ML17104A201: Difference between revisions
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0-3, Hot Shutdown With Xenon Present, Rev 04500 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of 0-3, Hot Shutdown With Xenon Present. | 0-3, Hot Shutdown With Xenon Present, Rev 04500 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of 0-3, Hot Shutdown With Xenon Present. | ||
Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 9 minutes Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 9 minutes Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | ||
Information For Evaluator's Use: | Information For Evaluator's Use: | ||
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | ||
Line 60: | Line 59: | ||
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | ||
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | ||
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A1a RO NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A1a RO NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 68: | Line 66: | ||
I- | I- | ||
<( | <( | ||
en | en c: .... | ||
c: .... | |||
Cl> Cl> | Cl> Cl> | ||
E .c E E en z 0 ::::J | E .c E E en z 0 ::::J | ||
Line 105: | Line 101: | ||
The operator initials Step 6.2.2. | The operator initials Step 6.2.2. | ||
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ | JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ | ||
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A1a RO NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A1a RO NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 165: | Line 160: | ||
0-3.1, Boron Concentration for the Xenon Free All Rods In- Most Reactive Rod Stuck Out Shutdown Margin, Rev 05800 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of 0-3.1. | 0-3.1, Boron Concentration for the Xenon Free All Rods In- Most Reactive Rod Stuck Out Shutdown Margin, Rev 05800 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of 0-3.1. | ||
Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 15 minutes Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 15 minutes Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | ||
Information For Evaluator's Use: | Information For Evaluator's Use: | ||
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | ||
Line 172: | Line 166: | ||
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | ||
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | ||
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1b RO NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1b RO NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 210: | Line 203: | ||
Shutdown Boron Concentrations vs Cycle Burnup At Hot, No Load Conditions, AND RECORD below: | Shutdown Boron Concentrations vs Cycle Burnup At Hot, No Load Conditions, AND RECORD below: | ||
: 1. Single Loop | : 1. Single Loop | ||
: 2. Two Loop The operator uses Attachment 1 to | : 2. Two Loop The operator uses Attachment 1 to determine that the two loop SOM (1.3%L\p) for 18,000 MWD/MTU is 411(400-420) ppm; and records this value in the space provided. | ||
determine that the two loop SOM (1.3%L\p) for 18,000 MWD/MTU is | |||
411(400-420) ppm; and records this value in the space provided. | |||
Examiner Note: Although the operator will perform the single loop calculation, only the two-loop calculation is critical. | Examiner Note: Although the operator will perform the single loop calculation, only the two-loop calculation is critical. | ||
(0-3.1, 6.2.2) INCREASE each The operator performs the single 5 - - - | (0-3.1, 6.2.2) INCREASE each The operator performs the single 5 - - - | ||
Line 220: | Line 209: | ||
shutdown margin due to one or more control rods NOT able to be verified fully inserted: | shutdown margin due to one or more control rods NOT able to be verified fully inserted: | ||
: 1. Single Loop | : 1. Single Loop | ||
: 2. Two Loop The operator performs the two | : 2. Two Loop The operator performs the two loop calculation; and records 811 (800-820) ppm in the space provided. | ||
loop calculation; and records 811 (800-820) ppm in the space provided. | |||
Examiner Note: Although the operator will perform the single loop calculation, only the two-loop calculation is critical. | Examiner Note: Although the operator will perform the single loop calculation, only the two-loop calculation is critical. | ||
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1b RO NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1b RO NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 243: | Line 230: | ||
*6 - - - | *6 - - - | ||
547°F to 535°F Boron current temperature is 539°F, and RequiremenV stable; and records this value. | 547°F to 535°F Boron current temperature is 539°F, and RequiremenV stable; and records this value. | ||
RECORD current OR desired RCS temperature. | RECORD current OR desired RCS temperature. | ||
(0-3.1, Step 6.3.2) CALCULATE The operator performs the | (0-3.1, Step 6.3.2) CALCULATE The operator performs the | ||
Line 276: | Line 262: | ||
*10 calculations have been required boron concentration of independently verified, is further 848.3 (837.3-857.3) ppm and the boration needed to ensure SOM? current boron concentration of 800 ppm; and determines that further 1 boration is required. | *10 calculations have been required boron concentration of independently verified, is further 848.3 (837.3-857.3) ppm and the boration needed to ensure SOM? current boron concentration of 800 ppm; and determines that further 1 boration is required. | ||
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ | JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ | ||
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1b RO NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1b RO NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 340: | Line 325: | ||
Appendix C Page 4 of 7 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | Appendix C Page 4 of 7 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | ||
Information For Evaluator's Use: | Information For Evaluator's Use: | ||
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | ||
Line 347: | Line 331: | ||
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | ||
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | ||
~ | ~ | ||
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 RO NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 RO NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 356: | Line 339: | ||
I- | I- | ||
<( | <( | ||
en | en c: | ||
c: | |||
Q) | Q) | ||
E I.. | E I.. | ||
Line 374: | Line 355: | ||
I Annunciator F-6 out of service and on F-6 MCB A Overlay. | I Annunciator F-6 out of service and on F-6 MCB A Overlay. | ||
complete paperwork. | complete paperwork. | ||
The operator completes | The operator completes Attachment 1 of OPG-ANNUNCIATOR FLAGGING in accordance with the provided KEY. | ||
Attachment 1 of OPG-ANNUNCIATOR FLAGGING in accordance with the provided KEY. | |||
(Directed Action) Place MCB The operator places a Black DOT | (Directed Action) Place MCB The operator places a Black DOT | ||
*3 - - - | *3 - - - | ||
Line 384: | Line 363: | ||
Examiner Note: Each Annunciator on Attachment 1 may not be initialed and dated as OOS by the operator until the CRSRO initials and dates as authorization to remove the Annunciators from service. During the post-JPM discussion the Examiner should initial and date Attachment 1 for authorization, and then the operator will initial and date the Attachment 1 for removal from service of each Annunciator. | Examiner Note: Each Annunciator on Attachment 1 may not be initialed and dated as OOS by the operator until the CRSRO initials and dates as authorization to remove the Annunciators from service. During the post-JPM discussion the Examiner should initial and date Attachment 1 for authorization, and then the operator will initial and date the Attachment 1 for removal from service of each Annunciator. | ||
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ | JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ | ||
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 RO NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 RO NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 450: | Line 428: | ||
Appendix C Page 4 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | Appendix C Page 4 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | ||
Information For Evaluator's Use: | Information For Evaluator's Use: | ||
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | ||
Line 457: | Line 434: | ||
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | ||
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | ||
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A3 RO NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A3 RO NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 472: | Line 448: | ||
(Directed Action) Determine the The operator determines that 3 | (Directed Action) Determine the The operator determines that 3 | ||
*2 - - - | *2 - - - | ||
accumulated Dose each time the minutes in a radiation field of 234 repetitive task is performed. mrem/hour will yield a dose of 11. 7 mrem 234 mrem/hr x 1hr/60 minutes x 3 minutes/task = 11. 7 mrem/task | accumulated Dose each time the minutes in a radiation field of 234 repetitive task is performed. mrem/hour will yield a dose of 11. 7 mrem 234 mrem/hr x 1hr/60 minutes x 3 minutes/task = 11. 7 mrem/task (Directed Action) Determine how The operator determines that a | ||
(Directed Action) Determine how The operator determines that a | |||
*3 - - - | *3 - - - | ||
many times the repetitive task can Task which accumulates 11. 7 be performed before allowable mrem can be performed Six times RWP limits have been reached. without exceeding a dose limit of 75 mrem. | many times the repetitive task can Task which accumulates 11. 7 be performed before allowable mrem can be performed Six times RWP limits have been reached. without exceeding a dose limit of 75 mrem. | ||
Line 494: | Line 467: | ||
i Examiner Note: The operator may indicate that the individual may take a radiation monitoring device which continually indicates the radiation dose in the ~rea to satisfy Step 4.3.3.3; however, the fact that the dose rates in the SFB have been confirmed by RP permits and a briefing has been performed allows entry with an Electronic Dosimeter (which is required per Step 4.3.3.2). | i Examiner Note: The operator may indicate that the individual may take a radiation monitoring device which continually indicates the radiation dose in the ~rea to satisfy Step 4.3.3.3; however, the fact that the dose rates in the SFB have been confirmed by RP permits and a briefing has been performed allows entry with an Electronic Dosimeter (which is required per Step 4.3.3.2). | ||
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ | JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ | ||
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A3 RO NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A3 RO NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 566: | Line 538: | ||
==References:== | ==References:== | ||
IP-OUT-2, Outage Risk Management, Rev 02200 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of IP-OUT-2 Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 8 minutes Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue. | IP-OUT-2, Outage Risk Management, Rev 02200 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of IP-OUT-2 Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 8 minutes Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue. | ||
Information For Evaluator's Use: | Information For Evaluator's Use: | ||
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | ||
Line 574: | Line 544: | ||
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | ||
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | ||
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1a SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1a SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 582: | Line 551: | ||
I- | I- | ||
<( | <( | ||
en | en c: | ||
c: | |||
Q) | Q) | ||
I.. | I.. | ||
Line 593: | Line 560: | ||
to-boil for a loss of RHR under reviews it and arrives at Present Plant conditions. Attachment E. | to-boil for a loss of RHR under reviews it and arrives at Present Plant conditions. Attachment E. | ||
The operator determines that Page 5 of 11 on Attachment E, Time to - - - | The operator determines that Page 5 of 11 on Attachment E, Time to - - - | ||
Reach Saturation with Pressurizer Full and RCS Closed, most closely approximates present plant conditions, and addresses this | Reach Saturation with Pressurizer Full and RCS Closed, most closely approximates present plant conditions, and addresses this page. | ||
The operator finds the intersecting cell for Time after Shutdown {hrs) - | |||
page. | |||
The operator finds the intersecting | |||
cell for Time after Shutdown {hrs) - | |||
25 and Time to Reach Saturation (hrs) w/Trcs = 140°F to 2.[[estimated NRC review hours::46 hours]]. | 25 and Time to Reach Saturation (hrs) w/Trcs = 140°F to 2.[[estimated NRC review hours::46 hours]]. | ||
(Directed Action) Determine time- The operator reviews IP-OUT-2, 2 - - - | (Directed Action) Determine time- The operator reviews IP-OUT-2, 2 - - - | ||
Line 608: | Line 571: | ||
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1a SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1a SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Appendix C Page 5 of 7 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I- | Appendix C Page 5 of 7 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-CJ) | ||
I-CJ) z | |||
CJ) | |||
I- | |||
CJ) z | |||
-c: | -c: | ||
E E I.. | E E I.. | ||
Line 622: | Line 581: | ||
Examiner Note: The +0.1/0.0 allowance is based on the fact that there have been [[estimated NRC review hours::121 hours]] rather than [[estimated NRC review hours::120 hours]] since the shutdown, and the operator may interpolate between the 120 hour time to reach saturation in minutes and the 150 hour time to reach saturation in minutes. If this is the case, and the operator assumed a linear function between the two points, the time would be increased by approximately 0.1 minutes. | Examiner Note: The +0.1/0.0 allowance is based on the fact that there have been [[estimated NRC review hours::121 hours]] rather than [[estimated NRC review hours::120 hours]] since the shutdown, and the operator may interpolate between the 120 hour time to reach saturation in minutes and the 150 hour time to reach saturation in minutes. If this is the case, and the operator assumed a linear function between the two points, the time would be increased by approximately 0.1 minutes. | ||
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ | JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ | ||
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A1a SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A1a SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 697: | Line 655: | ||
Appendix C Page 4of10 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | Appendix C Page 4of10 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | ||
Information For Evaluator's Use: | Information For Evaluator's Use: | ||
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | ||
Line 704: | Line 661: | ||
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | ||
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | ||
~ | ~ | ||
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1b SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1b SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 733: | Line 689: | ||
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1b SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1b SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Appendix C Page 6of10 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I- | Appendix C Page 6of10 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-I- | ||
I- | |||
en | en | ||
- c: | - c: | ||
Line 750: | Line 703: | ||
declared INOPERABLE AND PERFORM seq~ential backflush PER T-27.9 or T-27.10. | declared INOPERABLE AND PERFORM seq~ential backflush PER T-27.9 or T-27.10. | ||
The operator compares the current | The operator compares the current | ||
~P for A EOG Lube Oil Cooler of 8.2 PSID to the limit and recognizes that the A EOG is OPERABLE and proceeds. | ~P for A EOG Lube Oil Cooler of 8.2 PSID to the limit and recognizes that the A EOG is OPERABLE and proceeds. | ||
The operator compares the current | The operator compares the current | ||
~P for B EOG Lube Oil Cooler of 8.5 PSID to the limit and recognizes that the B EOG is OPERABLE and proceeds. | ~P for B EOG Lube Oil Cooler of 8.5 PSID to the limit and recognizes that the B EOG is OPERABLE and proceeds. | ||
The operator compares the current | The operator compares the current | ||
~P for A EOG Jacket Water Cooler of 7. 7 PSID to the limit and recognizes that the A EOG is OPERABLE and proceeds. | ~P for A EOG Jacket Water Cooler of 7. 7 PSID to the limit and recognizes that the A EOG is OPERABLE and proceeds. | ||
The operator compares the current | |||
~p for B EOG Jacket Water Cooler - - - | ~p for B EOG Jacket Water Cooler - - - | ||
of 8.3 PSID to the limit and recognizes that the B EOG is INOPERABLE and that a sequential backflush needs to be performed to restore operability. | of 8.3 PSID to the limit and recognizes that the B EOG is INOPERABLE and that a sequential backflush needs to be performed to restore operability. | ||
Line 781: | Line 731: | ||
Cooler SW O/P is greater than 6.0 Jacket Water Cooler O/P is greater PSIO, THEN INITIATE an Issue than 6.0 PSIO, and identifies that Report requesting a PRI 2 Work an Issue Report requesti,ng a PRI Order for a planned LCO entry to 2 Work Order for the A EOG to backflush the cooler. flush the cooler must be initiated. | Cooler SW O/P is greater than 6.0 Jacket Water Cooler O/P is greater PSIO, THEN INITIATE an Issue than 6.0 PSIO, and identifies that Report requesting a PRI 2 Work an Issue Report requesti,ng a PRI Order for a planned LCO entry to 2 Work Order for the A EOG to backflush the cooler. flush the cooler must be initiated. | ||
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ | JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ | ||
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1b SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1b SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 868: | Line 817: | ||
Appendix C Page 4 of 10 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | Appendix C Page 4 of 10 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | ||
Information For Evaluator's Use: | Information For Evaluator's Use: | ||
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | ||
Line 875: | Line 823: | ||
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | ||
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | ||
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 914: | Line 861: | ||
Function Determination per Attachment 2. | Function Determination per Attachment 2. | ||
(A-52.4, Attachment 2, Step 1.0) | (A-52.4, Attachment 2, Step 1.0) | ||
*7 The operator determines that both PERFORM a loss of safety LCO 3. 7.8 and 3.8.3 have been | *7 The operator determines that both PERFORM a loss of safety LCO 3. 7.8 and 3.8.3 have been function evaluation as follows: | ||
function evaluation as follows: | |||
entered for other OOS equipment, and places a YES in the Have any of the following support "Entered?" Column, and circles system LCOs been entered? | entered for other OOS equipment, and places a YES in the Have any of the following support "Entered?" Column, and circles system LCOs been entered? | ||
YES; in accordance with the provided KEY. | YES; in accordance with the provided KEY. | ||
YES/ NO 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | YES/ NO 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Appendix C Page 6of10 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-ct I-ct en | Appendix C Page 6of10 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-ct I-ct en c: ... | ||
c: ... | |||
Cl> Cl> | Cl> Cl> | ||
E .c EE en z 0 ::::J | E .c EE en z 0 ::::J | ||
:::> Uz (A-52.4, Attachment 2, Step 2.0) | :::> Uz (A-52.4, Attachment 2, Step 2.0) | ||
*8 The operator determines that there Has only one (1) LCO been are three LCOs currently in effect | *8 The operator determines that there Has only one (1) LCO been are three LCOs currently in effect entered (i.e., total #of LCOs in (LCO 3.7.8, 3.8.3 and 3.8.4), and effect is only 1)? | ||
entered (i.e., total #of LCOs in (LCO 3.7.8, 3.8.3 and 3.8.4), and effect is only 1)? | |||
circles NO in accordance with the provided KEY; and proceeds. | circles NO in accordance with the provided KEY; and proceeds. | ||
YES I NO IF NO, THEN a loss of safety function evaluation is required. | YES I NO IF NO, THEN a loss of safety function evaluation is required. | ||
(A-52.4, Attachment 2, Step 3.0) | (A-52.4, Attachment 2, Step 3.0) | ||
*9 The operator uses Attachment 2 Using the attached Loss of Safety and compares the various | *9 The operator uses Attachment 2 Using the attached Loss of Safety and compares the various Function Matrix, determine if any I combinations of affected LCOs combination of LCO's has the and observes that there are no potential to result in a loss of empty boxes in the matrix for any ' | ||
Function Matrix, determine if any I combinations of affected LCOs combination of LCO's has the and observes that there are no potential to result in a loss of empty boxes in the matrix for any ' | |||
safety function. Only combinations ' | safety function. Only combinations ' | ||
combination of affected LCOs and which are not shaded in the box determines that no combination of require further evaluation (i.e., | combination of affected LCOs and which are not shaded in the box determines that no combination of require further evaluation (i.e., | ||
Line 943: | Line 882: | ||
1:6 checkbox, in accordance with Return to Attachment 1. | 1:6 checkbox, in accordance with Return to Attachment 1. | ||
the provided KEY. | the provided KEY. | ||
(A-52.4, Attachment 1, Step 1.0/7) 10 The operator recognizes that the PERFORM a "What If' risk "What If' risk assessment has | (A-52.4, Attachment 1, Step 1.0/7) 10 The operator recognizes that the PERFORM a "What If' risk "What If' risk assessment has assessment in EOOS for already been performed and inoperable equipment IAW Step places a checkmark in the Step 1. 7 5.2.E. | ||
assessment in EOOS for already been performed and inoperable equipment IAW Step places a checkmark in the Step 1. 7 5.2.E. | |||
checkbox in accordance with the provided KEY. | checkbox in accordance with the provided KEY. | ||
(A-52.4, Attachment 1, Step 1.0/8) 11 The operator recognizes that the - - - | (A-52.4, Attachment 1, Step 1.0/8) 11 The operator recognizes that the - - - | ||
Line 966: | Line 903: | ||
Risk Mitigation Strategies per Step 5.2.E.12 and 5.2.E.13. | Risk Mitigation Strategies per Step 5.2.E.12 and 5.2.E.13. | ||
IMPLEMENT Risk Mitigation Strategies per WC-AA-104, INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT. | IMPLEMENT Risk Mitigation Strategies per WC-AA-104, INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT. | ||
(A-52.4, Att~chment 1, Step 13 The operator recognizes that the 1.0/10) IF equipment being Fire Protection Engineer is | (A-52.4, Att~chment 1, Step 13 The operator recognizes that the 1.0/10) IF equipment being Fire Protection Engineer is removed from service is used for determining the compensatory Appendix R response THEN measures; and places a DETERMINE required checkmark in the Step 1.10 compensatory actions PER A-checkbox in accordance with the 601.13 IAW Step 5.2.F AND provided KEY. | ||
removed from service is used for determining the compensatory Appendix R response THEN measures; and places a DETERMINE required checkmark in the Step 1.10 compensatory actions PER A-checkbox in accordance with the 601.13 IAW Step 5.2.F AND provided KEY. | |||
Record in Section 2.0 of this Attachment. | Record in Section 2.0 of this Attachment. | ||
(A-52.4, Attachment 1, Step 2.0) | (A-52.4, Attachment 1, Step 2.0) | ||
*14 The operator addresses LCO 3.8.4 REQUIRED ACTIONS/APPENDIX and recognizes that ACTION | *14 The operator addresses LCO 3.8.4 REQUIRED ACTIONS/APPENDIX and recognizes that ACTION R COMPENSATORY ACTIONS (if Condition A is applicable; and applicable) completes Section 2.0 in accordance with the provided KEY. | ||
R COMPENSATORY ACTIONS (if Condition A is applicable; and applicable) completes Section 2.0 in accordance with the provided KEY. | |||
(A-52.4, Attachment 1, Step 3.0) | (A-52.4, Attachment 1, Step 3.0) | ||
*15 The operator addresses LCO 3.8.4 - | *15 The operator addresses LCO 3.8.4 - | ||
REQUIREMENTS IF REQUIRED and recognizes that ACTION | REQUIREMENTS IF REQUIRED and recognizes that ACTION ACTIONS/COMPLETION TIMES Condition B is potentially ARE NOT MET applicable if the requirements of Condition A are not met; and completes Section 3.0 in accordance with the provided KEY. | ||
ACTIONS/COMPLETION TIMES Condition B is potentially ARE NOT MET applicable if the requirements of Condition A are not met; and completes Section 3.0 in accordance with the provided KEY. | |||
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 993: | Line 924: | ||
Time: - - | Time: - - | ||
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ | JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ | ||
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 1,062: | Line 991: | ||
Appendix C Page 4 of 10 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | Appendix C Page 4 of 10 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | ||
Information For Evaluator's Use: | Information For Evaluator's Use: | ||
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | ||
Line 1,069: | Line 997: | ||
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | ||
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges tre initiating cue . | The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges tre initiating cue . | ||
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A3 SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A3 SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 1,076: | Line 1,003: | ||
I- Q) Q) | I- Q) Q) | ||
I- <( E .o STEP ELEMENT STANDARD <( | I- <( E .o STEP ELEMENT STANDARD <( | ||
"" ""z | "" ""z E E 0 :l Uz CUE Provide Candidate with the Radiation Histories of Three Available Operators and the Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Two Pages of this JPM), and Handout 1. | ||
E E 0 :l Uz CUE Provide Candidate with the Radiation Histories of Three Available Operators and the Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Two Pages of this JPM), and Handout 1. | |||
(Directed Action) Determine dose The operator evaluates the R-5 | (Directed Action) Determine dose The operator evaluates the R-5 | ||
*1 - - - | *1 - - - | ||
Line 1,102: | Line 1,027: | ||
AA-203, Exposure Control and Authorization. Addison's administrative limit is 750 mrem, and can only receive an additional 50 mrem. | AA-203, Exposure Control and Authorization. Addison's administrative limit is 750 mrem, and can only receive an additional 50 mrem. | ||
See Attached KEY. | See Attached KEY. | ||
I Boyle has a High Lifetime | I Boyle has a High Lifetime Exposure (Definition 2.4) and has | ||
Exposure (Definition 2.4) and has | |||
' an administrative dose control level of 1000 mrem TEDE/year (Step 4.1.3). | ' an administrative dose control level of 1000 mrem TEDE/year (Step 4.1.3). | ||
Boyle's administrative limit is 1000 mrem, and can receive an additional 200 mrem. | Boyle's administrative limit is 1000 mrem, and can receive an additional 200 mrem. | ||
See Attached KEY. | See Attached KEY. | ||
Corbin has an administrative dose control level of 2000 mrem TEDE/year (Step 4.1.2). | |||
Corbin has an administrative dose | |||
control level of 2000 mrem TEDE/year (Step 4.1.2). | |||
Corbin's administrative limit is 2000 mrem, and can only receive an additional 30 mrem. | Corbin's administrative limit is 2000 mrem, and can only receive an additional 30 mrem. | ||
See Attached KEY. | See Attached KEY. | ||
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ | JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ | ||
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A3 SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A3 SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 1,194: | Line 1,112: | ||
Appendix C Page 4 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | Appendix C Page 4 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | ||
Information For Evaluator's Use: | Information For Evaluator's Use: | ||
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | ||
Line 1,201: | Line 1,118: | ||
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | ||
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | ||
~ | ~ | ||
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A4 SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A4 SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 1,223: | Line 1,139: | ||
Appendix C Page 6 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION I-I- | Appendix C Page 6 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION I-I- | ||
- c: | - c: | ||
Q) | Q) | ||
Line 1,231: | Line 1,146: | ||
CJ) | CJ) | ||
CJ) z EE | CJ) z EE | ||
:::> 0 :J uZ The operator addresses Table F-1, | :::> 0 :J uZ The operator addresses Table F-1, Fission Product Barrier Matrix, and determines the following: | ||
Fission Product Barrier Matrix, and determines the following: | |||
* A LOSS of the Fuel Clad Barrier has occurred (A CSFST | * A LOSS of the Fuel Clad Barrier has occurred (A CSFST | ||
[Red Path Condition exists F-0.2 Core Cooling], (B Core Exit TCs [Core Exit TCs ~1200°F]) | [Red Path Condition exists F-0.2 Core Cooling], (B Core Exit TCs [Core Exit TCs ~1200°F]) | ||
* A POTENTIAL LOSS of the RCS Barrier has occurred (A CSFST [Red path condition exists F-0.3 Heat Sink and Heat Sink is required]) | * A POTENTIAL LOSS of the RCS Barrier has occurred (A CSFST [Red path condition exists F-0.3 Heat Sink and Heat Sink is required]) | ||
* A POTENTIAL LOSS of the I Containment Barrier exists (B Core Exit TCs (Core Exit TCs | * A POTENTIAL LOSS of the I Containment Barrier exists (B Core Exit TCs (Core Exit TCs cannot be restored .:;1200°F within 15 minutesl) | ||
The operator addresses F-Fission Product Barrier Degradation, of EP-AA-1012 Addendum 3 and determines that an SAE exists based on FS1 .1, Loss or potential loss of ANY two barriers (Table F-1). | |||
cannot be restored .:;1200°F within 15 minutesl) | |||
The operator addresses F-Fission | |||
Product Barrier Degradation, of EP-AA-1012 Addendum 3 and determines that an SAE exists based on FS1 .1, Loss or potential loss of ANY two barriers (Table F-1). | |||
Examiner Note: The operator will determine that there is a LOSS and two POTENTIAL LOSS' of the three Fission Product Barriers which will result in an SAE, higher than both the ALERTS caused by the pipe rupture (HA2.1) and the RPS Failure (SA3.1) | Examiner Note: The operator will determine that there is a LOSS and two POTENTIAL LOSS' of the three Fission Product Barriers which will result in an SAE, higher than both the ALERTS caused by the pipe rupture (HA2.1) and the RPS Failure (SA3.1) | ||
(Directed Action) Complete EP- The operator completes EP-CE- | (Directed Action) Complete EP- The operator completes EP-CE- | ||
Line 1,249: | Line 1,158: | ||
Data Form (Part 1) (CNG) | Data Form (Part 1) (CNG) | ||
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ | JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ | ||
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A4 SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A4 SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 1,317: | Line 1,225: | ||
Appendix C Page 4of15 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | Appendix C Page 4of15 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | ||
Information For Evaluator's Use: | Information For Evaluator's Use: | ||
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | ||
Line 1,325: | Line 1,232: | ||
These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | ||
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | ||
2017 Systems NRG - Control Room JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Systems NRG - Control Room JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 1,359: | Line 1,265: | ||
1 (FR-Z.1 Step 1) Verify All Cl And The operator reads the NOTE, and - - - | 1 (FR-Z.1 Step 1) Verify All Cl And The operator reads the NOTE, and - - - | ||
CVI Valve Status Lights - BRIGHT proceeds. | CVI Valve Status Lights - BRIGHT proceeds. | ||
The operator observes all Cl And CVI Valve Status Lights are BRIGHT except MOV-813 and | The operator observes all Cl And CVI Valve Status Lights are BRIGHT except MOV-813 and MOV-814. | ||
MOV-814. | |||
The operator proceeds to the Step | The operator proceeds to the Step | ||
' 1 RNO. | ' 1 RNO. | ||
Examiner Note: At any time during this JPM, the operator may recognize that automatic actions have failed, and take manual action as needed to operate equipment as needed (See A-503.1, Step 5.3.D, Manual Backup). While the operator may take this action, and it is permitted by procedures, and expected; if the action is not taken the operator will still be successful by adherence to the procedure assigned. | Examiner Note: At any time during this JPM, the operator may recognize that automatic actions have failed, and take manual action as needed to operate equipment as needed (See A-503.1, Step 5.3.D, Manual Backup). While the operator may take this action, and it is permitted by procedures, and expected; if the action is not taken the operator will still be successful by adherence to the procedure assigned. | ||
Examiner Note: Any attempt by the operator to actuate CS by depressing two MCB pushbuttons simultaneously will not be successful (pushbutton operation has failed). | Examiner Note: Any attempt by the operator to actuate CS by depressing two MCB pushbuttons simultaneously will not be successful (pushbutton operation has failed). | ||
Line 1,403: | Line 1,306: | ||
<C | <C | ||
(/) | (/) | ||
z | z c: .... | ||
c: .... | |||
Cl> | Cl> | ||
E .c EE Q) | E .c EE Q) | ||
Line 1,428: | Line 1,329: | ||
Appendix C Page 9 of 15 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I- | Appendix C Page 9 of 15 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I- | ||
<C I- | <C I- | ||
<C en | <C en c: .... | ||
c: .... | |||
Cl) Cl) | Cl) Cl) | ||
E .o E E en z 0 ::I | E .o E E en z 0 ::I | ||
Line 1,437: | Line 1,336: | ||
The operator observes the 8 Containment Spray Pump Green status light is LIT, and the Red status light is OFF. | The operator observes the 8 Containment Spray Pump Green status light is LIT, and the Red status light is OFF. | ||
The operator observes Containment pressure to be ::::::40-50 psig. | The operator observes Containment pressure to be ::::::40-50 psig. | ||
The operator proceeds to the Step 2.b RNO . | The operator proceeds to the Step 2.b RNO . | ||
*6 (FR-Z.1 Step 2.b RNO) Manually The operator places the A - - - | *6 (FR-Z.1 Step 2.b RNO) Manually The operator places the A - - - | ||
start pumps. Containment Spray Pump Control Switch to START and observes the Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF. | start pumps. Containment Spray Pump Control Switch to START and observes the Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF. | ||
Line 1,448: | Line 1,344: | ||
The operator proceeds to the Step 2.c RNO. | The operator proceeds to the Step 2.c RNO. | ||
*8 (FR-Z.1 Step 2.c RNO) IF NaOH The operator places the Control flow NOT indicated, THEN place Switch for AOV-836A in OPEN. | *8 (FR-Z.1 Step 2.c RNO) IF NaOH The operator places the Control flow NOT indicated, THEN place Switch for AOV-836A in OPEN. | ||
switches for NaOH tank outlet The operator places the Control valves to OPEN. | switches for NaOH tank outlet The operator places the Control valves to OPEN. | ||
Switch for AOV-8368 in OPEN. | Switch for AOV-8368 in OPEN. | ||
Line 1,487: | Line 1,382: | ||
-s::: | -s::: | ||
Q) Q) | Q) Q) | ||
E .o E E | E .o E E en z 0 :::s | ||
en z 0 :::s | |||
:J (.)z | :J (.)z | ||
* The operator places the MOV- - - - | * The operator places the MOV- - - - | ||
Line 1,495: | Line 1,388: | ||
OR The operator places the MOV-8600 Control Switch in OPEN and observes the Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF. | OR The operator places the MOV-8600 Control Switch in OPEN and observes the Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF. | ||
I The operator will observe flow on I Fl-930. | I The operator will observe flow on I Fl-930. | ||
Examiner Note: The operator may OPEN all four valves, however, at least one valve in each set must be OPEN to satisfy the Critical Nature of this Step. | Examiner Note: The operator may OPEN all four valves, however, at least one valve in each set must be OPEN to satisfy the Critical Nature of this Step. | ||
SIM DRIVER NOTE: Call the Control Room as the EO and report "V-815A has been locally closed, however. MOV-813 will NOT operate manually." | SIM DRIVER NOTE: Call the Control Room as the EO and report "V-815A has been locally closed, however. MOV-813 will NOT operate manually." | ||
Line 1,507: | Line 1,399: | ||
tn z | tn z | ||
-c: | -c: | ||
E | E CJ) CJ) | ||
CJ) CJ) | |||
E .c E | E .c E | ||
tn 0 :l | tn 0 :l | ||
Line 1,533: | Line 1,423: | ||
Appendix C Page 13of15 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP STANDARD I- | Appendix C Page 13of15 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP STANDARD I- | ||
<C I- | <C I- | ||
<C | <C cQ): '- | ||
cQ): '- | |||
E .o Q) | E .o Q) | ||
ELEMENT | ELEMENT | ||
Line 1,551: | Line 1,439: | ||
The operator observes the C CNMT RECIRC Fan Charcoal Filter Damper Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF. | The operator observes the C CNMT RECIRC Fan Charcoal Filter Damper Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF. | ||
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM . | JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM . | ||
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM A NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM A NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 1,612: | Line 1,499: | ||
Appendix C Page 4of13 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | Appendix C Page 4of13 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | ||
Information For Evaluator's Use: | Information For Evaluator's Use: | ||
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | ||
Line 1,620: | Line 1,506: | ||
These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | ||
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | ||
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 1,671: | Line 1,556: | ||
used for the RCP being started, THEN TURN ON the containment sound monitor for the respective RCP. OTHERWISE, MARK this Step NIA. | used for the RCP being started, THEN TURN ON the containment sound monitor for the respective RCP. OTHERWISE, MARK this Step NIA. | ||
3 (0-1.1, Step 6.5.10.5) CLOSELY The operator monitors RCS heat MONITOR RCS heatup rate AND up rate and pressure on PPCS. | 3 (0-1.1, Step 6.5.10.5) CLOSELY The operator monitors RCS heat MONITOR RCS heatup rate AND up rate and pressure on PPCS. | ||
RCS pressure after starting of the 2nd RCP. | RCS pressure after starting of the 2nd RCP. | ||
*4 (0-1.1, Step 6.5.10.6) PLACE The operator places the TCV-145 LETDOWN DIVERT TO DI OR - - - | *4 (0-1.1, Step 6.5.10.6) PLACE The operator places the TCV-145 LETDOWN DIVERT TO DI OR - - - | ||
Line 1,687: | Line 1,571: | ||
Q) en z 0 ::I | Q) en z 0 ::I | ||
:::> (.) z 5 (0-1.1, Step 6.5.10. 7) START the The operator marks RCP B step 2nd RCP PER S-2.1, starting NIA. | :::> (.) z 5 (0-1.1, Step 6.5.10. 7) START the The operator marks RCP B step 2nd RCP PER S-2.1, starting NIA. | ||
instructions section AND MARK RCP NOT started NIA. The operator refers to S-2.1 for the ARCP. | instructions section AND MARK RCP NOT started NIA. The operator refers to S-2.1 for the ARCP. | ||
* RCPA | * RCPA | ||
Line 1,723: | Line 1,606: | ||
The operator observes RCP A F-177 and A SEAL FLOW F-175, and determines the #1 Seal Leak Rate. | The operator observes RCP A F-177 and A SEAL FLOW F-175, and determines the #1 Seal Leak Rate. | ||
The operator observes Pl-420 (Rx Coolant Loop Low Range Pressure) and determines the #1 Seal DP. I Using the combination of #1 Seal Leak Rate and #1 Seal DP the operator verifies their intersection is within the NORMAL OPERATING RANGE on Attachment 3. | The operator observes Pl-420 (Rx Coolant Loop Low Range Pressure) and determines the #1 Seal DP. I Using the combination of #1 Seal Leak Rate and #1 Seal DP the operator verifies their intersection is within the NORMAL OPERATING RANGE on Attachment 3. | ||
(S-2.1, Step 6.1.6) Select RCP A 9 The operator marks this step NA, | (S-2.1, Step 6.1.6) Select RCP A 9 The operator marks this step NA, on the Containment Sound and proceeds. | ||
on the Containment Sound and proceeds. | |||
Monitor, N/A if Sound Monitor is not available. | Monitor, N/A if Sound Monitor is not available. | ||
(S-2.1, Step 6.1. 7) Make a Plant 10 The operator announces starting - - - | (S-2.1, Step 6.1. 7) Make a Plant 10 The operator announces starting - - - | ||
Line 1,750: | Line 1,631: | ||
directed. | directed. | ||
The operator places the A RCP | The operator places the A RCP | ||
' control switch to the START position and observes the Red status light is LIT and the Green status light is OFF. | ' control switch to the START position and observes the Red status light is LIT and the Green status light is OFF. | ||
The operator adjusts PCV-135 as necessary to maintain RCS Pressure such that RCP #1 Seal DP >220 PSID, as seen on Pl-420, and no PORV lift (410 PSIG). | The operator adjusts PCV-135 as necessary to maintain RCS Pressure such that RCP #1 Seal DP >220 PSID, as seen on Pl-420, and no PORV lift (410 PSIG). | ||
SIM DRIVER: If directed, adjust Charging Pump speed, and report actions taken to the operator. | SIM DRIVER: If directed, adjust Charging Pump speed, and report actions taken to the operator. | ||
(S-2.1, Step 6.1.9) Turn off the 12 The operator marks this step NA, Containment Sound Monitor (mark and proceeds. | (S-2.1, Step 6.1.9) Turn off the 12 The operator marks this step NA, Containment Sound Monitor (mark and proceeds. | ||
N/A if not used). | N/A if not used). | ||
(S-2.1, Step 6.1.10) WHEN the A 13 The operator verifies the RCP has RCP has been operating for been running for one minute. | (S-2.1, Step 6.1.10) WHEN the A 13 The operator verifies the RCP has RCP has been operating for been running for one minute. | ||
greater than 1 minute, THEN STOP the RCP A Oil Lift Pump. The operator places the RCP A Oil Lift Pump in the STOP position and observes the Green status light is LIT and the Red status light is OFF. | greater than 1 minute, THEN STOP the RCP A Oil Lift Pump. The operator places the RCP A Oil Lift Pump in the STOP position and observes the Green status light is LIT and the Red status light is OFF. | ||
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM B NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM B NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 1,765: | Line 1,643: | ||
<C I- | <C I- | ||
<( | <( | ||
en | en r(I):: | ||
r(I):: | |||
E .c I.. | E .c I.. | ||
(I) | (I) | ||
Line 1,803: | Line 1,679: | ||
monitor the A RCP Motor bearing Display RCPS on PPCS. | monitor the A RCP Motor bearing Display RCPS on PPCS. | ||
temperature. This can be done by using PPCS Group Display RCPS. Using the PPCS the operator determines A RCP Motor Bearing temperatures are rising. | temperature. This can be done by using PPCS Group Display RCPS. Using the PPCS the operator determines A RCP Motor Bearing temperatures are rising. | ||
T2092: Upper Thrust Bearing | T2092: Upper Thrust Bearing T2161: Upper Radial Bearing (AR-A-24, Step 2.2) IF bearing 18 The operator determines that - ' - | ||
T2161: Upper Radial Bearing (AR-A-24, Step 2.2) IF bearing 18 The operator determines that - ' - | |||
temperatures AND indicated level conditions are NOT normal and appear normal, THEN initiate a proceeds. | temperatures AND indicated level conditions are NOT normal and appear normal, THEN initiate a proceeds. | ||
CNMT entry to investigate the sight glass level. IF the lower bearing oil level is greater than 1" BELOW the notch on the sight glass, THEN prepare to remove the pump from service. Otherwise, the level is acceptable to continue operation. | CNMT entry to investigate the sight glass level. IF the lower bearing oil level is greater than 1" BELOW the notch on the sight glass, THEN prepare to remove the pump from service. Otherwise, the level is acceptable to continue operation. | ||
*19 (AR-A-24, Step 2.3) If level is 1.5" The operator places the A RCP below normally indicated level and control switch to the STOP position | *19 (AR-A-24, Step 2.3) If level is 1.5" The operator places the A RCP below normally indicated level and control switch to the STOP position visibly lowering then: and observes the Green status | ||
visibly lowering then: and observes the Green status | |||
* Trip the reactor light is LIT and the Red status light | * Trip the reactor light is LIT and the Red status light | ||
* When all E-0 immediate is OFF . | * When all E-0 immediate is OFF . | ||
actions done, then trip affected RCP Examiner Note: The operator will NOT perform E-0 Actions because the plant is in Mode 5. | actions done, then trip affected RCP Examiner Note: The operator will NOT perform E-0 Actions because the plant is in Mode 5. | ||
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM . | JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM . | ||
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 1,871: | Line 1,742: | ||
==References:== | ==References:== | ||
P-17, Operations Control Room Operating Instructions, Rev 01800 OP-AA-101-111-1001, Operations Expectations and Standards, Rev 18 A-503.1, Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide, Rev 04600 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of Attachment 2 of P-17 Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 9 minutes Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | P-17, Operations Control Room Operating Instructions, Rev 01800 OP-AA-101-111-1001, Operations Expectations and Standards, Rev 18 A-503.1, Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide, Rev 04600 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of Attachment 2 of P-17 Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 9 minutes Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | ||
Information For Evaluator's Use: | Information For Evaluator's Use: | ||
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | ||
Line 1,880: | Line 1,749: | ||
These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | ||
* The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | * The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | ||
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM C NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM C NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 1,902: | Line 1,770: | ||
<C I- | <C I- | ||
<C en z | <C en z | ||
c: | c: | ||
E .c EE I.. | E .c EE I.. | ||
Line 1,931: | Line 1,798: | ||
-c: Q) | -c: Q) | ||
Q) | Q) | ||
EE | EE E..c en z 0 :J | ||
E..c en z 0 :J | |||
::> Uz (Attachment 2, Step 1.1.4) | ::> Uz (Attachment 2, Step 1.1.4) | ||
*4 The operator presses the "A" Main - - - | *4 The operator presses the "A" Main - - - | ||
Line 1,947: | Line 1,812: | ||
The operator presses the "A" FRV Bypass Valve MANUAL pushbutton and holds for 2-3 seconds; and observes the White "MAN" backlight is LIT. | The operator presses the "A" FRV Bypass Valve MANUAL pushbutton and holds for 2-3 seconds; and observes the White "MAN" backlight is LIT. | ||
Examiner NOTE: WHEN the "A" FRV Bypass controller is in MANUAL for 90 seconds, TRIGGER #1 will automatically operate causing the A FRV to close over 60 seconds. | Examiner NOTE: WHEN the "A" FRV Bypass controller is in MANUAL for 90 seconds, TRIGGER #1 will automatically operate causing the A FRV to close over 60 seconds. | ||
(Attachment 2, Step 1.1. 7) 7 The operator presses the "A" FRV SLOWLY CLOSE the Bypass FRV Bypass Valve controller CLOSE | (Attachment 2, Step 1.1. 7) 7 The operator presses the "A" FRV SLOWLY CLOSE the Bypass FRV Bypass Valve controller CLOSE WHILE VERIFYING the Main FRV pushbutton and observes the compensates by opening slightly. | ||
WHILE VERIFYING the Main FRV pushbutton and observes the compensates by opening slightly. | |||
controller output lowering. | controller output lowering. | ||
The operator observes the FRV controller output rises as the FRV Bypass Valve closes. | The operator observes the FRV controller output rises as the FRV Bypass Valve closes. | ||
Line 1,970: | Line 1,833: | ||
These deviations fall under the Maintenance Rule. Therefore, 50.59 is not required." | These deviations fall under the Maintenance Rule. Therefore, 50.59 is not required." | ||
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM. | JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM. | ||
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 2,005: | Line 1,867: | ||
Facility Evaluator: Date: | Facility Evaluator: Date: | ||
Method of testing: | Method of testing: | ||
Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: x Classroom - - - Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE | Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: x Classroom - - - Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied. | ||
I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied. | |||
Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM), and Handouts 1-2. | Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM), and Handouts 1-2. | ||
Initial Conditions: | Initial Conditions: | ||
Line 2,034: | Line 1,894: | ||
Appendix C Page 4of13 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | Appendix C Page 4of13 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | ||
Information For Evaluator's Use: | Information For Evaluator's Use: | ||
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | ||
Line 2,042: | Line 1,901: | ||
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | ||
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | ||
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 2,080: | Line 1,938: | ||
*2 The operator reads the NOTE, and., | *2 The operator reads the NOTE, and., | ||
PERFORM the following for the proceeds. | PERFORM the following for the proceeds. | ||
affected bank: | affected bank: | ||
The operator obtains Lift Coil DISCONNECT lift coils of RCC's Cabinet Key and opens Lift Coil that DID NOT drop. Cabinet. | The operator obtains Lift Coil DISCONNECT lift coils of RCC's Cabinet Key and opens Lift Coil that DID NOT drop. Cabinet. | ||
Line 2,135: | Line 1,991: | ||
(S-3.1, Attachment 2, Step 2.1) US 10 The operator reads the Step, and - - - | (S-3.1, Attachment 2, Step 2.1) US 10 The operator reads the Step, and - - - | ||
SHALL acknowledge reactivity proceeds. | SHALL acknowledge reactivity proceeds. | ||
manipulation and provide input and oversight. [G0092]. 'I | manipulation and provide input and oversight. [G0092]. 'I (S-3.1, Attachment 2, Step 3.0) | ||
(S-3.1, Attachment 2, Step 3.0) | |||
*11 The operator places the RMW - - - | *11 The operator places the RMW - - - | ||
PLACE RMW MODE SELECTOR MODE SELECTOR control switch control switch to BORATE position. | PLACE RMW MODE SELECTOR MODE SELECTOR control switch control switch to BORATE position. | ||
Line 2,175: | Line 2,029: | ||
The operator observes HCV-110A - - - | The operator observes HCV-110A - - - | ||
output rising. | output rising. | ||
' The operator observes the AOV- - - - | ' The operator observes the AOV- - - - | ||
11 OB Red status light is LIT, and Green status light is OFF. | 11 OB Red status light is LIT, and Green status light is OFF. | ||
Line 2,216: | Line 2,069: | ||
Examiner Note: There are two Reactor Emergency Trip pushbuttons either of which will manually trip the reactor when depressed. | Examiner Note: There are two Reactor Emergency Trip pushbuttons either of which will manually trip the reactor when depressed. | ||
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM . | JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM . | ||
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 2,280: | Line 2,132: | ||
Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 6 minutes , | Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 6 minutes , | ||
Fill in the JPM Start Time when th~ student acknowledges the Initiating Cue. | Fill in the JPM Start Time when th~ student acknowledges the Initiating Cue. | ||
Information For Evaluator's Use: | Information For Evaluator's Use: | ||
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | ||
Line 2,289: | Line 2,139: | ||
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | ||
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | ||
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM E NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM E NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 2,351: | Line 2,200: | ||
(0-6.9.2, Step 6.3.1.4) CLOSE | (0-6.9.2, Step 6.3.1.4) CLOSE | ||
*4 The operator reads the NOTEs, BUS 12A ALT FEED FROM 767 and proceeds. | *4 The operator reads the NOTEs, BUS 12A ALT FEED FROM 767 and proceeds. | ||
52/12BY. | 52/12BY. | ||
The operator places the 52/12BY control switch in the CLOSE position and observes the Red status light is LIT and the Green status light is OFF. | The operator places the 52/12BY control switch in the CLOSE position and observes the Red status light is LIT and the Green status light is OFF. | ||
Line 2,368: | Line 2,216: | ||
THEN VERIFY breaker is OPEN AND RESET (Green light ILLUMINATED, White light EXTINGUISHED). | THEN VERIFY breaker is OPEN AND RESET (Green light ILLUMINATED, White light EXTINGUISHED). | ||
OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A. | OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A. | ||
(0-6.9.2, Step 6.3.1.6/6.a-c) IF 6 The operator observes that the - - - | (0-6.9.2, Step 6.3.1.6/6.a-c) IF 6 The operator observes that the - - - | ||
BUS 12A NORMAL FEED FROM 52/12AY Red status light is still LIT | BUS 12A NORMAL FEED FROM 52/12AY Red status light is still LIT | ||
Line 2,380: | Line 2,227: | ||
EXAMINER NOTE: ALTERNATE PATH DECISION POINT OCCURS IN THE NEXT STEP 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM E NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | EXAMINER NOTE: ALTERNATE PATH DECISION POINT OCCURS IN THE NEXT STEP 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM E NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Appendix C Page 8 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I- | Appendix C Page 8 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-I- | ||
I- | |||
en | en | ||
- cQ): | - cQ): | ||
Line 2,397: | Line 2,241: | ||
BUS 12A NORMAL FEED FROM and proceeds. | BUS 12A NORMAL FEED FROM and proceeds. | ||
7T, 52/12AY, is NOT OPEN. | 7T, 52/12AY, is NOT OPEN. | ||
, The operator observes that the | , The operator observes that the 52/12AY Red status light is still LIT and both the Green and White status lights are OFF. | ||
52/12AY Red status light is still LIT and both the Green and White status lights are OFF. | |||
(Attachment 1, Step 2) VERIFY 9 The operator observes the - - - | (Attachment 1, Step 2) VERIFY 9 The operator observes the - - - | ||
CLOSED BUS 12A ALT FEED 52/12BY Red status light is LIT FROM 767, 52/12BY. | CLOSED BUS 12A ALT FEED 52/12BY Red status light is LIT FROM 767, 52/12BY. | ||
Line 2,460: | Line 2,302: | ||
Maintenance AND System Engineer of breaker problem. | Maintenance AND System Engineer of breaker problem. | ||
CUE Acknowledge as Maintenance and System Engineer JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM . | CUE Acknowledge as Maintenance and System Engineer JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM . | ||
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM E NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM E NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 2,516: | Line 2,357: | ||
Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 16 minutes NOTE: This JPM should be Pre-Briefed in the Briefing Room. | Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 16 minutes NOTE: This JPM should be Pre-Briefed in the Briefing Room. | ||
Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | ||
Information For Evaluator's Use: | Information For Evaluator's Use: | ||
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | ||
Line 2,524: | Line 2,364: | ||
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | ||
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | ||
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM F NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM F NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 2,667: | Line 2,506: | ||
ACCUM A N2 FILL VENT VALVE, 834A Control Switch to the CLOSE AOV-834A. (MCB) position and observes the Green status light is LIT, and the Red | ACCUM A N2 FILL VENT VALVE, 834A Control Switch to the CLOSE AOV-834A. (MCB) position and observes the Green status light is LIT, and the Red | ||
., status light is OFF . | ., status light is OFF . | ||
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM. | JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM. | ||
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM F NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM F NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 2,727: | Line 2,564: | ||
Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 5 minutes NOTE: This JPM should be Pre-Briefed in the Briefing Room. | Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 5 minutes NOTE: This JPM should be Pre-Briefed in the Briefing Room. | ||
Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | ||
Information For Evaluator's Use: | Information For Evaluator's Use: | ||
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | ||
Line 2,735: | Line 2,571: | ||
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. ' | Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. ' | ||
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | ||
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM G NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM G NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 2,757: | Line 2,592: | ||
- c: Cl> | - c: Cl> | ||
Cl> | Cl> | ||
E .c E E | E .c E E en z 0 ::I | ||
en z 0 ::I | |||
:::> Uz CUE Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handout 1. | :::> Uz CUE Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handout 1. | ||
(S-23.2.3, Step 6.1.1) VERIFY The operator contacts the 1 - - - | (S-23.2.3, Step 6.1.1) VERIFY The operator contacts the 1 - - - | ||
Line 2,866: | Line 2,699: | ||
Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 8 minutes NOTE: This JPM should be Pre-Briefed in the Briefing Room. | Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 8 minutes NOTE: This JPM should be Pre-Briefed in the Briefing Room. | ||
Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | ||
Information For Evaluator's Use: | Information For Evaluator's Use: | ||
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | ||
Line 2,874: | Line 2,706: | ||
These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | ||
* The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | * The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | ||
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 2,907: | Line 2,738: | ||
* G-11, LO STEAM PRESSURE LOOP A 600 PSI | * G-11, LO STEAM PRESSURE LOOP A 600 PSI | ||
* G-27, STM LINE A LO-LO PRESS CHANNEL ALERT 514 PSI ,, | * G-27, STM LINE A LO-LO PRESS CHANNEL ALERT 514 PSI ,, | ||
(ER-INST.1, Attachment 30, Step The operator reads the NOTE, and 1 - - - | (ER-INST.1, Attachment 30, Step The operator reads the NOTE, and 1 - - - | ||
1.0/1.1) DETERMINE the expected proceeds. | 1.0/1.1) DETERMINE the expected proceeds. | ||
Line 2,927: | Line 2,757: | ||
*I LOW PRESS Light OFF IF Pl- LOW PRESS Proving Light is OFF - - - | *I LOW PRESS Light OFF IF Pl- LOW PRESS Proving Light is OFF - - - | ||
468 ::; 600 psig if the Pl-468 reading is ::; 600 psig, and circles OFF for 468 LOOP A-1 LOW PRESS. | 468 ::; 600 psig if the Pl-468 reading is ::; 600 psig, and circles OFF for 468 LOOP A-1 LOW PRESS. | ||
464 LOOP A-1 The operator recognizes that the | 464 LOOP A-1 The operator recognizes that the | ||
* HIGH TRIP Light OFF IF HI TRIP Proving Light is OFF if the - - - | * HIGH TRIP Light OFF IF HI TRIP Proving Light is OFF if the - - - | ||
Line 2,974: | Line 2,803: | ||
The acknowledges the sound of a MCB Annunciator alarming. | The acknowledges the sound of a MCB Annunciator alarming. | ||
The operator closes and locks the I R-2 PROTECTION CHANNEL 1 I door. | The operator closes and locks the I R-2 PROTECTION CHANNEL 1 I door. | ||
I | I I I (ER-INST.1, Attachment 30, Step The operator observes that the Lo 4 - - - | ||
I I (ER-INST.1, Attachment 30, Step The operator observes that the Lo 4 - - - | |||
3.0) VERIFY the bistable status Press SI, PC468A bistable status lights AND Annunciators listed light is LIT. | 3.0) VERIFY the bistable status Press SI, PC468A bistable status lights AND Annunciators listed light is LIT. | ||
above are lit. | above are lit. | ||
Line 2,995: | Line 2,822: | ||
I- | I- | ||
<( | <( | ||
en | en s::: | ||
s::: | |||
Q) | Q) | ||
E .c EE i... | E .c EE i... | ||
Line 3,034: | Line 2,859: | ||
Appendix C Page 10of12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I- | Appendix C Page 10of12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I- | ||
<C I- | <C I- | ||
<C en | <C en c: .... | ||
c: .... | |||
Cl> Cl> | Cl> Cl> | ||
E .c en z E E 0 :J | E .c en z E E 0 :J | ||
Line 3,043: | Line 2,866: | ||
CUE Acknowledge as US. | CUE Acknowledge as US. | ||
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM. | JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM. | ||
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM H NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM H NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 3,099: | Line 2,921: | ||
==References:== | ==References:== | ||
ER-PRZR.1, Restoration of PRZR Heaters During Blackout, Rev. 00700 Drawing 03200-0122, Sheet 1, Pressurizer Backup Heater Panel B1 ACPDPA12 Schedule, Rev 2 Drawing 03200-0122, Sheet 2, Pressurizer Backup Heater Panel B1 ACPDPA12 Arrangement, Rev 0 Drawing 03200-0123, Sheet 1, Pressurizer Backup Heater Panel B2 ACPDPA13 Schedule, Rev 2 Drawing 03200-0123, Sheet 2, Pressurizer Backup Heater Panel B2 ACPDPA13 Arrangement, Rev 0 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of ER-PRZR.1 Handout 2: Photo of ACPDPAB12 Handout 3: Photo of ACPDPAB13 Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 9 minutes Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | ER-PRZR.1, Restoration of PRZR Heaters During Blackout, Rev. 00700 Drawing 03200-0122, Sheet 1, Pressurizer Backup Heater Panel B1 ACPDPA12 Schedule, Rev 2 Drawing 03200-0122, Sheet 2, Pressurizer Backup Heater Panel B1 ACPDPA12 Arrangement, Rev 0 Drawing 03200-0123, Sheet 1, Pressurizer Backup Heater Panel B2 ACPDPA13 Schedule, Rev 2 Drawing 03200-0123, Sheet 2, Pressurizer Backup Heater Panel B2 ACPDPA13 Arrangement, Rev 0 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of ER-PRZR.1 Handout 2: Photo of ACPDPAB12 Handout 3: Photo of ACPDPAB13 Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 9 minutes Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | ||
Information For Evaluator's Use: | Information For Evaluator's Use: | ||
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | ||
Line 3,106: | Line 2,927: | ||
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | ||
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | ||
2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Appendix C Page 4of10 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time: | Appendix C Page 4of10 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time: | ||
STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I- | STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-I- | ||
I- | |||
en | en | ||
-c .... | -c .... | ||
Line 3,154: | Line 2,971: | ||
Verify Emergency DIG B load less than 1550 KW. IF NOT, THEN go to step 4.2.4. | Verify Emergency DIG B load less than 1550 KW. IF NOT, THEN go to step 4.2.4. | ||
I CUE If the operator contacts the Control Room, as the CO, state that "the B EOG is loaded to 1650 KW." ., | I CUE If the operator contacts the Control Room, as the CO, state that "the B EOG is loaded to 1650 KW." ., | ||
(ER-PRZR.1, Step 4.2.414.2.4.1) The operator recognizes that the B 5 - - - | (ER-PRZR.1, Step 4.2.414.2.4.1) The operator recognizes that the B 5 - - - | ||
To energize a minimum of 125 KW EDG is loaded to 1650 KW, marks of PRZR Backup heaters, perform the Step NA, and proceeds. | To energize a minimum of 125 KW EDG is loaded to 1650 KW, marks of PRZR Backup heaters, perform the Step NA, and proceeds. | ||
Line 3,170: | Line 2,986: | ||
I- | I- | ||
<( | <( | ||
en | en c: ... | ||
c: ... | |||
Q) Q) | Q) Q) | ||
E .c E E en z 0 :::J | E .c E E en z 0 :::J | ||
Line 3,183: | Line 2,997: | ||
The operator places Breaker # 03 to OFF. - - - | The operator places Breaker # 03 to OFF. - - - | ||
The operator places Breaker # 05 to OFF. I - - - | The operator places Breaker # 05 to OFF. I - - - | ||
The operator places Breaker # 06 to OFF. - - - | The operator places Breaker # 06 to OFF. - - - | ||
The operator places Breaker # 07 to OFF. - - - | The operator places Breaker # 07 to OFF. - - - | ||
The operator places Breaker #. 08 to OFF. | The operator places Breaker #. 08 to OFF. | ||
CUE After the operator manipulates each breaker, state that "The Breaker Handle is in the OFF position." | CUE After the operator manipulates each breaker, state that "The Breaker Handle is in the OFF position." | ||
Examiner Note: The Breaker manipulations can be accomplished in any order. | Examiner Note: The Breaker manipulations can be accomplished in any order. | ||
Line 3,196: | Line 3,008: | ||
<C I- | <C I- | ||
<C (J') | <C (J') | ||
s:: | s:: | ||
E .c | E .c Cl) Cl) | ||
Cl) Cl) | |||
(J') z E E | (J') z E E | ||
::::> 0 :J Uz CUE When the operator identifies the location of ACPDPAB13, provide Handout 3. Due to potential safety concern with panel's elevation, after identifying the panel inform the operator that they may simulate/describe breaker actions on provided drawing. | ::::> 0 :J Uz CUE When the operator identifies the location of ACPDPAB13, provide Handout 3. Due to potential safety concern with panel's elevation, after identifying the panel inform the operator that they may simulate/describe breaker actions on provided drawing. | ||
Line 3,207: | Line 3,016: | ||
ACPDPAB13 open all breaker backup heater breaker panel switches EXCEPT Breaker Switch ACPDPAB13. | ACPDPAB13 open all breaker backup heater breaker panel switches EXCEPT Breaker Switch ACPDPAB13. | ||
#1, #3, and #6. (Total capacity available should be approximately The operator places Breaker # 02 125 KW) to OFF. | #1, #3, and #6. (Total capacity available should be approximately The operator places Breaker # 02 125 KW) to OFF. | ||
The operator places Breaker # 04 | The operator places Breaker # 04 to OFF. - - - | ||
to OFF. - - - | |||
' The operator places Breaker # 05 to OFF. - - - | ' The operator places Breaker # 05 to OFF. - - - | ||
CUE After the operator manipulates each breaker, state that "The Breaker Handle is in the OFF position." | CUE After the operator manipulates each breaker, state that "The Breaker Handle is in the OFF position." | ||
Line 3,225: | Line 3,032: | ||
I- | I- | ||
<( | <( | ||
en | en c: .... | ||
c: .... | |||
G.> G.> | G.> G.> | ||
E .c E E en z 0 ::::J | E .c E E en z 0 ::::J | ||
Line 3,234: | Line 3,039: | ||
CUE When the operator contacts the Control Room, as the CO, state that "the B EOG is loaded to 1775 KW, and steady." | CUE When the operator contacts the Control Room, as the CO, state that "the B EOG is loaded to 1775 KW, and steady." | ||
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM . | JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM . | ||
2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 3,289: | Line 3,093: | ||
Handout 2: Internal view of the Local Control Cabinet used in JPM Step 6. | Handout 2: Internal view of the Local Control Cabinet used in JPM Step 6. | ||
Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 8 minutes Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 8 minutes Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | ||
Information For Evaluator's Use: | Information For Evaluator's Use: | ||
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | ||
Line 3,297: | Line 3,100: | ||
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | ||
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | ||
2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 3,332: | Line 3,134: | ||
Appendix C Page 5 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I- | Appendix C Page 5 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I- | ||
<C I- | <C I- | ||
<C en | <C en c: | ||
c: | |||
Q) | Q) | ||
EE a... | EE a... | ||
Line 3,347: | Line 3,147: | ||
*4 - - - | *4 - - - | ||
CHARGING PUMP DISCHARGE Handwheel in the Clockwise ISOLATION VAL VE TO RCP direction. | CHARGING PUMP DISCHARGE Handwheel in the Clockwise ISOLATION VAL VE TO RCP direction. | ||
SEAL INJECTION, V-289 (Above the Charging Pump Pulse | SEAL INJECTION, V-289 (Above the Charging Pump Pulse Dampener). I CUE The Valve handwheel rotates freely, and then stops. ' | ||
Dampener). I | |||
CUE The Valve handwheel rotates freely, and then stops. ' | |||
(ER-FIRE.2, Step 8.1.5) OPEN The operator rotates the V-358 | (ER-FIRE.2, Step 8.1.5) OPEN The operator rotates the V-358 | ||
*5 - - - | *5 - - - | ||
Line 3,369: | Line 3,165: | ||
Appendix C Page 6 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION I-I- | Appendix C Page 6 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION I-I- | ||
<C en | <C en cQ): .... | ||
cQ): .... | |||
E .c Q) | E .c Q) | ||
STEP ELEMENT STANDARD <C en z E E | STEP ELEMENT STANDARD <C en z E E | ||
Line 3,407: | Line 3,201: | ||
CUE Pressurizer Level is 31% and slowly rising. | CUE Pressurizer Level is 31% and slowly rising. | ||
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM . | JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM . | ||
2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM J NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM J NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 3,457: | Line 3,250: | ||
Appendix C Page 3 of 7 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of Page 3 of 17 of FR-S.1. | Appendix C Page 3 of 7 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of Page 3 of 17 of FR-S.1. | ||
Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 4 minutes Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 4 minutes Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue . | ||
Information For Evaluator's Use: | Information For Evaluator's Use: | ||
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | UNSAT requires written comments on respective step. | ||
Line 3,465: | Line 3,257: | ||
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. | ||
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue . | ||
2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM K NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | 2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM K NUREG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
Line 3,481: | Line 3,272: | ||
52-1/MG1A, CRD MG SET A BKR CUE The sound of the breaker operating is heard, and th~ Green OPEN flag is showing. | 52-1/MG1A, CRD MG SET A BKR CUE The sound of the breaker operating is heard, and th~ Green OPEN flag is showing. | ||
Examiner Note: The operator may trip the MG Set Breakers in ANY order. | Examiner Note: The operator may trip the MG Set Breakers in ANY order. | ||
Examiner Note: If the operator attempts to trip the s2-2/MG1B first, it will not trip, and Step 1 is NOT critical. | Examiner Note: If the operator attempts to trip the s2-2/MG1B first, it will not trip, and Step 1 is NOT critical. | ||
(FR-S.1, Step 1 RNO) Dispatch The operator presses the TRIP | (FR-S.1, Step 1 RNO) Dispatch The operator presses the TRIP | ||
Line 3,503: | Line 3,293: | ||
<( | <( | ||
(./) | (./) | ||
c: | c: | ||
Q) t... | Q) t... | ||
Line 3,515: | Line 3,304: | ||
CUE The sound of the breaker operating is heard, and the Green OPEN flag is showing. | CUE The sound of the breaker operating is heard, and the Green OPEN flag is showing. | ||
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM. | JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM. | ||
I | I 2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM K NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | ||
2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM K NU REG 1021, Revision 10 | |||
Appendix C Page 6 of 7 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM K Examinee's Name: | Appendix C Page 6 of 7 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM K Examinee's Name: | ||
Line 3,544: | Line 3,331: | ||
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The D SAFW Pump is OOS for breaker maintenance, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement. | Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The D SAFW Pump is OOS for breaker maintenance, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement. | ||
Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 1 C-BOP Swap Service Water Pumps/D Service Water Pump Trip C(TS)-SRO I 2 2 C-RO Leak on the CCW System/B CCW Pump Trips C(TS)-SRO 3 3 I-BOP PZR Level Channel 427 fails LOW I-RO l(TS)-SRO 4 4 R-RO Turbine Control Valve CV-L4 Drifts Closed/Downpower N-BOP N-SRO 5 5 M-RO Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of M-BOP MS IVs M-SRO 6 6 C-RO Automatic Rx Trip fails C-SRO 7 5 C-RO MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start C-SRO 8 NA C-BOP D SAFW Pump is restored C-SRO | Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 1 C-BOP Swap Service Water Pumps/D Service Water Pump Trip C(TS)-SRO I 2 2 C-RO Leak on the CCW System/B CCW Pump Trips C(TS)-SRO 3 3 I-BOP PZR Level Channel 427 fails LOW I-RO l(TS)-SRO 4 4 R-RO Turbine Control Valve CV-L4 Drifts Closed/Downpower N-BOP N-SRO 5 5 M-RO Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of M-BOP MS IVs M-SRO 6 6 C-RO Automatic Rx Trip fails C-SRO 7 5 C-RO MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start C-SRO 8 NA C-BOP D SAFW Pump is restored C-SRO | ||
* (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor | * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022117) | ||
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022117) | |||
Ginna 2017 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 100% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past [[estimated NRC review hours::4 hours]], with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Per the daily work schedule, CROl-7, Swapping Service Water Pumps, is to be performed this shift, swapping the D for the C Service Water Pumps. | Ginna 2017 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 100% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past [[estimated NRC review hours::4 hours]], with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Per the daily work schedule, CROl-7, Swapping Service Water Pumps, is to be performed this shift, swapping the D for the C Service Water Pumps. | ||
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The D SAFW Pump is OOS for breaker maintenance, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement. | The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The D SAFW Pump is OOS for breaker maintenance, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement. | ||
Line 3,557: | Line 3,342: | ||
After this, a large steam break occurs downstream of the MSIVs in the Intermediate Building, and both MSIVs will fail to automatically or manually close. Simultaneously, the reactor will fail to trip automatically. The operator will need to manually trip the Reactor. Additionally, all AFW Pumps fail to start due to the high-energy break. The crew will implement E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." | After this, a large steam break occurs downstream of the MSIVs in the Intermediate Building, and both MSIVs will fail to automatically or manually close. Simultaneously, the reactor will fail to trip automatically. The operator will need to manually trip the Reactor. Additionally, all AFW Pumps fail to start due to the high-energy break. The crew will implement E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." | ||
Both MSIVs will automatically close after 90 seconds. The crew will transition to FR-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink," at Step 9 of E-0; and will be required to initiate RCS Bleed and Feed. Upon successful implementation of RCS Bleed and Feed, the D SAFW Pump will become available, and the crew will restore a feed source to the B S/G in accordance with ATT-22.0, "Attachment Restoring Feed Flow." | Both MSIVs will automatically close after 90 seconds. The crew will transition to FR-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink," at Step 9 of E-0; and will be required to initiate RCS Bleed and Feed. Upon successful implementation of RCS Bleed and Feed, the D SAFW Pump will become available, and the crew will restore a feed source to the B S/G in accordance with ATT-22.0, "Attachment Restoring Feed Flow." | ||
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022117) | Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022117) | ||
The scenario will terminate at Step 27.b of FR-H.1, after feed flow has been restored from the D SAFW Pump. | The scenario will terminate at Step 27.b of FR-H.1, after feed flow has been restored from the D SAFW Pump. | ||
Line 3,565: | Line 3,349: | ||
Establish RCS bleed and feed so that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently such that the SI Pumps inject flow (EOP-Based) | Establish RCS bleed and feed so that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently such that the SI Pumps inject flow (EOP-Based) | ||
Safety Significance: Fail.ure to initiate RCS bleed and feed before the RCS saturates at a pressure above the shutoff head of the high-head ECCS pumps results in significant and sustained core uncovery. If RCS bleed is initiated so that the RCS is depressurized belo~ the shutoff head of the high-head ECCS pumps, then core uncovery is prevented or minimized. | Safety Significance: Fail.ure to initiate RCS bleed and feed before the RCS saturates at a pressure above the shutoff head of the high-head ECCS pumps results in significant and sustained core uncovery. If RCS bleed is initiated so that the RCS is depressurized belo~ the shutoff head of the high-head ECCS pumps, then core uncovery is prevented or minimized. | ||
PROGRAM: Ginna Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N17-1-1 | PROGRAM: Ginna Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N17-1-1 | ||
Line 3,594: | Line 3,377: | ||
: 24. ATT-5.1, "Attachment SAFW From SW" (Rev 01200) | : 24. ATT-5.1, "Attachment SAFW From SW" (Rev 01200) | ||
Validation Time: 105 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Essential Training & Consulting, LLC Facility Review: | Validation Time: 105 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Essential Training & Consulting, LLC Facility Review: | ||
Rev.022117 | Rev.022117 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Facility: Ginna Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: N17-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO) | ||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Facility: Ginna Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: N17-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO) | |||
(RO) | (RO) | ||
(BOP) | (BOP) | ||
Line 3,602: | Line 3,383: | ||
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The D SAFW Pump is OOS for breaker maintenance, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement. | Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The D SAFW Pump is OOS for breaker maintenance, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement. | ||
Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 1 C-BOP Swap Service Water Pumps/D Service Water Pump Trip C(TS)-SRO 2 2 C-RO Leak on the CCW System/B CCW Pump Trips C(TS)-SRO 3 3 I-BOP PZR Level Channel 427 fails LOW I-RO l(TS)-SRO 4 4 R-RO Turbine Control Valve CV-L4 Drifts Closed/Downpower N-BOP N-SRO 5 5 M-RO Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of M-BOP MS IVs M-SRO 6 6 C-RO Automatic Rx Trip fails C-SRO 7 5 C-RO MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start C-SRO 8 NA C-BOP D SAFW Pump is restored C-SRO | Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 1 C-BOP Swap Service Water Pumps/D Service Water Pump Trip C(TS)-SRO 2 2 C-RO Leak on the CCW System/B CCW Pump Trips C(TS)-SRO 3 3 I-BOP PZR Level Channel 427 fails LOW I-RO l(TS)-SRO 4 4 R-RO Turbine Control Valve CV-L4 Drifts Closed/Downpower N-BOP N-SRO 5 5 M-RO Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of M-BOP MS IVs M-SRO 6 6 C-RO Automatic Rx Trip fails C-SRO 7 5 C-RO MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start C-SRO 8 NA C-BOP D SAFW Pump is restored C-SRO | ||
* (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I )nstru ment, (C)omponent, (M)ajor | * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I )nstru ment, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Ginna 2017 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 100% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past [[estimated NRC review hours::4 hours]], with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Per the daily work schedule, CROl-7, Swapping Service Water Pumps, is to be performed this shift, swapping the C for the D Service Water pumps. | ||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Ginna 2017 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 100% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past [[estimated NRC review hours::4 hours]], with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Per the daily work schedule, CROl-7, Swapping Service Water Pumps, is to be performed this shift, swapping the C for the D Service Water pumps. | |||
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The D SAFW Pump is OOS for breaker maintenance, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement. | The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The D SAFW Pump is OOS for breaker maintenance, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement. | ||
Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will swap the C and the D Service Water Pumps in accordance with P-17, "Operations Control Room Operating Instructions." Because of restrictions on running four Service Water Pumps simultaneously, the operator will likely stop the C Service Water Pump prior to starting the D Service Water Pump. When the operator stops the C Service Water Pump, its Discharge Check Valve will stick partially open, resulting in lower system pressure, even after the D Service Water Pump is started. The operator may restart the pump based on these indications, or enter AP-SW.1, "Service Water Leak." When the C SW Pump is re-started the D Service Water Pump will trip. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-J-9, "SAFEGUARDS BREAKER TRIP,'' and AP-SW.2, "Loss of Service Water." The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3. 7.8, "Service Water (SW) | Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will swap the C and the D Service Water Pumps in accordance with P-17, "Operations Control Room Operating Instructions." Because of restrictions on running four Service Water Pumps simultaneously, the operator will likely stop the C Service Water Pump prior to starting the D Service Water Pump. When the operator stops the C Service Water Pump, its Discharge Check Valve will stick partially open, resulting in lower system pressure, even after the D Service Water Pump is started. The operator may restart the pump based on these indications, or enter AP-SW.1, "Service Water Leak." When the C SW Pump is re-started the D Service Water Pump will trip. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-J-9, "SAFEGUARDS BREAKER TRIP,'' and AP-SW.2, "Loss of Service Water." The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3. 7.8, "Service Water (SW) | ||
System." | System." | ||
Following this, a CCW System Supply Relief Valve will lift' and fail to reseat causing a 30 gpm CCW System leak. Approximately two minutes afterwards the B CCW Pump will trip, and the A CCW Pump will automatically start. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-A-17, "MOTOR OFF RCP CCWP," and enter AP-CCW.2, "Loss of CCW During Power Operation." | Following this, a CCW System Supply Relief Valve will lift' and fail to reseat causing a 30 gpm CCW System leak. Approximately two minutes afterwards the B CCW Pump will trip, and the A CCW Pump will automatically start. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-A-17, "MOTOR OFF RCP CCWP," and enter AP-CCW.2, "Loss of CCW During Power Operation." | ||
The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, "Component Cooling Water System." | The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, "Component Cooling Water System." | ||
Line 3,615: | Line 3,393: | ||
Then, turbine control valve CVL-4 will drift closed. The crew will respond per AP-TURB.2, "Turbine Load Rejection,'' begin a load reduction to less than 50% power using AP-TURB.5, "Rapid Load Reduction." | Then, turbine control valve CVL-4 will drift closed. The crew will respond per AP-TURB.2, "Turbine Load Rejection,'' begin a load reduction to less than 50% power using AP-TURB.5, "Rapid Load Reduction." | ||
After this, a large steam break occurs downstream of the MSIVs in the Intermediate Building, and both MSIVs will fail to automatically or manually close. Simultaneously, the reactor will fail to trip automatically. The operator will need to manually trip the Reactor. Additionally, all AFW pumps fail to start due to the high-energy break. The crew will implement E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." | After this, a large steam break occurs downstream of the MSIVs in the Intermediate Building, and both MSIVs will fail to automatically or manually close. Simultaneously, the reactor will fail to trip automatically. The operator will need to manually trip the Reactor. Additionally, all AFW pumps fail to start due to the high-energy break. The crew will implement E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." | ||
Both MSIVs will automatically close after 90 seconds. The crew will transition to FR-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink,'' at Step 9 of E-0; and will be required to initiate RCS Bleed and Feed. Upon successful implementation of RCS Bleed and Feed, the D SAFW | Both MSIVs will automatically close after 90 seconds. The crew will transition to FR-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink,'' at Step 9 of E-0; and will be required to initiate RCS Bleed and Feed. Upon successful implementation of RCS Bleed and Feed, the D SAFW Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Pump will become available, and the crew will restore a feed source to the B S/G in accordance with ATT-22.0, "Attachment Restoring Feed Flow." | ||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Pump will become available, and the crew will restore a feed source to the B S/G in accordance with ATT-22.0, "Attachment Restoring Feed Flow." | |||
The scenario will terminate at Step 27.b of FR-H.1, after feed flow has been restored from the D SAFW Pump. | The scenario will terminate at Step 27.b of FR-H.1, after feed flow has been restored from the D SAFW Pump. | ||
Critical Tasks: | Critical Tasks: | ||
Line 3,624: | Line 3,400: | ||
Establish RCS bleed and feed so that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently such that the SI Pumps inject flow (EOP-Based) | Establish RCS bleed and feed so that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently such that the SI Pumps inject flow (EOP-Based) | ||
Safety Significance: Failure to initiate RCS bleed and feed before the RCS saturates at a pressure above the shutoff head of the high-head ECCS pumps results in significant and sustained core uncovery. If RCS bleed is initiated so that the RCS is depressurized below the shutoff head of the high-head ECCS pumps, then core uncovery is prevented or minimized. | Safety Significance: Failure to initiate RCS bleed and feed before the RCS saturates at a pressure above the shutoff head of the high-head ECCS pumps results in significant and sustained core uncovery. If RCS bleed is initiated so that the RCS is depressurized below the shutoff head of the high-head ECCS pumps, then core uncovery is prevented or minimized. | ||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Reset to Temp IC 155 T = 0 (From IC-24): | Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Reset to Temp IC 155 T = 0 (From IC-24): | ||
0 (Originally IC-24). | 0 (Originally IC-24). | ||
Line 3,643: | Line 3,418: | ||
Insert MALF FPS01-Z38 on T-4 (delayed 10 seconds) 0 Prior to Crew | Insert MALF FPS01-Z38 on T-4 (delayed 10 seconds) 0 Prior to Crew | ||
* Hang Protective Tags per OPG-Protective Briefing Equipment. | * Hang Protective Tags per OPG-Protective Briefing Equipment. | ||
Scenario E11ent Description NRC Scenario 1 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D Crew Briefing | Scenario E11ent Description NRC Scenario 1 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D Crew Briefing | ||
* Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements | * Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements | ||
Line 3,653: | Line 3,427: | ||
D At direction of Event3 PZR Level Channel 427 fails LOW examiner Trigger#2 PZR03B (0, NO Ramp) | D At direction of Event3 PZR Level Channel 427 fails LOW examiner Trigger#2 PZR03B (0, NO Ramp) | ||
D At direction of Event 4 Turbine Control Valve CV-L4 Drifts examiner Closed/Down power Trigger#3 TUR11 B (0 over 20 seconds) | D At direction of Event 4 Turbine Control Valve CV-L4 Drifts examiner Closed/Down power Trigger#3 TUR11 B (0 over 20 seconds) | ||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D At direction of Event 5 Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed examiner closure of MSIVs Trigger #4 STM03 (2.4E7 No Ramp) | Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D At direction of Event 5 Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed examiner closure of MSIVs Trigger #4 STM03 (2.4E7 No Ramp) | ||
STM05A = OPEN (Delete after 90 seconds) | STM05A = OPEN (Delete after 90 seconds) | ||
Line 3,660: | Line 3,433: | ||
FPS01-Z38 (Delayed 10 seconds) | FPS01-Z38 (Delayed 10 seconds) | ||
D Post-Rx Trip Event 6 Automatic Rx Trip fails RPS05A Note: These malfunctions are inserted at T=O. | D Post-Rx Trip Event 6 Automatic Rx Trip fails RPS05A Note: These malfunctions are inserted at T=O. | ||
RPS05B | RPS05B D Post-Rx Trip Event 7 MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start FDW12=0 Note: These malfunctions are inserted at T=O. | ||
D Post-Rx Trip Event 7 MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start FDW12=0 Note: These malfunctions are inserted at T=O. | |||
FDW11A FDW11B FDW15 D At direction of Events D SAFW Pump is restored examiner Close MOV 9701 B Note: These malfunctions are inserted at T=O. | FDW11A FDW11B FDW15 D At direction of Events D SAFW Pump is restored examiner Close MOV 9701 B Note: These malfunctions are inserted at T=O. | ||
OVR [DO]- When directed remove MALF/OVRs. | OVR [DO]- When directed remove MALF/OVRs. | ||
FDW35B=OFF OVR [DO]- | FDW35B=OFF OVR [DO]- | ||
FDW37B=OFF OVR [DO)- | FDW37B=OFF OVR [DO)- | ||
FDW43B=OFF D Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner | FDW43B=OFF D Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 1 Event# -----Page 8 of 59 | ||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 1 Event# -----Page 8 of 59 | |||
---n Event | ---n Event | ||
Line 3,740: | Line 3,509: | ||
* Verify idle SW pump check valve closed | * Verify idle SW pump check valve closed | ||
* Idle pump shaft stopped co (Step 6 RNO) Notify the Control Room of any Examiner NOTE: It is indication of check valve failure. expected that the US will direct the re-start of the C SW Pump based on the Note prior to Step 3 of AP-SW .1. | * Idle pump shaft stopped co (Step 6 RNO) Notify the Control Room of any Examiner NOTE: It is indication of check valve failure. expected that the US will direct the re-start of the C SW Pump based on the Note prior to Step 3 of AP-SW .1. | ||
