ML20202G381
| ML20202G381 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 04/10/1986 |
| From: | Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20202G360 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-85-010, EA-85-10, NUDOCS 8604140337 | |
| Download: ML20202G381 (25) | |
Text
o UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of:
LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Docket No. 50-382 (Waterford, Unit 3)
License No.
NPF-38 EA 85-10 ORDER IMPOSING CIVIL MONETARY PENALTIES I
Louisiana Power & Light Company (the licensee) is the holder of Operating License NPF-38 (the license) issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or NRC) on March 16, 1985. The license authorizes the licensee to operate the Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 in accordance with the conditions specified therein.
II NRC safety inspections of the licensee's activities under Construction Permit CPPR-103 were c,onducted from June 1983 - September 1985.
During these inspections, the NRC staff determined that the licensee had not conducted its activities in full compliance with NRC requirements. A written Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties (N0V) was served upon the licensee by letter dated May 24, 1985. The NOV stated the nature of the violations, the provisions of the NRC's requirements that the licensee had violated, and the amount of the civil penalties proposed for the violations.
The licensee responded to the NOV on July 19, 1985. Upon consideration of the licensee's response, and the statements i
of fact, explanations, and arguments for remission or mitigation of the proposed civil penalties contained therein, as set forth in the Appendix to this Order, the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, has determined that civil penalties in the amount of One Hundred Ten Thousand Dollars ($110,000) should be imposed.
H604140337 860410 PDR ADOCK 05000382 l
G PDR l
.. IV In view of the foregoing and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2282, PL 96-295, and 10 CFR 2.205, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
The licensee pay civil penalties in the amount of $110,000 within thirty days of the date of this Order by check, draft, or money order payable to the Treasurer of the United States and mailed to the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement,'USNRC, Washington, D.C. 20555.
V The licensee may, within thirty days of the date of this Order, request a hearing. A req'uest for a hearing shall be addressed to the Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement at the above address. A copy of the hearing request shall also be sent to the Executive Legal Director, Office of the Executive Legal Director, USNRC, Washington, D.C. 20555.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will issue an Order designating the time and place of hearing. Upon failure of the licensee to request a hearing within thirty days of the date of this Order, the provisions of this Order shall be effective without further proceedings.
If payment has not been made by that time, the matter may be referred to the Attorney General for collection.
In the event the licensee requests a hearing as provided above, the issues to be considered at such hearing shall be:
'O l (a) whether the licensee violated NRC requirements as set forth in the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties, as amended by the enclosed Appendix, and (b) whether on the basis of such violations this Order should be sustained.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COP 9t!SSION
)
s mes M. Tay rector ffice of Inspection and Enforcement Dated at Bethesda, Maryland the /d' day of April 1986 s
I
7 APPENDIX On May 24, 1985 t Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties (NOV) was issued to Louisiana Power and Light Company (LP&L) for violations of NRC requirements identified during several special and routine NRC inspections.
LP&L's response to the NOV was provided in a letter dated July 19, 1985.
The response provides the reasons why the licensee believes several proposed violations are not violations and why mitigation of some of the proposed civil penalties is appropriate. LP&L also provides additional information unavailable at the time of the NRC inspection and clarifies existing infomation reprding the disputed violations. The contested violations are restated below foilowed by a description of the licensee's response, and the NPC's evaluation and conclusions. Violations that are admitted and where mitigation is requested are not restated. However, a description of the licensee's response and the NRC's evaluation and conclusions are provided as appropriate.
Violation I.D - Failure To Take Adequate Corrective Action (Licensee admits Violations I.A I.B. I.C, I.E, I.F., and I.G)
Criterion XVI of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B requires that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such ai failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected.
In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken 4to preclude repetition.
Louisiana Power and Light (LP&L) Quality Assurance (QA) Manual Section QR 16.0, Revision 2, " Corrective Action," paragraph 16.3, requires, in part, that LP&L and its major contractors implement procedures for correction of significant conditions adverse to quality which include determining the cause(s) of the significant adverse conditions, taking prompt corrective action to prevent repetition of the adverse conditions, and documenting and reporting tne adverse conditions along with their determined cause(s) and corrective actions to appropriate levels of management for review and assessment.
Contrary to the above:
LP&L failed to take adequate actions to correct two Significant Construction Deficiencies (SCD) 73 and 78 which they issued on April 11, 1983, and April 28, 1983, respectively, to address welding deficiencies by American Bridge in the Reactor Containment Building and the Reactor Auxiliary Building. A comprehensive reinspection program was initiated by LP&L and rework has been completed. A subsequent inspection by the NRC of approximately 380 welds fabricated by Peden Steel Company, which was an American Bridge subcontractor, revealed several welds which did not meet the specified acceptance criteria.
Reference (Ref): Construction Appraisal Team (CAT) [NRC Inspection Report 50-382/84-07],Section VIII.B.4.
Summary of the Licensee's Response LP&L admits the violation as stated with the follt, wing exceptions. LP&L denies that corrective actions for 5C0-73 were incomplete in that SCD-13 was retracted
Appendix by LP&L and became a subset of SCO-78. Thus, actions were completed for SCO-73 under the scope of 5C0-78. Additionally, since Peden Steel was not a subcontractor for American Bridge, the scope of both SCDs did not include Peden Steel activities.
LP&L does admit, however, that corrective actions were incomplete for S00-78.
The NRC identified that the scope of 5C0-78 did not, but should have, included the American Bridge work on the missile framing for both steam generators.
NRC Evaluation of Licensee's Response The NRC staff reviewed SCD-73, dated April 11, 1983, and SCO-78, dated April 28, 1983, and verified that 500-73 had been incorporated into SCD-78.
In addition, the NRC staff's review verified that Peden Steel was not a subcontractor for American Bridge and, therefore, was not within the scope of SCO-73 or 5C0-78. However, the failure of the licensee to include work performed by American Bridge on the 1
steam generator missile framing as part of the total reinspection effort identified in the scope of SCO-78 sufficiently illustrates an example of a significant weakness that existed in LP&L's implementation of its quality assurance program with regard to its corrective action program.
Conclusion The subject violation has been amended to read as follows:
A LP&L failed to take adequate actions to correct Significant Construction Deficiency 78, issued on April 28, 1983 that addressed welding deficiencies by American Bridge in the Reactor Containment Building and the Reactor Auxiliary Building. A comprehensive reinspection program was initiated by LP&L and rework has been completed. However, work performed by American Bridge on the steam generator missile framing was not included in the scope of Significant Construction Deficiency 78.
The NRC staff views this as a single example of the licensee's failure to take adequate corrective action to identified problems. Therefore, as actions taken to resolve deficiencies identified by Significant Construction Deficiency 73 were apparently appropriate, the civil penalties associated with Violation I.D. are being mitigated 50%, a reduction of civil penalties in the amount of Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500).
