ML20197C965

SALP Repts 50-272/85-98 & 50-311/85-98 for Oct 1985 - Sept 1986

ML20197C965
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	01/20/1987
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20197C962	List: ML20197C957 ML20197C965
References
50-272-85-98, 50-311-85-98, NUDOCS 8701290021
Download: ML20197C965 (63)

See also: IR 05000272/1985098

Text

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ENCLOSURE ,

SALP BOARD REPORT =

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

L~

REGION I

SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE

INSPECTION REPORT 5U-272/85-98 AND 50-311/85-98

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY

SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

ASSESSMENT PERIOD: OCTOBER 1, 1985 - SEPTEMBER 30, 1986

BOARD MEETING: DECEMBER 11, 1986

MEETING WITH LICENSEE: JANUARY 21, 1987

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. INTRODUCTION................................................... 1

A. Purpose and 0verview...................................... 1

B. SALP Board and Attendees.................................. 1

C. Background................................................ 2

II. CRITERIA....................................................... 7

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III. SUMMARY OF RESULTS............................................. 9

3.1 Facility Performance...................................... 9

3.2 Overall Facility Evaluation............................... 9

IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS........................................... 11

A. Plant Operations.......................................... 11

B. Radiological Control s and Chemi stry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

C. Maintenance............................................... 19

D. Surveillance.............................................. 21

E. Emergency Preparedness.................................... 23

F. Se cu ri ty a nd Sa fegua rd s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

G. Outages and Engineering Support........................... 28

H. Licensing Activities...................................... 32

I. Assurance of Quality...................................... 35

J. Training and Qualification Effectiveness............ ..... 38

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V. SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES.................................. 41

A. Investigations and Allegations Review....................... 41

B. Escalated Enforcement Actions............................. 41

C. Management Conferences.................................... 41

D. Licensee Event Reports (LERs)............................. 41

TABLES

TABLE 1 - INSPECTION REPORT ACTIVITIES ........................ 42

TABLE 2 - INSPECTION HOUR SUMMARY.............................. 45

TABLE 3 - ENFORCEMENT SUMMARY................................... 46

TABLE 4 - LISTING OF LERS BY FUNCTIONAL AREA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

TABLE 5 - LER SYN 0PSIS......................................... 50

TABLE 6 - UNPLANNED AUTOMATIC TRIPS AND SHUTDOWNS...... ........ 53

TABLE 7 - SUMMARY OF LICENSING ACTIVITIES...................... 58

ATTACHMENTS

ATTACHMENT 1 - TIME SHUT DOWN PER MONTH IN DAYS................ 60

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose and Overview

The Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) is an inte-

grated NRC staff effort to collect the available observations and

data on a periodic basis and to evaluate licensee performance based

upon this information. The SALP program is supplemental to normal

regulatory processes used to ensure compliance to NRC rules and

regulations. SALP is intended to be sufficiently diagnostic in order

to provide a rational basis for allocating NRC resources and to provide

meaningful guidance to the licensee's management to promote quality

and safety of plant operation.

An NRC SALP Board, composed of the staff members listed below, met on

December 11, 1986, to review the collection of performance observa-

tions and data to assess the licensee performance in accordance with

the guidance in NRC Manual Chapter 0516, " Systematic Assessment of

Licensee Performance." A summary of the guidance and evaluation

criteria is provided in Section II of this report.

This report is the SALP Board's assessment of the licensee's safety

performance at the Salem Generating Station for the period October 1,

1985 through September 30, 1986. The summary findings and totals

reflect the twelve month assessment period.

B. SALP Board Members

Board

W. Kane, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Chairman

S. Collins, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Part-time

Chairman

T. Martin, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

W. Johnston, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety

P. Eselgroth, Chief, Projects Branch No. 2, DRP

L. Norrholm, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 28, DRP

T. Kenny, Senior Resident Inspector, Salem

D. Fischer,. Licensing Project Manager, NRR

Attendees

K. Gibson, Resident Inspector, Salem

R. Summers, Project Engineer, Reactor Projects Section 28, DRP

W. Borchardt, Senior Resident Inspector, Hope Creek

D. Allsopp, Resident Inspector, Hope Creek

R. Bellamy, Chief, Emergency Preparedness and Radiological

Protection Branch, DRSS

M. Shanbaky, Chief, Facilities Radiation Protection Section, DRSS

T. Dragoun, Senior Radiation Specialist, DRSS

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C. BACKGROUND

C.1 Licensee Activities

Both Salem units have achieved availability factors well above

the national average (68.5%) during the assessment period. For

the period through August of 1986, Unit I was available 82% of

the time, and Unit 2 was available 90% of the time. The Salem

Urits historically have experienced high forced outage rates.

The lifetime forced outage rate for Unit 1 is about 27%, and for

Unit 2 about 35%. This has improved in most recent years. In

1985, Unit I was operated with an availability of 95.3% while

surpassing the U.S. record for annual gross generation by a

nuclear unit.

Unit 1

Unit 1 began the assessment period operating at 100% power.

On October 6, 1985, the unit tripped when a senior shift

supervisor opened the vent line resulting in a condenser low

vacuum signal during troubleshooting of a condenser vacuum

sensing device. This trip ended the unit's longest continuous

run at 278 days. The plant then entered a 16 day outage to per-

form maintenance and testing activities. The October 21, 1985,

unit startup was terminated because a control rod could not be

fully withdrawn from the core. The control rod connectors were

repaired and, on October 22, 1985, the unit was returned to 100%

power.

On December 16, 1985, the unit surpassed nine million megawatt

hours electrical generation, establishing a new United States

recntd for gross electrical generation in a calendar year.

The unit tripped from 100% power on January 16, 1986, when an

equipment operator closed a breaker cabinet door too hard caus-

ing 1A vital bus to trip and shutdown control rod banks C and D

to drop into the core resulting in a high negative neutron flux

rate trip. On January 31, 1986, the unit tripped from 100%

power due to No.11 Steam Generator (SG) Low Feedwater Flow -

Low Level caused by a nalfunction of feed regulating valve

11BF19. On February 4, 1986, the turbine was taken off line to

repair a lube oil leak on the lube oil regulating valve to No. 4

bearing. The plant was maintained in Mode 2 during the repairs.

The unit tripped from 100% power on February 20, 1986, due to

No. 14 Steam Generator Low Feedwater Flow - Low Level caused by

a broken electrical connection to the solenoid valve resulting

in loss of air to feed regulating valve 14BF19. The electrical

connections on all four feed regulating valves were replaced and

the unit was returned to power on February 21, 1986.

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On March 21, 1986, the unit was taken off line for its sixth

refueling outage. Replacement of three moisture separator

reheaters, upgrade of condensate pumps, 45 design changes, and

reduction of the backlog of outage-related maintenance work

requests were accomplished during the 46 day outage. The unit-

was returned to service on May 6, 1986. Subsequently, the unit

tripped from 95% power on May 12, 1986, due to No. 14 Steam

Generator Low Feedwater Flow - Low Level as a result of a limit

switch going off its normally closed position and the subsequent

loss of both main feedwater pump. On June 6, 1986, the unit

tripped from 100% power due to i e failure of the auxiliary

power transformer (APT) and resuiting actuation of the generator

protection system. The unit returned to power on June 7, but

was limited to 90% power due to loading restraints on Nos. 11

and 12 station power transformers. On June 12, 1986, the ur.it

tripped due to a feed flow / steam flow mismatch in conjunction

with a No.13 Steam Generator low level signal. The cause was a

feedwater heater control PC board that became wet due to rain

and the cabinet door being left open to facilitate test leads

used for testing following the refueling outage. Resulting

false signals led to faulty feedwater system response and

eventual tripping of No. 11 feedwater pump. During the ensuing

restart on June 13, 1986, following the unit synchronization,

the unit tripped while shifting the turbine lube oil coolers.

On July 21, 1986, the licensee initiated a normal shutdown of

the unit to inspect and repair a main generator hydrogen leak

into the stator water cooling system. The unit returned to

service on July 29 and operated until August 5, 1986, when the

unit tripped on No. 12 Steam Generator (SG) Low Low Level due to

the loss of No. 11 SG feed pump caused by a failed suppression

diode in the Woodward governor circuit which resulted in an

overspeed condition. During the August 6, 1986, startup, the

unit tripped from 35% on No.11 Steam Generator low flow in

conjunction with Nos. 11 and 13 SG low level. This condition

resulted from No. 12 SG feedwater pump sustaining a runback

during troubleshooting on No. 11 SG feed pump. Also on August

6, the licensee identified an environmental qualification dis-

crepancy in wiring for Limitorque motor operators and placed the

unit in cold shutdown to replace the wires. On August 12, 1986

the unit was returned to 100% power.

On September 2, 1986, limited loading requirements on the

station power transformers (SPT) were imposed as a result of the

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Unit 2 reactor trip, safety injection, false loss of offsite

power event of August 26, 1986. The unit was placed in hot

shutdown on September 17, 1986, to repair a steam leak on high

pressure turbine cold reheat piping to the moisture separator

reheater and reheat steam system. The unit was returned to

power on September 24, 1986.

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Unit 2

Unit 2 began the SALP period operating at 100% power.

On October 7,1985, the unit tripped from 100% power due to a

momentary ground on "C" vital bus caused by an I&C technician

performing surveillance on the bus. On October 30, 1985, the

licensee declared an unusual event and commenced a controlled

shutdown to repair a weld crack on a charging system instrument

line which rendered both charging pumps inoperat,le. The unit

was taken to hot shutdown on December 10, 1985, (Mode 4) to

repair high pressure turbine steam line leaks and seat leakage

from main steam safety valves. On December 19, the unit was

taken to cold shutdown (Mode 5) to repair leaks on Nos. 21 and

23 Reactor Coolant pumps (RCP) seals. The unit returned to

power on January 5,1986. Again, on January 19, 1986, a

controlled shutdown and cooldown (Mode 5) was performed to

replace Nos. 22 and 24 RCP seals due to excessive leakage. The

unit returned to power on February 3,1986.

On April 16, 1986, the unit tripped on No. 23 Steam Generator

High-High Level as a result of a transient following loss of No.

22 Steam Generator Feed Pump (SGFP) due to an accumulation of

water in the control oil. On May 2, 1986, a controlled shutdown

was initiated to perform environmental equipment qualification

inspection in containment. The unit returned to power on May 3.

The unit tripped on July 14, 1986, due to the loss of No. 2B

Vital Instrument Bus Inverter, which caused a false reactor trip

signal. Following inverter repair, unit startup was commenced

on July 15. During the startup, a reactor trip occurred as a

result of a voltage spike on No. 2B Vital Instrument Bus caused

by personnel error during testing of the instrument inverter.

The unit was synchronized on July 16. However, later that day,

a reactor trip occurred on No. 23 Steam Generator High-High

Level as a result of governor control problems on No. 21 SGFP.

Following repairs, the unit returned to service on July 20,

1986.

The unit was placed in cold shutdown (Mode 5) from August 6-14,

1986, to replace Limitorque motor operator wiring to correct an

environmental qualification discrepancy.

On August 26, 1986, I&C troubleshooting activities caused spuri-

ous signals in the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) result-

ing in a reactor trip and safety injection (SI). This event was

compounded by a false loss of offsite power (" blackout") signal

that resulted when, during vital bus transfers between station

power transformers (SPT), 2 of 3 vital busses were momentarily

unpowered coincidentally. Following the event, as a result of

commitments made at an NRC/ licensee meeting on August 30, 1986,

and in a licensee justification dated August 31, 1986 for

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restart of Unit 2 and continued operation of Unit 1, NRC granted

permission for restart of Unit 2 and for continued operation of

Unit 1. The commitments consisted of limiting loading on the

station power transformers, powering the group busses from the

SPTs, and performing additional analyses on the electrical

system. On September 1, 1986, the unit was returned to power.