AR-J-9, SAFEGUARD BREAKER TRIP us IF alarm is due to loss of SW pump(s), THEN NOTE: The US will address refer to AP-SW .2 AP-SW.2. | AR-J-9, SAFEGUARD BREAKER TRIP us IF alarm is due to loss of SW pump(s), THEN NOTE: The US will address refer to AP-SW .2 AP-SW.2. | ||
AP-SW.2, LOSS OF SERVICE WATER co (Step 1) Verify 4SOV AC Emergency Susses 17 and 18 - ENERGIZED co (Step 2) Verify SW Pump Alignment: NOTE: The A and B SW Pumps are running. | AP-SW.2, LOSS OF SERVICE WATER co (Step 1) Verify 4SOV AC Emergency Susses 17 and 18 - ENERGIZED co (Step 2) Verify SW Pump Alignment: NOTE: The A and B SW Pumps are running. | ||
Line 3,774: | Line 3,541: | ||
* MCB Annunciator A-22; CCW PUMP DISCHARGE LO PRESS (In and out) | * MCB Annunciator A-22; CCW PUMP DISCHARGE LO PRESS (In and out) | ||
* MCB Annunciator A-13, CCW SURGE TANK LO LEVEL 41.2% | * MCB Annunciator A-13, CCW SURGE TANK LO LEVEL 41.2% | ||
Time Pos. ,, Expected Actions/Behavior Comments | Time Pos. ,, Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The crew may enter AP-CCW.2 directly. | ||
NOTE: The crew may enter AP-CCW.2 directly. | |||
AR-A-17, MOTOR OFF RCP CCWP HCO (Step 1) Verify which motor tripped. | AR-A-17, MOTOR OFF RCP CCWP HCO (Step 1) Verify which motor tripped. | ||
HCO. (Step 2) IF a RCP has tripped, THEN ..... NOTE: An RCP has NOT tripped. | HCO. (Step 2) IF a RCP has tripped, THEN ..... NOTE: An RCP has NOT tripped. | ||
Line 3,797: | Line 3,562: | ||
THEN ........ | THEN ........ | ||
HCO (*Step 2) Monitor CCW Surge Tank Level - NOTE: This is a Continuous APPROXIMATELY 50% AND STABLE .... ~ction. The US will make one or more board operators aware. | HCO (*Step 2) Monitor CCW Surge Tank Level - NOTE: This is a Continuous APPROXIMATELY 50% AND STABLE .... ~ction. The US will make one or more board operators aware. | ||
NOTE: The CCW Surge Tank Level is lowering. | NOTE: The CCW Surge Tank Level is lowering. | ||
HCO (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following: | HCO (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following: | ||
Line 3,833: | Line 3,597: | ||
If directed to isolate the leak, Remove MALF CL GOS NOTE: The US may contact Chemistry and direct them to isolate CCW to the Sample Coolers. | If directed to isolate the leak, Remove MALF CL GOS NOTE: The US may contact Chemistry and direct them to isolate CCW to the Sample Coolers. | ||
I If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as Chemistry. | I If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as Chemistry. | ||
NOTE: After the CCW to the | NOTE: After the CCW to the Sample Cooler is isolated the crew may elect to isolate SG Slowdowns. | ||
Sample Cooler is isolated the crew may elect to isolate SG Slowdowns. | |||
HCO/ (Step 8) Check for CCW Leakage In CNMT: | HCO/ (Step 8) Check for CCW Leakage In CNMT: | ||
EO | EO | ||
Line 3,859: | Line 3,620: | ||
HCO (Step 11) Check Normal or Excess Letdown NOTE: Normal Letdown is in | HCO (Step 11) Check Normal or Excess Letdown NOTE: Normal Letdown is in | ||
- IN SERVICE service. | - IN SERVICE service. | ||
HCO (Step 12) Check CCW System Leak Isolated | HCO (Step 12) Check CCW System Leak Isolated | ||
* Surge tank level -APPROXIMATELY 50% | * Surge tank level -APPROXIMATELY 50% | ||
Line 3,880: | Line 3,640: | ||
us (Step 16) Notify Higher Supervision NOTE: The US may notify the WCC/Supervision. | us (Step 16) Notify Higher Supervision NOTE: The US may notify the WCC/Supervision. | ||
SIM DRIVER: as WCC/Supervision, acknowledge . | SIM DRIVER: as WCC/Supervision, acknowledge . | ||
I us (Step 17) Return To Procedure Or Guidance In Effect NOTE: The US will check the Tech Specs. | I us (Step 17) Return To Procedure Or Guidance In Effect NOTE: The US will check the Tech Specs. | ||
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.7, COMPONENT COOLING (CCW) WATER SYSTEM us 3.7.7 Two CCW trains, two CCW heat exchangers, and the CCW loop header shall be OPERABLE. | TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.7, COMPONENT COOLING (CCW) WATER SYSTEM us 3.7.7 Two CCW trains, two CCW heat exchangers, and the CCW loop header shall be OPERABLE. | ||
Line 3,913: | Line 3,672: | ||
AR-F-11, PRESSURIZER LO Level 13% | AR-F-11, PRESSURIZER LO Level 13% | ||
HCO (Step 1) Perform a channel check NOTE: LT-427 will indicate low compared to the others. | HCO (Step 1) Perform a channel check NOTE: LT-427 will indicate low compared to the others. | ||
. us (Step 2) Go to the appropriate procedure: | . us (Step 2) Go to the appropriate procedure: | ||
* AP-RCS.1 for RCS leak | * AP-RCS.1 for RCS leak | ||
Line 3,962: | Line 3,720: | ||
* Select Point ID L0427 | * Select Point ID L0427 | ||
* Turn "OFF" scan processing . | * Turn "OFF" scan processing . | ||
* Select "Change". | * Select "Change". | ||
* Answer prompts us (Step 10) GO TO step 6.4.4 NOTE: The US will return to the body of the procedure. | * Answer prompts us (Step 10) GO TO step 6.4.4 NOTE: The US will return to the body of the procedure. | ||
Line 4,009: | Line 3,766: | ||
HCO/ (Step 6.4.6) IF placing 40 GPM orifice in NOTE: A 60 gpm Orifice was co service ........ previously in service. | HCO/ (Step 6.4.6) IF placing 40 GPM orifice in NOTE: A 60 gpm Orifice was co service ........ previously in service. | ||
HCO/ (Step 6.4. 7) IF placing 60 GPM orifice in co service THEN .... | HCO/ (Step 6.4. 7) IF placing 60 GPM orifice in co service THEN .... | ||
* PLACE LOW PRESS LTDN PRESS ' | * PLACE LOW PRESS LTDN PRESS ' | ||
PCV-135 in MANUAL at - 60% open. | PCV-135 in MANUAL at - 60% open. | ||
Line 4,027: | Line 3,783: | ||
HCO/ (Step 6.4.14) PLACE Pressurizer level I | HCO/ (Step 6.4.14) PLACE Pressurizer level I | ||
co control (Charging Pump) to AUTO. | co control (Charging Pump) to AUTO. | ||
ER-INST.1, REACTOR PROTECTION BISTABLE DEFEAT AFTER INSTRUMENTATION LOOP FAILURE HCO (Step 6.4.6) WHEN PRZR level is restored to normal, THEN place an operating charging pump controller in AUTO. | ER-INST.1, REACTOR PROTECTION BISTABLE DEFEAT AFTER INSTRUMENTATION LOOP FAILURE HCO (Step 6.4.6) WHEN PRZR level is restored to normal, THEN place an operating charging pump controller in AUTO. | ||
HCO (Step 6.3.6) Open associated block valve NOTE: No Block Valve was closed in step 4.4.3 Closed. | HCO (Step 6.3.6) Open associated block valve NOTE: No Block Valve was closed in step 4.4.3 Closed. | ||
Line 4,054: | Line 3,809: | ||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# | Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# | ||
3 Page 30 of 59 | 3 Page 30 of 59 | ||
--~ | --~ | ||
Line 4,089: | Line 3,843: | ||
* MCB Annunciator G-15, ST,EAM DUMP ARMED | * MCB Annunciator G-15, ST,EAM DUMP ARMED | ||
* Steam dumps cycle I Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP-TURB.2, TURBINE LOAD REJECTION HCO (*Step 1) Montor RCS Tavg NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware. | * Steam dumps cycle I Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP-TURB.2, TURBINE LOAD REJECTION HCO (*Step 1) Montor RCS Tavg NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware. | ||
* Tavg-GREATER THAN 545°F | * Tavg-GREATER THAN 545°F | ||
* Tavg-LESS THAN 579°F co (Step 2) Check Turbine Valves: | * Tavg-LESS THAN 579°F co (Step 2) Check Turbine Valves: | ||
Line 4,104: | Line 3,857: | ||
NOTE: The US will go to AP-TURB.5 and conduct Rapid Load Reduction Brief prior to commencing load reduction. | NOTE: The US will go to AP-TURB.5 and conduct Rapid Load Reduction Brief prior to commencing load reduction. | ||
AP-TURB.5, RAPID LOAD REDUCTION HCO (Step 1) Initiate Load Reduction ., | AP-TURB.5, RAPID LOAD REDUCTION HCO (Step 1) Initiate Load Reduction ., | ||
* Verify rods in AUTO | * Verify rods in AUTO | ||
* Initiate boration at the rate determined in NOTE: The HCO will initiate a OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC. boration. | * Initiate boration at the rate determined in NOTE: The HCO will initiate a OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC. boration. | ||
Line 4,127: | Line 3,879: | ||
* Match Tavg and Tref | * Match Tavg and Tref | ||
* Compensate for Xenon HCO (*Step 4) Monitor PRZR Pressure- NOTE: This is a Continuous TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG IN AUTO Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware. | * Compensate for Xenon HCO (*Step 4) Monitor PRZR Pressure- NOTE: This is a Continuous TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG IN AUTO Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware. | ||
I co ., (*Step 5) Monitor MFW Regulating Valves- NOTE: This is a Continuous | I co ., (*Step 5) Monitor MFW Regulating Valves- NOTE: This is a Continuous RESTORING S/G LEVEL TO 52% IN AUTO Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware. | ||
RESTORING S/G LEVEL TO 52% IN AUTO Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware. | |||
HCO (*Step 6) Monitor PRZR Level- TRENDING NOTE: This is a Continuous TO PROGRAM IN AUTO CONTROL Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware. | HCO (*Step 6) Monitor PRZR Level- TRENDING NOTE: This is a Continuous TO PROGRAM IN AUTO CONTROL Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware. | ||
NOTE: PRZR Level control may still be in MANUAL. | NOTE: PRZR Level control may still be in MANUAL. | ||
co. (Step 7) Check IA Available To CNMT | co. (Step 7) Check IA Available To CNMT | ||
Line 4,149: | Line 3,898: | ||
* Hotwell level at setpoint co (Step 9 RNO) IF controller demand approaching 70% (Large Reject Valve Opens), THEN place controller in Manual I | * Hotwell level at setpoint co (Step 9 RNO) IF controller demand approaching 70% (Large Reject Valve Opens), THEN place controller in Manual I | ||
and control level. | and control level. | ||
US/ (Step 10) Check If Condensate Booster ' | US/ (Step 10) Check If Condensate Booster ' | ||
co Pumps Should Be Secured | co Pumps Should Be Secured | ||
Line 4,193: | Line 3,941: | ||
Safety Significance: Failure to manually trip " the reactor causes a challenge to the subcriticality CSF beyond that irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. | Safety Significance: Failure to manually trip " the reactor causes a challenge to the subcriticality CSF beyond that irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. | ||
Additionally, it constitutes an "incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking action which complicates the event mitigation strategy that demonstrates the inability by the crew to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of the RPS. | Additionally, it constitutes an "incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking action which complicates the event mitigation strategy that demonstrates the inability by the crew to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of the RPS. | ||
co (Step 2) Verify Turbine Stop Valves - Immediate Action CLOSED | co (Step 2) Verify Turbine Stop Valves - Immediate Action CLOSED co (Step 3) Verify sufficient AC . Immediate Action Emergency buses Energized To At Least 440 VOLTS: | ||
co (Step 3) Verify sufficient AC . Immediate Action Emergency buses Energized To At Least 440 VOLTS: | |||
* Bus 14 OR Bus 16 AND | * Bus 14 OR Bus 16 AND | ||
* Bus 17 OR Bus 18 HCO/ (Step 4) Check if SI is Actuated: Immediate Action co | * Bus 17 OR Bus 18 HCO/ (Step 4) Check if SI is Actuated: Immediate Action co | ||
Line 4,225: | Line 3,970: | ||
* All fans RUNNING | * All fans RUNNING | ||
* Charcoal filter dampers green status lights - EXTINGUISHED HCOI (Step 3) Check If Main Steamlines Should NOTE: Although these co Be Isolated: valves failed to close Any MSIV - OPEN immediately after the Steam Break, they automatically | * Charcoal filter dampers green status lights - EXTINGUISHED HCOI (Step 3) Check If Main Steamlines Should NOTE: Although these co Be Isolated: valves failed to close Any MSIV - OPEN immediately after the Steam Break, they automatically | ||
' closed 90 seconds after the | ' closed 90 seconds after the break, and are expected to be closed here. | ||
break, and are expected to be closed here. | |||
HCOI (Step 3.a RNO) Go to Step 4. | HCOI (Step 3.a RNO) Go to Step 4. | ||
co HCOI (Step 4)Verify MFW Isolation: | co HCOI (Step 4)Verify MFW Isolation: | ||
Line 4,255: | Line 3,998: | ||
* Letdown orifice valves - CLOSED | * Letdown orifice valves - CLOSED | ||
* AOV-200A i | * AOV-200A i | ||
* AOV-200B | * AOV-200B | ||
* AOV-202 HCO/ (Step 7) Check CCW System Status: | * AOV-202 HCO/ (Step 7) Check CCW System Status: | ||
Line 4,284: | Line 4,026: | ||
* MOV-8178 | * MOV-8178 | ||
., HCO/ (Step 10) Verify GREATS Actuation: | ., HCO/ (Step 10) Verify GREATS Actuation: | ||
co | co | ||
* At least one damper in each flowpath - | * At least one damper in each flowpath - | ||
Line 4,307: | Line 4,048: | ||
IF less than 2 MDAFW pumps are running, NOTE: Although both Steam THEN manually open TDAFW pump steam Supply Valves indicate supply valves. OPEN, the TDAFW Pump has failed to supply flow. | IF less than 2 MDAFW pumps are running, NOTE: Although both Steam THEN manually open TDAFW pump steam Supply Valves indicate supply valves. OPEN, the TDAFW Pump has failed to supply flow. | ||
* MOV-3505A | * MOV-3505A | ||
* MOV-3504A | * MOV-3504A CO/ (Step 8) Verify AFW Valve Alignment: | ||
CO/ (Step 8) Verify AFW Valve Alignment: | |||
HCO | HCO | ||
* AFW flow- INDICATED TO BOTH NOTE: There is no AFW S/G(s) flow indicated to either SIG. | * AFW flow- INDICATED TO BOTH NOTE: There is no AFW S/G(s) flow indicated to either SIG. | ||
Line 4,343: | Line 4,082: | ||
* Go to Step 13 . | * Go to Step 13 . | ||
HCO (Step 13) Actuate SI and Cl HCO (Step 14) Verify RCS Feed Path: | HCO (Step 13) Actuate SI and Cl HCO (Step 14) Verify RCS Feed Path: | ||
* Check SI Pump .Status - All Running | * Check SI Pump .Status - All Running HCO (Step 15) Establish RCS Bleed Path: | ||
HCO (Step 15) Establish RCS Bleed Path: | |||
* Open both PRZR PORV block valves | * Open both PRZR PORV block valves | ||
* Place both PRZR PORV switches to OPEN | * Place both PRZR PORV switches to OPEN | ||
Line 4,369: | Line 4,106: | ||
* Place ACCUM TO SURGE TK VLV SOV-8616A to OPEN | * Place ACCUM TO SURGE TK VLV SOV-8616A to OPEN | ||
* To depressurize the RCS in accordance with the guidance provided by the EOP step, perform the following: | * To depressurize the RCS in accordance with the guidance provided by the EOP step, perform the following: | ||
* For PCV-431 C, place over-pressurization system arming switch, N2 ARMING VLV SOV-8619B, to ARM | * For PCV-431 C, place over-pressurization system arming switch, N2 ARMING VLV SOV-8619B, to ARM | ||
* For PCV-430, place over-pressurization system arming switch, N2 ARMING VLV SOV-8619A, to ARM | * For PCV-430, place over-pressurization system arming switch, N2 ARMING VLV SOV-8619A, to ARM | ||
Line 4,391: | Line 4,127: | ||
* 450B | * 450B | ||
* 450C FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK I | * 450C FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK I | ||
HCO (Step 15.d) Verify PORVs - BOTH OPEN | HCO (Step 15.d) Verify PORVs - BOTH OPEN HCO (Step 16) Check If SI Can Be Reset: | ||
HCO (Step 16) Check If SI Can Be Reset: | |||
* Check SI blocked status light - | * Check SI blocked status light - | ||
EXTINGUISHED | EXTINGUISHED | ||
Line 4,421: | Line 4,155: | ||
* Bus 15 normal feed breaker - | * Bus 15 normal feed breaker - | ||
CLOSED | CLOSED | ||
* Verify turbine building SW isolation I valves - OPEN | * Verify turbine building SW isolation I valves - OPEN | ||
* MOV-4613 and MOV-4670 | * MOV-4613 and MOV-4670 | ||
Line 4,449: | Line 4,182: | ||
* Core exit T/Cs - STABLE OR LOWERING I | * Core exit T/Cs - STABLE OR LOWERING I | ||
* RVLIS Level (no RCPs)- GREATER NOTE: Adverse THAN 77% [82% adverse CNMT] Containment may exist. | * RVLIS Level (no RCPs)- GREATER NOTE: Adverse THAN 77% [82% adverse CNMT] Containment may exist. | ||
HCO/ (Step 22) Complete Steps 1 through 7 of E-0, co REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION While Continuing With This Procedure CRITICAL TASK: | HCO/ (Step 22) Complete Steps 1 through 7 of E-0, co REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION While Continuing With This Procedure CRITICAL TASK: | ||
.Establish RCS bleed and feed so that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently such that the SI Pumps inject flow (EOP-Based) | .Establish RCS bleed and feed so that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently such that the SI Pumps inject flow (EOP-Based) | ||
Line 4,463: | Line 4,195: | ||
Other Examiners follow FR-H.1 Actions, Step 23, on Page 53. | Other Examiners follow FR-H.1 Actions, Step 23, on Page 53. | ||
On the other hand, the US may recognize that each of the required E-0 Steps have been completed and proceed to Step 23 of FR-H.1 . | On the other hand, the US may recognize that each of the required E-0 Steps have been completed and proceed to Step 23 of FR-H.1 . | ||
I If so, ALL Examiners proceed to Step 23 of FR-H.1 action on Page 53. | I If so, ALL Examiners proceed to Step 23 of FR-H.1 action on Page 53. | ||
E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION HCO/ (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip: | E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION HCO/ (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip: | ||
Line 4,524: | Line 4,255: | ||
Automatic Rx Trip/Manual Pushbutton Rx Trip fails/MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start/D SAFW Pump is restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (Step 6.a RNO) Depress manual Cl NOTE: Although this action co pushbutton. is directed, it will not be performed because a CAUTION prior to Step 22 of FR-H.1 directs the operator to not reverse any actions taken to establish RCS Bleed and Feed; and taking this action will isolate IA to Containment. | Automatic Rx Trip/Manual Pushbutton Rx Trip fails/MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start/D SAFW Pump is restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (Step 6.a RNO) Depress manual Cl NOTE: Although this action co pushbutton. is directed, it will not be performed because a CAUTION prior to Step 22 of FR-H.1 directs the operator to not reverse any actions taken to establish RCS Bleed and Feed; and taking this action will isolate IA to Containment. | ||
HCO/ * (Step 6 Continued) Verify Cl and CVI NOTE: AOV-5392 is NOT co valve status lights - BRIGHT BRIGHT, but no action will be taken to reverse this. | HCO/ * (Step 6 Continued) Verify Cl and CVI NOTE: AOV-5392 is NOT co valve status lights - BRIGHT BRIGHT, but no action will be taken to reverse this. | ||
* CNMT RECIRC fan coolers SW outlet ' | * CNMT RECIRC fan coolers SW outlet ' | ||
valve status lights - BRIGHT | valve status lights - BRIGHT | ||
Line 4,532: | Line 4,262: | ||
* AOV-200A | * AOV-200A | ||
* AOV-200B | * AOV-200B | ||
* AOV-202 HCO/ (Step 7) Check CCW System Status: | * AOV-202 HCO/ (Step 7) Check CCW System Status: | ||
co | co | ||
Line 4,551: | Line 4,280: | ||
* Verify SI pump C- RUNNING | * Verify SI pump C- RUNNING | ||
* Verify SI pump A - RUNNING | * Verify SI pump A - RUNNING | ||
' | ' | ||
* Verify SI pump B - RUNNING | * Verify SI pump B - RUNNING | ||
Line 4,621: | Line 4,349: | ||
* Standby AFW flow | * Standby AFW flow | ||
* Condensate flow | * Condensate flow | ||
* WHEN a feed source is available, THEN control feed flow per requirements of ATT-22, ATTACHMENT RESTORING FEED FLOW | * WHEN a feed source is available, THEN control feed flow per requirements of ATT-22, ATTACHMENT RESTORING FEED FLOW SIM DRIVER Instructions: DELETE the following: | ||
OVR [DO] FDW35B=OFF OVR [DO] FDW37B=OFF OVR [DO] FDW43B=OFF OVR [DO] FDW35A=OFF OVR [DO] FDW37 A=OFF Contact Control Room as WWM and state that the D SAFW has become available. | |||
SIM DRIVER Instructions: DELETE the following: | |||
OVR [DO] FDW35B=OFF OVR [DO] FDW37B=OFF OVR [DO] FDW43B=OFF OVR [DO] FDW35A=OFF OVR [DO] FDW37 A=OFF Contact Control Room as WWM and | |||
state that the D SAFW has become available. | |||
NOTE: The US will use ATT-5.1 to restore AFW flow using the D AFW Pump. | NOTE: The US will use ATT-5.1 to restore AFW flow using the D AFW Pump. | ||
ATTACHMENT-5.1, ATTACHMENT SAFW co (Step A) IF SW is not available OR cannot NOTE: SW is available. | ATTACHMENT-5.1, ATTACHMENT SAFW co (Step A) IF SW is not available OR cannot NOTE: SW is available. | ||
Line 4,641: | Line 4,365: | ||
* STANDBY AUX FW PUMP CROSSOVER VLV, MOV-9703B co (Step C) Align SAFW Pump C to feed SIG A NOTE: If the C SAFW Pump as follows: has NOT previously failed, the crew may try to start this pump as well; however, it will fail to start. | * STANDBY AUX FW PUMP CROSSOVER VLV, MOV-9703B co (Step C) Align SAFW Pump C to feed SIG A NOTE: If the C SAFW Pump as follows: has NOT previously failed, the crew may try to start this pump as well; however, it will fail to start. | ||
co (Step D) Align SAFW Pump D to selected NOTE: The crew will SIG as follows: attempt to start the D SAFW | co (Step D) Align SAFW Pump D to selected NOTE: The crew will SIG as follows: attempt to start the D SAFW | ||
: 1) Ensure SI reset Pump using the guidance of | : 1) Ensure SI reset Pump using the guidance of Step 27.a of FR-H.1. ' | ||
Step 27.a of FR-H.1. ' | |||
: 2) Ensure the following valves open: | : 2) Ensure the following valves open: | ||
* MOV-9701 B, SAFW PUMP D DISCHARGE | * MOV-9701 B, SAFW PUMP D DISCHARGE | ||
Line 4,656: | Line 4,378: | ||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# _5_,_6.... | Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# _5_,_6.... | ||
7,,_&_8_ _ Page ~of _5_9_ _, | 7,,_&_8_ _ Page ~of _5_9_ _, | ||
1 Event | 1 Event | ||
Line 4,705: | Line 4,426: | ||
C-SRO 3 3 I-RO Master Pressure Controller (431 K) Fails HIGH l(TS)-SRO 4 NA R-RO Unscheduled Trip of Transmission Circuits/Downpower N-BOP N-SRO 5 4 C-BOP B FRV fails AS-IS (Manual Control Available) | C-SRO 3 3 I-RO Master Pressure Controller (431 K) Fails HIGH l(TS)-SRO 4 NA R-RO Unscheduled Trip of Transmission Circuits/Downpower N-BOP N-SRO 5 4 C-BOP B FRV fails AS-IS (Manual Control Available) | ||
C-SRO 6 5 M-RO Ejected Control Rod M-BOP M-SRO 7 6 C-BOP Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip C-SRO 8 7 C-RO Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start C-SRO 9 8 NA A RHR Pumps trips | C-SRO 6 5 M-RO Ejected Control Rod M-BOP M-SRO 7 6 C-BOP Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip C-SRO 8 7 C-RO Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start C-SRO 9 8 NA A RHR Pumps trips | ||
* (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I )nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor | * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I )nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022217) | ||
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022217) | |||
Ginna 2017 NRC Scenario #3 The plant is at 70% power (BOL). The plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the B MFW Pump. Corrective Maintenance was performed and plant power raised to 70% four days ago. It is intended to observe the B MFW operation for two more days at this power level and then raise power to 100%. The area has experienced steady light rain for the past [[estimated NRC review hours::4 hours]], with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. It is expected to perform post-maintenance testing on the B RHR Pump on this shift. | Ginna 2017 NRC Scenario #3 The plant is at 70% power (BOL). The plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the B MFW Pump. Corrective Maintenance was performed and plant power raised to 70% four days ago. It is intended to observe the B MFW operation for two more days at this power level and then raise power to 100%. The area has experienced steady light rain for the past [[estimated NRC review hours::4 hours]], with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. It is expected to perform post-maintenance testing on the B RHR Pump on this shift. | ||
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A Control Rod Shroud Fan is OOS for breaker maintenance, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement. | The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A Control Rod Shroud Fan is OOS for breaker maintenance, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement. | ||
Line 4,718: | Line 4,437: | ||
During the load reduction, a failure of the B FRV to control in AUTO will occur. The operator will respond per AR-G-5, "SIG/ B LEVEL DEVIATION +/-7%," or upon observing an abnormally high level in the B Steam Generator and control the B FRV manually. | During the load reduction, a failure of the B FRV to control in AUTO will occur. The operator will respond per AR-G-5, "SIG/ B LEVEL DEVIATION +/-7%," or upon observing an abnormally high level in the B Steam Generator and control the B FRV manually. | ||
After this, Shutdown Bank Control Rod K-9 will be ejected from the core causing a LOCA, and an automatic Rx Trip/SI signal will occur. On the trip the Main Turbine will fail to trip, and the operator will need to manually trip the Turbine. Additionally, the A and the B SI Pumps will fail to start automatically. The operator will be required to manually start both SI Pumps. The operator will enter E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and transition to E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant." | After this, Shutdown Bank Control Rod K-9 will be ejected from the core causing a LOCA, and an automatic Rx Trip/SI signal will occur. On the trip the Main Turbine will fail to trip, and the operator will need to manually trip the Turbine. Additionally, the A and the B SI Pumps will fail to start automatically. The operator will be required to manually start both SI Pumps. The operator will enter E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and transition to E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant." | ||
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022217) | Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022217) | ||
Shortly after transition to E-1 the A RHR Pump will trip. The operator will transition to ECA-1.1, "Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation," due to a loss of both RHR Pumps. The operator will take actions to minimize the inventory loss from the RWST. | Shortly after transition to E-1 the A RHR Pump will trip. The operator will transition to ECA-1.1, "Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation," due to a loss of both RHR Pumps. The operator will take actions to minimize the inventory loss from the RWST. | ||
Line 4,727: | Line 4,445: | ||
Direct that actions be taken to prepare to establish, or establish Makeup to RWST; and minimize RWST outflow prior to the completion of Step 10.a of ECA-1.1 (EOP-Based) | Direct that actions be taken to prepare to establish, or establish Makeup to RWST; and minimize RWST outflow prior to the completion of Step 10.a of ECA-1.1 (EOP-Based) | ||
Safety Significance: Under the postulated plant conditions, failure to establish makeup flow to the RWST and/or to minimize RWST outflow leads to (or accelerates) depletion of RWST inventory to the point at which ECCS pumps taking suction on the RWST must be stopped. Loss of pumped injection (coincident with loss of emergency cooling recirculation) will lead to a severe or an extreme challenge to the core cooling CSF. Failure to perform the critical task causes these challenges to occur needlessly or, at best, prematurely (that is, before they would occur if the critical task is performed). Thus, failure to perform the critical task under the postulated plant conditions leads to "a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario." It also represents a demonstrated inability by the crew to "take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety." | Safety Significance: Under the postulated plant conditions, failure to establish makeup flow to the RWST and/or to minimize RWST outflow leads to (or accelerates) depletion of RWST inventory to the point at which ECCS pumps taking suction on the RWST must be stopped. Loss of pumped injection (coincident with loss of emergency cooling recirculation) will lead to a severe or an extreme challenge to the core cooling CSF. Failure to perform the critical task causes these challenges to occur needlessly or, at best, prematurely (that is, before they would occur if the critical task is performed). Thus, failure to perform the critical task under the postulated plant conditions leads to "a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario." It also represents a demonstrated inability by the crew to "take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety." | ||
PROGRAM: Ginna Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N17-1-3 | PROGRAM: Ginna Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N17-1-3 | ||
Line 4,753: | Line 4,470: | ||
: 20. ATT-8.1, "Attachment DIG Stop" (Rev 6) | : 20. ATT-8.1, "Attachment DIG Stop" (Rev 6) | ||
Validation Time: 87 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Essential Training & Consulting, LLC Facility Review: | Validation Time: 87 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Essential Training & Consulting, LLC Facility Review: | ||
Rev.022217 | Rev.022217 Scenario Event Description NRG Scenario 3 Facility: Ginna Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: N17-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO) | ||
Scenario Event Description NRG Scenario 3 Facility: Ginna Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: N17-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO) | |||
(RO) | (RO) | ||
(BOP) | (BOP) | ||
Line 4,765: | Line 4,480: | ||
C-SRO 3 3 I-RO Master Pressure Controller (431 K) Fails HIGH l(TS)-SRO 4 NA R-RO Unscheduled Trip of Transmission Circuits/Downpower N-BOP N-SRO 5 4 C-BOP B FRV fails AS-IS (Manual Control Available) | C-SRO 3 3 I-RO Master Pressure Controller (431 K) Fails HIGH l(TS)-SRO 4 NA R-RO Unscheduled Trip of Transmission Circuits/Downpower N-BOP N-SRO 5 4 C-BOP B FRV fails AS-IS (Manual Control Available) | ||
C-SRO 6 5 M-RO Ejected Control Rod M-BOP M-SRO 7 6 C-BOP Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip C-SRO 8 7 C-RO Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start C-SRO 9 8 NA A RHR Pumps trips | C-SRO 6 5 M-RO Ejected Control Rod M-BOP M-SRO 7 6 C-BOP Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip C-SRO 8 7 C-RO Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start C-SRO 9 8 NA A RHR Pumps trips | ||
* (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I )nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor | * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I )nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Ginna 2017 NRC Scenario #3 The plant is at 70% power (BOL). The plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the B MFW Pump. Corrective Maintenance was performed and plant power raised to 70% four days ago. It is intended to observe the B MFW operation for two more days at this power level and then raise power to 100%. The area has experienced steady light rain for the past [[estimated NRC review hours::4 hours]], with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. It is expected to perform post-maintenance testing on the B RHR Pump on this shift. | ||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Ginna 2017 NRC Scenario #3 The plant is at 70% power (BOL). The plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the B MFW Pump. Corrective Maintenance was performed and plant power raised to 70% four days ago. It is intended to observe the B MFW operation for two more days at this power level and then raise power to 100%. The area has experienced steady light rain for the past [[estimated NRC review hours::4 hours]], with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. It is expected to perform post-maintenance testing on the B RHR Pump on this shift. | |||
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A Control Rod Shroud Fan is OOS for breaker maintenance, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement. | The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A Control Rod Shroud Fan is OOS for breaker maintenance, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement. | ||
Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will start the B RHR Pump per STP-0-2.2.-COMP-B, "Residual Heat Removal Pump B Comprehensive Test," and then stop the pump due to a pump seal water cooler failure using the guidance of A-503.1, "Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures User's Guide." The operator will respond using AP-CCW.2, "Loss of CCW During Power Operation." The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS - | Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will start the B RHR Pump per STP-0-2.2.-COMP-B, "Residual Heat Removal Pump B Comprehensive Test," and then stop the pump due to a pump seal water cooler failure using the guidance of A-503.1, "Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures User's Guide." The operator will respond using AP-CCW.2, "Loss of CCW During Power Operation." The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS - | ||
Line 4,777: | Line 4,490: | ||
During the load reduction, a failure of the B FRV to control in AUTO will occur. The operator will respond per AR-G-5, "SIG/ B LEVEL DEVIATION +/-7%," or upon observing an abnormally high level in the B Steam Generator and control the B FRV manually. | During the load reduction, a failure of the B FRV to control in AUTO will occur. The operator will respond per AR-G-5, "SIG/ B LEVEL DEVIATION +/-7%," or upon observing an abnormally high level in the B Steam Generator and control the B FRV manually. | ||
After this, Shutdown Bank Control Rod K-9 will be ejected from the core causing a LOCA, and an automatic Rx Trip/SI signal will occur. On the trip the Main Turbine will fail to trip, and the operator will need to manually trip the Turbine. Additionally, the A and the B SI Pumps will fail to start automatically. The operator will be required to manually start both SI Pumps. The operator will enter E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and transition to E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant." | After this, Shutdown Bank Control Rod K-9 will be ejected from the core causing a LOCA, and an automatic Rx Trip/SI signal will occur. On the trip the Main Turbine will fail to trip, and the operator will need to manually trip the Turbine. Additionally, the A and the B SI Pumps will fail to start automatically. The operator will be required to manually start both SI Pumps. The operator will enter E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and transition to E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant." | ||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Shortly after transition to E-1 the A RHR Pump will trip. The operator will transition to ECA-1.1, "Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation," due to a loss of both RHR Pumps. The operator will take actions to minimize the inventory loss from the RWST. | Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Shortly after transition to E-1 the A RHR Pump will trip. The operator will transition to ECA-1.1, "Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation," due to a loss of both RHR Pumps. The operator will take actions to minimize the inventory loss from the RWST. | ||
The scenario will terminate at Step 10.a RNO of ECA-1.1, after the crew has stopped one SI Pump. | The scenario will terminate at Step 10.a RNO of ECA-1.1, after the crew has stopped one SI Pump. | ||
Line 4,783: | Line 4,495: | ||
Trip all RCPs within 5 minutes of reaching trip criteria (EOP-Based) | Trip all RCPs within 5 minutes of reaching trip criteria (EOP-Based) | ||
Safety Significance: Failure to trip all RCPs when required can lead to core uncovery and to fuel temperatures in excess of 2200°F. Analyses have shown that if the RCPs are tripped within 5 minutes of the trip criteria being met, PCT will remain below 2200°F, and if this action is delayed beyond 5 minutes, this PCT will be exceeded. It is a management expectation that the RCPs be tripped as quickly as possible, but within 5 minutes when the trip criteria is met. Failure to take this action represents mis-operation by the operator which leads to degradation of the fuel cladding fission produce barrier, and a violation of a license condition. | Safety Significance: Failure to trip all RCPs when required can lead to core uncovery and to fuel temperatures in excess of 2200°F. Analyses have shown that if the RCPs are tripped within 5 minutes of the trip criteria being met, PCT will remain below 2200°F, and if this action is delayed beyond 5 minutes, this PCT will be exceeded. It is a management expectation that the RCPs be tripped as quickly as possible, but within 5 minutes when the trip criteria is met. Failure to take this action represents mis-operation by the operator which leads to degradation of the fuel cladding fission produce barrier, and a violation of a license condition. | ||
Direct that actions be taken to prepare to establish, or establish Makeup to RWST; and minimize RWST ouJflow prior to the completion of Step 1O.a of ECA-1.1 (EOP-Based) | Direct that actions be taken to prepare to establish, or establish Makeup to RWST; and minimize RWST ouJflow prior to the completion of Step 1O.a of ECA-1.1 (EOP-Based) | ||
Safety Significance: Under the postulated plant conditions, failure to establish makeup flow to the RWST and/or to minimize RWST outflow leads to (or accelerates) depletion of RWST inventory to the point at which ECCS pumps taking suction on the RWST must be stopped. | Safety Significance: Under the postulated plant conditions, failure to establish makeup flow to the RWST and/or to minimize RWST outflow leads to (or accelerates) depletion of RWST inventory to the point at which ECCS pumps taking suction on the RWST must be stopped. | ||
Loss of pumped injection (coincident with loss of emergency cooling recirculation) will lead to a severe or an extreme challenge to the core cooling CSF. Failure to perform the critical task causes these challenges to occur needlessly or, at best, prematurely (that is, before they would occur if the critical task is performed). Thus, failure to perform the critical task under the postulated plant conditions leads to "a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario." It also represents a demonstrated inability by the crew to "take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety." | Loss of pumped injection (coincident with loss of emergency cooling recirculation) will lead to a severe or an extreme challenge to the core cooling CSF. Failure to perform the critical task causes these challenges to occur needlessly or, at best, prematurely (that is, before they would occur if the critical task is performed). Thus, failure to perform the critical task under the postulated plant conditions leads to "a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario." It also represents a demonstrated inability by the crew to "take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety." | ||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Reset to Temp IC 157 T = 0 (From IC-26): | Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Reset to Temp IC 157 T = 0 (From IC-26): | ||
D (Originally IC-26). | D (Originally IC-26). | ||
Line 4,806: | Line 4,516: | ||
D Prior to Crew | D Prior to Crew | ||
* Hang Protective Tags per OPG-Protective Briefing Equipment. | * Hang Protective Tags per OPG-Protective Briefing Equipment. | ||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D Crew Briefing | Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D Crew Briefing | ||
* Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements | * Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements | ||
Line 4,815: | Line 4,524: | ||
I ON (60 seconds after B RHR Pump Start) | I ON (60 seconds after B RHR Pump Start) | ||
MALF CLG05=10 (CCW | MALF CLG05=10 (CCW | ||
' Leak) | ' Leak) | ||
D At direction of Event2 A ARV Fails OPEN (3411) examiner Trigger#2 STM04A (100 over 45 second Ramp) | D At direction of Event2 A ARV Fails OPEN (3411) examiner Trigger#2 STM04A (100 over 45 second Ramp) | ||
Line 4,825: | Line 4,533: | ||
REM-EDS-031 (OPEN) | REM-EDS-031 (OPEN) | ||
(Loss of Circuit 913) | (Loss of Circuit 913) | ||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D Turbine Load Event 5 B FRV fails AS-IS (Manual Control Available) at 380 MWe Trigger #6 FDW07C (Current Controller Output) | Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D Turbine Load Event 5 B FRV fails AS-IS (Manual Control Available) at 380 MWe Trigger #6 FDW07C (Current Controller Output) | ||
D At direction of Event 6 Ejected Control Rod examiner Trigger#7 ROD05-K9 (1400 gpm, No Ramp) | D At direction of Event 6 Ejected Control Rod examiner Trigger#7 ROD05-K9 (1400 gpm, No Ramp) | ||
Line 4,831: | Line 4,538: | ||
I D Post-Rx Trip Events Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start RPS07A Note: These malfunctions are inserted at T=O. | I D Post-Rx Trip Events Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start RPS07A Note: These malfunctions are inserted at T=O. | ||
RPS07B D Post-Rx Trip Event9 A RHR Pumps trips RHR01A Note: This malfunction is inserted at T=O, conditional on SI Actuation. | RPS07B D Post-Rx Trip Event9 A RHR Pumps trips RHR01A Note: This malfunction is inserted at T=O, conditional on SI Actuation. | ||
D Terminate the scenario up~n direction of Lead Examiner | D Terminate the scenario up~n direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _ _ _ _ _ Page 8 of 59 | ||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _ _ _ _ _ Page 8 of 59 | |||
---11 Event | ---11 Event | ||
Line 4,870: | Line 4,575: | ||
NOTE: The US will go to AP-CCW.2. | NOTE: The US will go to AP-CCW.2. | ||
AP-CCW.2, LOSS OF CCW DURING POWER OPERATION HCO (Step 1) Check CCW Pump Status: ' | AP-CCW.2, LOSS OF CCW DURING POWER OPERATION HCO (Step 1) Check CCW Pump Status: ' | ||
* Both CCW pump breaker white lights - | * Both CCW pump breaker white lights - | ||
EXTINGUISHED | EXTINGUISHED | ||
Line 4,909: | Line 4,613: | ||
* Level - ST ABLE i | * Level - ST ABLE i | ||
* Sump A pumps - OFF | * Sump A pumps - OFF | ||
* RCP oil levels - STABLE | * RCP oil levels - STABLE HCO/ (Step 9) Check for CCW Leakage In AUX NOTE: The EO has already EO BLDG: reported CCW leakage in the Aux Building. | ||
HCO/ (Step 9) Check for CCW Leakage In AUX NOTE: The EO has already EO BLDG: reported CCW leakage in the Aux Building. | |||
* Start frequency of AUX BLDG sump pump(s)- NORMAL (Refer to RCS daily leakage log) | * Start frequency of AUX BLDG sump pump(s)- NORMAL (Refer to RCS daily leakage log) | ||
* Waste holdup tank level - STABLE OR RISING AS EXPECTED HCO (Step 10) Verify CCW System Leak - | * Waste holdup tank level - STABLE OR RISING AS EXPECTED HCO (Step 10) Verify CCW System Leak - | ||
Line 4,959: | Line 4,661: | ||
If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as WCCS/Plant Supervision; and state that management will call back with a Shutdown direction. I B. Required B.1 Be in Mode [[estimated NRC review hours::6 hours]] Action and 3. | If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as WCCS/Plant Supervision; and state that management will call back with a Shutdown direction. I B. Required B.1 Be in Mode [[estimated NRC review hours::6 hours]] Action and 3. | ||
associated AND ' | associated AND ' | ||
Completion B.2 Be in Mode [[estimated NRC review hours::12 hours]] Time not met. 4 NOTE: The US may call WCC/Maintenance to address the failed RHR Pump. | Completion B.2 Be in Mode [[estimated NRC review hours::12 hours]] Time not met. 4 NOTE: The US may call WCC/Maintenance to address the failed RHR Pump. | ||
If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as WCC; and direct that the B RHR Pump be placed in PULL STOP. | If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as WCC; and direct that the B RHR Pump be placed in PULL STOP. | ||
Line 4,981: | Line 4,682: | ||
* Rx power increase s slightly 1 | * Rx power increase s slightly 1 | ||
* PPCS Alarm Point V3411 A ARV OPEN goes into ALARM | * PPCS Alarm Point V3411 A ARV OPEN goes into ALARM | ||
* Turbine load reduces automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments | * Turbine load reduces automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The crew may take early action per the guidance of A-503.1 and/or go to AP-FW.2. | ||
NOTE: The crew may take early action per the guidance of A-503.1 and/or go to AP-FW.2. | |||
A-503.1, EMERGENCY AND ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES USERS GUIDE co (Step 5.3.A.5) Actions are permitted to NOTE: It is expected that the mitigate or compensate for equipment or CO will take manual control of controller failures to isolate leaks. Permitted the valve. | A-503.1, EMERGENCY AND ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES USERS GUIDE co (Step 5.3.A.5) Actions are permitted to NOTE: It is expected that the mitigate or compensate for equipment or CO will take manual control of controller failures to isolate leaks. Permitted the valve. | ||
actions include those actions necessary to take manual control and stabilize the affected parameters, or to isolate a leak. Examples include closing or isolating a failed open PORV, taking manual control of a failed FRV controller, etc. These deviations fall under the Maintenance Rule. Therefore, 50.59 is not required. | actions include those actions necessary to take manual control and stabilize the affected parameters, or to isolate a leak. Examples include closing or isolating a failed open PORV, taking manual control of a failed FRV controller, etc. These deviations fall under the Maintenance Rule. Therefore, 50.59 is not required. | ||
Line 5,002: | Line 4,701: | ||
* Safe Shutdown Equipment Operability is not affected. I | * Safe Shutdown Equipment Operability is not affected. I | ||
* Leakage is within make-up capability (GE BETZ). | * Leakage is within make-up capability (GE BETZ). | ||
* SIG Level Stable at or Trending to 52%. ' | * SIG Level Stable at or Trending to 52%. ' | ||
HCOI (*Step 2) Determine if a Load Reduction is NOTE: This is a Continuous co required: Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware. | HCOI (*Step 2) Determine if a Load Reduction is NOTE: This is a Continuous co required: Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware. | ||
Line 5,053: | Line 4,751: | ||
* V-5558 for 28Heater i | * V-5558 for 28Heater i | ||
us (Step 8) Evaluate effect on continued Plant operation: ' | us (Step 8) Evaluate effect on continued Plant operation: ' | ||
* Refer to the following Technical NOTE: The US may refer to Specifications: Technical Specification 3.7.4, however, it will be determined that LCO 3. 7.4 is met. | * Refer to the following Technical NOTE: The US may refer to Specifications: Technical Specification 3.7.4, however, it will be determined that LCO 3. 7.4 is met. | ||
* ITS Section 3. 7 Plant System | * ITS Section 3. 7 Plant System | ||
Line 5,128: | Line 4,825: | ||
* Annunciator AA-13, PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVE POSITION - | * Annunciator AA-13, PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVE POSITION - | ||
EXTINGUISHED HCO (Step 10) Check AUX Spray Valve, AOV-296 | EXTINGUISHED HCO (Step 10) Check AUX Spray Valve, AOV-296 | ||
-CLOSED | -CLOSED HCO (Step 11) Check PRZR Pressure Control | ||
HCO (Step 11) Check PRZR Pressure Control | |||
* Pressure - TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG NOTE: With the HCO controlling PRZR pressure in MANUAL, pressure is restoring to normal. | * Pressure - TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG NOTE: With the HCO controlling PRZR pressure in MANUAL, pressure is restoring to normal. | ||
us | us | ||
Line 5,244: | Line 4,938: | ||
* Depress the GO button HCO | * Depress the GO button HCO | ||
* Place PRZR backup heaters switch to I I | * Place PRZR backup heaters switch to I I | ||
ON | ON HCO (*Step 2) Monitor RCS Tavg NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware. | ||
HCO (*Step 2) Monitor RCS Tavg NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware. | |||
* Tavg- GREATER THAN 545°F | * Tavg- GREATER THAN 545°F | ||
* Tavg - LESS THAN 579°F HCO (Step 3) Adjust Boric Acid Addition Rate As Necessary To (refer to OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC): | * Tavg - LESS THAN 579°F HCO (Step 3) Adjust Boric Acid Addition Rate As Necessary To (refer to OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC): | ||
Line 5,326: | Line 5,018: | ||
us APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3 except when both steam generators are isolated from both main feedwater pumps. | us APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3 except when both steam generators are isolated from both main feedwater pumps. | ||
ACTIONS ' | ACTIONS ' | ||
CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The US will determine ACTION TIME that the failed FRV controller B. One or more B.1 Close or [[estimated NRC review hours::72 hours]] does NOT render the FRV MFRV(s) isolate inoperable. | CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The US will determine ACTION TIME that the failed FRV controller B. One or more B.1 Close or [[estimated NRC review hours::72 hours]] does NOT render the FRV MFRV(s) isolate inoperable. | ||
inoperable. | inoperable. | ||
Line 5,378: | Line 5,069: | ||
== Description:== | == Description:== | ||
Ejected Control Rod/ Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ A RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 0 SI pumps -AT LEAST TWO RUNNING 0 RCS pressure minus maximum SIG pressure - LESS THAN 210 psi [240 psi adverse CNMTl LOSS OF SW CRITERIA AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION SFP COOLING CRITERIA HCO (*Step 5) Verify CNMT Spray Not Required: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware. | Ejected Control Rod/ Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ A RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 0 SI pumps -AT LEAST TWO RUNNING 0 RCS pressure minus maximum SIG pressure - LESS THAN 210 psi [240 psi adverse CNMTl LOSS OF SW CRITERIA AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION SFP COOLING CRITERIA HCO (*Step 5) Verify CNMT Spray Not Required: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware. | ||
NOTE: The Containment Pressure is expected to be | NOTE: The Containment Pressure is expected to be | ||
::=2 psig and rising slowly. | ::=2 psig and rising slowly. | ||
Line 5,424: | Line 5,114: | ||
co RUNNING HCOI (Step 6) Verify Cl and CVI: | co RUNNING HCOI (Step 6) Verify Cl and CVI: | ||
co | co | ||
* Cl and CVI annunciators - LIT | * Cl and CVI annunciators - LIT | ||
* Annunciator A-26, CNMT ISOLATION | * Annunciator A-26, CNMT ISOLATION | ||
Line 5,496: | Line 5,185: | ||
* MOV-3504A | * MOV-3504A | ||
* MOV-3505A CO/ (Step 11) Check CCW Flow to RCP thermal HCO Barriers: ' | * MOV-3505A CO/ (Step 11) Check CCW Flow to RCP thermal HCO Barriers: ' | ||
* Annunciator A-7. RCP 1A CCW RETURN HI TEMP OR LOW FLOW - I | * Annunciator A-7. RCP 1A CCW RETURN HI TEMP OR LOW FLOW - I EXTINGUISHED | ||
EXTINGUISHED | |||
* Annunciator A-15, RCP 1B CCW RETURN HI TEMP OR LOW FLOW EXTINGUISHED CO/ (*Step 12) Monitor RCS Tavg - STABLE AT NOTE: Tavg is expected to HCO OR TRENDING TO 547°F be less than 54 7°F and lowering. | * Annunciator A-15, RCP 1B CCW RETURN HI TEMP OR LOW FLOW EXTINGUISHED CO/ (*Step 12) Monitor RCS Tavg - STABLE AT NOTE: Tavg is expected to HCO OR TRENDING TO 547°F be less than 54 7°F and lowering. | ||
CO/ (Step 12 RNO) IF temperature less than HCO 547°F and lowering, THEN perform the following: | CO/ (Step 12 RNO) IF temperature less than HCO 547°F and lowering, THEN perform the following: | ||
Line 5,520: | Line 5,207: | ||
* Normal PRZR spray valves - CLOSED | * Normal PRZR spray valves - CLOSED | ||
* PCV-431A | * PCV-431A | ||
* PCV-431 B | * PCV-431 B CO/ (Step 14) Monitor RCP Trip Criteria: | ||
CO/ (Step 14) Monitor RCP Trip Criteria: | |||
HCO | HCO | ||
* RCP status - ANY RCP RUNNING | * RCP status - ANY RCP RUNNING | ||
Line 5,539: | Line 5,224: | ||
Subtract time recorded at time of the RCP Trip Criteria met on Page 34 _ _ = | Subtract time recorded at time of the RCP Trip Criteria met on Page 34 _ _ = | ||
minutes. ' | minutes. ' | ||
CO/ (Step 15) Check If S/G Secondary Side Is HCO Intact: | CO/ (Step 15) Check If S/G Secondary Side Is HCO Intact: | ||
* Pressure in both S/G's-STABLE OR Rising | * Pressure in both S/G's-STABLE OR Rising | ||
Line 5,596: | Line 5,280: | ||
* Narrow range level - GREATER THAN NOTE: Adverse 7% [25% adverse CNMT] Containment is likely to exist at this time. | * Narrow range level - GREATER THAN NOTE: Adverse 7% [25% adverse CNMT] Containment is likely to exist at this time. | ||
* Control feed flow to maintain narrow NOTE: Adverse range level between 17% [25% adverse Containment is likely to exist CNMT] and 50% at this time. | * Control feed flow to maintain narrow NOTE: Adverse range level between 17% [25% adverse Containment is likely to exist CNMT] and 50% at this time. | ||
HCO (Step 4) Monitor If Secondary Radiation Levels Are Normal | HCO (Step 4) Monitor If Secondary Radiation Levels Are Normal | ||
* Steamline radiation monitor (R-31 and R-32) | * Steamline radiation monitor (R-31 and R-32) | ||
Line 5,647: | Line 5,330: | ||
ammeter HCO (Step 11) Check If Charging Flow Has Been Established: | ammeter HCO (Step 11) Check If Charging Flow Has Been Established: | ||
* Charging pumps - ANY RUNNING NOTE: There are NO Charging Pumps running. | * Charging pumps - ANY RUNNING NOTE: There are NO Charging Pumps running. | ||
* (Step 11 a RNO) Perform the following: | * (Step 11 a RNO) Perform the following: | ||
* IF CCW flow is lost to any RCP NOTE: CCW flow to the thermal barrier OR any RCP #1 seal RCP has NOT been lost, nor outlet temperature greater than is any RCP #1 seal outlet 235°F, THEN ....... temperature greater than 235°F. | * IF CCW flow is lost to any RCP NOTE: CCW flow to the thermal barrier OR any RCP #1 seal RCP has NOT been lost, nor outlet temperature greater than is any RCP #1 seal outlet 235°F, THEN ....... temperature greater than 235°F. | ||
Line 5,850: | Line 5,532: | ||
TURNOVER SHEET for NRC Exam Scenario #3 Equie.ment Problems/OOS: Planned Activities for Shift: Electrical System Ogerator Declarations See NOTES | TURNOVER SHEET for NRC Exam Scenario #3 Equie.ment Problems/OOS: Planned Activities for Shift: Electrical System Ogerator Declarations See NOTES | ||
* Perform post-maintenance testing on the B None in effect RHR Pump using STP-0-2.2-COMP-B A-52.4 EQUIPMENT DATE/TIME 005 LCO TITLE EXP DATE ECO B RHR Pump [[estimated NRC review hours::71 hours]] ago 3.5.2 ECCS - Modes 1, 2 and 3 [[estimated NRC review hours::72 hours]] 1 hour | * Perform post-maintenance testing on the B None in effect RHR Pump using STP-0-2.2-COMP-B A-52.4 EQUIPMENT DATE/TIME 005 LCO TITLE EXP DATE ECO B RHR Pump [[estimated NRC review hours::71 hours]] ago 3.5.2 ECCS - Modes 1, 2 and 3 [[estimated NRC review hours::72 hours]] 1 hour A-52.12 EQUIPMENT DATE/TIME 005 TRM/ODCM TITLE EXP DATE ECO A Control Rod Shroud Yesterday Indefinitely Fan A Condensate Booster Yesterday Indefinitely Pump | ||
A-52.12 EQUIPMENT DATE/TIME 005 TRM/ODCM TITLE EXP DATE ECO A Control Rod Shroud Yesterday Indefinitely Fan A Condensate Booster Yesterday Indefinitely Pump | |||
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022217) | Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022217) | ||
Line 5,862: | Line 5,542: | ||
Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 1 C-RO Loss of B Instrument Bus C-BOP I C(TS}-SRO 2 NA R-RO Load Reduction ' | Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 1 C-RO Loss of B Instrument Bus C-BOP I C(TS}-SRO 2 NA R-RO Load Reduction ' | ||
N-BOP N-SRO 3 2 C-RO PORV Leak/Block Valve Failure C(TS)-SRO 4 3 C-BOP DownpowerlFailure of Turbine ControllEHC C-SRO 5 4 M-RO Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal M-BOP M-SRO 6 5 C-RO Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control RoomlATWS C-BOP C-SRO 7 6 C-BOP One SIG Safety Valve on each SIG Lifts and sticks partially OPEN C-SRO | N-BOP N-SRO 3 2 C-RO PORV Leak/Block Valve Failure C(TS)-SRO 4 3 C-BOP DownpowerlFailure of Turbine ControllEHC C-SRO 5 4 M-RO Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal M-BOP M-SRO 6 5 C-RO Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control RoomlATWS C-BOP C-SRO 7 6 C-BOP One SIG Safety Valve on each SIG Lifts and sticks partially OPEN C-SRO | ||
* (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor | * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022217) | ||
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022217) | |||
Ginna 2017 NRC Scenario #5 The plant is at 48% power (MOL). The plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the B MFW Pump. | Ginna 2017 NRC Scenario #5 The plant is at 48% power (MOL). The plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the B MFW Pump. | ||
Station Management has decided to shutdown the plant and repair the pump, and conduct other maintenance activities. The area has experienced steady light rain for the past [[estimated NRC review hours::4 hours]], with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The crew is expected to lower power and proceed to Mode 3 on this shift. | Station Management has decided to shutdown the plant and repair the pump, and conduct other maintenance activities. The area has experienced steady light rain for the past [[estimated NRC review hours::4 hours]], with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The crew is expected to lower power and proceed to Mode 3 on this shift. | ||
Line 5,876: | Line 5,554: | ||
After this, an inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal will occur and both MS IVs will close. The reactor will fail to automatically trip and the operator will attempt to trip the reactor manually. The crew will enter E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." | After this, an inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal will occur and both MS IVs will close. The reactor will fail to automatically trip and the operator will attempt to trip the reactor manually. The crew will enter E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." | ||
The reactor will fail to trip manually from the control room, and the crew will enter FR-S.1, "Response to Reactor Restart/ATWS." On the trip one SIG Safety Valve on each SIG lifted and stuck partially OPEN. | The reactor will fail to trip manually from the control room, and the crew will enter FR-S.1, "Response to Reactor Restart/ATWS." On the trip one SIG Safety Valve on each SIG lifted and stuck partially OPEN. | ||
The crew will successfully de-energize the Rod Drive MG set(s) causing to control rods to drop into the core. Upon completion of FR-S.1, the crew will transition back to E-0, and then to E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," based on the failed Pressurizer PORV and Block Valve. Shortly after entry into E-1, the crew will transition to E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation." While implementing E-2, the crew will recognize that both S/Gs are faulted and transition to ECA-2.1, | The crew will successfully de-energize the Rod Drive MG set(s) causing to control rods to drop into the core. Upon completion of FR-S.1, the crew will transition back to E-0, and then to E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," based on the failed Pressurizer PORV and Block Valve. Shortly after entry into E-1, the crew will transition to E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation." While implementing E-2, the crew will recognize that both S/Gs are faulted and transition to ECA-2.1, Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022217) | ||
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022217) | |||
"Uncontrolled Depressurization of Both Steam Generators." The crew may take a pre-emptive action of throttling AFW flow to both S/Gs per A-503.1, "Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide." | "Uncontrolled Depressurization of Both Steam Generators." The crew may take a pre-emptive action of throttling AFW flow to both S/Gs per A-503.1, "Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide." | ||
The scenario will terminate at Step 7 of ECA-2.1, after the crew has stopped the RHR Pumps. | The scenario will terminate at Step 7 of ECA-2.1, after the crew has stopped the RHR Pumps. | ||
Line 5,885: | Line 5,561: | ||
Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor power remains higher than it otherwise would if the action is taken. Performance of the critical task would move the reactor power lower to prevent a subsequent an unnecessary challenge to reactor core operational limits. A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control. | Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor power remains higher than it otherwise would if the action is taken. Performance of the critical task would move the reactor power lower to prevent a subsequent an unnecessary challenge to reactor core operational limits. A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control. | ||
Control the AFW flowrate to 50 gpm per SG in order to minimize the RCS Cooldown rate before an extreme challenge {Red Path) develops to the integrity CSF {EOP-Based) | Control the AFW flowrate to 50 gpm per SG in order to minimize the RCS Cooldown rate before an extreme challenge {Red Path) develops to the integrity CSF {EOP-Based) | ||
Safety Significance: Failure to control the AFW flow rate to the SGs leads to an unnecessary and avoidable extreme challenge to the integrity CSF. Also, failure to perform the Critical Task increases challenges to the SUBCRITICALITY Critical Safety Function which otherwise would not occur. | Safety Significance: Failure to control the AFW flow rate to the SGs leads to an unnecessary and avoidable extreme challenge to the integrity CSF. Also, failure to perform the Critical Task increases challenges to the SUBCRITICALITY Critical Safety Function which otherwise would not occur. | ||
PROGRAM: Ginna Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N17-1-5 | PROGRAM: Ginna Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N17-1-5 | ||
Line 5,916: | Line 5,590: | ||
: 23. ECA-2.1, "Uncontrolled Depressurization of Both Steam Generators" (Rev 03601) | : 23. ECA-2.1, "Uncontrolled Depressurization of Both Steam Generators" (Rev 03601) | ||
Validation Time: 77 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Essential Training & Consulting, LLC Facility Review: | Validation Time: 77 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Essential Training & Consulting, LLC Facility Review: | ||
Rev.022217 | Rev.022217 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Facility: Ginna Scenario No.: 5 Op Test No.: N17-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO) | ||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Facility: Ginna Scenario No.: 5 Op Test No.: N17-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO) | |||
(RO) | (RO) | ||
(BOP) | (BOP) | ||
Line 5,925: | Line 5,597: | ||
Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 1 C-RO Loss of B Instrument Bus C-BOP C(TS)-SRO 2 NA R-RO Load Reduction ' | Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 1 C-RO Loss of B Instrument Bus C-BOP C(TS)-SRO 2 NA R-RO Load Reduction ' | ||
N-BOP N-SRO 3 2 C-RO PORV Leak/Block Valve Failure C(TS)-SRO 4 3 C-BOP Downpower/Failure of Turbine Control/EHC C-SRO 5 4 M-RO Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal M-BOP M-SRO 6 5 C-RO Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS C-BOP C-SRO 7 6 C-BOP One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN C-SRO | N-BOP N-SRO 3 2 C-RO PORV Leak/Block Valve Failure C(TS)-SRO 4 3 C-BOP Downpower/Failure of Turbine Control/EHC C-SRO 5 4 M-RO Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal M-BOP M-SRO 6 5 C-RO Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS C-BOP C-SRO 7 6 C-BOP One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN C-SRO | ||
* (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor | * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Ginna 2017 NRC Scenario #5 The plant is at 48% power (MOL). The plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the B MFW Pump. Station Management has decided to shutdown the plant and repair the pump, and conduct other maintenance activities. The area has experienced steady light rain for the past [[estimated NRC review hours::4 hours]], with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. | ||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Ginna 2017 NRC Scenario #5 The plant is at 48% power (MOL). The plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the B MFW Pump. Station Management has decided to shutdown the plant and repair the pump, and conduct other maintenance activities. The area has experienced steady light rain for the past [[estimated NRC review hours::4 hours]], with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. | |||
The crew is expected to lower power and proceed to Mode 3 on this shift. | The crew is expected to lower power and proceed to Mode 3 on this shift. | ||
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The B MFW is OOS for bearing replacement, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement. | The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The B MFW is OOS for bearing replacement, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement. | ||
Line 5,942: | Line 5,612: | ||
The crew will successfully de-energize the Rod Drive MG set(s) causing to control rods to drop into the core. Upon completion of FR-S.1, the crew will transition back to E-0, and then to E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," based on the failed Pressurizer PORVand Block Valve. | The crew will successfully de-energize the Rod Drive MG set(s) causing to control rods to drop into the core. Upon completion of FR-S.1, the crew will transition back to E-0, and then to E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," based on the failed Pressurizer PORVand Block Valve. | ||
Shortly after entry into E-1, the crew will transition to E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation." | Shortly after entry into E-1, the crew will transition to E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation." | ||
While implementing E-2, the crew will recognize that both S/Gs are faulted and transition to ECA- | While implementing E-2, the crew will recognize that both S/Gs are faulted and transition to ECA-Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 2.1, "Uncontrolled Depressurization of Both Steam Generators." The crew may take a pre-emptive action of throttling AFW flow to both S/Gs per A-503.1, "Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide." | ||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 2.1, "Uncontrolled Depressurization of Both Steam Generators." The crew may take a pre-emptive action of throttling AFW flow to both S/Gs per A-503.1, "Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide." | |||
The scenario will terminate at Step 7 of ECA-2.1, after the crew has stopped the RHR Pumps. | The scenario will terminate at Step 7 of ECA-2.1, after the crew has stopped the RHR Pumps. | ||
Critical Tasks: | Critical Tasks: | ||
Line 5,950: | Line 5,618: | ||
Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor power remains higher than it otherwise would if the action is taken. Performance of the critical task would move the reactor power lower to prevent a subsequent an unnecessary challenge to reactor core operational limits. A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control. | Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor power remains higher than it otherwise would if the action is taken. Performance of the critical task would move the reactor power lower to prevent a subsequent an unnecessary challenge to reactor core operational limits. A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control. | ||
Control the AFW flowrate to 50 gpm per SG in order to minimize the RCS Cooldown rate before an extreme challenge (Red Path) develops to the integrity CSF (EOP-Based) | Control the AFW flowrate to 50 gpm per SG in order to minimize the RCS Cooldown rate before an extreme challenge (Red Path) develops to the integrity CSF (EOP-Based) | ||
Safety Significance: Failure to control the AFW flow rate to the SGs leads to 'an unnecessary and avoidable extreme challenge to the integrity CSF. Also, failure to perform the Critical Task increases challenges to the SUBCRITICALITY Critical Safety Function which otherwise would not occur. | Safety Significance: Failure to control the AFW flow rate to the SGs leads to 'an unnecessary and avoidable extreme challenge to the integrity CSF. Also, failure to perform the Critical Task increases challenges to the SUBCRITICALITY Critical Safety Function which otherwise would not occur. | ||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D Reset to Temp IC 159 T =0 (From IC-20): | Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D Reset to Temp IC 159 T =0 (From IC-20): | ||
(Originally IC-20). | (Originally IC-20). | ||
Line 5,960: | Line 5,626: | ||
* OVR-FDW08A=OFF Take A CB Pump Control Switch to TRIP Insert OVR-CND04A=OFF I | * OVR-FDW08A=OFF Take A CB Pump Control Switch to TRIP Insert OVR-CND04A=OFF I | ||
I Hang LOTO Tags as necessary Insert MALF RPS05A, No Manual, Reactor Trip | I Hang LOTO Tags as necessary Insert MALF RPS05A, No Manual, Reactor Trip | ||
' BKR A Failure | ' BKR A Failure Insert MALF RPS05B, No Manual, Reactor Trip BKR B Failure Insert OVR-EDS47D and 47G =FALSE (Bus 15 Low Side Breaker) | ||
Insert MALF RPS05B, No Manual, Reactor Trip BKR B Failure Insert OVR-EDS47D and 47G =FALSE (Bus 15 Low Side Breaker) | |||
Insert OVR-EDS34D and 34G =FALSE (Bus 15 High Side Breaker) | Insert OVR-EDS34D and 34G =FALSE (Bus 15 High Side Breaker) | ||
Set T-29 = x06i230a==1 (Close for MOV-515) | Set T-29 = x06i230a==1 (Close for MOV-515) | ||
Set Trigger 30 = True when a reactor trip signal occurs on either Train A or B Insert MALF STM09A, 30%, 0 ramp, T-30 (Safety valve 3508 on B SG opens after Rx trip) | Set Trigger 30 = True when a reactor trip signal occurs on either Train A or B Insert MALF STM09A, 30%, 0 ramp, T-30 (Safety valve 3508 on B SG opens after Rx trip) | ||
Insert MALF STM09B, 30%, 0 ramp, T-30 (Safety valve 3509 on A SG opens after Rx trip) | Insert MALF STM09B, 30%, 0 ramp, T-30 (Safety valve 3509 on A SG opens after Rx trip) | ||
Insert MALF EDS07B on T-1 Insert MALF PZR05B 5%, No Ramp {Throttled back to 2% after the operator attempts to close the PORV Block Valve) on T-2 Insert MALF TUR09D on T-3 OVR-TUR050=0FF on T-3 OVR-TUR05P=OFF on T-3 Insert MALF STM05A (0%, No Ramp) on T-4 Insert MALF STM05B (0%, No Ramp) on T-4 OVR-PZR04A, ON (Green light LIT) on T-29 OVR-PZR04B, ON (Red light LIT) on T-29 OVR-PZR04C, FALSE {Close signal) on T-29 OVR-PZR04D, TRUE (Open signal) on T-29 PZR05B (2%) on T-29 | Insert MALF EDS07B on T-1 Insert MALF PZR05B 5%, No Ramp {Throttled back to 2% after the operator attempts to close the PORV Block Valve) on T-2 Insert MALF TUR09D on T-3 OVR-TUR050=0FF on T-3 OVR-TUR05P=OFF on T-3 Insert MALF STM05A (0%, No Ramp) on T-4 Insert MALF STM05B (0%, No Ramp) on T-4 OVR-PZR04A, ON (Green light LIT) on T-29 OVR-PZR04B, ON (Red light LIT) on T-29 OVR-PZR04C, FALSE {Close signal) on T-29 OVR-PZR04D, TRUE (Open signal) on T-29 PZR05B (2%) on T-29 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D Prior to Crew | ||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D Prior to Crew | |||
* Hang Protective Tags per OPG-Protective Briefing Equipment. | * Hang Protective Tags per OPG-Protective Briefing Equipment. | ||
* Place Black Dot on all required MCB Annunciators (H-2 and H-4) | * Place Black Dot on all required MCB Annunciators (H-2 and H-4) | ||
Line 5,985: | Line 5,647: | ||
OVR-PZR04C, FALSE (Close signal) | OVR-PZR04C, FALSE (Close signal) | ||
OVR-PZR04D, TRUE (Open signal) | OVR-PZR04D, TRUE (Open signal) | ||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D At direction of Event 4 Downpower/Failure of Turbine Control/EHC examiner Trigger#3 TUR09D OVR-TUR050=0FF OVR-TUR05P=OFF D At direction of Event 5 Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal examiner Trigger#4 STM05A (0%, No Ramp) | Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D At direction of Event 4 Downpower/Failure of Turbine Control/EHC examiner Trigger#3 TUR09D OVR-TUR050=0FF OVR-TUR05P=OFF D At direction of Event 5 Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal examiner Trigger#4 STM05A (0%, No Ramp) | ||
STM05B (0%, No Ramp) | STM05B (0%, No Ramp) | ||
D Post-Rx Trip Event 6 Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS RPS05A, No Manual Note: These malfunctions are inserted at T=O. | D Post-Rx Trip Event 6 Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS RPS05A, No Manual Note: These malfunctions are inserted at T=O. | ||
RPS05B, No Manual D Post-Rx Trip Event 7 One SIG Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN STM09A, 30%, 0 ramp Note: These malfunctions are inserted at T=O, STM09B, 30%, 0 ramp conditional on Rx Trip (T-30). | RPS05B, No Manual D Post-Rx Trip Event 7 One SIG Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN STM09A, 30%, 0 ramp Note: These malfunctions are inserted at T=O, STM09B, 30%, 0 ramp conditional on Rx Trip (T-30). | ||
D Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner | D Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# -----Page 8 of 66 | ||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# -----Page 8 of 66 | |||
--~I Event | --~I Event | ||
Line 6,021: | Line 5,680: | ||
* Verify an alternate power supply is available by checking supply voltage as follows: | * Verify an alternate power supply is available by checking supply voltage as follows: | ||
* Maintenance- Supply voltage approximately 120 volts (El/CVTAUX, above Instr Bus D) I | * Maintenance- Supply voltage approximately 120 volts (El/CVTAUX, above Instr Bus D) I | ||
* Normal - Inst Bus B -Annunciator E-14, LOSS B INSTR. BUS, extinguished | * Normal - Inst Bus B -Annunciator E-14, LOSS B INSTR. BUS, extinguished HCO (Step 6.1.2) Close letdown isolation valve, NOTE: The HCO will isolate AOV-427. Normal Letdown. | ||
HCO (Step 6.1.2) Close letdown isolation valve, NOTE: The HCO will isolate AOV-427. Normal Letdown. | |||
NOTE: VCT level indication is lost, and with LID isolated, actual level is lowering, and US may direct EO to monitor VCT level locally (no ER-INST.3 procedure guidance) | NOTE: VCT level indication is lost, and with LID isolated, actual level is lowering, and US may direct EO to monitor VCT level locally (no ER-INST.3 procedure guidance) | ||
If so, SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge, and Use Insight from Scenario Setup, or Monitor VCT level on drawing VCT1 and report value to US (When requested or the remainder of the scenario). | If so, SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge, and Use Insight from Scenario Setup, or Monitor VCT level on drawing VCT1 and report value to US (When requested or the remainder of the scenario). | ||
Line 6,069: | Line 5,726: | ||
CLOSED. | CLOSED. | ||
I NOTE: The US will continue with ER-INST.3. | I NOTE: The US will continue with ER-INST.3. | ||
' ER-INST.3, INSTRUMENT BUS POWER RESTORATION | ' ER-INST.3, INSTRUMENT BUS POWER RESTORATION us (Step 6.4.3.2) RESTORE normal letdown per NOTE: Restored per Section S-3.2E, PLACING IN OR REMOVING FROM 6.3 and 6.4 of S-3.2E. | ||
us (Step 6.4.3.2) RESTORE normal letdown per NOTE: Restored per Section S-3.2E, PLACING IN OR REMOVING FROM 6.3 and 6.4 of S-3.2E. | |||
SERVICE NORMAL LETDOWN/EXCESS LETDOWN. | SERVICE NORMAL LETDOWN/EXCESS LETDOWN. | ||
NOTE: The US will hand this off to the HCO or the CO, and continue on in ER-INST.3. | NOTE: The US will hand this off to the HCO or the CO, and continue on in ER-INST.3. | ||
Line 6,131: | Line 5,786: | ||
CO/EO (Step 6.4.11) DISPATCH an AO to verify NOTE: The US may dispatch proper operation of Battery Chargers if an EO. | CO/EO (Step 6.4.11) DISPATCH an AO to verify NOTE: The US may dispatch proper operation of Battery Chargers if an EO. | ||
necessary. | necessary. | ||
If so, SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge. | If so, SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge. | ||
HCO/ (Step 6.4.12) EVALUATE MCB Annunciator NOTE: Annunciator K-32 co status (refer to AR procedures) needs follow-up. | HCO/ (Step 6.4.12) EVALUATE MCB Annunciator NOTE: Annunciator K-32 co status (refer to AR procedures) needs follow-up. | ||
Line 6,157: | Line 5,811: | ||
B. Class 1E B.1 Power AC [[estimated NRC review hours::2 hours]] CVTfor AC Instrument Bus Instrument B from its non-Bus B Class 1E CVT. | B. Class 1E B.1 Power AC [[estimated NRC review hours::2 hours]] CVTfor AC Instrument Bus Instrument B from its non-Bus B Class 1E CVT. | ||
inoperable AND B.2 Restore 7 Days Class 1E CVT for AC Instrument Bus B to OPERABLE status. | inoperable AND B.2 Restore 7 Days Class 1E CVT for AC Instrument Bus B to OPERABLE status. | ||
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.9, DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS- MODES 1, 2, 3 AND4 | TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.9, DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS- MODES 1, 2, 3 AND4 us LCO 3.8.9 Train A and Train B of the following electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE: | ||
us LCO 3.8.9 Train A and Train B of the following electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE: | |||
a) AC power; b) AC instrument bus power; and c) DC power us APPLICABILITY: modes 1, 2, 3 and 4. | a) AC power; b) AC instrument bus power; and c) DC power us APPLICABILITY: modes 1, 2, 3 and 4. | ||
CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The US will note that ACTION TIME while Instrument Bus B was B. One AC B.1 Restore AC [[estimated NRC review hours::2 hours]]. de-energized, they were in Instrument Instrument bus B.1, but came out of this action bus electrical electrical power power distribution train when power to the Bus was distribution to OPERABLE restored. | CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The US will note that ACTION TIME while Instrument Bus B was B. One AC B.1 Restore AC [[estimated NRC review hours::2 hours]]. de-energized, they were in Instrument Instrument bus B.1, but came out of this action bus electrical electrical power power distribution train when power to the Bus was distribution to OPERABLE restored. | ||
Line 6,210: | Line 5,862: | ||
HCO (Step 10) Board operator SHALL inform US that reactivity manipulation is complete. | HCO (Step 10) Board operator SHALL inform US that reactivity manipulation is complete. | ||
[G0092]. | [G0092]. | ||
HCO (Step 11) RECORD amount of boric acid added on S-12.4, RCS Leakage Surveillance Record Instructions, Attachment RCS Leakage Surveillance Record. | HCO (Step 11) RECORD amount of boric acid added on S-12.4, RCS Leakage Surveillance Record Instructions, Attachment RCS Leakage Surveillance Record. | ||
0-5.1, LOAD REDUCTION co (Step 6.2.4) START the load reduction at the EH Control Panel as follows: | 0-5.1, LOAD REDUCTION co (Step 6.2.4) START the load reduction at the EH Control Panel as follows: | ||
Line 6,267: | Line 5,918: | ||
I Indications Available: | I Indications Available: | ||
* PORV Block Valve Red status light LIT | * PORV Block Valve Red status light LIT | ||
* PORV Block Valve Green status light LIT ' | * PORV Block Valve Green status light LIT ' | ||
* Pressurizer Pressure continues to decreases slowly Examiner NOTE: If the crew enters AP-RCS.1 at any time, proceed to the actions on Page 27. | * Pressurizer Pressure continues to decreases slowly Examiner NOTE: If the crew enters AP-RCS.1 at any time, proceed to the actions on Page 27. | ||
Line 6,291: | Line 5,941: | ||
* AOV-431A | * AOV-431A | ||
* AOV-4318 HCO (Step 6) Check PRZR Pressure Controller, 431 K, Demand - LESS THAN 50% | * AOV-4318 HCO (Step 6) Check PRZR Pressure Controller, 431 K, Demand - LESS THAN 50% | ||
HCO (Step 7) Check PRZR PORVs: | HCO (Step 7) Check PRZR PORVs: | ||
* PORVs - CLOSED NOTE: PCV-431 C will be in mid-position. | * PORVs - CLOSED NOTE: PCV-431 C will be in mid-position. | ||
Line 6,354: | Line 6,003: | ||
SIM DRIVER: IF crew does not enter AP-RCS.1, then PROMPT (as Ops Management) that plant should be SID per AP- | SIM DRIVER: IF crew does not enter AP-RCS.1, then PROMPT (as Ops Management) that plant should be SID per AP- | ||
., TURB.5 at 1%/minute. | ., TURB.5 at 1%/minute. | ||
Examiner NOTE: The following assumes that the US enters AP-RCS.1. IF AP-TURB.5 is entered instead, Move forward to Event 4 on Page 36, and check the Technical Specifications after the Scenario. | Examiner NOTE: The following assumes that the US enters AP-RCS.1. IF AP-TURB.5 is entered instead, Move forward to Event 4 on Page 36, and check the Technical Specifications after the Scenario. | ||
AP-RCS.1, REACTOR COOLANT LEAK HCO (*Step 1) Monitor PRZR Level - STABLE AT NOTE: This is a Continuous PROGRAM LEVEL Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware. | AP-RCS.1, REACTOR COOLANT LEAK HCO (*Step 1) Monitor PRZR Level - STABLE AT NOTE: This is a Continuous PROGRAM LEVEL Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware. | ||
Line 6,403: | Line 6,051: | ||
* Charging indication: | * Charging indication: | ||
I | I | ||
* Seal injection flows - GREATER THAN 6 GPM AND STABLE | * Seal injection flows - GREATER THAN 6 GPM AND STABLE I | ||
I | |||
* RCP Labyrinth seal D/Ps - | * RCP Labyrinth seal D/Ps - | ||
GREATER THAN 15 INCHES AND APPROXIMATELY EQUAL | GREATER THAN 15 INCHES AND APPROXIMATELY EQUAL | ||
Line 6,433: | Line 6,079: | ||
* R-48 | * R-48 | ||
* SIG blowdown radiation monitor (R-19) - | * SIG blowdown radiation monitor (R-19) - | ||
NORMAL | NORMAL | ||
* Steamline radiation monitors - NORMAL | * Steamline radiation monitors - NORMAL | ||
Line 6,448: | Line 6,092: | ||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# | Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# | ||
3 Page 31 of 66 | 3 Page 31 of 66 | ||
---11 Event | ---11 Event | ||
Line 6,461: | Line 6,104: | ||
- IN SERVICE service. | - IN SERVICE service. | ||
I HCO (Step 14) Establish Stable Plant Conditions: | I HCO (Step 14) Establish Stable Plant Conditions: | ||
* PRZR level - TRENDING TO NOTE: Charging may still be PROGRAM IN AUTO CONTROL in Manual; and if so, the HCO may return to AUTO. | * PRZR level - TRENDING TO NOTE: Charging may still be PROGRAM IN AUTO CONTROL in Manual; and if so, the HCO may return to AUTO. | ||
* Check PRZR pressure - TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG IN AUTO HCO (Step 15) Establish Control Systems In Auto | * Check PRZR pressure - TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG IN AUTO HCO (Step 15) Establish Control Systems In Auto | ||
Line 6,544: | Line 6,185: | ||
SIM DRIVER Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP-TURB.5, RAPID LOAD REDUCTION Examiner NOTE: The crew may perform ATT-23.0 based I | SIM DRIVER Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP-TURB.5, RAPID LOAD REDUCTION Examiner NOTE: The crew may perform ATT-23.0 based I | ||
on the Note prior to Step 1 of AP-TURB-5. | on the Note prior to Step 1 of AP-TURB-5. | ||
' If so, Examiner following CO | ' If so, Examiner following CO continue, while other Examiners continue with Step 1 of AP-TURB.5 on Page 37. | ||
continue, while other Examiners continue with Step 1 of AP-TURB.5 on Page 37. | |||
ATT-23.0, ATTACHMENT TRANSFER 4160V LOADS co (Step 1) Place Bus 12A- Bus 11A TIE SYNCHROSCOPE to ON. | ATT-23.0, ATTACHMENT TRANSFER 4160V LOADS co (Step 1) Place Bus 12A- Bus 11A TIE SYNCHROSCOPE to ON. | ||
co (Step 2) Close BUS 12A - BUS 11 A Tl E 4160V. | co (Step 2) Close BUS 12A - BUS 11 A Tl E 4160V. | ||
co (Step 3) Place BUS 12A- BUS 11A TIE SYNCHROSCOPE to OFF. | co (Step 3) Place BUS 12A- BUS 11A TIE SYNCHROSCOPE to OFF. | ||
Line 6,563: | Line 6,201: | ||
co (Step 9) Reset alarms L-20 AND L-28, locally NOTE: The CO will contact the in the Relay Room Addition. EO to perform this action. | co (Step 9) Reset alarms L-20 AND L-28, locally NOTE: The CO will contact the in the Relay Room Addition. EO to perform this action. | ||
SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge and will need to insert: | SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge and will need to insert: | ||
REM-EDS49=RESET REM-EDS50=RESET | REM-EDS49=RESET REM-EDS50=RESET AP-TURB.5, RAPID LOAD REDUCTION Examiners NOTE: Examiners following HCO and US, continue HERE. | ||
AP-TURB.5, RAPID LOAD REDUCTION Examiners NOTE: Examiners following HCO and US, continue HERE. | |||
NOTE: The US will conduct a load reduction brief. | NOTE: The US will conduct a load reduction brief. | ||
HCO (Step 1) Initiate Load Reduction | HCO (Step 1) Initiate Load Reduction | ||
Line 6,579: | Line 6,214: | ||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# | Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# | ||
4 Page 38 of 66 | 4 Page 38 of 66 | ||
---11 Event | ---11 Event | ||
Line 6,612: | Line 6,246: | ||
* Manual control of PRZR heaters and sprays If PRZR pressure can NOT be controlled NOTE: This procedure has manually, THEN refer to AP-PRZR.1, already been completed. | * Manual control of PRZR heaters and sprays If PRZR pressure can NOT be controlled NOTE: This procedure has manually, THEN refer to AP-PRZR.1, already been completed. | ||
ABNORMAL PRESSURIZER PRESSURE. | ABNORMAL PRESSURIZER PRESSURE. | ||
co (*Step 5) Monitor MFW Regulating Valves - NOTE: This is a Continuous RESTORING S/G LEVEL TO 52% IN AUTO Action. The US will make both board operators aware. | co (*Step 5) Monitor MFW Regulating Valves - NOTE: This is a Continuous RESTORING S/G LEVEL TO 52% IN AUTO Action. The US will make both board operators aware. | ||
HCO (*Step 6) Monitor PRZR Level - TRENDING NOTE: This is a Continuous TO PROGRAM IN AUTO CONTROL Action. The US will make both board operators aware. | HCO (*Step 6) Monitor PRZR Level - TRENDING NOTE: This is a Continuous TO PROGRAM IN AUTO CONTROL Action. The US will make both board operators aware. | ||
Line 6,632: | Line 6,264: | ||
* Hotwell level at setpoint co (*Step 10) Check If Condensate Booster NOTE: This is a Continuous Pumps Should Be Secured Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware. | * Hotwell level at setpoint co (*Step 10) Check If Condensate Booster NOTE: This is a Continuous Pumps Should Be Secured Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware. | ||
Condensate booster pumps - 2 PUMPS NOTE: There are no I RUNNING Condensate Booster Pumps running. | Condensate booster pumps - 2 PUMPS NOTE: There are no I RUNNING Condensate Booster Pumps running. | ||
us (Step 10.a RNO) IF no pumps running THEN qo to step 11 . | us (Step 10.a RNO) IF no pumps running THEN qo to step 11 . | ||
co (Step 11) Check If One MFW Pump Should Be Secured | co (Step 11) Check If One MFW Pump Should Be Secured | ||
Line 6,672: | Line 6,302: | ||
* Open Bus 13 and Bus 15 normal feed breakers. | * Open Bus 13 and Bus 15 normal feed breakers. | ||
* IF Bus 13 or Bus 15 indicating lights are extinguished or flickering, THEN | * IF Bus 13 or Bus 15 indicating lights are extinguished or flickering, THEN | ||
* Verify rod drive MG sets tripped . | * Verify rod drive MG sets tripped . | ||
* Close Bus 13 and Bus15 normal NOTE: \he CO may re-close feed breakers. breakers for Bus 13. | * Close Bus 13 and Bus15 normal NOTE: \he CO may re-close feed breakers. breakers for Bus 13. | ||
Line 6,709: | Line 6,338: | ||
HCO/ Foldout Page NOTE: The crew will monitor co these conditions throughout the I | HCO/ Foldout Page NOTE: The crew will monitor co these conditions throughout the I | ||
performance of FR-S.1. | performance of FR-S.1. | ||
LOSS OF SW CRITERIA | LOSS OF SW CRITERIA HCO/ (Step 4) Initiate Emergency Boration of RCS: NOTE: With the HCO driving co Rods the CO may need to complete the Emergency Boration. | ||
HCO/ (Step 4) Initiate Emergency Boration of RCS: NOTE: With the HCO driving co Rods the CO may need to complete the Emergency Boration. | |||
* Check SI status: | * Check SI status: | ||
* All SI annunciators - Examiner NOTE: It is likely EXTINGUISHED that SI will be actuated. If | * All SI annunciators - Examiner NOTE: It is likely EXTINGUISHED that SI will be actuated. If | ||
Line 6,778: | Line 6,404: | ||
valve status lights - BRIGHT | valve status lights - BRIGHT | ||
* FCV-4561 | * FCV-4561 | ||
* FCV-4562 | * FCV-4562 | ||
* Letdown orifice valves - CLOSED | * Letdown orifice valves - CLOSED | ||
Line 6,794: | Line 6,419: | ||
== Description:== | == Description:== | ||
Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN | Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (Step 9) Verify SI Pump and RHR Pump co Emergency Alignment: | ||
Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (Step 9) Verify SI Pump and RHR Pump co Emergency Alignment: | |||
* RHR pump discharge to Rx vessel deluge - OPEN | * RHR pump discharge to Rx vessel deluge - OPEN | ||
* MOV-852A | * MOV-852A | ||
Line 6,805: | Line 6,428: | ||
* Verify SI pump C discharge valves - | * Verify SI pump C discharge valves - | ||
OPEN | OPEN | ||
* MOV-871A | * MOV-871A | ||
* MOV-8718 HCO/ (Step 10) Verify GREATS Actuation: | * MOV-8718 HCO/ (Step 10) Verify GREATS Actuation: | ||
Line 6,878: | Line 6,500: | ||
* Open Bus 13 and Bus15 normal feed breakers. | * Open Bus 13 and Bus15 normal feed breakers. | ||
* IF Bus 13 or Bus 15 indicating lights are extinguished or flickering, THEN | * IF Bus 13 or Bus 15 indicating lights are extinguished or flickering, THEN | ||
* Verify rod drive MG sets tripped . | * Verify rod drive MG sets tripped . | ||
* Close Bus 13 and Bus15 normal feed breakers. | * Close Bus 13 and Bus15 normal feed breakers. | ||
Line 6,935: | Line 6,556: | ||
CLOSED I | CLOSED I | ||
HCOI (Step 5) Verify At Least Two SW Pumps - | HCOI (Step 5) Verify At Least Two SW Pumps - | ||
co RUNNING | co RUNNING HCOI (Step 6) Verify Cl and CVI: | ||
HCOI (Step 6) Verify Cl and CVI: | |||
co | co | ||
* Cl and CVI annunciators - LIT | * Cl and CVI annunciators - LIT | ||
Line 6,963: | Line 6,581: | ||
* SI flow indicators - CHECK FOR FLOW | * SI flow indicators - CHECK FOR FLOW | ||
* RHR flow indicator - CHECK FOR FLOW iHCO/ (Step 7b RNO) IF RCS pressure less than NOTE: RCS Pressure will co 150 psig manually ... remain > 150 psig. | * RHR flow indicator - CHECK FOR FLOW iHCO/ (Step 7b RNO) IF RCS pressure less than NOTE: RCS Pressure will co 150 psig manually ... remain > 150 psig. | ||
HCO/ (Step 9) Verify SI Pump and RHR Pump co Emergency Alignment: | HCO/ (Step 9) Verify SI Pump and RHR Pump co Emergency Alignment: | ||
* RHR pump discharge to Rx vessel deluge - OPEN | * RHR pump discharge to Rx vessel deluge - OPEN | ||
Line 7,025: | Line 6,642: | ||
* IF cooldown continues, THEN control total feed flow between 200 gpm to 230 gpm until narrow range level greater than 7% [25% adverse CNMT] in at least one SIG. | * IF cooldown continues, THEN control total feed flow between 200 gpm to 230 gpm until narrow range level greater than 7% [25% adverse CNMT] in at least one SIG. | ||
* WHEN S/G level greater than 7% in one NOTE: Since both S/Gs are SIG, THEN limit feed flow to that faulted, the CO may use A-required to maintain level in at least one 503.1 criteria and limit AFW SIG. flow to each SIG to 100 gpm. | * WHEN S/G level greater than 7% in one NOTE: Since both S/Gs are SIG, THEN limit feed flow to that faulted, the CO may use A-required to maintain level in at least one 503.1 criteria and limit AFW SIG. flow to each SIG to 100 gpm. | ||
* IF cooldown continues, THEN close both | * IF cooldown continues, THEN close both NOTE: Both MSIVs are Closed. | ||
NOTE: Both MSIVs are Closed. | |||
MS IVs. I CO/ (Step 13) Check PRZR PORVs and Spray HCO Valves: | MS IVs. I CO/ (Step 13) Check PRZR PORVs and Spray HCO Valves: | ||
* PORVs - CLOSED CO/ (Step 13 RNO) IF PRZR pressure less than NOTE: PRZR PORV PCV-HCO 2335 psig, THEN manually close PORVs. 431 C and its Block Valve are Stuck OPEN. | * PORVs - CLOSED CO/ (Step 13 RNO) IF PRZR pressure less than NOTE: PRZR PORV PCV-HCO 2335 psig, THEN manually close PORVs. 431 C and its Block Valve are Stuck OPEN. | ||
Line 7,050: | Line 6,665: | ||
* E-3 TRANSITION CRITERIA | * E-3 TRANSITION CRITERIA | ||
* COLD LEG RECIRCULATION ,, | * COLD LEG RECIRCULATION ,, | ||
SWITCHOVER CRITERION | SWITCHOVER CRITERION | ||
* AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION HCO (Step 1) Monitor RCP Trip Criteria: | * AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION HCO (Step 1) Monitor RCP Trip Criteria: | ||
Line 7,086: | Line 6,700: | ||
* COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER CRITERION | * COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER CRITERION | ||
* AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION | * AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION | ||
* E-3 TRANSITION CRITERIA ' | * E-3 TRANSITION CRITERIA ' | ||
