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| | issue date = 08/24/1999 | | | issue date = 08/24/1999 |
| | title = LER 99-004-01:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Chevron Separator Vanes Were Installed Backwards.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg.Moisture Separator Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed | | | title = LER 99-004-01:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Chevron Separator Vanes Were Installed Backwards.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg.Moisture Separator Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed |
| | author name = VITALI C | | | author name = Vitali C |
| | author affiliation = ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. | | | author affiliation = ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| | addressee name = | | | addressee name = |
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| {{#Wiki_filter:I)NRCFORM366{61688)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAMEi1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantLICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER){Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/characters foreachblock)PAGEI3)1OF7DOCKETNUMBERl2)050002448"ICPYPP"Bth''PILew(P"information collection request:50hrs.Reportedlessonslearnedareincorporated intothelicensing processandfedbacktoindustry. | | {{#Wiki_filter:I) |
| Forwardcommentsregarding burdenestimatetotheRecordsManagement Branch(TRF33),U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission, Washington.
| | NRC FORM |
| DC205554001
| | {6 1688) 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8"ICPYPP " B th''P IL ew(P information collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) industry. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (TR F33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington. DC 205554001 and to |
| ~andtothePapenvork Reduction Project{3150%104), | | {See reverse for required number of |
| OfficeofManagement andBudget,Washington, DC20503.Ifaninformation collection doesnotdisplayacurrently validOMBcontrolnumber,theNRCmaynotconductorsponsor.andaTITlE(4)Containment Recirculation FanMoistureSeparator VanesIncorrectly Installed ResultsinPlantBeingOutsideItsDesignBasisEVENTDATE(5ILERNUMBER{6)REPORTDATE(7)OTHERFACILITIES INVOLVED{6)MONTHDAYYEARYEARSEOUENTIAL NUMBERREYLSIONNUMBERMONTHOAYYEARFACILITYNAMEDOCKETNUMBER05000041219991999-004-0108241999FACILITYNAMEDOCKETNUMBER05000OPERATING MODE(9)POWERLEVEL(10)000THISREPORTISSUBMITTED P20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(T) 20.2203(a)(2)
| | ~ |
| (i)20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
| | the Papenvork Reduction Project {3150%104), Office of digits/characters for each block) Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor. and a FACILITY NAME i1) DOCKET NUMBER l2) PAGE I3) |
| URSUANTTOTHEREQUIREMENTS OF10CFRE:(Check50.73(a)(2)
| | R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 1 OF 7 T ITlE (4) |
| {i)(B)20.2203(a) | | Containment Recirculation Fan Moisture Separator Vanes Incorrectly Installed Results in Plant Being Outside Its Design Basis EVENT DATE (5I LER NUMBER {6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED {6) |
| (2)(v)20.2203(a) | | SEOUENTIAL FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER REYLSION MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH OAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 05000 04 12 1999 1 999 - 004 01 08 24 1999 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED P URSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR E: (Check one or more) (11) |
| {3)(i)20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4)
| | MODE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a) (2) (v) 50.73(a)(2) {i)(B) 50.73(a) (2)(viii) |
| X50.73{a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2){iii)50.73(a)(2)(iv) oneormore)(11)50.73(a)(2)(viii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71OTHER20.2203(a)
| | POWER 20.2203(a)(T) 20.2203(a) {3)(i) X 50.73{a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) |
| (2)(iii)20.2203(a)(2) | | LEVEL (10) 000 20.2203(a)(2) (i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a) (2) {iii) 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER 20.2203(a) (2) (iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a) {2)(v) Specify ln Abstract below 20.2203(a)(2) (iv) 50.36(c) (2) 50.73(a)(2) {vii) or in NRC Form 366A LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER {12) |
| (iv)50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2)LICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER{12)50.73(a){2)(v)50.73(a)(2) | | NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Iiciude Area Code) |
| {vii)SpecifylnAbstractbeloworinNRCForm366ANAMETELEPHONE NUMBER(IiciudeAreaCode)CarmenVitali-SeniorEngineer(716)771-3606CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TOEPIXIln>.CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABIE TOEPIXSUPPLEMENTAL REPORTEXPECTED(14)YES(Ifyes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE).XNoEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE(15)MONTHOAYYEARABSTRACT{Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately 15single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)OnApril12,1999,atapproximately 1600EDST,theplantwasshutdowninMode5.Itwasdiscovered thatthecontainment recirculation fanchevronmoistureseparator vaneswereinstalled backwards, sothatthepathforairflowwaslesstortuous, decreasing moistureseparation effectiveness. | | Carmen Vitali - Senior Engineer (716) 771-3606 REPORTABLE REPORTABIE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TO EPIX TO EPIX I ln>. |
| Corrective actionwastoremovethevanesandinstallthemintheproperorientation. | | SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) MONTH OAY YEAR EXPECTED YES No SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). X DATE (15) |
| Theincorrect installation wasaresultofimproperassemblybythemanufacturer inthe1960's.Theoriginalmoistureremovalequipment consisted ofanassemblymadeupofthechevrontypevanesandfiberglass moistureremovalpads.Thisequipment wasshop-assembled andshippedtoGinnaStation.Vendorphotographs takenduringoriginalshopassemblyshowthevanesinstalled inamannernowknowntobeincorrect.
| | ABSTRACT {Limitto 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16) |
| Corrective actiontopreventrecurrence isoutlinedinSectionV.99090i0030 990E)24PDRADOCK050002448PDR NRCFORM366A(6.1998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET(2)05000244LERNUMBER(6)yEARSEIIUENTIAE NUMBERNUMBER1999-004-01PAGE(3)2OF7TEXTiifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofhfRCForm366AI(17)PRE-EVENT PLANTCONDITIONS:
| | On April 12, 1999, at approximately 1600 EDST, the plant was shutdown in Mode 5. It was discovered that the containment recirculation fan chevron moisture separator vanes were installed backwards, so that the path for air flow was less tortuous, decreasing moisture separation effectiveness. |
| OnApril12,1999,theplantwasshutdowninMode5forthe1999refueling outage.Amongthemanyactivities inprogressduringthe1999refueling outage,maintenance wasbeingperformed ontheContainment Recirculation FanCoolers(CRFC)~Atapproximately 1600EDST,anengineerfromNuclearEngineering Services(NES)discovered thatthechevronmoistureseparator vanesfortheCRFCswereinstalled contrarytothatshowninavendormanualdiagram,butcorrectly asshownonavendoroutlinedrawing.DESCRIPTION OFEVENT:A.DATESANDAPPROXIMATE TIMESOFMAJOROCCURRENCES:
| | Corrective action was to remove the vanes and install them in the proper orientation. |
| oOriginalconstruction circa1969:Eventdateandtime.oApril12,1999,1600EDST:Discovery dateandtime.oApril17,1999,1000EDST:Chevronmoistureseparator vanesarecorrectly installed.
| | The incorrect installation was a result of improper assembly by the manufacturer in the 1960's. The original moisture removal equipment consisted of an assembly made up of the chevron type vanes and fiberglass moisture removal pads. This equipment was shop-assembled and shipped to Ginna Station. Vendor photographs taken during original shop assembly show the vanes installed in a manner now known to be incorrect. |
| B..EVENT:OnApril12,1999,theplantwasshutdowninMode5forthe1999refueling outage.Amongthemanyactivities inprogressduringthe1999refueling outage,maintenance wasbeingperformed ontheContainment Recirculation FanCoolers(CRFC).Atapproximately 1600EDST,anengineerfromNuclearEngineering Services(NES)discovered thatthechevronmoistureseparator vanesfortheCRFCswereinstalled contrarytothatshownonavendormanualdiagram,butcorrectly asshownonavendoroutlinedrawing.Afterfurtherevaluation anddiscussions withthevendor,itwasconcluded thatthevaneswereinstalled backwards, sothatthepathforairflowislesstortuousthanifthevaneswerecorrectly installed.
| | Corrective action to prevent recurrence is outlined in Section V. |
| ThesevanesareTypeTMistExtractors, manufactured byAmericanAirFilterCo.,Inc.TheCRFCSystemconsistsoffourfanunits(A,B,C,andD),ofwhichtheAandCunitssupplycharcoalfilters.Eachcoolingunitconsistsofamotor,fan,coolingcoils,dampers,moistureseparators (vanesandpads),highefficiency particulate air(HEPA)filters,ductdistributors andnecessary instrumentation andcontrols.
