ML20116P193

Response to NRC & Util Responses to Aslab 850322 Memorandum & Order ALAB-801.Motion to Reopen Record of Licensing Proceedings for Litigation of Util Competence Should Be Granted.Supporting Documentation & Svc List Encl

ML20116P193
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	05/06/1985
From:	Bernabei L, Shohet G JOINT INTERVENORS - WATERFORD
To:	NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP)
References
CON-#285-888 ALAB-801, OL, NUDOCS 8505070549
Download: ML20116P193 (57)

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 00CKEi[0 UShRC BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD 15 MY -7 N0:19 In the Matter of

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0FFICE OF SECRt3Ad.

LOUISIANA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY

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(Waterford Steam Electric Station,

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Unit 3)

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JOINT INTERVENORS' RESPONSE TO NRC STAFF AND LOUISIANA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY RESPONSES TO ALAB-801 Pursuant to this Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board

(" Appeal Board") Memorandum and Order of March 22, 1985 ("ALAB-801"), Joint Intervenors submit the following response to the

' Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC" or " Commission") and Louisiana Power and Light Company ("LP&L") responses.

I.

THE NRC STAFF FAILS IN SSER-9 AND ITS MOST CURRENT RESPONSE TO PROVIDE SUBSTANTIATION FOR ITS CLAIM THAT LP&L HAS RESOLVED THE QUALITY ASSURANCE BREAKDOWN AND VERIFIED THAT WATERFORD IS CONSTRUCTED SAFELY.

This Appeal Board requested that the Staff explain and support its conclusion in SSER-7 and SSER-9 that the quality assurance ("QA") breakdowns described in these two supplements to NUREG-0787 have been corrected so that the safety of Waterford's construction and future operation may be ensured.

ALAB-801 at 11-13.

Specifically, it requested that the Staff explain its current position on Allegation 48, discussed in SSER-7, and Issue 23, discussed in SSER-9.

I_d. at 13.

The NRC' Staff response to these two issues, presented largely through the Affidavits of J. Harrison and D. Crutchfield, 1

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provide the Appeal Board with little more support than SSER-7 and SSER-9 for the NRC Staff's current opinion that LP&L has remedied the QA failings of the past.

In most cases the NRC Staff and LP&L have been vague as to the corrective actions taken to verify i

the quality of Waterford's construction; corroborated Joint Intervenors' claims that the QA problems have continued through-out the construction of Waterford and that LP&L failed to take any corrective action except under severe pressure from the NRC; and placed in relief the need for adjudicatory hearings to ensure that the past QA breakdown has not left indeterminate the con-struction quality of Waterford 3.

Given the failure of the NRC Staff or LP&L to be specific as to the percentage of reinspection of safety-related systems and components; the amount of documentation reviewed; the systems walked-down; and the problems found, this Appeal Board has no choice but to order adjudicatory hearings.

The NRC Staff has not provided the specific basis to demonstrate that after a quality assurance breakdown of the magnitude suffered at Waterford 3 LP&L has done adequate testing, reinspection, re-review and engineer-ing analysis to assure the plant's safety.

A.

The NRC Staff's Claim that Allegation 48 Involved Large-ly the Breakdown of the LP&L, Ebasco, and Mercury Audit Function Is Not Valid.

The NRC Staff claims that Allegation A-48 involved only the breakdown of the " audit element of Mercury, Ebasco, and LP&L's QA programs."

Harrison Affidavit, at 16.

The Staff then contends that since audits are the " third level of assurance" there is less need to be concerned about their deficiencies.

Ibid.

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However, it is clear fron the discussion of this allegation in SSER-7 that this allegation included a " complete QA breakdown" which could affect the quality of all Mercury construction.

1 SSER-7, App. J at 96.

The NRC Staff's contention at this time that this allegation 4

involved only a " partial" QA breakdown cannot be substantiated.

Harrison Affidavit at 20.

The Staff next argues that any concern about the quality of Mercury's work has been resolved by 100 percent reinspection of the work of Mercury N-1 instrumentation installation.

It states that since no significant hardware problems were found with this l

1. A draft of this section of SSER-7 makes even clearer that Allegation 48 included a breakdown of all QA functions.

In the section entitled " Assessment of Allegation" the NRC Staff described the implied significance of the allegation in the following way:

4 That is, quality control inspectors did not do adequate inspections; Mercury personnel did not have the freedom to write nonconformance reports ("NCR's") and obtain effective corrective acrtion; EBASCO and Mercury did not follow any procedure; QA records did not adequately document QA activi-ties; and the licensee and contractors' audit program, which is the last defense for identifying QA/QC problems, was not adequately implemented.

See Draft of Allegation A-48, at 1-2, attached and incor-porated herein as Exhibit 1.

Joint Intervanors realize that this Appeal Board previously struck a portion of their proffered reply of February 25, 1985, which tendered this exhibit.

However, the Appeal Board did not j

specifically address the usefulness of this exhibit but held that Joint Intervenor's supplemental argument on this point was un-necessary.

Memorandum and order (March 14, 1985), Slip. Op. at i

6 n.4.

At this time Joint Intervenors believe that argument on this point is appropriate in response to the NRC Staff's discus-sion of Allegation 48.

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safety-related work, 100 percent reinspection of Mercury's other 2

safety-related work was not needed.

It is true that the NRC has not established set procedures l

or regulations to verify the quality of a plant's safety-related j

work after a plant has been completed and the Staff concludes that the utility's quality assurance program has not functioned over the life of its construction.

However, at other troubled plants such as Zimmer and Midland, the NRC Staff has required 100 percent reinspection of safety-related work in those areas where the work is accessible and the QA program has historically failed to provide the required quality check.

The Staff has required nondestructive or other types of testing to verify the quality of safety-related work which is not accessible.

At Waterford by contrast the NRC Staff has required minimal reinspection even for the egregious QA breakdown for Mercury's work.

In addition to the QA problems described in Allegation 48, SSER-7, and Issue 23, SSER-9, the NRC Staff documented problems with qualification of Mercury welders and welding procedures, Issue 22, SSER-9; improper dispositioning of Mercury NCR's, Issue 6, SSER-9; voided or missing Mercury NCR's, Issue 13, SSER-9; and lack of qualification of Mercury QC/QA personnel, Issue 1, SSER-9.

Yet the Staff in this " worst case" has not required a compre-hensive reinspection of all Mercury's safety-related work.

For Issue 22, the Staff has apparently not required reinspection of a

2. The Staff also argues that all N-2 instrumentation installed prior to mid-1982 was 100 percent reinspected by qualified EBASCO QC inspectors.

Harrison Affidavit at 19.

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significant portion of the welds done by unqualified welders, but merely concluded that since "most of the Mercury welders re-viewed" were qualified to make groove welds, and a welder qualified to make groove welds is also qualified to make fillet i

i welds, that Mercury welders were sufficiently qualified to do their work at Waterford.

SSER-9, App. J at 82-83.

This is the 4

equivalent of stating that "most" of the welds were done by i

welders "mostly" qualified to do them.

This is hardly the rigorous standard which the welding codes for nuclear safety-related work require.

Regarding improper dispositioning of Mercury NCR's, the Staff allowed merely a paperwork review, redispositioning, and re-analysis, and required minimal reinspection.

Harrison Affi-davit at 32.

The Staff permitted this type of corrective action even though the office of Investigations ("0I") is investigating potential falsification of QA documentation and much Mercury doc-umentation is not original or complete.

As discussed in detail in Joint Intervenors' Reply to Appli-cant and NRC Staff Responses to Joint Intervenors' Motion to Roopen (Jan. 25, 1985), at 15-19, the NRC Staff applied very lenient standards to qualify QC inspectors, including i

Mercury QC personnel, and then required little reinspection of the work of those QC inspectors who could not meet this degraded standard.

The needed confidenco in Mercury's safety-related work can-not be gleaned from LP&L's minimal corrective action at Water-1 ford.

The NRC Staff has largely detailed the numerous QA fail-5 1

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ings which throw into question the quality of Mercury's work but described little corrective action that would resolve these questions.

B.

The NRC Staff's Conclusory Statements about LP&L's Corrective Action Do Not Provide Adequate Assurance of the Quality of Waterford's Construction.

The NRC Staff has repeated its conclusion that the correc-tive actions LP&L has taken since the Eisenhut Letter of June 13, 1984, provide adequate assurance of the quality of Waterford's construction.

Harrison Affidavit at 25-30.

It claims that its conclusion that these 23 items listed in the Eisenhut lack collective safety significance corroborates LP&L's identical conclusion.

Id. at 30.

However, the NRC Staff's reasoning is faulty in several respects.

First, LP&L's assessment was not reached independently of the NRC Staff's.

LP&L and the Staff together, in ad hoc, private conferences, developed a common approach to resolving the 23 items.

As is clear from the numerous revisions to LP&L's corrective action program, LP&L never put forward a definite program accepted or rejected by the NRC but instead proffered a series of continually-revised approaches to the problems.

More-over, as explained in Harrison's earlier affidavit, the NRC Staff assisted LP&L in developing these approaches in a series of closed meetings.

Harrison Affidavit (Feb. 28, 1985), at 13-14.

Therefore, the Staff cannot claim today that its assessment of I

the individual and collective significance of the 23 issues of potential safety significance is " independent" or developed 6

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3 separately from LP&L's response.

Harrison Affidavit at 29.

The need for the Staff to provide such intensive assistance to LP&L in developing and implementing a corrective action pro-gram reflects poorly on the company's willingness to identify and correct safety problems on its own, a critical requirement for NRC licensees.

Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-106, 6 AEC 182,184 (1973).

More importantly, the NRC Staff and LP&L have failed to support their conclusion that adequate corrective action has been

.taken to resolve the 23 items of potential safety significance outlined in the Eisenhut Letter.

The Staff's claim that LP&L has integrated the lessons learned from its past failings into a good operations-QA Program does nothing to verify the quality of Waterford's construction.

Harrison Affidavit at 28-30.

Moreover, neither LP&L nor the NRC Staff has ever specifi-

' cally described the corrective action LP&L has supposedly taken.

