this time, while it appears that the quality-related issues are being addressed, Mercury is still not supporting the project schedule. For this reason, Ebasco assigns a small Task Force with members from Construction Management, Design Engineering, and Quality Assurance to work closely with the various organizations and personnel to determine if improvements could be developed. One of the Task Force's initial actions is to increase the Joint Walkdown Teams from 5 to 8. A position of Project Coordinator is established,to provid's a means of communicating status to other organizations and communicating priorities '

within Mercury. Also, an additional Craft Supervisor is assigned to  ;

Mercury. November 1982: As a result of evaluating the causes for missing completion schedules on open items identified by the Joint Walkdown Teams, the following changes (. w 

                               ,                  are implemented:

System Administrators are assigned to Mercury, reporting to the Project 

                                                                                                                                   ~

t i Coordinator. They are assigned a particular system and responsibility to track all items for that system through the various groups to completion while providing status information to other groups. - It is' agreed that the key to getting Mercury on track is to define the remaining scope of work. Therefore the Joint Walkdown Team is again increased to 12 to expedite identification of status. December 1982: '. Because of the release of Mercury's Project Engineer and the resignation of [ Mercury's QA/QC Site Manager in November, and because Mercury has i difficulty finding qualified replacements, the following reassignments are implemented: 

'                                              Mercury's Construction Manager assumes the position of Project Manager.                                                                    ~

The Project Manager assumes the position of Project Engineer. The Project Administrator position is eliminated and the individual is reassigned as 1 Assistant Project Manager. Mercury's Corporate QA Manager is sent to the site and assumes the responsibilities of the QA/QC Site Manager. 23-15

A new Mercury position of Lead System Administrator is established'. January 1983: After considerable discussion concerning the QA/QC Site Manager, Mercury assigns the V.P. of F&M Technical Services, as Manager. This new Manager resigns af ter approximately 2 weeks on the project. An acting QA/QC Site Manager is temporarily assigned and proves capable of retaining the position. February 1983: Mercury releases Ebasco personnel assigned as General Superintendent and Assistant to the Construction Superintendent. March 1983: Ebasco assigns a new Construction Manager. , August 1983: Mercury releases the last assigned Craf t Supervisor back to Ebasco. III. Staffing In addition to the organizational changes described above, the folloling (. covers Mercury staffing levels during this time period. Manual Non Manual June 1982 140 100 July 1982 125 110 ' August 1982 150 130 l September 1982 135 145 October 1982 140 175 . November 1982 180 215 l 

    ,            December 1982                  160              200 January 1983                   190              175 February 1983                  110              175 l                 March 1983                      90          -

195 l April 1983 95 160 May 1983 85 150 June 1983 80 135 July 1983 70 120 August 1983 45 75 September 1983 15 15 October 1983 0 7 l November 1983 0 5 23-16 l 

                                    - - - , - -     e--              e n w..,--   --  -,-a   w   m,- --,----ww   - - -- y-

ll l i' IV. Reduction in Mercurv Work-Scope Because Mercury continued to be unable to support the project schedule, and due to management prudence with respect to the effort required for future quality installation, the Mercury work-scope was gradually reduced over the following year. In order to preserve the documentation and installed system ASME Code integrity'until another stamp holder could take over in an J orderly manner, Mercury was retained on the job. Shortly after Mercury resumed safety-related work (June / July,1982) at Waterford 3 the ANSI B31.1 work was reassigned from Mercury to Ebasco. This was accomplished in several ways: 1) by changing the responsibility of work items on Start-up System Punchlists during daily Start-up meetings,

2) by assigning the Completion Verification Sheets of DCNs/FCRs to Ebasco instead of Mercury, and 3) by assigning CIWAs to Ebasco instead of Mercury.

By early 1983, Mercury had been directed not to perform any work in the Turbine Generator Building or the Yard Areas, such work being reassigned to Ebasco. In March,1983 Mercury was informed that Secondary Sampling System work would be performed by Ebasco and that LP&L would install six temperature elements in the Reactor Coolant System. In April, 1983 a significant portion of work, installation of instrument. drain lines, was deleted from Mercury's scope and transferred to Ebasco. Additionally, the responsibility for performing integrity tests of ANSI B31.1 installations in the Turbine Generator Building was removed from ( Mercury and assumed by LP&L/Ebasco. Concurrently, from June, 1982, Ehasco was preparing to assume Mercury l responsibilities. Ebasco had assigned a separate group of Construction Engineers, Supervisors, and Quality personnel to prepara procedures, develop detail sketches, work packages, etc. in order that work could be deleted from the scope of Mercury's contract. By July, 1982 Ebasco had initiated procedure preparation; by September, activities were progressing in the field; and by early 1983 Ebasco had received an ASME Survey and "N". Stamp. . As a result of this concurrent ongoing program, in July, 1983 Mercury was relieved of further responsibilities save for ASME P2 work. All other work including engineering and documentation review would be performed by Ebasco. Finally, in late July, Mercury was requested to terminate all work except turnover of QA records and other relevant documentation. The P2 work was accepted by the ANI in July / August of 1983 and Mercury was o relieved of further scope. Mercury's last craft personnel were on-site September 13, 1983. The last non-manual and QA personnel were on-site November 22, 1983. 23-17 i

  • O
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ATTACHMENT 2 Analysis of Mercury Tubing, Tube Track and Support Installation Records As a result of the corrective actions initiated in response to the Mercury  ; problems which led up to the June, 1982 Stop Work Order, an improvement in Mercury's quality performance, with respect to hardware installation, is expected. It is reasonable to expect this assumption to be reflected in the Mercury QA records documentation submitted to Ebasco for review. This analysis is intended to provide confirmation of the accuracy of this assumption. Documentation records for the 19 Mercury OCRs (installation travellers) which were initiated for new system installation begun after the SWO on tubing, tube track and support installations were compared to 19 Mercury OCRs on system work near ec=pletion (other than subsequent corrective rework) at the time of the SWO. The 19 post-SWO OCRs comprise the entirety of new Mercury tubing, tube track and support safety-related instrumentation system installations initiated after the SWO. Two aspects of the documentation were analyzed:

1. Documentation deficiencies were categorized and the cuantities of deficiencies for the pre- and post-SWO packages were compared (see the following Section I).
 .             2.         The Mercury Non-Conformance Reports (NCRs) written against the systems comprising the 19 pre-SWO OCRs were identified and

(' categorized as to when the work was completed (see cWe following Section II). , Based on the present review, adequate documentation exists to confirm a definite improvement in the quality of Mercury work following the SWO and initiation of corrective actions. In addition, confirmation was obtained that during the period 6/82 - 8/83 the majority of Mercury NCRs were written against work completed prior to the SWO. I. The 38 OCRs were reviewed for documentation deficiencies in two areas 

           ' - tubing installation and tube track / support installation.

The documentation categorization and review results are as follows: TUBINGINSTALbATION Category Descrincion A Software discrepancies requiring no QC ~ reinspection or rework to resolve (minor paperwork problems). B Software discrepancies requiring Ebasco QC reinspection to resolve; no rework required (e.g. verify support type or heat number). C Documentation discrepancies which were upgraded to discrepancy netices or NCRs - 23-18

Results Category Installation Prior to 7/1/82 Installation After 7/1/82 A 40 (31%) .183 (90%) B 62 (48%) 8 ( 4%) C 27 (21%) 10 ( 5%) TOTAL 129 201 TUBE TRACK / SUPPORT INSTALLATION Category Description A Support or tube track documentation packages with no deficiencies. B Support or tube track documentatica packages with documentation deficiencies which required Ebasco , QA reinspection to resolve; no rework required. C Support or tube track installations with missing

  • or incomplete documentation; reinspection

( , required. Results Category Installation Prior to 7/1/82 Installation After 7/1/82 A 109 (51%) 147 (65%) B 48 (23%) 39_ _(17%) 

                                                                                                ~~

C - 55 (26%) 39 (17%) TOTAL 212 225 A comparison of the significant documentation deficiencies, Categories B'and C, indicates improved quality perfor=ance. The improvement is particularly evident with respect to tubing installations. Although this comparison is limited by the number of OCRs that represent completely new (post-SWO) work, the data suggest that corrective action measures and continued management overview of Mercury were effective in bringing about an improvement in Mercury's quality related activities with respect to hardware installations. 23-19 e

  • er -

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II. Using the same pre-SWO OCRs as the previous section, a review was conducted to identify all NCRs written against the OCRs. During the review, NCRs were categorized according to the following scheme: Categorv Description I NCRs written prior to 6/23/82 against work performed prior to 6/23/82. 2 NCRs written subsequent to 6/23/82 against work performed prior to 6/23/82. 3 NCRs written subsequent to 6/23/82 againe: work performed subsequent to 6/23/82. Category I reflects NCRs written prior to corrective action; Category 2 covers those NCRs written during the corrective action walkdowns of pre-SWO Mercury work; and Category 3 NCRs are those written against work perforned following corrective action. The review results are as follows: NCRs on Installations Primarily Completed . Category - Prior to 6/23/82 (; - 1 23 2 65 3 37 TOTAL 127 Of importance is the relationship between Category 2 and Category 3 NCRs - nearly a 2 to I ratio betwen NCRs written on pre-SWO work and NCRs written on post-SWO work. The present review supports the

  • position that the majority of Mercury NCRs written during the 6/82 -

' 8/83 period (see Attachment 3H) were actually v-itten during the corrective action phase against Mercury work complaced prior to 6/23/82 and are not indicative of a continuing problem with Mercury. 23-20 h e

  • e 0
        . . -               , . . - . . _ . - - _ -        - - - - - .         . . . ~ . _ . - , - .      .-..    . - - . _

ATTACHMENT 3 Corrective Action Status In response to the Mercury problems encompassed by Issue #23 a number of corrective actions were implemented, several of which went well beyond the Mercury concern by addressing generic problems. The following material details Mercury corrective actions. To assist in identifying those which were commitments to the NRC in response to the Notice of Violation, the table in Attachment 3A is provided.

1. Mercury' Company, as a result of the Stop Work Order on 6/23/82, reassigned craft off safety-related system work and began developing a reindoctrination/ reorientation program. LP&L QA was directly involved in the development of the documented retraining program which was completed and approved on June 25, 1982. The Mercury program included training for record reviewers, QC inspectors, craft and engineering personnel. The program was submitted and documented in Mercury Letter WA-964 dated June 25, 1982 and reviewed / approved by Ebasco letter F-58853 dated June 25, 1982. The implementation of the retraining of reinspection / rework teams began on June 26, 1982. Verification is available in Ebasco letter F-58490-AST dated June 28, 1982. The Ebasco/LP&L concurrence of proper execution of the retraining program'was accomplished on June 29, 1982 and is documented in Ebasco letter F-58490-AST dated June 28, 1982 which released Mercury on safety-related work by retrained" personnel. The Mercury retraining program continued through March,.1983.
2. Following the Stop Work Order, Mercury began implementation of corrective action commitments. Concurrently, Ebasco mobilized a QA Management Team on -

7/6/82 to support and oversee the Mercury program. On 7/7/82 the Team outlined an action plan which assigned, to Ebasco QA Managers, i' responsibilities in the areas of:

  • i A.- Improvement in tracking and timely completion of Significant Construction Deficiencies, Nonconformance Reports, Deficiency Notices and Audits.

B. Increased contractor QA Surveillance (actual as-built verification by assigning a QA Surveillance Engineer to Mercury). l 

                                                   ,s                *
                                                                                                           \

C. Reorganization of'Ebarco QA auditing functions and organization + - to improve the3huality and content of sub-contractor oversight. D. Establishment of a QA Records Turnover Review system and organization, by assigning an Ebasco QA Records Group to work parallel with the Contractor's QA reviewers. F 23-21 i 8 l 

                                                                                             .         6 l
a. , . . - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --~ ' -~ ~ ~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~l

While the action plan of the QA Management Team was initiated in response to the problems identified with Mercury, the scope of the plan included all sub-contractors. Additionally the action plan provided for an increase in the Ebasco~ document review, QC and supervisory staffs and retraining of personnel involved in documentation review. The action plan items were implemented as follows: Area A - established by week 8/30/82.

Area B - established by week 8/30/82 (for detailed information see Item #4 below).

Area C - established by week 7/26/82. Area D - Ebasco QA Records Coordinator was assigned on 7/26/52.

3. With LP&L concurrence. Ebasco formed a Quality Assurance Surveillance Group (Action Item 3, above) to increase involvement in the in-process construction activities including hardware installation, system turnover, walkdown inspection and system testing.

Actions taken after formation of the Surveillance Group include: A) ' Issuance of a new procedure QAI-15 " Surveillance of Site s Contractors" Rev. O, 7/26/82. ] B) Issuance of a new procedure QAI-16 " Qualification of Quality Surveillance Personnel" Rev. O, 7/30/82. C) The QA Surveillance personnel were trained and recertified to the , new procedures.

  • D) A QA Surveillance Plan and Schedule was completed on 8/17/82.

The concept of full time QA surveillance of site contractor activities can play an important role in the construction management process. The extent and effectiveness of the surveillance group in identifying deficiencies which addressed not only Mercury but other site contractors is evidenced by the surveillances conducted, and resulting nonconformances identified, which were then resolved by the Site Quality Program. For example, a total of 48 surveillances were conducted on* Mercury from 8/82 thru 5/83 which identified non-conforming conditions such as undersize velds (Ref. SH-1, 12/21/82 & TM-1, 12/27/82) and unacceptable welder qualifications (Ref. NB-17,' 10/11/82). A listing of the Mercury surveillances is included in . Attachment 3B.

4. The Quality Programs and Procedures of affected organizations were reviewed and revised, as applicable.
  ;                                                                           23-22 i

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                                                                                                 . . .                   -         = _-       .

Mercury Company during the time period from March, 1982 thru June, 1983 revised 32 of the existing 48 approved procedures for use on Waterford 3. This involved a total of 70 actual procedural revisions. Included in these revisions were installation procedures, QA program auditing and process control traveler preparation and control (see Attachment 3D). Ebasco during the time period from May, 1982 thru May, 1984 revised, voided or issued a total of 30 procedures which are listed in Attachment 3C. The program revisions / additions included the following which are detailed in other corrective action responses or available on site fo. review: A. Establishment of a QA Surveillance Group. B. Redefinition / assignment of site training responsibilities. C. Establishment of a Quality Analysis Group. D. Separation of the Quality Assurance Installation Review Group (QAIRG) from QA Engineering and increased staff levels. 

                                           "E.             Development of specific records review forms for individual Contractors.

F. Stricter controls on the system turnover process.

5. A Task Force was developed, established and staffed separately by the Corporate Management of LP&L to perform Quality Records Review and physical
     .(                        Verification by walkdowns of selected activities, of. contractors and subcontractors who performed safety-related work prior to June 1, 1982, to assure compliance with the QA program.

The LP&L Task Force was comprised of personnel from LP&L QA and the LP&L Nuclear Project Support Engineering Group. The action plan for the Task Force was approved by the LP&L Vice-President-Nuclear Operations. LPSL procedure QP19.1, " Task Force Installation Verification" was approved and issued on January 11, 1983, under the direction of the QA Manager. The procedure provided direction for the implementation methods and reporting mechanisms necessary to ensure adequacy of contractor work prior to June 1, 1982. . - Specifically, for 15 contractors, walkdowns were performed using checklists to verify that the installed condition was in accordance with related ! documentation. Where system walkdowns' ware impractical, analytical means were empicyed to confirm the adequacy of the installation. Where applicable, dimensional checks of mechanical components,~inline equipment, cable tray and pipe supports, componaut locations, welds, and terminations (separation) were verified to ensure agreement with engineered /as-built drawings. Checklists were sufficiently detailed to ensure necessary discipline items were verified. Record reviews were performed on the supporting documentation for the physical activities verified during walkdowns. Checklists were used to document these record reviews Verification of the as-built drawings to the physical configuration as installed was the prime concern of the record reviews. 23-23 ,

In April, 1983 the LP&L Task Force review was completed. The Task Force findings were transmitted to Ebasco as LP&L Audit W3S-83-QP19.1/W3S-83-3 in accordance with the LP&L Quality Assurance Program. In September, 1983, following corrective action, LP&L Audit W3S-83-QP19.1/W3S-83-3 was closed. The Task Force review identified some record and system installation deficiencias requiring further reinspection and corrective actions as documented in W3I83-0115 (4-8-83) and W3K83-1808 (11-21-83). 

                      .The NRC (in Inspection Report 50-382/84-34) reviewed the LP&L Task Force implementation and results. An open item was identified by the NRC concerning physical verifications of Chicago Bridge and Iron installations.

As noted by the LP&L Task Force, the Hot Functional Testing during the period of their review prevented a walkdown of the physical installations, however, a review of radiographic documentation was conducted. The open item notwithstanding, the NRC indicated that "[t]he Task Force verification effort and findings did contribute to the overall LP&L and NRC assessment of the acceptability of the contractor work and effectiveness of LP&L's QA program."

6. The LP&L QA organization was enlarged and supplemented with contract personnel in order to provide broader QA coverage of safety-related site activities. Attachment 3E details the LP&L QA staffing history demenstrating the dramatic increase in QA personnel over the last half of 1982.
7. The LP&L QA organization dsveloped pr,ocedures and conducted audits to verify system configuration and documentation prior to turnover to LP&L 4 C Start-up. Procedure *QASP 17.5, " Quality Records Review" assures

' verification of sy' stem configuration and documentation prior to system turnover to LP&L.

8. Plant staff, in conjunction with start-up engineers performed system walkdowns and verified status of the configurations of the systems prior to transfer to the plant staff. Thirty days prior to any scheduled system transfer the cognizant Plant Staff engineer along with the Startup and Ebasco engineers perform e. system walkdown to generate deficiency lists and review the system configuration to determine that it is constructed as
depicted in system drawings. A walkdown by the same personnel and other Plant Staff-personnel is then conducted fourteen days prior to scheduled system transfer to verify, among other things, acceptable progress in addressing system deficiencies. The pre-transfer walkdown process is identified in Startup procedure SAP-40, " System Transfer from Startup to Plant Staff", and Plant Operating Manual Procedure UNT-TEM-003 (previously, UNT-l'-008), " Review and Approval of System Transfer".
9. The responsibility for Significant Construction Deficiencies, Inspection Reports and other required reporting was transferred from LP&L QA to LP&L Licensing. This change allowed more time for direct involvement by LP&L QA in construction activities.

? + i 23-24 j . . 

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10. A review of the Mercury Historical Nonconformance Report files indicated a significant increase in the generation / resolution of nonconformance reports after the 6/23/82 Stop Work Order. A total of approximately 436 NCRs had been generated by Mercury prier to the SWO and a total of approximately 3323 NCRs were genetsted subsequent to the SWO. During the entire program a total of approximately 1632 Mercury Nonconformance Reports were upgraded
          .to Ebasco NCRs. This increase in NCRs can be correlated to the corrective action walkdowns conducted during 1982/83 as shown id Attachment 3F.

The increase is indicative of corrective actions taken particularly in management /supervisien attention and the retraining of QC inspection personnel together with a better definition of inspection criteria. It is also indicative of the methodology employed whereby the inspection activities instituted to assure acceptance of all Mercury safety-related work was completed on a system by system basis rather than trying to address all Mercury systems at once., This approach resulted in the identification and closure of deficiencies over a longer period of time. For additional analysis of the Mercury NCRs please see Attachment 2.

11. As effective as the corrective actions were in resolving hardware related concerns and upgrading the Waterfold III QA program, problems with Mercury still occurred, but with much less frequency. Examples of these concerns include the reopening of SCD 61 (Sandvik tubing defect) and SCD 84 (tube' track welding) cited in NRC Issue #6. Many of the documentation and hardware problems identified *af ter the SWO can be attributed to ineffectual o programs in existence prior to the SWO. Nonetheless, the SWO corrective actions were effective in not allowing the partial QA breakdown to

(. continue. The overall impact of the Mercury issues will be addressed in 

           " collective significance".

4 m' = f 23-25 e b

ATTACHMENT 3A , Location in Issue #23 Where Notice of Violation Commitments Addressed

1. An extensive training / retraining program Attachment #3, was implemented by Mercury for their ' Item 1 records review, QC inspector, craft and engineering personnel. This program will continue in order to maintain the proficiency of these personnel.
2. Joint system walkdowns with Mercury Attachment #5, and Ebasco have been initiated for Item 1 the purpose of problem identification Attachment #3, and resolution prior to system , Item 10 release and turnover.
3. Fercury has increased their documention Attachment #1 review and QC inspection staffs.
4. Ebasco formed a QA Surveillance Group Attachment #3, to perform random physical inspections
                            ~                                  Item 3 to assure contractor compliance to established requirements.                                    .

( 

  \
5. Ebasco has increased its document review, Attachment #3, QC and supervisory staffs and has *
                                                              ' Item 1 retrained personnel involved in review of documentation.
6. The LP&L QA organization has been Attachment #3, enlarged and supplemented with contract Item 6 personnel in order to provide broader QA coverage of safety-related site activities.
7. LP&L QA has developed procedures and Attachment #3, will conduct audits to verify system Item 7 configuration and documentation prior to turnover to LP&L Start-up. -
8. Plant staff, in conjunction with' Attachment #3, Start-up engineers, will perform Ice = 8 system walkdowns and will verify the status of the current as-built configuration of the system prior to transfer to plant staff.
9. Responsibility for Significant Attachment #3, Construction Deficiencies, Inspection Item 9 Reports, and other required reporting
 \_          has been transferred from QA to Licensing.

23-26 . -

2-Location in Issue #23 Where Notice of Violation Commitments Addressed

10. LP&L has developed an aggressive plan to Attachment #3, establish methods for quality record Item 5 reviews and applicable physical verification for selected activities performed by 15 contractors who performed safety related activities prior to June 1, 1982. The plan will be i=plemented by LPSL QA and Engineer-ing personnel.
11. LP&L and its contractors have. reviewed Attachment #3, for adequacy those procedures related Item 4 to the turnover process and have revised them as necessary to assure that review requirements are clearly stated.

( . f i 23-27 e r -- v - --v,w r 3 - m --- v->,, y,-- ye, ,,c-,-, ,,,4 m--- - , - - 

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ATTACHMENT 3B Ebasco Surveillance Group Surveillances of Mercurv 8/18/82 W3-NY-15 NBl' Surveillance - Walkdown 8/18/82 W3-NY-15 NB2 { Procedure Revision Form 276-1 ' 8/25/82 W3-NY-15 N33 Review OCR Package 607 8/23-24/82 W3-NY-15 NB4 Review OCR Package 607 SP-660 8/26-27/82 W3-NY-15 NB5 Review OCR Package 1312 9/1/82 W3-NY-15 NB6 Piping & Tubing - Code Stamping 9/7/82 W3-NY-15 NB7 Walkdown - Welding 9/8-12/82 W3-NY-15 NB8 Walkdown & Review Inser. Packages 9/15/82. W3-NY-15 N39 Weld Machine Calibration 9/18/82 W3-NY-15 NB10 Measuring & Test Equipment 9/23/82 W3-NY-15 NB11 Walkdown 9/27/82 W3-NT-15 NB12 

                 '9/30/82                                                         Visual Exam Proc. QCP-3110/R3
          ,                        W3-NY-15           NB13                        Mercury Removal of Items 10/1/82          W3-NY-15           NB14                        Walkdown of Sys RCP Support IB 10/4/82          W3-NY-15           N315.                       FCR-AS-2066 10/5/82       ,  W3-NY-15           NB16                        Instrument / Support 10/11/82         W3-NY-15           NB17                        Welder Qualifications 10/14/82         W3-NY-15           N318                        Audit of QA/QC Personnel - Cert 10/14/82        W3-NY-15            NB19                        In process support 10/14/82        W3-NY-15            NB20                        Storage SS Tubing 10/19/82        W3-NY-15            NB21                       NCRs Assoc Sus 46 10/21'82        W3-NY-15           NB22                       DN USE 11/12/62        W3-NY-15           NB23                       Walkdown OCR 670 11/12/82        W3-NY-15           NB24                       Remdval of Items 11/12/82 W3-NY-15           NB25                       Walkdown OCR-388/758

(~ 11/18/82 W3-NY-15 NB26 Removal of Items 11/19/82 #$-NY-15 NB27 Walkdown OCR 1756 11/19/82 W3-NY-15 N328 11/20/82 Thermowell Installation Procedure W3-NY-15 NB29 NCR-W3-4504 SUS 47 11/23/82 W3-NY-15 N330 OCR 1687 11/29/82 W3-NY-15 NB31 Mercury QA Training 12/3/82 W3-NY-15 N332 NCR Admin. Closure ' 12/3/82 W3-NY-15 N333 Instrument TE-MS-83455 1/6/82 W3-NY-15 NB34 Use of Form 211 to Doc. NCR Condition Program 12/21/82 W3-NY-15 SH1 Walkdown SUS 43A-3 12/27-31/82 W3-NY-15 TM1 Walkdown Instr. Lines 12/28/82 W3-NY-15 TM2 Walkdown Surveillance 12/29/82 W3-NY-15 TM3 CAR #129 Review 1/4/83 W3-NY-15 TM4 . Pneu Test Witness 1/6/83 W3-NY-15 TPl Walkdown Inst. Lines 1/17-18/83 W3-NY-15 TP2 Training 1/25/83 W3-NY-15 NB35 ISO Revision 2/15/83 W3-NY-15 SH2 QCP-3110.5 2/18/83 W3-NY-15 TM5 Use of Correspondence 4/18/83 W3-NY-15 TM6 Inst. Cabinets & Racks 4/25/83 W3-NY-15 TP3 SP-663 (R-2) 5/20/83 W3-NY-15 IM7 Hydro /Pneu Testing , 5/27/83 W3-NY-15 GM1 SP-664 1 s 23-28 e , 

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ATTACHMENT 3C Ebssco Prcctdurcl Revisions May 1982 - June 1984 Procedure No. Procedure Title Revision / Dates QAI-1 QA Records Management Instructions 11 2/8/84 10 8/5/82 9 8/3/82 

          ~QAI-2            QA Review of Site Gen. Procedure of                                                               3        7/2/82
        .,                 Activities Affecting Quality QAI-6           Processing of Safety Related PR/PO                                                                 7        6/4/84 6        5/9/S4 5       10/28/82 4        7/1/82 QAI-7           QA Instruction for Surveillance &                                                                  2        2/21/84 Corrective Action                                                                                  1        7/2/82 QAI-9           Review & Handling of Construction                                                                 2         4/20/83 Installation Records QAI-14                                                                                                            4         6/5/83 Training,ds QA Recor           Personnel & Qualification Requirements for
                                                                   ,                                                         3         9/24/82 2         8/24/82

(- 1 0 8/10/82 7/26/82 QAI-15 Surveillance of Site Contractors ' 4 6/5/83 3 9/24/82 2 8/24/82 

                                                                                                                           '1         8/10/82 0         7/26/82 QAI-16        . Qualification of Quality Surveillance                                                            2         3/13/84 Personnel                                                                                          1        9/28/82 0         7/30/82 t

QAI-18 Data Report Processing Quality Assurance 3 10/3/83 Engineering Department 2 8/30/83 1 8/3/83 O 6/1/83 4 QAI-19 Processing of Discrepancy Notices (DNs) and 2 2/10/'4 Engineering Discrepancy (EDNs) 1 7/15/83 0 6/15/83 QAI-20 Walkdown Reverification of Hangers 1 7/11/83 0 6/27/83 23-29 - - - e , , - , ~ -<,p --,.e ,- , , , , , ,r,,- --n,- - ,.--,-,-r-. - - - , . . . - , ----r,- ,,-., ye-- -,

1 3 Ebtsco Praccdural Rcvisions i May 1982 - June 1984 Procedure No. Procedure Title Revision / Dates , QAI-22 Preparation of Response to NRC Inspection 1 8/30/83 Reports 0 8/2/83 QAI-23 Review of Ebasco Construction Quality 4 2/4/84 [ R2 cords 3 11/30/83 2 11/8/83 1 10/18/83 0 8/29/83 QAI-25 QA Instruction for Auditing at Waterford 3 0 8/22/83 QAI-26 Initiation / Preparation of PRI/SCD Reports 0 2/10/84 t- QAI-29 Review & Recurrence Control of Adverse Trends 0 1/30/84 Reported by the Ebasco Trend Analysis QAI-30 Documentation Statusing Review Instruction 0 2/1/84 QAI-31 Processing of Nonconformance Reports 0 2/9/84 WQC-167. Review /Trans. of Quality Related Records , 1 5/24/82 { WQC-168 Inspection of Instrumentation Installation 3Al 6/22/82 WQC-169 General QC Inspections 1 6/22/82 r WQC-200 Inspection & Test Status ASME QC VOIDED i-WQC-201 Control of Wald Filler Metals ASME QC VOIDED WQC-202 Inspection of Piping Hangers / Supports 2A3 10/18/82 Including Rupture &. Whip Restraints 3 WQC-204 ASME Piping / Tubing Installation Inspection 1 IQ/20/82 . WQC-205 Inspection of In-Place Storage & Maintenance 0 10/26/82 of Mech. Piping; Permanent Plant Items i WQC-208' Piping System Cleanliness Ihspection 3Al 9/9/82 Procedure WQC-209 Inspection & Surveillance of Ebasco 0 10/26/82 Installed Conditional Acceptance Items WQC-212 Ebasco QC Requirements of NDE Services ASME 2 10/20/82 WQC-213 Quality Control Review of ASME Section III O 10/25/82 , Piping / Tubing Travelers 23-30 . - G 

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ATTACHMENT 3D Mercury Procedural Revisions May 1982 --June 1984 Procedure No. Procedure Title Revisions / Dates MCP-2100 Welding Centrol 4-13 3/3/83 12 1/13/83 11 9/27/82 MCP-2101 Welding Repair 4 1/25/83 3 10/13/83 MCP-2170 Pressure Testing 8 4/19/83 7 2/20/83 6 6/22/82 5 5/3/82 FCP-2010 Document Control 10 5/17/83 9 10/4/82 f 8 6/4/82 7 6/2/82 6 3/11/82 PCP-2030 Material & Equipment Contrcl 

                                                                                                                         *5                           10/11/82
       'CP-3010      QA. Records Control                                                                                      4'                      10/16/S2 ,

QCP-3020 QA Program Auditing . 4 9/13/82 3 7/26/82 Qualification of Inspection & Test Personnel QCP-3050 4 10/17/82 QCP-3110 Visual Examination 4 9/30/82 QCP-3110.4 Pipe & Tubing Inspection , 10 2/18/83 9 9/29/82 QCP-3110.5 Welding Inspection 8 2/21/83 7 1/19/83 

                                      ,-                   .                                                                 6                       8/6/82 m;2                   ,

5 4/5/82 SP-650 Preparation, Review & Approval of Special 4 3/15/32 Procedures L SP-652 -Installation of Process Pipe Hanger Supports 10 1/14/83 10/17/82 9 8 6/29/82

' 7 6/12/82
  • 6 23-31

Mercury Procedural Revisions May 1982 - June 1984 

         -Precedure No.      Procedure Title                                      Revision / Dates SP-653      Fabrication & Installation of Safety Class 2 & 3       6       1/13/83 Process Pipe                                            5       10/12/82 SP-654     Tube Tray Hanger Fabrication & Installation             9      1/14/83 8       12/20/82 7      9/28/82 6       7/21/82 SP-655     Construction Procedure for Assenbly Fabrication        5       1/12/83
                     &' Installation of Seismic Class 1 Local Instrument Assemblies S9-656     Fabrication of Local Instrument Piping & Tubing        5       1/13/83 Assemblies                                              4       10/12/82 SP-657     Installation of Impulse Lines                          6       3/2/83 5       1/13/83 4       10/12/82    .

S Installation of Seismic 'l Tube Tray for ASME 4 3/15/83 (P-658 Class 2.& 3 Tubing ' SP-659 Procedure for Receiving Interface 4 2/8/82 SP-660 Procedure for Preparation & Control of the 7 12/17/82 Process Control Traveler 6 10/21/82 S' 9/27/82 4 6/7/82

SP-661 Welding NDE Interface 4 4/4/83 SP-664 Handling of Noncomformances & Corrective Action 4 6/20/83 3 5/10/83 2 3/8/83 1 9/27/82 SP-666 Drilled-In Expansion Type Anchors In Concrete 8 2/24/83 for Category I Structures Seismic Class I 7 9/28/82 6 S/16/82 5 5/18/82 L

SP-667 Control of As-Built Information s 5 9/30/82 4 5/14/82 

      's_

23-32

Merepry Procedural Revisions May 1982 - June 1984 

   .grocedure No.            Procedure Title                                                                         Revision / Dates SP-671            Release and Turnover from Mercury to Ebasco                                                 1            2/14/83 Construction SP-672            Welding Parameter Card Procedure                                                           0             8/13/82 WPS-3              Welding Procedure "B"                                                                   12               11/2/82 11               8/12/82 WPS-D             Welding Procedure "D"                                                                   13               11/2/82 12               8/12/82 WPS-E              Welding Procedure "E"                                                                  11                11/2/82 WPS-G              Welding Procedure "G"                                                                  11                11/2/82 10                8/12/82 WPS-Y              Manual Gas Tungsten Arc / Shield Metal Arc Welding                                     10                8/13/82 ASME Section IX Group Metal Thickness Range e

c . . t p.. 1 23-33 -

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MERCURY- NCR'S WRITTEN. BETWEEN 6/23/82 8 8/83-I

800-708 l

700~ 1 i 600-f , TOTAL = 3323 , 500- 479 y m U l l15 1 406 403 z 400- m

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!" 200-j67, I79 I79 I 

                                                                                                                                                         - IG4 14 9 1

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                                                                                                                ~

i 100- . (sauemc;.umasenmus:mmacu22nu n= m n m r" m w m rs 1 1 I 7 I I I I I 8 I I I I I G/23/02 7 0 9 10 Il 12 1/83 2 3 4 5 6 7 8/83 1 i

ATTACHMENT 4 ., -Audit of Mercury Installations 

           .The established Quality Programs of LP&L, Ebasco and Mercury were approved and accepted by all required organizations. They meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVIII and ANSI N45.2 standards invoked on the Waterford III project. 'With respect to the NRC concern regarding the apparent failure to audit the entire QA Program the following is provided.

I. LP&L QA Audit Program i As documented in the Waterford 3 PSAR, during the ccustruction phase LP&L Quality Assurance was committed to function primarily as a , Quality Surveillance group. Ebasco was responsible for assuring contractor compliance with their respective QA program requiremehts. In fulfillment of its role, LP&L QA conducted audits of contractor activities as deamed necessary. LP&L QA maintained a monthly audit schedule and revised it based upon available resources and criticality of activities to be monitored. In the case of Mercury, a total of 28 audits were scheduled. Attachment 4A is a summary of the. completed

LP&L-QA audits of Mercury. Additionally, 13 unsched21ed surveillances of Mercury were conducted by LP&,L as shown in Attachment 43.

II. Ebasco QA Audit Program ( The Ebasco QA audit program was structured to audit contractors yearIy

for compliance with the applicable 10CFR50 Appendix B criteria. In

[ the case of Mercury, Mercury compliance to criterion IV was not i audited by Ebasco since permanent installation material procurement was handled by Ebasco. Attachment 4C provides a matrix of Ebasco audits of Mercury with respect to the Appendix 3 criteria. This s attachment demonstrates that the required audits were conducted. 

                        ^

III. Mercury OA Audit Program The Mercury Quality Assurance Program required a minimam of one l internal audit be conducted annually on each auditable QA Manual ( Section. The Mercury audit schedule was reviewed and shown to be deficient in not completing audits of.all QA Manual sections as required during 1981, prior to the SWO. Following the SWO, Mercury met their commitment requirements to the end of their contract. Information on the Mercury internal audits is available for NRC l review. l ( 23-36 . .

l l ATTACHMENT 4A LP&L AUDITS OF MIRCURY COMPANY (1979 - 1983) 1979 W3S79-6 1/15/79 EEI Checklist W3S79-18 3/19/79 CEI checklist W3S-79-36 5/29/79 Criteria V - Mercury Procedures W3S-79-37 6/7/79 Criteria VI - Mercury Procedures W3 S-79-41 6/25/79 Criteria X - Mercury Procedures W3 S-79-42 12/3/79 Criteria IX - Mercury Procedures 1980 W3S-80-35 9/12/80 Criteria II, X - Mercury Procedures W35-80-39 7/2-10/2/80 QA Program Review 1981 W3S-81-8 1/12-2/23/81 SP 654, 666 W3S-81-15 3/25/81 SP-655, MCP 2140 W3 S-81-32 8/27/81 Mercury QA Program 

 .,                                       W3S-81-36          8/21-9/2/81                                        Criteria XIII - Mercury
       *
  • Procedures W3S-81-39 10/8/81 Criteria V - SP-660 W3 S-81-41 10/16/81 C- W3S-81-51 12/7/81 Criteria II - Mercury Procedures Criteria III - SP-667 I; 1982 W3S-82-13 1/20/82 Criteria XI - Mercury Procedures W35-82-14 2/4/82 Criteria XII - Met. Lab W3 S-82-62 7/22/82 Criteria V', X, III W3S-82-62 7/22/82 Criteria III, V, X W3 S-82-64 7/30/82 Ceiteria XV, XVI
                ,                        W35-82-77           10/5/82                                            Criteria   II, X, QCP-3050 W3 S-82-84          11/8/82                                            Criteria   VI W3 S-82-85          10/25-11/8/82                                    -10CFR50/ ANSI N45.2 1983                          W3S-83-10          7/8/83-                                             Criteria V - Mercury Procedures 1

e N 23 -37

ATTACHMENT 4B LP&L SURVEILLANCES OF i s MERCURY COMPANY (1979-1983) 1979 No Surveillance Performed 1980 W35-80-8s 2/21/80 Mercury Walkdown RAB W35-80-36s 9/22/80 . Mercury Criteria V W3S80-40s 10/17/80 Protection of SR Instrument Impulse Line 1981 W3S-81-31s 8/7/81 Mercury Mechanical Separation 1982 W3S-82-56s 7/6/82 Mercury 10CFR50/ ANSI N45.2 . W3S-82-57s_ 7/11/82 Mercury 10CFR50/ ANSI N45.2 W35-82-54s 6/28/82 Mercury 10CFR50/ ANSI N45.2 W3S-82-55s 6/24/82 Mercury 10CFR50/ ANSI N45.2 W35-82-59s 7/23/82 Mercury SP-665 W35-82-61s 7/21/82 Mercury ANSI N45.2.2 , W35-82-73s 9/23/82 Seismic / Tube Track . W35-82-79s 10/18/82 Mercury Criteria V W35-82-81s 10/28/S2 SP-667, QCP-3110.4 1983 W35-83-19s

  • 8419/83 . Hydro-Pneumatic Testing *

( . 9 l li

  • t f
                                                                                                                                    ~

23-38

ATTACHHF 4C Ebasco 18 CRITERIA . J CFRS3 APPFNDIX 8 - Audits ' cf Hercury 1 11 111 ty 'y - VI V11 VIII IX Note 2 79-11-1 79-12-4 N/A 79-2-1 , 79-10-2 79-11-2 '79-2-3 79-11-3 79-7-1 79-10-3 79-2-3 79-4-4 79-1-8 79-1-1 79-6-6 79-1-8 79-1-5 79-2-3 79-7-3 I' ' 79-1-5 79-3-3 79-8-2' 79-3-1 79-3-2 79-8-4 79-4-3 79-8-5 79-4-3 79-8-7 79-5-3 79-10-4 79-6-2 80-12-1 80-2-3 80-9-1 N/A 80-9-2 80-4-6 Note 5 80-2-8 80-7-2 80-6-2 1980 80-4-7 ' 80-6-1 80-2-1 80-7-1 80-8-4 ' 80-4-2 

                                                                                                                                                                              ~~

81-9-1 81-1-4 81-9-3 N/A 31-4"-l 81-2-2 Note 5 81-1-3 81-2-3 1981 81-3-2 81-5-2 81-12-1 82-2-1 82-11-1 82-7-6 N/A 82-2-1 82-5-1 Hote 5 82-11-2 82-1-2 82-10 1982 82-6-1 . 82-2-2 82-2-1 82-10-2 82-7-11 , 82-7-1 , . 82-11-1 1983 83-2-3 83-2-3 83-1-2 N/A 83-5-1 83-3-1 Hote 5 , ~E;-6-2 83-6-1 NOTES: 1. Portinent Chronological Events 

                                                                                                            .s 1978 - Fall tiercury Hobilization                           -

1930 - Hercu'ry Audit for code ,etomping. (83-3-7) - 1981 - Mercury Audit for seismit; support (81-11-1) attachment

  • 1983 - Hercury demobilized August 1983
2. Piercury organizat ion was revleGed by Ehasco as part of the QA Program Hanual Review
                 ,                                 conducted in 1978 and 1979.                  Ref. f ile folder F NY-15 Ebasco QA Records Vuul t"
                        ; ,,              3.       NIHK hydro testing commenced in lat e 1981
4. Audita not performed due to Contract Closure ,,

s

5. Ehanco audits of services used by Mercury would be conducted as part of '
                                                 ' Rhasco audits performed relative to other Criterion (e.g. Criterion XII)                                                                        ;
                                                                                                                      " ,14     r

q ( Al"rACIIHFNT 4f-JCONT'D): . 18 CRITERIA - 10CFkau APPENDIX H. Ebneco Audits cf Hercury- X XI XII XIII XIV XV _ XVI XV t1 XVIII 79-11-4 79-3-3 79-8-6 79-4-5 79-12-4 79-10-4 79-10-4 79-11-2 79-9-4 79-6-2 79-2-1 79-8-2 79-3-1 79-4-2 79-4-7 79-6-3 79-2-3 79-3-6 79-4 4 79-4-6 79-3-7 79-2-1 1979 ' 79-3-7 79-2-2 79-3-3 78-12-2 } 79-2-1 . 79-2-3 ! 80-3-2 80-4-8 80-7-2 80-10-5. 80-1-3 80-1-3 80-6-4 80-8-3 80-1-1 80-3-8 80-3-8 Program

80-1-2 Audit 1980 80-3-1 Note 3 4

80-5-1 80-7-3 80-7-4

  • 81-2-1
  • 81-3-1 81-9-4 81-9-2 81-1-1 81-1-1 81-4-2 81-5-1 1931 81-3-4 Nate 3 -

81-12-3 - 1982 82-7-4 82-5-3 82-7-9 82-11-3 82-12-2 82-4-2 82-4-2 82-6-5 82-6-1 82-7-5 e 1983 83-5-2 83-6-1 83-2-2 Note 4 Note 4 83-6-2 83-6-2 Note 4 I 83-5-2 a s. e l i ) 23-40 i

t-ATTACHMENT 5 Verification of the .*cceptability of Mercury Installations Since the Stop Work Order on Mercury safety related activities in June 1982, Mercury installed systems have been heavily scrutinized by LP&L and Ibasco. The Mercury installations have also been subjected to NRC field review. . Additionally, Kemper Insurance participated in the ASME Section III N-Stamp application process and, as such, was required to witness hydrostatic testing of all ASME Safety Class 2 installations. In consideracion of these activities and corrective action taken, LP&L'now has a high degree of confidence in the adequacy of the Mercury installations. The following is a brief discussion of some of the significant LP&L and Ebasco verification activities with respect to Mercury installations.

1. . A direct result of the Stop Work Order, was the initiation in July 1982 of joint Mercury and Ebasco walkdowns of instrumentation installations on a startup system basis. LP&L QA and Startup were involved in the initial phases of the program. Walkdown results were ,

documented on punch lists and evaluated for nonconforming conditions and establishment of corrective action. The walkdewns were conddet3d . 

  ~

in two phases. The first phase consisted primarily of. tubing along with the associated tubetrack and clamps. The second phase consisted of a walkdown of supports which commenced in January 1983. The ' *- walkdowns resulted in the generation of a large number of NCRs and . rework... Attachments 2, 1 and 3F discuss the significance of the NCRs.

2. In addition to LP&L QA participation in the corrective action walkdowns discussed above, LP&L QA performed a status review at the time of system turnover in accordance with the requirements of LP&L procedure QASP 17.5. This review consisted of a minimum 10. percent review of the documentation, and a random field sampling of. hardware versus as-built drawings. Portions of the Mercury installation for the following startup systems were field verified:

18-3, 36-1, 36-3, 39, 43A, 43B, 43E, 43H, 43J, 46A, 46B, 46C, 46D, 46E, 46H, 52A-1, 51A-2, 52B, 52C, 53A, 55A, 56A, 58, 59, 60A, 60B, 60C, 66, 71B, 73 and 76. 

                  - As a result of these reviews LP&L was able to conclude that the as-built conditions generally reflected the system drawings, and that
- no significant hardware deficiencies were encountered.
3. Ebasco conducted various other field verification activities relative to dercury installations. These are summarized as follows:

23-41 . - - V . . 

    ,-e.. r      w r ..v-  ,   -,-.=%.*,n.v..-.&m,r=- - - , - - -      --,.._,,,v, ,,-..~...w..-,-,..,..,--,i.-4.-.,--.....w.2          n----.mww.,               ev . ,--_w,     .. .m.-

I 

                                           -a.               As part of the closure of SCD 57 Ebasco QA initiated a corrective action supplement which consisted in part of a sample field inspection of various attributes related to                                                                                                           ;

Mercury installations. This inspection took place in February, 1984

b. Ebasco engineering conducted a plant walkdown in order to identify and correct miscellaneous hardware deficiencies which normally result from ongoing construction activities. -
                                                         . This walkdown was conducted in accordance with Ebasco procedure ASP-IV-141 and included all safety relaten areas of'the plant. Deficiencies, along with QA/QC verification of corrective action on safety related items, were documented en punch lists.                                     The program was established in support of the area closecut and transfer process, which took place in March, 1984 through May 1984. This walkdown provided another level of assurance on the Mercury
  • installations.

c.- Since August, 1982 the Ebasco QA Surveillance Group has conducted 48 documented surveillances of Mercury hardware and dccumentation. Any findings were resolved and, when necessary, NCRs were initiated to evaluate potentially' significant discrepancies. The activities of the Ebasco QA Surveillance Group are discussed in greater detail in

  • Attachment 3. Generally, this in-process surveil' lance
'       (~                                                program provided another means of monitoring Mercury L,                                                activities, thus ensuring the adequacy of the installations.
4. The most significant activity, aside from the corrective action walkdown discussed in item 1, involved the Ebasco QA records review of Mercury documentation. This review was necessary due to the

_ demobilization of Mercury in August of 1983 without the completion of the Mercury records review. The review commenced in November, 1983 and was completed in March, 1984. A group of 46 QA reviewers, 3 inspectors, supervisure and clerical staff was assembled for this - effort. The review was conducted in accordance with QA instruction QAI-23. As deficient or missing documents were identified QC inspectors were' dispatched to re-verify the installations. As a result, approximately 67% of tube track installations were reinspected; approximately 35% of Swismic Category I supports were reinspected; and approximately 24% of the Mercury installed anchors were reverified for proper torque. Attachment SA provides a summary of the review and reinspection scope resulting from the Ebasco QA 

                . records review. Available records indicate that an insignificant 1

amount of rework resulted from the reinspection process. 5. The adequacy of Mercury installations is being further confirmed by } reinspections in progress in response to NRC issue #1. l ?- 

        's 23-42 j

O b s , - - - , . , . . - , , , --...w.-,,_-,,,.,wrr,,. o w-, , . . , , ,-_,.,..e~,,,,s.,n-,---,.. w ,, ,-,,m..n,,,,_.,,n,,..,.,p,.~ ,,,,-.,,.we,.,e--yg.evee,.,-,,- .,,,,.,,,,we,.,y,-,,

s. 

