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REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMSHUTDOWNLiMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATiON3.4.1.3a.Atleasttwoo<thecoolantloopslistedbelowshallbeOPERABLE:1.ReactorCoolantLoop1anditsassociatedsteamgeneratorandreactorcoolantpump,*2.ReactorCoolantLoop2anditsassociatedsteamgeneratorandreactorcoolantpump,*3.ReactorCo'olantLoop3anditsassociatedsteamgeneratorandreactorcoolantpump,*4.ReactorCoolantLoop4andi.tsassociatedsteamgeneratorandreactorcoolantpump,*5.ResidualHeatRemoval-East,**6.ResidualHeatRemoval.-Hest,**b.Atleastoneoftheabovecoolantloopsshallbeinoperation.***APPLICABILITY:MODES4and5ACTION:a.WithlessthantheaboverequiredloopsOPERABLE,immediatelyinitiatecorrectiveactiontoreturntherequiredloopstoOPERABLEstatusassoonaspossible;beinCOLDSHUTDOWNwith-in20hours.b.Withnocoolant'locpin.operation,suspendalloperationsin-volvingareductioninboronconcentrationoftheReactorCool-'nt'ystemandimmediatelyinitiatecorrectiveactiontoreturntherequiredcoolantlooptooperation.+AreactorcoolantpumpshallnotbestartedwithoneormoreoftheRCScoldlegtemperatureslessthanorequalto188oFunless1)thepressurizerwatervolumeislessthan52.00%ofspanor2)thesecondarywatertemperatureofeachsteamgeneratorislessthan50oFaboveeachoftheRCScoldlegtemper-atures.Operabilityofareactorcoolantloop(s)doesnotrequireanOPERABLEauxiliaryfeedwatersystem.**ThenormaloremergencypowersourcemaybeinoperableinMODE5.***Allreactorcoolantpumpsandresidualheatremovalpumpsmaybede-energizedforupto1hourprovided1)nooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcausedilutionofthereactorcoolantsystemboronconcentration,and2)coreout-lettemperatureismaintainedatleast10oFbelowsaturationtemperature.D.C.Cook-Unit13/44-3 REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMSURYEILLANCEREUIREMENTS4.4.1.3.1Therequiredresidualheatremovalloop(s)shallbedeterminedOPERABLEperSpecification4.0.5.4.4.1.3.2Therequiredreactorcoolantpump(s),ifnotinoperation,shallbedeterminedtobeOPERABLEonceper7daysbyverifyingcorrectbreakeralignmentsandindicatedpoweravailability.4.4.1.3.3Therequiredsteamgenerator(s)shallbedeterminedOPERABLEbyverifyingsecondarysideleveltobegreaterthanorequalto25>ofwiderangeinstrumentspanatleastonceper12hours.4.4.1.3.4Atleastonecoolantloopshallbeverifiedtobeinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolantatleastonceper12hours.g,lr1~ID.C.COOK-UNIT13/44-3a REFUELINGOPERATIONS3/4.9.8RESIDUALHEATREMOVALANDCOOLANTCIRCULATIONLIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION3.9.8.1Atleastoneresidualheatremovalloopshallbeinoperation.APPLICABILITY:MODE6.ACTION:a.Withlessthanoneresidualheatremovalloopinoperation,exceptasprovidedinb.below,suspendalloperationsinvolvinganincreaseinthereactordecayheatloadorareductioninboronconcentrationoftheReactorCoolantSystem.Closeallcontainmentpenetrationsprovidingdirectaccessfromthecontainmentatmospheretotheoutsideatmospherewithin4hours.b.Theresidualheatremovalloopmayberemovedfromoperationforupto1hourper8hourperiodduringtheperformanceofCOREALTERATIONSinthevicinityofthereactorpressurevesselhotlegs.c.TheprovisionsofSpecification3.0..3arenotapplicable.SURVEILLANCEREQUIREi~lENTS4~~4.9.8.1Aresidualheatremovalloopshallbedeterminedtobeinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolanataflowrateof>3000gpmatleastonceper24hours.D.C.COOK-UNIT13j49-9 REFUELINGOPERATIONSLOWWATERLEVELLIMITINGCONOITIONFOROPERATION3.9.8.2TwoindependentResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)loopsshallbeOPERABLE.*APPLICABILITY:MOOE6whenthewaterlevelabovethetopofthereactorpressurevesselflangeislessthan23feetwiththeupperinternalsremoved.ACTION:a.WithlessthantherequiredRHRloopsOPERABLE,immediatelyinitiatecorrectiveactiontoreturntherequiredRHRloopstoOPERABLEstatusassoonaspossible.b.TheprovisionsofSpecification3.0.3arenotapplicable.SURVEILLANCEREUIREMENTS4.9.8.2TherequiredResidualHeatRemovalloopsshallbedeterminedOPERABLEperSpecification4.0.5.*ThenormaloremergencypowersourcemaybeinoperableforeachRHRloop.D.C.COOK-UNIT13/49-9a REFUELINGOPERATIONS3/4.9.10MATERLEYEL-REACTORYESSELLIHITIHGCOHDITIOHFOROPERATION3.9.10Atleast23feetofwater,shallbemaintainedoverthetopofthereactorpressurevesselflange.APPLICABILITY:DuringmovementoffuelassembliesorcontrolrodswithinthereactorpressurevesselwhileinMODE6.withtheupperinternalsremoved.ACTION:Miththerequirementsoftheabovespecificationnotsatisfied,suspendalloperationsinvolvingmovementoffuelassembliesorcontrolrodswithinthepressurevessel.TheprovisionsofSpecification3.0.3arenotapplicable.SURVEILLANCEREUIREHEHTS4.9.10Thewaterlevelsha')1bedeterminedtobeat,leastitsminimum"requireddepthwithin2hourspriortothestartofandatleastonceper24hoursthereafterduringmovementoffuelassembliesorcontrolrods.~~D.C.Cook-Unit13/49-11 3/4.4REACTORCOOLANTSY<BASES3/4.4.1REACTORCOOLANTLOOPSANDCOOLANTCIRCULATIONTheplantisdesignedtooperatewithallreactorcoolantloopsinoperation,andmaintainONBRabove1.30duringallnormaloperationsandanticipatedtransients.Inl100ES1and2withonereactorcoolantloopnotinoperationthisspecificationrequiresthatt'eplantbei.natleastHOTSTN'DBYwithin1hour.InNODE3,'singlereactorcoolantloopprovidessufficientheatremovalcapabilityforremovingdecayheat;however,singlefailurecons~rationsrequirethattwoloopsbeOPERABLE.Int<ODES4and5,asinglereactorcoolantlooporRHRloopprovidessufficientheatremovalcapabilityforremovingdecayheat;butsinglefailureconsiderationsrequirethatatleasttwoloopsbeOPERABLE.ThusifthereactorcoolantloopsarenotOPERABLE,thisspecificationrequirestwoRHRloopstobeOPERABLE.TheoperationofoneReactorCoolantPumporoneRHRpumpprovidesadequateflowtoensuremixing;preventstratificationandproducegradualreactivitychangesduringboronconcentrationreductionsintheReactorCoolantSystem.Thereactivitychanoerateassociatedwithboronreductionwill,therefore,bewithinthecapabilityofoperatorrecognitionandcontrol.TherestrictionsonstartingaReactorCoolantPumpwithoneormoreRCScoldlegsl,essthanorequalto188FareprovidedtopreventRCSpress~retransients,-causedbyenergyadditionsfromthesecondlysystem,whichcouldexcedthelimitsofAppendixGto10CFRPart50.TheRCSwillbeprotectedagainstoverpressuretransientsandwillnotexceedhelimitsofAppendixGbyeither(1)restrictingthewatervolumeinthepressurizerandtherebyprovidingavolumefortheprimarycoolanttoexpandinto,or(2)byrestrictingstartingoftheRCPstowhenthesecondarywatertrapratureofeachsteamgeneratorislessthan50FaboveeachoftheRCScoldlegtemperatures.0.C.Cook-Unit183/44-1 3/4.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTe.l8ASES3/4.4.2and3/<.4.3SAFETYVAL'/ESThepressurizercodesafetyvalvesoperatetopreventtheRCSfrombeingpressurizedaboveitsSafetyLimitof2735psia.Eachsaetyvalveisdesignedtorelieve420,000lbsperhourofsaturatedsteamatthevalvesetpoint.Thereliefcapacityofasinglesafetyvalveisadeauatetorelieveanyoveroressureconditionuhichcouldoccurduringshutdown.IntheeventthatnosafetyvalvesareOPERABLE,anooeratingRHRlooo,connectedtotheRCS,providesoverpressurereliefcapabilityandwillpteventRCSoverpressurization.Ouringoperation,a11pressurizercodesafetyvalvesmustbeOPERA8LEtopreventtheRCSfrombeingoressurizedaboveitssafetyIimitof2735psig.Thecombinedreliefcapacityofallofthesevalvesisgreaterthanthemaximumsurgeraterosultinafromacomoletelossofloadassumingnoreactortripuntilthefirs~ReactorProtectiveSystemtripsetpoint:sreached(i.e.,nocreditistaken,oradirectroactortriponthelossorload)andalsoassuminanoooerationafthepoweroperaedreliefvalves.orsteamdumpvalves.Oemonstrationofthe'afetyvalves'i,tsettinasui11occuronlyduringshudownandwillbeperformedinaccordanceuiththe"rovisicnsofSectionXIoftheASl1EBoilerandPressureCode,1974Edition.0.C.COOK-Ui'(ITI83/44-Ia REFUELINGOPERATIONSBASES3/4.9.6MANIPULATORCRANEOPERABILITYTheOPERABILITYrequirementsforthemanipulatorcranesensurethat:1)manipulatorcraneswillbeusedformovementofcontrolrodsandfuelassemblies2)eachcranehassufficientloadcapacitytoliftacontrolrodorfuelassemblyand3)thecoreinternalsandpressurevesselareprotectedfromexcessiveliftingforceintheeventtheyareinadvertentlyengageddur-ingliftiingoperations.'I3/4.9.7CRANETRAVEL-SPENTFUELSTORAGEBUILDINGTherestrictiononmovementofloadsinexcessofthenominalweightofafuelassemblyoverotherfuelassembliesensuresthatnomorethanthecontentsofonefuelassemblywillberupturedintheeventofafuelhandlingaccident.Thisassumptionisconsistentwiththeactivityreleaseassumedintheaccidentanalyses.3/4.9.8RESIDUALHEATREMOVALANDCOOLANTCIRCULATIONTherequirementthatatleastoneresidualheatremoval(RHR)loopbeinoperationensuresthat(1)sufficientcoolingcapacityisavailabletoremovedecayheatandmaintainthewaterinthereactorpressurevesselbelow140oFasrequiredduringtheREFUELINGMODE,and(2)sufficientcoolantcirculationismaintainedthroughthereactorcoretominimizetheeffectofaborondilutionincidentandpreventboronstratification.TherequirementtohavetwoRHRloopsOPERABLEwhenthereislessthan23feetofwaterabovethereactorpressurevesselflangeensuresthatasinglefailureoftheoperatingRHRloopwillnotresultinacompletelossofresidualheatremovalcapability.Withthereactorvesselheadremovedand23feetofwaterabovethereactorpressurevesselflange,alargeheatsinkisavailableforcorecooling.Thus,intheeventofafailureoftheoperatingRHRloop,adequatetimeisprovidedtoinitiateemergencyprocedurestocoolthecore.3/4.9.9CONTAINMENTPURGEANDEXHAUSTISOLATIONSYSTEMTheOPERABILITYofthissystemensuresthatthecontainmentventandpurgepenetrationswillbeautomaticallyisolatedupondetectionofhighradiationlevelswithinthecontainment.TheOPERABILITYofthissystemisrequiredtorestrictthereleaseofradioactivematerialfromthecontain-mentatmospheretotheenvironment.D.C.COOK-UNIT1B3/49-3 REFUELINGOPERATIONSBASES3/4.9.10and3/4.9.11lriATERLEVEL-REACTORVESSELANDSTORAGEPOOLTherestrictionsonminimumwaterlevelensurethatsufficientwaterdepthisavailabletoremove99KoftheassumedlOXiodinegapactivityreleasedfrom.theruptureofanirradiatedfuelassembly.Theminimumwaterdepthisconsistentwiththeassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysis.3/4.9.12STORAGEPOOLVENTILATIONSYSTEMThelimitationsonthestoragepoolventilationsystemensurethatallradioactivematerialreleasedfromanirradiatedfuelassembly'willbefilteredthroughtheHEPAfiltersandcharcoaladsorberpriortodischargetotheatmosphere.TheOPERABILITYofthissystemandtheresultingiodineremovalcapacityareconsistentwiththeassumptionsoftheaccidentanalyses.3/4.9.13SPENTFUELCASKMOVEMENTThelimitationsofthisspecificationensuresthat,duringin-sertionorremovalofspentfuelcasksfromthespentfuelpool,fuelcaskmovementwillbeconstrainedtothepathandliftheightassumedintheCaskDropProtectionSystemsafetyanalysis.Restrict-ingthespentfuelcaskmovementwithintheserequirementsprovidesprotectionforthespentfuelpoolandstoredfuelfromtheeffectsofafuelcaskdropaccident.3/4.9.14SPENTFUELCASKDROPPROTECTIONSYSTEMThelimitationsontheuseofspentfuelcasksweighinginexcessof110tons(nominal)-providesassurancethatthespentfuelpoolwouldnotbedamagedbyadroppedfuelcasksincethisweightisconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedinthesafetyanalysisfortheperformanceoftheCaskDropProtectionSystem.D.C.COOK-UNIT1IB3/49-4 AttachmentNo.3toAEP:NRC:00420ADonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnitNos.1and2DecayHeatRemovalTechnicalSpecifications