In its most recent filing, the NRC Staff has stated that Issues 5, 7, 8,

11, 13 and 16 were resolved by document reviews; " recon-ciliating and correlating records"; and statistical and engineer-ing analyses.

Id. at 27.

Yet nowhere described is the per-centage of the documentation reviewed; the percentage of records reconciliated and correlated; or the amount and type of statis-

3. At the Zimmer, Midland and Diablo Canyon plants, once the NRC Staff had documented a QA breakdown, the agency provided for channels of public participation to ensure these problems were adequately resolved.

The public, including intervenor groups, made useful suggestions about the reform programs.

Moreover, encouraging this public participation enhanced the credibility of the final programs carried out by the utilities.

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4 tical and engineering analyses performed.

Moreover, the Appeal Board can gain little confidence in any paperwork review when OI's investigation focuses specifically on possible falsification

~ of QA documentation and improper intimidation and harassment of QA/QC personnel.

The quality of all QA documentation must be suspect at best, and totally discounted in the worst cases.

Certainly without some reinspection, the NRC Staff cannot claim these record problems are resolved.

e Further, with regard to Mercury's work, the NRC Staff has admitted that documentation problems were correlated with hard-ware deficiencies.

SSER-7, App. 7, at 99.

Therefore, even if LP&L can somehow logically " reconcile" the QA records, it is

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possible if not likely that the faulty QA records indicate faulty construction work.

The NRC Staff has stated that LP&L has resolved Issues 1, 4,

9, 10, 14, 17, 18, 20, 21, and 22 by performing " hardware rain-spections, engineering evaluations and statistical sampling."

Nowhere is the percentage of reinspection done of safety-related

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4 4.

In only a few instances has the NRC Staff provided sufficient information in SSER-9 so that one can determine the percentage of documents LP&L reviewed.

For example, to resolve Issue-11, LP&L apparently reviewed 100 percent of the testing records for cadwelds.

However, tests were conducted on only about four percent of the questionable cadwelds.

SSER-9, App. J, at 55.

LP&L reviewed 100 percent of the soil packages which were questioned by the NRC under Issue 7.

Id. at 36.

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5 systems described in the NRC Staff submissions.

Joint Inter-venors have described the minimal reinspection required of the work of unqualified QC inspectors (Issue 1).

Joint Intervenors'

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Reply, supra, at 15-19.

The NRC Staff has replied that other means were used to verify the quality of the work.

However, as explained above, methods other than reinspection are unlikely to l

be adequate substitutes.

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The NRC Staff has stated that LP&L performed " minor hardware

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changes" to resolve Issues 1, 2, 3,

6, 12, 15 and 19.

Harrison Affidavit at 27.

Nowhere described or documented are these 6

" minor" changes or the problems they were meant to remedy.

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5. Occasional references to the reinspection or document review sample size prove the rule that neither the NRC Staff nor LP&L document consistently the percentage of reinspection and review LP&L performed.

In response to Issue 1 concerning lack of qualification of QC and QA personnel, LP&L has done a 100 percent j

reinspection of all N-1 instrumentation installation, and a 35 to 100 percent reinspection of tubing and tube track supports.

Id.

j at 13-14.

LP&L has conducted a 100 percent documentation revlow of Tompkins-Beckwith's work, id. at 17, and admitted that LP&L and Ebasco reinspected only about three percent of Tompkins-Beckwith's work.

NRC Staff Further Response Pursuant to Appeal

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1 Board's Order of February 13, 1985 (Feb. 28, 1985), at 25.

To close-out Item 4, LP&L reviewed no more than.3 percent of lower-tier documents (900 out of 32,000) and did no reinspection.

J. Cain Letter to D. Eisenhut (Oct. 19, 1984), at i

j 4-4.

1 To resolve Item 14, LP&L started with a 10 percent review of j

contractors' Information Reports and gradually increased the sample size to 13 percent because of the large number of design i

control problems it detected.

SSER-9, App. J, at 61-62.

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6. Through review of SSER-7 and SSER-9 Joint Intervenors

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determined that LP&L has done at least the following rework:

1 (footnote continued on following page) i

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1 Therefore the NRC Staff has provided no accountability for its and LP&L's conclusion that the changes were " minor" or sufficient to remedy the identified problems.

Without such accountability, this Appeal Board cannot find that the NRC Staff's glib assur-ances satisfy its concern about the quality of Waterford's con-struction.

i C.

The NRC Staff's Conclusion that LP&L Has Honestly and Effectively Carried Out its Corrective Action Program Is Suspect in Light of the Unresolved " Integrity concerns" about LP&L Managers Heading the Program.

A more basic problem with the NRC Staff's conclusion is that it has largely relied on LP&L managers to carry out LP&L's proffered corrective action program rigorously and honestly when they have demonstrated they do not have sufficient integrity and honesty to do so.

See Joint Intervenors' Motion to Reopen (Nov.

7, 1984), at 15-32.

Specific individuals who headed up LP&L's corrective action effort, including Thomas Gerretts, LP&L Cor-porate QA Manager, are themselves under suspicion for potential deliberate circumvention of safety regulations.

Certainly, there exists an inherent conflict of interest for these individuals to have headed the corrective action program since any problems they identify will be ones for which they will be held responsible.

(footnote continued from previous page) a) Issue 2: LP&L has reworked 18 N1 instrumentation installations, SSER-9, App. J, at 20; b) Issue 6: LP&L performed rework for five Ebasco NCR's prior to February, 1984, and two NCR's after February, 1984; id.

at 30; and c) Issue 12: LP&L replaced 850 bolts, or about seven percent of the 12,000 bolts inspected, id. at 57.

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LP&L acknowledged as much in its attempts during the summer of 1984 to determine the targets of the OI investigation for the alleged purpose of removing them from any role in its corrective action program.

Id. at 16 and Exhibit 46.

Moreover, from remarks made by NRC Commissioner James Asselstine, in voting against grant of an operating license for Waterford, it appears there is evidence that LP&L senior managers have not always been candid and forthright with the agency.

See Transcript of March 15, 1985 Commission Meeting, at 107, attached 7

and incorporated herein as Exhibit 2.

Given these " integrity" concerns, this Appeal Board cannot find that LP&L's corrective action program, directed by indi-viduals under suspicion, adequately resolves the past QA break-down, at least prior to the completion of OI's investigation.

In an order issued on May 2, 1985, the Appeal Board directed OI representatives to appear before it in an in camera, ex parte hearing on May 30, 1985.

Notice (May 2, 1985).

The Appeal Board has ordered this hearing and prior briefings of the Board on the status of OI investigations pursuant to the Commission's " State-ment of Policy: Investigations, Inspections, and Adjudicatory Proceedings," 49 Fed. Reg. 36,032 (1984) j In order to preserve their position on any possible appeal of this action Joint Intervenors respectfully move this Board 7, Commissioner Asselstine also noted that the Office of

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Investigations was continuing to investigate a number of so-called " integrity issues" and to him "one of these items is significant."

Ibid.

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that they be allowed to participate in any such briefing of the Appeal Board under restriction of any appropriate protective order to prevent public disclosure.

Joint Intervenors understand that the Appeal Board is bound by the Commission Policy Statement but interject their objection to an in camera, ex parte proceeding at this time in order not to waive their objection to this Commission procedure.

D.

The NRC Staff's Reliance on NRC Efforts to Ensure Waterford's Future Safe Operation is Unwarranted.

The NRC Staff has argued that its inspection efforts; its walkdown of safety systems; and its oversight of LP&L efforts have guaranteed the safe construction and will assure the future safe operation of Waterford.

See, e.g.,

Harrison Affidavit at 35-38.

Clearly the NRC Staff has neither the resources nor the responsibility to guarantee that an unwilling licensee will com-ply with NRC regulations.

It is only a willing and honest licensee which can ensure Waterford's safe operation.

The NRC Staff also argues that once deficiencies are identi-fled, LP&L has corrected them prior to turnover of systems.

Id.

at 49.

However, LP&L's history at Waterford is the opposite.

It failed to correct problems identified in the December, 1982 Notice of Violation ("NOV") and failed to acknowledge, much less correct, problems identified by the NRC's Inquiry Team and CAT Inspection effort.

See Joint Intervenors' Motion to Reopen, at 32-34 and Exhibit 9.

Further, how can LP&L's QA program be credited with identi-fying the problems with systems' turnover, Harrison Affidavit at 49, when LP&L did nothing to correct the problems either 12

before the NRC NOV or after?

As late as June, 1984, LP&L had still failed to take adequate corrective action to resolve the QA 8

breakdown documented in December, 1982.

II.

THE NRC STAFF HAS PROVIDED NO SUPPORT FOR ITS ASSERTION THAT LP&L CAN BE TRUSTED TO MANAGE WATERFORD SAFELY IN THE FUTURE GIVEN ITS LONG HISTORY OF FAILING TO MEET COMMITMENTS TO THE NRC.

In addressing the Appeal Board's question about LP&L's current capability to operate Waterford safely in light of its past failure to implement adequately its QA program, ALAB-801 at 13, and Joint Intervenors' charge B(4), the NRC Staff provides no support for its current endorsement of LP&L management.

Dennis Crutchfield states merely that LP&L has responded adequately to Issue 16 by employing a consultant and establishing its own team to follow up on employee interviews begun in January, 1984.

Crutchfield Affidavit at 7-8.

He also notes that the NRC has no rcquirement that utilities set up a formal pro-gram to survey QA personnel to determine QA problems.

Id. at 10.

Mr. Crutchfield misses the point of charge B(4).

LP&L committed to this interview program in order to identify QA prob-lems, and to satisfy the NRC's growing concern about Waterford's QA breakdown.

Certainly, LP&L's failure to resolve problems once identified reflects poorly on the company's initiative and its basic management capabilities.

It was only after the NRC forced followin,The NRC Staff relied on LP&L and contractor walkdowns 8.

g the 1982 NOV to assure proper turnover of systems to Ebasco and LP&L.

Harrison Affidavit at 35-36.