co (Step 1) Check Secondary Pressure Boundary: | co (Step 1) Check Secondary Pressure Boundary: | ||
Line 7,112: | Line 6,725: | ||
co (Step 2) Control Feed Flow to Minimize RCS Cooldown: | co (Step 2) Control Feed Flow to Minimize RCS Cooldown: | ||
(Step 2a) Check cooldown rate in RCS cold NOTE: The cooldown rate is legs - LESS THAN 100°F/HR likely to be higher than 100°F/HR. | (Step 2a) Check cooldown rate in RCS cold NOTE: The cooldown rate is legs - LESS THAN 100°F/HR likely to be higher than 100°F/HR. | ||
co (Step 2a RNO) Lower feed flow to 50 gpm to NOTE: The CO will lower the each SIG and go to Step 2c. AFW flow rate to each SG to 50 gpm in an effort to control the cooldown rate. | co (Step 2a RNO) Lower feed flow to 50 gpm to NOTE: The CO will lower the each SIG and go to Step 2c. AFW flow rate to each SG to 50 gpm in an effort to control the cooldown rate. | ||
NOTE: A Red Path will likely occur on the Heat Sink Critical Safety Function Status Tree, | NOTE: A Red Path will likely occur on the Heat Sink Critical Safety Function Status Tree, | ||
,, and the US will address this | ,, and the US will address this procedure. The procedure will NOT be implemented however, since operator action has caused the Red Path. | ||
procedure. The procedure will NOT be implemented however, since operator action has caused the Red Path. | |||
CRITICAL TASK: | CRITICAL TASK: | ||
Control the AFW flowrate to 50 gpm per SG in order to minimize the RCS Cooldown rate before an extreme challenge (Red Path) develops to the integrity CSF (EOP-Based) | Control the AFW flowrate to 50 gpm per SG in order to minimize the RCS Cooldown rate before an extreme challenge (Red Path) develops to the integrity CSF (EOP-Based) | ||
Line 7,133: | Line 6,742: | ||
* SI pumps -AT LEAST TWO RUNNING | * SI pumps -AT LEAST TWO RUNNING | ||
* RCS pressure minus maximum SIG pressure - LESS THAN 210 psi [240 psi adverse CNMT] | * RCS pressure minus maximum SIG pressure - LESS THAN 210 psi [240 psi adverse CNMT] | ||
I us (Step 3c RNO) Go to Step 4 | I us (Step 3c RNO) Go to Step 4 HCO (*Step 4) Monitor PRZR PORVs and Block NOTE: This is a Continuous Valves: Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware. | ||
HCO (*Step 4) Monitor PRZR PORVs and Block NOTE: This is a Continuous Valves: Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware. | |||
* Power to PORV block valves - | * Power to PORV block valves - | ||
AVAILABLE | AVAILABLE | ||
Line 7,188: | Line 6,795: | ||
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A SI Pump is OOS for breaker swap and is expected to be back in 90 minutes, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement. | Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A SI Pump is OOS for breaker swap and is expected to be back in 90 minutes, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement. | ||
Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Raise power and Start second AFW Pump N-BOP N-SRO 2 1 C-BOP,' Loss of Compensating Voltage to Intermediate Range N35 C(TS)-SRO 3 2 C-RO 480VAC Ground/A CCW Pump trips w/B CCW Pump failure to C(TS)-SRO start in AUTO 4 3 C-RO B RCP Thermal Barrier leak C-SRO 5 4 C-BOP Fault on 480V Bus 17/SW Pump C fails to start C(TS)-SRO 6 5 M-RO PRZR Steam Space Break M-BOP M-SRO 7 6 C-RO Cl fails to automatically/manually actuate C-SRO 8 7 C-RO Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset C-BOP C-SRO | Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Raise power and Start second AFW Pump N-BOP N-SRO 2 1 C-BOP,' Loss of Compensating Voltage to Intermediate Range N35 C(TS)-SRO 3 2 C-RO 480VAC Ground/A CCW Pump trips w/B CCW Pump failure to C(TS)-SRO start in AUTO 4 3 C-RO B RCP Thermal Barrier leak C-SRO 5 4 C-BOP Fault on 480V Bus 17/SW Pump C fails to start C(TS)-SRO 6 5 M-RO PRZR Steam Space Break M-BOP M-SRO 7 6 C-RO Cl fails to automatically/manually actuate C-SRO 8 7 C-RO Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset C-BOP C-SRO | ||
* (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor | * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022317) | ||
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022317) | |||
Ginna 2017 NRC Scenario #6 The plant is at 0.5% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past [[estimated NRC review hours::4 hours]], with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The crew will raise and stabilize plant power between 2-3%; until maintenance on the A SI Pump is complete. | Ginna 2017 NRC Scenario #6 The plant is at 0.5% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past [[estimated NRC review hours::4 hours]], with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The crew will raise and stabilize plant power between 2-3%; until maintenance on the A SI Pump is complete. | ||
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A SI Pump is OOS for breaker swap and is expected to be back in 90 minutes, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement. | The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A SI Pump is OOS for breaker swap and is expected to be back in 90 minutes, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement. | ||
Line 7,203: | Line 6,808: | ||
The operator will transition from E-0 to E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant." At Step 7 of E-1, and after SI is reset, a Loss of Off-Site Power will occur and all Safeguards Equipment will need to be re-started. | The operator will transition from E-0 to E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant." At Step 7 of E-1, and after SI is reset, a Loss of Off-Site Power will occur and all Safeguards Equipment will need to be re-started. | ||
The scenario will terminate at Step 9 (or beyond) of E-1 after all ECCS equipment is re-started and Instrument Air has been restored to the Containment. | The scenario will terminate at Step 9 (or beyond) of E-1 after all ECCS equipment is re-started and Instrument Air has been restored to the Containment. | ||
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022317) | Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022317) | ||
Critical Tasks: | Critical Tasks: | ||
Line 7,212: | Line 6,816: | ||
Establish High-Head Injection with at least two SI Pumps after SI has been Reset and following a Loss of Off-Site Power (EOP-Based) | Establish High-Head Injection with at least two SI Pumps after SI has been Reset and following a Loss of Off-Site Power (EOP-Based) | ||
Safety Significance: Failure to manually start at least two 50% capacity SI pumps under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity." In this case, at least two SI pumps can be manually started from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually start both SI pumps, which are 50% capacity pumps, also represents a failure by the crew to "demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario, and recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start the SI pumps (when it is possible to do so) is a "violation of the facility license condition." Performance of the critical task would return the plant to a condition for which analysis shows acceptable results. | Safety Significance: Failure to manually start at least two 50% capacity SI pumps under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity." In this case, at least two SI pumps can be manually started from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually start both SI pumps, which are 50% capacity pumps, also represents a failure by the crew to "demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario, and recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start the SI pumps (when it is possible to do so) is a "violation of the facility license condition." Performance of the critical task would return the plant to a condition for which analysis shows acceptable results. | ||
PROGRAM: Ginna Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N17-1-6 | PROGRAM: Ginna Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N17-1-6 | ||
Line 7,237: | Line 6,840: | ||
: 20. ATT-8.5, "Attachment Loss of Offsite Power" (Rev 1) | : 20. ATT-8.5, "Attachment Loss of Offsite Power" (Rev 1) | ||
Validation Time: 94 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Essential Training & Consulting, LLC Facility Review: | Validation Time: 94 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Essential Training & Consulting, LLC Facility Review: | ||
Rev.022317 | Rev.022317 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 Facility: Ginna Scenario No.: 6 Op Test No.: N17-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO) | ||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 Facility: Ginna Scenario No.: 6 Op Test No.: N17-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO) | |||
(RO) | (RO) | ||
(BOP) | (BOP) | ||
Line 7,246: | Line 6,847: | ||
Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Raise power and Start second AFW Pump I | Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Raise power and Start second AFW Pump I | ||
N-BOP N-SRO 2 1 C-BOP Loss of Compensating Voltage to Intermediate Range N35 C(TS)-SRO 3 2 C-RO 480VAC Ground/A CCW Pump trips w/B CCW Pump failure to C(TS)-SRO start in AUTO 4 3 C-RO B RCP Thermal Barrier leak C-SRO 5 4 C-BOP Fault on 480V Bus 17/SW Pump C fails to start C(TS)-SRO 6 5 M-RO PRZR Steam Space Break M-BOP M-SRO 7 6 C-RO Cl fails to automatically/manually actuate C-SRO 8 7 C-RO Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset C-BOP C-SRO | N-BOP N-SRO 2 1 C-BOP Loss of Compensating Voltage to Intermediate Range N35 C(TS)-SRO 3 2 C-RO 480VAC Ground/A CCW Pump trips w/B CCW Pump failure to C(TS)-SRO start in AUTO 4 3 C-RO B RCP Thermal Barrier leak C-SRO 5 4 C-BOP Fault on 480V Bus 17/SW Pump C fails to start C(TS)-SRO 6 5 M-RO PRZR Steam Space Break M-BOP M-SRO 7 6 C-RO Cl fails to automatically/manually actuate C-SRO 8 7 C-RO Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset C-BOP C-SRO | ||
* (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor | * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 Ginna 2017 NRC Scenario #6 The plant is at 0.5% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past [[estimated NRC review hours::4 hours]], with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The crew will raise and stabilize plant power between 2-3%; until maintenance on the A SI Pump is complete. | ||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 Ginna 2017 NRC Scenario #6 The plant is at 0.5% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past [[estimated NRC review hours::4 hours]], with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The crew will raise and stabilize plant power between 2-3%; until maintenance on the A SI Pump is complete. | |||
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A SI Pump is OOS for breaker swap and is expected to be back in 90 minutes, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement. | The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A SI Pump is OOS for breaker swap and is expected to be back in 90 minutes, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement. | ||
Shortly after taking the watch, the crew will start the 2nd AFW Pump and raise and stabilize power at 2-3% per Section 6.5 of 0-1.2, "Plant Startup From Hot Shutdown To Full Load." | Shortly after taking the watch, the crew will start the 2nd AFW Pump and raise and stabilize power at 2-3% per Section 6.5 of 0-1.2, "Plant Startup From Hot Shutdown To Full Load." | ||
Line 7,258: | Line 6,857: | ||
Additionally, when the SI occurs, instrument air to containment will be isolated and the B RCP Thermal Barrier Return Isolation Valve will fail open. The CCW leak will need to be re-isolated. | Additionally, when the SI occurs, instrument air to containment will be isolated and the B RCP Thermal Barrier Return Isolation Valve will fail open. The CCW leak will need to be re-isolated. | ||
The operator will transition from E-0 to E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant." At Step 7 of E-1, and after SI is reset, a Loss of Off-Site Power will occur and all Safeguards Equipment will need to be re-started. | The operator will transition from E-0 to E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant." At Step 7 of E-1, and after SI is reset, a Loss of Off-Site Power will occur and all Safeguards Equipment will need to be re-started. | ||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 The scenario will terminate at Step 9 (or beyond) of E-1 after all ECCS equipment is re-started and Instrument Air has been restored to the Containment. | Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 The scenario will terminate at Step 9 (or beyond) of E-1 after all ECCS equipment is re-started and Instrument Air has been restored to the Containment. | ||
Critical Tasks: | Critical Tasks: | ||
Line 7,268: | Line 6,866: | ||
Establish High-Head Injection with at least two SI Pumps after SI has been Reset and following a Loss of Off-Site Power (EOP-Based) | Establish High-Head Injection with at least two SI Pumps after SI has been Reset and following a Loss of Off-Site Power (EOP-Based) | ||
Safety Significance: Failure to manually start at least two 50% capacity SI pumps under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity." In this case, at least two SI pumps can be manually started from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually start both SI pumps, which are 50% capacity pumps, also represents a failure by the crew to "demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario, and recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start the SI pumps (when it is possible to do so) is a "violation of the facility license condition." Performance of the critical task would return the plant to a condition for which analysis shows acceptable results. | Safety Significance: Failure to manually start at least two 50% capacity SI pumps under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity." In this case, at least two SI pumps can be manually started from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually start both SI pumps, which are 50% capacity pumps, also represents a failure by the crew to "demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario, and recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start the SI pumps (when it is possible to do so) is a "violation of the facility license condition." Performance of the critical task would return the plant to a condition for which analysis shows acceptable results. | ||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Reset to Temp IC 160 T = 0 {From IC-18): | Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Reset to Temp IC 160 T = 0 {From IC-18): | ||
D (Originally IC-18). | D (Originally IC-18). | ||
Line 7,288: | Line 6,885: | ||
* Provide the crew with a copy of S-3.1 and 0-1.2 complete through Step 6.4 . | * Provide the crew with a copy of S-3.1 and 0-1.2 complete through Step 6.4 . | ||
* Handout current Reactivity Plan . | * Handout current Reactivity Plan . | ||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D T-0 Begin Familiarization Period D At direction of Event1 Raise power and Start second AFW Pump examiner D Stabilized at 2- Event2 Loss of Compensating Voltage to Intermediate 3% power Range N35 Trigger #1 NIS05A (1 E-8 amps, 0 Ramp) | Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D T-0 Begin Familiarization Period D At direction of Event1 Raise power and Start second AFW Pump examiner D Stabilized at 2- Event2 Loss of Compensating Voltage to Intermediate 3% power Range N35 Trigger #1 NIS05A (1 E-8 amps, 0 Ramp) | ||
D At direction of Event 3 480VAC Ground/A CCW Pump trips w/B CCW examiner Pump failure to start in AUTO Trigger #2 ON, (Simulates simultaneous 480V ground). | D At direction of Event 3 480VAC Ground/A CCW Pump trips w/B CCW examiner Pump failure to start in AUTO Trigger #2 ON, (Simulates simultaneous 480V ground). | ||
Line 7,298: | Line 6,894: | ||
D At direction of Event6 PRZR Steam Space Break examiner Trigger #5 PZR07 (89000, 600 second Ramp) | D At direction of Event6 PRZR Steam Space Break examiner Trigger #5 PZR07 (89000, 600 second Ramp) | ||
D Post-Rx Trip Event 7 Cl fails to automatically/manually actuate RPS06 Note: This malfunction is inserted at T=O. | D Post-Rx Trip Event 7 Cl fails to automatically/manually actuate RPS06 Note: This malfunction is inserted at T=O. | ||
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D Post-Rx Trip Events Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset Trigger #6 Note: This malfunction is inserted after SI is reset in E-1. | Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D Post-Rx Trip Events Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset Trigger #6 Note: This malfunction is inserted after SI is reset in E-1. | ||
EDS01A EDS01B D Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner | EDS01A EDS01B D Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# | ||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# | |||
----- Page 8 of | ----- Page 8 of | ||
--1 54 Event | --1 54 Event | ||
Line 7,359: | Line 6,952: | ||
Indications Available: | Indications Available: | ||
* MCB Annunciator E-9, IR N-35 LOSS OF COMPENSATION VOLTAGE | * MCB Annunciator E-9, IR N-35 LOSS OF COMPENSATION VOLTAGE | ||
* The N35 indication is sliqhtly hiqher than N36 indication Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior. Comments AR-E-9, IR N-35 LOSS OF COMPENSATION VOLTAGE | * The N35 indication is sliqhtly hiqher than N36 indication Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior. Comments AR-E-9, IR N-35 LOSS OF COMPENSATION VOLTAGE us (Step 1) Refer to ER-NIS.2 NOTE: The US will go to ER-NIS.2. | ||
us (Step 1) Refer to ER-NIS.2 NOTE: The US will go to ER-NIS.2. | |||
ER-NIS.2, IR MALFUNCTION co (Step 6.1) DEFEAT the reactor trip and rod NOTE: E-7 alarm, NIS TRIP stop function for the affected channel by BYPASS, will light placing the level trip switch in the BYPASS position. | ER-NIS.2, IR MALFUNCTION co (Step 6.1) DEFEAT the reactor trip and rod NOTE: E-7 alarm, NIS TRIP stop function for the affected channel by BYPASS, will light placing the level trip switch in the BYPASS position. | ||
us (Step 6.2) NOTIFY l&C to repair the faulty NOTE: The US may notify the channel. WCC/l&C. | us (Step 6.2) NOTIFY l&C to repair the faulty NOTE: The US may notify the channel. WCC/l&C. | ||
Line 7,414: | Line 7,004: | ||
* AP-CCW.2, LOSS OF CCW DURING POWER OPERATION HCO (Step 2) Notify AO to check CCW pumps. NOTE: The US may direct the EO to check the CCW Pumps. | * AP-CCW.2, LOSS OF CCW DURING POWER OPERATION HCO (Step 2) Notify AO to check CCW pumps. NOTE: The US may direct the EO to check the CCW Pumps. | ||
If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO, and report A CCW Pump Motor Hot to Touch. | If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO, and report A CCW Pump Motor Hot to Touch. | ||
HCO (Step 3) IF CCW pump cavitation is evident NOTE: The US may direct the with normal CCW surge tank level as EO to check the CCW Pumps. | HCO (Step 3) IF CCW pump cavitation is evident NOTE: The US may direct the with normal CCW surge tank level as EO to check the CCW Pumps. | ||
indicated on Ll-618, .... If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO, and report no evidence of cavitation exists on any CCW Pump. | indicated on Ll-618, .... If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO, and report no evidence of cavitation exists on any CCW Pump. | ||
Line 7,449: | Line 7,038: | ||
* RCP motor bearings temperature (PPCS Group Display - RCPS OR RCP temperature monitor RK-20A recorder) - | * RCP motor bearings temperature (PPCS Group Display - RCPS OR RCP temperature monitor RK-20A recorder) - | ||
:::; 200°F. | :::; 200°F. | ||
HCO (*Step 5) Monitor If Letdown Should B~ NOTE: This is a Continuous Isolated: Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware. | HCO (*Step 5) Monitor If Letdown Should B~ NOTE: This is a Continuous Isolated: Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware. | ||
* Check annunciator A-12, Non-Regen Hx Letdown Out Hi Temp 145°F - | * Check annunciator A-12, Non-Regen Hx Letdown Out Hi Temp 145°F - | ||
Line 7,497: | Line 7,085: | ||
us (Step 16) Notify Higher supervision NOTE: The US may notify the WCC/Plant Supervision. | us (Step 16) Notify Higher supervision NOTE: The US may notify the WCC/Plant Supervision. | ||
SIM DRIVER: as wees, acknowledge. | SIM DRIVER: as wees, acknowledge. | ||
us (Step 17) Return to Procedure Or Guidance | us (Step 17) Return to Procedure Or Guidance In Effect Examiner NOTE: If the US does NOT enter AP-CCW .2, continue HERE. | ||
In Effect Examiner NOTE: If the US does NOT enter AP-CCW .2, continue HERE. | |||
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.7, COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW} | TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.7, COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW} | ||
SYSTEM us LCO 3.7.7 Two CCW trains, two CCW heat exchangers, and the CCW loop header shall be OPERABLE. | SYSTEM us LCO 3.7.7 Two CCW trains, two CCW heat exchangers, and the CCW loop header shall be OPERABLE. | ||
Line 7,527: | Line 7,113: | ||
* RMS-17, R-17 Component Coolinq, indication is risina Time Pos. \ | * RMS-17, R-17 Component Coolinq, indication is risina Time Pos. \ | ||
Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The crew may enter AP-RCS.1 first, but will ultimately shift to AP-RCP.1. | Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The crew may enter AP-RCS.1 first, but will ultimately shift to AP-RCP.1. | ||
AR-B-10, RCP 18 LABYR SEAL LO DIFF PRESS 15" H20 HCO (Step 1) Check AOV-142 position correct for plant conditions. | AR-B-10, RCP 18 LABYR SEAL LO DIFF PRESS 15" H20 HCO (Step 1) Check AOV-142 position correct for plant conditions. | ||
HCO (Step 2) GO TO applicable procedure: NOTE: If the US enters AP-RCP .1 when CCW surge level | HCO (Step 2) GO TO applicable procedure: NOTE: If the US enters AP-RCP .1 when CCW surge level | ||
Line 7,658: | Line 7,243: | ||
NOTE: The US will go to AP-SW.2. | NOTE: The US will go to AP-SW.2. | ||
AP-SW.2, LOSS OF SERVICE WATER co (Step 1) Verify 480V AC Emergency Susses NOTE: Bus 17 is de-energized. | AP-SW.2, LOSS OF SERVICE WATER co (Step 1) Verify 480V AC Emergency Susses NOTE: Bus 17 is de-energized. | ||
17 and 18- ENERGIZED co (Step 1 RNO) Ensure associated D/G(s) | 17 and 18- ENERGIZED co (Step 1 RNO) Ensure associated D/G(s) running and attempt to manually load busses 17 and/or 18 onto their respective D/G(s). | ||
running and attempt to manually load busses 17 and/or 18 onto their respective D/G(s). | |||
IF neither bus 17 nor bus 18 can be NOTE: Bus 18 ,is energized. | IF neither bus 17 nor bus 18 can be NOTE: Bus 18 ,is energized. | ||
energized, THEN ....... | energized, THEN ....... | ||
Line 7,685: | Line 7,268: | ||
I co (Step 4) Isolate SW To Non-Essential Loads | I co (Step 4) Isolate SW To Non-Essential Loads | ||
* Close screenhouse SW isolation valves | * Close screenhouse SW isolation valves | ||
* MOV-4609 | * MOV-4609 | ||
* MOV-4780 | * MOV-4780 | ||
Line 7,713: | Line 7,295: | ||
SIM DRIVER: as wees, acknowledge. | SIM DRIVER: as wees, acknowledge. | ||
co (Step 7) Check SW System Status: | co (Step 7) Check SW System Status: | ||
* Check SW loop header pressures: ' | * Check SW loop header pressures: ' | ||
* PPCS SW low pressure alarm status | * PPCS SW low pressure alarm status | ||
Line 7,760: | Line 7,341: | ||
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# | Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# | ||
5 Page 31 of 54 | 5 Page 31 of 54 | ||
---fl Event | ---fl Event | ||
Line 7,770: | Line 7,350: | ||
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.9, DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS- MODES 1, 2, 3 AND 4 | TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.9, DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS- MODES 1, 2, 3 AND 4 | ||
us LCO 3.8.9 Train A and Train B of the i following electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE: | us LCO 3.8.9 Train A and Train B of the i following electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE: | ||
* AC power. ' | * AC power. ' | ||
us APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. | us APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. | ||
Line 7,800: | Line 7,379: | ||
Regardless of further actions in AP-RCS.1, ultimately the crew will need to trip the reactor and actuate SI. | Regardless of further actions in AP-RCS.1, ultimately the crew will need to trip the reactor and actuate SI. | ||
i E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION I | i E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION I | ||
HCO (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip: Immediate Action | HCO (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip: Immediate Action | ||
* At least one train of reactor trip breakers | * At least one train of reactor trip breakers | ||
Line 7,822: | Line 7,400: | ||
HCOI (Step 4) Check if SI is Actuated: Immediate Action co I | HCOI (Step 4) Check if SI is Actuated: Immediate Action co I | ||
* Any SI Annunciator - LIT | * Any SI Annunciator - LIT | ||
* SI sequencing - BOTH TRAINS STARTED | * SI sequencing - BOTH TRAINS STARTED HCOI Foldout Page NOTE: The crew will co monitor these conditions throughout the performance of E-0. | ||
HCOI Foldout Page NOTE: The crew will co monitor these conditions throughout the performance of E-0. | |||
RCP TRIP CRITERIA NOTE: This condition is expected to be met. | RCP TRIP CRITERIA NOTE: This condition is expected to be met. | ||
* IF BOTH conditions listed below occur, THEN trip both RCPs: | * IF BOTH conditions listed below occur, THEN trip both RCPs: | ||
Line 7,843: | Line 7,418: | ||
ACTION VERIFICATION NOTE: The US will hand off ATT-27 .0 to either the HCO or the CO, and continue with the other operator in E-0. | ACTION VERIFICATION NOTE: The US will hand off ATT-27 .0 to either the HCO or the CO, and continue with the other operator in E-0. | ||
Examiner following operator performing ATT-27.0 continue below. | Examiner following operator performing ATT-27.0 continue below. | ||
Examiner following operator | Examiner following operator NOT performing ATI-27.0 continue at Page 40. | ||
NOT performing ATI-27.0 continue at Page 40. | |||
E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, ATTACHMENT 27.0, ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC ACTION VERIFICATION HCO/ (Step 1) Verify SI and RHR Pumps Running: | E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, ATTACHMENT 27.0, ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC ACTION VERIFICATION HCO/ (Step 1) Verify SI and RHR Pumps Running: | ||
co | co | ||
Line 7,913: | Line 7,485: | ||
* MOV-814 IF valve(s) can NOT be closed from NOTE: All valves that.have the MCB, THEN ..... DIM status lights will be manually closed using ATT-27.0 or ATT-3.0. | * MOV-814 IF valve(s) can NOT be closed from NOTE: All valves that.have the MCB, THEN ..... DIM status lights will be manually closed using ATT-27.0 or ATT-3.0. | ||
NOTE: The HCO/CO will dispatch an EO. | NOTE: The HCO/CO will dispatch an EO. | ||
SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge and use REM-MIS099 to close AOV-1723; and MIS100 to close ,,AOV- | SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge and use REM-MIS099 to close AOV-1723; and MIS100 to close ,,AOV-1728. | ||
1728. | |||
CRITICAL TASK: | CRITICAL TASK: | ||
Close Containment Isolation Valves, or their Alternate Valves using ATT-3.0, before indicating to the US that ATT-27.0 is complete (EOP-Based) | Close Containment Isolation Valves, or their Alternate Valves using ATT-3.0, before indicating to the US that ATT-27.0 is complete (EOP-Based) | ||
Line 7,933: | Line 7,503: | ||
HCO/ (Step 7) Check CCW System Status: | HCO/ (Step 7) Check CCW System Status: | ||
co ' | co ' | ||
* Verify CCW pump -AT LEAST ONE NOTE: Neither CCW Pump RUNNING is running. | * Verify CCW pump -AT LEAST ONE NOTE: Neither CCW Pump RUNNING is running. | ||
HCO/ (Step 7 RNO) IF offsite power available, NOTE: Neither CCW Pump co THEN manually start one CCW pump. can be started (A previously tripped, B cannot be started with the D/G powering Bus 16). Because of this, the RCPs need to be tripped. | HCO/ (Step 7 RNO) IF offsite power available, NOTE: Neither CCW Pump co THEN manually start one CCW pump. can be started (A previously tripped, B cannot be started with the D/G powering Bus 16). Because of this, the RCPs need to be tripped. | ||
Line 7,954: | Line 7,523: | ||
co | co | ||
* Ensure SI pumps Band C running. IF either pump NOT, runninq, THEN ......... I | * Ensure SI pumps Band C running. IF either pump NOT, runninq, THEN ......... I | ||
* Ensure SI pump C aligned to discharge | * Ensure SI pump C aligned to discharge line A: | ||
line A: | |||
* MOV-871A open | * MOV-871A open | ||
* MOV-871 B closed | * MOV-871 B closed | ||
Line 8,062: | Line 7,628: | ||
* Stop both RCPs NOTE: If RCP Trip Criteria is NOT met, the RNO will be performed (Go to Step 15); | * Stop both RCPs NOTE: If RCP Trip Criteria is NOT met, the RNO will be performed (Go to Step 15); | ||
and RCP Trip Criteria is expected to be met later . | and RCP Trip Criteria is expected to be met later . | ||
I CO/ (Step 15) Check If S/G Secondary Side Is HCO Intact: | I CO/ (Step 15) Check If S/G Secondary Side Is HCO Intact: | ||
* Pressure in both S/G's-STABLE OR Rising | * Pressure in both S/G's-STABLE OR Rising | ||
Line 8,085: | Line 7,650: | ||
* R-30 | * R-30 | ||
* CNMT pressure - LESS than 0.5 psig us (Step 17.a RNO) Go to E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1. | * CNMT pressure - LESS than 0.5 psig us (Step 17.a RNO) Go to E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1. | ||
NOTE: The US will go to E- | NOTE: The US will go to E-1. | ||
1. | |||
The US will conduct an alignment brief. | The US will conduct an alignment brief. | ||
E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT HCO/ Foldout Page NOTE: The crew will co monitor these conditions throughout the performance of E-1. | E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT HCO/ Foldout Page NOTE: The crew will co monitor these conditions throughout the performance of E-1. | ||
RCP TRIP CRITERIA NOTE: This condition is expected to be met. | RCP TRIP CRITERIA NOTE: This condition is expected to be met. | ||
Line 8,104: | Line 7,666: | ||
* RCS pressure minus maximum SIG pressure - LESS THAN 210 psi [240 psi adverse CNMT] | * RCS pressure minus maximum SIG pressure - LESS THAN 210 psi [240 psi adverse CNMT] | ||
* Stop both RCPs NOTE: If the RCPs have NOT been stopped prior to this step, they will be stopped here. | * Stop both RCPs NOTE: If the RCPs have NOT been stopped prior to this step, they will be stopped here. | ||
HCOI (Step 2) Check If SIG Secondary Side Is co Intact: | HCOI (Step 2) Check If SIG Secondary Side Is co Intact: | ||
* Pressure in both SIGs - STABLE OR RISING | * Pressure in both SIGs - STABLE OR RISING | ||
* Pressure in both SIGs - GREATER THAN 110 PSIG | * Pressure in both SIGs - GREATER THAN 110 PSIG co (*Step 3) Monitor Intact SIG Levels: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware. | ||
co (*Step 3) Monitor Intact SIG Levels: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware. | |||
* Narrow range level - GREATER THAN 7% [25% adverse CNMT] | * Narrow range level - GREATER THAN 7% [25% adverse CNMT] | ||
* Control feed flow to maintain narrow NOTE: Adverse range level between 17% [25% adverse Containment is likely to exist CNMT] and 50% at this time. | * Control feed flow to maintain narrow NOTE: Adverse range level between 17% [25% adverse Containment is likely to exist CNMT] and 50% at this time. | ||
Line 8,148: | Line 7,706: | ||
* CS pumps, if previously running NOTE: NO CS Pumps are running. | * CS pumps, if previously running NOTE: NO CS Pumps are running. | ||
* TDAFW pump, if bbth 11 A AND 11 B NOTE: The TD AFW Pump deenergized is in PULL STOP. | * TDAFW pump, if bbth 11 A AND 11 B NOTE: The TD AFW Pump deenergized is in PULL STOP. | ||
HCO (Step 2) Manual start is required for the following equipment: | HCO (Step 2) Manual start is required for the following equipment: | ||
* SI pumps NOTE: B is Running; and the C SI Pump must be re-started. | * SI pumps NOTE: B is Running; and the C SI Pump must be re-started. | ||
Line 8,189: | Line 7,746: | ||
* Close non-safeguards bus tie breakers: | * Close non-safeguards bus tie breakers: | ||
* Bus 13 to Bus 14 tie | * Bus 13 to Bus 14 tie | ||
* Bus 15 to Bus 16 tie | * Bus 15 to Bus 16 tie | ||
* Reset Control Room lighting | * Reset Control Room lighting |
Latest revision as of 14:44, 24 February 2020
ML17104A201 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Ginna ![]() |
Issue date: | 03/03/2017 |
From: | David Silk NRC Region 1 |
To: | Exelon Generation Co |
Shared Package | |
ML16210A441 | List: |
References | |
CAC U01943 | |
Download: ML17104A201 (448) | |
Text
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet NRC EXAM Admin JPM A1a RO 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A1a RO (Rev_022217) NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 2 of 7 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:
Task
Title:
Perform a Post-Trip Xenon JPM No.: 2017 Admin - NRC Reactivity Calculation JPM A1a RO KIA
Reference:
G 2.1.43 (4.1)
Examinee: Examiner:
Facility Evaluator: Date:
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: x Classroom X Simulator - - - Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task' successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.
Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue {Last Page of this JPM) and Handout 1.
Initial Conditions:
- The plant has tripped from 50% power.
- The reactor had been operating at this power for the last 3 days prior to the trip.
- There are no stuck control rods, or control rods that are NOT fully inserted.
- The following data has been provided:
- The date and time of the plant trip was 0730 on 3/3/17
- The cycle burnup from the PPCS is 12,514 MWD/MTU
- You are the HCO.
Initiating Cue: The US has directed you to perform a Xenon Reactivity Calculation in accordance with 0-3, Hot Shutdown With Xenon Present, up to Step 6.2.2.
Task Standard: The operator will determine that it will take 13.5 hours0.208 days <br />0.0298 weeks <br />0.00685 months <br /> for Xenon to decay to the value at the time of shutdown, and that this will occur at 2100 on 3/3/17.
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A1a RO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 3 of 7 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Required Materials: Calculator General References must be available for the operator to reference.
General
References:
0-3, Hot Shutdown With Xenon Present, Rev 04500 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of 0-3, Hot Shutdown With Xenon Present.
Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 9 minutes Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue .
Information For Evaluator's Use:
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.
- Denotes critical steps.
Number any comments in the "Comment Number column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the "Comments" section. The comment section should be used to document: the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the site's appropriate tracking system.
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue .
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A1a RO NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 4 of 7 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:
STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
<(
I-
<(
en c: ....
Cl> Cl>
E .c E E en z 0 ::::J
- > Uz CUE Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handout 1.
NOTE The preferred method for determining Xenon reactivity is to use the PPCS program, XENON PREDICT. Use of Attachment 1, Time To Equilibrium Xenon, for a shutdown from non-equilibrium power conditions is an approximation and, if used, the results should be confirmed by the Reactor Engineer as soon as possible.
(0-3, Step 6.2.1/6.2.1.1) The operator recognizes that the 1 - - -
CALCULATE the date and time for XENON PREDICT program is Xenon to return to the value at OOS, marks this step NA, and time of shutdown by one of the proceeds to Step 6.2.1.2 followinQ methods:
IF the PPCS program, XENON PREDICT will be used to determine the date and time for Xenon to return to the value at time of shutdown, THEN PERFORM the following.
OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.
(0-3, Step 6.2.1.2/6.2.1.2.a) IF The operator records 50%.
- 2 - - -
Attachment 1, Time To Equilibrium Xenon, will be used to determine The operator initials Step 6.2.1.2.a.
the date and time for Xenon to return to the value at time of shutdown, THEN PERFORM the following: OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.
RECORD the average power for the 6 hours0.25 days <br />0.0357 weeks <br />0.00822 months <br /> prior to reactor shutdown.
Power: %
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1a RO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 5 of 7 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
<C I-
<C en
-c: ...
Q)
EE Q)
E .c en z 0 :::s
- > Uz (0-3, Step 6.2.1.2.b) DETERMINE The operator observes that the
- 3 - - -
the amount of time for Xenon to current burnup recorded in decay to the value at time of Prerequisite 5.8 is 12,514 shutdown, using the Table in MWD/MTU.
Attachment 1. USE the power level recorded in Step 6.2.1.2.a and the The operator uses Attachment 1 current burnup recorded in and finds the intersecting point for Prerequisite Step 5.8. 10000 MWD/MTU and 50% power to be 13.5 hours0.208 days <br />0.0298 weeks <br />0.00685 months <br />, and records.
Hours The operator initials Step 6.2.1.2.b.
(0-3, Step 6.2.2) CALCULATE the The operator observes that the
- 4 - - -
date and time at which Xenon will Date and Time of the Trip were equal the value at time of 0730 on 3/3/17.
shutdown by adding the hours I determined in Step 6.2.1.1.f OR The operator adds 13.5 hours0.208 days <br />0.0298 weeks <br />0.00685 months <br /> to 6.2.1.2.b to Step 5.7 and recording the time of trip and determines that below. Xenon will equal the value at time of shutdown at 2100 on 3/3/17, Date Time and records.
The operator initials Step 6.2.2.
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A1a RO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 6 of 7 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A1a RO Examinee's Name:
Date Performed:
Facility Evaluator:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Name (print)
Examiner's Signature: Date:
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A1a RO NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- The plant has tripped from 50% power.
- The reactor had been operating at this power for the last 3 days prior to the trip.
- There are no stuck control rods, or control rods that are NOT fully inserted.
- The following data has been provided:
- The date and time of the plant trip was 0730 on 3/3/17
- The cycle burnup from the PPCS is 12,514 MWD/MTU
- You are the HCO.
INITIATING CUE: The US has directed you to perform a Xenon Reactivity Calculation in accordance with 0-3, Hot Shutdown With Xenon Present, up to Step 6.2.2.
NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet NRC EXAM Admin JPM A1b RO 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A1b RO (Rev_022217) NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 2 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:
Task
Title:
Verify SOM for a Shutdown Reactor JPM No.: 2017 Admin - NRC with Untrippable Rods JPM A1b RO KIA
Reference:
G 2.1.37 (4.3)
Examinee: Examiner:
Facility Evaluator: Date:
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: x Classroom X Simulator Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this' Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.
Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handout 1.
Initial Conditions:
- The plant is stable in MODE 3 following an inadvertent reactor trip from 100% power.
- Two Control Rods have stuck at 225 steps on the trip.
- Average Reactor Coolant Temperature is 539°F and stable.
- Core Burnup is 18,000 MWD/MTU.
- Plant Management has determined the Reactor Coolant System will not be borated to Cold Shutdown and both Reactor Coolant Pumps will continue to run during the shutdown.
- You are the HCO.
Initiating Cue:
- The US has directed you to verify SOM per 0-3.1, Boron Concentration for the Xenon Free All Rods in - Most Reactive Rod Stuck Out Shutdown Margin, to the point at which Independent Verification is required.
- Assuming your calculations have been independently verified, is further boration needed to ensure SOM?
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1b RO NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 3 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Task Standard: The operator will complete Sections 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 in accordance with the provided KEY, and determine that further RCS boration is required to ensure SOM.
Required Materials: Calculator General References must be available for the operator to reference.
General
References:
0-3.1, Boron Concentration for the Xenon Free All Rods In- Most Reactive Rod Stuck Out Shutdown Margin, Rev 05800 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of 0-3.1.
Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 15 minutes Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue .
Information For Evaluator's Use:
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.
- Denotes critical steps.
Number any comments in the "Comment Number" column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the "Comments" section. The comment section should be used to document: the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the site's appropriate tracking system.
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue .
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1b RO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 4 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:
....c: ....
I- Cl> Cl>
I- <( E .c STEP ELEMENT STANDARD <(
(/)
(/)
z E E
- > 0 :::J
(.)z CUE Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue {Last Page of this JPM) and Handout 1.
(0-3.1, Section 5.0) Prerequisites The operator completed Section in 1 - - -
accordance with the provided KEY.
NOTE Control rods that are NOT able to be verified fully inserted include control rods that are confirmed stuck (untrippable) or have lost rod position indication.
(0-3.1, Step 6.1/6.1.1) Stuck Rod The operator recognizes that with 2 - - -
Calculation/IF THREE or more only two stuck rods, this step does control rods are NOT able to be not aP,ply, and marks this Step NA verified fully inserted, THEN BORATE the RCS to 2750 ppm AND MARK Step 6.1.2 and Sections 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 N/A, OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.
NOTE The calculation below must be performed, even if all° rods are verified on the bottom, in which case record "O" for Number of RCCA.
(0-3.1, Step 6.1.2) IF ONE or The operator performs the
- 3 - - -
TWO control rods are NOT able to calculation of Step 6.1.2, and be verified fully inserted, THEN determines that the required CALCULATE required increase in increase in boron concentration to boron concentration to compensate for the decrease in compensate for the decrease in shutdown margin for two stuck shutdown margin, OTHERWISE, controls rods is 400 ppm.
MARK this Step N/A.
NOTE If RCS temperature is maintained at 547°F then this section will be performed for shutdown margin requirements.
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1b RO NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 5 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION I-I-
<C
-c: t...
G> G>
E .o STEP ELEMENT STANDARD <C
(/)
(/)
z EE
- > 0 :::s
(.) z (0-3.1, Step 6.2/6.2.1) HZP Xenon The operator uses Attachment 1 to 4 - - -
Free Boron determine that the single loop RequiremenUDETERMINE HZP SOM (1.8%L\p)for 18,000 Xenon Free, minimum required MWD/MTU is 476 ppm; and Shutdown Margin Boron records this value in the space Concentration using Attachment 1, provided.
Shutdown Boron Concentrations vs Cycle Burnup At Hot, No Load Conditions, AND RECORD below:
- 1. Single Loop
- 2. Two Loop The operator uses Attachment 1 to determine that the two loop SOM (1.3%L\p) for 18,000 MWD/MTU is 411(400-420) ppm; and records this value in the space provided.
Examiner Note: Although the operator will perform the single loop calculation, only the two-loop calculation is critical.
(0-3.1, 6.2.2) INCREASE each The operator performs the single 5 - - -
required boron concentration to loop calculation; and records 876 compensate for the decrease in ppm in the space provided.
shutdown margin due to one or more control rods NOT able to be verified fully inserted:
- 1. Single Loop
- 2. Two Loop The operator performs the two loop calculation; and records 811 (800-820) ppm in the space provided.
Examiner Note: Although the operator will perform the single loop calculation, only the two-loop calculation is critical.
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1b RO NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 6 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
<(
CJ)
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CJ) z
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E E I..
Q) Q)
E .c
- > 0 :::::s Uz NOTE
- If RCS temperature is maintained between 547°F and 535°F then both Section 6.2 and 6.3 will be performed for shutdown margin requirements.
- 0-2.2, Plant Shutdown From Hot Shutdown To Cold Shutdown, requires boration to the 1.80% Lip N-1 CSD boron concentration PRIOR TO removing a Reactor Coolant Pump from service when RCS temperature is less than 547°F.
- SOM verification for the single loop condition in the step below is intended to be used ONLY in the event of Reactor Coolant Pump failure or emergency shutdown.
(0-3.1, 6.2.2) Cooldown from The operator recognizes that the
- 6 - - -
547°F to 535°F Boron current temperature is 539°F, and RequiremenV stable; and records this value.
RECORD current OR desired RCS temperature.
(0-3.1, Step 6.3.2) CALCULATE The operator performs the
- 7 - - -
reactivity addition due to cooldown calculation; and records 224 pcm.
by subtracting 547°F from RCS temp recorded on Step 6.3.1 AND multiplying result by (- 28.0 pcm/°F).
(0-3.1, Step 6.3.3) CALCULATE The operator performs the
- 8 - - -
boron required to compensate for calculation; and records 37.3 pcm.
cooldown by dividing reactivity determined in Step 6.3.2 by (-6.0 pcm/ppm).
(0-3.1, Step 6.3.4) INCREASE The operator performs the single 9 - - -
each required boron concentration loop calculation; and records 913.3 to compensate for decrease in ppm in the space provided.
shutdown margin due to cooldown, in addition to one or more control rods NOT able to be verified fully inserted:
- 1. Single Loop
- 2. Two Loop 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1b RO NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 7 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
<(
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Q)
E Q)
E .c E
en z 0 ::::s
- > Uz 9 (Cont'd)
The operator performs the two loop calculation; and records 848.3 - - -
- (837.3-857.3) ppm in the space provided.
Examiner Note: Although the operator will perform the single loop calculation, only the two-loop calculation is critical.
(Directed Action) Assuming your The operator compares the
- 10 calculations have been required boron concentration of independently verified, is further 848.3 (837.3-857.3) ppm and the boration needed to ensure SOM? current boron concentration of 800 ppm; and determines that further 1 boration is required.
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1b RO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 8 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A1b RO Examinee's Name:
Date Performed:
Facility Evaluator:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Name (print)
Examiner's Signature: Date:
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1b RO NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- The plant is stable in MODE 3 following an inadvertent reactor trip from 100% power.
- Two Control Rods have stuck at 225 steps on the trip.
- Average Reactor Coolant Temperature is 539°F and stable.
- Core Burnup is 18,000 MWD/MTU.
- Plant Management has determined the Reactor Coolant System will not be borated to Cold Shutdown and both Reactor Coolant Pumps will continue to run during the shutdown.
- You are the HCO.
INITIATING CUE:
- The US has directed you to verify SOM per 0-3.1, Boron Concentration for the Xenon Free All Rods in - Most Reactive Rod Stuck Out Shutdown Margin, to the point at which Independent Verification is reqpired.
- Assuming your calculations have been independently verified, is further boration needed to ensure SOM?
Yes I No (Circle One)
NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet NRC EXAM Admin JPM A2 RO 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 RO (Rev_022217) NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 2 of 7 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:
Task
Title:
Remove Annunciators From Service JPM No.: 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 RO KIA
Reference:
G 2.2.43 (3.0)
Examinee: Examiner:
Facility Evaluator: Date:
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: x Classroom X Simulator - - - Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.
Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM} and Handout 1 Initial Conditions:
- The plant is operating at 100% power.
- The US has determined that the following MCB Annunciators must be flagged:
- A-31, CCW SYSTEM LO FLOW 1800 GPM, is LIT because FT-619 has been isolated for field maintenance (No Tags have been or will be hung).
- F-6, PRESSURIZER HEATER BREAKER TRIP, l&C has jumpered out the input from the backup heater breaker.
- F-19, PRZR SAFETYVLV OUTLET HI TEMP 145°F, will be intermittently alarming and clearing for the next hour due to l&C working on the instrument loop.
- The US indicates these conditions are expected to exist throughout the shift and then be restored to normal.
- The US indicates that Control Operators must increase the frequency of monitoring alternate MCB system parameters for each annunciator until the alarms are restored to normal.
- You are the HCO.
Initiating Cue:
- The US has directed you to flag each of the annunciators as required.
- Ensure all required paperwork is prepared.
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 RO NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 3 of 7 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Task Standard: The operator will place a Black Dot on A-31, a Yellow Dot on F-6, and a Black Dot on F-19; and complete Attachment 1, Alarm Out of Service Log, of OPG-ANNUNCIATOR-FLAGGING per the attached KEY.
Required Materials: A selection of Red, Yellow, Blue and Black Flagging Dots General References must be available for the operator to reference.
General
References:
OPG-ANNUNCIATOR-FLAGGING, Annunciator, Flagging, Rev 001 AR-A-31, CCW SYSTEM LO FLOW 1800 GPM, Rev 8 AR-F-6, PRESSURIZER HEATER BREAKER TRIP, Rev 7 AR-F-19, PRZR SAFETY VLV OUTLET HI TEMP 145°F, Rev 01101 Handouts: Handout 1: Overlay of MCB Annunciator Panels A and F Handout 2: Blank copy of OPG-ANNUNCIATOR-FLAGGING, with last page printed in Landscape orientation (only provided if requested).
1 Time Critical Task: .No Validation Time: 11 minutes 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 RO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 4 of 7 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue .
Information For Evaluator's Use:
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.
- Denotes critical steps.
Number any comments in the "Comment Number" column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the "Comments" section. The comment section should be used to document: the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the site's appropriate tracking system.
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue .
~
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 RO NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 5 of 7 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:
STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
<(
I-
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en c:
Q)
E I..
Q)
E .c E
en z 0 :J
- > Uz CUE Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handout 1.
(Directed Action) Place MCB The operator places a Black DOT
- 1 - - -
Annunciator A-31 out of service on A-31 MCB A Overlay.
and complete paperwork.
The operator completes Attachment 1 of OPG-ANNUNCIATOR FLAGGING in accordance with the provided KEY.
(Directed Action) Place MCB The operator places a Yellow DOT
- 2 - - -
I Annunciator F-6 out of service and on F-6 MCB A Overlay.
complete paperwork.
The operator completes Attachment 1 of OPG-ANNUNCIATOR FLAGGING in accordance with the provided KEY.
(Directed Action) Place MCB The operator places a Black DOT
- 3 - - -
Annunciator F-19 out of service on F-19 MCB A Overlay.
and complete paperwork.
The operator completes Attachment 1 of OPG-ANNUNCIATOR FLAGGING in accordance with the provided KEY.
Examiner Note: Each Annunciator on Attachment 1 may not be initialed and dated as OOS by the operator until the CRSRO initials and dates as authorization to remove the Annunciators from service. During the post-JPM discussion the Examiner should initial and date Attachment 1 for authorization, and then the operator will initial and date the Attachment 1 for removal from service of each Annunciator.
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 RO NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 6 of 7 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 RO Examinee's Name:
Date Performed:
Facility Evaluator:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Name (print)
Examiner's Signature: Date:
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 RO NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- The plant is operating at 100% power.
- The US has determined that the following MCB Annunciators must be flagged:
- A-31, CCW SYSTEM LO FLOW 1800 GPM, is LIT because FT-619 has been isolated for field maintenance (No Tags have been or will be hung).
- F-6, PRESSURIZER HEATER BREAKER TRIP, l&C has jumpered out the input from the backup heater breaker.
- F-19, PRZR SAFETY VLV OUTLET HI TEMP 145°F, will be intermittently alarming and clearing for the next hour due to l&C working on the instrument loop.
- The US indicates these conditions are expected to exist throughout the shift and then be restored to normal.
- The US indicates that Control Operators must increase the frequency of monitoring alternate MCB system parameters for each annunciator until the alarms are restored to normal.
- You are the HCO.
INITIATING CUE:
- The US has directed you to flag each of the annunciators as required.
- Ensure all required paperwork is prepared.
NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet NRC EXAM Admin JPM A3 .RO 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A3 RO (Rev_022217) NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 2 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:
Task
Title:
Evaluate Stay Time with lowered JPM No.: 2017 Admin - NRC Spent Fuel Pool Level JPM A3 RO KIA
Reference:
G 2.3.7 (3.5)
Examinee: Examiner:
Facility Evaluator: Date:
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: x Classroom ---
x Simulator - - - Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When' you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.
Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM), and Handout 1.
Initial Conditions:
- A station wide accident has occurred due to an Earthquake.
- The plant is in Mode 6 with a full core off-load.
- The Spent Fuel Pool level has lowered to 10 feet above the top of the fuel, and has stabilized at this level.
- The crew is implementing ER-SFP.2, Diverse SFP Makeup and Spray.
- R-5, Spent Fuel Pit Rad Monitor, reads 2.34E+02 mr/hr on the PPCS Radiation Monitors Screen.
- RP has confirmed these radiation levels by survey.
- A dose limit of 75 mrem has been placed on any individual performing emergency tasks within the Spent Fuel Building.
- An operator has been assigned a repetitive task within ER-SFP.2 which will require them to enter the Spent Fuel Building and proceed to the area around the Spent Fuel Pool, and remain there for 3 minutes, before exiting the building.
- You are supporting the Operational Support Center (OSC) Director.
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A3 RO NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 3 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Initiating Cue:
- The OSC Director has directed you to estimate how many times the assigned individual can perform this repetitive task before the operator must be replaced by another operator.
- The OSC Director has directed you to evaluate what this individual will need to enter the Spent Fuel Building in order to comply with RP-AA-460, Controls For High And Locked High Radiation Areas, without being accompanied by RP Personnel or receiving any approved deviations from the RP Manager.
Task Standard: The operator will determine that the repetitive task can be performed 6 times before another operator will need to perform the task; and identify that the operator entering the SFP must meet the requirements of Section 4.3.3 of RP-AA-460 (Be on an RWP, have a functioning Electronic Dosimeter, and be briefed by RP personnel).
Required Materials: Calculator General References must be available for the operator to reference.
I General
References:
ER-SFP.2, Diverse SFP Makeup and Spray, Rev 005 Technical Specifications, Amendment 119 RP-AA-460, Controls for High and Locked Radiation Areas, Rev 29 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of RP-AA-460 Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 6 minutes 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A3 RO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 4 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue .
Information For Evaluator's Use:
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.
- Denotes critical steps.
Number any comments in the "Comment Number column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the "Comments" section. The comment section should be used to document: the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the site's appropriate tracking system.
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue .
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A3 RO NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 5 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:
I-I-
<t en
-c: lo.
Cl> Cl>
E .c STEP ELEMENT STANDARD <t en z E E
- > 0 :::s Uz CUE Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM), and Handout 1.
(Directed Action) Determine dose The operator evaluates the R-5
- 1 - - -
rate in the Spent Fuel Pool Area reading and determines that the area radiation levels are 234 mrem/hour.
(Directed Action) Determine the The operator determines that 3
- 2 - - -
accumulated Dose each time the minutes in a radiation field of 234 repetitive task is performed. mrem/hour will yield a dose of 11. 7 mrem 234 mrem/hr x 1hr/60 minutes x 3 minutes/task = 11. 7 mrem/task (Directed Action) Determine how The operator determines that a
- 3 - - -
many times the repetitive task can Task which accumulates 11. 7 be performed before allowable mrem can be performed Six times RWP limits have been reached. without exceeding a dose limit of 75 mrem.
75 mrem x task/11.7 mrem = 6.4 tasks Since the task cannot be partially performed, the task can be performed six times before the operator must be replaced with another operator.
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A3 RO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 6 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
<C I-
<C CJ)
-cCl): ....
E .a E E Q)
CJ) z 0 :::J
=> (.) z (Directed Action) Evaluate what The operator recognizes that the
- 4 - - -
this individual will need to enter the dose rates in the SFB qualify the Spent Fuel Building in order to SFP as a High Radiation Area.
comply with RP-AA-460, Controls For High And Locked High The operator reviews RP-AA-460 Radiation Areas, without being and determines that Section 4.3.3 accompanied by RP Personnel. applies.
The operator determines that the individual will need to (1) be on an RWP, (2) have a functioning Electronic dosimeter, and (3) be briefed by RP personnel.
i Examiner Note: The operator may indicate that the individual may take a radiation monitoring device which continually indicates the radiation dose in the ~rea to satisfy Step 4.3.3.3; however, the fact that the dose rates in the SFB have been confirmed by RP permits and a briefing has been performed allows entry with an Electronic Dosimeter (which is required per Step 4.3.3.2).
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A3 RO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 7 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A3 RO Examinee's Name:
Date Performed:
Facility Evaluator:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Name (print)
Examiner's Signature: Date:
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A3 RO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 8 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Record Answers Below:
- of times operator can enter the Spent Fuel 6 Building:
Identify what the individual needs to enter:
(1) be on an RWP (2) have a functioning Electronic dosimeter (3) be briefed by RP personnel Critical in RED 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A3 RO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- A station wide accident has occurred due to an Earthquake.
- The plant is in Mode 6 with a full core off-load.
- The Spent Fuel Pool level has lowered to 10 feet above the top of the fuel, and has stabilized at this level.
- The crew is implementing ER-SFP.2, Diverse SFP Makeup and Spray.
- R-5, Spent Fuel Pit Rad Monitor, reads 2.34E+02 mr/hr on the PPCS Radiation Monitors Screen.
- RP has confirmed these radiation levels by survey.
- A dose limit of 75 mrem has been placed on any individual performing emergency tasks within the Spent Fuel Building.
- An operator has been assigned a repetitive task within ER-SFP.2 which will require them to enter the Spent Fuel Building and proceed to the area around the Spent Fuel Pool, and remain there for 3 minutes, before exiting the building.
- You are supporting the Operational Support Center (OSC)
Director.
INITIATING CUE:
- The OSC Director has directed you to estimate how many times the assigned individual can perform this repetitive task before the operator must be replaced by another operator.
- The OSC Director has directed you to evaluate what this individual will need to enter the Spent Fuel Building in order to comply with RP-AA-460, Controls For High And Locked High Radiation Areas, without being accompanied by RP Personnel or receiving any approved deviations from the RP Manager.
Record Answers Below:
- of times operator can enter the Spent Fuel Building:
Identify what the individual needs to enter:
NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet NRC EXAM Admin JPM A1a SRO 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A1a SRO (Rev_022217) NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 2 of 7 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:
Task
Title:
Determine Time to Boil for a Loss of JPM No.: 2017 Admin - NRC Shutdown Cooling JPM A 1a SRO KIA
Reference:
G 2.1.25 (4.2)
Examinee: Examiner:
Facility Evaluator: Date:
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: x Classroom X Simulator Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.
Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handout 1.
Initial Conditions:
- The plant is in Mode 5 for a refueling outage.
- The reactor has been shutdown for 25 hours1.042 days <br />0.149 weeks <br />0.0342 months <br />.
- The pressurizer is solid with LTOP in service.
- RCS temperature is 140°F.
- The Ginna Defense-In-Depth computer program used to calculate time to boil and core uncovery is unavailable.
- You are the US.
Initiating Cue: The Shift Manager has directed you to determine the Time to Boil given a Loss of RHR and the following two sets of conditions:
- For present plant conditions, AND
- Exactly four (4) days from now when:
- RCS level will be 64 inches
- RCS temperature will be 100°F
Appendix C Page 3 of 7 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Task Standard: The operator will use IP-OUT-2 and determine that the Time to Boil for the present plant conditions is 2.46 hours1.917 days <br />0.274 weeks <br />0.063 months <br />, and for the projected conditions four days from now is .43 hours1.792 days <br />0.256 weeks <br />0.0589 months <br /> (25.96 +0.1/-0.0 minutes).
Required Materials: Calculator General References must be available for the operator to reference.
General
References:
IP-OUT-2, Outage Risk Management, Rev 02200 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of IP-OUT-2 Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 8 minutes Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue.
Information For Evaluator's Use:
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.
- Denotes critical steps.
Number any comments in the "Comment Number" column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the "Comments" section. The comment section should be used to document: the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to ma.nagement expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the site's appropriate tracking system.
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue .
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1a SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 4 of 7 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:
STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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(Directed Action) Determine time- The operator reviews IP-OUT-2, 1 - - -
to-boil for a loss of RHR under reviews it and arrives at Present Plant conditions. Attachment E.
The operator determines that Page 5 of 11 on Attachment E, Time to - - -
Reach Saturation with Pressurizer Full and RCS Closed, most closely approximates present plant conditions, and addresses this page.
The operator finds the intersecting cell for Time after Shutdown {hrs) -
25 and Time to Reach Saturation (hrs) w/Trcs = 140°F to 2.46 hours1.917 days <br />0.274 weeks <br />0.063 months <br />.
(Directed Action) Determine time- The operator reviews IP-OUT-2, 2 - - -
to-boil for a loss of RHR Exactly reviews it and arrives at four (4) days from now when: Attachment E.
- RCS level will be 64 inches
- RCS temperature will be 100°F
- PRZR manway will be OFF The operator determines that Page 7 of 11 on Attachment E, Time to - - -
Reach Saturation at 64" and RCS Open, most closely approximates present plant conditions, and addresses this page.
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1a SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 5 of 7 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-CJ)
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- 120 and Time to Reach Saturation (hrs) w/Trcs = 100°F to 0.43 hours1.792 days <br />0.256 weeks <br />0.0589 months <br />/25.96 (+0.1/-0.0) minutes.
Examiner Note: The +0.1/0.0 allowance is based on the fact that there have been 121 hours5.042 days <br />0.72 weeks <br />0.166 months <br /> rather than 120 hours5 days <br />0.714 weeks <br />0.164 months <br /> since the shutdown, and the operator may interpolate between the 120 hour0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> time to reach saturation in minutes and the 150 hour0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br /> time to reach saturation in minutes. If this is the case, and the operator assumed a linear function between the two points, the time would be increased by approximately 0.1 minutes.
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A1a SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 6 of 7 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1a SRO Examinee's Name:
Date Performed:
Facility Evaluator:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Name (print)
Examiner's Signature: Date:
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A1a SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- The plant is in Mode 5 for a refueling outage.
- The reactor has been shutdown for 25 hours1.042 days <br />0.149 weeks <br />0.0342 months <br />.
- The pressurizer is solid with LTOP in service.
- RCS temperature is 140°F.
- The Ginna Defense-In-Depth computer program used to calculate time to boil and core uncovery is unavailable.
- You are the US.
INITIATING CUE: The Shift Manager has directed you to determine the Time to Boil given a Loss of RHR and the following two sets of conditions:
- For present plant conditions, AND
- Exactly four (4) days from now when:
- RCS level will be 64 inches
- RCS temperature will be 100°F
- PRZR manway will be OFF Record Answers Below:
Present Plant Conditions:
Projected Plant Conditions:
(Four Days from now)
NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet NRC EXAM I
Admin JPM A1b SRO 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A1b SRO (Rev_022217) NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 2of10 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:
Task
Title:
Verify Required Service Water to JPM No.: 2017 Admin - NRC Emergency Diesel Generators JPM A1b SRO KIA
Reference:
G 2.1.20 (4.6)
Examinee: Examiner:
Facility Evaluator: Date:
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: x Classroom X Simulator Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.
Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM} and Handout 1.
Initial Conditions:
- The plant is operating at 100% power.
- The crew has entered AP-ELEC.2, Safeguard Busses Low Voltage or System Abnormal Frequency, due to low voltage on the ESF Busses.
- Both Emergency Diesel Generators are running supplying their respective ESF Busses.
- ECC reports that the Electrical Grid voltage will be stabilized in approximately 30 minutes.
- 0-6.13, Daily Surveillance Log, is in progress.
- The SW Controlotron flow instrumentation is unavailable.
- The A, B and C Service Water Pumps are operating.
- Lake Temperature is 60°F.
- The following Service Water readings are recorded for the Emergency Diesel Generators:
- SW ~P for A EOG Jacket Water Heat Exchanger is 7.7 PSID
- SW ~P for B EOG Jacket Water Heat Exchanger is 8.3 PSID
- You are the US.
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A1b SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 3of10 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Initiating Cue: Verify that the EOG Service Water Differential Pressures (L'.lPs) are within required limits by performing Step 6.4.3 of 0-6.13, Daily Surveillance Log, and identify all, if any, required action.
Task Standard: The operator will identify that the A EOG is OPERABLE and declare the B EOG inoperable. For the A EOG, the operator will identify that an Issue Report requesting a PRI 2 Work Order for the A EOG to flush the Lube Oil and Jacket Water coolers must be prepared. For the B EOG, the operator will identify that a sequential backflush must be performed to restore operability.
Required Materials: General References must be available for the operator to reference.
General
References:
AP-ELEC.2, Safeguard Susses Low Voltage or System Abnormal Frequency, Rev 01503 0-6.13, Daily Surveillance Log, Rev 189
- Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of 0-6.13.
Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 12 minutes 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1b SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 4of10 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue .
Information For Evaluator's Use:
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.
- Denotes critical steps.
Number any comments in the "Comment Number column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the "Comments" section. The comment section should be used to document: the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the site's appropriate tracking system.
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue .
~
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1b SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 5of10 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:
STEP ELEMENT STANDARD 1-
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NOTE The limits specified for SW dPs are only applicable during Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. System Engineering should be consulted for limits during Modes 5, 6 AND Defueled conditions when lineups differ significantly from normal operations.
CAUTION
- Additional monitoring of heat exchanger DIPs should be performed during silting conditions.
[G0231]
- The typical order of heat exchanger fouling during silting conditions are as follows: i
- 1. Circulating Water Seal Water Strainers
- 2. Auxiliary Feedwater Service Water Strainers
- 3. EOG Heat Exchangers [G0231]
NOTE
- Controlotron accuracy and uncertainties are included in values provided in Attachment 13, EOG SW DIP Limits - SW Flowrate Known [G0007], tables.
- To determine actual dP limits, lake temperature and SW flows may be interpolated. DO NOT extrapolate limits past 500 GPM SW flow.
(0-6.13, Step The operator recognizes that the 1
6.4.316.4.3.116.4.3.1.a) PERFORM Controlotron flow instrumentation the following DIG checks: is unavailable, and that the use of Attachment 13 is unwarranted.
IF normally closed EOG SW AOVs are bypassed OR EOG is operating, THEN VERIFY Emergency DIG Service Water (SW) DIPs within limits as follows:
IF current Emergency DIG SW inlet flowrates are known as measured by Controlotron, THEN USE Attachment 13, for SW DIP limits for Lube Oil and Jacket Water Coolers.
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1b SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 6of10 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-I-
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Emergency DIG SW inlet flowrates Attachment 12.
are unknown, THEN USE Attachment 12, EOG SW DIP Limits - SW Flowrate Not Known
[G0007], for SW DIP limits for Lube Oil and Jacket Water Coolers.
(0-6.13, 6.4.3.1.c) IF ~p across Using Attachment 12, the operator
- 3 - - -
any Emergency DIG cooler is determines that the EOG SW DIP within 1.0 psi of, OR exceeds limits Limit for the EOG Lube Oil Cooler specified above, THEN ENSURE is 9.6 PSID and for the EOG affected Emerg'ency DIG is Jacket Water Cooler is 9.1 PSID.
declared INOPERABLE AND PERFORM seq~ential backflush PER T-27.9 or T-27.10.
The operator compares the current
~P for A EOG Lube Oil Cooler of 8.2 PSID to the limit and recognizes that the A EOG is OPERABLE and proceeds.
The operator compares the current
~P for B EOG Lube Oil Cooler of 8.5 PSID to the limit and recognizes that the B EOG is OPERABLE and proceeds.
The operator compares the current
~P for A EOG Jacket Water Cooler of 7. 7 PSID to the limit and recognizes that the A EOG is OPERABLE and proceeds.
The operator compares the current
~p for B EOG Jacket Water Cooler - - -
of 8.3 PSID to the limit and recognizes that the B EOG is INOPERABLE and that a sequential backflush needs to be performed to restore operability.
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1b SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 7of10 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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(0-6.13, 6.4.3.1.d) IF Jacket Water The operator recognizes that the A
- 4 - - -
Cooler SW O/P is greater than 8.0 Lube Oil Cooler O/P is greater than PSIO, THEN INITIATE an Issue 8.0 PSIO, and identifies that an Report requesting a PRI 2 Work Issue Report requesting a PRI 2 Order for a planned LCO entry to Work Order for the A EOG to flush backflush the cooler. the cooler must be initiated.
(0-6.13, 6.4.3.1.e) IF Lube Oil The operator recognizes that the A
- 5 - - -
Cooler SW O/P is greater than 6.0 Jacket Water Cooler O/P is greater PSIO, THEN INITIATE an Issue than 6.0 PSIO, and identifies that Report requesting a PRI 2 Work an Issue Report requesti,ng a PRI Order for a planned LCO entry to 2 Work Order for the A EOG to backflush the cooler. flush the cooler must be initiated.
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1b SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 8of10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A1b SRO Examinee's Name:
Date Performed:
Facility Evaluator:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Questibn Documentation:
Result:. SAT UNSAT Examiner's Name (print)
Examiner's Signature: Date:
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A 1b SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 9of10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION KEY:
A EOG OPERABLE: YES I NO (Circle One)
B EOG OPERABLE: YES I NO (Circle One)
All Required Action (If Any):
Declare the B EOG is INOPERABLE and schedule a sequential backflush performed to restore operability.
Prepare an Issue Report requesting a PRI 2 Work Order for the A EOG to flush the Lube Oil and Jacket Water coolers. (Or Equivalent).
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A1b SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- The plant is operating at 100% power.
- The crew has entered AP-ELEC.2, Safeguard Susses Low Voltage or System Abnormal Frequency, due to low voltage on the ESF Susses.
- Both Emergency Diesel Generators are running supplying their respective ESF Susses.
- ECC reports that the Electrical Grid voltage will be stabilized in approximately 30 minutes.
- 0-6.13, Daily Surveillance Log, is in progress.
- The SW Controlotron flow instrumentation is unavailable.
- The A, B and C Service Water Pumps are operating.
- Lake Temperature is 60°F.
- The following Service Water readings are recorded for the Emergency Diesel Generators:
- SW LiP for A EOG Jacket Water Heat Exchanger is 7.7 PSID
- SW LiP for B EOG Jacket Water Heat Exchanger is 8.3 PSID
- You are the US.
INITIATING CUE: Verify that the EOG Service Water Differential Pressures (LiPs) are within required limits by performing Step 6.4.3 of 0-6.13, Daily Surveillance Log, and identify all, if any, required action.
Identify:
A EOG OPERABLE: YES I NO (Circle One)
B EOG OPERABLE: YES I NO (Circle One)
All Required Action (If Any):
NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet NRC EXAM Admin JPM A2 SRO 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 SRO (Rev_022217) NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 2of10 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:
Task
Title:
Perform a Safety Function JPM No.: 2017 Admin - NRC Determination JPM A2 SRO KIA
Reference:
G 2.2.37 (4.6)
Examinee: Examiner:
Facility Evaluator: Date:
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: x Classroom X Simulator Plant 1
READ T0 THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.
Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handout 1.
- The plant is operating at 100% power.
Initial Conditions:
- The current date and time is 3/4/17 at 1200.
- The following equipment is Out of Service:
- D Service Water Pump (LCO 3.7.8, Condition A was entered today at 1000 and all necessary paperwork has been completed.).
- DIG B Fuel Oil particulate (LCO 3.8.3, condition B was entered on 3/1/17 at 1200 and all necessary paperwork has been completed.).
- Battery Charger B for maintenance. It is expected to be returned to service 3/5/17 at 1200.
- At 1200 today Battery Charger B1 failed due to a ground.
- The B Battery Monitoring System ammeter indicates "negative 114 amps."
- Issue Report IR-2017-000284 has been initiated for the 81 Battery Charger ground.
- The crew has taken the appropriate action to stabilize the plant.
- You are the US.
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 3of10 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Initiating Cue:
- Complete an A-52.4, Attachment 1, through step 4.0, and Attachment 2 for the given plant conditions.
- The EIN for Battery Charger B1 is BYCB1.
- A "what if" risk assessment has been performed.
- The WWM has been notified and risk mitigation strategies are being implemented.
- The Fire Protection Engineer is determining the compensatory requirements.
Task Standard: The operator will complete Sections 1.0, 2.0, 3.0 and 4.0 of Attachment 1 and all of Attachment 2 of A-52.4 in accordance with the provided KEY.
Required Materials: General References must be available for the operator to reference.
General
References:
A-52.4, Control of Limiting Conditions for Operating Equipment, Rev 147 A-52.3, Safety Function Determiqation Program, Rev 5 Technical Specifications, Amendment 119 Technical Specifications Bases, Rev 76 A-601.13, Fire Protection Compensatory Actions, Rev 6 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of A-52.4 Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 29 minutes 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 4 of 10 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue .
Information For Evaluator's Use:
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.
- Denotes critical steps.
Number any comments in the "Comment Number column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the "Comments" section. The comment section should be used to document: the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the site's appropriate tracking system.
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue .
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 5of10 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time-STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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Examiner Note: The steps may be performed in any order.
(A-52.4, Attachment 1, Step 1.0/1) 1 The operator records Battery - - -
Equipment
Description:
Charger 81 (Or Equivalent) in accordance with the provided KEY.
(A-52.4, Attachment 1, Step 1.0/2) 2 The operator records BYCB1 (Or - - -
Equipment EIN:
Equivalent) in accordance with the provided KEY.
(A-52.4, Attachment 1, Step 1.0/3) 3 The operator places a checkmark - - -
Reason for equipment to be .,
in the IR checkbox in accordance rendered inoperable: '
with the provided KEY.
(A-52.4, Attachment 1, Step 1.0/4) 4 The operator places a checkmark - - -
Present Plant MODE:
in the MODE 1 checkbox in accordance with the provided KEY.
(A-52.4, Attachment 1, Step 1.0/5)
- 5 The operator records 3.8.4 in - - -
LCO:
accordance with the provided KEY.
(A-52.4, Attachment 1, Step 1.0/6) 6 The operator addresses - - -
PERFORM Loss of Safety Attachment 2.
Function Determination per Attachment 2.
(A-52.4, Attachment 2, Step 1.0)
- 7 The operator determines that both PERFORM a loss of safety LCO 3. 7.8 and 3.8.3 have been function evaluation as follows:
entered for other OOS equipment, and places a YES in the Have any of the following support "Entered?" Column, and circles system LCOs been entered?
YES; in accordance with the provided KEY.
YES/ NO 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 6of10 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-ct I-ct en c: ...
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E .c EE en z 0 ::::J
- > Uz (A-52.4, Attachment 2, Step 2.0)
- 8 The operator determines that there Has only one (1) LCO been are three LCOs currently in effect entered (i.e., total #of LCOs in (LCO 3.7.8, 3.8.3 and 3.8.4), and effect is only 1)?
circles NO in accordance with the provided KEY; and proceeds.
YES I NO IF NO, THEN a loss of safety function evaluation is required.
(A-52.4, Attachment 2, Step 3.0)
- 9 The operator uses Attachment 2 Using the attached Loss of Safety and compares the various Function Matrix, determine if any I combinations of affected LCOs combination of LCO's has the and observes that there are no potential to result in a loss of empty boxes in the matrix for any '
safety function. Only combinations '
combination of affected LCOs and which are not shaded in the box determines that no combination of require further evaluation (i.e.,
these LCOs result in a potential "empty" boxes). Do any loss of safety function; and circles combination of LCOs result in a NO in accordance with the potential loss of safety function?
provided KEY.
YES I NO The operator returns to Attachment IF NO, THEN the LCOs in effect 1* and places a check in the Step provide necessary ACTIONS.
1:6 checkbox, in accordance with Return to Attachment 1.
the provided KEY.
(A-52.4, Attachment 1, Step 1.0/7) 10 The operator recognizes that the PERFORM a "What If' risk "What If' risk assessment has assessment in EOOS for already been performed and inoperable equipment IAW Step places a checkmark in the Step 1. 7 5.2.E.
checkbox in accordance with the provided KEY.
(A-52.4, Attachment 1, Step 1.0/8) 11 The operator recognizes that the - - -
IF equipment is being removed for Battery Charger B 1 is NOT being planned maintenance, .....
removed for planned maintenance and places a "NA" aside the Step 1.8 checkbox in accordance with the provided KEY.
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 7of10 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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IF equipment being removed from WWM has been notified and risk service is due to emergent mitigation strategies are being maintenance issues, THEN implemented and places a PERFORM the following:
checkmark in the Step 1.9 checkbox in accordance with the NOTIFY WWM and implement provided KEY.
Risk Mitigation Strategies per Step 5.2.E.12 and 5.2.E.13.
IMPLEMENT Risk Mitigation Strategies per WC-AA-104, INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT.
(A-52.4, Att~chment 1, Step 13 The operator recognizes that the 1.0/10) IF equipment being Fire Protection Engineer is removed from service is used for determining the compensatory Appendix R response THEN measures; and places a DETERMINE required checkmark in the Step 1.10 compensatory actions PER A-checkbox in accordance with the 601.13 IAW Step 5.2.F AND provided KEY.
Record in Section 2.0 of this Attachment.
(A-52.4, Attachment 1, Step 2.0)
- 14 The operator addresses LCO 3.8.4 REQUIRED ACTIONS/APPENDIX and recognizes that ACTION R COMPENSATORY ACTIONS (if Condition A is applicable; and applicable) completes Section 2.0 in accordance with the provided KEY.
(A-52.4, Attachment 1, Step 3.0)
- 15 The operator addresses LCO 3.8.4 -
REQUIREMENTS IF REQUIRED and recognizes that ACTION ACTIONS/COMPLETION TIMES Condition B is potentially ARE NOT MET applicable if the requirements of Condition A are not met; and completes Section 3.0 in accordance with the provided KEY.
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 8of10 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION
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STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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"' "'::::>z EE 0 :::J Uz (A-52.4, Attachment 1, Step 4.0) 16 The operator completes Section DECLARATION OF INOPERABLE 4.0 in accordance with the EQUIPMENT provided KEY.
Declare equipment inoperable (Log in official record):
Equipment deemed inoperable by:
Date: - -
Time: - -
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 9of10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 SRO Examinee's Name:
Date Performed:
Facility Evaluator:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Name (print)
Examiner's Signature: Date:
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A2 SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- The plant is operating at 100% power.
- The current date and time is 3/4/17 at 1200.
- The following equipment is Out of Service:
- D Service Water Pump (LCO 3.7.8, Condition A was entered today at 1000 and all necessary paperwork has been completed.).
- DIG B Fuel Oil particulate (LCO 3.8.3, condition B was entered on 3/1 /17 at 1200 and all necessary paperwork has been completed.).
- Battery Charger B for maintenance. It is expected to be returned to service 3/5/17 at 1200.
- At 1200 today Battery Charger B 1 failed due to a ground.
- The B Battery Monitoring System ammeter indicates "negative 114 amps."
- Issue Report IR-2017-000284 has been initiated for the B1 Battery Charger ground.
- The crew has tak~n the appropriate action to stabilize the plant.
- You are the US.
INITIATING CUE:
- Complete an A-52.4, Attachment 1, through step 4.0, and Attachment 2 for the given plant conditions.
- The EIN for Battery Charger B1 is BYCB1.
- A "what if" risk assessment has been performed.
- The WWM has been notified and risk mitigation strategies are being implemented.
- The Fire Protection Engineer is determining the compensatory requirements.
NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet NRC EXAM Admili JPM A3 SRO 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A3 SRO (Rev_022217) NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 2 of 10 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:
Task
Title:
Evaluate Stay Time with lowered JPM No.: 2017 Admin - NRC Spent Fuel Pool Level JPM A3 SRO KIA
Reference:
G 2.3. 7 (3.6)
Examinee: Examiner:
Facility Evaluator: Date:
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: x Classroom X Simulator - - - Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.
Provide Candidate with the Radiation Histories of Three Available Operators and the Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Two Pages of this JPM), and Handout 1.
Initial Conditions:
- A station wide accident has occurred due to an Earthquake.
- The plant is in Mode 6 with a full core off-load. *
- The Spent Fuel Pool level has lowered to 10 feet above the top of the fuel, and has stabilized at this level.
- . The crew is implementing ER-SFP.2, Diverse SFP Makeup and Spray.
- R-5, Spent Fuel Pit Rad Monitor, reads 2.34E+02 mr/hr on the PPCS Radiation Monitors Screen.
- A dose limit of 75 mrem has been placed on any individual performing emergency tasks within the Spent Fuel Building.
- An operator has been assigned a repetitive task within ER-SFP.2 which will require them to enter the Spent Fuel Building and proceed to the area around the Spent Fuel Pool, and remain there for 3 minutes, before exiting the building.
- There are three operators available to perform this repetitive task (See attached radiological histories)
- You are supporting the Operational Support Center (OSC) Director.
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A3 SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 3of10 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Initiating Cue:
- The OSC Director has directed you to estimate how many times the assigned individual can perform this repetitive task before the operator must be replaced by another operator.
- The OSC Director has directed you to evaluate the radiological histories of the three available operators and identify the individual(s) that can receive 75 mrem without reliance on an extension of an administrative dose limit in accordance with RP-AA-203, Exposure Control and Authorization.
Task Standard: The operator will determine that the repetitive task can be performed 6 times before another operator will need to perform the task; and identify that Boyle is the only operator that can receive 75 mrem without processing an administrative dose limit extension.
Required Materials: Calculator General References must be available for the operator to reference.
General R~ferences: ER-SFP.2, Diverse SFP Makeup and Spray, Rev 005 Technical Specifications, Amendment 119 RP-AA-203, Exposure Control and Authorization, Rev 5 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of RP-AA-203 Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 6 minutes 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A3 SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 4 of 10 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue .
Information For Evaluator's Use:
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.
- Denotes critical steps.
Number any comments in the "Comment Number" column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the "Comments" section. The comment section should be used to document: the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the site's appropriate tracking system.
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges tre initiating cue .
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A3 SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 5of10 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:
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"" ""z E E 0 :l Uz CUE Provide Candidate with the Radiation Histories of Three Available Operators and the Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Two Pages of this JPM), and Handout 1.