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REACTOR'".GOLANTSYSTEMSHUTDOWNLIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION3.4.1.3a.AtleasttwoofthecoolantloopslistedbelowshallJ1.ReactorCoolantLoop1anditsassociatedsteamreactorcoolantpump,*beOPERABLE:generatorand2.ReactorCoolantLoop2anditsassociatedsteamgeneratorandreactorcoolantpump,*3.ReactorCoolantLoop'anditsassociatedsteamgeneratorandreactorcoolantpump,*4.ReactorCoolantLoop4anditsassociatedsteamgeneratorandreactorcoolantpump,*5.ResidualHeatRemoval-East,**6.ResidualHeatRemoval-West"'.Atleastoneoftheabovecoolantloopsshallbeinoperation.**"APPLICABILITY:MODES4and5ACTION:a.Withlessthantheaboverequired,loopsOPERABLE,immediatelyinitiatecorrectiveactiontoreturntherequiredloopstoOPERABLEstatusassoonaspossible;beinCOL'DSHUTDOWNwith-in20hours.b.Withnocoolantloopinoperation,suspendalloperatiorsin-volvingareductioninboronconcentrationoftheReactorCool-antSystemandimmediatelyinitiatecorrectiveactiontoreturntherequiredcoolantlooptooperation.'AreactorcoolantpumpshallnotbestartedwithoneormoreoftheRCSco!dlegtemperatureslessthanorequalto152oFunless1)thepressu~izerwatervolumeislessthan62.00Kofspanor2)thesecondarywatertemperatureofeachsteamgeneratorislessthan50FaboveeachoftheRCScoldlegtemper-atures.Operabilityofareactorcoolantloop(s)doesnotrequireanOPERABLEauxiliaryfeedwatersystem.**ThenormaloremergencypowersourcemaybeinoperableinMODE5.-""Allreactorcoolantpumpsandresidualheatremovalpumpsmaybede-energizedforuoto1hourprovided1)nooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcausedilutionofthereactorcoolantsystemboronconcentration,and2)coreout-lettemperatureismaintainedatleast10oFbelowsaturationtempera;ure.D.C.Cook-Unit23/44-3 REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMSURVEILLANCEREUIREtlENTS4.4.1.3.1Therequiredresidualheatremovalloop(s)shallbedeterminedOPERABLEperSpecification4.0.5.4.4.1.3.2Therequiredreactorcoolantpump(s),ifnotinoperation,shallbedeterminedtobeOPERABLEonceper7daysbyverifyingcorrectbreakeralignmentsandindicatedpoweravailability.4.4.1.3.3Therequiredsteamgenerator(s)shallbedeterminedOPERABLEbyverifyingsecondarysideleveltobegreaterthanorequalto255ofwiderangeinstrumentspanatleastonceper12hours.4.4.1.3.4Atleastonecoolantloopshallbeverifiedtobeinop'erationandcirculatingreactorcoolantatleastonceper12hours.D.C,COOK-UNIT23/44-3a REFUELINGOPERATIONS.3/4.9.8RESIDUALHEATREHOYALANDCOOLANTCIRCULATIONLIt'IITI<<GCONDITIONFOROPERATION3.9.8.1Atleastoneresidualheatremovalloopshallbeinoperation.APPLIABILITY:YiODE6.ACTION:a.b.C.<lithlessthanoneresidualheatremovalloopinoperation,exceptasprovidedinb,below,suspendalloperationsinvolvinganinc~easeinthereactordecayheatloadorareductioninboronconcntrationoftheReactorCoolantSystem.Closeallcontainmntpenetrationsprovidirgdirectaccessfromthecontain:~;entatmospheretotheoutsideatmospherewithin4hours.Theresidualheatremovalloopmayberemovedfromoperationforupto1hourper8hour.periodduringtheperformanceofCOREALTERATIONSinthevicinityofthereactorpressurevesselhotlegs.TheprovisionsofSpecification3.0..3arenotapplicable.SUR".EILANCEREQUIREi'iENTS4.9.8.1Aresidualheatremovalloopshallbedeterm',nedtobeinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolantataflowrateof>3000gpmatleastonceper24hours.0.C.COO"''>NIT23/49-8  
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'REFUELINGOPERATIONSLOll<IATERLEi/ELLIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION3.9.8.2TwoindependentResidualHeatRemoval(RHR)loopsshallbeOPERABLE.+APPLICABILITY:NODE6whenthewaterlevelabovethetopofthereactorpressurevesselflangeislessthan23feetwiththeupperinternalsremoved.ACTION:a.>lithlessthantherequiredRHRloopsOPERABLE,immediatelyinitiatecorrectiveactiontoreturntherequiredRHRloopstoOPERABLEstatusassoonaspossible.b.TheprovisionsofSpecification3.0.3arenotapplicable.SURYEILLANCEREUIREjlENTS4.9.8.2TherequiredResidualHeatRemovalloopsshall-bedeterminedOPERABLEperSpecification4.0,5.*ThenormaloremergencypowersourcemaybeinoperableforeachRHRloop.D.C.COOK-UNIT23/49-8a REFUELINGOPERATIONS3/4.9.10MATERLEVEL-REACTORVESSELLIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION~~~3.9.10Atleast23feetofwater.shallbemaintainedoverthetopofthereactorpressurevesselflange.APPLICABILITY:Duringmovementoffuelassembliesorcontrolrodswithinthe,reactorpressurevesselwhileinMODE6withtheupperinternalsremoved.ACTION:kiththerequirementsoftheabovespecificationnotsatisfied,suspendalloperationsinvolvingmovementoffuelassembliesorcontrolrodswithinthepressurevessel.TheprovisionsofSpecification3.0.3arenotapplicable.SURVEILLANCEREUIREHENTS4.9.10Thewaterlevelshallbedeterminedtobeatleastitsminimumrequireddepthwithin2hourspriortothestartofandatleastonceper24hoursthereafterduringmovementoffuelassembliesorcontrolrods.D.C.COOK-UNIT23/49-10 3/4.4REACTORCOOLANTSY"1BASES3/4.4.1REACTORCOOLANTLOOPSANDCOOLANTCIRCULATIONTheplantisdesignedtooperatewithallreactorcoolant1oopsinoperation,andmaintainDNBRabove1.30duringallnormaloperationsandanticipatedtransients.InMODES1and2withonereactorcoolantloopnotinoperationthisspecificationrequiresthattheplantbeinaileastHOTSTAJ.DBYwithinIhour.InMODE3,asinglereactorcoolant1oopprovidessufficientheatremovalcapabilityforremovingdecayheat;however,singlefailureconstrationsrequirethattwoloopsbeOPERABLE.InMODES4and5,asinglereactorcoolantlooporRHRloopprovidessufficientheatremovalcapabilityforremovingdecayheat,;butsinglefailureconsiderationsrequirethatatleasttwoloopsbeOPERABLE.ThusifthereactorcoolantloopsarenotOPERABLE,ihisspecificationrequirestwoRHRloopstobeOPERABLE.TheoperationofoneReactorCoolantPumporoneRHRpumpprovidesadequa.eflowtoensuremixing,preventstratificationandproducegradua1reactivitychangesduringboronconcentrationreductionsintheReactorCoolantSystem..hereactivitychangerateassociaiedwithboronrductionwill,therefore,bewithinthecapabilityofoperatorrecognitionandcontrol.TherestrictionsonstartingaReactorCoolantPumpwith.oneormoreRCScoldlegsl.essthanorequalto152OFareprovidedtopreventRCSpressuretransients,-causedbyenergyadditionsfromthesecondssystem,whichcouldexceedthelimitsofAppendixGto10CFRPart50.TheRCSwillbeproiectedagainstoverpressureiransientsandwillnotexceed=helimiiso7AppendixGbyeither(1)restrictingthewatervolumeinthepressurizerandtherebyprovidingavolumefortheprimarycoolanttoexpandinto.or(2)byrestrictingstartingofthePCPstowhenthesecondarywatert~ratureofeachsteamgeneratorislessthan50ofaboveeachoftheRCScoldlegtemperatures.D.C.Cook-Unit2B3/44-1 3/4.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMBASES3/4.4.2and3/4.4.3SAFETYVALVESThepressurizercodesafetyvalvesoperatetopreventtheRCSfrombeingpressurizedaboveitsSafetyLimitof2735psig.Eachsafetyvalveisdesignedtorelieve420,000lbsperhourofsaturatedsteamatthevalvesetpoint..Thereliefcapacityofasinglesafetyvalveisadequatetorelieveanyoverpressureconditionwhichcouldoccurduringshutdown.IntheeventthatnosafetyvalvesareOPERABLE,anoperatingRHRloop,connectedtotheRCS,providesoverpressurereliefcapabilityandwillpreventRCSoverpressurization.Duringoperation,allpressurizercodesafetyvalvesmustbeOPERABLEtopreventtheRCSfrombeingpressurizedaboveitssafetylimitof2735psig.ThecombinedreliefcapacityofallofthesevalvesisgreaterthanthemaximumsurgerateresultingfromacompletelossofloadassumingnoreactortripuntilthefirstReactorProtectiveSystemtripsetpointisreached(i.e.,nocreditistakenforadirectreactortriponthelossofload)andalsoassumingnooperationofthepoweroperatedreliefvalvesorsteamdumpvalves.D.C.COOK-UNIT2B3/44-la REFUELINGOPERATIONSBASES3/4.9.6MANIPULATORCRANEOPERABILITYTheOPERABILITYrequirementsforthemanipulatorcranesensurethat:1)manipulatorcraneswillbeusedformovementofcontrolrodsandfuel.assemblies,2)eachcranehassufficientloadcapacitytoliftacontrolrodorfuelassembly,and3)thecoreinternalsandpressurevesselareprotectedfromexcessiveliftingforceintheeventtheyareinadvertentlyengagedduringliftingoperations.3/4.9.7CRANETRAVEL-SPENTFUELSTORAGEBUILDINGTherestrictiononmovementofloadsinexcessofthenominalweightofafuelandcontrolrodassemblyandassociatedhandlingtooloverotherfuelassembliesinthestoragepoolensuresthatintheeventthisloadisdropped1)theactivityreleasewillbelimitedtothatcontainedinasinglefuelassembly,and2)anypossibledistortionoffuelinthestoragerockswillnotresultinacriticalarray.Thisassumptionisconsistentwiththeactivityreleaseassumedintheaccidentanalyses.3/4.9.8RESIDUALHEATREMOVALANDCOOLANTCIRCULATIONTherequirementthatatleastoneresidualheatremoval(RHR)loopbeinoperationensuresthat(1)sufficientcoolingcapacityisavailabletoremovedecayheatandmaintainthewaterinthereactorpressurevesselbelow140oFasrequiredduringtheREFUELINGMODE,and{2)sufficientcoolantcir-culationismaintainedthroughthereactorcoretominimizetheeffectofaborondilutionincidentandpreventboronstratification.TherequirementtohavetwoRHRloopsOPERABLEwhenthereislessthan23feetofwaterabovethereactorpressurevesselflangeensuresthatasinglefailureoftheoperatingRHRloopwillnotresultinacompletelossofresidualheatremovalcapability.Withthereactorvesselheadremovedand23feetofwaterabovethereactorpressurevesselflange,alargeheatsinkisavailableforcorecooling.Thus,intheeventofafailureoftheoperatingRHRloop,adequatetimeisprovidedtoinitiateemergencyproce-durestocoolthecore.D.C.COOK-UNIT2B3/49-2 REFUELINGOPERATIONSBASES3/4.9.9"ONTAINMENTPURGEANDXHAUSTISOLATIONSYSTEMTheOPERABILITYofthissystemensuresthatthecontainmentventandpurgepenetrationswillbeautomaticallyisolatedupondetectionofhighradiationlevelswithinthecontainment.TheOPERABILITYofthissystemisrequiredtorestrictthereleaseofradioactivematerialfromthecontainmentatmospheretotheenvironment.3/4.9.10and3/4.9.11MATERLEVEL-REACTORVESSELANDSTORAGEPOOLTherestrictionsonminimumwaterlevelensurethatsufficientwaterdepthisavailabletoremove99%oftheassumed10%iodinegapactivityreleasedfromtheruptureofanirradiatedfuelassemble.Theminimumwaterdepthisconsistentwiththeassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysis.3/4.9.12STORAGEPOOLVENTILATIONSYSTEMThelimitationsonthestoragepoolventilationsystemensurethatallradioactivemaerialreleasedfromanirradiatedfuelassemblywillbefilteredthroughtheHEPAfiltersandcharcoaladsorberpriortodis-chargetotheatmosphere.TheOPERABILITYofthissystemandtheresult-ingiodineremovalcapacityareconsistentwiththeassumptionsoftheaccidentanalyses.3/4.9.13SPENTFUELCASKMOVEMENTThelimitationsofthisspecificationensuresthat,duringin-sertionorremovalofspentfuelcasksfromthespentfuelpool,fuelcaskmovementwillbeconstrainedtothepathandliftheightassumedintheCaskDropProtectionSystemsafetyanalysis.Restrict-ingthespentfuelcaskmovementwithinthese,requirementsprovidesprotectionforthespentfuelpoolandstoredfuelfromtheeffectsofafuelcaskdropaccident.3/4.9.14SPENTFUELCASKDROPPROTECTIONSYSTEMThelimitationsontheuseofspentfuelcasksweighinginexcessof110tons(nominal)providesassurancethatthespentfuelpoolwouldnotbedamagedbyadroppedfuelcasksincethisweightisconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedinthesafetyanalysisfortheperformanceoftheCaskDropProtectio.sSystem.D.C.COOK.-UNIT2B3/49-3}}
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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SHUTDOWN LiMITING CONDITION    FOR OPERATiON 3.4.1.3    a. At least two    o< the coolant loops listed below shall        be OPERABLE:
: 1. Reactor Coolant Loop    1  and its  associated  steam generator and reactor coolant pump,*
: 2. Reactor  Coolant Loop  2  and its  associated  steam generator and reactor coolant pump,*
: 3. Reactor Co'olant Loop 3 and    its  associated  steam generator and reactor coolant pump,*
: 4. Reactor Coolant Loop    4 and  i.ts associated  steam generator and reactor coolant pump,*
: 5. Residual Heat Removal - East,**
: 6. Residual Heat Removal.   - Hest,**
: b. At least one of the above coolant loops shall        be  in operation.***
APPLICABILITY:     MODES 4  and 5 ACTION:
: a. With less than the above required loops        OPERABLE, immediately initiate corrective action to return      the required loops to OPERABLE  status  as soon as  possible; be  in COLD SHUTDOWN    with-in 20  hours.
: b. With no coolant'locp in. operation, suspend all operations in-volving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor and immediately initiate corrective action to return Cool-'nt'ystem the required coolant loop to operation.
  +A  reactor coolant pump shall not be started with one or more of the RCS cold leg temperatures less than or equal to 188 oF unless 1) the pressurizer water volume is less than 52.00% of span or 2) the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 50 oF above each of the RCS cold leg temper-atures. Operability of a reactor coolant loop(s) does not require an OPERABLE auxiliary feedwater system.
**The normal or emergency power source may be inoperable in            MODE  5.
***Allreactor coolant pumps and residual heat removal pumps may be de-energized for up to hour provided 1) no operations are permitted that would cause 1
dilution of the reactor coolant system boron concentration, and 2) core out-let temperature    is maintained at least    10 oF below  saturation temperature.
D. C. Cook - Unit  1                        3/4 4-3
 