However, it is clear from the CAT inspection findings alone that these walkdowns were not sufficient to ensure that nonconforming conditions in safety systems were fixed prior to turnover to LP&L.

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on LP&L a corrective action program that the utility began to resolve the problems.

NRC licensees are expected to resolve all potentially safety-significant problems, whether they come to light by means of a voluntary or a required program.

NRC inspector Raymond Mullikin supports Joint Intervenors' claim that LP&L failed to correct QA and construction deficien-cies although it had previously committed to do so.

Mullikin Affidavit at 2-3.

However, he claims this is not of current concern to the NRC because eventually LP&L did correct many of the deficiencies.

Id. at 3-6.

Yet again the NRC Staff misses the point that the NRC had to identity the problems over and over again to LP&L before it took appropriate corrective action.

Moreover, the NRC Staff continued to find that the corrective action which LP&L took was deficient.

Id. at 6-8.

The Staff found discrepancies in a field inspection of 50 pipe supports and restraints which led to a second LP&L QA walkdown.

That inspection discovered that fully 400 supports or restraints required some rework.

In addition, the NRC Staff found that LP&L had violated site procedures in its maintenance of safety-related motors.

Although the Staff found the deficien-cies were minor and not of safety significance, it is disturbing that even though the NRC had pointed out these problems in several inspections, LP&L did not implement corrective action which fully satisfied all requirements.

Id. at 57.

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III.

THE NRC STAFF HAS NOT SUBSTANTIATED ITS CLAIM THAT LP&L'S HISTORIC FAILURE To MAINTAIN ADEQUATE QA STAFFING HAS NOT AFFECTED THE SAFETY OF WATERFORD'S CONSTRUCTION.

The NRC Staff, in response to Joint Intervenors' " charges" A(1) (b) and B(5), has admitted that LP&L historically failed to maintain adequate QA staffing, which led to the QA breakdown.

Harrison Affidavit at 46-47; Constable Affidavit at 3-6.

How-ever, it also claims that QA staffing, both Construction and Operations, increased dramatically starting in 1982, when LP&L began to realize the potential detrimental effects of inadequate staffing.

Harrison Affidavit at 48; constable Affidavit at 9, 15-16.

The Staff also contends that LP&L and NRC's reinspection and review efforts since June, 1984, demonstrate that LP&L's chronic failure to maintain adequate staffing has not impacted the safety of Waterford's construction.

Harrison Affidavit at 48; Constable Affidavit at 10-11.

However, Joint Intervenors believe that the Staff has not proven that LP&L's minimal reinspection and review efforts show Waterford's safe construction.

Moreover, the Staff has failed to address a second central point of Joint Intervenors' charges LP&L has since as early as 1978 ignored repeated warnings that its chronically understaffed QA program was endangering the safe construction of Waterford.

Constable, for example, states that it mattered little that LP&L ignored a 1978 internal memorandum which called for the addition of a QA engineer.

Constable Affidavit at 9-10; Exhibit 7 to Joint Intervanors' Motion to Reopen.

Moreover, Constable claims that the NRC did not require LP&L to conduct the MAC audit 15

r and so it matters little that LP&L ignored the audit's recommen-9 dation for increased staffing.

Constable Affidavit at 7.

The NRC Staff does not address the central issue that LP&L either negligently or deliberately ignored repeated warnings that its deficient QA staffing was affecting'the quality of Water -

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ford's construction.

The NRC Staff's claim that QA staffing increased drama-tically since 1982 means little unless one determines whether this additional QA staff was devoted to construction QA or opera-tions QA.

It is inevitable that the staff for Operations QA would increase at the end of construction to work on procedures and testing.

This staff would not serve to verify the quality of the plant's construction or ensure the yet-to-be completed con-struction was safe.

Without knowing the specific number of additional construction QA personnel and their specific func-tions, the NRC Staff's claim that QA staffing increased drama-tically since 1982 tells the Appeal Board little about the quality of Waterford's constr' action or LP&L's attitude toward QA.

The Staff appears to excuse LP&L's failure to deal with Mercury's failings until 1983, when LP&L terminated Mercury, by stating that LP&L needed first to replace Mercury with a quali-fled ASME "N" Stamp Holder.

Harrison Affidavit at 7.

Certainly LP&L and Ebasco's primary concern should have been that Mercury do the instrumentation work in compliance with all NRC and job

9. Constable states also that the NRC Staff learned of the MAC audit for the first time in a cambit newspaper article. Ibid.

It appears that LP&L should have disclosed the report to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55(e) since the deficiencies noted dis-closed a breakdown in the QA program and potentially affected the safety of the plant's construction.

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requirements, and the cost and schedule concerns should have been secondary.

Apparently, the NRC Staff is willing to excuse Mercury's shoddy work during the interim time when LP&L was obtaining a new subcontractor.

This Appeal Board should not be as willing to tolerate LP&L or Ebasco's placing cost and scheduling concerns before safety.

The NRC Staff also points to a March, 1982 ACRS Memorandum which suggests that LP&L's prior staffing shortages were resolved.

Constable Affidavit at 15 and Exhibit 5.

However, it is clear that given the NRC's continuing concern about inadequate staffing up through June, 1984, the ACRS' hopes in March, 1982, that the problem had been resolved were simply wishful thinking.

More importantly, it appears that despite whatever increases in construction QA and operations staffing Ebasco made beginning in 1982, LP&L did not significantly increase its construction QA staffing until much later. Constable Affidavit at 6.

Without such increased staffing LP&L could not assume effective control over Ebasco.

This did not occur until 1984, when the NRC required of LP&L a formal corrective action program.

It is precisely this refusal or chronic inability of LP&L to heed early warnings of safety problems which Joint Intervenors argue show LP&L's lack of character to operate a nuclear power plant.

The NRC Staff also argued that the QA breakdown noted in its December, 1982 Inspection Report 50-382/82-14, was " partial" because it occurred in the subtier between Ebasco and Mercury.

Constable Affidavit at 5; Exhibit 1.

However, during this time, LP&L had abdicated effective control over QA to Ebasco so that 17

the failure of Ebasco adequately to control Mercury's work demon-strated a lack of any QA controls over instrumentation installa-tion.

Therefore, this subtier breakdown was in effect a " total QA breakdown" for the installation of instrumentation.

IV.

CONCLUSION.

In light of the foregoing arguments and documentation of the serious and as-yet unresolved quality assurance breakdown at Waterford, this Appeal Board should grant Joint Intervenors' motion to reopen the record of these licensing proceedings for litigation of whether LP&L has constructed Waterford safely and whether LP&L has the requisite character and competence to operate Waterford safely in the future.

Respectfully Submitted, A A n _0 M0

ju Lynhe Bernabei George Shoh Government Accountability Project 1555 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C.

20036 (202) 232-8550 Attorneys for Joint Intervenors DATED:

May 6, 1985 s

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Draft 1.,/

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4/30/84 (TSK4)

EXHIBIT 1 g

SSER

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Task: Allegation A-48, A-60! A-295

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t Reference No.: 4-83-A-88/2b; 4-83-A-88/12; 4-84-A-06/176 Q g x.u,,ss Trn.

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pauc y.

Cha-acterization:fACompleteBreakdownintheQAProgrambetweenEBASCOand

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o the Mercury, Company cf Nc. ~vu (CU. L-ect W3 N Y 15) g

. Assessment of A11ecation: The implied,',cf.cty significance of this allegation 7.C d :. : /..

.* x,3. G i s. -2. ]. L

• -.'('=j is that, a " complete" QA breakdowngccw, eil.

Ihmt (e, quality siiirol inspactors did not de adequate inspections;-Herce y na*cnnngJH to't heva-c N

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th-ir.spu-tAcas; Mercury personnel did not hav3.the'"f reedom to write Jg,onconformance / reports (NCRs) and,.phta,in effective corrective action; EBASCO m,

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and Mercury did not follow say procedure;; QA records did not adequately

~. ".> x document QA activities; and the Mccn ee and contractors audit prograT.,which w w o.b y r',not*~ M b

e=L,deYense-for ider,tifyir5 M,j,rj 3-j I;-

.i l.;f f

G.LS o sta,da ;.c.' ai:'im p-21:23.9Thisbreakdownr.ct-rellyextendstoLouisiana fe w o-4 Power & Light (LP&L)) -fi*ee i6, 2re the applicant for g license h "~'

/

kd b e e-

-fL.

c a.-s ee-e * ~~ $ N.

4%4

,,, a w d.

ea QcA.ta *.. %

4.u. % en c~ &: ' -

2=

-i'.-

f,

& N - W **"*' O

• ^^b

.,9,.;,,

n.r I

.i,.

a.t. 5 u + d N *S a & :)

c

,i i

? aft 1

(

Y,l f

()

jr8 5/30/84 (TSK4)

..-Kd4 9,, M '

N 0

1<

'y

~

3; IV R Reywet

o. 50-382/8 -14h m e-12 describes a small LP&L QA

(

staff (476'p^: itis k e,n.4 Jy 3 Ma g,

de heavy reH1mee on EBASCO Construction management y

'T+:

for"onsite[onstructionQA.

In turn, EBASCO, QA {10 auditorsfaudited QA e

i

+

programs of other onsite contractors and.because these auditors had additional !

ggA Gud'[

the ;;di'Anf,_14et limiteh heir effectivenessA. LP&L's annual of /

duties p hsi 3

g.,,

^

EBASCo included a review of 143 audits conducted by EBASCO QA deevng 1981.

L The audit m..sy concluded that, EBASCO audit program was adequate but /n' measures should be established by EBASCO todetermine the effectiveness of the -

c ntracto k QA progra.f.

EBASCO M c v ne did not address th('summ;rj

~

comments l ', ~s:' ' h $ ' '

5

.s ld u.~-

The, report refere-ed 20 ce stated that in early 1982 EBASCO submitted 7 [**'

ECCS systems to LP&L for turnover.

LP&L audit of these turnover packa,ges.

f included QA records review and er walkdown inspection of system {s c,_

, All4-hg

-f 1 -

systemsp ere -ejected). LF&L reported this QA breakdown to the NRC on tRefere'icc^ e tentially Report 6cle Incicent No. 80.h'g!vNs at May 26, 1952, c

iater G,.