(Directed Action) Determine dose The operator evaluates the R-5
- 1 - - -
rate in the Spent Fuel Pool Area reading and determines that the area radiation levels are 234 mrem/hour.
(Directed Action) Determine the The operator determines that 3
- 2 - - -
accumulated Dose each time the minutes in a radiation field of 234 repetitive task is performed. mrem/hour will yield a dose of 11. 7 mrem 234 mrem/hr x 1hr/60 minutes x 3 minutes/task = 11. 7 mrem/task (Directed Action) Determine how The operator determines that a
- 3 - - -
many times the repetitive task can Task which accumulates 11.7 be performed before allowable mrem can be performed Six times RWP limits have been reached. without exceeding a dose limit of 75 mrem.
75 mrem x task/11. 7 mrem =6.4 tasks Since the task cannot be partially performed, the task can be performed six times before the operator must be replaced with another operator.
See Attached KEY.
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A3 SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 6of10 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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- 4 - - -
radiological histories of the three dose control level of 2000 mrem available operators and identify the TEDE/year (Step 4.1.2).
individual(s) that can receive 75 mrem without reliance on an This reduced by 1250 mrem extension of an administrative because of a current year No dose limit in accordance with RP- Record (Step 4.1.5)
AA-203, Exposure Control and Authorization. Addison's administrative limit is 750 mrem, and can only receive an additional 50 mrem.
See Attached KEY.
I Boyle has a High Lifetime Exposure (Definition 2.4) and has
' an administrative dose control level of 1000 mrem TEDE/year (Step 4.1.3).
Boyle's administrative limit is 1000 mrem, and can receive an additional 200 mrem.
See Attached KEY.
Corbin has an administrative dose control level of 2000 mrem TEDE/year (Step 4.1.2).
Corbin's administrative limit is 2000 mrem, and can only receive an additional 30 mrem.
See Attached KEY.
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A3 SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 7of10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A3 SRO Examinee's Name:
Date Performed:
Facility Evaluator:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Name (print)
Examiner's Signature: Date:
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A3 SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 8of10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Record Answers Below:
- of times operator can enter the Spent Fuel 6 Building:
Identify which operators can receive 75 mrem Boyle without extending an administrative dose limit:
Critical in RED 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A3 SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET Radiation Histories of Three Available Operators Name Age Lifetime Current Annual Additional Exposure in Exposure in Notes Rem mi Iii rem Addison 32 10 700
- One NO RECORD in current year dose history
- No Lifetime PSE Boyle 28 30 800
- No Lifetime PSE Corbin 24 20 1970
- No Lifetime PSE NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- A station wide accident has occurred due to an Earthquake.
- The plant is in Mode 6 with a full core off-load.
- The Spent Fuel Pool level has lowered to 10 feet above the top of the fuel, and has stabilized at this level.
- The crew is implementing ER-SFP.2, Diverse SFP Makeup and Spray.
- R-5, Spent Fuel Pit Rad Monitor, reads 2.34E+02 mr/hr on the PPCS Radiation Monitors Screen.
- A dose limit of 75 mrem has been placed on any individual performing emergency tasks within the Spent Fuel Building.
- An operator has been assigned a repetitive task within ER-SFP.2 which will require them to enter the Spent Fuel Building and proceed to the area around the Spent Fuel Pool, and remain there for 3 minutes, before exiting the building.
- There are three operators available to perform this repetitive task (See attached radiological histories)
- You are supporting the Operational Support Center (OSC)
Director.
INITIATING CUE:
- The OSC Director has directed you to estimate how many times the assigned individual can perform this repetitive task before the operator must be replaced by another operator.
- The OSC Director has directed you to evaluate the radiological histories of the three available operators and identify the individual(s) that can receive 75 mrem without reliance on an extension of an administrative dose limit in accordance with RP-AA-203, Exposure Control and Authorization.
Record Answers Below:
- of times operator can enter the Spent Fuel Building:
Identify which operators can receive 75 mrem without extending an administrative dose limit:
NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet NRC EXAM Admin JPM A4 SRO 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A4 SRO (Rev_022217) NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 2 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:
Task
Title:
Emergency Classification - Site JPM No.: 2017 Admin - NRC Area Emergency JPM A4 SRO KIA
Reference:
G 2.4.41 (4.6)
Examinee: Examiner:
Facility Evaluator: Date:
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: x Classroom X Simulator Plant I
READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete 'the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.
Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handouts 1-2.
Initial Conditions:
- The crew had to manually trip the Reactor when a loss of Main Feedwater occurred.
- The reactor failed to trip automatically on SG Low Level prior to the manual trip.
- Due to a pipe rupture in the IB, all AFW pumps have failed and cannot be started.
- SG Levels are 290 inches and slowly lowering.
- The crew has transitioned from E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," with CETs reported by STA to be 1200°F and slowly rising.
- Actions to stop the temperature rise have been unsuccessful.
Initiating Cue: Classify the Event and complete the GNP NY State Radiological Emergency Data Form (Part 1) (CNG) boxes 1-7.
THIS IS A TIME CRITICAL JPM 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A4 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 3 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Task Standard: The operator will declare a Site Area Emergency based on EAL FS1 .1, and complete the GNP NY State Radiological Emergency Data Form (Part 1) (CNG) in accordance with the attached KEY.
Required Materials: General References must be available for the operator to reference.
General
References:
EP-AA-1012 Addendum 3, Emergency Action Levels, Rev 3 EP-CE-114-1 OO-F-07, GNP NY State Radiological Emergency Data Form (Part 1) (CNG), Rev C Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of EPJA-0, Rev 1, E-Plan Wall Charts Handout 2: Blank copy of EP-CE-114-100-F-07, GNP NY State Radiological Emergency Data Form (Part 1) (CNG)
Time Critical Task: YES - 15 Minutes Validation Time: 5 minutes 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A4 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 4 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue .
Information For Evaluator's Use:
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.
- Denotes critical steps.
Number any comments in the "Comment Number" column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the "Comments" section. The comment section should be used to document: the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the site's appropriate tracking system.
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue .
~
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A4 SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 5 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:
STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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(.) z CUE Provide Candidate with the Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handouts 1-2.
(Directed Action) Classify the 1 The operator addresses H- - - -
Event Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety, 2 - Fire or Explosion, of EP-AA-1012 Addendum 3 and determines that an ALERT exists based on an explosion (pipe rupture) resulting in visibl1 damage to any Safety-Related structure, system, or component within ANY Table H-1 area (ln~ermediate Building).
The operator addresses S-System Malfunction, 3 - Criticality & RPS - - -
Failure, of EP-AA-1012 Addendum 3 and determines that an ALERT exists based on an automatic trip failed to shut down the reactor as indicated. by reactor power >5%
AND Manual actions taken at the reactor qonsole successfully shut down the reactor as indicated by reactor power :::;5% (manual trip successful).
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A4 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 6 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION I-I-
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STEP ELEMENT STANDARD <
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- > 0 :J uZ The operator addresses Table F-1, Fission Product Barrier Matrix, and determines the following:
- A LOSS of the Fuel Clad Barrier has occurred (A CSFST
[Red Path Condition exists F-0.2 Core Cooling], (B Core Exit TCs [Core Exit TCs ~1200°F])
- A POTENTIAL LOSS of the RCS Barrier has occurred (A CSFST [Red path condition exists F-0.3 Heat Sink and Heat Sink is required])
- A POTENTIAL LOSS of the I Containment Barrier exists (B Core Exit TCs (Core Exit TCs cannot be restored .:;1200°F within 15 minutesl)
The operator addresses F-Fission Product Barrier Degradation, of EP-AA-1012 Addendum 3 and determines that an SAE exists based on FS1 .1, Loss or potential loss of ANY two barriers (Table F-1).
Examiner Note: The operator will determine that there is a LOSS and two POTENTIAL LOSS' of the three Fission Product Barriers which will result in an SAE, higher than both the ALERTS caused by the pipe rupture (HA2.1) and the RPS Failure (SA3.1)
(Directed Action) Complete EP- The operator completes EP-CE-
- 2 - - -
CE-114-100-F-F-07, GNP NY 114-1 OO-F-07 in accordance with State Radiological Emergency the attached KEY (Page 7 of 8).
Data Form (Part 1) (CNG)
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A4 SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 7 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A4 SRO Examinee's Name:
Date Performed:
Facility Evaluator:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Result: SAT:. UNSAT Examiner's Name (print)
Examiner's Signature: Date:
2017 Admin - NRC JPM A4 SRO NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 8 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION RECS Message Number 1 Monroe County Checkbox Checked Wa vne County Checkbox Checked
- 1. Message Transmitted AT: Left Blank
- 2. This is: A. An Actual Event
- 3. Classification: C. Site Area EmerQency
- 4. Classification Time: Current Date and Time
- 5. Release: A. No Release
- 6. PAR: A. No Need for Protective Actions Outside the Site Boundary
- 7. EAL Number:/Description FS 1.1, Loss or potential loss of ANY two barriers (Table F-1).
Critical in RED 2017 Admin - NRC JPM A4 SRO NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- The crew had to manually trip the Reactor when a loss of Main Feedwater occurred.
- The reactor failed to trip automatically on SG Low Level prior to the manual trip.
- Due to a pipe rupture in the IB, all AFW pumps have failed and cannot be started.
- SG Levels are 290 inches and slowly lowering.
- The crew has transitioned from E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," with CETs reported by STA to be 1200°F and slowly rising.
- Actions to stop the temperature rise have been unsuccessful.
INITIATING CUE: Classify the Event and complete the GNP NY State Radiological Emergency Data Form (Part 1) (CNG) boxes 1-7.
THIS IS A TIME CRITICAL JPM NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet NRC EXAM SIM JPM A 2017 Systems NRC- Control Room JPM A (Rev_022217) NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 2 of 15 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:
Task
Title:
Verify Containment Isolation and JPM No.: 2017 Systems NRC -
Heat Removal Control Room JPM A (Alternate Path)
KIA
Reference:
EPE E14 EA1.1 (3.7/3.7)
Examinee: NRC Examiner:
Facility Evaluator: Date:
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: x Classroom - - - Simulator x
- - - Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.
Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM), and Handout 1.
Initial Conditions:
- The plant tripped from 100% power and safety injection has actuated.
- The crew entered E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transitioned to E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.
- Due to a degrading transient, an Orange Path now exists on the Containment Critical Safety Function Status Tree.
- You are the HCO.
Initiating Cue: The US has directed you to verify Containment Isolation and Heat Removal systems are operating as expected by performing FR-Z.1, Response to High Containment Pressure, starting from Step 1.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM A NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 3of15 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Task Standard: The operator will take action to verify Containment Isolation and Heat Removal systems are operating in accordance with Steps 1-3 of FR-Z.1.
When the operator discovers that two Containment Isolation Valves have failed to close as expected the operator will close or direct that alternative valves be closed in accordance with ATT-3.0, Attachment Cl/CVI. When it is revealed that one of the two actions on ATT-3.0 were unsuccessful at providing Containment Isolation, the operator will need to take actions to trip the Reactor Coolant Pumps, and close an alternate valve in the CCW System to fully achieve Containment Isolation.
Required Materials: None General
References:
AR-A-27, Containment Spray 2/3 + 2/3 > 28 PSI, Rev 9 AR-A-28, Containment Spray Channel Alert 2/3 > 28 PSI, Rev 8 F-0.5, Containment, Rev 2 FR-Z.1, Response to High Containment Pressure, Rev 01200 ATT-3.0, Attachment Cl/CVI, Rev 01200 P-7, Safety Injection and Containment Spray Systems, Rev 23 OP-AA-101-111-1001, Operations Standards and Expectations, Rev 18 A-503.1, Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures User's Guide, Rev 04600 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of FR-Z.1, Response to High Containment Pressure Handout 2: Blank copy of ATT-3.0, Attachment Cl/CVI.
Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 14 minutes 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM A NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 4of15 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue .
Information For Evaluator's Use:
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.
- Denotes critical steps.
Number any comments in the "Comment Number" column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the "Comments" section. The comment section should be used to document: the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the site's appropriate tracking system.
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps.
These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue .
2017 Systems NRG - Control Room JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 5of15 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet SIMULATOR OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES
- 1. Initiate to any 100% IC (IC-19).
NOTE: It is okay to use a similar IC to the IC listed above, provided the IC actually used is verified to be compatible with this and other JPMs that are scheduled to be run concurrently.
- 2. Insert Malfunctions RPS08A and RPS08B, No Manual (Failure of CS Automatic Actuation/No Manual, Both Trains).
- 3. Insert Malfunction STM11A, 1.7e+05 (Steam Line Break Inside Containment, 'A' SIG).
- 4. Insert Malfunction RPS11-A5Aand RPS11-A5B, Fail As-ls (MOV-813 and 814fail as-is on T-Signal, cannot be operated).
- 5. Insert REM-EDS054, Closed, on T-1 (Breaker for MOV-817).
- 6. Place simulator in RUN.
- 7. Carry out action of E-0 and transition to E-2.
- 8. Upon transition to E-2, increase malfunction STM11A to 1.7e+07 (Steam Rupture Inside Containment, 'A' SIG).
- 9. Ensure Annunciator A-28 is LIT, that Containment Pressure is > 28 psig, and that CS has NOT automatically actuated.
- 10. Place simulator in FREEZE.
- 11. Reset to IC-161(October,2016)
- 12. Place simulator in RUN when directed by examiner.
- 13. When the above steps are completed for this and other JPMs to be run concurrently then validate, if not previously validated, the concurrently run JPMs using the JPM Validation Checklist.
- 14. This completes the setup for this JPM.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 6of15 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:
STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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NOTE FOLDOUT Page should be open and monitored periodically.
1 (FR-Z.1 Step 1) Verify All Cl And The operator reads the NOTE, and - - -
CVI Valve Status Lights - BRIGHT proceeds.
The operator observes all Cl And CVI Valve Status Lights are BRIGHT except MOV-813 and MOV-814.
The operator proceeds to the Step
' 1 RNO.
Examiner Note: At any time during this JPM, the operator may recognize that automatic actions have failed, and take manual action as needed to operate equipment as needed (See A-503.1, Step 5.3.D, Manual Backup). While the operator may take this action, and it is permitted by procedures, and expected; if the action is not taken the operator will still be successful by adherence to the procedure assigned.
Examiner Note: Any attempt by the operator to actuate CS by depressing two MCB pushbuttons simultaneously will not be successful (pushbutton operation has failed).
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM A NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 7of15 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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- > (.) z 2 (FR-Z.1 Step 1 RNO) IF flow path The operator recognizes that the - - -
NOT required, THEN manually Rx Support Cooler CCW flowpaths close affected Cl and CVI valves. are NOT required under the current conditions.
IF valves can NOT be verified closed by MCB indication, THEN The operator observes the MOV-close alternate isolation valves. 813 Red status light is LIT, and the (Refer to ATT-3.0, ATTACHMENT Green status light is OFF.
Cl/CVI).
The operator places the MOV-813 Control Switch to CLOSE, and observes Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF.
The operator observes the MOV-814 Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF.
I The operator places the MOV-814 Control Switch to CLOSE, and observes Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF.
The operator refers to ATT-3.0.
CUE When the operator is looking to find ATT-3.0, PROVIDE operator with Handout 2 CATT-3.0).
NOTE Locked valve key may be required for local operations.
3 (ATT-3.0 Step 1) For each of the The operator reads the Note, and - - -
following AUTO ISOL VALVES proceeds.
that will not close, take the action The operator will contact an EO directed in the ALTERNATE and direct that MOV-813 be locally ISOLATION column.
closed.
MOV-813 (CCW) Locally close MOV-813 (AB Int Level).
CUE IF the operator waits for the EO response on local operation of MOV-813, prior to proceeding to the check of MOV-814, THEN report as the EO that MOV-813 will NOT close manually. FOLLOW the action of JPM Step 11; THEN return to JPM Step 3 below, and continue.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 8 of 15 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD 1-
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- 3 (ATT-3.0 Step 1) For each of the *The operator will contact an EO following AUTO ISOL VALVES and direct that V-815A be locally that will not close, take the action closed.
directed in the ALTERNATE The operator will proceed to Step 2 ISOLATION column.
of FR-Z.1 while the local action is MOV-814 (CCW) Close V-815A taking place.
(AB INT LEVEL)
CUE IF the operator waits for the EO response on local operation of MOV-814, prior to proceeding to FR-Z.1 Step 2/2.a below, THEN report as the EO that V-815A has been CLOSED, and continue.
SIM DRIVER NOTE: The EO response will depend on the action of the operator. If the operator provides the EO direction and continues while waiting for a response (As expected), the EO response will be delayed until Performance Step 10. At that time provide the following:
As the EO, report that V-815A has been locally closed, and report that MOV-813 will NOT operate manually.
There is NO Remote for V-81 SA (Not Modeled).
IF the operator waits for an EO response prior to continuing with the procedure, the Examiner will provide the EO cues; and PERFORM the local EO Actions listed in Step 11 as required.
CAUTION IF ECA-1.1, LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION, IS IN EFFECT, THEN CNMT SPRAY SHOULD BE OPERATED AS DIRECTED IN ECA-1.1, RATHER THAN STEP 2 BELOW.
IF E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, IS IN EFFECT, THEN CNMT SPRAY SHOULD BE OPERATED AS DIRECTED IN E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, RATHER THAN STEP 2 BELOW.
4 (FR-Z.1 Step 2/2.a) Verify CNMT The operator reads the Cautions, Spray Actuated: and proceeds.
Verify RWST outlet to SI and The operator observes the MOV-CNMT spray pumps - OPEN 896A Red status light is LIT and the Green status light is OFF.
- MOV-896A
- MOV-896B The operator observes the MOV-896B Red status light is LIT and the Green status light is OFF.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM A NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 9 of 15 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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- > Uz 5 (FR-Z.1 Step 2.b) Verify CNMT The operator observes the A - - -
spray pumps - RUNNING Containment Spray Pump Green status light is LIT, and the Red status light is OFF.
The operator observes the 8 Containment Spray Pump Green status light is LIT, and the Red status light is OFF.
The operator observes Containment pressure to be ::::::40-50 psig.
The operator proceeds to the Step 2.b RNO .
- 6 (FR-Z.1 Step 2.b RNO) Manually The operator places the A - - -
start pumps. Containment Spray Pump Control Switch to START and observes the Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF.
The operator places the 8 Containment Spray Pump Control Switch to START and observes the Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF.
7 (FR-Z.1 Step 2.c) Verify NaOH The operator observes Fl-930 and - - -
flow (Fl-930) notes flow at "O."
The operator proceeds to the Step 2.c RNO.
- 8 (FR-Z.1 Step 2.c RNO) IF NaOH The operator places the Control flow NOT indicated, THEN place Switch for AOV-836A in OPEN.
switches for NaOH tank outlet The operator places the Control valves to OPEN.
Switch for AOV-8368 in OPEN.
- AOV-836A
- AOV-8368 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM A NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 10of15 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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(.) z Examiner Note: One of the two valve Control Switches must be in the OPEN position to satisfy the Critical Step.
Flow on Fl-930 will NOT be observed until Performance Step 10. When the Containment Spray Pump Discharge Valves are OPEN.
9 (FR-Z.1 Step 2.d) Verify CNMT The operator observes the MOV- - - -
spray pump discharge valves - 860A Green status light is LIT, and OPEN the Red status light is OFF.
- MOV-860A The operator observes the MOV-
- MOV-8608 8608 Green status light is LIT, and
- MOV-860C the Red status light is OFF. I
- MOV-8600 The operator observes the MOV-860C Green status light is LIT, and I
the Red status light is OFF. I The operator observes the MOV-8600 Green status light is LIT, and the Red status light is OFF.
The operator proceeds to the Step 2.d RNO.
- 10 (FR-Z.1 Step 2.d RNO) Ensure at The operator places the MOV- - - -
least one in each set valves - 860A Control Switch in OPEN and* .
OPEN. observes the Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is
- MOV-860A or MOV-8608 OFF.
- MOV-860C or MOV-8600 OR The operator places the MOV-8608 Control Switch in OPEN and observes the Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM A NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 11 of 15 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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- The operator places the MOV- - - -
860C Control Switch in OPEN and observes the Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF.
OR The operator places the MOV-8600 Control Switch in OPEN and observes the Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF.
I The operator will observe flow on I Fl-930.
Examiner Note: The operator may OPEN all four valves, however, at least one valve in each set must be OPEN to satisfy the Critical Nature of this Step.
SIM DRIVER NOTE: Call the Control Room as the EO and report "V-815A has been locally closed, however. MOV-813 will NOT operate manually."
EXAMINER NOTE: ALTERNATE PATH DECISION POINT OCCURS IN THE NEXT STEP NOTE Locked valve key may be required for local operations.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM A NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 12of15 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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- 11 (ATT-3.0Step1) For each of the The operator reads the NOTE, and - - -
following AUTO ISOL VALVES proceeds.
that will not close, take the action
- The operator will refer to ATT-3.0, directed in the ALTERNATE contact the EO, and direct that the ISOLATION column.
EO unlock and close the breaker MOV-813(CCW): IF MOV-813 can for MOV-817.
not be closed, THEN perform the
- The operator will place the A RCP following:
Control Switch to STOP and
- Direct AO with locked valve observe the Green status light is key to unlock and close LIT, and the Red status light is breaker for MOV-817 (MCC D OFF.
POS 10C) *The operator will place the B RCP
- Stop both RCPs Control Switch to STOP and
- Manually close MOV-817 observe the Green status light is (MCB). IF MOV-817 will not LIT, and the Red,status light is close, THEN direct AO to OFF.
locally close MOV-817 (AB INT LEVEL). *The operator will place the MOV-817 Control Switch to CLOSE and observe the Green status light is LIT, and the Red status light is OFF.
The operator returns to FR-Z.1.
SIM DRIVER NOTE: Upon direction from the operator to unlock and close the MOV-817 breaker, operate Trigger 1 (REM-EDS054 (MOV-817 Breaker Closed).
Call as EO and report that you have unlocked and closed the MOV-817 breaker.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM A NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 13of15 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP STANDARD I-
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- J 12 (FR-Z.1 Step 3/3.a) Verify CNMT The operator observes the A - - -
RECIRC Fans Running: CNMT RECIRC Fan Red status light is LIT, and the Green status All fans - RUNNING light is OFF.
The operator observes the B CNMT RECIRC Fan Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF.
The operator observes the C CNMT RECIRC Fan Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF.
I The operator observes the D CNMT RECIRC Fan Red status
'" light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF.
13 (FR-Z.1 Step 3.b) Charcoal filter The operator observes the A - - -
dampers green status lights - CNMT RECIRC Fan Charcoal EXTINGUISHED Filter Damper Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF.
The operator observes the C CNMT RECIRC Fan Charcoal Filter Damper Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF.
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM .
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM A NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 14 of 15 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM A Examinee's Name:
Date Performed:
Facility Evaluator:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Name (print)
Examiner's Signature: Date:
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM A NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- The plant tripped from 100% power and safety injection has actuated.
- The crew entered E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and then transitioned to E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.
- Due to a degrading transient, an Orange Path now exists on the Containment Critical Safety Function Status Tree.
- You are the HCO.
INITIATING CUE: The US has directed you to verify Containment Isolation and Heat Removal systems are operating as expected by performing FR-Z.1, Response to High Containment Pressure, starting from Step 1.
NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet NRC EXAM SIM JPM B 2017 Systems NRC- Control Room JPM B (Rev_022217) NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 2of13 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:
Task
Title:
Start an RCP during Plant Startup JPM No.: 2017 Systems NRC -
Control Room JPM B (Alternate Path)
KIA
Reference:
003 A4.01 (3.3/3.2)
Examinee: NRC Examiner:
Facility Evaluator: Date:
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: x Classroom X Plant
- - - Simulator READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues., 'when you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.
Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM), and Handouts 1-3.
Initial Conditions:
- The plant is returning to service after a refueling outage.
- B RCP is running and the S-2.1, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation, used to start the pump has been closed out.
- The crew is performing 0-1.1, Plant Heatup From Cold Shutdown to Hot Shutdown, and has reached step 6.5.10.3 - PLACE PCV 135 in MANUAL AND CONTROL RCS pressure at approximately 325 psig.
- A new S-2.1 is being used to start the A RCP and is complete up to Step 6.1.3.
- An Equipment Operator is at the "A" RCP to monitor the start.
- You are the HCO.
Initiating Cue:
- The US has assigned you to start the A RCP in accordance with Steps 6.5.10.3 through 6.5.10. 7 of 0-1.1.
- The CO will respond to alarms not directly related to this task and is available for adjusting Charging Pump speed during the RCP start, but you must direct any adjustments.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 3of13 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Task Standard: The operator will start the "A" RCP per 0-1.1 and S-2.1, and then diagnose a low oil level in the pump, and stop the pump per plant Annunciator Response Procedures.
Required Materials: None General
References:
0-1.1, Plant Heatup From Cold Shutdown to Hot Shutdown, Rev 16900 S-2.1, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation, Rev 04700 AR-A-24, RCP OIL LEVEL +/- 1.25, Rev 01601 Handouts: Handout 1: A marked up copy of 0-1.1 up to the NOTE prior to Step 6.5.10.3 Handout 2: A marked up copy of S-2.1, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP OPERATION, up to Step 6.1.2.
Handout 3: A completed Attachment 5, RCP A, of S-2.1, marked up for current plant conditions Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 12 minutes NOTE: This JPM should be Pre-Briefed in the Briefing Room.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM B NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 4of13 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue .
Information For Evaluator's Use:
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.
- Denotes critical steps.
Number any comments in the "Comment Number" column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the "Comments" section. The comment section should be used to document: the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the site's appropriate tracking system.
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps.
These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue .
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 5of13 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet SIMULATOR OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES
- 1. Reset to IC-29 NOTE: It is okay to use a similar IC to the IC listed above, provided the IC actually used is verified to be compatible with this and other JPMs that are scheduled to be run concurrently.
- 2. Start the B RCP and heat up the RCS to 140° F (May take 8-10 hours0.417 days <br />0.0595 weeks <br />0.0137 months <br /> starting from IC-29).
- 3. Insert MALF RCS08A (-2.5) ramped in over 30 seconds on Trigger #1 ("A" RCP Oil Leak)
- 4. Ensure the follows conditions are met:
- The "B" RCP is running
- RCS Temperature is> 140°F and< 199°F
- RCS pressure is ==325 psig I
- PCV-135 is in AUTO
- LTOP Display on overhead n;ionitor
- Marked up portions of 0-1.1 'are consistent with Simulator conditions
- Marked up portions of body of S-2.1 are consistent with Simulator conditions
- Marked up portions of Attachment 5 of S-2.1 are consistent with Simulator conditions
- Blank Attachment 6 of 0-1.1 on the HCO Desk
- 5. Place RCP Parameters on Group Display
- 6. Place simulator in FREEZE.
- 7. Reset to IC-162 (October, 2016):
- 8. Replace A-20, C-5 and F-29 alarm tiles for low pressure conditions.
- 9. Place simulator in RUN when directed by examiner.
- 10. When the above steps are completed for this and other JPMs to be run concurrently then validate, if not previously validated, the concurrently run JPMs using the JPM Validation Checklist.
- 11. This completes the setup for this JPM.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 6of13 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:
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- > Uz CUE Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handouts 1-3.
NOTE
- An Operator should be ready to open PCV-135 should a pressure spike occur when the Reactor Coolant Pump is started.
- IF RCS pressure goes down after RCP start, THEN closing PCV-135 will raise RCS pressure faster than raising Charging Pump speed.
(0-1.1, Step 6.5.10.3) PLACE PCV The operator reads the NOTEs,
- 1 135 in MANUAL AND CONTROL and proceeds. - - -
RCS pressure at approximately .,
325 psig. The operator balances the PCV '
135 Automatic-to-Manual control and places the controller to Manual.
The operator controls pressure at
==325 psig.
(0-1.1, Step 6.5.10.4) IF the 2 Based on Initial Conditions, the .. - - -
containment sound monitor is to be operator marks the step N/A.
used for the RCP being started, THEN TURN ON the containment sound monitor for the respective RCP. OTHERWISE, MARK this Step NIA.
3 (0-1.1, Step 6.5.10.5) CLOSELY The operator monitors RCS heat MONITOR RCS heatup rate AND up rate and pressure on PPCS.
RCS pressure after starting of the 2nd RCP.
- 4 (0-1.1, Step 6.5.10.6) PLACE The operator places the TCV-145 LETDOWN DIVERT TO DI OR - - -
control switch to the VCT position VCT, TCV-145 to VCT to prevent and observes the Red status light pressure transient on mixed bed. is LIT and the Green status light is OFF.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM B NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 7 of 13 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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instructions section AND MARK RCP NOT started NIA. The operator refers to S-2.1 for the ARCP.
- RCPA
- RCPB NOTE
- Starting the Oil Lift Pump will increase RCP seal clearances and may result in a change of state for MCB Alarm 8-17, RCP 1A No. 1 SEAL HI-LO FLOW.
- A pressure interlock prevents starting of the RCP unless a minimum oil pressure is available to the Upper Thrust Shoes of the Motor Thrust Bearing.
I
- 6 (S-2.1, Section 6.11Step 6.1.3) The operator refers to Section 6.1.
STARTING RCP N Start RCP A - - -
Oil Lift Pump. The operators reads the NOTEs, and proceeds.
The operator places the RCP A Oil Lift Pump in the START position and observes the Red status light is LIT and the Green status light is OFF.
The operator notes the time.
Examiner Note: The time should be marked to ensure the Lift Oil Pump has been running for at least 2 minutes prior to starting the RCP but the RCP will not start unless the pressure interlock is satisfied (Once the White Light is LIT, use Time Compression).
(S-2.1, Step 6.1.4) AFTER 2 7 The operator observes that the - - -
minutes, VERIFY RCP A Lift RCP A White status light is LIT.
Pressure WHITE light is lit.
The operator verifies 2 minutes has elapsed since the start of the Lift Oil Pump.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM B NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 8of13 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD
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- 8 The operator refers to S-2.1, - - -
No. 1 Seal Leakoff is still in the Attachment 3, and determines the NORMAL OPERATING RANGE of combination of #1 Seal Leak Rate Attachment 3, RCP Seal Leakoff.
and #1 Seal DP are within the NORMAL OPERATING RANGE.
The operator observes RCP A F-177 and A SEAL FLOW F-175, and determines the #1 Seal Leak Rate.
The operator observes Pl-420 (Rx Coolant Loop Low Range Pressure) and determines the #1 Seal DP. I Using the combination of #1 Seal Leak Rate and #1 Seal DP the operator verifies their intersection is within the NORMAL OPERATING RANGE on Attachment 3.
(S-2.1, Step 6.1.6) Select RCP A 9 The operator marks this step NA, on the Containment Sound and proceeds.
Monitor, N/A if Sound Monitor is not available.
(S-2.1, Step 6.1. 7) Make a Plant 10 The operator announces starting - - -
Announcement that RCP A will be Reactor Coolant Pump A.
started.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 9of13 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD
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>220 psid on the #1 seal DP indicator and below the PORV setpoint of 410 psig.
- Maintain RCS pressure at approximately 325 psig, as indicated on Pl-420, by setting of the Low Pressure Letdown Controller, PCV-135.
(S-2.1, Step 6.1.8) Start RCP A.
- 11 The operator reads the NOTEs, - - -
and proceeds.
The operator may assign the second board operator to adjust Charging Pump speed, when I
directed.
The operator places the A RCP
' control switch to the START position and observes the Red status light is LIT and the Green status light is OFF.
The operator adjusts PCV-135 as necessary to maintain RCS Pressure such that RCP #1 Seal DP >220 PSID, as seen on Pl-420, and no PORV lift (410 PSIG).
SIM DRIVER: If directed, adjust Charging Pump speed, and report actions taken to the operator.
(S-2.1, Step 6.1.9) Turn off the 12 The operator marks this step NA, Containment Sound Monitor (mark and proceeds.
N/A if not used).
(S-2.1, Step 6.1.10) WHEN the A 13 The operator verifies the RCP has RCP has been operating for been running for one minute.
greater than 1 minute, THEN STOP the RCP A Oil Lift Pump. The operator places the RCP A Oil Lift Pump in the STOP position and observes the Green status light is LIT and the Red status light is OFF.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM B NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 10of13 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION I-
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- > Uz 14 (S-2.1, Step 6.1.11) Monitor the The operator refers to Section 6.3 following parameters for RCP A and begins verifying parameters.
IAW Section 6.3, Normal Operation:
- RCP A Seal Leakoff Flows
- RCP A #1 Seal D/P
- Seal Return Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature (A.O.)
- RCP A Oil Levels
- RCP A Vibration Monitor CUE If the operator asks Seal Return Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature, state that it is 80°F. ,'
SIM DRIVER: When this step is in progress, operate Trigger #1 (insert MALF RCSOBA, -
2.5, ramp over 30 seconds)
EXAMINER NOTE: ALTERNATE PATH DECISION POINT OCCURS IN THE NEXT STEP (AR-A-24, Step 1) When first 15 The operator acknowledges MCB starting the pump, then allow 30 Annunciator A-24, and addresses seconds for alarm to clear. Trip the ARP.
pump if alarm still does not clear.
The operator may stop the RCP any time after reading this step by placing the A RCP control switch to the STOP position and observing the Green status light is LIT and the Red status light is OFF.
Examiner Note: The critical task for stopping the RCP is met if the operator trips the RCP at any time after reading this step but before the RCP A breaker trips on overcurrent. RCP A will trip on overcurrent after approximately 3.5 minutes.
Examiner Note: Once the RCP is tripped, terminate the JPM. If the RCP automatically trips prior to the operator tripping the RCP, the JPM is FAILED.
2017 Systems NRG - Control Room JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 11 of 13 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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- > (.) z (AR-A-24, Step 2) When operating, 16 The operator observes RCP A Oil - - -
then verify level using RCP Oil Level (at the RMS rack side panel)
Level Indicators and Plant Process is lowering.
Computer System.
(AR-A-24, Step 2.1) Immediately 17 The operator observes Group - - -
monitor the A RCP Motor bearing Display RCPS on PPCS.
temperature. This can be done by using PPCS Group Display RCPS. Using the PPCS the operator determines A RCP Motor Bearing temperatures are rising.
T2092: Upper Thrust Bearing T2161: Upper Radial Bearing (AR-A-24, Step 2.2) IF bearing 18 The operator determines that - ' -
temperatures AND indicated level conditions are NOT normal and appear normal, THEN initiate a proceeds.
CNMT entry to investigate the sight glass level. IF the lower bearing oil level is greater than 1" BELOW the notch on the sight glass, THEN prepare to remove the pump from service. Otherwise, the level is acceptable to continue operation.
- 19 (AR-A-24, Step 2.3) If level is 1.5" The operator places the A RCP below normally indicated level and control switch to the STOP position visibly lowering then: and observes the Green status
- Trip the reactor light is LIT and the Red status light
- When all E-0 immediate is OFF .
actions done, then trip affected RCP Examiner Note: The operator will NOT perform E-0 Actions because the plant is in Mode 5.
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM .
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM B NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 12of13 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2017 Systems NRG - Control Room JPM B Examinee's Name:
Date Performed:
Facility Evaluator:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Name (print)
Examiner's Signature: Date:
2017 Systems NRG - Control Room JPM B NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- The plant is returning to service after a refueling outage.
- B RCP is running and the S-2.1, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation, used to start the pump has been closed out.
- The crew is performing 0-1.1, Plant Heatup From Cold Shutdown to Hot Shutdown, and has reached step 6.5.10.3 -
PLACE PCV 135 in MANUAL AND CONTROL RCS pressure at approximately 325 psig.
- A new S-2.1 is being used to start the A RCP and is complete up to Step 6.1.3.
- An Equipment Operator is at the "A" RCP to monitor the start.
- You are the HCO.
INITIATING CUE:
- The US has assigned you to start the A RCP in accordance with Steps 6.5.10.3 through 6.5.10.7 of 0~1.1.
- The CO will respond to alarms not directly related to this task and is available for adjusting Charging Pump speed during the RCP start, but you must direct any adjustments.
NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet NRC EXAM SIM JPM C 2017 Systems NRC- Control Room JPM C (Rev_022217) NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 2 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:
Task
Title:
Placing Main FRV in Auto when JPM No.: 2017 Systems NRC -
Bypass FRV is Controlling SIG Control Room JPM C Level in Auto (Alternate Path)
KIA
Reference:
059 A2.12 (3.113.4)
Examinee: NRC Examiner:
Facility Evaluator: Date:
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: x Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.
Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM), and Handout 1.
Initial Conditions:
- The plant is operating at 31 % power.
- The "A" Feed Reg Valve Bypass Valve has been placed in AUTO, and the "A" Feed Reg Valve has been placed in MANUAL at the request of Maintenance.
- You are the CO.
Initiating Cue: The US has directed you to place the "A" FRV back in AUTO and to close the "A" FRV Bypass Valve IAW Attachment 2 of P-17.
Task Standard: The operator will place the "A" FRV in AUTO and close the "A" Feed Reg Valve Bypass Valve in accordance with Attachment 2 of P-17; and then take manual control of the "A" Feed Reg Valve and stabilize the "A" SIG level when it is recognized that the "A" Feed Reg Valve controller has failed to operate in AUTO.
Required Materials: None 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 3 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet General
References:
P-17, Operations Control Room Operating Instructions, Rev 01800 OP-AA-101-111-1001, Operations Expectations and Standards, Rev 18 A-503.1, Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide, Rev 04600 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of Attachment 2 of P-17 Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 9 minutes Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue .
Information For Evaluator's Use:
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.
- Denotes critical steps. ;
Number any comments in the "Comment Number" column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the "Comments" section. The comment section should be used to document: the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the site's appropriate tracking system.
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps.
These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.
- The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue .
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM C NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 4 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet SIMULATOR OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES
- 1. Reset to IC-9 (Any At Power IC which will support the "A" Feed Reg Valve Bypass Valve operating in AUTO with the 'A" FRV operating in MANUAL)
NOTE: It is okay to use a similar IC to the IC listed above, provided the IC actually used is verified to be compatible with this and other JPMs that are scheduled to be run concurrently.
- 2. Raise power to 31 % power and stabilize plant.
- 3. Insert Malfunction FDW07 A = 0 (60 second Ramp and 90 second delay) (Failure of the "A" FRV Controller to operate in AUTO) on Trigger #1 (x0603100==1 ["A" FRV Bypass Controller in MANUAL]).
- 4. Place simulator in RUN I
- 5. Place the "A" FRV Bypass Valve in AUTO and the Main FRV in MANUAL per Attachment 1, CROl-1 of P-17.
- 6. Place simulator in FREEZE.
- 7. Reset to IC-163 (October, 2016)
- 8. Trend SGLVL-WIDE on PPCS.
- 9. Place simulator in RUN when directed by examiner.
- 10. When the above steps are completed for this and other JPMs to be run concurrently then validate, if not previously validated, the concurrently run JPMs using the JPM Validation Checklist.
- 11. This completes the setup for this JPM.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM C NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 5 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:
STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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NOTE
- PPCS points V4271 and V4272 have warnings 70%, and high alarms, 90%, to alert operators when the FRV Bypass AOV's are approaching position limits.
- The FRV controllers respond faster the longer the buttons are held down .
(Attachment 2, Step 1.1/1.1.1) The operator reads the NOTEs, 1 - - -
PERFORM the following to place and proceeds.
the Main, FRV in AUTO:
' The operator observes the "A" Main FRV controller White "MAN" VERIFY the desired Main FRV is backlight is LIT.
in MANUAL.
(Attachment 2, Step 1.1.2)
- 2 The operator presses the "A" Main - - -
SLOWLY CLOSE the desired Main FRV controller CLOSE pushbutton FRV by DEPRESSING the Main and observes the controller output FRV Controller closed pushbutton.
lowering.
The operator will observe feed flow to the "A" using Fl-466, 467 and 500 on the MCB and/or the Feedwater System Page on the PPCS (Attachment 2, Step 1.1.3) 3 The operator observes the "A" - - -
VERIFY the Bypass FRV fully FRV Bypass Valve controller OPENS to maintain Feed Flow output rising, and that "A" SIG feed constant.
flow remains constant.
Examiner NOTE: During the transfer between the two valves, MCB Annunciator G-3, S/G A LEVEL DEVIATION +/-7%, may alarm.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM C NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 6 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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- > Uz (Attachment 2, Step 1.1.4)
- 4 The operator presses the "A" Main - - -
PLACE the Main FRV in AUTO for FRV controller AUTO pushbutton the desired SIG.
and observes the White "AUTO" backlight is LIT.
(Attachment 2, Step 1.1.5) 5 The operator observes the "A" - - -
VERIFY Main FRV is responding FRV controller output rising, and as expected.
that "A" SIG feed flow remains constant.
I NOTE The Bypass FRV Manual Pushbutton must be depressed for 2-3,, seconds to allow the ADFACS DPU to go through its processor cycle time. '
(Attachment 2, Step 1.1.6) 6 The operator reads the NOTE, and - - -
PLACE the Bypass FRV to proceeds.
MANUAL for the desired SIG.
The operator presses the "A" FRV Bypass Valve MANUAL pushbutton and holds for 2-3 seconds; and observes the White "MAN" backlight is LIT.
Examiner NOTE: WHEN the "A" FRV Bypass controller is in MANUAL for 90 seconds, TRIGGER #1 will automatically operate causing the A FRV to close over 60 seconds.
(Attachment 2, Step 1.1. 7) 7 The operator presses the "A" FRV SLOWLY CLOSE the Bypass FRV Bypass Valve controller CLOSE WHILE VERIFYING the Main FRV pushbutton and observes the compensates by opening slightly.
controller output lowering.
The operator observes the FRV controller output rises as the FRV Bypass Valve closes.
EXAMINER NOTE: ALTERNATE PATH DECISION POINT OCCURS IN THE NEXT STEP 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM C NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 7 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION
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(Attachment 2, Step 1.1.8)
- 8 The operator observes the "A" ENSURE the Main FRV is FRV Controller output lowering controlling SIG level In AUTO with uncontrollably with the controller in the Bypass FRV closed in Manual.
AUTO, and the A SIG feed flow and Narrow Range level lowering.
The operator presses the MAN Pushbutton on the "A" FRV controller and observes the White Backlight is LIT.
The operator adjusts the output of the "A" FRV controller to control the position of the "A" FRV, raise feed flow to the "A" SIG and stabilize "A" SIG Narrow Range level.
Examiner NOTE: The operator may manually re-open the A FRV Bypass Valve, however, at this power level this action alone will be insufficient to stabilize the A S/G level.
Examiner NOTE: The response action is permitted as an identified procedural deviation as indicated in A-503.1, Step 5.3.A.5 which states "Actions are permitted to mitigate or compensate for equipment or controller failures or to isolate leaks.
Permitted actions include those actions necessary to take manual control and stabilize the affected parameters, or to isolate a leak. Examples include closing or isolating a failed open PORV, taking manual control of a failed FRV controller, etc.
These deviations fall under the Maintenance Rule. Therefore, 50.59 is not required."
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM C NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 8 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM C Examinee's Name:
Date Performed:
Facility Evaluator:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Name (print)
Examiner's Signature: Date:
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM C NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- The plant is operating at 31 % power.
- The "A" Feed Reg Valve Bypass Valve has been placed in AUTO, and the "A" Feed Reg Valve has been placed in MANUAL at the request of Maintenance.
- You are the CO.
INITIATING CUE: The US has directed you to place the "A" FRV back in AUTO and to close the "A" FRV Bypass Valve IAW Attachment 2 of P-17.
NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet NRC EXAM SIM JPM 0 2017 Systems NRC- Control Room JPM D (Rev_022217) NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 2of13 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:
Task
Title:
Dropped Rod Recovery w/Second JPM No.: 2017 Systems NRC -
Dropped Rod Control Room JPM D (Alternate Path)
KIA
Reference:
APE 003 AA1.02 (3.6/3.4)
Examinee: NRC Examiner:
Facility Evaluator: Date:
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: x Classroom - - - Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.
Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM), and Handouts 1-2.
Initial Conditions:
- Reactor power is stable at 42%.
- Control Rod E-11 dropped into the reactor core 24 hours1 days <br />0.143 weeks <br />0.0329 months <br /> ago.
- AP-RCC.3, "Dropped Rod Recovery," has been carried out.
- The crew is currently in ER-RCC.1, Retrieval of a Dropped Rod, and has completed this procedure through Step 6.2.3.
- All Technical Specifications have been addressed.
- All necessary repairs have been made.
- It has been determined that the Control Rod can be recovered at power.
- You are the HCO.
Initiating Cue:
- The US has directed you to recover the dropped rod in accordance with ER-RCC.1, starting with Step 6.2.4.
- The Reactor Engineer has directed that a 120 gallon boration be made at 3 gpm during the recovery of the Control Rod.
- The CO will manipulate the P/A converter and control the secondary plant, as you direct.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 3of13 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Task Standard: The operator will attempt to recover Control Rod E-11 per ER-RCC.1; and then manually trip the reactor during the recovery when it is diagnosed that two dropped rods exist.
Required Materials: Lift Coil Cabinet Key Marked up copy of AP-RCC.3 on the RO Desk General
References:
ER-RCC.1, Retrieval of a Dropped Rod, Rev 02102 AP-RCC.3, Dropped Rod Recovery, Rev 01000 S-3.1, Boron Concentration Control, Rev 03200 A-503.1, Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedure User Guide, Rev 04600 Handouts: Handout 1: ER-RCC.1, Retrieval of a Dropped Rod, marked up through Step 6.2.3. I Handout 2: Blank copy of S-3.1, Boron Concentration Control.
Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 18 minutes NOTE: This JPM should be Pre-Briefed in the Briefing Room.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM D NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 4of13 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue .
Information For Evaluator's Use:
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.
- Denotes critical steps.
Number any comments in the "Comment Number" column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the "Comments" section. The comment section should be used to document: the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM.
Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the site's appropriate tracking system.
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue .
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 5of13 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet SIMULATOR OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES
- 1. Reset to IC-20 (Or any appropriate 48% power IC)
NOTE: It is okay to use a similar IC to the IC listed above, provided the IC actually used is verified to be compatible with this and other JPMs that are scheduled to be run concurrently.
- 2. Insert Malfunction ROD02-E11 =Stationary (Control Rod E-11 Dropped)
- 3. Place simulator in RUN
- 4. Carry out actions of AP-RCC.3 through step Be.
- 5. Carry out actions of ER-RCC.1 through Step 6.2.3.
- 6. Allow conditions to stabilize.
I
- 7. Remove Malfunction ROD02-E11
- 8. Insert Malfunction ROD02-L6 =i'Stationary (Control Rod L-6 Dropped) on Trigger #1 (Conditional= X071314A==1 [Rod Withdrawal Signal), 10 seconds delayed].
- 9. Place simulator in FREEZE.
- 10. Reset to IC-164 (October, 2016)
- 11. Place simulator in RUN when directed by examiner.
- 12. When the above steps are completed for this and other JPMs to be run concurrently then validate, if not previously validated, the concurrently run JPMs using the JPM Validation Checklist.
- 13. This completes the setup for this JPM.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM D NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 6of13 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:
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- > 0 :::s Uz CUE Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handouts 1-2.
(ER-RCC.1, Step 6.2.4) PLACE The operator places the Control
- 1 CONTROL ROD BANK Rod Bank Select Switch to the - - -
SELECTOR SWITCH on control SBA position.
board to the affected bank.
NOTE The disconnect switches are located in the LIFT COIL DISCONNECT PANEL on the back of the control board. i (ER-RCC.1, Step 6.2.S/6.2.S.1)
- 2 The operator reads the NOTE, and.,
PERFORM the following for the proceeds.
affected bank:
The operator obtains Lift Coil DISCONNECT lift coils of RCC's Cabinet Key and opens Lift Coil that DID NOT drop. Cabinet.
The operator Disconnects lift coils for SOB A Group 1 Control Rods E3, C9, 111, and KS (Disconnect Switch in "Down" position).
The operator Disconnects lift coils*:
for SOB A Group 2 Control Rods 13, CS, and K9 (Disconnect Switch in "Down" position).
Examiner Note: The TOGGLE SWITCH is above the Nomenclature in the Lift Coil Switch Cabinet.
3 (ER-RCC.1, Step 6.2.S.2) VERIFY The operator observes the SOB A - - -
that the lift coil for the dropped Group 2 Control Rod E11 lift coil RCC is CONNECTED. Disconnect Switch in the "Up" position.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM D NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 7 of 13 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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- > (.) z 4 (ER-RCC.1, Step 6.2.5.3) The operator observes group - - -
RECORD reading on group counter for Shutdown Bank A counter for affected group (Refer Group 2, and records 223 Steps.
to Attachment 1, RCC Bank Grouping).
steps (ER-RCC.1, Step 6.2.5.4) RESET
- 5 The operator opens the Shutdown - - -
step counter of only the affected Bank A Group 2 Counter window group (group 1 or 2) by opening and depresses middle pushbutton, the counter window and resetting and observes reading of "O."
to 0 (depress reset pushbutton RS).
(ER-RCC.1, Step 6.2.5.5) IF the 6 The operator recognizes that the - - -
dropped RCC is in the Shutdown Dropped Rod is in a Shutdown Bank THEN GO TO step 6.2.6.
Bank, and proceeds to Step 6.2.6.
CAUTION Reactor power and TAvG will rise as RCC is being retrieved, the positive reactivity from the RCC shall be offset by RCS Boration such that power is maintained stable and less than 50%.
NOTE The amount of boric acid required and rate to be added to recover the dropped RCC should be determined by the Reactor Engineer.
(ER-RCC.1, Step 6.2.6/6.2.6.1) 7 The operator reads the CAUTION - - -
PERFORM the following to restore and NOTE, and proceeds.
the dropped RCC to its bank position:
The operator addresses INITIATE a Boration to add the Attachment 2, Normal Boration, of amount of Boric Acid determined S-3.1.
by the Reactor Engineer to recover the dropped RCC per reactivity plan guidance.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM D NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 8of13 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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=> Uz (S-3.1, Attachment 2, Step 1.0) 8 The operator recognizes that the - - -
ENSURE Attachment 1, Makeup Reactor Engineer has determined Determinations, is complete.
that a 120 gallon boration be made at 3 gpm during the recovery of the Control Rod, and proceeds.
(S-3.1, Attachment 2, Step 2.0) 9 The operator informs the US of the - - -
Board operator SHALL inform US intent to change reactivity via of intent to change core reactivity.
boration.
CUE The US acknowledges.
(S-3.1, Attachment 2, Step 2.1) US 10 The operator reads the Step, and - - -
SHALL acknowledge reactivity proceeds.
manipulation and provide input and oversight. [G0092]. 'I (S-3.1, Attachment 2, Step 3.0)
- 11 The operator places the RMW - - -
PLACE RMW MODE SELECTOR MODE SELECTOR control switch control switch to BORATE position.
to the BORATE position.
(S-3.1, Attachment 2, Step 4.0)
- 12 The operator makes note of the - - -
SET BA TO BA BLENDER FLOW HCV-11 OA controller's current CONTROL VALVE, HCV-110A, setting, and adjusts the controller controller to flow rate determined to 3.0 gpm.
in Attachment 1, Makeup Determinations, Step 1.1.
(S-3.1, Attachment 2, Step 5.0)
- 13 The operator sets YI C-11 0 to 120 - - -
SET BA COUNTER, YIC-110, to gallons.
quantity determined in Attachment 1.
NOTE Key parameters including Reactor Coolant Tavg AND control rod position indication, OR subcritical count rate SHALL be observed as boric acid is injected to ensure proper response. [G0092] [G0132]
(S-3.1, Attachment 2, Step 6.0)
- 14 The operator reads the NOTE, and - - -
PLACE RMW CONTROL switch to proceeds.
START position.
The operator places the RMW CONTROL switch to the START position.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 9 of 13 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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- > (.) z (S-3.1, Attachment 2, Step 7.0) 15 The operator observes the A Boric - - -
VERIFY the following:
Acid Transfer Pump Red status
- BORIC ACID TRANSFER light is LIT, and Green status light PUMP A OR B starts.
is OFF.
- BA TO BA BLENDER FLOW CONTROL VLV, HCV-110A, OR throttles open to preset flow The operator observes the B Boric position. Acid Transfer Pump Red status
- REACTOR MAKEUP TO CHG light is LIT, and Green status light PUMP, AOV-11 OB, opens. is OFF.
The operator observes HCV-110A - - -
output rising.
' The operator observes the AOV- - - -
11 OB Red status light is LIT, and Green status light is OFF.
NOTE The following MCB annunciators will alarm as withdrawal starts:
- C-30, ROD CONTROL URGENT FAILURE ROD STOP .
EXAMINER NOTE: ALTERNATE PATH DECISION POINT OCCURS IN THE NEXT STEP 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM D NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 10of13 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION
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(.) z (ER-RCC.1, Step 6.2.6.2)
- 16 The operator reads the NOTEs, - - -
WITHDRAW the dropped RCC to and proceeds.
maintain TAVG at TREF The operator places the "In-Out Rod Control Switch" to the "Out" position and raises the Control Rod to the required position while maintaining Tavg at Tref.
The operator acknowledges the Rod Control Urgent Failure Rod Stop annunciator upon rod withdrawal as an expected alarm.
1 The operator observes second dropped rod while recovering the first dropped rod, and re-enters
- AP-RCC.3 at Step 1.
SIM DRIVER:
Ensure that malfunction ROD02-L6 becomes ACTIVE ten (10) seconds after the rod withdrawal signal is initiated.
(AP-RCC.3 Step 1) Verify Only 17 The operator observes that Control - - -
One Rod Has Dropped Rod L6 Rod Bottom light is LIT, and Control Rod E11 is still being recovered; and concludes that more than one Control Rod has dropped.
The operator proceeds to the RNO.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 11 of 13 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION
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STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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- 18 The operator manually trips the - - -
rods dropped, THEN trip the reactor by depressing one of the reactor AND go to E-0, REACTOR Reactor Emergency Trip TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
pushbuttons, and begins to perform the Immediate Actions of E-0.
Examiner Note: There are two Reactor Emergency Trip pushbuttons either of which will manually trip the reactor when depressed.
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM .
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM D NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 12of13 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM D Examinee's Name:
Date Performed:
Facility Evaluator:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Name (print)
Examiner's Signature: Date:
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM D NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- Reactor power is stable at 42%.
- Control Rod E-11 dropped into the reactor core 24 hours1 days <br />0.143 weeks <br />0.0329 months <br /> ago.
- AP-RCC.3, "Dropped Rod Recovery," has been carried out.
- The crew is currently in ER-RCC.1, Retrieval of a Dropped Rod, and has completed this procedure through Step 6.2.3.
- All Technical Specifications have been addressed.
- All necessary repairs have been made.
- It has been determined that the Control Rod can be recovered at power.
- You are the HCO.
INITIATING CUE:
- The US has directed you to recover the dropped rod in accordance with ER-RCC.1, starting with Step 6.2.4.
- The Reactor Engineer has directed that a 120 gallon boration be made at 3 gpm during the recovery of the Control Rod.
- The CO will manipulate the P/A converter and control the secondary plant, as you direct.
NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet NRC EXAM I
SIM JPM E 2017 Systems NRC- Control Room JPM E (Rev_022217) NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 2of12 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:
Task
Title:
Establish 100/0 Electric Lineup on JPM No.: 2017 Systems NRC-Circuit 767 Control Room JPM E (Alternate Path)
KIA
Reference:
062 A4.01 (3.3/3.1)
Examinee: NRC Examiner:
Facility Evaluator: Date:
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: x Classroom - - - Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.
Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM), and Handout 1.
Initial Conditions:
- The plant is operating at 100% power.
- The Electric Plant is currently in a 50/50 NORMAL lineup.
- RG&E ECC has requested that the plant be placed in a 100/0 lineup on Circuit 767 for scheduled maintenance on offsite Circuit 7T later today.
- An A-52.12 for removal of Circuit 7T is being prepared.
- You are the CO.
Initiating Cue:
- The US has directed you to establish a 100/0 Electric Plant alignment per 0-6.9.2, Establishing and/or Transferring Offsite Power to BUS 12A I BUS 12B, Section 6.3.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM E NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 3 of 12 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Task Standard: The operator will transfer 4160V buses from a 50/50 NORMAL Lineup to 100/0 Lineup on Circuit 767, recognize a failure of breaker 52/12AY to auto trip, and implement Attachment 1 of 0-6.9.2 to realign the electric plant to a 50/50 lineup.
Required Materials: None General
References:
0-6.9.2, Establishing And/Or Transferring Offsite Power to Bus 12A/12B, Rev 023 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of 0-6.9.2, Establishing And/Or Transferring Offsite Power to Bus 12A/12B.
Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 6 minutes ,
Fill in the JPM Start Time when th~ student acknowledges the Initiating Cue.
Information For Evaluator's Use:
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.
- Denotes critical steps.
Number any comments in the "Comment Number" column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the "Comments" section. The comment section should be used to document: the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM.
Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the site's appropriate tracking system.
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue .
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM E NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 4of12 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet SIMULATOR OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES
- 1. Reset to IC-19 (Or any appropriate 100% power IC)
NOTE: It is okay to use a similar IC to the IC listed above, provided the IC actually used is verified to be compatible with this and other JPMs that are scheduled to be run concurrently.
- 2. Ensure the electric plant is in a Normal 50/50 electric plant lineup
- 3. Create an Event and Schedule File as follows:
The simulator electrical model does not have the capability to fail the auto trip feature of 52/12AY when 52/12BY is closed in. Having the 52/12AY synchroscope also ON, however, defeats this interlock and would prevent the breaker from opening. Since there is only one
( 1) synchroscope handle, however, and is being used to close the 52/12BY breaker, a "software work around" must be accomplished by opening an Event and Schedule file:
I
- Insert override OVR-EDS69D =FALSE (12AY Trip signal)
- Insert override OVR-EDS69G =FALSE (12AY Pull-to-stop signal)
- Insert override OVR-EDS69F =FALSE (12AY Norm Aft Trip signal)
- insert override OVR-EDS29 =TRUE on T-1 (Conditional x05i115a [12A ALT Synch Switch taken to ON position])
- Open Event 2 in the Events box:
- Enter jbk 12by & ! x05i115a in the Event Code box (T-2)
- Type "Remove Override EDS29 when" in the Description box (optional)
- Enter the following in the Schedule box:
Insert Pause @Time Event Action (type exactly) Description remove override OVR-D D 2 EDS29
- Open and RUN the schedule file.
- 4. Place simulator in FREEZE.
- 5. Reset to IC-165 (October, 2016)
- 6. Place simulator in RUN when directed by examiner.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM E NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 5 of 12 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet
- 7. When the above steps are completed for this and other JPMs to be run concurrently then validate, if not previously validated, the concurrently run JPMs using the JPM Validation Checklist.
- 8. This completes the setup for this JPM.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM E NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 6of12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:
STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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(0-6.9.2, Step 6.3.1/6.3.1.1) The operator observes the 1 - - -
ESTABLISH Offsite Power to 12A 52/12ABY Red status light is LIT Bus using Circuit 767 as follows: and the Green status light is OFF.
MARK BUS 12A NORMAL FEED The operator checks the CLOSED FROM 7T, 52/12AY, box.
breaker initial position:
- OPEN
- CLOSED I
(0-6.9.2, Step 6.3.1.2) VERIFY 2 The operator observes the Breaker - - -
CLOSED CIRCUIT BKR 76702 34 76702 Red statµs light is LIT and KV BUS.
the Green status light is OFF.
(0-6.9.2, Step 6.3.1.2) TURN ON
- 3 The operator places the synch - - -
BUS 12A ALT FEED FROM 767, switch for Bus 12A ALT Feed from 52/12BY, SYNCHROSCOPE.
767 to ON.
Examiner Note: The operator may inform you that J-6, 4KV MAIN OR TIE BREAKER TRIP, and L-20, 12A XFMR OR 12A BUS TROUBL~, will alarm after closing Bus 12A Normal Feed breaker.
NOTE Next Step will cause the following MCB Alarms to ILLUMINATE:
- J-6, 4KV MAIN OR TIE BREAKER TRIP
- L-20, 12A XFMR OR 12A BUS TROUBLE Steps 6.3.1.5 through 6.3.1.7 SHALL be performed without delay following completion of Step 6.3.1.4.
(0-6.9.2, Step 6.3.1.4) CLOSE
- 4 The operator reads the NOTEs, BUS 12A ALT FEED FROM 767 and proceeds.
52/12BY.
The operator places the 52/12BY control switch in the CLOSE position and observes the Red status light is LIT and the Green status light is OFF.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM E NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 7of12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD
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Evaluator NOTE: Closing this ALTERNATE feed breaker SHOULD automatically trip the Normal feed breaker and result in J-6, 4KV Main or Tie Breaker Trip (0-6.9.2, Step 6.3.1.5) IF BUS 12A 5 The operator recognizes that - - -
NORMAL FEED FROM ?T, 52/12AY was initially CLOSED, 52/12AY, was initially OPEN, and marks this Step N/A.
THEN VERIFY breaker is OPEN AND RESET (Green light ILLUMINATED, White light EXTINGUISHED).
OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.
(0-6.9.2, Step 6.3.1.6/6.a-c) IF 6 The operator observes that the - - -
BUS 12A NORMAL FEED FROM 52/12AY Red status light is still LIT
?T, 52/12AY, was initially and both the Green and White CLOSED, THEN PERFORM the status lights are OFF.
following:
The operator places the 52/12AY
- VERIFY breaker OPENED control switch to TRIP and then to (Green light ILLUMINATED, AUTO, and observes that the Red White light ILLUMINATED). status light is still LIT and both the
- PLACE BUS 12A NORMAL Green and White status lights are FEED FROM ?T, 52/12AY, OFF.
control switch to TRIP AND THEN to AUTO.
- VERIFY breaker is OPEN AND RESET (Green light ILLUMINATED, White light EXTINGUISHED).
EXAMINER NOTE: ALTERNATE PATH DECISION POINT OCCURS IN THE NEXT STEP 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM E NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 8 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-I-
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(.) z (0-6.9.2, Step 6.3.1. 7) IF BUS 12A 7 The operator observes that the - - -
NORMAL FEED FROM 7T, 52/12AY Red status light is still LIT 52/12AY, is NOT OPEN, THEN and both the Green and White IMMEDIATELY PERFORM status lights are OFF.
Attachment 1, 7T/Bus 12A
- Circulating Current Contingency The operator proceeds to Action. OTHERWISE, MARK this Attachment 1.
Step N/A.
CAUTION This attachment is only performed as directed when breaker 52/12A Y is NOT OPEN.
(Attachment 1, Step 1) VERIFY 8 ! The operator reads the CAUTION, - - -
BUS 12A NORMAL FEED FROM and proceeds.
7T, 52/12AY, is NOT OPEN.
, The operator observes that the 52/12AY Red status light is still LIT and both the Green and White status lights are OFF.
(Attachment 1, Step 2) VERIFY 9 The operator observes the - - -
CLOSED BUS 12A ALT FEED 52/12BY Red status light is LIT FROM 767, 52/12BY.
and the Green status light is OFF.
(Attachment 1, Step 3) VERIFY 10 The operator observes that the - - -
BUS 12A VOLTMETER 4160 V BUS 12A VOLTMETER reads indicates approximately 4000
=4160 VOLTS VOLTS.
(Attachment 1, Step 4) VERIFY 11 The operator observes the Breaker - - -
CLOSED CIRCUIT BKR 7T1352 7T1352 Red status light is LIT and 34 KV BUS.
the Green status light is OFF.
NOTE Next Step SHOULD automatically trip BUS 12A ALT FEED FROM 767, 52/12BY.
Performance of next Step will cause MCB Alarm J-6, 4KV MAIN OR TIE BREAKER TRIP, to ILLUMINATE.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM E NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 9of12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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- > (.) z (Attachment 1, Step 5) TURN OFF
- 12 The operator reads the NOTEs - - -
BUS 12A ALT FEED FROM 767 and proceeds. '
52/12BY, SYNCHROSCOPE '
AND REMOVE handle. The operator places the synch switch for Bus 12A ALT Feed from 767 to OFF, and removes the handle.
Examiner Note: MCB Annunciator J-6, 4KV MAIN OR TIE-BREAKER TRIP
- expected alarm.
- is an (Attachment 1, Step 6) VERIFY 13 The operator observes the - - -
BUS 12A ALT FEED FROM 767 52/12BY Green and White status 52/12BY, OPENS (Green light ,
lights are LIT and the Red status ILLUMINATED, White light light is OFF.
ILLUMINATED).
I (Attachment 1, Step 7) PLACE 14 The operator places the 52/12BY - - -
BUS 12A ALT FEED FROM 767 control switch to TRIP and then to 52/12BY, control switch to TRIP' AUTO.
AND THEN to AUTO.
(Attachment 1, Step 8) VERIFY 15 The operator observes the - - -
BUS 12A ALT FEED FROM 767 52/12BY Green status light is LIT 52/12BY is OPEN AND RESET ,
and the Red and White status (Green light ILLUMINATED, White lights are OFF.
light EXTINGUISHED).
(Attachment 1, Step 9) PLACE
- 16 The operator places the 52/12AY - - -
BUS 12A NORMAL FEED FROM control switch to CLOSE and then 7T, 52/12AY, control switch to to AUTO and observes that the CLOSE AND THEN to AUTO.
Red status light is LIT and the Green and White status lights are OFF.
(Attachment 1, Step 10) VERIFY 17 The operator observes the - - -
BUS 12A NORMAL FEED FROM 52/12AY the Red status light is LIT 7T, 52/12AY, is CLOSED AND and the Green and White status RESET (Red light ILLUMINATED lights are OFF.
White light EXTINGUISHED). ,
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM E NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 10 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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- > Uz (Attachment 1, Step 11) 18 The operator calls Electrical - - -
IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY Electrical Maintenance and the SE.
Maintenance AND System Engineer of breaker problem.
CUE Acknowledge as Maintenance and System Engineer JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM .
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM E NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 11 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM E Examinee's Name:
Date Performed:
Facility Evaluator:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Name (print)
Examiner's Signature: Date:
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM E NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- The plant is operating at 100% power.
- The Electric Plant is currently in a 50/50 NORMAL lineup.
- RG&E ECC has requested that the plant be placed in a 100/0 lineup on Circuit 767 for scheduled maintenance on offsite Circuit 7T later today.
- An A-52.12 for removal of Circuit 7T is being prepared.
- You are the CO.
INITIATING CUE:
- The US has directed you to establish a 100/0 Electric Plant alignment per 0-6.9.2, Establishing and/or Transferring Offsite Power to BUS 12A I BUS 12B, Section 6.3.
NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet NRC EXAM SIM JPM F 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM F (Rev_022217) NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 2 of 11 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:
Task
Title:
Add Nitrogen to an SI Accumulator JPM No.: 2017 Systems NRC -
Control Room JPM F KIA
Reference:
006 A4.02 (4.0/3.8)
Examinee: NRC Examiner:
Facility Evaluator: Date:
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: x Classroom - - - Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.
Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM), and Handout 1.
Initial Conditions:
- The plant is operating at 100% power.
- MCB Annunciator C-11, ACCUMULATOR 1A (LOOP B) PRESS 730 PSI 760, alarms.
- You are the HCO.
Initiating Cue:
- The US has directed you to coordinate with the Equipment Operator and raise the pressure in the A Accumulator to 745 +/-10 psig per S-16.2, Nitrogen Makeup to the SI Accumulators, using nitrogen cluster A.
- The Equipment Operator has a Field Copy of S-16.2 and has completed the Aux Bldg High Press N2 Valve alignment.
Task Standard: The operator will raise the A SI Accumulator pressure to 745+/-1 O psig per S-16.2.
Required Materials: None General
References:
S-16.2, Nitrogen Makeup to the SI Accumulators, Rev 032 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 3 of 11 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet AR-C-11, ACCUMULATOR 1A (LOOP B) PRESS 730 PSI 760, Rev 00700 Handouts: Handout 1: Copy of S-16.2, Nitrogen Makeup to the SI Accumulators, marked up through prerequisite 5.6.
Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 16 minutes NOTE: This JPM should be Pre-Briefed in the Briefing Room.
Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue .
Information For Evaluator's Use:
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.
- Denotes critical steps.
Number any comments in the "Comment Number column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the "Comments" section. The comment section should be used to document: the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM.
Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the site's appropriate tracking system.
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue .
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM F NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 4 of 11 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet SIMULATOR OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES
- 1. Reset to IC-19 (Or any appropriate 100% power IC)
NOTE: It is okay to use a similar IC to the IC listed above, provided the IC actually used is verified to be compatible with this and other JPMs that are scheduled to be run concurrently.
- 2. Open AOV-834A and HCV-945 to lower the A SI Accumulator pressure to =728 psig (Pl-941) and alarm C-11 received.
- 3. Close AOV-834A and HCV-945.
- 4. Insert REM SIS06 =705 (This will be adjusted higher during the performance of the JPM using Trigger #1 ).
- 5. Insert REM SIS06 = 760 on Trigger #1 (10 Second Ramp)
- 6. Place simulator in FREEZE.
- 7. Reset to IC-166 (October, 2016)
- 8. Place simulator in RUN when directed by examiner.
- 9. When the above steps are completed for this and other JPMs to be run concurrently then validate, if not previously validated, the concurrently run JPMs using the JPM Validation Checklist.
- 10. This completes the setup for this JPM.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 5 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:
STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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- > (.)z CUE Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handout 1.
NOTE Step ladder will be needed to reach V-1827, V-1827 A and V-1827B located Aux. Bldg. Middle level about 10 feet off floor just South of East stairway.
(S-16.2, Step 6.2.1) IF Aux Bldg The operator reads the NOTE, and 1 - - -
High Press N2 valve alignment has proceeds.
been completed, THEN with US approval, MARK this Step N/A. The operator recognizes from the Initiating Cue that the Aux Bldg High Press N2 valve alignment has been completed, and marks this Step N/A.
CUE IF the operator asks the US for approval to mark' this Step N/A state that permission is granted to do so.
(S-16.2, Step 6.2.2) OPEN SI The operator places the AOV-
- 2 - - -
ACCUM A N2 FILL VENT VALVE, 834A Control Switch to the OPEN AOV-834A. (MCB) position and observes the Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF.
(S-16.2, Step 6.2.3) OPEN The operator places the AOV-846
- 3 - - -
ACCUM N2 SUPPLY ISOL Control Switch to the OPEN VALVE, AOV-846. (MCB) position and observes the Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF.
(S-16.2, Step 6.2.4) IF Nitrogen The operator recognizes from the 4 - - -
Cluster is in Low Pressure backup Initiating Cue that the Nitrogen mode PER S-4.2.9, Nitrogen Cluster is in Low Pressure backup Backup Supply to Auxiliary mode (Direction has been provided Building, THEN MARK N/A closure to use N2 Cluster A), and marks of applicable 1803 valve in Step this Step N/A.
6.2.5 AND use of that cluster for charging Accumulators in Step 6.2.6. OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 6 of 11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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(.) z (S-16.2, Step 6.2.5) PERFORM The operator contacts the 5 - - -
the following to verify N2 Cluster Equipment Operator and directs isolation valves to Low Pressure that Step 6.2.5 be performed.
N2 Header CLOSED:
- VERIFY CLOSED N2 CLUSTER A ISOL VL V TO LP N2 HOR, V-1803A.
- VERIFY CLOSED N2 CLUSTER C ISOL VL V TO LP N2 HOR, V-1803C.
SIM DRIVER (Or Examiner):
As Equipment Operator, report that Step 6.2.5 has been completed.
NOTE N2 Cluster pressure must be greater than 800 psi.
(S-16.2, Step 6.2.6/6.2.6.1) The operator reads the NOTE, and
- 6 - - -
PERFORM ONE of the following to proceeds.
align N2 supply AND MARK options NOT used N/A: The operator contacts the Equipment Operator and directs From N2 Cluster A: that Step 6.2.6 and 6.2.6.1 be performed.
- OPEN N2 CLUSTER A OUTLET BLOCK VL V, V-1806A.
- RECORD Cluster pressure at start of charge.
- OPEN N2 CLUSTER A ISOL VLV TO ACCUMULATOR FILL LINE, V-1805A.
SIM DRIVER (Or Examiner):
As Equipment Operator, report that Step 6.2.6.1 has been completed.
If asked, report A Cluster pressure of 2100 psig.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM F NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 7of11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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- > (.) z CAUTION Regulator valve discharge pressure MUST be less than 755 psig to avoid lifting N2 INLET TO ACCUMULATORS RELIEF VLV, RV-8621.
(S-16.2, Step 6.2.7/6.2.7.1) IF The operator reads the CAUTION,
- 7 - - -
NITROGEN PRESSURE and proceeds.
CONTROL, AOV-944C, is OPERABLE, THEN PERFORM The operator contacts the the following to charge Equipment Operator and directs accumulator using regulated that Step 6.2. 7 and 6.2. 7.1 be pressure: performed.
ADJUST NITROGEN PRESSURE CONTROL, AOV-944C, as necessary AND MAINTAIN regulator valve discharge pressure.
less than 755 psig. ,'
SIM DRIVER (Or Examiner):
As Equipment Operator, report that Step 6.2.7.1 has been completed.
(S-16.2, Step 6.2.7.2) OPEN The operator contacts the
- 8 - - -
NITROGEN SUPPLY ISOLATION, Equipment Operator and directs V-944D, to begin charging that Step 6.2.7.2 be performed.
SIM DRIVER:
As Equipment Operator align N2 by operating Trigger #1. THEN, report that Step 6.2.7.2 has been completed.
The operator observes Pl-941 to be rising. - - -
Examiner Note: MCB Annunciator C-11 is expected to clear when the A SI Accumulator Pressure is > 730 psig.
NOTE IF IST surveillance testing of CV-8623 is being performed AND SI Accumulator nitrogen pressure is at high end of the allowable band, THEN only a verification of a pressure increase during SI Accumulator charging needs to be performed to satisfy the IST surveillance test for CV-8623.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM F NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 8of11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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- > () z (S-16.2, Step 6.2.7.3) WHEN The operator reads the NOTE, and 9 - - -
Accumulator N2 pressure reaches proceeds.
745 psig (735 to 755 psig), THEN CLOSE NITROGEN SUPPLY The operator observes Pl-941 to ISOLATION, V-944D. be> 735 psig, but< 755 psig; and MCB Annunciator C-11 is EXTINGUISHED; and contacts the Equipment Operator and directs that Step 6.2.7.3 be performed.
SIM DRIVER:
Observe A SI Accumulator pressure as it is being pressurized. As Equipment Operator adjust N2 by setting REM SIS06 to the current A Accumulator pressure. THEN, report that Step 6.2.7.3 has been completed.
10 (S-16.2, Step 6.2.8) IF NITROGEN The operator recognizes that AOV- I:
PRESSURE CONTROL, AOV- 944C is NOT inoperable, marks - - -
944C, is INOPERABLE, THEN Step 6.2.8 N/A, and proceeds.
PERFORM the following to charge accumulator using NITROGEN SUPPLY BYPASS, V-944E:
OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.
(S-16.2, Step 6.2.9/6.2.9.1) The operator contacts the 11 - - -
PERFORM ONE of the following to Equipment Operator and directs secure N2 supply alignment AND that Step 6.2.9 and 6.2.9.1 be MARK options NOT used N/A: performed.
From N2 Cluster A:
- CLOSE N2 CLUSTER A ISOL VLV TO ACCUMULATOR FILL LINE, V-1805A.
- RECORD Cluster pressure at end of charge.
- CLOSE N2 CLUSTER A OUTLET BLOCK VLV, V-1806A.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM F NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 9of11 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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(.) z SIM DRIVER (Or Examiner):
As Equipment Operator, report that Step 6.2.9.1 has been completed.
If asked, report A Cluster pressure of 1500 psig.
(S-16.2, Step 6.2.10) CLOSE The operator places the AOV-846
- 12 - - -
ACCUM N2 SUPPLY ISOL Control Switch to the CLOSE VALVE, AOV-846. (MCB) position and observes the Green status light is LIT, and the Red status light is OFF.
(S-16.2, Step 6.2.11) CLOSE SI The operator places the AOV-
- 13 - - -
ACCUM A N2 FILL VENT VALVE, 834A Control Switch to the CLOSE AOV-834A. (MCB) position and observes the Green status light is LIT, and the Red
., status light is OFF .
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM F NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 10of11 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM F Examinee's Name:
Date Performed:
Facility Evaluator:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Name (print)
Examiner's Signature: Date:
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM F NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- The plant is operating at 100% power.
- MCB Annunciator C-11, ACCUMULATOR 1A (LOOP B)
PRESS 730 PSI 760, alarms.
- You are the HCO.
INITIATING CUE:
- The US has directed you to coordinate with the Equipment Operator and raise the pressure in the A Accumulator to 745
+/-10 psig per S-16.2, Nitrogen Makeup to the SI Accumulators, using nitrogen cluster A.
- The Equipment Operator has a Field Copy of S-16.2 and has completed the Aux Bldg High Press N2 Valve alignment.
NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet NRC EXAM SIM JPM G 2017 Systems NRC- Control Room JPM G (Rev_022317) NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 2 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:
Task
Title:
Startup the Containment Mini-Purge JPM No.: 2017 Systems NRC -
Control Room JPM G KIA
Reference:
029 A2.01 (2.9/3.6)
Examinee: NRC Examiner:
Facility Evaluator: Date:
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: x Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the' task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.
Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM}, and Handout 1.
Initial Conditions:
- The plant is operating at 100% power.
- A Containment entry for maintenance is scheduled for tomorrow.
- The Prerequisites of S-23.2.3, Containment Mini-Purge System Operation, have been established for startup of the Containment Mini-Purge System.
- You are the CO.
Initiating Cue:
- The US has directed you to startup the Containment Mini-Purge System per S-23.2.3.
- An Equipment Operator has a Field Copy of S-23.2.3 and is standing by to assist.
Task Standard: The operator will start the Containment Mini-Purge System per S-23.2.3.
Required Materials: None 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM G NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 3 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet General
References:
S-23.2.3, Containment Mini-Purge System Operation, Rev 013 CH-704, Containment Mini-Purge Releases, Rev 00000 Handouts: Handout 1: Copy of S-23.2.3, Containment Mini-Purge System Operation, marked up through prerequisite 5.13.2.
Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 5 minutes NOTE: This JPM should be Pre-Briefed in the Briefing Room.
Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue .
Information For Evaluator's Use:
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.
- Denotes critical steps.
Number any comments in the "Comment Number" column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the "Comments" section. The comment section should be used to document: the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM.
Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the site's appropriate tracking system.
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed. '
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue .
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM G NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 4 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet SIMULATOR OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES
- 1. Reset to IC-19 (Or any appropriate 100% power IC)
NOTE: It is okay to use a similar IC to the IC listed above, provided the IC actually used is verified to be compatible with this and other JPMs that are scheduled to be run concurrently.
- 2. Verify that Prerequisite conditions required by Section 5.0 of S-23.2.3 are MET.
- 3. Place simulator in FREEZE.
- 4. Reset to IC-167 (October, 2016)
- 5. Place simulator in RUN when directed by examiner.
- 6. When th~ above steps are completed for this and other JPMs to be run concurrently then validate, if not previously validated, the concurrently run JPMs using the JPM Validation Checklist.
- 7. This completes the setup for this JPM.
2017 Systems NRG - Control Room JPM G NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 5 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:
STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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(S-23.2.3, Step 6.1.1) VERIFY The operator contacts the 1 - - -
LOCKED CLOSED ILRT VENT Equipment Operator and directs INR ISOL VLV, AOV-7479. that Step 6.1.1 be completed.
SIM DRIVER:
As Equipment Operator, report that Step 6.1.1 has been completed.
(S-23.2.3, Step 6.1.2) OPEN The operator places the AOV-7970
- 2 - - -
CONTAINMENT MINI PURGE Control Switch in the OPEN EXHAUST VAL VE, AOV-7970. position and observes the Red (Inside Containment) status light is LIT, and the Green status light !s OFF.
(S-23.2.3, Step 6.1.3) OPEN The operator places the AOV-7971
- 3 - - -
CONTAINMENT MINI PURGE Control Switch in the OPEN EXHAUST VALVE, AOV-7971. position and observes the Red (Outside Containment) status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF.
(S-23.2.3, Step 6.1.4) OPEN The operator places the AOV-7478
- 4 - - -
CNMT MINI PURGE SUPPLY Control Switch in the OPEN VLV, AOV-7478. (Inside position and observes the Red Containment) status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF.
(S-23.2.3, Step 6.1.5) OPEN The operator places the AOV-7445
- 5 - - -
CNMT MINI PURGE SUPPLY Control Switch in the OPEN VLV, AOV-7445. (Outside position and observes the Red Containment) status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF.
NOTE Blower discharge valve AOV-7480 will stroke open on blower start.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM G NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 6 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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(.) z (S-23.2.3, Step 6.1.6) START 1A The operator reads the NOTE, and
- 6 - - -
Mini-Purge Supply System Blower proceeds.
AND VERIFY containment pressure rise. (Pressure should The operator places the 1A Mini-start rising in 4-5 minutes) Purge Supply System Blower Control Switch in the START position and observes the Red status light is LIT, and the Green status light is OFF.
Examiner NOTE: Step 6.1.6 of S-23.2.3 refers to the 1A Mini-Purge Supply System Blower. The MCB label refers to this component as the CNMT Mini Purge Supply Fan 1A.
Examiner NOTE: MCB Annunciator C-17, CONTAINMENT VENT SYSTEM, will flash when the Blower is started.
Examiner NOTE: Terminate JPM as soon as Containment pressure is observed to be rising.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM G NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 7 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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- > Uz (S-23.2.3, Step 6.1.7) PERFORM The operator monitors MCB 7 - - -
one of the following steps to Containment pressure (Pl-944) for ensure containment mini-purge is indication of rising pressure, OR occurring; N/A option(s) not used: establish a trend of P0944 on the
- VERIFY containment purge PPCS.
occurring by increasing then stabilizing containment pressure. N/A if mini-purge valve adjustments are required.
- IF containment pressure is increasing too rapidly, THEN ADJUST Instrument Air PCV 15475 to close MINI-PURGE SUPPLY FAN A OUTLET DAMPER, AOV-7480. *t OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.
- IF containment pressure is not increasing, THEN ADJUST Instrument Air PCV-15475 to open MINI-PURGE SUPPLY FAN A OUTLET DAMPER, AOV-7480. OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM G NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 8 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM G Examinee's Name:
Date Performed:
Facility Evaluator:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Name (print)
Examiner's Signature: Date:
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM G NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- The plant is operating at 100% power.
- A Containment entry for maintenance is scheduled for tomorrow.
- The Prerequisites of S-23.2.3, Containment Mini-Purge System Operation have been established for startup of the Containment Mini-Purge System.
- You are the CO.
INITIATING CUE:
- The US has directed you to startup the Containment Mini-Purge System per S-23.2.3.
- An Equipment Operator has a Field Copy of S-23.2.3 and is standing by to assist.
NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet NRC EXAM SIM JPM H 2017 Systems NRC- Control Room JPM H (Rev_022317) NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 2 of 12 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:
Task
Title:
Defeat a Failed SIG Pressure JPM No.: 2017 Systems NRC -
Channel Control Room JPM H KIA
Reference:
012 A4.04 (3.313.3)
Examinee: NRC Examiner:
Facility Evaluator: Date:
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance: Actual Performance: x Classroom Simulator X Plant READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.
Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM}, and Handout 1.
Initial Conditions:
- The plant is operating at 100% power.
- Steam Pressure Channel Pl-468 has just failed LOW.
- All appropriate actions have been taken to stabilize the plant.
- The Brief for defeating the associated channel has been completed.
- You are the CO.
Initiating Cue: The US has directed you to defeat affected Steam Generator pressure channel as per Attachment 30, Red Channel - SIG Pressure Channel Pl-468, of ER-INST.1, Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrumentation Loop Failure.
Task Standard: The operator will defeat SIG Pressure Channel Pl-468 using Attachment 30 of ER-INST.1.
