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| | number = ML17107A005 | | | number = ML17107A005 |
| | issue date = 04/14/2017 | | | issue date = 04/14/2017 |
| | title = 2017/04/14 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Ngf LAR and Exemption RAIs (CAC Nos. MF8076 to MF8081) | | | title = NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Ngf LAR and Exemption RAIs (CAC Nos. MF8076 to MF8081) |
| | author name = Lingam S P | | | author name = Lingam S |
| | author affiliation = NRC/NRR/DORL/LPLIV-1 | | | author affiliation = NRC/NRR/DORL/LPLIV-1 |
| | addressee name = Cox M, Dilorenzo M, Stephenson C | | | addressee name = Cox M, Dilorenzo M, Stephenson C |
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| {{#Wiki_filter:1NRR-PMDAPEm ResourceFrom:Lingam, SivaSent:Friday, April 14, 2017 2:19 PMTo:Michael.Dilorenzo@aps.com; Matthew.Cox@aps.com; Carl.Stephenson@aps.comCc:Pascarelli, Robert; Lukes, Robert; Beacon, Daniel; Lehning, John; Woodyatt, Diana; Kaizer, Joshua; Panicker, Mathew; Clifford, Paul; Thomas.N.Weber@aps.com | | {{#Wiki_filter:NRR-PMDAPEm Resource From: Lingam, Siva Sent: Friday, April 14, 2017 2:19 PM To: Michael.Dilorenzo@aps.com; Matthew.Cox@aps.com; Carl.Stephenson@aps.com Cc: Pascarelli, Robert; Lukes, Robert; Beacon, Daniel; Lehning, John; Woodyatt, Diana; Kaizer, Joshua; Panicker, Mathew; Clifford, Paul; Thomas.N.Weber@aps.com |
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| ==Subject:== | | ==Subject:== |
| Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - NGF LAR and Exemption RAIs (CAC Nos. MF8076 to MF8081)By application dated July 1, 2016 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System Accession No. ML16188A336), Arizona Public Service (APS, the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS), Units 1, 2, and 3. The proposed changes revise TS 4.2.1, "Reactor Core, Fuel Assemblies" and 5.6.5.b, "Core Operating Limits Report (COLR)" and will allow the use of Combustion Engineering (CE) 16x16 Next Generation Fuel clad with the Optimized ZIRLOTM material in PVNGS, Units 1, 2, and 3. To support the fuel transition, APS also requested an exemption from certain requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulation (10 CFR) 50.46 and 10 CFR 50 Appendix K to allow the use of Optimized ZIRLOTM as a cladding material in PVNGS. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has reviewed the above-mentioned submittal, has conducted two regulatory audits, and has determined that additional information is required to complete the review. We transmitted the draft requests for additional information (RAIs) to you by e-mail on March 28, 2017. Subsequently, at your request, we held clarification conference calls on April 12 and April 13, 2017, discussing the draft RAIs. Please note the following official RAIs, and provide your responses within 45 days from the date of this e-mail as mutually agreed. Your timely responses will allow the NRC staff to complete its review on schedule.. | | Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - NGF LAR and Exemption RAIs (CAC Nos. MF8076 to MF8081) |
| RAI 1. CENPD-178-P-A Methodology The CENPD-178-P-A methodology referenced in the submittal specifies that a hydraulic shaker attaches to the bottom of the assembly during the forced vibration fuel assembly testing. The testing facility contains an apparatus that uses an electro-mechanical shaker that attaches to the center of the assembly. Please clarify which shaker is used and justify its use as part of the methodology. | | By application dated July 1, 2016 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System Accession No. ML16188A336), Arizona Public Service (APS, the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS), Units 1, 2, and 3. The proposed changes revise TS 4.2.1, Reactor Core, Fuel Assemblies and 5.6.5.b, Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) and will allow the use of Combustion Engineering (CE) 16x16 Next Generation Fuel clad with the Optimized ZIRLOTM material in PVNGS, Units 1, 2, and 3. To support the fuel transition, APS also requested an exemption from certain requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulation (10 CFR) 50.46 and 10 CFR 50 Appendix K to allow the use of Optimized ZIRLOTM as a cladding material in PVNGS. |
| RAI 2. Transition Core Control Element Assembly Drop Times Please provide justification that the full core Next Generation Fuel (NGF) and full core Value Added Fuel (referred to as STD) control element assembly (CEA) drop time analyses bound the CEA drop times expected for transition cores containing both NGF and STD fuel assemblies. | | The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has reviewed the above-mentioned submittal, has conducted two regulatory audits, and has determined that additional information is required to complete the review. We transmitted the draft requests for additional information (RAIs) to you by e-mail on March 28, 2017. Subsequently, at your request, we held clarification conference calls on April 12 and April 13, 2017, discussing the draft RAIs. Please note the following official RAIs, and provide your responses within 45 days from the date of this e-mail as mutually agreed. Your timely responses will allow the NRC staff to complete its review on schedule.. |
| | | RAI 1. CENPD-178-P-A Methodology The CENPD-178-P-A methodology referenced in the submittal specifies that a hydraulic shaker attaches to the bottom of the assembly during the forced vibration fuel assembly testing. The testing facility contains an apparatus that uses an electro-mechanical shaker that attaches to the center of the assembly. Please clarify which shaker is used and justify its use as part of the methodology. |
| RAI 3. Bounded and Non-Impacted Chapter 15 Events In Section 7 of Attachment 8, Non-Loss-of-Coolant-Accident (LOCA) Safety Analysis, Table 7-1 lists the impact of the use of NGF on Chapter 15 Non-LOCA events. a. Transition to NGF fuel is determined to have "no impact" on a number of Chapter 15 events, listed below. For these events, please explain the process for determining that the inputs are unchanged and justify why they are unchanged. If any of the input has changed, please justify that the event is not impacted. | | RAI 2. Transition Core Control Element Assembly Drop Times Please provide justification that the full core Next Generation Fuel (NGF) and full core Value Added Fuel (referred to as STD) control element assembly (CEA) drop time analyses bound the CEA drop times expected for transition cores containing both NGF and STD fuel assemblies. |