Violation II - Failure to Ensure Qualification of QA Personnel Sumary of Licensee Response LP&L admits the violation as stated in the NOV. However, the licensee requests mitigation of the civil penalties proposed for this violation in that, because of the potential severity of this violation, it initiated and completed prompt, intensive, and exhaustive corrective action. Specifically, a verification program was implemented to review the professional credentials of 100 percent of the Quality Assurance / Quality Control (QA/QC) personnel ever employed during the construction phase of Waterford 3 who performed safety-related activities.
In addition, the NUS Corporation provided an independent overview of the program.
The licensee's conclusions, as communicated in the " Collective Significance" document as part of its response to the Prelicensing Assessment, indicated that with the exception of Mercury Company, the disposition of most deficiencies identified in Prelicensing Assessment Nos. 1 and 10 did n]t require any reinspection.
For Issue No. 20, an engineering evaluation of the work perforr:ed
Appendix by the Construction Management Team (CMT) personnel established that questions about personnel qualifications did not render the work indeterminate. Also, many other methods (e.g., Authorized Nuclear Inspector, Nondestructive Examination, prerequisite preoperations/ integrated testing, overinspections, etc.) provide assurance that quality has been built into the plant.
Since no significant hardware changes were required, positive evidence as to the adequacy of the overall Construction QA program was provided.
NRC Evaluation of the Licensee's Response The QA program is required to provide control over activities affecting the quality of identified structures, systems, and components to an extent con-sistent with their importance. One aspect of this QA program is the need for verification of quality by inspection and tests. To ensure the validity of this verification of quality, the personnel performing activities affecting quality must possess sufficient education and experience, and be suitably trained, to achieve and maintain proficiency in performing their activities.
When a breakdown in the quality verification program occurs, extensive corrective actions are necessary to reestablish confidence in the structures, systems, and components important to safety. LP&L accomplished this by implementing a verification program for the review of the professional credentials of 100 percent of the QA/QC personnel ever employed at Waterford 3 who performed safety-related work, performing engineering evaluations of work performed by individuals that may not have been qualified, and using other methods (e.g., ANI, NDE, prerequisite preoperations/ integrated testing, over-inspections, etc.) which provided assurance that quality had been built into the plant.
The NRC staff acknowledges that LP&L has taken corrective actions. However, these actions were not unusually prompt nor extensive in view of the severity of the problem, and were necessary to verify the quality of the plant after the construction of the facility was essentially completed. The intent of the QA program is to provide control over activities while they are in progress. These violations provide multiple examples where LP&L's QA program did not ensure qualification of QA personnel performing safety-related inspection activities while construction activities were in progress.
Therefore, mitigation of the civil penalties for prompt and extensive corrective actions is not appropriate.
Conclusion The NRC staff believes that imposing the proposed civil penalty amount assoc-iated with Violation II is warranted. Mitigation based on prompt and extensive corrective action for this violation is not appropriate in this case.
Further-more, the civil penalties emphasize the need for LP&L to ensure that QA/QC personnel satisfy the appropriate qualification requirements during the operations phase so that an effective operations QA program can be better implemented.
Appendix Violation III - Failure to Adequately Disposition Conditions Adverse to Quality (Only the pertinent portions of the violation that are denied are restated below.)
Criterion XVI of'10 CFR 50, Appendix B requires that measures to be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected.
In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition.
LP&L QA Manual Section QR 16.0, " Corrective Action," paragraph 16.2, requires in part that the major contractors and their suppliers establish written pro-cedures for identifying, for determining the cause of, for evaluating, and for correcting conditions adverse to quality, such as failures malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment and nonconformances.
A.
Ebasco Procedure ASP-III-7, Issue K, " Processing of Nonconformances,"
paragraph 4.3, defines a nonconformance as a condition in characteristics, documentation, or procedure which renders the quality of the item or service unacceptable or indeterminate. Attachment 7.1, Item 15, requires that the recommended disposition provide specific resolution to correct the nonconforming condition, provide specific resolution to correct the nonconforming condition, including program changes necessary, i.e.,
revision to specifications, procedures, retraining of personnel, etc.
In addition, Item 20 requires that a separate individual evaluate the disposition to ensure that the recommended disposition provides justification as applicable to support and document compliance with applicable codes and standards or makes reference to the appropriate analysis reports.
Contrary t'o the above, the disposition for the following examples of Ebasco NCRs was not adequate to resolve the identified nonconformance.
(30 examples were provided for this violatien. The examples are restated as necessary in the Sunnary of the Licensee's Response below.)
8.
Mercury Procedure SP-669, " Procedure for Handling of Nonconformances and Corrective Action," paragraph 4.2, defines a disposition as, "Those actions required to resolve a nonconformance."
Contrary to the above, the recommended disposition for the following examples of Mercury NCRs was not adequate to resolve the identified nonconformance...
(15 examples were provided for this violation.
Examples are restated as necessary in the Summary of the Licensee's Response below.)
C.
Ebasco Procedure ASP-IV-70, " Handling of Engineering Discrepancy Notices,"
in paragraph 4.1 defines a discrepancy as "A deviation from the specified requirements (including procedures) that can be readily corrected in accordance with standard approved operating procedures or specifications based on good engineering practices.
Discrepancies do not require an elaborate engineering evaluation or disposition for correction.
They are deviations from good engineering practice and procedures."
j
Appendix Contrary to the above, LP&L and its contractor Ebasco demonstrated a pattern.of dispositioning Engineering Discrepancy Notices (EDNs) " accept as is" or "use as is" when Ebasco Procedure ASP-IV-70, " Handling of Engineering Discrepancy Notices," did not allow this disposition. The correct disposition of an EDN is to bring the subject item into conformance or generate a nonconformance for disposition.
Examples of EDNs dispositioned " accept as is" are:
1.
EON-EC-1648 Arc strikes and undercut 2.
EDN-C-1618 Procedural violations on rework of emergency diesel generator component.
3.
EDN-EC-1476 MT or PT on the weld root pass was bypassed.
Ref: SSER-7, A-302.
Summary of the Licensee's Response The licensee denies ten of the thirty examples in Violation III.A., denies three of the nine examples in Violation III.B. and denies Violation III.C in its entirety. The licensee did not address six of the examples in Violation III.A and these are presumed to be admitted.
LP&L also requests mitigation of the civil penalties proposed for Violations III.A and III.B. A description of each of the licensee's arguments for the contested violations follows:
III.A. Citation: NCR-7139 - Involved field inspections of horizontal seismic supports for radiation monitors RE-HV 50215, and RE-HV 0200.6S. Only the data for the RE-HV 50215 support was the correct attachment.