| | 99090i0030 990E)24 PDR ADOCK 05000244 8 PDR |
| Airisdrawnintothecoolersthroughthefananddischarged intothecontainment atmosphere.
| |
| Themoistureseparators functiontoreducethemoisturecontentoftheairstream tosupporttheeffectiveness oftheHEPAandpost-accident charcoalfilters.
| |
| NRCFORM366A(61998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMIVIISSION FACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET(2)05000244LERNUMBER(6)rEANSEGUENTNL NUMUENNUMSEA1999-004-01PAGE(3)3OF7TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366AI(17)Following thecoolingcoilsisthemoistureseparator section,designedtoremoveentrained moistureexitingthecoolingcoils.Twoseparatemoistureremovalprocesses areemployed; thefirstbydirectimpingement onverticalhookedvanes,andthesecondbytrappingonseparator pads.Runofffrombothstagesflowsintocollection pansfromwhichitispipedtothecontainment sump.Themoistureseparator casings,hookedvanes,andcollection pansarefabricated ofgalvanized steel.Withthevanesinstalled backwards, themoistureseparation capability isdecreased.
| |
| CRFCperformance wasnotcompletely analyzedforthiscondition.
| |
| Thesupplierofthemoistureremovalequipment (American AirFilter)wascontacted.
| |
| Itwasconcluded thatthiscondition wasaresultofimproperassemblybythemanufacturer inthe1960's.Theoriginalmoistureremovalequipment consisted ofanassemblymadeupofthechevrontypevanesandfiberglass moistureremovalpads.Thisequipment wasshop-assembled andshippedtoGinnaStation.Vendorphotographs takenduringoriginalshopassemblyshowthevanesinstalled inamannernowknowntobeincorrect.
| |
| Asdirectedbythesupplier, thevaneshadtobedismantled andthencorrectly installed.
| |
| C.INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, ORSYSTEMSTHATCONTRIBUTED TOTHEEVENT:NoneD.OTHERSYSTEMSORSECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:
| |
| NoneE.METHODOFDISCOVERY:
| |
| Thiseventwasdiscovered byanengineerfromNES,whowassupporting CRFCmaintenance.
| |
| F.OPERATORACTION:TheplantwasinMode5atthetimeofdiscovery, andtheCRFCsarenotrequiredtobeoperableinthismode.AftertheNESengineernotifiedtheShiftSupervisor ofthiscondition, noimmediate actionswereneededbytheControlRoomoperators.
| |
| Subsequently, theShiftSupervisor notifiedhighersupervision andtheNRCGinnaSeniorResidentInspector.
| |
| TheShiftSupervisor notifiedtheNRCper10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i),non-emergency fourhournotification, atapproximately 1948EDSTonApril12,1999.G.SAFETYSYSTEMRESPONSES:
| |
| None NRCFORM366AISIB98)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAMEI1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETI2)05000244LERNUMBERIB)TEARSEQUENTIAL REVISIQNNUMBERNUMBER1999-OP4..O1PAGEI3)4OF7TEXTllfmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366'17)III.CAUSEOFEVENT:A.IMMEDIATE CAUSE:Theimmediate causeoftheplantpossiblyoperating outsideitsdesignbasiswasthattheinstalled configuration resultedindecreased moistureseparation capability afteradesignbasisaccident, resulting inlesscoolingcapability.
| |
| B.INTERMEDIATE CAUSE'heintermediate causewasinstallation ofimproperly assembled moistureseparator units.Theoriginalmoistureremovalunitsconsisted ofassemblies madeupofthechevrontypevanesandfiberglass moistureremovalpads.Thisequipment wasshop-assembled andshippedtoGinnaStation.Vendorphotographs takenduringoriginalshopassemblyshowthevanesinstalled inamannernowknowntobeincorrect.
| |
| C.ROOTCAUSE:Theunderlying causeofthevanesbeinginstalled backwards wasamanufacturing error.IV.ANALYSISOFEVENT:Thiseventisreportable inaccordance with10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(ii)(B),whichrequiresareportof,"Anyeventorcondition thatresultedinthecondition ofthenuclearpowerplant,including itsprincipal safetybarriers, beingseriously degraded; orthatresultedinthenuclearpowerplantbeing:(B)Inacondition thatisoutsidethedesignbasisoftheplant.Anassessment wasperformed considering boththesafetyconsequences andimplications ofthiseventwiththefollowing resultsandconclusions:
| |
| Therewerenooperational orsafetyconsequences orimplications attributed tothemoistureseparator vanesinstalled backwards because:Themaximumairvelocitythroughthecontainment recirculation fancoolingcoilsafteraloss-of-coolantaccident(LOCA)airvelocitythroughthecoilisbelowtheAmerican'Society ofHeating,Refrigerating andAir-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE)threshold of600feetperminute(FPM)formoistureentrainment bothforthenewandoldconfiguration.
| |
| Thecoilswillactasmoistureseparators duetothedepthofthecoilandspacingbetweenfins,eveniftheyarenotoperating
| |
| .Aheatingcoilsimilartothecoolingcoilsinstalled atGinna,wastestedwithaspraystreamequivalent totheGinnaStationLOCAenvironment directedatthecoilentrance, butwithaslightlylowerairstreamvelocity(400FPM)thanGinna.Nomoisturecarry-over wasobservedontheoutletofthecoiloronthemoistureseparator downstream ofthecoil.Approximately 5%ofthespraywasevaporated bythecoilheating.
| |
| NRCFORM366A(91998)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET(2)05000244LERNUMBER(6)"TEARSEOUENTIAL REUISIONNUMBERNUMBER1999-004-01PAGE(3)6OF7TEXTIifmorespaceisrequired, useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm366AI(17)Additional louversarelocatedontheinlettothecoilswhichwillremovesomeentrained moisturepriortoenteringthecoolingcoils,whicharenottakencreditforintheCRFCunitoperation.
| |
| Theairvelocitysignificantly reducesafterexitfromthecoolingcoils,andwouldallowentrained dropletstofalltothefanunitfloorpriortoreachingtheHEPAfilterswhicharelocatedapproximately 6feetfromthecoolingcoils.0Themoistureseparator mediapadslocatedupstreamoftheHEPAfiltershavebeentestedandfoundtoremovemoistureupto1.5Ibs/100cu.ft.Themaximumexpectedentrained moisturecontentinthecontainment environment duetocontainment sprayandcondensation isonlyOAIbs/1000cu.ft.Theoriginalmediapadsinstalled atGinna(American AirFilterModelM-105)werereplacedwithnewmodelM-81padsthathavenotbeentestedtoGinnaLOCAconditions.
| |
| However,duetosimilarities indesign,theyareexpectedtoremainfunctional eventhoughtheyhavenotbeencreditedtofunctionduetolackofqualification.
| |
| Themoistureseparator vanesontheoutletofthecoilwouldstillremoveentrained watereventhoughtheyareinstalled backwards, duetotheirtortuouspath.Thenumberofhookswhichprotrudeintotheflowstreamisreducedfrom3to1.However,themoistureremovalisdominated bythespacingbetweenadjacentvanes,lengthofeachvaneandnumberofvaneturnsinpath,allofwhichareunaffected withthevanesinstalled backwards.
| |
| Thewaterdropsfollowasine-wave paththroughthevanes.Theoverallefficiency forthebackwards installation isestimated tobe25%.Themoistureremovalcapacityrequirement asspecified intheoriginalBillofMaterials forthemoistureremovalsectionoftheCRFCunitis0.4Ibs/1000cu.ft.This25%reduction inthevaneefficiency canbeeasilycompensated forbythemoistureremovalpadssincetheyweretestedatmoisturelevelsofgreaterthan1.0Ibs/1000cu.ft.Inaddition, theHEPAfilterswerealsotestedandtheirpressuredropincreased by0.5incheswithanequivalent moistureloadingofOAIbs/1000cu.ft.Itisbelievedthattheadditional 0.5inchesofpressurelossiswithintheexistingmarginoftheas-installed equipment andwouldresultinreduction intotalsystemCRFCflowoflessthan10%0ThemainimpactofaslightlyreducedCRFCcoolingcapability onthedesignbasisaccidents (DBAs)suchasLOCAsandMainSteamLineBreaks(MSLBs)wouldbeareduction inthelongtermcoolinganddepressurization capability ofcontainment.
| |
| Impactonpeakcontainment pressures forDBAsisexpectedtobenegligible.