| | RAI 3. Bounded and Non-Impacted Chapter 15 Events In Section 7 of Attachment 8, Non-Loss-of-Coolant-Accident (LOCA) Safety Analysis, Table 7-1 lists the impact of the use of NGF on Chapter 15 Non-LOCA events. |
| | : a. Transition to NGF fuel is determined to have no impact on a number of Chapter 15 events, listed below. For these events, please explain the process for determining that the inputs are unchanged and justify why they are unchanged. If any of the input has changed, please justify that the event is not impacted. |
| * Startup of an Inactive Reactor Coolant Pump | | * Startup of an Inactive Reactor Coolant Pump |
| * Inadvertent Deboration | | * Inadvertent Deboration |
| * Inadvertent Operation of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) 2* Steam Generator Tube Rupture b. A number of Chapter 15 events, listed below, are determined to be "bounded" without specific justification. Please justify that these events are bounded. Please identify the bounding assumptions and justify that they are appropriate. If the bounded event has been quantitatively analyzed, please provide the margin between the new NGF analysis and the bounding analysis. For comparison, please also provide the analogous margin associated with the current "bounded" STD analysis of record (AOR) for these events. | | * Inadvertent Operation of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) 1 |
| | * Steam Generator Tube Rupture |
| | : b. A number of Chapter 15 events, listed below, are determined to be bounded without specific justification. Please justify that these events are bounded. Please identify the bounding assumptions and justify that they are appropriate. If the bounded event has been quantitatively analyzed, please provide the margin between the new NGF analysis and the bounding analysis. For comparison, please also provide the analogous margin associated with the current bounded STD analysis of record (AOR) for these events. |
| * Decrease in Feedwater (FW) Temperature | | * Decrease in Feedwater (FW) Temperature |
| * Increase in Main FW Flow | | * Increase in Main FW Flow |
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| * Loss of Non-emergency AC Power to the Station Auxiliaries | | * Loss of Non-emergency AC Power to the Station Auxiliaries |
| * Loss of Normal FW Flow | | * Loss of Normal FW Flow |
| * Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction - Pressurizer Level Control System Malfunction with Loss of AC Power (LOP) RAI 4. Evaluated Chapter 15 Events a. Please justify that the CENTS evaluations, completed as part of the Chapter 15 AORs, remain applicable for the transient system response, and do not require re-analysis to support the transition to NGF. b. Attachment 7/8, Section 7.1.3: Please demonstrate that the "system model changes" due to NGF are bounded by the AOR for the Increase in Main Steam Flow (IMSF), Inadvertent Opening of a Steam Generator Atmospheric Dump Valve (IOSGADV), and IOSGADV with LOP events. Please demonstrate that the AOR flow coastdown remains conservative, Please identify what system model changes are necessary because of NGF, and justify why they are small. Please demonstrate that these small changes result in an insignificant impact to the overall transient system. c. Attachment 7/8, Section 7.1.3: Please demonstrate that the current analysis for calculated fuel failure (i.e. AOR Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) vs. NGF DNBR) bounds the IMSF+LOP and IOSGADV+LOP events. d. Attachment 7/8, Section 7.3.4: Please identify the fuel specific failure analysis methodology and describe the fuel failure analysis that was completed. Please compare it with the fuel failure AOR and explain the relevance of less than 4 seconds of overall time in DNB. RAI 5. Additional Description of SKBOR Palo Verde has proposed to use the SKBOR code to determine the time available prior to precipitation of boric acid following a postulated LOCA affecting one of the reactor coolant system cold legs. The use of SKBOR represents a change to the original methodology for analyzing long-term core cooling that is described in topical report CENPD-254-P-A. A detailed description of the SKBOR methodology was not included in the license amendment request (LAR). Therefore, please submit documentation concerning the following: | | * Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction - Pressurizer Level Control System Malfunction with Loss of AC Power (LOP) |
| | RAI 4. Evaluated Chapter 15 Events |
| | : a. Please justify that the CENTS evaluations, completed as part of the Chapter 15 AORs, remain applicable for the transient system response, and do not require re-analysis to support the transition to NGF. |
| | : b. Attachment 7/8, Section 7.1.3: Please demonstrate that the system model changes due to NGF are bounded by the AOR for the Increase in Main Steam Flow (IMSF), Inadvertent Opening of a Steam Generator Atmospheric Dump Valve (IOSGADV), and IOSGADV with LOP events. Please demonstrate that the AOR flow coastdown remains conservative, Please identify what system model changes are necessary because of NGF, and justify why they are small. Please demonstrate that these small changes result in an insignificant impact to the overall transient system. |
| | : c. Attachment 7/8, Section 7.1.3: Please demonstrate that the current analysis for calculated fuel failure (i.e. AOR Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) vs. NGF DNBR) bounds the IMSF+LOP and IOSGADV+LOP events. |
| | : d. Attachment 7/8, Section 7.3.4: Please identify the fuel specific failure analysis methodology and describe the fuel failure analysis that was completed. Please compare it with the fuel failure AOR and explain the relevance of less than 4 seconds of overall time in DNB. |
| | RAI 5. Additional Description of SKBOR Palo Verde has proposed to use the SKBOR code to determine the time available prior to precipitation of boric acid following a postulated LOCA affecting one of the reactor coolant system cold legs. The use of SKBOR represents a change to the original methodology for analyzing long-term core cooling that is described in topical report CENPD-254-P-A. A detailed description of the SKBOR methodology was not included in the license amendment request (LAR). Therefore, please submit documentation concerning the following: |
| : a. A technical description of the SKBOR code. | | : a. A technical description of the SKBOR code. |
| 3b. A description of the post-processing steps (e.g., using NSAPLOT) to determine additional parameters such as the void distribution, loop differential pressure, and hot leg entrainment criteria.
