ML20135F093

Testimony of Bb Hayes Before Senate Government Governmental Affairs Committee on 870326 Re Discovery of Sensitive NRC Document in Files of Senior Official of Louisiana Power & Light Co

ML20135F093
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	04/09/1987
From:	NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To:
References
NUDOCS 9703110183
Download: ML20135F093 (12)

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.t :PONv OF BEN S. HAYES f

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF IN.'ESTIGATICNS I j

UNITED STATES N'JCLEAR REGULATORf COMMISSION .

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Py nare is Ben B. Hayes. I was appoir.ted the first perranert director of the

N;C Office of Investigations (01) in February 1983. I came to the NRC afte- U years of criminal investigative experience with the Internal Revenue

• Service, -

4 Criminal Investigation Division. My last assignment prior to coming t6 the 'P". -

l was as Chiy of Criminal Investigations for the Cleveland District which covers Ncrthern Ohio;

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20 n On-March 26, 1967,'1 was : deposed under oath by Mr. Stephen Ryan, Counsel for the Majority in the Senate Government Governmental Affairs Committee. My appearance at that deposition was as a result of a written request from Senator Glenn, the Comnittee Chairman rather than on my own initiative. I subsecuently was afford-

, ed an opportunity to review the transcript of my deposition. Over this past weekend, I was informed that the Committee would like me to summarize the fr'or-mation that I provided during the deoosition, and sponsor this sureary as ry testimony today. I was not able to complete my review of this testimony until I returned from leave yesterday. I would like to emphasize that the opportuni*y to provide my testimony, either during my depositien or here today, is not a privilege that I particularly sought. To the contrary, it was thrust updn re.

, , Noretheless, the information that I have provided to the Committee St3#f, ard a -'cr I an sumrarizing today, is truthful and as accurate as I car make it.

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the NRC organization responsible for the conduct of all investigaticns

'.ir.g NRC licensees, licensee vendors, and other persons or entities over

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MC has jurisdiction. The office is staffed with investigators having.a' range of experience gained with other Federal investigative agencies such ti tre Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforce ert acr'ristration, e g

nternal Revenue Service, the Naval Investigative Service, and the Arr. :-ir"!'

Investigations Division. O! investigations that uncover or docurent wecr;":' ;

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that appears to violate criminal statutes are referred to the U.S. Departre t # /,

Justice. Investigative reports are also sent to the NCC cf#icial who recuester the C: investigation so that the NRC may take any necessary actions to o"cie::

the public health and safety.

9703110183 870409 PDR ADOCK 0 D00382 T PDR l

2-There is a stecng feelir; withir the industry and certair cuarters o' the Co .

missicn to "decriminali:e" 0 investigations, i.e. net prosecute the criri ra'.

ly. There are significant and important persons in the Conrission, both at the staff and Commission level, who desire far less emphasis on CriminEl, crose-cutions. During the years that I have been Director, O! has been in a constaat battle to maintain its independence. There are people within the NEC, inclue-ing some on the Commission itself, that want to decrease the level of . con #rcria-tion that exists between 01 and the nuclear industry.

MID-50Vdd DOCUMENTS 4

I have been asked to describe the circumstances surrounding the discovery by OI investigators of a sensitive NRC document in the files of a senior official of Louisiana Power and Light (LP&L), the utility licensed to operate the Waterford Nuclear Plant near New Orleans, La. During the course of an investigation at Waterford in March 1985, one of my investigators found this document in the personal files of the Vice President-Nuclear of LP&L. The NRC document is an internal NRC memorandum prepared by the Technical Assistant to then Caanissioner Victor Gilinsky which had been addressed to the then Directer of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement. The memorandum dealt with allegations of collusior between the NRC and LP&L, as well as cracks in the reactor base mat. The 01 investigator who found the documents, Mr. William J. Ward, immediately recog-nizec the importance of the documents, initialed and dated the reverse of them

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for evidentiary purposes, and brought them to my attention.

! reted the following characteristics of the documents. First, the internal N C

-: : aadur appeared to have come directly out of Commissioner Thomas Roberts'

':e or files in view of the initials on it. Second, the memorandum was at-

+" to a transmittal memorandum on the letterhead of Middle South Services, which bore the date of June 15, 1983. It was addressed to Mr. John J.

-:a-o and was sent from a Middle South c#ficial by the na s c' Gec ge E.

