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{{#Wiki_filter:ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form
{{#Wiki_filter:ES-401                                        PWR Examination Outline                                        Form ES-401-2 Facility: CPNPP                                                                              Date of Exam: June 19, 2017 RO K/A Category Points                                SRO-Only Points Tier        Group K    K  K  K    K    K  A    A    A    A    G*                  A2          G*      Total 1    2  3  4    5    6  1    2    3    4          Total
: 1.            1        3    3  3                3    3              3      18                                  6 Emergency &
Abnormal            2        1    1  1      N/A        2    2    N/A      2      9                                  4 Plant Evolutions    Tier Totals    4    4  4                5    5              5      27                                10 1        3    3  2  4    1    2  2    2    3    3    3      28                                  5 2.
Plant            2        2    1  1  1    1    0  1    1    0    1    1      10                                  3 Systems Tier Totals    5    4  3  5    2    2  3    3    3    4    4      38                                  8
: 3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities          1        2        3          4                  1    2      3    4 Categories 3        3        2          2        10                                  7 Note:    1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two). (One Tier 3 Radiation Control K/A is allowed if the K/A is replaced by a K/A from another Tier 3 Category).
: 2. The point total


==SUMMARY==
==SUMMARY==
Event 1 The first event is a failure of Pressurizer Pressure Channel PT-455 high. The crew will enter ABN-705, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction, Section 2.0, Pressurizer Pressure Instrument Malfunction. The associated PORV will open and the operator will close the PORV, its associated Block Valve, and place 1-PK-455A, Master Pressurizer Pressure Controller in manual and control PZR pressure. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications. Event 2 The operating CRDM vent fan trips. The crew will refer to 1-ALB-3A, Window 2.1, CNTMT FN MASTER TRIP, and ensure that at least one CRDM vent fan is in service, and manually start an alternate vent fan, per SOP-801A, Containment Ventilation System. They will use either Section 5.3.1, Control Rod Drive Mechanism Ventilation System Startup, or Section 5.3.3, Alternating Control Rod Drive Mechanism Ventilation Fans, for this evolution. Event 3 1-FI-542A, SG 1-04 STM FLO, Selected Steam Flow transmitter fails Low. The crew will enter ABN-707, Section 2.0, Steam Flow Instrument Malfunction. The operators will take manual control of the affected FRV and master feed pump speed control. The alternate channel will be selected for control and the system will be returned back to automatic control. Event 4 Failure of Cold Leg Loop 1 NR Temperature Transmitter (TE-411B). It will fail low (510°F). The Reactor Operator will take action per ABN-704, Tc/N-16 Instrumentation Malfunction, Section 2.0. This event requires taking manual control of rods, since the Tc failure results in a lower Tave and rods will withdraw in automatic until C-11 is reached. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications for this malfunction. Event 5 Event 5 is the precursor to the major event and involves a trip of the main feed pump with a turbine runback (rod control is still in manual from the previous event). Operators will take action per ABN-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain System Malfunction, Section 2.0, and ramp the unit down. The second feed pump will trip 3 minutes after the first. Event 6,7,8 After the loss of the 2nd MFP a reactor trip is warranted and an attempt will be made to manually trip the Reactor via the Normal Trip Switches and by de-energizing both buses supplying the Control Rod Drive Mechanism Motor Generators. Operators will enter FRS-0.1A, Response To Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT. Operators will be required to drive control rods inward until the reactor trip breakers are opened locally and Emergency Borate. After the reactor is shutdown a tube rupture will occur on SG 1-04. Operators will exit FRS-0.1A; perform the actions of EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and transition to EOP-3.0A, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. A failure of SG 1-04 FWIV to close will complicate the event. Terminating Criteria Scenario will be terminated when the operators have completed an RCS cooldown, and an RCS Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1  Page 3 of 53 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 1 Rev. 3 Risk Significance: Failure of risk important system prior to trip: Pressurizer Pressure Channel Fails high       Main Feed Pump B Trips   Risk significant core damage sequence: Main Feed Pump A Trips; ATWT   Risk significant operator actions:   Isolation of Ruptured Steam Generator                                                                                                     complicated by FWIV failure to close Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1  Page 4 of 53 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 1 Rev. 3 Critical Task Determination Critical Task Safety Significance Cueing Measurable Performance Indicators Performance Feedback  Ensure Control Rods inserting Steps / Minute During Reactor Trip Failure Prior to Exiting FRS-0.1A, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT The safeguards systems that protect the plant during accidents are designed assuming that only decay heat and pump heat are being added to the RCS. DRPI lights indicating rods are withdrawn after both reactor trip switches have been turned, two red indicating lights lit for both reactor trip breakers after the reactor trip switches have been turned, power range detectors showing power greater than 5%. Procedurally driven from FRS-0.1A Observance of the RO verifying control rods are Steps / Minute in auto and when speed slows then rods are placed in manual and driven in DRPI indicating lights moving in the inward direction, rod speed indicator showing rod speed during the transient. After reactor trip breakers opened two green lights for the reactor trip breakers Identify and Isolate the Ruptured Steam Generator Prior to Commencing an Operator Induced Cooldown per EOP-3.0A, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. STI-214.01, TCA-1.9; FSAR 15.6.3.1.1; WCAP-16871-P, Section 6.4; DBD-ME-027. (NOT TCA due to additional failure) Procedurally driven from EOP-3.0A, to identify and isolate a ruptured SG. Indications include MSL Radiation alarms and SG level. The operator will not be able to close the MSIV, so all other MSIVs must be closed. The operator will ensure the FW isolation valves are closed, and reduce AFW flow to SG 1-04. SG pressure increasing, AFW flow reduced to zero and valve position indications.
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Page 5 of 53 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 1 Rev. 3 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP  Initialize to IC18 and LOAD 2017 NRC Scenario 1. EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION DEMAND VALUE INITIATING PARAMETER SETUP IRF FWR021 MDAFWP 1-02 Breaker Racked Out f:0 K0 6 IMF RP15E Reactor Trip Breakers Jammed Closed f:1 K0 IOR DIED1B41 Bus Breaker CS-1B4-1 Fails to Open f:3 K0  8 IMF FW38D SG (1-04) FWIV Fails to Close f:1 K0 (2)  1 IMF RX08A Pressurizer Pressure Channel (PT-455) fails high f:2500 K1  2 IMF CH10 CRDM Vent Fan #1 trips f:1 K2  3 IMF RX02G SG 1-04 Steam Flow (FI-542A) fails low f:0 K3  4 IMF RP05A NR Cold Leg 1 Temp (TE-411B) fails low f:510 K4 5 IMF FW03B Main Feedwater Pump B trip f:1 K5 6 IMF FW03A Main Feedwater Pump A trip f:1 K5 +180 IMF RP15E Reactor Fails to trip Reactor trip breakers jammed closed f:1 K0 IOR DIED1B41 Bus Breakers CS-1B4-1 Fails to open f:3 K0 6 IRF RPR112 Locally open Reactor Trip Breaker Train A f:2 K10 IRF RPR113 Locally open Reactor Trip Breaker Train B f:2 K10 7 IMF SG02D SG (1-04) Tube Rupture (2 tubes) f:2 (1) 8 IMF FW38D SG (1-04) FWIV fails to close f:1 K0 (2) (1) {LORPRTBAL_1.Value} IMF SG02D f:2 r:60 Tube rupture will be set to actuate upon the RTB lights changing from red to green (60 second ramp) (2) {DIFWHS2137.Value=0} DMF FW38D Allow 1-HV-2137 SG 1-04 FWIV to close with handswitch Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1  Page 6 of 53 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 1 Rev. 3 Simulator Operator: INITIALIZE to IC18 and LOAD NRC Scenario 1. ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE. ENSURE RED Danger Tag on MDAFWP 1-02 and place in PULL-OUT     ENSURE GEM Box PLACED on 1-HS-2450A for MDAFWP 1-01   ENSURE all Control board Tags are removed. ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions (771 ppm)   ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed. ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 10 Mwe/min. ENSURE 60/90 buttons DEPRESSED on ASD   ENSURE ASD speakers are ON at half volume. ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover. ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk:     - COPY of IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.5, Operating at     Constant Turbine Load. ENSURE Control Rods are in AUTO with Bank D at 215 steps. Control Room Annunciators in Alarm: PCIP-1.1 SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.2 IR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.4 CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.6 RX  10% PWR P-10 PCIP-2.1 SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.2 IR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.5 SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.2 PR TRN A LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK PCIP-4.2 PR TRN B LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK 1-SSII2   Train B MDAFW is Solid Red Page 1 of 51 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 2 Rev. 3     Appendix D Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-1   Facility: CPNPP 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 2 Examiners:  Operators: Op Test No.: June 2017 NRC   Initial Conditions: 100% power MOL RCS Boron is 771 ppm (by sample). MDAFWP 1-02 is out of service for scheduled maintenance. Turnover: Maintain steady-state power conditions. Severe weather has been reported in the area. The Station has entered ABN-907, Acts of Nature. Pressurizer Steam Space Sample is in progress by Chemistry. Critical Tasks: CT Isolate Reactor Coolant System Leakage Paths in accordance with ECA-0.0A, Loss of All AC Power prior to exiting ECA-0.0A. CT Restore Power to Bus 1EA1 in accordance with ECA-0.0A, Loss of All AC Power, prior to exit from ECA-0.0A. CT Manually start RHR Pump 1-01 in accordance with EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 or EOP-1.0A, Attachment 1A prior to exiting EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 ED07A C (RO, BOP, SRO)          TS (SRO) Loss of Inverter (IV1PC1) 2 SW01B C (BOP, SRO)       TS (SRO) SSW Pump 1-02 trips 3 CV16A I (RO, SRO) VCT Level Channel LT-112 Fails Low 4 FW14B TC09I RD15A R (RO) C (BOP, SRO)      TS (SRO) Heater Drain Pump 1-02 Trip Automatic Turbine Runback Failure Rods fail to control in automatic 5 ED01 M (RO, BOP, SRO) Loss of All AC Power Due to Loss of Offsite Power 6 EG15A C (BOP, SRO) Emergency Diesel Generator 1-01 fails to start Emergency Diesel Generator 1-02 in pull-out due to SSW pump trip 7 OVRD C (RO, SRO) Pressurizer Steam Space Sample Valves (1/1-4165A & 1/1-4176A) fail to auto close. Manual closure required. 8 RC08A2 M (RO, BOP, SRO) LBLOCA occurs when DG 1-01 is Emergency Started 9 RH01C C (BOP) RHR Pump 1-01 fails to auto-start from sequencer * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications   Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 9 Total malfunctions (5-8) 4 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 4 Abnormal events (2-4) 2 Major transients (1-2) 2 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 3 Critical tasks (2-3)
Event 1 The first event is a failure of Pressurizer Pressure Channel PT-455 high. The crew will enter ABN-705, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction, Section 2.0, Pressurizer Pressure Instrument Malfunction. The associated PORV will open and the operator will close the PORV, its associated Block Valve, and place 1-PK-455A, Master Pressurizer Pressure Controller in manual and control PZR pressure. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.
Page 2 of 51 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 2 Rev. 3 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2   SCENARIO 2  
Event 2 The operating CRDM vent fan trips. The crew will refer to 1-ALB-3A, Window 2.1, CNTMT FN MASTER TRIP, and ensure that at least one CRDM vent fan is in service, and manually start an alternate vent fan, per SOP-801A, Containment Ventilation System. They will use either Section 5.3.1, Control Rod Drive Mechanism Ventilation System Startup, or Section 5.3.3, Alternating Control Rod Drive Mechanism Ventilation Fans, for this evolution.
Event 3 1-FI-542A, SG 1-04 STM FLO, Selected Steam Flow transmitter fails Low. The crew will enter ABN-707, Section 2.0, Steam Flow Instrument Malfunction. The operators will take manual control of the affected FRV and master feed pump speed control. The alternate channel will be selected for control and the system will be returned back to automatic control.
Event 4 Failure of Cold Leg Loop 1 NR Temperature Transmitter (TE-411B). It will fail low (510°F). The Reactor Operator will take action per ABN-704, Tc/N-16 Instrumentation Malfunction, Section 2.0. This event requires taking manual control of rods, since the Tc failure results in a lower Tave and rods will withdraw in automatic until C-11 is reached. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications for this malfunction.
Event 5 Event 5 is the precursor to the major event and involves a trip of the main feed pump with a turbine runback (rod control is still in manual from the previous event). Operators will take action per ABN-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain System Malfunction, Section 2.0, and ramp the unit down. The second feed pump will trip 3 minutes after the first.
Event 6,7,8 After the loss of the 2nd MFP a reactor trip is warranted and an attempt will be made to manually trip the Reactor via the Normal Trip Switches and by de-energizing both buses supplying the Control Rod Drive Mechanism Motor Generators. Operators will enter FRS-0.1A, Response To Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT. Operators will be required to drive control rods inward until the reactor trip breakers are opened locally and Emergency Borate. After the reactor is shutdown a tube rupture will occur on SG 1-04. Operators will exit FRS-0.1A; perform the actions of EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and transition to EOP-3.0A, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. A failure of SG 1-04 FWIV to close will complicate the event.
Terminating Criteria Scenario will be terminated when the operators have completed an RCS cooldown, and an RCS depressurization has begun, or at the Examiners discretion.
Page 2 of 53 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 1 Rev. 3
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Risk Significance:
Failure of risk important system prior to trip:   Pressurizer Pressure Channel Fails high Main Feed Pump B Trips Risk significant core damage sequence:         Main Feed Pump A Trips; ATWT Risk significant operator actions:             Isolation of Ruptured Steam Generator complicated by FWIV failure to close Page 3 of 53 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 1 Rev. 3
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Critical Task Determination Measurable Safety                                                              Performance Critical Task                                     Cueing                 Performance Significance                                                              Feedback Indicators Ensure Control       The safeguards        DRPI lights indicating        Observance of the  DRPI indicating Rods inserting 48  systems that          rods are withdrawn after      RO verifying      lights moving in the Steps / Minute       protect the plant      both reactor trip switches    control rods are  inward direction, During Reactor Trip during accidents      have been turned, two        inserting  48    rod speed indicator Failure Prior to     are designed          red indicating lights lit for Steps / Minute in  showing rod speed Exiting FRS-0.1A,   assuming that only    both reactor trip breakers    auto and when      during the transient.
Response to         decay heat and        after the reactor trip        speed slows then  After reactor trip Nuclear Power       pump heat are          switches have been            rods are placed in breakers opened Generation / ATWT   being added to the     turned, power range          manual and driven  two green lights for RCS.                   detectors showing power      in                the reactor trip greater than 5%.                                 breakers Procedurally driven from FRS-0.1A Identify and Isolate Take one or more      Procedurally driven from      The operator will  SG pressure the Ruptured        actions that would    EOP-3.0A, to identify        not be able to    increasing, AFW Steam Generator      prevent a              and isolate a ruptured        close the MSIV, so flow reduced to Prior to             challenge to plant    SG. Indications include      all other MSIVs    zero and valve Commencing an        safety. STI-214.01,   MSL Radiation alarms          must be closed. position indications.
Operator Induced    TCA-1.9; FSAR         and SG level.                The operator will Cooldown per        15.6.3.1.1; WCAP-                                   ensure the FW EOP-3.0A, Steam      16871-P, Section                                     isolation valves Generator Tube      6.4; DBD-ME-027.                                     are closed, and Rupture.            (NOT TCA due to                                     reduce AFW flow additional failure)                                 to SG 1-04.
Page 4 of 53 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 1 Rev. 3
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize to IC18 and LOAD 2017 NRC Scenario 1.
DEMAND    INITIATING EVENT TYPE MALF #                              DESCRIPTION VALUE PARAMETER SETUP    IRF      FWR021      MDAFWP 1-02 Breaker Racked Out                        f:0        K0 IMF      RP15E      Reactor Trip Breakers Jammed Closed                  f:1       K0 6
IOR    DIED1B41    Bus Breaker CS-1B4-1 Fails to Open                    f:3       K0 8      IMF      FW38D      SG (1-04) FWIV Fails to Close                        f:1      K0 (2) 1      IMF       RX08A      Pressurizer Pressure Channel (PT-455) fails high  f:2500        K1 2      IMF        CH10      CRDM Vent Fan #1 trips                                f:1        K2 3     IMF       RX02G      SG 1-04 Steam Flow (FI-542A) fails low                f:0      K3 4      IMF       RP05A      NR Cold Leg 1 Temp (TE-411B) fails low             f:510        K4 5     IMF       FW03B     Main Feedwater Pump B trip                           f:1       K5 IMF       FW03A     Main Feedwater Pump A trip                           f:1     K5 +180 Reactor Fails to trip -Reactor trip breakers 6      IMF      RP15E                                                            f:1       K0 jammed closed IOR     DIED1B41     Bus Breakers CS-1B4-1 Fails to open                   f:3       K0 IRF     RPR112     Locally open Reactor Trip Breaker Train A             f:2       K10 6
IRF     RPR113     Locally open Reactor Trip Breaker Train B             f:2       K10 7     IMF       SG02D     SG (1-04) Tube Rupture (2 tubes)                     f:2       (1) 8     IMF     FW38D       SG (1-04) FWIV fails to close                         f:1     K0 (2)
(1) {LORPRTBAL_1.Value} IMF SG02D f:2 r:60 Tube rupture will be set to actuate upon the RTB lights changing from red to green (60 second ramp)
(2) {DIFWHS2137.Value=0} DMF FW38D Allow 1-HV-2137 SG 1-04 FWIV to close with handswitch Page 5 of 53 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 1 Rev. 3
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Simulator Operator: INITIALIZE to IC18 and LOAD NRC Scenario 1.
ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE.
ENSURE RED Danger Tag on MDAFWP 1-02 and place in PULL-OUT ENSURE GEM Box PLACED on 1-HS-2450A for MDAFWP 1-01 ENSURE all Control board Tags are removed.
ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions (771 ppm)
ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed.
ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 10 Mwe/min.
ENSURE 60/90 buttons DEPRESSED on ASD ENSURE ASD speakers are ON at half volume.
ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover.
ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk:
                        - COPY of IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.5, Operating at Constant Turbine Load.
ENSURE Control Rods are in AUTO with Bank D at 215 steps.
Control Room Annunciators in Alarm:
PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.2 - IR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.6 - RX  10% PWR P-10 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.2 - IR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.2 - PR TRN A LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK PCIP-4.2 - PR TRN B LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK 1-SSII2 - Train B MDAFW is Solid Red Page 6 of 53 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 1 Rev. 3
 
Appendix D                                       Scenario Event Description                             Form ES-D-1 Facility:           CPNPP 1 & 2                     Scenario No.:       2     Op Test No.:     June 2017 NRC Examiners:                                                      Operators:
Initial Conditions: 100% power MOL - RCS Boron is 771 ppm (by sample). MDAFWP 1-02 is out of service for scheduled maintenance.
Turnover: Maintain steady-state power conditions. Severe weather has been reported in the area. The Station has entered ABN-907, Acts of Nature. Pressurizer Steam Space Sample is in progress by Chemistry.
Critical Tasks: CT       Isolate Reactor Coolant System Leakage Paths in accordance with ECA-0.0A, Loss of All AC Power prior to exiting ECA-0.0A.
CT     Restore Power to Bus 1EA1 in accordance with ECA-0.0A, Loss of All AC Power, prior to exit from ECA-0.0A.
CT     Manually start RHR Pump 1-01 in accordance with EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 or EOP-1.0A, Attachment 1A prior to exiting EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Event No.     Malf. No.         Event Type*                                   Event Description C (RO, BOP, SRO) 1         ED07A                              Loss of Inverter (IV1PC1)
TS (SRO)
C (BOP, SRO) 2        SW01B                                SSW Pump 1-02 trips TS (SRO) 3         CV16A       I (RO, SRO)             VCT Level Channel LT-112 Fails Low FW14B       R (RO)                 Heater Drain Pump 1-02 Trip 4          TC09I      C (BOP, SRO)           Automatic Turbine Runback Failure RD15A       TS (SRO)               Rods fail to control in automatic 5           ED01       M (RO, BOP, SRO)       Loss of All AC Power Due to Loss of Offsite Power Emergency Diesel Generator 1-01 fails to start 6          EG15A      C (BOP, SRO)
Emergency Diesel Generator 1-02 in pull-out due to SSW pump trip Pressurizer Steam Space Sample Valves (1/1-4165A & 1/1-4176A) 7          OVRD        C (RO, SRO) fail to auto close. Manual closure required.
8         RC08A2       M (RO, BOP, SRO) LBLOCA occurs when DG 1-01 is Emergency Started 9         RH01C       C (BOP)                 RHR Pump 1-01 fails to auto-start from sequencer
      *   (N)ormal,     (R)eactivity,   (I)nstrument,     (C)omponent,   (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications Actual               Target Quantitative Attributes 9     Total malfunctions (5-8) 4     Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 4     Abnormal events (2-4) 2     Major transients (1-2) 2     EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1      EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 3      Critical tasks (2-3)
Page 1 of 51 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 2 Rev. 3
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 SCENARIO 2  


==SUMMARY==
==SUMMARY==
The crew will assume the watch at 100% power with no scheduled activities per IPO-003A, Power Operations. Severe weather has been reported in the area. MDAFWP 1-02 is tagged out for scheduled maintenance. A Pressurizer Steam Space sample is in progress. Event 1 The first event is a loss of Inverter IV1PC1, crew actions are in accordance with ABN-603, Loss of a Protection or Instrument Bus, and include stabilizing the plant, restoring an alternate power source, and verification of instrument restoration. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications and determine that TS 3.8.9 is applicable during the loss and exited upon power restoration. Event 2 The next event is a trip of Station Service Water Pump 1-02. The crew will enter ABN-501, Section 2.0, Station Service Water Pump Trip. Various equipment controls, as directed by ABN-501, are placed in PULL OUT to prevent starting with no cooling water available. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications. Event 3 VCT level channel LT-112 will fail low. This will result in an automatic makeup. The RO will respond in accordance with the ALM and stop the auto makeup. The crew will refer to ABN-105, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction to place the makeup system into manual alignment until automatic control is restored. Event 4 The next event is a trip of a Heater Drain Pump with an automatic turbine runback failure. The crew responds per ABN-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain System Malfunction, Section, 4.0. When it is determined that automatic plant response has not activated, control rods are placed/verified in auto and a manual Turbine Runback will be initiated. The control rods will fail to operate in auto, and must be manually controlled by the RO. The crew will stabilize load at 700 MWe. During this event, control rod position may drop below the Rod Insertion Limit (RIL) and when informed, the SRO will refer to Technical Specifications. Events 5, 6, 7 The major event is a Loss of Offsite Power with a failure of Diesel Generator 1-01 to automatically start. Operators will perform an emergency start of DG 1-01 in accordance with ECA-0.0A, Loss of All AC Power. The event is complicated by the Pressurizer Steam Space Sample in progress and the valves must be manually closed. Event 8 A LBLOCA will occur (delayed by 120 seconds) when DG 1-01 is emergency started. RHR Pump1-01 fails to auto-start from the SI sequencer; it is a critical task to manually start the only available RHR Pump. Entries into both FRP-0.1A, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition and FRZ-0.1, Response to High Containment Pressure, will be required; however the actions of these procedures will not be substantive. Termination Criteria This scenario is terminated when the crew has performed the actions of EOP-1.0, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, and determined a transition to EOS-1.3 A, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation is required OR if conditions are met to transfer to EOS-1.3A due to RWST level.
 