| | 2 |
| : c. A description of how the boric acid concentration of the sump fluid is determined. RAI 6. Thermal Conductivity Degradation and Radial Fall-Off Curve Penalty Palo Verde has proposed imposing a radial fall-off curve to offset the lack of explicit consideration of thermal conductivity degradation (TCD) in the fuel performance models in the FATES3B and STRIKIN-II codes. | | : b. A description of the post-processing steps (e.g., using NSAPLOT) to determine additional parameters such as the void distribution, loop differential pressure, and hot leg entrainment criteria. |
| : a. Please provide technical justification that the proposed allowance for TCD is adequate for the full set of analyzed events within Palo Verde's licensing basis (e.g., by comparing the results calculated by FATES3B and STRIKIN-II against those of a fuel performance code that explicitly models TCD and has been reviewed by the NRC staff). b. Please provide confirmation that the actual radial fall-off curves implemented to ensure compliance with the TCD allowance will be included in the applicable Core Operating Limits Report submittals for PVNGS. RAI 7. Appendix K LOCA LOOP Considerations Palo Verde has assumed that the limiting results for evaluating the large-break LOCA event would occur when offsite power is unavailable. The availability of offsite power would result in earlier ECCS pump start times than considered in the LAR submittal. While it is possible that earlier ECCS pump start times may tend to refill the downcomer more rapidly (thereby promoting an earlier reflooding of the reactor core), it is also possible that the downcomer may continue to be refilled largely by the safety injection tanks, even if earlier ECCS pump start times are implemented. In the latter case, the earlier spilling of ECCS coolant into containment would tend to produce a more severe containment pressure reduction, and hence offer increased resistance to reflooding the core. The net impact of these countervailing tendencies on the results of the large-break LOCA analysis is not obvious; in particular, the NRC staff notes the counterintuitive observation that, according to the current, conservative Appendix K evaluation methodology, large-break LOCA scenarios with full availability of the ECCS are calculated to be more limiting than cases with a single failure that would reduce ECCS flow. Therefore, please provide the results of an additional analysis of the large-break LOCA event with offsite power available and realistic pump start times to confirm whether the results are bounded by the analysis presented in the LAR submittal. RAI 8. Statistical Treatment of the Inadvertent Fuel Misloading Event Palo Verde has proposed to implement a statistical methodology for treating the event described in Section 15.4.7 of its Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), "Inadvertent Loading of a Fuel Assembly into the Improper Position." The proposed methodology has not been previously reviewed and approved by the NRC staff and was not sufficiently described in the LAR. a. Either please provide an adequate description and justification for the proposed approach or confirm that Palo Verde will continue to use current licensing-basis methods to analyze this event. b. If fuel failure is predicted for the UFSAR Section 15.4.7 event "Inadvertent Loading of a Fuel Assembly into the Improper Position," please confirm that the consequences of the event are bounded by those of other analyzed events within the applicable event category, and hence, are a small fraction of Title 10 CFR 100 limits. Further please clarify the failure mode of the affected fuel rods and explain whether the failure mechanism could propagate to neighboring rods. RAI 9. Containment Analyses 4a. In Section 9.1 of Attachment 8, Mass and Energy Release Analysis for Postulated LOCAs , it is stated that an evaluation of the impact of NGF on the LOCA Mass and Energy (M&E) AORs was performed. Additionally, a comparison of fuel parameters and operating conditions was performed. Please describe how the containment LOCA M&E release was determined for the NGF analyses. To confirm that the AOR LOCA M&E short term (UFSAR Table 6.2.1-4 and 6.2.1-5) and long term (from the end of post reflood) releases remain bounding, please provide quantitative results comparing to the AOR M&E releases for the following: i. Short-term M&E release during blowdown. Also, please confirm that the AOR containment pressure response for peak pressure determination and containment temperature response for equipment environmental qualification remain bounding. ii. Long-term M&E release for the sump temperature response. Also, please confirm that the AOR sump temperature profile for the ECCS pumps net positive suction head analysis remain bounding. b. In Section 9.2 of Attachment 8, M&E Release Analysis for Postulated Secondary System Pipe Ruptures Inside Containment, it is stated that the AOR FW temperature bounds the NGF temperature. What is the FW temperature used for AOR and the NGF analysis? Please explain how the AOR temperature produces bounding results. c. In Section 9.2 of Attachment 8, it is stated that the M&E source energy based on NGF operating conditions will remain bounded by the AOR main steam line break (MSLB) source energy. Please justify quantitatively that the parameters that determine the AOR MSLB containment M&E source energy bound those that determine the M&E source energy with NGF. Siva P. Lingam U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Project Manager (NRR/DORL/LPL4-1) | | : c. A description of how the boric acid concentration of the sump fluid is determined. |
| Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Location: O8-D5; Mail Stop: O8-B3 Telephone: 301-415-1564; Fax: 301-415-1222 E-mail address: siva.lingam@nrc.gov Hearing Identifier: NRR_PMDA Email Number: 3440 Mail Envelope Properties (Siva.Lingam@nrc.gov20170414141900) | | RAI 6. Thermal Conductivity Degradation and Radial Fall-Off Curve Penalty Palo Verde has proposed imposing a radial fall-off curve to offset the lack of explicit consideration of thermal conductivity degradation (TCD) in the fuel performance models in the FATES3B and STRIKIN-II codes. |
| | : a. Please provide technical justification that the proposed allowance for TCD is adequate for the full set of analyzed events within Palo Verdes licensing basis (e.g., by comparing the results calculated by FATES3B and STRIKIN-II against those of a fuel performance code that explicitly models TCD and has been reviewed by the NRC staff). |
| | : b. Please provide confirmation that the actual radial fall-off curves implemented to ensure compliance with the TCD allowance will be included in the applicable Core Operating Limits Report submittals for PVNGS. |
| | RAI 7. Appendix K LOCA LOOP Considerations Palo Verde has assumed that the limiting results for evaluating the large-break LOCA event would occur when offsite power is unavailable. The availability of offsite power would result in earlier ECCS pump start times than considered in the LAR submittal. While it is possible that earlier ECCS pump start times may tend to refill the downcomer more rapidly (thereby promoting an earlier reflooding of the reactor core), it is also possible that the downcomer may continue to be refilled largely by the safety injection tanks, even if earlier ECCS pump start times are implemented. In the latter case, the earlier spilling of ECCS coolant into containment would tend to produce a more severe containment pressure reduction, and hence offer increased resistance to reflooding the core. The net impact of these countervailing tendencies on the results of the large-break LOCA analysis is not obvious; in particular, the NRC staff notes the counterintuitive observation that, according to the current, conservative Appendix K evaluation methodology, large-break LOCA scenarios with full availability of the ECCS are calculated to be more limiting than cases with a single failure that would reduce ECCS flow. Therefore, please provide the results of an additional analysis of the large-break LOCA event with offsite power available and realistic pump start times to confirm whether the results are bounded by the analysis presented in the LAR submittal. |