"h c ^gcc-te significant Deficiency Report 57, " Inadequate Instrumentation and Control Installations and Turnover Documentatio g" Because of serious problems with "as-built drawing and deficient installation of I&C systems,*5

• b-sA time NRC imposed a civil penalty iW: L;tter 50-0C2 Ef M-,no c + a e

December 6, 1982.

2

Draft 1 k

( /30/84 (TSK4) i s

ct g

LP&Y(LetterMI83-0001 and 0015[de4ed January 4,1983, and April 8, t

2 1983, respectivelh y._ _nded to D e NRC,In p:: tier ".:p ouJ Wouc-i of w

V4eh u va.

Ug';acknowledgg, th:-

s a partial breakdown in the Waterford 3 QA Program "at the sub-tier levels and involving contractor /

subcontractor organizations identified in USNRC Inspection L.%

e,e.,% y) n%1 Report 50-382/82-14 p -. _

the violation was stet ^d te e caused by:

(1) insufficient training of inspectors, QA reviewers, and craftsmen, (2) inadequate staffing,O M(3) inadequate walkdown of completed and O i. D.

4.

1 i.

tr

-4% ; ; '. 8J..;

systems.

Simps 'eee, outlined,te take.cerr::tive articr " t%::

2 ese by April 4, 1983; however, the last LP&L letter dateA April 5, 198, stated that

" final review of corrective action documentation is scheduled to be completed in late May 1984 The Final Report will be submitted to the NRC on June 15, 1984."

Because of the above quality assurance and enforcement history.tte NRC

. La~

}

determined-that t':

ethed:'en tc #0?le w this allegation uld be-44

. ~.. ' }d-evahret4-4he iaf eetetien e' Mercury,Q^ "r:gre, (2) -:.:Wate t.

f ell e-:

(

4 f

Au EBASC0p4 reg :, and gyphatr LP&L QA /rograff by eselu ti y; thg, audit /

pr:;r.= and resultant corrective actiog,'g9ftn_; respect to7' J,e m ent ana sa n e p4;T

-t. %l

~ ~

lliJ'.:.

7 Q Q h_e OA breakdown d m U - ~ ^', f ^ " xd " ::ry.

4!f additional Ih.$)>ffI*.-ifA$)3 problems were identified et "cr: rj, m.1, th a audits of other contractors gold m :

d for similar QA m deficiencies.

O 3

' /Y m.ib M M "/f;2 D"ft 1 fh.

Jr?stv II '

f (.(d Cb_

g'.

f-5/30/84 (TSK4) 0JabrH

%L A's

\\& h,A14 p

n s

'\\ReRew&Mercuer4uditt and-Corree+WiML@The NRC staff re.in:d M p - ---~

evaluated A Manual (QAM), Sections 1 through 18; procedures QCP-3020, 3060,

'm ano SP-664;, audit log; N, matrix of all construction procedures; 8 auditor qualificationfiles;64interpalaudits all 1979 through 198,3 audits; and [/.)<

T'& w3 ilBh :,; G, G.

Jy.

ormerMercuryemploy)/esandother QAAnnualRepohbre.t July 1981-1!h?g. everal A

site personnel having direct kn wiedge of the company.fone [iiterviewg The following is a summary of these interviews /T Wt and evaluation 1.

f-

',k Ir.terviews and Evaluation of Mercury Manacement i

The Mercury Company was plagued by poor and discontinuous management 3

s we ;-)g, ta M

e n there were 4 project superintendents,"h product engineers and f

5,s U. W 4 QA site supervisors from mid 1978 t**u mid 1983.

Site QA/QC C.. % " M

^

personnel received-peer support from corporate QA management and as a a

resul3manyQCinspectorsresigned.

Several QC inspectors wrote letters of resignation describing these peor conditions and were threatened with immediate dismissal if these letters were not withdrawn.

L.'. m n

?-

QA/QC personnel,' constantly weae overridden by cost and schedule concerns

( tc1sdaMwG Q: W.% 4 becauseEBASCOandMercurymanagementwerej/

"in bed together" and ran

~

'roughXshodoverQC.

There was a high turnover among QC inspectors.

EBASCO management was aware of these problems shortly af ter Mercury came on site. More than one source stated that LP&L and EBASCO did not properly control and as,sure that Mercury QA records were retained W.*/M W

onsite but allowed to " haul" away Waterford Project records that i A

4

w_

Draft 1

(

5/30/84 (TSK4) should have remained on site.

NRC staff members also found that LP&L W4 wee still unsure as to exactly what records were on site and what l

records.should be on site.

EBASCO and LP&L management 'i..elly-became e**

fully aware of serious Mercury problems in 198.lg1982 g almost threg*Wg r

,, s u nt 9

• *5 years after wey chme on site and after almost 80% of the wor,'ThYy g

-g p g(, F b a.s ec, m*ag & TSwvvb +AcMmerm s = g e. d t'

• r ap arently assumed that it was too late to obtain corrective act on or # 4.

,cha 9 e

MJ,pinpossible gc,

4 a-

!P ' 'l 7

h,,, Pp;iiuvAS ' Evaluation of Corporate Annual Report r,

f f

Mercury Internal Audit No.1-9-80 (January 8,1980) finding No.1,s t

.**E,e

./

documented that 'Dc Mercury management,'revie/of the QA program hd M:n

.2 w

net *e since September 1978;(when-Weir p :; :- imht:-t:thr -e;-gett4ng j underway).

The audit log showed this finding to be closed t'he same date y,f % W.i'.o.i, pe-fer :d 4-9-90; however, EBASCO Audit CBB/AEZ-83-2-3 determined that the audit was not signed off as closed and'only one annual review.or k Ek1 i > ;' -

repet-hed-been-euempi b5ed-ed thH was for the pe -isd July Bly\\ w 82,

~:

~

s y! L t, s

,1, The NRC staff found,no additional annual reviews and'the one review ky, j.1 oe,w) referenced was neither ah, acceptable nor adequate,t u i;-,efu m ed.

niit'e- = rn:;teMe -.:r repite ev % ef the status and adequacy w

d of the Mercury site QA program.

The staff further concludeg that this failure to perform effective QA program reviews has significantly contributed to all the Mercury conditions identified as adverse to 5

k

?" aft 1 i,

5/30/84 (TSK4) hampu e6 6 '"

^

'D*"

'^*

quality,,,, ? :. failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, I

defective material and equipment and other nonconformances that were not 3

promptly identified and correctedy8ASCO end L"'t r:n:;;;r:nt 5:ar direct g neibility for not accorbg that : :ystem.. impiementeo w m nrg "M

such QA program breakdowns 40--the-ettent4en-efMBL and-9M-maaegement at-the appropriate level 1:ohure-eenective-ectier.

Although -t+ tis. '"l'7^

T r4 O.,

mt ;;n:tructi;r d:(4e4+acy was identified af ;early as January signm r

1980, E8ASCO audits did not identify the same problem until February 28, kam 0;erfthersignificantandsimilarproblems,wereid'entifiedin 198 5

A EBASCO Audits NE-79-9-4, NB-80-8-3, and SW-82-6-1,which should have

~

alerted management to these problems as early as September 1979 but not j

.,9' y

later than June 7, 1982.

Not only was this deficiency never specifically reported,but it was never corrected.

[a.' Reciepr.a<f Evaluation of Mercurv Internal Audits

.l' Mercury Internal Audit No. 1-11-804+ad.hanuary11,198fdecumented f

g v.o

<+7 A '," f en that 1nternal audit on QAM Sections 10 mm*^

), '.;), f,, N u.s.,,J ~..'l'  : e' d%' a A \\A."b 11,14,15, and 17 wen not, 3

% 'wa ene at least once er year.p 1979 a: e d e1, Internal Audit

~*

y QAm p

No. 5-11-82 W May 11, 198p documented that Sections 2, 7, 12, t

13, 14, and 15 N not been-audited during 1981.

Corrective Action,

p Request (CAR) wak nitiated as a result of the 1980 audit but CAR i

No. 44 was issued May 11, 1982, more than two years after the same finding in Internal Audit No.1-11-80pc. pr w.ph C M' 6

(

D* aft 1

\\ i 5'/30/84 (TSK4)

~1 p >tl*

, ry M 3 4 Wly' ",

.,\\ j,

).

g g

The NRC staff " '

" " Section 5 Procurement, war -e r audi ed t

/

'/

3 by Marcery from 1978 through 1983 because they stateg t d they. b t purchasednomaterials{b,owever,MercuryLettersWQ-1216and1225 da94(December 15, 1982, and January 4, 198 discuss Mercury's issuance of a purchase order to Welders Testing Laboratory in late p-1978 remainwg in effect as of January 1983.

LP&L acknowledged this g

finding and wher ?!'ed 4'

ther service; acr; p r;hn d stated that r*-

g

' sG )libration services were purch::d.

e..l1 ca The NRC staff A.. ewe reviewed t

exi thg[les-+t Mercuryf ano determined that QAM Sections 5,12,17, and 18 were not audited in 1980.

The failure to audit Section 12 "honconforming Items and Corrective Action',' is significant because s af :r o. nn) *.

L.., e (i 's,.

~

" [;'

~

etl-) 44.e apparent failure to take corrective action regarding Wec" 7 l

tusA v

h3managementreviewsandinternalaudits,n-tp:-fe---Sand'2)thi;:::

A lih T'110 0...'Jun:A:

Section 12 was not audited in 1981.

QAM Sections 5, 14, and 16 were yd-1J A not audited in 1981.

QAM Sections 5, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 were not audited in 1983.s I)

.b.6,'

r(

..,. u Jtesponse letters to audit findings describing corrective action were re-fW in the file for calendar year (CY) 1979, ht. responses were et t

found for CY 1980-1983.

7

(

Draft 1

( )

'b/30/84 (TSK4) s W

s.