A ite. The memorandum was marked "confidental" with that term unders:cred. Tre trief text of that memorandum states, " Attached is a me c aa.dum received #r ~

so.rces inside the NRC regarding Waterford ouality assurance matters. Inis re :randum is for your information but I would hope tha you would limi: 4ts distribution to protect the source within the NRC".

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I felt tha* the decuren's indica *ed

• hat Middle South (the holding torpany fC r LP&L: had a source directly inside the NRC, especially inasmuch as the docuner $

care fror the files of Commissioner Roberts. Particularly startling was the.

fact that the document was received in Commissioner Roberts of fice on. Thursday,  !

June 9,1983, and was transnitted by Mr. White of LP&L only four working days later, June 15, 1983.

The memorandum was impcrtant as it dealt with a base mat issue which was under active review by the HEC staff, and that it reports collusion with the licensee on the part of NRC personnel, a very serious alle-gation in my opinion.

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The document also notes that LP&L may have withheld information on the base mat cracks from the NRC. OI subsequently initiated an investigation of that issue.

For a licensee to know that the NRC was discussing the issues of possible collusion and the base mat issue would give them a tremendous advantage. This is an example of someone within the NRC tipping a licensee of a potential inves-tigation. There have been instances where senior managers have tipped the fact that they intended to refer a matter to 01 for investigation, or advised licens-ees as to how to respond to an official incuiry by the Commission.

After leaving copies of the document at the Waterford Site, we returned to Wash-ir.gton and consulted with other members of the 0! Head;uarters staff. Having concluded that the document in question came from the Office of Cornissioner Acberts, based on various markings contained on the documents, I saw two cctions: take it to the Director of the NRC Office of Insoecter and Auditor, or ta' e it to the Chairman of the NRC. I elected to take the matter to the Chair-3 who at that tine was Nunzio J. Palladino, w

with the Chairman and the Chairman's Executive Assistant to share the  ;

ant with them, and to explain how it Came into the possessien of OI. Chair-

~a lladino asked a few ouestions about the circumstances, including whe*her I rad discussed the matter with Corcissioner Roberts. The Chairman asked re 'cr rj recorrerdation and I responded that the matter should be referred t0 the Directer of OIA. On March 14, 1985, ! received a one pace c.enerandum fror tre  !

C"airmia that was hard delivered to my office. That mercrandum directed ce to O discuss the matter with Commissioner Roberts as soor as pessible, and stated  !

• • 3* the Chairman had given Co-'missioner Roberts the ccpies of the decurents

• hat I had provided him. The memorandur also stated that the reorganizatice l

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. 0 plaa cf 1930 provides that supervision of the personrel withic each Co e ssice-er's office is that Commissioners' responsibility. That re crar.dum did nct di.

rect me to refer the matter to 0IA.

The next day, March 15, 1995, I and Mr. William Ward, Assistant to the Direc,cr l

of CI, met with Commissioner Roberts and Comissioner Roberts' legal Assistart, Mr. James Cutchin, in Commissioner Roberts' office. Comissioner Ro'berts hey up what, was apparently his file copy of the mercrandum in question. The memo -

randum that he showed me appeared to be identical to the copy we found at the Waterford Site. Commissioner Roberts indicated that he had inquired into the matter, talked to all members of his staff, and was convinced V;c no one on his staff had sent the documents; he suggested the documents might have been cb-tained by janitorial personnel or perhaps part time help that had Deen working in his office. Commissioner Roberts asked me why I did not personally bring the matter'to him. I replied that I thought my first obligation was to notify the Chairman.

Commissioner Roberts then requested that I send him all copies of the documents in 01 files. I advised Cocrissioner Roberts that I had taken notes during my prier discussion with the Chairman.

Commissioner Roberts then stated he wanted all copies of my notes as well. I complied with Corrissicner Roberts ' in-structions. As we were leaving his office, Corrissicner Roberts coment4d that

,.,, he would probably see this on the Hill. We assumed that Comnissioner Roberts  ;

was referring te his upcoming confirmation hearings which WOuld be held prior to Hs reap: ointment as an NRC Commissioner. Af ter reflectirg en the car.rer in

-'en tne matter had been handled, I elected te annotate tre March la, 1955, a .du to reflect Commissioner Roberts' recuest for the dccumentatier relat-to this matter. This annotation was made by me on March 15, 1955, at which it was countersigned by Mr. Ward.