Response: The licensee denies the violation stating that the disposition was properly implemented in accordance with the Nonconformance Report j
(NCR). Only a minor revision was necessary to substitute the documentation for support 38E089 with the documentation for 35E088. The disposition was t
unaffected by this revision.
(Note: Correct support designation should be RE-UV-50315 not RE-UV-50215)
Citation: NCR-6159 - Inspection of tubetrack welding identified that prior to July 1982, an unknown quantity of welding was performed using WPS "B" procedure without backing plates. Traceability problems were not identified and addressed by the NCR-6159.
In addition, the sample used for tensile testing the welds should have been representative of the weakest weld joint in lieu of the strongest (i.e., worst case example should have been used to conduct tests).
I Response: The licensee denies this violation. The licensee, while it maintains that traceability was not in fact a subject or a concern of this l
NCR, indicates that tubetrack materials were purchased, received and maintained by Ebasco's QA program. Also, the tensile test specimen to which the violation refers was designed to obtain tensile strength of the weld joint so that, when converted to stress, the strength could be j
translated in subsequent calculations utilizing geometries of the real joints and the manner of load application.
Appendix Citation: NCR-7547 - Noted discrepancies against OCR-1830 and Mercury ER~-UBUE. The disposition was based on passing hydrostatic test for acceptability of fitup discrepancy between the union and tubing. The disposition does not account for the effects of service conditions such as vibration and cyclic loads; and an engineering evaluation was not performed.
Response: LP&L denies the violation in that the disposition was based on field inspection and rework of connections, not on satisfying hydrostatic test criteria for acceptability. The connections were also radiographed to further ensure fit-up was acceptable. Ebasco Specification LOU 1564-100 requires minimum engagement of 1/4" where as actual was 5/16".
Therefore, fit-ups of the connections were acceptable.
Citation: NCR-1650 - Identified that the pressure gauge on the anchor bolt tension tester was out of tolerance, reading +450 psi higher than actN1. The NCR disposition was to retest all anchor bolts installed prior to the date the tension test gauge was determined to be out of calibration.
However, the affected bolts cannot be identified since the torquing procedure, QCP-309, did not require the recording of the tester serial number.
Response: LP&L denies the violation. LP&L argues that the disposition to the NCR does not require identification of the specific anchor
)olts tested, only that an anchor bolt be retested for each representative group.
However, LP&L indicates that as a result the NRC staff's disposition concern, corrective action had not been implemented on all representative groups of anchor bolt.
Citation: NCR-6165 - States "... welder R-1 is not qualified to this procedurb..." The disposition states, "... Measures taken to preclude recurrence is required..." No indications of the actions taken could be located.
Response: LP&L denies the violation. The disposition as originally written referenced welder R-1 instead of welder R-7.
Welder R-7 was qualified to the welding procedure, so a nonconforming condition never existed. LP&L maintains that the disposition as originally written on the face of the NCR was adequate to resolve the identified nonconformance.
Citation: NCR-7182, NCR-7180, NCR-7181, NCR-7184, NCR-6723 - These NCRs also involve a violation of ANSI N45.2, Section 13 requirements in that QCP 309 did not require the tension testing equipment's serial number, calibration date, and pressure gauge number to be recorded.
Response: - LP&L denies that the NCRs involve a violation of ANSI N45.2, Section 13 in that Quality Control Procedure (QCP) 309 did not require the tension testing equipments serial number, calibration date and pressure gauge number to be recorded.
LP&L admits that QCP 309 did not require recording of the above information; however, its program provides all controls necessary to meet ANSI h45.2, Section 13. Therefore, the dispositions were in fact adequate to resolve all nonconformances that were identified.
.=.
Appendix 7 Citation: NCR 6514 - The problem of traceability for the weld being performed was still in question; not addressed. The NCR also questioned use of some Bergen-Patterson designed supports installed by Mercury without traceability. This problem was also not addressed by referenced attachment.
Response: LP&L denies the violation. Traceability of welds was not a subject of this NCR as written. Rather, the use of Bergen-Patterson designed supports installed by Mercury Company without traceability was questioned. The disposition accepted the supports as installed as no unqualified steel was used by Mercury Company to fabricate safety-related supports; the affected supports were not required to be fabricated in accordance with ASME Section III, subsection NF requirements; and structural members supplied originally by Bergen patterson were not stamped with heat numbers and is the probable cause of Mercury's documentation not noting heat numbers. LP&L maintains this NCR was therefore dispositioned properly.
Citation: NCR-4219 (Mercury-614) - Identified a violation of WCP 3110.4, paragraph 6.
The sample system piping had been bent downward causing a low point in the piping. The piping was being forced down by support SLRR-188.
QCP-3110.4 stated that " tubing must be properly routed." This disposition stated that "... tubing was reevaluated after support SLRR-188 and sample line were installed, after completion of Penetration 29 work."
There were no records for rework or reinspection to indicate satisfactory reinstallation of supports and sample lines.
Ref: SSER-7, A-33 (applicable to all above NCRs).
Response: LP&L denies the violation. This disposition was signed by the instrumentation and control engineer who, once Penetration #29 was reworked.
1 as documinted on Mercury Company NCR 684, evaluated the affected piping and verified that it met the installation criteria. Therefore, LP&L maintains this NCR was dispositioned properly.
Citation: NCR-7724 - Addressed problems with the qualification of Mercury welders.
Ebasco's disposition of this NCR failed to determine if (1) welder M-109 had performed welds to WPS-Y for which he was not qualified; (2) welder M-101 had performed welds to WPS-Y for which he was not qualified; (3) welder M-85 had performed welds to WPS-D after his qualificai. ions record had been voided.
Ref: SSER-7, A-215.
Response: LP&L denies the violation in that the welders referenced in the NCR were appropriately qualified to the appropriate procedures, but due to documentation errors, their qualification appeared questionable. The licensee maintains that the disposition to the NCR resolves these discrepancies and was adequate to resolve the nonconformance. However, based on the above dispositions, a Welder Qualification records review was performed to assure that discrepancies did not exist regarding welding procedure accuracy. The review identified no additional deficiencies and concluded that the Welder Qualification Records were accurate.
)
Appendix Citation: NCR-6719/R1 - Identified problems with Mercury hydrostatic test conditions. The Ebasco disposition of the NCR was based on analyzing the
" worse case" hydrostatic test conditions; however, only one test was reviewed by Ebasco.
Response: LP&L denies the violation. The licensee maintains that three tests were in fact analyzed by Ebasco. Later, a worst case hydrostatic test configuration was identified. The licensee notes that Ebasco did not
" assume" a worst case but actually detennined a worst case hydrostatic test. Several hydrostatic test configurations had to be evaluated before the worst case could be determined.