| | RAI 8. Statistical Treatment of the Inadvertent Fuel Misloading Event Palo Verde has proposed to implement a statistical methodology for treating the event described in Section 15.4.7 of its Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Inadvertent Loading of a Fuel Assembly into the Improper Position. The proposed methodology has not been previously reviewed and approved by the NRC staff and was not sufficiently described in the LAR. |
| | : a. Either please provide an adequate description and justification for the proposed approach or confirm that Palo Verde will continue to use current licensing-basis methods to analyze this event. |
| | : b. If fuel failure is predicted for the UFSAR Section 15.4.7 event Inadvertent Loading of a Fuel Assembly into the Improper Position, please confirm that the consequences of the event are bounded by those of other analyzed events within the applicable event category, and hence, are a small fraction of Title 10 CFR 100 limits. Further please clarify the failure mode of the affected fuel rods and explain whether the failure mechanism could propagate to neighboring rods. |
| | RAI 9. Containment Analyses 3 |
| | : a. In Section 9.1 of Attachment 8, Mass and Energy Release Analysis for Postulated LOCAs , it is stated that an evaluation of the impact of NGF on the LOCA Mass and Energy (M&E) AORs was performed. Additionally, a comparison of fuel parameters and operating conditions was performed. Please describe how the containment LOCA M&E release was determined for the NGF analyses. To confirm that the AOR LOCA M&E short term (UFSAR Table 6.2.1-4 and 6.2.1-5) and long term (from the end of post reflood) releases remain bounding, please provide quantitative results comparing to the AOR M&E releases for the following: |
| | : i. Short-term M&E release during blowdown. Also, please confirm that the AOR containment pressure response for peak pressure determination and containment temperature response for equipment environmental qualification remain bounding. |
| | ii. Long-term M&E release for the sump temperature response. Also, please confirm that the AOR sump temperature profile for the ECCS pumps net positive suction head analysis remain bounding. |
| | : b. In Section 9.2 of Attachment 8, M&E Release Analysis for Postulated Secondary System Pipe Ruptures Inside Containment, it is stated that the AOR FW temperature bounds the NGF temperature. What is the FW temperature used for AOR and the NGF analysis? Please explain how the AOR temperature produces bounding results. |
| | : c. In Section 9.2 of Attachment 8, it is stated that the M&E source energy based on NGF operating conditions will remain bounded by the AOR main steam line break (MSLB) source energy. Please justify quantitatively that the parameters that determine the AOR MSLB containment M&E source energy bound those that determine the M&E source energy with NGF. |
| | Siva P. Lingam U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Project Manager (NRR/DORL/LPL4-1) |
| | Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Location: O8-D5; Mail Stop: O8-B3 Telephone: 301-415-1564; Fax: 301-415-1222 E-mail address: siva.lingam@nrc.gov 4 |
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| | Hearing Identifier: NRR_PMDA Email Number: 3440 Mail Envelope Properties (Siva.Lingam@nrc.gov20170414141900) |
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| ==Subject:== | | ==Subject:== |
| Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - NGF LAR and Exemption RAIs (CAC Nos. MF8076 to MF8081) Sent Date: 4/14/2017 2:19:06 PM Received Date: 4/14/2017 2:19:00 PM From: Lingam, Siva Created By: Siva.Lingam@nrc.gov Recipients: "Pascarelli, Robert" <Robert.Pascarelli@nrc.gov> Tracking Status: None "Lukes, Robert" <Robert.Lukes@nrc.gov> Tracking Status: None "Beacon, Daniel" <Daniel.Beacon@nrc.gov> | | Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - NGF LAR and Exemption RAIs (CAC Nos. MF8076 to MF8081) |
| Tracking Status: None "Lehning, John" <John.Lehning@nrc.gov> Tracking Status: None "Woodyatt, Diana" <Diana.Woodyatt@nrc.gov> Tracking Status: None "Kaizer, Joshua" <Joshua.Kaizer@nrc.gov> | | Sent Date: 4/14/2017 2:19:06 PM Received Date: 4/14/2017 2:19:00 PM From: Lingam, Siva Created By: Siva.Lingam@nrc.gov Recipients: |
| Tracking Status: None "Panicker, Mathew" <Mathew.Panicker@nrc.gov> Tracking Status: None "Clifford, Paul" <Paul.Clifford@nrc.gov> Tracking Status: None "Thomas.N.Weber@aps.com" <Thomas.N.Weber@aps.com> Tracking Status: None "Michael.Dilorenzo@aps.com" <Michael.Dilorenzo@aps.com> | | "Pascarelli, Robert" <Robert.Pascarelli@nrc.gov> |
| Tracking Status: None "Matthew.Cox@aps.com" <Matthew.Cox@aps.com> Tracking Status: None "Carl.Stephenson@aps.com" <Carl.Stephenson@aps.com> Tracking Status: None Post Office: Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 12089 4/14/2017 2:19:00 PM Options Priority: Standard Return Notification: No Reply Requested: No Sensitivity: Normal Expiration Date: Recipients Received:}} | | Tracking Status: None "Lukes, Robert" <Robert.Lukes@nrc.gov> |
| | Tracking Status: None "Beacon, Daniel" <Daniel.Beacon@nrc.gov> |
| | Tracking Status: None "Lehning, John" <John.Lehning@nrc.gov> |
| | Tracking Status: None "Woodyatt, Diana" <Diana.Woodyatt@nrc.gov> |
| | Tracking Status: None "Kaizer, Joshua" <Joshua.Kaizer@nrc.gov> |
| | Tracking Status: None "Panicker, Mathew" <Mathew.Panicker@nrc.gov> |
| | Tracking Status: None "Clifford, Paul" <Paul.Clifford@nrc.gov> |
| | Tracking Status: None "Thomas.N.Weber@aps.com" <Thomas.N.Weber@aps.com> |
| | Tracking Status: None "Michael.Dilorenzo@aps.com" <Michael.Dilorenzo@aps.com> |
| | Tracking Status: None "Matthew.Cox@aps.com" <Matthew.Cox@aps.com> |
| | Tracking Status: None "Carl.Stephenson@aps.com" <Carl.Stephenson@aps.com> |
| | Tracking Status: None Post Office: |
| | Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 12089 4/14/2017 2:19:00 PM Options Priority: Standard Return Notification: No Reply Requested: No Sensitivity: Normal Expiration Date: |
| | Recipients Received:}} |
Letter Sequence RAI |
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MONTHYEARML16188A3332016-07-0101 July 2016 Description and Assessment of Proposed License Amendment - Technical Analysis Project stage: Other ML16190A2272016-07-13013 July 2016 Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure, 6/30/16 Affidavit Executed by J. Gresham, Westinghouse; Technical Analysis Next Generation Fuel Implementation Amendment Request Project stage: Withholding Request Acceptance ML16216A4612016-08-0303 August 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Units 1, 2, and 3 - Acceptance Review of Next Generation Fuel License Amendment and Exemption Requests (CAC Nos. MF8076, MF8077, and MF8078; MF8079, MF8080, and MF8081) Project stage: Acceptance Review ML16217A1652016-08-0404 August 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Units 1, 2, and 3 - Acceptance Review of Next Generation Fuel License Amendment and Exemption Requests (CAC Nos. MF8076, MF8077, and MF8078; MF8079, MF8080, and MF8081) Project stage: Acceptance Review ML16291A4482016-10-19019 October 2016 Audit Plan - 11/2-3/2016 Regulatory Audit at Westinghouse Facility in Rockville to Support Amendment and Exemption Requests Related to Implementation of Next Generation Fuel (CAC MF8076-MF8081) Project stage: Other ML17003A0862016-11-0303 