Page 3 of 51 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 2 Rev. 3 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2   Risk Significance:   Failure of risk important system prior to trip:     Loss of Inverter IV1PC1 Loss of SSWP 1-02 / DG 1-02 Turbine Runback Failure   Loss of All AC Power  Risk significant core damage sequence: LOCA Failure of RHR Pump 1-01   Risk significant operator actions: Isolate RCS Leakage Paths Restore Safeguards Bus Manual Start of RHR Pump 1-01 Page 4 of 51 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 2 Rev. 3 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2     Critical Task Determination Critical Task Safety Significance Cueing Measurable Performance Indicators Performance Feedback  Isolate Reactor Coolant System Leakage Paths in accordance with ECA-0.0A, Loss of All AC Power prior to exiting ECA-0.0A. Take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. Procedural direction at ECA-0.0A Step 3 to minimize RCS inventory loss. Valve position indication and letdown flow. The operator will manually close the Letdown Isolation Valves and Primary Sample Isolation Valves. Valve position will change and letdown flow will lower to zero. MLB indication for closed valve position. Restore Power to Bus 1EA1 in accordance with ECA-0.0A, Loss of All AC Power, prior to exit from ECA-0.0A. Recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component resulting in degraded ECCS capacity. Procedural direction at ECA-0.0A Step 5 to restore power via EDG 1-01 to Safeguard Bus 1EA1. Bus voltage indication and EDG parameters. The operator will manually perform an emergency start on EDG 1-01 using the handswitch on CB-11. Indication of DG running and loading via bus voltage and frequency. Manually Start RHR Pump 1-01 in accordance with EOP-0.0A Attachment 2 or EOP-1.0A, Attachment 1A prior to exiting EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Procedural direction in EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 to verify RHR Pumps running. Also procedural direction in EOP-1.0A, Attachment 1A to manually start ECCS pumps as necessary to maintain PRZR level. RHR Pump 1-02 in this case has no power, therefore RHR Pump 1-01 must be manually started to provide makeup flow to the RCS as this is a LBLOCA and RHR flow is required. The operator will start RHR Pump 1-01 using handswitch 1/1-APRH1, RHRP 1 on CB-04. Indication of pump start including light indication, flow and discharge pressure on CB-04.
The crew will assume the watch at 100% power with no scheduled activities per IPO-003A, Power Operations. Severe weather has been reported in the area. MDAFWP 1-02 is tagged out for scheduled maintenance. A Pressurizer Steam Space sample is in progress.
Page 5 of 51 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 2 Rev. 3 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2    SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP  INITIALIZE to IC-18 and LOAD NRC Scenario 2. EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION DEMAND VALUE INITIATING PARAMETER SETUP IRF FWR021 MDAFWP 1-02 Breaker Racked Out f:0 K0 4   IMF TC09I Automatic Turbine Runback Failure f:1 K0  6 IMF EG15A DG 1-01 Fails to Auto Start f:1 K0 7 IOR LOANMLB 1A2_1   PSS Valve MLB Light 1-4165A f:1 K0 IOR LOANMLB 1B2_1    PSS Valve MLB Light 1-4167A f:1 K0 9 IMF RH01C RHR Pump 1-01 fails to start on sequencer f:1 K0 1 IMF ED07A Loss of Inverter (IV1PC1) f:1 K1 1 IRF EDR01 Transfer 1PC1 to alternate power f:0 K10 2 IMF SW01B Loss of SSW Pump 1-02 f:1 K2 3 IMF CV16A VCT Level Channel LT-112 Fails Low f:0 K3 4 IMF FW14B Heater Drain Pump 1-02 Trip f:1 K4 4 IMF RD15A Rods fail to move in Auto f:1 K4 4 IMF TC09I Automatic Turbine Runback Failure f:1 K0 5 IMF ED01 Loss of Offsite Power f:1 K5 6 IMF EG15A Diesel Generator 1-01 Fails to Auto Start f:1 K0 7 IMF OVRD PRZR Steam Space Sample Valves (1/1-4165A & 1/1-4176A) Failure f:1 K0  8 IMF RC08A2 LBLOCA linked to DG Emergency Start {DIEG1DG1E.Value=4} f:1 +120  9 IMF RH01C RHR Pump 1-01 fails to start on sequencer f:1 K0 Page 6 of 51 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 2 Rev. 3 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2   Simulator Operator:  INITIALIZE to IC-18 and LOAD NRC Scenario 2. ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE. ENSURE RED Danger Tag on MDAFWP 1-02 and place in PULL-OUT. ENSURE GEM Box PLACED on 1-HS-2450A for MDAFWP 1-01. ENSURE all Control Board Tags are removed. ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions (771 ppm). ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed. ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 10 MWe/minute. ENSURE 60/90 buttons DEPRESSED on ASD. ENSURE ASD speakers are ON to half volume. ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover. ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk: - COPY of IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.5, Operating at Constant Turbine Load. ENSURE Control Rods are in AUTO with Bank D at 215 steps. Control Room Annunciators in Alarm: PCIP-1.1 SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.2 IR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.4 CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.6  RX 0% PWR P-10 PCIP-2.1 SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.2 IR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.5 SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.2 PR TRN A LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK PCIP-4.2 PR TRN B LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK 1-SSII2   Train B MDAFW is Solid Red Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1   Page 1 of 39 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 3 Rev. 3  Facility: CPNPP 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: June 2017 NRC Examiners:   Operators:             Initial Conditions: 1 x 10-8 amps following a refueling outage. MDAFWPs are maintaining Steam Generator Water Levels 60-75%. Steam dumps are in Steam Pressure mode. Boron is 1669 ppm (by sample). Turnover: Raise power to 3% per IPO-002A, Plant Startup From Hot Standby, Section 5.4 Critical Tasks: CT 1 - Initiate a MSLI or Manually close MSLI valves, due to failure to automatically isolate, prior to exiting EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, or EOP-2.0, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. CT 2 - Trip reactor coolant pumps within 5 minutes upon a loss of Subcooling per EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection OR EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 - R (RO, SRO) N (BOP) Raise power to 2% to 3% 2 TP06A TP07B C (BOP, SRO) Turbine Plant Cooling Water Pump 1 Trip   Turbine Plant Cooling Water Pump 2 Failure to Auto-Start 3 OVRD C (RO, SRO) Letdown HX Outlet flow controller Failure TK-130 fails low, TCV-129 fails to automatically divert 4 RX08B RX16B I (RO, SRO) TS (SRO)) PT-456 PZR Pressure Transmitter fails high, PORV PCV-456 fails 25% open  5 FW24B C (BOP, SRO) TS (SRO) AFW Pump 1-02 trips, manual start of TDAFW Pump required   6 RD09B6 RD04B6 RD04F6 RC19C M (ALL) Seismic event, Ejected rod, SBLOCA @ 1500 gpm, Stuck rod 7 MS02 M (ALL) Main Steam line leak downstream of the MSIVs (MSLI does not occur automatically) * (N)ormal,   (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,   (C)omponent,    (M)ajor,   (TS)Technical Specifications Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 7 Total malfunctions (5-8) 2 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 4 Abnormal events (2-4) 2 Major transients (1-2) 2 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 0 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 2 Critical tasks (2-3)
Event 1 The first event is a loss of Inverter IV1PC1, crew actions are in accordance with ABN-603, Loss of a Protection or Instrument Bus, and include stabilizing the plant, restoring an alternate power source, and verification of instrument restoration. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications and determine that TS 3.8.9 is applicable during the loss and exited upon power restoration.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3   Page 2 of 39 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 3 Rev. 3  SCENARIO 3  
Event 2 The next event is a trip of Station Service Water Pump 1-02. The crew will enter ABN-501, Section 2.0, Station Service Water Pump Trip. Various equipment controls, as directed by ABN-501, are placed in PULL OUT to prevent starting with no cooling water available. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.
Event 3 VCT level channel LT-112 will fail low. This will result in an automatic makeup. The RO will respond in accordance with the ALM and stop the auto makeup. The crew will refer to ABN-105, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction to place the makeup system into manual alignment until automatic control is restored.
Event 4 The next event is a trip of a Heater Drain Pump with an automatic turbine runback failure. The crew responds per ABN-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain System Malfunction, Section, 4.0. When it is determined that automatic plant response has not activated, control rods are placed/verified in auto and a manual Turbine Runback will be initiated. The control rods will fail to operate in auto, and must be manually controlled by the RO. The crew will stabilize load at 700 MWe. During this event, control rod position may drop below the Rod Insertion Limit (RIL) and when informed, the SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.
Events 5, 6, 7 The major event is a Loss of Offsite Power with a failure of Diesel Generator 1-01 to automatically start. Operators will perform an emergency start of DG 1-01 in accordance with ECA-0.0A, Loss of All AC Power. The event is complicated by the Pressurizer Steam Space Sample in progress and the valves must be manually closed.
Event 8 A LBLOCA will occur (delayed by 120 seconds) when DG 1-01 is emergency started. RHR Pump1-01 fails to auto-start from the SI sequencer; it is a critical task to manually start the only available RHR Pump. Entries into both FRP-0.1A, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition and FRZ-0.1, Response to High Containment Pressure, will be required; however the actions of these procedures will not be substantive.
Termination Criteria This scenario is terminated when the crew has performed the actions of EOP-1.0, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, and determined a transition to EOS-1.3 A, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation is required OR if conditions are met to transfer to EOS-1.3A due to RWST level.
Page 2 of 51 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 2 Rev. 3
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Risk Significance:
Failure of risk important system prior to trip:   Loss of Inverter IV1PC1 Loss of SSWP 1-02 / DG 1-02 Turbine Runback Failure Risk significant core damage sequence:             Loss LOCAof All AC Power Failure of RHR Pump 1-01 significant operator actions:
Risk                                              Isolate RCS Leakage Paths Restore Safeguards Bus Manual Start of RHR Pump 1-01 Page 3 of 51 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 2 Rev. 3
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Critical Task Determination Measurable Safety                                                          Performance Critical Task                                 Cueing             Performance Significance                                                          Feedback Indicators Isolate Reactor     Take one or more    Procedural direction at The operator will      Valve position will Coolant System      actions that would  ECA-0.0A Step 3 to     manually close the      change and Leakage Paths in    prevent a challenge minimize RCS            Letdown Isolation      letdown flow will accordance with    to plant safety. inventory loss. Valve  Valves and Primary      lower to zero.
ECA-0.0A, Loss of                        position indication and Sample Isolation        MLB indication for All AC Power prior                      letdown flow.          Valves.                 closed valve to exiting                                                                              position.
ECA-0.0A.
Restore Power to   Recognize a failure  Procedural direction at The operator will      Indication of DG Bus 1EA1 in        or an incorrect      ECA-0.0A Step 5 to      manually perform an     running and accordance with    automatic actuation restore power via EDG  emergency start on      loading via bus ECA-0.0A, Loss of  of an ESF system    1-01 to Safeguard Bus   EDG 1-01 using the      voltage and All AC Power, prior or component        1EA1. Bus voltage       handswitch on CB-11. frequency.
to exit from        resulting in         indication and EDG ECA-0.0A.           degraded ECCS        parameters.
capacity.
Manually Start      Recognize a failure Procedural direction in The operator will start Indication of pump RHR Pump 1-01 in    or an incorrect      EOP-0.0A, Attachment   RHR Pump 1-01 using    start including light accordance with    automatic actuation  2 to verify RHR         handswitch              indication, flow EOP-0.0A            of an ESF system    Pumps running. Also    1/1-APRH1, RHRP 1      and discharge  or    or component.       procedural direction in on CB-04.              pressure on EOP-1.0A,                                EOP-1.0A, Attachment                            CB-04. A prior                      1A to manually start to exiting                              ECCS pumps as EOP-1.0A, Loss of                       necessary to maintain Reactor or                              PRZR level. RHR Secondary Coolant.                       Pump 1-02 in this case has no power, therefore RHR Pump 1-01 must be manually started to provide makeup flow to the RCS as this is a LBLOCA and RHR flow is required.
Page 4 of 51 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 2 Rev. 3
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP INITIALIZE to IC-18 and LOAD NRC Scenario 2.
DEMAND  INITIATING EVENT TYPE  MALF #                  DESCRIPTION VALUE PARAMETER SETUP  IRF  FWR021      MDAFWP 1-02 Breaker Racked Out              f:0      K0 4   IMF    TC09I    Automatic Turbine Runback Failure          f:1      K0 6    IMF  EG15A      DG 1-01 Fails to Auto Start                f:1       K0 LOANMLB IOR             PSS Valve MLB Light 1-4165A                f:1      K0 1A2_1 7
LOANMLB IOR              PSS Valve MLB Light 1-4167A                 f:1       K0 1B2_1 9   IMF   RH01C     RHR Pump 1-01 fails to start on sequencer   f:1       K0 1   IMF   ED07A     Loss of Inverter (IV1PC1)                   f:1       K1 1   IRF   EDR01     Transfer 1PC1 to alternate power           f:0     K10 2   IMF   SW 01B    Loss of SSW Pump 1-02                       f:1       K2 3   IMF   CV16A     VCT Level Channel LT-112 Fails Low         f:0       K3 4   IMF   FW14B     Heater Drain Pump 1-02 Trip                 f:1       K4 4   IMF   RD15A     Rods fail to move in Auto                   f:1       K4 4   IMF   TC09I     Automatic Turbine Runback Failure           f:1       K0 5   IMF   ED01     Loss of Offsite Power                       f:1       K5 6   IMF   EG15A     Diesel Generator 1-01 Fails to Auto Start   f:1       K0 PRZR Steam Space Sample Valves 7    IMF  OVRD                                                  f:1      K0 (1/1-4165A & 1/1-4176A) Failure LBLOCA linked to DG Emergency Start 8    IMF  RC08A2                                                  f:1      +120
{DIEG1DG1E.Value=4}
9   IMF   RH01C     RHR Pump 1-01 fails to start on sequencer   f:1       K0 Page 5 of 51 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 2 Rev. 3
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Simulator Operator:  INITIALIZE to IC-18 and LOAD NRC Scenario 2.
ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE.
ENSURE RED Danger Tag on MDAFWP 1-02 and place in PULL-OUT.
ENSURE GEM Box PLACED on 1-HS-2450A for MDAFWP 1-01.
ENSURE all Control Board Tags are removed.
ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions (771 ppm).
ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed.
ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 10 MWe/minute.
ENSURE 60/90 buttons DEPRESSED on ASD.
ENSURE ASD speakers are ON to half volume.
ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover.
ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk:
                        - COPY of IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.5, Operating at Constant Turbine Load.
ENSURE Control Rods are in AUTO with Bank D at 215 steps.
Control Room Annunciators in Alarm:
PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.2 - IR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.6 - RX 10% PWR P-10 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.2 - IR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.2 - PR TRN A LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK PCIP-4.2 - PR TRN B LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK 1-SSII2 - Train B MDAFW is Solid Red Page 6 of 51 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 2 Rev. 3
 
Appendix D                                         Scenario Outline                                   Form ES-D-1 Facility:        CPNPP 1 & 2                         Scenario No.:       3     Op Test No.:     June 2017 NRC Examiners:                                                       Operators:
                              -8 Initial Conditions:     1 x 10 amps following a refueling outage. MDAFWPs are maintaining Steam Generator Water Levels 60-75%. Steam dumps are in Steam Pressure mode. Boron is 1669 ppm (by sample).
Turnover: Raise power to 3% per IPO-002A, Plant Startup From Hot Standby, Section 5.4 Critical Tasks: CT 1 - Initiate a MSLI or Manually close MSLI valves, due to failure to automatically isolate, prior to exiting EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, or EOP-2.0, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.
CT 2 - Trip reactor coolant pumps within 5 minutes upon a loss of Subcooling per EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection OR EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
Event No.       Malf. No.         Event Type*                               Event Description R (RO, SRO) 1              -                              Raise power to 2% to 3%
N (BOP)
TP06A                              Turbine Plant Cooling Water Pump 1 Trip 2                        C (BOP, SRO)
TP07B                              Turbine Plant Cooling Water Pump 2 Failure to Auto-Start Letdown HX Outlet flow controller Failure TK-130 fails low, 3            OVRD        C (RO, SRO)
TCV-129 fails to automatically divert RX08B         I (RO, SRO)           PT-456 PZR Pressure Transmitter fails high, PORV PCV-456 4
RX16B        TS (SRO))            fails 25% open C (BOP, SRO) 5          FW24B                              AFW Pump 1-02 trips, manual start of TDAFW Pump required TS (SRO)
RD09B6 RD04B6 6                        M (ALL)               Seismic event, Ejected rod, SBLOCA @ 1500 gpm, Stuck rod RD04F6 RC19C Main Steam line leak downstream of the MSIVs (MSLI does not 7            MS02        M (ALL) occur automatically)
      *   (N)ormal,     (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,   (C)omponent,    (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications Actual                   Target Quantitative Attributes 7     Total malfunctions (5-8) 2     Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 4     Abnormal events (2-4) 2     Major transients (1-2) 2     EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 0     EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 2      Critical tasks (2-3)
Page 1 of 39 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 3 Rev. 3
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 SCENARIO 3  