Ref: SSER-7, A-49.
III.B Citation: NCR-363 - Indicated a problem with fitup of emergency diesel generator fuel oil tank "A".
This was a safety-related system; therefore, an authorized nuclear inspector (ANI) review should have been performed, but was not.
Response: LP&L denies the violation in that the ASME process pipe connected to the emergency diesel generator fuel oil tank "A" as described in the NCR is an ASME Class 3 installation and does not require ANI review.
Citation: NCR-554 - Noted numerous problems with supports during a walkdown. There was no proof of work being performed to correct these problems other than a memo (Form 211) stating that work was performed.
Response: LP&L denies the violation in that Form 211 attached to the NCR is a standard Mercury Quality Control Report on which the QC Inspector documented his inspection of acceptable resolution to each identified concern.' Additionally, Form 211 references Mercury Company Work Package
- 1723 which was found to contain documentation of all rework activities required by the NCR.
Citation: NCR-658 - Identified problems with OCR 1671 seismic Category I support, B-430-x23-J-42. The NCR stated "the disposition has been completed, all rework documented." There was no other documentation in the package other than the NCR W3-7317 acceptance letter.
Response: LP&L denies the violation in that Mercury Company Nonconformance Procedure SP-664 does not specifically require supporting documentation to be attached to an NCR if it is cross-referenced to the NCR. Although documentation was not in the package, the NCR and rework documentation were cross-referenced for retrievability and verification that corrective action was completed.
Ref: SSER-7, A-232 (applicable to NCRs included in Violation III.8).
III.C The licensee denies this violation in its entirety. The licensee argues that procedures were followed, dispositions were made, and corrective actions were taken. LP&L maintains that procedure ASP-IV-70, " Handling of Engineering Discrepancy Notices" (EDNs), states, in Sections 6.3.2.4 and Sections 6.3.2.5, respectively:
i i
1 1
Appendix "The Engineering Inspector may either provide the recomended disposition himself or forward the EON to the appropriate discipline Resident Engineer for reconnended disposition. Once the recommended disposition has been completed, the EDN shall be forwarded to the appropriate discipline Senior Resident Engineer, or his designee, for disposition."
"After the Senior Resident Engineer, or his designee, has provided the disposition, he shall indicate to whom the EON is to be referred for corrective action, or whether an ESSE evaluation is required.
(An ESSE evaluation is required whenever the disposition recomends or accepts a deviation from approved design criteria.)"
The licensee further argues that the violation documents the supposition that correct EDN dispositions require conformance or generation of an NCR for disposition. The procedure did not prohibit any specific disposition, but did require controls for appropriate dispositioning and concurrence.
NRC Evaluation of the Licensee's Response The NRC staff notes that Violations III.A and III.B included 39 examples of problems identified in LP&L's program of dispositioning conditions adverse to quality, 13 of which were disputed by the licensee. (The NRC staff also notes that no response was received from the licenses for six of the examples in Violation III.A). The NRC staff reviewed the NCRs where LP&L denied that a violation in fact existed and, using the additional information and clarified dispositions provided by the licensee, determined that those NCRs had been properly dispositioned (NCRs 7139, 6159, 7547, 1650, 6165, 7182, 7180, 7181, 7184, 6723, 6514, 4219, 7724, 6719/R1, 363, 554, and 658). However, at least three of these 13 examples required additional comprehensive reviews because of inaccurate information provided in the NCRs (NCRs 6514, 7724, and 6165).
In addition, the licensee acknowledged that even though deficiencies were processed in accordance with site procedures, the procedures did not provide adequate specific guidelines, which led to the excessive need for judgments and interpretation. As a result, the LP&L Operations QA Audit (SA-W3-QA-84-06, performed January 24-30,1984), and the continued screening review of 100 percent of Ebasco and subcontractor NCRs to varying degrees, throughout 1984, was necessary to determine the extent of this problem.
Therefore, the NRC staff believes that the remaining examples are sufficient to establish that the violations were themselves significant enough to warrant civil penalties.
In addition, since extensive reviews were required to assess the adequacy of the licensee's nonconformance reporting program, the NRC staff believes that mitigation of the civil penalties based on extensive corrective actions would not be appropriate.
With regard to Violation III.C. the NRC staff's concern involved the use of EDNs rather than NCRs, not whether the processing of EONS was procedurally controlled. As the violation as proposed stated, "... paragraph 4.1 defines a discrepancy as deviation from the specified requirements (including procedures) that can be readily corrected (emphasis added) in accordance with standard approved operating procedures or specifications based on good engineering practices..." The NRC staff evaluation of the three EDNs cited in the violation
Appendix indicated that the conditions documented may have represented a greater problem than that of a discrepancy as defined by ASP-IV-70, paragraph 4.1.
Furthermore, the NRC staff believes that a more elaborate evaluation of these problems may have been appropriate. However, upon further review, the NRC staff also agrees that the procedure did not prohibit any specific disposition, such as "use-as-is," as the licensee successfully argued. Therefore, Violation III.C is being withdrawn.
Conclusion Violations III.A and III.B should be amended to delete the examples of the violations LP&L denied in its response.
The NRC staff views the remaining examples sufficient to establish the licensee's significant failure to adequately disposition conditions adverse to quality. However, since some of the examples are being withdrawn, a reduction of the proposed civil penalties associated with Violations III.A and III.B in the amount of Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
($2,500)iswarranted. Violation III.C is also being withdrawn, reducing the proposed civil penalties' amount by another Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000).
Violation IV - Failure to Establish QA Program for Application of Nuclear Protective Coatings Sumary of the Licensee's Response The licensee admits the violation occurred as stated in the NOV. However, LP&L believes that this violation warrants mitigation due to the following extenuating circumstances.
Corrective actions, as defined in its response, were extensive.
Deficiencies associated with this violation were reported to the NRC as a Significant Construction Deficiency in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e) and all corrective actions have been completed.
NRC Evaluation'of the Licensee's Response The NRC staff acknowledges that the licensee took corrective action in evaluating and repairing the protective coatings for the interior of the containment vessel.
However, these repairs and evaluations were necessary to ensure the integrity of the protective coatings and to determine the effect failed coatings material may have on safety systems during a design basis accident.
In addition, the NRC staff acknowledges the submittal of the required report and the completion of all corrective actions.
However, the NRC staff views the failure of LP&L to implement a QA program for application of nuclear protective coatings as significant weakness that existed in LP&L's QA program during construction. The corrective actions taken were necessary because of this weakness and, therefore, are considered neither prompt nor extensive. Thus, the NRC staff does not believe that migitation of the civil penalties proposed for Violation IV is warranted. The NRC staff is imposing the full civil penalty amount associated with this violation to emphasize to the licensee the importance for it to ensure similar weaknesses are not carried over into the operational QA program.