On September 11, 1986, the unit tripped on loss of Nos. 22 and

23 Reactor Coolant Pumps due to the deenergizing of 2F and 2G

non-vital (group) busses caused by an electrical short on a non-

vital transformer coincident with an internal failure of No. 22

Station Power Transformer. Spare transformers were installed

and the unit returned to power on September 28, 1986.

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C.2 Inspection Activities

An NRC senior resident inspector was assigned for the entire assess-

ment period; a resident inspector was assigned in July, 1986. The

total NRC inspection effort for the period was 2679 hours0.031 days <br />0.744 hours <br />0.00443 weeks <br />0.00102 months <br /> (resident

and region-based). Table 2 (Inspection Hour Summary) shows inspec-

tion time distribution in each of the appraisal functional areas.

During the period, two NRC team inspections were conducted in the

following areas:

a. Environmental qualification of electrical equipment.

b. Special inspection of the false loss of offsite power event of

August 26, 1986.

An NRC Emergency Preparedness inspection team observed the annual

emergency exercise on September 16, 1986.

Tabulations of Inspection Activities ard Violations are attached as

Tables 1 and 3, respectively.

This report also discusses " Training and Qualification Effectiveness"

and " Assurance of Quality" as separate functional areas. Although

these topics, in themselves, are assessed in the other functional

areas through their use as evaluation criteria, the two areas provide

a synopsis. For example, quality assurance effectiveness has been

assessed on a day-to-day basis by resident inspectors and as an

integral aspect of specialist inspections. Although quality work is

the responsibility of every employee, one of the management tools to

measure this effectiveness is reliance on quality assurance inspec-

tions and audits. Other major factors that influence quality, such

as involvement of first-line supervision, safety committees, and work

attitudes, are discussed in each functional area.

The topic of fire protection is not discussed as a separate functional

area in this assessment period because of insufficient inspection

activity. The available observations on fire protection and house-

keeping are included in the various relevant functional areas.

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II. CRITERIA

Licensee performance is assessed in selected functional areas. Each func-

tional area represents areas significant to nuclear safety and the

environment, and are normal programmatic areas. The following evaluation

criteria were used, as appropriate, to assess each area:

1. Management involvement and control in assuring quality.

2. Approach to resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint.

3. Responsiveness to NRC initiatives.

4. Enforcement history.

5. Reporting and analysis of reportable events.

6. Staffing (including management).

7. Training effectiveness and qualification.

Based upon the SALP Board assessment each functional area evaluated is

classified into one of three performance categories. The definitions of

these performance categories are:

Category 1: Reduced NRC attention may be appropriate. Licensee manage-

ment attention and involvement are aggressive and oriented toward nuclear

safety; licensee resources are ample and effectively used such that a high

level of performance with respect to operational safety or construction is

being achieved.

Category 2: NRC attention should be maintained at normal levels. Licen-

see management attention and involvement are evident and are concerned

with nuclear safety; licensee resources are adequate and are reasonably

effective such that satisfactory performance with respect to operational

safety or construction is being achieved.

Category 3: Both NRC and licensee attention should be increased. Licen-

see management attention or involvement is acceptable and considers

nuclear safety, but weaknesses are evident; licensee resources appear

strained or not effectively used such that minimally satisfactory perform-

ance with respect to operational safety or construction is being achieved.

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Trend: The SALP Board may determine to include an appraisal of the

performance trend of a functional area. Normally, this

performance trend will only be used where both a definite trend

of performance is discernible to the Board and the' Board believes

that continuation of the trend will result in a change of

performance level.

Improving _

Licensee performance was determined to be improving near the

close of the assessment period.

Declining

Licensee performance was determined to be declining near the

close of the assessment period,

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III. SUMMARY OF RESULTS

3.1 Facility Performance

Category Category

Last Period This Period

(9/1/84 - (10/1/85 - Recent

Functional Area 9/30/85) 9/30/86) Trend

A. Plant Operations 2 2 Improving

B. Radiological Controls 1 1

and Chemistry

C. Maintenance 2 'l

D. Surveillance 2- 2

E. Emargency Preparedness 2 1

F. Security and Safeguards 1 1

G. Outages and Engineering Support 2 2

H. Licensing Activities 2 2

I. Assurance of Quality N/A 2 Improving

J. Training and Qualification N/A 2

Effectiveness

3.2 Overall Facility Evaluation

During this rating period, our assessment of performance included

the results of changes to your organization and a new management

philosophy. Your performance has shown improvements and has

established some strengths, however, there remain some weaknesses

that warrant attention.

Your management philosophy and oversight which stress responsibility,

accountability, and ownership, have resulted in the placement of managers

who are technically competent and effective leaders. Quality improve-

ment programs have been instituted to identify and correct not only

discrepancies within the station programs, but also the material

condition of the facility. As a result of your initiative to utilize

union personnel in these programs, the relationship between management

and workers has improved. Your organization displays cooperation and

responsiveness to NRC concerns and initiatives, and all levels of

management maintain an open dialogue with NRC representatives.

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The root cause analyses following plant occurrences are now being

performed in more depth. These analyses and investigations

have been successful in identifying and correcting the causes of

events leading to trips and plant safety concerns. Employee-

management relationships have improved. Outage planning and perform-

ance have become more structured as evidenced by the more timely

completions of outages.

There have been a number of identified personnel errors. The programs

in place seem to be sound and have identified problems that were caused

or missed by personnel performing operations, surveillance or trouble-

shooting activities. There have been a number of identified const-

ruction deficiencies and equipment failures that have led to plant

problems. The majority of these were the result of balance of plant

problems. Although the engineering support to the station has improved

we acknowledge that you have identified, through a contractor, that

additional concerns within the engineering organization need correction.

The above listed observations are further amplified within the speci-

fic sections of this report. You have continued to operate a safe and

efficient facility. You have developed effective programs to operate

the facility and should continue to refine those programs with specific

emphasis on addressing the personnel errors and construction / material

deficiencies that were identified during this evaluation period.

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IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

A. Plant Operations (47.7%,1278 hours0.0148 days <br />0.355 hours <br />0.00211 weeks <br />4.86279e-4 months <br />)

1. Analysis

This area was under continuous inspection by the resident inspectors.

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Two special team inspections related to plant trips with accompanying

electrical faults were conducted. The last assessment period identi-

fied deficiencies in procedure adherence, on the spot changes that

led to improper plant operation and a high number of reactor plant

trips. The last assessment also requested the licensee to make a

presentation of their assessment of the reactor trips to Region I

management and recommended that the order issued May 6, 1983 concern-

ing the ATWS event be rescinded.

The licensee has a strong management team committed to plant better-

ment, which clearly understands NRC policies and regulations. There

, is consistent evidence of prior planning and the assignment of prior-

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ities by the licensee when dealing with plant operations. Reviews,

decisions and corrective actions are clear, timely and in keeping

with NRC and industry standards. Often the corrections to identified

concerns and procedural policies presented by the licensee exceed the

requirements.

The licensee's new organization, which was in place at the beginning

of this evaluation period, emphasizes plant operation with a focus on

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responsibility, accountability and ownership. Management has esta-

blished new standards for the nuclear department with emphasis on

goals and objectives for all management positions as far down as the

engineer level as part of their performance ratings. Personnel are

then graded on the results of their performance. Additionally, a

strong emphasis has been placed on control of radiation exposure in

day-to-day activities as well as outages. There has been very good

success in this area. (Refer to Section B of this report.)

The SORC (Station Operations Review Committee) continues to be a

strong influence on operations. The meetings are focused on plant

safety and integration of the new issues into the overall operations

i of the facility. All reactor trips and their cause and analysis are

reviewed and concurred in by the SORC prior to unit startup. The

committee stresses root cause analysis of the trips and considers

refinements that should be taken to prevent recurrence. During the

review of the events which surrounded a reactor trip with an accomp-

anying electrical fault in the switchyard that led to a false black-

out signal, the SORC organized a series of task forces to focus on

the cause and analysis of the event. These task forces analyzed the

event, identified cause and effect and presented their findings to

the SORC prior to restart.

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The licensee has strengthened procedure adherence and "on the spot"

changes. During this assessment period, there were no identified

concerns in these two areas. There was however, a concern identified

with regard to a long-standing item which management had failed to

correct that led to a plant trip. The event began when the operators

tied closed a limit switch, that in the past has been identified as a

contributor to plant trips. The breaking of the tie down line initi-

ated the trip because the limit switch opened. The concern has been

resolved and licensee communications with all parties have reiterated

management policy on the consequences of bypassing limit switches.

Long-standing fire protection issues referred to in the last assess-

ment period, such as a continuous action statement in effect because

of improper, broken or otherwise disabled fire doors, improperly

installed fire dampers, and deficiencies within the sprinkler and

detection system have been corrected. A new fire chief has been

hired and the staffing of the on site protection organization is

considered to be adequate. The licensee has identified several

problems within the fire protection program that led to a violation.

The responses correcting the problem, which included the use of fire

watches and identification of technical specification related doors,

was generally timely and no additional problems of this nature have

been identified. However, the licensee is still identifying concerns

within the fire protection program . Actions have been taken to

correct the identification of fire barriers that are not readily

identifiable without special markings. In general, the fire protec-

tion program has improved; and, the current staff is identifying

deficiencies that have always existed within the program but had not

been previously detected.

Housekeeping at the facility has improved. The good material appear-

ance in all areas of the facility is readily apparent. In the auxil-

iary building, the radiologically controlled areas have been reduced

and the material appearance has significantly improved. Ground water

in-leakage has been addressed and virtually eliminated. The itcensee

has a full time staff devoted to plant material condition and clean-

liness. Most of the facility has been painted (utilizing a color

coding scheme) and a component identification program is underway.

The appearance, cleanliness, and condition of the facility is consi-

dered to be outstanding.

During this assessment period, the licensee has been very responsive

to NRC initiatives, including closing out old NRC open items by dedt-

cating a staff to work with the resident inspector to address these

items. The licensee (all major departments) conducts quarterly

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meetings with the resident inspectors to address future initiatives,

current events and programmatic changes. The licensee has a strong

Licensee Event Report (LER) reporting system. Thirty-eight nonsecurity

events were reported for the station during this reporting period in

accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 procedures. Twenty LERs regarding Unit 1,

and eleven LERs regarding Unit 2 were submitted in accordance with

10 CFR 50.73. A summary of these event reports is found in Tables

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4 and 5 of this report. In addition, based on a limited sample review,

the NRC Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data concluded

that the Salem Generating Station LERs were of a very high quality.

The licensee met with NRC Region I on two occasions during this

period. On May 6, 1986, a meeting prompted by the last SALP dealt

with the licensee's initiatives for trip reduction at the Salem

Station. (The trip analysis for this period is discussed later in

this section.) On August 26, 1986, a meeting was held to discuss the

licensee's intentions regarding the restart of Unit 2 following a

reactor trip and safety injection with an accompanying false loss of

offsite power signal.

The licensee has been responsive to identified plant conditions that

warrant plant shutdown. Without hesitation, on five occasions, rela-

ting to Environmental Qualification and plant degraded conditions,

the licensee placed the units in a condition to expedite repairs. In

several cases the units were brought to the cold shutdown condition.