Required Materials: None General
References:
ER-INST.1, Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrumentation Loop Failure, Rev 037 2017 Systems NRC- Control Room JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 3 of 12 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of Attachment 30, Red Channel - SIG Pressure Channel Pl-468, of ER-INST.1, Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrumentation Loop Failure.
Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 8 minutes NOTE: This JPM should be Pre-Briefed in the Briefing Room.
Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue .
Information For Evaluator's Use:
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.
- Denotes critical steps.
Number any comments in the "Comment Number" column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the "Comments" section. The comment section should be used to document'. the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the site's appropriate tracking system.
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps.
These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.
- The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue .
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 4 of 12 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet SIMULATOR OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES
- 1. Reset to IC-19 (Or any appropriate 100% power IC)
NOTE: It is okay to use a similar IC to the IC listed above, provided the IC actually used is verified to be compatible with this and other JPMs that are scheduled to be run concurrently.
- 2. Place simulator in RUN.
- 3. Insert MALF SGN3A= 0.
- 4. Respond using ER-INST.1 through Step 6.8.1.
- 5. Place simulator in FREEZE.
- 6. Reset to IC-168 (October, 2016)
- 7. Place simulator in RUN when directed by examiner.
- 8. When the above steps are completed for this and other JPMs to be run concurrently then validate, if not previously validated, the concurrently run JPMs using the JPM Validation Checklist.
- 9. This completes the setup for this JPM.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM H NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 5 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:
STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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- > (.) z CUE Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM} and Handout 1.
NOTE The following bistable status light is expected to be lit after the DEFEAT:
- Hi Steam Flow, FC464A
- Hi Hi Steam Flow, FC464B
- Lo Press SI, PC468A The following Annunciator is expected to be lit after the DEFEAT:
- G-26, SIG A HI STEAM FLOW i
(ER-INST.1, Attachment 30, Step The operator reads the NOTE, and 1 - - -
1.0/1.1) DETERMINE the expected proceeds.
Bistable proving light status for the post defeat condition as follows: The operator observes Pl-468 and records 0 psig.
RECORD the following Data:
The operator observes PP(;S
- SIG A Pressure Pl-468 Point F0464 and records 3. 7E6 PSIG lbm/hour.
- SIG A Steam Flow F0464 (PPCS) lb/hr 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 6 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION
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1.2) DETERMINE the expected LO LO PRESS SI Proving Light is post defeat Bistable proving light OFF if the Pl-468 reading is::; 514 status and circle the expected psig, and circles OFF for 468 status in table below: LOOP A-1 LO LO PRESS SI.
468 LOOP A-1
468 ::; 600 psig if the Pl-468 reading is ::; 600 psig, and circles OFF for 468 LOOP A-1 LOW PRESS.
464 LOOP A-1 The operator recognizes that the
- HIGH TRIP Light OFF IF HI TRIP Proving Light is OFF if the - - -
F0464 (PPCS) :2: 0.50X10 6 lb/hr F0464 reading is :2: 0.50X10 6 lb/hr, and circles OFF for 464 LOOP A-1 HITRIP.
464 LOOP A-1 The operator recognizes that the
- HI-HI TRIP Light OFF IF F0464 HI-HI TRIP Proving Light is OFF if - - -
(PPCS) :2: 4.40X10 6 lb/hr the F0464 reading is :2: 4.40X 106 lb/hr, and circles ON for 464 LOOP A-1 HI-HI TRIP.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM H NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 7 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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- > Uz (ER-INST.1, Attachment 30, Step The operator obtains a Key and
- 3 2.0) In the (RED) R-2 proceeds to R-2 PROTECTION PROTECTION CHANNEL 1 rack, CHANNEL 1.
PLACE the following bistable proving switches to DEFEAT (UP), The operator unlocks and opens AND verify the proving light status the R-2 PROTECTION CHANNEL is correct per the table above: 1 door.
468 LOOP A-1 The operator verifies that the 468 - - -
The operator places the 468 LOOP A-1 LO LO PRESS SI proving switch to the UP position, and observes that the proving light remains 0FF.
468 LOOP A-1 The operator verifies that the 468
The operator places the 468 LOOP A-1 LOW PRESS proving switch to - - -
the UP position, and observes that the proving light remains OFF.
464 LOOP A-1 The operator verifies that the 464
- HIGH TRIP LOOP A-1 HIGH TRIP Proving Light is OFF.
The operator places the 464 LOOP A-1 HIGH TRIP proving switch to - - -
the UP position, and observes that the proving light remains OFF.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM H NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 8 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION I-I-
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STEP ELEMENT STANDARD <C en z E E
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(.) z 464 LOOP A-1 The operator verifies that the 464
- HI-HI TRIP LOOP A-1 HI-HI TRIP Proving Light is OFF.
The operator places the 464 LOOP A-1 HI-HI TRIP proving switch to - - -
the UP position, and observes that the proving light turns ON.
The acknowledges the sound of a MCB Annunciator alarming.
The operator closes and locks the I R-2 PROTECTION CHANNEL 1 I door.
I I I (ER-INST.1, Attachment 30, Step The operator observes that the Lo 4 - - -
3.0) VERIFY the bistable status Press SI, PC468A bistable status lights AND Annunciators listed light is LIT.
above are lit.
The operator observes that the Hi Steam Flow, FC-464A, bistable - - -
status light is LIT.
The operator observes that the Hi Hi Steam Flow, FC464B, bistable - - -
status light is LIT.
The operator observes that MCB Annunciator G-26, SIG A HI - - -
STEAM FLOW, is LIT.
The operator observes that MCB Annunciator G-11, LO STEAM - - -
PRESSURE LOOP A 600 PSI, is LIT.
The operator observes that MCB Annunciator G-27, STM LINE A - - -
LO-LO PRESSURE CHANNEL ALERT 514 PSI, is LIT.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 9 of 12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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- > Uz (ER-INST.1, Attachment 30, Step At the PPCS Console, the operator
- 5 - - -
4.0/4.1) DELETE the point from selects "Sub/Delete/Restore" the PPCS by PERFORMING the display.
following:
SELECT the "Sub/Delete/Restore" display.
(ER-INST.1, Attachment 30, Step At the PPCS Console, the operator
- 6 - - -
4.2) SELECT Point ID P0468. selects "Point ID P0468."
(ER-INST.1, Attachment 30, Step At the PPCS Console, the operator
- 7 - - -
4.3) TURN "OFF" scan processing. selects "OFF," for scan processing.
(ER-INST.1, Attachment 30, Step At the PPCS Console, the operator
- 9 - - -
4.4) SELECT "Change". selects "CHANGE."
(ER-INST.1, Attachment 30, Step At the PPCS Console, the operator
- 10 - - -
4.5) ANSWER prompts. answers prompts.
(ER-INST.1, Attachment 30, Step At the PPCS Console, the operator
- 11 - - -
4.6) SELECT Point ID F0464.: selects "Point ID F0464."
(ER-INST.1, Attachment 30, Step At the PPCS Console, the operator
- 12 - - -
4.7) TURN "OFF" scan processing. selects "OFF," for scan processing.
(ER-INST.1, Attachment 30, Step At the PPCS Console, the operator
- 13 - - -
4.8) SELECT "Change. selects "CHANGE."
(ER-INST.1, Attachment 30, Step At the PPCS Console, the operator
- 14 - - -
4.9) ANSWER prompts. answers prompts.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM H NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 10of12 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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=> Uz (ER-INST.1, Attachment 30, Step The operator reports to the US that 15 - - -
5.0) GO TO step 6.8.2. Attachment 30 is complete, and that ER-INST.1 Step 6.8.2 must be addressed.
CUE Acknowledge as US.
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM.
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM H NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 11 of 12 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM H Examinee's Name:
Date Performed:
Facility Evaluator:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Name (print)
Examiner's Signature: Date:
2017 Systems NRC - Control Room JPM H NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- The plant is operating at 100% power.
- Steam Pressure Channel Pl-468 has just failed LOW.
- All appropriate actions have been taken to stabilize the plant.
- The Brief for defeating the associated channel has been completed.
- You are the CO.
INITIATING CUE: The US has directed you to defeat affected Steam Generator pressure channel as per Attachment 30, Red Channel - SIG Pressure Channel Pl-468, of ER-INST.1, Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrumentation Loop Failure.
NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet NRC EXAM In-Plant JPM I 2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM I (Rev_022317) NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 2of10 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:
Task
Title:
Energize a Minimum of 100 KW B/U JPM No.: 2017 Systems NRC -
Heaters onto EOG In-Plant JPM I KIA
Reference:
APE 056 AA 1.03 (3.2/3.3)
Examinee: Examiner:
Facility Evaluator: Date:
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance: x Actual Performance:
Classroom Simulator Plant x I
READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.
Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM} and Handout 1.
Initial Conditions:
- The plant was operating at 100% power when it experienced an SI coincident with a loss of all AC power.
- The B EOG is now running and carrying approximately 1650 KW on Buses 16 and 17.
- PRZR level is 20% and stable.
- SI has been RESET.
- The crew has taken all required actions needed to restore Pressurizer Heaters on the EOG.
- You are an extra Control Operator.
Initiating Cue: The US has directed you to energize a minimum 100 KW of PRZR BACKUP heaters per ER-PRZR.1, Restoration of PRZR Heaters During Blackout.
Task Standard: The operator will energize 125 KW of pressurizer backup heaters per ER-PRZR.1.
Required Materials: PPE (Hardhat, Safety Glasses, Hearing Protection, Safety Shoes etc.)
2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM I NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 3 of 10 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet General
References:
ER-PRZR.1, Restoration of PRZR Heaters During Blackout, Rev. 00700 Drawing 03200-0122, Sheet 1, Pressurizer Backup Heater Panel B1 ACPDPA12 Schedule, Rev 2 Drawing 03200-0122, Sheet 2, Pressurizer Backup Heater Panel B1 ACPDPA12 Arrangement, Rev 0 Drawing 03200-0123, Sheet 1, Pressurizer Backup Heater Panel B2 ACPDPA13 Schedule, Rev 2 Drawing 03200-0123, Sheet 2, Pressurizer Backup Heater Panel B2 ACPDPA13 Arrangement, Rev 0 Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of ER-PRZR.1 Handout 2: Photo of ACPDPAB12 Handout 3: Photo of ACPDPAB13 Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 9 minutes Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue .
Information For Evaluator's Use:
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.
- Denotes critical steps.
Number any comments in the "Comment Number" column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the "Comments" section. The comment section should be used to document: the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the site's appropriate tracking system.
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue .
2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 4of10 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:
STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-I-
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- > Uz CUE Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handout 1.
PRECAUTIONS
- A minimum of 100 KW of PRZR heaters should be restored within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of initiation of natural circulation to prevent loss of subcooling. (ITS LCO 3.4.9)
- PRZR level must be GREATER THAN 13% (50% adverse CNMT) to energize PRZR heaters.
- Continuous DIG loading should not exceed 1950 KW.
- During accident conditions, the on duty RP Technician should be consulted prior to entry into the controlled area. 1
- The PASS purge line to the VCT may require flushing to minimize radiological hazards prior to entering the SFP Hx area.
NOTE DIG accident loading is listed in UFSAR Table 8.3-2.
(ER-PRZR.1, Step 4.0.1) The operator reads the 1 - - -
PRECAUTIONS, and proceeds.
This procedure is divided into the following sections: The operator reads the NOTE, and proceeds.
4.1 Restoring PRZR Proportional HTRs The operator proceeds to Step 4.2.
4.2 Restoring PRZR Backup HTRs (ER-PRZR.1, Step 4.2/4.2.1) The operator recognizes from the 2 - - -
Perform the following to restore all Initial Conditions that SI has been or part of the PRZR Backup reset, and proceeds.
heaters:
Verify SI has been reset (Annunciator K-6 clear). Reset SI if necessary.
CUE If the operator contacts the Control Room, as the CO, state that "MCB Annunciator K-6 is CLEAR."
(ER-PRZR.1, Step 4.2.2) Verify The operator recognizes from the 3
Emergency DIG B is supplying Bus Initial Conditions that DIG B is
- 16. supplying Bus 16, and proceeds.
2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 5of10 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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(ER-PRZR.1, Step 4.2.314.2.3.1) The operator recognizes from the 4 - - -
To energize all PRZR Backup Initial Conditions that DIG B is heaters ( 400 KW) perform the loaded to 1650 KW, and proceeds following: to Step 4.2.4.
Verify Emergency DIG B load less than 1550 KW. IF NOT, THEN go to step 4.2.4.
I CUE If the operator contacts the Control Room, as the CO, state that "the B EOG is loaded to 1650 KW." .,
(ER-PRZR.1, Step 4.2.414.2.4.1) The operator recognizes that the B 5 - - -
To energize a minimum of 125 KW EDG is loaded to 1650 KW, marks of PRZR Backup heaters, perform the Step NA, and proceeds.
the following:
IF Emergency DIG B load is GREATER THAN 1825 KW, THEN evaluate plant status and reduce DIG loading to less than 1825 KW.
(ER-PRZR.1, Step 4.2.4.2) The operator proceeds to backup 6 - - -
Dispatch an AO to the PRZR heater breaker panel backup heater breaker panel (AUX ACPDPAB12.
BLDG intermediate floor by SFP Hx).
Examiner Note: ACPDPAB12 is located on the AB Middle level, behind 'A' SFP heat exchanger.
CUE When the operator identifies the location of ACPDPAB12, provide Handout 2. Due to potential safety concern with panel's elevation, after identifying the panel inform the operator that they may simulate/describe breaker actions on provided drawing.
2017 Systems NRG- In-Plant JPM I NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 6of10 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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- > Uz (ER-PRZR.1, Step 4.2.4.3) At The operator places Breaker# 01
- 7 - - -
ACPDPAB12 open all breaker to OFF.
switches EXCEPT Breaker Switch
- 4.
The operator places Breaker # 02 to OFF. - - -
The operator places Breaker # 03 to OFF. - - -
The operator places Breaker # 05 to OFF. I - - -
The operator places Breaker # 06 to OFF. - - -
The operator places Breaker # 07 to OFF. - - -
The operator places Breaker #. 08 to OFF.
CUE After the operator manipulates each breaker, state that "The Breaker Handle is in the OFF position."
Examiner Note: The Breaker manipulations can be accomplished in any order.
Examiner Note: Breakers in panel ACPDPAB12 are identical to the breakers in ACPDPAB13 in upcoming step.
Examiner Note: Nearest ladder station is on the wall next to the Spent Fuel Pool DI room gate 2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM I NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 7of10 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
<C I-
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- > 0 :J Uz CUE When the operator identifies the location of ACPDPAB13, provide Handout 3. Due to potential safety concern with panel's elevation, after identifying the panel inform the operator that they may simulate/describe breaker actions on provided drawing.
(ER-PRZR.1, Step 4.2.4.4) At The operator proceeds to the
- 8 - - -
ACPDPAB13 open all breaker backup heater breaker panel switches EXCEPT Breaker Switch ACPDPAB13.
- 1, #3, and #6. (Total capacity available should be approximately The operator places Breaker # 02 125 KW) to OFF.
The operator places Breaker # 04 to OFF. - - -
' The operator places Breaker # 05 to OFF. - - -
CUE After the operator manipulates each breaker, state that "The Breaker Handle is in the OFF position."
(ER-PRZR.1, Step 4.2.4.5) Note The operator contacts the Control 9 - - -
Emergency DIG B wattmeter Room and directs them to report B reading. EOG Load.
CUE When the operator contacts the Control Room, as the CO, state that "the B EOG is loaded to 1650 KW."
(ER-PRZR.1, Step 4.2.4.6) Place The operator contacts the Control
- 10 - - -
PRZR backup heater breaker Room and requests them to place switch to ON to load heaters onto the PRZR backup heater breaker Emergency DIG B. switch to ON.
CUE When the operator contacts the Control Room, as the CO, state that "the PRZR Backup Heater Control Switch is in ON."
2017 Systems NRG- In-Plant JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 8of10 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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- > Uz (ER-PRZR.1, Step 4.2.4. 7) Verify a The operator contacts the Control 11 - - -
minimum of 100 KW has been Room and requests them to report loaded on Emergency DIG B. B EOG Load.
CUE When the operator contacts the Control Room, as the CO, state that "the B EOG is loaded to 1775 KW, and steady."
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM .
2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM I NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 9of10 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM I Examinee's Name:
Date Performed:
Facility Evaluator:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Name (print)
Examiner's Signature: Date:
2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM I NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- The plant was operating at 100% power when it experienced an SI coincident with a loss of all AC power.
- The B EOG is now running and carrying approximately 1650 KW on Buses 16 and 17.
- PRZR level is 20% and stable.
- SI has been RESET.
- The crew has taken all required actions needed to restore Pressurizer Heaters on the EOG.
- You are an extra Control Operator.
INITIATING CUE: The US has directed you to energize a minimum 100 KW of PRZR BACKUP heaters per ER-PRZR.1, Restoration of PRZR Heaters During Blackout.
NOTE: No p'lant equipment should be operated during the performance of this JPM. All actions must be SIMULATED.
NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet NRC EXAM In-Plant JPM J 2017 Systems NRG- In-Plant JPM J (Rev_022317) NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 2 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:
Task
Title:
Take Local Manual Control of a JPM No.: 2017 Systems NRC -
Charging Pump In-Plant JPM J KIA
Reference:
004 A2.15 (3.5/3. 7)
Examinee: Examiner:
Facility Evaluator: Date:
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance: x Actual Performance:
Classroom Simulator Plant X READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for' this Job Performance Measure will be satisfied.
Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue {Last Page of this JPM) and Handout 1.
Initial Conditions:
- A fire in the Cable Tunnel requires evacuation of the Control Room, and ER-FIRE.2, "Alternate Shutdown for Cable Tunnel Fire," is being implemented.
- Attachment 4 of ER-FIRE.2 has been performed up to Step 8.0.
- You are the CO Initiating Cue: The US has directed you to start and control the A Charging Pump in accordance with procedure ER-FIRE.2, Attachment 4, Step 8.0, until charging flow is verified to the RCS.
Task Standard: The operator will start, control and initiate charging flow locally from the A Charging Pump per Attachment 4 of ER-FIRE.2.
Required Materials: PPE (Hardhat, Safety Glasses, Hearing Protection, Safety Shoes etc.)
Appendix "R" Locker key Locked Valve key General
References:
ER-FIRE.2, Alternate Shutdown for Cable Tunnel Fire, Rev. 034 2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 3 of 9 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Handouts: Handout 1: Attachment 4, Control Operator (CO), of ER-FIRE.2 marked up to Step 8.0.
Handout 2: Internal view of the Local Control Cabinet used in JPM Step 6.
Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 8 minutes Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue .
Information For Evaluator's Use:
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.
!
- Denotes critical steps.
Number any comments in the "Comment Number column on the following pages. Then anr.iotate that comment in the "Comments" section. The comment section should be used to 'document: the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the site's appropriate tracking system.
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue .
2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 4 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:
STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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NOTE To maintain radio communications from the charging pump room, it may be necessary to exit the room OR communicate from the doorway.
CAUTION
- Charging Pump A local/remote switch must be in local before placing DC control power switch to local.
- ABELIP may be affected by fire. Notify SM to monitor Charging Pump flow and PRZR level, if I
required. '
(ER-FIRE.2, Step 8.0/8.1/8.1.1) The operator reads the NOTE, and
- 1 - - -
PROCEED to Charging Pump proceeds.
Room.
The operator places the PERFORM the following to place Local/Remote switch for A Charging in service: Charging Pump to LOCAL.
PLACE the LOCAL/REMOTE ,,
switch for Charging Pump A to LOCAL.
CUE The A Charging Pump Local/Remote switch is in LOCAL.
(ER-FIRE.2, Step 8.1.2) The operator places the A
- 2 - - -
PLACE CHG PMP ALT DC Charging Pump alternate DC 43A/CHP1 A to LOCAL (in control power switch to LOCAL.
ABELIP).
CUE The A Charging Pump Alternate DC Control Power switch is in LOCAL.
2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 5 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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- 3 - - -
ENERGIZE the ABELIP by presses the ON button.
DEPRESSING the ON button located at the bottom of the cabinet.
CUE The ABELIP ON pushbutton is pressed.
(ER-FIRE.2, Step 8.1.4) CLOSE The operator rotates the V-289
- 4 - - -
CHARGING PUMP DISCHARGE Handwheel in the Clockwise ISOLATION VAL VE TO RCP direction.
SEAL INJECTION, V-289 (Above the Charging Pump Pulse Dampener). I CUE The Valve handwheel rotates freely, and then stops. '
(ER-FIRE.2, Step 8.1.5) OPEN The operator rotates the V-358
- 5 - - -
RWST MAKEUP AOV BYPASS Handwheel 90° in the Counter-VALVE TO CHARGING PUMP Clockwise direction.
SUCTION, V-358 (in the overhead between A&B Charging Pumps).
CUE The Valve handwheel rotates 90°, and then stops.
(ER-FIRE.2, Step 8.1.6) LOCALLY In the local control cabinet, the
- 6 - - -
CLOSE Breaker 52/CHP1 A by operator presses PB-1/CHP1A.
depressing PB-1/CHP1A, (in local control cabinet).
CUE The sound of a breaker closing is heard.
Examiner Note: Provide a copy of Handout 2 (Cabinet internals) and have the operator demonstrate the action taken.
(ER-FIRE.2, Step 8.1.7) At At CHARGING PUMP A 7 - - -
CHARGING PUMP A VFD/CHP1A, the operator VFD/CHP1A, VERIFY white Power observes the White POWER ON ON light is lit. light.
CUE The White POWER ON light is LIT.
2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM J NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 6 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION I-I-
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- > 0 j Uz (ER-FIRE.2, Step 8.1.8) At At CHARGING PUMP A 8 - - -
CHARGING PUMP A VFD/CHP1 A, the operator places VFD/CHP1A, VERIFY the Local/Remote Switch in Local/Remote Switch is in LOCAL. LOCAL.
CUE The A Charging Pump Local/Remote switch is in LOCAL.
(ER-FIRE.2, Step 8.1.9) START At CHARGING PUMP A
- 9 - - -
CHARGING PUMP A by VFD/CHP1A, the operator presses Depressing the VFD Start button at the A Charging Pump START VFD/CHP1A. pushbutton I
I CUE The Red VFD RUNNING status light is LIT.
(ER-FIRE.2, Step 8.1'.10) RAISE At CHARGING PUMP A
- 10 - - -
CHARGING PUMP A speed to VFD/CHP1A, the operator adjusts 1,360 +/- 10 RPM by using the the Speed Command Speed Command Potentiometer Potentiometer to 1,360+/-10 RPM.
local controls at VFD/CHP1A.
CUE The speed (located on the digital display panel} indicates 1,360 RPM.
(ER-FIRE.2, Step 8.1 .'11) The operator contacts Shift 11 - - -
NOTIFY SM that CHARGING Manager on the radio and PUMP A is running. indicates that the Charging Pump is running.
CUE The SM Acknowledges, and directs that Pressurizer Level be raised to 40%.
(ER-FIRE.2, Step 9.0) VERIFY At the ABELIP, the operator
- 12 - - -
PRZR level GREATER THAN 15% observes Pressurizer Level and STABLE OR RISING. IF NOT, THEN RAISE charging flow.
CUE Pressurizer Level is 30% and slowly lowering.
2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM J NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 7 of 9 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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- > Uz 12 (Cont'd) At CHARGING PUMP A VFD/CHP1A, the operator adjusts - - -
the Speed Command Potentiometer clockwise.
CUE Pressurizer Level is 31% and slowly rising.
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM .
2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM J NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 8 of 9 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM J Examinee's Name:
Date Performed:
Facility Evaluator:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Dodumentation:
Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Name (print)
Examiner's Signature: Date:
2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM J NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- A fire in the Cable Tunnel requires evacuation of the Control Room, and ER-FIRE.2, "Alternate Shutdown for Cable Tunnel Fire," is being implemented.
- Attachment 4 of ER-FIRE.2 has been performed up to Step 8.0.
- You are the CO INITIATING CUE: The US has directed you to start and control the A Charging Pump in accordance with procedure ER-FIRE.2, Attachment 4, Step 8.0, until charging flow is verified to the RCS.
NOTE: No plant equipment should be operated during the performance of this JPM. All: actions must be SIMULATED.
NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Job Performance Measure Form ES-C-1 Worksheet NRC EXAM In-Plant JPM K 2017 Systems NRG- In-Plant JPM K (Rev_022317) NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 2 of 7 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Facility: Ginna Task No.:
Task
Title:
Locally Open the Rx Trip Breakers JPM No.: 2017 Systems NRC-ln-Plant JPM K KIA
Reference:
EPE 029 EA 1.11 (3.9/4.1)
Examinee: Examiner:
Facility Evaluator: Date:
Method of testing:
Simulated Performance: x Actual Performance:
Classroom Simulator Plant X READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the initial conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide initiating cues. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this Job Performa'nce Measure will be satisfied.
Provide Candidate with Initial Conditions/Cue (Last Page of this JPM) and Handout 1.
Initial Conditions:
- The plant has experienced a reactor trip signal and the crew entered procedure E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
- The reactor trip could not be verified, and the crew entered FR-S.1, Response to Reactor Restart/ATWS.
- You are an extra Control Operator.
Initiating Cue: The US has directed you to locally depress the trip pushbutton for BOTH Control Rod Drive Motor Generator Set Breakers at the CROM Control Panel per the Step 1 RNO of FR-S.1.
Task Standard: The operator will attempt to trip the Control Rod Drive Motor Generator Set Breaker(s); and when it is discovered that the 52-2/MG1 B will not trip, manually trip both Rx Trip Breakers when directed.
Required Materials: PPE (Hardhat, Safety Glasses, Hearing Protection, Safety Shoes etc.)
General
References:
E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Rev. 048 FR-S. 1, Response to Reactor Restart/ATWS, Rev. 021 2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM K NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 3 of 7 Form ES-C-1 Job Performance Measure Worksheet Handouts: Handout 1: Blank copy of Page 3 of 17 of FR-S.1.
Time Critical Task: NO Validation Time: 4 minutes Fill in the JPM Start Time when the student acknowledges the Initiating Cue .
Information For Evaluator's Use:
UNSAT requires written comments on respective step.
- Denotes critical steps.
Number any comments in the "Comment Number column on the following pages. Then annotate that comment in the "Comments" section. The comment section should be used I
to document: the reason that a step is marked as unsatisfactory, marginal performance relating to management expectations, or problems the examinee had while performing the JPM. Comments relating to procedural or equipment issues should be entered and tracked using the site's appropriate tracking system.
Some operations that are performed from outside of the control room may require multiple steps. These items may be listed as individual steps in this JPM. It is acceptable for the candidate to direct the local operator to perform groups of procedure steps instead of calling for each individual item to be performed.
The timeclock starts when the candidate acknowledges the initiating cue .
2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM K NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 4 of 7 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION JPM Start Time:
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(FR-S.1, Step 1 RNO) Dispatch The operator presses the TRIP
- 1 - - -
EO to locally DEPRESS trip pushbutton for 52-1/MG1A.
button for BOTH Control Rod Drive Motor Generator Set breakers at The operator observes the Breaker CROM Control Panel: Flag.
52-1/MG1A, CRD MG SET A BKR CUE The sound of the breaker operating is heard, and th~ Green OPEN flag is showing.
Examiner Note: The operator may trip the MG Set Breakers in ANY order.
Examiner Note: If the operator attempts to trip the s2-2/MG1B first, it will not trip, and Step 1 is NOT critical.
(FR-S.1, Step 1 RNO) Dispatch The operator presses the TRIP
- 2 - - -
EO to locally DEPRESS trip pushbutton for 52-2/MG 1B.
button for BOTH Control Rod Drive Motor Generator Set breakers at The operator observes the Breaker CROM Control Panel: Flag.
52-2/MG1 B, CRD MG SET B BKR CUE The sound of the breaker operating is NOT heard, and the Red CLOSED flag is showing.
The operator contacts the Control Room and reports that the 52- - - -
2/MG1 B will not manually trip.
CUE As the US direct that the operator locally trip the Reactor Trip Breakers.
(US Directed Action) Locally trip The operator presses the TRIP
- 3 - - -
52/RTA. pushbutton for 52/RTA.
The operator observes the Breaker Flag.
CUE The sound of the breaker operating is heard, and the Green OPEN flag is showing.
2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM K NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 5 of 7 Form ES-C-1 PERFORMANCE INFORMATION STEP ELEMENT STANDARD I-
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(US Directed Action) Locally trip The operator presses the TRIP 4 - - -
52/RTB. pushbutton for 52/RTB.
The operator observes the Breaker Flag.
CUE The sound of the breaker operating is heard, and the Green OPEN flag is showing.
JPM Stop Time: _ _ __ CUE: This terminates the JPM.
I 2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM K NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Page 6 of 7 Form ES-C-1 VERIFICATION OF COMPLETION Job Performance Measure No.: 2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM K Examinee's Name:
Date Performed:
Facility Evaluator:
Number of Attempts:
Time to Complete:
Question Documentation:
Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner's Name (print)
Examiner's Signature: Date:
2017 Systems NRC - In-Plant JPM K NU REG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix C Form ES-C-1 JPM CUE SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS:
- The plant has experienced a reactor trip signal and the crew entered procedure E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
- The reactor trip could not be verified, and the crew entered FR-S.1, Response to Reactor Restart/ATWS.
- You are an extra Control Operator.
INITIATING CUE: The US has directed you to locally depress the trip pushbutton for BOTH Control Rod Drive Motor Generator Set Breakers at the CROM Control Panel per the Step 1 RNO of FR-S.1.
NOTE: No plant equipment should be operated during the performance of this JPM. All actions must be SIMULATED.
NUREG 1021, Revision 10
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022117)
Facility: Ginna Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: N17-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)
(RO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 4 hours0.167 days <br />0.0238 weeks <br />0.00548 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Per the daily work schedule, CROl-7, Swapping Service Water Pumps, is to be performed this shift, swapping the C for the D Service Water pumps.
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The D SAFW Pump is OOS for breaker maintenance, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement.
Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 1 C-BOP Swap Service Water Pumps/D Service Water Pump Trip C(TS)-SRO I 2 2 C-RO Leak on the CCW System/B CCW Pump Trips C(TS)-SRO 3 3 I-BOP PZR Level Channel 427 fails LOW I-RO l(TS)-SRO 4 4 R-RO Turbine Control Valve CV-L4 Drifts Closed/Downpower N-BOP N-SRO 5 5 M-RO Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of M-BOP MS IVs M-SRO 6 6 C-RO Automatic Rx Trip fails C-SRO 7 5 C-RO MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start C-SRO 8 NA C-BOP D SAFW Pump is restored C-SRO
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022117)
Ginna 2017 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 100% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 4 hours0.167 days <br />0.0238 weeks <br />0.00548 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Per the daily work schedule, CROl-7, Swapping Service Water Pumps, is to be performed this shift, swapping the D for the C Service Water Pumps.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The D SAFW Pump is OOS for breaker maintenance, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement.
Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will swap the C and the D Service Water Pumps in accordance with P-17, "Operations Control Room Operating Instructions." Because of restrictions on running four Service Water Pumps simultaneously, the operator will likely stop the C Service Water Pump prior to starting the D Service Water Pump. When the operator stops the C Service Water Pump, its Discharge Check Valve will stick partially open, resulting in lower system pressure, even after the D Service Water Pump is started. The operator may restart the pump based on these indications, or enter AP-SW.1, "Service Water Leak." When the C SW Pump is re-started the D Service Water Pump will trip. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-J-9, "SAFEGUARDS BREAKER TRIP," and AP-SW.2, "Loss of Service Water." The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.8, "Service Water (SW) System."
Following this, a CCW Sys.tern Supply Relief Valve will lift and fail to reseat causing a 30 gpm CCW System leak. Approximately two minutes afterwards the B CCW Pump will trip, and the A CCW Pump will automatically start. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-A-17, "MOTOR OFF RCP CCWP," and enter AP-CCW.2, "Loss of CCW During Power Operation." The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3. 7. 7, "Component Cooling Water System."
Subsequently, Pressurizer Level Channel 427 will fail LOW, resulting in letdown isolation and de-energizing the pressurizer heaters. The crew will respond per AR-F-11, "PZR LOW LEVEL 13%,"
and ER-INST.1, "Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrumentation Loop Failure." They will defeat the failed channel, reset PZR heaters, reduce charging to a single charging pump, and re-establish letdown per S-3.2.E, "Placing In or Removing From Service Normal Letdown/Excess Letdown." The crew will start a second charging pump and slowly restore PZR level to program (56%). The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip System (RTS)
Instrumentation" and LCO 3.4.9, "Pressurizer."
Then, turbine control valve CVL-4 will drift closed. The crew will respond per AP-TURB.2, "Turbine Load Rejection," begin a load reduction to less than 50% power using AP-TURB.5, "Rapid Load Reduction."
After this, a large steam break occurs downstream of the MSIVs in the Intermediate Building, and both MSIVs will fail to automatically or manually close. Simultaneously, the reactor will fail to trip automatically. The operator will need to manually trip the Reactor. Additionally, all AFW Pumps fail to start due to the high-energy break. The crew will implement E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."
Both MSIVs will automatically close after 90 seconds. The crew will transition to FR-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink," at Step 9 of E-0; and will be required to initiate RCS Bleed and Feed. Upon successful implementation of RCS Bleed and Feed, the D SAFW Pump will become available, and the crew will restore a feed source to the B S/G in accordance with ATT-22.0, "Attachment Restoring Feed Flow."
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022117)
The scenario will terminate at Step 27.b of FR-H.1, after feed flow has been restored from the D SAFW Pump.
Critical Tasks:
Manually trip the reactor from the control room before transition to FR-S.1 (EOP Based)
Safety Significance: Failure to manually trip the reactor causes a challenge to the subcriticality CSF beyond that irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, it constitutes an "incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking action which complicates the event mitigation strategy that demonstrates the inability by the crew to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of the RPS.
Establish RCS bleed and feed so that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently such that the SI Pumps inject flow (EOP-Based)
Safety Significance: Fail.ure to initiate RCS bleed and feed before the RCS saturates at a pressure above the shutoff head of the high-head ECCS pumps results in significant and sustained core uncovery. If RCS bleed is initiated so that the RCS is depressurized belo~ the shutoff head of the high-head ECCS pumps, then core uncovery is prevented or minimized.
PROGRAM: Ginna Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N17-1-1
REFERENCES:
- 1. Technical Specification LCO 3. 7.5, "Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System" (Amendment 88)
- 2. P-17, "Operations Control Room Operating Instructions" (Rev 01800)
- 3. AR-PPCS-P2160, "SERVICE WATER PUMPS A & B HEADER" (Rev 00001)
- 4. AR-PPCS-P2161, "SERVICE WATER PUMPS C & D HEADER" (Rev 00001)
- 5. AP-SW.1, "Service Water Leak" (Rev 02300)
- 6. AP-SW.2, "Loss of Service Water" (Rev 00801)
- 7. AR-J-9, "SAFEGUARDS BREAKER TRIP" (Rev 12)
- 8. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.8, "Service Water (SW) System" (Amendment 102) 1
- 9. AR-A-17, "MOTOR OFF RCP CCWP" (Rev 8)
- 10. AP-CCW.2, "Loss of CCW During Power Operation" (Rev 02300)
- 11. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, "Component Cooling Water System" (Amendment 80)
- 12. AR-F-11, "PZR LOW LEVEL 13%" (Rev 4)
- 13. ER-INST.1, "Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrumentation Loop Failure" (Rev 037)
- 14. S-3.2E, "Placing In or Removing From Service Normal Letdown/Excess Letdown" (Rev 02700)
- 15. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip System {RTS) Instrumentation" (Amendment 112)
- 16. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.9, "Pressurizer" (Amendment 80)
- 17. AP-TURB.2, "Turbine Load Rejection" (Rev 02400)
- 18. AP-TURB.5, "Rapid Load Reduction" (Rev 01700)
- 19. E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection" (Rev 048)
- 20. FR-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink" (Rev 04100)
- 21. ATT-12.0, "Attachment N2 PORVS" (Rev 6)
- 22. ATT-27.0, "Attachment Automatic Actuation Verification" (Rev 00400)
- 23. ATT-22.0, "Attachment Restoring Feed Flow" (Rev 00700)
- 24. ATT-5.1, "Attachment SAFW From SW" (Rev 01200)
Validation Time: 105 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Essential Training & Consulting, LLC Facility Review:
Rev.022117 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Facility: Ginna Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: N17-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)
(RO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 4 hours0.167 days <br />0.0238 weeks <br />0.00548 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Per the daily work schedule, CROl-7, Swapping Service Water Pumps, is to be performed this shift, swapping the C for the D Service Water pumps.
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The D SAFW Pump is OOS for breaker maintenance, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement.
Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 1 C-BOP Swap Service Water Pumps/D Service Water Pump Trip C(TS)-SRO 2 2 C-RO Leak on the CCW System/B CCW Pump Trips C(TS)-SRO 3 3 I-BOP PZR Level Channel 427 fails LOW I-RO l(TS)-SRO 4 4 R-RO Turbine Control Valve CV-L4 Drifts Closed/Downpower N-BOP N-SRO 5 5 M-RO Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of M-BOP MS IVs M-SRO 6 6 C-RO Automatic Rx Trip fails C-SRO 7 5 C-RO MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start C-SRO 8 NA C-BOP D SAFW Pump is restored C-SRO
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I )nstru ment, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Ginna 2017 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 100% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 4 hours0.167 days <br />0.0238 weeks <br />0.00548 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Per the daily work schedule, CROl-7, Swapping Service Water Pumps, is to be performed this shift, swapping the C for the D Service Water pumps.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The D SAFW Pump is OOS for breaker maintenance, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement.
Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will swap the C and the D Service Water Pumps in accordance with P-17, "Operations Control Room Operating Instructions." Because of restrictions on running four Service Water Pumps simultaneously, the operator will likely stop the C Service Water Pump prior to starting the D Service Water Pump. When the operator stops the C Service Water Pump, its Discharge Check Valve will stick partially open, resulting in lower system pressure, even after the D Service Water Pump is started. The operator may restart the pump based on these indications, or enter AP-SW.1, "Service Water Leak." When the C SW Pump is re-started the D Service Water Pump will trip. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-J-9, "SAFEGUARDS BREAKER TRIP, and AP-SW.2, "Loss of Service Water." The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3. 7.8, "Service Water (SW)
System."
Following this, a CCW System Supply Relief Valve will lift' and fail to reseat causing a 30 gpm CCW System leak. Approximately two minutes afterwards the B CCW Pump will trip, and the A CCW Pump will automatically start. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-A-17, "MOTOR OFF RCP CCWP," and enter AP-CCW.2, "Loss of CCW During Power Operation."
The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, "Component Cooling Water System."
Subsequently, Pressurizer Level Channel 427 will fail LOW, resulting in letdown isolation and de-energizing the pressurizer heaters. The crew will respond per AR-F-11, "PZR LOW LEVEL 13%, and ER-INST.1, "Reactor Protection Bistable Defeaf After Instrumentation Loop Failure."
They will defeat the failed channel, reset PZR heaters, reduce charging to a single charging pump, and re-establish letdown per S-3.2.E, "Placing In *or Removing From Service Normal Letdown/Excess Letdown." The crew will start a second charging pump and slowly restore PZR level to program (56%). The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation" and LCO 3.4.9, "Pressurizer."
Then, turbine control valve CVL-4 will drift closed. The crew will respond per AP-TURB.2, "Turbine Load Rejection, begin a load reduction to less than 50% power using AP-TURB.5, "Rapid Load Reduction."
After this, a large steam break occurs downstream of the MSIVs in the Intermediate Building, and both MSIVs will fail to automatically or manually close. Simultaneously, the reactor will fail to trip automatically. The operator will need to manually trip the Reactor. Additionally, all AFW pumps fail to start due to the high-energy break. The crew will implement E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."
Both MSIVs will automatically close after 90 seconds. The crew will transition to FR-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, at Step 9 of E-0; and will be required to initiate RCS Bleed and Feed. Upon successful implementation of RCS Bleed and Feed, the D SAFW Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Pump will become available, and the crew will restore a feed source to the B S/G in accordance with ATT-22.0, "Attachment Restoring Feed Flow."
The scenario will terminate at Step 27.b of FR-H.1, after feed flow has been restored from the D SAFW Pump.
Critical Tasks:
Manually trip the reactor from the control room before transition to FR-S.1 (EOP Based)
Safety Significance: Failure to manually trip the reactor causes a challenge to the subcriticality CSF beyond that irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, it constitutes an "incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking action which complicates the event mitigation strategy that demonstrates the inability by the crew to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of the RPS.
Establish RCS bleed and feed so that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently such that the SI Pumps inject flow (EOP-Based)
Safety Significance: Failure to initiate RCS bleed and feed before the RCS saturates at a pressure above the shutoff head of the high-head ECCS pumps results in significant and sustained core uncovery. If RCS bleed is initiated so that the RCS is depressurized below the shutoff head of the high-head ECCS pumps, then core uncovery is prevented or minimized.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Reset to Temp IC 155 T = 0 (From IC-24):
0 (Originally IC-24).
Take D SAFW Pump Control Switch to PULL STOP Close MOV 9701 B OVR [DO] FDW35B=OFF OVR [DO] FDW37B=OFF OVR [DO] FDW43B=OFF Take A CB Pump Control Switch to TRIP Insert OVR-CND04A=OFF Hang LOTO Tags as necessary Set Trigger #30 = x06i188a==1 (C SWP CS to STOP)
Insert MALF CLG09C, 50%, T-30 (SWP C Discharge Check Valve fails OPEN)
Set Trigger #29 = x06i188b==1 (C SWP CS to CLOSE)
Insert MALF CLG01D T-29 (SWP D Trip)
Insert MALF RPS05A, MAN AVAIL (Reactor trip
'" breaker A failure)
Insert MALF RPS05B, MAN AVAIL (Reactor trip breaker B failure)
Insert MALF FDW12=0 (TD AFW Pump Trips on Overs peed)
Insert MALF FDW11A (A MDAFW Pump fails to START)
Insert MALF FDW11B (B MDAFW Pump fails to START)
Insert MALF FDW15A (C SAFW Pump fails to START)
Insert MALF CLG05 (30 gpm, No Ramp) on T-1 Insert CLG02B (B CCW Pump Trip 2 Minute Delayed) on T-1 Insert MALF PZR03B (0, No Ramp) on T-2 Insert TUR11B (0 over 20 seconds) on T-3 Insert MALF STM03 (2.4E7 No Ramp) on T-4 Insert MALF STM05A = OPEN on T-4 (Delete after 90 seconds)
Insert MALF STM05B = OPEN on T-4 (Delete after 90 seconds)
Insert MALF FPS01-Z37 on T-4 (delayed 10 seconds)
Insert MALF FPS01-Z38 on T-4 (delayed 10 seconds) 0 Prior to Crew
- Hang Protective Tags per OPG-Protective Briefing Equipment.
Scenario E11ent Description NRC Scenario 1 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D Crew Briefing
- Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements
- Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew .
- Provide the crew with a copy of P-17 .
- Handout current Reactivity Plan D T-0 Begin Familiarization Period D At direction of Event1 Swap Service Water Pumps/D Service Water examiner Pump Trip CLG09C (50%) (T-30)
CLG01 D (T-29) T-30 (C SWP CS to STOP), Discharge Check Valve sticks OPEN I T-29 (C SWP CS to CLOSE), D SWP Trips Note: These malfunctions are inserted (\lt T=O D At direction of Event2 Leak on the CCW System/B CCW Pump Trips examiner Trigger#1 CLG05 (30 gpm, No Ramp)
CLG02B (B CCW Pump Trip 2 Minute Delayed)
D At direction of Event3 PZR Level Channel 427 fails LOW examiner Trigger#2 PZR03B (0, NO Ramp)
D At direction of Event 4 Turbine Control Valve CV-L4 Drifts examiner Closed/Down power Trigger#3 TUR11 B (0 over 20 seconds)
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D At direction of Event 5 Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed examiner closure of MSIVs Trigger #4 STM03 (2.4E7 No Ramp)
STM05A = OPEN (Delete after 90 seconds)
STM05B = OPEN (Delete after 90 seconds)
FPS01-Z37 (Delayed 10 seconds)
FPS01-Z38 (Delayed 10 seconds)
D Post-Rx Trip Event 6 Automatic Rx Trip fails RPS05A Note: These malfunctions are inserted at T=O.
RPS05B D Post-Rx Trip Event 7 MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start FDW12=0 Note: These malfunctions are inserted at T=O.
FDW11A FDW11B FDW15 D At direction of Events D SAFW Pump is restored examiner Close MOV 9701 B Note: These malfunctions are inserted at T=O.
OVR [DO]- When directed remove MALF/OVRs.
FDW35B=OFF OVR [DO]-
FDW37B=OFF OVR [DO)-
FDW43B=OFF D Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 1 Event# -----Page 8 of 59
---n Event
Description:
Swap Service Water Pumps/D Service Water Pump Trip Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will swap the C and the D Service Water Pumps in accordance with P-17, "Operations Control Room Operating Instructions."
Because of restrictions on running four Service Water Pumps simultaneously, the operator will likely stop the C Service Water Pump prior to starting the D Service Water Pump. When the operator stops the C Service Water Pump, its Discharge Check Valve will stick partially open, resulting in lower system pressure, even after the D Service Water Pump is started. The operator may restart the pump based on these indications, or enter AP-SW.1, "Service Water Leak." When the C SW Pump is re-started the D Service Water Pump will trip. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-J-9, "SAFEGUARDS BREAKER TRIP," and AP-SW.2, "Loss of Service Water." The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3. 7.8, "Service Water (SW) System."
SIM DRIVER Instructions: NA (All Malfunctions will occur based on MCB Manipulations)
Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments P-17, OPERATIONS CONTROL OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS ATTACHMENT 7, CROI SWAPPING SERVICE WATER PUMPS co (Step 1.1) IF Service Water system NOTE:. The Service Water chlorination is in service, THEN NOTIFY system chlorination is NOT in Chemistry prior to alternating SW pumps. service.
OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.
co (Step 1.2) IF required, THEN THROTTLE NOTE: This action will not be CCW HX A SW OUTLET ISOL VLV, V-4619 required.
AND CCW HX B SW OUTLET ISOL VLV, V-4620, as necessary to obtain SW header pressure 55-60 psig as indicated on Pl-2160 and Pl-2161.
co (Step 7.1) STOP C Service Water Pump NOTE: It is likely that the crew will stop the C SW Pump and then start the D SW Pump. If not, follow the actions of Step 8.1 through 8.3, and then return here.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# ------Page 9 of
---11 59 Event
Description:
Swap Service Water Pumps/D Service Water Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments co (Step 7.2) VERIFY motor heater for C NOTE: The CO will contact the Service Water Pump energized. EO.
SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge; and report de-energized. (Not simulated) co (Step 7.3) VERIFY C Service Water Pump is NOTE: The CO will contact the NOT rotating. EO.
SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge, and report that the C SW Pump Shaft is rotating backwards.
co (Step 7.4) VERIFY Service Water header
., pressure on Pl-2160 and Pl-2161 lowers .
co (Step 8.1) START D Service Water Pump co (Step 8.2) VERIFY motor heater for D NOTE: The CO will contact the Service Water Pump de-energized. EO.
SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge; and report de-energized. (Not simulated) co (Step 8.3) VERIFY Service Water header Examiner NOTE: The SW pressure on Pl-2160 and Pl-2161 rises. Header Pressure will be lower than expected, AND the US may direct re-start of the C SW Pump after the D SW Pump is started.
If so, the D SW Pump will TRIP when the C SW Pump is started. In this case the Examiner should move forward to actions associated with AR-J-9 (Page 12).
If NOT, continue to AR-PPCS-P2160/P2161 actions.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event#
Page 10 of 59
---ti Event
Description:
Swap Service Water Pumps/D Service Water Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AR-PPCS-2160 (2161), SERVICE WATER PUMPS A & B (C & D) HEADER co (Step 1) IF alarms are due to additional NOTE: The US may direct the cooling demand because of warmer lake re-start of the C SW Pump.
temperatures, THEN ensure 3 SW pumps are operatinq.
us (Step 2) Refer to the appropriate procedure:
., Header Pressure will be lower
' than expected, AND the US may direct re-start of the C SW Pump.
If so, the D SW Pump will TRIP Move Forward to actions associated with AR-J-9.
If NOT, continue to AR-PPCS-P2160/P2161 actions.
AP-SW.1, SERVICE WATER LEAK co (Step 1) Verify 480V AC Emergency Busses 17 and 18 - ENERGIZED co (Step 2) Verify At Least One SW Pump NOTE: The A and B and D Running In Each Loop: SW Pumps are running.
- A or B Pump in loop A
- C or D Pump in loop B co (Step 3) Check SW System Status:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# ------Page 11 of 59
--~I Event
Description:
Swap Service Water Pumps/D Service Water Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- Pressure in both loops - NOTE: Pressure in the A loop APPROXIMATELY EQUAL is higher than in the B loop due to the C Pump discharge Check Valve stuck partially open.
co (Step 3.a RNO) IF three SW pumps NOTE: Neither condition is operating and either loop pressure is less met.
than 40 psig, THEN .....
If only two SW pumps operating and either loop pressure less than 45 psig, THEN ....
co (Step 3.b) Check SW loop header pressures NOTE: With the C SW Pump
-GREATER THAN 55 PSIG. discharge check valve partially stuck open, the B Loop pressure is not greater than 55 psig.
co (Step 3.b RNO) IF either SW loop pressure is NOTE: The cause of the lower less than 55 PSIG with three SW pumps B loop pressure condition can running AND cause can NOT be corrected, be started by starting the C THEN .... SW Pump (Note prior to Step 3).
co (Step 4) Check For SW Leakage In CNMT: NOTE: There is no SW leak in the Containment.
- Check Sump A indication
- Sump A pump start frequency-RISING (Refer to RCS Daily Leakage Log) us (Step 4 RNO) IF the SW leak is NOT in the CNMT, THEN go to Step 6.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# - - - - - - Page 12 of
---11 59 Event
Description:
Swap Service Water Pumps/D Service Water Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments co (Step 6) Dispatch AO To Screenhouse To NOTE: The CO will contact the Perform The Following: EO.
SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge, and report that the C SW Pump Shaft is rotating backwards.
- Verify idle SW pump check valve closed
- Idle pump shaft stopped co (Step 6 RNO) Notify the Control Room of any Examiner NOTE: It is indication of check valve failure. expected that the US will direct the re-start of the C SW Pump based on the Note prior to Step 3 of AP-SW .1.
AR-J-9, SAFEGUARD BREAKER TRIP us IF alarm is due to loss of SW pump(s), THEN NOTE: The US will address refer to AP-SW .2 AP-SW.2.
AP-SW.2, LOSS OF SERVICE WATER co (Step 1) Verify 4SOV AC Emergency Susses 17 and 18 - ENERGIZED co (Step 2) Verify SW Pump Alignment: NOTE: The A and B SW Pumps are running.
- Check At Least One SW Pump Running In Each Loop:
- A or B Pump in loop A
- C or D Pump in loop B
- Return to procedure or guidance in NOTE: The US may call effect. WCC/Electrical Maintenance to address the tripped D SW Pump and stuck open check valve on the C SW Pump.
If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as WCC/Electrical Maintenance.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# ------Page 13 of 59
---11 Event
Description:
Swap Service Water Pumps/D Service Water Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The US will address Technical Specifications.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.8, SERVICE WATER (SW) SYSTEM us LCO 3.7.8 four SW pumps and the SW loop header shall be OPERABLE.
us APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The US will identify ACTION TIME that Condition A is applicable.
A. One SW A.1 Restore SW 14 days pump pump to inoperable. OPERABLE status.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2
_2_ _ _ _ _ Page Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 1 Event# 14 of
---1 59 Event
Description:
Leak on the CCW System/B CCW Pump Trips Following this, a CCW System Supply Relief Valve will lift and fail to reseat causing a 30 gpm CCW System leak. Approximately two minutes afterwards the B CCW Pump will trip, and the A CCW Pump will automatically start. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-A-17, "MOTOR OFF RCP CCWP," and enter AP-CCW.2, "Loss of CCW During Power Operation." The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, "Component Cooling Water System."
SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #1 (CLGOS (30 gpm), CLG02B (2 minutes delayed))
Indications Available:
- CCW Surge Tank Level starts to lower.
- MCB Annunciator A-17; MOTOR OFF RCP CCWP
- MCB Annunciator A-22; CCW PUMP DISCHARGE LO PRESS (In and out)
- MCB Annunciator A-13, CCW SURGE TANK LO LEVEL 41.2%
Time Pos. ,, Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The crew may enter AP-CCW.2 directly.
AR-A-17, MOTOR OFF RCP CCWP HCO (Step 1) Verify which motor tripped.
HCO. (Step 2) IF a RCP has tripped, THEN ..... NOTE: An RCP has NOT tripped.
us (Step 3) IF a CCW pump has tripped, THEN go to the applicable AP-CCW procedure:
- AP-CCW.2 (LOSS OF CCW DURING POWER OPERATION)
NOTE: The US will go to AP-CCW.2.
AP-CCW.2, LOSS OF CCW DURING POWER OPERATION HCO (Step 1) Check CCW Pump Status:
- Both CCW pump breaker white lights -
EXTINGUISHED
- Annunciator A-17, MOTOR OFF RCP CCWP - EXTINGUISHED
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# _2_ _ _ _ _ Page 15 of 59
---11 Event
Description:
Leak on the CCW System/B CCW Pump Trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 1 RNO) Perform the following:
- Ensure standby CCW pump running .
IF no CCW pump can be operated, NOTE: The A CCW Pump is THEN ........ running.
- IF annunciator A-22, CCW PUMP NOTE: Annunciator A-22 is DISCHARGE LO PRESS 60 PSI, lit, NOT lit.
THEN ........
HCO (*Step 2) Monitor CCW Surge Tank Level - NOTE: This is a Continuous APPROXIMATELY 50% AND STABLE .... ~ction. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
NOTE: The CCW Surge Tank Level is lowering.
HCO (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following:
- Open RMW to CCW surge tank, MOV-823.
- Start RMW pump(s) . NOTE: The HCO may start one or both RMW Pumps.
- IF surge tank level stable or rising, THEN NOTE: The makeup flow into control level at approximately 50% while the CCW Surge Tank will be continuing with Step 3. able to stabilize the tank level.
HCO (*Step 3) Monitor CCW Hx Outlet NOTE: This is a Continuous Temperature (MCB rear or PPCS point ID Action. The US will make one T0621) or more board operators aware.
- CCW Hx Outlet temperature - LESS THAN 120°F HCO (*Step 4) Monitor RCP Indications: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# _2_ _ _ _~ Page 16 of 59
---ti Event
Description:
Leak on the CCW System/B CCW Pump Trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- Annunciator A-7 (A-15), RCP 1A (1 B)
CCW return Hi Temp or low flow 165 gpm 125°F alarm - EXTINGUISHED
- RCP motor bearings temperature (PPCS Group Display - RCPS OR RXP temperature monitor RK-30A recorder) -
~ 200°F HCO (*Step 5) Monitor If Letdown Should Be NOTE: This is a Continuous Isolated: Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
- Check annunciator A-12, Non-Regen Hx Letdown Out Hi Temp 145°F -
EXTINGUISHED
- Check excess letdown temperature - NOTE: Excess Letdown is LESS THAN 195°F NOT in service.
HCO (Step 6) Check CCW Valve Alignment -
NORMAL
- Direct AO to check local flow indications NOTE: The US will dispatch per ATT-1.1, ATTACHMENT NORMAL an EO.
CCW FLOW SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge.
HCO (Step 7) Locally Check Seal Water Hx CCW NOTE: The US may direct the Outlet Flow - NORMAL (Fl-605) EO to report status of Seal Water Hx CCW Outlet Flow.
If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO, and report flow is 15 gpm.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 1 Event# _2_ _ _ _ _ Page 17 of 59
---11 Event
Description:
Leak on the CCW System/B CCW Pump Trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments SIM DRIVER: As EO, call and report that Relief Valve V770 (Near Sample Coolers) is lifting to the drain system. The leak appears to be isolable, and valves V772C (Inlet lso Valve) and V772D (Outlet lso Valve) are nearby.
If directed to isolate the leak, Remove MALF CL GOS NOTE: The US may contact Chemistry and direct them to isolate CCW to the Sample Coolers.
I If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as Chemistry.
NOTE: After the CCW to the Sample Cooler is isolated the crew may elect to isolate SG Slowdowns.
HCO/ (Step 8) Check for CCW Leakage In CNMT:
- Level - ST ABLE
- Sump A pumps - OF~
- Waste holdup tank level - STABLE OR NOTE: The US may direct the RISING AS EXPECTED EO to report status of the WHUT.
If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO, and report level is slowly rising (Modify if leak is isolated).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# _2_ _ _ _ _ Page 18 of 59
---11 Event
Description:
Leak on the CCW System/B CCW Pump Trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 10) Verify CCW System Leak -
IDENTIFIED
- Leak identified
- Isolate leak if possible NOTE: The leak has likely been discovered and isolated.
- Refer to IP-ENV-3, RESPONSE TO A NOTE: The US may ask the SPILL OF HAZARDOUS SM to address.
MATERIAL/WASTE If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as SM.
HCO (Step 11) Check Normal or Excess Letdown NOTE: Normal Letdown is in
- IN SERVICE service.
HCO (Step 12) Check CCW System Leak Isolated
- Surge tank level -APPROXIMATELY 50%
HCO * (Step 12a RNO) IF level less than 50%, NOTE: The Surge Tank Level THEN continue filling. is stable (still rising if NOT isolated).
IF;;::: 50% THEN perform the following:
- Stop RMW pump(s) .
- Close MOV-823 .
HCO * (Step 12 Continued) Surge tank level -
STABLE HCO (Step 13) Direct RP To Sample CCW System NOTE: The US may notify For Chromates RP/Chemistry.
SIM DRIVER: as RP/Chemistry, acknowledge.
HCO/ (Step 14) Evaluate MCB Annunciator Status co (Refer to AR Procedures)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# _2_ _ _ _ _ Page 19 of 59
---11 Event
Description:
Leak on the CCW System/B CCW Pump Trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments us (Step 15) Evaluate Plant Conditions:
- CCW system malfunction - IDENTIFIED NOTE: Although the leak has AND CORRECTED. been isolated, the B CCW Pump has tripped, and needs to be evaluated.
us (Step 16) Notify Higher Supervision NOTE: The US may notify the WCC/Supervision.
SIM DRIVER: as WCC/Supervision, acknowledge .
I us (Step 17) Return To Procedure Or Guidance In Effect NOTE: The US will check the Tech Specs.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.7, COMPONENT COOLING (CCW) WATER SYSTEM us 3.7.7 Two CCW trains, two CCW heat exchangers, and the CCW loop header shall be OPERABLE.
us APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The US will identify ACTION TIME that Condition A is applicable.
A. OneCCW A.1 Restore 72 hours3 days <br />0.429 weeks <br />0.0986 months <br /> train CCW train to inoperable. OPERABLE status.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# _2
_ _ _ _ _ Page 20 of 59
--~I Event
Description:
Leak on the CCW System/B CCW Pump Trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The US may call WCC/Maintenance to address the CCW leak/Pump Trip.
If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as wee.
NOTE: The US will likely conduct a Plant Status Brief.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# "1 Event# _3_ _ _ _ _ Page 21 of
--1 59 Event
Description:
PZR Level Channel 427 fails LOW Subsequently, Pressurizer Level Channel 427 will fail LOW, resulting in letdown isolation and de-energizing the pressurizer heaters. The crew will respond per AR-F-11, "PZR LOW LEVEL 13%," and ER-INST.1, "Reactor Protection Bistable Defeat After Instrumentation Loop Failure." They will defeat the failed channel, reset PZR heaters, reduce charging to a single charging pump, and re-establish letdown per S-3.2.E, "Placing In or Removing From Service Normal Letdown/Excess Letdown." The crew will start a second charging pump and slowly restore PZR level to program (56%). The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip System (RTS)
Instrumentation" and LCO 3.4.9, "Pressurizer."
SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #2 (PZR03B (0, NO Ramp))
Indications Available:
- MCB Annunciator F-6; PRESSURIZER HEATER BREAKER TRIP
- MCB Annunciator F-11; PRESSURIZER LO LEVEL 13%
- Normal Letdown Isolation Valve AOV-427 Green status light LIT, Red status light OFF
- Normal Letdown Orifice Isolation Valve AOV-202 Green status light LIT, Red status light OFF
- Pres$urizer Level Channel Ll-427 indicates 0%
Time ,Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The US may enter ER-INST.1 directly.
AR-F-11, PRESSURIZER LO Level 13%
HCO (Step 1) Perform a channel check NOTE: LT-427 will indicate low compared to the others.
. us (Step 2) Go to the appropriate procedure:
- AP-RCS.1 for RCS leak
- ER-INST.1 for failed channel NOTE: The US will go to ER-INST.1.
ER-INST.1, REACTOR PROTECTION BISTABLE DEFEAT AFTER INSTRUMENTATION LOOP FAILURE HCO (Step 6.1.1) IDENTIFY the failed instrument NOTE: The HCO will identify channel by observation of the bistable status that Ll-427 has failed LOW.
light board, MCB annunciators, and the MCB metering indication.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# _3_ _ _ _ _ Page 22 of 59
--~I Event
Description:
PZR Level Channel 427 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments us (Step 6.1.2) WHEN a failed instrument loop and/or channel has been identified, THEN refer to the appropriate section of this procedure listed below:
- PRZR Level Channel Failures (Section NOTE: The US proceeds to 6.4) Section 6.4.
us (Step 6.4.1) IF PRZR low level heater cut out has occurred THEN monitor PRZR pressure AND DEFEAT failed channel in a timely manner to allow restoration of PRZR heaters (ITS Section 3.4.9). I HCO (Step 6.4.2) If letdown isolation valve, AOV.- NOTE: Letdown isolated 427 has closed, THEN perform the following:
- Place charging pump speed controllers NOTE: The HCO will place in MANUAL AND minimize charging Charging Pump Speed in flow. MANUAL.
- Stop all but one charging pumps (s) . NOTE: The HCO will stop one Charging Pump.
- Adjust HCV-142 as necessary to NOTE: The HCO will close maintain RCP labyrinth seal liP betwE'.en HCV-142 due to letdown 20 and 80 inches. isolation.
- Place loop B cold leg to REGEN HX .
AOV-427 switch (MCB) to close position
- Consider placing excess letdown in Examiner NOTE: The US will service, refer to S-3.2E, PLACING IN likely defeat channel and then OR REMOVING FROM SERVICE return Normal Letdown to NORMAL LETDOWN/EXCESS service (See Steps on Page LETDOWN 25). However, the US may also elect to place Excess Letdown in service first.
HCO (Step 6.3.4) REFER TO the appropriate NOTE: The US will go attachment to defeat the associated control Attachment 10, White Channel functions: - PRZR Level Ll-427.
Attachment 9, Red Channel - PRZR Level LI-426
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 1 Event# _3_ _ _ _ _ Page 23 of _ 59 __,,I Event
Description:
PZR Level Channel 427 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Attachment 10, White Channel - PRZR Level Ll-427 Attachment 11, Blue Channel - PRZR Level Ll-428 NOTE: The US will hand this off to the CO.
ER-INST.1, REACTOR PROTECTION BISTABLE DEFEAT AFTER INSTRUMENTATION LOOP FAILURE ATTACHMENT 10 WHITE CHANNEL- PRZR LEVEL Ll-427 NOTE: The CO will conduct Instrument Defeat Brief.
HCO (Step 1) Ensure Charging pump controllers are in MANUAL co (Step 2) In the PLP PRESS AND LEVEL NOTE: The CO will unlock and rack, check the PRZR level defeat switch open the PLP PRZR PRESS L/428A position. AND LEVEL Rack Cabinet, take the required action, and then close and lock the cabinet door.
- IF L/428A is in NORMAL, THEN place L-428A to DEFEAT-2.
co (Step 3) Notify the CRS that PRZR Heaters and Letdown can now be restored per steps 6.4.4 and 6.4.5.
co (Step 4) DETERMINE the expected Bistable proving light status for the post defeat condition as follows:
RECORD the following Data:
- PRZR Level Ll-427 %
co (Step 5) DETERMINE the expected post defeat Bistable proving light status and circle the expected status in table below:
- 427 CHANNEL 2 HIGH LEVEL TRIP NOTE: The CO will determine Light OFF if Ll-427 ~87% that the Proving Light should be ON in the Post-Defeat condition.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# _3_ _ _ _ _ Page 24 of 59
---;1 Event
Description:
PZR Level Channel 427 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments co (Step 6) In the (WHITE) W-1 PROTECTION NOTE: The CO will unlock and CHANNEL 2 rack, PLACE the following open the W-1 PROTECTION bistable proving switches to DEFEAT (UP) CHANNEL 2 Rack Cabinet, AND verify the proving light status is correct: take the required action, and 427 CHANNEL 2 then close and lock the cabinet door.
HIGH LEVEL TRIP NOTE: The B/S proving light should be ON after defeat.
HCO (Step 7) PLACE the PRZR level recorder transfer switch (MCB) to position 428.
HCO (Step 8) VERIFY the bistable status lights AND Annunciators listed above are lit.
HCO/ (Step 9) Remove the PRZR level channel co from the PPCS, by performing the following:
- On the "Sub/Delete/Restore" display
- Select Point ID L0427
- Turn "OFF" scan processing .
- Select "Change".
- Answer prompts us (Step 10) GO TO step 6.4.4 NOTE: The US will return to the body of the procedure.
ER-INST.1, REACTOR PROTECTION BISTABLE DEFEAT AFTER INSTRUMENTATION LOOP FAILURE HCO (Step 6.4.4) Reset PRZR heaters breakers as necessary.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 1 Event# _3_ _ _ _ _ Page 25 of __59 _,,
Event
Description:
PZR Level Channel 427 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 6.4.5) Restore normal letdown as NOTE: If excess letdown was follows, if desired. placed on service earlier then Section 6.6 (Removing Excess Letdown from Service) will be performed.
- COMPLETE removal of normal letdown from service per S-3.2E, PLACING IN OR REMOVING FROM SERVICE NORMAL LETDOWN/EXCESS LETDOWN.
- RESTORE normal letdown per S-3.2E, PLACING IN OR REMOVING FROM SERVICE NORMAL LETDOWN/EXCESS LETDOWN.
NOTE: The US will conti~ue with ER-INST.1.
S-3.2E, PLACING IN OR REMOVING FROM SERVICE NORMAL LETDOWN/EXCESS LETDOWN NOTE: This action will complete the removal of Normal Letdown from Service.
HCO/ (Step 6.2.1) PLACE Charging Pumps in co MANUAL HCO/ (Step 6.2.2) ENSURE CLOSED Letdown '"
co Orifice isolation valves.
AOV-200A AOV-2008 AOV-202 HCO/ (Step 6.2.3) CLOSE LTDN ISOLATION VLV co RHR to NRHX, AOV-427.
HCO/ (Step 6.2.4) REDUCE charging flow while co throttling closed charging flow to Regenerative Heat Exchanger HCV-142 to maintain greater than 20" RCP labyrinth seal
~P.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# ~3 _ _ _ _ _ Page 26 of 59
---11 Event
Description:
PZR Level Channel 427 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (Step 6.2.5) CLOSE LETDOWN ISOL VLV co RHR TO NRHX AOV-371.
HCO/ (Step 6.2.6) PLACE NRHX LTON OUTLET co TEMP (Tl-130) TCV-130 in MANUAL/
CLOSED.
HCO/ (Step 6.3.1) Determine if a flush is required. NOTE: Since letdown has co If the letdown line has been isolated for less been isolated ONLY a few than one hour perform section 6.4 and N/A minutes, a flush will NOT be section 6.5 with permission of the Shift required.
Manager or Control Room Supervisor.
I HCO/ (Step 6.4.1) Restore Letdown Without a co Flush HCO/ (Step 6.4.1.1) ENSURE letdown is secured co PER Section 6.2 prior to restoring.
HCO/ (Step 6.4.1.2) IF charging flowpath to Loop B co COLD Leg is desired (preferred method),
THEN PERFORM the following:
- ENSURE CLOSED CHARGING VLV
. RHX TO LOOP B HOT, AOV-392A.
HCO/ (Step 6.4.1.3) IF Charging flowpath to Loop NOTE: Charging alignment to co B HOT leg is desired, ..... the Hot Leg will NOT be desired.
HCO/ (Step 6.4.2) START a second Charging co Pump at minimum speed.
HCO/ (Step 6.4.3) SLOWLY OPEN charging flow to co Regenerative Heat Exchanger HCV-142 to reduce labyrinth seal .:1P to - 40".
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# _3_ _ _ _ _ Page 27 of 59
11 Event
Description:
PZR Level Channel 427 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (Step 6.4.4) ADJUST Charging Pump speed co while maintaining - 40" labyrinth seal ~p UNTIL HCV-142 is fully OPEN.
HCO/ (Step 6.4.5) ESTABLISH greater than or co equal to 22 gpm charging line flow.
HCO/ (Step 6.4.6) IF placing 40 GPM orifice in NOTE: A 60 gpm Orifice was co service ........ previously in service.
HCO/ (Step 6.4. 7) IF placing 60 GPM orifice in co service THEN ....
- PLACE LOW PRESS LTDN PRESS '
PCV-135 in MANUAL at - 60% open.
- PLACE NRHX LTDN OUTLET TEMP (Tl-130) TCV-130 in MANUAL at - 60%
open.
HCO/ (Step 6.4.8) OPEN LETDOWN ISOL VLV co RHR TO NRHX AOV-371.
HCO/ (Step 6.4.9) PLACE LTDN LOOP B COLD co LEG TO RHX AOV-427 to OPEN and THEN to AUTO.
HCO/ (Step 6.4.10) OPEN desired Letdown orifice co valve AOV-200A, AOV-2008, or AOV-202 AND MARK AOV's not opened N/A.
AOV-200A AOV-2008 AOV-202 HCO/ (Step 6.4.11) ADJUST LOW PRESS LTDN co PRESS PCV-135 to achieve Letdown pressure of - 250 psig on Pl-135.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# _3_________ Page 28 of 59
---'"'ii Event
Description:
PZR Level Channel 427 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (Step 6.4.12) PLACE LOW PRESS LTDN co PRESS, PCV-135 IN AUTO.
HCO/ (Step 6.4.13) PLACE NRHX LTDN OUTLET Examiner NOTE: At the co TEMP (Tl-130) TCV-130 in AUTO at the discretion of the Lead setpoint recorded in Step 5.4. Examiner move to Event #4. If the event is terminated HERE, check the TS evaluation after the scenario.
HCO/ (Step 6.4.14) PLACE Pressurizer level I
co control (Charging Pump) to AUTO.
ER-INST.1, REACTOR PROTECTION BISTABLE DEFEAT AFTER INSTRUMENTATION LOOP FAILURE HCO (Step 6.4.6) WHEN PRZR level is restored to normal, THEN place an operating charging pump controller in AUTO.
HCO (Step 6.3.6) Open associated block valve NOTE: No Block Valve was closed in step 4.4.3 Closed.
us (Step 6.4. 7) Check the following ITS Sections for LCOs:
- Section 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, Function 8
- Section 3.3.3, Table 3.3.3-1, Function 2
- Section 3.4.9 us (Step 6.4.8) GO TO Step 6.15.
HCO (Step 6.15.1) IF necessary, VERIFY an operable channel is selected for the affected recorder.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario# 1 Event# _3_ _ _ _ _ Page 29 of 59 N17-1
11 Event
Description:
PZR Level Channel 427 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions!Behavior Comments HCO (Step 6.15.2) Verify the following systems in AUTO if desired:
0 Rod Control co 0 Turbine EH control HCO 0 PRZR Pressure control
- HC 431K
- PRZR spray valves
- PRZR heaters HCO 0 PRZR level control co 0 Steam Dump (unless 151 stage pressure failed) I I
co 0 MFW control co 0 SIG Atmos Relief Viv Contr9I us (Step 6.15.3) NOTIFY the following people: NOTE: The US may notify the 0 Operations Supervision SM/STA/WWM.
0 STA SIM DRIVER: as SM/ST A/WWM, acknowledge.
0 Work Week Manager us (Step 6.15.4) REFER to the followi~g for NOTE: The US may ask the Notification Requirements: SM.
SIM DRIVER: as SM, acknowledge.
- CNG-NL-1.01-1004, REGULATORY REPORTING
- OPG-NOTIFICATION, REQUIRED NOTIFICATIONS TO THE PSC/PIO/CEG SENIOR MANAGEMENT/OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT NOTE: The US will address the Technical Specifications.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR TRIP (RTS} INSTRUMENTATION us LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event#
3 Page 30 of 59
--~
Event
Description:
PZR Level Channel 427 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1 (Function 8)
CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: Function 8 is affected.
ACTION TIME A. One or more A.1 Enter the Immediately functions with Condition NOTE: The US will identify one channel referenced in that Condition A&D are inoperable. Table 3.3.1-1 for applicable.
the channel(s).
D. As required D.1 6 hours0.25 days <br />0.0357 weeks <br />0.00822 months <br /> by Required Place channel in Action A.1 and trip referenced by Table 3.3.1-1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.9, PRESSURIZER us LCO 3.4.9: The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE.
us APPLICABILITY: modes 1, 2 and 3.
CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The US will identify ACTION TIME that the crew was in this TS B. Pressurizer B.1 Be in MODE 6 hours0.25 days <br />0.0357 weeks <br />0.00822 months <br />. LCO when the Heaters tripped heaters 3.
capacity not on low pressurizer level, and within limits. AND out of this TS LCO when the heaters were reset.
B.2 Be in MODE 12 hours0.5 days <br />0.0714 weeks <br />0.0164 months <br />.
4.
NOTE: The US may address LCO 3.3.3, but determine that this TS is met using in-service instruments.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2
_4_ _ _ _ _ Page Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# 31 of
--1 59 Event
Description:
Turbine Control Valve CV-L4 Drifts Closed/Downpower Then, turbine control valve CVL-4 will drift closed. The crew will respond per AP-TURB.2, "Turbine Load Rejection," begin a load reduction to less than 50% power using AP-TURB.5, "Rapid Load Reduction."
SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #3 (TUR11 B (0 over 20 seconds))
Indications Available:
- MW lowering on turbine
- CLV-4 closing/closes
- Rx Power lowering (7-8% change)
- Tref lowering
- Rods stepping in to lower Tavg
- MCB Annunciator G-15, ST,EAM DUMP ARMED
- Steam dumps cycle I Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP-TURB.2, TURBINE LOAD REJECTION HCO (*Step 1) Montor RCS Tavg NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
- Tavg-GREATER THAN 545°F
- Tavg-LESS THAN 579°F co (Step 2) Check Turbine Valves:
- Turbine stop valves and reheat steam valves-OPEN
- Turbine control valves-ALL VALVES AT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME POSITION
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2
_4_ _ _ _ _ Page Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# 32 of
---11 59 Event
Description:
Turbine Control Valve CV-L4 Drifts Closed/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments us (Step 2 RNO) If failure of turbine control NOTE: The US may use both valves indicated, THEN reduce power to less AP-TURB.2 and 5 than 80% (refer to AP-TURB.5, RAPID simultaneously during the LOAD REDUCTION). down power.
SIM DRIVER: as Plant Management, direct that power be lowered to 70%.
NOTE: The US will go to AP-TURB.5 and conduct Rapid Load Reduction Brief prior to commencing load reduction.
AP-TURB.5, RAPID LOAD REDUCTION HCO (Step 1) Initiate Load Reduction .,
- Verify rods in AUTO
- Initiate boration at the rate determined in NOTE: The HCO will initiate a OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC. boration.
co
- Reduce turbine load in Auto as follows:
- Place Turbine EH Control in OPER PAN., IMP PRESS IN, if desired.
- Select desired rate on thumbwheel NOTE: The CO will.
select1 %/Minute.
- Reduce the setter to the desired load
- Depress the GO button NOTE: The CO will start the load decrease.
HCO
- Place PRZR backup heaters switch to ON HCO (*Step 2) Monitor RCS Tavg NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one
- Tavg- GREATER THAN 545°F or more board operators
- Tavg- LESS THAN 579°F aware.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# _4________~ Page 33 of 59
11 Event
Description:
Turbine Control Valve CV-L4 Drifts Closed/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 3) Adjust Boric Acid Addition Rate As Necessary To (refer to OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC):
- Maintain rods above the insertion limit
- Match Tavg and Tref
- Compensate for Xenon HCO (*Step 4) Monitor PRZR Pressure- NOTE: This is a Continuous TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG IN AUTO Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
I co ., (*Step 5) Monitor MFW Regulating Valves- NOTE: This is a Continuous RESTORING S/G LEVEL TO 52% IN AUTO Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
HCO (*Step 6) Monitor PRZR Level- TRENDING NOTE: This is a Continuous TO PROGRAM IN AUTO CONTROL Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
NOTE: PRZR Level control may still be in MANUAL.
co. (Step 7) Check IA Available To CNMT
- Instr Air to CNMT !sol Valve, AOV-5392 -
OPEN HCO/ (Step 8) Check Steam Dump Status:
co
- Annunciator G-15, STEAM DUMP NOTE: The Steam Dump ARMED - LIT System will be ARMED.
- Steam dump operating properly in AUTO
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# _4_ _ _ _ _ Page 34 of _5_9_-11 Event
Description:
Turbine Control Valve CV-L4 Drifts Closed/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments co (Step 9) Check Hotwell Level: NOTE: Depending on progress through this procedure, the crew may or may not perform the RNO. If not, MOVE to Step 10.
- Hotwell level controller in AUTO
- Controller demand LESS THAN 60%
- Hotwell level at setpoint co (Step 9 RNO) IF controller demand approaching 70% (Large Reject Valve Opens), THEN place controller in Manual I
and control level.
US/ (Step 10) Check If Condensate Booster '
co Pumps Should Be Secured
- Condensate booster pumps - 2 PUMPS NOTE: There are two RUNNING Condensate Booster Pumps running.
- Verify the following:
- Verify reactor power is 70%-75% NOTE: Rx power is expected to be> 75%.
us (Step 10.b RNO) Go to Step 18.
us (Step 18) Evaluate Plant Status IF load was reduced more than 15% RTP in NOTE: The US may call one hour, THEN notify RP to obtain primary Chemistry to address the samples required by ITS LCO 3.4.16 samples.
If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as Chemistry (Note that Sample Coolers were previously isolated).
NOTE: The US may address remaining steps of AP-TURB.2 while continuing the power reduction.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #5-8.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# _5....,,_6..._,7.._,_&_8_ _ Page ~ of _5_9__
11 Event
Description:
Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of MSIVs/
Automatic Rx Trip/Manual Pushbutton Rx Trip fails/MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start/D SAFW Pump is restored After this, a large steam break occurs downstream of the MSIVs in the Intermediate Building, and both MSIVs will fail to automatically or manually close. Simultaneously, the reactor will fail to trip automatically. The operator will need to manually trip the Reactor. Additionally, all AFW pumps fail to start due to the high-energy break. The crew will implement E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." Both MSIVs will automatically close after 90 seconds. The crew will transition to FR-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink," at Step 9 of E-0; and will be required to initiate RCS Bleed and Feed. Upon successful implementation of RCS Bleed and Feed, the D SAFW Pump will become available, and the crew will restore a feed source to the B SIG in accordance with ATT-22.0, "Attachment Restoring Feed Flow." The scenario will terminate at Step 27.b of FR-H.1, after feed flow has been restored from the D SAFW Pump.
SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #4 STM03 (2.4E7 No Ramp), STMOSA=OPEN (Deleted after 90 Seconds), STMOSB=OPEN (Deleted after 90 Seconds), FPS01-Z37 and Z38 (10 Seconds delayed))
Indications Available:
- Various MCB alarms
- Steam noise is heard in the Control Room
- Fire Alarms Z-37 and Z-38
- Lowering SIG levels
- No AFW flow
- Rx does NOT automatically trip when required.
Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION HCO (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip: Immediate Action
- At least one train of reactor trip breakers
-OPEN
- Neutron flux - LOWERING
- MRPI indicates - ALL CONTROL AND SHUTDOWN RODS ON BOTTOM with no instrument fluctuations concurrent with fire.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# __.5,_6.._,_7,._&_8__ Page ~ of _5_9_-11 Event
Description:
Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of MSIVs/
Automatic Rx Trip/Manual Pushbutton Rx Trip fails/MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start/D SAFW Pump is restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 1 RNO) Manually trip reactor. Immediate Action
- IF reactor trip breakers NOT open OR there is a fire in the power block, THEN ....
- IF the reactor will NOT trip OR IF power range NIS indicates greater than 5%,
THEN .....
CRITICAL TASK:
Manually trip the reactor from the control room before transition to FR-S.1 (EOP Based)
Safety Significance: Failure to manually trip " the reactor causes a challenge to the subcriticality CSF beyond that irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions.
Additionally, it constitutes an "incorrect performance that necessitates the crew taking action which complicates the event mitigation strategy that demonstrates the inability by the crew to recognize a failure of the automatic actuation of the RPS.
co (Step 2) Verify Turbine Stop Valves - Immediate Action CLOSED co (Step 3) Verify sufficient AC . Immediate Action Emergency buses Energized To At Least 440 VOLTS:
- Bus 14 OR Bus 16 AND
- Any SI Annunciator- LIT
- SI sequencing - BOTH TRAINS STARTED
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# _5...,,_6,,_7.._,&_B__ Page ~ of -'5~9--' 1 Event
Description:
Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of MSIVs/
Automatic Rx Trip/Manual Pushbutton Rx Trip fails/MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start/D SAFW Pump is restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ Foldout Page NOTE: The crew will co monitor these conditions throughout the performance of E-0.
RCP TRIP CRITERIA LOSS OF SW CRITERIA AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION SFP COOLING CRITERIA HCO (*Step 5) Verify CNMT Spray Not Required: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
- Annunciator A-27, CNMT SPRAY EXTINGUISHED
- CNMT pressure - LESS THAN 28 PSIG co (Step 6) Direct Operator to Perform ATT-27.0, ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC ACTION VERIFICATION NOTE: The US will hand off ATT-27.0 to either the HCO or the CO, and continue with the other operator in E-0.
Examiner following operator performing ATT-27.0 continue below.
Examiner following operator NOT performing ATT-27.0 continue at Page 41.
E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, ATTACHMENT 27.0, ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC ACTION VERIFICATION HCO/ (Step 1) Verify SI and RHR Pumps Running:
co
- All SI pumps - RUNNING
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# a__
_5.;..;.....6....._,7.....&.... Page ~ of _5_9_-11 Event
Description:
Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of MSIVs/
Automatic Rx Trip/Manual Pushbutton Rx Trip fails/MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start/D SAFW Pump is restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- All fans RUNNING
- Charcoal filter dampers green status lights - EXTINGUISHED HCOI (Step 3) Check If Main Steamlines Should NOTE: Although these co Be Isolated: valves failed to close Any MSIV - OPEN immediately after the Steam Break, they automatically
' closed 90 seconds after the break, and are expected to be closed here.
HCOI (Step 3.a RNO) Go to Step 4.
co HCOI (Step 4)Verify MFW Isolation:
co ,,
- MF\/\( pumps - TRIPPED
- MFW Isolation valves - CLOSED
- SIG A, AOV-3995
- SIG B, AOV-3994
- SIG blowdown and sample valves -
CLOSED HCOI (Step 5) Verify At Least Two SW Pumps -
co RUNNING HCOI (Step 6) Verify Cl and CVI:
co
- Cl and CVI annunciators - LIT
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# _s_._6...., _7....&_B__ Page : : _ of _5_9_-n Event
Description:
Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of MSIVs/
Automatic Rx Trip/Manual Pushbutton Rx Trip fails/MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start/D SAFW Pump is restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- Annunciator A-26, CNMT ISOLATION
- Annunciator A-25, CNMT VENTILATION ISOLATION
- Verify Cl and CVI valve status lights -
BRIGHT
- FCV-4561
- FCV-4562 I
- Letdown orifice valves - CLOSED
- AOV-200A i
- AOV-200B
- AOV-202 HCO/ (Step 7) Check CCW System Status:
co
- Verify CCW pump-AT LEAST ONE RUNNING ,.