| |
| Sincepeakcontainment pressures typically occurwithinthefirstcoupleofminutesfollowing DBAs,theincreaseinHEPAfilterhydraulic resistance wouldnotbefullydeveloped overthistimeduetothelimitedwaterloadingontheHEPAfiltersimmediately following aDBA.Additionally, theearlyoccurrence ofcontainment peakpressures limitstheintegrated amountofenergythatisremovedbytheCRFCsuptothetimeofpeakcontainment pressure.
| |
| Therefore, anydegradation inCRFCheatremovalcapability duetoreducedairsideflowimmediately following aDBAwouldhaveanegligible impactontheoverallcontainment energybalanceatthetimeofpeakcontainment pressure.
| |
| Baseduponthesefactors,anyincreaseinpeakcontainment pressurethatcouldhaveoccurredasaresultoftheimproperly installed louversisjudgedtobewithintheoverallstructural capability ofthecontainment following aDBA,althoughcontainment designpressuremayhavebeenslightlyexceeded.
| |
| r NRCFORM366A(61968)LlCENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET(2)05000244LERNUMBER(6)yEARBEOUENTNL NUMBERNUN'IBER1999-004-01PAGE(3)6OF7TEXTIlfmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366AI(17)Aspreviously stated,themajorimpactofreducedheatremovalcapability duetowaterloadingoftheHEPAfilterswouldbeonlongtermcontainment cooling,sinceContainment Sprayflowisterminated aftertheplanthastransitioned totheRecirculation Modeofcooling.Anyreduction inCRFCcoolingcapability duetoreducedairflowwouldcauseaslowercontainment coodownanddepressurization.
| |
| Althoughthisslowercontainment cooldowncouldpotentially affecttheEquipment Qualification (EQ)profilesofsafety-related equipment incontainment, areviewoftheexistingGinnaEQprofilesforcontainment indicates thatsufficient marginexistsduringthefirsttwenty-four hoursfollowing aDBAtoaccommodate aslowercooldown.
| |
| Consequently, noadverseimpactonpastoperability ofqualified equipment incontainment isexpectedtohaveexisted.oTheGinnaControlRoomandoff-sitedosecalculations werere-evaluated assumingactualcontainment integrated leakagefromtestingperformed in1996andactualpredicted containment depressurization ratesforGinna.Basedontheseassumptions andcontinuous operation oftheCRFCsinapost-LOCA environment, itisestimated thataminimumcharcoalfilteriodineremovalefficiency of10%wouldberequiredtomaintainoff-sitedosesbelow300RemandControlRoomthyroiddosesbelow30RemandtherebysatisfytheGinnalicensing basisrequirement asrequiredby10CFR100andGeneralDesignCriterion (GDC)19.Basedonadditional analysisthatwasperformed byRG(ltEin1999,charcoalfilterswerefoundtohave40%oftheirvolumestillavailable foriodineremovalevenwhen100%saturated.
| |
| Sincetheminimumrequiredcharcoaliodineremovalefficiency isappreciably smallerthantheminimumexpectedcharcoalefficiency of40%forawettedcondition, thedesignfunctionofthefiltersasitrelatestothyroidsdosetoon-siteandoff-sitepersonnel wouldstillhavebeensatisfied evenwiththelouversinstalled backwards.
| |
| Basedontheaboveandthereviewofpastplanttransients, itcanbeconcluded thatthepublic'shealthandsafetywasassuredatalltimes.V.CORRECTIVE ACTION:A.ACTIONTAKENTORETURNAFFECTEDSYSTEMSTOPRE-EVENT NORMALSTATUS:Themoistureseparator vanesweredismantled andcorrectly re-installed.
| |
| B.ACTIONTAKENORPLANNEDTOPREVENTRECURRENCE:
| |
| Theas-leftconfiguration ofthemoistureseparator unitsdoesnotallowthevanestobeinstalled incorrectly.
| |
| VI.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
| |
| A.FAILEDCOMPONENTS:
| |
| None
| |
|
| |
|
| NRCFORM366A(6.1898)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET(2)05000244LERNUMBER(6)yEARSEOUENTIAE REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER1999-004-01PAGE(3)7OF7TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366AJ(17)B.PREVIOUSLERsONSIMILAREVENTS:AsimilarLEReventhistorical searchwasconducted withthefollowing results:Nodocumentation ofsimilarLEReventswiththesamerootcauseatGinnaStationcouldbeidentified.
| | NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6.1998) |
| C.SPECIALCOMMENTS: | | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| | TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) yEAR SEIIUENTIAE NUMBER NUMBER R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 1999 - 004 01 2 OF 7 TEXT iifmore space is required, use additional copies of hfRC Form 366AI (17) |
| | PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS: |
| | On April 12, 1999, the plant was shutdown in Mode 5 for the 1999 refueling outage. Among the many activities in progress during the 1999 refueling outage, maintenance was being performed on the Containment Recirculation Fan Coolers (CRFC) At approximately 1600 EDST, an engineer from Nuclear |
| | ~ |
| | Engineering Services (NES) discovered that the chevron moisture separator vanes for the CRFCs were installed contrary to that shown in a vendor manual diagram, but correctly as shown on a vendor outline drawing. |
| | DESCRIPTION OF EVENT: |
| | A. DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES OF MAJOR OCCURRENCES: |
| | o Original construction circa 1969: Event date and time. |
| | o April 12, 1999, 1600 EDST: Discovery date and time. |
| | o April 17, 1999, 1000 EDST: Chevron moisture separator vanes are correctly installed. |
| | B.. EVENT: |
| | On April 12, 1999, the plant was shutdown in Mode 5 for the 1999 refueling outage. Among the many activities in progress during the 1999 refueling outage, maintenance was being performed on the Containment Recirculation Fan Coolers (CRFC). At approximately 1600 EDST, an engineer from Nuclear Engineering Services (NES) discovered that the chevron moisture separator vanes for the CRFCs were installed contrary to that shown on a vendor manual diagram, but correctly as shown on a vendor outline drawing. After further evaluation and discussions with the vendor, it was concluded that the vanes were installed backwards, so that the path for air flow is less tortuous than if the vanes were correctly installed. These vanes are Type T Mist Extractors, manufactured by American Air Filter Co., Inc. |
| | The CRFC System consists of four fan units (A, B, C, and D), of which the A and C units supply charcoal filters. Each cooling unit consists of a motor, fan, cooling coils, dampers, moisture separators (vanes and pads), high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters, duct distributors and necessary instrumentation and controls. Air is drawn into the coolers through the fan and discharged into the containment atmosphere. The moisture separators function to reduce the moisture content of the airstream to support the effectiveness of the HEPA and post-accident charcoal filters. |
| | |
| | NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMIVIISSION (61998) |
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| | TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) rEAN SEGUENTNL NUMUEN NUMSEA R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 1999 004 01 3 OF 7 TEXT (Ifmore space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366AI (17) |
| | Following the cooling coils is the moisture separator section, designed to remove entrained moisture exiting the cooling coils. Two separate moisture removal processes are employed; the first by direct impingement on vertical hooked vanes, and the second by trapping on separator pads. |
| | Runoff from both stages flows into collection pans from which it is piped to the containment sump. |
| | The moisture separator casings, hooked vanes, and collection pans are fabricated of galvanized steel. With the vanes installed backwards, the moisture separation capability is decreased. CRFC performance was not completely analyzed for this condition. |
| | The supplier of the moisture removal equipment (American Air Filter) was contacted. It was concluded that this condition was a result of improper assembly by the manufacturer in the 1960's. |
| | The original moisture removal equipment consisted of an assembly made up of the chevron type vanes and fiberglass moisture removal pads. This equipment was shop-assembled and shipped to Ginna Station. Vendor photographs taken during original shop assembly show the vanes installed in a manner now known to be incorrect. As directed by the supplier, the vanes had to be dismantled and then correctly installed. |
| | C. INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT: |
| | None D. OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED: |
| | None E. METHOD OF DISCOVERY: |
| | This event was discovered by an engineer from NES, who was supporting CRFC maintenance. |
| | F. OPERATOR ACTION: |
| | The plant was in Mode 5 at the time of discovery, and the CRFCs are not required to be operable in this mode. After the NES engineer notified the Shift Supervisor of this condition, no immediate actions were needed by the Control Room operators. |
| | Subsequently, the Shift Supervisor notified higher supervision and the NRC Ginna Senior Resident Inspector. The Shift Supervisor notified the NRC per 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (2) (i), non-emergency four hour notification, at approximately 1948 EDST on April 12, 1999. |
| | G. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES: |
| | None |
| | |
| | NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IS IB98) |
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| | TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME I1) DOCKET I2) LER NUMBER IB) PAGE I3) |
| | SEQUENTIAL REVISIQN TEAR NUMBER NUMBER R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 1999 OP4 .. O1 4 OF 7 TEXT llfmore spaceis required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366'17) |
| | III. CAUSE OF EVENT: |
| | A. IMMEDIATE CAUSE: |
| | The immediate cause of the plant possibly operating outside its design basis was that the installed configuration resulted in decreased moisture separation capability after a design basis accident, resulting in less cooling capability. |
| | B. INTERMEDIATE CAUSE'he intermediate cause was installation of improperly assembled moisture separator units. The original moisture removal units consisted of assemblies made up of the chevron type vanes and fiberglass moisture removal pads. This equipment was shop-assembled and shipped to Ginna Station. Vendor photographs taken during original shop assembly show the vanes installed in a manner now known to be incorrect. |