Conclusion The request for mitigation of the civil penalty associated with this violation has been denied.
9 Appendix Violation V - Failure To Maintain Quality Assurance Records (Only the pertinent portions of the violation that are denied are restated below.)
Criterion XVII of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, requires that sufficient records be maintained to furnish evidence of activities affecting quality. The records shall include at least the following: operating logs and the results of reviews, inspections, tests, audits, monitoring of work performance and material analyses. The records shall also include closely related data such as qualifications of personnel, procedures, and equipment.
Inspection and test records shall as a minimen, identify the inspector or data records, the type of observation, the resultr, the acceptability, and the action taken in connection with any deficiencies roted. Records shall be identifiable and retrievable.
Consistent with applicable regulatory requirements, the applicant shall establish requirement 3 concerning record retention, such as duration, location, and assigned responsibility.
LP&L QA Manual Section QR-2.0, " Quality Assurance Program," Table 2.1, states that LP&L is comitted to guidance document ANSI N45.2.9, " Requirements for Collection, Storage, and Maintenance of Quality Assurance Records for Nuclear Plants," draft 11, Revision 0, January 1,1973. This ANSI standard requires that the licensee retain QA records in accordance with the retention periods listed in Appendix A of this standard.
The following is a sample list of types of records with the retention periods indicated.
Years After Record Type Permanent Comercial Operation Concrete Placement Records x
Soil Compaction Test Reports x
Field Inspectio,n Report and Release x
Material Properties Reports x
Performance Test Procedures and Results Records x
Nonconformance Reports x
Welding Personnel Qualifications 2
Welding Procedures x
Welding Inspection Reports (Magnetic, Liquid Penetrant, Radiographic, Ultrasonic) x Welding Filler Metal Material Reports x
Contrary to the above, the NRC inspectors noted that the following QA documents had not been maintained as required by ANSI N45.2.9...
(Ten examples were provided for this violation. The examples are restated as necessary in the Sumary of the Licensee's Response below.)
Sumary of the Licensee's Response LP&L denies three of the ten examples cited in Violation V.
LP&L further requests mitigation of the proposed civil penalties for the seven examples admitted.
Specifically, the licensee admits Examples A and B of Violation V recognizing that accountability measures for Ebasco and Mercury NCRs could have been enhanced early in the construction phase. Mitigation of civil penalties is requested on the basis that these two violations had no impact on actual hardware installations
Appendix and that closed or voided Ebasco and Mercury NCRs were accounted for. LP&L also admits Example D, but requests mitigation of proposed civil penalties based on its extensive corrective actions for inspector qualifications and ceitification as explained in the Summary of Licensee Response for Violation II.
In addition, the licensee admits Examples E, F, G, and I of Violation V, but believes they represent isolated and minor examples of missing documentation. Documentation noted by NRC to be missing was found (Example G), or the associated hardware was determined to be adequate, based on evaluation or reconstruction of other associated documentation (Examples E, F, G, and I).
In addition, for Examples E and I, Ebasco and LP&L performed a review of 100 percent of the concrete placement packages to assure overall program adequacy.
For Example G, an extensive analysis was performed and concluded that the soil backfill was capable of resisting all impound loads including seismic effects.
(Note:
In Item E, "3 of 5" should read "5 of 5."
Concrete placement package 593-501-16 should read 499-503-16.)
Violations V.C., V.H., and V.J. are denied by LP&L, and are restated below with the response following.
V.C. Citation: C8&I did not maintain records of coating materials purchased from Carboline for applications to the inside of the containment vessel.
Ref:
SSER-7, A-256 Response: The licensee denies this violation believing that this violation is subsumed by Violation IV. Chicago Bridge and Iron's contract had no QA requirements for protective coatings applications inside the containment.
Hence no records of coating materials purchased from Carboline were maintained.
V.H. Citation:
Inspection documentation does not exist for several bolted connection) on the east and west main steam line framing (elevation +46 and above).
Ref: SSER-7, A-30 Response: LP&L denies the violation as stated.
SCD-78, dated March 29, 1983, identified deficiencies in American Bridge structural steel installations and documentation (reference NRC Violation I.D).
LP&L recognizes and agrees that corrective actions (scoping) were inadequate, but maintains that in place programs and procedures would have required proper reinspection and documentation if the SCD corrective actions had been scoped properly.
Ebasco procedures ASP-IV-128 and 129 had been developed when SCD-78 was issued. These procedures would have been used and were, in fact, used after the scoping problem was brought to its attention.
V.J. Citation: CCW system structure (cooling tower) pour package (499-804-8A1).
The top of the wall pour was identified as not being covered with water for one day during that airing period.
Discrepancy Notice (ON) L308 specified that the normal curing period be extended two extra days. Curing information for the final day was not in the package.
Ref:
CAT,Section V.B.1
Appendix Response: LP&L denies the violation as stated in the NOV in that Discrepancy Notice DN-C-308 was dispositioned in error on October 20, 1976 to extend l
the curing time for the concrete placement to four days (from October 20-23,1976). The licensee subsequently issued NCR W3-236. This NCR became the higher tier and controlling document. Since the NCR (W3-236)
I did not require any additional curing days in that the disposition was
{
" accept-as-is", no additional reports were required to be maintained.
{
l NRC Evaluation of the Licensee's Response The NRC staff reviewed Examples C, H, and J of Violation V using the infonnation provided in the licensee's response. As a result of this review, the NRC staff is withdrawing Examples C, H and J from the NOV. With regard to Example H, whether or not procedures were developed that would have been used to require inspection and documentation is not at issue for the cited violation. The fact j
that documentation did not exist at the time of the NRC review effort is at issue, and the response provided by LP&L to the cited violation addresses this issue. With regard to Example J, the NRC staff would point out that the Discrepancy Notice is a QA record that should reflect accurate information, i
even though it is a " lower tier" document.
Furthermore, its disposition appears appropriate with regard to the concern of shrinkage cracking, a concern that is not always addressed by simply satisfying compressive strength requirements.
The NRC staff believes the seven remaining examples cited in Violation V are sufficient to establish the failure of LP&L to properly maintain QA records during the construction process.
Extensive reviews were performed by the licensee to assure program adequacy due to weaknesses that existed in the licensee's QA program during construction.
In the NRC staff's view, mitigation I
of the civil penalties associated with Violation V based on the performance of these required reviews would not be appropriate. Even though the associated hardware was determined to be adequate, it is significant that these intensive inspections and investigations were necessary. Also, these civil penalties emphasize to the licensee the importance the NRC places on the maintenance of QA records.
Conclusion Examples C, H, and J have been withdrawn from Violation V.