*sve been soecifically asked what I would have dcre hac

• ceer ir crarge c' the irvestigatica of this incident. I Would have interv 9Wed the Middle Sc;th 4

ssd LF&L officials involved in this matter under oath, t include all recicderts of the document. I would have placed Corrissierer Roberts' staff under cat 9, 3rd have' questioned each member about the extert of their krcwledge concer drg this memorandum. In short, I would have conducted a very extersive and evaus-tive investigation to determine who was leaking informatien to a licensee.

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The leaked cocument was de#initely not the ty;e o# d:cu e-; that is putlic'j l released. I would have objected if the docure": were proocsed to be released tc the licensee within 7 days of it being provided to the NEC Sta#f. I have rever 1

before seen an internal document of this nature given to a party atinterest, 1 1

either in this or any other agency where I have worked.  ;

, In response to specific questions during my deposition, : acknowledged that Commissioner Roberts' office has been, in general, a continual critic. of 0: ,

I operations. Commissioner Roberts has raised proposals be' ore the Commission j that would limit in some respects 01's ability to initiate investigations, to make referrals to the Department of Justice, or otherwise to conduct the busi-ness of 01.

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. Another incident involved a second Middle South utility, Grand Gulf Nuclear i Station in Mississippi. The then Regional Administrator of the NRC Region II

. Office in Atlanta, Georgia, or his immediate staff, reviewed draft documents

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that the licensee proposed to submit to the NRC. On detecting the fact that the l documents appeared to contain a material false statenent, the Regional Adminis-trator or his staff told the licensee to go back and resubrit the document be-

! cause it would be considered a material false statement.

T'!* ORC 5' EMS 4

Pcther incident occurred that appeared to be an improper contact between the

• 's Executive Director for Operations (ECO), Victor Stello, and the Tennessee

.!ey Autberity (TVA) Manager of Nuclear Power, Mr. Steven hkite. The E20 is

~ P ti ally the chief operating officer of the NRC. Post of the day to day

.ities of the NRC to include inspection, erforcement, licensinc, and cther

'atory activities are done under his general supervisien. The general sub-

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t o# that contact was one of the major issues being investigated by 0: cer-cercing the well pubifcized difficulties regarding the 'il 3;le3r prcgra, ,

l t Ey way of background, in December 1985, NRC Ccerissioner Asselstine was being i

b-4e'ed by NRC Region II personnel as well as T!: represe-tatives on the status

c' the Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant in Tennessee. I a- tc'd that durir; P3

brie #ing, members of the TVA Nuclear Sa#ety Review Staf# re;crted that the o'aat was not built in accordance with NRC recuirerents; specifically, that the Watts i

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. t Bar cuality ass racce pregrar was nct in cor'ormance with the requirements c e Ap;encie B te l' CFR 50.

Subsecuent to this briefing, the NRC sent a Jaruary 3, 1956, letter to TVA asking TVA's official pcsition as to whether Watts Bar was in ccepliance with Appendix B, and allowed TVA 7 days to respond irr writi g,

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The N2C letter was very imco-tart. If TVA were te have indicated that the clart was not in corp!iance with Appendix B, then tne NEC Sta#f night have issued 3r immediate stop work order to halt corstruction. It was also noteworthy that l Watts Bar was very close to licensing; in fact, they were anticipating licensing as early as April 1986.

I was informed by Harold Denton, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, that Mr. Stello had initiated a telephone call in his presence while the two of then and other NRC staff were returning from a meeting at the Commission offices on H Street in Washington D.C.. Mr. Denton related that the telephone call was l

to Mr. Steven White, the TVA Manager of Nuclear Power, and that the conversation dealt with TVA's proposed response to the NRC's January 3 letter. Mr. Denton

, was very uncomfortable with that because of his view that White should respond without any advice from the Comm.ission. Mr. Denton told me that James Taylor, Director, !E, was also present in the van during that telepbone call. I then went to Mr. Taylor and asked him about it. Mr. Taylor confirmed that the call took clace.

was very concerned on learning of that phone call as CI hac ongoing invdstiga-t ons regarding TVA, and one investigation in particular had addressed the issue i

c' whetmer a former TVA manager had lied to the NRC cccce-rdrg readiness of aetit 9ar for fuel load. There would be no reason for a liceasee not to try to a reading from the NRC as to how best to handle a very difficult situatior

" 25 a reply to that letter; however, in my view, it weild be improper for

'. : ' to give it. Mr. Denton indicated that Mr. White appeared to be shopping ac. ice as to how to reply to the January 3 letter. At tre time of the tele-

'**e conversation, the NRC had not recetved a rescense to Pe letter. Suc" a res;cnse was not received until March 20, 1986.