       /

ATTACEMENT SA 

                              , . ),                       Summary of the Ebasco QA Records Review YlY i'

I. The following is a summary of the work scope related to the Mercury documentation review conducted by Ebasco QA. Further, a summary of field QC verificaticus resulting from the review process is provided in Section II. A. Tubing Installations Records Review ASME Section ASME Section Review Scope III-Class 2 III-Class 3 Total Number of Systems 13 36 49 Number of Mercury Travelers (OCRs) 86 284 370 Number of Instruments 150 835 985 B. Seismic Category 1 Support, tube track, and other miscellaneous hardware installations Review Scope Quentity Tube track supports , 5142 

   ,(                         Primary sample line pipe supports                                                        314
      \. .                    Tube track installations                                                                 665 Instrument stands                                                                        184 Bulk fabricated supports / fittings /

7230 (.spprox.) l anchor plates Instrument mounts 267 II. QC reinspections were initiated in order to resolve documentation deficiencies identified in the review process. A summary of re-inspections is as follows: A. Tubing Installations Reinspections were initiated to verify the following: Attribute Quantity Heat number 30 Material Identification 15 Welder's I.D. 11 Tube Slope 4 Verify repair of damaged tubing 7 Wall thickness 2 Defective weld 1 i Instrument installation 3 l . TOTAL .73 (Note 1) 23-43 . - - w - - , , , g < - , . , - , , - - - - w-,,, - , ~ - , . , - - - ---,.4 -,,, ,,,,.we ,,a- , v-,,-..,---- ,,,,-.o,,-veme--a ,wy---

3. Supports / tube track and other miscellaneous Seismic Category 1 installations Reinspections were initiated to verify the folieving:

Attribute Quantity Support configuration, location 2058 and welds Tube track 514 Instrument Stends 211 Torque verification of anchor 896 bolts including proper imbedment and thread engagement Support type only 159 Final visual of support weld only 88 Pipe support configuration 77 Miscellaneous attributes (Ht. No., 216 Weld *er I.D., etc.) (' 

                                      . TOTAL                        -- -

4219 (Note 1) As a result of these re-inspections a total of 113 NCRs, and 1035 Discrepancy Notices were dispositioned. * 

                   ~~

Note 1 - Sone duplication of reinspection or unsuccessful inspection is included in chese numbers. x 23-44 - - 4 

                          - . . , . ,          . _       7--, - ,        .-,, , .-,, - ,,-. ,            .--r--  ...-.e., , , , . . , ,.-

LP&L EXHIBIT 6 _ RESPONSE g m m )g (WITHOUT ATTACILMENTS ITEM NO.: 22 (,_ y tin.E: Welder Qualifications (Mertury) and Filler Material Control (Site Wide) . NRC DESCRI? TION OF CONCERN: The staff reviewed in process veld records for the installatien of instrumentation syste=s by Mercury Company. Syste=s reviewed included Reactor Coolant, Safety Injection, Co=ponent Cooling Wster, Main Stea=, Main Feed, and Charging Water. The staff selected welders from these records and reviewed their qualifications to the velding process used during the ti=e frame of actual velding.

  • 9 Based on the staff's review it appears that some Mercury velders were not qualified. Proble=s included: velders not qualified to the correct velding procedure; velders qualified for a specific process, even though they dere not tested for that process; actual dates on qualification records appeared qugstionable, the- welder =ay have velded prior to being tested. he staff ref.cludes that there are questions relative to the Mercury velder qua'11fication status.

Also during this review the staff evaluated the controls being used to centrol filler =aterial. The staff found that the requirements for "rebaking" of lov ' hydrogen electrodes did not meet the requirement of the ASME and AWS Codes. The * { Codes require lov hydrogen electrodes to be rebaked at te=peratures of 450* to  ; 

        . 800*F for two hours. The site practice for all site contractors was to rebake                        L
   -(1g,     at 200*F for eight hours.       Justification for this Code' deviation has not been                  .

provided by LP&L. LP&L shall (1) Atte=pt to locate the =issing docu=entation and deter =1ne if the velders were properly qualified, or (2) If the documentation to support preper qualifica 1c= cannot be located, LP&L shall propose a program to assure the quality of all ualds perfor=ed by questionably qualified velders. LP&L shall also provide engineering justification for the allevance of "rebake" te:peratures and holding times that differ from the requirements of the ASME and AWS Codes. DISCUSSION: . . Welder Qualificacions

  • LP&L has per'for ed a review of all Mercsry velders for proper qualification.

This review was initiated in October 1983 as a disposition to NCR-W3-7218. It cencluded that, with a single exception, all Mercury velders making safety and seis=ic veld:ents were properly qualified, and had velded only in processes for which they were so qualified. The single. exception was identified, corrected, and dispositioned via NCR-W3-7219. A separate concern not covered in this response, involving the adequacy of the tube track welding process, is addressed in SCD 84 TNCR-W3-6159) . Since the NRC's special review, NCR-W3-7218 has been supplemented with an attachment which provides clearer and more auditable docu=entation of the review. l 22-1 l_._.._ ._ _ .

As a result of concerns regarding discrepancies in Mercury velder qualification records noted by the NRC during the special review, and brought to LP&L's attention during a =eeting ' on May 18, 1984, NCR-W3-7724 was opened. As a ( disposition to this NCR, a review was conducted that confir=ed that the documentation to support the proper velding procedure qualification of all Mercury velders was in order with the exception of three =inor discrepancies . which have been corrected. Although the review conducted by LP&L via NCR-W3-7724 covered all Mercury velders, a specific. response to questions regarding the qualifications of the 13 velders identified by the NRC during the special review, is contained in Attach =ent 1. lacluded in this attach =ent are the three documentation discrepancies noted and corrected. In the case of the 13 velders cited by the NRC, docu=entation' supports the fact that all velded in processes for which they were qualified, except for M315 (See Attachment #1, iten lH); this velder did perform a veld out of his qualification. The veld, however, was rejected in process by the Mercury QC 

     ,        inspector, and the veld was redone by a qualified velder.

Filler Material Control The Waterford 3 site procedures for filler =sterial control were designed to preclude the need for drying -("rebaking") as used or defined by the ASME and AWS Codes and did not include provisions for "rebaking". The site procedures and corrective action taken in'the isolated cases of deviation from site procedures ". vere adequate to =aintain the =cisture content 11=1tations specified by the codes for low hydrogen electrodes. l 

                                                                                                                      ?

f)

  • The AWS Dl.1, Structural Welding Code (paragraph 4.9), states that lov hydrogen, l type' E-7018, electrodes should be dried ("rebaked") when either of the following l conditions exists:
1. If electrodes are not purchased in her:etically sealed containers
2. or if the her=eti? ally sealed container shows evidence of da= age
3. or if electrodes are not used within fcur (4) hours of re'= oval fro = a drying or storage / holding oven.

Condition 3 is also addressed in ASME Section III, NZ-2440. Storage and Handling of Welding Materials which states " Suitable storage and handling s of electrodes, flux, and other velding materials shall be taken to mini =12e absorption of moisture by fluxes and cored, f abricated, and coated electrodes." .'  : 9 s Lov hydrogen electrodes used at Waterford vere specified to be purchased in hermetically sealed containers. This practice eli=inated the need to dry the electrodes for condition 1) above. - Ebasco Discrepancy Notices were reviewed to find conditions of da= age to hec =etically sealed containers. Attach =ent 6 includes all DNs found which noted seal da= age to lov hydrogen electrode centainers. The disposition and corrective action in all cases attached was to scrap or return the electrodes to the 

             =anuf acturer for replace =ent. This practice eliminated the need to dry the

( electrodes for condition 2) above. i e 22-2 I _ r 

                                        . _ _ . - -       . - . _ ,          - _. ~       -   . - - - -

c . -_ Site procedure ASP-IV-18. " Receiving; Storage, Issuing, and Control of Weldin:; Electrodes and Filler Metals", Attach =ent 3, and individual contractor procedures (such as To=pkins-Beckwith's T37-3, " Weld Material Control 

    ;              - Procedure", Attach =ent 4), were written with the intent to control the velding                                                                                                               ,
                      .aterials in a manner that would minimize absorption of moisture or exposure to                                                                                                              '

ambient conditions. ' ASF-IV-18 and TBP-3 required that low hydrogen electrodes, upon re= oval from , sealed - containers, be placed ' in ' holding ovens for eight (8) hours at 200*F mini =us prior to issue and that when these electrodes were issued that they were to be held in " point-of-use" ovens (rod caddies) prior to use. The si a - procedures for holding oven temperature (200*F minimum) comply with ASME's ' reco==endation of'50*F to 250*F above ambient (ASME S&ction II, Part C, SFA 5.1, l Table A.1, 1977 Edition) but do not comply with the AWS D1.1 250*F mini =u= (AWS Dl.1-75, - Paragraph 4.9). Although the wording of other site contractor procedures may have varied from the attached two procedures (i.e. leather i pouches versus rod caddies), the moisture absorption of filler caterial as addressed and controlled in a similar fashion. We believe, under the conditions above and through co=pliance with the site ' procedures, even . vich the holding ' temperature variation from AWS, that the eluctrodes would not have absorbed excessive amounts of moisture and that adequate filler material control, to meet condition 3) above, was present. To identify and evaluate representative ' cases where deviations fro: veld red control procedures occurred, all Ebasco Nonconformance Reports and

  • Tompkins-Beckwith Discrepancy Notices were reviewed. Isolated cases vere found which pertain to rod ovens and associated problems and are shown in Attachment
5. The corrective action for these cases consisted of either returning the -

[ i d. ty electrodes to the holding ovens for the eight (8) hours or scrapping. L

p.

To justify the adequacy of corrective action, the two conditions, of these

r in Attachment 5, where lov hydrogen electrodes could have potentially ab sorbed ,

the greatest amount of moisture (T-3 Discrepancy Notices W-339 and W-742) vere ' evaluated. Both of these DN's noted conditions where holding ovens lost pcmr over the weekend with the electrodes possibly exposad to ambient conditions for approximately forty-eight (48) hours. Ambient conditions for these two (2) DT s would be sMlar to that shown in Attachment 7. To detercine the effects of thilexposurt, the following tests were performed: +

1. The manufacturer, Alloy Rods Division of Che=etron Corporation, of the cajority of the low hydrogen electrodes used at the site was contacted and .

sub=itted product literature on moisture absorption of E-7018 electrodes " (see Attachment 8). The curves shovn' on page three (3) of the attach =ent indicate that the electrodes noted ii ,the two (2) T-B Discrepancy Notices (if they were the "new" moisture resistant style electrode) would not have exceeded the ASME allowable moisture content of 0.60': (ASME Section II, Part C, SFA 5.5, Table 7, 1977 Edition).

2. In censideration that Attach =ent 8 kpplied to Alloy Rods Divisien't new moisture resistan't coating (in use in mid 1981) and that the T-3 DN's were prior to this date, the manufacturer was requested to test noisture absorption of the "old" style electrodes. Alloy Rods perfor=ed two separate tests of the old style electrodes to confirm our position that the effects of the ceditions and subsequent corrective action taken in the j (~ case of the DN's was adequate and that drying or "rebaking" was not 3 required.
                                                                                 .22-3

The first test directly, exposed the. electrodes to a humidity cabinet for 

                              . forty-eight ' (48) hours at 60*F and 80: relative humidity. The moisture f                       content at the start was 0.10% and at the and of forty-eight (48) hours had increased to values between 0.56: to 1.26", depending on electrode position i                                 in the bundle. The bundle'was then placed in a dry rod oven for eight (8)                                                                                      e hours at 250*F. The moisture content at the end of this time varied between 0.19 and 0.26%, which was well below the allowable 0.60%.

The second test simulated the conditions that occurred at site. A holding 

   ,                             oven, Phoenix Type 300, was unplugged for -forty-eight (48) hours. The
                              - moisture content at the start was 0.08% and at the and of the 48 hours had-increased to 0.23%, which was still below the allowable 0.60: without
                              . subsequent reconditioning at 250*F for eight (8). hours.

The test results of the both tests are shown in Attach =ent 9. The ' literature and testing performed by the manufacturer, confirm that the control of low hydrogen velding electrodes, even considering the isolated deviations from site procedures, was adequate. The adequacy of' the Waterford 3 Velding program was further confirmed by the satisfactory results of project and NRC NDE efforts. 

                   ' In summar'        y , LP&L's position is that 1) .the veld material control program at Waterford meets the intent of both ASME and - AWS Code requirements. 2) that the site procedures were designed. to avoid the need for . rebaking. 3) in the -

isolated instances where deviations from site procedures occurred, the 1 l corrective action was adequate to maintain the moisture content- li=itations specified by the ' codes for lov hydrogen electrodes. 4) the adequacy of the veld material centrol program is substantiated by the acceptable results of the NDE examination, when performed, of velds where lov hydrogen electrodes were used. CAUSE: The apparent cause for this concern is the complexity in understanding valder qualification hierarchy; i= proper placement of a "rebake" sign on an Ebasco red even; and lack of specific justification on corrective actions in some instances in which specified holding temperatures were not maintained. 1 The Mercury velders and their qualifications are in order and the site filler metal control procedures were adequate to limit the moisture content of the lov nydrogen electrodes. Minor deviations ' fro: literal code interpretatiens are , 

                                                                                                                                                                                                ~

justifiable. , GENERIC IMPLICATIONS: ,'I As discussed above, the review of Mercury's record confirmed that the 

                  - docu=entation to support the proper qualification of Mercury velders is in order. The concern related to the control of moisture content in low hydrogen electrodes was treated generically in that procedures for all site contractors
                  ' vere reviewed and found to be acceptable. To ensure that velding being perfor=ed under the. Plant Maintenance Program was and will be properly accomplished, an
                                    ~

audit of'that program was initiated and is in progress. , [ ' 4 22-4 P e mus 

                       .    .v.+      r-- e-..rs,,.y. ,.- c+.1   ...mm.e -w,--.- ,..--.,,..,,,w,wwe
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                                                                                                             . .,                    )
    .- c>                                                                                                                            ;
               . Adequate centrols for receiving, storage, and issuing of velding electrodes were

{ present., i < SAFETY SICNIFICANCE: l I Documentation exists to support the qualification of all specific welders called ,i into question. All other Mercury velders also had documentation to support  ! their qualification. There were three minor discrepancies which have been ' 

                   . corrected.

Deviations from Code requirements for control of moisture content of lov . hydroged electrodes were justifiable. ' There is, therefore, to. affect on plant safety and this issue should not pose a constraint to fuel load or power operation. - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN / SCHEDULE: NCR-W3-7724 addressed and resolved velding procedure qualification errors for velders M101, M109 and M85. NCR W3-7218 attachments 4 and 5 showed that M'ercury velders making safety related and seismic weldsents were certified within the tine frame they'perforned welding at Waterford 3. 1 ATTACHMENTS: l Attachment 1 Specific Responses to NRC Mercury Welder Qualification Concerns *! I Attachment 2 Mercury Procedure Cross-Qualification Chart h h' J% Attachment 3 Procedure ASP-IV-18. Receiving, Storage, Issuing and Control of ).. IJ NF Welding Electrodes and Filler Metals f Attachment 4 Tompkins-Beckwith Procedure T3P-3, " Welding Material Control  ! Procedure". i E Attachment 5 Ebasco Non-Conformance Reports and T-B Discrepancy Notices on s Weld Material Control. ' Attachment 6 Ebasco Discrepancy Notices on Da= aged Electrode Containers. . Attachment 7 Weather Conditions for February, 1979. Attachment 8 Alloy Rod's Division, "It's,A Fact", dated Septe=ber 30, 1981. # Attachment 9 Letter dated 9/4/84, Alloy Rod Incorporated to Ebasco Services.

REFERENCES:

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Paragraph NX2440, 1977 Edition. AWS Structinral Welding Code, D1.1-75 Paragraph 4.9. ,. .22-5 Om-. .m o 

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     ~
                                                            -               LP&L EXHIBIT 7 Wm                                 W

RESPONSE

ITEM NO: 20 (Revision 1) TITLE: Construction Materials Testing (CMT) Personnel Qualification Records NRC DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN: The Inquiry Team effort included a review of the disposition of the generic problem identified during the LP&L Task Force verification relative to GEO Construction Testing (GEO) documentation for personnel qualifications in the area of CMT. The utility should conduct a review of supporting documentation for GEO corrective action stated in Attachment 6 of NCR W3-F7-116 (Ebasco W3-6487). This review should focus on the identification of CMT personnel placed in GEO Categories 1, 2, or 3 who were apparently qualified solely on written statements by other individuals attesting to the individuals training and qualifications. For such individuals, the applicant should pursue any new information or evaluations which could provide further assurance in support of the actual past work experience and training referenced by the written statements. DISCUSSION: As requested by the staff, LP&L has pursued and obtained additional information on the GEO individuals performing inspections and tests as will be explained in the sections of this response entitled " Collection and Verification of Pershnnel Data" and " Disposition of Deficiencies". Also, evaluations have been made of work performed by CEO person'el as briefly outlined herein. A verification program was implemented to review the professional credentials of 100% of the site QA/QC personnel who may have performed safety-related functions at Waterford 3, including supervisors, managers and remaining QA/QC personnel. Assessment of the qualifications of all GEO Construction Material Testing (CKI) personnel, including those identified in Attachment 6 of Ebasco NCR W3-6497 (the NRC reference to Ebasco NCR W3-6487 is apparently a typographical error), was a part of that verification progra=. 

                      ~~
       -The responses to Issues No. I and 10 discuss inspector qualifications for other Waterford 3 contractor personnel.

The program, which is being performed under the overall direction of LP&L, consists of three major elements: o Collection and verification of personnel data. o Evaluation of qualifications against specified standards. o Dispositioning of deficiencies resulting from cases where inspections, tests or data collection were conducted by personnel whose qualifications against the appropriate standards could not be confirmed. l 20-1

d , , ,a Collection and Verification of Personnel Data Personnel data were collected from various sources, including site files, contractor home office files, personal contact with individuals or supervisors and a thorough background verification program. i Efforts were made to verify the education and work experience of 100% of' the -! GEO-CMI QA/QC personnel by researching Waterford 3 GEO-CMT records and by , contacting schools, former employers and others. While the success rate of the i background verification effort for GEO-CMT was good, there were cases where confirmatory information was not obtainable. In such cases, the judgement of the LP&L Review Board, as described below, was used to rule on the reliability of the available information. Evaluation of Qualifications to Specified Standards QA/QC personnel data were evaluated in order to classify individuals as either having verified qualifications orinot. Training, education and work experience were the qualifications of primary concern. These qualifications were verified against the following criteria: . (1) Inspectors - ANSI N45.2.6-1973 ,. (2) Other QA/QC Personnel - QA Program requirements Initial qualification determinations for GEO-CMT personnel were performed first

by Ebasco and then separately by an LP&L review group. In order to control the ,

consistency of these determinations, approved proc,edures were utilized. Determinations related primarily to balancing education, experience and training factors. , The LP&L review group qualification determina't ions were rendered in two categories: " qualified" and "potentially not qualified". "Potentially not t qualified" determinations were referred to an LP&L Review Board comprised of senior LP&L QA personnel. The Review Board determinations were further reviewed by a consultant vary. familiar with inspector qualification and related standards. This process resulted in a final determination for all QA/QC personnel as either " qualified", or " unqualified". The qualification review p,rocess is descrued in QASP 19.12 and QAI-32. The , following points further clarify the process: l'. The meaning of the term " unqualified" must be amplified. In some cases determinat. ions were made that, based on verified data, , individuals' backgrounds did not warrant qualification to ANSI N45.2.6-1973. In other cases, however, individuals were considered 

                                                 " unqualified" as an expedient in reaching resolution to the concern.                                          ,

This occurred in cares in which:

a. Research of records, inquiries to past employers and employees contact with schools and verification of training received was
,                                                       either not possible or could not be concluded in a reasonable

[ period of time. 20-2 

    -   - _ _ , _ . - . ~ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ .. , _                                        _ _ . _ . . _ . _ _ . , _ . . . _ . _ . . - -

         . 0-
b. . Apparent discrepancies existed between background information
                                                      .provided by some individuals and that obtained in the verification process, and resolution could not be achieved on a j-                                .                        timely basis.                      Minor discrepancies        were excused; however.

l significant discrepancies generally rendered any other significant but unverified data as suspect.

2. In the process used, being judged as " unqualified" to ANSI l N45.2.6-1973 did not automatically render the individual's work as
invalid. For example, an individual may not have the education and experience qualifications for ' all inspection work. yet be fully competent through specific training to perform the particular tasks assigned to him, which might have been very simple and repetitive in nature. Such an individual potentially satisfies ANSI requirements, which ultimately require that an individual's qualifications be sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the individual can 1 4

competently perform a particular task. Whether or not the individual is technically qualified, the individual's work can be deemed valid.

3. During the construction period, GEO made undocumented judgements with respect to the need for ' eye examinations for inspection personnel.

Such judgements were based on the level of visual acuity or color perception required to achieve competent inspections. Such judgements i were also made as part of the verification program and disposition 

!                                         process and will be documented. It is noted that such judgements are specifically suggested in ANSI N45.2.6-1978.                                       This factor was not
                                   ,      deemed disqualifying.
}

I 4. Some individuals were classified as inspectors but performed no safety related inspections and were otherwise not involved in quality related work. To the extent such individuals were identified, they were excluded from the overall inspector population. ' i i Disposition of Deficiencies 

;               For those individuals found " unqualified" the LP&L review board initiated Corrective Action Request (CAR) EQA84-21S1 to formally disposition the identified deficiencies.                                           Ebasco NCR-W3-6497 has been reopened and when reclosed, will reflect the disposition of that CAR .

3 l Disposition of CAR EQA84-21S1 was accomplished by 3 methods as follows: P i

1) Assessment of Key CMT tests and of skills required to perform these tests.

( The key tests were as follows: a) Concrete - The most important test is the final cylinder break test as this test serves to confirm the strength of the concrete actually placed in the structure. Other tests on concrete are generally either performed as measures to avoid subsequent replacement of sub-specification concrete or were performed in co11ceting the concrete-

for and preparing of the test cylinders. The break test requires minimal skill in setting up and starting a compression device which compresses a pre-molded cylinder to failure. A large gauge records j the force required which is easily translated into the data required.

i 1 Y 20-3 

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  • e e *w W-=*e= w w

i- . .o - Further confidence in the quality of the as-built. material is provided by.the fact that improper operator action would tend to degrade test results, i.e. . . improper testing would cause . the concrete to appear less strong than it actually is. 

              .b)       Soils - The most important test is the field density test as it measures whether the bahkfill material has been compacted to specific requirements. The field portion of the work, which was performed by the technician, consisted of digging a small hole and placing the removed soil in an airtight container, positioning a rubber balloon apparatus over the hole, inflating the balloon to a predetermined 1

pressure and reading a volume indicator scale. Further, confidence in the quality of the as-built material is provided by the quantity of tests conducted. As stated in the engineering report supporting the response to issue 7, to insure control of backfill placement approximately three times as many field density tests were conducted as required by the technical . specifications. c) Cadwelds - There was only one type of test on cadwelds conducted by l GEO-CMT and that was the break test. This test is as-simple as the concrete break test. The test specimens are secured in a tension device, tension is applied and the failure strength is read from a gauge and recorded. I i It has been determined that only minimal training would be required

for an unskilled individual to become ' proficient in performing the above tests. A single demonstration coupled with minimal practice under proper i supervision is sufficient. GEO has formally confirmed that " Prior to.being assigned to production work, all personnel were trained to perform the work '

required." On the basis of th,e above, though not strictly qualified to , ANSI N45.2.6-1973, individuals could be considered competent to perform the technician or data collection type functions described. l 2) Quality of Testing Performed by Personnel in Question i A detailed analysis was conducted of inspection / testing performed by a large sample of Level I personnel in question. This sample is felt to

include the most significant exposure in terms of potential for inferior i inspection / testing. Level II and III personnel either performing or
directly supervising the performance of the tests described above should be
competent to perform such functions. i i

t t 4 l 20-4

3) Engineering Evaluation
                - A statistical analysis was conducted, using industry standard techniques, to evaluate test results for concrete and the class A backfill (Reference 3). In the case of concrete both the overall and within-test coefficients of variation
                 - demonstrated excellent control of the product which would not be the case had the tests not been well conducted. Backfill test results also' demonstrate good consistency. A review of cadweld data and test results described in Issue 11
  • indicates reliability of the test data and confirms the adequacy of the cadweld testing. This evaluation verifies the overall adequacy of the _ work of all levels,. Levels (I, II and III) of GEO-CMT QC personnel.

1 CAUSE: I Implementation of ANSI N45.2.6-1973 allows substitution for education and

experience levels by noting that "... education and experience requirements specified for the various levels should not be treated as absolute when other factors provide reasonable assurance that a person can competently perform a a particular task." GEO and its predecessor organizations issued certifications
, of qualifications for testing personnel under successive programs which employed

!- auch substitutions and which became more detailed and better documented with l time. The program in place since 1978 generally parallels the ANSI Standard for inspector certification. However, the verification program revealed that verification of background data was not adequate or documented, documentation of

the justification for substitution of other factors for the requisite degree of training, education or experience was sometimes not provided, lacked depth, was not totally in accord with contractor procedures or the ANSI standard, as currently interpreted. '

l - GENERIC IMPLICATIONS: This issue has 6een treated generically. The scope of the verification program included 100% of the QA/QC personnel of all site contractors who may have performed safety-related work, including GEO CMT personnel.

With regard to future work, qualification and certification of inspectors (including NDE personnel) will be administered through strict compliance ~ with
LP&L Nuclear Operations Procedures which meet the requirements of Regulatory i Guide 1.58 Rev. 1 (ANSI N45.2.6-1978) and SNT-TC-1A-1975, as applicable.

f l l SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: The results of the verification program and evaluation of the work performed by i 

                  " unqualified" GEO CMT personnel provides reasonable assurance that the related

! installations will perform satisfactorily in service. There is no recognized reason that this issue should constrain fuel load or power operation. 5 f I 20-5 i 

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e. .

CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN / SCHEDULE: On the basis of Reference 3 CAR EQA84-21S1 has been dispositioned. EEFERENCES:

1. QASP 19.12. Review of Contractor QA/QC Personnel Qualification Verification
2. QAI-32. Instructions for Verification of QA/QC Personnel Qualifications
3. Engirmering Evaluation of Report on the Review and Analysis of the work of GEO - Construction Material Testing.

4 t 4 s * 't 1 4 . , 4 9

  • I I

r 20-6 

                                                        -        LP&L EXHIBIT 8        -

RESPONSE

ITEM NO.: 6 (Revisien 1) Il LE: Dispositioning of Nonconformance and Discrepancy Reports NRC DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN: The staff conducted a review of Ebasco nonconformance reports (NCRs) randomly selected from the Ebasco QA vault and the NCR tracking system. The selected NCRs were reviewed for content, compliance with procedures, accuracy, completeness of the disposition and final closure. Of the NCRs reviewed it is the staff's judgement that approximately one third contained questionable dispositions. OtherNCPqggefoundstillopen. , The implied safety significance is that improperly dispositioned NCRs or lack of NCR closure could place the quality of installation in question. For example. Ebasco NCR-W3-5564 identifics that welds were painted before the final weld inspection was perfo rmed. The NCR was closed out with a letter stating that the final inspection will be performed to inspect only for undersizing and lack of weld material where installation drawing calls for veld material. No paint was to be removed therefore the inspector could not inspect for welding defects. The NCRs reviewed by the staff dealt with a wide variety of issues. The following is a list of example Ebasco NCRs that the staff feels contain . questionable dispositions or exceeded closure time requirements. ( Ebasco W3 NCRs . NCR-7139 NCR-7177 NCR-3912 NCR-7182 "NCR-5563 NCR-7181 NCR-7184 NCR-6159 NCR-6723 NCR-3919 NCR-7547 NCR-6221 NCR-1650 NCR-6511 NCR-6623 NCR-4219 NCR-5586 NCR-7432 NCR-7180 NCR-4137 NCR-6165 NCR-4088 NCR-7099 NCR-6786 NCR-6597 NCR-7533 NCR-7179 NCR-7140 NCR-5565 The staff also found similar type problems related to Mercury NCRs in that

  • the dispositions were questionable; , supporting documentation could not be located; rework appears to have not been accomplished; NCRs were not processed; a sufficient basis was not provided; and closure basis was inadequate.

The following NCRs fall into these categories: Mercury NCRs 180 420 528 568 625 255 429 540 591 656 268 438 554 594 658 363 487 560 595 380 491 565 614 6-1

Additiennily during this rcvicw th2 cesff found probicns with Ebacco diccrepancy reports (DRs) in that it appears some DRs should have been elevated to NCRs: closure. references were incorrect or inappropriate; closure action was improper; documentation was inaccurate; closure was via a DR, should have been an NCR; disposition failed to address the discrepcncy; and the disposition of "use-as-is" had insufficient basis. The following DRs fall into these categories: Ebasco DRs Related to Turnover Packages Q2-CS-LC-27 ED-1C-1143 Q2/3-FW/1C-851 Q1-RC-LWS-RC-2 Q2-SI-1C-89 LW3-RC-29 QMC-APO-P47E Q2-LW3-SI-10F/E C(W)-1C-342 CC-1C-6 The staff concludes that some Ebasco and Mercury NCRs and Ebasco DRs were questionably dispositioned and that LP&L shall (1) Propose a program that assures that all NCRa and DRs are appropriately upgraded and adequately dispositioned and corrective action completed, and (2) correct any problem detacted. DISCUSSION: LP&L initiated a program, beginning in February 1984, to review Ebasco site 

  ,Nonconformance Reports (NCRs) to verify the effectiveness of the Waterford 3 deficiency reporting / disposition programs during construction.         That program consisted of a review of Ebasco site NCRs closed prior to initiation of the

'- program (approximately 7100). Cach Ebasco site. NCR was reviewed and independently assessed'by LP&L to determine if: - o The disposition addressed the described discrepancy; o The NCR was reviewed for reportability 10CFR50.55(e) a'nd 10CFR21; and o The NCR had received the appropriate signatures. This response discusses and presents summary results of the original review and a significantly expanded program addressing dispositioned NCRs/DRs (voided and administratively closed NCRs are addressed in the response to Issue 13). This program provides adequate confidende ~ that the overall construction deficiency reporting / disposition system was effectively implemented. Corrective action as a result of the expanded review is also discussed. Discussion of the issue is structured along the lines of the major elements of the expandad program as follows:

1. Review of the specific nonconformance reports and deficiency reports identified by the NRC. .

II. Review of Ebasco Nonconformance Reports III. Review of Mercury Nonconformance Reports IV. Review of Ebasco Deficiency Reports. 6-2

Throo g:ncrcl etnclucions hivo rasultcd to dato from tha originci cnd exprnd:d reviews, as follows:

1. No additional condition was identified in these reviews which, were it to have remained uncorrected, would have affected adversely the safety of operations of Waterford 3.
2. Corrective action required as a result of the reviews _nvolved correction of docu=entatien deficiencies, reinspection or engineering evaluation and only limited hardware rework.
  .               3. Due to the structure of the filing system, systematic review of the Waterford 3 construction deficiency documentation is difficult, but is achievable.

I. Review of the Soecific NCRs and DRs identified by the NRC The Ebasco and Mercury NCRs and the Ebasco DRs identified by the NRC' were first reviewed by Ebascc Quality Assurance Engineers. The NCRs and DRs were reviewed for proper disposition, corrective action completion, appropriate documentation, and proper closure. Upon completion of Ebasco's review and required corrective actions, LP&L QA reviewed the NCRs and corrective actions taken by Ebasco, and sampled the Ebasco review of DRs. LP&L Project Engineering reviewed the NCR's for technical concent. The review of NRC identified Ebasco and Mercury NCRs and Ebasco DRs was scoped - as follows: A. Ebasco Nonconformance Repotts c~ - , Thirty Ebasco NCRs are identified by the NRC in this issue. In addition, seven Ebasco NCRs related to this issue are specifically* . identified in Supplement 7 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SSER)* which was issued on October 1, 1984. Attachment 1 summarizes the results of the revi w of NRC identified Ebasco NCRs. B. Mercury Nonconfor=ance Reports Twenty-three Mercury NCRs are identified by the NRC in this issue. An additional fifteen Mercury NCRs related to this issue are specifically identified in the SSER. Attachment 2 summarizes the results of the review of NRC identified Mercury NCRs. C. Ebasco Deficiency Reports ! Ten Ebasco DRs are identified by the NRC in this issue. An additional three Ebasco DRs related to this issue are specifically identified in the SSER. Limited docu=entation deficiencies were identified and corrected, none of which were safety significant, NUREG 0787 (SER Supplement 7 - September 1984) h d l 6_1 _ . . , _ . _ - __m-_,,,__ _ . _ , _ , _ _ . , , , _ - _ _ _ . _ , - _ ,

The review cf tha NRC identified docuesnes har been completed. While 0.\ program procedural deficiencies existed, no safety significent deficiencies have been identified. II. Eeview of Ebasco Nonconfermance Reports The review of Ebasco site Nonconfor=ance Reports ence: passed approximately 98% of the site NCR numbers issued by Ebasco during the construction of Waterford 3. The review consisted of several elements, each with its own particular level of review. Figure 6-1 depicts the ele =ents of Ebasco NCR review process in the form of a flow diagram, in order to facilitate understanding of the process. FIGURE 6-1 REVIEW OF E3ASCO NCRs NCR'S 1530E3 SY EE ASCO 

                                                                                         ~             7,800 NCR'S I

INITIAL LPSL REVIEW DCTAILE '.P SL R EVI EW NCR*$ CLOSED PRICR NC R 'S CLCSED TO 2/84 AFTER 2/84 

     .      N T.1,00 NCR'S                         ,                       .                                                                                                                 $32 hCR* S

(' P C*ENTI ALLY ' PCTINTI A LLY CEFICIENT OEFICIENT S ATIS FA CTOR Y ESASCO " REVIEW S ATISFAC TOR Y 4 NCR'S & RESPONSES ,v 461 NCR'S N6643 NCR'S .N 4!T Tl NCR'S j m 303 NCA*S I 1 

                          ~~~

I LPSL REVIEW , , a 508 NCR'S XTAILED SAMPLE REYF#l S ATIS Fa CTO R Y lCriC:ENT . PEC4RW OEF103 ENC:E! .146 NCR'S 124 NC R'S SAFETY SIGhlFIC ANT 0 FIC: ENC:ES-C N:A! l y fv362 NC9'Sy S ATISFACTO RY OEFICIENT. PRoCR AM CEFICIENCICS - 23 NCR'S SAFETY SIGNf FtC ANT DEriC:ENCIES - 0 N:R'S O O a 95 

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                                                        . . , - , . - - - . - . - -       .y.  , , . -       .,--..-r    ,-,   --.,w          -                          -
                                                                                                                                           .,,-,..7--, , - ~ _ - - , , , - , - - .- -- - - -

Thi following paragraphs discuss tha individuel clercnts of tha rcview of Ebasco I NCRs: A. LP&L 0A Review of Ebasco NCRs closed prior to February 1984

1. ' Initial Review
                                   ~
        .        In February 1984, LP&L QA initiated a review of Ebasco NCRs. This review was undertaken to verify, by way of a Work Instruction, that:
a. The disposition addressed the described discrepancy;
b. The NCR was reviewed for reportability under 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR21; and
c. The NCR had received the appropriate signatures.

Approximately 7100 Ebasco NCRs were reviewed and 437 potentially deficient NCRs were identified. Upon completion of the evaluation, it was determined that 122 NCRs were deficient in disposition, corrective action, software or closure, or combinations thereof. Corrective cction required as a result of this review involved only limited hardware rework and correction of documentation deficiencies. I Seventy-two of the NCRs were considered. potentic11y deficient for lack of

. documented evidence that they had been reviewed for reportability per 10CFR50.55 e) or 10CFR21. Subsequent documenrod ' reviq, w s of these NCRs l determined (that none were repertable. *
l. f *
N. '
2. Detailed Review '

LP&L selected 124 (approximately 28%) of the potentially deficient NCRs identified in the initial review for an in-depth review. .This review included hardware verification for rework / repair, software verification for updating as-built drawings and specifications and evaluation of documentation for the required corrective actions and retrievability .of ~ documentation. As a result of this detailed review, 33 NCRs were found to be deficient. and seven CIWAs were initiated to address the deficiencies. None of these deficiencies met the criterion for safety significance. Corrective' action - for 30 of the deficient NCRs involved correction of documentation deficiencies, reinspection or engineering evaluation. For - the remaining three, limited discretionary rework is being performed. B. Detailed LP&L OA Review of Ebasco NCRs closed after February 1984 Ebasco NCRs closed after February 1984 were reviewed as a separate group by LP&L QA. Review of these NCRs was in-depth and was for the purpose of verifying proper disposition, adequate documentation to support the required corrective action, required software changes completed and proper closure. Five' hundred thirty two (532) NCRs were reviewed with 71 NCRs requiring resolution of comments. Of those 71 NCRs, 24 were determined to have valid deficiencies. Corrective action for 22 of the deficient NCRs involved correction of documentation deficiencies, reinspection or enginscring evaluation. For the remaining two, limited discretionary rework is being performed. 6-5

C. 'Ebrace NCR Closurea Tim lintss

!- With respect to the NRC concern regarding timeliness of Ebasco NCR closure, Ebasco procedure ASP-III-7, " Processing ~ of Nonconformance", required completion of corrective action within twenty (20) days of receipt of the- t 

 ,                       dispositioned NCR.              If the verification of corrective- action was ' ' no t I-                        completed within the allotted twenty days, a written request for extension F                       - was to be filed uith the Ebasco Quality Assurance Department for approval.

The twentf day time period did not begin until the nonconformance report had been dispositioned and evaluated by the appropriate departments. The twenty day requirement was for administrative control only and did not adversely af fect the quality of Waterford 3.- In- December, 1983, Ebasco 4 procedure ASP-III-7 was revised to deleta this requirement. 1 All Ebasco NCRs closed as of approximately the end of September, 1984 ! (Approximately 98% of the Ebasco NCRs issued) were subjected to an LP&L review as - described above. While program deficiencies existed, and minor rework was required, no safety significant deficiencies have been identified. III. Mercurv Nonconformance Reports i Mercury dispositioned approximately 3700 Mercury NCRs. Of these, approximately 1700 were upgraded to Ebasco NCRs and, as such, were reviewed [ as - Ebasco NCRs (See Sectt,on II of this response). The remaining Mercury NCRs were reviewed as follows: i

A. Mercury NCRs dispositioned "Use As-Is" were reviewed to assure that
                                .they were upgraded to Ebasco NCRs, as required. As a result of this
j. (- review, eleven NCRs were deemed to require upgrading .to Ebasco NCRs.

4 (. , These, eleven NCRs are now identified on Ebasco NCRs, and were l processed under the Ebasco NCR program.

  • l-1 B. Approximately 1850 Mercury NCRs were dispositioned " rework / repair" or i
                                "rej ect . " In most cases, when Mercury designated a deficiency to be                                     -

corrected by " repair", it was, in fact, a " rework." For example, in !. dispositioning rej ected welds, Mercury would specify the weld be

" repaired" in accordance with procedures to meet the design

! requirements. This is accually a " rework" disposition. Mercury l procedures did state that deviations from original design or technical ! . specification outside the tolerances allowed was a " repair". Mercury i procedures required nonconformances meeting this criteria to be upgraded to Ebasco NCRs so that these deviations would be reviewed and approved by Ebasco. 

                                                      /
                               ' A random sampleJof 66 Mercury NCRs from those dispositioned " rework /

l repair" was selected for review. These NCRs were reviewed for proper disposition, adequate documentation of corrective actions required,and

proper closure. LP&L QA reviewed each sampled Mercury NCR in l accordance with QASP 19.17. Deficiencies were corrected and
- documented. None were found to be of safety significance. ,

t ! C. Seven hundred twenty five (725) of the 1850 Mercury NCRs dispositioned ! " rework / repair" and " reject" were reviewed by Ebasco for reportability l per 10CFR50.55(e) . None of the NCRs were determined to be reportable. i . LP&L QA selected a random sample of 64 of these NCRs for a l reportability review and the Ebasco conclusions were confirmed. i r 6-6 l I

D. Mercury documented material conditionally released from Ebasco on Material Receiving Reports (MRR) and assigned Mercury NCR numbers to 

   '               each    such   MRR   in   accordance      with   Mercury    Procedure    SP664.

Approximately 120 Mercury NCRs of this type were identified by Ebasco. LP&L reviewed the Mercurt files and, although the conditional releases appeared to have been preperly handled, there were instances where supporting information (Ebasco NCRs, DNs) was neither referenced nor included in the documentation package. The supperting infor=ation is available and will be either included or referenced, in the NCR packages, as appropriate. This review of dispositioned Mercury NCRs is complete. While program 

 ,     deficiencies existed, no safety significant deficiencies have been identified.
      .The results of these sample reviews establish a 95:; confidence level that at least 95% of the total population of Mercury NCRs do not contain unreported conditiona reportable under 10CFR50.55(e) or 10CFR21.

IV. Review of Ebasco Deficiency Reports The Ebasco QAIRG review of contractors records required that deficiencies be documented on Deficiency Reports in accordance with QAl-9, " Review and Handling of Construction Installation (DRs) Records". A random sample of DRs generated as result of the review of Mercury and Tompkins-Beckwith records was reviewed for proper closure. For each contractor, 230 QAI 9.2 Deficiency Report Sheets were selected and reviewed as follows: (' L A. The review of Deficiency Reports on Tompkins-Beckwith included 115 Deficiency Report Sheets on piping and one hundred fif teen QAI 9.2 

                ' Deficiency Report Sheets on seismic hangers and supports. These QAl
  • 9.2 Deficiency Report Sheets included approximately 856 DRs. This review identified 12 DRs which required engineering evaluation and concurrence. Although minor deficiencies, such as missing references, signatures or dates were identified, the DR cl:sures were satisfactory.

B. The review of the 230 Mercury QAI 9.2 Deficiency Report Sheets was divided equally among P-2 and P-3 tubing, ,and tube track supports. These QAI 9.2 Deficiency Report Sheets included approximately 1173 DRs. The review identified 31 DRs which required engineering evaluation. The engineering evaluations are in progress. Although minor deficiencies, such as missing references, signatures or dates were identified, the DR closures were satisfactory. LP&L QA performed audits of the Ebasco review. These audits included random samples of the Mercury and Tompkins-Beckwith des reviend by Ebasco. While documentation deficiencies existec, no safety significant deficiencies, or deficiencies requiring rework, have been identified. CAUSE The retiew program verified that deficiencies were generally processed in , accordance with the site procedurcs. Howeve , those procedures did not provide adequately specific. guidelines for the implementation of procedural requirements which led to excessive need for judgements and interpretatiens. This program weakness led to

  • the inconsistencies in handling deficiencies at Waterford 3 which have been identified by LP&L and the NRC.

6-7 t

GENERIC IMPLICATIONS 

        'The review program encompassed approximately 98% of the Ebasco NCRs and statistically justified samples of Mercury NCRs and Ebasco DRs. The results of an in-depth review and verification of a conservative sample of NCRs and DRs'has provided adequate confidence that the deficiency system did not allow conditions in dispositioned NCRs/DRs to romain unreported per 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR21.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE , LP&L has perfor=ed a review of major elements of the construction deficiency reporting / disposition system. The results of this review indicate that, in general, the system was effectively implemented. The procedu:as contained the basic requirements for documenting and controlling deficient conditions. The deficiencies identified during the review of nonconformances are considered minor in nature and were generally resolved with the addition of documentation or further evaluation. The items dispositioned as rework were based on good engineering practice or management conservatism rather than on safety significance. There is no recognized reason that this issue should constrain fuel load or power operation. CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN / SCHEDULE All reviews and required corrective actions are completed. , i ATTACHMENTS

1. Ebasco Nonconformance Reports Identified by the NRC.

q, .- .

2. Mercury Nonconformance Reports Identified by ifhe NRC.
   ~ '~

REFERENCES _,_ _ None. l 6-8

ATTACHMENT 1 s E3ASCO NCNCONFORMANCE REPORTS IDENTIFIED BY THE NRC The following is a list of E3ASCO Ncnconformance Reports (NCRs) identified by the NRC in Issue No. 6 and in Supplement 7 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SSER). The list identifies the NRC. Concerns with each NCR and the Resolution , or Corrective Action. The list also summarizes additional concerns identified as a result of the LP&L Review and the Resolution or Corrective Action. It should be ncted that dispositioned NCR's were reviewed. for reportability under 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR21 and none were found to be reportable. A. Ebsseo NCR's Identified in Issue No. 6 l

1. NCR W3-1650 (a) NRC CONCERN How was it determined which bolts to ratest when QCP 309 did not require the recording of tester serial number on previous tests?

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION All uses of gauge QC 4.2.2 by F&M (QCP-309) were accepted-as-is by ESSE with no further action required. 

                                                                 ~                  "

Tension tester gauge QC 4.2.2 was issued and tracked on Ebasco's (o 

  .                    M&TE Master L'og. Review of this , log indicated each centractor
             .         that was issu'ed QC 4.2.2 during the time it was out of calibration. Each contractor reviewed his installation records to see if tension testing was done during this time. If so, a description of the work was given to ESSE for evaluation. Each use was accepted as-is by ESSE based upon the small degree of error found during recalibration.

! (b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS l

1. All issunnees of subject pressure gauge not properly addressed in NCR.

l 2. Statement by user of pressure gauge is not acceptable for ! dispositioning of NCR. - l RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION l l 1. Records of tension tests were evaluated by ESSE of thoso users (contractors) of gauge not previously addressed. l 2. Review conducted of contractor tension test records did not reveal any use of pressure gauge by this individual. I Documentation of this review attached to NCR. l i . 6-9

ATTACHMENT 1

2. NCR W3-3912 (a) NRC CCNCERNS
1. Involved nine 23J-2 type supports discovered during walkdown for which the fit-up inspection was by-passed. The original NCR disposition f ailed to address the actions required to prevent the reuse of the items. Attachment No. 14 of this NCR identified this issue which was resolved by stating "it was not required for the disposition of this NCR..." No other NCR was reopened or referenced to resolve the issue.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. Support #8 was not removed because of HVAC interferences.

This support will be ,$roperly tagged as "not to be utilized-nonconforming".

2. Support #13 (angle to plate) would be acceptable for rouse in its intended design application since it would not be possible to cluster enough tubing attachments to reach the yield point of the structure.
3. The remainder of the supports (angle to existing steel) were removed. Since the material is traceable by heat number, it is approved for safety-related applications.
3. NCR W3-3919 (a) NRC CONCERNS
1. 530' more tubing installed than received.
2. Requisicion on warehouse (ROW) changed using Liquid Paper.
3. 10% of OCR Packages selected to verify heat number of installed tubing. Only one (1) OCR Package actually reflected heat in question.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION NCR re-opened and re-evaluated by QA Engineering and ESSE. Final evaluation was to accept-as-is based upon t.h e contractor's Material control Program.

4. NCR W3-4088 (Mercury 491)

(a) NRC CONCERNS There was no description attached to the NCR to verify that corrective action was accomplished or completed. t 6-10

y ATTACHMENT 1

4. NCR W3-4088 (Continued)

RESOLUTION OR CCRRECTIVE ACTION

1. Found and attached a copy of LP&L CIWA 828372. which . was issued to perform the corrective action for SCR-W3-4088,
2. Found and attached a Mercury Q.C. report which verifies adequate completion of corrective action.
3. Found and attached a Mercury weld data report for the replacement welds.
4. Found and attached. a copy of drawing 100-T-035-A, which reflects the, replacement welds described in 03 above.

(b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS

1. Inadequate "use-as-is" justification provided by engineering, for discrepant items B, C, & G on NCR attachment #1.
2. Drawing 100-T-035-A showing the affected instrument line was f

not attached to the NCR.

3. Supporting weld data documentation was not attached to the NCR.

RES0iUTION dR CORRECTIVE ACTION 

                                                                                                        ~                                        '

(-

1. Obtained and att' ached additional ESSE evaluations to the NCR.
2. Obtained and attached copy of drawing 100-T-035A to'the NCR.
3. Obtained and attached a copy of Mercury's weld data report ~~-"

for the replacement welds.

5. NCR W3-4137 (Mercury #420)

(a) NRC CONCERNS

1. Improper NCR closure ,and reopening.
2. Incorrect reporting system (DN in lieu of NCR).

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. NCR-W3-4137 was reopened and processed in accordance with applicable procedures.

(b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS

1. NCR Corrective Action did not adequately correct the discrepancies. ,
2. DN-SQ-1991 was not properly processed in accordance with the applicable procedures.

e 6-11

m b 

                       ,.                                                                        g        ,

a j q mg V y ATTACHMENT 1 

                                                                              \

c

5. NCR W3-4137 (Mercury il420) '
                                                                                                      .:e,"

RESOLUTION CR CORRECTIVE ACTION 

                                                                                                        \

l '. Support 'was reinspected to provide "as-built" and submit:ed to engineering for design evaluation. ESSE evaluated the condition to be acceptable and drawing was revised to reflect existing field condicien. _ 2.~ Corrective action for violation of Procedure WQC-il50 (DN in lieu of NCR) cannot be accomplished since subject procedure has been retired.