No mitigation of civil penalties associated with this violation is warranted.
j Violation VI - Failure to Adequately Review Quality Assurance Records Summary of the Licensee Response LP&L admits the violations as stated in the NOV. The licensee believes these violations identified were either a misinterpretation of requirements (Example A) or were isolated instances in which in-place design control requirements were not followed (Examples B and C). The licensee believes that mitigation is warranted based on prompt and extensive corrective actions.
7 I
Appendix NRC Evaluation of the Licensee's Response These examples represent deficiencies identified by the NRC in various reviews after the licens~ee's contractor had conducted its document reviews performed to verify the acceptability of the Construction-Installation Records. Two of these (Examples A and B), are considered particularly significant in that hardware changes as well as additional reviews were required to verify the acceptability of the installations. These examples are indicative of LP&L's failure to adequately review QA records.
In addition, actions taken by the licensee were not unusually extensive in view of the problems identified.
Therefore, mitigation of the civil penalties associated with this violation would not be appropriate.
Conclusion No mitigation of the civil penalties associated with Violation VI is warranted.
Violation VII - Improper Welder Certification Criterion XVI of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, requires that measures be established to assure that special processes, including welding, heat treating, and nondestructive testing, are controlled and accomplished by qualified procedures in accordance with applicable codes, standards, specifications, criteria, and other special requirements.
LP&L QA Manual Section QR 9.0, Revision 2, " Control of Special Processes,"
requires that "Special process control records shall provide objective evidence that special processes were performed in compliance with approved special process control procedures by qualified personnel. Results of nondestructive examinations, i,nspections, and tests shall be recorded in accordance with applicable codes, standards, and specifications. Special process control shall be retained by the vendor and/or supplied to LP&L as required by contract or purchase order. Qualifications records of procedures, equipment, and personnel associated with special processes shall be established, filed, and kept up-to-date."
Contrary to the above, the following examples of Mercury welder certification records indicated the welders were certified to welding procedures for which they were not qualified.
A.
Welder M Was originally qualified to WPS-B but the record had been retyped and incorrectly indicated the welder was qualified to WPS-Y. The NRC staff reviewed the welder's qualifications record, but could find no qualification to WPS-Y.
B.
Welder M-109 - The NRC staff found that the welder's WPS-Y qualifications record was dated November 26, 1982, and voided October 22, 1983; however, the welder qualification status record did not show qualification or welding performed to WPS-Y.
Appendix C.
Welder M This welder's qualification status record reflected dates different than those recorded on the welder qualificatiens record for WPS-E. This record had been revised to change the qualification test date from December 18, 1979, to December 18, 1978. However, the welder qualification status record indicated the test was performed on December 18, 1979, as originally dated.
D.
Welder M-101 - This welder was originally qualified to WPS-B but the welder's qualification test record had been revised and the qualification changed to WPS-Y. The NRC staff reviewed the welder's qualification record, but could find no qualification to WPS-Y.
Ref: SSER-7, A-215 Sumary of the Licensee Response LP&L denies the violation as stated. A review of all Mercury welders for proper qualifications was initiated in October 1983 as a result of the disposition to NCR-W3-7218. The review revealed that Mercury welders making safety and seismic welds were properly qualified with the exception of one welder. The identified exception was dispositioned using NCR-W3-7219. Since the NRC review, NCR-W3-7218 has been supplemented with an attachment that provides a clearer and more auditable documentation of the review.
NCR-W3-7724 was issued as a result of concerns regarding discrepancies in Mercury welder qualifications records noted by the NRC inspectors during the special inspections. The licensee determined that welders had welded to processes for which they were qualified with the exception of welder M-315.
This welder did perform a weld out of his qualifications; however, the weld was rejected in process by the Mercury QC inspector and redone by a qualified welder.
NRC Evaluation of the Licensee's Response Based on the licensee's response the NRC staff agrees with LP&L's contention that the violation is not valid as stated in the NOV. The licensee argues that welders were certified to welding procedures for which they were qualified.
Based on the supplementary documentation to NCR-W3-728 and a reevaluation of NCRs W3-7219 and W3-7724, the NRC staff agrees with that argument. The four examples cited in the violation indicated that documentation provided for certification of the welders was not appropriate to reflect the welder's qualifications and therefore, not properly established, filed, and kept up-to-date.
In addition, at the time of the NRC review, these records were incomplete and difficult to retrieve.
However, since welders were certified to welding procedures for which they were qualified, a reduction in the civil penalties associated with this violation is warranted.
Conclusion Violation VII is being withdrawn from the NOV. The civil penalties associated with this violation are being withdrawn in the amount of Five Thousand Dollars
($5,000).
Appendix Violation VIII - Failure to Properly Identify Conditions Adverse to Quality (Only the pertinent portion of tne violation that is denied is restated below.)
Criterion XVI of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, requires that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and NCRs are properly identified and corrected.
LP&L QA Manual Section 16.0, " Corrective Action," paragraph 16.2, requires, in part, that the major contractors and their suppliers establish written procedures for identifying, for determining the cause of, for evaluating, and for correcting conditions adverse to quality such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances.
B.
Ebasco Procedure ASP-III-7, " Corrective Action," paragraph 6.2.1, requires, in part, that an NCR be issued if the condition cannot be corrected within the scope of approved engineering drawings, specifications, or procedures, or if elaborate engineering evaluation is required, or involves items designed ASME Section III.
Paragraph 4.3 of this procedure defines a nonconformance as "a condition in characteristic, documentation, or procedure which renders the quality of an item or service unacceptable or indeterminate. Examples of nonconformances include: physical defects, test failures, incorrect or inadequate documentation, or deviation from prescribed inspection or test procedures."
Contrary to the above, the following deficiencies were identified Juring performance of Ebasco Quality Assurance Instruction QAI 9, " Review and Handling of Construction - Installation Records":
Item 1.
03-CC-1C-6
- 9.2 dated May 27, 1983, reviewed Item 1 - Torque wrench CT-339 was designated by field instructions for torquing of bolts to 90 ft/lbs. This wrench, designated for work between 0-600 ft/lbs. had not been calibrated for use in the lower range.
Resolution was "use as is" since the bolts are evenly torqued, but resolution did not address the problem with the calibration of the torque wrench. An NCR should have been issued.
Item 2.
02-SI-1C-89
- 9.2 dated March 24, 1983, reviewed Item 17 - Dravo certified material test report (CMTR) which indicated the piping material specified was 376TP304. The bill of material specified the material as 358TP304. An NCR should have been issued.
Item 3.
02-LW3-SI-10-F/E
- 9.2 reviewed Item 11 - Supplemental data was added to quality assurance records. The additions were neither initialed or dated, as required by ANSI N45.2.9, paragraph 3.2.6.