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SURYEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.4. 1.3. 1    The required residual heat removal loop(s) shall    be determined  OPERABLE per Specification 4.0.5.
4.4.1.3.2        The required reactor coolant pump(s),   if not in operation, shall be determined to be        OPERABLE once per 7 days by  verifying correct breaker alignments and  indicated power availability.
4.4.1.3.3 The required steam generator(s) shall be determined            OPERABLE by verifying secondary side level to be greater than or equal to          25> of wide range instrument span at least once per 12 hours.
4.4.1.3.4 At least one coolant loop shall be verified to          be  in operation  and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours.
g,lr1 ~ I D. C. COOK       - UNIT 1                    3/4 4-3a
 
REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.8  RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION LIMITING CONDITION    FOR OPERATION 3.9.8.1  At least one residual heat removal loop shall    be in operation.
APPLICABILITY:     MODE  6.
ACTION:
: a. With less than one residual heat removal loop in operation, except as provided in b. below, suspend all operations involving an incr ease in the reactor decay heat load or a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System. Close all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere within 4 hours.
: b. The  residual heat removal loop may be removed from operation for  up  to hour per 8 hour period during the performance of 1
CORE ALTERATIONS in the vicinity of the reactor pressure vessel hot legs.
: c. The  provisions of Specification 3.0..3 are not applicable.
4 ~ ~
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREi~lENTS 4.9.8.1  A  residual heat removal loop shall be determined to be in operation and circulating reactor coolan      at a flow rate of > 3000 gpm at least once per 24 hours.
D. C. COOK - UNIT  1                  3j4 9-9
 