| | C. ROOT CAUSE: |
| | The underlying cause of the vanes being installed backwards was a manufacturing error. |
| | IV. ANALYSIS OF EVENT: |
| | This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a) (2) (ii) |
| | (B), which requires a report of, "Any event or condition that resulted in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded; or that resulted in the nuclear power plant being: (B) In a condition that is outside the design basis of the plant. |
| | An assessment was performed considering both the safety consequences and implications of this event with the following results and conclusions: |
| | There were no operational or safety consequences or implications attributed to the moisture separator vanes installed backwards because: |
| | The maximum air velocity through the containment recirculation fan cooling coils after a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) air velocity through the coil is below the American'Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) threshold of 600 feet per minute (FPM) for moisture entrainment both for the new and old configuration. |
| | The coils will act as moisture separators due to the depth of the coil and spacing between fins, even if they are not operating . A heating coil similar to the cooling coils installed at Ginna, was tested with a spray stream equivalent to the Ginna Station LOCA environment directed at the coil entrance, but with a slightly lower air stream velocity (400 FPM) than Ginna. No moisture carry-over was observed on the outlet of the coil or on the moisture separator downstream of the coil. |
| | Approximately 5% of the spray was evaporated by the coil heating. |
| | |
| | NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (9 1998) |
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| | TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) |
| | SEOUENTIAL REUISION TEAR NUMBER NUMBER R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 999 - |
| | 1 004 01 6 OF 7 TEXT Iifmore space is required, use addi tional copies of NRC Form 366AI (17) |
| | Additional louvers are located on the inlet to the coils which will remove some entrained moisture prior to entering the cooling coils, which are not taken credit for in the CRFC unit operation. |
| | The air velocity significantly reduces after exit from the cooling coils, and would allow entrained droplets to fall to the fan unit floor prior to reaching the HEPA filters which are located approximately 6 feet from the cooling coils. |
| | 0 The moisture separator media pads located upstream of the HEPA filters have been tested and found to remove moisture up to 1.5 Ibs/100 cu.ft. The maximum expected entrained moisture content in the containment environment due to containment spray and condensation is only OA Ibs/1000 cu.ft. The original media pads installed at Ginna (American Air Filter Model M-105) were replaced with new model M-81 pads that have not been tested to Ginna LOCA conditions. |
| | However, due to similarities in design, they are expected to remain functional even though they have not been credited to function due to lack of qualification. |
| | The moisture separator vanes on the outlet of the coil would still remove entrained water even though they are installed backwards, due to their tortuous path. The number of hooks which protrude into the flow stream is reduced from 3 to 1. However, the moisture removal is dominated by the spacing between adjacent vanes, length of each vane and number of vane turns in path, all of which are unaffected with the vanes installed backwards. The water drops follow a sine-wave path through the vanes. The overall efficiency for the backwards installation is estimated to be 25%. The moisture removal capacity requirement as specified in the original Bill of Materials for the moisture removal section of the CRFC unit is 0.4 Ibs/1000 cu.ft. This 25% reduction in the vane efficiency can be easily compensated for by the moisture removal pads since they were tested at moisture levels of greater than 1.0 Ibs/1000 cu.ft. In addition, the HEPA filters were also tested and their pressure drop increased by 0.5 inches with an equivalent moisture loading of OA Ibs/1000 cu.ft. It is believed that the additional 0.5 inches of pressure loss is within the existing margin of the as-installed equipment and would result in reduction in total system CRFC flow of less than 10% |
| | 0 The main impact of a slightly reduced CRFC cooling capability on the design basis accidents (DBAs) such as LOCAs and Main Steam Line Breaks (MSLBs) would be a reduction in the long term cooling and depressurization capability of containment. Impact on peak containment pressures for DBAs is expected to be negligible. Since peak containment pressures typically occur within the first couple of minutes following DBAs, the increase in HEPA filter hydraulic resistance would not be fully developed over this time due to the limited water loading on the HEPA filters immediately following a DBA. Additionally, the early occurrence of containment peak pressures limits the integrated amount of energy that is removed by the CRFCs up to the time of peak containment pressure. |
| | Therefore, any degradation in CRFC heat removal capability due to reduced air side flow immediately following a DBA would have a negligible impact on the overall containment energy balance at the time of peak containment pressure. Based upon these factors, any increase in peak containment pressure that could have occurred as a result of the improperly installed louvers is judged to be within the overall structural capability of the containment following a DBA, although containment design pressure may have been slightly exceeded. |
| | |
| | r NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6 1968) |
| | LlCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| | TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) yEAR BEOUENTNL NUMBER NUN'IBER R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 1999 004 01 6 OF 7 TEXT Ilfmore space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366AI (17) |
| | As previously stated, the major impact of reduced heat removal capability due to water loading of the HEPA filters would be on long term containment cooling, since Containment Spray flow is terminated after the plant has transitioned to the Recirculation Mode of cooling. Any reduction in CRFC cooling capability due to reduced air flow would cause a slower containment coodown and depressurization. Although this slower containment cooldown could potentially affect the Equipment Qualification (EQ) profiles of safety-related equipment in containment, a review of the existing Ginna EQ profiles for containment indicates that sufficient margin exists during the first twenty-four hours following a DBA to accommodate a slower cooldown. Consequently, no adverse impact on past operability of qualified equipment in containment is expected to have existed. |
| | o The Ginna Control Room and off-site dose calculations were re-evaluated assuming actual containment integrated leakage from testing performed in 1996 and actual predicted containment depressurization rates for Ginna. Based on these assumptions and continuous operation of the CRFCs in a post-LOCA environment, it is estimated that a minimum charcoal filter iodine removal efficiency of 10% would be required to maintain off-site doses below 300 Rem and Control Room thyroid doses below 30 Rem and thereby satisfy the Ginna licensing basis requirement as required by 10 CFR 100 and General Design Criterion (GDC) 19. Based on additional analysis that was performed by RG(ltE in 1999, charcoal filters were found to have 40% of their volume still available for iodine removal even when 100% saturated. Since the minimum required charcoal iodine removal efficiency is appreciably smaller than the minimum expected charcoal efficiency of 40% for a wetted condition, the design function of the filters as it relates to thyroids dose to on-site and off-site personnel would still have been satisfied even with the louvers installed backwards. |
| | Based on the above and the review of past plant transients, it can be concluded that the public's health and safety was assured at all times. |
| | V. CORRECTIVE ACTION: |
| | A. ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS: |
| | The moisture separator vanes were dismantled and correctly re-installed. |
| | B. ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: |
| | The as-left configuration of the moisture separator units does not allow the vanes to be installed incorrectly. |
| | VI. ADDITIONALINFORMATION: |
| | A. FAILED COMPONENTS: |
| | None |
| | |
| | NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6.1898) |
| | LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) |
| | TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) |
| | SEOUENTIAE REVISION yEAR NUMBER NUMBER R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 1999 - 004 01 7 OF 7 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366AJ (17) |
| | B. PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS: |
| | A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results: No documentation of similar LER events with the same root cause at Ginna Station could be identified. |
| | C. SPECIAL COMMENTS: |
| None}} | | None}} |
LER 99-004-01:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Chevron Separator Vanes Were Installed Backwards.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg.Moisture Separator Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installedML17265A743 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Ginna ![Constellation icon.png](/w/images/b/be/Constellation_icon.png) |
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Issue date: |
08/24/1999 |
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From: |
Vitali C ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
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To: |
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Shared Package |
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ML17265A742 |
List: |
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References |