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An above average number of trips (18) continued to be evident at

Salem Station. Six of these trips are attributable to operator

error. Although the errors are not causally linked, they are avoid-

able trips that should be addressed by the licensee.

The mean trip rates per 1,000 critical hours, for the units are 1.8

, for Unit 1 and 1.1 for Unit 2. The rates attained for both units are

above the 1985 average for Westinghouse plants which was about 1.0 per

1,000 critical hours.

The overall staffing of the facility is essentially complete. There

are several proposed new positions which are currently being evalu-

ated and filled within station engineering, site protection (fire

protection) and radiation protection departments. During this

, assessment period, a new President and Chief Operating Officer was

selected, a Senior Vice President position was eliminated, the oper-

ations engineer was replaced, and a radiation protection engineer was

hired. The organizational changes are designed to remove some of the

management chain between the higher levels of the organization and

the individuals actually performing the work. This change is ,

i intended to improve direct communications.

In summary, the licensee exhibits consistent evidence of prior plan-

,

ning and assignment of priorities. Decision making is consistent at

all levels. Reviews are generally timely, thorough and technically

, sound. Corrective actions taken are effective and thoroughly address

the root cause. The licensee has an aggressive approach to the

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problems encountered in the operation of a nuclear facility and is

generally' effective, timely and thorough with regard to overall

operations of the facility. However, trips remain excessive and need

to be addressed.

2. Conclusion

Rating: Category 2

Trend: Improving.

3. Board Recommendations

Licensee

None

NRC

None

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B. Radiological Controls and Chemistry (9L 241 hours0.00279 days <br />0.0669 hours <br />3.984788e-4 weeks <br />9.17005e-5 months <br />)

1. Analysis

In the previous assessment period, this area was rated as Category 1.

During that period, the licensee demonstrated a strong commitment to

collective man-rem exposure reduction and radwaste reduction. Due to

poorly written and ambiguous radiological controls procedures, minor

performance difficulties were encountered resulting in several minor

violations. However, overall licensee performance in this area was

excellent.

In the current period, one radwaste violation was cited but was with-

drawn when the licensee presented additional information. There were

no escalated enforcement actions, civil penalties or confirmatory

action letters. There was one routine inspection in each of the

following program areas: Radiation Protection; Radioactive Waste

Management and Transportation; Confirmatory Chemistry Measurements;

and Non-radiological Chemisfry. There was one special inspection to

observe the packaging and shipment of primary resin.

During this period, there was a major physical rearrangement of the

main access control point to increase controls over access to radio-

logical areas of Units 1 and 2. In addition, a computer system was

installed that controls personnel entries via interactive terminals,

performs required recordkeeping, and provides entry / exit data trends

for management review. New office space was built adjacent to the

control point providing convenient access for the Radiation Protec-

tion Manager and his entire staff. Frisking of personnel is now

accomplished with very sensitive automatic machines installed at the

control point exit. This has enhanced control of radioactive

material.

During this period, the licensee's performance continued at the high

level noted in the previous assessment except in the chemistry

program, where a persistent lack of improvement was noted, as discus-

sed below.

A weakness regarding the need to consolidate radiation protection

(RP) procedures and provide better control of changes to chemistry

procedures was not resolved by the licensee, although this matter was

highlighted in the previous SALP. Although, the licensee has commit-

ted to complete implementation of the new procedures prior to the

beginning of the 1987 refueling outages.

Radiation Protection

There is consistent evidence of management involvement in outage

planning to achieve good radiation protection performance and to keep

exposures ALARA. Emphasis on ALARA and support of ALARA by upper

, .

16

management is substantial. The contract for the major refueling work

included a limit for total exposure with financial penalties if the

specification was exceeded. The stem packing on approximately 400

valves was replaced with a low leakage design that will reduce main-

tenance requirements in radiation areas and minimize contaminated

areas.

The management review of an entry by two personnel into the reactor

sump area while the flux thimbles were withdrawn, creating very high

radiation levels, was thorough and technically sound from a radiation

protection perspective. However, the licensee was requested to

review the breakdown .in controls afforded by the operations shift

supervisors. A review of licensee action plans indicates that the

response to this NRC initiative will involve sweeping changes involv-

ing most station departments in an attempt to permanently prevent a

similar event from recurring.

The radiation protection department has demonstrated a consistent

ability to resolve technical issues from a safety standpoint. The

major effort and expense to improve the effectiveness of the control

point was already discussed. The Radiation Protection Manager has  !

established the policy that no tools or equipment are allowed to

leave the controlled area in order to reduce the amount of material

brought into the area. The radwaste department found that signifi-

cant exposure occurred to personnel attaching the lid on a waste

container. A new tool was designed and fabricated to reduce such

exposure.

The RP department staff was expanded during the latter part of the

previous assessment period. All of the key positions were filled by

qualified and experienced personnel within a reasonable time.

Certain programs in common with Hope Creek station such as personnel

dosimetry, respiratory protection training, and whole body counting

have been transferred to the corporate RP staff. The station RP

staff can now concentrate on the day-to-day and outage activities.

Improvements in the training program have resulted in improved under-

standing of the work and adherence to procedures. A screening exam

is now administered to contractor technicians hired for outage

support to verify their understanding of basic regulations. A prac-

tical factors portion has also been added for senior contractor tech-

nicians to demonstrate the plant-specific RP techniques in use at

Salem Station. The training department staff is given in plant

assignments during the outage to provide first hand experience and

give a good understanding of training needs.

i

e a,

17

Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation

Management involvement and control in the radioactive waste manage-

ment program continued at the level noted during the previous assess-

ment period. Specific goals for reducing the volume of solid radio-

active waste generated were established, monitored and generally met

by an aggressive campaign involving corporate and plant staffs.

Quality control and assurance activities (including appropriate

inspection hold points in preparation, packaging and shipping proce-

dures, periodic surveillance of ongoing activities and audits of

radioactive waste preparation, classification, packaging and shipping

activities) were evident and contributed to adequate adherence to

packaging and' shipping requirements. Although a minor deviation from

previous licensee commitments was noted in the retraining program for

Quality Control inspectors, the training program \gdnerally provided

instruction in all aspects of radioactive wasts preparation, classi-

fication, packaging and shipping activities. l

Records of waste disposal are complete, well maintained and provide

additional information which the licensee effectively' utilizes in

managing and planning solid radioactive waste processing, preparation

and packaging activities. The computer program utilized for activity

determination and classification is frequently updated as additional

waste stream analysis data are provided by the licensee's vendor.

Effluent Control and Monitoring .

A generally effective program for liquid and gaseous effluent control

was evident. Followinp a reorganization, chemistry has responsibil-

ity for chemical and radigchemical analyses of primary and secondary

coolant and other liquid and gaseous process streams in the plant,

control of liquid and gaseous effluents including offsite dose calcu-

lations and performance of HEPA and charcoal filter system testing.

During the period, one violation of the chemistry quality control

program was identified concerning the use of expired chemicals and

reagents. This, and other weaknesses in the licensee's chemical and

radiochemical quality control program, as discussed below, indicates

inadequate attention to detail and insufficient oversight.

In 1984, chloride measurement procedures lacking the sensitivity and

detectubility necessary to meet Technical Specification requirements

were identified. During this assessment period, delay in the resolu-

tion of this technical issue contributed to a disagreement in the

measurement of standard chloride solutions submitted by the NRC for

analysis by the licensee. Disagreement in fluoride, chromium,

Iron-55 and Xenon-133 determinations were also noted, suggesting a

more general problem with laboratory quality control. An apparent

lack of management attention to technical detail in quality control

was evidenced by bias in a multichannel analyzer, lack of prescribed

warning or control limits on control charts and poor agreement in

-, s

18

infrequent intercomparisons with the licensee's participating labor-

atories. .Although several of these weaknesses were brought to the

licensee's attention by contractor audits in August 1984, December

1984, and May 1985, timely improvements in quality control were not

provided. The licensee's corrective action system apparently failed

to adequately evaluate and correct the weaknesses noted in the vendor

audits. The licensee possesses an ion chromatograph that can meet

the sensitivity requirements for the anion analyses; but, the licen-

see has not aggressively pursued the use of this instrument.

In the beginning of the assessment period, inadequate control of

procedure changes was demonstrated when changes in chemistry proce-

dures for obtaining pre release samples from Waste Gas Decay Tanks

were not reflected in Operations procedures resulting in failure to

continuously monitor the Waste Gas Heidup system for oxygen. In

another~ event, inadequate procedures resulted in oxygen concentra-

tions in excess of Technical Specification limits in two Waste Gas

Decay Tanks. These events suggest that the problem with the control

of procedure changes as was noted during the previous assessment

period, also occurred early in this period. However, these problems

were resolved during this period and the events have not recurred.

In summary, the licensee's radiological control program continues to

be effective and procedural enhancements are currently being resolved

with implementation scheduled prior to the 1987 Refueling Outage. In

contrast to the radiological control program, the licensee's chemis-

try and radiochemistry programs need to be strengthened.

2. Conclusion

Rating: Category 1

Trond: None

!

3. Board Recommendation

Licensee

Increased licensee attention in the area of laboratory QA/QC is

warranted in order to assure the quality of the analytical results.

NRC

None

_ . . . _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _.

_ _ - _____ _ _.

e s

19

C. Maintenance (12.4%, 332 hours0.00384 days <br />0.0922 hours <br />5.489418e-4 weeks <br />1.26326e-4 months <br />)

1. Analysis

The previous SALP identified an increasing backlog of Maintenance

Work Requests (MWR's), an adequate, but cumbersome method of record

storage and the need to assess the combining of the I&C, Maintenance

and Electrical departments under one manager. Also, the previous

SALP was based primarily on the day-to-day observations of the resi-

dent inspectors. This SALP, similarly was based on observations by

the resident inspectors; however, a programmatic inspection by

region-based inspectors was also conducted.

The last SALP identified a concern involving an increasing backlog

of maintenance work requests in conjunction with the elimination of

contract maintenance personnel. During this assessment period, the

backlog has been reduced to a manageable, constant number by licensee

traintenance personnel with safety-related work requests being addres-

sed as top priority. The internal planning organization within the

maintenance department plans the work and work requirements includ-

ing: post maintenance testing, special instructions, tools needed,

manpower and procedure requirements. The maintenance worker then is

, only tasked with the actual work and documentation.

The maintenance work order system is now totally computerized and

includes the scheduling of preventive maintenance, surveillance

tests, and environmental qualification type preventative maintenance.

Overall, this system has allowed the licensee to prioritize the main-

tenance work and to further refine the preventive maintenance program.

This system is used in the planning, management, and control of main-

tenance activities.

With regard to record storage methods, an inspection of station

records was conducted during this assessment period with no problems

being identified.

The control of activities, decision making on the part of management,

and policy adherence has substantially improved because of the new

alignment within the maintenance organization. The new alignment

includes one manager and two engineers, one for mechanical and one

for electrical and I&C. This change, in conjunction with the newly

created system engineers, has contributed to a more " root cause"

oriented troubleshooting approach to plant problems. This was

evidenced in the troubleshooting of several feedwater pump problems

I

that occurred on both units. Two trips during this period were

attributed to maintenance related troubleshooting.