REFUELING OPERATIONS LOW WATER  LEVEL LIMITING CONOITION    FOR OPERATION 3.9.8.2  Two independent Residual Heat Removal (RHR) loops shall be OPERABLE.*
APPLICABILITY:   MOOE 6  when the water level above the top of the reactor pressure vessel flange is less than 23 feet with the upper internals  removed.
ACTION:
: a. With less than the required    RHR  loops  OPERABLE, immediately initiate corrective action to return the required      RHR loops to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.
: b. The  provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.
SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.9.8.2 The required Residual Heat      Removal  loops shall be determined  OPERABLE per Specification 4.0.5.
*The normal or emergency power source may be inoperable      for  each RHR  loop.
D. C. COOK - UNIT  1                3/4 9-9a
 
REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9. 10 MATER LEYEL  - REACTOR YESSEL LIHITIHG COHDITIOH    FOR OPERATION 3.9.10 At least 23 feet of water, shall      be maintained over the top of the reactor pressure vessel flange.
APPLICABILITY: During movement      of fuel assemblies or control rods within the reactor pressure vessel while in    MODE 6 .with the upper internals removed.
ACTION:
Mith the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, suspend all operations involving movement of fuel assemblies or control rods within the pressure vessel. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.
SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHEHTS 4.9. 10 The water level sha')1 be determined to be at, least its minimum "required depth within 2 hours prior to the start of and at least once per 24 hours thereafter during movement of fuel assemblies or control rods.
                                                            ~ ~
D. C. Cook - Unit 1                  3/4 9-11
 
3/4.4    REACTOR COOLANT SY<
BASES 3/4.4.1    REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION The  plant is designed to operate with all reactor coolant loops in operation, and maintain    ONBR above 1.30 during all normal operations and anticipated transients. In l100ES 1 and 2 with one reactor coolant loop not in operation this specification requires that t'e plant be i.n at least HOT STN'DBY within 1 hour.
In  NODE 3,'   single reactor coolant loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; however, single failure        cons~   rations require that two loops be OPERABLE.
In  t<ODES  4 and 5, a single reactor coolant loop or RHR loop provides sufficient    heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations require that at least two loops be OPERABLE. Thus            if  the reactor coolant loops are not OPERABLE, this specification requires two RHR loops to be OPERABLE.
The  operation of one Reactor Coolant    Pump  or one RHR pump provides adequate flow to ensure mixing; prevent stratification        and produce gradual reactivity changes  during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System.
The reactivity chanoe rate associated with boron reduction will, therefore,             be within the capability of operator recognition and control.
The  restrictions on starting a Reactor Coolant Pump with one or more  RCS  cold legs l,ess than or equal to      188 F are provided to prevent RCS press~re transients,- caused by energy additions from the secondly system, which could exce d the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50. The RCS will be protected against overpressure transients and will not exceed          he limits of Appendix G by either (1) restricting the water        volume in the  pressurizer    and thereby providing a volume for the primary coolant to expand into, or (2) by restricting starting of the RCPs to when the secondary water trap rature of each steam generator is less than        50    F above each of the RCS cold leg tempera tures.
: 0. C. Cook - Unit    1                     8 3/4 4-1
 