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LER-99-004, NUDOCS 9909010030 |
Download: ML17265A743 (9) |
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Similar Documents at Ginna |
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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
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[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17265A7541999-09-22022 September 1999 LER 99-011-00:on 990823,small Tears Were Discovered in Flexible Duct Work Connector at Inlet of CR HVAC Sys Return Air Fan (AKF08).Caused by in-leakage Greater than That Assumed.Implemented Temporary Mod 99-029.With 990922 Ltr ML17265A7431999-08-24024 August 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Chevron Separator Vanes Were Installed Backwards.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg.Moisture Separator Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A7181999-07-23023 July 1999 LER 99-007-01:on 990423,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Instrument & Control Technicians Inadvertently Pulling Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Channel.Setpoint Adjustments Were Completed by Different Crew of Technicians ML17265A7081999-07-22022 July 1999 LER 98-003-02:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Was Noted Due to Invalid Causes.Caused by Various Degraded Components in CR RM Sys.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored ML17265A7031999-07-19019 July 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990617,determined That Temporary Unescorted Access Had Been Granted to Contractor Employee.Caused by Incomplete Info Re Circumstances of Individual Military Separation.Individual Access Was Revoked.With 990719 Ltr ML17265A7021999-07-15015 July 1999 LER 99-010-00:on 990615,ventilation Isolation of Auxiliary Bldg Occurred When Auxiliary Bldg Gas Radiation Monitor R-14 Reached High Alarm Setpoint.Cr Operators Rest Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation Isolation Signal.With 990715 Ltr ML17265A6851999-06-21021 June 1999 LER 99-001-01:on 990222,deficiencies in NSSS Vendor steam- Line Brake Mass & Energy Release Analysis Results in Plant Being Outside Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Deficiencies in W.Temporary Administrative Replaced.With 990621 Ltr ML17265A6661999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-009-00:on 990503,instrumentation Declared Inoperable in Multiple Channels Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts. Caused by Unanticipated High Frequency AC Voltage Ripple. Entered TS LCO 3.0.3.With 990602 Ltr ML17309A6541999-05-27027 May 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990427,overtemperature Delta T Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Faulted Bistable During Calibr of Redundant Channel.Plant Was Stabilized in Mode 3 & Faulted Bistable Was Subsequently Replaced.With 990527 Ltr ML17265A6631999-05-24024 May 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990423,technicians Inadvertently Pulled Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Cahnnel,Causing Reactor Trip,Due to High Range Flux Trip.Caused by Personnel Error. Labeling Scheme Improved ML17265A6601999-05-21021 May 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990421,start of turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Was Noted.Caused by MOV Being Left in Open Position.Closed Manual Isolation Valve to Secure Steam to Pump.With 990521 Ltr ML17265A6441999-05-13013 May 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990413,undervoltage Signal of Safeguards Bus During Testing Resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg. Caused by Personnel Error.Blown Fuse Was Replaced & Offsite Power Was Restored to Safeguards Bus 17.With 990513 Ltr ML17265A6431999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Moisture Separator Vanes Were Incorrectly Installed,Per 10CFR21.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg. Subject Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A6141999-03-31031 March 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990301,two Main Steam non-return Check Valves Were Declared Inoperable Due to Exceedance of Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Changes in Methodology & Matls.Packing Gland Torque Will Be Adjusted.With 990331 Ltr ML17265A6131999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990227,discovered That Surveillance Had Not Been Performed at Frequency,Per Ts.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure O-6.13 Will Be Evaluated for Enhancement Documentation of Completion of ITS Srs.With 990329 Ltr ML17265A6061999-03-24024 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990222,plant Was Noted Outside Design Basis.Caused by Deficiencies in NSSS Vendor Slb Mass & Energy Release.Placed Temporary Administrative Restriction 40 Degrees F Max on Screenhouse Bay Temp ML17265A4951998-12-21021 December 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 981120,loss of 34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751,resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg.Caused by Faulted Cable Splice.Performed Appropriate Actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1.With 981221 Ltr ML17265A4931998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 971030,determined That Improperly Performed Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Procedure non-adherence.Appropriate Calibr Procedures Were Properly Performed with 24 H of Condition Discovery ML17265A4691998-11-25025 November 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Systems (Creats) Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored to CR ML17265A4271998-10-0505 October 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Air Samples Were Taken & Determined That Source of Radiation Was Naturally Occurring Radon.With 981005 Ltr ML17265A3671998-07-14014 July 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 971019,CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Actuating Function Was Not Operable.Caused by Mispositioned Switch.Revised Procedure CPI-MON-R37.W/980714 Ltr ML17265A1921998-03-11011 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980209,discovered That Boraflex Degradation in SPF Was Greater than Was Assumed.Caused by Dissolution of Boron on Boraflex Matrix,Per 10CFR50.21.Removed Spent Fuel Assemblies from Selected Degraded Storage Rack Cells ML17265A1641998-02-0606 February 1998 LER 97-007-01:on 971117,reactor Engineer Recognized That Neutron Flux Low Range Trip Circuitry for Channel Was Not in Tripped Condition as Required.Caused by Technical Inadequacies.Channel Defeat Will Be Identified ML17265A1601998-02-0606 February 1998 LER 97-006-01:on 971103,verification of B Concentration Was Not Performed Due to Misinterpretation of Event Sequence. Audible Count Rate Function Was Restored to Operable Status ML17264B1441997-12-17017 December 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 971117,NF Low Range Trip Circuitry for Channel N-44 Was Not Placed in Tripped Condition.Caused by Technical Inadequacies in Procedures.Implemented EWR 4862 to Resolve Design deficiency.W/971217 Ltr ML17264B1291997-12-0303 December 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 971103,NIS Audible Count Rate Function Was Inoperable.Caused by Misinterpretation of Event Sequence Due to Not Verifying Boron Concentration.B Verification Occurred Every 12 H Per ITS LCO Action 3.9.2.C.3.W/971203 Ltr ML17264B1271997-12-0101 December 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 971031,undetected Unblocking of SI Actuation Signal Occurred at Low Pressure Condition,Due to Faulty Bistable Which Resulted in Inadvertent SI Actuation Signal.Sias,Ci & CVI Signals Were Reset ML17264B1211997-11-24024 November 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 971024,radiation Monitor Alarm Were Noted Due to Higher than Normal Radioactive Gas Concentration Resulted in Cvi.New R-12 Alarm Setpoint Was Maintained for Duration of Refueling Outage ML17264B0461997-09-29029 September 1997 LER 97-003-01:on 970730,bistable Instrument Trip Setpoint Could Have Exceeded Allowable Value.Caused by Insufficient Existing Margin Between Trip Setpoint & Allowable Value. Held Switches in Tripped configuration.W/970929 Ltr ML17264B0111997-08-27027 August 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970730,high Steam Flow Bistable Instrument Setpoint Plus Instrument Uncertainty Could Exceed Allowable Value in ITS Was Identified.Caused by Entry Into ITS LCO 3.0.3.Switches Placed in Tripped configuration.W/970827 Ltr ML17264A9941997-08-19019 August 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970720,34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751 Was Lost.Caused by Automatic Actuation of B Emergency DG Due to Undervoltage on Safeguards Buses 16 & 17.Offsite Power Restored to Safeguards Buses 16 & 17.W/970819 Ltr ML17264A9911997-08-11011 August 1997 LER 96-009-02:on 960723,determined That Leak Rate Outside Containment Was Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Isolated Leak & Cut Out & Replaced Leaking Pipe ML17264A8271997-03-0303 March 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970131,discovered Service Water Temp Was Less than Specified Value.Caused by non-representative Method of Monitoring.Increased Water Temp in Screenhouse Bay to Greater than 35 Degrees F.W/970303 Ltr ML17264A8071997-01-22022 January 1997 LER 96-015-00:on 961223,discovered Thermally Induced Overpressure Transient Could Occur.Caused by Thermal Expansion of Fluid During Design Basis Accident Condition. Installed Relief Valve on Affected line.W/970122 Ltr ML17264A7471996-11-27027 November 1996 LER 96-013-00:on 961029,circuit Breakers Closed While in Mode 3 & Resulted in Condition Prohibited by TS Due to Personnel Error.Circuit Breakers for MOV-878B & MOV-878D Were re-opened.W/961127 Ltr ML17264A6051996-09-19019 September 1996 LER 96-012-00:on 960820,feedwater Transient Occurred,Due to Closure of Feedwater Regulating Valve,Causing Lo Lo Steam Generator Level Reactor Trip.Sgs Were Restored & Missing Screw in 1/P-476 Was replaced.W/960919 Ltr ML17264A6061996-09-19019 September 1996 LER 96-009-01:on 