November 2016 Enclosure 2 Slides Regulatory Audit Report for November 2-3, 2016 Project stage: Other ML17003A0762017-01-10010 January 2017 Regulatory Audit Report for the November 2-3, 2016, Audit at the Westinghouse Facility in Rockville, MD, for the License Amendment and Exemption Requests Associated with Next Generation Fuel (CAC Nos. MF8076-MF8081) Project stage: Other ML17054C4642017-02-27027 February 2017 Second Regulatory Audit Plan for March 8, 2017, Audit at Excel Facility in Rockville, Maryland, in Support of Next Generation Fuel License Amendment Request and Exemption Project stage: Other ML17076A3702017-03-16016 March 2017 Submittal of Proprietary Westinghouse Information Presented at the Regulatory Audit Held on March 8, 2017, at Excel Facility in Rockville, Maryland, Regarding Next Generation Fuel License Amendment Request and Exemption Project stage: Request ML17079A4462017-03-27027 March 2017 Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure Project stage: Withholding Request Acceptance ML17082A4462017-03-28028 March 2017 PVNGS Units 1, 2, and 3 Transition to CE 16x16 Ngf - Draft RAIs Rev 3 Project stage: Draft RAI ML17107A0052017-04-14014 April 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Ngf LAR and Exemption RAIs (CAC Nos. MF8076 to MF8081) Project stage: RAI 2016-08-04
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Category:E-Mail
MONTHYEARML24011A1002024-01-10010 January 2024 March 2024 Emergency Preparedness Program Inspection - Request for Information ML23334A1612023-11-30030 November 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - RAIs Associated with License Renewal Commitment for Pressurizer Surge Line Welds Inspection Program to Manage Environmentally Assisted Fatigue ML23334A0072023-11-29029 November 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Official RAIs for LAR That Revises TSs 3.5.1, SITs - Operating; 3.5.2, SIT Shutdown; 3.6.5, Containment Air Temperature; and SRs for TS 3.5.1, SITs Operating ML23298A1232023-10-25025 October 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde, Unit 1 - RAIs for Relief Request 70, Proposed Alternatives for Pressurizer Lower Shell Temperature Nozzle ML23243B0082023-08-31031 August 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Action: Opportunity to Review and Comment on a New NRC Information Collection, 10 CFR Part 50.55a, Codes and Standards (3150-XXXX) ML23233A0132023-08-18018 August 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Acceptance Review of License Renewal Commitment for Pressurizer Surge Line Welds Inspection Program to Manage Environmentally Assisted Fatigue ML23220A0512023-08-0303 August 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Re Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - SUNSI Review of UFSAR, Rev. 22 ML23202A0162023-07-20020 July 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Acceptance Review of LAR to Revise TSs 3.5.1, SITs - Operating; 3.5.2, SIT Shutdown; 3.6.5, Containment Air Temperature; and SRs for TS 3.5.1, SITs Operating ML23143A1332023-05-23023 May 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Acceptance Review of LAR Revising TS 3.3.11 to Adopt TSTF-266-A, Rev. 3, Eliminate the Remote Shutdown System Table of Instrumentation and Controls ML23130A0132023-05-10010 May 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Acceptance Review for Authorized Use of Mururoa Supplied Air Suits (Models V4F1 and MTH2) Pursuant to 10 CFR 20.1703 and 10 CFR 20.1705 ML23017A0932023-01-17017 January 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde - Acceptance of License Amendment Request Regarding Adoption of TSTF-107, Separate Control Rods That Are Untrippable Versus Inoperable (L-2022-LLA-0181) ML23013A0632023-01-13013 January 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Unit 1 -Request for Additional Information - U1R23 Inspection Summary Report for Steam Generator Tubing ML22348A1672022-12-14014 December 2022 March 2023 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Inspection - Request for Information ML22339A2372022-12-0505 December 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Unit 1 Request for Additional Information - U1R23 Inspection Summary Report for Steam Generator Tubing ML22173A0682022-06-17017 June 2022 Email Concurrence on SE Input for Columbia Pltr LAR ML22167A1872022-06-16016 June 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Revised Acceptance Review of LAR to Adopt TSTF-567, Add Containment Sump TS to Address GSI-191 Issues ML22136A0922022-05-16016 May 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Acceptance Review of LAR to Adopt TSTF-487-A, Revision 1, Relocate DNB Parameters to the COLR ML22075A1902022-03-16016 March 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Acceptance Review of LAR to Adopt TSTF-567, Add Containment Sump TS to Address GSI-191 Issues ML22055A5842022-02-24024 February 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde, Unit 3 - Final RAIs for 22nd Refueling Outage (Spring 2021) Steam Generator Tube Inservice Inspection Report ML22034A0132022-02-0202 February 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde, Unit 2 - Verbal Approval of RR-69 to Extend Containment Tendon Inspection from 2/8/22 to 6/8/22 ML22032A0312022-01-31031 January 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Acceptance Review for an Exemption Regarding Elimination of Dafas Using RIPE Process ML22025A4012022-01-0303 January 2022 March 2022 Emergency Preparedness Program Inspection - Request for Information ML21333A1982021-11-19019 November 2021 NRC Review of PVNGS Training Needs Analysis and Training Required by Condition I of the Confirmatory Order EA-20-054 ML21306A1882021-10-18018 October 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Second Pre-submittal Meeting for the Proposed Exemption to Eliminate Dafas Using RIPE Process ML21272A0592021-09-28028 September 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - SUNSI Review of UFSAR, Rev. 21 ML21264A1352021-09-17017 September 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2 and 3 - Acceptance Review of LAR Associated with Permanent Extension of Containment ILRT Frequency to 15 Years (Type a) and CIV Leak Rate Test Frequency to 75 Months (Type C) ML21237A0762021-08-25025 August 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Acceptance Review of RR-67, Request for Alternative Frequency to Containment Unbonded Post-Tensioning System Inservice Inspection ML21228A0082021-08-16016 August 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Acceptance Review of an LAR for Administrative Changes to Technical Specifications ML21228A1042021-08-12012 August 2021 RR-67, Request for Alternative Frequency to Containment Unbonded Post-Tensioning System Inservice Inspection (EPID L-2021-LLR-0050) (Email) ML21237A5172021-08-10010 August 2021 Email to PV Licensee and Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 - Notification of Inspection of the Licensees Implementation Industry Initiative Associated with the Open Phase Condition (NRC Bulletin 2012-01) and Request Fo ML21160A1442021-06-0909 June 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1 and, 2 - Acceptance Review for Order Approving Transfers of Control of Licenses for Minority Interests Subject to Expiring Leases ML21154A0082021-05-26026 May 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2 and 3 - Official RAIs for LAR Associated with Permanent Extension of Containment ILRT Frequency to 15 Years (Type a) and CIV Leak Rate Test Frequency to 75 Months (Type C) ML21146A3342021-05-14014 May 2021 ISFSI - Final Package for an Order Associated with Indirect Transfers of Control of Licenses from Pnm to Avangrid ML21132A2372021-05-12012 May 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3, and ISFSI - Final Package for an Order Associated