3/4.4    REACTOR COOLANT SYSTe.l 8ASES 3/4.4.2  and 3/<.4.3  SAFETY VAL'/ES The  pressurizer code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psia. Each sa ety valve is designed to relieve 420,000 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve set point. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adeauate to relieve any overoressure condition uhich could occur during shutdown.
In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an ooerating RHR looo, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will pt event RCS overpressurization.
Ouring operation, a11 pressurizer code safety valves must be OPERA8LE  to prevent the RCS from being oressurized above its safety I imit of 2735 psig. The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maximum surge rate rosultina from a comolete loss of load assuming no reactor trip until the firs~ Reactor Protective System trip set point:s reached (i.e., no credit is taken, or a direct roactor trip on the loss or load) and also assumina no ooeration af the power opera ed relief valves. or steam dump valves.
Oemonstration of the'afety valves'i, t settinas ui11 occur only during shu down and will be performed in accordance uith the "rovisicns of Section XI of the ASl1E Boiler and Pressure Code, 1974 Edition.
: 0. C. COOK-Ui'(IT I                8 3/4 4-Ia
 
REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.6    MANIPULATOR CRANE OPERABILITY The OPERABILITY  requirements  for the manipulator cranes ensure  that:
: 1) manipulator cranes will be used for movement of control rods and fuel assemblies 2) each crane has sufficient load capacity to        lift a control rod or fuel assembly and 3) the core internals and pressure vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged dur-ing  liftiing operations.                                                   'I 3/4.9.7    CRANE TRAVEL  - SPENT FUEL STORAGE BUILDING The  restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of  a  fuel assembly over other fuel assemblies ensures that no more than the contents of one fuel assembly will be ruptured in the event of a fuel handling accident. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the accident analyses.
3/4.9.8    RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION The requirementthat at least one residual heat removal (RHR) loop be in operation ensures that (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel below 140oF as required during the REFUELING MODE, and (2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained through the reactor core to minimize the effect of a boron dilution incident and prevent boron stratification.
The requirement to have two RHR loops OPERABLE when there is less than 23  feet of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange ensures that a single fai lure of the operating RHR loop will not result in a complete loss of residual heat removal capability. With the reactor vessel head removed and 23 feet of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange, a large heat sink is available for core cooling. Thus, in the event of a failure of the operating RHR loop, adequate time is provided to initiate emergency procedures to cool the core.
3/4.9.9    CONTAINMENT PURGE AND EXHAUST ISOLATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY  of this system ensures that the containment vent and purge  penetrations  will  be automatically isolated upon detection of high radiation levels within the containment. The OPERABILITY of this system is required to restrict the release of radioactive material from the contain-ment atmosphere to the environment.
D. C. COOK-UNIT    1                  B  3/4 9-3
 
REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.10  and  3/4.9.11 lriATER LEVEL    - REACTOR VESSEL AND STORAGE POOL The  restrictions  on minimum water level ensure      that sufficient water depth  is available to  remove 99K of the assumed lOX        iodine gap activity released from .the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis.
3/4.9.12    STORAGE POOL VENTILATION SYSTEM The  limitations  on  the storage pool ventilation system ensure that all radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly'will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber prior to discharge to the atmosphere.       The OPERABILITY of this system and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the accident analyses.
3/4.9.13    SPENT FUEL CASK MOVEMENT The limitations of this specification ensures that, during in-sertion or removal of spent fuel casks from the spent fuel pool, fuel cask movement will be constrained to the path and assumed in the Cask Drop Protection System safety analysis.
lift height Restrict-ing the spent fuel cask movement within these requirements provides protection for the spent fuel pool and stored fuel from the effects of a fuel cask drop accident.
3/4.9.14    SPENT FUEL CASK DROP PROTECTION SYSTEM The limitations on the use of spent fuel casks weighing in excess of  110 tons (nominal) -provides assurance that the spent fuel pool would not be damaged by a dropped fuel cask since this weight is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analysis for the performance of the Cask Drop Protection System.
I D. C. COOK-UNIT    1                  B    3/4 9-4
 
Attachment No. 3  to AEP:NRC:00420A Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Decay Heat Removal Technical Specifications
 
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REACTOR '".GOLANT SYSTEM SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION      FOR OPERATION 3.4.1.3      a. At least two of the coolant loops listed below shall                      be OPERABLE:
J
: 1. Reactor Coolant Loop 1 and                its  associated  steam generator and reactor coolant pump,*
: 2. Reactor Coolant Loop    2 and            its  associated  steam generator and reactor coolant pump,*
: 3. Reactor Coolant Loop'     and            its  associated  steam generator and reactor coolant pump,*
: 4. Reactor Coolant Loop    4 and            its  associated  steam generator    and reactor coolant pump,*
: 5. Residual Heat Removal - East,**
: 6. Residual Heat Removal - West               "'.
At least one of the above coolant loops shall                    be  in operation.**"
APPLICABILITY:       MODES  4 and 5 ACTION:
: a. With less than the above required, loops OPERABLE, immediately initiate corrective action to return the required loops to OPERABLE  status  as soon as  possible;             be  in COL'D SHUTDOWN  with-in 20  hours.
: b. With no coolant loop in operation, suspend all operatiors in-volving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Cool-ant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required coolant loop to      operation.'A reactor coolant    pump shall not be started with one or more of the RCS co!d leg temperatures      less  than or equal to 152 oF unless 1) the pressu~izer water volume is less      than  62.00K  of span or 2) the secondary water temperature of each steam    generator  is  less  than 50 F above each of the RCS cold leg temper-atures. Operability of a reactor coolant loop(s) does not require an OPERABLE auxiliary feedwater system.
**The normal or emergency power source may be inoperable in                          MODE  5.
-""All reactor coolant        pumps and residual heat removal pumps may be de-energized for  uo  to  1  hour provided 1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the reactor coolant system boron concentration, and 2) core out-let temperature is maintained at least 10 oF below saturation tempera;ure.
D. C. Cook   - Unit    2                      3/4 4-3
 
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE RE UIREtlENTS 4.4.1.3.1 The required residual heat removal loop(s) shall    be determined    OPERABLE per Specification 4.0.5.
4.4.1.3.2    The required reactor coolant pump(s), if not in operation, shall    be determined to be  OPERABLE once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments and  indicated power availability.
4.4.1.3.3 The required steam generator(s) shall be determined    OPERABLE  by verifying secondary side level to be greater than or equal to    255  of wide range instrument span at least once per 12 hours.
4.4. 1.3.4  At least one coolant loop shall be verified to be  in op'eration  and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours.
D. C, COOK   - UNIT 2                    3/4 4-3a
 
REFUELING OPERATIONS
.3/4.9.8  RESIDUAL HEAT REHOYAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION LIt'IITI<<G CONDITION      FOR OPERATION 3.9.8.1    At least one residual heat removal loop shall      be in operation.
APPLI ABILITY:         YiODE 6.
ACTION:
: a.     <lith less than one residual heat removal loop in operation, except as provided in b, below, suspend all operations involving an inc~ ease in the reactor decay heat load or a reduction in boron conc ntration of the Reactor Coolant System. Close all containm nt penetrations providirg direct access from the contain:~;ent atmosphere to the outside atmosphere within 4 hours.
: b. The    residual heat removal loop may be removed from operation for    up to 1 hour per 8 hour. period during the performance of CORE ALTERATIONS in the vicinity of the reactor pressure vessel hot legs.
C. The    provisions of Specification 3.0..3 are not applicable.
SUR".EIL ANCE REQUIREi'iENTS 4.9.8.1    A    residual heat removal loop shall be determ',ned to be in operation and circulating reactor        coolant at a flow rate of > 3000 gpm at least once per 24 hours.
: 0. C. COO"'     '>NIT 2                3/4 9-8
 