6. NCR W3-4219 (a)' NRC CONCERNS There are no records for rework or reinspection to indicate satisfactory reinstallation of supports and sample lines.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION Sample line ' vas reworked to original design and tracked on Mercury NCR 664.  ?.eference Attachment #3 of NCR W3-4219 for an 

            ,    acceptable evaluation by Construction Engineering.

( .

7. NCR W3-5563 (a) NRC CONCERNS ,

t

1. Inspections signed off by an uhiqualified inspector. s (
2. Inspection reports co-signed by Level II inspector 3 years '

and 5 months later. - RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ' 

                                                                                                                      \

NCR reopened and CIWA #011340 written to re-inspect Fuel Handling - Building (FHB) Crane. This work was completed and CIWA closed on 11/15/84. The installation was found to be acceptable. ' t 9 i

8. NCR W3-5564 s (a) NRC CONCERNS **

Disposition of NCR for inspection through paint is unacceptable, due to paint, precludes adequate visual inspection of the welds. RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION Downgrading of FHB stairways from seismic class 1 to seismic class II eliminates te requirements for visual inspection. 

                                            '-7.._-,.._... _ _ .      . _ - _ _ . - _ _ - -                          ..-

g' . 

  ,. . y ATTACHMENT 1
8. NCR W3-5564 (Continued) *

(b) LF&L IDEN~IFIED CONCERNS w-

1. No QC verification signate.e on the sketches provided in attachment #23 of.the NCR.
*'                               2. Insufficient ESSE evaluar on for downgrading seismic Class 1 stairs in the FHB, to se.smic class II.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. Ebasco Q.C. performed and documented a verification of the items identified in the stairwell on NCR attachment #23, and attached the results to the NCR as attachment #24.
2. ESSE Electrical and HVAC reviewed the information in NCR attachments #23 and #24, and determined them to be non-safety.
9. NCR W3-5565 t
                                                                                  ~

(a) NRC CONCERNS , 1. The Qualification of the Q.C. inspector who performed the f , inspection of reeving of the F.H.B. Crane. c 2. The documentation of the reinspection was not' attached to the NCR as directed by,the NCR. 4 RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. The Fuel Handling Building Crane was turned ever to the LP&L with subsequent testing and reinspection performed by the LP&L on 1/29/83 per procedure SPO-40-002.
2. The testing and inspection data performed by LP&L has been attached to the NCR.

(b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS Nonconformance was reopened on April 26, 1984 to add attachment i 1A and closed the same day without documented evidence that the investigation as required in the attachment was actually performed. RESOLUTION'OR CORRCCTIVE ACTION Attachment 5 has been added to the NCR to reference LP&L test procedure SPO-40-002 which documented the final functional

testing of the subject crane.
                  ,oye. . . , _ -w          ---e       eg          w' * ' ' - " * * * " " ' - " " " - ' " " " - " * ' - " ' ' ' -             '

ATTACHMEhi 1

10. NCR W3-5586 (a) NFC CONCE2NS
1. Welders Test Lab was not on Mercury's quclified suppliers litt, and this item was not addressed in the NCR disposition.
2. Statement provided by Welders Test Lab, that "a Mercury i Inspector reviewed all tests", is not adequate.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. Mercury audits of Welders Test Lab for years 1979, 1980, 1981 & 1982 added as information to verify Mercury surveillance of supplier's activities.
2. Statements from present and former contractor employees and corporate officials added to support the fact that qualified contractor personnel reviewed all tests.
11. NCR W3-6159 (a) NRC CONCERNS:

3 (

  • 1. Traceability problems were not identified and addressed by the NCR. -
2. The sample used for- ter eil'e testing the welds was questionable in that the worst case example should have been used for the test.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. All tubetrack materials are purchased, received and maintained by Ebasco's QA Program. Material is requisitioned by subcontractors from the Ebasco warehouse.
2. Calculated stress levels imposed on the veld were
                         . conservatively established, taking credit for only 50% of the specified weld          length    and   assuming   design    basis earthquake.

(b) LP&L IDB7IFIED CONCERNS

1. Six (6) out of twenty-two (22) welds were found to contain .

weld defects. What was done to increase the sample size?

2. No evidence to indicate the test samples were selected fron
                          " Worst Case" installations                                                           I s
                                         ^

_m.._-- _ _ _ , . _ , - _ ,

ATTAC10iENT 1

11. NCR W3-6159 (Continued)

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. QAIRG records review required reinspection of 67'; of tube track. No other rejectable condit, ions were found.
                  -2. Calculated stress levels imposed on the weld                                      were conservatively established, taking credit for only 50% of the specified weld              length         and            assuming design    basis earthquske.
12. NCR W3-6165 (a) NRC CONCERN
1. There is no indication of measures taken to preclude recurrence.

RF. SOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. A review of filler metal requisitions and T&B time sheets
   ,   ,                 indicates that welder R-7 not R-1 made the veld concerned, and R-1 was not employed during the time the weld was made,
   -(           .

therefore, measures taken to preclude recurrence was not necessary. ~ (b) LP&L IDENTI'FIED CONCERNS

1. Documented verification that velder R-1 was not on site should be . .cluded.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. Review attached to NCR indicating welder R-1 not on site during the time period weld was made.
13. NCR W3-6221 (a) NRC CONCERN
1. Weld control records signed off by Level I Inspector.
2. Letter of designation based on revision of QA Manual not if effect at the time of letter issuance.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION ,

1. LP&L QA evaluated inspectors experience, education, and training and determined the inspector was qualified to .

perform the designated activities.

ATTACHMENT 1

14. NCR W3-6511 (c) NRC CONCZRNS
1. The NCR only addressed the fact that the taxinum gap was violated, should have included undersize weld; lack of fusion; are strikes and undercut.
2. There are no records of rework or reinspection.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECT!VE ACTION

1. Support was reinspected by Ebasco QC and as-built data supplied cc ESSE. ESSE accepted support "as-is".
2. Documentation posted to Mercury installation package to assure update to as-built installation documentation.
15. NCR W3-6597 (Mercury #2870)

(a) NRC CONCERNS

1. NCR exceeded the closure time requirements of ASP-III-7, section 6.1.3.a.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION C: -

1. The closure time requireme'nt is generically addressed in Issue #6 report. -

(b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS

1. No traceability for installed bolt, nut and lockwasher.
2. No torquing for the bolting above.
3. DCN not referenced on drawing.
4. Were new H11ti's installed?

If this was a re-verification of torqua, where is original torqr.e documentation? RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. Nonc required -

purchased co=mercial grade with C of C provided by supplier. 1

2. No torque value required.
3. DCN was incorporated on drawing.  ;
4. New Hilti's were not installed. This was the original torque inspection.

i 4 y wo - w +w - - 

                                                              ---w   ~           ~ v

ATTACHMENT 1

16. NCR W3-6623 (c) NRC CONCERNS
1. What actions were done to assure that no additional heat numbers were falsified?
2. Identity of the person who forged the signature and entered the incorrect heat numbers on the Ouality Records.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. A review of all installed process tubing records back to their applicable CMTR was performed by Ebasco QAIRG.
2. Identity of person is unknown and cannot be ascertained since contractor is no longer on site.

(b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS

1. Evidence that the " untraceable" material was returned to the warehouse or scrapped.
2. Evidence that a search for r'.;itional f alsified records was performed with regard to the Mercury program.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. Warehouse records were researched no evidence 'of return was
                        .found.

2.- QAIRG and LP&L turnover review found no other cases of falsification.

17. NCR W3-6723 (a) NRC CONCERNS
  • F&M procedure QC-309 violated ANSI N45.2 Section 13, because it -

did not require the tension tester serial number, pressure gage number or calibration date to be recorded. LESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION During the time frame involved there were only two (2) pressure gauges / tension testers that were utilized sitewide. QC 4.2.1 & QC 4.2.2. These gauges were maintained under Ebasco 's M&TE procedure WQC-4. Copies of the calibration records are attached to NCR-W3-7184.

ATTACHMENT 1

18. NCR W3-6786 (a) NRC CONCERN
1. Possible heat numbers not recorded on the as-built drawings.
2. NCR did not address where the required hect numbers were recorded.
3. NCR did not address how traceability was maintained.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. NCR-W3-4593 was reopened and addressed the following:
a. Verified that any tubing purchased non-safety was not used in a safety application or was replaced.
b. Site procedure required material purchased non-safety to be identified (i.e. painting, marking, etc.)
c. NCR-W3-4593 S/1 was referenced in all Mercury P2 and P3 OCR packages where direct traceability is not documented,
d. A list of manufacturers and heat numbers for tubing is attached to NCR-W3-6786 and 4593.

(b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS , , (' l. 2 .- 

                                   . Heat numbers not posted to "As-Built" drawings.

NCR did not adequately address if the "PAB" (Preliminary As 

   .                               . Built) Program.
3. The NCR did not determine if all possible heat numbers were traceable to the safety /non-safety installations and/or to the applicable P.O.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION 1,2&3 NCR-W3-4593 was re-opened, redispositioned and addressed the concerns as stated above for NCR-W3-6786. NCR-W3-4593 S/l with attachments addressing heat numbers added to NCR-W3-6786.

19. NCR W3-7099 (a) NRC CONCERNS
1. No documentation to adequately support the NCR Disposition.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. Stress calculations utilized as a basis for disposition have been attached to the NCR.
           ,,.,-.n      p,      --      ,m,-        ,e.-g,,,------,,.-mg----
                                                                                - - - - , - .   -e--e -r.eww....-,---,,r-,-  -
                                                                                                                                ,.w -.r.. m-. ew-,   , e- w e n   -mm-,-s,-, - - -

1 ATTACHMENT'l 

 .        19. NCR W3-7099 (Continued)

(b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS

1. Cracks in heat affected zone of cabinets 48A & B.
2. Smaller than design embed plates.
3. Flare bevel in lieu of fillet velds.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. Cracks evaluated and accepted by ESSE based on low stress.
2. Embed plates are the correct size; cabinet 48A requires a split 4"x4"x3/8 tube steel (which leaves 3" wide exposure) and cabinet 48B required a 4" wide plate.
3. Flare bevels, fillets and lengths accepted by ESSE based on design calculations indicating low stresses in weld.
20. NCR W3-7139 (a) NRC CONCERNS QC data in NCR was incorrect for 2 of 3 radiation monitors.

RESOLUTION OR CdRRECTIVE ACTION . C:~ - NCR re-opened and lett'er of clarification and inspection report added to NCR. . (b)- LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS F&M Inspection Report #303-71-624 contains only sheet 1 of 3 and does not include a list of the discrepant supports. RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION Sheets 2 and 3 of Inspection Report added.

21. NCR W3-7140 (a) NRC CONCERNS None were identified in the allegations associated with this issue in Supplement 7 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SS ER) .

ATTACHMENTJ r

21. NCR W3-7140 (Continued)

(b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCE21;S

1. Traceability of rework materials not recorded.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. Rework consisted of additional welding only, filler metal requisition form enclosed in documentation of NCR.
22. NCR W3-7177 (a) NRC CONCERNS
1. No calibration of pressure gauge used on expansion anchor tension tester.
2. Requirement that three additional anchors be tested after failure of one not adhered to.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. Inspectors signature attests that tension testing was performed per governing specification. *
2. Subsequent retests were performed with acceptable results.
   ' 23. NCR W3-7179                       .                                                    -

(a) NRC CONCERN None were identified in the allegations associated with this , issue in Supplement 7 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SSER). (b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS NCR is acceptable RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION None required. l 1 s l

F ATTACHMENT 1

24. NCR W3-7180 (a) NRC CONCERNS F&M procedure QC-309 violated ANSI N45.2 Section 13, because it did not require the tension tester serial number, pressure gage number or calibration date to be recorded.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION During the time frame involved there were only. two (2) pressure gauges / tension testers that were utilized sitewide, QC 4.2.1 & QC 4.2.2. These gauges were maintained under Ebasco's M&TE procedure WQC-4. Copies of the calibration records are attached to NCR-W3-7184.

25. NCR W3-7181 (a) NRC CONCERNS F&M procedure QC-309 violated ANSI N45.2 Section 13, because it did not require the tension tester serial number, pressure gage number or calibration -date to be recorded.

C- ~ RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION at During the time frame involved there were only two (2) pressure - gauges / tension testers that were utilized sitewide,-QC 4.2.1 & QC 4.2.2. These gauges were maintained under Ebasco's M&TE procedure "QC-4. Copies of the calibration records are attached to NCR-W3-7184.

26. NCR W3-7182 (a)_. NRC CONCERNS F&M procedure QC-309 violated ANSI N45.2 Section 13, because it did not require the tension tester serial number, pressure gage number or calibration date to be recorded.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION During the cine frame involved there were only two (2) pressure gauges / tension testers that were utilized sitewide, QC 4.2.1 & QC. 4.2.2. These gauges were er.intained under Ebasco's M&TE procedure WQC-4. Copies of the calibration reecrds are attached [ to NCR-W3-7184.

ATTACHMENT 1

27. NCR W3-7184 '

(a) NRC CONCERNS F&M procedure QC-309 violated ANSI N45.2 Section 13, because it did.not require the tension tester serial number, pressure gage number or calibration date to be recorded. RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION , During the time frame involved there were only two (2) pressure gauges / tension teaters that were utilized sitewide, QC 4.2.1 & QC 4.2.2. These gauges were maintained under Ebasco's M&TE procedure WQC-4. Copies of the calibration records are attached to NCR-W3-7184.

28. NCR W3-7432 (a) NRC CONCERNS
1. Concrete preplacement & post-placement documentation could not be matched. -
2. No specific references were used for voiding the NCR.

( 3. QA . Engineer approved the recommended disposition and then voided the'NCR. . RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION .

1. NCR-W3-7431 R1 addressed curing violations. NCR-W3-7435 addressed the placement documentation.
2. Late entry added to NCR-W3-7432 referencing NCR's W3 7431 R1
                                 & W3-7435.
3. Not a procedural violation per ASP-III-7 Rev. '5. The recommended disposition was approved 11/23/83; NCR was voided 1/16/84.
  1. 29. NCR W3-7533 (a) NRC CONCERNS None were identified in the allegations associated with this issue in supplement 7 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SSER).

(b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS NCR is acceptable. RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION None required. 

                                                                             .._~                                                                                            ,
       , , , -   .   .   ,-        - ~ ,    .- , ,-. - . , - , - - , . .               , , , - - . - , . _ , - - , - , , - . , . - . - - -   , , - , . _ . . , , - - - - -

ATTACHMENT 1 2

30. NCR W3-7547 (a) NRC CONCERNS
1. Improper i sgineering evaluation is demonstrated with an accept-as-is disposition based on an acceptable hydrostatic test.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION The disposition was based on prior acceptance of fit-up and final weld inspection and that the pressure boundary had not been violated therefore no hydrostatic test is required. (b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS:

1. Is the fit-up of FW-5 acceptable?

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. Radiographic examination of FW-5 was performed and fit-up gap engagement requirements were met.
       ,   B. _Ebasco NCR'S Identified-in Supplement 7 to the SSER
              ~                                                    '

The _ following Ebasco NCR's were identified by the NRC in Supplement 7 to the Safety Evaluation Report published October 1, 1984.

1. NCR W3-3947 a) NRC CONCERN Fit-up inspection was by-passed and the support- had been completely welded out with only the welder's identification number.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION pj' Inspection revealed an acceptable heat number (15537) cf 1:;" angle and filler metal withdrawal authorization slip furnished - for hanger. An additional visual inspection revealed an accep:able final weld. i. l

_m

F ATTACHMENT 1

2. NCR W3-4593 a) MRC CONCERN Disposition inadequate.

RESOLUTION OR CCRRECTIVE ACTION NCR was re-opened as Supplement 1 (S/1) since original disposition of NCR-W3-4593 had not been correctly implemented. Mercury's material control program was analyzed based on purchase of materials, material identification and dimensional verification. = In April, 1954, NCE-W3-4593 S/l was closed. Based 'on this analysis, it can be shown that safety-related tubing of correct size and wall thickness was installed by Mercury. Therefore, having addressed the requirements of a material control program and identified and corrected deficiencies noted, direct heat traceability is not required for Mercury tubing installation. In additi.on, NCR-W3-4593 S/1 was referenced in all of Mercury's P2 and P3 OCR packages where direct traceability was no t-documented, cnd a document was attached, which provided a list of manufacturers of tubing, and heat numbers furnished. L.

3. NCK W3-581i ,

a) NRC CONCERN l Identified the problem of instrumentation supports being painted i prior to final weld visual inspection. Disposition had been to , inspect the welds through paint which was unacceptable. RESOLUTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION ' NCR supplemented with ESSE evaluation " Reinspection of Welds through Paint for Size and Profile" for additional justification. .

4. NCR W3-5973 a) NRC CONCERN None were identified in the Allegations associated with this
       ,         issue in Supplenent 7 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SSER).          ,

ATTACHMENT 1

4. NCR W3-5973 (Continued)  !

, b)- LP&L CONCERN NCR is acceptable, j RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION 

                                               ~

None required. . i

5. NCR W3-5974 a) NRC CONCERNS l The NCR's disposition is questionable as the problem still ,

existed in that safety and non-safety grade material could have 4 been mixed. l RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION The attachments added to NCR as a result of corrective action , were the back-up data used in verifying whether or not the  ; material was safety related. Each Seismic I hanger / piping system , component was verified by the QAIRG group as being safety i. 

  '('-         related.            Thgse items which were found to be non-safety were                       L removed and safety. material installed.                    ,                                 i      ,

i

6. NCR U3-6514 a) NRC CONCERN
              -Mercury installed supports without material traceability.

i RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION Bergen Patterson designed supports 7 other than ASME NF supports, do not require traceability. The structural members were supplied by Bergen Patterson and cere received with a certificate . of compliance. b) LP&L CONCERN Attachment No. 6, Iten 1 is not justification for closure of NCR. RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION A late entry note added to Attachment No. 6 provided an expanded discussion on the use and acceptance of letter F-61147E. The statement (Item 1) of Attachment No. 6, in conjunction with Itces 2 and 3 of the Attachment, were the basis for closing this NCR. j 6-25

l l ATTACHMENT 1 9

7. NCR W3-6719 l

a) NRC CONCERNS  ! The hydrostatic test conditions were assumed by Ebasco to be the 

                " worst case" and therefore that "all" other hydrostatic tests performed by Mercury were deemed satisfactory. This was not the case, since only one test was reviewed by Ebasco.

RESOLUTION OK CORRECTIVE ACTION Attachment No. 17 written by ESSE clarifying justification of selection of worst case condition and providing support calculations. e

  • C -

e L 5_ :,4

ATTACHMENT 2 MERCURY NONCONFOTWANCE REPORTS IDENTIFIED-BY THE NRC f The following is a list of Mercury Nonconfornance Reports (NCR's) identified by the NEC in Issue No. 6 and in Supplement 7 to the Safety Evaluaticn Report (SSER). The list identifies the NRC concerns with each NCR and the Resolution or Corrective Action. The list aise summarizes any additional concerns identified as a result of the LP&L Review and the Resolution or Corrective Action. It should be noted that dispositioned NCR's were reviewed for reportability under .0CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR21 and ncne were found to be reportable. . l A. Mercury NCR's Identified in Issue No. 6

1. NCR-180 (Ebasco NCR W3-6839)

(a) NRC CON JJS None were identified in the allegations associated with this issue in Supplement 7 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SSER). (b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS

1. No objective evidence provided for "as-built" condition of the discrepant Hilti's for the Engineering Evaluation.

{' RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION -

1. Testing was performed on bolts with an embedment of 3" where field installation procedures required 3h". Results of re-inspection of Hilti bolts under records review and N1 instrument walkdowns have found the as-built conditions to be generally acceptable. Any Hilti bolts without letter designation were ultrasonicly tested for length to determine proper embedment.
2. NCR-255 (a) NRC CONCERN None were identi51ed in the allegations associated with this issue in SuppleT.ent 7 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SSER).

(b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS The documentation of the corrective action was not available for eight of the fourteen supports requiring retorque. . RESOLL' TION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION The supports identisied as having misplaced documentation were reinspected. This ' action has been completed with acceptable I-results and attached within the N.C.R. package. 

                                                                 -e i-m3   --,g  -  -,y.,--  ,,,m,--,         ,-y..v-,~,e .,.,.-,.--,-m.,,i-.-,w-w., ,

I ATTACHMENT 2 , l

3. Mercury NCR-268 (a) NRC CCNCERN None were identified in the allegations associated with this issue in Supplement 7 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SSER).

(b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS

1. This NCR is not a rework as stated, it is a "use-as-is" since as-built information is to be redlined.
2. Should have been up-graded to an Ebasco NCR.
                             .3. No objective evidence Ebasco Engineering has approved the as-built conditions.
4. All deficiencies identified in the description' are . not addressed in the ds.sposition completed section of the NCR.
5. There is not obj ective evidence to indicate that all existing field conditions havC ' been incorporated into the redline drawing.
6. NCR was written 1/26/82 and closed 12/22/82. Training records supplied for corrective action are dated 11/29/82 (due te updated revision of five procedures released this date) and 6/17/84 (due to Ebasco audit) there is no evidence of timely retraining of personnel per disposition of NCR. ,

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. The NCR represents a procedural violation for failure to redline ~t he drawing prior to the installation of. the supports. There was no physical rework due to the actual installation being acceptable. This NCR was written as an in-process deficiency due to the inspector's findings during walkdown inspection.
2. The NCR wts not used to accept a deviation from design requirements, thus, did not require upgrad1ng to an Ebasco NCR.
3. As-built conditions were in accordance with- Ebasco guidelines provided to Mercury in the specifications and drawings.
4. The deficiencies identified were addressed by redlining the L drawing and requiring the training to address the procedural violation.
5. Copy of the drawing is attached.
6. No specific training records could be located for this NCE.

However, as a result of SCL ./57, all Mercury personnel : ere retrained. This training addressed redlining. J 9

ATTACHMENT 2 I 4 NCR-363 (a) NEC CONCERN An Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI) review was not performed for installation of strongback support lugs to ASME process pipe. RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION ASME process pipe is class 3 and does not require ANI review. (b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS

1. Mercury NCR should have been upgraded to an Ebasco NCR.
2. Mercury Proj ect Engineer did not verify similar installations for like condition.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. ESSE approved the existing condition by issuance of an DCN.
2. Ebasco QA reviewed similar installations and the review results were placed with the Mercury NCR File.
5. NCk-380(EbascoNCR-W3-4015) ,
         , (a) .NRC CONCERIS None were. identified in the allegations associated with this issue in Supplement 7 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SSER).

(b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS

1. Three sets of weld data records for support 604-70 are attached to the NCR. Unable to deter.nine which record is being used as a basis for acceptability.
2. Mercury documentation cannot be found for welding performed _

by velder M-229. RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. NCR-W3-4015 was revised to NCR-W3-4015 R-1 for clarification of this discrepancy.
2. Research by Ebasco revealed that welder M-229 was qualified to perform the welding on the anchor plates.
6. NCR-420 (Ebasco NCR W3-4137)

See Ebasco NCR W3-4137 - (Attachment 1, Item A.5) ( 4 4 e

ATTACHMENT 2 

 /  7. NCR-429 (Ebasco NCR W3-3965) 1 (a) NCR CONCEPSS l

None were identified in the allescrions associated with this issue in Supplement 7 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SSER). 

     .  (b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS NCR is acceptable.

RESOLUTION OR CORREC~IVE ACTION None required.

8. NCR-438 (Ebasco NCR W3-4013)

(a) NRC CONCERN None were identified in the allegations associated with this issue in Supplement 7 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SSER). (b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS

1. The disposit,1on did not addiess the action taken to preclude C- the use of the, angle iron 'that was removed from the Mercury suppo rt'.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION The piece of angle was removed from the Mercury support, thereby resolving the nonconforming condition. Maintaining traceability of non-safety material (angle) is not required.

9. NCR-487 (Ebasco NCR W3-4044)

(a) NRC CONCEPSS None were identified iri che allegations associated with this  ! issue in Supplement 7 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SSER). (b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS . I*

1. Item No. 15 - Attachment #3 - Evaluation does not provide ,

evidence that drawing has been redlined to reflect field . 3 conditions. Calculations should also be accached to verify

  • additional loads for the attachment steel.
2. Per field verification, tubing for pressure indicator PI-SI-7140 has reverse slope and loese clamp. l j

6-30

ATTACHMENT 2 

     /            9. NCR-487 (Ebasco NCR W3-4044) (Continued)

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. The referenced item conforms to the' hanger detail, therefore, Mercury drawing 160-T-033A does not require redlining. Calculations for the attachment steel have been attached to the NCR.
2. Additional engineering evaluation has been added to address the reverse slope and the loose clamp has been corrected.
10. NCR-491 (Ebasco NCR W3-4088)

See Ebasco NCR W3-4088 - (Attachment 1, Item A.4)

11. MERCURY NCR-528 (Ebasco NCR W3-4824)

(a) NRC CONCERNS None were identified in the allegations associated with this issue in Supplement 7 to the Safety EvaJuation Report (SSER). (b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS * 

                                                         ~
1. No statement or documentation was . attached to the NCR to resolve traceability of heat #M2245.
   ~      ~ ~~
2. Disposition of NCR fails to state whether the correct ID#

was etched on the plate.

3. No documentation was attached to the NCR to verify.

corrective action taken. RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION 1 & 3.' Attached a copy of MRR-77-11206 to NCR, indicating heat code MZ-245 (M2245), and associated supplier C of C.

2. Field verified heat number 7428779 on anchor plate.
12. NCR-540 "

(a) NRC CONCERNS None were identified in the allegations associated with this issue in Supplement 7 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SSER). g. m

ATTACHMENT 2 

  /     12. NCR-540 (Continued)

(b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCZRNS

1. Documentation not attached to NCR for replacer.cnt of support locator #31.
2. Documentation ~not attached- to NCR for replacement of tubing that had cold spring.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. Mercury documentation was attached to NCR for replacement of support locator #31 with an acceptable support locator #33.
2. Mercury documentation was attached to NCR for replacement of tubing with cold spring.
13. NCR-554 (a) NRC CONCERNS No documented evidence of corrective action for hanger deficiencies identified during_walkdown.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION . v- 

                                                                                            ~*

Documentation search and re-iaspection established , rework ~,was accomplished. (b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS

1. No welding documentation for repair of supports.
2. No inspection documentation for repair of supports.

, 3. Inadequate documentation of corrective action to correct elongated holes in tube track. RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION i 1 & 2. Documentation search and reinspection established l rework was accomplished. , ) l 3. Reinspection established rework was accomplished.

14. NCR-560 (Ebasco NCR W3-5428)

(a) NRC CONCERNS L None identified in the allegation associated with this issue in l Supplement 7 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SSER). K. , 6-32 l-

ATTACHMENT 2

14. NCR-560 (Ebasco NCR W3-5428) (Continued) a (b) LPOL IDENTIFIED CONCERNS
1. The NCR was closed without the appropriate documentation being attached to verify revision of drawing #163-L-003A and Support Inspection Reports.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE f.CTION

1. A review of drawing #163-L-003A revealed the required revision to reflect locators 3, 4, and 5 to be 000-H-150-N.

A copy of the drawing has been attached.

2. Copies of the Support Inspection Reports for each support i

locator 3, 4, and 5 have been attached.

3. CIWA 011645 was issued for reverification of the torque on Hilti bolts for supports 3 and 4.

i

15. NCR-565 (Ebasco NCR W3-4730)

(a) NRC CONCERNS None identified in the allegation associated with this issue in Suppptment 7 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SSER). - (b) LP&L 3 ENTIFIED CONCERNS 6 The review of Mercury NCR-3243 which was issued to resolve items 

                      #1 and 2 of NCR-565 fails to provide adequate documentation to determine resolution.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION , The required documentation has been obtained from Mercury files and added to the NCR to resolve comments. ! 16. NCR-568 (Ebasco NCR-W3-4730) (a) NRC CONCERNS No documentation was attached to the NCR as objective evidence for corrective action taken. (b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS I The disposition of items #2, 3, 4, and 5 fail to provide adequate engineering basis for accept-as-is. m 

                                              $aOO

s ATTACHMENT 2

16. NCR-568 (Ebasco NCR-W3-4730) (Continued)

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION Items #2, 3, 4, and 5 were inspected for compliance to FCR-IC-579 (basis for accept-as-is of elongated holes) . Items 3, 4, and 5 were acceptable. Item 2 was acceptable after evaluation by Design Engineering.

17. NCR-591 (Ebasco NCR-W3-4206)

(a) NRC CONCERNS None were identified in the allegations associated with this issue in Supplement 7 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SSER). (b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS

1. The analysis conducted for this NCR was not attached, including ESSE concurrence.
          .             RESOLUTIONS OR' CORRECTIVE ACTION 1,   Calculations were performed by ESSE to substantiate analysis q{

described in NCR.. MKalysis was attached to.the NCR.

18. NCR-594 (Ebasco NCR-W3-5557)-~ _

(a) NRC CONCERNS None were identified in the allegations associated with this issue in Supplement 7 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SSER). (b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS No documentation that drawing has been redlined. RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION Support in question is a typical detail and therefore not red-lined. Deviation is referenced appropriately in OCR package.

19. NCR-595 (Ebasco NCR-W3-4197)

(a) NRC CONCERNS None were identified in the allerttions associated with this issue in Supplement 7 to the Safety 'valuatien i Report (SSER). 6-34

ATTACHMENT 2 

      /'
19. NCR-595 (Ebasco NCR-W3-4197) (Continued) -

(b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS

1. Saveral supports installed which are not per an approved installation detail.
           ,               RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION
1. Description . of NCR incorrectly written as Locator "5" was actually installed as Locator "23".
2. The anchor place installation for Locator "23" is acceptable per the general notes section of the B-430 ' series detail drawings.
3. Attachments to NCR were trade to clarify installation details.
20. NCR-614 (Ebasco NCR W3-4219)

See Ebasco NCR W3-4219 - (Attachment 1, Item A.6)

21. NCR-625-(Ebasco NCR-W3-5282) y (a) NRC CONCERNS -
                       ,~                     .

None were identified in ' the allegations associated with this issue in Supplement 7 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SSER). (b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS

1. One weld sign-off for two welds.
2. Reason for voiding installation and location information.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. Inspection reports identify welder of both joints.
2. Information voided due to redline #6.
22. NCR-656 (Ebasco NCR-W3-4303)

(a) NRC CONCERNS None were identified in the allegations associated with this issue in Supplement 7 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SSER). 

                                                     ?e N*

T ATTACHMENT 2 >

22. NCR-656 (Ebasco NCR-W3-4303) (Continued)

(b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS

1. Process tubing supports installed without approved installation details.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. Design Engineering reevaluated to accept-as-is per notation on installation detail of supports.
2. The current as-built condition was reverified by Ebasco QA Surveillance Engineering.
23. MERCURY NCR-658 (a) NRC CONCERNS No documentation was attached to the NCR as objective evidence for corrective action taken.

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. A field verification by EBASCO reve'aled that corrective ,

C action per the NC,R's disposition had been correctly performed. 

        ..                       2. Found and atta'ched to the NCR, a Mercury anchor inspection report for retorquing of Hilti bolts.

(b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS No documentation was attached to the NCR as obj ective evidence for corrective action taken. RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. Ebasco field verification revealed that corrective action per the NCR's recommended disposition had been properly performed (see Ebasco General Inspection report SW-913).
2. Found and attached te the NCR, a Mercury anchor inspection report for retorquing of Hilti bolts.

k

e - 

                                                                                                                                                 ~l i

ATTACHMENT 2 I S. MERCURY NCR's IN SUPPLEMENT 7 TO THE SSER The following Mercury NCR's were identified by the NRC in Supplement 7 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) published October 1, 1984. Mercury NCRs 588 and 889 were determined to have been administrative 1y closed and accordingly are addressed in the response to Issue 13.

1. NCR-313 ,

t (a) NRC CONCERNS l Identified seven h inch stainless steel lines for P2 instruments  : that were damaged by weld spatter. The NCR stated that the lines were replaced and documented as such in operational concrol record (OCR) 995 and OCR 1020, but it could not be ascertained from these rework packages that the repair and reinspection was either started or completed. There was no documentation with these NCR's to prove that corrective action was completed. , I (b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS i The documentation of the corrective action was not included in i the Mercury NCR package. i ( - - RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION ,

1. Documen. cation was copied from the ' referenced OCR packages, reviewed and added to the NCR package. l
2. A reinspection was performed by Ebasco QC Inspector and the  ;

satisfactory QC Inspection Report was added to the NCR l package. ,

2. NCR-322  !
                  -                                                                                                                           i (a) NRC CONCERNS Identified seven h inch stainless steel lines for P2 instruments that were damaged by weld spatter. The NCR stated that the lines were replaced and documented as such in operational control                                        -

record (OCR) 995 and OCR 1020, but it could not be ascertained from these rework packages that the repair and reinspection was , either started or completed. There was no documentation with , these NCR's to proved that corrective action was completed. (b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS 1 The NCR package was lacking documentation to support closure of , the NCR. ' c.~~ ,

ATTACH' MENT 2 2.- NCR-322 (Continued) RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION'

1. Documentation was retrieved from the referenced CCR package and added to the NCR package.
2. A reinspection was performed by Ebasco QC Inspector and the
  • satisfactory QC Inspection Report was added to the NCR package.  !
3. NCR-337 (a) NRC CONCERNS -

Identified seven inch stainless steel lines for P2 instruments that were damaged by weld spatter. The NCR stated that the lines were replaced and documented as such in operational control record (OCR) 995 and OCR 1020, but it could not be ascertained from these rework packages that the repair and reinspection was either started or completed. There was no documentation with these NCR's to proved that corrective action was completed. (b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS

  • The NCR package was lacking documentation to support closure of
  • the NCR. .

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION  !

1. The referenced OCR package was researched and records needed to support closure of the NCR were reviewed and found to be acceptable.
2. An inspection was performed by Ebasco QC Inspector with satisfactory results. QC Inspection Report was added to the NCR package.
4. NCR-572 (a) NRC CONCERNS ,

I Notad that the weld on support locator #26 was undersized. The , NCR stated that the weld was reworked and weld metal added co bring veld to sufficient size. There was no reference as to what OCR was issued to perform this rework or traceability of weld , metal used in the perfcrmance of this job. Also, there were no inspection reports identified or contained in the package.  ! n i e i' 

 ?
                                                                                      /. 10

ATTACHMENT 2 e I 4 NCR-572 (Continued) RESOL 1' TION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

l. Support No. 26 was redesignnted as support No. 1714-33 by Redline No. 6 of Drawing No. 163-T-013-A.
2. A copy of documentation for weld build up was located and placed in file.

l i

5. NCR-673  :
                                                                                                  !     l (a) NRC CONCERNS                                                               l      1 I      l Identified problems with instrument tubing installed by OCR              !      l
                        #723.                                                              _

(b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS t The lines identified by Mercury NCR-673 were identified as P7N3 class lines and are covered by the requirements of ANSI B31.1. l The corrective action was to be tracked and resolved by Mercury  ! Co. Engineering Department. Documentation was not in NCR folder to show that the problem was tracked and resolved. C RESOLilTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION ,'

l. Ebasco re-inspected these lines on 8/2/84 and found that the discrepancies noted in this NCR had been corrected, and the condition no longer existed.
2. Copies of documentation to verify the re-inspection were placed in the NCR folder.
6. NCR-674 (a) NRC CONCERNS Identified problems with the electronagnetic control panel worked ,

by OCR #1246. (b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS i l Documentation was missing from NCR folder to support disposition I and closure of NCR. l

e - s , i ATTACHMENT 2 ,

6. NCR-674 (Continued). f.

RESOLUTIGfi OR CORRECT 3'E. ACTION

1. Ebasco reinspech d the supports anc tubing addressed on this .

NCR, and ESSE accepted the installatian as-is. -

2. Copies of the inspection and' evaludtion were placed in the NCR folder for support documentation,to justify disposition "

( and closure of this NCR. 

                                                                                                        \:
7. NCR-675 d (a) NRC CONCERNS Identified problems with instrument tubing installed by OCR "
                      #720.

(b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS Documentation was not in NCR folder cc 'sup, port disposition and  ! closure of the NCR. ., l 

           ,         RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION                                                          f

{- 

                                                                                                              !        3
1. Documentation was located to show that Ebasco performed 'en l (

inspection ' and copy of the inspection report was placed in .] 

                      . the NCR folder.                                                                  l.
                                                                                                                      %/
8. NCR-676 (a) NRC CONCERNS
   ,                 Identified problems with instrument tubing installed by OCR                    s

___#720. (b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS 3

  • 1 i

Documentation v.as not in the NCR folder to justify closure of { l this NCR. RESOLUTION OR CORFECTIVE ACTION

1. Ebasco inspected the tubing and found that'the n.inor bow I would not affect the applicable pressure switch. ESSE ,

concurred and accepted the installaticn as-is.

2. Copies of the evabacion have been placed in the NCR folder ,

L to support closure of the NCR. j e I

itTTACHMENT 2 I

9. NCR-677 (a) NCR CONCERNS Identified problems with instrument cubing installed by OCR
                         #1332.

(b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS Documentation not available in NCR folder to support disposition and closure of this NCR. RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION

1. Ebasco re-inspected the tubing addressed by this NCR and ESSE accepted the installation as-is.

I

2. Copies of the inspection and evaluation have been placed in the NCR folder to support disposition and closure of this NCR.
10. NCR-678 l t
        .        (a) NRC CONCERNS                                     '

C- l Identified problems with instrument tubing installed by OCR 

                         #723.                                            -

, (b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS Sufficient documentation not in NCR folder to support disposition and closure of NCR. I RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION l - i l 1. Ebasco re-inspected the tubing addressed - in this NCR, and  ; the resuits were evaluated by ESSE to use-as-is.

2. Copies of the inspection and evaluation have been placed in  !

the NCR folder to support disposition and closure of this l NCR. I i I 11. NCR-806 (Ebasco NCR W3-7547) , i i (a) NRC CONCERNS  : l  ! Ebasco NCR W3-7547 noted discrepancies against OCR#1830 and . Mercury NCR-806. The disposition of this NCR is unsatisf actory . due to the systen: pessing a hydrostatic test is used as the basis ', 

     ,                  for accountability of fit-up discrepancy.                                       j l                             .

I A-a1

4 : ATTACHMENT 2 P

11. NCR-806 (Ebasco NCR W3-7547) (Continued)

RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION See Attachment 1, item A.30 (Ebasco NCR W3-7547).

12. NCR-2234 (Ebasco NCR W3-4593)

(a) NRC CONCERNS Stated that no heat numbers could be verified between FW13 and . FW13R. This is for OCR#666, System 52B. The recommended , disposition was per Attachment #4 of NCR W3-4593. - (b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS Documentation not available is NCR folder to support disposition and closure of NCR. I RESOLUTION OR CORRECTIVE ACTION i

1. Copies of the referenced attachment of Ebasco NCR W3-4593 j ,

were'placed in this NCR package.  : l

2. Documentation necessary to support closu're of this NCR was ,

C added to the package as supplemental information. I i i

13. NCR-3149 . ,

i (a) NRC CONCERNS I Indicated that there was no doccuented indications that welder M-343 was qualifind to welding procedure specification D (WPS-D). Disposition of this problem was by use of a weld test coupon subsequently found on April 27, 1983, but no longer available. No documentation existed on the qualification of this v . der or , on his retest. Thus, all welds made by this we.. 4r were suspect. l (b) LP&L IDENTIFIED CONCERNS  ; Documentation was not available .in NCR folder to support  ! justification and closure of this NCR. I RESOLUTION OR CORREC'"IVE ACTION j The welder's (M-343) certification records were located and , , placed in the NCR folder.

b LP&L FXIIBIT 9 Mm W

RESPONSE

s ITEM NO.: 4 TITLE: L'ower Tier Corrective Actions Are Not Seing Upgraded to NCRs NRC DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN: The staff reviewed the Corrective Action system to verify if lower tier corrective action documents were being properly upgraded to NCRs as required by l 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B Criteria XV and XVI. Specifically the staff looked l ct a number of Field Change Requests (FCRs), Design Change Notices (DCNs), and Engineering Deficiency Notices (EDNs) selected from printouts of safety-related equipment and systems document issuance logs. The selected docunents were reviewed for . content and basis for issuance (i.e. before the fact design change or after the fact nonconformance). Finally a walkdown was perfor=ed to verify proper identification and change control completion. In addition Tompkins-Beckwith (T-B) Discrepancy Notices (DNs) were reviewed. As a result of its review the staff found the following issues.

a. Field Change Requests - Sixty-three FCRs and 21 revisions to FCRs were l evaluated. It appears as though 35 should have been NCRs and another l 4 reflected conditions that may have warranted an NCR. The list below provides examples of FCRs that should have been NCRs.

F-MP-1818 F-AS-1631 , F-AS-3698 F-E-3089 F-AS-3648 'F-MP-2138 F-AS-2338 F-MP-2151 F-MP-1434 F-E-2288

b. Design Change Notices - Fourteen DCNs and 5 revisions to DCNs were reviewed. It appears as though 4 of those should have been upgraded to NCRs. Listed below are examples of these. ~

DCN-703 and Revision 1 DCN-IC-478 DCN-ME-30 1 DCN-E-790 It appears as though the problems idtatified in DCN-703 are related to FCR-MP-2138 and may have been reportable under 10 CFR Parts 21 or 50.55(e).

c. Engineering Discrepancy Notices (EDNs) - Seventy-six ELNs were reviewed for proper identification and control. Of those 76, it appears as though 51 of those should have been NCRs. Exa ples cf these are listed below.

l EDN-EC-1476 EDN-EC-1548 EDN-EC-1502 l EDN-EC-1479 4-1 - 

 ~-                      v In addition during the review, another 35 were " voided" with no action taken. The voiding action was perforned by a clerk. Examples of voided EDNs are p.s follows:

EDN-EC-0630 EDN-EC-ll75 EDN-EC-1176 EDN-EC-1140

d. Tompkins-Beckwith - The staff reviewed a sample of the handling of information requests and Discrepancy Notices by Ebasco. As a result of that review it appeared that a number of these items should have been upgraded to NCRs. Examples of these are listed below.

W-6519 W-5755 W-6183 W-742 W-6322 W-5917 W-3656* -W-381 W-1876 W-5824* W-4112 W-5047 W-5692 W-5416 W-6243 W-5916 W-6349 W-2105 W-728* W-4968* ' W.-4648 W-4969* The asterisked (*) items all related to incorrect heat numbers being entered incorrectly or c'lerical errors being made on tod slips. 1 In summary, the staff found that the QA program requirements for nonconformance identification, control and proper action do not appear to have been complied with. LP&L shall rc. view all FCRs, DCNs, EDNs, and T-B DNs to assure that proper corrective action was taken, including an adequate review by QA. This action shall include the steps required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, and for Construction Deficiency Reporting, 50.55(e). Also included in this review shall be the examination of improper voiding of all other design changes or discrepancies notices that affected safety-related systems or that were misclassified as non-safety related. DISCUSSION: 

      'To confirm that the requirements of 10CFR 50 Appendix B, Criteria III, XV and XVI and 10CFR50.55(e)/10CFR21, as applicable to FCRs, DCNs, EDNs and I-B DNs, were met. LP&L has taken the following actions:

A review of the FCR's/DCN's and lower tier documents identified by the NRC has been perforned to determine if the conditions described should have been processed as an NCR. Any determined to have warranted.such ' processing were then reviewed for safety significance under the reportability criteria of 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR21. 4-2

A similar review was performed on a sample of approximately 900 lower tier documents and FCR's/DCN's. The voided EDNs identified by the NRC were reviewed to ensure that . proper actions had been taken or-that voiding was proper. An additional sample of 49 voided EDNs-was reviewed in the same manner. A sample of over 160 EDNs were reviewed to determine if the proper safety classification had been assigned. All 145 Mechanical (M) and Welding.(W) voided T-3 DNs were reviewed to ensure that proper actions had been taken or that voiding was proper. In the discussion that follows, the results of these actions as well as a description of the size and type of sample reviewed will be presented. An overview of the lower tier reporting system as well as the processing of DCNs and FCRs is provided as Appendix A. The discussion together with the appendix demonstrates that, although interpretive errors allowed a small percentage of conditions that should have been dispositioned on an NCR to be processed on another document, adequate procedural quality safeguards existed such that high confidence exists that conditions of safety significance received the proper 

    .Gvaluation and reportability review. Of the documents reviewed none met the criteria for reportability of 10CFR50.55(e) or 10CFR21. In addition, no-plant hardware changes were required as a result of this review.

I. REVIEW OF LOWER TIER DOCUMENTS AND FCRs/DCNs IDENTIFIED BY THE NRC

  • In addition to those iteus specifically cited in the NRC DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN, the NRC subsequently provided a list to LP&L of uncited lower tier documents and FCRs/DCNs which the NRC identified as potentially warranting processing as an NCR.

A review of these documents was performed by Ebasco to determine if any 4 warranted processing as an NCR, and if so, whether the condition described met the criteria for safety significance and reportability in accordance with -10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR21. In addition, a joint committee, headed by LP&L (two LP&L and two F.basco engineers) conducted an indepth evaluation of the 121 documents identified by the NRC. This committee determined how many documents warranted processing as an NCR; reviewed all documents pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e) and l 10CTR21; and determined how many FCRs/DCNs had been appropriately preceeded ! by a construction field document. These field documents were then reviewed to ensure that they were being used to identify in-process constructability problems and not "after the fact" deficiencies. The committee identified the following two items which required ratesting , or reverification: [ FCR-MP-2151 - This FCR was developed to add a one inch isolation valve L upstream of a damaged regulator valve during RCS hydrostatic testing. i These valves are located in a branch line (sample line) off of the L !~ pressurizer surge line. Our review indicated that the regulator valve 

                       -was subsequently repaired. However no documentation was available to c

t substantiate that six welds on line 2RC3/4-051A/3-2 had been hydrostatically tested. ' L 4-3

On October' 2,1984 Ebasco initiated Condition Identification and Work Authorization (CIWA) - 19024 to test the welds. On October 4, 1984, all welds were hydrostatically tested and confirmed to be acceptable. EDN-EC-1595 - Satisfactory doccmentation could not be ' located to show proper closure of this EDN. The EDN required specific QC signoffs for wiring modifications perfor=ed within the Process Analog Control (PAC) system panels CP-42 and 49. Since some of the individual signoffs were not done initially, the EDN required that LP&L perferm a QC check on the terminations. On September 25, 1984 two CIWAs were developed to perform the specific wiring verifications and to evaluate any noted discrepancies. After

verification of all terminations, and by utilizing referenced DCNs to determine subsequent changes, all wiring was confirmed to be correct.

The following are the overall results of the reviews for documents questioned by the NRC: Of the 36 identified FCRs, six (6) were judged to have warranted processing via an NCR; none was judged to meet the criteria for reportability per 10CFR50 55(e) and 10CFR21. Of the seven (7) identified DCNs, none were judged to have warranted processing,via an NCR; none was judged to meet the criteria for reportability per 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR21. ' Of the 55 identified EDNs, two (2) were judged to have warranted processing via an NCR; none was judged to =eet the criteria for reportability per 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR21. Of the 23 identified T-B DNs, two (2) were judged to have warranted processing via an NCR; none was judged to meet the criteria for reportability per 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR21. Of the 43 design documents (36 FCRs and 7 DCNs) reviewed, 40 should have appropriately been preceeded by a lead field document. Of these, seven (7) either did not have a lead field document or the field document identified a nonconformance instead of a constructability problem. Two of these 7 design documents were non-safety related. Details of the evaluation of the cited examples are contained in l Attachments 1 and 2. II. RANDOM SAMPLE OF LOWER TIER DOCUMENTS AND FCRs/DCNs F 

               'A sample size of approximately 900 documents was initially reviewed by Ebasco from a total population of approximately 32,000 documents. Except for'the fact that only documents pertaining to safety-related components, structures or syste=s were chosen, the sample was random.
The objectives of the review were to

i Determine if the condition described on the document should have been L processed as an NCR, and i 4 - -- - - - - -- --- ~ ~ - ~'

If so,-did the condition meet the criteria for. safety significance and reportability as defined in 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR21. The review was conducted by expsrienced engineers familiar with the Waterford-3 design. The initiet evaluation was checked by another reviewer. If it was judged th- c the condition should have been upgraded to an.NCR, Ebasco Licensing and QA performed a review- for safety significance and reportability. These results were further reviewed by two committee representatives (LP&L committee chairman and an Ebasco representative) . Of the total documents reviewed, it was judged that 39 (4%) should have i been processed as an NCR. However, tha disposition for these 39 documents was, in all cases adequately evaluated and documented. Additionally, none of the document-described conditions were considered to meet the criteria for safety significance and reportability in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR21. III. REVIEW OF VOIDED DOCUMENTS To address the apparent NRC concern that inproper voiding of documents may have caused the identified conditions to go unresolved, LP&L and Ebasco conducted a sample review of EDNs and a total review of T-B "M" and "W" DNs. In addition, LP&L identified that voiding of EDNs was never procedurally allowed and voiding of T-B DN's was only allowed af ter August, 1981. LP&L reviewed'53 of a total of 222 voided EDNs. These documents are identified in Attachment 3. The review indicated that the EDNs were voided because either th2y were not an actual deficiency or were subsequently resolved by other means. Based on the review of the 53 voided documents, there is a confidence level of 95% that 95% of the unsampled voided EDNs contained no safety significant issues. A total of 145 "M" and "W" T-B DNs were voided. Of this total, 13 were voided because they were found to be ncn-safety related and required no l further review. Sixteen of the DNs had been voided because they were upgraded to NCRs. Ihe balance of voided DNs (116) were voided for one of the following reasons:

1) The review concluded that no discrepancy existed.
2) Misinterpretatien of procedures by inspectors.