with Indirect Transfers of Control of Licenses from Pnm to Avangrid ML21103A3632021-04-13013 April 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Acceptance Review for Indirect Transfer of Control of Licenses Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.80 and 10 CFR 72.50 ML21064A2372021-03-0303 March 2021 ISI Request for Information Rls ML21053A0262021-02-22022 February 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2 and 3 - Acceptance Review of LAR Associated with Permanent Extension of Containment ILRT Frequency to 15 Years (Type a) and CIV Leak Rate Test Frequency to 75 Months (Type C) ML21043A1462021-02-11011 February 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Official RAI for an Order Associated with Indirect License Transfer from Public Service Company of New Mexico to Avangrid, Inc ML21023A0212021-01-13013 January 2021 PVNGS PI&R Request for Information RA ML20366A1682020-12-31031 December 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3, and ISFSI - Acceptance Review of an Order Associated with Indirect Transfers of Control of Licenses ML21005A2712020-12-29029 December 2020 102-08208 PVNGS Communication Required by Confirmatory Order EA-20-054 ML20325A0392020-11-19019 November 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 2 - Verbal Authorization of RR 66 to Extend Containment Tendon Inspection by One Year Based on 10 CFR 50.55a(Z)(2) ML20316A0162020-11-0909 November 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 2 - Acceptance Review of RR 66, Request Containment Post-Tensioning System Inspection One-Time by One Year Due to COVID-19 Pandemic ML20295A4912020-10-21021 October 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Acceptance Review of LAR Associated with Adopting TSTF-501, Relocate Stored Fuel Oil and Lube Oil Volumes to Licensee Control ML20265A0982020-09-21021 September 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Acceptance Review of License Amendment Associated with Making Necessary Administrative Changes to Technical Specifications ML20108E9462020-04-16016 April 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) Clarification to PVNGS Part 26 Exemption Request (ML20105A481) ML20091K0752020-03-31031 March 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 2 - Acceptance Review of RR 65, Request for Relief from RPV Bottom Mounted Instrumentation Nozzles and a Pressurizer Surge Line Weld Overlay Examination ML20091M1992020-03-31031 March 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 2 - Verbal Authorization of RR 65, Request for Relief from RPV Bottom Mounted Instrumentation Nozzles and a Pressurizer Surge Line Weld Overlay ISI Examinations ML20050C9742020-02-19019 February 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1,2, and 3 - Framatome Htp Fuel LAR and Exemption Third Audit Summary (EPIDs L-2018-LLA-0194 and L-2018-LLE-0010) 2024-01-10
[Table view] Category:Request for Additional Information (RAI)
MONTHYEARML24011A1002024-01-10010 January 2024 March 2024 Emergency Preparedness Program Inspection - Request for Information ML23334A1612023-11-30030 November 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - RAIs Associated with License Renewal Commitment for Pressurizer Surge Line Welds Inspection Program to Manage Environmentally Assisted Fatigue ML23334A0072023-11-29029 November 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Official RAIs for LAR That Revises TSs 3.5.1, SITs - Operating; 3.5.2, SIT Shutdown; 3.6.5, Containment Air Temperature; and SRs for TS 3.5.1, SITs Operating ML23298A1232023-10-25025 October 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde, Unit 1 - RAIs for Relief Request 70, Proposed Alternatives for Pressurizer Lower Shell Temperature Nozzle ML23031A3392023-01-31031 January 2023 In-service Inspection Request for Information ML23013A0632023-01-13013 January 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Unit 1 -Request for Additional Information - U1R23 Inspection Summary Report for Steam Generator Tubing ML22348A1672022-12-14014 December 2022 March 2023 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Inspection - Request for Information ML22339A2372022-12-0505 December 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Unit 1 Request for Additional Information - U1R23 Inspection Summary Report for Steam Generator Tubing ML22272A3252022-09-29029 September 2022 Licensed Operator Positive Fitness-For-Duty Test Request for Additional Information ML22209A1752022-07-28028 July 2022 Inservice Inspection Request for Information ML22187A2632022-07-0606 July 2022 Notification of Inspection (NRC IR 05000528/2022004, 05000529/2022004 and 05000530/2022004) and Request for Information ML22067A2292022-03-0202 March 2022 Inservice Inspection Inspection PWR Request for Information ML22055A5842022-02-24024 February 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde, Unit 3 - Final RAIs for 22nd Refueling Outage (Spring 2021) Steam Generator Tube Inservice Inspection Report ML22035A3302022-02-10010 February 2022 Requests for Confirmation of Information for Exemption to Delete Diverse Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System Based on Risk-Informed Process for Evaluations ML22025A4012022-01-0303 January 2022 March 2022 Emergency Preparedness Program Inspection - Request for Information ML21245A2222021-09-0101 September 2021 Request for Information ML21200A2392021-07-20020 July 2021 Docs Request AC - AA August 2021 ML21154A0082021-05-26026 May 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2 and 3 - Official RAIs for LAR Associated with Permanent Extension of Containment ILRT Frequency to 15 Years (Type a) and CIV Leak Rate Test Frequency to 75 Months (Type C) ML21064A2372021-03-0303 March 2021 ISI Request for Information Rls ML21042B9692021-02-18018 February 2021 Notification of NRC Design Bases Assurance Inspection and Initial Request for Information ML21043A1462021-02-11011 February 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Official RAI for an Order Associated with Indirect License Transfer from Public Service Company of New Mexico to Avangrid, Inc ML21023A0212021-01-13013 January 2021 PVNGS PI&R Request for Information RA ML21011A1972021-01-12012 January 2021 Unit 2, and Unit 3 - Notification of an NRC Fire Protection Baseline Inspection (NRC Inspection Report 05000528/2021012, 05000529/2021012 and 05000530/2021012) and Request for Information ML20227A0992020-08-14014 August 2020 Licensed Operator Positive Fitness-For-Duty Test Request for Additional Information ML20118D1362020-04-28028 April 2020 Licensed Operator Positive Fitness-For-Duty Test Request for Additional Information ML20049A0992020-02-14014 February 2020 Notification of Cyber Security Inspection (NRC Inspection Report 05000528/2020401; 05000529/2020401; and 05000530/2020401) and Request for Information ML20049A0252020-02-12012 February 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 - Official RAIs for License Amendment Request Associated with Changes to Emergency Plan Staffing Requirements ML20021A3172020-01-21021 January 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 - Official RAIs for Relief Request 64, Impractical Examinations for the Third 10-Year ISI Interval ML19317D0782019-11-13013 November 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1 - Requests for Additional Information on Unit 1 21st Refueling Outage Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report ML19234A3202019-08-29029 August 2019 Redacted - Request for Additional Information for Amendment and Exemption Request to Support the Implementation of Framatome High Thermal Performance Fuel (EPID L-2018-LLA-0194; EPID L-2018-LLE-0010) ML19155A1842019-05-30030 May 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3 - Mvib Official RAIs for RR-63, Impractical Examinations for the Third 