Ecth Mr. Denton and Mr. Taylor felt the NRC shculd be cealdrg at ams lerg?

w th ~V' on sucn a critical issue. Because o' ry cor.cer's about the possit'e i

ircropriety of the telephone call, concerns that were heightered by the ohicas concerr expressed by Mr. Denton and Mr. Taylcr, : electec tc discuss the recter

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with CFai- ar Pai'acirc. Chairran palladino requested that ! take the ratter ::

Ms. Sha en Connelly, the Director of 0:A, which ! did that sa e day.

After reporting the matter to OIA, I was deposed by investigators from that office shortly after making the initial report to Ms. Cecrelly. I sut, sequent'y read the O!A report concerning this matter and noted that the report consistee of my deposition and that of Mr.Stello, neither of which was taken under oath.

It also consisted of memoranda of interview rather than depositior$s of l Messrs. Taylor and Denton. The thrust of Mr.Stello's deposition was that he' ~

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advised White not to give a definitive response'to the January 3,1986 NRC let-ter which, in fact, asked for a very definitive response.

The March 20, 1986 TVA response was not, in fact, definitive, i.e., it did not provide a clear yes or no answer. Rather, it reported that Mr. White found that there was no " pervasive" breakdown in the quality assurance program at Watts

. Bar. The CIA report on this matter concluded that there was no misconduct by NRC officials. l l

My 01A deposition was taken four days af ter my initial report to Ms. Connelly l

(April 11,1986), but Mr Denton and Mr. Taylor were not interviewed until the middle of June 1986. Mr. Stello was not deposed until July 30, 1986. In my view, this was a very serious, sensitive matter that deserved an expeditious review and investigation, and that especially considering the stature of Mr.Stello in the NRC structure, an investigation should be quick, ComDiete, and t*c"cuch.

irc 'ro. the report, no one from TVA was interviewed regarding any aspect c' irvestigation. During my Committee deposition, in response to Mr. Ryar's i c r. , I acknowledged, that I would have placed Mr. White under cath and a

taken a deposition concerning that teleDhene call. I agreed that a fair c"aracterization of this matter was that a very senior M: c"icial was in c:r-ta:t with the licensee in a way that creates the impressicn that the o"icia' tipped the licensee as to how they should answer a Dar*icular inquiry that was als; the subject of an 01 investigation.

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T:4ESTS BY STELLO in the latter part of 1985 -- late November or early December -- I' met witn Chairman Palladino' to give him an update on ongoing investigations involvir; 1 TVA.

Responding to the Chairman's questions, I offered my impression that the Commission's handling of the TVA matter appeared to be disorganizeds and that ,

NRC had not in fact set forth a comprehensive program to identify the. problems at TVA, much less a program geared toward resolving these issues.

Consequently, I recommended that the Commission appoint a senior executive to take the responsibility over the TVA project and provide that executive w"th the '

1 necessary resources. Later that day, I provided a similar briefing to then Commissioner, now Chairman, Zech. I subsequently drove to a management meeting at the NRC Region ! Office at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. The next morning

. the managerrent meeting commenced under the leadership of then E00 Mr. William Dircks. That morning, Mr.Stello c6me up to me, and standing face to face and shaking his fist in my face said, " Ben if what you said comes to pass, I'm going to get you." At first I thought Mr.Stello was kidding, and I responded in a jovial tone, "What are you doing Vic, threatening me?" Mr. Stello's reply was "I don't care how long it takes, I'm going to get you " I believe Mr.Stello was dead serious.

A little later, Mr. Dircks, '.:ie EDO, met with me in a small conference roor; in the presence of Mr. Denton, Mr. Taylor, and the Region II Administrator, Mr.

ircks said, "All right, Ben, what in the hell did you tell the Commissierers 4: 3use we've got to do damage control". I informed Mr. Dircks that I provided

- Chairman and Commissioner Zech my personal views as they requested, that I

- -t to the Cha. man, and when asked for my views, I intend to give then to The threatening incident and the conversation with Mr. Dircks took place on December 5, 1985. Within thirty days, Mr. Dircks retired, ard Mr. Stelle becace the Acting EDO.