HCO/ (Step 8) Verify SI And RHR Pump Flow:
co
- SI flow indicators - CHECK FOR FLOW
HCO/ (Step 8b RNO) IF RCS pressure less than co 150 psig .. .. .. .. IF NOT, THEN go to Step 9.
HCO/ (Step 9) Verify SI Pump And RHR Pump co Emergency Alignment:
- RHR pump discharge to Rx vessel deluge - OPEN
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# _5_,_6.._,_,7,_&_8_ _ Page ~ of _5_9_-1 1
Event
Description:
Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of MSIVs/
Automatic Rx Trip/Manual Pushbutton Rx Trip fails/MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start/D SAFW Pump is restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- MOV-852A
- MOV-8528
- Verify SI pump C - RUNNING
- Verify SI pump A - RUNNING
- Verify SI pump B - RUNNING
- Verify SI pump C discharge valves -
OPEN
- MOV-817A I
- MOV-8178
., HCO/ (Step 10) Verify GREATS Actuation:
co
- At least one damper in each flowpath -
CLOSED
- Normal Supply Air
- Normal Return Air
- Lavatory Exhaust Air
- GREATS fans - BOTH RUNNING HCO/ (Step 11) Verify Cl and CVI During a Fire co Event
- A confirmed fire has occurred in the control complex or cable tunnel (fire systems SOS, S06, S08, Z05, Z18, or Z19).
HCO/ (Step 11 RNO) Go to END co
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# _s....._6...._7,,_&_8_ _ Page _41_ of _5_9_-11 Event
Description:
Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of MSIVs/
Automatic Rx Trip/Manual Pushbutton Rx Trip fails/MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start/D SAFW Pump is restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Examiner following operator NOT performing ATT-27.0 continue HERE.
CO/ (Step 7) Verify Both MDAFW Pumps NOTE: Neither MDAFW HCO RUNNING Pump is operating.
NOTE: The US may direct the EO to investigate the failure of the AFW System.
If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO, and I
report that the area is filled with steam.
CO/ (Step 7 RNO) Manually start both MDAF:W NOTE: Neither MDAFW HCO pumps. Pump will manually start.
IF less than 2 MDAFW pumps are running, NOTE: Although both Steam THEN manually open TDAFW pump steam Supply Valves indicate supply valves. OPEN, the TDAFW Pump has failed to supply flow.
- MOV-3505A
- MOV-3504A CO/ (Step 8) Verify AFW Valve Alignment:
HCO
CO/ (Step 8 RNO) Manually align valves as NOTE: AFW flow cannot be HCO necessary. established to either S/G.
CO/ (*Step 9) Monitor Heat Sink: NOTE: This is a Continuous HCO Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
- Check SIG narrow range level GREATER THAN 7% [25% adverse CNMT] in any SIG
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# _5_.,_6._,....
7 ,_&_8_ _ Page ~ of _5_9_-1 1
Event
Description:
Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of MSIVs/
Automatic Rx Trip/Manual Pushbutton Rx Trip fails/MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start/D SAFW Pump is restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO/ (Step 9.a RNO) Perform the following:
HCO
- IF total AFW is less than 200 gpm, NOTE: AFW flow cannot be THEN manually start pumps and align established to either SIG.
valves to establish greater than 200 gpm AFW flow. IF AFW flow greater than 200 gpm can NOT be established, THEN go to FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK, Step 1.
NOTE: The US will transition to FR-H.1.
FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK HCO/ Foldout Page NOTE: The crew will co monitor these conditions throughout the performance of FR-H.1.
LOSS OF SW CRITERIA HCO (Step 1) Check If Secondary Heat Sink Is Required:
a) RCS pressure- GREATER THAN ANY NON-FAULTED S/G PRESSURE b) Check RCS cold leg temperature GREATER THAN 350°F
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# 7 *.._&_B_ _ Page
_5_.,_6........ ~ of _5_9_..
1 Event
Description:
Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of MSIVs/
Automatic Rx Trip/Manual Pushbutton Rx Trip fails/MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start/D SAFW Pump is restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments co (*Step 2) Check if Bleed and Feed is Examiner NOTE: The Required condition for RCS Bleed and Feed may NOT be met when the crew arrives at this step. However, these conditions will exist within 5-10 minutes. The crew will continue to Step 3, and then move forward to Step 13 when RCS Bleed and Feed conditions are met.
- Both S/G level wide range levels LESS NOTE: Both S/G Wide THAN 120 inches [160 inches adverse Range levels are expected CNMT] to be <120 inches.
- Stop both RCPs; us
- Go to Step 13 .
HCO (Step 13) Actuate SI and Cl HCO (Step 14) Verify RCS Feed Path:
- Open both PRZR PORV block valves
- Place both PRZR PORV switches to OPEN
- Align RCS overpressure protection system to open both PRZR PORVs (Refer to ATT-12.0, ATTACHMENT N2 PO RVS)
NOTE: The HCO will perform ATT-12.0.
ATT-12.0, ATTACHMENT N2 PORVS
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# .....
5._6....._,7,,_&_8_ _ Page ~ of _5_9_-1 1
Event
Description:
Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of MSIVs/
Automatic Rx Trip/Manual Pushbutton Rx Trip fails/MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start/D SAFW Pump is restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 1) WHEN IA to CNMT NOT available, THEN perform the following to operate one (or both) PRZR PORV(s) in accordance with guidance provided by the procedure step:
- Select a PORV with an operable block valve, obtain a key for the RCS over-pressurization system, and perform the appropriate step below:
- PCV-431C
- Verify block valve MOV-515 -
OPEN AND OPERABLE I
- Place ACCUM TO SURGE TK VLV SOV-8616B to OPEN
- PCV-430 '"
- Verify block valve MOV-516 -
OPEN AND OPERABLE
- Place ACCUM TO SURGE TK VLV SOV-8616A to OPEN
- To depressurize the RCS in accordance with the guidance provided by the EOP step, perform the following:
- IF it is desired to maintain PORV(s) open below 41 O psig, THEN place over-pressure bistables to the trip position:
(IF NOT, THEN go to step D)
- In R-2 Protection Channel 1 Rack
- 452B
- 452C
- In W-2 Protection Channel 2 Rack
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# _s....._6.........
7*._&_8_ _ Page ~ of _5_9__
11 Event
Description:
Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of MSIVs/
Automatic Rx Trip/Manual Pushbutton Rx Trip fails/MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start/D SAFW Pump is restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- 451B
- 451C
- In B-2 Protection Channel 3 Rack
- 450B
- 450C FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK I
HCO (Step 15.d) Verify PORVs - BOTH OPEN HCO (Step 16) Check If SI Can Be Reset:
- Check SI blocked status light -
EXTINGUISHED
- Check the following:
- Either steamline pressure - LESS THAN 514 PSIG
- Reset SI HCO (Step 17) Reset Cl:
- Depress Cl reset pushbutton
- Verify annunciator A-26, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION-EXTINGUISHED co (Step 18) Verify Adequate SW Flow:
- Verify at least two SW pumps -
RUNNING
- Verify AUX BLDG SW isolation valves -
AT LEAST ONE SET OPEN
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# 1._&_8_ _ Page
_5_,,_6.._,.... ~ of _5_9_-1 1
Event
Description:
Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of MSIVs/
Automatic Rx Trip/Manual Pushbutton Rx Trip fails/MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start/D SAFW Pump is restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- MOV-4615 and MOV-4734
- MOV-4615 and MOV-4735 HCO (Step 19) Establish IA to CNMT:
- Verify non-safeguards buses energized from offsite power
- Bus 13 normal feed breaker -
CLOSED OR I
- Bus 15 normal feed breaker -
CLOSED
- Verify turbine building SW isolation I valves - OPEN
- MOV-4613 and MOV-4670
- MOV-4614 and MOV-4664
- Verify adequate air compressor(s) - NOTE: The C IA RUNNING Compressor is running.
- Check IA supply:
- Pressure - GREATER THAN 60 ..
- Pressure- STABLE OR RISING
- Verify IA to CNMT AOV-5392 - OPEN HCO (Step 20) Restore RCS Overpressure Protection System to Standby:
- Verify instrument bus D - ENERGIZED
- Place PORV PCV-430 and PCV-431 C Nz arming switches to BLOCK
- SOV-8619A
- SOV-8619B
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# _s....._6._,1......._&_a__ Page ~ of _5_9~
1 Event
Description:
Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of MSIVs/
Automatic Rx Trip/Manual Pushbutton Rx Trip fails/MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start/D SAFW Pump is restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- Close PORV PCV-430 and PCV-431 C N2 SURGE TK VL Vs
- SOV-8616A
- SOV-8616B HCO/ (Step 21) Verify Adequate RCS Bleed Path:
co
- Core exit T/Cs - STABLE OR LOWERING I
HCO/ (Step 22) Complete Steps 1 through 7 of E-0, co REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION While Continuing With This Procedure CRITICAL TASK:
.Establish RCS bleed and feed so that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently such that the SI Pumps inject flow (EOP-Based)
Safety Significance: Failure to initiate RCS bleed and feed before the RCS saturates at a pressure above the shutoff head of the high-head ECCS pumps results in significant and sustained core uncovery. If RCS bleed is initiated so that the RCS is depressurized below the shutoff head of the high-head ECCS pumps, then core uncovery is prevented or minimized.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# _s....._6........
1 .....&_B_ _ Page ~ of _5_9_-1 1 Event
Description:
Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of MSIVs/
Automatic Rx Trip/Manual Pushbutton Rx Trip fails/MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start/D SAFW Pump is restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The US may assign the HCO/CO to perform this action.
If so, HCO/CO Examiner follow actions of E-0.
Other Examiners follow FR-H.1 Actions, Step 23, on Page 53.
On the other hand, the US may recognize that each of the required E-0 Steps have been completed and proceed to Step 23 of FR-H.1 .
I If so, ALL Examiners proceed to Step 23 of FR-H.1 action on Page 53.
E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION HCO/ (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip:
co ..
- At least one train of reactor trip breakers
-OPEN
- Neutron flux - LOWERING
- MRPI indicates - ALL CONTROL AND SHUTDOWN RODS ON BOTTOM with no instrument fluctuations concurrent with fire HCO/ (Step 2) Verify Turbine Stop Valves -
co CLOSED HCO/ (Step 3) Verify sufficient AC Emergency co Susses Energized to at Least 440 VOL TS:
- Bus 14 or Bus 16 AND
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# __,5,_6....._7,._&_8_ _ Page ~ of _5_9_-1 1
Event
Description:
Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of MSIVs/
Automatic Rx Trip/Manual Pushbutton Rx Trip fails/MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start/D SAFW Pump is restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- Bus 17 or Bus 18 HCO/ (Step 4) Check if SI is Actuated:
co
- Any SI Annunciator - LIT
- SI sequencing - BOTH TRAINS STARTED.
HCO/ (*Step 5) Verify CNMT Spray Not Required: NOTE: This is a Continuous co Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
- Annunciator A-27, CNMT SPRAY -
EXTINGUISHED
- CNMT pressure - LESS THAN 28 PSIG HCO/ (Step 6) Direct Operator to Perform ATT-co 27.0, ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC ACTION VERIFICATION E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, ATTACHMENT 27.0, ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC ACTION VERIFICATION HCO/ (Step 1) Verify SI and RHR Pumps Running:
co
- All SI pumps - RUNNING
- All fans - RUNNING
- Charcoal filter dampers green status lights - EXTINGUISHED
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# _5~,_6_,_,7,-.&_B
_ _ Page ~ of _5_9_-1 1
Event
Description:
Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of MSIVs/
Automatic Rx Trip/Manual Pushbutton Rx Trip fails/MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start/D SAFW Pump is restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (Step 3) Check If Main Steamlines Should NOTE: Although these co Be Isolated: valves failed to close Any MSIV - OPEN immediately after the Steam Break, they automatically closed 90 seconds after the break, and are expected to be closed here.
HCO/ (Step 3.a RNO) Go to Step 4.
co HCO/ (Step 4) Verify MFW Isolation:
co
- MFW pum'ps - TRIPPED
- MFW Isolation valves - CLOSED
- S/G A, AOV-3995
- S/G B, AOV-3994
- S/G Slowdown and sample valves -
CLOSED HCO/ (Step 5) Verify At Least Two SW Pumps -
co RUNNING HCO/ (Step 6) Verify Cl and CVI:
co
- Cl and CVI annunciators - LIT NOTE: With Cl reset, Annunciators are NOT LIT.
- Annunciator A-26, CNMT ISOLATION
- Annunciator A-25, CNMT VENTILATION ISOLATION
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# _5....._6..:..,.....
7._&_8_ _ Page _51_ of _5_9_-i 1
Event
Description:
Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of MSIVs/
Automatic Rx Trip/Manual Pushbutton Rx Trip fails/MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start/D SAFW Pump is restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (Step 6.a RNO) Depress manual Cl NOTE: Although this action co pushbutton. is directed, it will not be performed because a CAUTION prior to Step 22 of FR-H.1 directs the operator to not reverse any actions taken to establish RCS Bleed and Feed; and taking this action will isolate IA to Containment.
HCO/ * (Step 6 Continued) Verify Cl and CVI NOTE: AOV-5392 is NOT co valve status lights - BRIGHT BRIGHT, but no action will be taken to reverse this.
valve status lights - BRIGHT
- FCV-4561
- FCV-4562
- Letdown orifice valves - CLOSED
- AOV-200A
- AOV-200B
- AOV-202 HCO/ (Step 7) Check CCW System Status:
co
co
- SI flow indicators - CHECK FOR FLOW
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# _5_,,_6.._,_.7,_&_8_ _ Page ::__ of _5_9_-11 Event
Description:
Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of MSIVs/
Automatic Rx Trip/Manual Pushbutton Rx Trip fails/MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start/D SAFW Pump is restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (Step 8b RNO) IF RCS pressure less than co 150 psig ........ IF NOT, THEN go to Step 9.
HCO/ (Step 9) Verify SI Pump And RHR Pump co Emergency Alignment:
- RHR pump discharge to Rx vessel deluge - OPEN
- MOV-852A
- MOV-8528 I
- Verify SI pump C- RUNNING
- Verify SI pump A - RUNNING
'
- Verify SI pump B - RUNNING
- Verify SI pump C discharge valves -
OPEN
- MOV-817A
- MOV-8178 HCO/ (Step 10) Verify GREATS Actuation:
co
- At least one damper in each flowpath -
CLOSED
- Normal Supply Air
- Normal Return Air
- Lavatory Exhaust Air
- GREATS fans - BOTH RUNNING HCO/ (Step 11) Verify Cl and CVI During a Fire co Event
- A confirmed fire has occurred in the control complex or cable tunnel (fire systems S05, S06, S08, Z05, Z18, or Z19).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# _s. . . _6.........
7._&_B_ _ Page ~ of _5_9_~
1 Event
Description:
Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of MSIVs/
Automatic Rx Trip/Manual Pushbutton Rx Trip fails/MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start/D SAFW Pump is restored Time Pos; Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (Step 11 RNO) Go to END co E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION co (Step 7) Verify Both MDAFW Pumps NOTE: Neither MDAFW Running Pump is running.
CO/ (Step 7 RNO) Manually start both MDAFW NOTE: Neither MDAFW HCO pumps. I Pump will manually start.
IF less than 2 MDAFW pumps are running, NOTE: Although both Steam THEN manually open TDAFW pump steam , Supply Valves indicate supply valves. ' OPEN, the TDAFW Pump has failed to supply flow.
- MOV-3505A
- MOV-3504A Examiner(s) following operator NOT performing E-0 Actions continue HERE.
FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECOND~RY HEAT SINK CO/ (Step 23) Maintain RCS Heat Removal:
HCO
- Maintain SI flow
- Maintain both PRZR PORVs and block valves - OPEN CO/ (Step 24) Check Power Availability to HCO Charging Pumps:
- Check Normal power available to Charging Pumps
- Bus 14 normal feed breaker -
CLOSED
- Bus 16 normal feed breaker -
CLOSED
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# _5_.,_6.._,7_.,_&_8_ _ Page ~ of _5_9_..,
1 Event
Description:
Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of MSIVs/
Automatic Rx Trip/Manual Pushbutton Rx Trip fails/MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start/D SAFW Pump is restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- Verify adequate Safeguard Bus capacity to run charging pumps. (6 amps each)
- Station Service transformer 14 ammeter. (278 amps)
- Station Service transformer 16 ammeter (278 amps)
CO/ (Step 25) Check If Charging Flow Has Been HCO Established:
- Charging pumps -ANY RUNNING CO/ (Step 25.a RNO) Perform the following:
HCO
- IF CCW flow is lost to any RCP thermal barrier OR any RCP #1 seal outlet temperature greater than 235°F, THEN .....
- Ensure HCV-142 open, demand at 0% .
CO/ * (Step 25 Continued) Align charging HCO pump suction to RWST:
- LCV-112B- OPEN
- LCV-112C- CLOSED
- Start charging pumps to establish NOTE: Two Charging maximum charging flow Pumps will be started.
CO/ (Step 26) Monitor IF CNMT Spray Should Be NOTE: There are no CS HCO Stopped: Pumps running.
- CNMT spray pumps -ANY RUNNING us (Step 26 RNO) Go to Step 27.
CO/ (Step 27) Continue Attempts To Establish HCO Secondary Heat Sink In At Least One S/G:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 1 Event# _5...., _6,.._7..._,_&_8__ Page =..__ of _5_9__
11 Event
Description:
Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of MSIVs/
Automatic Rx Trip/Manual Pushbutton Rx Trip fails/MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start/D SAFW Pump is restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- Attempt to restore one or more of the following:
- AFW flow
- Main FW flow
- Standby AFW flow
- Condensate flow
- WHEN a feed source is available, THEN control feed flow per requirements of ATT-22, ATTACHMENT RESTORING FEED FLOW SIM DRIVER Instructions: DELETE the following:
OVR [DO] FDW35B=OFF OVR [DO] FDW37B=OFF OVR [DO] FDW43B=OFF OVR [DO] FDW35A=OFF OVR [DO] FDW37 A=OFF Contact Control Room as WWM and state that the D SAFW has become available.
NOTE: The US will use ATT-5.1 to restore AFW flow using the D AFW Pump.
ATTACHMENT-5.1, ATTACHMENT SAFW co (Step A) IF SW is not available OR cannot NOTE: SW is available.
support required SAFW flow, THEN .....
co (Step B) IF feeding both S/Gs using only one NOTE: SAFW will be SAFW pump, THEN open either STANDBY aligned to feed BOTH SGs.
AUX FW PUMP CROSSOVER VLV (SAFW oump area):
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# 5, 6, 7, & 8 Page ~ of _59_-11 Event
Description:
Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of MSIVs/
Automatic Rx Trip/Manual Pushbutton Rx Trip fails/MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start/D SAFW Pump is restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OR
- STANDBY AUX FW PUMP CROSSOVER VLV, MOV-9703B co (Step C) Align SAFW Pump C to feed SIG A NOTE: If the C SAFW Pump as follows: has NOT previously failed, the crew may try to start this pump as well; however, it will fail to start.
co (Step D) Align SAFW Pump D to selected NOTE: The crew will SIG as follows: attempt to start the D SAFW
- 1) Ensure SI reset Pump using the guidance of Step 27.a of FR-H.1. '
- 2) Ensure the following valves open:
- MOV-9701 B, SAFW PUMP D DISCHARGE
- MOV-4615, AUX BLDG SW ISOL VLVS
- MOV-9704B, SAFW PUMP D ISOL VLV
- 3) Open MOV-9629B, SAFW PUMP D SUCTION VLV
- 4) Verify at least 1 SW pump running 5a) To feed SIG B, go to step 6.
- 6) Restore SAFW flow as directed by procedure in effect.
NOTE: Once the D SAFW Pump is started the crew will use the guidance of Step 27.b of FR-H.1 to restore flow to the SI Gs per ATT-22.0.
ATT-22.0, ATTACHMENT RESTORING FEED FLOW HCO (Step 1) Check affected SIG Loop RCS Temperature
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# Event# _5_,_6....
7,,_&_8_ _ Page ~of _5_9_ _,
1 Event
Description:
Steamline Break in Intermediate Building/Delayed closure of MSIVs/
Automatic Rx Trip/Manual Pushbutton Rx Trip fails/MDAFW and TDAFW Pumps fail to start/D SAFW Pump is restored Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- Affected Loop hot leg temperature Less Than 550°F.
us (Step 1.a RNO) Go to Step 2.
HCO (Step 2) Determine SIG feed flowrate requirements:
- Bleed and Feed initiated
- Check RCS temp stable or lowering
- Feed I
flow is restricted to less than or NOTE: Adverse equal to 100 gpm to affected SIG. Containment may exist at WHEN SIG level greater than 50 inches this time.
[100 inches adverse CNMT], THEN fill as desired to restore narrow range qreater than 7% [25% adverse CNMT]
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.
TURNOVER SHEET for NRG Exam Scenario #1 Core Age: EOL Procedure in Use: ACTIONS/NOTES:
100% Power, Equilibrium Xe P-17
- The plant is at 100% power (EOL} .
Outside Air Temp= 82°F
- The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 4 Water Temp = 70°F hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.
- Per the daily work schedule, CROl-7, Swapping Service Water Pumps, is to be performed this shift, swapping from C to D Service Water pumps.
Boron: 339 ppm RCS LEAKAGE: (gpm)
Total: .021
- The Service Water system chlorination is NOT in service .
BAST: 17,400 ppm Identified: .003 Unidentified: .018
- The 60 gpm letdown orifice is in service for Chemistry RCS Activity: Normal purposes.
- The D SAFW Pump is OOS for breaker maintenance .
- The Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement.
- Protected equipment IAW OPG Protected Equipment.
TURNOVER SHEET for NRC Exam Scenario #1 Equi12.ment Problems/OOS: Planned Activities for Shift: Electrical System 012erator Declarations See NOTES
- Swap C & D SW P1,1~m ps - -
None in effect A-52.4 EQUIPMENT DATE/TIME 005 LCO TITLE EXP DATE ECO Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW)
D SAFW Pump Yesterday, 24hrs ago 3.7.5 14 Days 18 hours0.75 days <br />0.107 weeks <br />0.0247 months <br /> System A-52.12 EQUIPMENT DATE/TIME 005 TRM/ODCM TITLE EXP DATE ECO A Condensate Booster Yesterday Indefinitely Pump
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022217)
Facility: Ginna Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: N17-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)
(RO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 70% power (BOL). The plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the B MFW Pump. Corrective Maintenance was performed and plant power raised to 70% four days ago.
It is intended to observe the B MFW operation for two more days at this power level and then raise power to 100%. The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 4 hours0.167 days <br />0.0238 weeks <br />0.00548 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.
It is expected to perform post-maintenance testing on the B RHR Pump on this shift.
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A Control Rod Shroud Fan is OOS for breaker maintenance, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement.
Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 1 C-RO Failure of B RHR Pump During Surveillance C(TS)-SRO 2' 2 C-BOP A ARV Fails OPEN (3411)
C-SRO 3 3 I-RO Master Pressure Controller (431 K) Fails HIGH l(TS)-SRO 4 NA R-RO Unscheduled Trip of Transmission Circuits/Downpower N-BOP N-SRO 5 4 C-BOP B FRV fails AS-IS (Manual Control Available)
C-SRO 6 5 M-RO Ejected Control Rod M-BOP M-SRO 7 6 C-BOP Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip C-SRO 8 7 C-RO Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start C-SRO 9 8 NA A RHR Pumps trips
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I )nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022217)
Ginna 2017 NRC Scenario #3 The plant is at 70% power (BOL). The plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the B MFW Pump. Corrective Maintenance was performed and plant power raised to 70% four days ago. It is intended to observe the B MFW operation for two more days at this power level and then raise power to 100%. The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 4 hours0.167 days <br />0.0238 weeks <br />0.00548 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. It is expected to perform post-maintenance testing on the B RHR Pump on this shift.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A Control Rod Shroud Fan is OOS for breaker maintenance, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement.
Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will start the B RHR Pump per STP-0-2.2.-COMP-B, "Residual Heat Removal Pump B Comprehensive Test," and then stop the pump due to a pump seal water cooler failure using the guidance of A-503.1, "Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures User's Guide." The operator will respond using AP-CCW.2, "Loss of CCW During Power Operation." The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS - MODES 1, 2, and 3."
Following this, the controller for the A SG ARV will fail such that the valve will travel to the full OPEN position. The operator will respond using A-503.1, "Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide," and/or AP-FW.2, "Secof)dary Coolant Leak," and take manual control of the ARV-3411, and close the valve. '
Subsequently, the Master Pressure Controller (431 K) will fail such that the output in Automatic goes to 100%, causing both Pressurizer Spray Valves to OPEN, and RCS Pressure to LOWER.
The operator will respond using AR-F-10, "PRESSURIZER LO PRESS 2205 PSI," and enter AP-PRZR.1, "Abnormal Pressurizer Pressure." The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, "RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits," and Technical Requirements Manual TR-3.4.3, "Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS)
Mitigation."
Then, the off-site transmission circuit 908 will de-energize, and the RG&E Energy Control Center (ECC) will request that Ginna verbally certify that the plant is capable of ramping down to 360 MWe net generation in 14 minutes upon Subsequent notification from ECC. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-J-28, "STATION 13A TROUBLE," enter 0-6.9, "Operating Limits for Ginna Station Transmission," and prepare for plant shutdown. After this, the off-site transmission circuit 913 will also de-energize and the ECC will call requesting that the previously agreed to downpower be executed. The operating crew will enter AP-TURB.5, "Rapid Load Reduction," and lower plant power to 340 MWe.
During the load reduction, a failure of the B FRV to control in AUTO will occur. The operator will respond per AR-G-5, "SIG/ B LEVEL DEVIATION +/-7%," or upon observing an abnormally high level in the B Steam Generator and control the B FRV manually.
After this, Shutdown Bank Control Rod K-9 will be ejected from the core causing a LOCA, and an automatic Rx Trip/SI signal will occur. On the trip the Main Turbine will fail to trip, and the operator will need to manually trip the Turbine. Additionally, the A and the B SI Pumps will fail to start automatically. The operator will be required to manually start both SI Pumps. The operator will enter E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and transition to E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant."
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022217)
Shortly after transition to E-1 the A RHR Pump will trip. The operator will transition to ECA-1.1, "Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation," due to a loss of both RHR Pumps. The operator will take actions to minimize the inventory loss from the RWST.
The scenario will terminate at Step 10.a RNO of ECA-1.1, after the crew has stopped one SI Pump.
Critical Tasks:
Trip all RCPs within 5 minutes of reaching trip criteria (EOP-Based)
Safety Significance: Failure to trip all RCPs when required can lead to core uncovery and to fuel temperatures in excess of 2200°F. Analyses have shown that if the RCPs are tripped within 5 minutes of the trip criteria being met, PCT will remain below 2200°F, and if this action is delayed beyond 5 minutes, this PCT will be exceeded. It is a management expectation that the RCPs be tripped as quickly as possible, but within 5 minutes when the trip criteria is met. Failure to take this action represents mis-operation by the operator which leads to degradation of the fuel cladding fission product barrier, and a violation of a license condition.
Direct that actions be taken to prepare to establish, or establish Makeup to RWST; and minimize RWST outflow prior to the completion of Step 10.a of ECA-1.1 (EOP-Based)
Safety Significance: Under the postulated plant conditions, failure to establish makeup flow to the RWST and/or to minimize RWST outflow leads to (or accelerates) depletion of RWST inventory to the point at which ECCS pumps taking suction on the RWST must be stopped. Loss of pumped injection (coincident with loss of emergency cooling recirculation) will lead to a severe or an extreme challenge to the core cooling CSF. Failure to perform the critical task causes these challenges to occur needlessly or, at best, prematurely (that is, before they would occur if the critical task is performed). Thus, failure to perform the critical task under the postulated plant conditions leads to "a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario." It also represents a demonstrated inability by the crew to "take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety."
PROGRAM: Ginna Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N17-1-3
REFERENCES:
- 2. STP-0-2.2.-COMP-B, "Residual Heat Removal Pump B Comprehensive Test" (Rev 007)
- 4. AP-CCW.2, "Loss of CCW During Power Operation" (Rev 02300)
- 5. A-503.1, "Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide" (Rev 04600)
- 6. AP-FW.2, "Secondary Coolant Leak" (Rev 00100)
- 8. AP-PRZR.1, "Abnormal Pressurizer Pressure" (Rev 01700)
- 9. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, "RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits" (Amendment 80)
- 10. Technical Requirements Manual TR-3.4.3, "Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS)
Mitigation" (Rev 61)
- 11. AR-J-28, "STATION 13A TROUBLE" (Rev 010)
- 12. 0-6.9, "Operating Limits for Ginna Station Transmission" (Rev 035)
- 13. AP-TURB.5, "Rapid Load Reduction" (Rev 01700)
- 14. AR-G-5, "SIG/ B LEVEL DEVIATION +/-7%" (Rev 00701)
- 15. Technical Specification LCO 3. 7.3, "Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MF IVs), Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (MFRVs), and Associated Bypass Valves" (Amendment 95)
- 16. E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," (Rev 048)
- 17. ATT-27.0, "Attachment Automatic Action Verification" (Rev 00400)
- 18. E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant" (Rev 04100)
- 19. ECA-1.1, "Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation" (Rev 02801)
- 20. ATT-8.1, "Attachment DIG Stop" (Rev 6)
Validation Time: 87 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Essential Training & Consulting, LLC Facility Review:
Rev.022217 Scenario Event Description NRG Scenario 3 Facility: Ginna Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: N17-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)
(RO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 70% power (BOL}. The plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the B MFW Pump. Corrective Maintenance was performed and plant power raised to 70% four days ago.
It is intended to observe the B MFW operation for two more days at this power level and then raise power to 100%. The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 4 hours0.167 days <br />0.0238 weeks <br />0.00548 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.
It is expected to perform post-maintenance testing on the B RHR Pump on this shift.
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A Control Rod Shroud Fan is OOS for breaker maintenance, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement.
Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 1 C-RO Failure of B RHR Pump During Surveillance C(TS)-SRO 2 2 C-BOP A ARV Fails OPEN (3411)
C-SRO 3 3 I-RO Master Pressure Controller (431 K) Fails HIGH l(TS)-SRO 4 NA R-RO Unscheduled Trip of Transmission Circuits/Downpower N-BOP N-SRO 5 4 C-BOP B FRV fails AS-IS (Manual Control Available)
C-SRO 6 5 M-RO Ejected Control Rod M-BOP M-SRO 7 6 C-BOP Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip C-SRO 8 7 C-RO Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start C-SRO 9 8 NA A RHR Pumps trips
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I )nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Ginna 2017 NRC Scenario #3 The plant is at 70% power (BOL). The plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the B MFW Pump. Corrective Maintenance was performed and plant power raised to 70% four days ago. It is intended to observe the B MFW operation for two more days at this power level and then raise power to 100%. The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 4 hours0.167 days <br />0.0238 weeks <br />0.00548 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. It is expected to perform post-maintenance testing on the B RHR Pump on this shift.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A Control Rod Shroud Fan is OOS for breaker maintenance, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement.
Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will start the B RHR Pump per STP-0-2.2.-COMP-B, "Residual Heat Removal Pump B Comprehensive Test," and then stop the pump due to a pump seal water cooler failure using the guidance of A-503.1, "Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures User's Guide." The operator will respond using AP-CCW.2, "Loss of CCW During Power Operation." The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS -
MODES 1, 2, and 3."
Following this, the controller for the A SG ARV will fail such that the valve will travel to the full OPEN position. The operator will respond using A-503.1, "Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide," and/or AP-FW.2, "Secondary Coolant Leak," and take mgnual control of the ARV-3411, and close the valve.
- Subsequently, the Master Pressure Controller (431 K) will fail such that the output in Automatic goes to 100%, causing both Pressurizer Spray Valves to OPEN, and RCS Pressure to LOWER.
The operator will respond using AR-F-10, "PRESSURIZER LO PRESS 2205 PSI," and enter AP-PRZR.1, "Abnormal Pressurizer Pressure." The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, "RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits," and Technical Requirements Manual TR-3.4.3, "Anticipated Transients Without Scram {ATWS) Mitigation."
Then, the off-site transmission circuit 908 will de-energize, and the RG&E Energy Control Center (ECC) will request that Ginna verbally certify that the plant is capable of ramping down to 360 MWe net generation in 14 minutes upon Subsequent notification from ECC. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-J-28, "STATION 13A TROUBLE," enter 0-6.9, "Operating Limits for Ginna Station Transmission," and prepare for plant shutdown. After this, the off-site transmission circuit 913 will also de-energize and the ECC will call requesting that the previously agreed to downpower be executed. The operating crew will enter AP-TURB.5, "Rapid Load Reduction," and lower plant power to 340 MWe.
During the load reduction, a failure of the B FRV to control in AUTO will occur. The operator will respond per AR-G-5, "SIG/ B LEVEL DEVIATION +/-7%," or upon observing an abnormally high level in the B Steam Generator and control the B FRV manually.
After this, Shutdown Bank Control Rod K-9 will be ejected from the core causing a LOCA, and an automatic Rx Trip/SI signal will occur. On the trip the Main Turbine will fail to trip, and the operator will need to manually trip the Turbine. Additionally, the A and the B SI Pumps will fail to start automatically. The operator will be required to manually start both SI Pumps. The operator will enter E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and transition to E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant."
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Shortly after transition to E-1 the A RHR Pump will trip. The operator will transition to ECA-1.1, "Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation," due to a loss of both RHR Pumps. The operator will take actions to minimize the inventory loss from the RWST.
The scenario will terminate at Step 10.a RNO of ECA-1.1, after the crew has stopped one SI Pump.
Critical Tasks:
Trip all RCPs within 5 minutes of reaching trip criteria (EOP-Based)
Safety Significance: Failure to trip all RCPs when required can lead to core uncovery and to fuel temperatures in excess of 2200°F. Analyses have shown that if the RCPs are tripped within 5 minutes of the trip criteria being met, PCT will remain below 2200°F, and if this action is delayed beyond 5 minutes, this PCT will be exceeded. It is a management expectation that the RCPs be tripped as quickly as possible, but within 5 minutes when the trip criteria is met. Failure to take this action represents mis-operation by the operator which leads to degradation of the fuel cladding fission produce barrier, and a violation of a license condition.
Direct that actions be taken to prepare to establish, or establish Makeup to RWST; and minimize RWST ouJflow prior to the completion of Step 1O.a of ECA-1.1 (EOP-Based)
Safety Significance: Under the postulated plant conditions, failure to establish makeup flow to the RWST and/or to minimize RWST outflow leads to (or accelerates) depletion of RWST inventory to the point at which ECCS pumps taking suction on the RWST must be stopped.
Loss of pumped injection (coincident with loss of emergency cooling recirculation) will lead to a severe or an extreme challenge to the core cooling CSF. Failure to perform the critical task causes these challenges to occur needlessly or, at best, prematurely (that is, before they would occur if the critical task is performed). Thus, failure to perform the critical task under the postulated plant conditions leads to "a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario." It also represents a demonstrated inability by the crew to "take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety."
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Reset to Temp IC 157 T = 0 (From IC-26):
D (Originally IC-26).
Perform STP-0-2.2-COMP-B up to Step 6.1.9.
Take the Control Rod Shroud Fan A Control Switch to the PULL STOP position.
Take A CB Pump Control Switch to TRIP Insert OVR-CND04A = OFF Hang LOTO Tags as necessary Insert MALF TUR02 (Turbine Fails to Trip on Rx Trip)
Insert MALF RPS07 A (A SI Pump fails to AUTO Start)
Insert MALF RPS07B (B SI Pump fails to AUTO Start)
Insert MALF RHR01A (A RHR Pump trips)
Insert the following on T-8 (X071198D==1 [B RHR Pump contrbl switch to PULL STOP]):
- MALF RHR01 B (B RHR Pump trips)
- OVR-RHR06A.= OFF
- OVR-RHR06B = OFF
- OVR-RHR06C = OFF Insert MALF ANN-A-RHR02 = ON (60 seconds after B RHR Pump Start) on T-1 (X070198R==1
[B RHR Red status light is LIT])
Insert MALF CLG05=10 (CCW Leak) on T-1 (X070198R==1 [B RHR Red status light is LIT])
Insert MALF STM~4A (100 over 45 second Ramp) on T-2 Insert MALF PZR04 (100%, No RAMP) on T-3 Insert REM-EDS-025 (OPEN) on T-4 Insert REM-EDS-023 (OPEN) on T-4 Insert REM-EDS-031 (OPEN) on T-5 Insert MALF FDW07C (Current Controller Output) on T-6 Insert MALF ROD05-K9 (1400 gpm, No Ramp) on T-7 Ensure PRcs-PstG graphed during the scenario.
D Prior to Crew
- Hang Protective Tags per OPG-Protective Briefing Equipment.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D Crew Briefing
- Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements
- Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew .
- Provide crew with marked up copy of STP-0-2.2-COMP-B to Step 6.1.9 .
- Handout current Reactivity Plan .
D T-0 Begin Familiarization Period D At direction of Event1 Failure of B RHR Pump During Surveillance examiner Trigger#1 MALF ANN-A-RHR02 =
I ON (60 seconds after B RHR Pump Start)
MALF CLG05=10 (CCW
' Leak)
D At direction of Event2 A ARV Fails OPEN (3411) examiner Trigger#2 STM04A (100 over 45 second Ramp)
D At direction of Event3 Master Pressure Controller (431 K) Fails HIGH examiner Trigger#3 PZR04 (100%, No RAMP)
D At direction of Event 4 Unscheduled Trip of Transmission examiner Circuits/Down power Trigger #4 Circuit Breaker 90812 -
REM-EDS-025 (OPEN) Note: Loss of Circuit 908 (Followed by Phone Circuit Breaker Call) 7X13A72 - REM-EDS-023 (OPEN)
Trigger #5 Note: Loss of Circuit 913 (Followed by Phone Circuit Breaker 91302 -
Call)
REM-EDS-031 (OPEN)
(Loss of Circuit 913)
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D Turbine Load Event 5 B FRV fails AS-IS (Manual Control Available) at 380 MWe Trigger #6 FDW07C (Current Controller Output)
D At direction of Event 6 Ejected Control Rod examiner Trigger#7 ROD05-K9 (1400 gpm, No Ramp)
D Post-Rx Trip Event7 Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip TUR02 Note: This malfunction is inserted at T=O.
I D Post-Rx Trip Events Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start RPS07A Note: These malfunctions are inserted at T=O.
RPS07B D Post-Rx Trip Event9 A RHR Pumps trips RHR01A Note: This malfunction is inserted at T=O, conditional on SI Actuation.
D Terminate the scenario up~n direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _ _ _ _ _ Page 8 of 59
---11 Event
Description:
Failure of B RHR Pump During Surveillance Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will start the B RHR Pump per STP-0-2.2.-
COMP-B, "Residual Heat Removal Pump B Comprehensive Test," and then stop the pump due to a pump seal water cooler failure using the guidance of A-503.1, "Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures User's Guide." The operator will respond using AP-CCW.2, "Loss of CCW During Power Operation." The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS - MODES 1, 2, and 3."
SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #1 (MALF ANN-A-RHR02 = ON (60 seconds after B RHR Pump Start) MALF CLG05=10 (CCW Leak)}
Indications Available:
- MCB Annunciator A-9, RHR PUMP COOLING WATER OUTLET LO FLOW 15 GPM Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments STP-0-2.2-COMP-B, RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP B COMPREHENSIVE TEST HCO (Step 6.1.9) WHEN notified that PART A - SIM DRIVER: As EO report Pre Run Readings of Attachment 5, RHR that Part A of Attachment 5 is Pump B Discharge Pressure Readings, has complete.
been completed, THEN CONTINUE with this procedure.
HCO (Step 6.1.10) START RHR Pump B HCO (Step 6.1.11) RECORD RHR Pump B start time:
HCO (Step 6.1.12) VERIFY flow is being indicated NOTE: The HCO will contact on recirculation flow meter, Fl-672. the EO, and direct that flow be verified.
SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge and report that Fl-672 is indicating 225 gpm.
HCO (Step 6.1.13) RECORD the flow indicated on Fl-672.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# ------Page 9 of 59
--~1 Event
Description:
Failure of B RHR Pump During Surveillance Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 6.1.14) CHECK RHR Pump B NOTE: The HCO will Recirculation Flow Acceptance Criteria is determine that the recirculation met. flow acceptance criteria is met.
HCO (Step 6.1.15) IF RHR Pump B Recirculation Flow Acceptance Criteria is NOT met, .....
HCO (Step 6.1.16) INSPECT all accessible areas NOTE: The HCO will contact of the RHR System for leakage, (that is, the EO, and direct that areas that can be entered without creating accessible areas be inspected.
ALARA concerns), including piping, valves SIM DRIVER: as EO, and heat exchangers. acknowledge.
AR-A-9, RHR PUMP COOLING WATER OUTLET LO FLOW 15 GPM NOTE: The HCO will contact the EO, and direct that the alarm be investigated.
SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge, and report that there is yellow water spraying out of the B RHR Seal Water Heat Exchanger and accumulating on the floor.
us (Step 1) GO TO the applicable AP-CCW NOTE: The US will select AP-procedure: CCW.2.
- AP-CCW.2, LOSS OF CCW DURING POWER OPERATION
- AP-CCW.3, LOSS OF CCW- PLANT SHUTDOWN A-503.1, EMERGENCY AND ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES USERS GUIDE
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# ------Page 10 of 59
---11 Event
Description:
Failure of B RHR Pump During Surveillance Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 5.3.A.5) Actions are permitted to NOTE: It is expected that the mitigate or compensate for equipment or HCO will stop the B RHR controller failures to isolate leaks. Permitted Pump based on this guidance.
actions include those actions necessary to take manual control and stabilize the affected parameters, or to isolate a leak. Examples include closing or isolating a failed open PORV, taking manual control of a failed FRV controller, etc. These deviations fall under the Maintenance Rule. Therefore, 50.59 is not required.
NOTE: The US will go to AP-CCW.2.
AP-CCW.2, LOSS OF CCW DURING POWER OPERATION HCO (Step 1) Check CCW Pump Status: '
- Both CCW pump breaker white lights -
EXTINGUISHED
- Annunciator A-17, MOTOR OFF RCP CCWP - EXTINGUISHED HCO (*Step 2) Monitor CCW Surge Tank Level - NOTE: This is a Continuous APPROXIMATELY 50% AND STABLE .... Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
NOTE: The CCW Surge Tank Level is lowering, however, the level is lowering slowly. The HCO may or may not refill the Surge Tank. If not, go to Step 3.
HCO (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following:
- Open RMW to CCW surge tank, MOV-823.
- Start RMW pump(s) .
- IF surge tank level stable or rising, THEN NOTE: The makeup flow into control level at approximately 50% while the CCW Surge Tank will be continuing with Step 3. able to stabilize the tank level.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# 11 of 59
- - - - - - Page ---ii Event
Description:
Failure of B RHR Pump During Surveillance Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (*Step 3) Monitor CCW Hx Outlet NOTE: This is a Continuous Temperature (MCB rear or PPCS point ID Action. The US will make one T0621) or more board operators aware.
- CCW Hx Outlet temperature - LESS THAN 120°F HCO (*Step 4) Monitor RCP Indications: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
- Annunciator A-7 (A-15), RCP 1A (1 B)
CCW return Hi Temp or low flow 165
' gpm 125°F alarm - EXTINGUISHED
- RCP motor bearings temperature (PPCS Group Display - RCPS OR RXP temperature monitor RK-30A recorder) -
- 200°F HCO (*Step 5) Monitor If Letdown Should Be NOTE
- This is a Continuous Isolated: Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
- Check annunciator A-12, Non-Regen Hx Letdown Out Hi Temp 145°F -
EXTINGUISHED
- Check excess letdown temperature -
LESS THAN 195°F HCO (Step 6) Check CCW Valve Alignment -
NORMAL
- Direct AO to check local flow indications NOTE: The US will dispatch per ATT-1.1, ATIACHMENT NORMAL an EO.
CCW FLOW SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# ------Page 12 of _ 59_.,I Event
Description:
Failure of B RHR Pump During Surveillance Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 7) Locally Check Seal Water Hx CCW NOTE: The US may direct the Outlet Flow - NORMAL (Fl-605) EO to report status of Seal Water Hx CCW Outlet Flow.
If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO, and report flow is 15 gpm.
HCO (Step 8) Check for CCW Leakage In CNMT:
- Level - ST ABLE i
- Sump A pumps - OFF
- RCP oil levels - STABLE HCO/ (Step 9) Check for CCW Leakage In AUX NOTE: The EO has already EO BLDG: reported CCW leakage in the Aux Building.
IDENTIFIED
- Leak identified NOTE: The leak has been discovered.
- Isolate leak if possible NOTE: The US/HCO may direct the EO to isolate the leak by closing V707B and 708B.
If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO, and DELETE MALFCLG05 60 seconds after the direction to isolate the leak. THEN, report that the valves have been closed.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# ......;.._____ Page 13 of 59
---11 Event
Description:
Failure of B RHR Pump During Surveillance Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- Refer to IP-ENV-3, RESPONSE TO A NOTE: The US may ask the SPILL OF HAZARDOUS SM or WCCS to address.
MATERIAL/WASTE If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as needed.
HCO (Step 11) Check Normal or Excess Letdown
- IN SERVICE HCO (Step 12) Check CCW System Leak Isolated
- Surge tank level -APPROXIMATELY 50%
- (Step 12a RNO) IF level less than 50%, NOTE: The Surge Tank may THEN continue filling. or may not be being filled. If it is, the Step 12 RNO will be performed.
IF~ 50% THEN perform the following:
- Stop RMW pump(s) .
- Close MOV-823 .
- (Step 12 Continued) Surge tank level -
STABLE HCO (Step 13) Direct RP To Sample CCW System NOTE: The US may notify RP.
For Chromates SIM DRIVER: as RP, acknowledge.
HCO/ (Step 14) Evaluate MCB Annunciator Status co (Refer to AR Procedures) us (Step 15) Evaluate Plant Conditions:
- CCW system malfunction - IDENTIFIED AND CORRECTED.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# -----Page 14 of
--1 59 Event
Description:
Failure of B RHR Pump During Surveillance Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments us (Step 16) Notify Higher Supervision NOTE: The US may notify the wee.
SIM DRIVER: as wees, acknowledge.
us (Step 17) Return To Procedure Or Guidance In Effect NOTE: The US will likely check the Tech Specs.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO 3.5.2, ECCS- MODES 1, 2 AND 3 I
us LCO 3.5.2 Two ECCS trains shall be OPERABLE I us APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# 15 of 59
---11 Event
Description:
Failure of B RHR Pump During Surveillance Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION The US will enter Condition B ACTION TIME based on the failure of the B A. One train A.1 Restore 72 hours3 days <br />0.429 weeks <br />0.0986 months <br /> RHR Pump to successfully inoperable train to OPERABLE complete Post-Maintenance AND status. Testing and an expiring At least 100% of Completion Time.
the ECCS flow equivalent to a NOTE: The US may call single WCCS/Supervision to address OPERABLE the Tech Spec Required EGGS train Shutdown.
available.
If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as WCCS/Plant Supervision; and state that management will call back with a Shutdown direction. I B. Required B.1 Be in Mode 6 hours0.25 days <br />0.0357 weeks <br />0.00822 months <br /> Action and 3.
associated AND '
Completion B.2 Be in Mode 12 hours0.5 days <br />0.0714 weeks <br />0.0164 months <br /> Time not met. 4 NOTE: The US may call WCC/Maintenance to address the failed RHR Pump.
If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as WCC; and direct that the B RHR Pump be placed in PULL STOP.
NOTE: The US will likely conduct a Plant Status Brief.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _2________~ Page 16 of
11 59 Event
Description:
A ARV Fails OPEN (3411)
Following this, the controller for the A SG ARV will fail such that the valve will travel to the full OPEN position. The operator will respond using A-503.1, "Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide," and/or AP-FW.2, "Secondary Coolant Leak," and take manual control of the ARV-3411, and close the valve.
SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #2 (STM04A (100% - 45 second ramp))
Indications Available:
- Steam Noise is heard as the valve OPENs
- AOV-3411 Controller Green Status Light goes DARK.
- AOV-3411 Red Status light on MCB Panel 6 is LIT (Vertical Section) .
- AOV-3411 Controller output goes toward 100% demand .
- Tavg decreases slightly
- Pzr Pressure decreases slightly
- Rx power increase s slightly 1
- Turbine load reduces automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The crew may take early action per the guidance of A-503.1 and/or go to AP-FW.2.
A-503.1, EMERGENCY AND ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES USERS GUIDE co (Step 5.3.A.5) Actions are permitted to NOTE: It is expected that the mitigate or compensate for equipment or CO will take manual control of controller failures to isolate leaks. Permitted the valve.
actions include those actions necessary to take manual control and stabilize the affected parameters, or to isolate a leak. Examples include closing or isolating a failed open PORV, taking manual control of a failed FRV controller, etc. These deviations fall under the Maintenance Rule. Therefore, 50.59 is not required.
OR AP-FW.2, LOSS OF SECONDARY COOLANT
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2
_2_ _ _ _ _ Page Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event#
A ARV Fails OPEN (3411) 17 of
1 59 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments co (*Step 1) Determine if Plant Operation can NOTE: This is a Continuous continue: Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
- Leak does not present an unmanageable safety threat.
- CNMT Pressure is being maintained less than 2 psig.
- CNMT Temperature is being maintained less than 125°F.
- Safe Shutdown Equipment Operability is not affected. I
- Leakage is within make-up capability (GE BETZ).
- SIG Level Stable at or Trending to 52%. '
HCOI (*Step 2) Determine if a Load Reduction is NOTE: This is a Continuous co required: Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
- Rx Power less than or equal to 100% .
- SIG Level Stable at or Trending to 52% .
- MFW Pump Suction Pressure greater than 200 psig and stable.
HCO (Step 3) Check Containment conditions NORMAL.
TCVDEW-S)
- CNMT Pressure
TCV17)
- CNMT Recirc Fan Cooler Dump Frequency
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _2__________ Page 18 of 59
11 Event
Description:
A ARV Fails OPEN (3411)
Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments co (Step 4) Check for Secondary Leak to NOTE: The A ARV has failed Atmosphere. OPEN.
- Check S/G Safety Valves CLOSED (PPCS POINTS: VMSSVA and VMSSVB)
- Check S/G ARVs CLOSED co (Step 4.b RNO) Place the ARV controllers in NOTE: Early action may have Manual and Close the Valves. been taken to close the A ARV.
IF the Valve will not close THEN ...
co * (Step 4 Continued) Verify no Steam or
' Feedwater Leakage in the Turbine or Intermediate Building (cleanside)
- Dispatch AO as necessary to NOTE: An EO may not be investigate leakage. dispatched to look for leaks because the Steam Noise has been eliminated when action was taken to close the A ARV manually.
HCO/ (Step 5) Check Condenser Steam dump co valves shut if not required for RCS Temp Control HCO/ (Step 6) Check MSR Tubes intact:
co
- Consult with System Engineering to determine if MSR Isolation is required.
co (Step 7) Check Feedwater Heater intact:
- Check MCB Alarm H-29 FDWTR HTR and Drain Tank Hi-Lo level Extinguished.
- Dump Valves Shut: (HOT Page on PPCS)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _2_ _ _ _ _ Page 19 of 59
---11 Event
Description:
A ARV Fails OPEN (3411)
Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- V-3343 for HOT
- V-5557 for 3A Heater
- V-3347 for 5A Heater
- V-5560 for 38 Heater
- V-3348 for 58 Heater
- V-5561 for 1A Heater
- V-5559 for 2A Heater
- V-5556 for 18 Heater
- V-5558 for 28Heater i
us (Step 8) Evaluate effect on continued Plant operation: '
- Refer to the following Technical NOTE: The US may refer to Specifications: Technical Specification 3.7.4, however, it will be determined that LCO 3. 7.4 is met.
- ITS Section 3. 7 Plant System
- ITS Section 3.6.4 Containment Pressure
- ITS Section 3.6.5 Containment Temperature us (Step 9) Check if Plant Shutdown and Cooldown Required:
- Consult with SM and Plant Management NOTE: The US may call if plant shutdown and cooldown required WCCS/Supervision to address the Tech Spec Required Shutdown (Previous Event) and the ARV failure.
If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as WCCS/Plant Supervision; and state that management will call back with a Shutdown direction.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _2_ _ _ _ _ Page 20 of 59
---11 Event
Description:
A ARV Fails OPEN (3411)
Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments us (Step 9.a RNO) Return to Procedure and Step in effect.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.4, ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVES (ARVs}
us LCO 3.7.4 Two ARV lines shall be OPERABLE us APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, MODE 3 with Reactor Coolant System average temperature (Tavg) ;::500°F CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The US will determine ACTION TIME that the failed ARV is A. One ARV A.1 Restore 7 days OPERABLE.
line ARV line to inoperable. OPERABLE status.
NOTE: The US will likely conduct a Plant Status Brief.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _3_ _ _ _ _ Page 21 of 59
ll Event
Description:
Master Pressure Controller (431 K) Fails HIGH Subsequently, the Master Pressure Controller (431 K) will fail such that the output in Automatic goes to 100%, causing both Pressurizer Spray Valves to OPEN, and RCS Pressure to LOWER. The operator will respond using AR-F-10, "PRESSURIZER LO PRESS 2205 PSI," and enter AP-PRZR.1, "Abnormal Pressurizer Pressure." The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, "RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits," and Technical Requirements Manual TR-3.4.3, "Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) Mitigation."
SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #3 (PZR04 (100, No Ramp))
Indications Available:
- Annunciator F-2, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE HI
- Annunciator F-10, PRESSURIZER LO PRESS 2205 PSI
- AOV-431A goes to full OPEN
- AOV-431 B goes to full OPEN
- 431 K Output moves to 100%
- All four Pzr Pressure channels are lowerinQ Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The crew may enter AP-PRZR.1 directly.
AR-F-10, PRESSURIZER LO PRESS 2205 PSI HCO (Step 1) Perform a channel check.
HCO (Step 2) Go to th.e applicable procedure:
us
- AP-PRZR.1, if pressure is abnormal for plant condition NOTE: The HCO may take action to place 431 Kin MANUAL control before arriving at the procedurally directed step, per the Guidance of A-503.1.
AP-PRZR.1, ABNORMAL PRESSURIZER PRESSURE HCO (Step 1) Check PZR Pressure:
- All 4 narrow range channels -
APPROXIMATELY EQUAL
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _3_ _ _ _ _ Page 22 of 59
--~I Event
Description:
Master Pressure Controller (431 K) Fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- All 4 narrow range channels -
TRENDING TOGETHER HCO (Step 2) Check Reactor Power - STABLE HCO (Step 3) Check PRZR Pressure:
- Pressure - LESS THAN 2235 PSIG
- Pressure- GREATER THAN 2000 PSIG I
HCO (Step 4) Check PRZR Heater Status:
- PRZR proportional heater breaker - 'I I
CLOSED
- PRZR heater backup group - ON HCO (Step 5) Verify Normal PRZR Spray valves - NOTE: The Spray Valves CLOSED should be CLOSED now, but were previously opened.
- AOV-431A
- AOV-431B HCO (Step 6) Check PRZR Pressure Controller, NOTE: The 431 K Output is at 431 K, Demand - LESS THAN 50% 100%.
HCO (Step 6 RNO) Place 431 Kin MANUAL and NOTE: This may have already lower output to restore PRZR pressure to been accomplished, per the 2235 psig. Guidance of A-503.1.
HCO (Step 7) Check PZR PORVs:
- PORVs - CLOSED
- Annunciator F-19, PRZR PORV OUTLET HI TEMP 145°F -
EXTINGUISHED us
- Go to Step 9 .
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _3_ _ _ _ _ Page 23 of 59
---11 Event
Description:
Master Pressure Controller (431 K) Fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 9) Check PRZR Safety Valves:
- Position indicator - LESS THAN 0.1 INCH HCO
- Annunciator F-18, PRZR SAFETY VLV OUTLET HI TEMP 145°F -
EXTINGUISHED
- Annunciator AA-13, PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVE POSITION -
EXTINGUISHED HCO (Step 10) Check AUX Spray Valve, AOV-296
-CLOSED HCO (Step 11) Check PRZR Pressure Control
- Pressure - TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG NOTE: With the HCO controlling PRZR pressure in MANUAL, pressure is restoring to normal.
us
- Go to Step 16 .
HCO (Step 16) Check PRT Indications:
- Level - BETWEEN 61 % AND 84%
- Pressure-APPROXIMATELY 1.5 PSIG AND STABLE
- Temperature-AT CNMT AMBIENT TEMPERATURE AND STABLE HCO (Step 17) Establish PRZR Pressure Control In Auto:
- Verify 431 K in AUTO HCO (Step 17 RNO) Place 431 Kin AUTO, if NOTE: Since the controller desired. has failed, this will NOT be desired.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _3_ _ _ _~ Page 24 of 59
---11 Event
Description:
Master Pressure Controller (431 K) Fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO * (Step 17b) Verify PRZR spray valves in AUTO.
- Verify PRZR heaters restored:
- PRZR proportional heaters breaker
-CLOSED
- PRZR backup heaters breaker -
RESET, IN AUTO.
us (Step 18) Evaluate MCB Annunciator Status (Refer to AR Procedures) i us (Step 19) Notify Higher Supervision f'i!OTE: The US may call WCC/Maintenance to address the failed controller.
If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as wee.
us (Step 20) Notify Reactor Engineer for NOTE: The US may call RE.
Transient Monitoring Program If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as RE.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS TEMPERATURE~ PRESSURE, AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS us (LCO 3.4.1) RCS DNB parameters for NOTE: According to Section pressurizer pressure, RCS average 2.10.1 of the COLR, the Przr temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall Pressure shall be ;?:2175 psig.
be within the limits specified in the COLR.
APPLICABILITY MODE 1.
CONDITION I REQUIRED ACTION I COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The US will identify that
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _3_ _ _ _ _ Page 25 of 59
---11 Event
Description:
Master Pressure Controller (431 K) Fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments A. One or A.1 Restore RCS 2 hours0.0833 days <br />0.0119 weeks <br />0.00274 months <br /> this TS was entered and exited more RCS DNB if and when RCS pressure DNB parameters(s) lowers to (and then rises parameters to within limit.
not within above) 2175 psig.
limits.
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENT 3.4.3, ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUT SCRAM (ATWS) MITIGATION us (TR 3.4.3) ATWS Mitigation shall be OPERABLE as follows:
Each PORV shall be capable of automatic actuation and each block valve shall be OPEN APPLICABILITY MODE 1 > 45%.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION The US will determine that TIME Condition A is required to be A. One or A.1 declare ATWS immediately entered.
more PORV mitigating automatic capability flow path inoperable.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2
_4_ _ _ _ _ Page Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# 26 of
--1 59 Event
Description:
Unscheduled Trip of Transmission eircuits/Downpower Then, the off-site transmission circuit 908 will de-energize, and the RG&E Energy Control Center (ECC) will request that Ginna verbally certify that the plant is capable of ramping down to 360 MWe net generation in 14 minutes upon Subsequent notification from ECC. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-J-28, "STATION 13A TROUBLE," enter 0-6.9, "Operating Limits for Ginna Station Transmission," and prepare for plant shutdown. After this, the off-site transmission circuit 913 will also de-energize and the ECC will call requesting that the previously agreed to downpower be executed.
The operating crew will enter AP-TURB.5, "Rapid Load Reduction," and lower plant power to 340 MWe.
SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #4 (Circuit Breaker 90812 -
REM-EDS-025 (OPEN) Circuit Breaker 7X13A72 -
REM-EDS-023 (OPEN) (Loss of Circuit 908)
Immediately after the recognition of the PPCS Alarms, contact the Control Room as RG&E ECC and state the following:
This is RG&E Energy Control Center. Circuit 908 has been lost, the exact cause is unknown, and crews are in route. There is no net generation reduction required at this time. RG&E ECC requests that Ginna verbally certify that the plant is capable of ramping down to 340 MWe net generation in 14 minutes upon Subsequent notification from RG&E ECC.
Indications Available:
- PPCS Alarm Point B7X13A72 Station 13A Breaker 7X13A72 in ALARM
- PPCS Alarm Point B90812 Station 13A Breaker 90812 in ALARM
- MCB Annunciator J-28, STATION 13A TROUBLE Time Pos. Expected Actions/~ehavior Comments AR-J-28, STATION 13A TROUBLE us (Step 4.1) Notify Plant electricians to NOTE: The US may notify the investigate. WCC/Electricians.
SIM DRIVER: as wees, acknowledge.
co (Step 4.2) Verify proper generator/system voltages.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _4_ _ _ _ _ Page 27 of 59
---11 Event
Description:
Unscheduled Trip of Transmission Circuits/Down power co (Step 4.3) Verify proper breaker alignment.
Refer to PPCS Electrical Distribution Display by clicking on "Station 13 Electrical" in the top menu display.
us (Step 4.4) REFER to 0-6.9, OPERATING LIMITS FOR GINNA STATION TRANSMISSION.
NOTE: The US will go to 0-6.9.
0-6.9, OPERATING LIMITS FOR GINNA STATION TRANSMISSION us (Step 6.1.1) AFTER CONFERING with an NOTE: The US/CO may notify I SRO THEN INFORM RG&E ECC the plant is RG&E ECC that the plant is capable of meeting the reduced net capable of meeting the generation level within 4, 14 or 29 minutes reduced net generation level upon SUBSEQUENT notification. within 4, 14 or 29 minutes '
upon SUBSEQUENT notification.
SIM DRIVER: as RG&E ECC, acknowledge.
us (Step 6.1.2) Shift Manager SHALL NOTE: The US will direct the COMPLETE Attachment 1, Generation SM to perform this action.
Output Ramp Down Written Certification, SIM DRIVER: as SM, AND FAX a copy to RG&E ECC within 15 acknowledge.
minutes of being notified of certification request.
us (Step 6.1.3) IMMEDIATELY REDUCE net NOTE: The US will mark this generation to the level directed by RG&E Step NA.
ECC for the trip or scheduled outage of a transmission circuit. OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.
us (Step 6.1.4) REFER TO AP-TURB.5, Rapid Load Reduction, for preparations to meet the load reduction time limit(s).
us (Step 6.1.5) IF either generator output NOTE: Neither breaker is breaker (1G13A72 or 9X13A72) is out of OOS or tripped.
service OR has tripped ....
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _4_ _ _ _ _ Page 28 of 59
---11 Event
Description:
Unscheduled Trip of Transmission Circuits/Down power us (Step 6.1.6) IF NECESSARY COORDINATE with RG&E ECC in lowering VAR's to lower generator output current. OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.
us (Step 6.1. 7) PERFORM a Pre Job Briefing so that immediate load reductions can commence upon notification from RG&E ECC of a subsequent circuit failure.
us (Step 6.1.8) WHEN notification is received from RG&E ECC that a SUBSEQUENT loss of transmission circuit has occurred, THEN REDUCE net generation to the level directed by RG&E ECC within the required time limit(s). ,'
SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #5 (Circuit Breaker 91302 -
REM-EDS-031 (OPEN) (Loss of Circuit 913)
Immediately after the recognition of the PPCS Alarms, contact the Control Room as RG&E ECC and state the following:
This is RG&E Energy Control Center. Circuit 913 has been lost, the exact cause is unknown, and crews are in route. Reduce net generation to the level directed by the previous guarantee 340 MWe net generation within 14 minutes.
Indications Available:
- PPCS Alarm Point B91302 Station 13A Breaker 91302 in ALARM
- MCB Annunciator J-28, STATION 13A TROUBLE NOTE: The US has already conducted a Power Reduction Brief.
AP-TURB.5, RAPID LOAD REDUCTION Examiner NOTE: When Turbine Load lowers to 380 MWe (Gross) Move to Event 5.
HCO (Step 1) Initiate Load Reduction
- Verify rods in AUTO
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _4_ _ _ _ _ Page 29 of 59
---ti Event
Description:
Unscheduled Trip of Transmission Circuits/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO
- Initiate boration at the rate determined in NOTE: The HCO will initiate a OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC. boration.
co
- Reduce turbine load in Auto as follows:
- Place Turbine EH Control in OPER PAN., IMP PRESS IN, if desired.
- Select desired rate on thumbwheel NOTE: The CO will 1%/Minute.
- Reduce the setter to the desired load
- Depress the GO button HCO
- Place PRZR backup heaters switch to I I
ON HCO (*Step 2) Monitor RCS Tavg NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
- Tavg- GREATER THAN 545°F
- Tavg - LESS THAN 579°F HCO (Step 3) Adjust Boric Acid Addition Rate As Necessary To (refer to OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC):
- Maintain rods above the insertion limit
- Match Tavg and Tref
- Compensate for Xenon SIM DRIVER: Operate Trigger #6 (FDW07C (Current Controller Output in
%)) to initiate Event 5.
HCO (*Step 4) Monitor PRZR Pressure - NOTE: This is a Continuous TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG IN AUTO Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _4_ _ _ _ _ Page 30 of 59
---11 Event
Description:
Unscheduled Trip of Transmission Circuits/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 4 RNO) Control PRZR pressure by one NOTE: Controller 431 K is in of the following: MANUAL from a previous malfunction.
- 431 K in MANUAL
- Manual control of PRZR heaters and sprays
- IF PRZR pressure can NOT be controlled manually, THEN .....
co (*Step 5) Monitor MFW Regulating Valves - NOTE: This is a Continuous RESTORING SIG LEVEL TO 52% IN AUTO Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
HCO (*Step 6) Monitor PRZR Level - TRENDING NOTE: This is a Continuous TO PROGRAM IN AUTO CONTROL Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
co (Step 7) Check IA Available to CNMT
- Instr Air to CNMT lsol Valve, AOV-5392
-OPEN co (*Step 8) Check Steam Dump Status: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
- Annunciator G-15, STEAM DUMP ARMED- LIT
- Steam dump operating properly in AUTO co (Step 9) Check Hotwell Level:
- Hotwell level controller in AUTO
- Controller demand LESS THAN 60%
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _4_ _ _ _ _ Page 31 of 59
---11 Event
Description:
Unscheduled Trip of Transmission Circuits/Down power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- Hotwell level at setpoint co (*Step 10) Check If Condensate Booster NOTE: This is a Continuous Pumps Should Be Secured Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
Condensate booster pumps - 2 PUMPS NOTE: There are no RUNNING Condensate Booster Pumps running.
us (Step 10.a RNO) IF no pumps running THEN qo to step 11 .
CO (Step 11) Check If One MFW Pump Should Be Secured *'
- Power LESS THAN 50%
US (Step 11a RNO) GO TO Step 18.
US (Step 18) Evaluate Plant Status
obtain primary samples required by SIM DRIVER: as RP, ITS LCO 3.4.16 acknowledge
- Power stable at desired level (Step 18b RNO) IF power greater than 20%
and further reduction is required, THEN continue load reduction and return to Step 2.
When the Crew diagnoses the failed Feed Reg Valve, Lead Examiner move to Event #5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _5_ _ _ _ _ Page 32 of 59
---11 Event
Description:
B FRV fails AS-15 (Manual Control Available)
During the load reduction, a failure of the B FRV to control in AUTO will occur. The operator will respond per AR-G-5, "SIG/ B LEVEL DEVIATION +/-7%," or upon observing an abnormally high level in the B Steam Generator and control the B FRV manually.
SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #6 (FDW07C (Current Controller Output in %))
Indications Available:
- B SG level starts to rise .
- MCB Annunciator G-22, ADFCS SYSTEM TROUBLE
- MCB Annunciator G-5, SIG LEVEL DEVIATION +/-7%
Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CO will dispatch the EO to the relay room to check the ADFCS Panel.
SIM DRIVER: as EO report that ADFCS Panel indicates "Control Card Failure" after 3 minutes.
AR-G-5, SIG LEVEL DEVIATION +/-7%
co (Step 4.1) PERFORM a channel check of the following:
- Ll-471
- Ll-472
- Ll-473 co (Step 4.2) IF Main Feedwater is supplying the S/G, THEN PERFORM the following as necessary:
- PLACE SG B MFW REG VLV HCV-476 NOTE: The CO will take in MANUAL. manual control of the B FRV, and control B S/G level manually.
- MANUAL.
- CONTROL SG level manually .
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2
__s _____ Page Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# 33 of
---11 59 Event
Description:
B FRV fails AS-IS (Manual Control Available)
Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The US may check the Tech Specs.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.3, MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES (MFIVS), MAIN FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVES (MFRVS), AND ASSOCIATED BYPASS VALVES us 3.7.3 Two MFIVs, two MFRVs, and associated bypass valves shall be OPERABLE.
us APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3 except when both steam generators are isolated from both main feedwater pumps.
ACTIONS '
CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The US will determine ACTION TIME that the failed FRV controller B. One or more B.1 Close or 72 hours3 days <br />0.429 weeks <br />0.0986 months <br /> does NOT render the FRV MFRV(s) isolate inoperable.
MFRV(s).
AND B.2 Verify MFRV(s) is closed Once per 7 day or isolated.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #6-9.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _6_.,_7.._,_8_&_9_ _ Page ~ of _5_9__
11 Event
Description:
Ejected Control Rod/ Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ A RHR Pumps trips After this, Shutdown Bank Control Rod K-9 will be ejected from the core causing a LOCA, and an automatic Rx Trip/SI signal will occur. On the trip the Main Turbine will fail to trip, and the operator will need to manually trip the Turbine. Additionally, the A and the B SI Pumps will fail to start automatically. The operator will be required to manually start both SI Pumps. The operator will enter E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and transition to E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant." Shortly after transition to E-1 the A RHR Pump will trip. The operator will transition to ECA-1.1, "Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation," due to a loss of both RHR Pumps. The operator will take actions to minimize the inventory loss from the RWST. The scenario will terminate at Step 1O.a RNO of ECA-1.1, after the crew has stopped one SI Pump.
SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #7 ROD05-K9 (1400 gpm, No Ramp)
Indications Available: I
- Pressurizer Pressure starts to lower.
- Containment Pressure starts to rise . '
- MRPI indicates a Control Rod K-9 error. '
Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner NOTE: RCS pressure will drop to within 210 psig [240 psig Adverse Containment] of Maximum SG Pressure shortly after the LOCA, and the SI Pumps are operating.
The five minute Clock to .
stop the RCPs should start when this occurs.
Record Time:
E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION HCO (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip: Immediate Action
- At least one train of reactor trip breakers
-OPEN
- . Neutron flux - LOWERING
- MRPI indicates - ALL CONTROL AND NOTE: One Control Rod (K-SHUTDOWN RODS ON BOTTOM with 9) does NOT indicate on the no instrument fluctuations concurrent Bottom.
with fire.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _6_.,_7.._,_8_&_9_ _ Page .::....__ of _5_9_-1 1
Event
Description:
Ejected Control Rod/ Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ A RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 1 RNO) Manually trip reactor.
- IF reactor trip breakers NOT open OR there is a fire in the power block, THEN .....
- IF the reactor will NOT trip OR IF power range NIS indicates greater than 5%,
THEN ......
co (Step 2) Verify Turbine Stop Valves - Immediate Action CLOSED i
co (Step 2 RNO) Manually trip turbine.
IF t'urbine trip can NOT be verified, THEN .....
co (Step 3) Verify sufficient AC Emergency Immediate Action buses Energized To At Least 440 VOLTS:
- Bus 14 OR Bus 16 AND
- Any SI Annunciator - LIT
- SI sequencing - BOTH TRAINS STARTED HCO/ Foldout Page NOTE: The crew will co monitor these conditions throughout the performance of E-0.
RCP TRIP CRITERIA NOTE: This condition is expected to be met.
- IF BOTH conditions listed below occur, THEN trip both RCPs:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _6
....._7....._8_&_9__ Page ~ of _5.;..;9;...._-ii Event
Description:
Ejected Control Rod/ Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ A RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 0 SI pumps -AT LEAST TWO RUNNING 0 RCS pressure minus maximum SIG pressure - LESS THAN 210 psi [240 psi adverse CNMTl LOSS OF SW CRITERIA AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION SFP COOLING CRITERIA HCO (*Step 5) Verify CNMT Spray Not Required: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
NOTE: The Containment Pressure is expected to be
- =2 psig and rising slowly.
- Annunciator A-27, CNMT SPRAY EXTINGUISHED
- CNMT pressure - LESS THAN 28 PSIG co (Step 6) Direct Operator to Perform ATT-27.0, ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC ACTION VERIFICATION NOTE: The US will hand off ATT-27.0 to either the HCO or the CO, and continue with the other operator in E-0.
Examiner following operator performing ATT-27.0 continue below.
Examiner following operator NOT performing ATT-27.0 continue at Page 40.
E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, ATTACHMENT 27.0, ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC ACTION VERIFICATION HCO/ (Step 1) Verify SI and RHR Pumps Running:
co
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _6.....,_1. . . ._8_&_9_ _ Page ::..__ of _5_9_-11 Event
Description:
Ejected Control Rod/ Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ A RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
HCO/ (Step 1.a RNO) Manually start SI Pumps co
HCO/ (Step 1.b RNO) Manually start RHR Pumps NOTE: No RHR Pumps can
! co be started.
., HCO/ (Step 2) Verify CNMT RECIRC Fans I
co RUNNING:
- All fans RUNNING
- Charcoal filter dampers green status lights - EXTINGUISHED HCO/ (Step 3) Check If Main Steamlines Should Be co Isolated:
- Any MSIV - OPEN
- Check if ANY main steamlines should be isolated
- Low Tavg (545°F) AND high steam flow (0.5x10 6 lb/hr) from either SIG OR
- High-High steam flow (4.4x106 lb/hr) from either SIG
- (Step3c RNO) Go to Step 4 .
HCO/ (Step 4) Verify MFW Isolation:
co
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _6
..........7.._,.._8_&_.9_ _ Page ~ of _5_9_-1 1
Event
Description:
Ejected Control Rod/ Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ A RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- MFW pumps - TRIPPED
- MFW Isolation valves - CLOSED
- SIG A, AOV-3995
- SIG B, AOV-3994
- SIG blowdown and sample valves -
CLOSED HCOI (Step 5) Verify At Least Two SW Pumps -
co RUNNING HCOI (Step 6) Verify Cl and CVI:
co
- Cl and CVI annunciators - LIT
- Annunciator A-26, CNMT ISOLATION
- Annunciator A-25, CNMT VENTILATION ISOLATION
- Verify Cl and CVI valve status lights -
BRIGHT
- FCV-4561
- FCV-4562
- Letdown orifice valves - CLOSED
- AOV-200A
- AOV-200B
- AOV-202 HCOI (Step 7) Check CCW System Status:
co
- Verify CCW pump -AT LEAST ONE RUNNING
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# ---'-'6'"-7..:..,..:..8..;..&_9__ Page .:.:.___ of _5_9__11 Event
Description:
Ejected Control Rod/ Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ A RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (Step 8) Verify SI And RHR Pump Flow:
co
- SI flow indicators - CHECK FOR FLOW
- (Step 8b RNO) IF RCS pressure less than 150 psig manually start pumps and align valves. IF NOT, THEN go to Step 9.
HCO/ (Step 9) Verify SI Pump And RHR Pump co Emergency Alignment:
- RHR pump discharge to Rx vessel deluge - OPEN
- MOV-852A
- MOV-8528
- Verify SI pump C - RUNNING
- Verify SI pump A - RUNNING
- Verify SI pump B - RUNNING
- Verify SI pump C discharge valves - NOTE: These valves are OPEN CLOSED.
- MOV-817A
- MOV-8178 HCO/ (Step 9.e RNO) Manually open valves as co necessary.
HCO/ (Step 10) Verify GREATS Actuation:
co
- At least one damper in each flowpath -
CLOSED
- Normal Supply Air
- Normal Return Air
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2
~ of _5_9_~
Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _6
...._7......_8_&_9_ _ Page 1
Event
Description:
Ejected Control Rod/ Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ A RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- Lavatory Exhaust Air
- GREATS fans- BOTH RUNNING HCO/ (Step 11) Verify Cl and CVI During a Fire co Event
- A confirmed fire has occurred in the control complex or cable tunnel (fire systems SOS, S06, S08, Z05, Z18, or Z19).
HCO/ (Step 11 RNO) Go to END co E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Examiner following operator NOT performing ATT-27.0 continue HERE.
CO/ (Step 7) Verify Both MDAFW Pumps HCO RUNNING CO/ (Step 8) Verify AFW Valve Alignment:
HCO
- AFW flow- INDICATED TO BOTH S/G(s)
HCO
- Check SIG narrow range level NOTE: Adverse GREATER THAN 7% [25% adverse Containment may exist at CNMT] in any SIG this time.
- Check SIG narrow range level BOTH SIG LESS THAN 50%
- Control feed flow to maintain SIG narrow NOTE: Adverse range level between 7% [25% adverse Containment may exist at CNMT] and 50%. this time.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _6
....._7......_8_&_9_ _ Page _41_ of _5_9_-1 1
Event
Description:
Ejected Control Rod/ Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ A RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO/ (Step 10) Check If TDAFW Pump Can Be HCO Stopped:
- Both MDAFW pumps - RUNNING
- PULL STOP TDAFW pump steam suoolv valves
- MOV-3504A
- Annunciator A-7. RCP 1A CCW RETURN HI TEMP OR LOW FLOW - I EXTINGUISHED
- Annunciator A-15, RCP 1B CCW RETURN HI TEMP OR LOW FLOW EXTINGUISHED CO/ (*Step 12) Monitor RCS Tavg - STABLE AT NOTE: Tavg is expected to HCO OR TRENDING TO 547°F be less than 54 7°F and lowering.
CO/ (Step 12 RNO) IF temperature less than HCO 547°F and lowering, THEN perform the following:
- Stop dumping steam .
- Ensure reheater steam supply valves are closed.
- IF cooldown continues, THEN control NOTE: Adverse total feed flow between 200 gpm to 230 Containment may exist at gpm until narrow range level greater than this time.
7% [25% adverse CNMT] in at least one SIG.
- WHEN S/G level greater than 7% [25%
adverse CNMT] in one SIG, THEN limit feed flow to that required to maintain level in at least one SIG.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _6...._7....._8_&_9_ _ Page ~ of _5_9_-1 1 Event
Description:
Ejected Control Rod/ Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ A RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- IF cooldown continues, THEN close both MS IVs.
CO/ (Step 13) Check PRZR PORVS And Spray HCO Valves:
- PORVs - CLOSED
- Auxiliary spray valve (AOV-296) -
CLOSED
- Check PRZR pressure - LESS THAN 2260 PSIG
- Normal PRZR spray valves - CLOSED
- PCV-431A
- PCV-431 B CO/ (Step 14) Monitor RCP Trip Criteria:
HCO
- SI pumps -AT LEAST TWO RUNNING
- RCS pressure minus maximum SIG NOTE: Adverse pressure - LESS THAN 210 psi [240 psi Containment may exist at adverse CNMT] this time.
and RCP Trip Criteria is expected to be met later.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _6.....,_7._,8_&_9_ _ Page ~of _5_9__
11 Event
Description:
Ejected Control Rod/ Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B 51 Pumps to Auto Start/ A RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRITICAL TASK:
Trip all RCPs within 5 minutes of reaching trip criteria Safety Significance: Failure to trip all RCPs when required can lead to core uncovery and to fuel temperatures in excess of 2200°F. Analyses have shown that if the RCPs are tripped within 5 minutes of the trip criteria being met, PCT will remain below 2200°F, and if this action is delayed beyond 5 minutes, this PCT will be exceeded. It is a management expectation that the RCPs be tripped as quickly as possible, but within 5 minutes when the trip criteria is met. Failure to take this action represents mis-operation by the operator which leads to degradation of the fuel cladding fission produce barrier, and a violation of a license condition.
i Record Pump Stop Time:
Subtract time recorded at time of the RCP Trip Criteria met on Page 34 _ _ =
minutes. '
CO/ (Step 15) Check If S/G Secondary Side Is HCO Intact:
- Pressure in both S/G's-STABLE OR Rising
- Pressure in both S/G's -GREATER THAN 110 PSIG CO/ (Step 16) Check if S/G Tubes are intact:
HCO
- Air Ejector radiation monitors (R-15, R-47, R-48) - NORMAL
- SIG blowdown radiation monitors (R-19) -
NORMAL
- Steamline radiation monitors (R-31, R-32)- NORMAL CO/ (Step 17) Check if RCS is intact:
HCO
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _6_.,_7..._,_8_&_9_ _ Page ~ of _5_9_-t 1
Event
Description:
Ejected Control Rod/ Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ A RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- CNMT area radiation monitors - NOTE: Containment NORMAL Radiation Monitors are in alarm.
- R-2
- R-7
- R-29
- R-30
- CNMT pressure - LESS than 0.5 psig us (Step 17.a RNO) Go to E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1.
NOTE: The US will go to E-1.
The US will conduct an alignment brief.
E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT HCO/ Foldout Page NOTE: The crew will co monitor these conditions throughout the performance of E-1.
RCP TRIP CRITERIA NOTE: This condition is expected to be met.
- IF BOTH conditions listed below occur, THEN trip both RCPs:
- SI pumps -AT LEAST TWO RUNNING
- RCS pressure minus maximum SIG NOTE: Adverse pressure - LESS THAN 210 psi [240 Containment is likely to exist psi adverse CNMT] at this time.
LOSS OF SW CRITERIA SI REINITIATION CRITERIA SI TERMINATION CRITERIA SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA E-3 TRANSITION CRITERIA
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _6_..,_7..._,8_&_9_ _ Page ~ of _5_9_
1 Event
Description:
Ejected Control Rod/ Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ A RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER CRITERION AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION HCO (Step 1) Monitor RCP Trip Criteria:
- SI pumps -AT LEAST TWO RUNNING
- RCS pressure minus maximum SIG pressure - LESS THAN 210 psi [240 psi adverse CNMT]
., this step, they will be
' stopped here.
CRITICAL TASK:
Trip all RCPs within 5 minutes of reaching trip criteria Safety Significance: Failure to trip all RCPs when required can lead to core uncovery and to fuel temperatures in excess of 2200°F. Analyses have shown that if the RCPs are tripped within 5 minutes of the trip: criteria being met, PCT will remain below 2200°F, and if this action is delayed beyond 5 minutes, this PCT will be exceeded. It is a management expectation that the RCPs be tripped as quickly as possible, but within 5 minutes when the trip criteria is met. Failure to take this action represents mis-operation by the operator which leads to degradation of the fuel cladding fission produce barrier, and a violation of a license condition.
Record Pump Stop Time:
Subtract time recorded at time of the RCP Trip Criteria met on Page 34 _ _ =
minutes.
HCO/ (Step 2) Check If S/G Secondary Side Is co Intact:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _6....._7.....8_&_9_ _ Page ~ of _5_9_-11 Event
Description:
Ejected Control Rod/ Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ A RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- Pressure in both S/Gs - GREATER THAN 110 PSIG co (*Step 3) Monitor Intact S/G Levels: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
- Narrow range level - GREATER THAN NOTE: Adverse 7% [25% adverse CNMT] Containment is likely to exist at this time.
- Control feed flow to maintain narrow NOTE: Adverse range level between 17% [25% adverse Containment is likely to exist CNMT] and 50% at this time.
HCO (Step 4) Monitor If Secondary Radiation Levels Are Normal
- Steamline radiation monitor (R-31 and R-32)
- Request Chem Tech sample S/Gs for NOTE: The US may contact activity Chemistry.
SIM DRIVER: as Chemistry, acknowledge.
HCO (*Step 5) Monitor PRZR PORV Status: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
- Power to PORV block valves -
AVAILABLE
- PORVs - CLOSED
- Block valves-AT LEAST ONE OPEN .
HCO (Step 6) Reset SI.