I

3) Premature inspection of in process work.
4) Duplication of lost DNs where original was later found.
5) Code Case acceptance.

Voiding of design changes (DCNs, FCRs) does not represent a safety issue in , that final plant configuration must be in accordance with final design specifications and drawings. If a potential design change was voided, the change was not implemented and the design configuration =ust still be in accordance with the latest revision of the drawings. 

        ~. -._ - _ _ _ .

4-5

Based on the above reviews, LP&L believes that the voiding of these documents does not represent a significant safety issue. IV. REVIEW FOR PROPER SAFETY CLASSIFICATION The NRC also requested that LP&L evaluate the document types in th'e concern to assure that non-safety related discrepancies / changes were not misclassified. As noted on Figure 1, correct DCN/FCR classification was reviewed and accepted by Construction Engineering and Design Engineering. These reviews provided adequate assurances that design documents were classified properly. The TB-DN procedure did not differentiate between safety and non-safety related. All DNs were procedurally required to be reviewed by QA for upgrading.- EDN processing was slightly different. Non-safety discrepancies did not normally receive QA review. For this reason LP&L has sampled 163 out of the approxi=ately 1200 non-safety related EDNs to determine if: 1) they were classified correctly and 2) if they were =isclassified, was the discrepancy a significant safety problem. The.results of the sample showed 

;           that 'none of EDNs were misclassified. On that basis, there is a confidence level of 95% that 98% of the total non-safety related EDN population was classified correctly. Based on this sample LP&L believes that no further
           , review is-warranted.

CAUSE: , The cause of the concern was due to the utilization of several specialty contractors with individual QA programs. The corrective action sections of these programs did not standardize the definition and use of NCR. This lack of , standardization caused a minor number of interpretive errors to be made. Interpretive errors led to processing a small percentage of conditions on a lower tier document or FCR/DCN that should have more appropriately been dispositioned on an NCE. GENERIC IMPLI, CATIONS: The potential generic implications of this concern were that significant conditions adverse to quality and safety may not have been properly evaluated, corrected, and reported in accordance with Criteria XVI of Appendix B to 10CFR50 and 10CFR50.55e/10CFR21. The review conducted has provided LP&L with a high level of confidence that such conditions have been processed properly. CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN / SCHEDULE: l' l LP&L feels that no further action is necessary for ite=s that should have been upgraded to NCRs. Our review has shown that the dispositions and corrective I actions defined on lower tier documents were adequately evaluated and properly , documented. l With respect to procedural violations identified during the review, LP&L is highly confident that present programs as i=plemented by Nuclear Operations 4 

      ,-                _ . _ . _ _ _             _ -6_   ___..     . _ . _ _  . _ _.-. _  _ _ .. - _ _

should preclude rscurrence. Since the operation phase will not utilize the number of subcontractors required during the construction phase, the QA program will be inherently less complex. As presently structured, the operations QA program is designed to implement the require =ents of 10CFR50, Appendix 3, Criteria III, XV, and XVI. The approved QA program is outlined in chapter 17.2 of the FSAR and implemented by well defined procedures and management controls. In addition Nuclear Operations and Nuclear Services have implemented programs to meet the legal reporting requirements defined in 10CFR parts 20, 21, 50, 70 and 4

95. LP&L will provide a more in depth discussion of the overall QA program in
,         the submittal that discusses the collective significance of the 23 NRC items of Ccncern.

SlJETY SIGNIFICANCE: The reviews described above reached the following conclusions: No conditions were found which required physical plant changes. No lower tier or design documents (FCRs/DCNs) that were judged to warrant processing as an NCR described conditions which, if lef t uncorrected, would adversely affect plant safety. The dispositions and corrective actions defined on the lower tier documents that should have been upgraded to NCRs were conservative and correct. Upgrading the documents would not have changed t,he * - dispositions or corrective actions. d The sample of lowe. tier documents discussed in Section II was random and consisted of over 900 documents out of a total of approximately 4 

                                               ^

32,000. The basic concern relates to the ability of the hardware to perform its intended safety function. For statistical purposes, therefore, a defect is defined as an instance in which, as a result of the review, a hardware deficiency was identified which, if lef t uncorrected, would adversely affect safety. No such defects were found and on that basis there is a confidence level of 95% chat 98% of the total population neither describe conditions that have safety significance nor meet the reportability criteria of 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR21. LP&L therefore believes that this concern has been adequately addressed and should not be considered a constraint to fuel load or power operation.

.ATTAC'dMENTS :
1) DCNs/FCRs Cited by NRC
2) Evaluation of T-3 DNs and EDNs l
3) Voided EDNs Appendix A: Overview of Lower Tier Documenting Reporting System and processing l of FCRs/DCNs.

I l _ ._ ___ _ _ _ ._J .7. ~ -- - - - - - - - - - - -

ATTACHMENT 1 - DCNs/FCRs CITED BY NRC 

         . FCR/DCN NO.                                                             RESOLUTION / COMMENTS
         - FCR-MP-1818                                                 This FCR and NCR W3-3897 were written within one day of each other. TB-182 (NCR) initiated-W3-3897. The FCR provided dimensional information for the NCR disposition of " replace". Drawings G-204-S7 provides evidence of FCR implementation..

This item is not considered reportable. FCR-AS-3698 This field change was generated to revise plate and bolts to accomodate as-built condition. DN-SQ-0924 was developed which subsequently caused CEIR-090 to be written. CEIR-090 was submitted and caused development of FCR-3698. The item is not considered reportable. FCR-AS-3648 Several design and corrective action documents were associated with this' support. Staport deficiencies were initially identified by an NCR. This NCR appears to have been closed: prematurely, 

                             .                                        however subsequent design documents ' corrected the                                ,

conditions. FCR-AS-3648 was issued to accomodate-the "as built" condition developed by the previcusly written NCR and design documents. The 4 item is not considered reportable. FCR-AS-2338 No NCR was generated. Based on' definition, an NCR should have been generated since a prefabricated { i piece of structural steel was shop released and incorrect. This item is not considered reportable. . FCR-MP-1434 Two TB-irs (4559, 5356) properly identified and documented the incorrect installation of the Dravo spool piece. The installation error is significant due to the piping segments safety 

                                                  ,                   function and should have been written as an NCR prior to shipment of the piping assembly.

Additionally the spool, as initially installed, caused further fit up problems which had to be cos<4cted to affect proper piping alignment. The disposition for the irs is conservative and properly documented on the FCR. The item is significant but not reportable since construction controls were in place to prevent the improperly installed spool from going uncorrected. n 

   ..-     ,m.      - . . . . . _ , _ . - ,_m.-__   .. - -, , . . . .        _       ._ __,,- ,m - _ _.__o _ _ , - ,----,,_,__.,_..,.._.m.   , , - . , , . - , _ -

ATTACH' MENT 1 DCNs/FCRs CITED BY NRC (Continued) FCR/DCN NO. -RESOLUTION / COMMENTS FCR-AS-1631 Original cracks were repaired via NCR W3-1548. Continued attempts at the repairs required by W3-1548 still resulted in cracked weld. FCR t.S-6131 was generated to allow alternate configuration to - eliminate cracking at this joint. This item is not considered reportable. FCR-E-3089 An NCR was written on this matter. NCR-5371 revealed that the enclosures for reactor coolant pump speed sensor amplifiers had been replaced. Apparently heavy corrosion had been noted. Stainless enclosures were substituted for carbon steel. Subsequently, Ebasco performed an unauthorized modification which negated the NEMA-Type III requirements for a weather proof enclosure. The FCR was generated to document the enclosure change and gasket replacement. The plant contains 24 sensor amplifiers. 16 are considered safety related since they feed safety channels for the Core Protection Calculator (CPC). 

                                   ~cwever, failure of the amplifiers signal due to environmental effects would.cause a reactor trip, but nor prevent a trip. Therefore tne stated condition does not represent a significant deficiency that could adversely affect the safe operation of the plant.

FCR-MP-2138 This item was identified by NCR-W3-4739. In DCN-MP-703 addition several CIWAs were generated to impl6 ment corrective actions. The cause of the cracking was due to overtorquing of the valves to limit RCS leakage prior to hydrostatic testing. The valves were replaced and tested satisfactorily. Although this deficiency is not considered reportable it was noted that the NCR was inadequately evaluated during the time of occurrence. The condition was evaluated with only one failure noted. After the addition of 13 valves to the NCR the condition was not immediately re-evaluated by Ebasco. During our review Ebasco Engineering and LP&L Engineering concluded that the condition was , not reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR21. 

        .      - - - - -   - - - -       -R

f.: ATTACHMENT 1 DCNs/FCRs CITEC BY NRC U (Continued) FCR/DCN NO. RESOLUTION / COMMENTS FCR-MP-2151 The FCR added a manue.1 valve upstream of a damaged' regulating valve to facilitate cold hydro testing. Documentation was available to document repair of the regulating valve; however no documentation was available to substantiate the hydrotesting of six welds in line 2RC3/4-05 LA/B-2. - Subsequently, the line was hydrotested successfully. A more _ detailed explanation of this FCR is contained in l the body of the response. This item is not considered reportable. FCR-2288 i This FCR was written in response to RFI-4143 which requested additional cable pull clarification. These cables are non-safety. This item is not considered reportable. DCN-IC-478 This DCN involved retagging of instruments in the warehouse bas'ed on an inventory survey. Subsequent. to the inventory sdrvey, a-DN was generaggd to document discrepant tag numbers based on a revised EMDRAC drawing. The DN (MC-3188) was-dispositioned to change-the tag numbers based on procedure ~ ASP-IV-54, a DCN was not necessary. The I tags have been changed and the DC is closed. QA documentation reflects revised tag numbers. This

item is not considered reportable.

DCN-E-790 This DCN was written as a r'esult of CIWA 820056 e which revealed a disparity _between design documents. This circuitry is not safety-related. This item is not considered reportable. DCN-ME-30 R1 This DCN was generated to document the as-built condition reflected in DCN-IC-1415 R1. DCN-1C-1415 R1 revised the model number for the ASCO solenoid from NP 831664E to NP 831665E. .The difference between these two types of solenoids is that the 665E model has an explosion proof and watertight enclosure while the 664E model only has a watertight enclosure. Both models are environmentally and seismically qualified. The change represents an upgrade based on ME-30 requirements. This item is not considered reportable. 

                                                                                 )

4d/cA

ATTACHMENT 1 DCNs/FCRs CITED BY NRC (Continued) The DCNs/FCRs cited by the NRC vere evaluated individually in this attachment. In 2 cases an NCR should have been written to document the discrepancy based on definition. However, there is no safety significance with respect to 10CFR50.55 (e)/21. In other cases, a corrective action document had been previously written, the item was nonsafety-related or the condition was identified on a pre-approved design document. 9 4 a 1 i b 

 ,          ,,.14, .--,p. ~ . - . ,m - --, -,w,v y--r - -   m---- .e-nr-- --rw-v"   - - - - - - - --*v-mr--n~m   v'~~' = ~ ' '  ' ' " ' " ' ~ ' ^ * ^ ~ * ' - *
  • i ATTACEMENT 2 EVALUATION OF T-3 DNs AND EDNs W-381 -

Welds painted prior to visual examination and dispositioned by Ebasco letter. The welds are not safety-related. W-728 - Hold Point for ANI bypassed. An additional LP examination was subsequently performed with ANI present. Discrepant condition brought back to requirements by additional testing. W-742 - Electric power off for an unknown time (weld rod ovens). Disposition by T-3 welding engineer assured that rod would be ' held at correct camperature for required time prior to issuance. Discrepant condition brought back to requirements. (Response to Concern 22 addressed this issue). W-1876 - Post Weld Heat Treatment not verified for FW5R1 by QC. Records were subsequently generated by involved craft per disposition. W-2105 - Bypassed ANI hold for fit-up inspection. Four additional reviews were procedurally required including the ANI review of completed 11008 & 11009 forms for acceptability. W-4112 - Coupling installed not in conformance with.MP-488RI. DCN , MP-488 required the addition of 6000# couplings to an MSIV Bypass line. Apparently 3000# couplings were incorrectly installed. This DK documented and identified the problem and requested design information. 3000# couplings were subsequently documented via redline procedures and was approved and the DCN and DN closed. W-5047 - Incorrect weld procedure used. Wald procedure which was used was metallurg1cally compatible. The disposition was conservative and correct. l-W-5416 - Two DNs and NCR 4010 were affiliated with this deficiency. The DN listed several welds that were deficient due to documentation problems. The problems were identified as part of the DN-T-2474, NCR-4010 support walkdown program. (NCR-4010 was upgraded and reported as SCD-60 which is still open) . W-5692 - No RT performed on base metal repair area. The DN was initiated to identify the need for RT instead of visual and PT examination specified on 2 previous DNs. This condition should have been written as an NCR. However, the DN disposition was conservative and not considered reportable. W-6183 - These DNs identified that flanges were torqued at values outside W-6322 of the calibrated torque wrench range. However, specific torque W-6519 values are not required by Code. These flanges were checked for leakage as part of system hydrostatic testing and were acceptable. 4-12 _ _ _ _ _ . __ _ _ _ _ _ . , _

ATTACHKENT 2 EVALUATION OF T-B DNs AND EDNs (Continued) W-6243 - A non-conservative interpass temperature of 600*F versus 350*F was specified on a weld record. Due to the type of weld involved (Bimetallic), the process involved and the documented welder training, neither interpass temperature would have been expected ' to be exceeded. W-6349 - Gap between lug and pipe clamp unacceptable per FCR 1553. Gap was evaluated by Ebasco per NCR 4010 program and accepted. W-3656,4648 - These DNs indicated clerical errors in transcribing heat numbers 4968,4869 or filler material on to QA documentation. Based on evaluation 5755,5824 of material dispursed by rod room, the justification for 5916,5917- maintaining the position that a clerical error existed appears well documented and logical. - The error both individually and collectively, is not considered safety significant. EDN-EC-1479 - Material documentation on a hanger was unavailable on the four snubbers. A supplement to the purchase order was developed to require QC review of the documentation. The snubbers were released ~after documentation requirements were resolved. 

     - EDN-EC-1476 - Root pass LP was not performedt Final UT inspection was per.ormed which volumatrically accepted the veld. This item     did not represent an AWS code violation.                               __

EDN-EC-1548 - Small nicks on cable jacket. The condition was corrected by repairing the cable to design / installation criteria. EDN-EC-1502 - An EDN should not have been issued. Conduit installed through other penetrations was allowed per design drawings (B-288) as long as-cable identification was maintained.

Conclusions:

LP&L's evaluation of the cited EDNs/DNs indicates that one case, by definition, should have been upgraded to an NCR. In this case, evaluation was performed by the appropriate groups including the quality assurance organization. The DN that should have been upgraded is not considered safety significant. E 4 4-13

ATTACHMENT 3 VOIDED EDNs 53 voided EDNs were reviewed of the 53, 17 were written against safety equipment-EDN NO. DESCRIPTION RESOLUTION

  • 1 EC-0630 Inadequate drainage at The EDN identified a non-safety /
                                    -35 (RAB).                                            non-seismic plumbing problem.

Further action was required to correct drainage problems throughout the plant. This action was accomplished by a contractor in late 1983 and early 1984 under the CIWA program. EC-1149 Potential Damaged Tubing. The EDN was voided because the tubing damage was previously addressed and closed out on EC-1136. EC-1431 Ucable to Locate SF-83-4-5. The Service Form was subsequently' located. EC-1104 Scale Change on Recorder A scale change was identified by JR-RC-005/006. CIWA 832097 and corrected by . DCN-ICP-540. EC-1392 EPSI Pump on Lower Guard. The. coupling guard bolts (non-safety) on EPSI pumps were not completely snugged down. Potential Problem Report #244 was transmitted to LP&L. The PER was closed by LP&L . Via CIWA 18006. EC-1393 Valve Stem Protector Valve stem protector lengthened. 2SI-V1544B4. No discrepancy exists. EC-1175 Material On Hold. Problem addressed in EDN-1175 as it pertains to proper control, storage and segregation of pernanent plant material was resolved on DN-MC-5 223. EC-1176 QC Vol. AG WQC.1. DN-1176 identified a potential warehouse inspection problem. Warehouse inspection forms were j retrieved which indicated inspection. EC-1347 Conduit Installation CP-6. DCN-E-1024 was developed to implemant the installation change. 4-14 

     -.       -   .  . . , . . - . - . - - . - .       . - .-     - . - . ~ , , . . . .                 - - . - - . - - . - - - . . - . - _ -

ATTACIEENT 3 (Continued) EDN NO. DESCRIPTION RESOLUTION

  • EC-1350 Box 31008-SB & 31009-NA3 FCR-E-3253 was issued to correct are not installed per the installation.

DCN-E-1100. EC-917 Eilti Bolt for valve 2SI- Based on field inspection, no V804A/B pulling out of discrepancy exists. concrete. EC-1140 Operators interchanged for Potential Problem Report 0245 was 3FW-V6074 & 6CD-V343. submitted to LP&L. Operators were not interchanged, tag on operator-must be changed based on Pacific Valve Inc. Electric Motor Operating Testing Report dated 12/20/79. This report identified operator S/R 240727 as belonging to tag 3FW-V607A. Valve 3FW-B605B does not have operator. Limitorque motor operator for,6CD-V343 must also be corrected. The PPR was closed by LP&L via CIWA 10055. EC-1205 Exposed Hilti and Core Based on field inspection, no Hole 762. anchor plates existed in the described area. Discrepancy invalid. EC-1110 Foundations for Fans E-22 Based on field inspection, no , A&B. discrepancy exists. l EC-0584 Cable Reel number change. NCR-2833 was generated. The DN should have been closed, i ~EC-1502- Conduit Installations As noted on Attachment 2, the conduit installation was allowed per B-288 drawings. !~ EC-1802 Tubetrack Identified that several short Ell shaped cantilevers existed on tubetrack. FCR-ICP-654 was subsequently issued to define the engineering disposition. All voided EDNs (cited) were evaluated in this attachment. In no case was an NCR required that was not generated. None of the problens identified in the EDNs have any safety significance as defined in 10CFR50.55(e) or 10CFR21. i 4-15

_m .. APPENDIX A TO CONCERN NO. 4 OVERVIEW OF LOWER TIER DOCDiENT REPORTING SYSTEM AND PROCESSING OF FCRs/DCNs During the initial design and construction phase LP&L established and implemented an approved QA program to evaluate discrepant and nonconforming conditions. This program was implemented throughout the construction phase of the project. In addition, Corporate procedures' required that individuals within the various organizations report all discrepant conditions for proper evaluation, including 10CTR50.55e and 10CTR21 (Ebasco 

     ' Procedure N-23) consideration.

The lower tier reporting system contributed to plant safety in that it allowed engineering, QA personnel and management to properly focus on issues of safety significance, evaluate their generic implications and trend performance. In the final analysis, however, judgement and interpretation was made on many conditions that ca=a close to meeting the criteria for processing as an NCR. Our review has demonstrated that based on a strict interpretation of the definition of nonconformance, such judgements were not always appropriate. It has also shown, however, that the program requirements which delineate the identification, processing and review guidelines for these lower tier documents as well as for DCNs and FCRs provided adequate safeguards such that significant safety problems received tha review, evaluation and ' , management visibility required by Criteria XVI of Appendix B to 10CFR50. DN, EDN Processing and Review Deviations from design criteria and specifications were generated from Engineering /QC inspections, whether by Ebasco or other contractor personnel. Ebasco/ Contractor procedures require that these conditions be 

       .dentified by discrepancy notices (e.g. EDNs and T-B DNs). Discrepancy notices, by procedures, were evaluated and dispositioned within the                     -

contractor's organization by Construction or QC, In each case (DN, EDN), the responsible QA organization was required by procedure to review the recommended disposition to ascertain if the DN, EDN should have been upgraded to an NCR. If an NCR was written, the DN/EDN was c closed. If QA agreed that the concern could be addressed properly on a DN, it was processed for corrective action and verification. The processing and review of contractor DNs and Ebasco EDNs was very similar to the processing of NCRs with respect to evaluating organi:ations and review. Procedures clearly identif.ied the appropriate evaluating organizations and formed an integral part of LP&L's Quality Program. Identification, control, and proper action, with respect to deviations ' design and installation requirements, were controlled by these procedures. (Attachment A-1) summarizes this processing and review cycle. Attachment A-2 summarizes these procedures with the responsible organizations for the processing and review of these documents. I 4-16

The attachments demonstrate that whether a condition was originally documented as a DN or EDN, as opposed to an NCR, it received a quality review. Such a review effectively acted as a " safety net" for conditions-with safety significance. Although occasional interpretive errors were made, the probability of conditions with safety significance not being processed on the appropriate level document was very low. Similarities in the review cycle are as follows: Condition identified by QC or inspection group Dispositioned by Construction, ISSE or QC QA supervisor or designee determined, by an interpretation of definition, if upgrading was required. QA/QC signature required / Engineering Inspector Signature. Verification of disposition by inspection (EDN Engineering Inspector /QC, DN-QC) FCR/DCN PROCESSING AND REVIEW Changes to design were generally initiated from three areas; information and new regulations received from regulatory agencies, field requests, and in-house design reviews which included vendor information received which was incorporated into design drawings and specifications. In house reviews - and regulatory information were evaluated and directly transcribed onto a DCN or FCR. Field information was typically received via contractor documents such as an Information Request (IR) or a Request For Information (RFI). These requests were "in process" construction documents which provided the contractor with a documented system to request clarification, detailed information, or to advise the eng'inser of constructability i problems. DCNs and FCRs were used to advise the field of engineering approved changes l to Ebasco design. These documents, when issued, carried the same impact - and importance as design specifications and drawings. They were not considered " lower tier" documents. As discussed below, they received a level of review commensurate with the design change. They were not used in l lieu of DNs, EDNs or NCRs for documenting and dispositioning design !_ discrepancies. Utilization of DCNs/FCRs minimized original drawing revisions and vers used as an interi= modification until design drawings are "as-built". It was the responsibility of the Lead Discipline Engineer to deterninc if the changes had a saf ety impact as defined in Ebasco Engineisring Procedure ! E-69 entitlet " Design Change Notice - Field Change Request". As defined in l E-69, major and minor changes which affect safety-related aspects of the i plant were processed, reviewed and documented in accordance with Topical l Report ETR-1001, Section QA-I-4, Design Control (see Figure A-1). Processing cf FCRs initiated by Construction included review and acceptance by Engineering. As in the case of DCNs, Engineering was responsible to verify that the change did not affect safety related aspects of the equipment / system. If the change affected safety, it was processed as defined in QA-I-4 4-17 

  ~. .

4 No documented review of DCNs/FCRs was required for 10CFR50.55e or 10CFR21 applicability. However, Engineering was responsible to meet the requirements of Ebasco Procedure N-23 " Reporting a Defect /Noncompliancy to the NRC". This procedure required each employee to consider the effect of deviations to design and procedures and to report these types of-deficiencies for evaluation as potentially significant deficiencies. The supervisor responsibilities required contact with QA for this preliminary evaluation. This procedure, by requiring QA input, made it similar to processing DNs/EDNs. Attachments A-1 and A-2 detail the processing and review cycle for DCNs and FCRs. Based on our review, there were cases where a DCN/FCR described a condition that warranted processing an NCR. However, none of these cases were considered safety significant with respect to 10CFR50.55e/21. 4 4 O t u i e l i 4-18

ATTACllMENT A ., HATRIX FOR PROCESSING AND REVIEW OF , MONCONFORMANCES (NCRs) DISCREPANCIES (DNs) ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES (EDNs) DESIGN CHANGE NOTICES (DCNs) AND FIEI.D CllANCE REQUESTS (FCRs) CENERATED BY DISPOSITIONED REVIEWED BY QA VERIFICATION OF INSPECTION PERSONNEL BY CONSTRUCTION (EBASCO OR CORRECTIVE ACTION DOC 11HENT (QC OR ENCR) OR QC CONTRACTOR) BY QA/QC PROCEDURE REFERENCE DN (Ebssco) Yes Yes Yes (Note 1) Yes WQC-150 DN (Contractor- Yes Yes Yes'(Note 1) Yes TB Procedure TBP-12 Typical)

  • I)N (Contractor- Yes Yes Yes (Note 1) Yes ,Culf Procedure PR 15.0 Typical)

EDN Yes Yes Yes (Note !) Yes or Engineering ASP-IV-70  ; Inspector NCR Yes Yes (or ESSE) Yes Yes ASP-III-7 I)CN No Yes As Req'd. by N/A Engineering Procedure E-69 Procedure FCR No Yes As Req'd. by N/A Engineering Procedure E-69 Procediare 40TE 1: Review by QA for Upgrading to NCR 4-19

  • FIG URE 1 DCN/FC2 PROCESSING PER ENGINEERING PROCEDURE E-69 FC2 P20 CESSING DCN PROCESSING CHANGE REQUEST CHANGE REQUEST GENERATED = GENERATED BY BY CONSTRUCTION = ENGINEERING (LDE)

CCN GENERATED ASA RESULTOF DECISION ON MAJ02ofy/ Nog DECIS/CN ON MAJOR / MINOR FCZAFFECTING MAJOR /MhVOR BYCONSTRUCTION SAFETY SYENGINEERhVG BASED ON E-69 BASED ON E-69 DEFINITION DEFINIT /0H y MAJORC2 MINGR .VAJOR U cNAM2 kmCMG _ V 

                                                                      ~

MINOR y SAFETY CHANGf y y,ygg CHANGE RECOMMENDED '

  • DISPOSITION a PROCESSED IN f,]fGNG ACCORDANCE =

BY CONSTRUCTION WITN ETR-/00/ pjyog V CHANGE U. yh07AFFECTING SAFETY , REVIEWED BY APPROPRIATE SRE / PR0d ENGINEERhVG SUPER. REVIEWS y . U - REVIEWED IfLDE ORPE SIGNED OEF BY DEC/CES THAT BY LDE, PE $ LDEi PE CHANGE SNeutD SUPERVIS/NG BE MAJOR of ENGINEER MINOR CHANGE y AFFECTING S/FETY y

CNANGE IS EXECUTED TRANSM/TTED TO CONSTRUCTIONFOR
                                                                                   /MPLEMENTAT/GN V

CHANGE IS EXECUTED

PRELIMINARY PROSPECTUS DATED MAY 25,1984 r 

       =g
    . 3 ,s PROSPECI'US E

p.j LPTxL EXdIBIT 10 (EXCFRPTO 3 :: ei 3e Louisiana Power & Light Company 33 

 .Qii I 2,000,000 Shares
                                            % Preferred Stock, Cumulative, S25 Par Value eii
   -a s 's a sN.I3                 Reference is made to " Description of New Preferred Stock-Redemption Provisions" herem for the terms "E3
8. of a limitation on the right of the Company to redeem shares of New Preferred Stock prior to June 1,1989.

2j8 3 me The New Preferred Stock will be entitled to a sinking fund suHicient to retire annually, commencing in June 1989, a nummum of 100,000 shares and a msnmum of 200,000 shares at $25 per share plus accumulated I.3 y and unpaid divider.ds. The Company intends to make an application to list the New Preferred Stock on the New York Stock 2.e y Exchange. Listing will be subject to meeting the requirements of such Exchange, including those relating to 3 Es distribution. 82.3 5= il'.s d j m.E 

   .~P-.

353= o A aig .

a. S 1* ~E : THESE SECURITIES HAVE NOT BEEN APPROVED OR DISAPPROVED BY THE
  $3j                  SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION NOR HAS THE COMMISSION
   $                      PASSED UPON THE ACCURACY OR ADEQUACY OF THIS PROSPECTUS.
 }K   a.g                   ANY REPRESENTATION TO THE CONTRARY IS A CRB11NAL OFFENSE.
  ;2*H 1

INd 5EE$ 2 W.. i$55 Nh This Prospectus is to be used in connection with the Company's Letter to Prospective Purchasers for N $ Q the New Preferred Stock (" Letter"). The Company will give notice (" Notice") pursuant to the Letter, at least 23% 55gg 's two hours prior to the time proposals for the purchase of the New Preferred Stock are to be su the firms specified in the Letter of the date, time and place for submission of proposals and the manner in 8 3 T $ which proposals are to be submitted. In accordance with the Letter, the Company has reserved the right (a) 0 a$5:, 

 $             ,3thej number to delete           the sinking fund provisions with respect to the New Preferre of shares of the New Preferred Stock to be purchased from it, by means of the Notice. The i S i 5 information contained in this Prospectus is qualified by, and subject to, the effect thereon of any reductio j f 5 5 in the number of shares of the New Preferred Stock and/or deletion of the sinking fund provisions with re 3g3E thereto.
 .IE$$
 $$25 f.f(,5 4 2
 *o.$.3*                                           Tiie date of this Prospectus is June                ,1984.

m.- . . . . . . . - . _ . - , _- .-. ._-

(. x f i Reference is made to information below concerning the ability of the Company to raise addi:ional fund , trom external sources through the sale of additional First Mortgage Bonds or Preferred Stock. The Company estimates that its construction expenditures during the period 1984 1966 will be approximately 5909.7 million. Of this amount, approximately $150.5 million will be spent in 1985 and $220.0 million in 1986 (including AFDC of 53.9 million in 1985 and $10.4 million in 1986). In addition, during tise period 1984-1986 the Company will require capital for the funding of $101 million of maturing long. term debt, for the redemption of $18 million of Preferred Stock pursuant to sinking fund requirements and for the funding of $243 million of deferred costs in connection with the Company's rate moderation proposal described below under "Recent Developments-Rate Matters". During the period 19841986, the Company estimates that its requirements for capital funds from external sources will be approximately $394 million. The Company is the owner of Unit 3 at the Waterford Steam Electric Generating Station ("Waterford 3"), a 1,104 megawatt nuclear generating unit currently under construction at Killona, Louisiana. The following tabulation shows estimated construction expenditures for Waterford 3 for the periods indicated. u.a.a.a Prior i. g god get go.s. 3 w com Yems or c ww. aw r. m usu o Waterford 3 (nuclear)* . . . . . . . . . . 52,206.1 5437.6 55.3 - 52,649.0 1984

  • The costs shown above include AFDC but exclude costs of acquiring nuclear fuel. Actual expendi;ures and 'date o' :ompletion may vary from the estimates because of availability of financing, changes in the Company's plans, additions and changes required by regulatory authorities, cost fluctuations, the availability of labor, materials and equipment, licensing and testing delays and other factors.

The Company anticipates that Waterford 3 will be ready for fuel loading in late May 1984. Although the Company has requested a full power operating license, it is expected, based upon recent Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") practice, that the initial license will be a "5% power license" which will permit the Company to load fuel at Waterford 3 and to operate at up to 5% of full power to conduct low power testing. Should a 5% power operating license be granted in the second quarter of 1984, the Company will proceed with arrangements for NRC reviews toward obtaming the full power license consistent with the start.up and power ascension schedule. Nuclear generating units under construction have been experiencing dalays during this period not only as a result of the testing process but also as a result of regulatory delays and opposition before regulators, or otherwise, of anti. nuclear groups. Assuming that the NRC issues an operating license in the second quarter of 1984, as expected, the Company estimates that the unit will be placed in commercial operation in the fourth quarter of 1984 at a total cost for such unit (excluding nuclear fuel) of 52.65 billion. Any delay in commercial operation would result in the cost of Waterford 3 increasing by approximately $12.25 million per month as a result of ongoing financing charges. Earnings coverage requirements are contained in the Company's Mortgage and Deed of Trust, dated as of April 1,1944, as supplemented, to The Chase National Bank of the City of New York (The Chase Manhattan Ba nk (National Association), successor) and Carl E. Buckley (J. A. Payne, successor), as trustees (" Mortgage"), and its Restated Articles of Incorporation, as amended (" Articles of Incorporation"), for tl'e issuance of additional First Mortgage Bonds and additional shares of Preferred Stock, respectively. Under the Mortgage, l additional First Mortgage Bonds may not (except for'the purpose of refunding maturing First Mortgage Bonds and certain other purposes) be issued unless the adjusted net earnings of the Company (as defined in the Mortgage) for 12 consecutive months out of the 15 months immediately preceding the issuance of the additional First Mortgage Bands shall have been at least twice the amount of the annual interest requirements on all First Mortgage Bonds at the time outstanding, including the additional First Mortgage Bonds being issued, and any indebtedness of prior rank. Under the Articles ofIncorporation, the Company may not, without the consent of the holders of at least a majority of the Preferred Stock then outstanding, issue additional shares of Preferred Stock unless the gross income of the Company (as defined in the Articles of incorporation) for 12 consecutive months out of the 15 months immediately preceding the issuance of the additional shares shall have been at least one and one. half times the sum of the annual interest charges on all interest. bearing indebtedness of the Company and the annual dividend requirements on all outstanding shares of Preferred Stock, including the additional shares being issued. 5 

        +
 -a           -p=r--     _

                                                                                                     -                   LPLL EXHIBIT ll          -
        ,                                                                                                                        CERPTS)

PREL15 TINA 2Y PROSPECTUS DAT JULY 24,1954 

  #                  PROSPECTUS 5

j *j a 2,000,000 Shares i 3H1 st-Louisiana Power & Light Company n1 s-  % Preferred Stock, Cumulative, $25 Par Value 

    -81p
      $$21 1!2' 3,

gE j The New Preferred Stock will be redeemable at the option of the Company at prices set forth herein, j provided that, prior to August 1,1989, no such redemption may be made through refunding at an effective j interest cost or dividend cost to the Company ofless than  % per annum. The New Preferred Stock will 1 u 3 be entitled to a sinking fund sufficient to redeem 100,000 shares at $25 per share, plus unpaid accumulated dividends, on each August I commencing in 1989. The Company may also redeem on each such date up to S'S an additional 100,000 shares at the same price. See " Description of New Preferred Stock" herein. W$3 1 5 g 3 Application will be made to list the New Preferred Stock on the New York Stock Exchange. Listing will y 23 f be made subject to meeting the requirements of the Exchange, including those relating to distribution. g vi 8 5 h= THESE SECURITIES HAVE NOT BEEN APPROVED OR DISAPPROVED BY TIIE I 8$ SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE CONINtISSION NOR HAS THE COatallSSION h IE PASSED UPON THE ACCURACY OR ADEQUACY OF THIS PROSPECTUS. S2* ANY REPRESENTATION TO THE CONTRARY IS A CRISIINAL OFFENSE. 38E f= fg Price to L'nderwriting Ia.,3 3} Pubt:ctl) Discounts and Commissions (2) Proceeds to CompanytlM31 Pe r S ha re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5 5 jE To tal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5 5 2 hE" 

     .i'            (1) Plus unpaid accumulated dividends,if any, froin August                        ,1984.

j (2) The Underwriting Agreement contains reciprocal covenants ofindemnity between the Company and the e.o*3 several Underwriters against certain civil liabilities, including certain liabilities under the Securities Act lB$$ of 1933. j3 } (3) Before deducting expenses payable by the Company estimated 5320,000. at e Ti , 3 3$5 i y$ % E tiThe New Preferred Stock is offered by the several Underwriters thereof named below and others named l jg{5j herein, subject to prior sale, when, as and ifissued and accepted by them and subject to approval of counsel. 

      , a,
  • It is expected that delivery of the New Preferred Stock will be made in New York City on or about August ,

U{E'i j 1984. sus Eca c 

     ; 843 Merrill Lynch Capital Markets                                                                       Lehman Brothers y                                                                                                      Shearson Lehman/Arnetican Express Inc.
    $ bh3.-

2E .4li;= 3 

    *3        8 l                                                                   The date of this Prospectus is August      ,1984

[ o I d The Company estimates that its construction expenditures during the penod 1984-1986 will be approximately 5910 million. Of this amount, approximately 5228 million will be spent in 1985 and 5220 million in 1986 (including AFDC of $28 million in 1985 and $11 million in 1986). In addition, during the period 1984-1986 the Company will require capital for the funding of $101 mTion of maturing long-term debt, for the redemption of $18 million of Preferred Stock pursuant to sinking fund requirements and for the funding of $225 million of deferred costs in connection with the Company's rate moderation proposal described below under "Recent Develap-**--Rate Matters". During the period 1984-1986, the Company expects to obtain

, capital funds from external sources of approximately 5500 million. ,

I The Company is the owner of Unit 3 at the Waterford Steam Electric Generating Station ("Waterford 3"), a 1,104 megawatt nuclear generating unit currently under construction at Killona, Louisiana. The 4 following tabulation shows estimated construction expenditures for Waterford 3 for the periods indicated. i eh.d w I Prior se Year of { tJag g 19,84 13 )_906 Total Cast Ceseleties i (DeMere la Minisms) ! Waterford 3 (nuclear)* . . . . . . . . . . 52,206 5370 573 - 52,649 1985

  • The costs shown above include AFDC but exclude costs of acquiring nuclear fuel. Actual expenditures

! and date of completion may vary from the estimates because of availability of Anancing, changes in the j Company's plans, additions and changes required by regulatory authorities, cost fluctuations, the availability j of labor, materials and equipment, licensing and testing delays and other factors. i The Company believes that Waterford 3 is ready for fuel loading. Although the Company has requested I a full power operating license, it is expected, based upon recent Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC")

practice, that the' initial license will be a "5% power license" which will permit the Company to load fuel .

l at Waterford 3 and to operate at up to 5% of full power to conduct low power testing. Upon obtaining a 5% power operating license, the Company will proceed with arrangements for NRC reviews toward obtaining l the full power license consistent with the start.up and power ascension schedule. Nuclear generating units

under construction have been expenencing delays,during this period not only as a result of the testing process i but also as a result of regulatory delays and opposition before regulators, or otherwise, of anti. nuclear groups.

By letter dated June 13,1984, the NRC notined the Company that certain issues, including issues relating j to the quali6 cations of certain quality control inspectors at Waterford 3, must be resolved prior to the issuance i of the initial license. The Company has submitted a program plan to the NRC for the resolution of these issues and discussions with the NRC staff are continuing. In addition, the Company has engaged an independent consultant to conduct a program of ultrasonic testing of the Waterford 3 basemat. This program is for the purpose of providing final assurances to the NRC relative to the structural integrity of the plant's

concrete foundation. Finally, certain additional issues resulting from a recent NRC construction assessment team review of Waterford 3 are being resolved as part of the normal licensing process. The Company's assessment of recent discussions with the NRC staffconcerning the resolution of these issues is that the issuance

, of an operating license should not be exnected before possibly late August or September 1984. A September i fuel loading will allow commercial operation in the Arst quarter of 1985. As construction costs are currently ! below budget, this delay is not expected to result in an increase in the estimated total cost for such unit

(excluding nuclear fuel) of 52.65 billion. However, any further delay in commercial operation would result j in the cost of Waterford 3 increasing, as ongoing Anancing charges are approximately $12.25 million per month.

l Earnings coverage requirements are contained in the Company's Mortgage and Deed of Trust, dated as j of April 1,1944, as supplemented, to The Chase National Bank of the City of New York (The Chase Manhattan Bank (National Association), successor) and Carl E. Buckley (J. A. Payne, successor), as trustees (" Mortgage"), l and its Restated Articles of Incorporation, as amended (" Articles of Incorporation"), for the issuance of additional First Mortgage Bonds and additional shares of Preferred Stock, respectively. Under the Mortgage, l

additional First Mortgage Bonds may not (except for the purpose of refunding maturing First Mortgage Bonds l and certain other purposes) be issued unless the adjusted net earnings of the Co npany (as defined in the Mortgage) for 12 consecutive months out of the 15 months immediately preceding the sssuance of the additional l First Mortgage Bonds shall have been at least twice the amount of the annual it erest requisements on all l First Mortgage Bonds at the time outstanding, including the additional First Mortgage Bonds being issued, i and any indebtedness of prior rank. Under the Articles of Incorporation, the Company may not, without the

! consent of the holders of at least a majority of the Preferred Stock then outstanding, issue additional shares l of Preferred Stock unless the gross income of the Company (as denned in the Articles of Incorporation) for i 5 i

RES?CNSI t~v""' .C* 1 

                                                       -              LP&L EXHIBIT 12
  !! LE:            Inspec:ien ?crsennel Issues        gamme NRC DESCR:?!!ON OF CONCE73:

As a par: cf the NEC s:cff's review, the credenticls cf quality assurance and quality centrol inspectors were examined. Included in this effort were the verification of previous job experience and qualifica: Lens and certification of personnel as inspec: ors. The following items were fcund. (1) NRC reviewed inspector certifications for 37 of 100 Mercury QC inspec: ors, including certifications for all Level III personnel. Twelve inspector certifications were found questionable due :o insufficient educa: ion or experience. (2) The certification records of 38 Tocipkins-Beckwith (T-3) QC inspectors were selected at randem and reviewed. Fourteen inspector certifications were found questionable due to insufficient education or experience. (3) A 30*. sample by the staff of inspector certifications of the Mercury QC work force revealed that no verification of pas: employmen: vt.s documented. A sample by the staff of inspector cortifications of the Tompkins-3eckwith QC work force produced similar results. The safety significance of these findings is that unqualified insractors may have inspected safety-related systems, thereby rendering verification of the quality of :hese systems indeterminant. LP&L shall: (1) verif;s the professional credentials of 100% of the' si:e QA/QC personnel, including supervisors and managers, (2) reinspect the work perfor=ed by inspectors found unqualifted, and (3) verify the proper cer:ification of the remaining site QA/QC personnel to ANSI NI,5.2.6-1973. DISCUSSION: A verificatien pregram was implemented to review the professional credentials of 100* of the site QA/QC personnel who may have performed safety-related func:1ons at Waterford 3, concentrating on inspec: ion personnel and including supervisors, managers and remaining QA/QC personnel. This verifica: ion progra: included :he QA/0C personnel cf all site crgeni:ations which performed safe:y rela:ed functicas. Pe rs ont.el fro the following organizations will be addressed in :his response: (1) LF&L (9) Gulf Engineering (2) Eoasce (10) Mercury Compan: of Scrwood (3) Au rican Bridge (11) Nisco ( ,) B&B Insula: ion (.2) "0oter (3) Chicago 3 ridge & Iron (13) Sline (6) Cembustien Engineering (ll.) Tempkins-3eckwich (7) Fisenbach and E ore (15) Waldingar (6) GEO (NCE) 1-1

n The: responses to Issues No. 10 and 20 discuss inspector qualifications Efor Fagles, GEO (CSI)'and J.A. Jcnes QA/QC personnel. Ihe program, which is being performed' undar the overall diEaction'. of : L? &L ,' consists of three major elements: o Collection and verification of personnel data. o Evaluation of qualifications against specifisd =candards, o Dispositioning of deficiencies resulting from cases vaere inspections-and tests were conducted by personnel whose qualifications against the appropriate standards could not be confirmed. Collection and Verification of Personnel Data Most of L the contractors which performed safety related work on Waterford 3 have demobilized. Personnel data was . collected from various sources, it.cluding site files. _ contractor heme office -files, personal contact with individuals or supervisors and through a background. verification program. Personnel data for LP&L QA/QC personnel was compiled under the supervision of LP&L. Personnel data'for Ebasco QA/QC personnel and that of the QA/QC personnel of other site contractors was compiled- under the supervision of Ebasco. Efforts were made to verify the education and work experience of' 100% of the 

   . site QA/QC personnel- by _ researching Waterford 3 contractor' records and by contacting schools, former employers and others.         The background' verification
 <   effort for site subcontracter personnel was a . joint LP&L/Ebesco effort. LP&L.

performed the* verification of the backgrounds' of its'own employees and of Ebasco employees.- Ebasco personnel were used to some extent in this effort under overall LP&L control. LP&L also audited and sampled the background verification performed by Ebasco. While the success race of this effort.vas good, there were cases where confirmatory information was not obtainable. In such cases, the judgement of the LP&L Review Board, as described belov, was used to rule on the 

   -reliability of the available information.

Evaluation of Oualifications to Specified Standards ' QA/QC personnel data were evaluated in order to classify individuals as either having verified qualificatiens or not. Training, education and work enperience were the qualifications of primary concern. These qualifications were verified against the following criteria: (1) Inspectors - ANSI N45.2.6-1973 (2) NDE Personnel - ASST SNT-TC-1A 1968 or 1975, as appropriate.. Other QA/QC Personnel - QA Program requirements (3) (4) Operational QC Personnel - Regulatory Guide 1.58 Kev. 1 (ANSI N45.2.6-1978) 1-2

Initial qualificati:n deter =inations for Ebasco and LP&L QA/QC personnel were perfor=ed by an LP&L review group, initial qualificatica determinations for QA/QC personnel of other centracters were performed firs: by Ebasco and then separa:ely by :he LP&L review grcup. In order to con:rol the consistency of these determinations, approved procedures were utilired. Deter =inations.related 

,                                                 primarily to balancing education, experience and training factors.

The LP&L review group qualification deter =1 nations were rendered in two categories: " qualified" and "potentially not qualified". "Potentially not qualified" determinations were referred to an LP&L Review Board comprised of senior LP&L QA personnel. The Review Board deter =inations were further reviewed by a consultant very familiar with inspector qualification and related standards. This process resulted in -a final determination for all QA/QC personnel as either " qualified" or " unqualified". In addition to the redundant reviews indicated above, LP&L has specifically requested the NUS/UNC Pre-Licensing Issues Task Force to verify the qualifica: ions to applicable standards of all LP&L QA/QC personnel and to sample Ebasco QA/QC personnel. The qualification review process is described in QASP 19.12 and QAI-32. The following points further clarify the process:

1. The meaning of the term " unqualified" must be a plified. In some cases determinations were made that, based on verified data, individuals' backgrounds did not warran: qualification to ANSI N45.2.6-1973. In other cases, however, individuals were considered
                                                              " unqualified" as an expedient in reaching resolution to the cohearn.

This occurred in cases in which:

a. Resea'rch of records, inquiries to past e=ployees, contact with schools and verification of training received was either not possible or could not be concluded in a reasonable period of time.
b. Apparent discrepancies existed between background information
provided by some individuals and that obtained in the .

verification process, and resolution could not be achieved on a timely basis. Minor discrepancies were excused; hevever, 4 significant discrepancies generally rendered any other significant but unverified data as suspect.

2. In the process used, being judged as " unqualified" :o ANSI N!.5.2.6-1973 did not automatically render the individual's work as invalid. For example, an individual may not have the educatfen and experience qualifications for all inspection work, yet be full /

competent through specific training or o:her ccans to perfor: the particular tasks assigned to him, which might have been very simple and repetitive in nature. Such an individual potentially satisfies ANSI requirements, which ulti=stely require that an individual's qualifications be sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the individual can co=petently perform a particular task. Whether or no: the individual is technica'.ly qualified, the individuals' work can be dee cd valid. 4 1-3 

                                            .)

l

3. Curing the' construction period, some. contractors made undocumented.

judgements with respect to the need for eye examinations for inspection - personnel. Such judgements were based en the level of ' visual acuity or color. perception- required to achieve competent inspections. Such judgements were- also made as part of the verification program and disposition process and will be decumented. It is noted that such judgements are specifically suggested in A55: N45.2.6-1978. This factor was not deemed disqualifying.

4. Some' individuals were classified as inspectors but performed no safety i related-inspections. To the extent such individuals were identified, they were excluded from the overall inspector population.