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l Subsequent to that meeting, there have been changes that affect the way in whi:h 0! operates. One of these actions was the establishment of the Investigatice Review Board (IRB). The purpose of the IRB is basically twofold, to establish naticnal priorities, and to assure that Staff investigative recuests are M

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warrarted. The IR5 has been in existence for five months. Prior to the establishment of the IRS, Regional Adtrinistrators cculd refer suspected wrongdoing matters directly to 01. This is no longer the case. A Regieral Administrator can co longer request an investigation without IRB conc"qrrence.

The practical effect of the IRB has been a dramatic downturn in the number o' wrongdoing matters referred to 01 for investigation. There have been a total of 8 requests for investigation in a five month period since the board h5s been in-operation. In contrast, for a comparable five month period just one year earli- -

'er, O! received 42 referrals for investigation. For example, as of the date of my deposition, one of the five NRC Regional offices, Region I, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, had not submitted a single request for investigation since the initiation of the IRB.

I agree with Comissioner Asselstine's statement that the IRB appears to be a

"... thinly veiled attempt by the E00 to control 01 by controlling what referrals are made, and thus what O! investigates." After Mr. Stello expressed the view that cases were being referred to 0! that should not have been, I wrote the E00 and asked for a list of such cases. Mr. Stello's response was a memorandum that basically stated that he didn't have the resources to answer that question. I failed to see what the problem was that the staff was attempting to resolve.

Another change was SECY 85-369 which placed major limitations upon the NRC staff in its referral of matters to 01. That document establishes priorities for c: . ducting investigations, defines wrongdoing, and provides a threshold for tta" requests for investigations. I believe the effect of that threshold has

en to direct the staff to make their own internal evaluation in a way usurping ultimate goal of an 01 investigation, i.e., the determination of whether the er is or is not willful. The staff's interpretation of this threshold ap-

+3 s to be that they are required to gather evidence indicating willfulness rather than merely reporting wrongdoing. This appears to have " chilled" sur#aC-ing cf wrongdoing items to 01. It is the role of the investigator to deterrine whether or not a particular act was done willfully.

Other limitations exist on the authority of OI to initiate investigations re-garding the character and competence of licensees. To begin an investigatice sclely relating to those issues 01 is required to make a recommendation to t"e  !

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Cor 'ssion as to whether the investigation is warranted, and then be guided by a majc-ity vote of the Comission as to whether or not to oper the case.

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1 There is one instance where the Comission declined to authorize an inves-tigatien of this nature that involved senior officials at the Wolf Creek Gen-erat eg Station operated by kansas Gas & Electric. On Dec. 24, 1984., I wrote d 1 the Comrission and outlined certain character issues pertaining to two senior Kansas Gas & Electric managers. Among the allegations described in that memcran-dum were senior officials of the licensee ordering licensee employees to break into -he car of a licensee employee in order to remove files; sexual harass-ment; and " blackballing" by the person responsible for the quality assurance prog-s at Wolf Creek. The latter involved an allegation that the official preve ted a former employee who had raised safety concerns from getting a job else. ere in the industry. The Comission subsequently voted 4 to 1 not to

. auth:-ize the investigation. (Commissioner Asselstine desired an inves-tiga::n.)

There were other instances of attempts to curtail 0! authority, especially O!'s auth: 'ty to self initiate investigations. A recent example of this was t*e Febr 1 y 13,1987 memorandum from Comissioner Roberts to the balance of the Comr'stion which criticizes certain in.(s igations initiated by OI. Commissioner

. Pobe-:5' memorandum recomends to the Cmissicn, that in the event that I did ct : : vide a satisfactory explanation, the Commission should, "... seriously c~s :t whether organization 61 and managemer,t changes are necessary to assure

• r *: functions as we intend it to function, and that its activities are ace-2' supervised and controlled."

- y understanding, based on his memorandum, tnat Commissioner Roberts be-

't.e that 0! no longer ins the right to self-initiate investigations on w-. ; :ing matters identified or reported by NRC empicyees. As noted in ov Mar: ::, 1987, response to Commissioner Roberts' memorandum, a rescense that we V e;a t: at the direction of the Comission, I feel OI must retain the abity t',

se' -initiate investigations regardless of the origin o# the allegation.