Maintenance support during outages is one of the contributing factors

to timely completion of outages. During the outages, the maintenance

{ department has been actively involved in two programs that have

l

. __

. _ _ - __-_.

a s

20

proved very beneficial to the operability, dependability and safety

of the units. They are: MOVATS (Motor Operated Valves Analysis and

Test System) which, when implemented, gives a more positive indica-

tion as to the status of motor operated valves with respect to their

settings for safety purposes; and the repacking of valves, both

accessible and inaccessible, during operations. The new packing

consists of a live loaded special packing that has reduced the number

of leaks in key safety related systems, and has also reduced the

amount of man rem that had been previously expended in the repacking

effort, especially in the inaccessible areas (high radiation).

In summary, the Maintenance department shows consistent evidence of

prior planning and assignment of priorities. The management struc-

ture is suited to the methods of performing maintenance in order to

meet deadlines and resolve issues in a timely manner. During this

assessment period there were no violations identified within this

area. The Maintenance department has an adequate staff with each

supervisor having 8 to 10 individuals assigned to him. There is

almost no turnover of personnel and the experience level of personnel

.is high.

2. Conclusion

Rating: Category 1

Trend: None

3. Board Recommendations

Licensee

None

,

NRC

None

,

. . - . . , . . - - -

, , . , - . . . - -

. .

.

21

D. Surveillance (10.1%, 272 hours0.00315 days <br />0.0756 hours <br />4.497354e-4 weeks <br />1.03496e-4 months <br />)

1. Analysis

The previous assessment identified a lack of strict adherence to

procedures and an incorrect interpretation of RCS leakage classifi-

cation. The assessment also acknowledged that both areas had been

corrected but adequate time had not elapsed to properly assess the

long-term results.

Surveillance tests performed by the licensee are the responsibility

of several departments, depending on the type of surveillance. The

operations, maintenance, chemistry, and site protection departments

participate in surveillance testing. This section addresses surveil-

lance tests performed without reference to the particular department

involved.

There has been no recurrence of RCS leakage identification or proce-

dure adherence problems during this period. However, testing led to

two reactor trips directly attributable to surveillance activities.

Several surveillance tests were performed late because of lack of

attention on the part of the responsible party. Several diesel

surveillance tests were performed late (by as much as several hours)

by the operations department and chemistry sampling of waste holdup

tanks, plant ventilation, and waste gas tanks was delayed due to

procedural and personnel errors. About 2500 safety related surveillance

tests are performed at the station per year.

During a QA audit of the valves within the IST program, the licensee

identified valves that required testing both in the IST program and

for containment integrity testing. These valves were added to the

proper surveillance tests and an assessment was performed on the

valves that had been missed. No adverse conditions were identified.

The containment valves were normally closed valves which were proven

to be closed.

There is evidence that the licensee has programs in place that comply

with the technical specifications. These programs were the reason

the licensee identified its own missed surveillance tests and omis-

sion of valves on the surveillance program. The reviews of these

programs, by the licensee, has identified the discrepancies in a

timely manner for resolution. The problem with missed surveillance

tests and troubleshooting practices by the licensee is not program

related, but rather personnel related, indicating that more awareness

on the part of plant personnel to prevent similar occurrences is

warranted.

, _ _ _

__ _ __

. .

22

In summary, the licensee has an excellent system for the identifica-

tion and scheduling of surveillance tests (as described in the main-

,

tenance section). The computerized system automatically identifies

surveillance tests and when they are due, however, personnel have not

performed all surveillances in a timely manner. The completed

surveillance procedures are complete, well maintained, and available.

Corrective action, if warranted, is effective and thorough. Training

received by the various departments is adequate and the direction and

practical lessons taught by the training department appear to be

effective.

2. Conclusion

Rating: Category 2

Trend: None

3. Board Recommendations

Licensee

None

NRC

None

,

. s

23

E. Emergency Preparedness (10.1%, 272 hours0.00315 days <br />0.0756 hours <br />4.497354e-4 weeks <br />1.03496e-4 months <br />)

1. Analysis

During the previous assessment period, the licensee was rated as

Category 2 in the area of Emergency Preparedness. That assessment

was based on observation of the annual exercise held on October 23,

1984, a followup inspection, and subsequent enforcement action. The

deficiencies identified during the October 23, 1984 exercise were

resolved. Evidence of this was verified during a team inspection on

July 8-11, 1985. All of the deficiencies which resulted in the civil

penalty were closed by the inspection team. All licensee nuclear

activities have been relocated to the site area. A new Vice Presi-

dent - Nuclear was selected and has placed a strong emphasis on emer-

gency preparedness. A full-time emergency preparedness manager was

assigned, the emergency training program has been substantially

improved, and an attendance / record / qualification system put in place.

During this assessment period, there were two announced inspections

of emergency preparedness activities consisting of obserwation of two

partial participation exercises conducted on December 4, 1985, and

September 16, 1986. Licensee responsiveness to NRC initiatives was

demonstrated by management attention and detailed corrective actions.

The NRC scenario review and the licensee changes to the scenarios

also fully satisfied NRC concerns. Each exercise scenario tested a

major portion of the Event Classification Guide, the Emergency Plan,

its implementing procedures, and provided an opportunity for licensee

personnel to demonstrate areas previously identified by the NRC as

needing corrective action. Areas identified during the preceding

exercise were corrected and did not recur during the subsequent exer-

cise. The licensee's staff correctly identified Emergency Action

Levels, effected offsite notifications within the prescribed time,

followed appropriate response procedures and formulated protective

action recommendations. No significant deficiencies were identified

and only a few areas for improvement were noted.

The licensee is currently installing a state-of-the-art notification

feedback system for offsite sirens. The Artificial Island generating

station received FEMA 44 CFR 350 approval for Delaware state and

local plans in January 1986 and submitted revised state and local

plans for New Jersey on October 10, 1986 for FEMA RAC review.

A commitment by management to strong emergency preparedness and

training programs has been made by licensee management as evidenced

by the quality of emergency response facilities and equipment,

response of the licensee's staff during exercises, increase in staf-

fing of the emergency preparedness group, and enhanced training acti-

vities for the emergency preparedness staff.

.. .

.

24

-

In summary, the licensee has significantly improved performance in

this area since the last SALP. . Continuing management support for

this program is demonstrated in the hardware upgrade currently in

progress, and in the staff's technical expertise.

2. Conclusion

Rating: Category 1

Trend: None

3. Board Recommendations

Licensee

None

NRC

None

r

,

.

l

l

,

!

!

I

l

l~

l

l

l

, , ., . . - - . . . - - , - - - ,

- _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _

. .

25

F. Security and Safeguards (2.0%, 52 hours6.018519e-4 days <br />0.0144 hours <br />8.597884e-5 weeks <br />1.9786e-5 months <br />)

1. Analysis

During the previous SALP, the licensee was Category I with an effec-

tive and closely monitored site security program. During this

assessment period, the licensee completed the incorporation of Hope

Creek into the security program.

During this assessment period, there was one unannounced physical

protection inspection of the security program, a special inspection

of the training and qualification program, and routine resident

inspections performed throughout the period. No violations were

identified.

During this assessment period, NRC followed up on the licensee's

commitments relative to deficiencies identified during an NRC Regula-

tory Effectiveness Review (RER) which was conducted in 1982. The

licensee promptly took correctivo action on those deficiencies that .

could be immediately addressed. Many of the remaining corrective

actions were of a long-term nature, including a major upgrading of

security facilities, systems, and equipment and incorporation of the

security program for the Hope Creek facility. Specific long-term

actions included the construction of a new access control facility

(opened October 1, 1985), installation of a new integrated security

computer system and associated hardwart, computerized access control

devices, state-of-the-art assessment aids, and new personnel search

equipment. The licensee's plans were developed and implemented in a

thorough, organized manner. The security upgrade program was carried

out in increments so that the activities would have a minimal adverse

impact on the existing Salem security program. The licensee provided

NRC with thorough and clear progress reports on the activities and

promptly identified changes to schedule. The performance of the new

systems and equipment has been sound and relatively maintenance free,

after the initial startup period. This performance results from the

extensive design, procurement and engineering effort expended on the

project. The licensee rarely had to rely on the use of extensive

human resources for compensatory measures while the upgrade project

was in progress.

Housekeeping of the access control facility and security facilities

is noteworthy. The general state of cleanliness demonstrates a high

degree of pride and morale on the part of the security force.

_-

_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

, ,

26

Management's interest in establishing and maintaining a quality

program is further evidenced by the high quality of performance indi-

cated during a special NRC inspection of the security force training

and qualification program that was conducted to determine the quality

of the training program and to measure the ability of security

personnel to carry out their assigned duties. The licensee has

required its security force contractor to establish and maintain a

strong training program. The training is conducted by individuals

who are experienced and assigned to security training only. Training

facilities have adequate classroom space and good training aids.

Lesson plans are well developed, thorough, and kept current through

feedback from supervisory personnel who perform on-the-job surveil-

lance of performance. The results of the special inspection indica-

ted that the security training program is broad in scope, of high

quality, and administered in a highly professional manner.

The licensee's security plans, procedures, and instructions are

clear, concise and thorough. Letters and reports submitted to NRC

are also clear, promptly submitted, technically accurate and seldom

generate questions from the NRC.

Corporate security management is actively involved in the Region I

Nuclear Security Organization and other nuclear industry groups

engaged in security innovations and the development of security

program standards. This is evidence of support of the securtty

program at a high management level in the licensee's organization.

To provide for continued effectiveness of the security program, the

licensee conducts in-house surveillances to monitor the performance

of the security organization. Experienced and knowledgeable person-

nel perform these surveillances and the results are aggressively

pursued to ensure prompt and effective cc,rrective action and feedback

to the training program. These survefilances are conducted in addi-

tion to the annual security program audit required by NRC.

The security program is strongly supported by the other plant opera-

ting divisions on site and frequent interface is evident. Security

force personnel exhibit excellent morale because they are recognized

and respected on site and they have been provided excellent security-

related equipment in order to perform their function. As a result,

they carry out their assigned duties and responsibilities in a

professional and dedicated manner.

The licensee submitted two security event reports pursuant to 10 CFR

73.71(c) during the assessment period. Both events were bomb threats

that were adequately responded to by the licensee and were subse-

quently determined to be hoaxes.

__ _ _ __________________---_-__-)

8 .P

27

During the assessment period, the licensee submitted complete revi-

sions to the security and contingency plans in accordance with the

provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(p). The changes -were clearly described in

a summary transmitted with each revision, plan pages were clearly

marked to facilitate review and the revisions were of high quality.

The revisions were considered acceptable.

In summary, the licensee's performance remained strong throughout the

period during which it successfully completed incorporation of Hope

Creek into the security program. The relative smooth transition

that occurred is a direct result of the management oversight that the

licensee commits to this program.

2. Conclusion

Rating: Category 1

Trend: None

3. Board Recommendations

Licensee

None

NRC

None

_

i .

l

l

'

28

G. Outaces and Engineering Support (8.7%, 232 hours0.00269 days <br />0.0644 hours <br />3.835979e-4 weeks <br />8.8276e-5 months <br />)

1. Analysis

During this assessment period there was a refueling outage (46 day

duration), and 8 other outages resulting from unplanned shutdowns.

(See Table 6 for details.)

The last SALP assessment discussed management changes which added a

planning department reporting directly to the station manager. The

assessment also illustrated the need to evaluate the new planning

department and how it would function during outages.

During the above outages, pre planning and oversight by the planning

department influenced the station's expedient completion of the

outages within the time allotted. The licensee also conducted pre-

planning meetings, held at least one per shift during outages, and

post-outage critiques to discuss the need for improvements in future

outages. At these meetings, the various departments are held

accountable for their progress during the outage. Afterwards, the

departments are responsible for refinements which could be made to

enhance future outages.