==SUMMARY==
==SUMMARY==
Event 1 In accordance with turnover instructions, the crew begins raising power to 2% to 3%, per IPO-002A, Plant Startup from Hot Standby, Section 5.4, Increasing Reactor Power to Approximately 2% Following Reactor Startup and Establishing Main Feedwater Flow to the SGs. Event 2 When the lead examiner is satisfied with the power increase (stable between 2-3%) a trip of the running TPCW Pump will occur. The standby pump will fail to automatically start and manual operator action will be required to start the standby pump. Crew response will be per ABN-306, Turbine Plant Cooling Water System Malfunction, Section 3.0. The crew will start the standby pump and verify other parameters for the system. Event 3 The next event is a failure of the Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet Flow Controller, TK-130. The controller output will fail to zero demand and cause TCV-4646, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL valve to close. This will result in Letdown Heat Exchanger High temperature alarms and Letdown flow will fail to divert to the VCT on high temperature. The crew will respond per the ALM, manually divert letdown flow to the VCT, and take manual control of TK-130 and raise demand to establish a Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet temperature of approximately 95°F. Event 4 Pressurizer Pressure channel PT-456 will fail high. PORV PCV-456 will open and when closed will stick at 25% open. The crew will enter ABN-705, Section 2.0, Pressurizer Pressure Instrument Malfunction. The primary action is to close the PORV block valve. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications. Event 5 After the crew has control of RCS pressure, the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (MDAFWP) 1-02 will trip. The crew will enter ABN-305, Auxiliary Feedwater System Malfunction. The crew will manually start the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFWP) and feed Steam Generators 1-03 and 1-04 with the TDAFWP. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications. Event 6 A seismic event occurs; this is a precursor for upcoming events. The crew will enter ABN-907, Acts of Nature, Section 2.0, Earthquake. 120 seconds after the seismic annunciators have come in, Control Rod B6 will partially eject from the core (SBLOCA) and Control Rod F6 will stick at 168 steps on the reactor trip. The reactor will trip and the crew will enter EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Emergency Boration verification via Safety Injection flow will be required due to the 2 Stuck Control Rods. The crew must secure RCPs within 5 minutes of loss of subcooling. Event 7 A Main steam line break in the turbine building will occur (downstream of the MSIVs,) as a result of the seismic event, requiring the MSIVs to be manually closed as they will fail to close automatically. Terminating Criteria Scenario will be terminated when the crew has RESET RHR Auto Switchover in EOP-1.0A, or at the lead Examiners discretion, Terminate the scenario.
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3  Page 3 of 39 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 3 Rev. 3 Risk Significance: Failure of risk significant systems prior to trip: PORV stuck open MDAFW Pump trips Risk significant core damage sequence: Rod Ejection then Small Break LOCA Main Steam Line Break   Risk significant operator actions: Manual start of TDAFWP Manual Main Steam line Isolation Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3   Page 4 of 39 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 3 Rev. 3 Critical Task Determination Critical Task Safety Significance Cueing Measurable Performance Indicators Performance Feedback  Initiate a MSLI or Manually close MSLI valves, due to failure to automatically isolate, prior to exiting EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, or EOP-2.0, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation. Take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. SG pressure along with RCS pressure and temperature falling. The operator will manually close the MSIVs from CB-07. All MSIV valve light indications will change from Red lit to Green lit and steam flow will go to zero for  SGs. Trip reactor coolant pumps within 5 minutes upon a loss of Subcooling per EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection OR EOP-1.0A Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. Take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. FSAR II.K.3.5; WCAP-9584; WOG ERG Generic Issue for RCP Trip / Restart. Procedurally driven from EOP-0.0A and EOP-1.0A Foldout pages. Availability of Subcooling indication both on meters and computer. The operator will secure ALL RCPs using the handswitches on CB-05. Indication of pump stop including light indication, flow and motor current.
Event 1 In accordance with turnover instructions, the crew begins raising power to 2% to 3%, per IPO-002A, Plant Startup from Hot Standby, Section 5.4, Increasing Reactor Power to Approximately 2% Following Reactor Startup and Establishing Main Feedwater Flow to the SGs.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3   Page 5 of 39 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 3 Rev. 3     SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP  INITIALIZE to IC 57 and LOAD NRC Scenario 3. EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION DEMAND VALUE INITIATING PARAMETER 2 IMF TP07B Turbine Plant Cooling Water Pump 2 Fail to  Auto-Start f:1 K0  7 IMF SS02A1 MSL Isolation Train A Master Relay Failure f:1 K0 7 IMF SS02A2 MSL Isolation Train B Master Relay Failure 2 IMF TP06A Turbine Plant Cooling Water Pump 1 Trip f:1 K2 2 IMF TP07B Turbine Plant Cooling Water Pump 2 Fail to  Auto-Start f:1 K0  3 IOR OVRD Letdown HX Outlet Flow Controller Failure (TK-130) Fails Low, with a failure of TCV-129 to divert f:10 OVRD K3 + 60 4 IMF RX08B PT-456 PZR Pressure Transmitter fails high f:2500 K4 4 IMF RX16B PORV PCV-456 fails 25% open. f:25 K4 + 4 4 IRF RCR24 PORV Block Valve breaker f:0 K11 5 IMF FW24B AFW Pump 1-02 trips f:1 K5 6 IRF AN2A_02 Seismic Event f:4 K6 AN2A_03 Seismic Event f:4 K6 IMF RD09B6 Ejected Rod B6 f:228 K6 + 120 RD04B6 Stuck Rod B6 (ejected for indication only) f:228 K6 + 120 RD04F6 Stuck Rod F6 f:168 K6 +120 RC19C SBLOCA f:1500 K6 + 120 (1) 7 IMF MS02 Main Steam Line leak downstream of the MSIVs f:2e+006 K6 + 270 7 IMF SS02A1 MSL Isolation Train A Master Relay Failure f:1 K0 7 IMF SS02A2 MSL Isolation Train B Master Relay Failure (1) {DIRPSIA2.Value=1} MMF RC19C f:1750 r:60 Modify SBLOCA to 1750 gpm on SI Initiation (60 sec ramp)
Event 2 When the lead examiner is satisfied with the power increase (stable between 2-3%) a trip of the running TPCW Pump will occur. The standby pump will fail to automatically start and manual operator action will be required to start the standby pump. Crew response will be per ABN-306, Turbine Plant Cooling Water System Malfunction, Section 3.0. The crew will start the standby pump and verify other parameters for the system.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3  Page 6 of 39 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 3 Rev. 3 Simulator Operator: INITIALIZE to IC 57 and LOAD NRC Scenario 3 ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE ENSURE all Control Board Tags are removed ENSURE Operator Aid reflects current boron conditions (1669 ppm BOL) ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed (C at 214 / D at 99) ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 8.9 MWe/minute ENSURE 60/90 buttons DEPRESSED on ASD ENSURE ASD speakers are ON to half volume ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk: - COPY of IPO-002A, Plant Startup From Hot Standby, Section 5.4,   Increasing Reactor Power to Approximately 2% Following Reactor   Startup and Establishing Main Feedwater Flow to the SGs ENSURE Control Rods are in MANUAL with Bank C at 214 steps and Bank D at 99   MODE2 ENSURE Steam Dump pot is set for 6.70 turns ENSURE Alarms in service for CV-01 and CV-03 on Panel Overview PLACE Pink MANUAL Magnet (Rectangle) above 1/1-RBSS, Rod Bank Select Switch Control Room Annunciators in Alarm: 1-ALB-6D-1.1 SR HI VOLT FAIL 1-ALB-6D-3.1 SR SHTDN FLUX ALM BLK PCIP-1.1 SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.3 AMSAC BLK TURB < 40% PWR C-20 PCIP-1.4 CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.7 RX  50% PWR TURB TRIP PERM P-9 PCIP-2.1 SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.4 LO TURB PWR ROD WITHDRWL BLK C-5 PCIP-2.5 SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.5  -7 PCIP-4.5 -LOOP FLO PERM P-8 PCIP-4.6  -13 1-ALB-7B-1.6 FW FLUSH VLV NOT CLOSE HV-2166 1-ALB-7B-1.12 FWPT A TRIP 1-ALB-8A-1.10 1 OF 4 TURB STOP VLV CLOSE                                                                             1-ALB-9A Various Heater Drain and Extraction Steam Alarms Appendix D        Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Page 1 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 4 Rev. 3 Facility: CPNPP 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: June 2017 NRC Examiners:   Operators:             Initial Conditions: 92% power MOL RCS boron is 777 ppm (by sample). Power has been reduced for Main Turbine testing; Control Bank D Rods are at 202 steps in Automatic. MDAFW Pump 1-02 is out of service for an oil change. Turnover: Maintain 92% power conditions. Place RWST on Recirculation using Containment Spray pump 1-01. Critical Tasks: CT Trip all Reactor Coolant Pumps in accordance with FRH-0.1A, Response To Loss Of Secondary Heat Sink, prior to Initiating Bleed and Feed Cooling. CT Initiate RCS Feed and Bleed in accordance with FRH-0.1A, Response To Loss Of Secondary Heat Sink, such that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently for Intermediate Head Injection to occur, prior to all Steam Generator Wide Range levels lowering to 0%. Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 - N (BOP, SRO) Recirculate the Refueling Water Storage Tank with Containment Spray Pump 1-01. 2 MS13C I (RO, SRO) SG 1-03 Steam Line Pressure Fails High (PT-2327) ARV Opens 3 CS02A TS (SRO) Containment Spray Pump 1-01 Trip. 4 NI04E I (RO, BOP, SRO) TS (SRO) NI42 Power Range Channel fails high. 5 CH03 C (BOP, SRO) Neutron Detector Well Fan 9 trips on motor overload 6 FW22 R (RO) C (BOP, SRO) Low Pressure Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve (PV-2286) Fails Open. 7 FW20A M (RO, BOP, SRO) Condensate Pump 1-01 trips; requiring a manual reactor trip. 8 ED05H FW09A M (RO, BOP, SRO) Loss of 6.9KV Bus 1EA1 (86-1 relay) when Generator Output Breakers Open TDAFW Pump trips on overspeed, Loss of all AFW 9 RX16B C (RO, SRO) PORV 456 fails to open manually or automatically * (N)ormal,   (R)eactivity,   (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor,   (TS)Technical Specifications Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 9 Total malfunctions (5-8) 3 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 5 Abnormal events (2-4) 2 Major transients (1-2) 1 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 2 Critical tasks (2-3)
Event 3 The next event is a failure of the Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet Flow Controller, TK-130. The controller output will fail to zero demand and cause TCV-4646, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL valve to close. This will result in Letdown Heat Exchanger High temperature alarms and Letdown flow will fail to divert to the VCT on high temperature. The crew will respond per the ALM, manually divert letdown flow to the VCT, and take manual control of TK-130 and raise demand to establish a Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet temperature of approximately 95&deg;F.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4  Page 2 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 4 Rev. 3 SCENARIO 4  
Event 4 Pressurizer Pressure channel PT-456 will fail high. PORV PCV-456 will open and when closed will stick at 25% open. The crew will enter ABN-705, Section 2.0, Pressurizer Pressure Instrument Malfunction.
The primary action is to close the PORV block valve. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.
Event 5 After the crew has control of RCS pressure, the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (MDAFWP) 1-02 will trip. The crew will enter ABN-305, Auxiliary Feedwater System Malfunction. The crew will manually start the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFWP) and feed Steam Generators 1-03 and 1-04 with the TDAFWP. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.
Event 6 A seismic event occurs; this is a precursor for upcoming events. The crew will enter ABN-907, Acts of Nature, Section 2.0, Earthquake. 120 seconds after the seismic annunciators have come in, Control Rod B6 will partially eject from the core (SBLOCA) and Control Rod F6 will stick at 168 steps on the reactor trip. The reactor will trip and the crew will enter EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Emergency Boration verification via Safety Injection flow will be required due to the 2 Stuck Control Rods. The crew must secure RCPs within 5 minutes of loss of subcooling.
Event 7 A Main steam line break in the turbine building will occur (downstream of the MSIVs,) as a result of the seismic event, requiring the MSIVs to be manually closed as they will fail to close automatically.
Terminating Criteria Scenario will be terminated when the crew has RESET RHR Auto Switchover in EOP-1.0A, or at the lead Examiners discretion, Terminate the scenario.
Page 2 of 39 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 3 Rev. 3
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Risk Significance:
Failure of risk significant systems prior to trip:     PORV stuck open MDAFW Pump trips Risk significant core damage sequence:               Rod Ejection then Small Break LOCA Main Steam Line Break Risk significant operator actions:                   Manual start of TDAFWP Manual Main Steam line Isolation Page 3 of 39 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 3 Rev. 3
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Critical Task Determination Measurable Performance Critical Task   Safety Significance               Cueing             Performance Feedback Indicators Initiate a MSLI or   Take one or more        SG pressure along with    The operator will  All MSIV valve light Manually close      actions that would      RCS pressure and          manually close the indications will MSLI valves, due to prevent a challenge    temperature falling.      MSIVs from        change from Red lit failure to          to plant safety.                                  CB-07.            to Green lit and automatically                                                                             steam flow will go isolate, prior to                                                                         to zero for SGs.
exiting EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, or EOP-2.0, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.
Trip reactor coolant Take one or more       Procedurally driven from  The operator will  Indication of pump pumps within 5      actions that would     EOP-0.0A and EOP-1.0A      secure ALL RCPs    stop including light minutes upon a loss prevent a challenge    Foldout pages.            using the          indication, flow and of Subcooling per   to plant safety.        Availability of Subcooling handswitches on    motor current.
EOP-0.0A, Reactor   FSAR II.K.3.5;          indication both on meters  CB-05.
Trip or Safety       WCAP-9584; WOG          and computer.
Injection OR         ERG Generic Issue EOP-1.0A Loss of     for RCP Trip /
Reactor or           Restart.
Secondary Coolant.
Page 4 of 39 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 3 Rev. 3
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP INITIALIZE to IC 57 and LOAD NRC Scenario 3.
DEMAND    INITIATING EVENT TYPE MALF #                        DESCRIPTION VALUE    PARAMETER IMF    TP07B    Turbine Plant Cooling Water Pump 2 Fail to            f:1        K0 2
Auto-Start 7    IMF  SS02A1    MSL Isolation Train A Master Relay Failure f:1        K0 7    IMF   SS02A2    MSL Isolation Train B Master Relay Failure 2    IMF    TP06A     Turbine Plant Cooling Water Pump 1 Trip                f:1        K2 IMF   TP07B    Turbine Plant Cooling Water Pump 2 Fail to 2                                                                            f:1       K0 Auto-Start Letdown HX Outlet Flow Controller Failure             f:10 3    IOR   OVRD     (TK-130) Fails Low, with a failure of TCV-129 to               K3 + 60 divert                                              OVRD 4     IMF   RX08B     PT-456 PZR Pressure Transmitter fails high         f:2500       K4 4     IMF   RX16B     PORV PCV-456 fails 25% open.                         f:25     K4 + 4 4     IRF   RCR24     PORV Block Valve breaker                               f:0       K11 5     IMF FW24B     AFW Pump 1-02 trips                                     f:1       K5 AN2A_02   Seismic Event                                           f:4       K6 IRF AN2A_03   Seismic Event                                           f:4       K6 RD09B6   Ejected Rod B6                                       f:228     K6 + 120 6
RD04B6   Stuck Rod B6 (ejected - for indication only)         f:228     K6 + 120 IMF RD04F6   Stuck Rod F6                                         f:168     K6 +120 RC19C     SBLOCA                                               f:1500   K6 + 120 (1) 7     IMF   MS02     Main Steam Line leak downstream of the MSIVs       f:2e+006     K6 + 270 7     IMF   SS02A1   MSL Isolation Train A Master Relay Failure f:1       K0 7     IMF   SS02A2   MSL Isolation Train B Master Relay Failure (1) {DIRPSIA2.Value=1} MMF RC19C f:1750 r:60 Modify SBLOCA to 1750 gpm on SI Initiation (60 sec ramp)
Page 5 of 39 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 3 Rev. 3
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Simulator Operator: INITIALIZE to IC 57 and LOAD NRC Scenario 3 ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE ENSURE all Control Board Tags are removed ENSURE Operator Aid reflects current boron conditions (1669 ppm BOL)
ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed (C at 214 / D at 99)
ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 8.9 MWe/minute ENSURE 60/90 buttons DEPRESSED on ASD ENSURE ASD speakers are ON to half volume ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk:
                      - COPY of IPO-002A, Plant Startup From Hot Standby, Section 5.4, Increasing Reactor Power to Approximately 2% Following Reactor Startup and Establishing Main Feedwater Flow to the SGs ENSURE Control Rods are in MANUAL with Bank C at 214 steps and Bank D at 99 ENSURE PCS TT06 is set to GTGC MODE2 and on scale ENSURE Steam Dump pot is set for 6.70 turns ENSURE Alarms in service for CV-01 and CV-03 on Panel Overview PLACE Pink MANUAL Magnet (Rectangle) above 1/1-RBSS, Rod Bank Select Switch Control Room Annunciators in Alarm:
1-ALB-6D-1.1 - SR HI VOLT FAIL 1-ALB-6D-3.1 - SR SHTDN FLUX ALM BLK PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.3 - AMSAC BLK TURB < 40% PWR C-20 PCIP-1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.7 - RX  50% PWR TURB TRIP PERM P-9 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.4 - LO TURB PWR ROD WITHDRWL BLK C-5 PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.5 - RX & TURB 10% PWR P-7 PCIP-4.5 - RX  48% PWR 3-LOOP FLO PERM P-8 PCIP-4.6 - TURB 10% PWR P-13 1-ALB-7B-1.6 - FW FLUSH VLV NOT CLOSE HV-2166 1-ALB-7B-1.12 - FWPT A TRIP 1-ALB-8A-1.10 - 1 OF 4 TURB STOP VLV CLOSE 1-ALB-9A - Various Heater Drain and Extraction Steam Alarms Page 6 of 39 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 3 Rev. 3
 
Appendix D                                            Scenario Outline                                Form ES-D-1 Facility:           CPNPP 1 & 2                       Scenario No.:           4       Op Test No.: June 2017 NRC Examiners:                                                       Operators:
Initial Conditions:     92% power MOL - RCS boron is 777 ppm (by sample). Power has been reduced for Main Turbine testing; Control Bank D Rods are at 202 steps in Automatic. MDAFW Pump 1-02 is out of service for an oil change.
Turnover:       Maintain 92% power conditions. Place RWST on Recirculation using Containment Spray pump 1-01.
Critical Tasks: CT Trip all Reactor Coolant Pumps in accordance with FRH-0.1A, Response To Loss Of Secondary Heat Sink, prior to Initiating Bleed and Feed Cooling.
CT Initiate RCS Feed and Bleed in accordance with FRH-0.1A, Response To Loss Of Secondary Heat Sink, such that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently for Intermediate Head Injection to occur, prior to all Steam Generator Wide Range levels lowering to 0%.
Event No.       Malf. No.         Event Type*                                   Event Description 1                                               Recirculate the Refueling Water Storage Tank with Containment
                      -      N (BOP, SRO)
Spray Pump 1-01.
2         MS13C         I (RO, SRO)             SG 1-03 Steam Line Pressure Fails High (PT-2327) - ARV Opens 3         CS02A         TS (SRO)                 Containment Spray Pump 1-01 Trip.
I (RO, BOP, SRO) 4        NI04E                                  NI42 Power Range Channel fails high.
TS (SRO) 5        CH03          C (BOP, SRO)             Neutron Detector Well Fan 9 trips on motor overload 6         FW22         R (RO)                   Low Pressure Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve (PV-2286) Fails C (BOP, SRO)            Open.
7         FW20A         M (RO, BOP, SRO)         Condensate Pump 1-01 trips; requiring a manual reactor trip.
Loss of 6.9KV Bus 1EA1 (86-1 relay) when Generator Output ED05H 8                      M (RO, BOP, SRO)        Breakers Open FW09A TDAFW Pump trips on overspeed, Loss of all AFW 9         RX16B         C (RO, SRO)             PORV 456 fails to open manually or automatically
    *   (N)ormal,     (R)eactivity,   (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications Actual                 Target Quantitative Attributes 9       Total malfunctions (5-8) 3       Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 5       Abnormal events (2-4) 2       Major transients (1-2) 1       EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1       EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 2      Critical tasks (2-3)
Page 1 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 4 Rev. 3
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 SCENARIO 4  


==SUMMARY==
==SUMMARY==
Event 1 As directed by the turnover the crew will recirculate the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) using Containment Spray Pump 1-01 per SOP-204A, Containment Spray System, Section 5.1.3, Recirculation through the Recirculation Header. Event 2 SG 1-03 Steam Line Pressure (PT-2327) fails high opening the ARV. Crew actions are per ABN-709, STM Line, STM HDR and Turbine 1st Stage Press, Feed HDR Press Instrument Malfunction. The crew will respond by checking STM Line pressures against set point and determining the ARV is open below set point. The RO will place the ARV in manual and close the valve. Event 3 When conditions are stable, Containment Spray Pump 1-01 will trip. Actions are per ALM-0022A, 1-ALB-2B, Window 1.3 ANY CSP OVRLD TRIP. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications. Event 4 Event 4 is a failure high of NI42 Power Range Channel. The crew will enter ABN-703, Power Range Instrumentation Malfunction. Since the failure is in the high direction, rods will be rapidly inserting. This will require the operator to place rod control to Manual, per Step 1.b of ABN-703. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications. Event 5 Event 4 will be a trip of the running Neutron Detector Well Fan #9. This will alarm 2.1 CNTMT FN MASTER TRIP. The ALM will direct the crew to determine which fan has tripped and start the other fan as required using SOP-801A, Containment Ventilation System. The crew will place the tripped fan handswitch in Pull Out or Stop as applicable. Event 5 The Low Pressure Heater Bypass Valve fails open. Entry into ABN-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain System Malfunction, Section 7.0, is required and Rod Control is returned to AUTO and a Manual Turbine Runback to 900 MWe is performed. During this event, Control Rod position may drop below the Rod Insertion Limit (RIL) and when informed, the SRO will refer to Technical Specifications Event 6 Major Event, Condensate Pump 1-01 trips. Both Main Feedwater Pumps trip and the reactor will be manually tripped. The crew will enter EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Event 7 The crew will experience a loss of Bus 1EA1. This will occur at the same time the Main Generator Breaker opens on the unit trip. With MDAFW Pump 1-02 tagged out, there are no motor driven AFW pumps available. There are no Main Feedwater Pumps or Condensate Pumps available. The only source of feedwater will be the Turbine Driven AFW Pump. Events 8 & 9 The TDAFW pump will trip on overspeed, leaving no viable source of feedwater and when Heat Sink is lost the crew will transition to FRH-0.1A, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. The step for checking that both Centrifugal Charging Pumps are available will be answered with a "NO", requiring tripping of all Reactor Coolant Pumps and to initiate bleed and feed. One PORV will fail to open; this will require all reactor vessel and pressurizer head vents to be opened.
 