HCO (Step 7) Reset Cl:
- Depress Cl reset pushbutton
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _6_.,_7.._,_8_&_9_ _ Page ~ of _5_9_-1 1 Event
Description:
Ejected Control Rod/ Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ A RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- Verify annunciator A-26, CNMT ISOLATION- EXTINGUISHED co (Step 8) Verify Adequate SW Flow:
- Check at least two SW pumps RUNNING
- Dispatch AO to establish normal NOTE: The US will dispatch shutdown alignment (Refer to ATT-17.0, an EO.
ATTACHMENT SD-1) SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge and perform Schedule File SD-1.
I HCO/ (Step 9),, Establish IA to CNMT:
co '
- Verify non-safeguards busses energized from offsite power
- Bus 13 normal feed - CLOSED OR
- Bus 15 normal feed - CLOSED
- Verify turbine building SW isolation valves - OPEN
- MOV-4613 and MOV-4670
- MOV-4614 and MOV-4664
- Verify adequate air compressors - NOTE: The C IA RUNNING Compressor is running.
- Check IA supply:
- Pressure - GREATER THAN 60 PSIG
- Pressure- STABLE OR RISING
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page ~ of _5_9_-11 Event
Description:
Ejected Control Rod/ Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ A RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments co (Step 10) Check Normal Power Available To Charging Pumps:
- Check Normal Power Available To Charging Pumps:
- Bus 14 normal feed breaker -
CLOSED
- Bus 16 normal feed breaker -
CLOSED
- Verify adequate Safeguards Bus capacity to run charging pumps (6 amps each) i
- Station Service transformer 14 ammeter
- Station Service transformer 16 '
ammeter HCO (Step 11) Check If Charging Flow Has Been Established:
- Charging pumps - ANY RUNNING NOTE: There are NO Charging Pumps running.
- (Step 11 a RNO) Perform the following:
- IF CCW flow is lost to any RCP NOTE: CCW flow to the thermal barrier OR any RCP #1 seal RCP has NOT been lost, nor outlet temperature greater than is any RCP #1 seal outlet 235°F, THEN ....... temperature greater than 235°F.
- Ensure HCV-142 open, demand at 0%.
- (Step 11 Continued} Charging pump suction aligned to RWST:
- LCV-112B - OPEN
- LCV-1112C - CLOSED
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _6_.,_7...._8_&_9_ _ Page ~ of _5_9_-1 1
Event
Description:
Ejected Control Rod/ Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ A RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- (Step 11 b RNO) manually align valves as necessary.
- (Step 11 Continued) Start charging NOTE: The HCO will start pumps and adjust charging flow as two Charging Pumps.
necessary to restore PRZR level HCO (Step 12) Check If SI Should Be Terminated:
- RCS pressure:
- Pressure - GREATER THAN 1650 NOTE: Adverse psig [1650 psig adverse CNMT] Containment is likely to exist at this time.
., RCS pressure is expected to
' be ::::1000 psig and stable.
Go to Step 13.
HCO (*Step 13) Monitor If CNMT Spray Should Be NOTE: This is a Continuous Stopped: Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
us * (Step 13a RNO) Go to Step 14 .
HCO (*Step 14) Monitor IF RHR Pumps Should Be NOTE: This is a Continuous Stopped: Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
- Check RCS pressure:
- Pressure- GREATER THAN 300 NOTE: Adverse psig [350 psig adverse CNMT] Containment is likely to exist at this time.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario#
Op Test No.: N17-1 3 Event# _6_.,_7....., _8_&_9_ _ Page ~ of _5_9_~
1 Event
Description:
Ejected Control Rod/ Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ A RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
us (Step 14.b RNO) Go to Step 15.
co (Step 15) Check RCS And SIG Pressures
- Check pressures in both SIGs -
STABLE OR RISING I
- Check pressures in both SIGs -
GREATER THAN 110 PSIG
- Verify Safeguards busses 14, 16, 17, and 18 voltage - GREATER THAN 440 VOLTS
- Verify Safeguards busses 14, 16, 17, and 18 voltage energized by offsite power:
- Emergency DIG output breakers -
OPEN
- AC emergency bus normal feed breakers - CLOSED
- Stop any unloaded emergency DIG and NOTE: Both DIGs are place in standby (Refer to ATT-8.1, running unloaded.
ATIACHMENT DIG STOP)
Examiner NOTE: The US will hand this off to the HCOICO.
Other Examiners continue on Page 52.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _6_.,_7.._,_8_&_9_ _ Page _s1_ of _5_9_.,. 1 Event
Description:
Ejected Control Rod/ Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ A RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments ATT-8.1, ATTACHMENT D/G STOP co (Step A) Perform the following to STOP DIG A and restore to AUTO:
- Verify DIG A Bus 14 supply breaker is OPEN.
- Verify DIG A Bus 18 supply breaker is OPEN.
- Using DIG A GOVERNOR, adjust DIG A speed to return frequency to 60Hz.
- Using DIG A AUTO VOLTAGE CONTROL rheostat adjust DIG A voltage to 480 volts.
- Place DIG A CONTROL switch to STOP AND immediately depress DIG A VOLTAGE SHUTDOWN button until voltage decays to zero.
- After -60 seconds, perform the following:
- Depress DIG A FIELD RESET
- Depress DIG A RESET
- Verify DIG A AIR START SOLENOID lights - LIT
- Verify DIG A START RELAY lights -
LIT
- IF alternate cooling is being supplied to NOTE: Alternate Cooling is the DIG A ...... NOT being supplied.
co (Step B) Perform the following to STOP DIG B and restore to AUTO:
- Verify DIG B Bus 16 supply breaker is OPEN.
- Verify DIG B Bus 17 supply breaker is OPEN.
- Using DIG B GOVERNOR, adjust DIG B speed to return frequency to 60Hz.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# __,6,_7_,_8_&_9__ Page ::..__ of _5_9_-11 Event
Description:
Ejected Control Rod/ Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ A RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- Using D/G B AUTO VOLTAGE CONTROL rheostat adjust D/G B voltage to 480 volts.
- Place D/G B CONTROL switch to STOP AND immediately depress D/G B VOLT AGE SHUTDOWN button until voltage decays to zero.
- After -60 seconds, perform the following:
- Depress D/G B FIELD RESET
- Depress D/G B RESET
- Verify D/G BAIR START SOLENOID lights - LIT
LIT ,
- IF alternate cooling is being supplied to NOTE: Alternate Cooling is the D/G B ......
- NOT being supplied.
E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT Other Examiners continue HERE.
HCO (Step 17) Evaluate Plant Status:
- Check auxiliary. building radiation -
NORMAL
- Plant vent iodine (R-108)
- Plant vent particulate (R-13)
- Plant vent gas (R-14)
- CCW liquid monitor (R-17)
- LTON line monitor (R-9)
- CHG pump room (R-4)
- WHEN TSC is manned, THEN request NOTE: The TSC will NOT evaluation of sampling requirements. be manned.
- RCS activity
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _6__,_7....._8_&_9__ Page ::....._ of _5_9_-11 Event
Description:
Ejected Control Rod/ Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ A RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- Verify adequate Rx head cooling:
- Verify at least one control rod shroud fan - RUNNING
- Verify one Rx compartment cooling fan - RUNNING HCO (Step 18) Verify CNMT Sump Recirculation Capability:
- Check RHR and Support systems:
- At least one recirculation flowpath, NOTE: There are NO ,,RHR including required power supplies, Pumps running.
from Sump Band back to RCS available per ATT-14.5, ATTACHMENT RHR SYSTEM us (Step 18.a RNO) IF at least one flowpath of cold leg recirculation capability can NOT be verified, THEN go to ECA-1.1, LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT ,,
RECIRCULATION.
NOTE: The US will transition to ECA-1 .1.
ECA-1.1, LOSS OF EMERGENCY COOLANT RECIRCULATION HCO/ Foldout Page NOTE: The crew will co monitor these conditions throughout the performance ofECA-1.1.
LOSS OF SW CRITERIA HCO (Step 1) Verify CNMT Sump Recirculation Capability:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# __,6,,_7...., _8_&_9_ _ Page ~ of _5_9__
11 Event
Description:
Ejected Control Rod/ Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ A RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 1.a RNO) IF Sump B level less than NOTE: There is no LOCA 113 inches due to a loss of RCS inventory outside Containment.
outside CNMT. THEN go to Step 2.
HCO * (Step 1.b) Check RHR system:
HCO (Step 1.b RNO) Perform the following:
I
- Manually or locally try to restore at NOTE: The US may call least one flowpath (Refer to ATT- WCC/Maintenance to 14.5, ATTACHMENT RHR SYSTEM address the need for an
" RHR Pump.
to identify minimum components for one flowpath}. If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as wee.
us
- Continue with Step 2. WHEN at least one flowpath is available. THEN do Steps 1c, 1d and 1e.
HCO (Step 2) Verify CNMT RECIRC Fans Running:
- All fans - RUNNING
- Charcoal filter dampers green status lights - EXTINGUISHED HCO (Step 3) Monitor RWST Level - GREATER THAN15%
HCO (Step 4) Determine CNMT Spray Requirements:
- Determine number of CNMT spray pumps required from table:
- CNMT spray pumps running - NOTE: There are NO CS EQUAL TO MINIMUM NUMBER Pumps running or required REQUIRED to be running.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _6....._7....._8_&_9_ _ Page ~ of _5_9_~
1 Event
Description:
Ejected Control Rod/ Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ A RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 5) Add Makeup To RWST As Necessary
- Refer to ATT-18.0, ATTACHMENT NOTE: The US/HCO may SFP-RWST (- 400 gpm can be direct the EO to initiate expected) makeup to the RWST.
If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO, and use the following Remotes:
V804 - CLG050=0 V789 - CLG089=1 V790 - CLG049=0 V803 - CLG052=1 Ramped over 60 seconds.
THEN report that Makeup has been initiated from the SFP.
- Refer to S-9J, BLENDING TO RWST
(- 50 gpm can be expected) co (Step 6) Monitor Intact SIG Levels:
- Narrow range level - GREATER THAN 7% [25% adverse CNMT]
- Control feed flow to maintain narrow range level between 17% [25%
adverse CNMT] and 50%.
co (Step 7) Initiate RCS Cooldown To Cold Shutdown:
- Establish and maintain cooldown NOTE: The current rate in RCS cold legs - LESS THAN cooldown rate is slightly >
100°F/HR 100°F/hour.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# _6_.,_7._,8_&_9_ _ Page ~of _5_9_
1 Event
Description:
Ejected Control Rod/ Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ A RHR Pumps trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- Dump steam to condenser form intact S/G(s)
HCO (Step 8) Check ECCS Pump Status:
HCO (Step 9) Reset SI If Necessary
' HCO (Step 10) Establish One Train Of SI Flow
CRITICAL TASK:
Direct that actions be taken to prepare to establish, or establish Makeup to RWST; and minimize RWST outflow prior to the completion of Step 10.a of ECA-1.1 {EOP-Based)
Safety Significance: Under the postulated plant conditions, failure to establish makeup flow to the RWST and/or to minimize RWST outflow leads to (or accelerates) depletion of RWST inventory to the point at which ECCS pumps taking suction on the RWST must be stopped. Loss of pumped injection (coincident with loss of emergency cooling recirculation) will lead to a severe or an extreme challenge to the core cooling CSF. Failure to perform the critical task causes these challenges to occur needlessly or, at best, prematurely (that is, before they would occur if the critical task is performed). Thus, failure to perform the critical task under the postulated plant conditions leads to "a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario." It also represents a demonstrated inability by the crew to "take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety."
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 3 Event# .......
6,_7..., _8_&_9__ Page ::..._ of _5_9_-1 1 Event
Description:
Ejected Control Rod/ Failure of Turbine to Trip on Rx Trip/ Failure of A and B SI Pumps to Auto Start/ A RHR Pumps trips Time I Pos. I Expected Actions/Behavior I Comments At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.
TURNOVER SHEET for NRC Exam Scenario #3 Core Age: BOL Procedure in Use: ACTIONS/NOTES:
70% Power, Equilibrium Xe STP-0-2.2-COMP-B
- The plant is at 70% power (BOL) .
Outside Air Temp= 51°F
- The plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the B MFW Water Temp= 45°F Pump. Corrective Maintenance was performed and plant power raised to 70% four days ago.
- It is intended to observe the B MFW operation for two more days at this power level and then raise power to 100%.
- The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 4 Boron: 1612 ppm RCS LEAKAGE: (gpm) hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is Total: .021 expected to continue throughout the shift.
BAST: 17,400 ppm Identified: .003 Unidentified: .018
- It is expected to perform post-maintenance testing on the B RHR Pump on this shift.
- The A Control Rod Shroud Fan is OOS for breaker maintenance.
- The Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement.
- Protected equipment IAW OPG Protected Equipment.
TURNOVER SHEET for NRC Exam Scenario #3 Equie.ment Problems/OOS: Planned Activities for Shift: Electrical System Ogerator Declarations See NOTES
- Perform post-maintenance testing on the B None in effect RHR Pump using STP-0-2.2-COMP-B A-52.4 EQUIPMENT DATE/TIME 005 LCO TITLE EXP DATE ECO B RHR Pump 71 hours2.958 days <br />0.423 weeks <br />0.0973 months <br /> ago 3.5.2 ECCS - Modes 1, 2 and 3 72 hours3 days <br />0.429 weeks <br />0.0986 months <br /> 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> A-52.12 EQUIPMENT DATE/TIME 005 TRM/ODCM TITLE EXP DATE ECO A Control Rod Shroud Yesterday Indefinitely Fan A Condensate Booster Yesterday Indefinitely Pump
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022217)
Facility: Ginna Scenario No.: 5 Op Test No.: N17-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)
(RO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 48% power (MOL). The plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the B MFW Pump. Station Management has decided to shutdown the plant and repair the pump, and conduct other maintenance activities. The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 4 hours0.167 days <br />0.0238 weeks <br />0.00548 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The crew is expected to lower power and proceed to Mode 3 on this shift.
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The B MFW is OOS for bearing replacement, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement.
Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 1 C-RO Loss of B Instrument Bus C-BOP I C(TS}-SRO 2 NA R-RO Load Reduction '
N-BOP N-SRO 3 2 C-RO PORV Leak/Block Valve Failure C(TS)-SRO 4 3 C-BOP DownpowerlFailure of Turbine ControllEHC C-SRO 5 4 M-RO Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal M-BOP M-SRO 6 5 C-RO Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control RoomlATWS C-BOP C-SRO 7 6 C-BOP One SIG Safety Valve on each SIG Lifts and sticks partially OPEN C-SRO
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022217)
Ginna 2017 NRC Scenario #5 The plant is at 48% power (MOL). The plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the B MFW Pump.
Station Management has decided to shutdown the plant and repair the pump, and conduct other maintenance activities. The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 4 hours0.167 days <br />0.0238 weeks <br />0.00548 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The crew is expected to lower power and proceed to Mode 3 on this shift.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The B MFW is OOS for bearing replacement, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement.
Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will attempt to lower power in accordance with 0-5.1, "Load Reduction," however, a loss of the B Instrument Bus will occur prior to the start of the load reduction. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-E-14, "LOSS B INSTR BUS." Power will be restored to the bus per guidance in ER-INST.3, "Instrument Bus Power Restoration," which will include the isolation and re-establishment of Normal Letdown in accordance with S-3.2E, "Placing In or Removing From Service Normal Letdown/Excess Letdown." The operator will address AR-K-32, "CV AIR DRYER LOW PRESS SG B/D TANK HIGH LEVEL," while restoring from the transient. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.8.7, "AC Instrument Bus Sources Modes 1-4," and LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems - Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4."
Following this, the operator will lower power in accordance with 0-5.1, "Load Reduction." The operator will address S-3.1, "Boron Concentration Control," to start the load reduction.
Subsequently, Pressurizer PORV-431C will fail partially open. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-F-19, "PRZR PORV OUTLET HI TEMP 145°F," and enter AP-PRZR.1, "Abnormal Pressurizer Pressure." When the operator attempts to isolate the PORV, the Block Valve will fail to shut fully resulting in a 2-5 gpm leak into the PRT. The crew may implement AP-RCS.1, "Reactor Coolant Leak," and prepare to make a Containment entry. Ultimately, the crew will be directed to take the unit off-line. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11, "Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves," LCO 3.4.13, "RCS Operational Leakage," LCO 3.4.1 "RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits," as well as Technical Requirements Manual TR 3.4.3, "Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS)
Mitigation."
Then, the operator will take the unit off line in accordance with AP-TURB.5, "Rapid Load Reduction."
The Main Turbine will fail in automatic control. The operator will diagnose the failure and use manual control of the turbine to conduct the down power.
After this, an inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal will occur and both MS IVs will close. The reactor will fail to automatically trip and the operator will attempt to trip the reactor manually. The crew will enter E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."
The reactor will fail to trip manually from the control room, and the crew will enter FR-S.1, "Response to Reactor Restart/ATWS." On the trip one SIG Safety Valve on each SIG lifted and stuck partially OPEN.
The crew will successfully de-energize the Rod Drive MG set(s) causing to control rods to drop into the core. Upon completion of FR-S.1, the crew will transition back to E-0, and then to E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," based on the failed Pressurizer PORV and Block Valve. Shortly after entry into E-1, the crew will transition to E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation." While implementing E-2, the crew will recognize that both S/Gs are faulted and transition to ECA-2.1, Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022217)
"Uncontrolled Depressurization of Both Steam Generators." The crew may take a pre-emptive action of throttling AFW flow to both S/Gs per A-503.1, "Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide."
The scenario will terminate at Step 7 of ECA-2.1, after the crew has stopped the RHR Pumps.
Critical Tasks:
Upon diagnosing an ATWS, manually insert the control rods within 1 minute, and continue insertion until the reactor is tripped or the rods are on the bottom {EOP-Based)
Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor power remains higher than it otherwise would if the action is taken. Performance of the critical task would move the reactor power lower to prevent a subsequent an unnecessary challenge to reactor core operational limits. A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control.
Control the AFW flowrate to 50 gpm per SG in order to minimize the RCS Cooldown rate before an extreme challenge {Red Path) develops to the integrity CSF {EOP-Based)
Safety Significance: Failure to control the AFW flow rate to the SGs leads to an unnecessary and avoidable extreme challenge to the integrity CSF. Also, failure to perform the Critical Task increases challenges to the SUBCRITICALITY Critical Safety Function which otherwise would not occur.
PROGRAM: Ginna Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N17-1-5
REFERENCES:
- 1. AR-E-14, "LOSS B INSTR. BUS" (Rev 12)
- 2. ER-INST.3, "Instrument Bus Power Restoration" (Rev 01200)
- 3. S-3.2E, "Placing In or Removing From Service Normal Letdown/Excess Letdown" (Rev 02700)
- 6. Technical Specification LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems - Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4" (Amendment 80)
- 7. 0-5.1, "Load Reduction" (Rev 05901)
- 8. S-3.1, "Boron Concentration Control" (Rev 03200)
- 9. AR-F-19, "PRZR PORV OUTLET HI TEMP 145°F" (Rev 01101)
- 10. AP-PRZR.1, "Abnormal Pressurizer Pressure" (Rev 01700)
- 11. AP-RCS.1, "Reactor Coolant Leak" (Rev 02100)
- 12. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11, "Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves" (Amendment 88)
- 13. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1 "RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits" (Amendment 80)
- 14. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.13, "RCS Operational Leakage" (Amendment 100)
- 15. Technical Requirements Manual TR 3.4.3, "Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS)
Mitigation" (Rev 61)
- 16. AP-TURB.5, "Rapid Load Reduction" (Rev 01700)
- 17. ATT-23.0, "Attachment Transfer 4160V Loads" (Rev 0)
- 18. E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection" (Rev 048)
- 19. FR-S.1, "Response to Reactor Restart/ATWS" (Rev 021)
- 20. E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant" (Rev 04100)
- 21. A-503.1 "Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide" (Rev 04600)
- 22. E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation" (Rev 01302)
- 23. ECA-2.1, "Uncontrolled Depressurization of Both Steam Generators" (Rev 03601)
Validation Time: 77 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Essential Training & Consulting, LLC Facility Review:
Rev.022217 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Facility: Ginna Scenario No.: 5 Op Test No.: N17-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)
(RO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 48% power (MOL). The plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the B MFW Pump. Station Management has decided to shutdown the plant and repair the pump, and conduct other maintenance activities. The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 4 hours0.167 days <br />0.0238 weeks <br />0.00548 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The crew is expected to lower power and proceed to Mode 3 on this shift.
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The B MFW is OOS for bearing replacement, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement.
Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 1 C-RO Loss of B Instrument Bus C-BOP C(TS)-SRO 2 NA R-RO Load Reduction '
N-BOP N-SRO 3 2 C-RO PORV Leak/Block Valve Failure C(TS)-SRO 4 3 C-BOP Downpower/Failure of Turbine Control/EHC C-SRO 5 4 M-RO Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal M-BOP M-SRO 6 5 C-RO Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS C-BOP C-SRO 7 6 C-BOP One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN C-SRO
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Ginna 2017 NRC Scenario #5 The plant is at 48% power (MOL). The plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the B MFW Pump. Station Management has decided to shutdown the plant and repair the pump, and conduct other maintenance activities. The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 4 hours0.167 days <br />0.0238 weeks <br />0.00548 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.
The crew is expected to lower power and proceed to Mode 3 on this shift.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The B MFW is OOS for bearing replacement, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement.
Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will attempt to lower power in accordance with 0-5.1, "Load Reduction, however, a loss of the B Instrument Bus will occur prior to the start of the load reduction. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-E-14, "LOSS B INSTR. BUS." Power will be restored to the bus per guidance in ER-INST.3, "Instrument Bus Power Restoration," which will include the isolation and re-establishment of Normal Letdown in accordance with S-3.2E, "Placing In or Removing From Service Normal Letdown/Excess Letdown." The operator will address AR-K-32, "CV AIR DRYER LOW PRESS SG B/D TANK HIGH LEVEL, while restoring from the transient. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.8. 7, "AC Instrument Bus Sources Modes 1-4, and LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems - Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4."
Following this, the operator w,ill lower power in accordance with 0-5.1, "Load Reduction." The operator will address S-3.1, "Boron Concentration Control, to start the load reduction.
Subsequently, Pressurizer PORV-431 C will fail partially open. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-F-19, "PRZR PORV OUTLET HI TEMP 145°F," and enter AP-PRZR.1, "Abnormal Pressurizer Pressure." When the operator attempts to isolate the PORV, the Block Valve will fail to shut fully resulting in a 2-5 gpm leak into the PRT. The crew may implement AP-RCS.1, "Reactor Coolant Leak, and prepare to make a Containment entry. Ultimately, the crew will be directed to take the unit off-line. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11, "Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves," LCO 3.4.13, "RCS Operational Leakage,"
LCO 3.4.1 "RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB)
Limits," as well as Technical Requirements Manual TR 3.4.3, "Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) Mitigation."
- Then, the operator will take the unit off line in accordance with AP-TURB.5, "Rapid Load Reduction." The Main Turbine will fail in automatic control. The operator will diagnose the failure and use manual control of the turbine to conduct the downpower.
After this, an inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal will occur and both MSIVs will close.
The reactor will fail to automatically trip and the operator will attempt to trip the reactor manually.
The crew will enter E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."
The reactor will fail to trip manually from the control room, and the crew will enter FR-S.1, "Response to Reactor Restart/ATWS." On the trip one SIG Safety Valve on each SIG lifted and stuck partially OPEN.
The crew will successfully de-energize the Rod Drive MG set(s) causing to control rods to drop into the core. Upon completion of FR-S.1, the crew will transition back to E-0, and then to E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," based on the failed Pressurizer PORVand Block Valve.
Shortly after entry into E-1, the crew will transition to E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation."
While implementing E-2, the crew will recognize that both S/Gs are faulted and transition to ECA-Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 2.1, "Uncontrolled Depressurization of Both Steam Generators." The crew may take a pre-emptive action of throttling AFW flow to both S/Gs per A-503.1, "Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide."
The scenario will terminate at Step 7 of ECA-2.1, after the crew has stopped the RHR Pumps.
Critical Tasks:
Upon diagnosing an ATWS, manually insert the control rods within 1 minute, and continue insertion until the reactor is tripped or the rods are on the bottom (EOP-Based)
Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor power remains higher than it otherwise would if the action is taken. Performance of the critical task would move the reactor power lower to prevent a subsequent an unnecessary challenge to reactor core operational limits. A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control.
Control the AFW flowrate to 50 gpm per SG in order to minimize the RCS Cooldown rate before an extreme challenge (Red Path) develops to the integrity CSF (EOP-Based)
Safety Significance: Failure to control the AFW flow rate to the SGs leads to 'an unnecessary and avoidable extreme challenge to the integrity CSF. Also, failure to perform the Critical Task increases challenges to the SUBCRITICALITY Critical Safety Function which otherwise would not occur.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D Reset to Temp IC 159 T =0 (From IC-20):
(Originally IC-20).
Energize the Pressurizer Backup Heaters Place the B MFW Pump Control Switch to PULL STOP Place the B MFW Pump DC Oil Pump Control Switch to PULL STOP Place the B MFW Pump AC Oil Pump Control Switch to OFF Remove the B MFW Pump AC Oil Pump from service by inserting the following:
- OVR-FDW20A=OFF
- OVR-FDW20C=OFF
- OVR-FDW08A=OFF Take A CB Pump Control Switch to TRIP Insert OVR-CND04A=OFF I
I Hang LOTO Tags as necessary Insert MALF RPS05A, No Manual, Reactor Trip
' BKR A Failure Insert MALF RPS05B, No Manual, Reactor Trip BKR B Failure Insert OVR-EDS47D and 47G =FALSE (Bus 15 Low Side Breaker)
Insert OVR-EDS34D and 34G =FALSE (Bus 15 High Side Breaker)
Set T-29 = x06i230a==1 (Close for MOV-515)
Set Trigger 30 = True when a reactor trip signal occurs on either Train A or B Insert MALF STM09A, 30%, 0 ramp, T-30 (Safety valve 3508 on B SG opens after Rx trip)
Insert MALF STM09B, 30%, 0 ramp, T-30 (Safety valve 3509 on A SG opens after Rx trip)
Insert MALF EDS07B on T-1 Insert MALF PZR05B 5%, No Ramp {Throttled back to 2% after the operator attempts to close the PORV Block Valve) on T-2 Insert MALF TUR09D on T-3 OVR-TUR050=0FF on T-3 OVR-TUR05P=OFF on T-3 Insert MALF STM05A (0%, No Ramp) on T-4 Insert MALF STM05B (0%, No Ramp) on T-4 OVR-PZR04A, ON (Green light LIT) on T-29 OVR-PZR04B, ON (Red light LIT) on T-29 OVR-PZR04C, FALSE {Close signal) on T-29 OVR-PZR04D, TRUE (Open signal) on T-29 PZR05B (2%) on T-29 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D Prior to Crew
- Hang Protective Tags per OPG-Protective Briefing Equipment.
- Place Black Dot on all required MCB Annunciators (H-2 and H-4)
D Crew Briefing
- Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements .
- Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew .
- Provide the crew with a copy of 0-5.1 complete through Section 6.1 and S-3.1 .
- Handout current Reactivity Plan .
D T-0 Begin Familiarization Period D At direction of Event1 Loss of B Instrument Bus examiner Trigger #1 I I
EDS07B D At direction of Event2 Load Reduction examiner D At direction of Event 3 PORV Leak/Block Valve Failure examiner Trigger#2 PZR05B 5%, No Ramp (Throttled back to 2%
after the operator attempts to close the PORV Block Valve)
Trigger #29 (Block Valve CS to CLOSE)
OVR-PZR04A, ON (Green light LIT)
OVR-PZR04B, ON (Red light LIT)
OVR-PZR04C, FALSE (Close signal)
OVR-PZR04D, TRUE (Open signal)
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D At direction of Event 4 Downpower/Failure of Turbine Control/EHC examiner Trigger#3 TUR09D OVR-TUR050=0FF OVR-TUR05P=OFF D At direction of Event 5 Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal examiner Trigger#4 STM05A (0%, No Ramp)
STM05B (0%, No Ramp)
D Post-Rx Trip Event 6 Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS RPS05A, No Manual Note: These malfunctions are inserted at T=O.
RPS05B, No Manual D Post-Rx Trip Event 7 One SIG Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN STM09A, 30%, 0 ramp Note: These malfunctions are inserted at T=O, STM09B, 30%, 0 ramp conditional on Rx Trip (T-30).
D Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# -----Page 8 of 66
--~I Event
Description:
Loss of B Instrument Bus Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will attempt to lower power in accordance with 0-5.1, "Load Reduction," however, a loss of the B Instrument Bus will occur prior to the start of the load reduction. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-E-14, "LOSS B INSTR BUS." Power will be restored to the bus per guidance in ER-INST.3, "Instrument Bus Power Restoration," which will include the isolation and re-establishment of Normal Letdown in accordance with S-3.2E, "Placing In or Removing From Service Normal Letdown/Excess Letdown." The operator will address AR-K-32, "CV AIR DRYER LOW PRESS SG B/D TANK HIGH LEVEL," while restoring from the transient. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.8.7, "AC Instrument Bus Sources Modes 1-4," and LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems - Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4."
SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #1 (EDS07B)
Indications Available:
- Multiple MCB Annunciators
- MCB Annunciator E-14, LOSS B INSTR BUS
- White and Red Bistable Status lights extinguish
- VCT Level (LT-112) fails low causing continuous Auto Makeup
- Tavg-Tref is 12°F (1 51 Stage Pressure has failed Low), with an Auto Rod Inward green Status light, but NO Auto Rod motion
- Normal Letdown has isolated due to one PZR level channel failing low Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments.
NOTE: The crew may enter ER-INST.3 directly.
AR-E-14, LOSS B INSTR BUS us 1. Restore power to Instrument Bus B (Refer to ER-INST.3, INSTRUMENT BUS POWER RESTORATION) us 2. Evaluate plant conditions to determine if additional action is required by referring to the following:
0 ITS Leo 3.8. 7 and 3.8.8 us 3. Notify the following: NOTE: The US may notify the
- SM wee.
SIM DRIVER: as wees,
- Electricians acknowledge.
- Electrical Planner
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# ------Page 9 of 66
---;1 Event
Description:
Loss of B Instrument Bus Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The US will go to ER-INST.3.
ER-INST.3, INSTRUMENT BUS POWER RESTORATION co (Step 6.1.1) IF Any instrument bus is deenergized THEN PERFORM the following:
- Verify an alternate power supply is available by checking supply voltage as follows:
- Maintenance- Supply voltage approximately 120 volts (El/CVTAUX, above Instr Bus D) I
- Normal - Inst Bus B -Annunciator E-14, LOSS B INSTR. BUS, extinguished HCO (Step 6.1.2) Close letdown isolation valve, NOTE: The HCO will isolate AOV-427. Normal Letdown.
NOTE: VCT level indication is lost, and with LID isolated, actual level is lowering, and US may direct EO to monitor VCT level locally (no ER-INST.3 procedure guidance)
If so, SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge, and Use Insight from Scenario Setup, or Monitor VCT level on drawing VCT1 and report value to US (When requested or the remainder of the scenario).
HCO (Step 6.1.3) Place charging pump controllers NOTE: The HCO will place in MANUAL Charging Pump speed control in Manual OR may secure one of the two Charging Pumps altogether.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event#
Page 10 of 66
---11 Event
Description:
Loss of B Instrument Bus Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The HCO may place the Auto Makeup to the VCT in Manual to prevent overfilling the VCT.
co (Step 6.1.4) Place hotwell level controller to manual, if desired.
HCO (Step 6.1.5) Place PRZR PRESS CONTROLLER 431 Kin MANUAL, if necessary.
HCO (Step 6.1.6) Place rods in MANUAL. NOTE: The HCO will place I
Rods in Manual.
us (Step 6.1. 7) Transfer Instrument Bus to an NOTE: The US will direct the available power supply. (Maintenance or bus to be energized from the Normal) Maintenance supply. (The US may direct the use of Attachment 2 of ER-INST.3, however, this is NOT required).
co
- IF on NORMAL FEED AND NOTE: Instrument Bus B is MAINTENANCE FEED desired, THEN now re-energized.
TRANSFER to MAINTENANCE co (Step 6.1.8) CHECK Instrument Bus supply NOTE: 0-6.11 requires voltage within ITS limits. (Refer to 0-6.11, voltage between 113-123V.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT/ROUTINE OPERATIONS CHECK SHEET) us (Step 6.1.9) Go to Step 6.4 HCO (Step 6.4.1) VERIFY one Charging Pump in AUTO, IF desired.
HCO (Step 6.4.2) VERIFY PRZR PRESS CONTROLLER 431 Kin AUTO.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# ------Page 11 of 66
---11 Event
Description:
Loss of B Instrument Bus Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 6.4.3) RESTORE PRZR Heaters as NOTE: Both the Proportional required. and the Backup Heaters will be reset.
HCO (step 6.4.4) IF letdown isolation valve, AOV-427 has been closed, THEN RESTORE Letdown as follows:
HCO (Step 6.4.4.1) COMPLETE removal of NOTE: Removed per Section normal letdown from service per S-3.2E, 6.2 of S-3.2E PLACING IN OR REMOVING FROM SERVICE NORMAL LETDOWN/EXCESS LETDOWN NOTE: The US will hand this off to the HCO or the CO, and continue on in ER-INST.3.
NOTE: The US may call WCC/Maintenance to address the failed Instrument Bus.
If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as WCC/Maintenance.
S-3.2E, PLACING IN OR REMOVING FROM SERVICE NORMAL LETDOWN/EXCESS LETDOWN HCO/ (Step 6.2.1) PLACE Charging Pumps in co MANUAL HCO/ (Step 6.2.2) ENSURE CLOSED Letdown co Orifice isolation valves.
- AOV-200A
- AOV-200B
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# -----Page 12 of 66
---11 Event
Description:
Loss of B Instrument Bus Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (Step 6.2.4) REDUCE charging flow while co throttling closed charging flow to Regenerative Heat Exchanger HCV-142 to maintain greater than 20" RCP labyrinth seal
!lP.
HCO/ (Step 6.2.5) CLOSE LETDOWN ISOL VLV co RHR TO NRHX AOV-371.
HCO/ (Step 6.2.6) PLACE NRHX LTDN OUTLET NOTE: TCV-130 Controller will co TEMP (Tl-130) TCV-130 in MANUAL/ be placed in MANUAL.
CLOSED.
I NOTE: The US will continue with ER-INST.3.
' ER-INST.3, INSTRUMENT BUS POWER RESTORATION us (Step 6.4.3.2) RESTORE normal letdown per NOTE: Restored per Section S-3.2E, PLACING IN OR REMOVING FROM 6.3 and 6.4 of S-3.2E.
SERVICE NORMAL LETDOWN/EXCESS LETDOWN.
NOTE: The US will hand this off to the HCO or the CO, and continue on in ER-INST.3.
S-3.2E, PLACING IN OR REMOVING FROM SERVICE NORMAL LETDOWN/EXCESS LETDOWN HCO/ (Step 6.3.1) Determine if a flush is required. NOTE: Since letdown has co If the letdown line has been isolated for less been isolated ONLY a few than one hour perform section 6.4 and N/A minutes, a flush will NOT be section 6.5 with permission of the Shift required.
Manager or Control Room Supervisor.
HCO/ (Step 6.4.1) IF the letdown line has been co isolated for less than one hour or as desired by the CRS, THEN PERFORM the following:
OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A.
HCO/ (Step 6.4.1.1) ENSURE letdown is secured co PER Section 6.2 prior to restoring.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# -----Page 13 of 66
---11 Event
Description:
Loss of B Instrument Bus Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (Step 6.4.1.2) IF charging flowpath to Loop B co COLD Leg is desired (preferred method),
THEN PERFORM the following:
HCO/ (Step 6.4.1.3) IF Charging flowpath to Loop NOTE: Charging alignment to co B HOT leg is desired, ..... the Hot Leg will NOT be
! desired.
HCO/ (Step 6.4.2) START a second Chprging NOTE: It is likely that two co Pump at minimum speed. charging pumps will be running.
HCO/ (Step 6.4.3) SLOWLY OPEN charging flow to co Regenerative Heat Exchanger HCV-142 to reduce labyrinth seal ~p to - 40".
HCO/ (Step 6.4.4) ADJUST Charging Pump speed co while maintaining - 40" labyrinth seal ~p UNTIL HCV-142 is fully OPEN.
HCO/ (Step 6.4.5) ESTABLISH greater than or co equal to 22 gpm charging line flow.
HCO/ (Step 6.4.6) IF placing 40 GPM orifice in NOTE: A 40 gpm Orifice was co service THEN PERFORM the following previously in service.
- PLACE LOW PRESS LTON PRESS PCV-135 in MANUAL at - 40% open.
- PLACE NRHX LTON OUTLET TEMP (Tl-130) TCV-130 in MANUAL at -40%
open.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# 14 of 66
Page --*1 Event
Description:
Loss of B Instrument Bus Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (Step 6.4.7) IF placing 60 GPM orifice in co service THEN ....
HCO/ (Step 6.4.8) OPEN LETDOWN ISOL VLV co RHR TO NRHX AOV-371.
HCO/ (Step 6.4.9) PLACE LTON LOOP 8 COLD co LEG TO RHX AOV-427 to OPEN and THEN to AUTO.
HCO/ (Step 6.4.10) OPEN desired Letdown orifice NOTE: AOV-2008 was co valve AOV-200A, AOV-2008, or AOV-202 previously opened.
AND MARK AOV's not opened N/A.
- AOV-200A
- AOV-2008
- AOV-200 HCO/ (Step 6.4.11) ADJUST LOW PRESS LTON co PRESS PCV-135 to achieve Letdown pressure of 250 psig on Pl-135.
HCO/ (Step 6.4.12) PLACE LOW PRESS LTON co PRESS, PCV-135 IN AUTO.
HCO/ (Step 6.4.13) PLACE NRHX LTON OUTLET co TEMP (Tl-130) TCV-130 in AUTO at the setpoint recorded in Step 5.4.
HCO/ (Step 6.4.14) PLACE Pressurizer level NOTE: With Pzr Level high, co control (Charging Pump) to AUTO. the HCO may leave the Charging Pumps in MANUAL.
NOTE: The US will continue with ER-INST.3, Step 6.4.5.
ER-INST.3, INSTRUMENT BUS POWER RESTORATION
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario# Event# 15 of 66 5
~-----
N17-1 Page ---11 Event
Description:
Loss of B Instrument Bus Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments co (Step 6.4.5) RESTORE EH control to AUTO/IMP IN, If desired.
HCO (Step 6.4.6) RESTORE ROD CONTROL NOTE: The HCO will place the BANK SELECTOR Switch to AUTO, if Rods back in Auto.
desired.
HCO (Step 6.4. 7) VERIFY CNMT ventilation isolation is reset.
HCO (Step 6.4.8) VERIFY Hotwell level controller in AUTO, if desired.
co (Step 6.4.9) RESTORE desired SW pump alignment.
co (Step 6.4.10) ENSURE motor fire pump breaker closed.
CO/EO (Step 6.4.11) DISPATCH an AO to verify NOTE: The US may dispatch proper operation of Battery Chargers if an EO.
necessary.
If so, SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge.
HCO/ (Step 6.4.12) EVALUATE MCB Annunciator NOTE: Annunciator K-32 co status (refer to AR procedures) needs follow-up.
AR-K-32, SG BLOWDOWN TANK HIGH LEVEL co {All Steps) Direct AO to remove and then NOTE: The US may dispatch restore Blowdown per T-14. F .1 , SG an EO.
Blowdown System Operation If so, SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge. Use REM-SGN01 =0/1 and REM-SGN02=0/1 as needed, report Flash Tank Level, and use REM-SGN05=RESET.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# ------Page 16 of 66
---ti Event
Description:
Loss of B Instrument Bus Time Pos~ Expected Actions/Behavior Comments ER-INST.3, INSTRUMENT BUS POWER RESTORATION us (Step 6.4.13) IF Instrument Bus D was NOTE: Instrument Bus D was affected, THEN ....... NOT affected.
us (Step 6.4.14) IF Instrument Bus A or C is NOTE: Instrument Bus A or C being powered from associated emergency is NOT being powered form AC Bus, then ...... the emergency AC Bus.
us (Step 6.4.15) RETURN to procedure or guidance in effect.
NOTE: The US w,ill likely conduct a Plant Status Brief.
NOTE: The US will address the Technical Specifications.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.7, AC INSTRUMENT BUS SOURCES-MODES 1, 2, 3 AND 4 us LCO 3.8.7 The following AC instrument bus power sources shall be OPERABLE:
a) Inverters for Instrument Buses A and C; and b) Class 1E constant voltage transformer (CVT) for Instrument Bus B.
us APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, AND 4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# 17 of 66
- -... 1 Event
Description:
Loss of B Instrument Bus Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The US will take ACTION TIME ACTIONS B.1 and B.2.
B. Class 1E B.1 Power AC 2 hours0.0833 days <br />0.0119 weeks <br />0.00274 months <br /> CVTfor AC Instrument Bus Instrument B from its non-Bus B Class 1E CVT.
inoperable AND B.2 Restore 7 Days Class 1E CVT for AC Instrument Bus B to OPERABLE status.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.9, DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS- MODES 1, 2, 3 AND4 us LCO 3.8.9 Train A and Train B of the following electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE:
a) AC power; b) AC instrument bus power; and c) DC power us APPLICABILITY: modes 1, 2, 3 and 4.
CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The US will note that ACTION TIME while Instrument Bus B was B. One AC B.1 Restore AC 2 hours0.0833 days <br />0.0119 weeks <br />0.00274 months <br />. de-energized, they were in Instrument Instrument bus B.1, but came out of this action bus electrical electrical power power distribution train when power to the Bus was distribution to OPERABLE restored.
train status.
SIM DRIVER: If the crew delays returning to the planned load reduction, Call as the WCCS, and state that Plant Management desires to initiate the load reduction to Mode 3.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _2_ _ _ _ _ Page 18 of
---11 66 Event
Description:
Load Reduction Following this, the operator will lower power in accordance with 0-5.1, "Load Reduction."
The operator will address S-3.1, "Boron Concentration Control," to start the load reduction.
SIM DRIVER Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 0-5.1, LOAD REDUCTION us (Step 6.2.1) IF desired to lower H2 concentration of the RCS during the load '
reduction, THEN REFER TO Procedure S-3.3C, H2 or 02 Removal From Primary System by Burping Volume Control Tank With N2. OTHERWISE, MARK this Step N/A. '
HCO (Step 6.2.2) ENSURE the ROD CONTROL NOTE: The HCO will likely BANK SELECTOR switch is in the desired A have the control rods in AUTO.
(AUTOMATIC) ORM (MANUAL) position AND MARK the position NOT used N/A.
- AUTOMATIC (A)
- MANUAL (M)
HCO (Step 6.2.3) REFER TO S-3.1, Boron Concentration Control, and OPG Reactivity Calculation, AND INITIATE Boric Acid additions to the Reactor Coolant System, as necessary.
S-3.1, BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL ATTACHMENT 2, NORMAL BORATION HCO (Step 1) ENSURE Attachment 1, Makeup NOTE: The HCO will address Determinations, is complete. Attachment 1.
HCO (Step 2) Board operator SHALL inform US of intent to change core reactivity.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _2__________ Page 19 of 66
11 Event
Description:
Load Reduction Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- US SHALL acknowledge reactivity manipulation and provide input and oversight. [G0092].
HCO (Step 3) PLACE RMW MODE SELECTOR control switch to BORATE position.
HCO (Step 4) SET BA TO BA BLENDER FLOW CONTROL VALVE, HCV-110A, controller to flow rate determined in Attachment 1, Makeup Determinations, Step 1.1.
HCO (Step 5) SET BA COUNTER, YIC-110, to quantity determined in Attachment 1.
HCO (Step 6) PLACE RMW CONTROL switch to ST ART position.
HCO (Step 7) Verify the following:
- BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP A OR B starts.
- BA TO BA BLENDER FLOW CONTROL VALVE, HCV-110A, throttles open to preset flow position.
- REACTOR MAKEUP TO CHG PUMP, AOV-110B, opens.
HCO (Step 8) WHEN boration is complete, THEN NOTE: The remainder of the PERFORM the following: Attachment 2 will be performed when the boration is complete.
- PLACE RMW MODE SELECTOR control switch to AUTO position.
- PLACE RMW CONTORL switch to START position and VERIFY RMW control red light ILLUMINATED.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# 2 Page 20 of 66
---11 Event
Description:
Load Reduction Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- SET BA TO BA BLENDER FLOW CONTROL VALVE, HCV-110A, for current RCS boron concentration PER Boration/Dilution tables OR PPCS Engineering Menu Boration/Dilution display.
HCO (Step 9) PLACE "BORATE" Human Performance Label next to RMW Mode Selector switch on MCB.
HCO (Step 10) Board operator SHALL inform US that reactivity manipulation is complete.
[G0092].
HCO (Step 11) RECORD amount of boric acid added on S-12.4, RCS Leakage Surveillance Record Instructions, Attachment RCS Leakage Surveillance Record.
0-5.1, LOAD REDUCTION co (Step 6.2.4) START the load reduction at the EH Control Panel as follows:
- IF the EH Control Panel is in OPER PAN, NOTE: Power is already less control, THEN PERFORM the following: than 98%, and the CO will use OTHERWISE, MARK this Substep N/A. IMP PRESS IN.
- LOWER the SETTER setpoint to the desired value using the T pushbutton.
- DEPRESS to GO pushbutton .
- OBSERVE the desired rate of load reduction.
- MAINTAIN the VPL set point approximately 10% above the indicated REFERENCE value as load decreases.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _2__________ Page 21 of 66
41 Event
Description:
Load Reduction Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments co
- WHEN less than or equal to 98% power AND it is desired to place EHC Control in the IMP IN mode THEN PERORM the following: OTHERWISE, MARK this step N/A.
- DEPRESS the HOLD pushbutton on the EHC Control panel.
- DEPRESS the IMP PRESS IN pushbutton.
- VERIFY the IMP PRESS IN pushbutton back light is ILLUMINATED.
- DEPRESS the GO pushbutton to resume power reduction.
- IF the EH Control Panel is in TURB, NOTE: The US will recognize,'
MANUAL control, THEN DEPRESS that Section 6.3 of 0-5.1 is MANUAL CONTROL VALVE LOWER NA, and proceed to Section pushbutton, as directed by Plant 6.4.
Management, to attain the desired rate of load reduction, OTHERWISE, MARK this substep N/A.
co (Step 6.4.1) WHEN at approximately 50% NOTE: The B MFWP is power, THEN REMOVE ONE Main already OOS.
Feedwater Pump form service.
us (Step 6.4.2) IF power reduction was greater NOTE: Chemistry has than 50%, THEN RAISE letdown flow to 60 reported that Normal Letdown gpm PER S-3.2P, Swapping CVCS Letdown can remain at 40 gpm Orifice Valves, OTHERWISE, MARK the throughout the load reduction.
substep N/A.
co (Step 6.4.3) WHEN power is being lowered to less than 40% (225 psig first stage pressure), THEN CHECK AMSAC AUTO BLOCK status light ILLUMINATED.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _3_ _ _ _ _ Page 22 of 66
11 Event
Description:
PORV Leak/Block Valve Failure Subsequently, Pressurizer PORV-431C will fail partially open. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-F-19, "PRZR PORV OUTLET HI TEMP 145°F," and enter AP-PRZR.1, "Abnormal Pressurizer Pressure." When the operator attempts to isolate the PORV, the Block Valve will fail to shut fully resulting in a 2-5 gpm leak into the PRT. The crew may implement AP-RCS.1, "Reactor Coolant Leak," and prepare to make a Containment entry. Ultimately, the crew will be directed to take the unit off-line. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11, "Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves," LCO 3.4.13, "RCS Operational Leakage," LCO 3.4.1 "RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits," as well as Technical Requirements Manual TR 3.4.3, "Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) Mitigation."
SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #2 (PZROSB 5%, No Ramp (Throttled back to 2% after the operator attempts to close the PORV Block Valve))
Indications Available:
- MCB Annunciator F~*19, PRZR PORV OUTLET HI TEMP 145°F
- Pressurizer Pressure decreases slowly
- PRT Pressure (Pl-440A) increases
- PCV-431 C has dual indication Time
- Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The crew may go to HOLD on the Turbine, and stop the boration.
AR-F-19, PRZR PORV OUTLET HI TEMP 145°F us (Step 1) IF Pressurizer pressure is lowering, NOTE: The HCO will THEN GO TO AP-PRZR.1, ABNORMAL recognize that Pzr Pressure is PRESSURIZER PRESSURE. lowering because of the Open PORV.
HCO (Step 2) Check PRZR PORV outlet NOTE: The HCO may attempt temperature, Tl-438. to close PCV-431 C, in accordance with A-503.1.
Upon recognizing that PCV-431 C did NOT close, the HCO will attempt to close MOV-515.
HCO (Step 3) Check PRT parameters.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _3_ _ _ _ _ Page 23 of 66
---11 Event
Description:
PORV Leak/Block Valve Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 4) Check Containment temperature.
us (Step 5) Start OR swap Containment Recirc Fans per Shift Manager directions.
us (Step 6) Refer to ITS LCO 3.4.11 and 3.4.13.
NOTE: The US will go to AP-PRZR.1.
SIM DRIVER Note: When the operator attempts to close the PORV Block Valve, Trigger #29 will activate, failing the valve at mid-position.
I Indications Available:
- PORV Block Valve Red status light LIT
- PORV Block Valve Green status light LIT '
- Pressurizer Pressure continues to decreases slowly Examiner NOTE: If the crew enters AP-RCS.1 at any time, proceed to the actions on Page 27.
AP-PRZR.1, ABNORMAL PRESSURIZER PRESSURE HCO (Step 1) Check PRZR Pressure:
- All 4 narrow range channels -
APPROXIMATELY EQUAL
- All 4 narrow range channels -
TRENDING TOGETHER HCO (Step 2) Check Reactor Power - STABLE HCO (Step 3) Check PRZR Pressure:
- Pressure- LESS THAN 2235 PSIG
- Pressure-GREATER THAN 2000 PSIG HCO (Step 4) Check PRZR heater Status:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2
_3.....__ _ _ _ Page Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# 24 of
---11 66 Event
Description:
PORV Leak/Block Valve Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- PRZR proportional heater breaker -
CLOSED
- PRZR heater backup group - ON NOTE: All Pzr Heaters will be energized.
HCO (Step 5) Verify Normal PRZR Spray Valves -
CLOSED
- AOV-431A
- AOV-4318 HCO (Step 6) Check PRZR Pressure Controller, 431 K, Demand - LESS THAN 50%
HCO (Step 7) Check PRZR PORVs:
- PORVs - CLOSED NOTE: PCV-431 C will be in mid-position.
HCO * (Step ?a RNO) Manually close PORVs NOTE: PORV will not close.
IF any valve can NOT be closed, THEN manually close the associated block valve.
- MOV-515 for PCV-431 C NOTE: The HCO will attempt to close the Block Valve unsuccessfully (if not attempted earlier).
HCO * (Step 7 Continued) Annunciator F-19, NOTE: F-19 is LIT.
PRZR PORV OUTLET HI TEMP 145°F -
EXTINGUISHED HCO * (Step 7b RNO) IF PORV leakage is indicated, THEN perform the following:
- Close PORV block valves one at a time AND check if pressure stabilizes.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# 3 Page 25 of 66
---11 Event
Description:
PORV Leak/Block Valve Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- MOV-515 NOTE: The HCO will attempt to close the Block Valve unsuccessfully (if not attempted earlier), and it will be recognized that the leaking PORV cannot be isolated.
us
HCO (Step 8) Attempt To Reseat Any Leaking PORV:
- Verify affected PORV block valve - NOTE: The PCV-431 C Block CLOSED Valve is stuck OPEN.
- MOV-515 for PCV-431 C .,
I HCO (Step 8.a RNO) Close the affected PORV NOTE: The PCV-431 C Block block - CLOSED valve. Valve is stuck OPEN.
HCO * (Step 8 Continued) Cycle the leaking NOTE: The US may or may PORV open then closed not take these actions knowing that the Block Valve is not, and cannot be closed.
- Open affected PORV block valve
- Verify leakage has stopped (Step 8.d RNO) IF leakage continues, THEN perform the following:
- Reclose leaking PORV block valve . NOTE: The PCV-431 C Block Valve is stuck OPEN.
us * (Step 8 Continued) Go to Step 11 HCO (Step 11) Check PRZR Pressure Control Restored:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _ 3 " - - - - - - Page 26 of
---11 66 Event
Description:
PORV Leak/Block Valve Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- Pressure - TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG NOTE: The Pressurizer Pressure is expected to be rising by this time.
us
- Go to Step 16 .
HCO (Step 16) Check PRT Indications:
- Level - BETWEEN 61 % AND 84%
HCO (Step 16.b RNO) Open PRT vent, AOV-527 NOTE: The HCO will attempt until PRT 1.5 PSIG AND ST ABLE pressure to control PRT pressure by is approximately 1.5 psig. IF PRT pressure venting.
will NOT lower, THEN open PRT drain valve, AOV-526, to reduce pressure until PRT pressure is approximately 1.5 psig.
HCO (Step 16.c) Temperature -AT CNMT NOTE: The HCO may attempt AMBIENT TEMPERATURE AND STABLE to bleed and feed the PRT using the RNO.
HCO (Step 17) Establish PRZR Pressure Control In Auto:
- Verify 431 K in AUTO
- Verify PRZR spray valves in AUTO
- Verify PRZR heaters restored:
- PRZR proportional heaters breaker -
CLOSED
- PRZR backup heaters breaker -
RESET, IN AUTO US/ (Step 18) Evaluate MCB Annunciator Status HCO/ (Refer to AR Procedures) co
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _3_ _ _ _ _ Page 27 of 66
---11 Event
Description:
PORV Leak/Block Valve Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments us (Step 19) Notify Higher Supervision NOTE: The US may call WCC/Supervision to address the failed PORV and Block Valve.
If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as wee.
us (Step 20) Notify Reactor Engineer for NOTE: The US will call RE.
Transient Monitoring Program SIM DRIVER: as RE, acknowledge.
SIM DRIVER: IF crew does not enter AP-RCS.1, then PROMPT (as Ops Management) that plant should be SID per AP-
., TURB.5 at 1%/minute.
Examiner NOTE: The following assumes that the US enters AP-RCS.1. IF AP-TURB.5 is entered instead, Move forward to Event 4 on Page 36, and check the Technical Specifications after the Scenario.
AP-RCS.1, REACTOR COOLANT LEAK HCO (*Step 1) Monitor PRZR Level - STABLE AT NOTE: This is a Continuous PROGRAM LEVEL Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
NOTE: The HCO may raise Charging Pump Speed (i.e.
perform RNO).
HCO (Step 2) Check VCT Makeup System:
- Verify VCT level - GREATER THAN 5%
- Ensure the following:
- RMW mode selector switch in AUTO NOTE: The HCO may still be borating for the load reduction.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2
_3_ _ _ _ _ Page Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# 28 of
---11 66 Event
Description:
PORV Leak/Block Valve Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- RMW control armed - RED LIGHT LIT
- Check VCT level:
- Level GREATER THAN 20%
- Level - STABLE OR RISING HCO (Step 3) Check If RCS Leakage In CNMT: NOTE: The leakage is into the PRT.
- Check CNMT radiation monitors - NOTE: The CNMT Monitors NORMAL may be slowly rising due to the PRT venting operations.
- R-2 .,
- R-7
- R-10A
- R-11
- R-12
- CNMT sump A pump run frequency-NORMAL (Refer to RCS Daily Leakage Log) us (Step 4) Dispatch EO to AUX BLDG To NOTE: The US will dispatch Investigate For CVCS Leak (locked area an EO.
keys required) SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge.
HCO (Step 5) Check For Leak To CCW System: NOTE: The leakage is into the PRT.
- CCW surge tank level -
APPROXIMATELY 50% AND STABLE
- CCW radiation monitor, R NORMAL HCO (Step 6) Check CVCS Conditions: NOTE: The leakage is into the PRT.
- Normal letdown - IN SERVICE
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _3_ _ _ _ _ Page 29 of 66
---;1 Event
Description:
PORV Leak/Block Valve Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- Letdown indication:
- Letdown flow-APPROXIMATELY 40 GPM (60 GPM IF AOV-202 OPEN)
- Low pressure LTON pressure -
APPROXIMATELY 250 PSIG
- Letdown pressure control valve, PCV-135, demand APPROXIMATELY 35% OPEN (40%
OPEN IF AOV-202 OPEN)
HCO
- Charging indication:
I
- Seal injection flows - GREATER THAN 6 GPM AND STABLE I
- RCP Labyrinth seal D/Ps -
GREATER THAN 15 INCHES AND APPROXIMATELY EQUAL
- Charging pump discharge pressure -
GREATER THAN RCS PRESSURE
- AUX BLDG radiation levels - NORMAL
- R-4
- R-9
- R-10B
- R-13
- Level - BETWEEN 61 % AND 84%
- Temperature - AT CNMT AMBIENT TEMPERATURE AND STABLE
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _3_ _ _ _ _ Page 30 of 66
---11 Event
Description:
PORV Leak/Block Valve Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 7 RNO) Check tailpipe and valve NOTE: Tailpipe temperatures leakoff temperatures for the PRZR safety are high.
valves and PORVs for indication of leakage.
IF no PORV or safety valve leakage is NOTE: There is PORV indicated, THEN ....... leakage indicated into the PRT.
HCO (Step 8) Check SIGs for Leakage:
- Air ejector radiation monitors - NORMAL
- R-15
- R-47
- R-48
- SIG blowdown radiation monitor (R-19) -
NORMAL
- Steamline radiation monitors - NORMAL
- R-31
- R-32
- SIG sample activity - NORMAL {Check NOTE: The US may call with Chemistry Department for normal) WCCIChemistry to address the samples.
If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as WCCIChem is try.
HCO (Step 9) Check SI Accumulator Levels - NOTE: The leakage is into the STABLE PRT.
HCO (Step 10) Check RCP Seal Leakoff Flows:
- Leakoff flows - WITHIN THE NORMAL OPERATING RANGE OF FIG-4.0, FIGURE RCP SEAL LEAKOFF
- Leakoff flows - STABLE HCO (Step 11) check RCDT Leak Rate - NOTE: The leakage is into the NORMAL (Refer to RCS Daily Leakage PRT.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event#
3 Page 31 of 66
---11 Event
Description:
PORV Leak/Block Valve Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 12) Check Valve Leakoff Temperatures NOTE: The US may dispatch
- NORMAL (Refer to Pressurizer Valve an EO.
Leak-Off Temperature Record Log) SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge and use OVR-IND-PZR11. After 3 Minutes report indications of PORVs
(::::220°F) and Safety Valves
(::::140°F).
HCO (Step 13) Check Normal or Excess Letdown NOTE: Normal Letdown is in
- IN SERVICE service.
I HCO (Step 14) Establish Stable Plant Conditions:
- PRZR level - TRENDING TO NOTE: Charging may still be PROGRAM IN AUTO CONTROL in Manual; and if so, the HCO may return to AUTO.
- Check PRZR pressure - TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG IN AUTO HCO (Step 15) Establish Control Systems In Auto
- Verify 431 K in AUTO
- Verify PRZR spray valves in AUTO
- Verify PRZR heaters restored:
- PRZR proportional heaters breaker -
CLOSED
- PRZR backup heaters breaker -
RESET, IN AUTO
- Verify one charging pump in AUTO HCO/ (Step 16) Evaluate MCB Annunciator Status co (Refer to AR Procedures) us (Step 17) Evaluate RCS Leakage:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _3_ _ _ _~ Page 32 of 66
---11 Event
Description:
PORV Leak/Block Valve Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- Leakage within limits (Refer to leakage surveillance sheet and ITS section 3.4.13)
- (Step 17a RNO) IF leak NOT isolable, SIM DRIVER: As the Shift but PRZR level and seal injection can be Manager, direct the US to maintained, THEN shut the plant down shutdown the plant using AP-(Refer to 0-2.1, NORMAL SHUTDOWN TURB.5 at 1%/minute.
TO HOT SHUTDOWN or AP-TURB.5, RAPID LOAD REDUCTION).
Examiner NOTE: The US may NOT check TS during the plant transient. If NOT, US Examiner check TS after the scenario is complete.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS us RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB)
Limits us LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for NOTE: According to Section pressurizer pressure, RCS average 2.10.1 of the COLR, the Przr temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be Pressure shall be ~2175 psig.
within the limits specified in the COLR.
APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The US will identify ACTION TIME that this TS was entered and A. One or more A.1 Restore RCS 2 hours0.0833 days <br />0.0119 weeks <br />0.00274 months <br /> exited if and when RCS RCS DNB DNB pressure lowers to (and then parameters parameter(s) not within to within limit.
rises above) 2175 psig.
limits.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.11, PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES (PORVs)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# 33 of 66
---11 Event
Description:
PORV Leak/Block Valve Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments us LCO 3.4.11 Each PORV and associated block valve shall be OPERABLE.
us APPLICABILITY MODES 1, 2, and 3.
CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The US will determine ACTION TIME that both Conditions B and C B. One PORV B.1 Close 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> apply.
inoperable. associated block valve.
AND B.2 Remove 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> power from associated block valve.
AND B.3 Restore PORVto 72 hours3 days <br />0.429 weeks <br />0.0986 months <br /> OPERABLE status.
C. One block C.1 Place 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> valve associated inoperable. PORVin manual control.
AND C.2 Restore 7 days block valve to OPERABLE status.
E. Required E.1 Be in MODE 6 hours0.25 days <br />0.0357 weeks <br />0.00822 months <br /> Action and 3.
Because ACTION B.1 cannot associated be completed, the US will Completion AND identify that Condition E must Time of E.2 Be in MODE 12 hours0.5 days <br />0.0714 weeks <br />0.0164 months <br /> be entered.
Condition A, B, 4.
C, or D not met.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.13, RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE us LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited:
- 1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE;
- 10 gpm identified LEAKAGE; and
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _3_ _ _ _ _ Page 34 of 66
---11 Event
Description:
PORV Leak/Block Valve Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- 150 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through any one steam generator (SG).
APPLICABILITY MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The US will evaluate ACTION TIME this Tech Spec and conclude A. RCS A.1 Reduce 4 hours0.167 days <br />0.0238 weeks <br />0.00548 months <br /> that the TS is met or not met operational LEAKAGE LEAKAGE not by using the rough estimate to within within limits for limits.
obtained in assessing the reasons other leakage through the PORV. 1f than pressure ! the crew determines that the boundary LEAKAGE or leakage from the PORV is primary to greater than 10 gpm, then I
secondary ' Condition A will be entered.
LEAKAGE.
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENT 3.4.3, ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUT SCRAM (ATWS) MITIGATION us TR 3.4.3 ATWS Mitigation shall be OPERABLE ~s follows:
- Each PORV shall be capable of automatic actuation and each block valve shall be open;
- Manual rod insertion shall be OPERABLE; and
APPLICABILITY MODE 1 > 45% RTP.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# ~3~~~~- Page 35 of 66
--~I Event
Description:
PORV Leak/Block Valve Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The US will determine ACTION TIME that the failed PORV Block A. One or more A.1 Declare Immediately Valve is NOT open, and that PORV ATWS Condition A applies.
automatic mitigating flow path capability inoperable. inoperable.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _4_ _ _ _ _ Page 36 of 66
11 Event
Description:
Downpower/Failure of Turbine Control/EHC Then, the operator will take the unit off line in accordance with AP-TURB.5, "Rapid Load Reduction." The Main Turbine will fail in automatic control. The operator will diagnose the failure and use manual control of the turbine to conduct the downpower.
SIM DRIVER Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP-TURB.5, RAPID LOAD REDUCTION Examiner NOTE: The crew may perform ATT-23.0 based I
on the Note prior to Step 1 of AP-TURB-5.
' If so, Examiner following CO continue, while other Examiners continue with Step 1 of AP-TURB.5 on Page 37.
ATT-23.0, ATTACHMENT TRANSFER 4160V LOADS co (Step 1) Place Bus 12A- Bus 11A TIE SYNCHROSCOPE to ON.
co (Step 2) Close BUS 12A - BUS 11 A Tl E 4160V.
co (Step 3) Place BUS 12A- BUS 11A TIE SYNCHROSCOPE to OFF.
co (Step 4) Open BUS 11A NORMAL FEED 4160V.
co (Step 5) Place BUS 11 B - BUS 12B TIE SYNCHROSCOPE to ON.
co (Step 6) Close BUS 11 B - BUS 12B TIE 4160V.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _4_ _ _ _ _ Page 37 of 66
---.1 Event
Description:
Downpower/Failure of Turbine Control/EHC Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments co (Step 7) Place BUS 11 B - BUS 12B TIE SYNCHROSCOPE to OFF.
co (Step 8) Open BUS 11 B NORMAL FEED 4160V.
co (Step 9) Reset alarms L-20 AND L-28, locally NOTE: The CO will contact the in the Relay Room Addition. EO to perform this action.
SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge and will need to insert:
REM-EDS49=RESET REM-EDS50=RESET AP-TURB.5, RAPID LOAD REDUCTION Examiners NOTE: Examiners following HCO and US, continue HERE.
NOTE: The US will conduct a load reduction brief.
HCO (Step 1) Initiate Load Reduction
- Verify rods in AUTO HCO
- Initiate boration at the rate determined in NOTE: The HCO may initiate OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC. a boration; or it may already be initiated and the rate will need to be adjusted.
- Reduce turbine load in Auto as follows:
co
- Place Turbine EH Control in OPER PAN., IMP PRESS IN, if desired.
- Select desired rate on thumbwheel NOTE: The CO will select 1%/Minute.
- Reduce the setter to the desired load
- Depress the GO button NOTE: The CO will start the load decrease.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event#
4 Page 38 of 66
---11 Event
Description:
Downpower/Failure of Turbine Control/EHC Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments SIM DRIVER Instructions: WHEN the CO depress GO on the Turbine Operate Trigger #3 (TUR09D, OVR-TUROSO =OFF, OVR-TUROSP = OFF)
Indications Available:
- Turbine Load does NOT decrease as expected
- EH valve control status lights:
- OPER PAN - DARK
- IMP PRESS OUT - DARK
- TURB MANUAL - LIT
- MANUAL CONTROL VALVE LOWER - LIT
- MANUAL CONTROL VALVE FAST- LIT
- MANUAL CONTROL VALVE RAISE - LIT
- Reference and Setter Control Valve Position are equalized co (Step 1.c RNO) IF Auto control is inoperable, NOTE: The CO will lower THEN reduce turbine load in manual at the Turbine Load in MANUAL.
desired rate.
Examiner NOTE: Once the CO has diagnosed the EHC Failure, and is lowering Turbine Load in Manual, MOVE to Events 5-7.
HCO * (Step 1 Continued) Place PRZR backup heaters switch to ON HCO (*Step 2) Monitor RCS Tavg NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make both board operators aware.
- Tavg- GREATER THAN 545°F
- Tavg - LESS THAN 579°F HCO (Step 3) Adjust Boric Acid Addition Rate As Necessary To (refer to OPG-REACTIVITY-CALC):
- Maintain rods above the insertion limit
- Match Tavg and Tref
- Compensate for Xenon
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _4_ _ _ _ _ Page 39 of _ 66__,I Event
Description:
Downpower/Failure of Turbine Control/EHC Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (*Step 4) Monitor PRZR Pressure - NOTE: This is a Continuous TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG IN AUTO Action. The US will make both board operators aware.
HCO (Step 4 RNO) Control PRZR pressure by one NOTE: Pressurizer Pressure of the following: may be trending down. If so, the RNO will be performed.
- 431 K in MANUAL
- Manual control of PRZR heaters and sprays If PRZR pressure can NOT be controlled NOTE: This procedure has manually, THEN refer to AP-PRZR.1, already been completed.
ABNORMAL PRESSURIZER PRESSURE.
co (*Step 5) Monitor MFW Regulating Valves - NOTE: This is a Continuous RESTORING S/G LEVEL TO 52% IN AUTO Action. The US will make both board operators aware.
HCO (*Step 6) Monitor PRZR Level - TRENDING NOTE: This is a Continuous TO PROGRAM IN AUTO CONTROL Action. The US will make both board operators aware.
co (Step 7) Check IA Available to CNMT
- Instr Air to CNMT lsol Valve, AOV-5392
-OPEN co (*Step 8) Check Steam Dump Status: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
- Annunciator G-15, STEAM DUMP ARMED - LIT
- Steam dump operating properly in AUTO
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario# _4_ _ _ _ _ Page Op Test No.: N17-1 5 Event# 40 of
---11 66 Event
Description:
Down power/Failure of Turbine Control/EHC Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments co (Step 9) Check Hotwell Level:
- Hotwell level controller in AUTO
- Controller demand LESS THAN 60%
- Hotwell level at setpoint co (*Step 10) Check If Condensate Booster NOTE: This is a Continuous Pumps Should Be Secured Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
Condensate booster pumps - 2 PUMPS NOTE: There are no I RUNNING Condensate Booster Pumps running.
us (Step 10.a RNO) IF no pumps running THEN qo to step 11 .
co (Step 11) Check If One MFW Pump Should Be Secured
- Power LESS THAN 50%
us (Step 11 a RNO) GO TO Step 18.
us (Step 18) Evaluate Plant Status
obtain primary samples required by SIM DRIVER: as RP, ITS LCO 3.4.16 acknowledge
- Power stable at desired level (Step 18b RNO) IF power greater than 20%
and further reduction is required, THEN continue load reduction and return to Step 2.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #5-7.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _5......_6_&_7_ _ _ Page _41_ of _6_6_ _
1 Event
Description:
Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN After this, an inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal will occur and both MSIVs will close. The reactor will fail to automatically trip and the operator will attempt to trip the reactor manually. The crew will enter E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." The reactor will fail to trip manually from the control room, and the crew will enter FR-S.1, "Response to Reactor Restart/ATWS." On the trip one SIG Safety Valve on each SIG lifted and stuck partially OPEN. The crew will successfully de-energize the Rod Drive MG set(s) causing to control rods to drop into the core. Upon completion of FR-S.1, the crew will transition back to E-0, and then to E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," based on the failed Pressurizer PORV and Block Valve. Shortly after entry into E-1, the crew will transition to E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation." While implementing E-2, the crew will recognize that both SIGs are faulted and transition to ECA-2.1, "Uncontrolled Depressurization of Both Steam Generators." The crew"may take a pre-emptive action of throttling AFW flow to both SIGs per A-503.1, "Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide."
The scenario will tern;iinate at Step 7 of ECA-2.1, after the crew has stopped the RHR Pumps.
SIM DRIVER Instructions: ., Operate Trigger #4 (STM05A (0%, No Ramp) and STM058 (0%, No Ramp))
Indications Available:
- Both MSIVs Closed (green status lights are LIT, Red status lights are DARK)
- All Steam Dump Valves are full Open (Red status lights are LIT)
- RCS Pressure is increased to greater than 2335 psig.
- Both Pzr Spray valves full Open.
- Pzr PORV PCV-4~0 full Open (PCV-431C Dual Indication from previous failure).
- RTBs are CLOSED.
Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION HCO (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip: Immediate Action
- At least one train of reactor trip breakers
-OPEN
- Neutron flux - LOWERING
- MRPI indicates - ALL CONTROL AND SHUTDOWN RODS ON BOTIOM with no instrument fluctuations concurrent with fire.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# 5, 6 & 7 Page ~ of _66_ _-11 Event
Description:
Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control RoomlATWSIOne SIG Safety Valve on each SIG Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 1 RNO) Manually trip reactor. Immediate Action
- IF reactor trip breakers NOT open, or there is a fire in the power block, THEN perform the following:
- Open Bus 13 and Bus 15 normal feed breakers.
- IF Bus 13 or Bus 15 indicating lights are extinguished or flickering, THEN
- Verify rod drive MG sets tripped .
- Close Bus 13 and Bus15 normal NOTE: \he CO may re-close feed breakers. breakers for Bus 13.
- Reset lighting breakers . .,
- IF the reactor will NOT trip OR IF power NOTE: The US will transition to range NIS indicates greater than 5%, FR-S.1.
THEN go to FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO REACTOR RESTART/ATWS, Step1.
NOTE: The US may direct the EO to open BOTH Control Rod Drive MG Set Breakers locally.
If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO, WAIT three Minutes and Insert MALF-ROD06B. THEN report that the RTBs have been opened locally.
FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO REACTOR RESTART/ATWS HCO (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip: Immediate Action
- At least one train of reactor trip breakers
-OPEN
- Neutron flux - LOWERING
- MRPI indicates - ALL CONTROL AND SHUTDOWN RODS ON BOTTOM with no instrument fluctuations concurrent with fire.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _5......_6_&_7_ _ _ Page ~ of _6_6_ _
1 Event
Description:
Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control RoomlATWSIOne SIG Safety Valve on each SIG Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior 'Comments HCO (Step 1 RNO) Manually trip reactor. Immediate Action
- IF reactor trip breakers NOT open, NOTE: The US may direct the THEN manually insert control rods. EO to open BOTH Control Rod Drive MG Set Breakers locally.
If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO, WAIT three Minutes and Insert MALF-ROD06B. THEN report that the RTBs have been opened locally.
I CRITICAL TASK:
Upqn diagnosing an ATWS, manually insert the control rods within 1 minute, and continue insertion until the reactor is tripped or the rods are on the bottom (EOP-Based)
Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor power remains higher than it otherwise would if the action is taken. Performance of the critical task would move the reactor power lower to prevent a subsequent an unnecessary challenge to reactor core operational limits. A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control.
co (Step 2) Verify Turbine Stop Valves - Immediate Action CLOSED co (Step 2 RNO) Manually trip turbine. Immediate Action
- IF turbine trip can NOT be verified ...
co (Step 3) Check AFW Pumps Running: Immediate Action NOTE: Since the Rx did not trip, the A MFW Pump is still running, and the MDAFW Pumps are still OFF.
co (Step 3a) MDAFW pumps - RUNNING Immediate Action
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _5....:.'....:.6_&_7_ _ _ Page ~ of _6_6_ _-1 1
Event
Description:
Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One SIG Safety Valve on each SIG Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments co (Step 3a RNO) Manually start MDAFW Immediate Action pumps.
co (Step 3b) TDAFW pump - RUNNING IF Immediate Action NECESSARY NOTE: With S/G levels high the TDAFW Pump is not necessary.
HCO/ Foldout Page NOTE: The crew will monitor co these conditions throughout the I
performance of FR-S.1.
LOSS OF SW CRITERIA HCO/ (Step 4) Initiate Emergency Boration of RCS: NOTE: With the HCO driving co Rods the CO may need to complete the Emergency Boration.
- Check SI status:
- All SI annunciators - Examiner NOTE: It is likely EXTINGUISHED that SI will be actuated. If
,, NOT, the crew will NOT perform the RNO requiring E-0 Actions.
If this is the case, MOVE forward to FR-S.1 Step 5 actions on Page 49.
HCO/ (Step 4.a RNO) Perform the following:
co
- Complete steps 3 through 7 of E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, while continuing with this procedure.
- IF SI flow indicated, THEN go to Step 5 .
IF NOT, THEN qo to Step 4b.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _5_.,_6_&_7_ _ _ Page ~ of _6_6_ _-t 1
Event
Description:
Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner NOTE: The US may hand off the E-0 Steps to either the HCO or the CO, and continue with the other operator in FR-S.1.
Examiner following operator performing the E-0 steps continue below.
Examiner following operator NOT performing the E-0 Steps continue at Page 49.
E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION HCO/ (Step 3) Verify sufficient AC co Emergency buses Energized To At Least 440 VOLTS:
- Bus 14 OR Bus 16 AND
co
- Any SI Annunciator - LIT
- SI sequencing - BOTH TRAINS STARTED.
HCO/ (*Step 5) Verify CNMT Spray Not Required:
co
- Annunciator A-27, CNMT SPRAY -
EXTINGUISHED
- CNMT pressure - LESS THAN 28 PSIG HCO/ (Step 6) Direct Operator to Perform ATT-co 27.0, ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC ACTION VERIFICATION
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _5__,_6_&_7_ _ _ Page ~of _6_6_ _...
1 Event
Description:
Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One SIG Safety Valve on each SIG Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 27.0, ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC ACTION VERIFICATION HCO/ (Step 1) Verify SI and RHR Pumps Running:
co
- All SI pumps - RUNNING
- All fans - RUNNING
- Charcoal filter' dampers green status lights - EXTINGUISHED HCOI (Step 3) Check If Main Steamlines Should co Be Isolated:
HCO/ (Step 3a RNO) Ge>> to Step 4.
co HCO/ (Step 4) Verify MFW Isolation:
co
- MFW pumps - TRIPPED
- MFW Isolation valves - CLOSED
- SIG A, AOV-3995
- SIG B, AOV-3994
- SIG Slowdown and sample valves -
CLOSED HCO/ (Step 5) Verify At Least Two SW Pumps -
co RUNNING
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _5_.,_6_&_7_ _ _ Page ~ of _6_6_ _-i 1
Event
Description:
Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One SIG Safety Valve on each SIG Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (Step 6) Verify Cl and CVI:
co
- Cl and CVI annunciators - LIT
- Annunciator A-26, CNMT ISOLATION
- Annunciator A-25, CNMT VENTILATION ISOLATION
- Verify Cl and CVI valve status lights -
BRIGHT
valve status lights - BRIGHT
- FCV-4561
- FCV-4562
- Letdown orifice valves - CLOSED
- AOV-200A
- AOV-200B
- AOV-202 HCO/ (Step 7) Check CCW System Status:
co
co
- RHR flow indicator - CHECK FOR FLOW HCO/ (Step 8b RNO) IF RCS pressure less than NOTE: RCS Pressure will co 150 psig manually ... remain > 150 psig.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _5_.,_6_&_7_ _ _ Page ~of _6_6_ _-4 1
Event
Description:
Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (Step 9) Verify SI Pump and RHR Pump co Emergency Alignment:
- RHR pump discharge to Rx vessel deluge - OPEN
- MOV-852A
- MOV-8528
- Verify SI pump C - RUNNING
- Verify SI pump A - RUNNING
- Verify SI pump B - RUNNING
- Verify SI pump C discharge valves -
OPEN
- MOV-871A
- MOV-8718 HCO/ (Step 10) Verify GREATS Actuation:
co
- At least one damper in each flowpath -
CLOSED
- Normal Supply Air
- Normal Return Air
- Lavatory Exhaust Air
- CREATS fans- BOTH RUNNING HCO/ (Step 11) Verity Cl and CVI During a Fire co Event
- A confirmed fire has occurred in the control complex or cable tunnel (fire systems S05, S06, S08, Z05, Z18, or Z19).
HCO/ (Step 11 RNO) Go to END co
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _5_.......
6_&_7_ _ _ Page ~ of _6_6_ _-1 1
Event
Description:
Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION HCO/ (Step 7) Verify Both MDAFW Pumps NOTE: Both MDAFW Pumps co Running should have already been manually started.
FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO REACTOR RESTART/ATWS Examiners following operator NOT performing E-0 Steps 3-7 continue HERE.
CO/ (Step 5) Check PRZR PORV Status:
HCO
- RCS pressure - LESS THAN 2335 '
- Check PORVs - BOTH CLOSED CO/ (Step 5.b RNO) IF PRZR pressure less than NOTE: PCV-431C has HCO 2335 psig, THEN manually close PORVs. previously failed OPEN, and its block valve cannot be closed.
- IF any PORV can NOT be closed, THEN NQTE: The US may dispatch manually close its block valve. IF block an EO.
valve can NOT be closed, THEN IFso, SIM DRIVER: as EO, dispatch EO to locally check breaker.
acknowledge.
- MOV-515, MCC D position 6C
- CVI Annunciator - LIT
- Annunciator A-25, CNMT VENTILATION ISOLATION
- Verify CVI valve status lights - BRIGHT
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _5~,..;.6..;.&....7_ _ _ Page ~of _6_6_ _-1 1
Event
Description:
Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWSIOne SIG Safety Valve on each SIG Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO/ (Step 7) Check If the Following Trips Have HCO Occurred:
- Reactor trip CO/ (Step 7a RNO) Dispatch EO to locally NOTE: The US may direct the HCO DEPRESS trip button for BOTH Control Rod EO to open BOTH Control Rod Drive Motor Generator Set breakers at Drive MG Set Breakers locally.
CROM Control Panel:
If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO, WAIT three Minutes and Insert MALF-ROD06B. THEN report that the RTBs have been opened locally.
'
- 52-2/MG1 B, CRD MG SET B BKR CO/ (Step 7 Continued) Turbine trip HCO CO/ (*Step 8) Check If Reactor IS Subcritical: NOTE: This is a Continuous HCO Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
- Energize MCC A AND B
- Check power range channels -
LESS THAN 5%
- Check Intermediate range channels
- Startup rate - NEGATIVE OR
- Intermediate range channels -
LOWERING us
- Go to Step 18 .
us (Step 18) Return to Procedure and Step in Effect
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _5.....6_&_7_ _ _ Page ~ of _6_6_ _-1 1
Event
Description:
Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each SIG Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The US will transition back to E-0 and start at any step between Step 1 and 8 that is considered the step-in-effect.
It may be that one board operator is still completing E-0 steps.
E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Hco (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip: Immediate Action
- At least one train of reactor trip breakers
-OPEN
- Neutron flux - LOWERIN<;3
- MRPI indicates - ALL CONTROL AND SHUTDOWN RODS ON BOTTOM with no instrument fluctuations concurrent with fire.
NOTE: The Step 1 may be performed again because the RTBs are still closed.
However, the control rods are inserted and Nuclear Power is
<5%.
HCO (Step 1 RNO) Manually trip reactor. Immediate Action
- IF reactor trip breakers NOT open, or there is a fire in the power block, THEN perform the following:
- Open Bus 13 and Bus15 normal feed breakers.
- IF Bus 13 or Bus 15 indicating lights are extinguished or flickering, THEN
- Verify rod drive MG sets tripped .
- Close Bus 13 and Bus15 normal feed breakers.
- Reset lighting breakers .
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _5....,_6_&_7_ _ _ Page ~of _6_6_ _-1 1
Event
Description:
Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- IF the reactor will NOT trip OR IF power range NIS indicates greater than 5%,
THEN ......
co (Step 2) Verify Turbine Stop Valves - Immediate Action CLOSED co (Step 3) Verify sufficient AC Immediate Action Emergency buses Energized To At Least 440 VOLTS:
- Bus 14 OR Bus 16 I AND
- Bus 17 OR Bus 18 I I
HCO (Step 4) Check if SI is Actuated: Immediate Action
- Any SI Annunciator- LIT
- SI sequencing - BOTH TRAINS STARTED.
HCO/ Foldout Page NOTE: The crew will monitor co these conditions throughout the performance of E-0.
- RCP TRIP CRITERIA
- LOSS OF SW CRITERIA
- AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION
- SFP COOLING CRITERIA HCO (*Step 5) Verify CNMT Spray Not Required: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
- Annunciator A-27, CNMT SPRAY -
EXTINGUISHED
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _5_.,_6_&_7_ _ _ Page .::__ of _66_ _-1 1
Event
Description:
Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments us (Step 6) Direct Operator to Perform ATT-27.0, ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC ACTION VERIFICATION NOTE: The US will hand off ATT-27.0 to either the HCO or the CO, and continue with the other operator in E-0.
Examiner following operator performing ATT-27.0 continue below.
I Examiner following operator NOT performing ATT-27.0 continue at Page 56.