Dis;csitior4cf Deficiencies For each centractor which performed safety .related work, the LP&L Review Board compiled 'a list of " unqualified" inspector personnel, and Corrective Action Requests (CAR) were written to formally track and disposition potential deficiencies. Disposition of such documents may require .research into inspections - performed by individuals, further .research into an individual's background, reinspection, engineering evaluation, analysis of previous reinspections or proof tests (NDE, hydrostatic tests), statistical analyses or rework in order'to assure acceptability of the plant components inspected by the personnel in question. Determination of the method of dispositioning is en a cas,e by case basis. 

 *             ~

For most contractors who performed safety related work, the disposition of r deficiencies generally has not required a large degree of reinspection. In the case of Mercury, substantial reinspection was initiated, particularly the N1 

     .' instrumentation cubing . installation.                     The _ N1 instrumentation has been found acespeable with no significant rework identified.                                      In other isolated cases,
      -reinspection . vas      also    deemed             appropriate.               To          dat.e ,           such reinspected installations have been found acceptable and no rework has been required.

Included in Attachment 1 are the verification program results for Mercury. Tompkins-Beckwith, NIS,CO, GEO (NDE) American Bridge, Chicago Bridge & Iron t.nd .- 

     -Combustion Engineering QC ' inspectors and explanations of how resultant                                                      -

deficiencias were recolved. Limited background verification efforts,re=ain for these' contractors' personnel. Should completion of the verification cause a change in the results, the response will be amendec accordingly. Supplements to this response for the ressining contractor personnel, including QA personnel for all contractors.~ vill be provided as they are completed. Remainin Site OA/0C personnel The qualifications of personnel currently performing QA/QC functions en site are being verified under the verification program. . 1-L _ _ - , . ,, _ . . . . _ _ - - _ _ _ . . _ ~ _ . . - - . _ _ _ . - . _ . - 

  .. _                ~           .      . . . _  _                _-  .-.      .

CXCSE: , ANSI N15.2.6-1973 allows subs:i:ution for education and e::perience levels by noting that "... education and e::perience requirements specified for the various levels should no: be :reated as absolute when other factors provido reasonable assurance that a person,can competently perform a par:icular task." Waterford 3

entractors, :s varying degrees, employed such subs:icutions in cer:1fying the qualifications of their QA/QC personnel. However, the verification program revealsd that verification of background data was not adequate or documen:ed, <

documenta: ion of the justification for substitution was sometimes not provided or lacked depth,_ and/or was not always totally in accord with contractor procedures or the ANSI Standards, as currently interpreted. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS: This issue has been treated generically. The scope of the verification program included 100'; of the QA/QC personnel of all site contractors who perfor=ed safety related work. With regard to future work, qualification and certification of inspectors (including NDE personnel) will be administered threugh strict compliance with LP&L Nuclear Operations Procedures which meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.58 Rev. 1 (ANSI N45.2.6-1978) and SNT-TC-1A-1975, as applicable. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: The results, to date, of the effort employed in responding to.this issue further config the many ocl tr methods (including independent (ANI, etc.) inspection, 

  <    nondestructive      testing,  prerequisite /preoperations/ integrated testing, and special analyses) employed at Waterford 3 to gain adequate confidence that'. the Waterford 3 systems, structures, and ccmponents will perform satisfactorily in service.

Satisfactory disposition of corrective action documentation, generated as a result of the verification program, will provide adequate assurance that the. installed structures, systems and components will perform satisfactorily in service. l !- CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN /SCHEDUI.E: Actions required to disposition corrective action documentation generated as a result of the verification program are in progress. To date, no items of safety significance have been iden:ified.  ? iority attention has been given to . complet:.on and disposi:ioning of QC (inspector) issues, since actual inspections have a _more direct bearing en the quality of the construe:ed plant. Non-inspector personnel qualification issues, and the inspectors for the remaining contractors,- will be addressed in supplements to this response. 1: , is currently en:icipated that the dispositions of QA/QC personnel qualification issues will be cceple:ed by November 21, 1984. ' ATTACHMENTS: Verification Program Resul:s and Disposition of Deficiencies, by Contrac:or. RE7E2ENCES:

1. QAS? 19.12, Review of Con:ractor QA/QC Personnel Qualification Verifica:1cn
2. QAl-32, Inc ructicns for Verification of QA/QC Personnel Qualifications 1-5

m ATTACEMENT 1 SITE ORGANIZATIO!!S ' WHIC'2 ?EF.FO?l4ED SAFETY RELATED WOPI

  • INDEX A. LP&L
3. E'casco C. American Bridge D. 3&3 Insulation E. Chicago Bridge & Iron F. Combus: ion Engineering G. Fischbach and Moore H. GE0'(NDE)

I. Gulf Engineering 

   .                            J. Mercury Co:pany of Norwood     ,

K. Nisco L. Nooter M. Sline N. Tompkins =3eckwith O. Waldinger

  • Fagles, GEO (CMI) and J. A.. Jones are included in Items No. 10 and 20.

1-6

r 1 ATTACEMENT 1 A. LP&L

1. On-Site Dates: April 1975 to present
2. Secoe of Work:

Owner

3. Scope of Inspection:
a. Construction Phase - Reinspection of selected construction activities.
b. Startup Phase - Inspection of designated startup activities.
c. Operations Phase - Inspection during:
1) Maintenance
        '                                                                       2)    Modifications               .
3) Repair.
4) Material Receiving
5) Storage' Activities
4. 0A Program Recuirements:
a. INSPECTORS
1) Construction Phase a) ANSI N45.2.6 - 1973
  • b) QASP 2.12 "QA Section Qualification and
                             .                  Certification of Inspection Personnel"
2) Startup Phase a) ANSI N45.2.( - 1978(Regulatory Guide 1.58, Revision 1, September 1980)
3) Operations Phase a) ANSI N45.2.6 - 1978(Regulatory Guide 1.58, Revision 1, September 1980) b) QI-010-001 " Inspector Qualification"
b. AUDITORS -
1) Construction Phass a) ' ANSI N45.2.23 - 1978(Used as guide only) b) QASP 2.3 " Qualification and Certification of Audit Personnel"
2) Startup Phase a) ANSI N45.2.23 *1978(Regulatory Guide 1.146-1980) b) QASP 2.3 " Qualification and Certification of Audit Personnel"
3) Operations Phase a) ANSI N45.2.22 - 1978(Regulatory Guide 1.146-1980) b) QASP 2.3 " Qualification and Certification of Audit Personnel"
                . 5.       Insoecter Cualification and Disoositionine of Deficiencies:

(In Progress) A-1 t d 

            ,e,      e,. -

r - - - - - , - + , , - . --r

n .. ._ . .. _. __ .. ATTACHMENT 1 L. EEASCO

1. On-Site Dates: April 1972 to present.
2. Scope of Work:
                   ~ a. Architect / Engineer
,                   b. Construction Management
c. Installation and Construction
3. Scope of Insoection:
a. Receiving Inspection
b. Surveillance of Contractor activities
c. Inspection of Ebasco installation and construction (all disciplines)
d. Independent QC inspection of construction activities through 1977.
4. QA Program Requirements / Contractual Commitments: '
a. QAZ Personnel -

Basic Site Orientation or QA and Safety

Orientation
                   'b. Quality Management / Supervisors - Basic Site Orientation or QA and                                                               .

Safety Ot..antation. . 

  ,                .c. QA Auditors - Ebasco Procedure QA G.3, " Qualification of QA Audit Personnel". Qualification requirements are based on education, nuclear experience, related Engineering, or canufacturing experience and professional credentials.
d. QA Records Reviewers - Ebasco Procedure OAI-14. " Training and Oualificatic Recuirements for Quality Assurance Records Personnel". Qualification requirements are high school graduate or G.E.D., QA Indoctrination, procedural training, and on-the-job training.
e. Nondestructive Testing Personnel - SNT-TC-1A and Ebasco Procedure NDE-1, -
                          "Ebasco Service Incoroorated Procedure for Training, Examination, and Certification of Nondestructive Exanination Personnel".
f. QC Personnel - ANSI N45.2.6, 1973 and Ebasco Procedure ASP-I-3, "Indectrination and Training".
5. Inseector cualificatie- and Discositionin2 of Deficiencies:

(In Progress) 5-1 f' __ . _, . . . _ _ , - - - - - . _ , - _ _ _ . .~._,_.~r . . _ . . - _ _ , , _ , , _ , . . . . , , _ , - -

ATTACEMENT 1 C. Av.IRICAN BRIDGE

1. On-Site Dates: March 1977 to May 1930
2. Scoca of Work:

Erection of cain and miscellaneous structural steel in .the follewing areas; reactor building, reactor anniliary building, fuel handling building, cooling tower area, turbine generator area, circulating water system and construction trestle.

3. Scoce of Inseection:
a. Receiving inspection (upon receipt from Ebasco warehouse).
b. Fit-up, in-process, and final visual inspection of welds on structural stesl.
c. Inspection of high strength belting, including torque inspection.
d. Inspection of installation of expansion type concrete anchors.
e. Calibration of inspection and testing equipment.
f. Housekeeping inspection.
4. 0A Program Requirements / Contractual Conmitments:
a. QA Personnel except Auditors - ANSI N45.2.6 and Procedure 14. " Personnel Training and Ouelification".
b. QA Auditors - ANSI N45.2.23, Quality Assurance Manual Section 1.18 and Procedure 8, " Audit Procedure".
c. QC Inspectors - ANSI N45.2.6 and Procedure 14. " Personnel Training and Qualification".
5. Inspector cualification and Dispositionine of Deficiencies,:

All Anerican Bridge QC inspectors are deter =ined to have been qualified. . e 

                                                                                           +

C-1

ATTACP. MENT 1 D. 313 INSULATICN

1. On-Site Dates: April 1982 to Prasent
2. Scope of Work:
a. Installation of penetration, radiation shields, fire stops, and air seals.
b. Installation of ventilation equipment providing ventilation for curing penetration seal materials,
c. Installation of flexible boot seals.
d. Seal internal conduit seals,
e. Drill holes in flange of EVAC penetration for sealing material.
f. Installation of protective envelop for cable tray, conduit, cable airdrop and junction boxes.
3. Scope of Insoection:
a. Material Receiving Inspection
b. Inspection performed on Electrical Cable Tray and Conduits are ns follows:
1. Penetration Seals Inspection
2. Cable Tray Wrap Inspection
3. Fire Protection Inspection
4. QA Progra Recuirements/ Contractual Commitments:
a. QA Personnel - No procec$ral requirements for qualification.
b. QC Inspectors - B&B Procedure QCP-0010, " Certification of Inscection and Examination Personnel", which meets the intent of ANSI N45.2.6.
5. Inspector Qualification and Dispositioning of Deficiencies:

(In Progress) O L-1

ATTACEMENT 1 E. CHICAGO BRIDG2 & IRON

1. On-Site Dates: June 1976 to April 1978
2. Scope of Work:
a. Erect Steel Containment Vessel co=plete with all appurtenances, equipment hatches, personnel locks and penetrations,
b. Post-weld heat treat Steel Containment Vessel.
c. Test Steel Containment Vessel.
d. Purchase Order includes applicable NDE.
e. Purchase Order, also covers design, fabrication, delivery, and handling of Steel Containment Vessel.
3. Scope of Inspection:
a. Receiving inspection.
b. Visual inspection of welds; fit-up, in-process, and final weld.
c. Perform and evaluate NDE of welds (MT cr LP and RT, as applicable).
d. Dimensional inspection.
e. Witness and evaluate site testing within CB&I work scope.
f. Assure calibration of jobsite M&TE is performed within CB&I work scope. -
g. Test ~ of Steel Containment Vessel includes Boap Bubble Tests, Overhead Pressure Test, Leak Plate Tests (including personnel locks) and operational testing.
4. QA Program Recuirements/Centractual Ccemitments:
a. QA Personnel'- CSI Procedure TIP-1, " Training Indoctrination and Qualification Program". This procedure references C3I's QA manual Appendi C for auditors and Appendix J for NDE personnel. NDE persennel are certified to SNT-TC-1A requirements. .
b. QC Personnel - C3I Procedure TIP-1, " Training Indoctrination and Qualification Program".
5. Inspector cualificatien and Dispositioning of Deficiencies:

All Chicago Bridge & ' Iron QC Inspectors are determined te have been qualilied. E-1

ATTACEMENT 1

7. COM3CSTION ENGINEERING
1. .Cn-Site Dates: March 1982 to January 1964
2. Scope of Work:
a. Provide Reactor Vessel. Internals installation assistance.
b. Perfor= related work.
c. Related work includes. installation procedures, technical direction, MFR., services and drawings, provide QA personnel, alignment =eets requirements of C-E reactor vessel internals installation =anual.
3. Scope of Inspection:
a. k*ork by contractor subject to inspection and testing by Owners Testing Lab.
b. Administrativa functions by contractors.
4. OA Program Recuirements/ Contractual'Cetnit=ents:
a. All QA/QC Personnel - Training to CE Avery Division Q/. Program, Standards,. Specifications, Codes, QA responsibilities _and documentation.
b. QA Auditors - Orientation and training, examination, on-th e-j ob training, and maintain proficiency through active participation.
c. Records Control Personnel - QC Software training, ti=e requirements are based on level of certification,
d. Inspector Personn,el -

Visual Inspection SNT-TC-1A and Dimensional and Mechanical ANSI N45.2.6.

f. Inseector Qsalification and Dispositioning of Deficiencies:

All Cochustion Engineering QC inspectors are determined to have been qualified. 

                                                   ?-1

F~ " ATTACHMENT 1 G. FISCH3ACH A'O MCORE

1. On-Site Dates: "ay 1977 to Decenber 1C83
2. Scope of Werk:
a. Installed safety and non-safety equip =ent, accessories, raceways, cable and non-vendor furnished interconnection. between i,quipnent, connections to all equipment, accessories and devices.
b. Installed seismic and non-seismic conduit, tray and box supports (AWS Dl.1).
c. Installed expansion anchors-and belting of structural steel.'
3. Scope of Inspections:

a.- Material Receiving inspection.

b. Support fit-up and final visual inspection.
c. Inspection of installation of equipment.
d. Inspection cf routing and cennection of trays and cenduit.
e. Inspection of routing and termination of cable.
f. Inspection fer proper bolting (Torque and tension testing).
g. Megger/ continuity testing of cable and equipment.
4. QA Progra= Recuirements/ Contractual Com=itnants:
a. QA Personnel - 10CFR50 Appendix 3 and ANSI N45.2.-
b. QA . Auditors. Personnel -

Documented experience of previous auditing, orientation, and training in QA progran, procedures,- and activities to be audited.

c. Inspector Personnel -

ANSI N45.2.6 and Fischbach & Moore Procedure QAP-101W3, " Personnel Oualification and Certification".

5. Inspector Oualification and Dispositioning of Deficiencies:

(In Progress) . G-1

r.--1 ATTACEMENT 1 H. GEO (NDE)

1. On-Site Dates: May 1977 to Present
2. Score of Work:
a. Performance of Mondestructive a:camination of ite=s and welds designated by the Client.
       .      b.  ' Process and evaluate test results,
c. Prepare reports.
d. Identify defects.
3. Score of Inspection:
a. Nondestructive er.a=ination cathods include but are not limited to: Radiography, Magnetic Particle, Ultrasonic, Liquid Penetrant, and Lead Detec'. ion.
b. Client has final acceptance or rejection of welds.
c. Although. leak detection was included in GEO scope of work, GEO was not required to perform any tests.
4. 0A Progra: Recuirements/ Contractual Co==itments:
a. QA Personnel .except Auditors -

No Procedural requirements for qualification.-

b. QA Auditors '-- CEO Procedure 5.2, " Qualification and certification of Audit Personnel" which references ANSI N45.2.23. -
c. Nondestructive Examination Personnel - SNT-TC-1A and GEO Procedure GEO-2.3 "Oualification and Certification'of NDE Personnel".
5. Inspector Qualification and Dispositioning of Deficiencies:

The verification program identified one (1) GEO (NDE) individual who performed radiography tasks and whose qualificatiens were decurzined as -not meeting the requirements o f . S NT-TC-1 A . Corrective Action . Report EQA84-14 was initiated to track the disposition of this deficiency. It has been determined that the individual in question.perfor=ed only field radiography work and was not involved in interpretation of radiographs. Had. field radiographs by this individual been defective, this would have been obvious and would have beca detected during the interpretation of the radiography, which was perfor:ed by personnel whose qualifications in accordance with SNT-TC-1A have been verified. H-1

1 l l l ATTACDIENT 1 ] 

                                  !. GULF ENGINEERING
1. On-Site Dates: January 1977 to Novenber 1933
2. Scoce of Work:
a. Install ASME III Safety Class I, II, III, and Non-safety related (331.1) equipment tank, pressure vessels, etc.
b. Install ASME III Class III piping systecs.
c. Install Seismic Class I supports,
d. Hydrostatic /?neu:stic testing on all syste=s erected.
3. Scone of Inspection:
a. Material Receiving Inspection.
b. Fit-Up and Final Visual for structural welds.
c. Fit-Up and Final Visual for pipe welds.
d. Insulation Resistance Testing Inspection - PR-9.2.
e. Grouting Inspection PR-il.l.
4. 0A Program Recuirements/ Contractual Co=mit=ents:
a. QA Personnel with exception of Auditors - Gulf Engineering QA Manual Section 20, Indoctrination and Training, Gulf Procedures PR 17.0 and 20.0.,
            " Indoctrination and Training".
b. QA Auditors - ANSI N45.2.23 and Gulf Procedure PR 18.0, " Auditing".
c. QC Inspectors - ANS'I N45.2.6 and the dulf Progra= requirenants listed in (a).
5. Inseector Qualification and Dispositioning of Deficiaccies:

(In Progress) I-1

ATTACHMENT 1 J. MERCURY COM?ANY OF NORWOOD

1. On-Site Dates: Septe=ber 1973 to November 1983
2. Scoce of Work:
a. Intall ASMI III P2 and P3 local instrument racks, cabinets, and tubing systems.
b. Install seismic Class I supports and tubetrack. .
c. Install non-seismic /non-safety instrument air system.
d. Install non-seismic supports.
e. . Hydrostatic or air test all tubing erected.

3.. Scope ci Insoection:

a. Receiving Inspection
b. Dimensional Inspection
c. Structural Inspections
d. Pressure Test Performance
e. Welding Inspection-
f. Piping and Tubing Inspection
g. Installed Equipment Inspection
4. OA Program Recuirements/ Contractual Commitments:
a. QN Engineering Personnel -

Mercury Procedure OCP-3070, " Personnel

  • Indoctrination and Training".
b. . Quality Managers / Supervisors - Mercury Procedure CCP-3070, " Personnel Indoctrination and Training".
c. Quality Assurance Auditors - Mercury Procedure QCP-3060, cualification of "0A Program Audit Personnel" which satisfies the requirements of ANSI N-45.2.23.
d. QA Records Reviewers - Mercury procedure OCP-3070, " Personnel Indoctrination and Training".
e. Nondestructive Testing Personnel - Mercury employed no NDE personnel. .
f. QC Personnel - ANSI N45.2.6 and Mercury- Procedure CCP-3050,
                " Qualification of Inspection, Enamination and Test Personnel".
5. Insoector Qualification and Diseositionine of Deficiencies:

l Using conservative standards as defined in the basic response, preliminary ' ! results indicate that a significant number of Mercury . inspectors did not fully teet the criteria of ANSI N45.2. 6-1973. The final results of the review of Mercury inspector qualifications will be provided in a supplemental response. Corrective Action Request EQA84-15 was initiated to track the disposition of this deficiency. J-1

Dir. position of CAA EQAS4-15 is based upon the entensive reinspections of Mercury work agains: established installation criteria and upon extensive :esting and engineering evaluation of the as-built ins:c11ations. Based on these ~ factors, L? 1. has a high degree of confidence in the abili:y of the installation within the scope of Mercury's responsibility te perform 1:s intended safety func:fons and supper: safe plant opers: ion. In light of the ex:ensive- verification, this conclusion is justified. even if a substantial number of Mercury inspectors -do no: sa:isfy. qualification requirements. At:achmen: No. J-l provides a matrin of inspection and NDE tests perfor=ed as part of the in-process installation activities in Mercury's work. secpe. The various reinspection, test and engineering verification activities are also tabulated in relation to the impacted Mercury installa: ions. Attachment No. J-2 is a description of several of the verifica:ica activi:ies additienally considerad in this assessment. A::achment No. J-3 is an assessment of safety significance with respect to the findings identified in the N1 installation reinspections recently completed by LP&L. The figure contained in Attachmen: J-4 represents Mercury's work scope 

                     -'- 6rially for the categories of installations described above.
                  ' Mercury u           .anstruction        activities                        which are                                   affected         by   QC   inspector qualifications have been ca:egorized as follows:

A. U1 Install"ations - N1 installation include tubing, instrumentation and related hardware which 

                                . perform a function required to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident and. allow the operator to safely shutdown the plant.
3. N2 Installation
                                'N2 installations include tubing, instrumentation and related hardware required to maintain pressure boundary integrity that do not perfor                                                                         a
                                                                                                                                                                                              ~

direct plant safety function. C. Seismic Cate2crv I Instrumentatien Suoports. Tube Track, and Instrumentation Stands ' These installations are required to wi:hstand.a safe shutdewn earthquake and thus assure :he integrity of N1 and N2 ins:allations. D. -Primarv Samoline Pioin2 and Related Suenorts/ Restraints l these installations consist of Seismic Ca:cgory 1 pipe supports and ASME Class 2 piping. u i o

J-2 l

Verifica:1cn activitics indspsaden: .of the initial. in-process inspections cre 

           , discussed in relation to each category of Mercury installation.

A. N'1 Inserumentaticn Oue co its importance to safe - plant operations, NL instrumen:acion has , undergone :he cost e:.::ensive re-verifica: ions of any Mercury installation category. These verification activi:ies are su= arized as follows:

1. Reinspectiens Reinspections performed in relation to N1 instrumentation include the following:
a. N1 Reinseection Program As a result the LP&L Review of NRC 1ssue No. 1 regarding Mercury QC qualifications,-LP&L deemed it prudent to undertake a further extensive reinspection of Mercury work. Accordingly, LP&L procedure QASP 19.15 was established to reinspect the sensing lines and associated hardware (e.g. tube track, support, etc.)

fcr the N1 instrument installations, which perform a safety-related function and provide a pressure boundary. The-reinspection is complete and no discrepancies impacting plant safety were found. This reinspection covered most of the installation attributes which are subject to in-process QC inspections. 

                      .      Certain attributes such as anchor bolt torquing .and weld fitup inspection were not included since reverification cannot be performed without destroying existing installations.,

Such attributes, however, were subjected to many in-process inspections and subsequent documentation reviews as is evidenced by the numerous NCRs which were dispositioned in thesel areas. The adequacy of Mercury anchor bolt installations was Orther later verified by Ebasco based on the corrective action required to close NCR 5864. This NCR required tension test verification of 108 Mercury installed anchor bolts. . An evaluation of the reinspection findings was performed for safety significance. The evaluation results and inspection

findings are discussed in detail in Attachment J-3. It has been concluded that, while deviations f rom established installation criteria' were identified, none were judged to be safety
significant. Further, in relation to the quantity of items.

reinspected, the number of identified discrepancies is small.

b. LP&L OA Inspection of Redundant N1 Instrumentation Immulse Lines for Mechanical Secaration This reinspection was perfor=cd under direct LP&L supervision in accordance with LP&L Procedure QASP 19.9. The inspecticn required the reverifica: ion of mechanical separa: ion requirenen:s L for redundant N1 ins rumentation installations. As a result of

';. this progran, 2 cut of 32 instrumen: ins :alla: ions inspectef were reworked to assure' proper mechanical separacion. 1-3

c. CCD 57 Correcticn Action Pro 2 ras This reinspection effort co==enced in July, 1982, and subsequently involved the reinspection of all N1 and N2-instrumentation installed in full or in part prior to July 1982.

Although these reinspections =ay have been perfor=ed by some of the QC inspectors whose credentials are currently suspect, this is mitigated by the fact that Ebasco Engineering participated in the ~ tubing installation walkdowns. LP&L QA cnd Startup also participated in many of the walkdowns.

d. Selective Beinsoection Procraes Imoactine N1 Installation Various reinspection progra=s were initiated by L?&L cad Ebasco QA _in relation :: established review programs in the 1982-1983 time frame. These reinspecticas impacted N1 Instrumentation, and are described as follows:
1) Ebasco OA Records Review Program Reinsoections During the records review process a limited nu=ber of reinspections were performed in order to reverify specific attributes related to tubing ine _.ilations. Refer to Attachment No. J-2 for more detail.

ii) LP&L OA Turnover Status Review 7- A limited number of field verific.ations were conducted by n LP&L QA as part of a system turnover stai:us review. These field verifications established a satisfactory level of confidence that the as-installed conditions were reflective of the approved installatien details. Refer to Attachment No. J-2'for more detail.

2. Testing Various NDE and testing progra=s have been implemented which provide ~

additional assurance with respect to the adequacy of N1 installations. These progra=s are su=marited as follows:

a. Pressure Boundary Tests In general, N1 and ASME Class 2 and 3 tubing installations were integrity tested in accordance with code require =ents. Certain f

N1 HVAC installations were exempted from integrity testing. In addition to Mercury QC inspectors, ASME integrity tests were witnessed by Ebasce, LP&L Startup and QC personnel, and in the case of Class 2 installation, the Mercury ANI representative.

b. Non-Destructive Testine N1 ASME Class 2 installations welds were subjected to liquia penetrant tests which were perfor ed by an independent contractor (GEO).

J-L m _

c. Het Functional Preootrational Testing During Pre-Core ' Ec: Fune: tonal Testing, N1 instrumentatic; was placed in service under nor=al plan: operating condi: ions. The integrity of these installations was verified under ther:21 grow:h - and pressure ccnditions by LP&L. Instrumen:ation icop -

functionality under plant startup and normal process flow conditions was also verified. These same systems will again be tested during Post Core Hot Functional Testing, prio to initial criticality.

3. N2 Installations N2 installations were subjected to cany of the same reverification progra=s. The major LP&L programs which did not involve N2 installations are 'the N1 instrumen:ation reinspection conducted by L?&L (Ites A.l.a) and the - LP&L QA inspection of redundant N1 instrumentation for Mechanical Separation (Ite: A.l.b).

The cos: noteworthy reverification efforts with respect to N2 installations involve the SCD 57 corrective action programs and pre-core hot functional testing programs. The comprehensiveness of these two progra=s citigate the consequences resulting from the QC inspection qualification concerns. Attachment No. J-3 discusses the justification for not extending the reinspection program conducted under QASP 19.15 (Item A.l.a) to include N2 installation. . . C. SeismicCategoryISuccorts,TubdTrackandInstrumen$ationStands As has been the case with N1 and N2 installation, Seismic Category I supports, tub'etrack and instrumentation stands have been subjected to various reinspections and verification , grograms. The cost notable are discussed below.

1. The N1 reinspections conducted by LP&L under procedure QASP . 19.15 included reinspections of Seismic Category I supports installed in NL instrument loops. Attributes inspected included support location, weld size and work =anship, anchor bol: embedcent, spacing, and correctness of hardware installations (i.e. nut, bolts , washer, etc.) .

Approximately 1600 supports were inspected under the program.

2. The Ebasco QA Records Review Progran Reinspection The QC reinspection conducted b'/ Ebasco in 1982-1983 involved approxicately 35% of all Mercury ins:alled instruments: ion seismic supports. These reinspections verified support configuration,-

locations and weld size. Partial inspection for only certain attributes (i.e. support type or veld ei:e, etc.) were also conducted. In addition to Seismic Category I supports, the QA Records review resulted in the full reinspection of 100% of the Seismic Ca:escry I instrunent stands installed by Mercury and approximately c7% of the tube track installation including hardware and welds. Anchor bolt e= bed:ent and torque were reverified in $96 instances. More de: ail ui h respec: to :he impac: of the Ebasco CA records review cr Seicnic Category I-hcrdware is provided in Attaen=en: No. J-2. J-5

D. ?rica v Satriint Pininr and Eelated Sucoorts/ Restraints This pcreien of Mercury work has been reverified in several ways. These are su==arited as fellows:

1. Reinsoection
a. Piping fillet welds were reinspected under SCD 62 which involved identification and repair of undersited fillet velds not meeting ASME Code requirements. Although reinspections may have been done by some of the same QC inspectors whose credentials are currently under question, the impact of their involvement is minimited since at least 2 inspectors looked at each veld.
b. All the Primary Sampling Supports / Restraints were reinspected by Ebasco QC during the QA records review process.
c. Both the piping and supports / restraints were verified by Ebasco ESSE as part of the 79-14 program.
d. Primary Sa=pling Supports / Restraint were reinspected by LPSL QA as part of the QASP-19.7 pipe hanger inspection program.
2. Testing
a. ASME Code Hydros of Primarv.Samoling Piping ASME Code hydros were 51tnessed by the Mercury ANI, LP&L Startup and Ebasco Engineering.
b. Non-Destructive Testing Since the primary sample tubing is ASXE Class 2, all fillet velds were liquid penetrant tested by GEO.
c. Hot Functional Testing (HFT)

During Pre-Core HFT, the Primary Sampling System was subjected to normal operating pressure and temperature conditions. Formal verification of the adequacy of installation was documented under the thermal monitoring progra= conducted during HFT. Similar postcore testing will be perfor=ed. The extent of reinspection testing and engineering verifications conducted in relation to the Mercury installed Pri=ary Sampling System is so comprehensive that the impact of QC inspector-qualificatiens is insignificant with respect to plant safety. SCM'GRY AND CONCLUSIONS In each installatien category, several r2 verification and testing activities have been performed which did not involve Mercury QC inspectors. Enen reinspection activities were performed by Mercury QC inspectors, credit is taken in this assass=ent due to either of two factors: 3-6

1. The Mercury QC inspector was accompanied by either an LPLL or Oasco representative er both (eg. SCD-57 valkdowns, hydros, etc.)
2. The reinspecticn was a duplication of previous reinspections, and thus the
        'i pact of' inspector qualification to ANSI N45.2.6-1973 is =inimited.

In conclusion, the a:ctant ce. which Mercury installations were reverified bu either testing, reinspection er engineering verification, substantial [y independent of the Mercury QC inspection process, provides sufficient confidence. that safety.related instrumentation has been properly installed. 4 4 9 W

  • e i

e 4 _ ,. _ ~ _ , _ . _ _ . . - _ . .- - . - -.._ .._ . ._.- ,

O ATTACEC.NT J-1 O 4 8 S u- e 1 I i 1 1 1 l l l 4 1 T-,-Q 1 I i I I _,.,w.,n,--, - - - - , , - , ,,,v----.--, , - - , - - - - ,.w - - - , - ~ , - ,- ,, .u-,- 

     ,     - -- - - - . . - - ,,- -. , - .-. ,,-          -.w....

ATTACHHENT .1-1 I&C PRillARY WF.I.D QC INSPECTION ASHE CollE - II4TFC. DOCHHENT REVIEW E34treit2Elll' t'I . A S". QTY. ItiVol.VED CER4FIGUltATION PERFORHfW IN:;PF.CTisNf NDE TEST HERC.ERASCO IPl. 'HTHER Tubing r/JI 51 Travelena 1/8" Socket 1. Cleanliness Isedep.* exam. In.lcr. 100Z 1002 1002 153 l} Sep 57 (Appros.) Weld 2. Component Vertiled I,y Kemper Exam. 2) QASP-19.15

1. HT Component No. Insurance By CEO
3) t} ASP-39.9 Verified . Record I.l g . -
4. IIT & Type Filler laeview Penet.

Itetal (ItNIZ) (1001)

5. Fit-up Physical
6. Final Inspectinn I
7. Welder ID (Approx 22) i
8. Weld No.
                                                                                          '9. Hechanical Separation 3

rubing Plia? 15 Travelers t/8" Socket 1. Cleanliness Inder.esam. Indep. 1001 foot l'80 % 15Z I) SCp 57-(Appvua.) Weld 2. Component Verlfleet by Kemper Exam.

3. Mr Component u. lusurance My CEO Vertfled Record Liq.
  • 4. IIT & Type Filter Review Penet.

Hetal (1048%) (1001)

5. Fit-Up Physical
6. Final . Inspection 1
7. Weleler ID (Approm 22)
8. Wald No.

Tuhlug P1N1 189 Tsavelers I/8" Socket I. Cleanliness 1002 1002 100Z 152

(Approx.) Weld 2. Component Vertiled I) QASP-19.15 With 2) QASP-19.9 1
3. HT Component No. Except Verifled
3) SCD 57 of
4. !!T & Type Filler HVAC
  • Hetal .
5. Fit-Up
6. Final
7. WelJer ID

, 8. Weld No.

9. Hechanical Separation I

i J-9 I 4 t 4 t

O 

                                                                                                         \
  • S ATTACHIG347 .5-1 l&C PRlHARY WELD C(HlWFHT QC INSPEC110il ASHR CODE INTEC. IMCliHFJIT REVIEW C1. ASS QTY.INVOLVrn CONFICURATI(el PERFtHtHisp INSPFCTlfilt NDE TEST HERC.FhASCO 1.PL 01MFR 1xl.Ing - I itf 2 95 Travelera 1/8" Socket I. Cleanliness

, (Approx.) ' Weld 2. Component Vertiled 100% 100% 1001 15% l) SCD 57 Wit h

3. NT Component No. F.ucept vertiled of
4. HT & Type Filler HVAC 4

Iktal

5. Fit-Up
6. Final
7. Welder ID

} 8. Wald No. l*2 Sample P2 10 Drawings 1/4" Socket

1. Cleanliness InJer. Exam. Indep. 1001 1D01 1001 151 ripe Weld. 2. Component Verfiled l} SCD 62 i By Kemper Enam 2) SCp 57

! 3. IIT Component Nog Insurance By CEO 

                                                       .                       Verliled                   Record        Liq.
4. HT & Type Filler Review . Penet.

Hetal (1002) (ID02)

5. Fit-Up thysical
6. Final Inspection

,is 7. Welder ID (Approm 22)

8. WolJ No.

Strong Back I' lH i 7 Tanks t/4" Socket l. Cleanliness I.' l'Iping for Weld 2. Component Verfiled loo! loot 100E 15% 1) SCD 57 l.evel .

2) QASP-39.15 Switchen 3. lit Component Ns.

= Ycrified 3) QASP-19.9 

'                                                                         4. HT & Twpe Filler                         ,

Hetal 

  '                                                                       5. Fit-Up
6. Final
7. Welder ID =
8. Wald N.s.
9. Hechanical Separation
 ;   Tulwe r wk    Seismic       650           Fallet Cl. I         (Appros.)

8001 '10Z 1) 671 lander QAl-21

2) QASP 19.85 (Ni puty) 4 J-10
  • i
  }

l

6 ATTACllHFJIT J-l ItC PRlHARY WF.I.D ASHE CODE QC INSPFETION INTEC. DOCllHtNI REVIEW i CtWrimtHT Cl. ASS QTY.lNVOI.VED C(WFICURATI(W FFRFORHtD INSPECTION NDE TEST HERC.ERASCO l.PL OTHDR Tubing i' Seismic 5l00 Fallet 1. Clesuliness Tul.ctrack C1. 1 (Approm.) 75% '5001 80% 1) 351 under yAl-2)

2. Component Vertfled 2) QASr-19/1% (HI thily)

Supporta 3. Heat No. Component Verifled

4. IIT & Type Fillet Metal
5. Fit-Up
6. Welder ID
1. Weld No. .
8. Final Desgen- Seismic 180 Fillet 1. Cleanliness ratersin (:4. I (Approm.)

Not 1002 101 1) Ibasco QC 1001 refunpection

2. Component Verlfle.1 Comp. 2) 79-14 W.nlkJ..wn

, Supp..its 3. HT No. & Type !

3) QASP-89.7 Faller thtal -
4. Welder ID *
5. Weld No. ,
6. Fit-Up .
7. Final Instaunent Seismic 200 Fillet 1. Cleanliness
;   St an.ls   Cl. I      (Approx.)                                                                                   Not    IDi[I 10Z  1) 100% un.ler QAl-21
2. Component Verlited Comp.

a

2) QASP-19.15 (NI Only)
3. HT No OF Component Verifted
                                                         '4. HT & Type Filter Metal
5. Welder ID
6. WeIJ No.
7. Fit-Up -
8. Final I.

1 I i J-Il 

                                                          .                 l

ATTACHMENT NO. J-2 VERIFICATION OF THE ACCE?TABILITY OF MERC"RY INSTALI.ATIONS Since the Step Work Order on J!arcury safety related activities was issued in July 1982, Mercury installed syste:s have been heavily scrutinited by LP&L and Ebasco. The Mercury-installations have also been subjected to NRC field review. Additionally, Kemper Insurance. participated in . the ASME Section III N-Sta:p application process and, as such, was required 'to witness hydrostatic testing of all ASME Safety Class 2 installations. The following is a brief discussion of seme of the significant LP&L and Ebasco verification activities with respect to Mercury installations. l.. . A direct result of the Stop Work Order, was the initiation in July 1932 of joint Mercury and Ebasco walkdowns of instrumentation installations on a startup system ba~ sis. LP&L QA and Startup were involved in the initial 

             . phases of the program.            Walkdown results were documented on punch lists and evaluated fer ncnconforming conditions and establishment of corrective action.         The walkdowns were conducted in two phases.                                             The first phase consisted pri=arily of tubing along with the associated tubetrack and clamps.- The second phase, which commenced in January 1983, consisted of a walkdown of supports. The walkdowns resulted in the generation of a large number of NCRs and rewcrk.                    Attachments 2, 3 and 3F of the response to NRC Issue 23 discuss the significance of the NCRs.
2. In addition to LP&L QA~ participation in the corrective action valkdowns discussed above, LP&L QA performed a status review at the time of systa=

l turnover in accordance with the requirements of LP&L Procedure QASP 17.5. This review consisted of a minimum 10% review of the documentation, 'and a random field sampling of hardware versus as-built - drawings. Portions of the _ Mercury installatien for 'the following startup systems were field verified: 18-3, 25-9, 36-1, 36-3, 39, 43A, 43B, 43E, 43H, 43J, 46A, 46B, 46C,

t. 46D, 46E, 46H, 52A-1, 52A-2, 523, 52C, 53A, 55A,56A, 58, 59, 60A,.60B, -

l 60C,'66, 713, 73 and 76. As a result of these reviews, LP&L was able to conclude that the as-built conditions generally reflected the system drawings, and that no significant hardware deficiencies were encountered.

3. Ibasco conducted various other field verification activities relative to Mercury installations. These are summarized as follows:
a. As part of the closure of SCD 57, Ebsseo QA initiated a corrective action supple =ent which consisted in part of a sample field inspection of various attributes related to Mercury installations. This inspection took place in February, 1984.

J-12 i L d' 

      ,  e,-     , , ,    c--    m,,-e -,.,,,..e  r, --v,,-v--m,    m .m -w-r-   --e n,--    em ,----,--,*-~+n--          -w.> ,+,wme~-           ,- w-~-,e <--. , -
b. Ebasco Engineering conducted a plant walkdown in order to identify and correct miscellanecus hardware deficiencies which normally result from ongoing construction activities. This walkdown was conducted in accordance with E*casco Procedure ASP-IV-141 and included all safety related areas of the plant. Deficiencies, along with QA/QC verification of corrective action on safety related items, were documented on punch lists. The program was established in support of the area closecut and transfer process, which took place in March, 1984 through May, 1984 This walkdown provided another level of assurance on the Mercury installations.
c. Since August 1982, the Ebasco QA Surveillance Group has conducted 48 documented surveillances of Mercury hardware and documentation. Any findings were resolved and, when necessary, NCRs were initiated to evaluate potentially significant discrepancies. The activities of the Ebasco QA Surveillance Group are discuss'ad in greater detail in Attachment 3 to the response to NRC Issue 23. Generally, this in-
  • process surveillance program provided another means of monitoring Mercury activities, thus ensuring the adequacy of the installations.
4. The cost significant ac tivity, aside f.om the corrective action walkdown discussed in Item 1, involved the Ebasco QA records review of Mercury documentation. This review was necessary due to the demobilization of Mercur-/ in August of 1983 without the completion of the Mercury records review. The review commenced in November, 1983 ard was completed in March, 1984. A group of 46 QA reviewers, inspectors, supervisors and clerical staff was asse= bled for this eff ort. The review was conducted in accordance with QA instruction QAI-23. As deficient or missing documents were identified, QC inspectors were dispatched to reverify the installations. As a result, approximately 67% of tube track installations were reinspected; approxinately 35% of Seismic Category 1 supports were reinspected; and approximately 24% of the Mercury installed anchors were reverified for proper torque. Attach =ent 5A to the response to NRC Issue 23 provides a summary of the review and reinspection scope resulting from the Ebasco QA records review. Available records indicate that an insignificant amount of rework resulted from the reinspection process.

l l i J-13

  • l l

l I i

4 -- SLN2ARY OF THE E3ASCO OA RECORDS REVIEW I. The following is a su==ary of the work scope related to the Mercury dccumentation review conducted by Ebasco QA. Further, a su= mary of fiele QC verifications resulting from the review process is provided in Section II. A. Tubing-Installations Records Review ASME Section ASME Section Review Scope III-C1 css 2 III-Class 3 Total 

            -Nu=ber of Systems                                              13                            36          49

, Number of Mercury Travelers (OCRs) 86 284 370 Number of Instruments 150 835 985

3. Seis=ic Category I Support. Tube Track, and Other Miscellaneous Hardware Installations Review Scope Quantity Tube Track Supports 5142 Primary Sa=ple Line Pipe Supports 314 Tube Track Installations 665 Instrument Stands 184 Bulk Fabricated Supports / Fit' tings /

Anchor Plates 7230 (Approx.)- Instrument Mounts 267 II. QA reinspections were initiated in order to resolve documentation deficiencies identified in the review process. A su=cary of .reinspections is as follows: A. Tubing Installations Reinspections were initiated to verify the following: Attribute Quantity. Heat Number 30 Material Identification 15 Welder's I.D. 11 Tube Slope 4 

            -Verify Repair of Da= aged Tubing                                                             7
             'Jall Thickness                                                                              2 Defective Weld                                                                 .             1 Instrument Installation                                                                      3 TOTAL                                                                                73   (Note ')

J-14 1 

                     . . . - . .  .          . _ - . . .   . . ~ _ _ . , .     . _ - , , _ _ _ _ . , _ _

1 1

3. Supports / Tube . Track and other ticcellaneous Seismic -Category 1 installations.

Reinspections were initiated to verify.the following: 1 i Attribute Ouantity-Support Configuration, Location & Welds 2058 l Tube Track 514 Instrument Stands 211 Torqua Verification of Anchor 3olt.$ Including l 

                ' Proper Embedzent and Thread Engagement                             896 Support Type Only                                                      159 Final Visual of Support Weld Caly           ,

4 g ,. ' 88 Pipe Support Configuration . 7e t. Miscellaneous Attributes (Ht. No . , Welder I'.D. , 4 Etc.) . '216 TOTAL ' " ' 4219 (Note 1) , As a result of these reinspections, a total of 113 NCRs and 1035 Discrepancy Notices were dispositioned. t -

t. .

t NOIS 1: Some duplication of riinspection or, unsuccessful inspection is included > 

 ,,         in these numbers.                        '
                                                   ~ . .

J-15

(._ . - -. - - - S' l }- L e i l-i s ATTACIDiENT J-3 i i , l . I J-16 i

j. .

i f L.-__.,____..__.._._...___..__.___.__.._._..__...._.___._.._.______.________. 

  .c g

ATTACHMENT NO. J-3 SUM!AAY OF MERCURY REINSPECTICUS RESULTING FROM NRC ISSUE NO. 1 As a' rescit of the L?&L' revicu ef NRC ' Issue No. I regarding - Mercury QC' eualifications. LP5L' deemed it prudent to undertake n further extensive reinspection of Mercury. work. Accordingly, LP&L precedure QAS?l9.15 was established _ to reinspect the sensing lines and associated hardware - (e.g. tube track, support, etc.) for the N1 instrument insta11ntions, which perform a safety-r21ated function and . provide a pressure boundary. The reinspection is complete and no discrepancias impacting plant safety were found. 

                  ., The discrepancies vere sorted into the following nine categories for evaluation:

A. Overspan on tubing B. Missing hardwan (e.g. missing nuts, bolts, Icekwashers, tube clasps) C. Incorrect tubeclamp type (2D,3D) D. Insufficient wald-on support r E. Incorrectly assembled hardware, track, support, etc. F. Undersited tubing veld G. Anchor bolt embedment E. Ancher bolt spacing I. Arc strike / grind mark on veld Table 1 sumscrizes tha number of findings in each category. l.. The purpese of this attachment is tcL discuss the ramifications of the identified 

           <       conditions with respect to plant safety and to discuss the need for furcher i'             a reinspections.
                  - Categerv  A,- Overspan en Tubine The most significant overspanned conditions found during the reinspection were calyzed under- design loading :onditions and -determined to be within ASME code allevable stresses. The 15 cases identified as rework items involved minor
                  - rel; cation of clamps and were reworked rather than submitted for complete                                                  '

engineering evaluation. It was j udge :1, however, that there was no safety sigt.ificance with the respect to the as found conditions in this category. Categorv B - Missing Hardt:are Missing hardware was further broken down into two categories: a) Missing lockwashers h b) Missing tube clamps, missing nut or- bolt for tube clamp assemblies,-and tube track support or track splice connections. 

                   "issing lockwashers pose a concern in that the nut is more likely to loosen under seismic conditions.                   Since the nuts were f ound . to be tight in these i                  instancas, the bolts should not loosen under short term seismic conditions.

J-17 

    P I
         $      N                 4m,e- a-t,.yeg - r- g-+ $ -W--
                                                             ,   *hf-re-    -uTf-   m- - - - n *t' ea * *y-t-wewe='= t--   t "WT N'ew W -- si

    . Induced vibration in tubetrack/ tubing       installations due to plant normal operating conditions is minimal,       and should net cr.use loosening of the
     . connection.

With respect to the missing tube clanp hardware, such cases were treated as an everspan condition for evaluation. Stress analysis evaluation of the identified discrepancies concluded _ that the as-found condition would not result in overstressing the tubing under design loading conditions. Missing tubetrack ' hardware likewise results in an overspanned condition. The resultant deflections would not result in f ailure of the tubing pressure 

    ' boundary under design loading conditions.

In summary, none of the missing hardware items degrade the everall system integrity and thus do not preclude the system from perfor=ing its intended safety function. However, missing hardware items were reworked in accordance with installation requirements. 

    . Cates;orv C - Incorrect Tube Clamo (2D & 3D)

The as-fcund conditions can be broken down further as follows:

1. Two dimensional (2D) clamps used in lieu of a three dimensional (3D) clamp.
2. Three dimensienal clamp used in lieu,of a two dimensional clamp.
 ,-   The first condition represents no safety significance in r. hat a 3D clamp simply
    .provides axial restraint as well as lateral and vertical restraint.             Axial restraint is also achieved by clamps installed en the tubing as it changes
    -direction.     (That is, tube clamps in a tube run - on a perpendicular plane of
    ' direction to the run to be restrained will provide restraint to-chat run).

The condition in which a 3D clamp is used in . lieu of a 2D clamp may pose a concern in that axial thermal' growth would be restricted. The only case where this condition may pose a problem is when there is a straight run of tubing between two 3D clamps coupled with high maximum operating system temperatures. Only. two such cases were noted out of the -68 total clamp discrepancies. 

    .Approximately 2600 cube clamps were inspected.

The probability that these lines would fail is low, since restricted-growth due to cyclical thermal loading of the cube in itself would not cause a pressure boundary failure. Frequent cyclical thermal loading is not anticipated en-Waterford since it is LP&L's policy to backfill instrumentation legs rather than-blowdown the line. In the unlikely event of a tube failure for the two identified instrument loops (had the cases not been corrected), the failure 

    -would not have been of safety significance.