An NCR should have been issued.
Appendix Item 4.
@C-HYPO P11.E
- 9.2 reviewed Items 43, 78, and 81 - Penetration test reports were generated as a result of the work required by CIWA 820914 and FCR 1498 R1 for the installation of seal rings in penetrations. The work perfonned was not inspected or documented. An NCR should have been issued.
- Refers to Quality Assurance Instruction QAI-9, Attachment 9.2,
" Construction - Installation Records Deficiency Report."
Ref: SSER-7,A-05 Sunnary of the Licensee's Response The licensee ad. nits that Example A occurred as stated in the NOV and that an NCR should have been written; however, the licensee requests mitigation based on prompt corrective action and claims no adverse safety condition would have resulted had the deficiency gone undetected.
LP&L denies that Example B occurred based on paragraphs 7.3.3 to 7.3.5 of Ebasco Procedure QAI-9, Revision 2.
The licensee believes these procedural requirements provide adequate assurance that Ebasco Form QAI-9.2, " Construction Installation Records Deficiency Report," was reviewed for potential nonconforming conditions.
The licensee believes the items cited in Example B are not considered to have been potentially nonconforming; however, further clarification should have been provided with the 9.2 resolutions.
The licensee recognizes that Example C reflects the NRC concern identified in the Prelicensing Assessment Issue No. 4; however, mitigation of the proposed i
civil penalties is requested in that no issues revealed conditions that required physical plantshanges. No lower tier documents that were judged to warrant c
processing as an NCR described conditions which, if left uncorrected, would adversely affect plant safety, and upgrading the documents to NCRs would not have changed the dispositions or corrective actions.
Furthermore, during a review of sampled documents, no defects (a hardware deficiency which if left uncorrected would adversely affect safety) were found and on that basis there was a confidence level of 95 percent that 90 percent of the total population neither described conditions that have safety significance nor met the reportability criterion of 10 CFR 50.55(e) and 10 CFR Part 21.
(Note for Example B: Correct Q3-CC-1C-16 to Q3-CC-1C-6 for Item 1 Correct date May 5, 1983 to May 21, 1983 for Item 1 Correct Q2-ST-IC-89 to Q2-S1-1C-89 for Item 2 Correct Q2-W3-ST-10F/E to Q2-LW3-SI-10-F/E for Item 3 Correct QMC-HVP0-P11E to QIVC-HVP0-P11-E for Item 4 Correct FCR 1490 R1 to FCR 1498RI.)
NRC Evaluation of the Licensee's Response This violation addresses what the NRC staff perceived as examples of the licensee's failure to properly identify conditions adverse to quality.
Eight different items in three different areas were cited. The licensee admits four of the items, and denies the remaining four items in one area (Example B).
Appendix An effective QA program that is implemented during the construction phase looks to identify and correct problems as construction progresses. A strong corrective action program ensures conditions adverse to quality are identified, and corrected and recurrence is prevented. As a result of the NRC reviews, the NRC staff concluded that LP&L did not have a strong corrective action program in-place during construction, and extensive inspections and investiga-tions were necessary to establish the extent of nonconformances when some were identified.
For instance, one example of a violation of separation criteria was identified in Example A.
LP&L then inspected 53 additional N1 instrument lines where 13 violations out of 276 locations were identified. All violations were evaluated and found acceptable. A walkdown of 12 other N1 instrument lines was performed, and one item required rework. While these reviews resulted in few hardware changes, they were necessary to verify the quality of construction at Waterford 3 because of the number of problems identified by the NRC in the various areas. Although the licensee requests mitigation for prompt corrective action, in the NRC staff's view, mitigation of any of the civil penalties associated with Example A, or any of the examples in Violation VIII, would deemphasize the importance for the licensee to ensure it has a strong corrective action program during operation, and that nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. Such a program must be in-place during both construction and operation.
The NRC staff does not agree with LP&L that all of the items cited in Example B are not potentially nonconforming. The NRC staff does agree with LP&L for two of the items, and items 3 and 4 are being withdrawn from Example B.
- However, for items 1 and 2, from the information provided both during the NRC review and in the licensee's response, these items should have been documented on NCRs for evaluation and disposition in accordance with the appropriate requirements.
In item 1, the torquing of flange bolts to the required values specified in field instruction wit,h a torque wrench that was not calibrated or of an incorrect range renders the actual torque values indeterminate. Likewise, for item 2, a conflict between a certified material test report and a bill of material would not be recognized as a clerical error by the individual performing the record review, otherwise the problem would not have been documented. Thus, by procedure, an NCR should have been written as the material was indeterminate.
In the NRC staff's view the three items cited in Example C are considered significant, particularly item 3.
The NRC staff would point out that it does not agree that these deficiencies are minor and controllable without the additional review provided by an NCR.
For the same reasons as discussed above, mitigation is not warranted.
In summary, the NRC staff's concern involving Violation VIII was that the examples cited in the violation represented a pattern of documenting nonconformances (items requiring an engineering evaluation) on documents or in systems other than the system approved by the LP&L QA program. The NRC staff believes the six items are in themselves sufficient to establish a weakness in the LP&L QA program for the failure to properly identify conditions adverse to quality.
Conclusion Items 3 and 4 of Example B in Violation VIII are withdrawn from the NOV. No mitigation or reduction in the civil penalties associated with Violation VIII is warranted.
~__
J Appendix Violation IX - Inadequate Procedures to Control Activities Affecting Quality (Only the pertinent portion of the violation that is denied is restated below.)
Criterion V of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, requires that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.
l LP&L QA Manual Section QP-5.0, Revision 2 " Instructions, Procedures and Drawings," required that " Safety-related activities of LP&L and its major contractors shall be described in documented instructions, procedures, drawings, specifications, checklists, or manuals appropriate to the circumstances.
Activities such as design, procurement, manufacturing, construction, installation, testing, inspection, and auditing shall be accomplished in accordance with these documents."
Contrary to the above, review of the following procedures revealed that the instructions were inadequate to ensure that activities affecting quality were correctly executed.
l A.
Ebasco Procedure ASP-IV-18, Issue Q, " Receiving, Storage, Issuing and j
Control of Welding Electrodes and Filler Materials," does not meet the storage and rebake requirements for storage of AWS A5.1 (7018), electrodes, as described by AWS D1.1-1980, to which Ebasco is committed. American Welding Society AWS D1.1-1980 requires that low hydrogen electrodes conforming to AWS A5.1 be purchased in hermetically sealed containers or be dried for at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> between 450 F and 500*F before they can be i
used. Electrodes shall be dried prior to use if the hermetically sealed container shows evidence of damage.