E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 27.0, ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC ACTION VERIFICATION HCO/ (Step 1) Verify SI and RHR Pumps Running:
co
- All SI pumps - RUNNING
- All fans - RUNNING
- Charcoal filter dampers green status lights - EXTINGUISHED HCO/ (Step 3) Check If Main Steamlines Should co Be Isolated:
HCO/ (Step 3a RNO) Go to Step 4.
co
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _5......_6_&_7_ _ _ Page :!..._ of _6_6_ _-t 1
Event
Description:
Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCOI (Step 4) Verify MFW Isolation:
co
- MFW pumps - TRIPPED
- MFW Isolation valves - CLOSED
- SIG A, AOV-3995
- SIG B, AOV-3994
- SIG Slowdown and sample valves -
CLOSED I
HCOI (Step 5) Verify At Least Two SW Pumps -
co RUNNING HCOI (Step 6) Verify Cl and CVI:
co
- Cl and CVI annunciators - LIT
- Annunciator A-26, CNMT ISOLATION
- Annunciator A-25, CNMT VENTILATION ISOLATION
- Verify Cl and CVI valve status lights -
BRIGHT
- FCV-4561
- FCV-4562
- Letdown orifice valves - CLOSED
- AOV-200A
- AOV-2008
- AOV-202 HCOI (Step 7) Check CCW System Status:
co
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _s.........6_&_7_ _ _ Page ~ of _6_6_ _
1 Event
Description:
Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control RoomlATWSIOne SIG Safety Valve on each SIG Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
co
- SI flow indicators - CHECK FOR FLOW
- RHR flow indicator - CHECK FOR FLOW iHCO/ (Step 7b RNO) IF RCS pressure less than NOTE: RCS Pressure will co 150 psig manually ... remain > 150 psig.
HCO/ (Step 9) Verify SI Pump and RHR Pump co Emergency Alignment:
- RHR pump discharge to Rx vessel deluge - OPEN
- MOV-852A
- MOV-8528
- Verify SI pump C- RUNNING
- Verify SI pump A - RUNNING
- Verify SI pump 8 - RUNNING
- Verify SI pump C discharge valves -
OPEN
- MOV-871A
- MOV-8718 HCO/ (Step 10) Verify GREATS Actuation:
co
- At least one damper in each flowpath -
CLOSED
- Normal Supply Air
- Normal Return Air
- Lavatory Exhaust Air
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _s....._6_&_7_ _ _ Page ~ of _6_6_ _-1 1
Event
Description:
Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- GREATS fans- BOTH RUNNING HCO/ (Step 11) Verity Cl and CVI During a Fire co Event
- A confirmed fire has occurred in the control complex or cable tunnel (fire systems S05, S06, SOB, Z05, Z18, or Z19).
HCO/ (Step 11 RNO) Go to END co E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Examiner following operator NOT performing ATT-27.0 continue HERE.
CO/ (Step 7) Verify Both MDAFW Pumps NOTE: Both MDAFW Pumps HCO Running should have already been manually started.
CO/ (Step 8) Verify AFW Valve Alignment:
HCO
- AFW flow- INDICATED TO BOTH S/G(s)
LESS THAN 230 GPM CO/ (*Step 9) Monitor Heat Sink: NOTE: This is a Continuous HCO Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
- Check SIG narrow range level -
GREATER THAN 7% [25% ADVERSE CNMT] in any SIG
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _5_.,_6_&_7_ _ _ Page ~of _6_6___
11 Event
Description:
Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One SIG Safety Valve on each SIG Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO/ (Step 9 RNO) Perform the following: NOTE: Since both S/Gs are HCO faulted, the CO may use A-503.1 criteria and limit AFW flow to each SIG to 100 gpm.
- Verify total AFW flow- GREATER THAN 200 GPM us
- Go to Step 10 co (Step 10) Check If TDAFW Pump Can Be Stopped:
- PULL STOP TDAFW pump steam supply valves
- MOV-3504A
- Annunciator A-7, RCP 1A CCW RETURN HI TEMP OR LO FLOW EXTINGUISHED
- Annunciator A-15, RCP 1B CCW RETURN HI TEMP OR LOW FLOW -
EXTINGUISHED CO/ (*Step 12) Monitor RCS Tavg - STABLE AT NOTE: Because of the failed HCO OR TRENDING TO 547°F open SG Safety Valves, the RCS will be cooling down rapidly.
NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
CO/ (Step 12 RNO) If tern perature less than HCO 547°F and lowering, THEN perform the following:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# 5, 6 & 7 Page ~ of _66_ _-1 1
Event
Description:
Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One SIG Safety Valve on each SIG Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- Stop dumping steam .
- Ensure reheater steam supply valves are closed.
- IF cooldown continues, THEN control total feed flow between 200 gpm to 230 gpm until narrow range level greater than 7% [25% adverse CNMT] in at least one SIG.
- WHEN S/G level greater than 7% in one NOTE: Since both S/Gs are SIG, THEN limit feed flow to that faulted, the CO may use A-required to maintain level in at least one 503.1 criteria and limit AFW SIG. flow to each SIG to 100 gpm.
- IF cooldown continues, THEN close both NOTE: Both MSIVs are Closed.
MS IVs. I CO/ (Step 13) Check PRZR PORVs and Spray HCO Valves:
- PORVs - CLOSED CO/ (Step 13 RNO) IF PRZR pressure less than NOTE: PRZR PORV PCV-HCO 2335 psig, THEN manually close PORVs. 431 C and its Block Valve are Stuck OPEN.
- IF any valve can NOT be closed, THEN manually close its block valve.
- MOV-515 for PCV-431 C
- IF a fire has occurred within the power block, THEN ......
- IF block valve can NOT be closed, THEN go to E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1.
NOTE: The US will go to E-1.
E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT HCO/ Foldout Page NOTE: The crew will monitor co these conditions throughout the performance of E-1.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _5_.,_6_&_7_ _ _ Page ~ of _6_6_ _-1 1
Event
Description:
Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One SIG Safety Valve on each SIG Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- RCP TRIP CRITERIA
- LOSS OF SW CRITERIA
- SI REINITIATION CRITERIA
- SI TERMINATION CRITERIA
- SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA IF any SIG pressure is lowering in an NOTE: The US may use this uncontrolled manner or is completely criteria to go to E-2.
depressurized AND has not been isolated, THEN go to E-2, FAULTED SIG ISOLATION, Step 1. I
- E-3 TRANSITION CRITERIA
- COLD LEG RECIRCULATION ,,
SWITCHOVER CRITERION
- SI pumps -AT LEAST TWO RUNNING
- RCS pressure minus maximum SIG pressure - LESS THAN 210 psi [240 psi adverse CNMT]
us (Step 1.c RNO) Go to Step 2.
HCOI (Step 2) Check If SIG Secondary Side Is co Intact:
- Pressure in both SIGs - STABLE OR RISING
- Pressure in both SIGs - GREATER NOTE: Both SIGs are THAN 110 PSIG depressurizing uncontrollably.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _s. . . _6_&_7_ _ _ Page ~ of _6_6_ _-11 Event
Description:
Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each SIG Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCOI (Step 2 RNO) IF any SIG pressure lowering co in an uncontrolled manner OR completely depressurized, THEN verify faulted SIG isolated unless needed for RCS cooldown:
- Steam lines
- Feed lines IF NOT, THEN go to E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step 1.
NOTE: The US will go to E-2.
E-2, FAUL TED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION HCOI Foldput Page NOTE: The crew will monitor co ' these conditions throughout the performance of E-2.
CLOSED co *(Step 2) Check If Any SIG Secondary Side Is Intact:
- Check pressure in SIG B - STABLE OR RISING us (Step 2 RNO) IF both S/G pressures lowering in an uncontrolled manner, THEN go to ECA-2.1 , UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF BOTH STEAM GENERATORS, Step 1 NOTE: The US will go to ECA-2.1.
ECA-2.1, UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF BOTH STEAM GENERATORS
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _5_.,,_6_&_7_ _ _ Page _61_ of _6_6_ _-1 1
Event
Description:
Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control RoomlATWSIOne SIG Safety Valve on each SIG Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCOI Foldout Page NOTE: The crew will monitor co these conditions throughout the performance of ECA-2.1.
- LOSS OF SW CRITERIA
- SI REINITIATION CRITERIA
- E-2 TRANSITION CRITERIA
- COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER CRITERION
- AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION
- E-3 TRANSITION CRITERIA '
co (Step 1) Check Secondary Pressure Boundary:
- Verify all of the following:
- MFW flow control valves - CLOSED
- MFW regulating valves
- MFW bypass valves
- MFW pump discharge valves -
CLOSED
- SIG blowdown and sample valves -
CLOSED
- TDAFW pump steam supply valves -
PULL STOP
- TDAFW pump flow control valves -
CLOSED
- SIG ARVs - CLOSED
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _5_.,_6_&_7_ _ _ Page ~of _66_ _-4 1
Event
Description:
Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Dispatch AO to locally isolate S/Gs (Refer NOTE: The US will dispatch an to ATT-10.0, ATTACHMENT FAULTED EO.
S/G) SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge, and perform Schedule ATT-10 for BOTH SGs.
co (Step 2) Control Feed Flow to Minimize RCS Cooldown:
(Step 2a) Check cooldown rate in RCS cold NOTE: The cooldown rate is legs - LESS THAN 100°F/HR likely to be higher than 100°F/HR.
co (Step 2a RNO) Lower feed flow to 50 gpm to NOTE: The CO will lower the each SIG and go to Step 2c. AFW flow rate to each SG to 50 gpm in an effort to control the cooldown rate.
NOTE: A Red Path will likely occur on the Heat Sink Critical Safety Function Status Tree,
,, and the US will address this procedure. The procedure will NOT be implemented however, since operator action has caused the Red Path.
CRITICAL TASK:
Control the AFW flowrate to 50 gpm per SG in order to minimize the RCS Cooldown rate before an extreme challenge (Red Path) develops to the integrity CSF (EOP-Based)
Safety Significance: Failure to control the AFW flow rate to the SGs leads to an unnecessary and avoidable extreme challenge to the integrity CSF. Also, failure to perform the Critical Task increases challenges to the SUBCRITICALITY Critical Safety Function which otherwise would not occur.
HCO (Step 2c) Check RCS hot leg temperature -
STABLE OR LOWERING.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _5,,_6_&_7_ _ _ Page ~ of _6_6_ _-;
1 Event
Description:
Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control Room/ATWS/One S/G Safety Valve on each S/G Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (*Step 3) Monitor RCP Trip Criteria: NOTE: This is a Continuous co Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
- SI pumps -AT LEAST TWO RUNNING
- RCS pressure minus maximum SIG pressure - LESS THAN 210 psi [240 psi adverse CNMT]
I us (Step 3c RNO) Go to Step 4 HCO (*Step 4) Monitor PRZR PORVs and Block NOTE: This is a Continuous Valves: Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
- Power to PORV block valves -
AVAILABLE
,, failure.
- Block valves -AT LEAST ONE OPEN HCO/ (Step 5) Check Secondary Radiation Levels -
co NORMAL
- Steamline radiation monitor (R-31 and R-32)
SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge.
- Request Chem Tech sample S/Gs for NOTE: The US may call activity. WCC/Chemistry to address the samples.
If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as WCC/Chem is try.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 5 Event# _5....:.'....:.6...;.&_7_ _ _ Page ~of _6._6_ _-1 1
Event
Description:
Inadvertent Main Steam Line Isolation Signal/ Failure of the Reactor to trip from the Control RoomlATWSIOne SIG Safety Valve on each SIG Lifts and sticks partially OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 6) Reset SI HCO (Step 7) Monitor If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped:
- RHR pumps -ANY RUNNING IN INJECTION MODE
- Check RCS Pressure:
- Pressure-GREATER THAN 300 psig [350 psig adverse CNMT]
- Pressure- STABLE OR RISING
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.
TURNOVER SHEET for NRC Exam Scenario #5 Core Age: MOL Procedure in Use: ACTIONS/NOTES:
48% Power, Equilibrium Xe
- The plant is at 48% power (MOL) .
Outside Air Temp= 45°F
- The plant was taken to 50% due to a failure of the B MFW Water Temp = 45°F Pump. Station Management has decided to shutdown the plant and repair the pump, and conduct other maintenance activities.
- The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 4 hours0.167 days <br />0.0238 weeks <br />0.00548 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected Boron: 1145 ppm RCS LEAKAGE: (gpm) to continue throughout the shift.
Total: .021 BAST: 17,400 ppm Identified: .003
- The crew is expected to lower power and proceed to Mode 3 on this shift.
RCS Activity: Normal Unidentified: .018
.. - -
- Chemistry has indicated that CRUD cleanup is complete and that letdown can remain at 40 gpm during the downpower.
- The Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement.
- The following Alarms are in:
- H-2, FEED WATER PUMP LIGHT LOAD
- H-4, MAIN FEED PUMP OIL SYSTEM
- Protected equipment IAW OPG Protected Equipment.
TURNOVER SHEET for NRG Exam Scenario #5 Equie.ment Prob/ems!OOS: Planned Activities for Shift: Electrical Sy:stem 0Qerator Declarations See NOTES
- Proceed to Mode 3 None in effect A-52.4 EQUIPMENT DATE/TIME OOS LCO TITLE EXP DATE ECO A-52.12 EQUIPMENT DATE/TIME OOS TRM/ODCM TITLE EXP DATE ECO A Condensate Booster Yesterday Indefinitely Pump B MFW Pump 2 hours0.0833 days <br />0.0119 weeks <br />0.00274 months <br /> ago Indefinitely
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022317)
Facility: Ginna Scenario No.: 6 Op Test No.: N17-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)
(RO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 0.5% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 4 hours0.167 days <br />0.0238 weeks <br />0.00548 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The crew will raise and stabilize plant power between 2-3%; until maintenance on the A SI Pump is complete.
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A SI Pump is OOS for breaker swap and is expected to be back in 90 minutes, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement.
Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Raise power and Start second AFW Pump N-BOP N-SRO 2 1 C-BOP,' Loss of Compensating Voltage to Intermediate Range N35 C(TS)-SRO 3 2 C-RO 480VAC Ground/A CCW Pump trips w/B CCW Pump failure to C(TS)-SRO start in AUTO 4 3 C-RO B RCP Thermal Barrier leak C-SRO 5 4 C-BOP Fault on 480V Bus 17/SW Pump C fails to start C(TS)-SRO 6 5 M-RO PRZR Steam Space Break M-BOP M-SRO 7 6 C-RO Cl fails to automatically/manually actuate C-SRO 8 7 C-RO Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset C-BOP C-SRO
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022317)
Ginna 2017 NRC Scenario #6 The plant is at 0.5% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 4 hours0.167 days <br />0.0238 weeks <br />0.00548 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The crew will raise and stabilize plant power between 2-3%; until maintenance on the A SI Pump is complete.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A SI Pump is OOS for breaker swap and is expected to be back in 90 minutes, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement.
Shortly after taking the watch, the crew will start the 2nd AFW Pump and raise and stabilize power at 2-3% per Section 6.5 of 0-1.2, "Plant Startup From Hot Shutdown To Full Load."
Subsequently, the compensating voltage power supply for the Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrument N35 will fail Low. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-E-9, "IR N-35 LOSS OF COMPENSATING VOLTAGE," and enter ER-NIS.2, "IR MALFUNTION." The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip Instrumentation."
Then, a 480VAC ground will occur on Bus 14 and the A CCW Pump will trip, and the B CCW Pump will fail to automatically start. The operator will either start the B CCW pump manually per A-503.1, "Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users ~uide," or respond in accordance with AR-A-22, "CCW PUMP DISCHARGE LO PRESS 60 PSI," and enter AP-CCW.2, "Loss of CCW During Power Operation." The operator will evaluate Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, "Component Cooling Water System."
After this, a thermal barrier leak will occur on the B RCP. The crew may enter AP-RCP.1, "RCP Seal Malfunction," but will ultimately respond per AP-CCW.1, "Leakage Into the Component Cooling Loop," and isolate the leak.
Next, a fault on 480V Bus 17 will occur, resulting in Bus 17 de-energizing. The operator will enter AP-ELEC.17/18, "Loss of Safeguards Bus 17/18." The C Service Water Pump will fail to start when manual start is attempted, leaving only the A SW Pump running. The operator may leave the B EOG running or trip it within AP-ELEC.17/18, but in either case aligri Alternate Cooling to the EOG. The operator will enter AP-SW.2, "Loss of Service Water," and take actions to isolate non-essential SW loads. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources -
Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4," and LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems - Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4."
Afterwards, a Pressurizer vapor space Small Break LOCA occurs over ten minutes. The operator will enter AP-RCS.1, "Reactor Coolant Leak," however, ultimately the reactor will be tripped, Safety Injection will be actuated, and the operator will enter E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."
On the plant trip, Containment Isolation will fail to automatically and manually actuate, and the operator will need to manually close the Containment Isolation Valves. Additionally, when the SI occurs, instrument air to containment will be isolated and the B RCP Thermal Barrier Return Isolation Valve will fail open. The CCW leak will need to be re-isolated.
The operator will transition from E-0 to E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant." At Step 7 of E-1, and after SI is reset, a Loss of Off-Site Power will occur and all Safeguards Equipment will need to be re-started.
The scenario will terminate at Step 9 (or beyond) of E-1 after all ECCS equipment is re-started and Instrument Air has been restored to the Containment.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_022317)
Critical Tasks:
Trip all RCPs within 2 minutes of loss of CCW to the RCPs or if RCP motor bearing temperature exceeds 200°F; or within 5 minutes of reaching Small Break LOCA trip criteria, whichever is reached first (EOP-Based)
Safety Significance: During an undervoltage condition on an ESF Bus coupled with an SI, the CCW Pump(s) will trip causing a loss of CCW flow to the RCPs. A Caution is provided in AP-CCW.2 and 3 which states "If CCW flow to a RCP is interrupted for greater than 2 minutes or if either RCP motor bearing temperature exceeds 200°F, then trip the affected RCP." This caution applies at all times, and is necessary to protect the long-term operations of the RCPs. It is a management expectation that the RCPs be tripped within 2 minutes of a loss of CCW to pump motor bearings. Additionally, failure to trip all RCPs when required during a Small Break LOCA can lead to core uncovery and to fuel temperatures in excess of 2200°F. Analyses have shown that if the RCPs are tripped within 5 minutes of the trip criteria being met, PCT will remain below 2200°F, and if this action is delayed beyond 5 minutes, this PCT will be exceeded. It is a management expectation that the RCPs be tripped as quickly as possible, but within 5 minutes when the trip criteria are met. Failure to take this action represents mis-operation by the operator which leads to degradation of the fuel cladding fission produce barrier, and a violation of a license condition.
Close Containment Isolation Valves, or their Alternate Valves using ATT-3.0, before indicating to the US that ATT-27.0 is complete (EOP-Based)
Safety Significance: Failure to close at least one Containment Isolation Valve on each critical penetration under the postulated conditions when it is possible to do so, constitutes mis-operation leading to degradation of the Containment Barrier. Failure to take this action leads to an unnecessary release of fission products to the auxiliary building, increasing the potential for release to the environment, and reducing accessibility to vital equipment within the Auxiliary Building. Higher radiation levels within the Auxiliary Building will result in a degradation of ALARA principles.
Establish High-Head Injection with at least two SI Pumps after SI has been Reset and following a Loss of Off-Site Power (EOP-Based)
Safety Significance: Failure to manually start at least two 50% capacity SI pumps under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity." In this case, at least two SI pumps can be manually started from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually start both SI pumps, which are 50% capacity pumps, also represents a failure by the crew to "demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario, and recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start the SI pumps (when it is possible to do so) is a "violation of the facility license condition." Performance of the critical task would return the plant to a condition for which analysis shows acceptable results.
PROGRAM: Ginna Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N17-1-6
REFERENCES:
- 1. Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS-Modes 1, 2 and 3" (Amendment 118)
- 2. 0-1.2, "Plant Startup From Hot Shutdown To Full Load" (Rev 204)
- 3. AR-E-9, "IR N-35 LOSS OF COMPENSATION VOLTAGE" (Rev 4)
- 4. ER-NIS.2, "IR MALFUNTION" (Rev 00501)
- 5. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip Instrumentation" (Amendment 112)
- 6. A-503.1, "Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide" (Rev 04600)
- 8. AP-CCW.2, "Loss of CCW During Power Operation" (Rev 02300)
- 9. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, "Component Cooling Water System" (Amendment 80)
- 10. AP-RCP.1, "RCP Seal Malfunction" (Rev 01800)
- 11. AP-CCW.1, "Leakage Into the Component Cooling Loop" (Rev 01901)
- 12. AP-ELECT.17/18, "Loss of Safeguards Bus 17/18" (Rev 00802)
- 14. Technical Specification LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems - Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4" (Amendment 80)
- 15. AP-RCS.1, "Reactor Coolant Leak" (Rev 02100)
- 16. E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection" (Rev 048)
- 17. ATT-3.0, "Attachment Cl/CVI" (Rev 01200)
- 18. ATT-27.0, "Attachment Automatic Action Verification" (Rev 00400)
- 19. E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant" (Rev 04100)
- 20. ATT-8.5, "Attachment Loss of Offsite Power" (Rev 1)
Validation Time: 94 minutes Author: David Lazarony, Essential Training & Consulting, LLC Facility Review:
Rev.022317 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 Facility: Ginna Scenario No.: 6 Op Test No.: N17-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)
(RO)
(BOP)
Initial Conditions: The plant is at 0.5% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 4 hours0.167 days <br />0.0238 weeks <br />0.00548 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The crew will raise and stabilize plant power between 2-3%; until maintenance on the A SI Pump is complete.
Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A SI Pump is OOS for breaker swap and is expected to be back in 90 minutes, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement.
Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Raise power and Start second AFW Pump I
N-BOP N-SRO 2 1 C-BOP Loss of Compensating Voltage to Intermediate Range N35 C(TS)-SRO 3 2 C-RO 480VAC Ground/A CCW Pump trips w/B CCW Pump failure to C(TS)-SRO start in AUTO 4 3 C-RO B RCP Thermal Barrier leak C-SRO 5 4 C-BOP Fault on 480V Bus 17/SW Pump C fails to start C(TS)-SRO 6 5 M-RO PRZR Steam Space Break M-BOP M-SRO 7 6 C-RO Cl fails to automatically/manually actuate C-SRO 8 7 C-RO Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset C-BOP C-SRO
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 Ginna 2017 NRC Scenario #6 The plant is at 0.5% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 4 hours0.167 days <br />0.0238 weeks <br />0.00548 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The crew will raise and stabilize plant power between 2-3%; until maintenance on the A SI Pump is complete.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A SI Pump is OOS for breaker swap and is expected to be back in 90 minutes, and the Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement.
Shortly after taking the watch, the crew will start the 2nd AFW Pump and raise and stabilize power at 2-3% per Section 6.5 of 0-1.2, "Plant Startup From Hot Shutdown To Full Load."
Subsequently, the compensating voltage power supply for the Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrument N35 will fail Low. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-E-9, "IR N-35 LOSS OF COMPENSATING VOLTAGE," and enter ER-NIS.2, "IR MALFUNTION." The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip Instrumentation."
Then, a 480VAC ground will occur on Bus 14 and the A CCW Pump will trip, and the B CCW Pump will fail to automatically start. The operator will either start the B CCW pump manually per, A-503.1, "Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide," or respond in accordance with AR-A-22, "CCW PUMP DISCHARGE LO PRESS 60 PSI," and enter AP-CCW.2, "Loss of CCW During Power Operation." The operator will evaluate Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, "Component Cooling Water System."
After this, a thermal barrier leak will occur on the B RCP. The crew may enter AP-RCP.1, "RCP Seal Malfunction," but will ultimately respond per AP-CCW.1, "Leakage Into the Component Cooling Loop," and isolate the leak.
Next, a fault on 480V Bus 17 will occur, resulting in Bus 17 de-energizing. The operator will enter AP-ELEC.17/18, "Loss of Safeguards Bus 17/18." The C Service Water Pump will fail to start when manual start is attempted, leaving only the A SW Pump running. The operator may leave the B EOG running or trip it within AP-ELEC.17 /18, but in either case align Alternate Cooling to the EOG. The operator will enter AP-SW.2, "Loss of Service Water," and take actions to isolate non-essential SW loads. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4," and LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems - Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4."
Afterwards, a Pressurizer vapor space Small Break LOCA occurs over ten minutes. The operator will enter AP-RCS.1, "Reactor Coolant Leak," however, ultimately the reactor will be tripped, Safety Injection will be actuated, and the operator will enter E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." On the plant trip, Containment Isolation will fail to automatically and manually actuate, and the operator will need to manually close the Containment Isolation Valves.
Additionally, when the SI occurs, instrument air to containment will be isolated and the B RCP Thermal Barrier Return Isolation Valve will fail open. The CCW leak will need to be re-isolated.
The operator will transition from E-0 to E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant." At Step 7 of E-1, and after SI is reset, a Loss of Off-Site Power will occur and all Safeguards Equipment will need to be re-started.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 The scenario will terminate at Step 9 (or beyond) of E-1 after all ECCS equipment is re-started and Instrument Air has been restored to the Containment.
Critical Tasks:
Trip all RCPs within 2 minutes of loss of CCW to the RCPs or if RCP motor bearing temperature exceeds 200°F; or within 5 minutes of reaching Small Break LOCA trip criteria, whichever is reached first (EOP-Based)
Safety Significance: During an undervoltage condition on an ESF Bus coupled with an SI, the CCW Pump(s) will trip causing a loss of CCW flow to the RCPs. A Caution is provided in AP-CCW.2 and 3 which states "If CCW flow to a RCP is interrupted for greater than 2 minutes or if either RCP motor bearing temperature exceeds 200°F, then trip the affected RCP." This caution applies at all times, and is necessary to protect the long-term operations of the RCPs. It is a management expectation that the RCPs be tripped within 2 minutes of a loss of CCW to pump motor bearings. Additionally, failure to trip all RCPs when required during a Small Break LOCA can lead to core uncovery and to fuel temperatures in excess of 2200°F. Analyses have shown that if the RCPs are tripped within 5 minutes of the trip criteria being met, PCT will remain below 2200°F, and if this action is delayed beyond 5 minutes, this PCT will be exceeded.
It is a management expectation that the RCPs be tripped as quickly as possible, but within 5 minutes when the trip criteria are met. Failure tQ take this action represents mis-operation by the operator which leads to degradation of the fuel cladding fission produce barrier, and a violation of a license condition.
Close Containment Isolation Valves, or their Alternate Valves using ATT-3.0, before indicating to the US that ATT-27.0 is complete (EOP-Based)
Safety Significance: Failure to close at least one Containment Isolation Valve on each critical penetration under the postulated conditions when it is possible to do so, constitutes mis-operation leading to degradation of the Containment Barrier. Failure to take this action leads to an unnecessary release of fission products to the auxiliary building, increasing the potential for release to the environment, and reducing accessibility to vital equipment within the Auxiliary Building. Higher radiation levels within the Auxiliary Building will result in a degradation of ALARA principles.
Establish High-Head Injection with at least two SI Pumps after SI has been Reset and following a Loss of Off-Site Power (EOP-Based)
Safety Significance: Failure to manually start at least two 50% capacity SI pumps under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity." In this case, at least two SI pumps can be manually started from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually start both SI pumps, which are 50% capacity pumps, also represents a failure by the crew to "demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario, and recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start the SI pumps (when it is possible to do so) is a "violation of the facility license condition." Performance of the critical task would return the plant to a condition for which analysis shows acceptable results.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Reset to Temp IC 160 T = 0 {From IC-18):
D (Originally IC-18).
Lower power and stabilize at 0.5%; and STOP the B MDAFW Pump.
Secure SG Slowdown flow by inserting REM-SGN10=CLOSED and SGN11=CLOSED ENSURE that the A CCW Pump is ON and the B CCW Pump is in STANDBY.
MALF SIS03A to prevent start of A SI pump
{OOS contingency)
Take A SI Pump Control Switch to PULL STOP Take A CB Pump Control Switch to TRIP Insert OVR-CND04A=OFF Hang LOTO Tags as necessary Insert MALF CLG10 {Auto start failure of standby CCW pump on low pressure)
Insert MALF CLG01C {SWP C Trip)
Insert MALF RPS06 {Cl fails to '
automatically/manually actuate) '
Insert MALF NIS05A (1 E-8 amps, 0 Ramp) on T-1 Insert MALF CLG02A on T-2 Set ANN-A-EDS33 = ON {Simulates simultaneous 480V ground, Alarm will clear 20 seconds after alarm), on T-2 Insert MALF RCS01B (11gpm,120 Second Ramp) on T-3 Insert MALF EDS04C on T-4 Insert MALF PZR07 {89000, 600 second Ramp)
- on T-5 Insert MALF EDS01 A and EDS01 B on T-6 D Prior to Crew
- Hang Protective Tags per OPG-Protective Briefing Equipment.
- Place Black Dot on all required MCB Annunciators (J-25)
D Crew Briefing
- Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements
- Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew .
- Provide the crew with a copy of S-3.1 and 0-1.2 complete through Step 6.4 .
- Handout current Reactivity Plan .
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D T-0 Begin Familiarization Period D At direction of Event1 Raise power and Start second AFW Pump examiner D Stabilized at 2- Event2 Loss of Compensating Voltage to Intermediate 3% power Range N35 Trigger #1 NIS05A (1 E-8 amps, 0 Ramp)
D At direction of Event 3 480VAC Ground/A CCW Pump trips w/B CCW examiner Pump failure to start in AUTO Trigger #2 ON, (Simulates simultaneous 480V ground).
A-EDS33= ON Alarm will clear 20 seconds after alarm.
CLG02A CLG10 (t=O)
NOTE: This Malfunction is inserted at T = 0.
D At direction of Event 4 , B RCP Thermal Barrier leak examiner Trigger#3 RCS01B (11 gpm, 120 second Ramp)
D At direction of Events Fault on 480V Bus 17/SW Pump C fails to start examiner Trigger #4 EDS04C CLG01 C (T=O) NOTE: This Malfunction is inserted at T = 0.
D At direction of Event6 PRZR Steam Space Break examiner Trigger #5 PZR07 (89000, 600 second Ramp)
D Post-Rx Trip Event 7 Cl fails to automatically/manually actuate RPS06 Note: This malfunction is inserted at T=O.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION D Post-Rx Trip Events Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset Trigger #6 Note: This malfunction is inserted after SI is reset in E-1.
EDS01A EDS01B D Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event#
Page 8 of
--1 54 Event
Description:
Raise power and Start second AFW Pump Shortly after taking the watch, the crew will start the 2nd AFW Pump and raise and stabilize power at 2-3% per Section 6.5 of 0-1.2, "Plant Startup From Hot Shutdown To Full Load."
SIM DRIVER Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments 0-1.2, PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT SHUTDOWN TO FULL LOAD I
us (Step 6.5) Steam Header Warmup and
., Power Ascension to Between 2% and 3%
co (Step 6.5.1) PERFORM the following to start the second AFW pump:
- CLOSE BOTH AFW Crossover VLVS .
- CLOSE AFW Bypass Valve for the pump to be started AND MARK valve NOT closed N/A.
- MAKE a Plant announcement for starting an AFW Pump.
- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP A
- AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP B NOTE: The CO will START the BAFW Pump.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# ------Page 9 of 54
...;...--11 Event
Description:
Raise power and Start second AFW Pump Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- THROTTLE the following AFW Bypass or Discharge Valves to control SIG Levels.
- MD AFW PUMP 1B DISCHARGE VLV, MOV-4008 HCO (Step 6.5.2) CONTINUE power ascension, NOTE: The HCO will raise raising power and Tavg while warming the power and stabilize between Steam Header. 2-3%.
us (Step 6.5.3) ENSURE a pre-job brief is performed PER HU-AA-1211, PRE-JOB BRIEFINGS, for Slowdown initiation. [G0092]
us (Step 6.5.4) WHEN load is raised above 2%,"
but less than 3%, Reactor Power, THEN PERFORM the following:
- ENSURE Slowdown Heat Recovery NOTE: The US will dispatch System in service PER T-14F.1, SIG an EO.
Slowdown System Operation. SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge.
- ENSURE maximum blowdown flow within limits of AFW flow AND heat capacity.
Examiner NOTE: The US may continue on in 0-1.2 as the HCO raises and stabilizes power at 2%, however no substantial actions will be taken.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# ------Page 10 of 54
---ti Event
Description:
Raise power and Start second AFW Pump Time I Pos~ I Expected Actions/Behavi.or I Comments When power is stabilized at 2-3% Lead Examiner move to Event #2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2
_2_ _ _ _ _ Page Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# 11 of
--1 54 Event
Description:
Loss of Compensating Voltage to Intermediate Range N36 Subsequently, the compensating voltage power supply for the Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrument N35 will fail Low. The operator will respond in accordance with AR-E-9, "IR N-35 LOSS OF COMPENSATING VOLTAGE," and enter ER-NIS.2, "IR MALFUNTION." The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip Instrumentation."
SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #1 (NISOSA (1 E-8%))
Indications Available:
- MCB Annunciator E-9, IR N-35 LOSS OF COMPENSATION VOLTAGE
- The N35 indication is sliqhtly hiqher than N36 indication Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior. Comments AR-E-9, IR N-35 LOSS OF COMPENSATION VOLTAGE us (Step 1) Refer to ER-NIS.2 NOTE: The US will go to ER-NIS.2.
ER-NIS.2, IR MALFUNCTION co (Step 6.1) DEFEAT the reactor trip and rod NOTE: E-7 alarm, NIS TRIP stop function for the affected channel by BYPASS, will light placing the level trip switch in the BYPASS position.
us (Step 6.2) NOTIFY l&C to repair the faulty NOTE: The US may notify the channel. WCC/l&C.
SIM DRIVER: as WCCS/l&C, acknowledge.
us (Step 6.3) REFER to ITS Section 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1, function 3 and Function 16a for NIS intermediate range channel operability requirements.
NOTE: The US will evaluate Technical Specifications.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM (RTS)
INSTRUMENTATION
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# 2 Page 12 of
11 54 Event
Description:
Loss of Compensating Voltage to Intermediate Range N36 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments us LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.
us APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.
CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The US will recognize ACTION TIME that Function 3 is applicable A. One or more A.1 Enter the Immediately and requires ACTION E.1.
Functions Condition with one referenced I
channel in Table NOTE: The US may call inoperable. 3.3.1-1 for WCC/Maintenance to address OR the channel(s). the status of the A SI Pump.,
Two source range If so, SIM DRIVER channels acknowledge as wee, report inoperable. that the paperwork is being E. As required E.1 Reduce 2 hours0.0833 days <br />0.0119 weeks <br />0.00274 months <br /> completed now and the pump by Required THERMAL is expected to be OPERABLE Action A.1 POWER to in about 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
and < 5E-11 referenced amps.
by Table OR If asked for plant management 3.3.1-1.
direction, after the US E.2 Increase 2 hours0.0833 days <br />0.0119 weeks <br />0.00274 months <br /> identifies the Tech Spec THERMAL options, indicate that POWER to 2! 8% RTP.
management will call back with direction.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _3_ _ _ _ _ _ Page 13 of 54
-~I Event
Description:
480VAC Ground/A CCW Pump trips w/B CCW Pump failure to start in AUTO Then, a 480VAC ground will occur on Bus 14 and the A CCW Pump will trip, and the B CCW Pump will fail to automatically start. The operator will either start the B CCW pump manually per A-503.1, "Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures Users Guide,"
or respond in accordance with AR-A-22, "CCW PUMP DISCHARGE LO PRESS 60 PSI," and enter AP-CCW.2, "Loss of CCW During Power Operation." The operator will evaluate Technical Specification LCO 3. 7. 7, "Component Cooling Water System."
SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #2 (CLG02A, A-EDS33 (ON))
Indications Available:
- MCB Annunciator A-17, MOTOR OFF RCP CCWP
- MCB Annunciator A-22, CCW PUMP DISCHARGE LO PRESS 60 PSIG
- A CCW Pump Green Breaker Status Light LIT
- A CCW Pump White Breaker Status Light LIT
- B CCW Pump Green Breaker Status Light LIT Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The HCO may start the B CCW directly, and/or the crew may enter AP-CCW .2 directly.
AR-A-17, MOTOR OFF RCP CCWP HCO (Step 1) Verify which motor tripped.
us (Step 2) IF a RCP has tripped, THEN ....
us (Step 3) IF a CCW pump has tripped, THEN go to the applicable AP-CCW procedure:
- AP-CCW .2 (LOSS OF CCW DURING NOTE: The US will transition to POWER OPERATION) AP-CCW.2.
- AP-CCW .3 (LOSS OF CCW - PLANT SHUTDOWN)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2
_3..___ _ _~ Page Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# 14 of
---11 54 Event
Description:
480VAC Ground/A CCW Pump trips w/B CCW Pump failure to start in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AR-A-22, CCW PUMP DISCHARGE LO PRESS 60 PSI us (Step 1) GO TO the applicable AP-CCW procedure:
- AP-CCW.2, LOSS OF CCW DURING POWER OPERATION HCO (Step 2) Notify AO to check CCW pumps. NOTE: The US may direct the EO to check the CCW Pumps.
If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO, and report A CCW Pump Motor Hot to Touch.
HCO (Step 3) IF CCW pump cavitation is evident NOTE: The US may direct the with normal CCW surge tank level as EO to check the CCW Pumps.
indicated on Ll-618, .... If so, SIM DRIVER acknowledge as EO, and report no evidence of cavitation exists on any CCW Pump.
us (Step 4) Refer to ITS LCO 3.4.6, 3.4.7, 3.4.8, 3.7.7, 3.9.4 and 3.9.5.
NOTE: The HCO may start the B CCW directly per the guidance of A-503.1, and/or the US may go to AP-CCW.2.
A-503.1, EMERGENCY AND ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES USERS GUIDE HCO (Step 1) Manual backup is the insertion of a manual trip, actuation, or control signal after a given parameter has reached or exceeded the setpoint for the corresponding automatic signal, based on the observed failure of the automatic function to occur. Manual backup is in an attempt to restore or maintain the design function.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _3_ _ _ _ _ Page 15 of 54
--..;1 Event
Description:
480VAC Ground/A CCW Pump trips w/B CCW Pump failure to start in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Exam.iner NOTE: The US may NOT enter AP-CCW.2. If NOT, proceed to Technical Specification evaluation on Page 17.
AP-CCW.2, LOSS OF CCW DURING POWER OPERATION Examiner NOTE: If the B CCW Pump is started already upon entry into this procedure, move on to Event 4 and the discretion of the Lead Examiner, and address TS Evaluation upon completion of the scenario.
HCO (Step 1) Check CCW Pump Status:
I
'
- Both CCW pump breaker white lights - NOTE: The A CCW Pump EXTINGUISHED white Breaker Status light will be LIT.
HCO (Step 1 RNO) Perform the following:
- Ensure standby CCW pump running . NOTE: The HCO will start the B CCW Pump here, if NOT previously started.
IF no CCW pump can be operated, .... NOTE: The B CCW Pump can be started.
- IF annunciator A-22, CCW PUMP NOTE: Once the B CCW Pump DISCHARGE LO PRESS 60 PSI, lit, ..... is started, this annunciator will NOT be LIT.
HCO (*Step 2) Monitor CCW Surge Tank Level - NOTE: This is a Continuous APPROXIMATELY 50% AND ST ABLE Action. The US will make one (PPCS Point L0618) or more board operators aware.
HCO (*Step 3) Monitor CCW Hx Outlet NOTE: This is a Continuous Temperature (MCB rear or PPCS point ID Action. The US will make one T0621) or more board operators aware.
- CCW Hx Outlet temperature - LESS THAN 120°F
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2
_3_ _ _ _ _ Page Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# 16 of
11 54 Event
Description:
480VAC Ground/A CCW Pump trips w/B CCW Pump failure to start in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (*Step 4) Monitor RCP Indications: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
- Annunciator A-7 (A-15), RCP 1A (18)
CCW return Hi temp or low flow 165 gpm 125°F alarm - EXTINGUISHED
- RCP motor bearings temperature (PPCS Group Display - RCPS OR RCP temperature monitor RK-20A recorder) -
- 200°F.
HCO (*Step 5) Monitor If Letdown Should B~ NOTE: This is a Continuous Isolated: Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
- Check annunciator A-12, Non-Regen Hx Letdown Out Hi Temp 145°F -
EXTINGUISHED
- Check Excess letdown temperature - NOTE: Excess Letdown is NOT LESS THAN 195°F in service.
HCO/ (Step 6) Check CCW Valve Alignment -
CO/ NORMAL EO
- Check MCB CCW valves (Refer to ATT- NOTE: The US will hand off 1.0, ATTACHMENT AT POWER CCW ATT-1.0 to the HCO or CO.
ALIGNMENT)
- Direct AO to check local flow indications NOTE: The US may dispatch per ATT-1.1, ATTACHMENT NORMAL an EO.
CCW FLOW SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge, and after 5 Minutes, report that ATT-1.1.
is complete.
HCO/ (Step 7) Locally Check Seal Water Hx CCW NOTE: The US may dispatch EO Outlet Flow - NORMAL an EO.
SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge, and report after 2 Minutes that flow is 16 gpm.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _3__________ Page 17 of
11 54 Event
Description:
480VAC Ground/A CCW Pump trips w/B CCW Pump failure to start in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments co (Step 8) check For CCW Leakage In CNMT:
- Level - ST ABLE
- Sump A pumps - OFF
SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge, and report that the WHUT Level is stable at 15%.
co (Step 10) Verify CCW System Leak -
IDENTIFIED
- Leak identified NOTE: The US will answer this "YES" being aware that there is NO leak, and continue.
- Isolate leak if possible
- Refer to IP-ENV-3, RESPONSE TO A NOTE: The US may NOT take SPILL OF HAZARDOUS this action, knowing that there MATERIAL/WASTE is no leak.
HCO (Step 11) Check Normal or Excess Letdown NOTE: Normal letdown is in
- IN SERVICE service.
HCO (Step 12) Check CCW System Leak Isolated
- Surge tank level -APPROXIMATELY 50%
- Surge tank level - ST ABLE
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _3_ _ _ _ _ Page 18 of 54
--~I Event
Description:
480VAC Ground/A CCW Pump trips w/B CCW Pump failure to start in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments co (Step 13) Direct RP To Sample CCW System NOTE: The US may NOT take For Chromates this action, knowing that there is no leak.
HCO/ (Step 14) Evaluate MCB Annunciator Status co (Refer to AR Procedures) us (Step 15) Evaluate Plant Conditions:
- CCW system rrialfunction - IDENTIFIED AND CORRECTED
us (Step 16) Notify Higher supervision NOTE: The US may notify the WCC/Plant Supervision.
SIM DRIVER: as wees, acknowledge.
us (Step 17) Return to Procedure Or Guidance In Effect Examiner NOTE: If the US does NOT enter AP-CCW .2, continue HERE.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.7, COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW}
SYSTEM us LCO 3.7.7 Two CCW trains, two CCW heat exchangers, and the CCW loop header shall be OPERABLE.
AAPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _3_ _ _ _ _ Page 19 of 54
---ti Event
Description:
480VAC Ground/A CCW Pump trips w/B CCW Pump failure to start in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments us CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The US will identify that ACTION TIME Condition A is applicable.
A. One CCW A.1 Restore 72 hours3 days <br />0.429 weeks <br />0.0986 months <br /> train CCW train inoperable. to NOTE: The US should OPERABLE recognize escalating MODE status.
change to >5% power cannot occur with LCO not met.
NOTE: The US will likely conduct a Plant Status Brief, indicating that the only option for the plant is to shut~own to comply with the LCO 3.3.1 Action.
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4. .,
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario#
Op Test No.: N17-1 6 Event# 4 Page 20 of
---11 54 Event
Description:
B RCP Thermal Barrier leak After this, a thermal barrier leak will occur on the B RCP. The crew may enter AP-RCP.1, RCP Seal Malfunction," but will ultimately respond per AP-CCW.1, "Leakage Into the Component Cooling Loop," and isolate the leak.
SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #3 (RCS01 B (11 gpm, 120 Second Ramp))
Indications Available:
- MCB Annunciator B-10, RCP 1B LABYR SEAL LO DIFF PRESS 15" H20
- 1B RCP Labyrinth Seal ~p is lowering
- CCW Surge Tank Level is rising
- RMS-17, R-17 Component Coolinq, indication is risina Time Pos. \
Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The crew may enter AP-RCS.1 first, but will ultimately shift to AP-RCP.1.
AR-B-10, RCP 18 LABYR SEAL LO DIFF PRESS 15" H20 HCO (Step 1) Check AOV-142 position correct for plant conditions.
HCO (Step 2) GO TO applicable procedure: NOTE: If the US enters AP-RCP .1 when CCW surge level
- AP-RCP.1, RCP SEAL MALFUNCTION
- AP-CVCS.1, eves LEAK
- AP-CVCS.3, LOSS OF ALL CHARGING rising, Step 7 will direct the US to AP-CCW.1.
FLOW AP-RCP .1, RCP SEAL MALFUNCTION HCO (Step 1) Check Total #1 Seal Flow - LESS THAN 8.0 GPM FOR EACH RCP HCO (Step 2) Check RCP Seal Return Valve AliQnment:
- RCP seal return isolation valve, MOV-313 - OPEN
- Verify RCP seal disch valves - OPEN
- RCP A, AOV-270A
- RCP B, AOV-2708
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _4_ _ _ _ _ Page 21 of 54
---ti Event
Description:
B RCP Thermal Barrier leak Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (Step 3) Check RCP Seal Return Flow:
- Total #1 Seal Flow - BETWEEN 0.8 GPM AND 6.0 GPM FOR EACH RCP us
- Go to Step 5.
HCO (Step 5) Check RCP Cooling:
- Annunciator A-7, RCP A CCW RETURN HIGH TEMP OR LOW FLOW -
EXTINGUISHED
- Annunciator A-15, RCP B CCW RETURN HIGH TEMP OR LOW FLOW I
- EXTINGUISHED (Step 6) Check RCP #2 Seal Indications: '
HCO '
- Annunciator B-3, RCP A STANDPIPE HI LEVEL +1 FT - EXTINGUISHED
- Annunciator B-4, RCP B STANDPIPE HI LEVEL +1 FT - EXTINGUISHED HCO (Step 7) Check RCP Labyrinth Seal D/Ps -
GREATER THAN 15 INCHES OF WATER HCO (Step 7 RNO) Perform the following:
- RCP A, AOV-754A
- RCP B, AOV-7548
- Verify seal injection flow greater than 5 GPM for affected RCP.
- Adjust HCV-142 to obtain at least 15 inches labyrinth seal ~P.
SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge and report ~p is normal.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# 4 Page 22 of 54 Event
Description:
B RCP Thermal Barrier leak Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- Check CCW surge tank level stable. IF level rising, THEN go to AP-CCW.1, LEAKAGE INTO THE COMPONENT COOLING LOOP.
NOTE: US enters AP-CCW .1 when CCW surge level rising.
AP-CCW.1, LEAKAGE INTO THE COMPONENT COOLING LOOP HCO (Step 1) Check CCW Indications
SYSTEM LEAKAGE SIM DRIVER: as RP,
' acknowledge.
- CCW radiation monitor, R-17, RISING NOTE: May declare a Local Radiation Emergency per EPIP1-13 HCO (Step 2) Check RCP Thermal Barrier NOTE: the B RCP Thermal Indications: Barrier L'lP is low.
- Labyrinth seal D/Ps - GREATER THAN 15 INCHES OF WATER AND APPROXIMATELY EQUAL HCO (Step 2 RNO) IF either pump has indication of a thermal barrier leak, THEN perform the following:
- Verify seal injection flow to affected RCP .
- Close CCW return from affected RCP NOTE: HCO closes AOV-thermal barrier (labyrinth seal D/P should 754B rise)
- RCP A, AOV-754A
- RCP B, AOV-754B us
- Evaluate CCW surge tank level trend. If leakage has stopped, THEN go to step
- 17. (PPCS Point L0618)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _4_ _ _ _ _ Page 23 of 54
---11 Event
Description:
B RCP Thermal Barrier leak Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments us (Step 17) Evaluate Plant Conditions:
- Determine if operation can continue SIM DRIVER: If asked, OPS (Consult Plant staff if necessary) - management has determined OPERATION CAN CONTINUE that a plant shutdown should be commenced.
HCO (Step 18) Check CCW Surge Tank Level -
APPROXIMATELY 50%
I HCO (Step 19) Establish Control Systems In Auto
- Verify rods in AUTO ., NOTE: The control rods are in I
MANUAL due to plant startup conditions.
- Verify 431 K in AUTO
- Verify PRZR spray valves in AUTO
- Verify PRZR heaters restored:
- PRZR proportional heaters breaker -
CLOSED
- PRZR backup heaters b'reaker -
RESET, IN AUTO
- Verify one charging pump in AUTO HCO/ (Step 20) Evaluate MCB Annunciator Status co (Refer to AR Procedures)
At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _5_ _ _ _ _ Page 24 of 54
---ll Event
Description:
Fault on 480V Bus 17/SW Pump C fails to start Next, a fault on 480V Bus 17 will occur, resulting in Bus 17 de-energizing. The operator will enter AP-ELECT.17/18, "Loss of Safeguards Bus 17/18." The C Service Water Pump will fail to start when manual start is attempted, leaving only the A SW Pump running. The operator may leave the B EOG running or trip it within AP-ELECT.17/18, but in either case align Alternate Cooling to the EOG. The operator will enter AP-SW.2, "Loss of Service Water," and take actions to isolate non-essential SW loads. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4," and LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems - Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4."
SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #4 (EDS04C)
Indications Available:
- MCB Annunciator L-15, BUS 17 UNDER VOLTAGE SAFEGUARDS
- MCB Annunciator L-5, SAFEGUARD BUS MAIN BREAKER OVERCURRENT TRIP
- Multiple MCB Annunciators
- Bus 17 Volts indicating 0
- Bus 17 amperage indicating 0
- B EOG starts, voltage at 480 VAC, but will not load on Bus 17 .
Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior '
Comments NOTE: The crew will enter AP-ELECT.17118 directly.
AP-ELECT.17/18, LOSS OF SAFEGUARDS BUS 17/18 co (Step 1) Verify Emergency DIG Associated NOTE: The B DIG is With Affected Bus - RUNNING RUNNING, but its breaker is NOT Closed.
- Bus 17- DIG B co (Step 2) Verify Both trains Of AC Emergency Susses Energized To At Least 440 VOL TS:
- Bus 14 and Bus 18
- Bus 16 and Bus 17 NOTE: Bus 17 is de-energized.
co (Step 2 RNO) IF Bus 14 AND Bus 16 are NOTE: Both buses are deenergized, THEN ..... energized.
IF one train deenergized, THEN perform the NOTE: ONLY Bus 17 is de-following: energized.
- Ensure DIG aligned for unit operation
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _5________~ Page 25 of 54
11 Event
Description:
Fault on 480V Bus 17/SW Pump C fails to start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- Mode switch in UNIT
- Voltage control selector in AUTO
- Check D/G running .
IF NOT, THEN ..... NOTE: The B D/G is RUNNING, but its breaker is NOT Closed.
- Adjust D/G voltage to approximately 480V.
- Adjust D/G frequency to approximately 60 Hz.
co (Step 3) Verify Service Water System Operation:
- A or B pump in Loop A
- C or D pump in Loop B NOTE: The US may address AP.SW.1, SW Leak, however this procedure will NOT address the low flow condition.
co (Step 3a RNO) Perform the following:
- Manually start SW pump as necessary NOTE: The CO may attempt to (357 kw each). START the C SW Pump, but it will fail.
- IF adequate cooling can NOT be NOTE: The US will have to supplied to a running D/G. decide whether or not 1 SW Pump is adequate cooling.
IF NOT, the US will direct that the B D/G be stopped, and address ER-D/G.2 for Alternate Cooling.
If SO, US will continue as scripted.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _5_ _ _ _ _ Page 26 of 54
---11 Event
Description:
Fault on 480V Bus 17/SW Pump C fails to start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- IF only one SW pump can be operated, THEN refer to AP-SW.2, LOSS OF SERVICE WATER.
NOTE: The US will go to AP-SW.2.
AP-SW.2, LOSS OF SERVICE WATER co (Step 1) Verify 480V AC Emergency Susses NOTE: Bus 17 is de-energized.
17 and 18- ENERGIZED co (Step 1 RNO) Ensure associated D/G(s) running and attempt to manually load busses 17 and/or 18 onto their respective D/G(s).
IF neither bus 17 nor bus 18 can be NOTE: Bus 18 ,is energized.
energized, THEN .......
co (*Step 2) verify SW Pump Alignment: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
- Check at least one SW pump running in each loop
- A or B pump in loop A NOTE: The A SW Pump is RUNNING.
- C or D pump in loop B NOTE: Both C and D SW Pumps are OFF.
co * (Step 2a RNO) Perform the following:
- Manually start SW pumps as NOTE: The CO may attempt to necessary (257 kw each). START the C SW Pump, but it will fail.
- IF adequate cooling can NOT be NOTE: The US will direct action supplied to a running D/G, based on whether or NOT one THEN ...... SW Pump can adequately cool the DIG.
us
- IF only one SW pump can be operated, THEN go to Step 3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _5_ _ _ _ _ Page 27 of 54
---11 Event
Description:
Fault on 480V Bus 17/SW Pump C fails to start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments co (Step 3) Align Alternate Cooling To One DIG (Refer to ER-D/G.2, ALTERNATE COOLING FOR EMERGENCY D/Gs):
NOTE: The US will dispatch an
align alternate cooling to D/G A per ER-D/G.2. SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge, and use REM-GEN22 =OPEN.
Report after 3 Minutes that ATT-2.2 is complete.
I co (Step 4) Isolate SW To Non-Essential Loads
- Close screenhouse SW isolation valves
- MOV-4609
- MOV-4780
- Close air conditioning SW isolation valves
- MOV-4663
- MOV-4733
SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge, and report after 3 Minutes that ATT-2.2 is complete.
co (Step 5) Monitor Plant Equipment Cooled By SW-TEMPERATURES STABLE
- MFP oil coolers
- Instrument air compressors
- Bus duct coolers
- Seal Oil unit
- Turbine lube oil cooler
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _5_ _ _ _ _ Page 28 of 54
--~I Event
Description:
Fault on 480V Bus 17/SW Pump e fails to start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- CCWHx
- SFP Hx
- AFPs
- Condensate Pumps
- Secondary sample coolers us (Step 6) Notify Higher Supervision NOTE: The US may notify the WCC/Plant Supervision.
SIM DRIVER: as wees, acknowledge.
co (Step 7) Check SW System Status:
-NOT LOW
- PPCS point ID P2160
- PPCS point ID P2161
- Pressure in both loops STABLE OR RISING
CO/ * (Step 7a RNO) Locally isolate selected NOTE: The US will dispatch an EO SW loads as desired (Refer to ATT 2.2, EO.
ATTACHMENT SW ISOLATION) SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge.
co * (Step 7b) Check at least one SW pump running in each loop:
- A or B pump in loop A NOTE: The A SW Pump is RUNNING.
- C or D pump in loop B NOTE: Both C and D SW Pumps are OFF.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2
_5_ _ _ _ _ Page Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# 29 of
---11 54 Event
Description:
Fault on 480V Bus 17/SW Pump C fails to start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments co * (Step 7b RNO) Perform the following:
- Continue efforts to start at least one SW pump in each loop.
us
- IF NOT, THEN return to Step 3. NOTE: The US will continue efforts to restore the SW System.
Examiner NOTE: Because of the transitory nature of this event, the examiner may need to address the Technical Specification evaluation after the scenario.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1, AC SOURCES-MODES 1, 2, 3 AND 4 us LCO 3.8.1 The following AC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:
- One qualified independent offsite power circuit connected between the offsite transmission network and each of the onsite 480 V safeguards buses required by LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Subsystems
- MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4"; and
- Two emergency diesel generators (DGs) capable of supplying their respective onsite 480 V safeguards buses required by LCO 3.8.9.
us APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION The US will recognize that LCO I ACTION I TIME
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# 5 Page 30 of
11 54 Event
Description:
Fault on 480V Bus 17/SW Pump C fails to start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments A. Offsite A.1 Declare 12 hours0.5 days <br />0.0714 weeks <br />0.0164 months <br /> from 3.8.1 Conditions A, B and C are power to required discovery of applicable.
one or more feature(s) Condition A 480 v inoperable concurrent with safeguards when its inoperability of bus( es) redundant redundant inoperable. required required feature(s) is feature(s) inoperable.
AND A.2 Restore offsite circuit to OPERABLE 72 hours3 days <br />0.429 weeks <br />0.0986 months <br /> status.
B. One DG B.1 Perform SR 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> inoperable. 3.8.1.1 for AND the offsite circuit. I Once per 8 hours0.333 days <br />0.0476 weeks <br />0.011 months <br /> thereafter B.2Declare 4 hours0.167 days <br />0.0238 weeks <br />0.00548 months <br /> from required ; discovery of feature(s') Condition B supported by concurrent with the inoperable inoperability of DG inoperable redundant when its required required feature(s).
redundant feature(s) is inoperable.
AND B.3.1 24 hours1 days <br />0.143 weeks <br />0.0329 months <br /> Determine OPERABLE DG is not inoperable due to common cause failure.
OR B.3.2 24 hours1 days <br />0.143 weeks <br />0.0329 months <br /> Perform SR 3.8.1.2 for OPERABLE DG.
AND B.4 Restore DG 7 days to OPERABLE status.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event#
5 Page 31 of 54
---fl Event
Description:
Fault on 480V Bus 17/SW Pump C fails to start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments C. Offsite C.1 Restore 12 hours0.5 days <br />0.0714 weeks <br />0.0164 months <br /> power to one or required offsite more480 V circuit to safeguards OPERABLE bus( es) status.
inoperable. OR AND C.2 Restore DG to OneDG OPERABLE 12 hours0.5 days <br />0.0714 weeks <br />0.0164 months <br /> status.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.9, DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS- MODES 1, 2, 3 AND 4
us LCO 3.8.9 Train A and Train B of the i following electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE:
- AC power. '
us APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION The US will recognize that LCO ACTION TIME 3.8.9 Condition A is applicable.
A. One AC A.1 Restore AC 8 hours0.333 days <br />0.0476 weeks <br />0.011 months <br /> electrical electrical power power distribution train ,,
distribution to OPERABLE train status.
inoperable At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events # Events #6-8.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _6_..._7_&_8_ _ _ Page .:::....__ of _5_4_1 Event
Description:
PRZR Steam Space Break/Cl fails to automatically/Manually actuate/ Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset Afterwards, a Pressurizer vapor space Small Break LOCA occurs over ten minutes.
The operator will enter AP-RCS.1, "Reactor Coolant Leak," however, ultimately the reactor will be tripped, Safety Injection will be actuated, and the operator will enter E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." On the plant trip, Containment Isolation will fail to automatically and manually actuate, and the operator will need to manually close the Containment Isolation Valves. Additionally, when the SI occurs, instrument air to containment will be isolated and the B RCP Thermal Barrier Return Isolation Valve will fail open. The CCW leak will need to be re-isolated. The operator will transition from E-0 to E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant." At Step 7 of E-1, and after SI is reset, a Loss of Off-Site Power will occur and all Safeguards Equipment will need to be re-started. The scenario will terminate at Step 9 (or beyond) of E-1 after all ECCS equipment is re-started and Instrument Air has been restored to the Containment.
SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #5 (PZR07, 89,000, 600 second Ramp)
Indications Available:.,
- MCB Annunciator F-10, PRESSURIZER LO PRESS 2205 PSI
- Pressurizer Pressure decreases at a faster rate
- Pzr level initially decreases and then starts to rise
- Containment Pressure starts to rise
- MCB Annunciator E-16, RMS PROCESS MONITOR HIGH ACTIVITY
- Containment Radiation Monitors (R-2, R-7, others) start to rise Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AP-RCS.1, REACTOR COOLANT LEAK HCO (Step 1) Monitor PRZR Level - STABLE AT PROGRAM LEVEL HCO (Step 1 RNO) IF PRZR level lowering, THEN start additional charging pumps and raise speed to raise PRZR level to program.
IF PRZR level continues to lower, THEN close letdown isolation AOV-427 AND excess letdown AOV-310.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _6....._7_&_8_ _ _ Page ~of _5_4_-1 1
Event
Description:
PRZR Steam Space Break/Cl fails to automatically/Manually actuate/ Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments IF available charging pumps are running at Examiner NOTE: The RCS maximum speed with letdown isolated, AND leak/LOCA is slow PRZR level is lowering, THEN trip the reactor developing and the crew and go to E-0, REACTOR TRIP or SAFETY may perform additional INJECTION. steps in AP-RCS.1 while determining that the Rx must be tripped and SI actuated.
Regardless of further actions in AP-RCS.1, ultimately the crew will need to trip the reactor and actuate SI.
i E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION I
HCO (Step 1) Verify Reactor Trip: Immediate Action
- At least one train of reactor trip breakers
-OPEN
- Neutron flux - LOWERING
- MRPI indicates - ALL CONTROL AND SHUTDOWN RODS ON BOTTOM with no instrument fluctuations concurrent with fire.
co (Step 2) Verify Turbine Stop Valves - Immediate Action CLOSED NOTE: The Turbine is NOT latched.
co (Step 3) Verify sufficient AC Immediate Action Emergency buses Energized To At Least 440 VOLTS:
- Bus 14 OR Bus 16 NOTE: Both buses are energized. The B D/G is powering Bus 16.
AND
- Bus 17 OR Bus 18 NOTE: Bus 17 is de-energized.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _....6,_7_&_8_ _ _ Page :!.__ of _5_4_-i 1
Event
Description:
PRZR Steam Space Break/Cl fails to automatically/Manually actuate/ Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments co (Step 3 RNO) Attempt to start any failed emergency DIG to restore power to all AC emergency buses.
- IF Bus 17 AND Bus 18 are deenergized, NOTE: Bus 18 is energized .
THEN .....
- IF Bus 14 AND Bus 16 are deenergized, NOTE: Both buses are THEN ....... energized. The B DIG is powering Bus 16.
HCOI (Step 4) Check if SI is Actuated: Immediate Action co I
- Any SI Annunciator - LIT
- SI sequencing - BOTH TRAINS STARTED HCOI Foldout Page NOTE: The crew will co monitor these conditions throughout the performance of E-0.
RCP TRIP CRITERIA NOTE: This condition is expected to be met.
- IF BOTH conditions listed below occur, THEN trip both RCPs:
0 SI pumps -AT LEAST TWO RUNNING 0 RCS pressure minus maximum SIG pressure - LESS THAN 210 psi [240 psi adverse CNMT]
LOSS OF SW CRITERIA AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION SFP COOLING CRITERIA
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _6_.,_7_&_8_ _ _ Page ~ of _5....4__
11 Event
Description:
PRZR Steam Space Break/Cl fails to automatically/Manually actuate/ Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO (*Step 5) Verify CNMT Spray Not Required: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
NOTE: The Containment Pressure is expected to be
==2 psig and rising slowly.
- Annunciator A-27, CNMT SPRAY EXTINGUISHED
co (Step 6) Direct Operator to Perform ATT-27.0, ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC .,
ACTION VERIFICATION NOTE: The US will hand off ATT-27 .0 to either the HCO or the CO, and continue with the other operator in E-0.
Examiner following operator performing ATT-27.0 continue below.
Examiner following operator NOT performing ATI-27.0 continue at Page 40.
E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, ATTACHMENT 27.0, ATTACHMENT AUTOMATIC ACTION VERIFICATION HCO/ (Step 1) Verify SI and RHR Pumps Running:
co
HCO/ (Step 1.a RNO) Manually start SI pumps NOTE: The A SI Pump co cannot be started.
HCO/ * (Step 1 Continued) Both RHR pumps -
co RUNNING
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _6_,_7_&_8_ _ _ Page ~of _5_4_-1 1
Event
Description:
PRZR Steam Space Break/Cl fails to automatically/Manually actuate/ Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (Step 2) Verify CNMT RECIRC Fans co RUNNING:
- All fans RUNNING
- Charcoal filter dampers green status lights - EXTINGUISHED HCO/ (Step 3) Check If Main Steamlines Should Be co Isolated:
- Any MSIV - OPEN
- Check if ANY main steamlines should be isolated
- Low Tavg (545°F) AND high steam flow (0 .5x10 6 lb/hr) from either S/G OR
- High-High steam flow (4.4x106 lb/hr) from either S/G HCO/ * (Step3c RNO) Go to Step 4 .
co HCO/ (Step 4) Verify MFW Isolation:
co
- MFW Isolation valves - CLOSED
- SIG A, AOV-3995
- SIG B, AOV-3994
- SIG blowdown and sample valves - NOTE: These valves are CLOSED OPEN.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _6....._7_&_8___ Page ::...__ of _5_4_ _,
1 Event
Description:
PRZR Steam Space Break/Cl fails to automatically/Manually actuate/ Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (Step 4.c RNO) Place SIG blowdown and co sample valve isolation switch to CLOSE.
HCO/ (Step 5) Verify At Least Two SW Pumps - NOTE: Only the A SW co RUNNING Pump is running.
HCO/ (Step 5 RNO) Perform the following:
co
I
- Bus 17
- Bus 18
- IF offsite power NOT available, THEN ensure SW isolation.
HCO/ (Step 6) Verify Cl and CVI: NOTE: Cl has not actuated.
co
- Cl and CVI annunciators - LIT
- Annunciator A-26, CNMT ISOLATION
- Annunciator A-25, CNMT VENTILATION ISOLATION HCO/ (Step 6.a RNO) Depress manual Cl NOTE: Only the A SW co pushbutton. Pump is running.
HCO/ * (Step 6 Continued) Verify Cl and CVI NOTE: Cl has failed to co valve status lights - BRIGHT auto/manual actuate.
HCO/ * (Step 6b RNO) Manually close affected co Cl and CVI valve(s).
- AOV-1786
- AOV-1787
- AOV-1721
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _6_.,_7_&_8_ _ _ Page ~ of _5_4_-11 Event
Description:
PRZR Steam Space Break/Cl fails to automatically/Manually actuate/ Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- AOV-371
- AOV-313
- AOV-5392
- AOV-745
- AOV-5735
- AOV-5736
- AOV-1723
- AOV-1728
- MOV-813
- MOV-814 IF valve(s) can NOT be closed from NOTE: All valves that.have the MCB, THEN ..... DIM status lights will be manually closed using ATT-27.0 or ATT-3.0.
NOTE: The HCO/CO will dispatch an EO.
SIM DRIVER: as EO, acknowledge and use REM-MIS099 to close AOV-1723; and MIS100 to close ,,AOV-1728.
CRITICAL TASK:
Close Containment Isolation Valves, or their Alternate Valves using ATT-3.0, before indicating to the US that ATT-27.0 is complete (EOP-Based)
Safety Significance: Failure to close at least one Containment Isolation Valve on each critical penetration under the postulated conditions when it is possible to do so, constitutes mis-operation leading to degradation of the Containment Barrier. Failure to take this action leads to an unnecessary release of fission products to the auxiliary building, increasing the potential for release to the environment, and reducing accessibility to vital equipment within the Auxiliary Building. Higher radiation levels within the Auxiliary Building will result in a degradation of ALARA principles.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _6....._7_&_8_ _ _ Page ::....__of _5_4_...1 Event
Description:
PRZR Steam Space Break/Cl fails to automatically/Manually actuate/ Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ * (Step 6 Continued) CNMT RECIRC fan co coolers SW outlet valve status lights -
BRIGHT
- FCV-4561
- FCV-4562
- Letdown orifice valves - CLOSED
- AOV-200A
- AOV-200B
- AOV-202 I
HCO/ (Step 7) Check CCW System Status:
co '
HCO/ (Step 7 RNO) IF offsite power available, NOTE: Neither CCW Pump co THEN manually start one CCW pump. can be started (A previously tripped, B cannot be started with the D/G powering Bus 16). Because of this, the RCPs need to be tripped.
HCO/ (Step 8) Verify SI And RHR Pump Flow:
co
- SI flow indicators - CHECK FOR FLOW
- RHR flow indicator - CHECK FOR FLOW
- (Step 8b RNO) IF RCS pressure less than 150 psig manually start pumps and align valves. IF NOT, THEN go to Step 9.
HCO/ (Step 9) Verify SI Pump And RHR Pump co Emergency Alignment:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _6_,,_7_&_8_ _ _ Page ~ of _5_4_-1 1 Event
Description:
PRZR Steam Space Break/Cl fails to automatically/Manually actuate/ Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- RHR pump discharge to Rx vessel deluge - OPEN
- MOV-852A
- MOV-852B
- Verify SI pump C - RUNNING
- Verify SI pump A - RUNNING HCO/ (Step 9 RNO) Perform the following:
co
- Ensure SI pumps Band C running. IF either pump NOT, runninq, THEN ......... I
- Ensure SI pump C aligned to discharge line A:
- MOV-871A open
- MOV-871 B closed
- Go to Step 10 .
HCO/ (Step 10) Verify GREATS Actuation:
co
- At least one damper in each flowpath -
CLOSED
- Normal Supply Air
- Normal Return Air
- Lavatory Exhaust Air
- GREATS fans- BOTH RUNNING HCO/ (Step 11) Verify Cl and CVI During a Fire co Event
- A confirmed fire has occurred in the control complex or cable tunnel (fire systems S05, S06, S08, Z05, Z18, or Z19).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 of _5_4_~
Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _6_.,_7_&_8_ _ _ Page _41_
1 Event
Description:
PRZR Steam Space Break/Cl fails to automatically/Manually actuate/ Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (Step 11 RNO) Go to END co E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Examiner following operator NOT performing ATT-27.0 continue HERE.
CO/ (Step 7) Verify Both MDAFW Pumps HCO RUNNING CO/ (Step 8) Verify AFW Valve Alignment:
HCO
- AFW flow- INDICATED TO BOTH S/G(s)
- AFW flow from each MDAFW pump LESS THAN 230 GPM CO/ (*Step 9) Monitor Heat Sink: NOTE: This is a Continuous HCO Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
- Check SIG narrow range level NOTE: Adverse GREATER THAN 7% [25% adverse Containment may exist at CNMT] in any SIG this time.
- Check SIG narrow range level BOTH SIG LESS THAN 50%
- Control feed flow to maintain S/G narrow NOTE: Adverse range level between 7% [25% adverse Containment may exist at CNMT] and 50%. this time.
CO/ (Step 10) Check If TDAFW Pump Can Be HCO Stopped:
- Both MDAFW pumps - RUNNING
- MOV-3504A
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _6
......,_7_&_8_ _ _ Page ~ of _5_4__
11 Event
Description:
PRZR Steam Space Break/Cl fails to automatically/Manually actuate/ Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- Annunciator A-7. RCP 1A CCW RETURN HI TEMP OR LOW FLOW -
EXTINGUISHED
- Annunciator A-15, RCP 1B CCW NOTE: The leak in the RETURN HI TEMP OR LOW FLOW Thermal Barrier to the B EXTINGUISHED RCP will unisolate when IA is isolated to the Containment.
CO/ (Step 11 RNO) Perform the fo,llowing:
HCO
- Stop affected RCPs . NOTE: If not already stopped the HCO will stop them here.
- Reset SI.
- Check adequate power available to run one charqinq pump.
- IF the Bus 14/16 Normal Feed NOTE: Bus 14 is supplied Breakers are closed THEN verify by off-site power.
adequate Safeguard Bus capacity to run one charging pump (6 amps)
- Station Service transformer 14 ammeter
- IF the Bus 14/16 DIG breakers are NOTE: Bus 16 is supplied closed THEN verify adequate by B D/G.
emergency DIG capacity to run one charging pump (75 kw)
- IF sufficient power is NOT available NOTE: Sufficient power is to operate a charging pump available to start a Charging THEN ...... Pump.
- Check seal outlet temperatures
- IF seal outlet temperatures are NOTE: The RCP bearing greater than 235°F, THEN ...... temperatures are likely<
235°F.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _6....._7_&_8_ _ _ Page ~of _5_4_-1 1 Event
Description:
PRZR Steam Space Break/Cl fails to automatically/Manually actuate/ Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- IF seal outlet temperatures are less than 235°F, THEN start one charging pump at minimum speed for seal injection
- Adjust HCV-142 to establish either of the following:
- Labyrinth seal D/P to each RCP NOTE: The B RCP may not greater than 15 inches of water. be able to >15"H20 because of the Thermal Barrier leak that has unisolated.
- -OR
- IF large imbalance in seal injection flow exists, THEN .....
CRITICAL TASK:
Trip all RCPs within 2 minutes of loss of CCW to the RCPs or if RCP motor bearing temperature exceeds 200°F; or within 5 minutes of reaching Small Break LOCA trip criteria, whichever is reached first (EOP-Based)
Safety Significance: During an undervoltage condition on an ESF Bus coupled with an SI, the CCW Pump(s) will trip causing a loss of CCW flow to the RCPs. A Caution is provided in AP-CCW.2 and 3 which states "If CCW flow to a RCP is interrupted for greater than 2 minutes or if either RCP motor bearing temperature exceeds 200°F, then trip the affected RCP." This caution applies at all times, and is necessary to protect the long-term operations of the RCPs. It is a management expectation that the RCPs be tripped within 2 minutes of a loss of CCW to pump motor bearings.
Additionally, failure to trip all RCPs when required during a Small Break LOCA can lead to core uncovery and to fuel temperatures in excess of 2200°F. Analyses have shown that if the RCPs are tripped within 5 minutes of the trip criteria being met, PCT will remain below 2200°F, and if this action is delayed beyond 5 minutes, this PCT will be exceeded. It is a management expectation that the RCPs be tripped as quickly as possible, but within 5 minutes when the trip criteria are met. Failure to take this action represents mis-operation by the operator which leads to degradation of the fuel cladding fission produce barrier, and a violation of a license condition.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _6_.,_7_&_8_ _ _ Page ~ of _5_4_-1 1
Event
Description:
PRZR Steam Space Break/Cl fails to automatically/Manually actuate/ Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO/ (*Step 12) Monitor RCS Tavg - STABLE AT NOTE: This is a Continuous HCO OR TRENDING TO 547°F Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
NOTE: Tavg is expected to be less than 54 7°F and lowering.
CO/ (Step 12 RNO) IF temperature less than HCO 547°F and lowering, THEN perform the following:
- Stop dumping steam .
- Ensure reheater steam supply valves are closed;.'
- IF cooldown continues, THEN control NOTE: Adverse total feed flow between 200 gpm to 230 Containment may exist at gpm u.ntil narrow range level greater than this time.
7% [25% adverse CNMT] in at least one SIG.
- WHEN S/G level greater than 7% [25%
adverse CNMT] in one SIG, THEN limit feed fl~w to that required to maintain level in* at least one SIG.
- IF cooldown continues, THEN close both NOTE: The CO will CLOSE MS IVs. both MSIVs.
CO/ (Step 13) Check PRZR PORVS And Spray HCO Valves:
- PORVs - CLOSED
- Auxiliary spray valve (AOV-296) -
CLOSED
- Check PRZR pressure - LESS THAN 2260 PSIG
- Normal PRZR spray valves - CLOSED
- PCV-431A
- PCV-4318
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _6_,,_7_&_8_ _ _ Page ~of _5_4_-11 Event
Description:
PRZR Steam Space Break/Cl fails to automatically/Manually actuate/ Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CO/ (Step 14) Monitor RCP Trip Criteria:
HCO
- RCP status - ANY RCP RUNNING NOTE: The RCPs are likely stopped by now. If not they will be stopped here.
- SI pumps -AT LEAST TWO RUNNING
- RCS pressure minus maximum SIG NOTE: Adverse pressure - LESS THAN 210 psi [240 psi Containment may exist at adverse CNMT] this time.
and RCP Trip Criteria is expected to be met later .
I CO/ (Step 15) Check If S/G Secondary Side Is HCO Intact:
- Pressure in both S/G's-STABLE OR Rising
- Pressure in both S/G's -GREATER THAN 110 PSIG ,.
CO/ (Step 16) Check if S/G Tubes are intact:
HCO
- Air Ejector radiation monitors (R-15, R-47, R-48) - NORMAL
- SIG blowdown radiation monitors (R-19) -
NORMAL
- Steamline radiation monitors (R-31, R-32)- NORMAL CO/ (Step 17) Check if RCS is intact:
HCO
- CNMT area radiation monitors - NOTE: Containment NORMAL Radiation Monitors are in alarm.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _6_.,_7_&_8_ _ _ Page ~ of _5_4_
1 Event
Description:
PRZR Steam Space Break/Cl fails to automatically/Manually actuate/ Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- R-2
- R-7
- R-29
- R-30
- CNMT pressure - LESS than 0.5 psig us (Step 17.a RNO) Go to E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1.
NOTE: The US will go to E-1.
The US will conduct an alignment brief.
E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT HCO/ Foldout Page NOTE: The crew will co monitor these conditions throughout the performance of E-1.
RCP TRIP CRITERIA NOTE: This condition is expected to be met.
- IF BOTH conditions listed below occur, THEN trip both RCPs:
0 SI pumps -AT LEAST TWO RUNNING 0 RCS pressure minus maximum NOTE: Adverse SIG pressure - LESS THAN 210 Containment is likely to exist psi [240 psi adverse CNMT] at this time.
LOSS OF SW CRITERIA SI REINITIATION CRITERIA SI TERMINATION CRITERIA SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA E-3 TRANSITION CRITERIA COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER CRITERION
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# ~6,...;7...;&;.;...8.;..__ _ Page ~of _54_-11 Event
Description:
PRZR Steam Space Break/Cl fails to automatically/Manually actuate/ Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERION HCO (Step 1) Monitor RCP Trip Criteria:
- SI pumps -AT LEAST TWO RUNNING
- RCS pressure minus maximum SIG pressure - LESS THAN 210 psi [240 psi adverse CNMT]
- Stop both RCPs NOTE: If the RCPs have NOT been stopped prior to this step, they will be stopped here.
HCOI (Step 2) Check If SIG Secondary Side Is co Intact:
- Pressure in both SIGs - STABLE OR RISING
- Pressure in both SIGs - GREATER THAN 110 PSIG co (*Step 3) Monitor Intact SIG Levels: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
- Narrow range level - GREATER THAN 7% [25% adverse CNMT]
- Control feed flow to maintain narrow NOTE: Adverse range level between 17% [25% adverse Containment is likely to exist CNMT] and 50% at this time.
HCO (Step 4) Monitor If Secondary Radiation Levels Are Normal
- Steamline radiation monitor (R-31 and R-32)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _6_.,_7_&_8_ _ _ Page ~of _5_4_-1 1
Event
Description:
PRZR Steam Space Break/Cl fails to automatically/Manually actuate/ Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- Request Chem Tech sample S/Gs for NOTE: The US may contact activity Chemistry.
SIM DRIVER: as Chemistry, acknowledge.
HCO (*Step 5) Monitor PRZR PORV Status: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The US will make one or more board operators aware.
- Power to PORV block valves -
AVAILABLE
- PORVs - CLOSED
- Block valves -AT LEAST ONE OPEN .
HCO (Step 6) Reset SI.
HCO (Step 7) Reset Cl:
- . Depress Cl reset pushbutton
- Verify annunciator A-26, CNMT ISOLATION- EXTINGUISHED SIM DRIVER Instructions: Operate Trigger #6 (EDS01A, EDS01 B)
Indications Available:
- Control Room lights dim .
- A DIG Breaker closes to re-power ESF Susses .
us Address ATT-8.5 to restore ECCS Equipment (Per CAUTION prior to Step 6.
ATTACHMENT 8.5, ATTACHMENT LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER HCO/ (Step 1) IF offsite power is lost after SI has co been reset, THEN the following equipment will auto start if available:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _6....._7_&_8_ _ _ Page ~ of _5_4_'""1 Event
Description:
PRZR Steam Space Break/Cl fails to automatically/Manually actuate/ Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
- Powered from D/G(s):
- One CCW pump, due to low header NOTE: The B CCW may be pressure (122 kw) running, or is available to start.
- MDAFPs, due to both MFP breakers NOTE: The CO must isolate open (223 kw each) (discharge AFW flow to the S/Gs which MOVs also open) has re-initiated.
HCO (Step 2) Manual start is required for the following equipment:
- CNMT recirc fans (205 kw each) NOTE: The A and D Fans will be started.
- Charging pumps (75 kw each) NOTE: A Charging Pump will be started.
- PRZR heaters (400 kw each)
- SAFW pumps
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2
_6~,_7_&.... ~ of _5_4_~
Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# 8_ _ _ Page 1
Event
Description:
PRZR Steam Space Break/Cl fails to automatically/Manually actuate/ Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRITICAL TASK:
Establish High-Head Injection with at least two SI Pumps after SI has been Reset and following a Loss of Off-Site Power (EOP-Based)
Safety Significance: Failure to manually start at least two 50% capacity SI pumps under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) ... capacity." In this case, at least two SI pumps can be manually started from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually start both SI pumps, which are 50% capacity pumps, also represents a failure by the crew to "demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario, and recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start the SI pumps (when it is possible to do so) is a "violation ,of the facility license condition." Performance of the critical task would return the plant to a condition for which analysis shows acceptable results.
E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT co (Step 8) Verify Adequate SW Flow:
RUNNING Pump is running.
co (Step 8.a RNO) Manually start SW Pumps as power supply permits (257 KW each)
- IF less than two SW pumps running, THEN perform the following:
- Ensure SW isolation .
us
- Refer to AP-SW .2, LOSS OF SERVICE WATER.
co * (Step 8 Continued} Dispatch AO to NOTE: The US will dispatch establish normal shutdown alignment an EO.
(Refer to ATT-17.0, ATTACHMENT SD- SIM DRIVER: as EO,
- 1) acknowledge.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _6_.,_7_&_8_ _ _ Page _s1_ of _5_4_-11 Event
Description:
PRZR Steam Space Break/Cl fails to automatically/Manually actuate/ Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments HCO/ (Step 9) Establish IA to CNMT:
co co
- Verify non-safeguards busses energized NOTE: Neither Non-from offsite power Safeguard Bus is being powered from Offsite Power.
- Bus 13 normal feed - CLOSED OR
- Bus 15 normal feed - CLOSED co (Step 9.a RNO) Perform the following:
I
- Close non-safeguards bus tie breakers:
- Bus 13 to Bus 14 tie
- Bus 15 to Bus 16 tie
- Reset Control Room lighting
- (Step 9 Continued) Verify turbine building SW isolation valves - OPEN
- MOV-4613 and MOV-4670
- , MOV-4614 and MOV-4664
- Verify adequate air compressors - NOTE: The US may RUNNING dispatch an EO to start the Diesel Air Compressor.
SIM DRIVER: IF so, as EO, acknowledge and use REM-MIS042. After 2 Minutes report that DAC is running.
- Check IA supply:
- Pressure - GREATER THAN 60 PSIG
- Pressure- STABLE OR RISING
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N17-1 Scenario# 6 Event# _6_._7_,&_8_ _ _ Page ::..__of _5_4__
11 Event
Description:
PRZR Steam Space Break/Cl fails to automatically/Manually actuate/ Loss of Off-site Power after SI is Reset Time I Pos. I Expected Actions/Behavior I Comments At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.
TURNOVER SHEET for NRC Exam Scenario #6 Core Age: SOL Procedure in Use:. *- .ACTIONS/NOTES:
0.5% Power, Equilibrium Xe 0-1.2
- The plant is at 0.5% power (Maintained between 0.5-10%) .
Outside Air Temp= 51°F
- The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 4 Water Temp= 50°F hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.
- A plant startup is in progress .
- The MSIVs have been opened. One hour of Steam Header Warm-up has been complete, and there are three more hours Boron: 2089ppm RCS LEAKAGE: (gpm) to go.
Total: .021
- The crew will raise and stabilize plant power between 2-3%;
BAST: 17,400 ppm Identified: .003 until maintenance on the A SI Pump is complete.
Unidentified: .018 RCS Activity: Normal
- The Condensate Booster Pump A is OOS for thrust bearing replacement.
- The 60 gpm Letdown Orifice is in service .
- The following Alarms are in:
- Protected equipment IAW OPG Protected Equipment.
TURNOVER SHEET for NRC Exam Scenario #6 EquiQ.ment Problems!OOS: Planned Activities for Shift: Electrical System 01::1erator Declarations See NOTES
- Stabilize power at 2-3% None in effect
- Start a second AFW Pump A-52.4 EQUIPMENT DATE/TIME 005 LCO TITLE EXP DATE ECO
~SI Pump Yesterday, 24hrs ago 3.5.2 ECCS - Modes 1, 2 and 3 72 hours3 days <br />0.429 weeks <br />0.0986 months <br /> 2 hours0.0833 days <br />0.0119 weeks <br />0.00274 months <br /> A-52.12 EQUIPMENT DATE/TIME 005 TRM/ODCM TITLE EXP DATE ECO A Condensate Booster Yesterday Indefinitely Pump