Catecorv D - Insufficient Veld On Sucoort The two identified conditions in this category were evaluated and found to be acceptable as installed, under design loading conditions. Thus, no item of safety significance was identified in this categor/. J-18

Catatorv E - Incorrectiv Asse bled Hardware The 49 identified conditions consisted pri=arily of loose bolts. Many instances involved one loose nut in a four bolt tube track splice asse:bly. In such , instances one bolt alone would be sufficien.. In instances of icose tube track to support belts or tube cla=p bolts, the icose i nut and bolt assembly provided so:e cla: ping action, ensuring no overspan condition existed that would degrade the overall system integrity under design conditions. The instances of this condition occurring are isolated throughout all the reinspected installations, which further reduces the i= pact on individual system integrity. Category F - Undersire Tubing Welds Twenty-Five undersited welds were identified. Thirteen were ceceptable based on a previous analysis (refer to NCR-W3-5350). The remaining 12 welds were repaired to meet ASME code requirements. However, in LP&L's judgement, had these undersited conditions gone undetected, the structural integrity of the weld to perform under design loading conditions would not have been compromised. Also, t hydrotests performed on non-atmospheric installatio ns provide further evidence relative to the adequacy of the weld. Given that only 12 out of the 

     - approximately 4800 welds reinspected were found to be undersized, LP&L believes that additional reinspection is not justified.          None of these conditions represent an item of safety significance even though repairs were required based on ASME code requirements.

Category G - Anchor 5olt Embedments F Three of the identified conditions in this category were reworked to be-consistent with installation criteria required. These were later analyzed and it was found that rework was not required and none of these conditions posed a concern relative to safety significance. . Category E - Anchor Bolt Spacing Violations The as-found conditions in this category were evaluated and determined to be acceptable as-is under design loading conditions. Therefore, no ites of safety significance was noted. Category I - Arc Strikes & Grird Marks Arc strikes or grind marks were identified on base metal pressure boundaries or at a weld. tihen buff ed and measured, the as-found conditions were deter =ined not to exceed established mini =u: vall thickness criteria or mini =um veld size requirements. Thus no condition of scfety significance was noted nor were any - repairs required. J-19 i

SLT4APll AND CCNCLUSIONS Conditions that have been designated for rework were done so generally to eet code require =ent's and to satisfy specific installation criteria. Had these conditions been lef e uncorrected, in L?iL's judgenent, they would not have impacted the overall ability of the system to function under design loading conditions. Further, the limited nu=ber of discrepancies found in each category as compared to the total number of itens inspected does not . justify further reinspection of Mercury installations. This is further substantiated by th e fact that most of the rework performed involved =inor hardware discrepancies (i.e. categories B,' C and E). - All' Mercury N1 instrument tubing installations were reinspected. Reinspection of N2 instrumentation, which is only safety related with respect to its pressure boundary integrity function, is not warranted. As noted, significant pressure boundary concerns were not identified in the N1 instrumentation reinspection. Only 12 out of 4,800 welds were repaired, and these repairs were due to code requirements, and not as a result of a degraded pressure boundary integrity condition. e / J-20

TABLE 1 4

SUMMARY

3Y DISCREPANCY TYPE VIOLATION APPROXIMATE TOTAL DISCREPANCIES TOTAL NIS'.3ER OF ACCEPTEL CODE TOTAL ITEMS IDENTIFIED

  • REWRK ITEMS AS IS-INSPECTED ** CITED ACTUAL A 10,500 ft. 55 21 15 6 3 5,500 75 67 67 .0 C 2,60.0 68 68 68 0 D. 3,700 15 2 0 2 E 5,500 60 49 49 0 F 4,800 25 12 12 J' G 3,600 40 3 3 0 H 3,600 88 42 0 42 I 10,500 ft. 7 7 0- 7 d

TOTAL 430- 274 221 53 e

  • QASP19.15 contained basic design criteria that had to be inspected against; This procedure did not account for prevf ous analysis, unique installation i
                  ' details or . certain criteria identified in the installation details notes section. The actual number of discrepancies reflect the valid violations from the specified detailed design criteria.
           **      Estimate based on typical installation of-10,500 linear fc. of tubing with accessories.                                                                                         ,

, J-21

Atta sent J-4 SCOPE OF ME R CUR Y'S WORK Significont Reinspections 8 NCR's Or inspections Oy Olliers G '82 *83 Walkdowns Mercury / Ebosco / LP8L 100 */. Of P2 / P3 Systerns Tubirvj, Tubetrock 8 Supports Additional Scope llems

  • I 'C* I Ni (Sofe Shuttkiwn) lastruments (~235) Ebos o C ~100%
                                                                                                                                           -Sirorvjbocks Ior Level
                                                                                                                ~ ~ -

N *' ' i. Or N2 (Ressse Boundary) Instruments (~000) e P2(Class 2) Pipe 8 Tubing 

                                                                                              *                                               -Geo PT's 100%
                                                                                                                 /                            -A    Hy r s 100*/.

o OC ~67 % 

                                                                  - R 6159                                       7 P3(Class 3) Tubing O       o!                    lo o                                                                                                       -LPGL liydros 100%
          \                 /        /                                                                        /                              with exception of ilVAC o       o                         o      Tube Clamps            Fillings                                    y                    ,
            .j                     Q                                 -Welded Or                               /
                                                                     -Swogelok Seismic Supports
                                     )                              l                                                                        -Ebosco OC ~35%

(y, l0 l ln l0 lFgl -NCR's i 5819,6512,6515 8 70GG 

          <             %            3            M     -IU               a       J     -

Io I Iol 1' " Drilled-in Anchors 

                                                                                                                                            - Ebosco OC - 24 %

o (M  % o- -Plates g_g -NCR 58Si 

         /                           \

O ol {O 'o Instrument Stonds . 

                                                      -Ebosco OC ~100%

s 

                                                                                          .I-22

ATTACHMENT 1 K. NISCO 

             -1. On-Site Dates: August 1973 to October 1983
2. Scope cf Work:
a. ' Installation of Reactor Coolant Pu=ps,
b. Installation and final setting of reactor vessel and (2) steam generators.
c. Installation of. Reactor Vessel head.
d. ' Installation and assembly of fuel handling system,
e. Fabrication and installation of seismic Class I supports.
                  'f.       Installation of pool ~ seal ring / rolling missile shield.
g. Perform hydrostatic testing on all systems installed.
                  -h.       Perform insulation resistance testing on electrical equipment.
                   'i.      Assembly and installation of CEDM system magnetic jack assenblies.
3. Scope of Inspection:
a. Material Receiving Inspection.

Jo . Inspection of fit-up and final welds.

c. Inspection of Proper Bolting (Torque and Tension).
d. Installed Equipment Inspection.
e. Hydrostatic Testing Inspection.
f. Insulation Resistance Testing. Inspection.
4. QA Program Requirements /Centractual Commitments:
a. . Quality Personnel,(including Auditors, QC Inspectors, and'QA Surveillance-
                          . Personnel) - Nisco's contract required all personnel. to Lreceive indoctrination and technical training.

i

b. QA Auditors - Nisco Procedure ES-116-3, " Qualification certification of Audit Personnel" required completion of self study courses, on-the-job ,

training, and oral or written examinations.

c. QC Inspectors /QA Surveillance Personnel - ANSI N45.2.5, Nisco Procedure-ES-116-2, "0ualification and Certification of Inspection Personnel", and Nisco . Procedure ES-117 " Inspection, Testing, and Examination Personnel-Training Procedure".
5. Inspector Qualification and Dispositioning of Deficiencies:

The verification program identified one (1) NISCO QC inspector who perfor=ed Level II inspections for approx 1=ately 5 conths and whose qualifications were determined as not =eeting the recuirements of ANSI. N45.2.6-1973 for Level II during that period of tine. Corrective Action Report EQA-84-4 was initiated to track the disposition of this deficiency. The Level. II qualifications of the identified individual had been questioned in L980 in a finding resulting fren an LP&L audit of NISCO (LP&L Audit NO. 80-25). Corrective action taken by MISCO to resolve that finding was accomplished shortly after the LP&L audit and included re= oval of the Level II certificcrion for the individucl and a reinspection of the installations which he had inspected as a Level II 

                 . inspector.       The quality of the construction activities inspected by
                 'the individual in question was further confirmed by acceptable NDI reports.       See NISCO Letter, dated July 16, 1980, attached.

K-1

T" t ? a. t 

    ^

i 3 ) ? 0-U h s ATTACHMENT K-1 ? . 1 . O K-2 L. .___- 

              --   - M- -qy., ,                g-, "" h v   3.,   '*YWerwww, . _ __

ATTACIDiENT 1 L. NOOTER

1. On-Site Dates: July 1976 to December 1981
2. Scene of Work:

Fabricate and Erect -

a. Refueling Water Pool Liner
b. Condensate Storage Pool Liner
c. Reactor Building Canal Liner including Floor Embedments, Floor and Wall-Embed =ents, and Refueling Cavity Seal Sed Place
d. Spent Fuel Storage Pool Liner
e. Spent Fuel Cask Storage Pool Liner
                   ' f.         Refueling Canal Liner                                                                                                          .
g. Spent Fuel Cask Decontamination Area Liner
h. Decontamination Room Liner
3. Scope of Inssection:
a. Receiving Inspection
b. Radiographic
  .                  c.        Magnetic Particle       '
d. Ultrasonic
e. Liquid Penetrant
f. Leak Detection (Vacuum Box Testing)
g. Calibration of Test Equipment
h. Final Visual Wald Inspection
4. 0A Program Requirements / Contractual Commitments:

i

a. Quality Assurance Engineer (includes Auditors) - No requirements for qualification.
b. Quality Assurance Technicians (includes Record Reviewers) - No requirements for qualification.
c. Quality Assurance Management / Supervisors -

No requirements for

qualification.

! d. Field Inspectors - Nooter Procedure SP-18, " Qualification of Inspectors",

j. field requirements are High School education or prior experience in manufacturing and construction, natural or corrected near distance acuity.

Such that they are capabla of reading the J-1 letters on the standard !- . Jueger test chart and color vision evaluated for personnel performing cole sensitive evaluations. In addition, prior to performing inspection.-the inspectors are briefed en job require =ents,

e. Nondestructive Examination Personnel -

SNT-TC-1A and Noccer Procedure NDE-10. "Nondestructiva Examination Personnel Qualificatien and Certification".

5. Inspector Qualification and Dissositionin ef Deficiencies:

(In ?rogress) L-1 

    +  y .,    e- +-.rv  .-,, ,.--,--   ,u-   y- -m_.-   --,c. , -.-,-e-    ----   -- -   .,-- gy  m-     e- w'*MT-r* &"fe---r   r---e-b '-w" W---"=7**v-   -

ATTACEMENT 1 M. SLINE

1. On-Site Dates: December 1977 to August 1984
2. Sccce of Work:
a. Application of Service Level I, Level II Coatings and Balatte of Plant Equip =ent and Structure.
3. Scope of Inspection:

a.. Surface Preparation Inspection

b. Product Selection Inspection
c. Paint and Protective Coating Application Inspection
d. Workmanship Inspection
e. Receiving and Issuing Material Inspections .
f. Calibration Inspections
4. 0A Program Recuire=ents/ Contractual Commitments:
a. QA Personnel except QA Manager - No procedural requirenents fo'r qualification,
b. QA Manager - Sline Precedure W3-1, "Certificatica and Oualification of Inspectors", which requires QA Manager to be a level III.
c. Inspector Personnel - Sline Procedure W3-1, " Certification and Qualification of Inspectors".
5. Inspector Qualification anc Dispositioning of Deficiencies:

(In Progress) M-1

m 

   ,                                         ATTACHMENT 1 N. TOMPKINS - BECKWITH (T-3[
1. On-Site Deces: June 1977 to June 1984
2. Scope of Work:

a.. PIPING

1. Insta lation of ASME III Safety Class I, II, III, and Non-Safety related (B31.1) Process Piping Systems.
2. Installation of Pipe Flange Bolts.
3. System Hydrostatic Testing.
b. HANGERS
1. Installation of associated Seismic and Non-Seismic Pipe Hangers / Supports (AWS D1.1 or ASME Section NF) .
2. Installation of Pipe Rupture and Whip Restraints including structural steel, U-bolts, restraining plates, spacers and shi=s for piping systems installed by T-B.
3. Installation of expansion anchor bolts for systems installed by T-B.
3. Scone of Inspection:
a. PIPING 1.

Fit-up anc final visual inspection.

2. . Inspection.of pipe flange bolts.
3. Hydrostatic testing,
b. HANGERS / RESTRAINTS
1. . Fit-up and final visual inspection.
2. Inspection of high strength bolting.
3. Inspection of expansion anchor-bolts.
c. GENERAL
1. Material Receiving inspection.
4. QA Program Recuirements/ Contractual Commitments:
a. Quality Assurance Auditors - T-B Procedure TBP-8, "Oualiev Assurance
                 -Audits", requirements shall have or be given appropriate trtining or orientation to develop their competence for perfor=ing required audits.
b. Quality Control ' Inspector /QA Surveillanca -

ANSI N45.2.6 and T-3 Procedure T3P-4, " Indoctrination, Training, and Certification of OA/QC Personnel". .: 

      -5.  'Insoecter cualification and Dis _. sitionin2 of Deficiencies:               .
           -Using conservative standards as defined in the basic response, 16 of the 147 T-3 inspectors did not fully meet the criteria of ANSI 15.2.6-1073.

Fur ts.a r , there has been a significant amount of required and elective overinspaccions, reinspections, tests and reviews conducted by T&E, Ebasco, LP&L and otners. These are displayed on the attached Tables I & II. Brief explanations, keyed to the tables, are: N-1

PIPINJ A'O PENETRATIONS (1) T-3 contracted Hartford Steam Soiler, Inc., :o provide third party Authori:ed Nuclear Inspection . services. The Authorized Nuc1 car Inspectors (ANI) inspected in-process and comple:ed work on a sample basis to _ independently assure compliance to the ASME Code. These inspections vere performed on items and processes that were also inspected by T-3 QC personnel. (2) T-3 inspectors only perfor=ed visual examinations of welds. All.other Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) was independently performed by Peabody /GEO Testing. GEO NDE included radiography, liquid penetrant, magnetic particle and ultrasonic testing. (3) All ' radiographs were independently reviewed by a qualified Ebasco Examiner. (4) Independent Preservice Inspection (PSI) of piping, pipe welds, and' pipe supports, per ASME Section XI requirements was performed by Virginia Corporation under contract to LP&L. This inspection consisted of both visual examination and ultrasonic testing of critical safety related installations previously installed and inspected by T-3 personnel. (5) All safety-related piping systems were hydrostatically tested to assure system integrity. In addition to T-B QC personnel, these tests were witnessed by the T-B,ANI (Hartford), Ebasco Start-Up personnel, LP&L Start-Up personnel, and the LP&L ANI (Factory Mutual - witnessed Class 3). s . (6) All piping documentation was reviewed by T-B and Ebasco QA personnel. On a sampling basis, LP&L QA personnel reviewed a minimum of 10% of this documentation. The LP&L QA documentation review ine! .tded field verification of approximately 3% of the installed hardware of small bore piping. (7) The Pre-Core Hot Functional Test has been performed and this test verified the integrity of the pipe welds under pressure and thermal loading based on simulated actual plant conditions. (8) Verification of piping configuration was accomplished as part of Ebasco Engineering IE Bulletin 79-14 program. The Pre-Core Hot Functional ther=al monitoring program further established the adequacy of the as-built pipin;; configuration to function as designed. . SEISMIC PIPE SUPPORTS (9) Ebasco Engineering has performed a field verification of Seismic Category I support / restraints which consis:ed of the following:

a. Suppor:/ restrain loca:1on'and functionality (!E Sulletin 79-1?.).
b. Comple:eness of hardware installation

('0) Support / Restrain; functicnality was verified during the Pre-Cora Ho: Func:ional Thermal Monitoring Test program. N-2

1: (11) As a result of : Significant Construction Deficiency No. 60 _(NCR 4010), 2 

                                            ~T-3 QC inspectors reinspected over 4500 safety-related' pipe supports.

(12) . Ebasco _ QA has perforned ~ a detailed as-built inspection of ' cVer 200 highly stressed hangers. (13) LP&L QA has inspected 3500 hangers in accordance wich' procedure QASP 19.7. (14) LPSL- contractad Helmut- Thielsch, a noted metallurgist, to independently review the support / restraint assembly structural welds _. In his report ha concluded that even those welds that were considered marginal in appearance, exceeded load carry requirements by a ecesiderable - amount. Further, he judged the structural welds to be comparchie to other nuclear power plants. j (15) The LP&L Piping Verification Grcup is responsible for the following activities cc be performed during Phase III testing program-

a. Monitor mechanical snubbers for cold / hot settings
b. Monitor spring hangers (except 2" & under non-seiscric/non-safety)
for cold / hot settings.
c. To clear the deficiencies found during the pre-core hot functional testing, a. portion of safety class (high energy) j-piping will be monitored for~ thermal expansion. -

i . (t - (16) All hanger documentation was reviewed by'T-B and Ebasco QA personnel, On a sampling basis, LP&L QA personnel reviewed a minimum . of.107. of , i this documentation. The LP&L QA documentation review included a field verification of approximately 3% of the installed hardware. The above reviews and inspections confirm .the overall acceptability of the e work performed by Tompkins-Beckwith. Therefore, there is adequate assurance that the safety related piping and supports will. satisfactorily

perfor= their intended functions and no further construction-related

, inspections or tests are warranted. 1 . 1 

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                                                                                                                         - NCR &nte Inspe6ttons (SCD he. 60)                               Field ill)                                                     Verliscattae
                                                                                                                         - Lleasco As-hwats inspecalans of enver 200 #1shly $rressed tiensers (QAl No. 2e)

(13) 

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                                                                                                            -t 4

T e 4 9 1 ). , t-

d ATTACEME'iT 1 C. WALDINGER

1. On-Site Dates: April 1977 to June 1979
2. Scope of Work:
a. Install HVAC duct, duct accessories, and supports. .
b. Install HVAC equipment.
c. Perform pre-operation, balancing, and functional testing of HVAC systems.

d.- Install plant stack.

e. Install duct insulation.
f. NDE by others. *

. g. .Waldinger's contract calls for furnishing and fabrication of ductwork, accessories, and supports; as well as installation.

h. Includes safety-related and/or seismic and non-safety related/non-seismic
1. - Leak and pressure testing of HVAC systems performed by Coastal Air Balanc (W3-r3-19) with TWC QC witness.
          -3. Scope of Inspection:
a. Receiving Inspection.
b. Inspection.of on-site fabrication.
c. Inspection of installation of drilled-in concrete expansion anchors.
d. Inspection of duct-duct connections. -
e. Fit-up and final visual inspection of structur'al welds.
f. Inspection of equipment setting (including bolt torquing).

(- g. Witness leak and pressure tests.

4. QA Program Requirements / Contractual Commitments:
a. QA Personnel - ANSI N45.2.6 paragraph 3.1 per Waldinger's QA Manual.
b. QA Auditors - Waldinger Procedure SQCP 18.1-1, " Audit" which is compatible with ANSI N45.2.23.
c. QC Inspectors - ANSI N45.2.6 and Waldinger Procedure SQCP-2.1-1,
                     " Qualification      of        Inspection.        Examination,   and Testing Personnel".
5. Inspector Qualification and Dispositioning of Deficiencies:

(In Progress) } t 0-1

1 

   . . ,    ,                                                               _ LP&L EXHIBIT 13
    ,                                                 RESPONSE k

ITEK NO. : 9 TITLE: Welder Certification NRC DESCRIITION OF CONCERN: The staff reviewed the records for the installation of the supports for certain ~ of the instrumentation cabinets in the Reactor Containment Building (RCB). The review included an examination of procurement records for the support material, weld rod control documents, welder certification reccrds and QC inspection records. Based on the staff review, it appears that documentation is missing on a number of support welds and it is not clear that the welders were certified for all of the weld positions used. Thus, the quality of the supports for the instrument cabinets are indeterminar.t. LP&L shall attempt to locate the missing documents and determine if the welders were appropriately certified. If the documentation cannot be located, appropriate action must be taken to assure the quality of the cabinet supports. DISCUSSION: The instrument cabinet support steel oIf concern to the NRC was installed by the ({$ J. A. Jones Construction Company. J. A. Jones' primary construction responsibility was to install reinforcing steel and place concrete. Welding by J. A. Jones was limited in scope and incidental to their primary responsibility. l As a result of the specific NRC concern, a thorough review was conducted of the documentation associated with welding of the instrument cabinets. Reviews were also conducted to identify the remaining scope of Jones welding and the extent of available documentation. As discussed below, no cases of welding out of l position were identified, and the adequacy of Jones welding was confirmed. A) Reactor Containment Building (RCB) Instrument Cabinets ( In order to determine that no welders welded out of a qualified position, a thorough review was conducted of Weld Inspection Reports (WIRs) associated with the support steel for the RCB instrument cabinets. This review determined that for 11 of the 18 instrument cabinocs, the WIRs indicated the welders were all qualified. l For the remaining seven cabinets documentation we.s not complete. Accordingly, it could not be conclusively established that no welders welded out of a qualified position. To confirm the integrity of the welding associated with these seven cabinet supports, a complete reinspection of six cabinet supports (welds on cabinet C-2B were inaccessible) was performed. The results of this inspection are documented in Attachment 9 to NCR 7549. The inspection did document conditions 

 '             requiring an engineering evaluation. However, the evaluation confirmed the l               capability of the rupport steel to perform 1tt safety functions under l               design conditions f acluding seismic loads required by the FSAR. No rework was required.

9-1

o 4 

           /~'                        Based on the inspection results of the six cabinets, LP&L elected to
           \                          reinspect the other 11 cabinets. Conditions requiring engineering

' evaluation were documented. The evaluations confirmed the as-built condition to be acceptable with no rework required. Based on partial documentation of welding on cabinet C-2B and the acceptable evaluation of the other 17 cabinets, no further evaluation of C-2B is necessary. The following summarizes the conclusions reached from reinspection and

  • evaluation of the instrument cabinets.

(1) Documentation for inspection of welding on the RCB instrument cabinet supports was not complete. (2) A review of the available documentation revealed no cases where out-of-position welding occurred. The J. A. Jones weld inspection procedure included instructions for completing WIRs that required a check of the welders certifications, and very few Jones welders were not qualified to all positions. This review has provided reasonable assurance that no J. A. Jones welders performed welding in positions for which they were not qualified. (3) In any instances where out-of-position welding may have occurred, the complete reinspection and subsequent evaluation of the as-built condition aas confirmed its adequacy. hB) Other Welding Performed by J. A. Jones , To ensure that conclusions reached relative-to the safety of the instrument cabinet supports could be extended to the rest of J. A. Jones welding, a thorough review was conducted to establish the scope of welding and adequacy of documentation. The additional J. A. Jones welding identified by this review consisted of 22 work packages. They were categorized as 1) temporary work or work done for construction convenience, 2) nonsafety-related welding, 3) safety-related or seismic welding. Work performed under categories 1 and 2 were not considered further due to their non-safety applications. For welding identified as safety-related or seismic, a documentation review was conducted. This review indicated that the available documentation associated with J. A. Jones other welding was as good, and in most cases, better than the' documentation associated with the RCB instrument cabinet supports welding. Documentation for three Field Change Requests (FCRs) (1898, 1916 and 1965) has not been located, however, Work Verification sheets indicating completion of this work provides a high level of confidence that the work was adequately performed. Welding identified as safety related or seismic was also determined to be of a low stress. No applications involving high stress were identified. The welding performed on the RCB instrument cabinet supports represented i a large percentage of the J. A. Jones welding. This welding was completely reinspected and analyzed without identification of any required rework. (, The acceptable condition of this work, combined with the favorable docume.tation on additional J. A. Jones welding, substantiates the

conclu ion that the additional J. A. Jones welding is adequate.

] I 9-2 1 

                                                                                                     .                                       3 1

i To provide additional confirmation of this conclusion, six of the twenty- {'s two packages determined to be the most important of J. A. Jones additional , u welding, were selected for inspection. Included in one of these work packages are the three FCRs for which full documentation has yet to be located. This inspection is documented by L-CIWA-18908, and identified no condition requiring corrective action. , 

                         'CAUSE:

The cause of this situation concerning documentation and quality of work on the I RCB instrument cabinet supports is believed to have been a combination of several factors that by themselves had no adverse effects, but as uniquely 3 combined in the instrument cabinet work, resulted in the deficiencies noted by the NRC. These factors were: (1) Limited relding performed by J. A. Jones provided limited opportunity for detecting any adverse condition in the welding program. (2) A " Welding Inspection Report" format that did not ensure documentation of inspection on an individual weld basis.

(3) Numerous revisions to the FCRs installing the instrument cabinet support s t eel. In some cases as many as three separate FCRs were required to complete the installation of steel for a single cabinet.

(4) Frequent modification / removal / reinstallation of support steel ss a result {g of (3) above.  ; (5) Due to (3) and (4) above, the installation required an inordinate length of time, with different welders involved in small portions of the overall job for each cabinet support. J The WIR used by Jones was, in retrospect, inadequate to deal with this combination of problems confined to these supports. As a result, it has ' been concluded that a portion of the welding associated with the instrumsnt cabinets may not have been inspected, and deficiencias were not documented and corrected. 1 GENERIC IMPLICATIONS: This concern has been addressed generically. A review of all welding performed by J.A. Jones was completed. Eles-nts ci the Jones nrogram that resulted in  ; problems on the cabinet supports were common to all welding performed by Jones. l However, the unique combination of problems observed on the cabinets was not cheerved elsewhere. , SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: Complete reinspection and engineering evaluation of the welding associated with 17 of the 18 RCB cabinets confirmed its capability to adequately perform its cafety function under design conditions. Review of documentation, determination . i 

  \                   of the low stresses involved and the selected inspection confirmed the adequacy of the remaining J. A. Jones welding. On this basis, there is no recognized reason that this issue should constrain fuel load or power operation.

9-3 

                                                                                        '}\
   '(    CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN / SCHEDULE:

Review and evaluation of the RCB instrument cabinet supports is complete. No further corrective action is required. 

                  ~

Identification and documentation review of J. A. Jones additional welding is complete. Six work packages were selected for inspection. No further corrective action resulted from this inspection. LP&L considers all corrective action usociated with this concern to be 7 completed. i ATTACHMENTS: None

REFERENCES:

(1) J. A. Jones QA Manual (2) NCR-W3-7549 (3) J.A. Jones Welding Inspection Procedure, W-SITP-14 (4) E. Stanley meno to file dated August 23, 1984, No. ES-84-08-7

(5) B. Grant /I. Ban meno to J. Houghtaling dated 10/10/84, No.ES-10145-84'
 @                                              t 1

l l - l l I 9-4

r 

 .                                                     _               LP&L EXHIBIT 14                                                      ,

r mm

RESPONSE

ITEM N.O.: 16 - TITLE: Surveys and Eric Interviews of QA Personnel NRC DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN: In a memorandum dated January 3, 1984, R.S. 'Leddick, L?&L Vice President for Nuclear Operations, direc:ed that the LP&L Quality Assurance (QA) personnel conduct interviews of the on-site contractor QA personnel to elicit any concerns the contractor' staff may have regarding the quality of construction of Waterford Unit 3. That memorandum also indicated that exit interviews would be similarly conducted with the contractor personnel prior to their leaving the Waterford 3 proj ect. A total of 407 such interviews were conducted beginning in January 1984 Individual responses were sent to the specific employee (s) who raised the Concern. l Eri: incarviews with the contractor QA E=ployees (resigned, transferred, or terminated) began on Janua:y 16, 1984. A co=pilation of the concerns raised during those interviews were forwarded for follow-up on May 22, 1984. The NRC staff reviewed all of the questionnaire forms and re:ponses to the questions identified by the LP&L QA staff. In some cases, the NRC raview identified additional potential issues, beyond those identified by LP&L, and responses that did not addre'ss the intent of the* concerns. Nevertheless, the 

  , staff found that the majority of thei concerns raised are being or have been~

addressed as part of all of the other NRC review efforts associated with Waterford 3. ' As a result of the scaff review, it is not evident that the survey and exit interviews have been vigorously pursued by LP&L to investigate the issuas raised for safety significance, root cause, and generic implications. - For exa ple, che exit interviews begen in January and are continuing. However, the procass of

reviewing the concent of tho'se interviewa did no t begin until 14:e May 1984 l For some of the i~nt erviews , additional infor acion should have been obtained l from the person interviewed bu: the interviewers did not indicate on the for=

whether or not they soughc additional fac:s. Finally for a number of areas, 

                                                                                                                                                ~

issues or potential proble=s were acknowledged but it is not clear : hat any f fellow-up accion occurred. i  : l The NRC scaff is concerned that the LP&L progras :o investiga:e issues does not promptly and thoroughly exasine the specific areas and the progra==atic i= plica:1cas of them. Other successful prograss have utilized independencly staffed groups to assess each issue raised and for= ally report to senior utility

  • canage=ent on their findings and recocmended corrective ac:1ons. These elements are not evident in the LP&L process. As a result, LP&L should develop and i=plement a for=21 program for handling issues raised by individuals. One of the first tasks to be dealt with by the program should be the review of the v responses previously provided to the QA survey and durine the ext: interviews.

8 16-1

c DISCUSSION: In addressing the' NRC staff's concerns, we will discuss first, the LP&L interview program as initially conducted by the company, and second, LP&L's plans for this program in the future. The initial program - a new type effort within LP&L-has been helpful and effective, LP&L believes, in identifying and resolving potential quality issues. At the same time, as reflected in experience to date and in the NRC staff comments, the program can be significantly improved. Program improvements, including those recommended by the NRC, are.being implemented. , I. PROGRAM AS INITIALLY CONDUCTED Discussion of the program is divided into six parts-establishment of the program,' implementation of the program in initial QA/QC interviews, implementation of the program in exit interviews, program review, program benefits and program shortcomings. A. Establishment of the Program In December 1983, construction work on Waterford 3 was essentially complete and the project was in a construction punch list mode. Syste testing and system turnover activities were nearing co=pletion, and the work force was in transition from centractor construction personnel to startup personnel and permanent plant staff. During this time frame, LP&L Management oecame aware, through a variety of sources, that rumors and allegations of construction quality concerns . were surfacing. Management / recogaized that first hand information was e very ,1=portant in addressing'such concerns and that the best source of information'should be the site QA/QC personnel. Accordingly, as an effort to identify and resolve such concerns, LP&L Manage =ent promptly established in early January 1984, a progra= co interview all on-site QA/QC personnel and to interview such personnel thereaf ter when they wure leaving the site. The objectives of this program were twofold:

1. Identify and resolve QA/QC concerns, in particular concerns of potential safety problems.
2. Communicate to these' personnel, if they desired, the disposition of their concerns.

This program was a new, voluntary effort of a type not previously - undertaken by the company; it was not an NRC requirement, nor was it part of a prior commitment. 6 9 e 16-2

6 The d: cision to cstchlich ras QA/QC incorview pregram was mada by the Senior Vice President - Nucler.r Operations af ter being proposed by the Corporate Quality . Assurance Manager. LP&L QA was assigned the 4 responsibility co conduct - such a program. Prime responsibility for program implementation was -assigned to a senior member of the !- C3rporate _QA Staff with 22 years experience in the utility industry. He was assigned by the LP&L Corporate Quality Assurance Manager as the principal interview team leader and is wide'ly respected for his competence and professicnalism. Reflecting his capability, that interview team leader was also designated by LP&L as' Construction - Appraisal Team coordinator for the company. , i

3. Imolementation of the Program in Initial QA/QC Interviews The program conmienced on January 3, 1984. On that date, the LP&L Senior Vice President- -

Nuclear Operations issued a memorandum l ' (Attachment 1) to Waterford 3 QA/QC personnel advising them that LP&L QA would, at his direction, be conducting -interviews with QA/QC 

                                      - personnel. It was further directe*d in the letter that the plan was to conduct interviews with QA/QC personnel prior to their leaving the site, and that the objective was to ider.tify quality concerns thess individuals might have.

The initial interviews of QA/QC personnel were begun on January 5 ! 1984. During this initial phase, 407 people involved in Quality Assurance and Quality Control functions were interviewed. Those , ,

  • interviewed are believed to have included all LP&L QA/QC personnel as 1

well as Ebasco gud subcontractor QA/QC personnel on site. e ' Interviews were conducted principally by two-man teams 'of LPSL QA j personnel. The Corporate Quality Assurance Manager briefed the i interviewers prior to the interviews and stressed that the objective was to obtain as much information as possible and that they should not intimidate, or appear to intimidate, the interviewees. 

                    ~

$ . Interviews were intended to be conducted in the following general - manner: $ Interviewee was shown a copy of the memorandum from the Senior tice President-Nuclear Operations. Interviewee was given the option to remain anonymous.

Interviewee was asked questions contained in a questionnaire l prepared by LP&L QA. The ' questionnaire included general i

questions ' inviting comments on quality concerns the interviewee wished to discuss. Responses were recorded on the questionnaire

  • by one of the interviewing team nenbers. In nest cases, the I interviries signed.the questionnaire.

The interviewee.was told he would be provided a copy of the response to his concerns if he so desired. i 1 4 16-3 

      -,,-m.,-        --w  w,   - - .-.--,-v-w,.,.,c,-        _g._-.,,w-w,,w,,,-+nww,,,     -,w,,-y-,  ,,--,,_,-w.-g-,---c.,_

                    'The prsgres, es imp 1.emented, w:o not dasign d to b2 cad - was e . .

auditable in the sense that all related corrective actions were documanced and - easily traceable. Thus, while concerns were evaluated and action was initiated as deemed appropriate, the questionnaire itself did not include a space for disposition of the concern. As the initial interviews were proceeding, interview comments were being contemporaneously reviewed by ' the interview team leader to determina: '

1. If a concern expressed by the interviewee required ,

addressing from a safety significance standpoint;

2. If the concern had generic implications; and .

l

3. If the interviewee desired a response to his concerns.

i Again, while this review in fact was performed, systematic records were not maintained. However, cdacerns detected were handled as indicated below. l 'Of the '.7 individuals interviewed, approximately two thirds expressed no conce. s. For the remainder, the interview team leader identified 72 potent ally safety related concerns (some concerns were referenced by more L 2n one individual). .

r. One of t. se , concerns was ahswered orally. As for the remaining 71
  • co'ncerns, the interview team lead *er prospaced these to the Corporate
                   - Q3ality I surance Manager, and LP&L then requested and obtained formal written       tsponses to these concerns from the persons believed to be best ab': to respond. .The concerns were consolidated in five requests for : spensa as follows:                  .

i l- Let er W3K84-0059 dated 1/11/84, from LP&L Corporate Quality - i Assurtste knager to Ebasco QA, listing 15 concerns; - Memorandum W3K84-0069 dated 1/1'2/84, from LP&L Corporate Quality . Assurance Manager to LP&L Plant Manager, listing 13 concerns; hecorandum W3K84-0097 dated L/16/84, from the interview team leader to LP&L Corporate Quality Assurance Manager, listing 4 concerns; Latter W3K84-0108 dated 1/17/84, from LP&L Corporate Quality Assurance Manager to Ebasco QA, listing 25 concerns; , Letter W3Ka4-0109 dated 1/17/84, from LP&L Corporate Quali;;y Assurance Manager to Ebasco QA, listing 14 concerns. 

                                                                                                            ~

In the letters and menoranda, LP&L QA set out the concerns essentially as stated by the interviewees,.with only cinor changes. 16-4 

  .. :::        : .. : .: - -- -- - -_.- -.--_                                . . ~ _ . _ . . . - - . . .         -             --

p As reficceed by tho dntes of thaca lottors and memorands, *- wars sent within a week, of completion of the interviews. Thus , : : n January, l 1984 LP&L interviewed 407 individuals, evaluated their concerns, and developed and sent written , requests for formal responses for 71 concerns determined to require such response. Responses to the letters and memoranda were coordinated between the individuals preparing a response and LP&L QA. Written responses were provided for all concerns, as follows: Letter W3QA-27541 dated 1/17/84 from E3ASCO QA to the LP&L Corporate Quality Assurance Manager.

  • Memorandum W3Q84-0010 dated 2/11/84 from the LP&L Plant Manager te the LP&L Corporate Quality Assurance Manager.

Letter W3QA-27570 dated 1/25/84 from E3ASCO QA to the LP&L Corporate Quality Assurance M4nager. Letter W3QA-27567 dated 1/25/84 from E3ASCO QA to the LP&L Corporate Quality Assurance Manager.

  • Memorandua W3K84-0170 dated 3/2/84 from the O tt Corporate QA Manager to the LP&L interview team leader.

As the responses were finally davaloped, 13 concerns were deemed to 

       ,               require corrective action, which was initiated through for=al project procedures.      The 13 concerns deemed to have required corrective                     '

actions can be categorized a's:' p

s. .

Four required procedural revistors or issuance of rsw procedures. Five required individual and/o groups of noncor. arn.ance reports to be ra. viewed. Three required some type of records review to be accomplished. One required a limited inspection. Of these concerns, corrective action for ten have been ec=pleted. The balance are scheduled to be completed prior to fuel lead, as referenced in the five response letters listed above. Fifty-eight concerns were deemed not to require corrective action by l the responding organization. In several instances, additional information was required from the interviewee for a full response. In these cases, the interview tec leader sought such information;

  • however, the interviewee generally did not provide it.

6 16-5 

           ~ ~ ~ ~ - -
                           - . . - - - , ".L: ~C':::: " *: :: - : ":. ~ - --               .  .-    .. -_- - . -

c During tha etursa of this intcrvicw cud rcvisv pecca. . the Corporate 

                                -Quality Assurance k nager kept the Senior Vice President-Nuclear Operations generally informed of the program's progress and of the overall results. This was done without detailed written reports.

The process, including identification of generic concerns , can be illustrated by the treatment of the following concern: lleview of NCRs. Several interviewees questioned whether particular NCRs had been properly dispositioned. LP&L QA considered this to be a generic issue and, indeed, it was one . that LP&L previously hed independently identified. Based on the independent identification, LP&L was considering conducting an extensive NCR review. The fact that several QA/QC personnel also raised this concern specifically confirmed for LP&L QA that ' such a review should be undertaken and the review was begun in February, 1984. C. Implementerion of the' Program in Exit Interviews In addition to initial interviews in January 1984 of on-site QA/QC personnel, the LP&L program requires interviews of QA/QC personnel leaving the site. Such interviews were commenced on January 16, 1984, and are continuing. Through July 1, 1984, a total of 174 interviews has been conducted. The format and procedure for the exit interviews has been the same as for the initial interv.iews; however, the response. process was longer in duration. * 

                                                                                .r.        ,

C, 

                               .Regarding the response proce'ss, the interview team leader reviewed the interview notes promptl'y after they were recorded to determine whether immediate action was required for the particular concern. On February                          .

10, 1984, the first concern requiring a response was raised in an exit interview. Between then and May 22- 1984, 12 additional such concerns were raised. In each instance, the interview team leador made* determinations that a response .would be required, but that ic=ediate-action was not necessary.

  • On May 22, 1984, these concerns were consolidated and listed in a l'atter (W3K84-1217) from LP&L to Ibasco QA and a formal response was requested. A response (letter .

l W3QA-28213) was issued by Ebasco QA on June 17, 1984 Of these concerns, one concern was deemed to require corrective action, which I has been accomplished. The delay in seeking formal responses in no l i way shows lack of concern (as has been suggested); rather, it raflects simply a perceived lack of safety need for immediate response and a i ' perception that other matters (CAT. Task Force) required priority attention. The exit interview program continues, and since May 22, 1984, five * 

                        ,       concerns requiring responses have been identified.                       Reflecting t.te NRC staff's expression of concern in the June 13,1984 letter and LP&L's l                                own reanalysis, LP&L compiled a listing of these concerns in mo=oranda

! W3K84-1517 dated July 2, 1984 and W3K84-1453 dau.d July 3, L984 .LP&L has requested the Quality Team (see et II, below) to obcain responses to these concerns. i 16-6 

    ,   ,,,-----.-,-se-                m       e+----wwre"w'--**P-+

rr D. Pregram Review Following the NRC letter of June 13, 1984,' several relatively quick internal reviews have been made of the interview program to date. The 

                                                           ~

interview team leader, for-instance, reviewed his own determinations. Further, LP&L's Independent Safe ty Engineering Group conducted a 

                            . review. As a result ' of these reviews, one adds.tional concern having potential safety significance was identified wnich required review and response. That concern related to Hi],ti bolts and was the ' subject of response request Letter W3K84-1466 dated June 25, 1984 to Ebasco                   .

QA (this letter also sought a formal response to the concern which the interview team leader had answered orally). Ebasco QA responded via 4 Letter W3QA-28220 dated July 6, 1984 to the LP&L Corporate QA Manager. The Hilti Belt concern was recommended to require no corrective action. u. In addition to these internal reviews, and as suggested by the NRC staff, an external organization is conducting a chorough review of all interviews to date and their disposition to assure that all concerns are identified, thoroughly developed and resolved. The external review is discussed further in Part II below. E. Program Be*afits The interview program as conducted by LP&L, clearly has been of benefit to LP&L. The ver/ fact that LP&L instituted a program is helpful in that the effort to date has convinced LP&L chat such an interview program can be an effective and valuable tool in identifying' 

                    .-       and resolving potential safety concerns. Further, QA/QC personnel, in

(, , , fact, were systematically . interviewed for expressions of quality concerns. The vast majority of individuals expressed no cod. erns. For those who raised concerns, tho'se concerns were addressed, corrective action was taken..as deemed necessary, and explanations of dispositica were given to individuals desiring this. The program, in short, has established and institutionaliced an additional channel for commmications within LP&L of potential safety concerns. - F. Program Shortcomings ' While the program has been beneficial, it also has had shortcomings. The most significant of these have been.che following: ~

1. The program was not established to be audicabic, i.e., all reviews and actions taken were not docuzenced and are not readily traceable.
2. No formal procedure was established for the program (this, for
  • example, allowed fer the lack of detailed written reports to upper manageceat) .
3. The program was conducted by in-house personnel who were not traised interviewers.
4. A more thorough review of the responses -ight have uncovered = ore concerns or = edified the concerns which were recognized.

16-7

r LP&L balisvos that thess program '. .ccomings aro addrosted and resolved by the program revisions instituted by LP&L as described in Part II below. II. CORRECTIVE ACTION' PLAN / SCHEDULE LP&L, in agreement with.the NRC staff, believes that the existing program can be significantly. enhanced. Reflecting its commit =ent to the program, LP&L had adopted the 'following program modifications: A. The enhanced interview program initially wiH be conducted by an independently managed organization. LP&L has selected Quality Technology Company for this effort. Quality Technology is responsible for a similar program at the Wolf Creek Generating Station in Kansas. Quality Technology's personnel include both individuals who have technical expertise regarding nuclear power plants and individuals with substantial experience in interview techniques. The head of the Waterford 3 " Quality Team" (as the program has been desis2ated) for Quality Technology win be Mr. Scott Schum. Mr. Schum is a former NRC Senior Resident Inspector, and he has a solid reputation within the industry. The " Quality Team" com=enced its operations onsite at Waterford 3 on July 6, 1984 It will be responsible for soliciting and receiving quality concerns and providing these concerns to the appropriate manager for analysis. and corrective action, as required, and for response back to the Quality Team. 

                                      ^

B. LP&L will closely =enitor the program. First, the program has been made audicable .in form,ii.e., all concerns and analyses and g dispositions thereof win be documanced in a readily traceable madner. 

     \

LP&L QA will conduct regular prograr audits. Second, " Quality Team" personnel, will initially report on Quality Team activities and concerns received at least weekly, to the Senior Vice President-Nuclear Operations with copies to the LP&L Corporate Quality Assurance Manager. Monthly Summary reports will encompass the concerns expressed by interviewees and the status of the disposition of those O concerns. Analyses of the safety significance, cause and generic implications will be performed for those concerns which are substantiated, and the results of such analyses win be pro =ptly reported to LP&L Managament. Concerns deemed to require immediate action will be i==ediately brought to the attention of LP&L Management. ' t C. A procedure for the progra= was for=any issued on July 13, 1984 This ( detailed procedure was prepared by the Quality Technology Company and was reviewed and approved by LP&L Management. "'ha interview portion of the program has already ec=menced and the re=ainder of the program 

               ,                is currently being phased into full implementation.
  • j D. The program has been expanded in scope. Exit interviews to date have been cenducted only with QA/QC personnel. The exit interview progra in the future win be applied to all appropriate onsite personnel, i

both of LP&L and Contractors, who are leaving. 4 l

  • I
  • i 16-8 l
                                                                                                  ~'

l .___ _  :==.=w - =- ~ ~ L- '

E.  ; Quality Technology's first ra rousibility, along with setting up the exit interview program and conducting interviews is to review the , concerns expressed in the interviews conducted to date by L?&L personnel. This review will cover both the initial LP&L interviews of January 1984, and the exic interviews subsequently conducted. Quality Technology has been directed to analyre interviews thoroughly for . additional-potential concerns and the cause and generic implications of all concerns, to follow-up on matters deemed to require further information, and to open a file for each individual's concern expressed and document specifically their dispositions. This effort, 

                               - will be completed prior to escalation above 5% power.                                                .

CAUSE: See paragraph I.T. above. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: To data all recognized items of safety significance found as a result"of the interviews are felt to have been adequately addressed. On this basis, there is no recognized reason that this issue should constrain operation at 5% power. This will be validated prior to escalation above 5% power. Additionally any further safety. concerns found as a result of the review specified in paragraph II.E. above, tha resolution of which are required prior to power exceeding 5%, will be evaluated prior thereto. GENERIC IMPLICAIIONS: 

                                                                             ?

None recogni ad to date. ( I 

     ,      f-The NRC can be assured that the company is vitally ' interested in having as effective and ;horough an interview program as possible. The co=pany believes that the preg; ram as initiated has been beneficial.                                   As with any new effort, however, the company has learned from its experience, as well as from the consnents of the NRC; and the company has strengthened the program accordingly.

The revisions and additions to the initial program are extensive and reflect LP&L's cocciement to the program. i ATTAC*dMINTS: (1) 1/3/S4 memorandum f cm R.S. Laddick - RETIRINCES: . None F e 16-9 m , ,- -,, v,_m-m--- - ---m-.-+ m-r--, 4,. ,em., , --y ennn,m,,,w.,e-

r' W' 4 *N 

  .:        t LO U1SI ANA        ,.ee - c~= eor...r   . . c .cx .c=.

P Q W E R & LI G H T! New causANs LeveasA7c,74-a==s e mc4) ses-asas MIOOt.E SOUTH ununt.s srstsM ROTH S. LEDDICK

  • Senior Vice Presscent
                                                                         .                 Nuclear Coerat:ons        ,

January 3, 1984 W3K84-0005 Q3-A35.01 TO: QA Personnel FROM: R. S. Leddick

SUBJECT:

In:erviews j The purpose of this letter is to advise you that, during the next two weeks, 

  ;.              LP&L QA personnel vill be conducting interviews with Ebasco and other onsite QA -

personnel. This is being done at my direction in order to identify any quali:y concerns that you =ay have. We also plan to conduct Exit In:erviews vi h you - prior to your leaving the Wa:erford Project. During these interviews, you should feel free to express any quality concerns you may hcve. No one need fear retribution for any:hing disclosed during the interview and you can remain 

                  .nony=cus if you wish.

LP&L intends to construct and operate Waterford 3 as safely as possible. Your help in achieving :his goal vill be greatly cypreciated. - =- - R. 5. Leddick RSL/cb cc: Intervievees e

, - m - g---. i AoviscRy cow.uTTas ON REA..fCR SAFEGUARDS 2, 

     'g ,.,hI>g !                            ,

woacron. e. c. 2ans b o March 9, 1982 LP&L EXHIBIT 15 (WITHOUT ENCLOSURES) , Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino

  • Chairman -

U. S. ' Nuclear Regulatory Commission < Washington, DC 2 CSS 5 SU30ECT: RE?CRT CN THE WATERFCRD STEAM ELECTRIC STATICN UNIT 3

Dear Dr. Palladino:

During its 252rd meeting, March 4-6, 1932, the Advisory Cc :nittee on Reactor Safeguards continued its review of the application of 1.cuisiana Pcwer and Light Cocpany (Applicant) for a license to operate the Water-ford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 (Waterford-3). This project was considered at a Subcommittee meeting on March 3, 1982 in Washington, - 0.C. arid at a previcus full Committee meeting on August 6-8, 1981. During the August caeting, the Committee prepared an interim report to you dated August 11, 1981. In its review the Committee had the benefit of discussions with the Applicant "and the NRC Staff. The Committee also had th.e benefit of the documents listed., In its interim report the Ccamittee expressed concern about the organiza-tional readiness of the Applicant to operate the plant and about the adequacy of the Applicant's training program. The report made several specific suggestions, and we indicated that we would report to you further on the adequacy of staffing and management. - During the meetings on March 3 and 4,1982, the NRC Staff reported its conclusion that the Applicant's organization, staff, and management will l be adequate to operate Waterford-3 in a safe manner by the time of . fuel l loading, currently scheduled for January 1983. The Appli, cant described ! efforts over the past six months to strengthen the Waterford-3 organiza-tion and training program. Tnese efforts include important changes in the corporate structure to provide increased dedication of management to l the task of completing and cperating Waterford-3, cha .ges 'in the operat-l ing organization to pennit improved focus on direct operational and technical support functions, substantial progress toward completion of staffing, the formation of a comprehensive training program, and estab-lishment of a strong Safety Review Committee. In addition, the Applicant described the integration of the Waterford-3 and contract personnel into an effective startup organization. l 

 . . - . - -                       - _               -,,----a,-,-,e-,r,.         ..,m.w
                                                                                  .             ..,v.   ..; n .   ,.2,,,,,,,

i 

            ,          Honorable :lunzio J. Falladino                                                                      P. arch 9                   1982 i

The Committee believes that the .ipplicant has effectively res;caded to the concerns regarding organization and ar. age:ent expressed in cur August 11, 1981 report. We believe that with continued dedication of Louisiana Power and Light Company management, satisfactory coe.pleticn of staffing and the . planned program for training, and due ccnsideration to other matters noted in our . August 11, 1981- report,. there is reasonable ' assurance the Waterford.. Steam Elfctric S atien Unit 3 can be cperated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. Sincerely, A%N P. Shecon . Chai. man - . .. . ... .. References ... . . . . . . . .. . - - .-. . , .. ..