C:f occasion, Commissioner Roberts' legal assistant criticized 0:'s sei' ir ; 1:f on of a recent hospital case, and stated during a telephone conversa;d0n w' ? 4. "Quite frankly, Ben, you may have comitted a material false state ~e .t

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before the Com-ission". (I'of Course did not.) I took the comment seriously, especially when I subsequently learned the legal assistant voiced the same con-cern to a member of the NRC Office of the General Counsel. Nonethel,ess, I be-lieve that 01 did the right thing, especially in the particular case in contre-l versy which was a blatant example of not allowing my office to conduct a thorough, aggressive investigation into some identified false documents.

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That was not the first time Commissioner Roberts' assistant has suggested to O!

staff members that their jobs may be in jeopardy. In one such incident, the he told Roger Fortuna, the Deputy Director of 01, that 01's management could be replaced if "we or I" ever were to find 01 not abiding by the "will" of the

-Commission.

One way of controlling OI would be to remove its independent status as a Commis-sion-level office and make it instead report to the EDO. There have been sever-

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al Comission initiatives to move 01 under the EDO. One such effort resulted in a two to two tie with one Comissioner, then Chairman Palladino, abstaining. The effect of such a move would be to remove 01's ability to go directly to the Comrissioners; rather, 01 would have to go through the EDO. A strong letter from the Department of Justice opposed any movement of OI under Staff.

The proposed movement of OI under the EDO was of great concern to my staff and I because we do not feel that we could exercise the independence, the thorough-ress, and completeness that we feel a professional Federal investigator must have to do a competent job were we to become a Staff office. If the Commission

's gcing to have an investigative arm, I believe that investigations of

. t ;deing matters must be supervised directly by the Corrission rather then the Staff.

cases involving potential violations of 18 USC 1001 have to be given to the Cor.-ission for consultation before being released to the Departrent of Jus

• ice.

Foreover, all referrals to the Department of Justice recuire consultation wi?

the NRC Office of the General Counsel. In response to Mr. Ryan's questier., I agreed that in disclosing these investigative results within the agency to the Cc~ issioners and their staff and Office of the General Counsel, the"e would be a Ocssibility that this information could get back to the licensee, especially in light of the situations where such tips have been made by NRC in the past.

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1 would like to erphasize, however, that although tM s is, of course, a pes.

sibility, I do not have any indication that it in 'act has ever occurred on a referred matter.

The Comnission has the right to tell 01 not to refer cases to the Department of Justice. The O! investigation related to the D.C. Cook Oclear Plant, was referred to the Department of Justice. That investigatioe focused on willful material false statements made to NRC by the licensee rect-ding compliance with NRC fire protection guidelines. At the conclusion of that 'nvestigation, I ex. ,1 ercised the authority I then had to refer matters. directly :o the Department of Justice. I no longer have that authority.

The completed report of investigation was provided the NRC Staff. The Staff de-  !

clined to make a-decision whether the false statement was ='llful. They took it to the Comission. In one of the meetings subsequently he': regarding the D.C.

l Cook matter, the Commission voted 3 to 2 that it was a mate-ial false statement, but then voted 3 to 2 that the statement was not willful. : recall that during that meeting, there was a discussion on the record as to :t-haps "unreferring" the matter from the Department of Justice. Apparently the :s:artment of Justice disagreed with the Commission as they sought and obtainec :-iminal indictments of the utility officials and the utility itself regardin; 19e material false statenents issues. These indictments were recently disr !!ed on statute of limitations grounds.

It w3s subsequent te that investigation and the controvert; surrounding the DC Sok referral that 01 was required to send any 0: reocris at we wished to

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: tne Department of Justice to the Office of tee Ge t al Counsel, and if inselved material false statement issues, to the Corr *sion as well, prior

< ;;h re'errals.

The Cc--ission has specifically directed 01 not to cceduct : cerfect crinira' investigations. Nonetheless, I believe criminal prosecut': of those licensees who chose to deliberately violate Comission rules ard reg.'Etions would have a deterrent effect on the conduct of other licensees. Notv- itanding these re-straints, hoaever, the Comnission has authorized te: nica' 3-d investigative support at the request of the Department of Justice :nce : s natter has been .

referred.

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