REFUELING OPERATIONS LOll <IATER LEi/EL LIMITING CONDITION    FOR OPERATION 3.9.8.2    Two  independent Residual Heat Removal (RHR) loops shall be OPERABLE.+
APPLICABILITY:     NODE 6 when the water level above the top of the reactor pressure vessel flange is less than 23 feet with the upper internals removed.
ACTION:
: a.   >lith less than the required  RHR  loops OPERABLE,   immediately initiate corrective action to return the required    RHR  loops to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.
: b. The  provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.
SURYE ILLANCE RE UIREjlENTS 4.9.8.2 The required Residual Heat      Removal  loops shall- be determined  OPERABLE per Specification 4.0,5.
*The normal or emergency power source may be inoperable        for  each RHR loop.
D. C. COOK   - UNIT 2                  3/4 9-8a
 
REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9. 10 MATER LEVEL  - REACTOR VESSEL
                                                              ~ ~ ~
LIMITING CONDITION  FOR OPERATION 3.9. 10 At least 23 feet of water. shall    be maintained over the top of the reactor pressure vessel flange.
APPLICABILITY: During movement      of fuel assemblies or control rods within the
,reactor pressure vessel while in    MODE 6 with the upper internals removed.
ACTION:
kith  the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, suspend all operations involving movement of fuel assemblies or control rods within the pressure vessel. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.
SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHENTS 4.9. 10 The water level shall be determined to be at least its minimum required depth within 2 hours prior to the start of and at least once per 24 hours thereafter during movement of fuel assemblies or control rods.
D. C. COOK - UNIT 2                  3/4 9-10
 
3/4.4    REACTOR COOLANT SY      "1 BASES 3/4.4.1    REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION The  plant is designed to operate with all reactor coolant 1oops in operation, and maintain    DNBR above 1.30 during all normal operations and anticipated transients. In MODES 1 and 2 with one reactor coolant loop not in operation this specification requires that the plant be in ai least HOT STAJ.DBY within I hour.
In  MODE  3, a single reactor coolant  1oop  provides  sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat;       however, single  failure const rations require that two loops be OPERABLE.
In  MODES    4 and 5, a single reactor coolant loop or RHR loop provides sufficient    heat removal capability for removing decay heat,; but single failure considerations require that at least two loops be OPERABLE. Thus          if the reactor coolant loops are not OPERABLE, ihis specification requires two RHR loops to be OPERABLE.
The  operation of one Reactor Coolant    Pump  or one RHR pump provides adequa.e flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification        and produce gradua1 reactivity changes during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System.
.he reactivity change rate associa ied wi th boron r duction will, therefore, be within the capability of operator recognition and control.
The  restrictions on starting a Reactor Coolant Pump with.one or more  RCS  cold legs l.ess than or equal to 152 OF are provided to prevent        RCS pressure transients,- caused by energy additions from the seconds system, which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50. The RCS will be proiected against overpressure iransients and will not exceed =he limiis o7 Appendix G by either (1) restricting the water volume in the pressurizer and thereby providing a volume for the primary coolant to expand into. or (2) by restricting starting of the PCPs to when the secondary water t~rature of each steam generator is less than        50 of above each of the RCS cold leg tempera tures.
D. C. Cook   - Unit  2                    B 3/4 4-1
 
3/4.4  REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES 3/4.4.2  and  3/4.4.3  SAFETY VALVES The pressurizer code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig. Each safety valve is designed to relieve 420,000 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve set point.. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown. In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating RHR loop, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure      relief capability and  will prevent  RCS  overpressurization.
During operation,   all pressurizer  code safety valves must be OPERABLE  to prevent the    RCS from being pressurized  above its safety limit of 2735 psig. The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maximum surge rate resulting from a complete loss of load assuming no reactor trip until the first Reactor Protective System trip set point is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct reactor trip on the loss of load) and also assuming no operation of the power operated relief valves or steam dump valves.
D. C. COOK   - UNIT 2                B 3/4 4-la
 
REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.6    MANIPULATOR CRANE OPERABILITY The OPERABILITY  requirements  for the manipulator cranes ensure that:
: 1) manipulator cranes will    be used  for movement of control rods and fuel .
assemblies, 2) each crane has    sufficient load capacity to lift a control rod or fuel assembly, and 3) the core internals and pressure vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.
3/4.9.7    CRANE TRAVEL  - SPENT FUEL STORAGE BUILDING The  restriction  on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of  a fuel  and  control rod assembly and associated handling tool over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool ensures that in the event this load is dropped 1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and 2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage rocks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the accident analyses.
3/4.9.8    RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION The requirement that at least one residual heat removal (RHR) loop be in operation ensures that (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel below 140oF as required during the REFUELING MODE, and {2) sufficient coolant cir-culation is maintained through the reactor core to minimize the effect of a boron dilution incident and prevent boron stratification.
The requirement to have two RHR loops OPERABLE when there is less than 23  feet of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange ensures that a single failure of the operating RHR loop will not result in a complete loss of residual heat removal capability. With the reactor vessel head removed and 23 feet of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange, a large heat sink is available for core cooling. Thus, in the event of a failure of the operating RHR loop, adequate time is provided to initiate emergency proce-dures to cool the core.
D. C. COOK   - UNIT 2                B 3/4 9-2
 
REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.9   "ONTAINMENT PURGE AND      XHAUST ISOLATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY  of this  system ensures      that the containment vent and purge penetrations will    be  automatically    isolated upon detection of high radiation levels within      the  containment. The OPERABILITY of this system is required to    restrict    the  release  of  radioactive material from the containment atmosphere      to  the  environment.
3/4.9.10  and  3/4.9.11    MATER LEVEL  - REACTOR VESSEL AND STORAGE POOL The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assemble.             The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis.
3/4.9.12    STORAGE POOL VENTILATION SYSTEM The limitations  on  the storage pool ventilation system ensure that all radioactive ma erial released from an irradiated fuel assembly will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber prior to dis-charge to the atmosphere.     The OPERABILITY of this system and the result-ing iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the accident analyses.
3/4.9.13    SPENT FUEL CASK MOVEMENT The limitations of this specification ensures that, during in-sertion or removal of spent fuel casks from the spent fuel pool, fuel cask movement will be constrained to the path and          lift  height assumed in the Cask Drop Protection System safety analysis.             Restrict-ing the spent fuel cask movement within these, requirements provides protection for the spent fuel pool and stored fuel from the effects of a fuel cask drop accident.
3/4.9.14    SPENT FUEL CASK DROP PROTECTION SYSTEM The limitations on the use of spent fuel casks weighing in excess of  110 tons (nominal) provides assurance that the spent fuel pool would not be damaged by a dropped fuel cask since this weight is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analysis for the performance of the Cask Drop Protectio.s System.
D. C. COOK. - UNIT 2                B  3/4 9-3}}

Latest revision as of 01:31, 4 February 2020

Tech Specs 3.4.1.1,4.4.1.1,3.4.1.2,4.4.1.2.1,4.4.1.2.2, 3.4.1.3,4.4.1.3.1,4.4.1.3.2,4.4.1.3.3,4.4.1.3.4,3.9.8.1, 4.9.8.1,3.9.8.2,4.9.8.2,3.9.10,4.9.10,3/4.4.1,3/4.4.2, 3/4.4.3,3/4.9.6,3/4.9.7,3/4.9.8,3/4.9.9 & 3/4.9.10
ML17331A783
Person / Time
Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 08/14/1981
From:
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:
Shared Package
ML17331A782 List:
References
NUDOCS 8108250265
Download: ML17331A783 (23)


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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SHUTDOWN LiMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATiON 3.4.1.3 a. At least two o< the coolant loops listed below shall be OPERABLE:

1. Reactor Coolant Loop 1 and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,*
2. Reactor Coolant Loop 2 and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,*
3. Reactor Co'olant Loop 3 and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,*
4. Reactor Coolant Loop 4 and i.ts associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,*
5. Residual Heat Removal - East,**
6. Residual Heat Removal. - Hest,**
b. At least one of the above coolant loops shall be in operation.***

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5 ACTION:

a. With less than the above required loops OPERABLE, immediately initiate corrective action to return the required loops to OPERABLE status as soon as possible; be in COLD SHUTDOWN with-in 20 hours.
b. With no coolant'locp in. operation, suspend all operations in-volving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor and immediately initiate corrective action to return Cool-'nt'ystem the required coolant loop to operation.

+A reactor coolant pump shall not be started with one or more of the RCS cold leg temperatures less than or equal to 188 oF unless 1) the pressurizer water volume is less than 52.00% of span or 2) the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 50 oF above each of the RCS cold leg temper-atures. Operability of a reactor coolant loop(s) does not require an OPERABLE auxiliary feedwater system.