10-Year ISI Interval ML19095A6552019-04-0404 April 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3 - Mphb Official RAIs for RR-63, Impractical Examinations for the Third 10-Year ISI Interval ML19044A7342019-02-13013 February 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde1, 2, and 3 - Official Requests for Additional Information for RR 62, Third and Fourth 10-Year ISI Intervals, Proposed Alternative - Pressurizer Heat Sleeve Repairs ML19008A3612019-01-0808 January 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Official RAIs for LAR Associated with Response Time Testing of Pressure Transmitters ML18341A0252018-12-0303 December 2018 Notification of NRC Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)(05000528/2019011, 05000529/2019011, and 05000530/2019011) and Initial Request for Information ML18271A0392018-10-0202 October 2018 Non Proprietary - Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Requested License Amendments and Exemptions Implementation of Framatome High Thermal Performance Fuel (Epids L-2018-LLA-0194 and L-2018-LLE-0010) ML18221A5102018-08-23023 August 2018 Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request to Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times (CAC Nos. MF6576, MF6577, and MF6578; EPID: L-2015-LLA-0001) ML18229A3132018-08-17017 August 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information Relief Request 58: Impractical Examinations for the Third 10-Year Inservice Inspection Interval Arizona Public Service Company Palo Verde Nuclear Generation Station, Unit 2 - Second Se ML18227A8672018-08-15015 August 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information Relief Request 58: Impractical Examinations for the Third 10-Year Inservice Inspection Interval Arizona Public Service Company Palo Verde Nuclear Generation Station, Unit 2 ML18124A0112018-05-0303 May 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Official Eeob RAIs for TSTF-505 (4b) LAR (CAC Nos. MF6576, MF6577, and MF6578; EPID L-2015-LLA-0001) ML18099A0072018-04-0606 April 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Official RAIs for 10 CFR 50.69 LAR (CAC Nos. MF9971, MF9972, and MF9973; EPID L-2017-LLA-0276) ML18094B1122018-04-0404 April 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Final RAIs for TSTF-505 (Initiative 4b) LAR (CAC Nos. MF6576, MF6577, and MF6578: EPID L-2015-LLA-0001) ML18066A7032018-03-0707 March 2018 Notification of Nrc Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Programs) 05000528/2018011, 05000529/2018011, and 05000530/2018011 Initial Request for Information ML17248A0162017-08-31031 August 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Final RAI for RRs PRR-03, PRR-04 and PRR-05, Pump Testing ML17107A0052017-04-14014 April 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Ngf LAR and Exemption RAIs (CAC Nos. MF8076 to MF8081) ML17082A4462017-03-28028 March 2017 PVNGS Units 1, 2, and 3 Transition to CE 16x16 Ngf - Draft RAIs Rev 3 ML17003A0182017-01-0202 January 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde, Unit 3 - Draft RAIs for the Second Emergency LAR Associated with EDG 3B Failure ML16258A0312016-09-14014 September 2016 PVNGS Units 1-3 - Notif of NRC Insp of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instr. Orders and Emer. Prep. Comm./Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plns(05000528/ 2016009;05000529/2016009;and 05000530/2016009) and ML16111B3312016-04-20020 April 2016 Notification of NRC Component Design Bases Inspection (05000528/2016007; 05000529/2016007; 05000530/2016007) and Initial Request for Information ML16083A2502016-03-23023 March 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 - Official RAIs for EAL LAR 2024-01-10
[Table view] |
Text
NRR-PMDAPEm Resource From: Lingam, Siva Sent: Friday, April 14, 2017 2:19 PM To: Michael.Dilorenzo@aps.com; Matthew.Cox@aps.com; Carl.Stephenson@aps.com Cc: Pascarelli, Robert; Lukes, Robert; Beacon, Daniel; Lehning, John; Woodyatt, Diana; Kaizer, Joshua; Panicker, Mathew; Clifford, Paul; Thomas.N.Weber@aps.com
Subject:
Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - NGF LAR and Exemption RAIs (CAC Nos. MF8076 to MF8081)
By application dated July 1, 2016 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System Accession No. ML16188A336), Arizona Public Service (APS, the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS), Units 1, 2, and 3. The proposed changes revise TS 4.2.1, Reactor Core, Fuel Assemblies and 5.6.5.b, Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) and will allow the use of Combustion Engineering (CE) 16x16 Next Generation Fuel clad with the Optimized ZIRLOTM material in PVNGS, Units 1, 2, and 3. To support the fuel transition, APS also requested an exemption from certain requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulation (10 CFR) 50.46 and 10 CFR 50 Appendix K to allow the use of Optimized ZIRLOTM as a cladding material in PVNGS.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has reviewed the above-mentioned submittal, has conducted two regulatory audits, and has determined that additional information is required to complete the review. We transmitted the draft requests for additional information (RAIs) to you by e-mail on March 28, 2017. Subsequently, at your request, we held clarification conference calls on April 12 and April 13, 2017, discussing the draft RAIs. Please note the following official RAIs, and provide your responses within 45 days from the date of this e-mail as mutually agreed. Your timely responses will allow the NRC staff to complete its review on schedule..
RAI 1. CENPD-178-P-A Methodology The CENPD-178-P-A methodology referenced in the submittal specifies that a hydraulic shaker attaches to the bottom of the assembly during the forced vibration fuel assembly testing. The testing facility contains an apparatus that uses an electro-mechanical shaker that attaches to the center of the assembly. Please clarify which shaker is used and justify its use as part of the methodology.
RAI 2. Transition Core Control Element Assembly Drop Times Please provide justification that the full core Next Generation Fuel (NGF) and full core Value Added Fuel (referred to as STD) control element assembly (CEA) drop time analyses bound the CEA drop times expected for transition cores containing both NGF and STD fuel assemblies.
RAI 3. Bounded and Non-Impacted Chapter 15 Events In Section 7 of Attachment 8, Non-Loss-of-Coolant-Accident (LOCA) Safety Analysis, Table 7-1 lists the impact of the use of NGF on Chapter 15 Non-LOCA events.
- a. Transition to NGF fuel is determined to have no impact on a number of Chapter 15 events, listed below. For these events, please explain the process for determining that the inputs are unchanged and justify why they are unchanged. If any of the input has changed, please justify that the event is not impacted.
- b. A number of Chapter 15 events, listed below, are determined to be bounded without specific justification. Please justify that these events are bounded. Please identify the bounding assumptions and justify that they are appropriate. If the bounded event has been quantitatively analyzed, please provide the margin between the new NGF analysis and the bounding analysis. For comparison, please also provide the analogous margin associated with the current bounded STD analysis of record (AOR) for these events.
- Loss of Non-emergency AC Power to the Station Auxiliaries
- Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction - Pressurizer Level Control System Malfunction with Loss of AC Power (LOP)
RAI 4. Evaluated Chapter 15 Events
- a. Please justify that the CENTS evaluations, completed as part of the Chapter 15 AORs, remain applicable for the transient system response, and do not require re-analysis to support the transition to NGF.