1. Louisiana Power and Light Cok.pany, "Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit No. 3, Final Safety Analysis Report," with Amendments 1-25.
2. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Oceration of Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit No. 3,"

NifREG-0787, dated July 1981'. with Supplement 1, dated ,0ctober 1981 

   . ..                      and Supplement 2, dated January 1932.

6 

                                                                                                                                      .~               . .     .         .

I i . 

            -l l. ' :: ~.. . . . .
                                         .......6.                 ..   .                            . . .       -

RESPONSE - LP&L EXHIBIT 16 ITEM No. 5 E TITLE: Vendor Documentation - Conditional Releases NRC DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN: As a part of the staff review of the QA Program, the staff evaluated the Ebasco vendor QA program. In assessing this program, the staff specifically looked at the receipt inspection program and the conditional release system. As a result of its evaluation, the staff found deficiencies with the handling of conditional certification of equipment (C of E) for Combustion Engineering supplied equipment. For example, one conditional C of E for the reactor vessel and internals was issued because as-built drawings, material certifications, and the fabrication plans had not been forwarded when the equipment was delivered to LP&L in 1976. The missing documents were sent to Ebasco sometime in 1978, according to the Ebasco quality records supervisor, but were apparently lost prior to being placed in the Ebasco document control system. The conditional certification of equipment was found when a check of all files was made in April or May 1984. The missing documents have been requested from CE, and a deficiency report was issued and placed on a master deficiency list. This problem has existed since July 20, 1976. The safety significance of this is that problems with the vendor QA records could affect installed safety related equipment. LP&L shall examine their records and deter =ine if all conditional certifications of equipment have been identified, reviewed and promptly resolved. DISCUSSION: LP&L has reviewed their records to ensure that Conditional Certifications of Equipment and other conditional release conditions have been identified, reviewed and resolved. The following discussion outlines the results of the review which indicate that such conditions are adequately under control and do not constitute a situation adverse to the health and safety of the public. Combustion Engineering The quality records associated with Combustion Engineering material and equipment have been re-reviewed. The review concluded that Conditional Certifications of Equipment had been received for 45 purchase orders, and that for 31 of these. Combustion Engineering had provided Unconditional Certifications of Equipment prior to the audit. Ebasco Deficiency Report 84-5-3, was prepared and issued on May 1, 1984, identifying the items for which Unconditional Certifications have not been received. This Deficiency Report was entered into the site tracking system. The issuance of Conditional Certifications of Equipment is controlled under CE's QA program. Although the probability is considered very low, there is a possibility that the operability of equipment could have been affectad. As described in CORRECTIVE ACTION, therefore, LP&L has cc=mitted to a review to =ake such a determination. l 5-1 l l

Subsequent to the audit, 13 additional Unconditional Certifications have been received including the replacement copy of the unconditional certification for the Reactor Vessel Assembly. The issues concerning the remaining items relate to revision of the design drawings in the technical manual and to the addition of a section to the technical manual to show the proper stack-up of subcomponents during reassembly. These issues are currently being prepared by the equipment vendor. Neither of these items will affect the ability to . properly operate the equipment, which has been asse= bled and checked out by the vendor at the site. The Unconditional Certification for this equipment should be-issued by September 15, 1984. LP&L acknowledges that Combustion Engineering issued Conditional-Certifications of Equipment associated with the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) that were not being formally tracked as open items. The existence of Conditional Certifications of Equipment was not considered a problem based on the site's understanding that they reflected incompleted purchase orders as opposed to hardware or software deficiencies. This situation has existed since the original shipments of material and equipment from Combustion Engineering. The site did informally track the Conditional Certifications of Equipment as open items. In addition, letters were periodically sent to CE requesting the status and resolution of these items. To provide further assurance, site activity associated with conditional certifications was assessed. As of August 7, 1984, LP&L operations has placed 69 purchase orders with CE for spare parts. Of these 69 purchase orders, one had a CE Conditional Certification. The equipment related to this Conditional Certification was issued to the plant on an LP&L QC Conditional Release in accordance with plant procedure QI-10-006. . Other Vendors and Contractors To assess the potential for existence of other manufacturing open items not tracked in the site tracking system, the site's material receiving and control system was reviewed. It was found that the system was being properly implemented and that any problems identified during the material receiving quality control inspection and manufacturing records review were being properly tracked as Discrepancy Notices (DNs) and Deficiency Reports (DRs), respectively. However, it was realized that the potential for a similar situation existed in areas where problems are identified off-site relating to material to be shipped to the site, Based on this, three areas have the potential for similar situations, and were selected for additional evaluation: a) Concerns noted by Ebasco Vendor Quality Assurance Representatives (VQARs) on the Release for Shipment for=s, b) Nonconformance Reports (NCRs) controlled by Ebasco's Home Office, and c) Material received at the site under manufacture, deliver and erect type contracts. 

  'The evaluation conducted is described on Attachments 1, 2 and 3 respectively, and the results summarized as follows:

5-2

m 

        ~.

a) A sample of 36 of a total of 118 Ebasco New-York safety-related Purchase Orders for material / equipment were selected on a discipline-by-discipline-(e.g.: Mechanical, Electrical.. Instrumentation). basis and reviewed.' This sample entailed approximately 750 shipments and approximately 11,000 items. No items adversely.affecting plant safety were identified. b) The status of Ebasco Home Office NCRs was reviewed to ensure adequate on-site identification and control. The review concluded that there axists adequate on-site identification and control af Ebasco Home Office NCRs. c) The evaluation of all safety-related manufacture, deliver and erect type contracts is complete. No items adversely affecting plant safety were identified. ' Therefore, based on this review, LP&L believes that vendor QA records are adequately administered. 

       -CAUSE:

The reviews performed have indicated that the issue concerning the tracking of open items is limited to CE Conditional Certifications. The cause was identified as using informal rather than formal tracking methods. This was due to the perception that the problems underlying the Conditional Certifications were limited to commercial concerns. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS: LP&L has addressed this concern generically. A review was conducted, as described above, and it was determined that there exists adequate identification and control of vendor material being shipped to the site. Material tracking is 

       -currently being performed using detailed written procedures for materials received onsite both for the remaining construction activities and for plant operation activities.

SAFETY SIGNITICANCE: Based on the above evaluations, all items potentially affecting plant safety are being properly controlled on site. CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN / SCHEDULE: . Based on the CE records review outlined in this Response, any CE open items that have been identified are now formally tracked. Any new CE Conditional Certifications will also be formally tracked. A review will be conducted of the Conditional Certifications which had been received for 45 CE purchase orders to determine if these conditions could have affected the operability of equipnen,t. This review will be completed by September 30, 1984 5-3 1

ATTAC10iENIS :

1) Concerns Noted by VQARs on the Release for Shipment Forms 1-A) Ebasco New York Safety Related Manufacturer Purchase Orders.

I 1-3) PCs Included in Scope of Audit.

2) NCRs Controlled by Ebasco's Home Office 2-A) Comparison of NYO NCR Log to the MIS Closed NCR Printout 2-B) NYO NCRs Requiring Verification of Disposition 2-C) Audited b70 NCRs
3) Material Received at the Site Under Manufacture, Deliver and Erect Type Contracts.

REFERENCES:

None 1 

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               .l l                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     l
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 .1 l

4 

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               +

b 5-4 i 3 J 

                                                                                                                                                           \

i 4 ATTACHMENT 1 Concerns Noted by VQARs on the Release for Shipment Terms 4 To resolve the NRC concern and determine the basis for the sample audit of vendor documentation the following data base was generated. ?- 1

A listing was generated of all New York Purchase Orders. This was generated on a discipline basis with the following guidelines

l Mechanical: ASME Code Class 1, 2, 3. MC and/or ANSI Safety Class 1, 2, 3 

                                                          ' Purchase Orders.

t i Electrical: Class IE P'urchase Orders. , ! Instrumentation & Control: ASME Code Class 1, 2, 3; ANSI Safety Class 1. 2, 3; IEEE Class IE and/or Seismic Category I , j Purchase Orders. I Architectural - Structural: Seismic Category I Purchase Orders. Miscellaneous: ANSI Safety Class 1, 2, 3; AMSE Code Class 1, 2, 3; IEEE Class IE and/or Seismic Category I Purchase Orders. The Nuclear Stoca Supply System (NY-403402 and Field Purchase Orders to CE) was - reviewed in total during the audit. (See Attachment 1-A for the listing j generated'.) l Attachment 1-A lists all of the one hundred-eighteen (118) New York Office . safety-related purchase orders.. From this the sample size of 36 (30%) was ! chosen (see Attachment 1-B) for.the breakdown of orders reviewed. The safety-i related purchase order documentation packages identified on Attachment 1-B were i researched. i i During this review a single concern was identified. On purchase order number , l NY-403659, Material Receiving Inspection Report #83-00598 (FCR-E-3119) material I was received and accepted on site with an outstanding Vendor Non-Conformance Report. The material (cable) was purchased on a Class 1E Purchase Order, but

was used in a Non-Nuclear Safety application. The disposition of this NCR
(NY-536) required the implementation of the referenced FCR. The corrective -

action was considered a " paper change" only and, therefore, there is no safety significance. i 

                                                                                                                                                       . I i

i l

i i

r j 5-5 e 

)
    . - .      ,.,--,.-.-.,,,y,+   ,~-,,,--,w.--,,-,,m.                   ._,-m--,-.,--.m,y.-m.4.,em                            y*-m mem_      , _ . ~

w' - f.TTACam ..f 1-A ERASCO New. York Safety Related Manufacturer Purchase Orders

  • Mechanical Electrical I&C Arch-Structural Miscellaneous j 433418 (2) 403447 (IE) 403470 (2.3) 403407 (I) 403514 (Radusste '- 2.1)

! 403422 (2/MC) 403454 (IE) 403485 (IE) 403480 (I) 403518 (Radwaste - 2.lE) 433431 (3) 403455 (IE) 403489 (IE) 403509 (I) 403543 'NVAC - 3) l 403433 (1.2.3) 403463 (IE) 403492 (2.3) 403513 (1) 403547 (dVAC - 2) l 403436 (2) 403472 (IE) 403499 (2.3) 403532 (I.3) 403548 (NVAC - 3) l 403452 (3) 403487 (IE) 403502 (1.2.3) 403533 (I) 403549 (NVAC - 3) 433458 (1.2.3) 403495 (IE) 403519 (IE) 403573 (I) 403555 (NVAC - 2.3) 433451 (2.3) 403496 (IE) 403523 (IE) 403574 (I) 403556 (HVAC - 2.3) 433457 (3) 403497 (IE) 403565 (2.3) 403578 (1) 403557 (NVAC - 3) 433469 (1.2.3) 403503 (IE) 403585 (I) 403582 (I) 403558 (MVAC - 2.3) 403479 (3) 403516 (IE) 403588 (IE) 403584 (I) 403559 (NVAC - 2) 433482 (3) 430517 (IE) 403594 (I) 403592 (I) 403566 (NVAC - 3) 431483 (2.3) 403530 (IE) 403627 (I) 403593 (I) 403567 (NVAC - 3) H 403484 (1.2.3) 403534 (IE) 403641 (2) 403608 (I) 403621 (Applied Physics - 1) 433488 (2.3) 403535 (IE) 403642 (1.2.3) 403611 (1) 403639 (HVAC - 3) 433493 (2.3) 403536 (IE) 403649 (IE) 403613 (1) 403675 (Applied Physics - IE) 433500 (2) 403550 (IE) 403681 (1,2) 403620 (I) i 433501 (2.3) 403552 (IE) 403688 (1.2.3) 403647 (I) 433504 (3) 403615 -(IE) 403694 (2.3) 403648 (I) 433505 (2.3) 403623 (IE) 403802 (IE) 403506 (1.2.3) 403625 (IE) 403507 (1.2.3) 403638 (IE) 403511 (1.2) 403640 (IE)

  • 433512 (3) 403644 (IE) 433522 (3) 403657 (IE) 403528 (3) 403659 (IE) -

433539 (2.3)

  • 433542 (2) 433546 (2) *Information in parentheses af ter P.O. number refers to the following safety related classes:

433591 (I) 1.2.3 - ASME Code Class 1.2.3 and/or ANSI Safety Class 1.2.3 403606 (1.2.3) ~ MC - ASME Code Class MC 433650 (3) IE - IEEE Class IE 433661 (2) 1 - Seismic Category I 403674 (1.2.3) , 403676 (1.2.3) - 433699 (I . l E) 403801 (1.lE) i 

                        .                       5-6

ATTACIA eT 1-B fos included in Scope of Audit ELECTRICAL PURCHASE ORDER SAFETY RELATED i 0F SHIPMENTS NUMBER CLASS COMPONENT (IRIRs)

  • i 0F ITEMS NY403447 IE 5 and 15 KV Power Cable 25 72 NY403455 IE 480V Volt Power Centers 26 1,812 NY403463 IE Storage Batteries 1 3 NY403496 IE Electrical Penetrations
  • 35 403 NY403497 IE 480 Volt Motor Control Centers 34 139 CY403516 IE Static Uninterrupted Power Supply 6 28 NY403659 IE Refueling Disconnect and Missile Shield 55 1.111 Cable 7 , 182 3.568 SUR TOTAL ARCHITECTURAL - STRUCTURAL PURCllASE ORDER SAFETY RELATED . # OF SHIPMENTS NUMBER CLASS COMPONENT (MRIRs) # OF ITEMS
                                                                      ~

! NY403407 I Reactor Building Crane 10 5 (lots) l j NY403582 I Maintenance & Hatch Shielding Door 5 6 l NY403584 I Anchor Bolts & Anchor Studs 5 1.164 l ( NY403613 1 RAR - Structural Steel 22 22 (lots) CY403532 1.3 Misc. Shop Fabricated Tanks 2 6 5

  • 44 1,203 SUB TOTAL
  • Materlat Receiving Inspection Report 5-7 ~

ATTACH. s T 1-B (Continued) - MECMANICAL PURCHASE ORDER SAFETY RELATED f 0F SHIPMENTS NUMRER CLASS COMPONENT (MRIRs) # OF ITEMS MY403422 2/MC Containment Piping Penetrations 41 .76 CY403458 1,2,3 2 " and Larger Stainless Station Valves 142 147 NY403469 1,2,3 2h" and Larger Stainless Steel Valves 8 8 NY40348% 1.2.3 Control Valves 5 11 NY403506 1,2,3 600f and Nigher Cate and Check Valves 70 656 CY403507 1,2,3 Stainless Steel Valves 30 177 NY403511 1,2 Safety and Relief Valves 23 29 CY433606 1,2,3 CoAtrol Valves and Accessories 8 50 CY403674 1,2,3 Line Service Solenoid Valves 8 39 NY433676 1,2,3 Self Contained Regulating Valves 1 

                       ,                                                                                         8 i   NY40%99               1,lE            Limit Switches                                          4              94 I                                                                     '

CY403801 1,lE Pilot Solenoid Valves 2 51 12 342 1,348 SUB TOTAL O l l .5-8 l

i ATTACH.-37 1-R (Continued) INSTRUMENTATION & CONTROL PURCHASE ORDER SAFETY RELATED # OF SHIPMENTS NUMBER CLASS COMPONENT (MRIRs) # OF ITEMS MY433485 IE Differential Pressure Switches 15 136 l CY433519 IE Process Analog Control 83 3,684 CY433585 1 Local Instrument Cabinets & kacks 10 86 [ l CY433627 1 Annubara 1 4 NY403642 1.2.3 Loy Differential Pressure Transmitters 4 28 NY403681 1.2 Thermocouple Assemblies 4 291 NY403688 1.2.3 Low Differential Pressure Transmitters 4 39 7 121 4,268 SUB TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS PURCllASE ORDER SAFETY RELATED I i 0F SHIPMENTS NUMBER CLASS COMPONENT (MRIRs) # OF ITEMS l NY403518 2.lE Hydrogen Analyzing 3 7 (Radvaste) NY403547 2 Check Valves 2 6 (llVAC)

  • CY403556 2.3 Electric Heating coils 11 159 l (HVAC)

! NY403559 2 Containment Fan Coolers 10 24 (HVAC) l l NY403675 IE Accidential Radiation Monitoring / System 30 349 l (Applied Physics) 5 56 $45 SUN TOTAL 5-9

l ATTACl51ENT l-R (Contineed) l I l l 1 SupetARY j f 0F PURCHASE l DISCIPLINE ORDERS ADDITED SHIPMENTS ITEMS ELECTRICAL 7  ; 182 3.568 ARCN/STRUCT 5 44 1,203 MECHANICAL 12 , 342 1.348 I&C 7 . 121 4,268 MISCELLANEOUS 5 56 545 TOTAL 36 745 10,932 k . 5-10 L 

                        ,                __                              . . _ .         .         _ - . = -   - .    -      -.

ATTACHMENT 2 NCRs Controlled by , Ebasco's Home Office

1. In June,1984, a review of all NYO (New York Office) issued NCRs has been  !

accomplished to determine if any NYO NCRs still open have been properly identified as open by the site in the Master Tracking System. The result is that there is one NYO NCR still open (NCR 646), and it was and still is properly identified on the Master Tracking System as an open i item. (See Attachment 2-A)

2. Concurrently, a review was also conducted to determine if NYO NCRs that i

required corrective action and Verification of Disposition were closed properly. The Criteria for correct closure were: a) Item (s) repaired, replaced, or otherwise rendered correct before i receipt at site. , l b) ' Item (s) were identified as requiring corrective action upon receipt at i site and tracked until accepted disposition was verified. 4 A total of 144 NCRs were identified as requiring Verification of 

;                Disposition. A sample of 20 were reviewed. One concern was noted. The Temporary Fuel Storage Racks should have been identified as having                                     .

incomplete documentation (analysis of fuel drop impact) when re'ceived on 5/21/81. NCR 628 was not issued until 11/10/83 to identify the problem and implement a solution. DCN-NY-AS-758 was issued on 3/14/84 and Station I Modification Package 84-133 was issued on 4/4/84 to implement the , corrective action. This ites has been properly tracked since the issuance i' of NCR 628. Temporary Fuel Storage Racks will not be used until installation of modifications described in SMP 84-133 is complete. There is no safety implication. Therefore, the QA process for controlling NYO NCRs requiring corrective - action and Verification of Disposition is acceptable. t i l I i 5-11 

        . - . ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ . . . . - _ _ _ . - . _ . - _ _ . _ _ , .                            __     _~

1 ATTACHMENT 2-A Comparison of NYO NCR Log to the MTS Closed NCR Printout Ceccarison:

1. - All items listed in MTS as closed were also listed as closed in NYO NCR log. >

Prablems Identified: a) NCR 30 was listed as closed in MTS and NCR 30 was superseded by NCR 40 per NYO NCR log. NCR 30 and the closed copy of NCR 40 are located in the correct file under P.O. NY403405 in the QA Records Vault. 

         ~ b)    NCR 576 was listed as voided in MTS. NCR 576 was closed per NYO NCR log. The closed copy of NCR 576 is located in the correct file under P.O. NY403458 in the QA Records Vault.

The NYO NCR log was correct in both cases. The errors do not affect the validity of closed status. MTS has been updated. Ce parison: There were 111 NCRs indicated as being closed in the NYO NCR log but were . not listed (n MTS. As MTS only tracks chose NCRs which require corrective action by the site, a 100% review of these NCRs was performed. NCRs which , required corrective action are closed and located in the files in the QA Records Vault. Problems Identified: None h 5-12

ATTACEMENT 2-B NYO NCRs Recuiring Verification of Disposition 011

  • 133 251 349 390R1 012 136 254 .351 498 019 147 256
  • 361 518 024
  • 155
  • 263 360R1
  • 549
                                        *- 264 026               156                             361R1                    551R1
  • 028
  • 170 265 367 557 031 171 266 371 '

563 034 175

  • 268 379 569 036 179 277 380 575 037 192 278 385 585 040 195 279 387 587 042 197
  • 284 389 588 043 201 285 397 589 050 206
  • 286 410 590 0 054
  • 207 296 411 593 055 208 29'7 412 60lR1 059 209 300 317R1 '

606 068

  • 210 102 423 607 081 218 310 428- 611 082
  • 221 311R1 429 612 083 225 312R1 430 613 #
  • 093 228 316 431 613R1 -

103

  • 232 317 447 617 .
108 236 318 448 618 112 237 320 449 622 119 241 321 453 625 121 243 332 454
  • 628 .

l 118 284

  • 347 467 635 l 129 246 348 457R1~

j

  • Items audited, see Attachment 2-C 5-13

ATTACHMENT 2-C Audited NYO NCRs local of 144 NYO NCRs required verification of disposition. A random sample for invcstigation follows.

1. - NCR 28, P.O. NY403509, C-3660-N, C3661-N
                        - Verify UI was perfor=ed.
                        - UT performed.
                        - NCR clouad prior to shipment.
2. - NCR 54, P.O. NY403487
                        - Verify flux and other material removed from tray.
                        - Reinspection performed.
                        - NCR closed prior to shipment.
3. - NCR 31. P.O. NY403405
                        - Wide gap weld.
                        - Procedure required and reviewed without com=ent.
                        - NCR closed prior to shipment.
4. - NCR 93, P.O. NY403439
                       - NCR 93 superseded by W3-1518.
                       - W3-1518 tracked until closure.
5. - NCR 133, P.O. NY430539
                       - Conf'irm castings meet ND 2571 of ASME III'ND.
                       - NCR closed prior to shipment.
6. - NCR 155, P.O. NY403484
                       - Verify conformance to ASTM standard for 2" 6-C70-28-1.
                       - Item is non-safety /non-seismic per Purchase Order spec.
                       - NCR closed.
7. - NCR 170, P.O. NY403509
                       - P oblem with heat creatment temperature.
                       - Resolved through evaluation.
                       - NCR tracked until closure.
8. - NCR 207, P.O. NY403578
                       - Lakeside Steel to furnish shims.

i, - Letter dated 12/18/78 states shim material provided to J. A. Jones. Problem resolved through NCR 210. As-Built installation verified by letter dated 12/18/78. 

                       - NCR tracked until closure.
9. - NCR 210, P.O. NY403578 .
                       - See NCR 207.
                       - NCR tracked until closure.
10. - NCR 221, P.O. NY403573
                       - High silicon content.
                       - Problem resolved.
                       - NCR closed prior to shipment.

5-14 

         - - - _                   _          ,.      . ,      _ __       _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - - - . . . , ~ - _ . . . - - . - _

ATTACHMENT 2-C (Continued) 11.- NCR 232 P.O. NY403583 

              - Missing-documentation.
              - Qualification reports accepted.
              - NCR tracked.until closure.

12.- NCR 263, P.O. NY403483 

              - Weld repair on end prep.
              - Parc not used.
              - NCR closed prior to shipment.

13.- NCR 264, P.O. NY403483 

              - Wald repair and prep.
              - Repair complete.
              - NCR closed prior to shipment 14.- NCR 268, P.O. NY403557
              - Confirm correct type motor supplied.
              - Confirmed.
              - NCR closed prior to shipment.

15.- NCR 284, P.O. NY403496 

              - Missing documentation.                ,
             -- Reports accepted.
              - NCR tracked until closure.

16.- NCR 286, P.O. NY403583 

              - Missing documentation.
              - Reports accepted.
              - NCR tracked until closure.

17.- NCR 347, P.O. NY 403613 

             - Spray Booth doors require repair.

l - Repaired. - 

              - NCR closed.

18.- NCR 361, P.O. NY403557 

             - Rev. I replaced - verify motor extension leads consist of acceptable material.
             - Verified by VQAR.
             - NCE closed prior to shipment.

19.- NCR 549 P.O. NY403640 

             - Need to identify unique color on CWDs 2945, 2646.

( - CWDs issued. 

             - NCR tracked until closure.

L 20.- NCR 628, P.O. NY403608 

             - P.O. requires drop analysis.
             - Items received 5/21/81; NCR issued 11/10/83.
             - Problem not promptly identified.
             - NCR is being tracked.
             - NCR-628 superceded by SMP 84-133.

! - SMP 84-133 tracked until closure. l l' 5-15 L

ATTACEKENT 3 Material Received at the Site Under Manufacture, Deliver and Erect Type Contracts Scope Daliver and Erect Purchase Orders and Contracts (Safety Related Only) Purchase Orders: NT403405 NY403508

NY403525 Contracts:

W3-F-6 W3-NY-4 W3-NY-17 W3-NY-23

- W3-NY-27 Discussion Deliver and Erect N.Y. Purchase Orders and Contracts Due to the differing nature of each Deliver and Erect (D&E) purchase order and contract, ehe definition of the sco'pe of research differed.

t Essentially for each of the following, a review was performed to assure - , that problems identified on material, parts or components were tracked. Deliver and Erect Purchase Order Review Scope and Results NY403405; Chicago Bridge & Iron; Steel Containment Vessel; Safety Class 2/ Seismic I , j A review of all Ebasco Vendor QA Release for Shipment (form 1035), Vendor QA Release Reports (form 719) and Ebasco New York office reviewed NCRs was performed. Additionally, a review of the CB&I Non-Conformance Control l List, Shop Release for Shipment Checklist and Site Receiving Inspection -

Reports was performed.

The review identified one Ebasco Release for Shipment (form 1305) which noted that 12 items required sandblasting at the site. The associated CB&I Release for Shipment form did not identify the condition and there are no i CB&I records to support that sandblasting was done. Of the 12 items, 7 are . embedded in concrete and did not require sandblasting. The remaining 5 items are part of the construction hatch storage rack located inside

containment and would have been repainted had any coating distress appeared a

per NCR-W3-4825 (PRI-94) . Furthermore, these 5 items are of small surface 4 area. The failure of the coating of such small and scattered areas during a DBA would not be of any safety significance. In addition, there is no indication that any of these materials will have adverse interactions with

engineering safety features.

5-16 

                                                                                                         .s.
      ~

ATTACEMENT 3 (Continued) NY403508; Nooter Corporation; Fuel Pit and Canal Liners; Safety Class NNS/ Seismic Class I A review of all of the Ebasco Vendor QA Release for Shipment (form 1305) and Vendor QA Release Reports (form 719) was performed 4 All documentation for each fabricated item was also reviewed for inclusion of appropriate Ebasco QA review stamp and/or signature. The review did not identify any problems which were not tracked and resolved. NY403525; Chicago Bridge & Iron; Diesel Oil Storage Tanks; Safety Class / Seismic Class I The safety related tanks on this order consist of the 1) - Diesel Oil Storage Tanks (2 each) and 2) - Diesel Oil Storage Feed Tanks (2 each). A review of all of the Ebasco Vendor QA Release for Shipment (form 1305) and Vendor QA Release Reports (forn 719) was performed. Additionally, a review of all documentation packages was performed which included the vendors Receiving Inspection Reports. The review did not identify any problems which were not tracked and i resolved. Deliver and Erect Contracts W3-F-6; Louisiana Industries; Concrete Supply and Delivery; Seismic I W3-NY-4; J. A. Jones; Civil Erection; Concrete and Structural Steel W3-NY-23; Sline Industrial Painting; Application of Nuclear Coatings and - Painting; Nucl. ear Safety Related - Inside Containment Coatings W3-NY-27; B&B; Installation of Penetration Radiation Seals, Fire Stops and Air Seals for Electrical, Mechanical and HVAC Systems; l Non-Nuclear Safety - Fire Protection , The contracts listed above did not have QA programs which allowed for i conditional releases. Upon receipt the material was inspected and l documentation was reviewed or verified complete. Any discrepancies either in hardware or software required the material to be placed en hold, in a hold area or rejected as appropriate. The material remained unavailable for issue until the noted discrepancies were dispositioned and closed. Because of the contractor's programs only acceptable material was available for installation. i l i 5-L7 i _ _ _ _ , _ . _ __ _____,-____.....__-_.____m . _ _ . __ _ -_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . . . . - , . _ . . - _

n e j .* ATTACHMENT 3 (Continued) W3-NY-17; The Waldinger Corporation; HVAC Ductwork, Supports and Accessories; HVAC Safety Class 1 (Safety Related/ Seismic I), Class 2 (Non-Safety Related/ Seismic 1), and Class 3 (Non-Safety Related/Non-Seismic) A search was made of Waldinger Deficiency Reports generated at their shop in Des Moines. This search revealed 12 Shop DRs which were transferred to the jobsite 'for closure. Tracking and closure has been verified for all of these DRs. It should also be noted that subsequent to May of 1979 a 100% review of the Waldinger shop manufacturing records was performed by Ebasco QA Records personnel. Documentation deficiencies identified during the review were addressed and closed at that time. j- . G 6 b I . I ) 5-18

SUPPLDfENT TO RESPONSE TO CONCERN NO. 5 SUBMITTED AUGUST 27, 1984 DISCUSSION: The Pre-Licensing Issues Task Force Support Group, during its validation :eview in support of the Tash Force effort, identified cwo additional CE purchase orders for which unconditional certifications did not exist in the files. This finding-prompted a 100" re-review of the quality records associated with CE material and equipment for the existence of conditional certifications. The following revisions to the response of August 27, 1984, have been identified. Conditional Certifications of Equipment had been received on 54 instead of 45 CE purchase orders. Of the additional nine purchase orders which had Conditional Certifications of Equipment only one is remaining without an unconditional certification. It is believed that there are two reasons for not identifying the additional nine purchase orders which had Conditional Certifications of Equipment: (A) In 1978 CE changed the form used. The earlier form had no check-off boxes 'to clearly state whether the certification was conditional or uncenditional.-(B) During the initial review, the reviewers saw the unconditional cartification and overlooked the possibility that a conditionel c+.rtification had existed for the purchase order being reviewed. 

 #      In conclusion, chere remain only two construction related, CE purchase orders
  • that have outstanding conditional certifications. It is anticipated that both of these purchase orders trill have unconditional certifications by September 30, 1984. ~ ~ ~

CAUSE: There is no change to the previously stated Cause. GENERIC LTLICATIONS: . There is no change in the previously stated Generic Implications. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: 

       -There is no change in the previously state Safety Significance.

, CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN / SCHEDULE: The only change to the Corrective Action Plan / Schedule, is that the operability revie i will now cover 54 instead of 45 purchase orders to determine if these condicians could have affected the operability of equipment. This review will be com71sted by October 15, 1984 I 

 .                                                               LP&L CGIIBIT 17         -

MM W 

                                              ?.ES?ONSE ITDI NC.: 10
     !!!LE:       Insoector Cualification (J.A. Jones and Fasles)

NRC DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN: - The NRC staff reviewed the qualification and certifications of QC inspectors in the civil / structural area. The review included the qttalifications of four Ebasco inspectors, five J. A. Jones inspectors, and eight Fegles inspectors. The inspector qualifications were ec= pared against the requirements of ANSI N45.2.6 and the contractor's procedures. , The staff found that four of the five J.A. Jones inspectors and two of the eight Tegles inspectors failed to meet the applicable certification requirements related to relevant experience. Since these inspectors were involved in the inspection of safety-related activities, the fact that they may not have been qualified to perform such inspections, renders the quality of the inspected construction activities as indeterminant. LP&L shall review all inspector qualifications and certifications for J.A. Jones and Fegles against the project requirements and provide the information in such a form that each requirement is . clearly shetvn to have b&en met by each inspec.co r. If an inspector 1,s found to not meet the qualification requirements, 

   .the licensee shall then review the records to datarmine the inspections made by the unqualified individuals and provide a statement on the impact of the deficiencies noted on the safety of the project.

DISCUSSION: A verification program was implemented to review the professional credentials of 100* of the si:e QA/QC personnel who may have performed safety-related functions at Waterford 3, including r,upervisors, managers and remaining QA/QC personnel. The responses to Issues No. I and 20 discuss inspector qualifications for Waterford 3 con:: actors other than J.A. Jones and Fegles. The program, which is being performed under the overall direction of LP&L, consists of three. majot elements: o Collection and verification of personnel data, o Evaluation of qualifications against specifisd standards. o Dispositioning of deficiencies resulting from cases where inspections and tests were conducted by personnel whose qualifications against the appropriate standards ceuld not be confirmed. 10-1

Collectien and Verification of Personnel Data Personnel. data vera collectad from various sources, including site files. contractor hcme office files, personal contact with individuals or supervisors 

          ;and~through a background verification program.

Efforts were made to verify the : education and work experience of 100P. of the J.A. Jones and Fegles QA/QC personnel by researching Waterford 3 contractor records and .,/ contacting schools, former employers and others. The background verification effort for J.A. Jones and 7egles' personnel was a joint LP&L/Ebasco effort. *anile the success race of this effort was good, there were cases where confirmator/ information was not obtainable. In such cases, the judgement of the LP&L Review Board, as described below, was used to rule en the reliability 

         ' of the available information.

Evaluation of Oualifications to Seecified Standards QA/QC personnel data were evaluated in order to classify individuals as either having verified qualifications or not. Training, education and work experience were the qualifications of primary concern. These qualifications were verified 

         - against the following criteria:

(1) Inspectors - ANSI N45.2.6-1973 

 ,                     ,    (2) Other QA/QC Pe'rsonnel - QA Program requirements Initial qualification determinations for J.A. Jones and Fegles QA/QC personnel were performed first by Ebasco and then separately by an LP&L review group. -In order to control the consistency of these determinations, approved procedures were . utilized. Determinations related primarily to balancing education, experience and training factors.

The LP&L review group qualification determinations were rendered - :.n two categories: " qualified" and "potentially not qualified". "Potentially. not qualified" determinations were referred to an LP&L Review Board comprised of - senior LP&L QA personnel. The Review Board determinations were further reviewed by . a. contracted 1ndividual very familiar with inspector qualification and related standards. This process resulted in a final determination for all QA/QC personnel-as either " qualified", or " unqualified". Ihe qualification review process is described in QASP 19.12 and QAI-32. The following points further clarify the process: , 1. The meaning of the term " unqualified" must be amplified. In some l cases determinations were made that, based. on verified data, individuals' backgrounds did not warrant qualification. to ANSI N45.2.6-1973. In other cases, however, individuals were censidered t 

                      " unqualified" as an expedient in reaching resolution to the concern.

4 This occurred in cases in which: ! 10-2 m 

     - . ..                                                                                                    i
                                                                                       ~
a. Research of records, inquiries to past employers'and employces, contact uith schools and -~ verification of training received was -

either not ' possible or could not be concluded in a reasenable period of= time. 

                                        ~
b. Apparent discrepancies existed between background information.

provided by some individuals and that obtained in the verification process, and resolution could not be achieved -on a timely basis. Minor discrepancies were excused; however, significant discrepancies generally rendered any other significant but unverified data as suspect.

2. In the- process used, being judged as " unqualified" to ANSI N45.2.6-1973 did not automatically render the individual's -verk as invalid. For example, an individual may not have the - education and experience qualifications for all inspectien work, yet be fully.

t competent through specific training - or other means to perform the particular tasks assigned to him, which might have - been very simple and repetitive in nature. - Such an individual potentially satisfies ANSI requirements, which ultimately require that an individual's qualifications be sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the individual can competently perform a particular task. Whether or not th ' individual is technically qualified, the individual's work can be deemed valid.

3. During the construction period, some contractors =ade undocumented'
   ' (.                  judgements with respect to the need f'or eye examinations for inspection personnel.         Such judgements were based on the level of       ..

visual acuity or colot perception required to achieve competent. inspections. Such judgements were also made- as art of- the . verification program and disposition process and will _ s. documanced. It is noted that such judgements are specifically suggested in' ANSI' N45.2.6-1978. This factor was not deemed disqualifying. Disposition of Deficiencies . For J.A. Jones and Fagles, the LP&L Review . B o ar'd compiled a list of 

              " unqualified" inspector personnel, and Corrective Action Requests (CAR) - were written to formally track and ' disposition potential deficiencies.              Limited background verification ef forts remain for J. A. Jones and Tegles personnel.

Shot.1d completion of the verification cause a change in the results, the response vill be amended accordingly. 10-3

Included in Attachment 1 are the varification pr> gram results for J.A. Jones and Feglas. For J.A. Jones, CAR EQAS4-22 identified 25 QC personnel who perfe rned inspectices while not meeting the requirements of ANSI N45.2.6-1973. The construction activities inspected by the identified J. A. Jones personnel with respect to the Common Foundation Basemat and Engineered Backfill were inspected by qualified Ebasco inspectors. Accordingly, inspection by the J.A. Jones persennel does.not render the quality of the inspected construction activities 

       -as    indeterminate. Adequacy of the inspected construction activities was independently confirmed by qualified inspectors.                     J.A. Jones      inspector qualification' deficiencies in. areas other than the Common Foundation Basemat and Engineered Backfill will be addressed in a supplemental response.

For Fegles, CAR EQAS4-20 identified three QC personnel who performed inspections while not meeting the requirements of ANSI N45.2.6-1973. The three individuals perforred preplacement inspections en a limited scope of slip form operations. Duplicate preplace=ent. inspections were performed by qualified Ebasco QC inspectors. Accordingly, inspection by the Fegles personnel does not rendet the quality of the inspected construction activities as indeterminate. ' Adequacy of the inspected construction activities was independently confirmed by qualified inspectors. 

       -CAUSE:

ANSI N45. 2.6-1973 allows substitution for education and experience levels by L noting that "... education and experience requirements specified for the various , levels should not be created- as absolute when other f actors . provide reasonable assurance that a person can competently perform a particular t,ask." J.A. Jones __ and Fagles, to varying degrees, employed such substitutions in certifying the qualifications of their. QA/QC personnel. However, the verification ' program revealed that verification of background data was. not adequate or documented, documentation - of the justification for substitution was sometimes not provided or lacked depth, and/cr was not always totally in" accord with J.A. -Jones /Feglas 

      -procedures or the ANSI standards, as currently interpreted.

GENERIC IMPLICATIONS: * 

                                                                                       ,          i                 ,-

n3 This issue has been treated generically. In response to this' Issue and Issues 1

and 20, the verification progra= included 100% of the QA/QC personnel; of all' site contractors who perfor=ed safety related work.
                                                                                                         . ,\

With regard to future werk, qualification and certification' of inspectors (including NDE personnel) will be administered through strict compliance with LP&L Nuclear Operations Procedures which meet tha requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.58 Rev. 1-(ANSI N45.2.6-1978) and SNT-TC-1A-1975, as applic:ble. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: g Satisfacecry disposition of CAR AEQAS4-16 (J. A. Jones) and CAR #EQAS4-7 (Fegl,es) will provide adequate assurance that the installaticas' by J. A. Jones and Fegles will perfor: satisf actorily in service. 10-4 i. i f' I it i ~ i -

t. _ g . .-

O CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN / SCHEDULE: Corrective actions required to. dispcsition CAR EQAS4-22 (J.A. Jones) are in 

                       .rogress. The CAR EQASi-20 (Fegles) corrective . action has been satisf actorily ce=pleted as described in Attachment 1.                To date,       no items        of   safety           '
                     -significance have been identified.            It is currently anticioated that tha dispositions of QA/QC personnel qualification issues will b'e co=pleted bv                                  "

November-21,1984 , . ATTACHME'iTS:

1. Results of Verification Program for J.A. Jones and Fegles.

REFERENCES:

1. QASP 19.12 Review of Centractor QA/QC Personnel Qualification Verification
2. QAI-32, Instructions for Verification of QA/QC Personnel Qualifications
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ATTACHMENT 1 A. J.A. JONES

1. On-Site Dates: October 1975 to March 1981
2. Scone of Werk:
a. Concrete Construction
b. Conerate Masonry
c. Concre:e Reinforcing Steel
d. Dewatering and Excavation
e. Waterproofing
f. Waterstops
g. Mechanical Splicing of Reinforcing Steel
h. Filter and Backfill
1. Structural Steel
3. Scope of Inspections:
a. Material Receiving Inspection
b. Site Fabrication Assembly & Installation Inspections
c. Structural Inspections
d. Civil Inspections ,

( . 4. 0A Progra: Recuirenents/ Contractual Commitnent:

a. .QA/QC Personnel, except Auditors, ' ANSI N45.2.6 and Manual TR-1,
                         " Training / Certification              Program",       Procedure-       POP-N-505,
                         " Qualification / Certification of Personnel"                       and    Procedure POP-N-702, " Personnel Training / Qualification / Certification".
b. Q.A. Auditors -

ANSI N-45.2.23 and Manual TR-1, 

                         " Training / Certification Program", and Procedure POP-N-505,                                   -
                         " Qualification / Certification            of     Personnel"       and    Procedure POP-N-702, " Personnel Training /Qualifica: ion / Certification".
5. Inspector Qualification and Dispositieninz of Deficiencies:

The Verification Program identified 25 J.A. Jones personnel who performed inspections and whose qualifications were de:ernined as not meeting :he requirenents of ANSI N45.2.6-1973. Co rrective Ac: ion Request EQA84-22 was initiated to trach the disposi: ion of this deficiency. A-1

a A review cf 'the work of :he iden:ified J. A. Jcnes inspec: ors has been completed with respect to the Coc=on Foundatica 3ssemat, inclucing cadwelds. This review also included the identifica: ion of overins;cc: ice performed by que.lified Ebasco inspec: ors who inspec:ed the cons: rue:icn of tha Concon Foundation 3asesa:. Where an inspection activity _was performed by an identified J.A. Jones 

        'inspec:or, the qualifications of the Ebasco inspector who perforced the overinspection of the sa=e activity was checked. In this canner it was demonstrated that each of the Co= mon Foundation .3asemat place =ents were inspected by one or more qualified inspectors.

The reinforcing bar cadwelds *which were inspected by J.A. Jones have also been addressed in' the response :o NRC Concern No. 11 for the entire N?IS. The cadwelds are dee=ed acceptable. The structural backfill inspections per' formed by J.A. Jones were overinspected by qualified Ebasco inspectors. In addition, statistical studies were perfor ed which de=onstrate :he consistency of the work. The clam shell Filter Blanket quality was addressed in NCR-W3-5997 including t.ddressing the uncertified J.A. Jones inspectors. The Blanket was found acceptable. Accordingly, inspection by the J.A. Jones personnel does not render. f the quality of the inspected' construction activities as indeterminate. ( Adequacy of the inspected construction activities was independently confirmed by qualified inspectors. J.A. Jones inspector qualification deficiencies in areas other than the Cor. mon Foundation .Basemat and Engineered Backfill vill be addressed in a supplemental response. Completion of the review of the work of the concrete inspectors on the balance of the J.A. Jones construction activities is e:cpected by November 9. This report will be supple =ented at th at time to reflect - the findings of that review, f 

  ,                                     A-2 i

i.

l l ATTACEMENT 1

3. FEGLES  ;
1. On-Site Dates: Dece=ber 1975 to August 1976 (Sh' eld Wall)

February 1979 to February 19c0 (De=e)

2. Scoue of Work:
a. Designing, furnishing, fabricating,erectingab.ddis=antlingslip forms for shield wall construction and conventionel for= work and supports for do=e construction,
b. Handling, placing and fastening reinforcing steel.

c.. Detail reinforcing steel for shield wall slip for= construction.

d. Handling, placing and setting to line and grade all ite=s to be
                     'e= bedded in the shield wall and in the do=e.
e. For=ing for blockouts in shield wall, installing waterstop, removing forms and patching voids or honeyco=b areas.
f. Placing, finishing and curing concrete by the slip for= =ethod for . the . shield wall and the do=e by conventional 2 stare construction.
3. Scope of Insoections:
           ,    a. Material receiving inspection

( b. For= erection inspection- 

 .k             c. Place =ent area preparation inspection
d. Concrete place =ent inspection *
e. Concrete finishing and curing inspection
f. Concrete repair inspection
g. Dece for= decentering inspection ,
h. Reinforcing sceci place =ent inspection
4. OA Progra= Recuirements/ Contractual Co==it=ents:

Fegles - Shield Wall Construction: December 1975 to August 1976

a. QA/QC Personnel except Auditors -

ANSI N45.2.6 and Fegles Procedure OAP-303, " Quality Assurance Plan" and OAP-303 Suoplement #2, " Personnel Oualifications".

b. QA Auditors - QA auditor must be a Corporate QA Manager.

Fegles - Dome Constructien: February 1979 to February 1980

a. QA/QC Personnel except Auditors - ANSI N45.2.6 and Fegles Procedure OAP-303.21, "Qaalification cf Insoection Personnel".
b. QA Auditors - QA Auditor =ust be a Corporate QA Manager (Level III).

B-1

w

3. = Inseeeter cualification and Discositionin; of Deficiencies:

The Derifier. tion program identified three Tegles QC perscnnel (out of the original seven (7) . identified on CAR EQA34-20) who perfor ed ' quality _ inspections and whose qualifice : ions were determined as not 

              -meeting the requirements of ANSI N43...o-1973.           Corrective Action Request EQA84-20 was initiated to track the disposition of this deficiency.

Ebasco - QA has determined that these three Fegles QC personnel were involved only with the slip form operations (placement series G-311) from April to May of 1976. The th ree' Fegles QC inspectors only perfor=ed preplacement inspections. These inspections were documented on the preplacement checklist. Further research concluded that although these ch'eee individuals did perf o rs - inspections , qualified Ebasco QC ~ inspectors perfor=ed 100% duplicate preplacement . inspections. Accordingly, inspection by ' the Fegles personnel does not render the quality of the inspected construction activities as indeterminate. Adequacy of the inspected construction activities was independently confirmed by qualified inspectors. 9 (. - B-2

1 LPTxL EXHIBIT 18 x

RESPONSE

MM M ITEM NO. : 13 TITLE: Missing NCRs NRC DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN: During the NRC's review of Ebasco's NCR Processing System the card index file of NCRs was examined and the staff noted that there are missing reports in the consecutively nu=bered NCRs. Specifically W3-27, 814, 859, 981, 1053, 1102, 1109,1228,1349, and 1438 are missing from your card index file. Others were also noted to be missing from the Ebasco QA vault. LP&L shall (1) obtain the missing NCRs, explain why these NCRs were not maintained in the filing system, review them for proper voiding, and (2) assure that when an issue is raised to an NCR, it is then properly filed for tracking and closure. DISCUSSION: An overall accountability review was conducted cf closed or voided NCRs (both site and Ebasco New York Office (NYO) issued). In certain cases NCR numbers were assigned and the associated NCRs were cancelled or voided; in other cases the investigation has concluded that NCR numbers within the sequential numbering of Ebasco site issued NCRs were not assigned to an NCR. The review described below substantiates that Ebasco NCRs have been properly accounted for. (. The review compared information from the NCR tracking mechanisms described below with the NCR ' card index files located in the Site QA Records Vanit in order to d identify additional closed or voided NCRs that were not on file in the vault. Emphasis was placed on NCRs which were indicated by the tracking mechanisms as being void. For each case in which it was determined that an index card was not on file, but for which the corresponding NCR record (original or copy) was actually located on file in the vault, an appropriate index card was prepared and filed. For each case in which neither index card nor a corresponding NCR record (original or copy) was located on file in the vault, a review was perfor=ed to either obtain the missing NCR or determine if it was ever issued. Based on advice by the NRC given to LP&L at a public ceeting held in Bethesda, Maryland on August 7, 1984, an additional review for accountability of all l Mercury NCRs, as described in CORRECTIVE ACTION, is also being conducted. l Backeround l Until June,1979, Ebasco Site QA utilized a manual tracking log for NCR number assignment and tracking purposes. A sa=ple of this log is included as Attachment 1. At that time, Ebasco QA cocmenced using a tracking card system for number assignment and tracking. A sample of a tracking card is included as Attachment 2. NCRs which were issued thereaf ter were monitored via the tracking card system. Each such card tracks the location of the NCR original at any time during the processing cycle by identifying the specific individual to who: it is assigned as well as the specific NCR trans=ittal memorandu: which routed the NCR to the individual. In addition to this system, Ebasco Site QA began utilizing a cc=puterized Master Tracking System (MIS) as a secondary tool for tracking NCRs in the 1980 timeframe. The card index file, referred to in the concern, is an index card system which is located in the QA records vault and is used to lccate docu=ents contained in the vault. 13-1

NCRs Issued By Ebasco Site QA The following is a summary of the review conducted for accountability of Ebasco site-issued NCRs. i The review encompassed over 7600 NCR numbers. The following is a summary of the review .results which specifically address those NCRs cited by the NRC as well as those identified by the review as being voided, and those NCR numbers whcih were unassigned.