44

-AHizus sed 4-p;regr;;h 2 BMe,thiserigftificettt eeneir ;iic';N Q

v defhiencjria,partialQAprogrambreakdown[has'neverspecifically-beenreported.eventhoughta[,:cetw;tm

- identified the deficiency in January 1980 and EBASCO identified the problem in June 1982.

Evenmcke/'

6.L4 +c serious. Mercury fever correctdB the problem after it was identified by Mercury and EBASCO.

fr Review of Auditor Oualificatiorth.

.b.n V>;,k ),i nI 0^

y s

n.,

Although auditer resumes ghc-ed adequate qualificattorT,squalification methods were inconsistent as some,y,..%.S t.,were giyen written exams, others

~. M.'

a,~t V ', A -

exams, and in one case

. the oral exam was waived.

The llow'ing a l

.J i.

i f...

• r cv:.

administrative or procedural defi,ciencies of r ncr

• nature Lt the, pcini - ~

poor record keepingg (w-

!. Of-- F M #'^ d ine:c. 'o

.. w. r.f.*:

s.>

... fir;6,%

+

e-

• W I. d.

fperformed as,' lead auditor ~on Dscember 19,1978, twt

?

./

1 e,.

auditor._ qualification r m.

sy-i@ygjj June-ry_ _

~~ ' '

.,7

~

rd-

_Rece-e 4-dtte he wasjualified as lead auditor en M{'{

M25.

January 22, 1979, a month after he performed the audit.

"k -e r

give1T-F;;

• n,M er-:.,under&.iogei..ent e.erded-.Peine"..t;,ewt enj-13 c '.~.,

.gw.;1.

e.

.tmui,iadon. /is eye examination was dated January 16, 1979, t

well after his firtt audit, l

j i

~

1

}

4 8

a ma

( k..

l

(~l,.:. 'KM.w.o).0C Y nc -

' )

(

(M K

& nh hirve documentation to show that he had

- rt:. l 1}

O' 'of.,.c SYsy-ki n; W ' e dge 2 n d rece hed orien 3 3..:d:

~.

u * :t:nding w ANSI N45.2 and N45.2.12; 10 CFR 50, Appendix B;

(.rb w s.'

ASME III, NCA 3000 and 4000; Mercury QA Manual; and Mercury Audit g

Procedure QCP-3020.

1

)ll). cl.b/. ?.!C.

'3 didnothaveeyeexamination,NcNNtticain ile for 1981.

J I.W.0 h

• tu:

1 c a r y.v a l b y (Y)k was not examined m-eenc4ance with paragraph 6.6 of

< - d-g,.;

p [-3060.

s.

wa, na eye exam f or 1980,,w

..c-

- /-: C QC

. d r:

and did not receive O r-4 % 4.

M sp ei'ied training.

J i

f, k

"C j

(,6 ) )<r. 8 Audit Participation Log was net available in the QA record files par C'l i

-s-K pi.t i b, paragraph 7.4 ofkQCP-30CO.

^

~ f..- M6,1 L

e /

E PeifW'Md Evaluation o' Mercury Audits of Imclementine Procedures The NRC Staf f review of MercurJyA,{onstruction,andspecialprocess

- c.. n.

procedures showed that Mercurysnev e audited the following. procedures; P

. 7, q.y c F-4%

f.

during the project:

MCP-2140, 2170, 2175; SP-650, 651, 652, 653, 654, s

L 655, 656, 657, 658, 661, 662, 663, 668, 670, 672; WPS-8, P, G; BP-1; and L

WPS-W3-4.

EBASCO Audit No. SW-82-6-1 dalad hune 7, 198 h Itcr % b 2

documented $iinding that Mercury implementing procedures had not been w

audited.

y 9

i

y

(

D-aft 1 5/30/84 (TSK4) s

,4 The NRC staff finding that many implementing procedures were not audited s

isparticularlysignificantsinceitmakes4(aplparentthateffective u.d, o..-) h ',w. ~ A..:. m' w't!!!: h 1),O]

corrective action was,not'taken.I It il-ah e portant

r. ate-tut many L

11: :) s) documentation and hardware deficiencies thet -ere identified were rel'ated y,.

/

procedures whid w: M not audited / I"$' b ' ' \\

to t

~%

L Mercury Procedure N05. QCr 020, 3050, 3060, 3110.1, 3110.4, 3110.5,, g 3e 5 jj,-

g 3110.6; SP-659, 664, 665, 666, and 667 were audited only, 6 yea Q

.A v. ^

W?

/

'.,T

d r.p'),' G N s a

d" + : the pr-icA 1979g1983.

These implementing procedures W re for ';. '- " '1 a-us..~. C ~ 4ud'iting, qualifjcation of i.spection/ test and audit personnel, pipe and tubing inspection, welding inspection, installed equipment inspection, l

material receiving, nonconformance and corrective action, installation of seismic expansion anchors and control of "as built" information.

Special g

orsupplementalauditsshouldhavebeenperformedinadditiontoannual (M.

audits of these areas because of

p:titim. w' nonconformances, oeficiencies, and audit findings.,.. LorHHLr.sas The NRC staff considers this failure to audit implementing procedu'res a breakdown in the Mercury QA program,.), y.1 p tc a Ttes.3should have been identified in

• /

the corrective. action response to the M udy identi'i d ""I civil yv.j..;;-)**!hl'C p3.,

penalty discu: Ad cbeves-and r~epresents inadequate corrective action.

10

(

praft 1

( i 5/30/84 (TSK4)

.3.'f.

(

Com - Gc w &FA

f. h R"egav Evaluation of 6ARs)

/\\

The NRC, staff reviewed 143 CARS issued by Mercury Company from J.

.h>Ar'1 December 19, 1978 through August 9, 1983,,All CAEs relating to audits j

a..x J

L, w vale:ted d The CAR Iv3 es reviewed ivi

% s '.. :%) r..".+ G audit findios b ends a nd-i t

\\

data +0dgthat EBASCO should have been aware of adverse trends l

m m,

cJ 2A

(

concerning audits as early as December 19, 1978 but certainly by CAR 1

3

~yr.o.:.wgsnE&

.)

No. B18 initiated August 6, 1979.

Ott)er C, ass (046-059), were isgbed j

d% j. '. i y,/.. # ; c.3./y May 24,1982:.and CAR 089 conc + c.in;; eudi ts_.

EBASCO QA management and 2,c _.. f.

er ~Rc C MS /)-.n U>A. _-

auditors should have reviewed tMs. log 4jrecognized the trends, and f

advised LP&L management.

Other trends which should have been recognized t

El:M. w

's and investigated (a,re as iviivw.

GE) SCARS 019, 024, 025,.026, 028, 033 Tssued between March 1980 and April 1982)identifi5d red line "as built" i

drawing control and installation problemd,tg3' CARS 019, 020, 021, 0227,

g-

.0E 025, 026, and 030 issued y one construction supervisor)tetue r th:-

3ame dates idcu tn nd; that raft personnel were not following procedures; and-tlE)]i e

CARS 020, 027, 034, 061, 069, 074, and 088pi;; ed 'E; 9

r

1. )

1M 3>

f QC cnd m. aigueween Mars 1550 and J '., 3C,1002, idico.;im-failure to T.~\\.,d A**

kwa f inspect welds because ef-craf t ignoring hold point;and QC failure to f-n i-s.

inspect weld joint fit-ups..These trends are only examples = th:= w:.ce' J

ef J,&

t t.+4 t.W c 4 m l

ottspr, adverse conditions wMeh-were identified xearly but.ef fectivE "' ')/D r

j gn

'sn 9 6 cs w>

Corrective action was not scured by 16 :::t..Tp MercuryforLP&Lp 11

m

(.

neaf% 1

,g ;

'5/30/84 (T5K4) 6 Review of Mercury Auditing, Nonconformance and Corrective Action Procedures qn o>. p ii '.' Jlso c.s.,,) D. * 'm di.l. Y h.0!. -

j

'[

8untina Ewherwel dudits of vendoripe#et%F4. services, such as M M

<O 7

6 s

e Tew cet t veu

., re. r!.e sacsdre :- d:.: by Welder's Testino Laboratory of Metarie, 74 e s

r not-described in 5AM 4ectic,.10. 0 vi QCP-20?n, Th. QAy d J not

~

--.d p W incorporate the requirements of ANSI N45.2.12 Draf t 3 Rev. 4, D' A.

j(i f.it.

.ef

' February 22,1974f p L[M5;p;;.4 followup action when CAR j.-

i is not issued and references to other applicable standardsjas s..

s.,

l spec}fiedinparagraph1.5ReferencedDocuments.ThisdeckdEtdid Q C F -1 j

=

-r

,.. n...w eM. require a pre-audit conference. Write the ANSI standard stated thataconference"shallbeconductedN u

r,1 %.

Nonconformanc.et and_. Corrective Actiond QAM Section 12 and SPP-664,

,...'.d o j,'.; d 'JfWJ'.* i e-Revisions 4, stated, in p -t, "When the suspected nonconforming / material, iters, and services are determined by the QA Manager-er. 4. his-de5L.:w.e to be nonconforming,, a)-Q~ "on ca4 a :c Repor-t '3 9-f 4 M ibit tie. 2 715 peratedpdenoncunfonience n uis c. oriell be b taken4rce the-#cnc0rfor-ence leg==4*t2S:d by QA (Esion. no. 4) and :h P be 5dicaea on T.ne honconTormance%pcM The NRC Staff determinedthatdraft/onconformance eport3(NCRs submitted by a y ,g -k b.t Fev 4.m inoiviGal or ep2**Nat the QA manage could reject the--draf t-NC4,. g s g,~ A:'d t 9 * /> r

• u L.-< q) e.h c
• 6 C ac" "Ah ould be acue,dableshowever,itwasIfoundthatdraft).NCRs st.a5 c.m M were not m-t-he QA records.