During major outages, photographs of the outage managers, coordina-

tors, department heads, contractor managers and coordinators are

posted in a conspicuous place to aid site personnel in determining

the proper contact for grievances or problems that develop. This has

improved communications.

During the outages the following good practices were noted by the

inspectors:

-

Supervisor and management presence at the work areas.

-

Accountability for work performed.

-

QA and QC direct involvement where required.

-

Direct portable radio communication between the key management

directors and contractors.

All of the above have contributed to closely directed and responsible

outages that reflect prior planning, aggressive management, and

organized decision making.

The licensee previously hired contractors for outages on a cost plus

basis with the contractors supplying their own QA and QC. The licen-

see has now adopted a different approach to the control of contrac-

tors in that their outage contract work is awarded on fixed price

contracts with the licensee supplying their own direct QA and

1

, w , ~

, - , - - - - - .

1

. .

29

QC. This practice brings about more thorough and complete design

change packages in order to assist in preparing bid packages. The

licensee has also attached monetary incentives and penalties for

exposure goals. During the refueling, the incentive was, for

Westinghouse to complete steam generator work, rewiring of the

control rod drive assemblies on the reactor head, head removal and

replacement, refueling, and reactor coolant pump seal work within

100 man rem. Westinghouse achieved this goal during the refueling

outage.

Changes were made in engineering support during this assessment

period. The Systems Engineering support organization completed

training and was assigned to the station. This organization, which

reports directly to station management, is not yet fully implemented.

However, the department has provided a strengthening of root cause

analysis, become involved in the day to day operations, and has a

direct input to the Design Change Requests and Safety Engineering

Reviews.

Another change has been the establishment of a corporate engineering

" single point of contact" to the station which has opened the line of

communication between the corporate engineering department and

station operations. This communication difference has improved

corporate support to the station and aided in the resolution of defi-

ciencies identified during outage meetings. There has also been a

concentrated effort in assuring the presence of sponsor engineers at

the site. These engineers sponsor the design changes being instal-

led. Disagreements and discrepancies are resolved in a timely manner

and the design caange packages are more complete from a documentation

perspective.

Inspections were conducted for followup of degraded piping systems

and their associated LER's. These inspections determined that

management involvement was evident concerning actions taken following

some 50 instances of degraded piping during the past six years. The

licensee's resolution of these failures was technically sound and

thorough. Extensive analysis and subsequent corrective actions taken

or planned were comprehensive and documented through complete, well-

maintained and available records.

Management involvement was not as evident with regard to followup of

IE Bulletins 79-02 and 82-02. The licensee demonstrated a lack of

effective followup to NRC concerns which were previously identified

during an earlier review of the licensee response to IE Bulletin

79-02. In addition, the licensee's response to IE Bulletin 82-02 was

incomplete, and inadequate quality assurance measures were also

identified. For both of the IE Bulletins, records were not complete

nor properly maintained.

t 0

30

Two additional areas of concern were identified in the engineering

support area during this assessment period. They are 10 CFR 50.59

evaluation and environmental qualification (EQ). In the area of

50.59 evaluations, one of the reviews was not researched in suffici-

ent depth to identify dynamic loading of the station electrical

system which led to significant electrical problems. However, this

was the only problem area identified during the review of

10 CFR 50.59 evaluations. With regard to this issue, the licensee

took immediate effective corrective action and has committed to a

long term program to reanalyze the station loading. In addition, the

licensee has met with the staff on several occasions to discuss their

analysis and longer term corrective action programs. With regard to

environmental qualification, it appears that not enough resources

were devoted to the effort both in the completeness of records and

staffing. While the plant site staffing was adequate, the engineer-

ing staff devoted to EQ was minimal as demonstrated by only two dedi-

cated engineers to support the EQ effort.

The Engineering Department has self-identified the need for further

improvement and contracted an independent evaluation of the depart-

ment with the following results;

-

The need to establish a performance measurement system

-

The need for simplification of management processes in the

following areas:

-

DCR's (Design Change Requests)

-

MB0 (Management By Objective)

-

Work Prioritization

-

Project Tracking and Control

-

Procurement

-

Decision Making / Communication

-

More effective resource utilization and,

-

More engineering technology utilization

The licensee has established a task force to address the above

concerns and is currently taking trips to identified utilities who

have demonstrated proven performance in these areas. The task force

members are conducting biweekly reviews with the Vice President -

Nuclear with a completion date set for mid-February,1987.

,

I %

31

"

In summary, outages have been pre planned with definite priorities

and emphasis on timely completion; controlled, using knowledgeable

personnel; and, completed within the time constraints of the sche-

dule. The Engineering Department has demonstrated evidence of prior

planning and assessment of priorities, has generally provided timely

responses to NRC and industry concerns and has performed a self-

initiated program evaluation designed to improve the department's

effectiveness. Although weaknesses still exist there has been

improvement noted along with an aggressive program to attain further

improvement.

2. Conclusion

Rating: Category 2

Trend: None

3. Board Recommendations

Licensee

!

The licensee should meet with NRC to present the results of Engineering

task force findings, and plans for addressing the findings.

NRC

None

.

, - -

- _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - .

.. _ .

e s

32

H. Licensing Activities (NA)

1. Analysis

During the previous assessment period, the licensee was rated as

Category 2. The two areas that had the most adverse impact on

performance were the long delays in processing licensing actions and

realignments in the licensee's staff.

During this SALP evaluation period, the licensee has shown good

management overview in the area of licensing activities. This was

especially evident through the timely submittal and subsequent

approval of several license amer.dments in anticipation of improving

cycle reload efficiency for Unit 2. The licensee's management demon-

strated active participation in licensing activities, and kept

abreast of current and prospective licensing actions. During the

rating period, a system for prioritizing both the licensee and the

NRC action items was formally initiated.

The licensee's submittals are usually timely. However, in many

instances additional information or revisions are necessary before

review can be completed. This occurs most often in the area of '

plant-specific licensing actions. The licensee's treatment of the no

significant hazards standards of 10 CFR 50.92 has shown steady

improvement, and is almost always adequate. In some cases, the

licensee needed to provide more detail.

The licensee maintains a significant technical capability in almost

all engineering and scientific disciplines necessary to resolve items

of concern to the NRC and the licensee. In addition, the licensee

utilizes the services of other nuclear support groups to assist in

the resolution of technical problems or to utilize new and proven

techniques that will enhance the operation and safety of the plant.

The licensee's good technical capability is reflected in the submit-

tals made in support of, or in response to, licensee or NRC initiated

actions. The licensee, though, does not always provide all of the

information necessary to complete a review without requests for addi-

tional information. However, few licensee responses to NRC requests

for additional information required subsequent questions. Also,

during the staff review of several safety issues, the licensee

requested meetings with the staff in anticipation of review diffi-

culties, thereby eliminating delays.

The licensee has been responsive to NRC initiatives in many instan-

ces. Schedules are negotiated with the licensee based on priorities.

The licensee has had difficulty meeting many of these negotiated

schedules. However, these schedular delays seem to be more a

resource management problem than a responsiveness problem. The

licensee appears to be more responsive to those items for which it

--

_ _ ,

4 *

33

has placed a high priority rather than those for which the NRC has

indicated a high priority. As discussed earlier, a new policy has

been formalized whereby both the licensee and the NRC agree on prior-

itization of certain licensing actions. This has helped alleviate

some of the past problems in this area.

The licensing group has exhibited a high degree of cooperation with

the NRC staff. The good communication between the licensing group

and the NRC has been beneficial to both in the processing of licens-

ing actions. Areas of expertise are well defined within the group.

In addition, the group does an excellent job of coordinating the

effort when input is required from the different groups within Public

Service Electric and Gas Company.

The licensing group holds informal training sessions on topics of

current and future interest. The group also participates in corpor-

atewide training program, and participates in industrywide training

programs provided by various organizations. In addition, the licen-

see has a training simulator located at the site.

The licensee's licensing activities are conducted by a well staffed,

and well trained group resulting in an overall efficient operation.

Management overview is evident in that the licensing groups is well

integrated into other plant activities and licensing activities

reflect a uniform approach. Upper management becomes involved in

licensing actions when necessary to assist in resolving potential

deadlocks. Further, during the reporting period, licensee manage-

ment, in their continuing effort to improve their SALP rating, met

with NRR management to discuss the issue.

In summary, one of the licensee's strengths appear to be in their

approach to resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint.

The licensee has extensive technical capability that is reflected in

their submittals and discussions with the NRC. Another strength is

in their staffing. The licensee continues to upgrade the experience,

capability and effectiveness of the licensing group, and the support-

ing administrative and technical personnel required to operate a good

facility. However, greater licensee attention needs to be focussed

on management involvement and control in assuring quality, where the

l licensee needs to put more emphasis on assuring that thorough details

l are provided in submittals in order that fewer iterations are

required during the review process; and, responsiveness to NRC initi-

atives, where the licensee needs to pay closer attention to submittal

schedules in order that the number of short-term schedular slippages

are reduced.

l

!

,

_

__ _ - - - _ _ _ . _ _ _ .- . _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

\ ',

34

2. Conclusion

Rating: Category 2

Trend: None

3. Board Recommendations

Licensee

None

NRC

None

i

s s

35

I. Assurance of Quality (NA)

1. Analysis

Assurance of Quality is a new separate functional area for this

SALP period and is a summary assessment of management oversight

and effectiveness in implementation of the quality assurance

program and administrative controls affecting quality. Activi-

ties affecting the assurance of quality as they apply specific-

ally to a functional area are addressed under each of the sepa-

rate functional areas. Consequently, this functional area is

not an assessment of the quality assurance department alone, but

is an overall evaluation of the effectiveness of management's

initiatives, programs, and policies which affect or assure qual-

ity.

Corporate and station managers are present and actively involved

in station activities commensurate with their level of responsi-

bility. They have displayed a thorough knowledge of plant

issues, and decisions have been timely with a proper perspective

on safety. For example, numerous elective plant outages were

undertaken by the licensee during the assessment period to

investigate and correct EQ deficiencies and random equipment

malfunctions. Licensee investigation, evaluation and response

to SG feed pump problems, electrical transformer faults, and the

August 26, 1986 false loss of off site power event were thor-

ough, timely, and technically adequate.

Two inspections were conducted during the assessment period to

review the implementation of the licensee's quality assurance

(QA) program. The QA Department has demonstrated significant

involvement with site activities. QA/QC involvement with daily

activities has been expanded and includes backshift coverage.

QA has expanded their valve and breaker surveillance program and

has instituted an audit program to perform in-depth reviews and

walkdowns of plant systems. Management support of QA involve-

ment is evidenced by the allocation of personnel to support

reorganization of the QA engineering department along with a

complete rewrite of the department procedures manual.

Continuing personnel assignments and departmental realignments

in maintenance, emergency planning, radiation protection, QA

engineering, and fire protection indicate that management fore-

thought and planning strive to enhance the departments' overall

performance. Increased management attention is warranted in the

chemistry department, however, as evidenced by weaknesses in the

chemical and radiochemical quality control program including

lack of control of chemical solutions which resulted in a viola-

tion, delay in correcting identified technical issues, and

continuing disagreements between laboratory comparison analyses.

. ._, _

_ , -

. _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ .

4 %

36

Additionally, weaknesses identified in IE Bulletin followup and

50.59 reviews indicate a need for management's attention in

these areas.