- b. Attachment 7/8, Section 7.1.3: Please demonstrate that the system model changes due to NGF are bounded by the AOR for the Increase in Main Steam Flow (IMSF), Inadvertent Opening of a Steam Generator Atmospheric Dump Valve (IOSGADV), and IOSGADV with LOP events. Please demonstrate that the AOR flow coastdown remains conservative, Please identify what system model changes are necessary because of NGF, and justify why they are small. Please demonstrate that these small changes result in an insignificant impact to the overall transient system.
- c. Attachment 7/8, Section 7.1.3: Please demonstrate that the current analysis for calculated fuel failure (i.e. AOR Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) vs. NGF DNBR) bounds the IMSF+LOP and IOSGADV+LOP events.
- d. Attachment 7/8, Section 7.3.4: Please identify the fuel specific failure analysis methodology and describe the fuel failure analysis that was completed. Please compare it with the fuel failure AOR and explain the relevance of less than 4 seconds of overall time in DNB.
RAI 5. Additional Description of SKBOR Palo Verde has proposed to use the SKBOR code to determine the time available prior to precipitation of boric acid following a postulated LOCA affecting one of the reactor coolant system cold legs. The use of SKBOR represents a change to the original methodology for analyzing long-term core cooling that is described in topical report CENPD-254-P-A. A detailed description of the SKBOR methodology was not included in the license amendment request (LAR). Therefore, please submit documentation concerning the following:
- a. A technical description of the SKBOR code.
2
- b. A description of the post-processing steps (e.g., using NSAPLOT) to determine additional parameters such as the void distribution, loop differential pressure, and hot leg entrainment criteria.
- c. A description of how the boric acid concentration of the sump fluid is determined.
RAI 6. Thermal Conductivity Degradation and Radial Fall-Off Curve Penalty Palo Verde has proposed imposing a radial fall-off curve to offset the lack of explicit consideration of thermal conductivity degradation (TCD) in the fuel performance models in the FATES3B and STRIKIN-II codes.
- a. Please provide technical justification that the proposed allowance for TCD is adequate for the full set of analyzed events within Palo Verdes licensing basis (e.g., by comparing the results calculated by FATES3B and STRIKIN-II against those of a fuel performance code that explicitly models TCD and has been reviewed by the NRC staff).
- b. Please provide confirmation that the actual radial fall-off curves implemented to ensure compliance with the TCD allowance will be included in the applicable Core Operating Limits Report submittals for PVNGS.
RAI 7. Appendix K LOCA LOOP Considerations Palo Verde has assumed that the limiting results for evaluating the large-break LOCA event would occur when offsite power is unavailable. The availability of offsite power would result in earlier ECCS pump start times than considered in the LAR submittal. While it is possible that earlier ECCS pump start times may tend to refill the downcomer more rapidly (thereby promoting an earlier reflooding of the reactor core), it is also possible that the downcomer may continue to be refilled largely by the safety injection tanks, even if earlier ECCS pump start times are implemented. In the latter case, the earlier spilling of ECCS coolant into containment would tend to produce a more severe containment pressure reduction, and hence offer increased resistance to reflooding the core. The net impact of these countervailing tendencies on the results of the large-break LOCA analysis is not obvious; in particular, the NRC staff notes the counterintuitive observation that, according to the current, conservative Appendix K evaluation methodology, large-break LOCA scenarios with full availability of the ECCS are calculated to be more limiting than cases with a single failure that would reduce ECCS flow. Therefore, please provide the results of an additional analysis of the large-break LOCA event with offsite power available and realistic pump start times to confirm whether the results are bounded by the analysis presented in the LAR submittal.
RAI 8. Statistical Treatment of the Inadvertent Fuel Misloading Event Palo Verde has proposed to implement a statistical methodology for treating the event described in Section 15.4.7 of its Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Inadvertent Loading of a Fuel Assembly into the Improper Position. The proposed methodology has not been previously reviewed and approved by the NRC staff and was not sufficiently described in the LAR.
- a. Either please provide an adequate description and justification for the proposed approach or confirm that Palo Verde will continue to use current licensing-basis methods to analyze this event.
- b. If fuel failure is predicted for the UFSAR Section 15.4.7 event Inadvertent Loading of a Fuel Assembly into the Improper Position, please confirm that the consequences of the event are bounded by those of other analyzed events within the applicable event category, and hence, are a small fraction of Title 10 CFR 100 limits. Further please clarify the failure mode of the affected fuel rods and explain whether the failure mechanism could propagate to neighboring rods.
RAI 9. Containment Analyses 3
- a. In Section 9.1 of Attachment 8, Mass and Energy Release Analysis for Postulated LOCAs , it is stated that an evaluation of the impact of NGF on the LOCA Mass and Energy (M&E) AORs was performed. Additionally, a comparison of fuel parameters and operating conditions was performed. Please describe how the containment LOCA M&E release was determined for the NGF analyses. To confirm that the AOR LOCA M&E short term (UFSAR Table 6.2.1-4 and 6.2.1-5) and long term (from the end of post reflood) releases remain bounding, please provide quantitative results comparing to the AOR M&E releases for the following:
- i. Short-term M&E release during blowdown. Also, please confirm that the AOR containment pressure response for peak pressure determination and containment temperature response for equipment environmental qualification remain bounding.
ii. Long-term M&E release for the sump temperature response. Also, please confirm that the AOR sump temperature profile for the ECCS pumps net positive suction head analysis remain bounding.
- b. In Section 9.2 of Attachment 8, M&E Release Analysis for Postulated Secondary System Pipe Ruptures Inside Containment, it is stated that the AOR FW temperature bounds the NGF temperature. What is the FW temperature used for AOR and the NGF analysis? Please explain how the AOR temperature produces bounding results.
- c. In Section 9.2 of Attachment 8, it is stated that the M&E source energy based on NGF operating conditions will remain bounded by the AOR main steam line break (MSLB) source energy. Please justify quantitatively that the parameters that determine the AOR MSLB containment M&E source energy bound those that determine the M&E source energy with NGF.
Siva P. Lingam U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Project Manager (NRR/DORL/LPL4-1)
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Location: O8-D5; Mail Stop: O8-B3 Telephone: 301-415-1564; Fax: 301-415-1222 E-mail address: siva.lingam@nrc.gov 4
Hearing Identifier: NRR_PMDA Email Number: 3440 Mail Envelope Properties (Siva.Lingam@nrc.gov20170414141900)
Subject:
Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - NGF LAR and Exemption RAIs (CAC Nos. MF8076 to MF8081)
Sent Date: 4/14/2017 2:19:06 PM Received Date: 4/14/2017 2:19:00 PM From: Lingam, Siva Created By: Siva.Lingam@nrc.gov Recipients:
"Pascarelli, Robert" <Robert.Pascarelli@nrc.gov>
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