Therefore, the disposition W o a, s u i i t i justification for rejection was not auditable because the draft,NCRs 12 i

( Draft 1 5/30/84 (TSK4) were destroyed. The NRC staff interviewed former Mercury pcr:c me N and other site personnel who had direct knowledge of the NCR system. They acknowledged that such a system may have impeded project W personnelpprocessing NCRs. An LP&L QA engineer stated that LP&L had 6 ECm addressed this problem when Mercury management was supplemented,i,n p-1982. Mercury personnel were encouraged to write NCRs and as a 3 t.o ' ' result the number increased from several hundred to more then 3000.',.

/,4c.

G-i This happened M-about 80% er-f ^tir of.:ee, Mercury %..u-ad 1 2 the NRC staff commented that this,would not necessarily solve the q r.~d.. A problem of failure to process or document rejection of draf t NRC's e='+ t (f r 1 that were submitted by personnel who left the site prior to WVsbNrte S'...Itv.Y - %.*. l /),,.: O.<1s; y,l.g ;' g jf<'f ) ~ g gg __ g e.p'u: W' g).-g act m. y y I Rev ew o' EBASCO Audits and Cor ective Act n-he NRC staf.f_ f i 'J3, A 4GP - 11 id;.*~.'l3.1. [reviewedy. EBASCO audits of all QA recorh p,,reemi.;/,se.imd u,m b U f, / <? 3 .g .l' y. retenu% EBASCO M Force Account,gA Re, cords Department, QA 5" - l.,'k ' - . Tomekim-Beckwith, B&E Cease iy, GEO Testing, and

i n e t* _. < t.;

~ (3..L "' k b RecordsHVAC,0.7D]$2s) g.- 7--- " -d"Q' included review 1fe ...v> .I' o' t, !. EBASCO Service, Inc. FFeviaw s A / r a e [ audit findings,and responses fo audits which contained findings. n.O'. u k [All1982auditsofFishchbach' Moore (19):r'"t! NISCO (20) and [L / / h 1 ' '., Tompkins-Beckwith (23) were reviewed for areas audited, findings, sc and responses in file. Eight EBASCO auditor qualification files I 5'[ } were reviewed.. .,. g r $ %

1. 9 mm ir;

m.... - Q--

yp. ny~ n- ~ 13

+ b y ,D 7o ,, i:. r. J fli ., y.,s i- [

• J T

t .. i :.:- i.N!.:. i d al,1; y

d. %be A-Qp

+ t i tu o. b p., i t: 5. g s. fir,a a.+s h. </. ./.. F h o*1.. 7 6 e a ... c... ,j . s,,- <.,t i.. i r'

/,-

tr. i -,l :, g g, i ..:(,

t...

j- , :i .s. s j. A) p. h','; j'v.0j t ;.,, i l l Ii

Draft 1 (- () S/30/84 (TSK4) -1Lc JJLC & h= W A -  ! 'N El 2 u g EBASCO audits of the Mercury Company (4+)-performed dtm4*g 'X'M p 1978 982 were re.i:. d :nd := Lated to determine if breakdowns in the QA program between Mercury and EBASCO existed. The following is ~N.5^* a summary o f-Jhd r4,, a - .,hl,ManacementBreakdown J.* ( b'$.Eh5 L

n f breakdown between EBASCO and Mercury management; io '.udi w f..

A. A-U- .9Ar*:a/ de ribed 2c.; under. par: graph I of

• rou r[. 1..-

IC ^ d !L . f.,,4 r. +. tr ' ." O'. ~ T+e n;dt:ntM. LP&L and EBASCO to A supplement Mercury management with EBASCO management to complete the project. i h.h.[.,AuditProcramBreakdown flA .)s. !,.' {';.*lu' . [/.{J I4 ,EBASCO audit and corrective action systems in +-dawn I h ti'-a.i E W, in that /EBASCO audits NS-79-9-4 NE-80-8-3, a d y i.a - NB-81-5-1. performed d,i ng-1979,1980,and198gtatedthat MercuryauditedeachsectionoftheQAmanua}despitethefact that the Mercury CAR Log and two or more audits stated that internal audits were ng conducted annually on each section of the Mercury QA Manual. EBASCOAuditSW-82-6-1date4 dune 7, 198 finally identified tire Mercur$ failure to audit their QA prograrg' i. :., SterrP :nd.i.ei.egement audi-ts-See grew was Q' Mi;cs:sions unde. par agrapns 2, 3, 4, andhevrNd-- c "nder "Ra. ic cf "c rcui.y Audiu ano (,orrective Actio'n.' 14 .i

Draft 1 (. ( ) 5/30/84 (TSK4) [ Nonconformance and Corrective Action System Breakdown e N vs. v r

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=pa-t Y3 Pere 9caph [.tM ne ve "- :' ~y-E ;i- -- ": or:rgt: n breakdowri A / in the corrective action system between Mercury and EBASCO M se~' 4 management wa+ evidensed the inability of either Company to (. i s h e ~ obtaincorrectiveactiof.Bothcompaniesapparentlyfailedto review, recognize, or take action on trends which should have been apparent shortly after Mercury implemented their site QA program. It also appears that the Mercury nonconformance f*), system impeded the freedom to initiate NCRs which could have . f, been W -d upgraded to CARS as a result of EBASCO management involvement; therefere, t'i; s co., te b; 4 breakJvwn ha* ween the twoJ.cmpaidaC av, ew Oc#2 e 7 py (. 6stL t s (~ d += d ,J.* -( W e : 2 v remi ne t i e r o f Lp;; 6 pv;,5 %. i i ty amr-Arritn The (/', ',Y

• NRC staff revi,ewed the LP&L Audit Program requirements,
• /

s' I procedures, audits (internal and management),and interviewed ~ '-L r v..Q;. j,' p purate and, site QA manager and,,QA engineers involved with t /- @ r,ts.tw s ncL b4 17 the audit program.g p + te n management and 16 site audits of EBASCO perferred by LP&L : e eWy Tv,4C Ly-f i ve LI&L sitesurveillancereportswerer:^sie-ed.~[' t he LP&L site audit g J.; a schedule fer 1979 through 1984:yn rene-ed. Special emphasis /. was placed on LP&L responsibility for management of the overall audit program. Since this is a primary and important functiony 1 I ,15

( ( (i/ 30/84 (TSK4) \\ r-F.:/44 ~ p q ;. pnw > ,W offLP&L Jceerni'y}-par-tk-ipat4cn-in-the projec-t 0i crtM,i re'y 3 heavily on EBASCO for design, construction, procurement, - 1,: quality assurance, and other functions t was extremely LPIL r. important for -tmem to review and assess the adequacy of the QA program,as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion II,and'It-q e establish and implement en comprehensive system of planned and i~ Q:. :) L periodic audits to verify / compliance with all aspects of the ,J %

1. t." n:w.o we program.and to determine the effectiveness 4uT p,y of we program.

The following i; ; 50mmarf.T.-. % uv p ; '/5 Y ' " I ^ - s f. > i.l, . ' =. ~ I.E.eview of Site Audits Scheduled Versus Audits Performed s,,,) .f 3.f; I r" - I, 2. L G The NRC staff reviewed audits scheduled and performed 1 I 3 ~ -+ % '- ? p '( eg 1979,2952,19S1,' 1002, -1983, rd 1984. There ~ ,s ' ' were 4 auditors in 1979 who were scheduling audits; f ,./., 2 4 however, the' number of full time auditors scheduling { audits appears to decline'to-3 during much of 1980. The 'T.> number of site auditors appears to rise back to 4 in 1981 / ~s or sligh more in 1982. The number scheduling audits s i 983 appears to be about 4. "The c.a wa' number of w faudi formed declined from approxi 60, 53, o I-j 91, 42, and 4ee d,uringdhe respect.1ve auw,,7z ~ 1979, 1980,1981','3982,1983, andthefirstfewmonthsof1984.l [,[. I' S the following p the monthly audits scheduled versus N 4 r C-6 }perfo' med: -40 perferred of 193 cc-heduhd, 00 vi - audits r r. r %.'C. L \\ t.%% Gwwa -1979 ^ yq3 go i4t= g i e 4 6% s ') t 3 2.o y 4' $Nbb /kV %A asA4 1p.e I

7-. Draf?. 1 (. ( ) 5/30/84 (TSK4) C % so.c.I) bn <9 84 *.S/J M" ^!> YN#M '* I A. '. 'e l 4') ),, g _,m, r, n, em, =, r=, m.ms re:;ntiu see:5 '_ : 70, th r ; _f ' ^^ * ' y ' ~ 4e t i o n y L%. p,; -, s4 fes ~' "; 2Mit:(....___, el- ' 4-- n 's ": M f weti^y:%,dr e tcheeA+d e ck c.i n.,pe,for ed, is avdit :y:t i :,.c, hn__ r, Jp '/ 5"5 c c, m - <, see p}. u, x,.. g j;,f / .a existefer me;., jears er.d 2: id...i.; fica in rnooie 5uuthm ' l '. G %,. Ser'.i :: fy) ( Awp*A 1 % M("55-) + 5 li'lkE79-6 (AFR E-88) / Cece Mer'. - e dettqs-ws T c, S '27/7: ^ ':1'70 and E80-15 (AFR E-122) dd/0/;; ~~ 'bece~ hee. (G s l980 9 l!e-42.'10/GO.CCorrective)0.cf ten was apparently not taken a ,1 D 4T nk :r

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g -it appears that auditors gave up as MSS Audit Report. p,'. ;o f .s. t ~~ ,.4_ S #es ES1-12 reported the conduct of QA Audits and QA N.,.. u'.?, !> Construction site auditPsatisfactory when only 53 of 178 e[l 1 QM & R,ces.T / q scheduled were performe4 swMimilarly,E82-15 -^-d""-d Dece'%teG*to' Y

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-I? 'c '*2 '_2/2 /:2 considered )( normal when 91 of 203 were ira 1. r w.>l A L i.&. /> e.* M. o conducted. Tha : tu:1., umber performed venes scheduled / ~,. may 5, % since tha'N. figures include reaudits and Y o may include QA surveillances which are not to be at. [s considered so auditt per ANSI N45.2.12p paragi oW 1.2,4,,, "Reyw.,ements for audit.ir.g ef QA Iregrem5 fu, Nuuienc pc.;cr= . M ents." This condition was discussed with the LP&L Site s -d.e:. h.%Uwe QA Manager who did not consider any-vi Lii> t6 be a problem. 3 GF#Nf th:t LP&L management, hts chosen to belie $ 4fve It-:ppe:r: can delegate all responsibility for their QA program to EBASCO. 17 i ;.