Scenario Event Description  NRC Scenario 4  Page 3 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 4 Rev. 3 Termination Criteria The scenario will be terminated when bleed and feed is initiated in accordance with FRH-0.1A; or at the discretion of the lead examiner. Risk Significance:   Failure of risk important system prior to trip: Loss of Containment Spray Pump 1-01       Loss of Main Feedwater Pumps due to Loss of Condensate Pumps   Risk significant core damage sequence: Loss of one Safeguards Bus (1EA1) TDAFW Pump trips on overspeed   Risk significant operator actions:   Restore Pressurizer Pressure Control Manually trip reactor on loss of all feedwater Initiate bleed and feed Scenario Event Description  NRC Scenario 4  Page 4 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 4 Rev. 3 Critical Task Determination Critical Task Safety Significance Cueing Measurable Performance Indicators Performance Feedback      Trip all Reactor Coolant Pumps in accordance with FRH-0.1A, Response To Loss Of Secondary Heat Sink, prior to Initiating Bleed and Feed Cooling. Without a source of water to provide a heat sink on the secondary side of the SGs, RCPs are tripped to extend the effectiveness if the remaining water inventory in the SGs. Procedural direction at FRH-0.1A Step 2 RNO a. to immediately stop all RCPs. The operator will manually stop RCPs using the handswitches on CB-05. Control board light and flow indications, along with loss of flow annunciators that the RCPs have stopped. Initiate RCS Bleed and Feed in accordance with FRH-0.1A, Response To Loss Of Secondary Heat Sink, such that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently for Intermediate-Head Injection to occur, prior to all Steam Generator Wide Range levels lowering to 0%. Actuating SI ensures feed path of cool water to the RCS and isolates the containment to confine any RCS releases from the bleed flow. The bleed flow through a PORV/Vent valves will ensure that enough cool water will feed from the ECCS flow path to remove sufficient decay heat. AFW flow will not be indicated on any AFW flow meter. Also no AFW pumps will be running. A RED path showing on CSFST for heat sink. The need for a heat sink as indicated by RCS temperature and pressure. Actuated SI, ensured at least one CCP and SI pump is running with flow indicated providing a feed path for the RCS. PRZR PORV as well as PRZR and Vessel vent valves open providing a bleed path for the RCS. Flow indicated on both a CCP and an SI pump. PRZR PORV open with block valve open. PRZR and Vessel vents open. RCS pressure lowering and CETs will indicate core cooling.
Event 1 As directed by the turnover the crew will recirculate the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) using Containment Spray Pump 1-01 per SOP-204A, Containment Spray System, Section 5.1.3, Recirculation through the Recirculation Header.
Scenario Event Description  NRC Scenario 4 Page 5 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 4 Rev. 3    SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR             SETUP INITIALIZE to IC 43 and LOAD NRC Scenario 4. EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION DEMAND VALUE INITIATING PARAMETER SETUP IRF FWR021 MDAFWP 1-02 Breaker Racked Out f:0 K0 8 IMF ED05H Bus 1EA1 86-1 lockout. f:1 (1) IMF FW09A TDAFW Pump trips on overspeed.  {LORPRTBAL_1.Value=1} IMF FW09A f:1 Rx Trip + 480 (3) 9 IMF RX16B PORV 456 fails to open manually or automatically f:1 K0 1 - - Recirculate RWST with CSP 1 - 2 IMF MS13C SG ARV PT-2327 Fails High ARV opens {DICSHS4764.Value=3} IMF MS13C f:1300 d:15 f:1300 CSP 1-01 start + 15 (2) 3 IMF CS02A Containment Spray Pump 1-01 Trip f:1 K3 4 IMF NI04E NI42 Power Range Channel fails high. f:200 K4 5 IMF CH03 Neutron Detector Well Fan 9 trips on motor overload f:1 K5 6 IMF FW22 Low Pressure Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve (PV-2286) fails open. f:1 K6  7 IMF FW20A Condensate Pump 1-01 trips f:1 K7 8 IMF ED05H Bus 1EA1 86-1 lockout. f:1 (1) IMF FW09A TDAFW Pump trips on overspeed.  {LORPRTBAL_1.Value=1} IMF FW09A f:1 Rx Trip + 480 (3) 9 IMF RX16B PORV 456 fails to open manually or automatically f:1 K0 (1) {LOEGW3_1.Value=1} IMF ED05H f:1 Inserts ED05H when Gen. Output Bkrs open (2) {DICSHS4764.Value=3} IMF MS13C f:1300 d:15 PT-2327 fails high 15 seconds after CSP 1-01 starts (3) {LORPRTBAL_1.Value=1} IMF FW09A Trip TDAFWP 480 seconds after Rx Trip Scenario Event Description  NRC Scenario 4  Page 6 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 4 Rev. 3 Simulator Operator: INITIALIZE to IC43 and LOAD NRC Scenario 4   ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE   ENSURE RED Danger Tag on MDAFWP 1-02 and place in PULL-OUT     ENSURE GEM Box PLACED on 1-HS-2450A for MDAFWP 1-01   ENSUURE all Control board Tags are removed   ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions (777 ppm)   ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed   ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 10 MWe/min   ENSURE 60/90 buttons DEPRESSED on ASD   ENSURE ASD speakers are ON at half volume   ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover   ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk:   - COPY of IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.5, Operating at     Constant Turbine Load   ENSURE Control Rods are in AUTO with Bank D at 202 steps     Control Room Annunciators in Alarm: PCIP-1.1 SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.2 IR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.4 CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.6 RX  10% PWR P-10 PCIP-2.1 SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.2 IR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.5 SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.2 PR TRN A LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK PCIP-4.2 PR TRN B LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK 1-SSII2   Train B MDAFW is Solid Red}}
Event 2 SG 1-03 Steam Line Pressure (PT-2327) fails high opening the ARV. Crew actions are per ABN-709, STM Line, STM HDR and Turbine 1st Stage Press, Feed HDR Press Instrument Malfunction. The crew will respond by checking STM Line pressures against set point and determining the ARV is open below set point. The RO will place the ARV in manual and close the valve.
Event 3 When conditions are stable, Containment Spray Pump 1-01 will trip. Actions are per ALM-0022A, 1-ALB-2B, Window 1.3 - ANY CSP OVRLD TRIP. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.
Event 4 Event 4 is a failure high of NI42 Power Range Channel. The crew will enter ABN-703, Power Range Instrumentation Malfunction. Since the failure is in the high direction, rods will be rapidly inserting. This will require the operator to place rod control to Manual, per Step 1.b of ABN-703. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.
Event 5 Event 4 will be a trip of the running Neutron Detector Well Fan #9. This will alarm 2.1 CNTMT FN MASTER TRIP. The ALM will direct the crew to determine which fan has tripped and start the other fan as required using SOP-801A, Containment Ventilation System. The crew will place the tripped fan handswitch in Pull Out or Stop as applicable.
Event 5 The Low Pressure Heater Bypass Valve fails open. Entry into ABN-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain System Malfunction, Section 7.0, is required and Rod Control is returned to AUTO and a Manual Turbine Runback to 900 MWe is performed. During this event, Control Rod position may drop below the Rod Insertion Limit (RIL) and when informed, the SRO will refer to Technical Specifications Event 6 Major Event, Condensate Pump 1-01 trips. Both Main Feedwater Pumps trip and the reactor will be manually tripped. The crew will enter EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Event 7 The crew will experience a loss of Bus 1EA1. This will occur at the same time the Main Generator Breaker opens on the unit trip. With MDAFW Pump 1-02 tagged out, there are no motor driven AFW pumps available. There are no Main Feedwater Pumps or Condensate Pumps available. The only source of feedwater will be the Turbine Driven AFW Pump.
Events 8 & 9 The TDAFW pump will trip on overspeed, leaving no viable source of feedwater and when Heat Sink is lost the crew will transition to FRH-0.1A, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. The step for checking that both Centrifugal Charging Pumps are available will be answered with a "NO", requiring tripping of all Reactor Coolant Pumps and to initiate bleed and feed. One PORV will fail to open; this will require all reactor vessel and pressurizer head vents to be opened.
Page 2 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 4 Rev. 3
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Termination Criteria The scenario will be terminated when bleed and feed is initiated in accordance with FRH-0.1A; or at the discretion of the lead examiner.
Risk Significance:
Failure of risk important system prior to trip:   Loss of Containment Spray Pump 1-01 Loss of Main Feedwater Pumps due to Loss of Condensate Pumps Risk significant core damage sequence:           Loss of one Safeguards Bus (1EA1)
TDAFW Pump trips on overspeed Risk significant operator actions:               Restore Pressurizer Pressure Control Manually trip reactor on loss of all feedwater Initiate bleed and feed Page 3 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 4 Rev. 3
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Critical Task Determination Measurable Safety                                                        Performance Critical Task                                   Cueing             Performance Significance                                                        Feedback Indicators Trip all Reactor     Without a source of    Procedural direction at  The operator will  Control board light Coolant Pumps in    water to provide a    FRH-0.1A Step 2 RNO a. manually stop      and flow accordance with      heat sink on the       to immediately stop all  RCPs using the      indications, along FRH-0.1A,            secondary side of     RCPs.                    handswitches on    with loss of flow Response To Loss    the SGs, RCPs are                              CB-05.             annunciators that Of Secondary Heat    tripped to extend                                                  the RCPs have Sink, prior to      the effectiveness if                                                stopped.
Initiating Bleed and the remaining Feed Cooling.       water inventory in the SGs.
Initiate RCS Bleed   Actuating SI          AFW flow will not be    Actuated SI,        Flow indicated on and Feed in         ensures feed path      indicated on any AFW    ensured at least    both a CCP and an accordance with     of cool water to the  flow meter. Also no      one CCP and SI      SI pump. PRZR FRH-0.1A,           RCS and isolates      AFW pumps will be        pump is running    PORV open with Response To Loss    the containment to     running. A RED path     with flow indicated block valve open.
Of Secondary Heat    confine any RCS       showing on CSFST for    providing a feed    PRZR and Vessel Sink, such that the  releases from the     heat sink. The need for  path for the RCS. vents open. RCS RCS depressurizes    bleed flow. The        a heat sink as indicated PRZR PORV as        pressure lowering sufficiently for    bleed flow through    by RCS temperature and   well as PRZR and    and CETs will Intermediate-Head    a PORV/Vent            pressure.               Vessel vent valves  indicate core Injection to occur, valves will ensure                              open providing a   cooling.
prior to all Steam  that enough cool                                bleed path for the Generator Wide      water will feed from                            RCS.
Range levels        the ECCS flow lowering to 0%.      path to remove sufficient decay heat.
Page 4 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 4 Rev. 3
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP INITIALIZE to IC 43 and LOAD NRC Scenario 4.
DEMAND        INITIATING EVENT TYPE MALF #                       DESCRIPTION VALUE       PARAMETER SETUP   IRF FWR021     MDAFWP 1-02 Breaker Racked Out                       f:0           K0 IMF   ED05H   Bus 1EA1 86-1 lockout.                                 f:1           (1) 8                    TDAFW Pump trips on overspeed.
IMF   FW09A                                                           f:1     Rx Trip + 480 (3)
{LORPRTBAL_1.Value=1} IMF FW09A 9     IMF   RX16B   PORV 456 fails to open manually or automatically       f:1           K0 1       -     -     Recirculate RWST with CSP 1-01                          -            -
SG ARV PT-2327 Fails High - ARV opens                       CSP 1-01 start + 15 2      IMF   MS13C                                                       f:1300
{DICSHS4764.Value=3} IMF MS13C f:1300 d:15                           (2) 3     IMF   CS02A   Containment Spray Pump 1-01 Trip                       f:1           K3 4     IMF   NI04E   NI42 Power Range Channel fails high.                 f:200           K4 Neutron Detector Well Fan 9 trips on motor 5      IMF    CH03                                                          f:1           K5 overload Low Pressure Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve 6      IMF    FW22                                                          f:1            K6 (PV-2286) fails open.
7      IMF   FW20A   Condensate Pump 1-01 trips                             f:1           K7 IMF   ED05H   Bus 1EA1 86-1 lockout.                                 f:1           (1) 8                    TDAFW Pump trips on overspeed.
IMF   FW09A                                                           f:1     Rx Trip + 480 (3)
{LORPRTBAL_1.Value=1} IMF FW09A 9     IMF   RX16B   PORV 456 fails to open manually or automatically       f:1           K0 (1) {LOEGW3_1.Value=1} IMF ED05H f:1 Inserts ED05H when Gen. Output Bkrs open (2) {DICSHS4764.Value=3} IMF MS13C f:1300 d:15 - PT-2327 fails high 15 seconds after CSP 1-01 starts (3) {LORPRTBAL_1.Value=1} IMF FW09A Trip TDAFWP 480 seconds after Rx Trip Page 5 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 4 Rev. 3
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Simulator Operator: INITIALIZE to IC43 and LOAD NRC Scenario 4 ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE ENSURE RED Danger Tag on MDAFWP 1-02 and place in PULL-OUT ENSURE GEM Box PLACED on 1-HS-2450A for MDAFWP 1-01 ENSUURE all Control board Tags are removed ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions (777 ppm)
ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 10 MWe/min ENSURE 60/90 buttons DEPRESSED on ASD ENSURE ASD speakers are ON at half volume ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk:
                        - COPY of IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.5, Operating at Constant Turbine Load ENSURE Control Rods are in AUTO with Bank D at 202 steps ENSURE TT06 set to GTGC PWROPS and all points on scale Control Room Annunciators in Alarm:
PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.2 - IR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.6 - RX  10% PWR P-10 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.2 - IR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.2 - PR TRN A LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK PCIP-4.2 - PR TRN B LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK 1-SSII2 - Train B MDAFW is Solid Red Page 6 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 4 Rev. 3}}

Latest revision as of 15:56, 4 February 2020

2017-06-FINAL Outlines
ML17179A010
Person / Time
Site: Comanche Peak  Luminant icon.png
Issue date: 06/19/2017
From: Vincent Gaddy
Operations Branch IV
To:
Vistra Energy
References
Download: ML17179A010 (60)


Text

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: CPNPP Date of Exam: June 19, 2017 RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K K K K K K A A A A G* A2 G* Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 Total

1. 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 6 Emergency &

Abnormal 2 1 1 1 N/A 2 2 N/A 2 9 4 Plant Evolutions Tier Totals 4 4 4 5 5 5 27 10 1 3 3 2 4 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 28 5 2.

Plant 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 10 3 Systems Tier Totals 5 4 3 5 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 38 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Categories 3 3 2 2 10 7 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two). (One Tier 3 Radiation Control K/A is allowed if the K/A is replaced by a K/A from another Tier 3 Category).
2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted with justification; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.
7. The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.
8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in a category other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

G* Generic K/As Page 1 of 13 CPNPP 2017 NRC RO ES-401-2 WRITTEN EXAM OUTLINE REV. 3

ES-401 2 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000007 (BW/E02&E10; CE/E02) Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 000009 Small Break LOCA / 3 Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a small break LOCA:(CFR 43.5 /

x 45.13) 3.0 39 EA2.22 Charging flow trend recorder 000011 Large Break LOCA / 3 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions / 4 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow):

x (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3) 2.9 40 AK1.04 Basic steady state thermodynamic relationship between RCS loops and S/Gs resulting from unbalanced RCS flow 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such x as graphs, curves, tables, etc. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 3.9 41 45.12) 000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System and the x following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7) 2.9 42 AK2.01 RHR heat exchangers 000026 Loss of Component Cooling Ability to determine and interpret the following as Water / 8 they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling x Water: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) 2.5 43 AA2.04 The normal values and upper limits for the temperatures of the components cooled by CCW.

000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control Knowledge of the reasons for the following System Malfunction / 3 responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: (CFR 41.5,41.10 /

x 45.6 / 45.13) 3.7 44 AK3.03 Actions contained in EOP for PZR PCS malfunction 000029 ATWS / 1 Knowledge of the interrelations between the and x the following an ATWS: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7) 2.9 45 EK2.06 Breakers, relays, and disconnects 000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the SGTR:

x (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3) 3.9 46 EK1.03 Natural circulation Page 2 of 13 CPNPP 2017 NRC RO ES-401-2 WRITTEN EXAM OUTLINE REV. 3

ES-401 3 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000040 (BW/E05; CE/E05; W/E12) Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat they apply to the Steam Line Rupture: (CFR 41.7 /

Transfer / 4 x 45.5 / 45.6) 4.3 47 AA1.04 Isolation of all steam lines from header 000054 (CE/E06) Loss of Main Knowledge of the operational implications of the Feedwater / 4 following concepts as they apply to Loss of Main x Feedwater (MFW): (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3) 3.6 48 AK1.02 Effects of feedwater introduction on dry S/G 000055 Station Blackout / 6 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Station Blackout:

x (CFR 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13) 4.3 49 EK3.02 Actions contained in EOP for loss of offsite and onsite power 000056 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus:

x (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) 3.0 50 AA2.16 Normal and abnormal Pzr level for various modes of plant operation.

000058 Loss of DC Power / 6 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear x Service Water: (CFR 41.4, 41.8 / 45.7 ) 3.5 51 AK3.04 Effect on the nuclear service water discharge flow header of a loss of CCW.

000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 2.4.21 Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat x 4.0 52 removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc. (CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12)

W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 Knowledge of the interrelations between the (LOCA Outside Containment) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) x EK2.2 Facilitys heat removal systems, including 3.8 53 primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

W/E11 Loss of Emergency Coolant 2.4.8 Knowledge of how abnormal operating Recirc. / 4 x procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs. 3.8 54 (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Page 3 of 13 CPNPP 2017 NRC RO ES-401-2 WRITTEN EXAM OUTLINE REV. 3

ES-401 4 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 BW/E04; W/E05 Inadequate Heat Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as Transfer - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 they apply to the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink) x (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6) 3.7 55 EA1.2 Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

000077 Generator Voltage and Electric Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as Grid Disturbances / 6 they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid x Disturbances: (CFR: 41.5 and 41.10 / 45.5 / 45.7 / 3.8 56 45.8 )

AA1.03 Voltage regulator controls K/A Category Totals: 3 3 3 3 3 3 Group Point Total: 18 Page 4 of 13 CPNPP 2017 NRC RO ES-401-2 WRITTEN EXAM OUTLINE REV. 3

ES-401 5 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 000003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 000024 Emergency Boration / 1 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Emergency Boration: (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 /

x 45.3) 3.6 57 AK1.02 Relationship between boron addition and reactor power 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 000032 Loss of Source Range NI / 7 2.2.36 Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as degraded x power sources, on the status of limiting 3.1 58 conditions for operations. (CFR: 41.10 /

43.2 / 45.13) 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 000036 (BW/A08) Fuel Handling Accident / 8 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Steam x Generator Tube Leak: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 3.1 59 45.6)

AA1.07 CVCS letdown flow indicator 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of x Condenser Vacuum: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) 3.9 60 AA2.02 Conditions requiring reactor and/or turbine trip 000059 Accidental Liquid Radwaste Rel. / 9 000060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. / 9 000061 ARM System Alarms / 7 000067 Plant Fire On-site / 8 000068 (BW/A06) Control Room Evac. / 8 000069 (W/E14) Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5 000074 (W/E06&E07) Inadequate Core Cooling / 4 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Degraded Core Cooling) (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) x 3.4 61 EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 W/EO1 & E02 Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 W/E13 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Steam Generator Overpressure) (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 x / 45.6) 3.1 62 EA1.3 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

Page 5 of 13 CPNPP 2017 NRC RO ES-401-2 WRITTEN EXAM OUTLINE REV. 3

ES-401 6 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 W/E15 Containment Flooding / 5 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Containment Flooding) (CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 /

x 45.6 / 45.13) 2.9 63 EK3.3 Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

W/E16 High Containment Radiation / 9 BW/A01 Plant Runback / 1 BW/A02&A03 Loss of NNI-X/Y / 7 BW/A04 Turbine Trip / 4 BW/A05 Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 BW/A07 Flooding / 8 BW/E03 Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 BW/E08; W/E03 LOCA Cooldown - Depress. / 4 Knowledge of the interrelations between the (LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization) and the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) x EK2.1 Components, and functions of control 3.6 64 and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

BW/E09; CE/A13; W/E09&E10 Natural Circ. / 4 2.4.2 Knowledge of system set points, interlocks and automatic actions associated x 4.5 65 with EOP entry conditions. (CFR: 41.7 /

45.7 / 45.8)

BW/E13&E14 EOP Rules and Enclosures CE/A11; W/E08 RCS Overcooling - PTS / 4 CE/A16 Excess RCS Leakage / 2 CE/E09 Functional Recovery K/A Category Point Totals: 1 1 1 2 2 2 Group Point Total: 9 Page 6 of 13 CPNPP 2017 NRC RO ES-401-2 WRITTEN EXAM OUTLINE REV. 3

ES-401 7 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 003 Reactor Coolant Pump Knowledge of RCPS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the x 2.5 1 following: (CFR: 41.7)

K4.03 Adequate lubrication of the RCP.

