ML20072N882

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reopen Contention 22 Re Available Info on Slab Cracks Initially Reported in 1977, Reappearing on 830511.New Hearing Requested to re-review Deficiencies in Plant Design

ML20072N882
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	07/15/1983
From:	Burstein C BURSTEIN, C.H., JOINT INTERVENORS - WATERFORD
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20072N836	List: ML20072N833 ML20072N859 ML20072N882
References
79-417-06-OL, 79-417-6-OL, ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8307180160
Download: ML20072N882 (5)

Text

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IN THE MATTER OF LOUISIANA V

POWER g ag, 6* &

GHT COMPANY NRC 50-382-OL IN TNE UNITED STATES W.

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION s ASLB 79-417.06,0; WATERFORD III JOINT INTERVENTION TAFT, LOUISIANA s.g ! A MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF i _ MOTION TO REOPEN CONTENTION The Waterford III Joint Intervenors respectfully subnit that this nuclear plant at Taft licensed, since it is so defective o b th'i. Louisiana can the execution, from the slab up n the concept and in I

up to the high standards prostuigated by th, that it can Regulatory Commission in 10 CFR 50 e U.S. Nuclear comprehensively with quality assurance, Appendix B, which The original Contention 22 dealt with slab underlying the reactor that first the cracks in the time,' the Nuclear Regulatory Comunis i appeared inAt1977 that the cracks could be filled with ep s on apparently decided that and that this would eliminate anyms.orobleoxy and more concr what Louisiana Power and Light Compan But on May 11, 1983, cracks" reappeared. y describes as " hairline Much information is now available comments made by LP&L officials the day b f , including were discovered, that suggest the cr e ore the newest cracks raise fundamental questions about the intacks in the plant 's design and the effect it will have egrity of the plant's any length of time sufficient to justifon future safe operation for Even though the water seeping throy putting the plant on line.

foundation now, as far as is known ugh the cracks in the design anticipates that the afound ti, is a small amount, the plan its projected operating life of thirty to forty years.on w I

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Wt tGrfard Memo P:ge 2 Despite LP&L's current attempts to minimize the importance of the new cracks, that company's own internal documents written in 1977 after cracks in the foundation directly below Waterford's nuclear reactor were discovered called them a "significant deviation from performance specifications" which could affect the " safe operation of the plant."

Water seepage through the foundation was not anticipated by Waterford's designers, raising questions about the adequacy of the original design and the engineering assumptions it is based upon.

It is reasonable to infer that the new cracks are caused by the same underlying wrong assumptions that caused the original cracks.

What other mishaps can flow from a design system '

that was conceptually infirm from the beginning?

l Unfortunately, Waterford III's " floating design" is suj, ceneris among U.S.

reactors, and it is doubtful if there is an identical situation anywhere in the world from which we may analogi safe design y.21 IL9n. Louisiana's unique geological structure, especially the mushy " jelly ground" nsture of the soils nearest the Mississippi River, made the plant's designers plan a foundation without pilings.

Three of Waterford III's main buildings, all of those dealing with the handling of nuclear materials, were built o n a "comanon foundation mat," a huge steel-reinforced concrete slab 270 feet wide 380 feet long, and 12 feet thick. Thus, the plant was to be, as it were, a steel and concrete vessel floating on the water-impregnated sands beneath and around it. But to keep the excavation dug for the comanon foundation mat dry while the vast slab was assemblod and the three buildings it supports erected, the builders had to install an elaborate water control and pumping system.

Unoer the "re-charging theory," the flow of groundwater

! would be controlled in such a way that the water around this r nuclear island would be in equilibrium with the weight of that i

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Watorferd Memo Page 3

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island, creating a buoyant effect that would " float" the island on the hydrostatic sand around it.

But in the spring of 1977, shortly before the initial cracks under the reactor were discovered, the Waterford III engineers could not control the rate of recharging as their construction plan required. According to a civil engineer for Waterford's prime contractor, who could be called for a witness at a new hearing, EBASCO Services, Inc. was slow to achieve the necessary equilibrium between the weight of the plant and that of the water in the surrounding soils. That lag, accoeding to Brian Grant, the engineer, helped the comanon foundation mat to flex in an unanticipated way, causing a condition EBASCO's engineers later analyzed as " stress reversal," a reflection of motion in the foundation, creating cracks running all the way through the foundation and letting water into the supposedly floating vessel.