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k (]Il 1 5)30/84(TSK4) -f. h Review of LP&L Audit of EBASCO OA Proaram f The NRC staff reviewed LP&L audits of EBASCO site activitysci v. F t #" 1981, 1983, and 1984. Nine audits were conducted in M?fD ,m J. J.',0 ' ("',,,gJM g. I N #;,;. w ,/1981[' in1983p(t4,.,during the first several months of Op/hhh2 t 1984. Since LP&L has chosen to delegate the function 96 4 qu g h-w K. M ated444eksite contractorsy design, construction, procurement and quality assurance functions)'%' audits pf )nt );i.d>A's EBASCO should be comprehensive,and ir, (deptt, e Jit Of th 9 ra rentirequalitgaspurancemanualandimplementingprocedures.. e g rc ineerj,ng nmad ' nnual audNdASC(QAJ. cog @' T+e-S wr_ - andits in 1Q01 rd 7 m 1333-40 4 appear to be N. ~ L \\ (sufficientlycomprehensivetomeettherequirementsof' / 10 CFR 50 Appentix B and LP&L QP 18.3, Revision 3- ./ ) p c; np' E.0, 9t M, February 8, 1978, which states, in part, " Site audits shall verify that safet,y 'related activities associated with LP&L Nuc. lear Power Plants are / performed in accordance with plicable regulatory requirements, specific ons, instructions, procedures, s and drawings. Th e audits a're necessary to assess the effectivenes of the Quality Assuranc,e programs of the N Archit Engineer, Construction Manager d contractors at-he construction site." 18 l

( )ft 1 5/30/84 (TSK4) & 5. osen a p l k8 Management of We Audit Programs g t- ;' ifr-4ffS# The NRC staff reviewed Mercury auditkand determined that - g /. thei pr:g n failed to audit some key quality control and construction procedures where deficiencies occurred. It yit D o. is obvious that, audit of these procedures dtseing-the ' c c es. L p 1978-1983 wow 4d have 34kely prevented these

• 't 6 0:.

deficiencies alt Mercury Company. . r.'. J U c :. T /e 2 *= s ult d davelopinc a "**4-cf procedures which had - t \\.,~.. k. \\ - 1' p<b:. ~ or,had not.been ="d4* & the NRC, rec,ognized several }sause n ' r bYn. ~2* 9 J.h,a!: ~ a:Sif'ats at documentatton and hardware deficiencies at Mercury Company in addition to several significant break-1. u. downs in the Mercury QA program))=e-. audit, nonconformance ,,--./y rac. t u.H.' ' ' "' +4 t-and corrective action system,. g W LP&L management -wa+ %,,., - f. F,.:)' asked fcr existing matrices, logs, or other documents 4 e,3w.,c M which would stesw all tf the contractor procedures wMrth ..;d b :a audited by LP&L, EBASCO and other site contractors. TheLP&LsiteQAmanagerandQA[onstructionengineer stated that they did not know what procedures had been y f, audited during he constructiorrgtM pJIn~the tTse 'h of e-adventege of tranigemenu ing that Mercury-Company"h - audited tfie impi ntation of their / i roc'durgs-nd assured proper' rol of-work-setivity is ) e j ,19 i

P" ( Draft 1 ( ) 5/30/84 (TSK4) N ~ s i obvious. Also in this. case Joer4ury cnd C0ASCO uvuld 41ot Y[,' a,s aen op-g,5 Ac' , properly apply audit Ter0Vftes unless they/*As the L d S( 0 f . frequency 4 audit nf the._ con:,t, og,un nd qua; i Ly control f i @rocedgres;- La., aneJrocedure may ha a d +=d to the ^uar I detriment of a nrnc-edtnT controllinn red line ara ings or wekiwig. LP&L stated that they h e not managed'the audit ushhnst function in this mannegbut simply monitored 16 awc't e' activities in a broad sense,and, there was no requirement . s...de to know what procedures were audited.% r .. :._ =.. -- s) N =. - -This/hilosophy is contrary to Criterion II of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,which states, in part, "This program shall be documented by written policies, procedures, or instructions and shall be carried out throughout plant life in accordance with those policies, procedures and ,q, gpy 7. jj JA,. ':.p,j u o.NA M '" h ",) 'f))' instructions." To assure % the NRC main'tains that wa s+ procedures which control work activities e t be monitored. 5 The NRC review of Tompkins-Beckwith, Fishbach and Moore, (F' and NISCO audits revealed that,,all procedures had m 4 been audited for these companies. Because many of these audits did not appropriately identify the QA manual sections a F g procedures, and construction procedure 3 t became almost i @% M e. impossible to. ave +4. what procedure was audited. 20 I

n. Draft'l ~ ~ " ' ~ ( \\ > 5/30/84 (TSK4) hf ' Review of LP&L Management Audits of 5 te QA Program n The NRC staff reviewed these audits to determine if LP&L had regularly reviewed the status and adequacy of the QA W program on site. The audits performed atgsite between 1972 and August 27 19797werenotcomprehensivejadiB- -tild afnt to the cch;ce&were {s.r* superficial paper reviews. i Audits after this date were more comprehensive,,but still do not appear to be comprehensive enough to cover all j relements of the QA Manual and implementing procedures, t ) a / ! also itppears that these audits were strictly limited to I I LP&L organizations %nt therefore, the audit would not 'N, extend to EBASCO and their wor't~ activities. Under this circumstance it is hard to understand how the success of ~ LP&L site QA can be measured against EBASCO perform'ance. MM C' ' W e^ $ * * 'i q g y grac-j / [ Q Revies of,Managemert Analysis Company (MAC) The NRC staf f reviewed portions of "*.C :=:ulth evaluations :. /1 c.m:r. ? 4 gy_f LP&L Waterford 3 Meg:: nt'r#FurvivrerJpt1Md in 1977, l,,f o l ,\\ '. ' :. ~ 1979, and 1980. The Executive Summary of the 1979 report c 4t_ 4 outlined many problems which "can critically impact the g.q. n s M.,YJJ ', );.M Waterford 3 Project." /f particular inte ;t e.m ye i fellowing quota en p ;;; 2, ', 5, 24

rc-as follows:

(1) "The long-held policy of Louisiana Power and Light has i 21

v. DM 1 '~ ( () 5/30/84 (TSK4) t been to conduct their business related to engineering, construction, and operation of power plants by utilizing a 'WM' leon'7'in-house organization very .with almost total p'. @gp (AE) reliance on the Architech-Engineer,for engineering and \\,k \\/ construction, and heavy use of consultant and outside service organizations during plant operations. This .> q policy of ' lean-ness'fand almost total reliance on the AE. Afd is, in MAC's opinion, one of the basic root causes of many of the problems associated with Waterford 3... rheavy reliance on outside consultant and service organizations during the operation of Waterford 3 will, in MAC's opinion, cause additional problems once the plant is in operation.... The designated role of the LP&L site project is currently that of liaison and is not sufficiently involved in the planning, monitoring, and c control of site activities.... The existing LP&L project and site organizations are lacking in numbers and in commercial nuclear power plant experience necessary to effectively monitor and control the Waterford 3 project... The LP&L Quality Assurance organization has s recognized basic fundairer.tal problems related to quality but in some cases has r>ut taken sufficient positive action to have problems resolved The 1979 MAC Report to LP&L ... g.g :. pm;;-:;4. 2 states, in part, "The QA group 22

..~ - k ( 5/30/84 (TSK4) 1 overall is strong... but few in number... it is MAC's recommendation that additional manpower be obtained. LP&L should monitor, audit and watch all of the critical activities... as they are accomplished at the site... Additional QA manpower should be applied to ensure contractor QA records are in auditable and buyable order." The 1380 MAC Report deals mainly with startup and operation; however, the theme of under-experienced and inadequate rstaffing is a recurring theme and should be evaluated by NRC staff who are responsible for operational startup,- testing, etc. NRbSta sM g. 3, y,.. x. s.J ~[k lJ S- ( ShH h *^ L C. c r. lib?N k WI "' M Aihere was a significant breakdown in the QA program both at EBASCO and Mercury,and between EBASCO and Mercury 2to the point that EBASCO management was [I iWto supplement Mercury &gemenMi d A DGU E "M O /-~ 4 - mana g,g pc. 3,, we avs kaua en did not thoroughly evaluate, determine all the causes, and identify the entire extent of the QA breakdown at Mercury Company even after receiving K.,*ik tid 31 ste j civil penalty,on December 6, 1982. This represents a failure to adequately evaluate the original Construction Deficiency Report No. 57 and report the ori) r full extent of the QA program breakdown)and represents a failure to take 23

{ \\ ~ 1 Jnm ef fective corrective action '^tW ^g determining the cause of the QA breakdown at the Mercury Companyj cM k (6) LP&L did not implement a program to increase iML manpower and involvement with the Waterford 3 Project. This failure to implement these MAC recom-CM d mendations are the root cause*of QA problems experienced in the past and n present. I 5 ,h ' M R.m % + v"'e'..p.. - $& $) h ..).., q; .g h.p;&. " 4 L. Q.Qf,' C/., * ',:% ' ' 8 ' '. .l. G; %.:. s...} 2" Jy.',Pe it, L ?.t..; 1

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( 64 5 W r n l l l l \\ I i i ( '/ w- --Ad i cas Recui red-M 2onstruction is com.;lete and constructica. of the overall LP&L and / s / N l / ccr.t raC tor aucit sys*e-is nct possible. Audits a*e a seCend line ~ '3 l cefense for inspections that fail tC Ce*ect de#ic'.. riardaare and 8' testinc of systers, *he e#0"e, if tnese Were adeOuate the pla.t car. be j \\ i adecuate despite the -fact that there was a QA breakdown in the audit and // co-rective.l The p-ie* y c; ;e.-