004 Chemical and Volume Knowledge of CVCS design feature(s)

Control and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7) x 3.1 2 K4.11 Temperature/pressure control in letdown line: prevent boiling, lifting reliefs, hydraulic shock, piping damage, and burst.

005 Residual Heat Removal Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause/effect relationships between the RHRS and the following x 3.2 3 systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

K1.01 CCWS 006 Emergency Core Cooling Knowledge of bus power supplies to x the following: (CFR: 41.7) 3.6 4 K2.04 ESFAS-operated valves 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Knowledge of the effect that a loss or Tank malfunction of the PRTS will have on x 3.3 5 the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

K3.01 Containment 008 Component Cooling Water Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated x 3.1 6 with operating the CCWS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

A1.04 Surge tank level 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 x 3.7 7

/ 45.5 to 45.8)

A4.01 PZR spray valve 012 Reactor Protection Ability to monitor automatic operation of x the RPS, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5) 3.6 8 A3.02 Bistables 013 Engineered Safety Features Knowledge of the effect that a loss or Actuation malfunction of the ESFAS will have on x 4.3 9 the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

K3.02 RCS 022 Containment Cooling x 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance 3.7 10 procedures. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

Page 7 of 13 CPNPP 2017 NRC RO ES-401-2 WRITTEN EXAM OUTLINE REV. 3

ES-401 8 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 025 Ice Condenser 026 Containment Spray 2.4.20 Knowledge of the operational x implications of EOP warnings, cautions, 3.8 11 and notes. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 039 Main and Reheat Steam Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the MRSS: (CFR: 41.5 /

x 3.6 12 45.7)

K5.08 Effect of steam removal on reactivity 059 Main Feedwater Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, x control, or mitigate the consequences 3.1 13 of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

A2.12 Failure of feedwater regulating valves 061 Auxiliary/Emergency Knowledge of the effect of a loss or Feedwater malfunction of the following will have on x the AFW components: (CFR: 41.7 / 2.5 14 45.7)

K6.01 Controllers and positioners 062 AC Electrical Distribution Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ac distribution system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or x 3.2 15 mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5

/ 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

A2.12 Restoration of power to a system with a fault on it 063 DC Electrical Distribution Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 x 2.8 16

/ 45.5 to 45.8)

A4.02 Battery voltage indicator 064 Emergency Diesel Generator Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ED/G system, including: (CFR: 41.7 x 3.6* 17

/ 45.5)

A3.07 Load Sequencing Page 8 of 13 CPNPP 2017 NRC RO ES-401-2 WRITTEN EXAM OUTLINE REV. 3

ES-401 9 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 073 Process Radiation Monitoring Knowledge of PRM system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which x provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7) 4.0 18 K4.01 Release termination when radiation exceeds setpoint 076 Service Water Knowledge of SWS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the x following: (CFR: 41.7) 2.9 19 K4.02 Automatic start features associated with SWS pump controls 078 Instrument Air Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the IAS and the following x 2.7 20 systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

K1.02 Service air 103 Containment Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated x with operating the containment system 3.7 21 controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

A1.01 Containment pressure, temperature, and humidity 006 Emergency Core Cooling Knowledge of the effect of a loss or System malfunction on the following will have x 3.0 22 on the ECCS: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

K6.05 HPI/LPI cooling water 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench 2.1.28 Knowledge of the purpose and Tank x function of major system components 4.1 23 and controls. (CFR: 41.7) 012 Reactor Protection Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7) x 3.3 24 K2.01 RPS channels, components, and interconnections 039 Main and Reheat Steam Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause/effect relationships between the MRSS and the following x 2.7 25 systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

K1.08 MFW 062 AC Electrical Distribution Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ac distribution system, including:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5) x 2.7 26 A3.04 Operation of inverter (e.g.,

precharging synchronizing light, static transfer)

Page 9 of 13 CPNPP 2017 NRC RO ES-401-2 WRITTEN EXAM OUTLINE REV. 3

ES-401 10 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 063 DC Electrical Distribution Knowledge of bus power supplies to x the following: (CFR: 41.7) 2.9 27 K2.01 Major DC loads 076 Service Water Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 x 2.9 28

/ 45.5 to 45.8)

A4.01 SWS pumps K/A Category Point Totals: 3 3 2 4 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 Group Point Total: 28 Page 10 of 13 CPNPP 2017 NRC RO ES-401-2 WRITTEN EXAM OUTLINE REV. 3

ES-401 11 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 001 Control Rod Drive Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design x limits) associated with operating the CRDS 3.1 29 controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

A1.02 T-ref.

002 Reactor Coolant Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between x the RCS and the following systems: (CFR: 3.5* 30 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

K1.12 NIS 011 Pressurizer Level Control 014 Rod Position Indication 015 Nuclear Instrumentation Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7) x 3.3 31 K2.01 NIS channels, components, and interconnections 016 Non-Nuclear Instrumentation 017 In-Core Temperature Monitor Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the ITM system will have on x 3.5 32 the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

K3.01 Natural circulation indications 027 Containment Iodine Removal 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control 029 Containment Purge Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

x 3.2* 33 (CFR: 41.7)

K4.03 Automatic Purge isolation 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 034 Fuel Handling Equipment Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between x the Fuel Handling System and the following 2.6 34 systems: (CFR: 41.7)

K1.04 NIS Page 11 of 13 CPNPP 2017 NRC RO ES-401-2 WRITTEN EXAM OUTLINE REV. 3

ES-401 12 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 035 Steam Generator Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the GS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or x 3.4 35 mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 /

43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5)

A2.03 Pressure/level transmitter failure 041 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control 045 Main Turbine Generator Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to x the MT/B System: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7) 2.7 36 K5.18 Purpose of low-power reactor trips (limited to 25% power) 055 Condenser Air Removal 056 Condensate 068 Liquid Radwaste Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room (CFR:41.7 / 45.5 to x 3.8 38 45.8)

A4.04 Automatic isolation 071 Waste Gas Disposal 072 Area Radiation Monitoring 075 Circulating Water x 2.1.27 Knowledge of system purpose 3.9 37 and/or function. (CFR: 41.7) 079 Station Air 086 Fire Protection K/A Category Point Totals: 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 Group Point Total: 10 Page 12 of 13 CPNPP 2017 NRC RO ES-401-2 WRITTEN EXAM OUTLINE REV. 3

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) Form ES-401-3 Facility: CPNPP Date of Exam: June 19, 2017 RO SRO-Only Category K/A # Topic IR # IR #

2.1.3 Knowledge of shift or short-term relief turnover 2.1. 3.7 66 practices. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

1. 2.1.21 Ability to verify the controlled procedure copy.

2.1. 3.5* 67 Conduct of (CFR: 41.10 / 45.10 / 45.13)

Operations 2.1.42 Knowledge of new and spent fuel movement 2.1. 2.5 68 procedures. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.7 / 45.13)

Subtotal 3 2.2.3 (multi-unit license) Knowledge of the design, 2.2. procedural, and operational differences between units. 3.8 69 (CFR: 41.5 / 41.6 / 41.7 / 41.10 / 45.12)

2. 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

Equipment 2.2. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13) 3.7 70 Control 2.2.7 Knowledge of the process for conducting special or 2.2. 2.9 71 infrequent tests. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.3 / 45.13)

Subtotal 3 2.3.5 Ability to use radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey 2.3. 2.9 72 instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc. (CFR:

41.11 / 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9) 3.

Radiation 2.3.12 Knowledge of radiological safety principles Control pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as 2.3. containment entry requirements, fuel handling 3.2 73 responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc. (CFR: 41.12 / 45.9 / 45.10)

Subtotal 2 2.4.12 Knowledge of general operating crew

4. 2.4. responsibilities during emergency operations. 4.0 74 Emergency (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12)

Procedures / 2.4.14 Knowledge of general guidelines for EOP usage.

Plan 2.4. 3.8 75 (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

Subtotal 2 Tier 3 Point Total 10 Page 13 of 13 CPNPP 2017 NRC RO ES-401-2 WRITTEN EXAM OUTLINE REV. 3

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: CPNPP Date of Exam: June 19, 2017 RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K K K K K K A A A A G* A2 G* Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 Total

1. 1 18 2 4 6 Emergency &

Abnormal 2 N/A N/A 9 2 2 4 Plant Evolutions Tier Totals 27 4 6 10 1 28 2 3 5 2.

Plant 2 10 0 2 1 3 Systems Tier Totals 38 4 4 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Categories 10 2 2 1 2 7 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two). (One Tier 3 Radiation Control K/A is allowed if the K/A is replaced by a K/A from another Tier 3 Category).
2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted with justification; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.
4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.
7. The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.
8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in a category other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

G* Generic K/As Page 1 of 10 CPNPP 2017 NRC SRO ES-401-2 WRITTEN EXAM OUTLINE REV. 3

ES-401 2 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000007 (BW/E02&E10; CE/E02) Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 000009 Small Break LOCA / 3 000011 Large Break LOCA / 3 Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA: (CFR 43.5 /

45.13) x 4.7 76 EA2.01 Actions to be taken, based on RCS temperature and pressure - saturated and superheated 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions / 4 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 000026 Loss of Component Cooling 2.2.38 Knowledge of conditions and limitations in Water / 8 x the facility license. (CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.1 / 4.5 77 45.13) 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3 000029 ATWS / 1 Ability to determine or interpret the following as x they apply to a ATWS: (CFR 43.5 / 45.13) 4.7 78 EA2.01 Reactor Nuclear Instrumentation.

000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 000040 (BW/E05; CE/E05; W/E12) 2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat x make operational judgments based on operating 4.7 81 Transfer / 4 characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation. (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13) 000054 (CE/E06) Loss of Main Feedwater / 4 000055 Station Blackout / 6 2.4.35 Knowledge of local auxiliary operator tasks x during an emergency and the resultant operational 4.0 79 effects. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 000056 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 2.4.45 Ability to prioritize and interpret the x significance of each annunciator or alarm. (CFR: 4.3 80 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.12) 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 000058 Loss of DC Power / 6 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 Page 2 of 10 CPNPP 2017 NRC SRO ES-401-2 WRITTEN EXAM OUTLINE REV. 3

ES-401 3 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 W/E11 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. / 4 BW/E04; W/E05 Inadequate Heat Transfer - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 000077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 K/A Category Totals: 0 0 0 0 2 4 Group Point Total: 6 Page 3 of 10 CPNPP 2017 NRC SRO ES-401-2 WRITTEN EXAM OUTLINE REV. 3

ES-401 4 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 000003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Inoperable /

x Stuck Control Rod: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) 4.4 82 AA2.03 Required actions if more than one rod is stuck or inoperable.

000024 Emergency Boration / 1 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer x Level Control Malfunctions: (CFR: 43.5 / 2.9 84 45.13)

AA2.07 Seal water flow indicator for RCP 000032 Loss of Source Range NI / 7 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 000036 (BW/A08) Fuel Handling Accident / 8 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 000059 Accidental Liquid Radwaste Rel. / 9 000060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. / 9 2.2.25 Knowledge of the bases in Technical x Specifications for limiting conditions for 4.2 83 operations and safety limits.

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 43.2) 000061 ARM System Alarms / 7 000067 Plant Fire On-site / 8 000068 (BW/A06) Control Room Evac. / 8 000069 (W/E14) Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5 000074 (W/E06&E07) Inad. Core Cooling / 4 000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 W/EO1 & E02 Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 W/E13 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 W/E15 Containment Flooding / 5 W/E16 High Containment Radiation / 9 2.2.42 Ability to recognize system x parameters that are entry-level conditions 4.6 85 for Technical Specifications. (CFR: 41.7 /

41.10 / 43.2 / 43.3 / 45.3 )

BW/A01 Plant Runback / 1 BW/A02&A03 Loss of NNI-X/Y / 7 Page 4 of 10 CPNPP 2017 NRC SRO ES-401-2 WRITTEN EXAM OUTLINE REV. 3

ES-401 5 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 BW/A04 Turbine Trip / 4 BW/A05 Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 BW/A07 Flooding / 8 BW/E03 Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 BW/E08; W/E03 LOCA Cooldown - Depress. / 4 BW/E09; CE/A13; W/E09&E10 Natural Circ. / 4 BW/E13&E14 EOP Rules and Enclosures CE/A11; W/E08 RCS Overcooling - PTS / 4 CE/A16 Excess RCS Leakage / 2 CE/E09 Functional Recovery K/A Category Point Totals: 0 0 0 0 2 2 Group Point Total: 4 Page 5 of 10 CPNPP 2017 NRC SRO ES-401-2 WRITTEN EXAM OUTLINE REV. 3

ES-401 6 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 003 Reactor Coolant Pump 2.4.35 Knowledge of local auxiliary x operator tasks during an emergency 4.0 86 and the resultant operational effects.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 004 Chemical and Volume Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the Control following malfunctions or operations on the CVCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, x 4.3 87 control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5)

A2.05 RCP Seal Failures.

005 Residual Heat Removal 006 Emergency Core Cooling 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 008 Component Cooling Water 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control 012 Reactor Protection 013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation 022 Containment Cooling 2.4.30 Knowledge of events related to system operation/status that must be x reported to internal organizations or 4.1 88 external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or transmission system operator. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11) 025 Ice Condenser 026 Containment Spray 039 Main and Reheat Steam Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MRSS; and (b) based on predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences x 3.6 89 of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

A2.05 Increasing steam demand, its relationship to increases in reactor power 059 Main Feedwater 061 Auxiliary/Emergency 2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions Feedwater x for operations and safety limits. 4.7 90 (CFR: 41.5 / 43.2 / 45.2)

Page 6 of 10 CPNPP 2017 NRC SRO ES-401-2 WRITTEN EXAM OUTLINE REV. 3

ES-401 7 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 062 AC Electrical Distribution 063 DC Electrical Distribution 064 Emergency Diesel Generator 073 Process Radiation Monitoring 076 Service Water 078 Instrument Air 103 Containment K/A Category Point Totals: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 Group Point Total: 5 Page 7 of 10 CPNPP 2017 NRC SRO ES-401-2 WRITTEN EXAM OUTLINE REV. 3

ES-401 8 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 001 Control Rod Drive Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunction or operations on the CRDS- and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of x those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 3.9 91 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

A2.14 Urgent failure alarm, including rod-out-of-sequence and motion-inhibit alarms.

002 Reactor Coolant 011 Pressurizer Level Control 014 Rod Position Indication 015 Nuclear Instrumentation 016 Non-Nuclear Instrumentation 017 In-Core Temperature Monitor 027 Containment Iodine Removal 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control 029 Containment Purge 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate x the consequences of those malfunctions or 3.5 92 operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 /

45.13)

A2.03 Abnormal spent fuel pool water level or loss of water level 034 Fuel Handling Equipment 035 Steam Generator 041 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control 045 Main Turbine Generator 055 Condenser Air Removal 056 Condensate Page 8 of 10 CPNPP 2017 NRC SRO ES-401-2 WRITTEN EXAM OUTLINE REV. 3

ES-401 9 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 068 Liquid Radwaste 2.2.38 Knowledge of conditions and x limitations in the facility license. 4.5 93 (CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13) 071 Waste Gas Disposal 072 Area Radiation Monitoring 075 Circulating Water 079 Station Air 086 Fire Protection K/A Category Point Totals: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 Group Point Total: 3 Page 9 of 10 CPNPP 2017 NRC SRO ES-401-2 WRITTEN EXAM OUTLINE REV. 3

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) Form ES-401-3 Facility: CPNPP Date of Exam: June19, 2017 RO SRO-Only Category K/A # Topic IR # IR #

2.1.6 Ability to manage the control room crew during plant 2.1. 4.8 94 transients. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13) 1.

Conduct of 2.1.5 Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, Operations 2.1. such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, 3.9 95 etc. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Subtotal 2 2.2.21 Knowledge of pre- and post-maintenance 2.2. 4.1 96

2. operability requirements. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2)

Equipment 2.2.20 Knowledge of the process for managing Control 2.2. 3.8 97 troubleshooting activities. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Subtotal 2 2.3.12 Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as 3.

2.3. containment entry requirements, fuel handling 3.7 98 Radiation responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, Control aligning filters, etc. (CFR: 41.12 / 45.9 / 45.10)

Subtotal 1 2.4.11 Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.

4. 2.4. 4.2 99 (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Emergency Procedures / 2.4.29 Knowledge of the emergency plan.

2.4. 4.4 100 Plan (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11)

Subtotal 2 Tier 3 Point Total 7 Page 10 of 10 CPNPP 2017 NRC SRO ES-401-2 WRITTEN EXAM OUTLINE REV. 3

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A RO EXAM Question 1 Could not write a question about RCP interlocks that 2/1 003 K4.02 prevent a cold water accident because there are none.

Replaced K/A 003 K4.02 with K/A 003 K4.03.

Question 2 Unable to write an operationally valid question on the design features and/or interlocks which provide for the minimum temperature requirements of the CVCS system 2/1 004 K4.10 to prevent boron crystallization as the only system that performs this function is the heat trace system which is not operated by Reactor Operators. All attempts resulted in LOD = 5 questions. Replaced K/A 004 K4.10 with K/A 004 K4.11 Question 3 Could not write a question about RHR and service water 2/1 005 K1.08 because the RHR HXs are cooled by CCW. Replaced K/A 005 K1.08 with K/A 005 K1.01.

Question 11 Could not write a discriminating question on CS 2/1 026 G2.4.2 setpoints/interlocks and automatic actions that were also Entry Conditions for the EOP. Replaced K/A 026 G2.4.2 with K/A 026 G2.4.20.

Question 17 Could not write a question on EDG automatic transfer 2/1 064 A3.09 switch because it is not utilized at Comanche Peak.

Replaced K/A 064 A3.09 with K/A 064 A3.07.

Question 22 CPNPP unable to write an acceptable question. K/A 2/1 005 K6.03 randomly resampled by Chief Examiner after exam review. Replaced K/A 005 K6.03 with K/A 006 K6.05 Question 29 Could not write a question about CCW cooling of CRDS 2/2 001 A1.10 because they are air cooled. Replaced K/A 001 A1.10 with K/A 001 A1.02.

Question 33 Could not write a question about Containment Purge 2/2 029 K4.02 interlocks/design features that mitigate/alleviate negative pressure in containment because there are none.

Replaced K/A 029 K4.02 with K/A 029 K4.03 Page 1 of 5 CPNPP 2017 NRC RO & SRO ES-401-4 RECORD OF REJECTED K/As REV. 3

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Question 34 Could not write a question on the effect of loss or malfunction of rad monitoring systems on the fuel handling systems because there are no interlocks/trips 2/2 034 K6.02 associated between the two. There are no other K6 category items with a value > 2.5 therefore, a K1 item was selected. Replaced K/A 034 K6.02 with K/A 034 K1.04.

Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A Question 38 Could not write a question about a cross tie valve between station (service) and Instrument Air because at CP the systems do not have a cross tie valve.

2/2 079 K4.01 Furthermore, all other K/As for system 079 with a value >

2.5 have to do with cross connecting the two systems and/or overlap with Q 20. Therefore, replaced K/A 079 K4.01 with K/A 068 A4.04.

Question 43 Could not write a question about time to component 1/1 026 AA2.06 damage due to a loss of component cooling due to lack of data to support a specific time for equipment damage.