960723,leakage Outside Containment Occurred,Due to Weld Defect,Resulting in Leak Rate Greater than Program Limits.Source of Leakage Isolated from RWST by Freeze Seal,Allowing Exit from ITS LCO 3.0.3.W/960919 Ltr ML17264A5911996-09-0505 September 1996 LER 96-011-00:on 960807,improper Configuration of Circuit Breaker Occurred,Due to Undetected Internal Interference, Resulting in Automatic Start of Both Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.Running AFW Pumps Were secured.W/960905 Ltr ML17264A5921996-09-0505 September 1996 LER 96-010-00:on 960806,latching of Main Turbine While in Mode 4 Occurred,Due to Defective Procedure,Resulting in Automatic Start of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.Caused by Defective Maint Procedure.Procedure revised.W/960905 Ltr ML17264A5891996-08-22022 August 1996 LER 96-009-00:on 960723,determined Leak on Piping Sys Outside Containment Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Pipe & Socket Welds Were Cut Out & Replaced. W/960822 Ltr ML17264A5781996-08-0606 August 1996 LER 96-008-00:on 960707,main Feedwater Pump Breakers Opened. Caused by Change in Seal Water Differential Pressure Occurred During Sys Realignment.Afw Flow Controlled as Desired to Maintain S/G level.W/960806 Ltr ML17264A5561996-07-12012 July 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 960612,CR Operators Identified Control Rods Misaligned & Not Moving in Proper Sequence.Caused by Faulty Firing Circuit Card in Rod Control Sys.Faulty Firing Circuit Card in 1BD Power Cabinet replaced.W/960712 Ltr ML17264A5421996-06-20020 June 1996 LER 96-006-00:on 960521,discovered Containment Penetration Not in Required Status.Caused by Personnel Error.Installed Flange Inside Containment Penetration 2.W/960620 Ltr ML17264A5411996-06-17017 June 1996 LER 96-005-00:on 960516,PORC Determined Deficient Procedures Do Not Meet SRs for Testing safety-related Logic Circuits. Caused by Inadequancies in Individual Testing Procedures. Procedures Re Improved TSs revised.W/960617 Ltr ML17264A5051996-05-17017 May 1996 LER 96-003-01:on 960308,identified That Both Pressurizer PORVs Inoperable Concurrently Due to Disconnection of Flex Hose to Both PORV Actuators to Install air-sets for Benchset & Limit Switch Activities.Hpes Completed ML17264A4481996-04-0808 April 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960308,both Pressurizer Relief Valves Inoperable.Hpes Evaluation Is Being Conducted to Determined Cause of Event.C/As:Both PORVs restored.W/960408 Ltr ML17264A4471996-04-0808 April 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960307,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump.C/As: Thermography performed.W/960408 Ltr ML17264A4101996-03-18018 March 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 950504,inservice Test Not Performed During Refueling Outage.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Surveillance Frequency.Valve Test Performed & Disassembled. W/960318 Ltr ML17264A2971995-12-14014 December 1995 LER 95-009-00:on 950817,surveillance Was Not Performed Due to Improper Application of TS Requirements Resulting in TS Violation.Testing of MOV-515 Was Performed on 951115.W/ 951214 Ltr ML17264A1711995-09-25025 September 1995 LER 95-008-00:on 950825,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump That Resulted in Manual Rt.Returned S/G Levels to Normal Operating levels.W/950925 Ltr 1999-09-22
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17265A7601999-10-0505 October 1999 Part 21 Rept Re W2 Switch Supplied by W Drawn from Stock, Did Not Operate Properly After Being Installed on 990409. Switch Returned to W on 990514 for Evaluation & Root Cause Analysis ML17265A7621999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 991008 Ltr ML17265A7531999-09-23023 September 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Corrective Action & Closeout of 10CFR21 Rept of Noncompliance Re Unacceptable Part for 30-4 Connector. Unacceptable Parts Removed from Stock & Scrapped ML17265A7541999-09-22022 September 1999 LER 99-011-00:on 990823,small Tears Were Discovered in Flexible Duct Work Connector at Inlet of CR HVAC Sys Return Air Fan (AKF08).Caused by in-leakage Greater than That Assumed.Implemented Temporary Mod 99-029.With 990922 Ltr ML17265A7471999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 990909 Ltr ML17265A7431999-08-24024 August 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Chevron Separator Vanes Were Installed Backwards.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg.Moisture Separator Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A7341999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 990806 Ltr ML17265A7291999-07-29029 July 1999 Interim Part 21 Rept Re safety-related DB-25 Breaker Mechanism Procured from W Did Not Pas Degradatin Checks When Drawn from Stock to Be Installed Into BUS15/03A.Holes Did Not line-up & Tripper Pan Bent ML17265A7181999-07-23023 July 1999 LER 99-007-01:on 990423,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Instrument & Control Technicians Inadvertently Pulling Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Channel.Setpoint Adjustments Were Completed by Different Crew of Technicians ML17265A7081999-07-22022 July 1999 LER 98-003-02:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Was Noted Due to Invalid Causes.Caused by Various Degraded Components in CR RM Sys.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored ML17265A7131999-07-22022 July 1999 Special Rept:On 990407,radiation Monitor RM-14A Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Failed Communication Link from TSC to Plant Process Computer Sys.Communication Link Was re-established & RM-14A Was Declaed Operable on 990521 ML17265A7031999-07-19019 July 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990617,determined That Temporary Unescorted Access Had Been Granted to Contractor Employee.Caused by Incomplete Info Re Circumstances of Individual Military Separation.Individual Access Was Revoked.With 990719 Ltr ML17265A7211999-07-19019 July 1999 ISI Rept for Third Interval (1990-1999) Third Period, Second Outage (1999) at Re Ginna Npp. ML17265A7021999-07-15015 July 1999 LER 99-010-00:on 990615,ventilation Isolation of Auxiliary Bldg Occurred When Auxiliary Bldg Gas Radiation Monitor R-14 Reached High Alarm Setpoint.Cr Operators Rest Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation Isolation Signal.With 990715 Ltr ML17265A7661999-06-30030 June 1999 1999 Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments Conducted Without Prior NRC Approval for Jan 1998 Through June 1999, Per 10CFR50.59.With 991020 Ltr ML17265A7011999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 990712 Ltr ML17265A6851999-06-21021 June 1999 LER 99-001-01:on 990222,deficiencies in NSSS Vendor steam- Line Brake Mass & Energy Release Analysis Results in Plant Being Outside Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Deficiencies in W.Temporary Administrative Replaced.With 990621 Ltr ML17265A6761999-06-16016 June 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Defects & noncompliances,10CFR21(d)(3)(ii), Which Requires Written Notification to NRC on Identification of Defect or Failure to Comply. Relays Were Returned to Eaton for Evaluation & Root Cause Analysis ML17265A6661999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-009-00:on 990503,instrumentation Declared Inoperable in Multiple Channels Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts. Caused by Unanticipated High Frequency AC Voltage Ripple. Entered TS LCO 3.0.3.With 990602 Ltr ML17265A6681999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990608 Ltr ML17265A6651999-05-27027 May 1999 Interim Rept Re W2 Control Switch,Procured from W,Did Not Operate Satisfactorily When Drawn from Stock to Be Installed in Main Control Board for 1C2 Safety Injection Pump. Estimated That Evaluation Will Be Completed by 991001 ML17309A6541999-05-27027 May 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990427,overtemperature Delta T Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Faulted Bistable During Calibr of Redundant Channel.Plant Was Stabilized in Mode 3 & Faulted Bistable Was Subsequently Replaced.With 990527 Ltr ML17265A6631999-05-24024 May 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990423,technicians Inadvertently Pulled Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Cahnnel,Causing Reactor Trip,Due to High Range Flux Trip.Caused by Personnel Error. Labeling Scheme Improved ML17265A6601999-05-21021 May 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990421,start of turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Was Noted.Caused by MOV Being Left in Open Position.Closed Manual Isolation Valve to Secure Steam to Pump.With 990521 Ltr ML17265A6591999-05-17017 May 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Relay Deficiency Detected During pre-installation Testing.Caused by Incorrectly Wired Relay Coil.Relays Were Returned to Eaton Corp for Investigation. Relays Were Repaired & Retested ML17265A6441999-05-13013 May 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990413,undervoltage Signal of Safeguards Bus During Testing Resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg. Caused by Personnel Error.Blown Fuse Was Replaced & Offsite Power Was Restored to Safeguards Bus 17.With 990513 Ltr ML17265A6431999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Moisture Separator Vanes Were Incorrectly Installed,Per 10CFR21.