In a report written July 29, 1977, an unidentified E3ASCO official wrote,"The 12 foot thick cosmon foundation mat is consiuered to be thick enough to not require waterproofing to prevent leakage, ,

therefore, this defect is considered to have possibly adversely affected the safe operation of the plant and is considered a significant deviation from performance specifications which will require extensive repairs to establish the adequacy of the structure."

A few days later EBASCO and LPLL reported the problem to the NRC as a significant construction deficiency, one of this agency's most seriour categories of construction failures in a nuclear power plant.

Despite the above report to the Comunission from which further hearing is sought, the builders of Waterford III never addressed the underlying cause of the cracks. Instead, they patched the cracks from the top of the foundation mat to stop the imunediate water seepage through them and went ahead with their construction schedule, which called for pouring great quantities of concrete over the places where the cracks first appeared. Brian Grant, the E3ASCO civil engineer, and Tom Gerrets, LP&L's Quality Assurance

W:terferd Memo Pcge 4 Manager for Waterford, defended this solution in a May 10, 1983 interview with Gambit Magazine, as reported in the edition of May 28, 1983. They insisted that the cracks indicated no structural problems with the foundation. They said the only problem was the possibility that the leaking water might affect the structural integrity of the concrete scheduled to be poured over the cracks.

Since patching the cracked surfaces stopped the water flow through them, they felt, at least long enough for the new concrete to be poured and set, there was no problem.

As long as there was no further movement in Waterford III's foundation, Grant and Gerrets stated, then there was no cause for concern. The original 1977 cracks indicated a kind of unanticipated movement, they achmitted,1xat the stress reversal problems that caused the old cracks had been arrested. Grant opined that the plant had finished settling, but admitted that further settlement would be a serious matter.

On May 11, 1983, ESASCO engineers wroi.e a new non-conformance report revealing the discovery of the new cracks. Report # 6212 admitted that water was percolating through new cracks in the floor of the reactor auxiliary buildings, which is also the top of the cousson foundation mat. LP&L officials admit that they are considering seeking NRC approval to change their Final Safety Analysis Report so that Waterford III need not be watertight.

Hover understands that the FSAR is LP&L's basic blueprint for the construction of Waterford III, an agreement with the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Comunission spelling out how Waterford III is constructed and guaranteeing its safety.

The reason for particular concern in the matter of Waterford III is that it is, as has already been mentioned, ,s_ulu aeneris --

there is no nuclear plant like it in existence to which we can

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Wetdtfard Memo Peg) 5 look to see if further settlement is to be expected and, if so, what are the implications for long and safe operation. No doubt scientists can be found to support Messrs. Grant and Gerrets in their prediction of safe operation. It is equally certain that

! other experts will disagree. If these men are correct that the plant is safe and will produce power for thirty years, we have at best a nuclear power plant that no one could ever thought in good faith was needed in a slow-growing area with Grand Gulf I and II so close. Waterford III is only 18 air miles from New Orleans, a city which is virtually impossible to evacuate,since it is almost surrounded by water -- yet the damage radius in the event of a meltdown is fifty miles. According to the Sandia Report commissioned by the NRC,97,000 people in the New Orleans area could die in what is said to be the unlikely event of a meltdown. In fact, that study said that Waterford III could be the third most dangerous plant in the country.

It is hard to believe , even if a nuclear plant with a cracked slab is safe to use for a few years, that it will ever give thirty to forty years of dependable service. But this much we do knows when Waterford III is decomunissioned, probably af ter a relatively short while even if there are no actual nuclear accidents, the cost will run in the billions. Surely, the cracked 1.

slab will add greatly to the cost of decomunissioning, which under normal conditions would equal the cost of building the nuclear plant, according to Dr. Duane Chapman of Cornell University. Therefore ,

for all the above reasons, the Joint Intervenors seek a new hearing.

l Respectfully sutsnitted, d? M ew L-Carole H. Burstein Co-Counsel for Joint Intervenors 445 Walnut Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70118 Telephones (504) 866-6363 l

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