Replaced K/A 026 AA2.06 with K/A 026 AA2.04.

Question 44 Could not write a discriminating question on the reason 1/1 027 AK3.02 for verifying alternate transmitters prior to shifting flow chart indication that had a LOD > 1. Replaced K/A 027 AK3.02 with K/A 027 AK3.03.

Question 50 Could not write a question about bypassing interlocks to re-energize Vital AC buses. There are various interlocks 1/1 057 AA2.20 associated with the system but during a loss of power to vital AC buses, there is no guidance to BYPASS these interlocks. Replaced K/A 057 AA2.20 with K/A 057 AA2.16.

Question 51 Could not write a question about automatic opening 1/1 062 AK3.01 /closing of valve on SSW HX because they do automatically reposition upon a loss of SSW. Replaced K/A 062 AK3.01 with K/A 062 AK3.04.

Question 70 Could not write a question to this K/A without referencing 3 2.2.4 plant specific information and still be generic in nature.

Replaced K/A G2.2.4 with K/A G2.2.12.

Question 71 3 2.2.20 Unable to write an RO level question to knowledge of the process for managing troubleshooting activities as ROs Page 2 of 5 CPNPP 2017 NRC RO & SRO ES-401-4 RECORD OF REJECTED K/As REV. 3

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 at CPNPP do not manage troubleshooting activities.

Replaced K/A G2.2.20 with K/A G2.2.7 Question 74 Could not write a question generic in nature on how 3 2.4.8 ABNs are used in conjunction with EOPs without referencing specific procedures. Replaced K/A G2.4.8 with K/A G2.4.12.

Question 75 3 2.4.19 Chief Examiner directed to CPNPP to resample to another K/A. Replaced K/A G2.4.19 with K/A G2.4.14 Page 3 of 5 CPNPP 2017 NRC RO & SRO ES-401-4 RECORD OF REJECTED K/As REV. 3

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A SRO Exam Question 76 Could not write a question with regard to reflux boiling 1/1 011 EA2.12 during a Large Break LOCA as there is no reflux boiling during a Large Break LOCA. Replaced K/A 011 EA2.12 with K/A 011 EA2.01.

Question 78 Could not write a discriminating question at the SRO 1/1 029 EA2.04 level for CCP operating indication during an ATWS.

Replaced K/A 029 EA2.04 with K/A 029 EA2.01.

Question 81 Could not write an SRO level question on when to commence a plant shutdown for Loss of Instrument Air.

1/1 065 AA2.05 Unable to write SRO level question on Loss of Instrument Air. Resampled to another Tier 1 Group 1 category.

Replaced K/A 065 AA2.05 with 040 G2.1.7 Question 82 Could not write a discriminating question with plausible 1/2 005 AA2.01 distractors for determining a stuck control rod from RCS temperature or NIs. Replaced K/A 005 AA2.01 with K/A 005 AA2.03.

Question 83 Could not write a question on EOP bases for a gaseous 1/2 060 G2.4.18 release because the EOP doesnt address accidental gaseous releases. Replaced K/A 060 G2.4.18 with K/A 060 G2.2.25.

Question 84 Could not write a question to the SRO level for this KA.

1/2 068 AA2.07 All KAs in the AA2 category for this KA are RO knowledge. Replaced K/A 068 AA2.07 with K/A 0028 AA2.07.

Question 85 BW/A02 &

BW/A02&A03 is a B&W K/A and is not applicable to 1/2 A03 Comanche Peak. Replaced K/A BW/A02 & A03 2.1.25 G2.1.25 with K/A W/E15 G2.1.7.

Question 85 Unable to write a question on Containment flooding related to plant performance and operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, or 1/2 W/E15 G2.1.7 instrument interpretation. Unable to write any questions related to containment flooding as CPNPPs procedure does not have enough information related to containment flooding to write a discriminating question. Replaced K/A W/E15 G2.1.7 with K/A W/E16 G2.2.42 Page 4 of 5 CPNPP 2017 NRC RO & SRO ES-401-4 RECORD OF REJECTED K/As REV. 3

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A Question 86 Could not write a question asking about the RCP 2/1 003 G2.2.3 differences between units because they are the same pump and use the same procedures. Replaced K/A 003 G2.2.3 with K/A 003 G2.4.35.

Question 87 Could not write a discriminating question at the SRO 2/1 004 A2.18 level for high VCT level. Replaced K/A 004 A2.18 with K/A 004 A2.15.

Question 87 Unable to write an SRO level question based on High or Low PRZR level and how to use procedures to correct, 2/1 004 A2.15 control, or mitigate these consequences; as every question written ends asking entry conditions to an ABN.

Replaced K/A 004 A2.15 with K/A 004 A2.05 Question 91 Could not write a question about axial power shaping 2/2 001 A2.04 rods because Comanche Peak does not use them.

Replaced K/A 001 A2.04 with K/A 001 A2.14.

Question 93 Could not write a question on Post Accident Inst for the 2/2 068 G2.4.3 Liquid Radwaste system because there is none.

Replaced K/A 068 G2.4.3 with K/A 068 G2.2.38.

Question 95 Could not write a question based on plant specific 3 2.1.7 information and still be generic in nature. Replaced K/A G2.1.7 with K/A G2.1.5.

Question 97 Could not write a question about interpreting control 3 2.2.44 room indications to understand operator actions without being Unit/System specific. Replaced K/A G2.2.44 with K/A G2.2.20.

3 2.3.4 Question 98 Could not write a discriminating SRO question on radiation exposure limits that did not overlap with Question 83. Replaced K/A G2.3.4 with K/A G2.3.12.

3 2.4.21 Question 100 Could not write a discriminating SRO question about assessing safety functions without being Unit/System specific and using actual parameters. Replaced K/A G2.4.21 with K/A G2.4.29.

Page 5 of 5 CPNPP 2017 NRC RO & SRO ES-401-4 RECORD OF REJECTED K/As REV. 3

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Task Summary Facility: CPNPP Units 1 and 2 Date of Examination: June 2017 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: NRC Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (See Note) Code*

2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials such Conduct of Operations as graphs, curves, tables, etc. (3.9).

(RA1) C,M,R JPM: Determine Loss of RHR Time Limitations (RO1413M).

2.1.26 Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such as rotating equipment, electrical, Conduct of Operations high temperatures, high pressure, caustic (RA2) C,M,R chlorine, oxygen, and hydrogen. (3.4)

JPM: Determine Electrical Safe Work Practice Requirements. (BA1110) 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

Equipment Control (3.7)

(RA3) C,M,R JPM: Perform Control Room AC Surveillance Data (RO4108A) 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.

Radiation Control (3.2)

(RA4) C,M,R JPM: Determine Escorted Radiation Worker Allowable Dose (BA1402)

Emergency Procedures/Plan NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.

  • Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (All Classroom)

(D)irect from bank (< 3 for ROs; < 4 for SROs & RO retakes) (0)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1) (4)

(P)revious 2 exams (< 1; randomly selected) (0)

Page 1 of 2 CPNPP 2017 NRC RO ES-301-1 ADMINISTRATIVE TOPICS OUTLINE Rev. 3

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Task Summary RA1 The applicant will calculate/determine time to saturation, approximate heat up rate, time to core uncovery, and containment closure time following a Loss of Residual Heat Removal System per ABN-104, RHR System Malfunction. The critical steps are to determine Time to Saturation, approximate Heat-up Rate, Time to Core Uncovery, and Containment Closure Time. This is a modified bank JPM. (K/A 2.1.25 - IR 3.9) (15 minutes)

RA2 The applicant is presented with a task to determine the Personnel Protective Equipment and Safety Boundaries for racking of the XCICE1, ventilation chiller X-01 compressor motor breaker from connect to disconnect in accordance with STA-124, Electrical Safe Work Practices. The critical steps will be to identify the Hazard/Risk Category, Clothing requirements and Boundaries. This is a modified bank JPM. (K/A 2.1.26 - IR 3.4) (15 minutes)

RA3 The applicant will complete the Control Room Air Conditioning System surveillance per OPT-116, CR AC SYSTEM. Record and complete all data on OPT-116-1, CR AC System Data Sheet. The critical steps are to determine if the surveillance is sat or unsat and determine a Technical Specification entry is required and inform the Unit Supervisor. This is a modified bank JPM.

(K/A 2.2.12 - IR 3.7) (12 minutes)

RA4 The applicant will utilize STA-655, Exposure Monitoring Program, and STA-656, Radiation Work Control, and determine if either of two escorted radiation workers (pump experts) can perform a designated task with or without shielding. The critical steps are to determine the radiation workers will exceed their administrative limits without shielding, and Worker B cannot perform the work even with shielding. However Worker A can perform the designated task with shielding. This is a modified bank JPM. (K/A 2.3.4 - IR 3.2) (30 minutes)

Page 2 of 2 CPNPP 2017 NRC RO ES-301-1 ADMINISTRATIVE TOPICS OUTLINE Rev. 3

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Task Summary Facility: CPNPP Units 1 and 2 Date of Examination: June 2017 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: NRC Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (See Note) Code*

2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all Conduct of Operations modes of plant operation. (4.4)

(SA1) C,D,R JPM: Perform RCS Pressure / Temperature Verification and Evaluate Technical Specifications. (SO1005) 2.1.4 Knowledge of individual licensed operator responsibilities related to shift staffing, such as medical requirements, Ano-solo@

Conduct of Operations operation, maintenance of active license (SA2) C,M,R status, 10CFR55, etc. (3.8)

JPM: Determine Licensed Operator License Status. (SO1004) 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

(4.1)

Equipment Control (SA3) C,M,R JPM: Perform Control Room AC System Surveillance Data / Evaluate Technical Specifications. (SO1202B) 2.3.12 Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel Radiation Control handling responsibilities, access to locked (SA4) C,D,R high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

(3.7)

JPM: Determine Radiation Levels and Reporting Requirements. (SO1112B) 2.4.41 Knowledge of emergency action level Emergency thresholds and classifications. (4.6)

Procedures/Plan C,M,R JPM: Classify an Emergency Plan Event /

(SA5) Determine if an Upgrade is Required.

(SO1136M)

NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.

  • Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (All Classroom)

(D)irect from bank (< 3 for ROs; < 4 for SROs & RO retakes) (2)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1) (3)

(P)revious 2 exams (< 1; randomly selected) (0)

Page 1 of 2 CPNPP 2017 NRC SRO ES-301-1 ADMINISTRATIVE TOPICS OUTLINE Rev. 3

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Task Summary SA1 The applicant will perform reactor coolant system pressure/temperature verification in accordance with ABN-905A, Loss of Control Room Habitability, Attachment 7, RCS Pressure / Temperature Verification and Evaluate Technical Specifications. The critical steps are to calculate saturation temperatures, RCS subcooling margin, and RCS cooldown rate as well as identify the correct Technical Specification LCO Condition, Required Actions, and Completion Time. This is a bank JPM.

(K/A 2.1.23 - IR 4.4) (17 minutes)

SA2 The applicant is presented with a detailed record (in table form) of watch standing and other activities performed by 4 individual Reactor Operators over a period of two quarters. The applicant will be required to analyze the work records of these four operators, and apply the guidance of ODA-315, Licensed Operator Maintenance Tracking, to evaluate and determine if the RO license status is active or inactive for each of the three operators. The critical steps are to determine that the RO licenses for two of the four operators are NOT active.

This is a modified bank JPM.

(K/A 2.1.4 - IR 3.8) (15 minutes)

SA3 The applicant will complete the Control Room Air Conditioning System surveillance per OPT-116, CR AC SYSTEM. Record and complete all data on OPT-116-1, CR AC System Data Sheet. The critical steps are to determine if the surveillance is sat or unsat and the correct Technical Specification LCO Condition, Required Action, and Completion Time. This is a modified bank JPM.

(K/A 2.2.12 - IR 4.1) (15 minutes)

SA4 The applicant will perform calculations to determine the dose that will be received to two NEOs while performing maintenance, utilizing STA-657, ALARA Job Planning/Debriefing and determine reporting requirements for an overexposure event per STA-501, Nonroutine reporting. The critical steps will be to calculate the dose received when performing maintenance in the fuel building for two different operators under different conditions and determined the correct oral and written Reporting Requirements for an overexposure event. This is a bank JPM.

(K/A 2.3.12 - IR 3.7) (25 minutes)

SA5 The applicant will determine the appropriate Emergency Plan Classification in accordance with EPP-201, Assessment of Emergency Action Levels, Emergency Classification, and Plan Activation. The critical steps will be to determine the correct classification and notification time. This is a modified bank JPM.

(K/A 2.4.41 - IR 4.6) (15 minutes)

Page 2 of 2 CPNPP 2017 NRC SRO ES-301-1 ADMINISTRATIVE TOPICS OUTLINE Rev. 3

ES-301 Control Room / In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: CPNPP 1 & 2 Date of Examination: June 2017 Exam Level: RO SRO(I) SRO (U) Operating Test Number: NRC Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

Safety System / JPM Title Type Code*

Function 001 - Control Rod Drive System (RO1008M)

S-1 A,M,S 1 Perform Control Rod Exercises 004 - Chemical and Volume Control System (RO1305)

S-2 A,D,S 2 Isolate RCS Leakage 011 - LOCA Emergency Core Cooling System (RO1507N)

S-3 Transfer From Hot-Leg Recirculation back to Cold leg L,N,S 3 Recirculation 061 - Auxiliary Feedwater System (RO3516A)

S-4 Respond to Inadvertent Start of Turbine Driven Auxiliary A,D,EN,S 4S Feedwater Pump (RO ONLY) 026 - Containment Spray System (RO1702)

S-5 A,EN,L,M,S 5 Verify Containment Spray Not Required 064 - Emergency Diesel Generator System (RO4302)

S-6 A,M,S 6 Load Emergency Diesel Generator 016 - Non Nuclear Instrumentation System (RO1827)

S-7 D,S 7 Respond to Turbine Impulse Pressure Instrument Malfunction 086 - Fire Protection System (RO4406C)

S-8 D,L,S 8 Respond to a Fire In the Control Room In-Plant Systems (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U) 004 - Chemical and Volume Control System (AO5403)

P-1 Perform Emergency Boration, Boric Acid Gravity Flow D,E,R 1 Valve Lineup 055 - Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power (Station Blackout)

(RO4217)

P-2 Alignment of PRZR Heaters with APGs supplying Safeguards E,L,M,R 6 Bus (Unit 1 Train B) 068 - Control Room Evacuation (AO6413)

P-3 Respond to a Fire in the Control Room or Cable Spreading A,D,E,L,R,P 8 Room, NEO #2 Actions (2015 NRC Exam)

Page 1 of 4 CPNPP 2017 NRC RO & SRO ES-301-2 SYSTEM JPM OUTLINE Rev. 3

ES-301 Control Room / In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 (6) / 4-6 (5) / 2-3 (3)

(C)ontrol room (8) / (7) / (3)

(D)irect from bank < 9 (6) / < 8 (5) / < 4 (2)

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant > 1 (3) / > 1 (3) / > 1 (2)

(EN)gineered safety feature > 1 (2) / > 1 (1) / > 1 (1) (control room system)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown > 1 (5) / > 1 (5) / > 1 (3)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) > 2 (5) / > 2 (5) / > 1 (2)

(P)revious 2 exams < 3 (1) / < 3 (1) / < 2 (1) (randomly selected)

(R)CA > 1 (3) / > 1 (3) / > 1 (2)

(S)imulator NRC JPM Examination Summary Description S-1 The applicants are given a copy of OPT-106A, Control Rod Exercise, and will perform a rod exercise on Control Bank D rods. This is an Alternate Path JPM as when restoring control rods to the initial position, one control rod will drop, and 1 second later another rod will drop. The Critical Steps are to select Control Bank D on the Rod Bank Select switch, move Control Bank D >10 and <13 steps using the Control Rod Motion Control switch and then back, trip the reactor per ABN-712, Rod Control System Malfunction, and manually trip the Turbine as it failed to trip automatically. This is a modified bank JPM. This JPM is under the Control Rod Drive System - Reactivity Control Safety Function. (K/A 001 A4.03 - 4.0 / 3.7)

(10 minutes)

S-2 The applicants will Utilize ABN-103, Excessive Reactor Coolant Leakage, and determine an RCS leak is in progress located in the Chemical and Volume Control System on the Letdown line. This is an Alternate Path JPM as the applicant must determine RCS Makeup intervals are NOT normal and isolate Letdown and Charging per Step 2.3.8 RNO. The applicant will then determine Excess letdown must be placed in service in accordance with SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System, as directed by ABN-103. The Critical Steps are to isolate Letdown, charge to RCP Seals only, close the RCS Loop 4 Charging Valve, close ONE of the Charging Pump to RCS Isolation valves, and determine Excess Letdown must be placed in service. This is a bank JPM. This JPM is under the Chemical and Volume Control System - Reactor Coolant Inventory Control Safety Function. (K/A 004 A2.07 - IR 3.4 / 3.7) (13 minutes)

Page 2 of 4 CPNPP 2017 NRC RO & SRO ES-301-2 SYSTEM JPM OUTLINE Rev. 3

ES-301 Control Room / In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 S-3 The applicants will transfer from Hot Leg Recirculation to Cold Leg Recirculation using EOS-1.4A, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation, Attachment 2, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation from Hot Leg Recirculation, with a LOCA in progress. The Critical Steps are to close the Train A RHR Pump 1 Crosstie valve, open the RHR to Cold Leg 1 and 2 Injection Isolation valve, close the Train B RHR Pump 1 Crosstie valve, open the RHR to Cold Leg 3 and 4 Injection Isolation valve, close the RHR to Hot Leg 2 and 3 Injection Isolation valve, stop SI Pump 1, close the SI to Hot Leg 2 and 3 Injection Isolation valve, open the SI to Cold Leg 1 and 4 Injection Isolation valve, re-start SI Pump 1, stop SI Pump 2, close the SI to Hot Leg 1 and 4 Injection Isolation valve, and re-start SI Pump 2. This is a New JPM.

This JPM is under the Emergency Core Cooling System - Reactor Pressure Control Safety Function. (K/A 011 EA1.11 - IR 4.2 / 4.2) (15 minutes)

S-4 With the unit at 100% power and Control Rods in manual due to a previous Nuclear Instrument malfunction, the applicant will respond to an inadvertent start of the TDAFW pump. This is an Alternate Path JPM as the applicant will attempt to isolate the TDAFW pump steam supply valve but it will fail to close. The applicant will verify the TDAFWP may be taken out of service and trip the pump. The Critical Steps are to place the Control Rods in Auto due to their previous failure, initiate a 50 MW Turbine Load Reduction, and trip the TDAFWP. This is a direct from bank JPM. This JPM is under the Auxiliary Feedwater System - Heat Removal From Reactor Core, Secondary Safety Function. This JPM is for the ROs ONLY.

(K/A 061 A2.07 - 3.4 / 3.5) (9 Minutes)

S-5 The applicants will perform the actions of EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Step 7, Verify Containment Spray Not Required. This is an Alternate Path JPM as containment pressure will have raised greater than 18 psig and several valves will have failed to operate automatically, also 2 Containment Spray pumps will fail to auto start. The Critical Steps are to actuate Phase B from CB-07, and either open the Train A Chem Add Tank Disch valve and the Train A Heat Exchanger Outlet valve or start both Train B Containment Spray Pumps, and secure all RCPs. This is a Modified bank JPM. This JPM is under the Containment Spray System - Containment Integrity Safety Function. This is a PRA significant action. (K/A 103 A2.03 - IR 3.5 / 3.8) (8 minutes)

S-6 With OPT-214A, Diesel Generator Operability Test in progress and following a fast start of Diesel Generator 1-01, the applicant is to continue with the surveillance and load DG 1-01 onto the Safeguards bus. This is an Alternate Path JPM as when the DG is loaded to approximately 2.2 MW and the operator is adjusting VARS, unit 1 reactor will trip. This will cause the operator to follow the test termination guidance in Attachment 10.7 to open the DG output breaker and adjust voltage and frequency. The Critical Steps are to turn on the Synchroscope, close the DG Output Breaker, load the DG to 2.2 - 2.5 MW, adjust KVARS to maintain reactive load on the DG between 0 - 500 KVAR, and open the DG Output Breaker when the Reactor trips. This is a modified bank JPM. This JPM is under the Emergency Diesel Generator System - Electrical Safety Function.

(K/A 064 A4.06 - IR 3.9 / 3.9) (10 minutes)

Page 3 of 4 CPNPP 2017 NRC RO & SRO ES-301-2 SYSTEM JPM OUTLINE Rev. 3

ES-301 Control Room / In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 S-7 The applicant will respond to a Turbine Impulse Pressure Instrument Malfunction per ABN-709, Steam Line, Steam Header, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction. The Critical Steps are to place Control Rods in manual, disable Steam Dumps, place Steam Dumps in Steam Pressure Mode in Auto, and transfer Turbine Impulse pressure to an Operable channel.