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg. Subject Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A6381999-05-0707 May 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Replacement Turbocharger Exhaust Turbine Side Drain Port Not Functioning as Design Intended.Caused by Manufacturing Deficiency.Turbocharger Was Reaasembled & Reinstalled on B EDG ML17265A6391999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990510 Ltr ML17265A6361999-04-23023 April 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Power Supply That Did Not Work Properly When Drawn from Stock & Installed in -25 Vdc Slot.Power Supply Will Be Sent to Vendor to Perform Failure Mode Assessment.Evaluation Will Be Completed by 991001 ML17265A6301999-04-18018 April 1999 Rev 1 to Cycle 28 COLR for Re Ginna Npp. ML17265A6251999-04-15015 April 1999 Special Rept:On 990309,halon Systems Were Removed from Svc & Fire Door F502 Was Blocked Open.Caused by Mods Being Made to CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys.Continuous Fire Watch Was Established with Backup Fire Suppression Equipment ML17265A6551999-04-0909 April 1999 Initial Part 21 Rept Re Mfg Deficiency in Replacement Turbocharger for B EDG Supplied by Coltec Industries. Deficiency Consisted of Missing Drain Port in Intermediate Casing.Required Oil Drain Port Machined Open ML17265A6291999-03-31031 March 1999 Rev 0 to Cycle 28 COLR for Re Ginna Npp. ML17265A6241999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Ginna Station.With 990409 Ltr ML17265A6141999-03-31031 March 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990301,two Main Steam non-return Check Valves Were Declared Inoperable Due to Exceedance of Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Changes in Methodology & Matls.Packing Gland Torque Will Be Adjusted.With 990331 Ltr ML17265A6131999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990227,discovered That Surveillance Had Not Been Performed at Frequency,Per Ts.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure O-6.13 Will Be Evaluated for Enhancement Documentation of Completion of ITS Srs.With 990329 Ltr ML17265A6061999-03-24024 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990222,plant Was Noted Outside Design Basis.Caused by Deficiencies in NSSS Vendor Slb Mass & Energy Release.Placed Temporary Administrative Restriction 40 Degrees F Max on Screenhouse Bay Temp ML17265A5661999-03-0101 March 1999 Rev 26 to QA Program for Station Operation. ML17265A5961999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990310 Ltr ML17265A5371999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990205 Ltr ML17265A5951998-12-31031 December 1998 Rg&E 1998 Annual Rept. ML17265A5001998-12-21021 December 1998 Rev 26 to QA Program for Station Operation. ML17265A4951998-12-21021 December 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 981120,loss of 34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751,resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg.Caused by Faulted Cable Splice.Performed Appropriate Actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1.With 981221 Ltr ML17265A4931998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 971030,determined That Improperly Performed Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Procedure non-adherence.Appropriate Calibr Procedures Were Properly Performed with 24 H of Condition Discovery ML17265A4761998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 981210 Ltr ML17265A4691998-11-25025 November 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Systems (Creats) Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored to CR ML17265A4531998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 981110 Ltr ML17265A4271998-10-0505 October 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Air Samples Were Taken & Determined That Source of Radiation Was Naturally Occurring Radon.With 981005 Ltr ML17265A4291998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 981009 Ltr 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
I)
NRC FORM
{6 1688) 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8"ICPYPP " B thP IL ew(P information collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) industry. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (TR F33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington. DC 205554001 and to
{See reverse for required number of
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the Papenvork Reduction Project {3150%104), Office of digits/characters for each block) Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor. and a FACILITY NAME i1) DOCKET NUMBER l2) PAGE I3)
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 1 OF 7 T ITlE (4)
Containment Recirculation Fan Moisture Separator Vanes Incorrectly Installed Results in Plant Being Outside Its Design Basis EVENT DATE (5I LER NUMBER {6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED {6)
SEOUENTIAL FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER REYLSION MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH OAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 05000 04 12 1999 1 999 - 004 01 08 24 1999 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED P URSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR E: (Check one or more) (11)
MODE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a) (2) (v) 50.73(a)(2) {i)(B) 50.73(a) (2)(viii)
POWER 20.2203(a)(T) 20.2203(a) {3)(i) X 50.73{a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
LEVEL (10) 000 20.2203(a)(2) (i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a) (2) {iii) 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER 20.2203(a) (2) (iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a) {2)(v) Specify ln Abstract below 20.2203(a)(2) (iv) 50.36(c) (2) 50.73(a)(2) {vii) or in NRC Form 366A LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER {12)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Iiciude Area Code)
Carmen Vitali - Senior Engineer (716) 771-3606 REPORTABLE REPORTABIE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TO EPIX TO EPIX I ln>.
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) MONTH OAY YEAR EXPECTED YES No SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). X DATE (15)
ABSTRACT {Limitto 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
On April 12, 1999, at approximately 1600 EDST, the plant was shutdown in Mode 5. It was discovered that the containment recirculation fan chevron moisture separator vanes were installed backwards, so that the path for air flow was less tortuous, decreasing moisture separation effectiveness.
Corrective action was to remove the vanes and install them in the proper orientation.
The incorrect installation was a result of improper assembly by the manufacturer in the 1960's. The original moisture removal equipment consisted of an assembly made up of the chevron type vanes and fiberglass moisture removal pads. This equipment was shop-assembled and shipped to Ginna Station. Vendor photographs taken during original shop assembly show the vanes installed in a manner now known to be incorrect.
Corrective action to prevent recurrence is outlined in Section V.
99090i0030 990E)24 PDR ADOCK 05000244 8 PDR
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6.1998)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) yEAR SEIIUENTIAE NUMBER NUMBER R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 1999 - 004 01 2 OF 7 TEXT iifmore space is required, use additional copies of hfRC Form 366AI (17)
PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS:
On April 12, 1999, the plant was shutdown in Mode 5 for the 1999 refueling outage. Among the many activities in progress during the 1999 refueling outage, maintenance was being performed on the Containment Recirculation Fan Coolers (CRFC) At approximately 1600 EDST, an engineer from Nuclear
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Engineering Services (NES) discovered that the chevron moisture separator vanes for the CRFCs were installed contrary to that shown in a vendor manual diagram, but correctly as shown on a vendor outline drawing.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:
A. DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES OF MAJOR OCCURRENCES:
o Original construction circa 1969: Event date and time.
o April 12, 1999, 1600 EDST: Discovery date and time.
o April 17, 1999, 1000 EDST: Chevron moisture separator vanes are correctly installed.
B.. EVENT:
On April 12, 1999, the plant was shutdown in Mode 5 for the 1999 refueling outage. Among the many activities in progress during the 1999 refueling outage, maintenance was being performed on the Containment Recirculation Fan Coolers (CRFC). At approximately 1600 EDST, an engineer from Nuclear Engineering Services (NES) discovered that the chevron moisture separator vanes for the CRFCs were installed contrary to that shown on a vendor manual diagram, but correctly as shown on a vendor outline drawing. After further evaluation and discussions with the vendor, it was concluded that the vanes were installed backwards, so that the path for air flow is less tortuous than if the vanes were correctly installed. These vanes are Type T Mist Extractors, manufactured by American Air Filter Co., Inc.
The CRFC System consists of four fan units (A, B, C, and D), of which the A and C units supply charcoal filters. Each cooling unit consists of a motor, fan, cooling coils, dampers, moisture separators (vanes and pads), high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters, duct distributors and necessary instrumentation and controls. Air is drawn into the coolers through the fan and discharged into the containment atmosphere. The moisture separators function to reduce the moisture content of the airstream to support the effectiveness of the HEPA and post-accident charcoal filters.
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMIVIISSION (61998)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) rEAN SEGUENTNL NUMUEN NUMSEA R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 1999 004 01 3 OF 7 TEXT (Ifmore space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366AI (17)
Following the cooling coils is the moisture separator section, designed to remove entrained moisture exiting the cooling coils. Two separate moisture removal processes are employed; the first by direct impingement on vertical hooked vanes, and the second by trapping on separator pads.
Runoff from both stages flows into collection pans from which it is piped to the containment sump.
The moisture separator casings, hooked vanes, and collection pans are fabricated of galvanized steel. With the vanes installed backwards, the moisture separation capability is decreased. CRFC performance was not completely analyzed for this condition.
The supplier of the moisture removal equipment (American Air Filter) was contacted. It was concluded that this condition was a result of improper assembly by the manufacturer in the 1960's.