Immediately after opening of the hermeticaljy sealed container or removal of the electrodes from drying ovens, electrodes shall be stored in ovens held at a temperature of at I
least 250 F (120 C). After the opening of hermetically sealed containers or removal from drying or storage ovens, electrode exposure to the atmosphere shall not exceed 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> prior to being returned to the storage area.
In the case that electrodes are exposed for a period greater than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, the electrodes are required to be redried.
Ebasco Procedure ASP-IV-18 requires that electrodes be stored in ovens of a temperature between 200-300 F for approximately 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> following removal from the hermetically sealed container and prior to use. Covered electrodes are not to be exposed to ambient temperatures for more than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and if unused are to be returned to the storage ovens for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> prior to reissuance. No instructions are given for electrodes exposed for a period greater than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
Ref: SSER-7, A-215
J 20 -
Appendix Summary of Licensee Response LP&L denies Example A contending that instructions were adequate to ensure activities affecting quality were correctly executed. The licensee does admit that Ebasco weld material control procedure, ASP-IV-18, never provided for rebaking weld rods. However, the procedure did require low hydrogen electrodes be redried or destroyed if the four hour American Welding Society (AWS) Code exposure limit was exceeded. This method was used to provide adequate drying using conventional rod ovens as opposed to rebake ovens which required higher temperatures. The required temperature and times did differ from AWS D1.1; however, they did meet ASME Section II, Part C, SFA 5.1, which is endorsed by AWS.
In addition, LP&L retained the weld rod manufacturer to duplicate this drying process which showed the technique to be adequate. Furthemore, the NRC staff previously determined that noted conditions had no safety significance or impact on hardware.
[ Reference SSER 9, " Discussion of 23 Issues as presented in the June 13, 1984 letter from D. G. Eisenhut (NRC) to J. M. Cain, LP&L, Issue 22."]
The licensee admits that the procedure as cited in Example B used by LP&L construction QA for " transfer" reviews was not approved until March 22, 1984.
However, the licensee requests mitigation of proposed civil penalties based on their extensive reviews finding no adverse safety conditions resulting from the use of an unapproved procedure.
NRC Evaluation of the Licensee's Response Example A was based upon the time and temperature requirements delineated in AWS D1.1-1980 to which Ebasco was committed to for control of low hydrogen electrodes (7018). The use of time and temperature requirements as established in ASME Section'II, Part C, SFA S.1, without first verifying the adequacy of the drying process, as opposed to the rebake process, using a suitable test program constitutes a failure to control an activity that directly affects quality.
Ebasco Procedure ASP-IV-18, Issue 0, " Receiving, Storage, Issuing, and Control of Welding Electrodes and Filler Materials," did not meet the storage and rebake requirements for storage of AWS AS.1 (7018) electrodes as described by AWS D1.1-1980. The procedure therefore was inadequate to control the rebake process for low hydrogen (7018) electrodes.
Example B is viewed to be significant by the NRC staff. The review performed by LP&L was necessary to determine if preoperational testing was adversely affected or invalidated and if system operability may have been jeopardized. This review was necessary because of the inadequate implementation of LP&L's QA program.
Therefore, mitigation of any of the civil penalties associated with Example B would not be appropriate.
Conclusion Example A of Violation IX was accurately identified as an inadequate procedure to control activities affecting quality.
Thus, no reduction in the proposed civil penalties amount is warranted.
In addition, mitigation of the civil penalties associated with Example B would not be appropriate.
+ - - -, - -
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4 Appendix Violation X - Failure to Control Conditionally Released Equipment Summary of the Licensee's Response The licensee admits the violation as stated in the NOV, but requests mitigation of the proposed civil penalties based on extensive reviews and the argument that no adverse safety condition existed.
NRC Evaluation of the Licensee's Response The NRC staff does not consider that mitigation would be appropriate in that the review performed by LP&L was necessary to verify that Conditional Certifications of equipment and other conditional release conditions have been identified, reviewed and resolved.
Conclusion No mitigation of civil penalties associated with Violation X is appropriate.
Violation XI - Failure to Maintain Design Control Summary of the Licensee's Response LP&L admits that approved procedures for design control were not followed or lacked clarity but denies that this violation represents a 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III violation since the design control program was in place.
NRC Evaluation of the Licensee's Response s
The NRC staff recognizes that Ebasco Procedure ASP-IV-58, Revision E, " Attachment to Seismic Supports," required that added loads be reported to engineering for inclusion into the " Seismic Allowable Load Chart." The examination of 28 seismic cable tray and HVAC supports by the NRC CAT inspector revealed that 18 exhibited loads were not shown on the design documents. Based on the potential significance and number of examples identified, the NRC staff concluded that the controls provided by the Ebasco procedure were not sufficient to ensure that added loads were identified and included on the " Seismic Allowable Load Chart." While a design control program was in place, weaknesses existed such that additional measures were necessary for the identification and control of design interfaces and for coordination among participating design organizations to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, " Design Control."
Conclusion The use of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III in this violation is appropriate.
Violation XII - Failure to Adequately Perform Document and Design Control Reviews The licensee admits this violation.
Appendix ' Violation XIII.C - Failure to Implement an Adequate Inspection Program (LP&L admits Violations XIII.A and XIII.8)
Criterion X of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, requires that a program for inspection of activities affecting quality be established for and executed by or for the organization performing the activity to verify conformance with the documented instructions, procedures, and drawings for accomplishing the activity.
LP&L QA Manual Section 10. " Inspection," paragraph 10.1, requires, in part, that LP&L's major contractors establish programs for inspection during manufacturing and construction to assure conformance with applicable instructions, procedures, drawings, specifications, and contract requirements.
C.
Contrary to the above, the licensee did not ensure that an adequate inspection program was implemented by their contractors to ensure that HVAC restraints were inspected to the actual as-built configuration.
Ref: CAT,Section III.B.3 Summary of the Licensee's Response The licensee denied this violation as stated. All cases noted in the NRC review were installations that conformed to the alternate installation details as shown on Ebasco design drawings, but did not conform to the contractor (Waldinger) generated " fabrication tickets" (shop fabrication drawings) which reflected basic design details. These contractor generated " fabrication tickets" were considered supplementary to the Ebasco (Contract) design drawings (which is noted on many of the Waldinger drawings). Therefore, acceptance of the modified connection based on alternate allowable design drawings was valid with regard to procedure requirements.
Waldinger's procedure should have stated that inspection criteria could be either " fabrication tickets" or " design drawings" which would have prevented the NRC finding and this alleged violation.
NRC Evaluation Based on the additional information provided, the NRC has concluded that Violation XIII.C should be withdrawn.
Conclusion The subject violation has been withdrawn. Withdrawal of the civil penalties in the amount of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) associated with this violation is warranted.