1. Four NCR numbers cited by the NRC and one additional NCR number .

(W3-963) were not entered in the card index file but were entered in the manual log with a~ general subject and with a void and/or void date notation. Copies of NCRs with these numbers have not been found. Our investigation (see Attachment 3) provides us with high confidence that these five NCRs were not issued. NCR Nos: W3-859 W3-963 W3-981

  • W3-1053 W3-1109
2. Four NCR numbers cited by the NRC were not entered in the card index file but were entered in the manual log with a general subject and with a void and/or void date notation. Original copies of the associated NCRs were not found; duplicate copies have, however, been
                         , found and designated as duplicate originals. Our investigations (See                                     .

Attachment 3) conclude that these NCRs were properly voided. A card index corresponding to each of these NCRs is now on file in the QA records vault.

  • NCR Nos: W3-814 W3-1102 W3-1228 W3-1349
3. The original copy of NCR W3-27 was and is located in the. appropriate -

file in the QA records vault. The manual tracking log properly indicates it as voided (See Attachment 3).

4. The NCR W3-1438 record, which pertains only to non-safety related items, had been properly renumbered to indicate a non-safety related designation and was and is located in the appropriate file.
5. The investigation provides us with high confidence that the below listed fifteen NCR numbers within the sequential numbering of Ebasco site-issued NCRs have not been assigned to an NCR.

NCR Nos: W3-228 W3-2016 W3-5026 W3-5080 W3-5287 W3-5361 13-2 

 . . ~ -     .    .-        -.     - - _ _         . _ -     - . . - - - - - - - . - . . . - _ - . - - - -

W3-5570 W3-5793 W3-6068 W3-6098 W3-6542 W3-6646 W3-6724 W3-6749 W3-6900 In the case of NCR W3-228, the manual tracking log shows the NCR . 1 number lined out and NCR number W3-211A inserted. The review has determined that the nonconforming condition described on the W3-228 entry had actually been previously documented by_ NCR W3-211. The review also shows that W3-211 was superceded and closed by issuance of W3-211A, which corresponds to J. A. Jones NCR W3-131A. This was substantiated by a review of W3-211A. The sketch attached to W3-211A indicates it to be W3-228. Further, the sketch and engineering evaluation provides the exact description noted on W3-211A. In summary, the review concludes W3-228 was issued under the same nonconforming description as NCR-W3-211. When this was discovered, NCR-W3-211 was superceded by W3-211A which is the same NCR as W3-228. In one instance (W3-2016), the Ebasco Site QA NCR file card indicates that the NCR was voided and refers to another NCR (W3-2026) which the investigation verified actually tracked the non-conforming condition. 

  .               For the remaining thirteen numbers listed above, it was escartained

( that no cards for these numbers were in the Ebasco Site- QA NCR tracking card files. In addition, there were no NCR card index files for any of these numbers on file in the Site QA records vault. A check of both the open and closed NCR files of the computerized Master Tracking System (MTS) revealed that none of these numbers had ever been entered into MTS. These particular numbers would have been assigned in 1982 or 1983. A review of the Ebasco Site QA transmittal logs revealed that no entries were made relative to any of these numbers. Ebasco Site QA has utilized uniquely numbered transmittal memoranda to forward NCRs for dispositioning and filing purposes. - Based upon the results of this review, it has been concluded that NCRs , with any of these numbers have probably not been issued. In order to provide additional clarification with regard to unassigned numbers, an entry has been placed into the Ebasco Site QA NCR. tracking card file for each of these numbers which indicates that the number has not been assigned an NCR. 

                                                                                                                          ~

NCRS Issued Bv Ebasco New York Office QA In addition 'to the review of site generated NCRs and NCR numbers, a review of the 659 NYO issued NCRs was undertaken to determine if numbers were missing from the_ sequence in the QA Records Vault Index File for closed or voided NYO NCRs. ' The following missing numbers were identified in the QA Records Vault Index File 4 of-NYO generated NCRs: NCR 199, 204, 483, 489, 543, 579, 642. A review of the NYO NCR Log and other QA Records indicates that the missing numbers in the QA Records Vault Index File were appropriate as no NCR was issued f or the involved items. All the above items were voided or cancelled prior to issuance of a Nonconformance Report and had been so noted in the NYO Log. The specific NYO NCRs listed above are discussed individually in Attachment 4. 13-3

CAUSE: The cause for the situation described in items 1 and 2 for site-issued NCRs was the manner in which NCRs were logged and tracked prior to June 1979. The situations described in items 1,2,3 and 4 are not indicative of any lo s.s o f accountability. The NCRs that were voided or cancelled.had been so noted in the site manual log. It is recognized that the manual log used until June 1979 provided less information with regard to the location of an NCR at any point '.n time than the current system. The nine NCR numbers mentioned in items 1 and 2

'were issued before instituting the tracking card system and MTS.

The probable cause for the situation described in Item 5 is that, from late 1982 to September 1983 Ebasco QA Engineers were co-located with Mercury Company on-site in a " satellite" of fice in the Mercury complex. In this time frame, when a Mercury NCR was generated and assigned a unique Mercury NCR number, the 

         " satellite" office Ebasco QA engineer would request an Ebasco NCR number by telephone to assign-to the Mercury NCR. This was in contrast to normal practice of assigning a number when the Ebasco NCR was written. It is likely that in some instances this request would be duplicated by another Ebasco QA Engineer, perhaps on second shift.

The net result would be that two Ebasco NCRs would be issued to address the same Mercury NCR. One Ebasco NCR thus would be used; one would not. This situation was later corrected by assigning a block of Ebasco NCR numbers for use by the " satellite" office. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that in the cases of three of the NCR numbers mentioned, it has been determined that these numbers were used to address specific Mercury NCRs. The nonconforming conditions described by these Mercury NCRs, however, were addressed by other Ebasco NCRs. ( - . GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

  • The review and investigation of the more than 8200 closed or voided NCRs has concluded that all are accounted for. In addition, the fact that all of the NCRs described in Items 1, 2 and 3 for site-issued NCRs were issued prior to the establishment of the improved tracking system indicates that the current system has provided improved control.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: - The review and investigation has concluded that all closed or voided NCRs are accounted for. On this basis, there is no recogni:ed reason that this issue should constrain fuel load or power operation. CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN / SCHEDULE: A review for accountability of all Mercury NCRs is in progress, including voided and administratively closed NCRs. The review will also determine if any dispositions of Mercury NCRs refer to Ebasco NCRs which the completed review has determined were never issued. This effort will be completed and resolved prior to fuel load. The results of this effort will be available for NRC review. 13-4

In addition to the measures already established (tracking card system and MTS), additional instructions and measures provide added assurance that NCRs are properly filed for tracking and closure. QAI-031 Revision 0 was issued by Ebasco Site QA on February 20, 1984. It contains detailed requirements for the proper closure (including closure by veiding) of NCRs and their subsequent transmittal to the Site QA records vault. NYO Procedure QAP-3 (Review of nonconformances) was revised to address voiding of NCRs. The procedure revision was completed on 07/20/84. Implementation of these requirements will provide better assurance that the remaining and future Ebasco NCRs are properly processed, closed, and filed. Reviews are being performed periodically by LP&L QA to verify the proper implementation of requirements. , It should be noted that LP&L has converted to operating procedures under which non-conforming conditions are identified as a Condition Identification Work Authorization (CIWA). Thd.s will be developed in detail when dealing with the collective significance of the 23 issues and programmatic changes stenming therefrom. ATTACHMENTS: *

1. Sample Manual Log Sheet
2. S a le Tracking Card
3. Site NCRs
4. NYO NCRs

REFERENCES:

(, None - ' l o 13-5

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DATE RESPONSIBILITY DUE DATE STATUS mqmc.- ..-.;. - 6/15/84 'B Fe Clawson@90 " T. 

                                                                                                                                       @**c                               -

none;". in proces5 W3NCR-21255 6/18/84 U. Quinby/M. McGrath N/A RD i m- .. .. W3NCR-21303 i 7/3/84 (U. , Qul_nby~/M2 ._...,: Mrar.a.th ".. .... .. '_ . . ' N./A~_;qc.%..CA27-I 

                                                                                                                                                                                                                          -,w >

L W3NCR-21393 '8/15/84 CLOSED on 8/15/84 t . I 1 1 l l l 

                 -       --                 ,        . . - - - , . . , - - - - -                         - , , , . , , . . , .              .          ,..,.,n.,,..,-..n.                         - - , . . , . , - . . . - . -                    , ,     -

 ;                                                                                      ATTACHKENT 3 r                                                                                        SITE NCRS NCR-W3-27                  .

The original NCR-W3-27 record was already in the appropriate file in the W3 Site QA records vault even though a corresponding index card was not on file. An 4 index card for this NCR has been prepared and is now on file in the W3 Site QA records vault. NCR-W3-27 was voided by the Ebasco QA Site Supervisor on February 17, 1976. It has been determined from the review of NCR-W3-27 and . supporting documentacien that the voiding of this NCR is both justified and j properly documented.

NCR-W3-814 i

The original NCR-W3-814 record could not be. located in the W3 Site QA records vault. However, a copy of this NCR was located and has been designated as the duplicate original. An index card for this NCR has been prepared and is now on 

             . file in the W3 Site QA records vault. The disposition to void NCR-W3-814 was

, approved by both Ebasco Engineering and the Ebasco QA Site Supervisor, and the

NCR was closed accordingly on March 31, 1978. It has been determined from the review of NCR-W3-814 and supporting documentation that the voiding of this NCR is both justified and properly documented.

1

NCR-W3-859 The NCR log entry for. NCR-W3-859 indicates a general subject and void date only.

C_ The entry does not identify either a preparer or data prepared. Additionally, a 1 review of the Ebasco Site QA transmittal log revealed that no entries were made [ relative to this NCR. (Since the beginning of project construction. Ebasco Site '

QA has forwarded NCRs for dispositioning and for filing as records by use of i

uniquely numbered transmittal memorandums.) A search of relevant files in the r-Site QA records vault and at other W3 Site locations was unable to locate an NCR with number W3-859. As a result of the investigation. LP&L has high confidence i that NCR-W3-859 was not issued. ( [ A review of documentation pertaining to Ebasco QA audit, and surveillance ' l activities relevant to the timeframe and general subject of the entry was performed. The timeframe of the entry was established as being between March 20 and March 23,1978 (The previous entry (NCR-W3-858) is dated March 20, 1978 and the void date for NCR-W3-859 is indicated to be March 23, 1978). The general subject description of the entry is indicated as " Erection of Plant Process Piping". l' It was discovered that Ebasco Site QA had performed an audit of the piping contractor's site welding program between March 16 and March 20, 1978. Audit I Report No. WO-78-3-1 was issued on April 13, 1978 and identified four findings which were detected during the audit. It has been concluded that the auditor 

            . presented one or more of the audit findings to Ebasco Site QA management for l             evaluation as to whether they should be identified on an NCR. Anticipating that an NCR would probably be issued, an entry in the NCR log was recorded in order to obtain an NCR number. However, since the findings were programmatic in nature. Ebasco Site QA management apparently determined that an audit report (rather than an NCE) was the appropriate document on which the findings should be identified.                                                                                                                                                    '

13-6 l 

   - -,           n,,.-.n,.-    ,,--, --,,--,., _ n , _ ,n n                      r,,,. ,,_ .-, - ,.-,...,    .,n-n-an_-,,,~ ..n,-,         _,,.m ,, v.,..,, _ v n , , ,

ATTACHMENT 3 (continued) The review of audit and survalliance documentation did not reveal any other activities performed within the timeframe discussed above which could be construed as being even remotely relevant to the general subject description of the NCR log entry for NCR-W3-859. The findings documented in Audit Report WG-78-3-1 were programmatic in nature and 

;      appropriately documented as audit findings. Appropriate corrective actions were taken by the contractor and verification of corrective action completion was                              ,

properly performed and documented by Ebasco Site QA. NCR-W3-963 The Ebasco Site QA NCR tracking log entry for NCR-W3-963' indicates that the NCR was issued to upgrade Gulf Engineering NCR 086A. The entry indicates that Gulf Engineering had described the nonconforming condition and a recommended disposition on June 22, 1983, but it does not indicate that the Gulf disposition was ever evaluated by Ebasco. In addition, Ebasco QA made an entry on January 25, 1979 to indicate that the NCR had been voided. Further investigation revealed that Gulf Engineering NCR 086 had been previously upgraded to Ebasco NCR-W3-945 on June 12, 1978. Gulf had provided a recommended disposition for the identified condition and Ebasco had approved the disposition on June 16, 1978. However, on June 22, 1978 Gulf annotated Block IV of their copy of NCR W3-945 with the wording " Refer to NCR 086A for re-evaluation of disposition" and annotated the Gulf NCR log entry corresponding to Gulf NCR 086 ' 

' (   with the wording "See NCR 086A dated 6/22/78". Further, on June 23,1978, Gulf                        .

deleted their annotation in Block IV of their copy of NCR W3-945, which had been i made on the previous day and added the annotation " Aux. skid aligned with Emerg. Gen. and new holes drilled in accordance with disposition". - It appears that Gulf had been planning to recommend another disposition for NCR W3-945 (Gulf NCR 086) by means of a supplement to Gulf NCR 086 (Gulf NCR 086A)

and had notified Ebasco Site QA accordingly in order to obtain a corresponding l Ebasco NCR number. Ebasco Site QA had assigned Ebasco NCR number W3-963 to a l Gulf NCR 086A and made a corresponding entry in the Ebasco Site QA NCR log, l with the understanding that Gulf would be providing the NCR descriptics and recommended disposition. However, Gulf apparently had decided to implement the approved disposition to NCR W3-945 (Gulf 086) rather than to propose a revised disposition via Gulf NCR 086A, which was never issued.

The former Gulf employee, who made the annotations on the Gulf NCR log and Gulf copy of NCR-W3-945 (Gulf NCR 086), has documented by letter (Gulf Engineering Co. QA-3912, 7/2/84) that a Gulf NCR 086A was not issued. If NCR 086A was not issued, then a corresponding Ebasco NCR-W3-963 would not have been issued. Ebasco Site QA was unaware that Gulf had decided not to issue Gulf NCR 086A and therefore, did not void the NCR-W3-963 entry in the Ebasco Site QA NCR log until several months later. l In addition, a review of the Ebasco Site QA transmittal log revealed that no l entries have ever been made relative to this NCR. A search of relevant files in the W3 Site QA records vault and at other W3 Site locations was unable to locate l an NCR vich nu=her W3-963. l 13-7 l< I _ _ _ _ _ - - , ~ ~ _ - -

ATTACHMENT 3 (continued) As a result of the evaluation, it has been concluded that an NCR-W3-963 was not issued. NCR-W3-981 The NCR log entry for NCR-W3-981 includes entries only for a general subject, a

preparer, and a date prepared. The entry also indicates that NCR-W3-981 is
                     " void". The entry in the general subject block refers to a specific heat                                                                 .

number, type, and size of welding electrode. The preparer is indicated as the Ebasco QA Site Supervisor at the time, and the date of preparation is indicated as July. 18,1978. Additionally, a review of the Ebasco Site QA transmittal log revealed that no entries have ever been made relative to this NCR. A search of relevant files in the W3 Site QA records vault and at other W3 ' Site locations was unable to locate an NCR with number W3-981. A review of documentation on file, applicable to the heat number of welding electrodes described in this NCR log entry, revealed that no Discrepancy Notices i or Deficiency Reports pertaining to that heat were issued. However, the review did reveal that the manufacturer of these electrodes had submitted a corrected certified material test report for that heat on July 19, 1978. The certification was corrected to add the manufacturer's ASME Section III Quality Systems Certificate number and expiration date and to add a statement certifying that the material was manufactured in accordance with the requirements of Section III Division 1 Subsection NCA-3800 of the ASME Code. The corrected certification was submitted to Ebasco Site QA on July 21, 1978.. ' As a result of the evaluation, LP&L har high confidence that NCR-W3-981 was not l issued. Ebasco Site QA had anticipated an NCR, to identify deficiencies in the original certified material test report which had been shipped with the welding , electrodes, would be notessary and a log entry was made. Prior to issuance, however, corrected certification was received which resolved Ebasco Site QA l~ concerns and the NCR was not issued. l NCR-W3-1053 The NCR log entry for NCR-W3-1053 includes entries only for a general subject, a preparer, and a date prepared. It also indicates that NCR-W3-1053 is " void". A review of the Ebasco Site QA transmittal log revealed that no entries were made relative to this NCR. A search of relevant files in the W3 Site QA records vault and at other W3 Site locations was unable to locate an NCR with number W3-1053. A reviev of Ebasco Receiving QC Discrepancy Notices, which were issued around the same timeframe as the NCR log entry date (September 25, 1978), was conducted. This review revealed that Ebasco Receiving QC had issued a DN MC-1681 on September 21, 1978. DN MC-1681 identified deficient tack welds on two pipe supports for the react:r coolant pump (the NCR log entry for general subject indicates " Reactor Coolant Pump"). A review of DN MC-1681 revealed that l 13-8

ATTACHMENT 3 (continued) it had been submitted by Ebasco Receiving QC to Ebasco Site QA for evaluation of the discrepancy for possible upgrading to an NCR. The Ebasco Receiving QC recommended disposition in Block No. 2 of the DN had been initially documented as " Issue NCR". Ebasco Site QA had initially concurred with this recommendation as c.videnced by the NCR log entry of September 25, 1978. However, after further evaluation of the discrepancy, Engineering requirements, and AWS Code requirecents, Ebasco Site QA determined that the issuance of an NCR was not warranted. On September 25, 1978, the QA Site Supervisor documented this . decision accordingly on the DN. The identified discrepancy was properly processed and resolved via DN MC-1681, which was closed on October 3,1978. As a result of the evaluation, LP&L has high confidence that NCR-W3-1053 was not issued. The discrepancy which corresponds to the NCR log entry for NCR-W3-1053 was properly processed resolved, and documented by DN MC-1681. j NCR-W3-1102 The original NCR-W3-1102 record could not be located in the W3 Site QA records vault. However, a copy of this NCR was obtained from another file at the W3 Site. The description of the nonconforming condition, which is documented in Block 1 of NCR-W3-1102, is identical to the condition documented by NCR-W3-1099. NCR-W3-1099 documents an acceptable disposition and corrective action for the i nonconforming condition. NCR-W3-1099 was properly closed on January 16, 1979. A copy of NCR-W3-1102, which is designated as the duplicate original record, has ( been annotated to indicate that it has been v'oided since it describes a condition already documented in NCR-W3-1099. The duplicate original record of NCR-W3-1102 and a corresponding index card are now on file in the W3 Sitd' QA ( records vault. [ NCR-W3-1109 The NCR log entry for NCR-W3-1109 includes entries only for a general subject, a preparer, and a preparation date. It also indicates that NCR-W3-1109 is " void". A review of the Ebasco Site QA transmittal log revealed that no entries were made relative to this NCR. .A search of relevant files in the W3 Site QA records vault and at other W3 Site locations was unable to locate an NCR with number W3-1109. A review was conducted of Ebasco Receiving QC Discrepancy Notices, which were issued around the same timeframe as the NCR log entry for preparation date l (November 2, 1978). This review revealed that Ebasco Receiving QC had issued a DN MC-1738 on October 18, 1978. DN MC-1738 identified damaged E 7018 1/8" , covered electrodes which had been received under Purchase Order WP3-1847. This corresponds with the brief description in the log entry for NCR-W3-1109 which states the name of the vendor and the notation: " covered electrodes,". It should be noted that Purchase Order WP3-1847 was the only WP3 purchase order issued to that vendor. An additional concern relative to Purchase Order WP3-1847 was that the vendor did not appear on the Ebasco QA Approved Vendors List, Revision 17, dated June 1, 1978, the applicable AVL revision at the time of the NCR entry. However, it is noted that the actual manufacturer of the subject welding electrodes and the l company which certified the material, was included on Revision 17 of the Ebasco QA AVL. 13-9 l

ATTACHMENT 3 (continued ) Ebasco Site QA anticipated the need for issuing an NCR to address one or both of the conditions described above and the entry had been made in the NCR log book to obtain an NCR number. However, after further investigation into the matter, 

               .Ibasco Site QA determined that the issuance of an NCR was not warranted.

As a result of the evaluation, it has been concluded that NCR-W3-1109 was never issued. The discrepant material which was identified by DN MC-1738 was scrapped and removed from the W3 Site in accordance with the approved disposition of the . DN. Additionally, Ebasco Site QA had approved Purchase Order WP3-1847 with the rationale that the vendor would be functioning merely as a distributor by supplying materials and documentation that had been provided by the material manufacturer, a vendor approved by Ebasco QA. NCR-W3-1228 The original NCR-W3-1228 record could not be located in the W3 Site QA records

  • vault. However, a copy of this NCR was obtained from another file at the W3 Site. A copy of NCR-W3-1228, which is designated as the duplicate original record, is now on file in the W3 Site QA records vault. Also, an index card, corresponding to this NCR, was prepared and is now on file in the W3 Site QA records vault. By direction of the Ebasco QA Site Supervisor, NCR-W3-1228 was voided and the condition was re-identified and processed on a Gulf Engineering Discrepancy Report (DR No. 21). The review indicates that NCR-W3-1228 was voided with proper justification and the reported condition was properly processed, corrected, and documented by Gulf Engineering DR No. 21.

NCR-W3-1349 The original NCR-W3-1349 record could not be located in the W3 Site QA records vault. However, a copy of this NCR was obtained from another file at the W3 Site. A copy of NCR-W3-1349, which is designated as the duplicate original record, is now on file in the W3 Site QA records vault. Also, an index card a corresponding to this NCR, was prepared and is now on file in the W3 Site QA records vault. It has been determined that NCR-W3-1349 was properly voided, since the same nonconforming condition was processed, corrected, and documented . by NCR-W3-1397. NCR-W3-1438 The original NCR-W3-1438 document, which pertains only to non-safety-related items, had been appropriately renumbered to a non-safety-related designation and was on file in another location at the W3 Site. An index card has been prepared , for NCR-W3-1438 and is on file in the W3 Site QA records vault. The index card irdicates that the NCR is non-safety related and it has been renumbered as NCR-W3-001 (NNS). i 4 i 13-10 

   . . ~ _ - -          . _ _ . . _ . . _ _ . _ . . . . _ _ _ . . . _ . - . - _ . . _ - . . _ . _ , - _

ATTACEMENT 4 NYO NCES i NCRS 199 and 204 NCRs 199 and 204 were assigned to purchase order 403502 to cover Qualification Reports that were not reviewed by Ebasco Engineering. Subsequently it came to l the attention of the NYO that DEF-78-5-19 identified the same problem as NCRs l 199 and 204. Report W3QA-6698 dated 3/22/79 indicates that Rosenount i Qualification Report No. 3788 was reviewed without comment and DEF-78-5-19 l closed. A formal notice of NCRs 199 and 204 being cancelled was transmitted to I the vendor on 4/11/80. Based on the investigation, LP&L has high confidence that NCR 199 and 204 were not issued. l NCR 483 I NCR 483 was assigned to purchase order 403501 to cover a hydrostatic test time t' different from specification requirements. Prior to issuing the NCR, the engineer revised the specification via DCN-ME-109. The NYO Log indicates NCR 483 was not issued and replaced by DCN-ME-109. A formal notice of this fact was transmitted to vendor on 3/6/84. NCR 489 NCR.489 was assigned to purchase order 403509. The NYO Log indicates a report date of 10/26/79; a description that states "No weld data high probability material is non-critical"; and a notation NCR 489 is Void. A search of relevant documentation in the QA Records Vault. NYO QA Files, NYO Vendor QA Files and order 403509 was conducted. . No original or copy of. NCR 489 was found. A ( specific review was made of all VQAR Reports and other relevant correspondence for the 6/79 through 6/80 time" frame. The review did not r& veal any concern which could be construed as being relevant to the general subject description for log entry NRC 489. Site QA Records indicate that order 403509 has no outstanding deficiencies. Based on the above, LP&L has high confidence that NCR 489 was not issued and that the void notation in the NYO log is valid. NCR 543 - NCR 543 was assigned to purchase order 403623 to cover short cable lengths. The NYO NCR Log indicates NCR 543 was voided because it was the same as NCR 545. NCR 545 was issued on 10/28/81 and properly dispositioned on 11/9/81. LP&L, therefore, has high confidence that NCR 543 was not issued. NCR 579 NCR 579 was assigned to purchase order 403640 to cover short cable lengths. NCR 579 .was voided and never issued as it duplicated a condition previously i described on NCR 573. NCR 573 was issued on 5/10/82 and properly dispositioned 

,              on the same day. NCR 579 was not issued and formal notification was made to vendor on 4/22/83.

NCR 642 NCR 642 was assigned to purchase order 403516 to cover a missing shipping / packaging procedure. Prior to initiating the NCR Form, the potential nonconforming condition was resolved by locating the missing document and no NCR was issued. 13-11

ST.i??LDIEN! TO T.iE RES?ONSE TO CONCERN NO. 13 S1* EMITTED SEPTEM3ER'4, 1984 DISCtSSION: As concitted to in the Corrective Action Plan / Schedule pcrtion of the rasponse to Concern No. 13, a ravic'< of Mercury NCRs. has been. perforncd by L?&L QA in accordance with procedure QASP 19.17 to determine whether cny were improperly voided or administratively closed. Also, an accountability of Mercury NCRs was - perfcrmed to reconcile whether a Mercury NCR document was issued / processed for-each .given number . issued by Mercury Company. This was accomplished by both a review of the Mercury NCR log and, a review of the Mercury NCR . documer.ts to 

       . assure that the specific categories of NCRs cuestioned by the NRC within the 4
SSER 7 were obtained.
       .The results of the raview performed on the voided cnd " administrative 1y closed" NCRs has determined that, except as noted below, they were appropriately processed and closed.        Cases were found where the documentation to support
closure was referenced .but not in the Mercury NCR file. This documentation is being retrieved from the appropriate files reviewed by LP&L QA and placed into the Mercury NCR files. Also, the review has shown that all but two of the Mercury NCRs can be accounted for and that two NCRs were incorrectly administratively closed and one was not processed. Attachment I details tha processing / resolution of these five NCRs. ,

In addition, this supplement .provides within ~ Attachment 2 some further clarification as to the processing / resolution of NCR-W3.859 and. NCR-W3-981, 

   ,    submitted in the response-to Concern No. 13.

3. 

       -There is no change to the.previously stated Cause, Generic Implications, Safety Significance and Corrective Action Plan / Schedule.

t An addition to the CAUSE as stated in the initial response is: 

       . In the case of Mercury, two NCRs were found to be missing, however investigation revealed these were isolated instances and there was no lack of resolution of the underlying problems.

. Mercury failed to process three other NCRs. i An' addition to GENERIC IMPLICATIONS as stated in the initial responsa is: This isssue has been approached generically. The review has encompassed Mercury 

       -voided -and administratively closed NCRs and all identifiable missing and

, unprocessed Mercury NCRs. ATTACHMENTS: . 4 

       .l. Mercury NCRs that are missing or care never processed.
2. Discussion of. site NCRs W3-859 and W3-981.

REFERENCES:

Ncne-13-12

o ATTACHMENT 1 MERCL'RY NCRs TMT ARE MISSING OR WERE NE'IER PROCESSD Mercurv NCR-2685 The description previded .in the NCR Los indicates that this NCR was written against OCR 1029, instru=ent number DPI/DPS-hV 5009A, Drawing No. 353-L-183-A to identify "no-fit up date" as the nonconforming condition. Since the description noted .in the log was not specific as-to what item (s) did not have a fit-up date, four areas were considered. These areas are the following:

1) Tubing - The tubing en the noted drawing is ANSI E31.1 and therefore no docu=ented inspection would be required.
2) Instrument Stand - The instrument stard is installed per Instrument Installations Detail B430 - X14 which is a non-seismic stand and therefore no docu=ented inspection would be required.
3) Tube Track - The tube track on the drawing is seis=ic but no fit-up inspections were required. 1,
4) Seismic Supports - There were 19 seismic supports on the subject drawing. I; These supports required a documented fit-up inspection.

e Af ter reviewing the documentation for all 19 supports, - ( it was determined that only one Support Locator (No.

12) was missing a fit-up inspection date on tha
                                " Support Inspection Report" form (262-1).

Further search revealed thct the " Support Inspection Report" form shows a late entry of the fit-up inspection date for Support Locator No. 12 made by the same person who initiated the NCR. It is deduced that the same individual identified the nonconforming . condition and then corrected it. As a result of this investigation, LP&L concludes that the condition identified by the missing NCR was corrected and documentation is available to show resolution. Mercurv NCR-2242 The Mercury NCR Log entry fer this NCE was crossed out by the log keeper noting that the NCR was written in error and that the number was never used. 

                                                                                                               .l.

It was found that at about the same time two more entries were =ade against the l' same OCR nu=ber, the same drawing number and the s:=a instrument that were noted against NCR-2212. The new entries were NCR-226', and NCR-22SS. NCR-22S5 was  !: closed uith the nctaticn that the same problem was tracked via NCR-2264 I t' 13-13

Marcurv NCR-2242 Cent'd) 7:o= the description previded in the NCR Log, the same ins: utent was identified on all three NCRs and it was resolved under NCR-2264. Since the NCR Log does no: describe the specific nonconforming condition, further research was perfor=ed :o determine if any si:uatica e::isted which may hcVe gone unaddressed. A review of Mercury QC inspec:fon reports (Form 211) of the sa=e period revealed that :hree differen: QC inspectors noted the same condition during three different walkdowns and recc== ended that NCRs be issued to correct the discrepancy. Fur:hermore, a Form 211 was found which records that an inspection was perfer=ed that verified the correction of the discrepancy and thus the cicsure of NCRs 2264, 2285 and 2242. . As a result of this investigation, LP&L concludes that the condition identified by the =issing NCR was corrected. Mercurv NCRs that were never Processed Three nonconformances .that were issued but were incorrectly administra 1vely closed or not processed by Mercury Q.A. Department were NCR-888 dated 9-19-82, 889 dated 9-19-82 and 2734 dated 3/10/84. Mercury should have processed these NCRs; subsequent actions have resolved the deficiencies contained therein. ,The rationale by Mercurf for not processing the NCRs and the resolution by Ebasco to

he NCR concerns are provided below:

NCR-888 , This NCR was generically written stating the several Q.C. personnel have been I certified to Level II vithout documented evidence. of qualification requirements. At the ti=e Mercury's management response was that the NCR was 

,       not processed based en "1) initia:or not a Mercury empicyee at time of writing
2) QCP-3110 paragraph 1.4 references QCP-3040 which does not apply to W-3 3)

ANSI N45.2.6 provisions incorporated by QCP-3050 as approved. All Mercury Company QC techs are trained and tested per QCP-3050 prior to performing inspections or tests." Ebasco's current review of the above document deter =ined tha : a) The initiater was terminated on the same date the NCR was initiated. b) Recently a review of all Mercury's quality assurance / quality inspection personnel has been undertaken for adherence to procedural and ANS1 requirements relative to qualification / certification status. The concern as stated in the NCR and reinspection is cddressed and resolved by the in-depth qualification / verification review being accomplished under Concern No. 1. NCR-839 This NCR was generically written noting a change to actual field installation versus Mercurf 's Q.C. support installation documentation. Mercury's Support Verifica ion Group and Mercury's Documenta ion Review Group had identified numercus deficiencies relative to hanger installa: ion traceability. At the time Mercury's =anage=ent response :o this NCR was :ha: the NCR was no: processed based on: "1) Initiator not a Mercury Co=pany employee a: : ice of writing. 2) The situation has already been identified by LP&L Audi:s, Ebas:: Audits, Mercury Company Audits and case-by-case NCR's . There is insufficient infor:ation :o process an NCR of this description. Mercury Company has established a prograc to investiga:e, evaluate and repor: cn :hese conditions wi:h LP",1 and Ebasco Q. A. concurrence." 13-14 _. - __ . -- c. . - - - - - _ . . _ , , -_ -. . - . . -

O NC2-3S9 (Cont'd) Eb:sco's currant review of the above docu=en: determined tha:: a) The initiater was :er=inated on :he same date the NCR wcs initiated. b) Since the :ine this 

          .NCR was initia:2d, numerous efforts have been undertaken to ve.rify that as-buil:

field condiciens do in fac: reflec: the Mercury as-buil dr: wings:

1) Ebasco Q.C. verification of supports per procedut a ECRRI-3. A tctal of 1852 supports were inspected for configuration, dimensions, location, amount of weldcent.
2) LP&L Construction Q. A. walkdown during :he status review cf turnover of systems. This consisted of 114 instrument supports.
3) All N1' (approximately 1600) supports were inspec:ed and documented in accordance with LP&L procedure QASP-19.15.
             . 4)    Meruury CR-3578 was upgraded to Ebasco NCR-W3-6512 which generically addressed ::accability of Mercury supports.

Based on the above efforts and the resulting documentation, :he concern stated on the NCR is considered to be resolved. NCR-2734 

         - Maximum lengths 4" x 3" x 1/4" angle were exceeded on supports 8-000-H-013N, 17-000 '4-008N, 18-000-H-013N by 1", 2" and 4" respectively.         Mercury failed to process this NCR.

Ebasco initiated CIWA 018917 to evaluate the cited problem. Ebasco (CSSE) has evaluated the condition and found it :c be acceptable. LP&L has concurred with ESSE evaluation. i j l l l 1 t l 13-15 

                                    ~^                                ~               ^    ^

ATTACH'4ENT 2 Q DISCUSSION OF SITE NCRs W3-S$9 and W3-981 u: l NCR-W3-S$9 The NCR los entr'f for NCR-W3-859 indicate; " Erection of Plant ' Process Piping" under. subject and it gives a void date only. The Ebasco Site QA transmittal leg has no entry relative to this NCR and a search of files in the Site QA records vault and other locations, did not locate-the subject NCR. A review of documentatien pertaining to Ebasco QA audit and surveillance activities relevant to the timeframe and general subject of the en:rf was performed. 1: was determined that Ebasco Site QA had performed an audit of the piping contractor's site welding program which -idantified four findings. There is a possibility that these findings were presented to Ebasco Site QA Management for evaluation and- an entry in the log made to obtain an NCR number. , Subsequently, it was probably decided that the. findings should be identified in ' g the audit report and not the NCR and the entry in the log was voided. q F As a result of this investigation, LP&L concludes that NCR-W3-859 was never issued. NCR-W3-981 The NCR log entry for NCR-W3-981 shows a July 18, 1978 date of preparation an'd r I includes .a specific heat number, type and size of welding electrode. The Ebasco Site QA transmittal log has no entry relative to this NCR and,a search of files in the Site QA records vault.and other locations, did not locate it. A review of documentation in file, . applicable to the subject welding electrodes heat number revealed that the manufacturer of these electrodes had submitted a corrected certified material test report for that hea: number. Apparently, Ebasco Site QA had anticipated that an NCR would be necessary to . identify deficiencies in the original certified material test report that was submitted with the welding electrodes and a NCR log entry was made. However, the receipt of the corrected certified material test report resolved the ! . deficiency and the entry was voided. 

          .As a result of this investigation, LP&L concludes that NCR *w'3-981 was never issued.

i 13-16 

     '                                                              LP&L EXHIBIT 19 (WITHOUT ATTACHMENTS)
  ,                                                      Wm                              -

W

RESPONSE

ITEM NO: 7 (Revision 1) TITLE: BACKFILL SOIL DENSITIES NRC DESCRIPTION OF CONCERN:. - The staff found that records are missing for the in-place density test of backfill in Area 5 (first 5' starting at Elevation -41.25'). These documents are important because the seismic response of the plant is a function of the soil densities. LP&L shall (1) Conduct a review of all soil packages for completeness and technical adequacy and locate all records and provide closure on technical questions, or (2) conduct a review of all soil packages for completeness and technical adequacy and where soil volumes cannot be verified by records as meeting criteria, perform and document actual soil conditions by utilizing penetration tests or other methods, or (3) Justify by analysis that the soil volumes with missing records, or technical problems as defined after the records review, are not critical in the structural capability of the plant under seismic loads. DISCUSSION:

  • LP&L has reviewed all soils packages for completeness and technical adequacy.
 ,     .has located-the items found missing by the staff, has identified those soil        ,

volumes for which completc records wste not found, and has justified by analysis that the structural captbility of the plant under seismic loads is assured. A detailed, engineering report has been prepared and attached to this response describing the review and analysis of the soil backfill densities, which reconfirms the adequacy of the backfill. This was also repeatedly demonstrated in the seven (7) statistical studies of backfill densities performed daring the construction period, which showed good control of the work was achieved vnd specification requirements generally exceeded. The following discussion is a summary of the findings of the attached report. The design criterion for the backfill was to obtain a liquefaction free material at 75% relative density. To confirm compliance with this design criterion, a detailed three stage program was implemented to perform a review for completeness and analysis of backfill soil censity and inspection reports for technical adequacy which verifies the structural capability of the plant under seismic loading conditions. The program effort was conducted under the direction of the Ebasco Site Soils Engineer who was present during the performance of the majority of the actual backfilling operations. Two basic sets of evaluations were performed, the first on soil backfill tes. records, and the second on the corresponding inspaction Reporta. During the Stage I effort, a detailed search was made of all locations containing soil backfill data. Additional test records and inspection reports were obtained from contractor and laboratory files and also Engineering, Laboratory and Quality Control indices and tabulations were retrieved. 7-1 1

Once the packages of soil data were located and collected, Stage II activities concentrated on a review of the documents for completeness and a corpilation of the data into a format amenable to review of the NRC concerns. . Included in the review were each type of Inspection Report and each type of test record in the soil packages. It was determined that the complete set of test 

       ,                             records and a nearly complete. set of inspection reports had been located..

In direct response to the first paragraph of the Description of the NRC Concern, the data for the 34 in-place density tests performed in the first 5.5' of Class A fill placed in Fill Area #5 from Elevation -41.75 to EL -36.25, has been located. Stage III activities consisted of engineering evaluation of the data gathered and organized in Stages I and II. The results of the Stage II and III evaluations for completeness and technical adequacy for both the test records and inspection reports are summarized as follows: (A) EVALUATION OF TEST RECORDS Test records deal with quantitative attributes of the fill such as density, moisture content and gradation. The test most indicative of quality is density, since it relares directly to liquefaction potential, however, the other attributes were also reviewed for acceptability. Utilizing the complete package of final backfill test records, totalling 

,,                                          approximately 3100 tests, overlay plots of relative density were I                                  constructed at each one foot interval of elevation and laboratory test data were tabulated during the Stage'II effort. These documents represent a graphical plot of density test frequency and distribution, and tabulate and display the final insitu relative densities.

The Stage III review and evaluation of the technical adequacy of the Class A backfill to provide structural stability of the plant under seismic loadings was based upon a comparison of the design requirements as stated in the Ebasco Specification LOU-1564.482 with existing documentation and with the relative density plots prepared in this review. These plots are available in the Site Quality Assurance Records Vault. These plots demonstrate satisfaction of requirements for test frequency and distribution throughout the fill volume. The evaluation included each type of test record required by the governing specifications and procedures and analyzed: The completeness of all test records The testing frequency and distribution of in place density tests The frequency of laboratory control tests l The performance of statistical studies The Class A Backfill relative density l 7-2 J 

                                                                          ~                     -                                           . . . ..

7y .- 

   .-                                                     3                                                                                                    t The results of these analyses are as follows:                                           g; (1) TheClassAbackfillsoiltestingrecordsarecompfats.                                                                            ()           '

(2) Field density and laboratory density and gradatic.n' tests were generally performed in accordance with the specified frequencies. )'  ! In.less than 8%lof the cases reviewed, the laboratory control tests were run at intervals slightly largar than the specified 

                                                                                                                                                           'l' (one control set per ten field density tests) criteria. The                                                             s               ,

backfill placed during these periods was randomly located throughout the fills and the relative'dtensities obtained during these intervals were found te be in compliance with the , specification reauirements.* This variance was therefore evaluated to be acceptable.. - s 

                                                                                                         -                           a;                            1
                                                                                           <.~                          .

(3) Field tests were located la accordance with )the specified random ~ g distribution. In less than 5% of the teses reviewed, the 1 location coc,rdinates of the inplace density tests were found to be in error. These tests were still a valid indicatar of'the- , n< relative density of the backfill ac..a random spot a a known , elevation in a known fill arca and were therefore u emed to be ' acceptable tests. m \ (4) Statistical studies of relative density were psrformed in - accordance with the specification requirements. 5 - { (5) The Class A backfill

  • soil densitiies are in accordance with the specification requirements and will,provida the required design ,

structural capability to the plant under seismic loads._ t . 

                                                                                                                   '~

(B) EVALUATION OF INSPECTION REPORTS \' l  : Inspection records generally deal with qualitativa ' attributes of the fill such as proper preparation of the fill starface and cleanliness of fill received. Production-related quantitative information such as fill-location, elevation and area are also prov1.ded. ' i , ,i:\' During for Classthe Stage A backfill wasII inventoried review activity, the total and combined intofile of inspection compatible soil reports ' ,' g3 1 - packages. Included in the irventory were approximstely.12,000' inspectiion .\. reports ranging from EL -44 to EL+20 throughout all seven fill areas. The reports were grouped and compiled by fill location, elevation and placement: date for each of the five types of inspection < forms and sununarized in - several tabulations. C s The evaluation of these inspection reports was dividad'into tvo i phases: the evaluation of the inspection reports to dat. ermine their overall completeness, and the evaluation of the frequency and. distribution of - 

 ,            inspection reports to determine their content.                            '         '

t Two comparative analyses were performed to determin6 the relative <5 completeness of the inspection documentation.' ' Tl e if 2xst analysia' performed 

                                                                                                           ~

wac a comparison of the quantity of inspection packages to testing pack.iges throughout the fills, while the second compared theldocumented - s surface area of inspection to the total surface creas of the fill j. placement. , , i 7-3 , 1 _ . _ _d

If.: 

        ,4 r
   ."             Once completeness of inspections was established, an additional analysis n @..

,; was performed to define the magnitude, the distribution and significance of iS k the documentation found to be missing. This analysis evaluated the

distribution of each type of inspection ' report by fill location and L ~c elevation, and determined types of missing documentation and the amounts of E' backfill by volume affected. The results of this analysis are as follows

(1) The distribution of the existing inspection documentation throughout the backfill'is essentially -identical to the distribution of the field j testing effort in that'where inspection reports are found for a given t fill area and elevation, a density test report is also found, thus

indicating a one to one relationship between inspection and testing activities. This is an expected trend since the inspection activity
included ordering tests performed. It is therefore concluded that the inspection activity took place whenever tests are found and that missing inspection reports are not indicative of lack of inspection activity.

4 i (2) Eighty percent of the volume of the backfill has a sufficient quantity i of each type of inspection report to fulfill the requirements of the

specification and inspection procedures.

l (3) For the 20% of the volume of the backfill which was missing some of the required inspection reports, 16% has an average of 81% of the reports required. 3.8% has one or more type of inspection missing, f' and 0.2% consisting of six one foot lifts in four fills have no ! /' inspection reports at all.- For details, see the Report, Section 4.B. and Table No. 2. The effect on each of these types of deficiencies was evaluated based upon the ! , quantity and type of inspection documentation existing above, below and around the affected fill areas, the relative density results in the affected areas and  ; the relatively small volume of fill affected. It was concluded that the deficiencies found in the inspection documentation are most probably due to lost folders, are not indicative of a lack of inspection effort, and will have no effect on the structural capability of the plant under seismic loads. CAUSE: The cause of this concern was the fact that some of the field inspection and laboratory test records for the Class A backfill were still in the contractor's QA records vaults. This contractor is still-active on site and had not i initiated the transfer of documentation to the LP&L-Ebasco Quality Assurance Vault. All available soil records are now permanently stored in this vault. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS: Based upon the results of the detailed review and analysis of backfill soil densities and corresponding inspection reports described in the discussion above, the Class A backfill was found to be sufficiently in compliance with the specificat d on requirements, s 7-4 { 

      ^

              -}

l e The large effort required to establish the completeness of the records is due to I the intrinsic difficulty of scoping a bulk process such as backfill in the absence of an administrative control tool, such as a logbook of inspections, which was not required b'y the implementing procedures. This scoping problem is believed to be unique to the soils / backfill effort. Difficulty in establishing records completeness also was.due to incomplete records turnover from ths'onsite. contractor involved. Therefore, a generic 

                             ~

concern exists as to the extent to which there has been incomplete records turnover on the part of remaining site contractors. This is addressed in the CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN below. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: ' ' Test records and inspection reports were located and analyzed demonstrating compliance with the specification. Therefore, the Class A backfill will perform its function with respect to structural design capability under seismic loads.- LP&L therefore believes that this issue is of no safety significance with respect to fuel load, power ascension or operation. CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN / SCHEDULE: y The complete set of laboratory test records, along with the attached report and corresponding documents, has been transmitted to the LP&L-Ebasco Quality Assurance Records Vault. . r' The remaining site subcontractor records for completed work have also been , transferred to Ebasco. Records for the minimal construct'on i and testing

  • I activities are being turned over as work is completed. This will assure accessibility and retrievability of subcontractor records and ultimate turnover to LP&L in accordance with the established records turnover program.

ATTACHMENTS: 

                          " Report on the Review and Analysis of Soil Backfill Densities" - NRC Concern No. 7.

l l 7-5

f[ r o I $* UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0% METE-UShi(C Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board In the Matter of ) '84 DEC -3 A10:55 

                                                       )

LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket No[F50-082 tQ1iRtTAc y UDCHETitta & Sggyg(g (Waterford Steam Electric Station, ) BRANCH Unit 3) ) w CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE' '- ~ This is to certify that copies of the foregoing " Applicant's Answer to Joint Intervenors' Motion to Reopen the Record to Admit Three New Contentions" and " Applicant's Response to Motion for Protective Order" were served, by 

          . deposit in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, to all those on the attached Service List, this 30th day of November, 1984.

I i i aptf f ^-- Alan D. Wasserman s. 4 Dated: November 30, 1984 l i i i L--

g.t l} UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board 

                  ~In the Matter of                          )
                                      ^
                                                             )

LOUISIANA POWER'& LIGHT COMPANY ') Docket'No. 50-382 * 

                                                             )

(Waterford Steam Electric ) Station, Unit 3) ) i SERVICE LIST Christine N. Kohl Sheldon J. Wolfe i Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Chairman, Atomic Safety and Chairman, Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 W. Reed Johnson Harry Foreman r- Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Appeal Board-- Director, Center for Population Studies U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Box 395, Mayo Washington, D.C. 20555 University of Minnesota Minneapolis, MN 55455 Howard A. Wilber Administrative Judge Walter H. Jordan Atomic Safety and Licensing Administrative Judge Appeal Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 881 West Outer Drive Washington, D.C. 20555 Oak Ridge, TN 37830 Sherwin E. Turk, Esquire Docketing & Service Section (3) Office of the Executive U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Legal Director Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Washington, D.C. 20555 Appeal Board Panel U.S. - Nuclear Regulatory Commission Carole H. Burstein, Esquire Washington, D.C. 20555 445 Walnut Street New Orleans, LA 70118 

             -Mr. Gary Groesch 2257 Bayou Road                               Lynne Bernabei, GAP New Orleans, LA 70119                         1555 Connecticut Ave., N.W.

Suite 202 l Washington, D.C. 20036 ,}}

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