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'c m:d t: 0 ,. ass -e :.rar an / Y'o! f ective aperationa1.2udit_JLytten is mt ahlished-ard-+epiteev j V f j ,} <n ew w y 2. LP&L M fattnr the a veJR3ta,"irdhgs-htoresponses to the NRC s N Const uctipo/ civil penalty and the4r Deficiency Report No. 57 i.e., 0 / l; ah n-J~* rtrevie," evaluate, and determine (le full extent of the QA breakdown'at I"- i the Mercury Company and effet ive \\ ./b 4:. h cor\\rective action repe=d+eg ttren 'te s y s/[1] - ' I. ~) !Y,l} ). l/ 9),,-a}v.ff 4 -y l t,, - j

r nraft 1 ( S/30/84 (TSK4) \\ ~' / ) \\ 3. LP&L should obtain a list of Mercury ' person el and contact ap'p opriate personnel to de rmine if they stiil have co ies of draft NCR which were rl \\ \\ not processed and 5ey consider /to be signific t deficiencies wh cfr hey- \\ thi e not been i entified and correcte. ~., m pe f - h&L management b,- -=: ' ' 'N jtw

m th:t t H he.ve en criv aive system ic;k=ted to recularly assNe s the/y w

status and adequacy of th QA Prpgra ~m' }l} p'Opten pohcy, procedures fM~ >>^.!s.*W'/.h. h t.WIvo w.).. ~ .lYh. !\\ whicn sno h'y / i writ ,m.gnd_sadequate manpower to .<9 > ll yj \\.. ,1 : o a ~.,.. implement such a' system. LPfLmana)gment1bou3dassure,..NRCstaffthat + _h : >.r: ' j .., - r-- ,4, they have such a system demonstrate +'N' ' u l 6 g eijeem. " " ~ + - 1 1 .,... r.] / .r.f j s y~ h .] P.. D k l s-AjJ'h.., ) 9 i-)).*,'jg :, References y-e t J. '., 4 1. LP&L PSAR Quality Assurance requirements. 2. LP&L QR 18.0, Revision 2, 10-10-75, Audits. 3. LP&L QP 18.3, Revision 3, 2-8-78, Conduct of Site Audits. 4. LP&L QP 18.4, Revision 2, 2-17-83, Schedule of Site Audits. 5. LP&L QR 2.0, Revision 2, 10-10-78, Table 2-1 LP&L Commitments (Includes Regulatory Guides and ANSI standards) 26

p ~ aft 1 k 5/30/84 (TSK4) 6. EBASCO QAS-1, Revision 4, 6-30-82, Planning QA Activities. e 7. EBASCO QAS-2, Revision 4, 6-30-82, General Audit Procedure 8. EBASCO Procedure QAS-3, Revision 4, 6-30-82, Processing Audit Reports 9. EBASCO QAI-25, Revision 0, 8-22-83, Instruction for Auditing 10. EBASCO QAI-7, Revision 2, 2-21-84, In,struction for Surveillance / Corrective Action. 11. Mercury QA Manual Sections 1-18, Revisions and Dates Various 12. Fischbach and Moore QA Manual Sections 1, 2, 3, 10, 15, 16, 17, and 18, various Revisions 4-1-81. 13. Fishbach and Moore QAP-103-W3, Revision 0, 6-10-77, Processing and Controlling Nonconformances. ~ 14. Fischbach and Moore QAP-106-W3, Revision 0, 6-10-77, Auditing. 15. NISCO QA Manual Section 15, Revision C, 6-6-78, Audits. 21

) ( i 5/30/84 (TSK4) i ) 16. Tompkins-Beckwith QA Manual Section V, 8-1-81, Audits l' h [ ', /,)h (l.*' ./3 'f,, j '.., s' /' 1 Statement Prepared By: im.-;- Date 5 PM Lhes Revie.ed By: Team Leader Date Reviewed By: Site Team Leader (s) Date Approved By: Task Management Date ,28

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p_- 105 1 All those in favor indicate by saying nye. 2 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: Aye. 3 COMMISSIONER ZECH: Aye. 4 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Aye. 5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Aye. 8 Opposed? 7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: No. 8 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: All right. Now, does any 8 Commissioner -- well, let me announce that the vote means 10 that we are authorizing the staff to allow this plant to 11 proceed towards full power based on the Commission's 12 deliberation, and we will issue the draft OGC order, the 18 target being to' issue it yet today, 'if we possibly can. 14 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: I was going to ask, will it 15 issue today? Is CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: That would be my intent. 17 MR. DENTON: Mr. Chairman, I think this is something 18 my understanding is,we need to see that before we proceed 18 with the actual issuance of the license. i l E MR. MALSCH: It should be ready for signature within 21 a few minutes. 22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: All right. 28 Now, do any Consissioners have additional comments they would like to make? COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE: I have just a few. I

p~- n.. 1 want to'tsy at tha cutzst that thic 10 a cloca case for ma, 2 and I think probably the closest one since-I have been'on 8 the Commission. 4 On the positive side I see a number of things. 5 First, the utilityt has made some management changes over the 6 past few years, and I think not the l' east of those wasLa 7 new chief executive officer and a new plant manager. 8 Another ; positive sign is that the CEO of this ~ 8 company is very actively involved, and I know that the staff 18 has been strongly supportive of Mr. Cain's contributions. 11 Third, I would say that performance seems to be 12 improving over the past couple of years under the new e-0 ~ 18 ' m naeemeat. nd 1 oertain1r hore *a t th t trend continnes. b 14 And finally, the start-up testing program seems 38 to have gone fairly well for this plant. 16 But I also see some things on the negative side. 17 First, this plant has had its share of difficulties in 18 construction. Twenty-three items identified by the staff 18 in 1984 were significant problem areas in my view. And my sense is that the utility did not always respond to those 81 problems in as vigorous and forthright a manner as we would E have liked. 8 Second, the seismic adequacy of the basemat to me ~ is still open to question, and I would like to see some 8 further analysis which would address at least some of the

.L U / j s 1 conc 2rna id:ntificd by Dr. Chat cnd Dr..Ma. And I just cdd p- ~ 2 at this point that I for.one very much' appreciate their 3 efforts in bringing t$ese matters to our attention. It is a 4 difficult thing for a member of the staff to do, and I think 5 they are to be commended for their efforts in making their 6 views known. 7 The third item on the negative side is that there 8 are a number of integrity issues that are still being 9 investigated by our Office of Investigations, and at least 10 one of these items is significant in my mind. 11 Fourth. With respect to senior managers of the 12 company, there is evidence that the company has not always 13 been as careful, forthright, and candid in its statements to 14 the NRC as is necessary. And fifth, 1 am uncomfortable with the fact that 15 16 the utility is using for the operation of the plant two 17 former operators at TMI-2 who are now under investigation 18 by NRC for their possible role in the. falsification of leak 19 rate tests at TMI-2 prior to the accident. 20 I believe that there is sufficient basis now for 21 baring them from operation of the Waterford-3 plant until 22 this matter is resolved. And their continued duty as 23 licensed operators at Waterford raises questions.in my mind 24 about the safe operation of the plant. 25 None of these items individually is sufficient to " ^ - " " " ^ g ag _ _,,

W 108 1 cause me to vote against the license. 'But I have to say that 7 2 when I look at them in the aggregate, I reached the conclusion 8 that there is not now a sufficient basis for me to conclude n 4 that this utility is ready to receive a full power operating V s license. 6 For that reason, I am voting "no." Thank you. 7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, let me make a statement. 8 I fully support the judgment that Waterford Unit 3 can be 8 operated at power levels up to full power with reasonable l g assurance that the public health and safety and common defense 11 and security are adequately protected, 12 On the matter regarding former TMO-2 operators-at j la Waterford which Commissioner Asselstine has brought up, I'. v 14 would have preferred that the two former TMI-2 operators at 15 Waterford be separated from actual operation of the plant to pending the outcome of the Hartman hearing. Nevertheless, 17 I think this plant can go forward at this time. ~ 38 Any other comments anyone wishes to make? COMMISSIONER ZECH:. I would just like to say, I j. think the plant can be operated safely, I think we have 21 reviewed it carefully. I'think the staff has made a very diligent and forthright effort to look'at all sides of.all g V g the issues, and I think they have presented themselves to us, as has everyone else, in a very candid manner I am satisfied that the plant can be operated safely

s t UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board 00LKETED USNRC In the Matter of ) ) '85 MY -7 A10 :19 LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY) Docket No. 50-382 OL ) fl (Waterford Steam Electric ) [gC G S8 Station, Unit 3) ) BRANCH ) a I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Joint Inter-venors' Response to NRC Staff and LP&L Responses to ALAB-801 have been served on the following persons this 6th day of May, 1985, by mailing a copy, first class, postage prepaid, unless otherwise no.ted: Service List l Christine N. Kohn, Chairman Sheldon J. Wolfe, Esq. Chairman Atomic Safety & Licensing Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Panel Dr. W. Reed Johnson U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety & Licensing Washington, D.C. 20555 Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. Docketing and Service Station (3) Washington, D.C. 20555 Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Howard A. Wilbur Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board Sherwin Turk, Esq. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. Office of Executive Legal Director Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board Panel Dr. Walter H. Jordan U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. Administrative Judge Washington, D.C. 20555 881 West Outer Drive Oak Ridge, TN 37830 h

P ( William J. Guste, Jr., Esq. Attorney General for the State of Louisiana 234 Loyola Avenue, 7th Floor New Orleans, LA 70112 Dr. Harry Foreman, Director Administrative Judge University of Minnesota Box 395, Mayo Minneapolis, MN 55455 Mr. Gary L. Groesch 302 Walnut Street New Orleans, LA 70118 Malcolm Stevenson, Esq. Monroe & Lemann 1424 Whitney Building New Orleans, LA 70130 E. Blake, Esq. B. Churchill, Esq. Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1800 M Street N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 Carole H. Burstein, Esq. 445 Walnut Street l New Orleans, LA 70118 I ) ne Bernabei}}