    • The normal or emergency power source may be inoperable in MODE 5.
      • Allreactor coolant pumps and residual heat removal pumps may be de-energized for up to hour provided 1) no operations are permitted that would cause 1

dilution of the reactor coolant system boron concentration, and 2) core out-let temperature is maintained at least 10 oF below saturation temperature.

D. C. Cook - Unit 1 3/4 4-3

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SURYEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.4. 1.3. 1 The required residual heat removal loop(s) shall be determined OPERABLE per Specification 4.0.5.

4.4.1.3.2 The required reactor coolant pump(s), if not in operation, shall be determined to be OPERABLE once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability.

4.4.1.3.3 The required steam generator(s) shall be determined OPERABLE by verifying secondary side level to be greater than or equal to 25> of wide range instrument span at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

4.4.1.3.4 At least one coolant loop shall be verified to be in operation and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

g,lr1 ~ I D. C. COOK - UNIT 1 3/4 4-3a

REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.8.1 At least one residual heat removal loop shall be in operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.

ACTION:

a. With less than one residual heat removal loop in operation, except as provided in b. below, suspend all operations involving an incr ease in the reactor decay heat load or a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System. Close all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
b. The residual heat removal loop may be removed from operation for up to hour per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> period during the performance of 1

CORE ALTERATIONS in the vicinity of the reactor pressure vessel hot legs.

c. The provisions of Specification 3.0..3 are not applicable.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREi~lENTS 4.9.8.1 A residual heat removal loop shall be determined to be in operation and circulating reactor coolan at a flow rate of > 3000 gpm at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

D. C. COOK - UNIT 1 3j4 9-9

REFUELING OPERATIONS LOW WATER LEVEL LIMITING CONOITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.8.2 Two independent Residual Heat Removal (RHR) loops shall be OPERABLE.*

APPLICABILITY: MOOE 6 when the water level above the top of the reactor pressure vessel flange is less than 23 feet with the upper internals removed.

ACTION:

a. With less than the required RHR loops OPERABLE, immediately initiate corrective action to return the required RHR loops to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.
b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.9.8.2 The required Residual Heat Removal loops shall be determined OPERABLE per Specification 4.0.5.

  • The normal or emergency power source may be inoperable for each RHR loop.

D. C. COOK - UNIT 1 3/4 9-9a

REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9. 10 MATER LEYEL - REACTOR YESSEL LIHITIHG COHDITIOH FOR OPERATION 3.9.10 At least 23 feet of water, shall be maintained over the top of the reactor pressure vessel flange.

APPLICABILITY: During movement of fuel assemblies or control rods within the reactor pressure vessel while in MODE 6 .with the upper internals removed.

ACTION:

Mith the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, suspend all operations involving movement of fuel assemblies or control rods within the pressure vessel. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHEHTS 4.9. 10 The water level sha')1 be determined to be at, least its minimum "required depth within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> prior to the start of and at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> thereafter during movement of fuel assemblies or control rods.

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D. C. Cook - Unit 1 3/4 9-11

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SY<

BASES 3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION The plant is designed to operate with all reactor coolant loops in operation, and maintain ONBR above 1.30 during all normal operations and anticipated transients. In l100ES 1 and 2 with one reactor coolant loop not in operation this specification requires that t'e plant be i.n at least HOT STN'DBY within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

In NODE 3,' single reactor coolant loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; however, single failure cons~ rations require that two loops be OPERABLE.

In t<ODES 4 and 5, a single reactor coolant loop or RHR loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations require that at least two loops be OPERABLE. Thus if the reactor coolant loops are not OPERABLE, this specification requires two RHR loops to be OPERABLE.

The operation of one Reactor Coolant Pump or one RHR pump provides adequate flow to ensure mixing; prevent stratification and produce gradual reactivity changes during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System.

The reactivity chanoe rate associated with boron reduction will, therefore, be within the capability of operator recognition and control.

The restrictions on starting a Reactor Coolant Pump with one or more RCS cold legs l,ess than or equal to 188 F are provided to prevent RCS press~re transients,- caused by energy additions from the secondly system, which could exce d the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50. The RCS will be protected against overpressure transients and will not exceed he limits of Appendix G by either (1) restricting the water volume in the pressurizer and thereby providing a volume for the primary coolant to expand into, or (2) by restricting starting of the RCPs to when the secondary water trap rature of each steam generator is less than 50 F above each of the RCS cold leg tempera tures.

0. C. Cook - Unit 1 8 3/4 4-1

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTe.l 8ASES 3/4.4.2 and 3/<.4.3 SAFETY VAL'/ES The pressurizer code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psia. Each sa ety valve is designed to relieve 420,000 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve set point. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adeauate to relieve any overoressure condition uhich could occur during shutdown.

In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an ooerating RHR looo, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will pt event RCS overpressurization.

Ouring operation, a11 pressurizer code safety valves must be OPERA8LE to prevent the RCS from being oressurized above its safety I imit of 2735 psig. The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maximum surge rate rosultina from a comolete loss of load assuming no reactor trip until the firs~ Reactor Protective System trip set point:s reached (i.e., no credit is taken, or a direct roactor trip on the loss or load) and also assumina no ooeration af the power opera ed relief valves. or steam dump valves.

Oemonstration of the'afety valves'i, t settinas ui11 occur only during shu down and will be performed in accordance uith the "rovisicns of Section XI of the ASl1E Boiler and Pressure Code, 1974 Edition.

0. C. COOK-Ui'(IT I 8 3/4 4-Ia

REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.6 MANIPULATOR CRANE OPERABILITY The OPERABILITY requirements for the manipulator cranes ensure that:

1) manipulator cranes will be used for movement of control rods and fuel assemblies 2) each crane has sufficient load capacity to lift a control rod or fuel assembly and 3) the core internals and pressure vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged dur-ing liftiing operations. 'I 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE BUILDING The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel assembly over other fuel assemblies ensures that no more than the contents of one fuel assembly will be ruptured in the event of a fuel handling accident. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the accident analyses.

3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION The requirementthat at least one residual heat removal (RHR) loop be in operation ensures that (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel below 140oF as required during the REFUELING MODE, and (2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained through the reactor core to minimize the effect of a boron dilution incident and prevent boron stratification.

The requirement to have two RHR loops OPERABLE when there is less than 23 feet of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange ensures that a single fai lure of the operating RHR loop will not result in a complete loss of residual heat removal capability. With the reactor vessel head removed and 23 feet of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange, a large heat sink is available for core cooling. Thus, in the event of a failure of the operating RHR loop, adequate time is provided to initiate emergency procedures to cool the core.

3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT PURGE AND EXHAUST ISOLATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of this system ensures that the containment vent and purge penetrations will be automatically isolated upon detection of high radiation levels within the containment. The OPERABILITY of this system is required to restrict the release of radioactive material from the contain-ment atmosphere to the environment.

D. C. COOK-UNIT 1 B 3/4 9-3

REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.10 and 3/4.9.11 lriATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL AND STORAGE POOL The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99K of the assumed lOX iodine gap activity released from .the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis.

3/4.9.12 STORAGE POOL VENTILATION SYSTEM The limitations on the storage pool ventilation system ensure that all radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly'will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber prior to discharge to the atmosphere. The OPERABILITY of this system and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the accident analyses.

3/4.9.13 SPENT FUEL CASK MOVEMENT The limitations of this specification ensures that, during in-sertion or removal of spent fuel casks from the spent fuel pool, fuel cask movement will be constrained to the path and assumed in the Cask Drop Protection System safety analysis.

lift height Restrict-ing the spent fuel cask movement within these requirements provides protection for the spent fuel pool and stored fuel from the effects of a fuel cask drop accident.

3/4.9.14 SPENT FUEL CASK DROP PROTECTION SYSTEM The limitations on the use of spent fuel casks weighing in excess of 110 tons (nominal) -provides assurance that the spent fuel pool would not be damaged by a dropped fuel cask since this weight is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analysis for the performance of the Cask Drop Protection System.

I D. C. COOK-UNIT 1 B 3/4 9-4

Attachment No. 3 to AEP:NRC:00420A Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit Nos. 1 and 2 Decay Heat Removal Technical Specifications

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REACTOR '".GOLANT SYSTEM SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.1.3 a. At least two of the coolant loops listed below shall be OPERABLE:

J

1. Reactor Coolant Loop 1 and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,*
2. Reactor Coolant Loop 2 and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,*
3. Reactor Coolant Loop' and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,*
4. Reactor Coolant Loop 4 and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,*
5. Residual Heat Removal - East,**
6. Residual Heat Removal - West "'.