Cooperation between departments and between management and

workers has improved significantly during this assessment

period. Fire protection discrepancies caused by poor communica-

tion between operations, site protection, and maintenance

departments have been discussed and resulted in procedure

changes. Training personnel are more integrated and involved

with plant activities such as being coordinators for outage

activities and reviewing LERs for lessons learned. Senior Shift

Supervisors are cycled through the training department as

instructors for two year periods. The licensee has instituted

"On-the-job" Team (0JT) Evaluations" in which representatives

from management, supervisory, and bargaining unit ranks period-

% ically form a team and critique selected station activities. A

central planning and work control center located outside the

control rooms is in the initial stages of implementation and is

a joint effort of the planning, operations, and maintenance

departments.

The licensee has exhibited aggressive and effective self-assess-

ment programs. The OJT evaluations noted above are one example.

QA department audits identified IST and containment integrity

surveillance deficiencies which resulted in improvements in

these areas. The security and fire protection staffs have

conducted in-house surveillances which have identified and

resulted e correction of deficiencies. The Engineering and

Plant Be t department initiated two self-identification

program n e end of the SALP period, to improve the depart-

ment's effe veness. Results will be assessed in future SALPs.

Licensee i atives in planning and job activity control have

proven effect e in successful completion of outages and in

meeting occup onal exposure goals. Innovative programs such

as fixed price ontracts for outage work and incentives for

achievement of exposure goals are indicative of licensee initi-

atives.

Programs to promote quality awareness and employee involvement

have been instituted during this SALP period and appear to be

well received by station personnel. Examples of these programs

are:

-

Plant Material Improvement Programs which include cleanup,

painting, and labeling activities in the plant.

-

Employee Involvement Program facilitates management /warker

interfaces and awards for good performance.

I

. .

s 5

-37

~v

Quality Awareness Committee comprised of nuclear department-

'

-

volunteers who periodically issue a " Quality Gram" promot-

ing improvements in quality performance.

-

Quality Awareness Days are sponsored by individual depart-

ments and inform other departments of quality-improvement

activities in progress within the sponsor department.

-

Quality Concerns Reporting Program enables plant personnel

to confidentially express quality concerns to be investi-

gated by licensee QA personnel.

Assurance of quality problems at Salem tend to be personnel-

related rather than programmatic deficiencies. Licensee manage-

ment has identified this weakness in their organization and has

been aggressive in putting programs in place to promote quality

'

work performed in a quality environment. Licensee management

may want to expand QA efforts in the balance of plant since most

of the reactor trips were related to secondary systems. The

effectiveness of these programs will be monitored in future

inspections and assessed in future SALPs.

2. Conclusion

Rating: Category 2

Trend: Improving

3. Board Recommendations

Licensee

None

NRC

None

i

e

4

e-- ,- - , - , -e -- - - - , - - - - - , - - .n, - - - -- ,- - ------

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ . -

1 s

38

J. Training and Qualification Effectiveness (NA)

1. Analysis

This is a new functional area in this assessment period. In the

prior assessment period, training was discussed within each

functional area and in the Section " Summary of Results." There

were no adverse findings identified during the last assessment

period.

The licensee operates and maintains well equipped training

facilities which provide training for all of the nuclear depart-

ments including operations, I&C technicians, electricians,

mechanics, chemists, health physics technicians, machinists, and

welders. INP0 recognizes ten training areas at Salem and all

ten areas have been accredited. The NRC performed a post-

accreditation audit on the licensee's training program in June,

1986. The report concluded, "that a strong management commit-

ment to training program improvement exists at Salem. Also, it

is apparent that there is an effort to continually update and

revise the training programs and task lists based on feedback

and experience. . . . Deficiencies identified . . . are an incom-

plete task analysis ... for deriving learning objectives and a

failure to identify which tasks are appropriate for continuing

training. The learning objectives at Salem were complete and

easily traced to tasks and test items."

During this assessment period, Region I administered three exam-

inations. In November, 1985, fifteen candidates were given writ-

ten and simulator / oral examinations for initial licenses. Of

the eight candidates for Senior Reactor Operator (SRO), one

failed the written exam and one failed the simulator / oral exams.

Of the seven candidates for Reactor Operator (RO), three failed

the written exam and two of those three also failed the simula-

tor / oral exams. In April, 1986, one SRO and three R0 candidates

from the November exam were reexamined. All received their

licenses.

Overall, Salem continues to have a satisfactory program for the

initial training of candidates; however, the failure rate on the

November exam implies that the utility needs to better screen

the candidates prior to the NRC examination.

One evaluation of the requalification program was made during

this reporting period in September, 1986. The utility training

staff submitted their written exams to the NRC for review.

Several questions were replaced by the NRC, and then the exam

was administered to seven SR0's and five R0's. Six of the SRO's

and all of the RO's passed the examination. The written

---

. .. .

s s

39

examination was graded by both the utility and by the NRC, and

examination grades agreed within 5%. The one SRO that failed

the examination has subsequently passed another examination.

No simulator / oral examinations were given during the September

portion of this year's requalification program. The requalifi-

cation program was found to be adequate to ensure that the oper-

ators maintain the requisite knowledge for safe operation of the

plant.

Staffing is adequate as is the training and qualification effec-

tiveness of the QA/QC staff. A full time QA department coordi-

nator has been assigned to the training center and is responsi-

ble for developing and maintaining QA portions of training

programs. The operations department has assigned a Senior Shift

Supervisor to the training department for a period of two years.

Licensee management has stated that this is a pilot program and

intends to rotate a new Senior Shift Supervisor into the train-

ing department every two years. The purpose is to lend opera-

tional expertise to the training department for operational

training and to give Senior Shift Supervisors a change from

shift work and the continuous pressure of operations.

Salem does not use a separate individual as a Shift Technical

Advisor (STA). Instead, they have instituted a policy that at

least one of the SRO-licensed individuals on shift will have an

engineering degree. This provides the flexibility for the indi-

vidual who is technically most competent to also be the indivi-

dual who is making the decisions.

Training effectiveness in the day-to-day operations should be

reviewed by the licensee. When evaluating the types of operator

and personnel errors at the facility, it appears that the train-

ing received is excellent and personnel perform within the

confines of that training. However, the training department may

need to expand training programs, especially in the area of

" troubleshooting", methodology of performing surveillance test-

ing on a running unit, and operator simulator training in the

area of feedwater losses and plant recovery.

In summary, the training and qualification program makes a posi-

tive contribution, commensurate with procedures and staffing

with a modest number of personnel errors. There is a well

defined program that is implemented for a large portion of the

staff. Inadequate training has been identified as a root cause

for several plant trips that have occurred during this assess-

ment period.

,

__ -

s

40

2. Conclusion:

Rating: Category 2

Trend: None

3. Board Recommendations:

Licensee:

None

_NRC :

None

i

.

t

!

l

l

l

1

!

- , - - - - _ , . - - - - - ,

_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_

s %

41

V. SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES

A. Investigations and Allegations Review

Three allegations were received, followed-up, and closed during this

assessment period. The allegations involved (1) radiation protection

program practices for laborers working in contaminated areas and

bringing contractors on site as visitors if they fail the GET exam;

(2) health physics concerns including working in reactor building at

power, neutron doses and monitoring, and resulting health problems;

and (3) decontamination work circumvented health physics procedures

and falsification of radiation level readings.

All three allegations were found to be unsubstantiated.

B. Escalated Enforcement Actions

1. Civil Penalties

None.

2. Orders

The order issued May 6, 1983 was rescinded on March 18, 1986.

3. Confirmatory Action Letters

None.

C. Management Conferences

Two management meetings were held during the assessment period. The

first (May 6,1986) was held as recommended in the last SALP and

involved a licensee presentation of the comparison and analysis of

Salem Unit I and Unit 2 trip histories. The second (August 30,1986)

meeting was held regarding the false loss of offsite power event of

August 26, 1986.

D. Licensee Event Reports (LERs)

Thirty-one LERs were submitted for the two Salem units during this

period. The LERs are listed in Table 5. A causal analysis concluded

that; twelve were due to personnel error and were related to reactor

trips, six resulted from equipment failure and were also related to

reactor trips. The analysis of these LERs is delineated in Table 6.

AE00 provided an evaluation of quality of Salem Generating Station

LERs as part of the SALP process. AEOD concluded that the LERs

reviewed were of a very high quality, additional details of this

analysis were provided to the licensee by letter dated November 19,

1986.

No causal link between the remaining LERs was determined.

l

-w o.

42

TABLE 1

INSPECTION REPORT ACTIVITIES

REPORT / DATES

UNIT 1 UNIT 2 INSPECTOR HOURS AREAS INSPECTED

85-23 85-24 RESIDENT 179 ROUTINE DAILY INSPECTIONS AND UNSCHEDULED

10/01/85 10/31/8 BACKSHIFT INSPECTIONS

85-24 85-27 SPECIALIST 0 OPERATOR EXAMINATIONS

11/18/85 01/03/8

85-25 85-26 CANCELLED

85-26 85-28 RESIDENT 159 ROUTINE DAILY INSPECTIONS AND UNSCHEDULED

11/01/85 11/30/8 BACKSHIFT INSPECTIONS

85-27 85-29 SPECIALIST 200 OBSERVATION OF THE LICENSEE'S ANNUAL

12/03/85 12/05/8 PARTIAL SCALE EMERGENCY EXERCISE

85-28 85-30 SPECIALIST 48 UNANNOUNCED INSPECTION OF DESIGN

,

12/09/85 12/13/85 CHANGES / MODIFICATIONS PROGRAM, COMPLETED

MODIFICATIONS & QA PROGRAM ANNUAL REVIEW

85-29 85-31 RESIDENT 68 ROUTINE DAILY INSPECTIONS AND UNSCHEDULED

12/01/85 12/31/85 BACKSHIFT INSPECTIONS

86-01 86-01 RESIDENT 152 ROUTINE DAILY INSPECTIONS AND UNSCHEDULED

01/01/31 01/31/86 BACKSHIFT INSPECTIONS

86-02 86-02 SPECIALIST 80 LIQUID & GASEOUS EFFLUENTS CONTROL PROGRAM

02/01/86 02/14/86 & RADI0 CHEMICAL MEASUREMENTS PROGRAM

86-03 86-03 SPECIALIST 31 INSPECTION OF THE NONRADIOLOGICAL CHEMISTRY

1/27/86 1/30/86 PROGRAM

86-04 86-04 RESIDENT 101 ROUTINE DAILY INSPECTIONS AND UNSCHEDULED

02/01/86 02/28/8 BACKSHIFT INSPECTIONS

86-05 86-05 SPECIALIST 40 SOLID RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE PREPARATION,

02/24/86 02/28/8 PACKAGING AND SHIPPING PROGRAM

86-06 86-06 RESIDENT 138 ROUTINE DAILY INSPECTIONS AND UNSCHEDULED

03/01/86 03/31/8 BACKSHIFT INSPECTIONS.