This is a bank JPM. This JPM is under the Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System -

Instrumentation Safety Function. (K/A 016 A2.01 - IR 3.0 / 3.1) (10 minutes)

S-8 The applicant will perform the actions for a Control Room fire in accordance with ABN-803A, Respond to a Fire in the Control Room or Cable Spreading Room, Attachment 1, Reactor Operator Actions to Achieve Hot Shutdown. The Critical Steps are to trip the Reactor, trip the TDAFWP, isolate Main Steam lines, isolate Letdown, open CCP suctions from the RWST, place CCP 1 in pull-out, secure all RCPs, place both RHR pumps in pull-out, and close the RWST to RHR pump 1 and 2 suction valves. This is a bank JPM. This JPM is under the Fire Protection System - Plant Service Systems Safety Function.

(K/A 068 AK3.12 - IR 4.1 / 4.5) (6 minutes)

P-1 The applicant will perform actions to align boric acid gravity flow per ABN-107, Emergency Boration, Attachment 6, Boric Acid Gravity Flow Valve Lineup. The Critical Steps include positioning the appropriate valves to align gravity flow from Boric Acid Tank X-01 to Unit 1. This is a Time Critical JPM per STI-214.01, Control of Timed Operator Actions. This is a bank JPM. This JPM is under the Chemical and Volume Control System - Reactivity Control Safety Function.

(K/A 004 A4.18 - IR 4.3 / 4.1) (15 minutes)

P-2 The applicant will utilize ECA-0.1A, Loss of All AC Power Recovery Without SI Required, Attachment 2, Alignment of PRZR Heaters With APGs Supplying AC Safeguards Bus to locally energize the correct number of PRZR Heater Groups based on current APG loading. The Critical Steps are to locally de-energize the PRZR Heater Groups, determine the maximum number of heater groups that may be energized based on current APG loading (calculation), and re-energize the correct number of PRZR Heater Groups. This is a modified from bank JPM. This JPM is under the Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power (Station Blackout) System -

Electrical Safety Function (K/A 055 EA2.03 - IR 3.9 / 4.7) (15 minutes)

P-3 During a Control Room evacuation due to a fire, the applicant is required to take action to control plant parameters from outside the control room. Actions will be performed using ABN-803A, Response to a Fire in the Control Room or Cable Spreading Room, Attachment 4, Nuclear Equipment Operator No. 2 Actions to Achieve Hot Shutdown. The critical steps include starting the Safety Chiller, Isolating RHR from the RWST and controlling AFW flow to the Steam Generators.

This is a PRA significant action. This is a direct from bank JPM. This JPM is under the Control Room Evacuation System - Plant Service Systems Safety Function.

This is a Previous JPM from the 2015 NRC exam.

(K/A 068 AA1.22 - IR 4.0 / 4.3) (10 minutes)

Page 4 of 4 CPNPP 2017 NRC RO & SRO ES-301-2 SYSTEM JPM OUTLINE Rev. 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: CPNPP 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: June 2017 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% power MOL - RCS Boron is 771 ppm (by sample). MDAFW Pump 1-02 is out of service for an oil change.

Turnover: Maintain steady state power conditions Critical Tasks: CT Ensure Control Rods inserting 48 Steps / Minute During Reactor Trip Failure Prior to Exiting FRS-0.1A, Response to Nuclear Power Generation / ATWT.

CT Identify and Isolate the Ruptured Steam Generator Prior to Commencing an Operator Induced Cooldown per EOP-3.0A, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description I (RO,SRO) 1 RX08A Pressurizer Pressure Channel (PT-455) fails high TS (SRO) 2 CH10 C (BOP, SRO) CRDM Vent Fan #1 trips 3 RX02G I (BOP, SRO) SG 1-04 Steam Flow (FI-542A) Fails Low I (RO, SRO) 4 RP05A NR Cold Leg 1 Temp (TE-411B) fails low TS (SRO) 5 RC03C R (RO) Loss of B MFP Loss of A MFP. Reactor fails to trip. Reactor trip breakers fail to 6 RC19C M (RO,BOP,SRO) open. Bus Breaker CS-1B4-1 Fails to Open 7 SG02D M (RO,BOP,SRO) SG 1-04 Tube Rupture (2 tubes) 8 FW38D C (BOP) SG 1-04 FWIV Fails to Close

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 8 Total malfunctions (5-8) 3 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 5 Abnormal events (2-4) 2 Major transients (1-2) 2 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 2 Critical tasks (2-3)

Page 1 of 53 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 1 Rev. 3

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 SCENARIO 1

SUMMARY

Event 1 The first event is a failure of Pressurizer Pressure Channel PT-455 high. The crew will enter ABN-705, Pressurizer Pressure Malfunction, Section 2.0, Pressurizer Pressure Instrument Malfunction. The associated PORV will open and the operator will close the PORV, its associated Block Valve, and place 1-PK-455A, Master Pressurizer Pressure Controller in manual and control PZR pressure. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.

Event 2 The operating CRDM vent fan trips. The crew will refer to 1-ALB-3A, Window 2.1, CNTMT FN MASTER TRIP, and ensure that at least one CRDM vent fan is in service, and manually start an alternate vent fan, per SOP-801A, Containment Ventilation System. They will use either Section 5.3.1, Control Rod Drive Mechanism Ventilation System Startup, or Section 5.3.3, Alternating Control Rod Drive Mechanism Ventilation Fans, for this evolution.

Event 3 1-FI-542A, SG 1-04 STM FLO, Selected Steam Flow transmitter fails Low. The crew will enter ABN-707, Section 2.0, Steam Flow Instrument Malfunction. The operators will take manual control of the affected FRV and master feed pump speed control. The alternate channel will be selected for control and the system will be returned back to automatic control.

Event 4 Failure of Cold Leg Loop 1 NR Temperature Transmitter (TE-411B). It will fail low (510°F). The Reactor Operator will take action per ABN-704, Tc/N-16 Instrumentation Malfunction, Section 2.0. This event requires taking manual control of rods, since the Tc failure results in a lower Tave and rods will withdraw in automatic until C-11 is reached. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications for this malfunction.

Event 5 Event 5 is the precursor to the major event and involves a trip of the main feed pump with a turbine runback (rod control is still in manual from the previous event). Operators will take action per ABN-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain System Malfunction, Section 2.0, and ramp the unit down. The second feed pump will trip 3 minutes after the first.

Event 6,7,8 After the loss of the 2nd MFP a reactor trip is warranted and an attempt will be made to manually trip the Reactor via the Normal Trip Switches and by de-energizing both buses supplying the Control Rod Drive Mechanism Motor Generators. Operators will enter FRS-0.1A, Response To Nuclear Power Generation/ATWT. Operators will be required to drive control rods inward until the reactor trip breakers are opened locally and Emergency Borate. After the reactor is shutdown a tube rupture will occur on SG 1-04. Operators will exit FRS-0.1A; perform the actions of EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and transition to EOP-3.0A, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. A failure of SG 1-04 FWIV to close will complicate the event.

Terminating Criteria Scenario will be terminated when the operators have completed an RCS cooldown, and an RCS depressurization has begun, or at the Examiners discretion.

Page 2 of 53 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 1 Rev. 3

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Risk Significance:

Failure of risk important system prior to trip: Pressurizer Pressure Channel Fails high Main Feed Pump B Trips Risk significant core damage sequence: Main Feed Pump A Trips; ATWT Risk significant operator actions: Isolation of Ruptured Steam Generator complicated by FWIV failure to close Page 3 of 53 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 1 Rev. 3

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Critical Task Determination Measurable Safety Performance Critical Task Cueing Performance Significance Feedback Indicators Ensure Control The safeguards DRPI lights indicating Observance of the DRPI indicating Rods inserting 48 systems that rods are withdrawn after RO verifying lights moving in the Steps / Minute protect the plant both reactor trip switches control rods are inward direction, During Reactor Trip during accidents have been turned, two inserting 48 rod speed indicator Failure Prior to are designed red indicating lights lit for Steps / Minute in showing rod speed Exiting FRS-0.1A, assuming that only both reactor trip breakers auto and when during the transient.

Response to decay heat and after the reactor trip speed slows then After reactor trip Nuclear Power pump heat are switches have been rods are placed in breakers opened Generation / ATWT being added to the turned, power range manual and driven two green lights for RCS. detectors showing power in the reactor trip greater than 5%. breakers Procedurally driven from FRS-0.1A Identify and Isolate Take one or more Procedurally driven from The operator will SG pressure the Ruptured actions that would EOP-3.0A, to identify not be able to increasing, AFW Steam Generator prevent a and isolate a ruptured close the MSIV, so flow reduced to Prior to challenge to plant SG. Indications include all other MSIVs zero and valve Commencing an safety. STI-214.01, MSL Radiation alarms must be closed. position indications.

Operator Induced TCA-1.9; FSAR and SG level. The operator will Cooldown per 15.6.3.1.1; WCAP- ensure the FW EOP-3.0A, Steam 16871-P, Section isolation valves Generator Tube 6.4; DBD-ME-027. are closed, and Rupture. (NOT TCA due to reduce AFW flow additional failure) to SG 1-04.

Page 4 of 53 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 1 Rev. 3

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize to IC18 and LOAD 2017 NRC Scenario 1.

DEMAND INITIATING EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION VALUE PARAMETER SETUP IRF FWR021 MDAFWP 1-02 Breaker Racked Out f:0 K0 IMF RP15E Reactor Trip Breakers Jammed Closed f:1 K0 6

IOR DIED1B41 Bus Breaker CS-1B4-1 Fails to Open f:3 K0 8 IMF FW38D SG (1-04) FWIV Fails to Close f:1 K0 (2) 1 IMF RX08A Pressurizer Pressure Channel (PT-455) fails high f:2500 K1 2 IMF CH10 CRDM Vent Fan #1 trips f:1 K2 3 IMF RX02G SG 1-04 Steam Flow (FI-542A) fails low f:0 K3 4 IMF RP05A NR Cold Leg 1 Temp (TE-411B) fails low f:510 K4 5 IMF FW03B Main Feedwater Pump B trip f:1 K5 IMF FW03A Main Feedwater Pump A trip f:1 K5 +180 Reactor Fails to trip -Reactor trip breakers 6 IMF RP15E f:1 K0 jammed closed IOR DIED1B41 Bus Breakers CS-1B4-1 Fails to open f:3 K0 IRF RPR112 Locally open Reactor Trip Breaker Train A f:2 K10 6

IRF RPR113 Locally open Reactor Trip Breaker Train B f:2 K10 7 IMF SG02D SG (1-04) Tube Rupture (2 tubes) f:2 (1) 8 IMF FW38D SG (1-04) FWIV fails to close f:1 K0 (2)

(1) {LORPRTBAL_1.Value} IMF SG02D f:2 r:60 Tube rupture will be set to actuate upon the RTB lights changing from red to green (60 second ramp)

(2) {DIFWHS2137.Value=0} DMF FW38D Allow 1-HV-2137 SG 1-04 FWIV to close with handswitch Page 5 of 53 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 1 Rev. 3

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Simulator Operator: INITIALIZE to IC18 and LOAD NRC Scenario 1.

ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE.

ENSURE RED Danger Tag on MDAFWP 1-02 and place in PULL-OUT ENSURE GEM Box PLACED on 1-HS-2450A for MDAFWP 1-01 ENSURE all Control board Tags are removed.

ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions (771 ppm)

ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed.

ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 10 Mwe/min.

ENSURE 60/90 buttons DEPRESSED on ASD ENSURE ASD speakers are ON at half volume.

ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover.

ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk:

- COPY of IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.5, Operating at Constant Turbine Load.

ENSURE Control Rods are in AUTO with Bank D at 215 steps.

Control Room Annunciators in Alarm:

PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.2 - IR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.6 - RX 10% PWR P-10 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.2 - IR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.2 - PR TRN A LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK PCIP-4.2 - PR TRN B LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK 1-SSII2 - Train B MDAFW is Solid Red Page 6 of 53 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 1 Rev. 3

Appendix D Scenario Event Description Form ES-D-1 Facility: CPNPP 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: June 2017 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% power MOL - RCS Boron is 771 ppm (by sample). MDAFWP 1-02 is out of service for scheduled maintenance.

Turnover: Maintain steady-state power conditions. Severe weather has been reported in the area. The Station has entered ABN-907, Acts of Nature. Pressurizer Steam Space Sample is in progress by Chemistry.

Critical Tasks: CT Isolate Reactor Coolant System Leakage Paths in accordance with ECA-0.0A, Loss of All AC Power prior to exiting ECA-0.0A.

CT Restore Power to Bus 1EA1 in accordance with ECA-0.0A, Loss of All AC Power, prior to exit from ECA-0.0A.

CT Manually start RHR Pump 1-01 in accordance with EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 or EOP-1.0A, Attachment 1A prior to exiting EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description C (RO, BOP, SRO) 1 ED07A Loss of Inverter (IV1PC1)

TS (SRO)

C (BOP, SRO) 2 SW01B SSW Pump 1-02 trips TS (SRO) 3 CV16A I (RO, SRO) VCT Level Channel LT-112 Fails Low FW14B R (RO) Heater Drain Pump 1-02 Trip 4 TC09I C (BOP, SRO) Automatic Turbine Runback Failure RD15A TS (SRO) Rods fail to control in automatic 5 ED01 M (RO, BOP, SRO) Loss of All AC Power Due to Loss of Offsite Power Emergency Diesel Generator 1-01 fails to start 6 EG15A C (BOP, SRO)

Emergency Diesel Generator 1-02 in pull-out due to SSW pump trip Pressurizer Steam Space Sample Valves (1/1-4165A & 1/1-4176A) 7 OVRD C (RO, SRO) fail to auto close. Manual closure required.

8 RC08A2 M (RO, BOP, SRO) LBLOCA occurs when DG 1-01 is Emergency Started 9 RH01C C (BOP) RHR Pump 1-01 fails to auto-start from sequencer

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 9 Total malfunctions (5-8) 4 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 4 Abnormal events (2-4) 2 Major transients (1-2) 2 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 3 Critical tasks (2-3)

Page 1 of 51 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 2 Rev. 3

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 SCENARIO 2

SUMMARY

The crew will assume the watch at 100% power with no scheduled activities per IPO-003A, Power Operations. Severe weather has been reported in the area. MDAFWP 1-02 is tagged out for scheduled maintenance. A Pressurizer Steam Space sample is in progress.

Event 1 The first event is a loss of Inverter IV1PC1, crew actions are in accordance with ABN-603, Loss of a Protection or Instrument Bus, and include stabilizing the plant, restoring an alternate power source, and verification of instrument restoration. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications and determine that TS 3.8.9 is applicable during the loss and exited upon power restoration.

Event 2 The next event is a trip of Station Service Water Pump 1-02. The crew will enter ABN-501, Section 2.0, Station Service Water Pump Trip. Various equipment controls, as directed by ABN-501, are placed in PULL OUT to prevent starting with no cooling water available. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.

Event 3 VCT level channel LT-112 will fail low. This will result in an automatic makeup. The RO will respond in accordance with the ALM and stop the auto makeup. The crew will refer to ABN-105, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction to place the makeup system into manual alignment until automatic control is restored.

Event 4 The next event is a trip of a Heater Drain Pump with an automatic turbine runback failure. The crew responds per ABN-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain System Malfunction, Section, 4.0. When it is determined that automatic plant response has not activated, control rods are placed/verified in auto and a manual Turbine Runback will be initiated. The control rods will fail to operate in auto, and must be manually controlled by the RO. The crew will stabilize load at 700 MWe. During this event, control rod position may drop below the Rod Insertion Limit (RIL) and when informed, the SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.

Events 5, 6, 7 The major event is a Loss of Offsite Power with a failure of Diesel Generator 1-01 to automatically start. Operators will perform an emergency start of DG 1-01 in accordance with ECA-0.0A, Loss of All AC Power. The event is complicated by the Pressurizer Steam Space Sample in progress and the valves must be manually closed.

Event 8 A LBLOCA will occur (delayed by 120 seconds) when DG 1-01 is emergency started. RHR Pump1-01 fails to auto-start from the SI sequencer; it is a critical task to manually start the only available RHR Pump. Entries into both FRP-0.1A, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition and FRZ-0.1, Response to High Containment Pressure, will be required; however the actions of these procedures will not be substantive.

Termination Criteria This scenario is terminated when the crew has performed the actions of EOP-1.0, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, and determined a transition to EOS-1.3 A, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation is required OR if conditions are met to transfer to EOS-1.3A due to RWST level.

Page 2 of 51 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 2 Rev. 3

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Risk Significance:

Failure of risk important system prior to trip: Loss of Inverter IV1PC1 Loss of SSWP 1-02 / DG 1-02 Turbine Runback Failure Risk significant core damage sequence: Loss LOCAof All AC Power Failure of RHR Pump 1-01 significant operator actions:

Risk Isolate RCS Leakage Paths Restore Safeguards Bus Manual Start of RHR Pump 1-01 Page 3 of 51 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 2 Rev. 3

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Critical Task Determination Measurable Safety Performance Critical Task Cueing Performance Significance Feedback Indicators Isolate Reactor Take one or more Procedural direction at The operator will Valve position will Coolant System actions that would ECA-0.0A Step 3 to manually close the change and Leakage Paths in prevent a challenge minimize RCS Letdown Isolation letdown flow will accordance with to plant safety. inventory loss. Valve Valves and Primary lower to zero.

ECA-0.0A, Loss of position indication and Sample Isolation MLB indication for All AC Power prior letdown flow. Valves. closed valve to exiting position.

ECA-0.0A.

Restore Power to Recognize a failure Procedural direction at The operator will Indication of DG Bus 1EA1 in or an incorrect ECA-0.0A Step 5 to manually perform an running and accordance with automatic actuation restore power via EDG emergency start on loading via bus ECA-0.0A, Loss of of an ESF system 1-01 to Safeguard Bus EDG 1-01 using the voltage and All AC Power, prior or component 1EA1. Bus voltage handswitch on CB-11. frequency.

to exit from resulting in indication and EDG ECA-0.0A. degraded ECCS parameters.

capacity.

Manually Start Recognize a failure Procedural direction in The operator will start Indication of pump RHR Pump 1-01 in or an incorrect EOP-0.0A, Attachment RHR Pump 1-01 using start including light accordance with automatic actuation 2 to verify RHR handswitch indication, flow EOP-0.0A of an ESF system Pumps running. Also 1/1-APRH1, RHRP 1 and discharge or or component. procedural direction in on CB-04. pressure on EOP-1.0A, EOP-1.0A, Attachment CB-04. A prior 1A to manually start to exiting ECCS pumps as EOP-1.0A, Loss of necessary to maintain Reactor or PRZR level. RHR Secondary Coolant. Pump 1-02 in this case has no power, therefore RHR Pump 1-01 must be manually started to provide makeup flow to the RCS as this is a LBLOCA and RHR flow is required.

Page 4 of 51 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 2 Rev. 3

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP INITIALIZE to IC-18 and LOAD NRC Scenario 2.

DEMAND INITIATING EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION VALUE PARAMETER SETUP IRF FWR021 MDAFWP 1-02 Breaker Racked Out f:0 K0 4 IMF TC09I Automatic Turbine Runback Failure f:1 K0 6 IMF EG15A DG 1-01 Fails to Auto Start f:1 K0 LOANMLB IOR PSS Valve MLB Light 1-4165A f:1 K0 1A2_1 7

LOANMLB IOR PSS Valve MLB Light 1-4167A f:1 K0 1B2_1 9 IMF RH01C RHR Pump 1-01 fails to start on sequencer f:1 K0 1 IMF ED07A Loss of Inverter (IV1PC1) f:1 K1 1 IRF EDR01 Transfer 1PC1 to alternate power f:0 K10 2 IMF SW 01B Loss of SSW Pump 1-02 f:1 K2 3 IMF CV16A VCT Level Channel LT-112 Fails Low f:0 K3 4 IMF FW14B Heater Drain Pump 1-02 Trip f:1 K4 4 IMF RD15A Rods fail to move in Auto f:1 K4 4 IMF TC09I Automatic Turbine Runback Failure f:1 K0 5 IMF ED01 Loss of Offsite Power f:1 K5 6 IMF EG15A Diesel Generator 1-01 Fails to Auto Start f:1 K0 PRZR Steam Space Sample Valves 7 IMF OVRD f:1 K0 (1/1-4165A & 1/1-4176A) Failure LBLOCA linked to DG Emergency Start 8 IMF RC08A2 f:1 +120

{DIEG1DG1E.Value=4}

9 IMF RH01C RHR Pump 1-01 fails to start on sequencer f:1 K0 Page 5 of 51 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 2 Rev. 3

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Simulator Operator: INITIALIZE to IC-18 and LOAD NRC Scenario 2.

ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE.

ENSURE RED Danger Tag on MDAFWP 1-02 and place in PULL-OUT.

ENSURE GEM Box PLACED on 1-HS-2450A for MDAFWP 1-01.

ENSURE all Control Board Tags are removed.

ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions (771 ppm).

ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed.

ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 10 MWe/minute.

ENSURE 60/90 buttons DEPRESSED on ASD.

ENSURE ASD speakers are ON to half volume.

ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover.

ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk:

- COPY of IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.5, Operating at Constant Turbine Load.

ENSURE Control Rods are in AUTO with Bank D at 215 steps.

Control Room Annunciators in Alarm:

PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.2 - IR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.6 - RX 10% PWR P-10 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.2 - IR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.2 - PR TRN A LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK PCIP-4.2 - PR TRN B LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK 1-SSII2 - Train B MDAFW is Solid Red Page 6 of 51 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 2 Rev. 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: CPNPP 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: June 2017 NRC Examiners: Operators:

-8 Initial Conditions: 1 x 10 amps following a refueling outage. MDAFWPs are maintaining Steam Generator Water Levels 60-75%. Steam dumps are in Steam Pressure mode. Boron is 1669 ppm (by sample).

Turnover: Raise power to 3% per IPO-002A, Plant Startup From Hot Standby, Section 5.4 Critical Tasks: CT 1 - Initiate a MSLI or Manually close MSLI valves, due to failure to automatically isolate, prior to exiting EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, or EOP-2.0, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

CT 2 - Trip reactor coolant pumps within 5 minutes upon a loss of Subcooling per EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection OR EOP-1.0A, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description R (RO, SRO) 1 - Raise power to 2% to 3%

N (BOP)

TP06A Turbine Plant Cooling Water Pump 1 Trip 2 C (BOP, SRO)

TP07B Turbine Plant Cooling Water Pump 2 Failure to Auto-Start Letdown HX Outlet flow controller Failure TK-130 fails low, 3 OVRD C (RO, SRO)

TCV-129 fails to automatically divert RX08B I (RO, SRO) PT-456 PZR Pressure Transmitter fails high, PORV PCV-456 4

RX16B TS (SRO)) fails 25% open C (BOP, SRO) 5 FW24B AFW Pump 1-02 trips, manual start of TDAFW Pump required TS (SRO)

RD09B6 RD04B6 6 M (ALL) Seismic event, Ejected rod, SBLOCA @ 1500 gpm, Stuck rod RD04F6 RC19C Main Steam line leak downstream of the MSIVs (MSLI does not 7 MS02 M (ALL) occur automatically)

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 7 Total malfunctions (5-8) 2 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 4 Abnormal events (2-4) 2 Major transients (1-2) 2 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 0 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 2 Critical tasks (2-3)

Page 1 of 39 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 3 Rev. 3

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 SCENARIO 3

SUMMARY

Event 1 In accordance with turnover instructions, the crew begins raising power to 2% to 3%, per IPO-002A, Plant Startup from Hot Standby, Section 5.4, Increasing Reactor Power to Approximately 2% Following Reactor Startup and Establishing Main Feedwater Flow to the SGs.

Event 2 When the lead examiner is satisfied with the power increase (stable between 2-3%) a trip of the running TPCW Pump will occur. The standby pump will fail to automatically start and manual operator action will be required to start the standby pump. Crew response will be per ABN-306, Turbine Plant Cooling Water System Malfunction, Section 3.0. The crew will start the standby pump and verify other parameters for the system.

Event 3 The next event is a failure of the Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet Flow Controller, TK-130. The controller output will fail to zero demand and cause TCV-4646, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL valve to close. This will result in Letdown Heat Exchanger High temperature alarms and Letdown flow will fail to divert to the VCT on high temperature. The crew will respond per the ALM, manually divert letdown flow to the VCT, and take manual control of TK-130 and raise demand to establish a Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet temperature of approximately 95°F.

Event 4 Pressurizer Pressure channel PT-456 will fail high. PORV PCV-456 will open and when closed will stick at 25% open. The crew will enter ABN-705, Section 2.0, Pressurizer Pressure Instrument Malfunction.

The primary action is to close the PORV block valve. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.

Event 5 After the crew has control of RCS pressure, the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (MDAFWP) 1-02 will trip. The crew will enter ABN-305, Auxiliary Feedwater System Malfunction. The crew will manually start the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFWP) and feed Steam Generators 1-03 and 1-04 with the TDAFWP. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.

Event 6 A seismic event occurs; this is a precursor for upcoming events. The crew will enter ABN-907, Acts of Nature, Section 2.0, Earthquake. 120 seconds after the seismic annunciators have come in, Control Rod B6 will partially eject from the core (SBLOCA) and Control Rod F6 will stick at 168 steps on the reactor trip. The reactor will trip and the crew will enter EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Emergency Boration verification via Safety Injection flow will be required due to the 2 Stuck Control Rods. The crew must secure RCPs within 5 minutes of loss of subcooling.

Event 7 A Main steam line break in the turbine building will occur (downstream of the MSIVs,) as a result of the seismic event, requiring the MSIVs to be manually closed as they will fail to close automatically.

Terminating Criteria Scenario will be terminated when the crew has RESET RHR Auto Switchover in EOP-1.0A, or at the lead Examiners discretion, Terminate the scenario.

Page 2 of 39 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 3 Rev. 3

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Risk Significance:

Failure of risk significant systems prior to trip: PORV stuck open MDAFW Pump trips Risk significant core damage sequence: Rod Ejection then Small Break LOCA Main Steam Line Break Risk significant operator actions: Manual start of TDAFWP Manual Main Steam line Isolation Page 3 of 39 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 3 Rev. 3

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Critical Task Determination Measurable Performance Critical Task Safety Significance Cueing Performance Feedback Indicators Initiate a MSLI or Take one or more SG pressure along with The operator will All MSIV valve light Manually close actions that would RCS pressure and manually close the indications will MSLI valves, due to prevent a challenge temperature falling. MSIVs from change from Red lit failure to to plant safety. CB-07. to Green lit and automatically steam flow will go isolate, prior to to zero for SGs.

exiting EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, or EOP-2.0, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation.

Trip reactor coolant Take one or more Procedurally driven from The operator will Indication of pump pumps within 5 actions that would EOP-0.0A and EOP-1.0A secure ALL RCPs stop including light minutes upon a loss prevent a challenge Foldout pages. using the indication, flow and of Subcooling per to plant safety. Availability of Subcooling handswitches on motor current.

EOP-0.0A, Reactor FSAR II.K.3.5; indication both on meters CB-05.

Trip or Safety WCAP-9584; WOG and computer.

Injection OR ERG Generic Issue EOP-1.0A Loss of for RCP Trip /

Reactor or Restart.

Secondary Coolant.

Page 4 of 39 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 3 Rev. 3

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP INITIALIZE to IC 57 and LOAD NRC Scenario 3.

DEMAND INITIATING EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION VALUE PARAMETER IMF TP07B Turbine Plant Cooling Water Pump 2 Fail to f:1 K0 2

Auto-Start 7 IMF SS02A1 MSL Isolation Train A Master Relay Failure f:1 K0 7 IMF SS02A2 MSL Isolation Train B Master Relay Failure 2 IMF TP06A Turbine Plant Cooling Water Pump 1 Trip f:1 K2 IMF TP07B Turbine Plant Cooling Water Pump 2 Fail to 2 f:1 K0 Auto-Start Letdown HX Outlet Flow Controller Failure f:10 3 IOR OVRD (TK-130) Fails Low, with a failure of TCV-129 to K3 + 60 divert OVRD 4 IMF RX08B PT-456 PZR Pressure Transmitter fails high f:2500 K4 4 IMF RX16B PORV PCV-456 fails 25% open. f:25 K4 + 4 4 IRF RCR24 PORV Block Valve breaker f:0 K11 5 IMF FW24B AFW Pump 1-02 trips f:1 K5 AN2A_02 Seismic Event f:4 K6 IRF AN2A_03 Seismic Event f:4 K6 RD09B6 Ejected Rod B6 f:228 K6 + 120 6

RD04B6 Stuck Rod B6 (ejected - for indication only) f:228 K6 + 120 IMF RD04F6 Stuck Rod F6 f:168 K6 +120 RC19C SBLOCA f:1500 K6 + 120 (1) 7 IMF MS02 Main Steam Line leak downstream of the MSIVs f:2e+006 K6 + 270 7 IMF SS02A1 MSL Isolation Train A Master Relay Failure f:1 K0 7 IMF SS02A2 MSL Isolation Train B Master Relay Failure (1) {DIRPSIA2.Value=1} MMF RC19C f:1750 r:60 Modify SBLOCA to 1750 gpm on SI Initiation (60 sec ramp)

Page 5 of 39 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 3 Rev. 3

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Simulator Operator: INITIALIZE to IC 57 and LOAD NRC Scenario 3 ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE ENSURE all Control Board Tags are removed ENSURE Operator Aid reflects current boron conditions (1669 ppm BOL)

ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed (C at 214 / D at 99)

ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 8.9 MWe/minute ENSURE 60/90 buttons DEPRESSED on ASD ENSURE ASD speakers are ON to half volume ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk:

- COPY of IPO-002A, Plant Startup From Hot Standby, Section 5.4, Increasing Reactor Power to Approximately 2% Following Reactor Startup and Establishing Main Feedwater Flow to the SGs ENSURE Control Rods are in MANUAL with Bank C at 214 steps and Bank D at 99 ENSURE PCS TT06 is set to GTGC MODE2 and on scale ENSURE Steam Dump pot is set for 6.70 turns ENSURE Alarms in service for CV-01 and CV-03 on Panel Overview PLACE Pink MANUAL Magnet (Rectangle) above 1/1-RBSS, Rod Bank Select Switch Control Room Annunciators in Alarm:

1-ALB-6D-1.1 - SR HI VOLT FAIL 1-ALB-6D-3.1 - SR SHTDN FLUX ALM BLK PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.3 - AMSAC BLK TURB < 40% PWR C-20 PCIP-1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.7 - RX 50% PWR TURB TRIP PERM P-9 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.4 - LO TURB PWR ROD WITHDRWL BLK C-5 PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.5 - RX & TURB 10% PWR P-7 PCIP-4.5 - RX 48% PWR 3-LOOP FLO PERM P-8 PCIP-4.6 - TURB 10% PWR P-13 1-ALB-7B-1.6 - FW FLUSH VLV NOT CLOSE HV-2166 1-ALB-7B-1.12 - FWPT A TRIP 1-ALB-8A-1.10 - 1 OF 4 TURB STOP VLV CLOSE 1-ALB-9A - Various Heater Drain and Extraction Steam Alarms Page 6 of 39 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 3 Rev. 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: CPNPP 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: June 2017 NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 92% power MOL - RCS boron is 777 ppm (by sample). Power has been reduced for Main Turbine testing; Control Bank D Rods are at 202 steps in Automatic. MDAFW Pump 1-02 is out of service for an oil change.

Turnover: Maintain 92% power conditions. Place RWST on Recirculation using Containment Spray pump 1-01.

Critical Tasks: CT Trip all Reactor Coolant Pumps in accordance with FRH-0.1A, Response To Loss Of Secondary Heat Sink, prior to Initiating Bleed and Feed Cooling.

CT Initiate RCS Feed and Bleed in accordance with FRH-0.1A, Response To Loss Of Secondary Heat Sink, such that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently for Intermediate Head Injection to occur, prior to all Steam Generator Wide Range levels lowering to 0%.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 Recirculate the Refueling Water Storage Tank with Containment

- N (BOP, SRO)

Spray Pump 1-01.

2 MS13C I (RO, SRO) SG 1-03 Steam Line Pressure Fails High (PT-2327) - ARV Opens 3 CS02A TS (SRO) Containment Spray Pump 1-01 Trip.

I (RO, BOP, SRO) 4 NI04E NI42 Power Range Channel fails high.

TS (SRO) 5 CH03 C (BOP, SRO) Neutron Detector Well Fan 9 trips on motor overload 6 FW22 R (RO) Low Pressure Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve (PV-2286) Fails C (BOP, SRO) Open.

7 FW20A M (RO, BOP, SRO) Condensate Pump 1-01 trips; requiring a manual reactor trip.

Loss of 6.9KV Bus 1EA1 (86-1 relay) when Generator Output ED05H 8 M (RO, BOP, SRO) Breakers Open FW09A TDAFW Pump trips on overspeed, Loss of all AFW 9 RX16B C (RO, SRO) PORV 456 fails to open manually or automatically

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 9 Total malfunctions (5-8) 3 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 5 Abnormal events (2-4) 2 Major transients (1-2) 1 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 2 Critical tasks (2-3)

Page 1 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 4 Rev. 3

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 SCENARIO 4

SUMMARY

Event 1 As directed by the turnover the crew will recirculate the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) using Containment Spray Pump 1-01 per SOP-204A, Containment Spray System, Section 5.1.3, Recirculation through the Recirculation Header.

Event 2 SG 1-03 Steam Line Pressure (PT-2327) fails high opening the ARV. Crew actions are per ABN-709, STM Line, STM HDR and Turbine 1st Stage Press, Feed HDR Press Instrument Malfunction. The crew will respond by checking STM Line pressures against set point and determining the ARV is open below set point. The RO will place the ARV in manual and close the valve.

Event 3 When conditions are stable, Containment Spray Pump 1-01 will trip. Actions are per ALM-0022A, 1-ALB-2B, Window 1.3 - ANY CSP OVRLD TRIP. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.

Event 4 Event 4 is a failure high of NI42 Power Range Channel. The crew will enter ABN-703, Power Range Instrumentation Malfunction. Since the failure is in the high direction, rods will be rapidly inserting. This will require the operator to place rod control to Manual, per Step 1.b of ABN-703. The SRO will refer to Technical Specifications.

Event 5 Event 4 will be a trip of the running Neutron Detector Well Fan #9. This will alarm 2.1 CNTMT FN MASTER TRIP. The ALM will direct the crew to determine which fan has tripped and start the other fan as required using SOP-801A, Containment Ventilation System. The crew will place the tripped fan handswitch in Pull Out or Stop as applicable.

Event 5 The Low Pressure Heater Bypass Valve fails open. Entry into ABN-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain System Malfunction, Section 7.0, is required and Rod Control is returned to AUTO and a Manual Turbine Runback to 900 MWe is performed. During this event, Control Rod position may drop below the Rod Insertion Limit (RIL) and when informed, the SRO will refer to Technical Specifications Event 6 Major Event, Condensate Pump 1-01 trips. Both Main Feedwater Pumps trip and the reactor will be manually tripped. The crew will enter EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Event 7 The crew will experience a loss of Bus 1EA1. This will occur at the same time the Main Generator Breaker opens on the unit trip. With MDAFW Pump 1-02 tagged out, there are no motor driven AFW pumps available. There are no Main Feedwater Pumps or Condensate Pumps available. The only source of feedwater will be the Turbine Driven AFW Pump.

Events 8 & 9 The TDAFW pump will trip on overspeed, leaving no viable source of feedwater and when Heat Sink is lost the crew will transition to FRH-0.1A, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. The step for checking that both Centrifugal Charging Pumps are available will be answered with a "NO", requiring tripping of all Reactor Coolant Pumps and to initiate bleed and feed. One PORV will fail to open; this will require all reactor vessel and pressurizer head vents to be opened.

Page 2 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 4 Rev. 3

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Termination Criteria The scenario will be terminated when bleed and feed is initiated in accordance with FRH-0.1A; or at the discretion of the lead examiner.

Risk Significance:

Failure of risk important system prior to trip: Loss of Containment Spray Pump 1-01 Loss of Main Feedwater Pumps due to Loss of Condensate Pumps Risk significant core damage sequence: Loss of one Safeguards Bus (1EA1)

TDAFW Pump trips on overspeed Risk significant operator actions: Restore Pressurizer Pressure Control Manually trip reactor on loss of all feedwater Initiate bleed and feed Page 3 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 4 Rev. 3

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Critical Task Determination Measurable Safety Performance Critical Task Cueing Performance Significance Feedback Indicators Trip all Reactor Without a source of Procedural direction at The operator will Control board light Coolant Pumps in water to provide a FRH-0.1A Step 2 RNO a. manually stop and flow accordance with heat sink on the to immediately stop all RCPs using the indications, along FRH-0.1A, secondary side of RCPs. handswitches on with loss of flow Response To Loss the SGs, RCPs are CB-05. annunciators that Of Secondary Heat tripped to extend the RCPs have Sink, prior to the effectiveness if stopped.

Initiating Bleed and the remaining Feed Cooling. water inventory in the SGs.

Initiate RCS Bleed Actuating SI AFW flow will not be Actuated SI, Flow indicated on and Feed in ensures feed path indicated on any AFW ensured at least both a CCP and an accordance with of cool water to the flow meter. Also no one CCP and SI SI pump. PRZR FRH-0.1A, RCS and isolates AFW pumps will be pump is running PORV open with Response To Loss the containment to running. A RED path with flow indicated block valve open.

Of Secondary Heat confine any RCS showing on CSFST for providing a feed PRZR and Vessel Sink, such that the releases from the heat sink. The need for path for the RCS. vents open. RCS RCS depressurizes bleed flow. The a heat sink as indicated PRZR PORV as pressure lowering sufficiently for bleed flow through by RCS temperature and well as PRZR and and CETs will Intermediate-Head a PORV/Vent pressure. Vessel vent valves indicate core Injection to occur, valves will ensure open providing a cooling.

prior to all Steam that enough cool bleed path for the Generator Wide water will feed from RCS.

Range levels the ECCS flow lowering to 0%. path to remove sufficient decay heat.

Page 4 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 4 Rev. 3

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP INITIALIZE to IC 43 and LOAD NRC Scenario 4.

DEMAND INITIATING EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION VALUE PARAMETER SETUP IRF FWR021 MDAFWP 1-02 Breaker Racked Out f:0 K0 IMF ED05H Bus 1EA1 86-1 lockout. f:1 (1) 8 TDAFW Pump trips on overspeed.

IMF FW09A f:1 Rx Trip + 480 (3)

{LORPRTBAL_1.Value=1} IMF FW09A 9 IMF RX16B PORV 456 fails to open manually or automatically f:1 K0 1 - - Recirculate RWST with CSP 1-01 - -

SG ARV PT-2327 Fails High - ARV opens CSP 1-01 start + 15 2 IMF MS13C f:1300

{DICSHS4764.Value=3} IMF MS13C f:1300 d:15 (2) 3 IMF CS02A Containment Spray Pump 1-01 Trip f:1 K3 4 IMF NI04E NI42 Power Range Channel fails high. f:200 K4 Neutron Detector Well Fan 9 trips on motor 5 IMF CH03 f:1 K5 overload Low Pressure Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve 6 IMF FW22 f:1 K6 (PV-2286) fails open.

7 IMF FW20A Condensate Pump 1-01 trips f:1 K7 IMF ED05H Bus 1EA1 86-1 lockout. f:1 (1) 8 TDAFW Pump trips on overspeed.

IMF FW09A f:1 Rx Trip + 480 (3)

{LORPRTBAL_1.Value=1} IMF FW09A 9 IMF RX16B PORV 456 fails to open manually or automatically f:1 K0 (1) {LOEGW3_1.Value=1} IMF ED05H f:1 Inserts ED05H when Gen. Output Bkrs open (2) {DICSHS4764.Value=3} IMF MS13C f:1300 d:15 - PT-2327 fails high 15 seconds after CSP 1-01 starts (3) {LORPRTBAL_1.Value=1} IMF FW09A Trip TDAFWP 480 seconds after Rx Trip Page 5 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 4 Rev. 3

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Simulator Operator: INITIALIZE to IC43 and LOAD NRC Scenario 4 ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE ENSURE RED Danger Tag on MDAFWP 1-02 and place in PULL-OUT ENSURE GEM Box PLACED on 1-HS-2450A for MDAFWP 1-01 ENSUURE all Control board Tags are removed ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions (777 ppm)

ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 10 MWe/min ENSURE 60/90 buttons DEPRESSED on ASD ENSURE ASD speakers are ON at half volume ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk:

- COPY of IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.5, Operating at Constant Turbine Load ENSURE Control Rods are in AUTO with Bank D at 202 steps ENSURE TT06 set to GTGC PWROPS and all points on scale Control Room Annunciators in Alarm:

PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.2 - IR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C-9 PCIP-1.6 - RX 10% PWR P-10 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.2 - IR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P-6 PCIP-3.2 - PR TRN A LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK PCIP-4.2 - PR TRN B LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK 1-SSII2 - Train B MDAFW is Solid Red Page 6 of 34 CPNPP NRC 2017 Scenario 4 Rev. 3