At least one of the above coolant loops shall be in operation.**"

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5 ACTION:

a. With less than the above required, loops OPERABLE, immediately initiate corrective action to return the required loops to OPERABLE status as soon as possible; be in COL'D SHUTDOWN with-in 20 hours.
b. With no coolant loop in operation, suspend all operatiors in-volving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Cool-ant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required coolant loop to operation.'A reactor coolant pump shall not be started with one or more of the RCS co!d leg temperatures less than or equal to 152 oF unless 1) the pressu~izer water volume is less than 62.00K of span or 2) the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 50 F above each of the RCS cold leg temper-atures. Operability of a reactor coolant loop(s) does not require an OPERABLE auxiliary feedwater system.
    • The normal or emergency power source may be inoperable in MODE 5.

-""All reactor coolant pumps and residual heat removal pumps may be de-energized for uo to 1 hour provided 1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the reactor coolant system boron concentration, and 2) core out-let temperature is maintained at least 10 oF below saturation tempera;ure.

D. C. Cook - Unit 2 3/4 4-3

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE RE UIREtlENTS 4.4.1.3.1 The required residual heat removal loop(s) shall be determined OPERABLE per Specification 4.0.5.

4.4.1.3.2 The required reactor coolant pump(s), if not in operation, shall be determined to be OPERABLE once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability.

4.4.1.3.3 The required steam generator(s) shall be determined OPERABLE by verifying secondary side level to be greater than or equal to 255 of wide range instrument span at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

4.4. 1.3.4 At least one coolant loop shall be verified to be in op'eration and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

D. C, COOK - UNIT 2 3/4 4-3a

REFUELING OPERATIONS

.3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REHOYAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION LIt'IITI<<G CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.8.1 At least one residual heat removal loop shall be in operation.

APPLI ABILITY: YiODE 6.

ACTION:

a. <lith less than one residual heat removal loop in operation, except as provided in b, below, suspend all operations involving an inc~ ease in the reactor decay heat load or a reduction in boron conc ntration of the Reactor Coolant System. Close all containm nt penetrations providirg direct access from the contain:~;ent atmosphere to the outside atmosphere within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
b. The residual heat removal loop may be removed from operation for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. period during the performance of CORE ALTERATIONS in the vicinity of the reactor pressure vessel hot legs.

C. The provisions of Specification 3.0..3 are not applicable.

SUR".EIL ANCE REQUIREi'iENTS 4.9.8.1 A residual heat removal loop shall be determ',ned to be in operation and circulating reactor coolant at a flow rate of > 3000 gpm at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

0. C. COO"' '>NIT 2 3/4 9-8

REFUELING OPERATIONS LOll <IATER LEi/EL LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.8.2 Two independent Residual Heat Removal (RHR) loops shall be OPERABLE.+

APPLICABILITY: NODE 6 when the water level above the top of the reactor pressure vessel flange is less than 23 feet with the upper internals removed.

ACTION:

a. >lith less than the required RHR loops OPERABLE, immediately initiate corrective action to return the required RHR loops to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.
b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURYE ILLANCE RE UIREjlENTS 4.9.8.2 The required Residual Heat Removal loops shall- be determined OPERABLE per Specification 4.0,5.

  • The normal or emergency power source may be inoperable for each RHR loop.

D. C. COOK - UNIT 2 3/4 9-8a

REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9. 10 MATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9. 10 At least 23 feet of water. shall be maintained over the top of the reactor pressure vessel flange.

APPLICABILITY: During movement of fuel assemblies or control rods within the

,reactor pressure vessel while in MODE 6 with the upper internals removed.

ACTION:

kith the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, suspend all operations involving movement of fuel assemblies or control rods within the pressure vessel. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREHENTS 4.9. 10 The water level shall be determined to be at least its minimum required depth within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> prior to the start of and at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> thereafter during movement of fuel assemblies or control rods.

D. C. COOK - UNIT 2 3/4 9-10

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SY "1 BASES 3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION The plant is designed to operate with all reactor coolant 1oops in operation, and maintain DNBR above 1.30 during all normal operations and anticipated transients. In MODES 1 and 2 with one reactor coolant loop not in operation this specification requires that the plant be in ai least HOT STAJ.DBY within I hour.

In MODE 3, a single reactor coolant 1oop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; however, single failure const rations require that two loops be OPERABLE.

In MODES 4 and 5, a single reactor coolant loop or RHR loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat,; but single failure considerations require that at least two loops be OPERABLE. Thus if the reactor coolant loops are not OPERABLE, ihis specification requires two RHR loops to be OPERABLE.

The operation of one Reactor Coolant Pump or one RHR pump provides adequa.e flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification and produce gradua1 reactivity changes during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System.

.he reactivity change rate associa ied wi th boron r duction will, therefore, be within the capability of operator recognition and control.

The restrictions on starting a Reactor Coolant Pump with.one or more RCS cold legs l.ess than or equal to 152 OF are provided to prevent RCS pressure transients,- caused by energy additions from the seconds system, which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50. The RCS will be proiected against overpressure iransients and will not exceed =he limiis o7 Appendix G by either (1) restricting the water volume in the pressurizer and thereby providing a volume for the primary coolant to expand into. or (2) by restricting starting of the PCPs to when the secondary water t~rature of each steam generator is less than 50 of above each of the RCS cold leg tempera tures.

D. C. Cook - Unit 2 B 3/4 4-1

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES 3/4.4.2 and 3/4.4.3 SAFETY VALVES The pressurizer code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig. Each safety valve is designed to relieve 420,000 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve set point.. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown. In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating RHR loop, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization.

During operation, all pressurizer code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its safety limit of 2735 psig. The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maximum surge rate resulting from a complete loss of load assuming no reactor trip until the first Reactor Protective System trip set point is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct reactor trip on the loss of load) and also assuming no operation of the power operated relief valves or steam dump valves.

D. C. COOK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-la

REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.6 MANIPULATOR CRANE OPERABILITY The OPERABILITY requirements for the manipulator cranes ensure that:

1) manipulator cranes will be used for movement of control rods and fuel .

assemblies, 2) each crane has sufficient load capacity to lift a control rod or fuel assembly, and 3) the core internals and pressure vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.

3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE BUILDING The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel and control rod assembly and associated handling tool over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool ensures that in the event this load is dropped 1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and 2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage rocks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the accident analyses.

3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION The requirement that at least one residual heat removal (RHR) loop be in operation ensures that (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel below 140oF as required during the REFUELING MODE, and {2) sufficient coolant cir-culation is maintained through the reactor core to minimize the effect of a boron dilution incident and prevent boron stratification.

The requirement to have two RHR loops OPERABLE when there is less than 23 feet of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange ensures that a single failure of the operating RHR loop will not result in a complete loss of residual heat removal capability. With the reactor vessel head removed and 23 feet of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange, a large heat sink is available for core cooling. Thus, in the event of a failure of the operating RHR loop, adequate time is provided to initiate emergency proce-dures to cool the core.

D. C. COOK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 9-2

REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.9 "ONTAINMENT PURGE AND XHAUST ISOLATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of this system ensures that the containment vent and purge penetrations will be automatically isolated upon detection of high radiation levels within the containment. The OPERABILITY of this system is required to restrict the release of radioactive material from the containment atmosphere to the environment.

3/4.9.10 and 3/4.9.11 MATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL AND STORAGE POOL The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assemble. The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis.

3/4.9.12 STORAGE POOL VENTILATION SYSTEM The limitations on the storage pool ventilation system ensure that all radioactive ma erial released from an irradiated fuel assembly will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber prior to dis-charge to the atmosphere. The OPERABILITY of this system and the result-ing iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the accident analyses.

3/4.9.13 SPENT FUEL CASK MOVEMENT The limitations of this specification ensures that, during in-sertion or removal of spent fuel casks from the spent fuel pool, fuel cask movement will be constrained to the path and lift height assumed in the Cask Drop Protection System safety analysis. Restrict-ing the spent fuel cask movement within these, requirements provides protection for the spent fuel pool and stored fuel from the effects of a fuel cask drop accident.

3/4.9.14 SPENT FUEL CASK DROP PROTECTION SYSTEM The limitations on the use of spent fuel casks weighing in excess of 110 tons (nominal) provides assurance that the spent fuel pool would not be damaged by a dropped fuel cask since this weight is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analysis for the performance of the Cask Drop Protectio.s System.

D. C. COOK. - UNIT 2 B 3/4 9-3