86-07 86-07 SPECIALIST 50 INSPECTION OF OPEN ITEMS RELATING TO

02/24/86 02/28/8 BULLETIN 79-07 & 79-14. ALSO ASSESSMENT OF

LERS BETWEEN 1981 & 1985 ON PIPING FAILURES

t

. . . _ .- .. ~ , - _ .-

% %

43

TABLE 1 (CONT'D)

REPORT / DATES-

UNIT 1 UNIT 2 INSPECTOR HOURS AREAS INSPECTED

86-08 86-08 CANCELLED

86-09 86-09 SPECIALIST 0 OPERATORS EXAMINATIONS

4/8 /86 4/10/86

86-10 86-10 SPECIALIST 82 MAINTENANCE PROGRAM AND ACTIVITIES

3/17/86 3/21/8

86-11 86-11 RESIDENT 128 ROUTINE DAILY INSPECTIONS AND UNSCHEDULED

4/01/86 5/12/8 BACKSHIFT INSPECTIONS

86-12 86-12 SPECIALIST 14 AUDIT SECURITY PROGRAM

4/21/86 4/22/8

86-13 86-13 SPECIALIST 68 INSPECTION OF THE RADIATION SAFETY PROGRAM

4/21/86 4/25/8

86-14 86-14 SPECIALIST 44 FOLLOWUP OF PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS

4/28/86 5/2 /86 EVALUATION OF LOCAL LEAK RATE TESTING

RESULTS AND FACILITY TOURS.

86-15 86-15 RESIDENT 116 ROUTINE DAILY INSPECTIONS AND UNSCHEDULED

5/13/86 6/16/86 BACKSHIFT INSPECTIONS

86-16 86-17 SPECIALIST 39 INSPECTION ON PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS

5/19/86 5/23/86 PART 21 REPORT ON ASCO VALVES AND

ACTIVITIES INCLUDING QA.

86-17 86-17 SPECIALIST 21 INSPECTION OF THE LICENSEE'S PREPARATION,

5/28/86 6/3 /86 PACKAGING AND SHIPPING OF SPENT PRIMARY

DEMINERALIZER RESIN.

86-18 86-18 CANCELLED

86-19 86-19 RESIDENT 89 ROUTINE DAILY INSPECTIONS AND UNSCHEDULED

6/17/86 7/21/86 BACKSHIFT INSPECTIONS.

86-20 86-20 SPECIALIST 93 INSPECTION OF QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM

6/30/86 7/8 /86

86-21 86-21 RESIDENT 133 ROUTINE DAILY INSPECTIONS AND UNSCHEDULED

7/22/86 8/18/86 BACKSHIFT INSPECTIONS.

86-22 86-22 SPECIALIST 72 OBSERVATION OF LICENSEE'S PARTIAL-SCALE

9/15/86 9/17/86 EMERGENCY EXERCIs2 CONDUCTED SEPTEMBER 16,

1986.

s .  ;

1

44

!

TABLE 1 (CONT'D)

-l

I

REPORT / DATES

UNIT 1 UNIT 2 INSPECTOR HOURS AREAS INSPECTED

86-23 86-23 SPECIALIST 192 E.Q. INSPECTION-

8/11/86 8/15/86

86-24 86-24 RESIDENT 121 ROUTINE DAILY INSPECTIONS AND UNSCHEDULED

8/19/86 9/30/86 BACKSHIFT INSPECTIONS.

86-25 86-25 SPECIALIST 33 FOLLOWUP OF BULLETIN 82-02.

9/8/86 9/12/86

---

86-26 SPECIALIST 150 SPECIAL INSPECTION TO EVALUATE A REACTOR

8/26/86 8/30/86 TRIP WITH SAFETY INJECTION COMPOUNDED BY

FALSE LOSS OF-OFFSITE POWER (BLACK 0UT)

SIGNAL.

86-26 -----

SPECIALIST 0 OPERATOR REQUALIFICATION EXAMINATION

9/11/86 9/12/86

---

86-29 SPECIALIST 40 SPECIAL INSPECTION TO FOLLOWUP ON FAILURE

9/12/86 9/19/86 0F LOAD CENTER TRANSFORMER AND STATION

POWER TRANSFORMER RESULTING FROM REACTOR

1 RIP.

i

___ __ _. - _ - . _ - . _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . .-

. - _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ .

-

-

t *.

45

4

TABLE 2'

INSPECTION HOUR SUMMARY (10/1/85-9/30/86)

-

SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

AREA HOURS  % OF TIME

A. PLANT OPERATIONS 1278 47.7

8. RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS AND CHEMISTRY- 241 9.0

C. MAINTENANCE 332 12.4

D. SURVEILLANCE 272 10.1

E. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 272 10.1~

F. SECURITY AND SAFEGUARDS ~52 2.0

G. OUTAGES AND ENGINEERING SUPPORT 232 8.7

H. LICENSING ACTIVITIES N/A N/A

I. ASSURANCE OF QUALITY . N/A N/A

J. TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION EFFECTIVENESS N/A N/A

TOTALS: 2679 -100.0

4

4

1

l

i

'

t

.

, ..

46

TABLE 3

ENFORCEMENT SUMMARY (10/1/85-9/30/86)

SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

,

SEVERITY LEVEL

AREA 1 2 3 4 5 DEV TOTAL

PLANT OPERATIONS 1 1 2

RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS AND CHEMISTRY 3 1 4

MAINTENANCE 1 1

SURVEILLANCE O

'

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 0

SECURITY AND SAFEGUARDS 0

'

OUTAGES AND ENGINEERING SUPPORT 0

.

' LICENSING ACTIVITIES 0

ASSURANCE OF QUALITY 0

>

TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION EFFECTIVENESS 0

TOTALS: 1- 4 2 7

,

a

I

I-

,

!

._. -

_ - - . _ _ . - , - . , - . . _ _ . , _ . - - _ - _ _ _ - _

_

s c. .

47

TABLE 3 (CONT'D)

ENFORCEMENT SUMMARY

SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

INSPECTION VIOL. FUNCTIONAL

REPORT REQUIREMENT LEVEL AREA VIOLATION

272/86-05 Bulletin 79.19 DEV. Rad Control Failure to provide

training to Quality

Control Inspectors. Rad

Waste Shipping.

272/86-06 Tech. Specs. 5 Rad Control Failure to comply with

quality assurance

procedures with regard

,

to shelf lives of

reagents and chemicals.

272/86-07 10 CFR 50 4 Operations Inadequacies in base

APP B plate flexibility

criteria.

272/86-13 Tech. Specs. 5 Rad Control Failure to follow

procedures when

, entering high radiation

areas. (Violation not

issued due to licensee

good practices - 10 CFR

2 Appendix C)

272/86-19 Tech. Specs. 5 Rad Control I&C technician helper

l

entered containment

j without proper

i

dosimetry. (Violation

!

not issued due to

licensee good practices

- 10 CFR 2 Appendix C)

272/86-24 Tech. Specs. 5 Operations Failure to post fire

watch (Violation not

issued due to licensee

good practices - 10 CFR~

2 Appendix C)

i

!

l

,.. _ _ _ - _ __ _. -

. . . ..

8

5

,

1

48

'

TABLE 3 (CONT'D)

INSPECTION VIOL. FUNCTIONAL

REPORT REQUIREMENT LEVEL AREA VIOLATION

'. 272/86-25 Bulletin 82-02 DEV. Maintenance Failure to control

Neolube and Felpro 5000

(Lubricant for threaded .

fasteners).

,

f

L

5

&

.

.i .

1

3-

.

I

l

.:

.i

k

, - , . - . . _ _

.....__ . --. _ _ . _ _ - _ _ . . _ . , - _ . _ . - - , .

,, _ . -

-s a.

..

49

,

..

1

TABLE 4

LISTING OF LERS BY FUNCTIONAL AREA

AREA NUMBER /CAUSE CODE

A B C D E X TOTAL

1. . Plant Operations 7 1 1 6 2 17-

'

2. Radiological Controls and Chemistry 1 1 1 3

3. Maintenance 0

'

4. Surveillance 4 1 3 8

5. Emergency Preparedness 0

6. Security and Safeguards 0

7. Outages and Engineering Support 2 1 3

8. Licensing Activities 0

Total 12 3 0 3 7 6 31

Cause Codes Unit 1 Unit 2 Total

'

A. Personnel Error 8 4 12

B. Design / Man./Const. Install. 3 0 3

C. External Cause 0 0 0

D. Defective Procedure 2 1 3

i

E. Component Failure 3 4 7

X. Other 4 2 6

Total 20 11 31

l

e

i

, , _,

._. . -

v- s

50

TABLE 5

LER SYN 0PSIS (10/1/85-9/30/86)

SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION-

UNIT 1

LER NUMBER EVENT DATE CAUSE CODE DESCRIPTION

85-012-00 10/06/85 A TURBINE TRIP / REACTOR TRIP

FROM 99% DUE TO FALSE LOW

CONDENSER VACUUM SIGNAL

85-013-00 11/22/85 A INADVERTENT LOSS OF TWO

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM

SUBSYSTEMS

86-001-00 1/16/86 X REACTOR TRIP FROM 100% ON

HIGH NEGATIVE FLUX RATE

86-002-00 1/31/86 X FAILURE T0 IMPLEMENT

PORTIONS OF THE INSERVICE

TESTING PROGRAM

86-003-00 1/31/86 E REACTOR TRIP FROM 100%

CAUSED BY PARTIAL CLOSURE OF

11BF19

86-004-00 2/9/86 A PLANT VENT SAMPLE NOT

OBTAINED AS REQUIRED BY THE

RETS

86-005-00 2/18/86 A DIESEL GENERATOR

SURVEILLANCE PERFORMED LATE

86-006-00 2/20/86 B REACTOR TRIP FROM 100%

,_ CAUSED BY THE CLOSURE OF

14BF19

-

86-007-00 4/8/86 X ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION

DISCREPANCIES

86-008-00 4/14/86 * X NOT ALL REQUIRED VALVES

LISTED IN VALVE POSITION

.

VERIFICATION SURVEILLANCES

l

i

!

[..

s . .-

51

TABLE 5 (CONT'D)

UNIT 1

LER NUMBER EVENT DATE CAUSE CODE DESCRIPTION

,

86-009-00 4/25/86 0 OXYGEN CONTENT OF WASTE GAS

DECAY TANKS EXCEEDED

ALLOWABLE LIMITS

86-010-00 5/12/86 A REACTOR TRIP FROM 95% DUE TO

THE LOSS OF BOTH STEAM

GENERATOR FEEDWATER PUMPS

86-011-00 6/27/86 0 FIRE WATCH NOT CONTINUOUSLY

MAINTAINED

86-012-00 6/6/86 E REACTOR TRIP FROM 100% -

MAIN GENERATOR PROTECTION

(APT DIFFERENTIAL RELAY

ACTUATION)

86-013-00 6/12/86 A REACTOR TRIP FROM 64% -

NO. 13 S/G STEAM FLOW / FEED

FLOW MISMATCH WITH LOW S/G

WATER LEVEL

'

86-014-00 6/13/86 A REACTOR TRIP FROM 15% -

TURBINE TRIP AND P-7

86-015-00 7/8/86 B ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION

OF RAYCHEM HEAT SHRINKABLE

TUBING DEFICIENT ,

86-016-00 8/5/86 E REACTOR TR1P 70% - NO. 12 SG

LOW-LOW LEVEL / REACTOR TRIP

36% - NO. 11 SG LOW

LEVEL & SFFF

86-017-00 7/31/86 A FIRE 000R C-8-1 INOPERABLE -

FAILURE TO ENTER T.S.

ACTION STATEMENT

86-018-00 8/6/86 B ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION

OF LIMITORQUE MOTOR VALVE

OPERATORS

em -

-

52

TABLE 5 (CONT'D)

UNIT 2

LER NUMBER EVENT DATE CAUSE CODE DESCRIPTION

85-021-00 10/6/85 E DIESEL OUTPUT BREAKER

FAILURE DURING DIESEL

SURVEILLANCE TESTING

85-022-00 10/7/85 X REACTOR TRIP CAUSED BY A

WIRING DIFFERENCE.