The original moisture removal equipment consisted of an assembly made up of the chevron type vanes and fiberglass moisture removal pads. This equipment was shop-assembled and shipped to Ginna Station. Vendor photographs taken during original shop assembly show the vanes installed in a manner now known to be incorrect. As directed by the supplier, the vanes had to be dismantled and then correctly installed.
C. INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT:
None D. OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:
None E. METHOD OF DISCOVERY:
This event was discovered by an engineer from NES, who was supporting CRFC maintenance.
F. OPERATOR ACTION:
The plant was in Mode 5 at the time of discovery, and the CRFCs are not required to be operable in this mode. After the NES engineer notified the Shift Supervisor of this condition, no immediate actions were needed by the Control Room operators.
Subsequently, the Shift Supervisor notified higher supervision and the NRC Ginna Senior Resident Inspector. The Shift Supervisor notified the NRC per 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (2) (i), non-emergency four hour notification, at approximately 1948 EDST on April 12, 1999.
G. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES:
None
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IS IB98)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME I1) DOCKET I2) LER NUMBER IB) PAGE I3)
SEQUENTIAL REVISIQN TEAR NUMBER NUMBER R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 1999 OP4 .. O1 4 OF 7 TEXT llfmore spaceis required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366'17)
III. CAUSE OF EVENT:
A. IMMEDIATE CAUSE:
The immediate cause of the plant possibly operating outside its design basis was that the installed configuration resulted in decreased moisture separation capability after a design basis accident, resulting in less cooling capability.
B. INTERMEDIATE CAUSE'he intermediate cause was installation of improperly assembled moisture separator units. The original moisture removal units consisted of assemblies made up of the chevron type vanes and fiberglass moisture removal pads. This equipment was shop-assembled and shipped to Ginna Station. Vendor photographs taken during original shop assembly show the vanes installed in a manner now known to be incorrect.
C. ROOT CAUSE:
The underlying cause of the vanes being installed backwards was a manufacturing error.
IV. ANALYSIS OF EVENT:
This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a) (2) (ii)
(B), which requires a report of, "Any event or condition that resulted in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded; or that resulted in the nuclear power plant being: (B) In a condition that is outside the design basis of the plant.
An assessment was performed considering both the safety consequences and implications of this event with the following results and conclusions:
There were no operational or safety consequences or implications attributed to the moisture separator vanes installed backwards because:
The maximum air velocity through the containment recirculation fan cooling coils after a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) air velocity through the coil is below the American'Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) threshold of 600 feet per minute (FPM) for moisture entrainment both for the new and old configuration.
The coils will act as moisture separators due to the depth of the coil and spacing between fins, even if they are not operating . A heating coil similar to the cooling coils installed at Ginna, was tested with a spray stream equivalent to the Ginna Station LOCA environment directed at the coil entrance, but with a slightly lower air stream velocity (400 FPM) than Ginna. No moisture carry-over was observed on the outlet of the coil or on the moisture separator downstream of the coil.
Approximately 5% of the spray was evaporated by the coil heating.
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (9 1998)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
SEOUENTIAL REUISION TEAR NUMBER NUMBER R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 999 -
1 004 01 6 OF 7 TEXT Iifmore space is required, use addi tional copies of NRC Form 366AI (17)
Additional louvers are located on the inlet to the coils which will remove some entrained moisture prior to entering the cooling coils, which are not taken credit for in the CRFC unit operation.
The air velocity significantly reduces after exit from the cooling coils, and would allow entrained droplets to fall to the fan unit floor prior to reaching the HEPA filters which are located approximately 6 feet from the cooling coils.
0 The moisture separator media pads located upstream of the HEPA filters have been tested and found to remove moisture up to 1.5 Ibs/100 cu.ft. The maximum expected entrained moisture content in the containment environment due to containment spray and condensation is only OA Ibs/1000 cu.ft. The original media pads installed at Ginna (American Air Filter Model M-105) were replaced with new model M-81 pads that have not been tested to Ginna LOCA conditions.
However, due to similarities in design, they are expected to remain functional even though they have not been credited to function due to lack of qualification.
The moisture separator vanes on the outlet of the coil would still remove entrained water even though they are installed backwards, due to their tortuous path. The number of hooks which protrude into the flow stream is reduced from 3 to 1. However, the moisture removal is dominated by the spacing between adjacent vanes, length of each vane and number of vane turns in path, all of which are unaffected with the vanes installed backwards. The water drops follow a sine-wave path through the vanes. The overall efficiency for the backwards installation is estimated to be 25%. The moisture removal capacity requirement as specified in the original Bill of Materials for the moisture removal section of the CRFC unit is 0.4 Ibs/1000 cu.ft. This 25% reduction in the vane efficiency can be easily compensated for by the moisture removal pads since they were tested at moisture levels of greater than 1.0 Ibs/1000 cu.ft. In addition, the HEPA filters were also tested and their pressure drop increased by 0.5 inches with an equivalent moisture loading of OA Ibs/1000 cu.ft. It is believed that the additional 0.5 inches of pressure loss is within the existing margin of the as-installed equipment and would result in reduction in total system CRFC flow of less than 10%
0 The main impact of a slightly reduced CRFC cooling capability on the design basis accidents (DBAs) such as LOCAs and Main Steam Line Breaks (MSLBs) would be a reduction in the long term cooling and depressurization capability of containment. Impact on peak containment pressures for DBAs is expected to be negligible. Since peak containment pressures typically occur within the first couple of minutes following DBAs, the increase in HEPA filter hydraulic resistance would not be fully developed over this time due to the limited water loading on the HEPA filters immediately following a DBA. Additionally, the early occurrence of containment peak pressures limits the integrated amount of energy that is removed by the CRFCs up to the time of peak containment pressure.
Therefore, any degradation in CRFC heat removal capability due to reduced air side flow immediately following a DBA would have a negligible impact on the overall containment energy balance at the time of peak containment pressure. Based upon these factors, any increase in peak containment pressure that could have occurred as a result of the improperly installed louvers is judged to be within the overall structural capability of the containment following a DBA, although containment design pressure may have been slightly exceeded.
r NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6 1968)
LlCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) yEAR BEOUENTNL NUMBER NUN'IBER R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 1999 004 01 6 OF 7 TEXT Ilfmore space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366AI (17)
As previously stated, the major impact of reduced heat removal capability due to water loading of the HEPA filters would be on long term containment cooling, since Containment Spray flow is terminated after the plant has transitioned to the Recirculation Mode of cooling. Any reduction in CRFC cooling capability due to reduced air flow would cause a slower containment coodown and depressurization. Although this slower containment cooldown could potentially affect the Equipment Qualification (EQ) profiles of safety-related equipment in containment, a review of the existing Ginna EQ profiles for containment indicates that sufficient margin exists during the first twenty-four hours following a DBA to accommodate a slower cooldown. Consequently, no adverse impact on past operability of qualified equipment in containment is expected to have existed.
o The Ginna Control Room and off-site dose calculations were re-evaluated assuming actual containment integrated leakage from testing performed in 1996 and actual predicted containment depressurization rates for Ginna. Based on these assumptions and continuous operation of the CRFCs in a post-LOCA environment, it is estimated that a minimum charcoal filter iodine removal efficiency of 10% would be required to maintain off-site doses below 300 Rem and Control Room thyroid doses below 30 Rem and thereby satisfy the Ginna licensing basis requirement as required by 10 CFR 100 and General Design Criterion (GDC) 19. Based on additional analysis that was performed by RG(ltE in 1999, charcoal filters were found to have 40% of their volume still available for iodine removal even when 100% saturated. Since the minimum required charcoal iodine removal efficiency is appreciably smaller than the minimum expected charcoal efficiency of 40% for a wetted condition, the design function of the filters as it relates to thyroids dose to on-site and off-site personnel would still have been satisfied even with the louvers installed backwards.
Based on the above and the review of past plant transients, it can be concluded that the public's health and safety was assured at all times.
V. CORRECTIVE ACTION:
A. ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS:
The moisture separator vanes were dismantled and correctly re-installed.
B. ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:
The as-left configuration of the moisture separator units does not allow the vanes to be installed incorrectly.
VI. ADDITIONALINFORMATION:
A. FAILED COMPONENTS:
None
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6.1898)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
SEOUENTIAE REVISION yEAR NUMBER NUMBER R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 1999 - 004 01 7 OF 7 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366AJ (17)
B. PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS:
A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results: No documentation of similar LER events with the same root cause at Ginna Station could be identified.
C. SPECIAL COMMENTS:
None