86-001-00 3/20/86 D WASTE GAS HOLDUP SYSTEM NOT

CONTINUOUSLY SAMPLED FOR

OXYGEN

. 86-002-00 4/16/86 E REACTOR TRIP / TURBINE TRIP

50% - NO. 23 S/G HIGH-HIGH

LEVEL

86-003-00 5/2/86 A REACTOR TRIP / SAFETY

INJECTION FROM 5% DURING

CONTROLLED SHUTDOWN

86-004-00 7/16/86 X REACTOR TRIP FROM 100%

-POWER - LOSS OF 2B

INVERTER

86-005-00 7/15/86 A REACTOR TRIP DURING

STARTUP - VOLTAGE SPIKE ON

28 INVERTER

86-006-00 7/16/86 E REACTOR TRIP FROM 52% POWER -

23 STEAM GENERATOR HIGH-HIGH

LEVEL

86-007-00 8/26/86 A REACTOR TRIP / SAFETY INJECTION

FROM 100% & LOSS OF 0FFSITE

POWER INDICATION

86-008-00 9/17/86

<

A

(f EQUIPMENT HATCH BETWEEN

ELEVATIONS REMOVED WITH NO

FIRE WATCH INSTITUTED

86-009-00 9/11/86 E REACTOR TRIP - TRANSFORMER

FAILURE

_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ .

f

% **

53

TABLE 6

UNPLANNED AUTOMATIC TRIPS AND SHUTDOWNS

.The reactor trips occurring during this assessment period fall into two cate-

gories. These categories include personnel error, and equipment failure or

malfunction. This section assesses the root cause of each trip within each

category from NRC's perspective.

Personnel Error

There were 12 of 18 trips attributed to personnel error. For the purposes of

this table, personnel error has been broken into four groups: (1) Personnel

error poor judgement, the individual should have known that the outcome of

the action could cause a trip; (2) Personnel error - lacking knowledge, the

individual had not been instructed, or the procedure did not address the issue,

did not have the knowledge that an act performed would cause a trip;

(3) Personnel error - inattention to detail, the individual took a haphazard {

approach to an unrelated task which subsequently led to a trip; and

(4) Personnel error - equipment malfunction, an equipment failure or malfunc-

tion in conjunction with a personnel error, where both were necessary to cause

the trip.

Equipment Malfunction / Failure

There were 6 trips attributed to equipment malfunction or failure. For the

purposes of this table, equipment malfunction / failure has been broken into

three groups; (1) Random failure - isolated failures which are not considered

generic, (2) Design deficiencies - failures attributed to equipment design, and

(3) Construction deficiencies - failures attributed to improper installation

durint construction.

Unplanned outages resulted from either of two reasons: (1) shutdown to repair

random equipment failures, or (2) outage to inspect, identify, or correct

environmental qualification deficiencies. During this assessment period there

were 8 forced outages, 5 due to equipment failure - random failures and 3 due

, to EQ.

Unit 1

Power Functional

Date Level Description Root Cause Area

1. 10/06/85 99% Condenser low vacuum signal caused Personnel Operations

by Senior Shift Supervisor opening error / poor

sensing device vent line during judgement

troubleshooting - 16 day outage

entered for maintenance and testing

activities.

10/22/85 Restart.

- . .

_ _ - _____ _ - _ ___-.

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

( * *.

54

TABLE 6 (CONT'D)

Power Functional

Date Level Description Root Cause Area

2. 1/16/86 100% High negative flux rate trip due Equipment

to equipment operator closing malfunction /

breaker cabinet door too hard Design

causing vital bus trip and 2 Deficiency

shutdown rods to drop into core.

1/18/86 Restart. (

3. 1/31/86 100% No.11 SG Low Flow - Low Level Equipment

due to partial closure of feed malfunction /

regulating valve 11BF19 caused random

by air leak on bypass valve failure

positioner. -

2/02/86 Restart.

[

4. 2/20/86 100% No.14 SG Low Flow - Low Level Equipment

due to broken solenoid valve failure /

connection and loss of air to construction

14BF19. The wire broke as a deficiency

result of a faulty installation

during construction and normal

vibration.

2/21/86 Restart.

5. 5/12/86 95% No. 14 SG Low Flow - Low Level, Personnel Operations

loss of both main feedwater error / poor

pumps due to the closure of judgement

14BF19 caused by operators tying

down and overriding a limit

switch on Train "A" Feedwater

Isolation Solenoid circuit.

5/13/86 Restart.

6. 6/6/86 100% Actuation of generator Equipment

protection system on failure failure /

of auxiliary power transformer. random

failure

6/7/86 Restart.

7. 6/12/86 64% No.13 SG Feed Flow / Steam Flow Personnel Surveillance

Mismatch with SG Low Level - error /

Wetted PC board caused false Inattention

feedwater .ignals and response to detail

and No. 11 feed pump trip. PC

board cabinet door left open

following refueling outage.

6/13/86 Restart.

.

. . .

._. .. - l

.

g , e,

55

TABLE 6 (CONT'D)

Power Functional

Date Level Description Root Cause Area

8. 6/13/86 15% Turbine trip /P-7 during shifting Personnel Operations

of lube oil coolers. error /

Lacking

knowledge

6/14/86 Restart.

9. 7/21/86 100% Normal shutdown to inspect and Equipment

repair main generator hydrogen failure /

leak. Random

failure

7/29/86 Restart.

10. 8/5/86 70% No. 12 SG Low-Low Level due to Equipment

loss of No. 11 SG Feed pump failure /

caused by blown suppression Random

diode, failure

8/6/86 Restart.

11. 8/6/86 35% No.11 SG Low Flow, Nos.11

'

'

Personnel Maintenance

and 13 SG Low Level resulted error /

from runback of No.12 SG Feed Lacking

pump during troubleshooting of knowledge

No. 11 Feed pump. (screwdriver

grounded control circuitry for

both pumps.)

12. 8/6/86 Unit placed in cold shutdown to EQ

replace Limitorque wiring with

EQ wires.

8/12/86 Restart.

13. 9/17/86 90% unit placed in hot shutdown to Equipment

repair steam leak on high failure /

pressure turbine piping, Random

resulted from erosion, failure

corrosion of piping.

9/24/86 Restart.

Unit 2

1. 10/7/85 100% "C" Vital bus momentarily Equipment

grounded during troubleshooting malfunction /

caused by I&C technician Design

plugging test leads into an deficiency

incorrectly wired vital bus

receptacle.

10/9/85 Restart.

-. . . ---

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

s .~*.

56

TABLE 6 (CONT'D)

!

Power Functional

Date Level Description Root Cause Area

2. 12/10/85 100% Controlled shutdown to repair Equipment /

- high pressure turbine steam Random

line leak failures

-

main steam safety valve seat

leakage

3. 12/17/85 N/A Cooldown to Mode 5 to repair Equipment /

Nos. 21 and 23 reactor coolant Construction

pump (RCP) seal leakage. deficiency

1/05/86 Restart.

4. 1/19/86 100% Controlled shutdown to replace Equipment /

Nos. 22 and 24 RCP seals. Construction

deficiency

2/03/86 Restart.

5. 4/16/86 50% No. 23 SG High-High Level Personnel Operations

due to transient following loss error /

of No. 22 SG Feed pump due to Equipment

water in control 011. malfunction

Operators initiated significant

turbine runback causing SG 1evel

fluctuations.

4/17/86 Restart.

6. 5/2/86 100% Controlled shutdown for EQ EQ -

inspection in containment. Regulatory

requirement

7. 5/2/86 5% Safety Injection on high steam Personnel Operations

flow and low Tave resulting in error /

Reactor Trip and as a result of Equipment

operator driving rods in to malfunction

reduce reactor power in

conjunction with spikes in steam

flow indication.

5/3/86 Restart.

8. 7/14/86 100% Loss of 2B Vital Instrument. Personnel

Bus Inverter due to inadvertent error /

re positioning of AC output Lacking

deion switch causing blown AC knowledge

outage fuses.

. . . . . .

.

.

s'*.

.

57

TABLE 6 (CONT'D)

Power Functional

Date Level Description Root Causes. Area

9. 7/15/86 0% Voltage spike on 2B Vital Personnel Surveillance

Instrument Inverter during error /

testing caused by I&C Poor

technician connecting leads judgement

incorrectly.

7/16/86 Restart.

10. 7/16/86 52% No. 23 SG High-High Level - Personnel Operations

due to sluggish response of error /

No. 21 SGFP caused by sediment Equipment-

in the governor actuator. malfunction

Operator brought No. 22 SGFP

up too quickly.

7/20/86 Restart.

11. 8/6/86 100% Controlled shutdown to replace EQ

Limitorque wires with E0 wires.

12. 8/26/86 100% Spurious Solid State Protection Personnel Maintenance

System signals caused by I&C error /

technician error during Inattention

troubleshooting (probe slipped to Detail

shorting 2C Vital Instrument bus)

9/1/86 Restart.

13. 9/11/86 75% Loss of Nos. 22 and 23 RCP's as Equipment /

a result of electrical failures Design

of a non-vital transformer deficiency

and No. 22 Station Power

Transformer.

9/28/86 Restart.

. -

3 * e.

,

58

u,

TABLE 7

SUMMARY OF LICENSING ACTIVITIES

, SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

1. NRR/ LICENSEE MEETINGS

Procedures Generation Package , 10/10/85

Semiautomatic Switchover 12/03/85

RVLS (Reactor Vessel Level System) 12/03/85

Service Water Header T/S Changes 12/19/85

Appendix "R" Exemptions 08/21/86

DCRDR (Detailed Control Room Design Review) 07/01/86 ,

DCRDR (Detailed Control Room Design Review) 09/23/86.

2. NRR SITE VISITS / MEETINGS

Preventive Maintenance Program 10/28-30/85

SPDS (System Parameter Display System) 12/04-06/85

Salem Training Accreditation 06/24-26/86

EQ Audit 08/11-15/86

3. COMMISSION MEETING

I

None

4. SCHEDULAR EXTENSION GRANTED

None

5. RELIEFS GRANTED

ASME Section XI Relief

'

6. EXEMPTIONS GRANTED

Appendix "J"

-7. LICENSEE AMENDMENTS ISSUED

t

AMENDMENT

NUMBERS TITLE DATE

,

Unit 1 Unit 2

68 43 Surveillance Testing of Hydrogen Analyzers 12/30/85

.

69 44 Coolant Loop Operability While in Mode 3 12/30/85

t

i

, - , , , , - , - , . -n.- - , - .-,,-, -, . , , --,n-, -- - - - - ,- -,, - , - - - . , - - - - - . - - - - - - , . - - - - - - - , - -

g .e, o.

59

TABLE 7 (CONT'D)

AMENDMENT

NUMBERS TITLE DATE

Unit 1 Unit 2

70 45 Surveillance Testing of Batteries 01/29/86

71- --

Increase rated Thermal Power 02/06/86

72 46 RHR Operation While In Modes 5 and 6 03/07/86

--

47 Revise RCS Pressure / Temperature Limits 03/10/86

73 48 Modify Analog Rod Positions Indication 03/19/86

. System

74 49 Safety Valve Operability Requirements 04/03/86

While Shutdown

75 --

Revise RCS Pressure / Temperature Limits 06/10/86

8. EMERGENCY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ISSUED

None

9. ORDERS ISSUED

None

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