ML17354B130

Forwards Licensee 980807 Written Ro/Sro License Exam, Supporting Documentation & Comments IAW Requirements of NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Exam Stds.

ML17354B130
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	09/14/1998
From:	Hovey R FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Peebles T, Reyes L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML17354B129	List: ML17354B130
References
RTR-NUREG-1021 L-98-214, NUDOCS 9810080006
Download: ML17354B130 (48)

Text

L-98-214 Mr. Luis A. Reyes Regional Administrator, Region II Attn: Thomas A. Peebles U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, S. W., Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30303

Dear Mr. Reyes:

Re: Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251

/

In accordance with the requirements of NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examiner Standards," Examiner Standards ES-501, "Initial Post-Examination Activities," enclosed are the Florida Power and Light Co. (FPL) August 7, 1998 written RO/SRO license examinations, supporting documentation and comments.

Should there be any questions, please contact Ms. Maria Lacal at (305) 246-6476.

Very truly yours, R. J. Hov y Vice President Turkey Point Plant OIH Enclosure cc: T. A. Peebles, Chief, Operations Branch, Region (w/o enclosure)

II, USNRC D. C. Payne, Lead Examiner, Region II, USNRC (w/o enclosure)

Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant ( w/o enclosure)

Document, Control Desk, USNRC, Washington, D.C. (w/o enclosure) 98f Q080006 9809i8 PDR ADOCK 05000250 V PDR an FPL Group company yN(:LOSUKE 4

( o(g (,m< be oA )

QUESTION: 056 (1.00) gG'he following conditions exist on Unit 3 with the unit in Mode 2:

~ A LOCA occurred and the operators responded using the EOP network.

~ With containment radiation levels at 2.3E4 R/hr, the operators enter EOP-FR-Z.3, Response to High Containment Radiation Level.

Unit 3 containment purge valves have no indication with green placards on VPB.

Containment Instrument Air Bleed Isolation valve status is as follows:

CV-3-2819 (I.C.) is open.

CV-3-2826 (O.C.) is closed.

The Unit 4 RCO reports the following Control Room Emergency Supply Fan status:

~ SF-1B is stopped.

The HIGH FLOW TRAIN B amber light is lit.

SF-1A is running.

Which ONE of the following describes the correct operator actions to be taken in response to the above events per FR-Z.3?

a~ Verify at least two emergency containment filter fans running.

b. Dispatch an operator to locally close CV-3-2819.

C~ Direct the Unit 4 RCO to start SF-1B and stop SF-1A.

d. Verify that the fuses for containment purge valves are pulled behind VPB.

ANSWER:

a. ~J L ~ 056 ( l. 0) aj zoo.

C:Nsystemhprogramhtexthgivenkey.sro 8/5/98

REFERENCE:

3-EOP-FR-Z.3, "Response to .Containment High Radiation Level" 690233803 Modified SRO 97 Exam Question 39 KA W/E16 EA2.2 (3.0/3.3) 10CFR55.43.5/45.13 Pg. 4.5-48 Level 2 old 39 C:Nsystemhprogramhtexthgivenkey.sro 8/5/98

JUSTIFICATION FOR ANSWER KEY CHANGE:

I The answer "b" is being accepted due to the fact that it is technically correct and plausible.

DISCUSSION:

Distractor "b" was originally analyzed as being implausible since the valve is physically located inside containment and local manipulation of the valve is impossible with high radiation/LOCA inside containment.

However, the specific direction of EOP-FR-Z.3 (which is what the question refers to) tells the operator to locally close ANY failed open instrument air bleed valve that cannot be remotely closed (no mention of valve location or radiation field concerns is given in FR-Z.3). Locally closing CV-3-2819 is therefore specifically directed by EOP-FR-Z.3.

Our definition of "local" encompasses all actions taken outside the control room. Instrument air to containment can be locally isolated (which would fail closed the valve) without entering containment. Locally isolating instrument air to fail a valve closed is locally closing the valve. This action is plausible and directed by FR-Z.3, making distractor "b" correct.

QUESTXON: 039 (1.00)

b. Plausible, because this is called for by RNO 1.c of FR-Z 3,

~

but not correct because the valve is inside containment. and the outside containment. valve is closed to isolate the penetration.

c>> Plausible, because SF-1B normally starts on control room recixculation, but not correct because SF-1A is satisfactory to establish contxol room ventilation and SF-1B is locked out by the high flow signal.

d. Plausible, because this is similar to RNO 1.b of FR-Z.3, but not correct. because the green placards on the purge valves denote that the valves have been verified closed with fuses pulled.

CASYSTKMPROGRAMMASTERS>WRHREF.SRO Rev. 8-1-98

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QUESTION: 028 (1. 00) 8,<

Unit 3 is in mode 3 when the following events occur:

MOV-3-626 spuriously closes.

Seal injection is NOT available.

RCP $ 1 seal leakoff temperature is 180'F.

The cause for MOV-3-.626 spurious closure has been corrected.

Which ONE of the following describes the recpxired operator actions to be taken in this circumstance7 a~ Manually open MOV-3-626 at VPB. Leave power on MOV-3-626.

b. Manually open MOV-3-626 at VPB. Remove power to MOV 626.

co Remove power to 'MOV-3-626 and station a watch at the breaker. Slowly open MOV-3-626 to establish a 1'F/minute cooldown rate on the RCP pump lower bearing.

d. Remove power to .MOV-3-626 and station a watch at the breaker. Slowly open MOV-3-626 to establish a 5'F/minute cooldown rate on the RCP pump lower bearing.

ANSWER: 028 (1. 0) c..-,ad. a.

g(is/gg,

REFERENCE:

3-ONOP-041.1 690214005 NEW KA 000026 AA1 ~ 06 (2.9/2.9) pg. 4.2-18 Level 2 old 11 C:Nsystemhprogram~texthgivenkey.sro 8/5/98

JUSTIFICATION FOR ANSWER KEY CHANGE:

The answer "aye is being accepted due to the existence of a plausible initiator (spurious high lio) of the spurious closure of MOV-3-626 which has specific procedural (ARP and EOP) direction to manually re-open MOV-3-626 without checking for the presence of seal injection. The ARP and EOP responses were not considered during the generation of this question.

DISCUSSION:

MOV-3426 is a motor operated valve which is closed by the following signals:

~ High thermal bamer cooling water flow Manual closure due to the switch

~ Phase B containmcnt isolation The most common cause of spurious closure of MOV-3426 is due to high thermal barrier cooling water flow. This condition can be caused by starting additional component cooling water pumps or by isolating CCW flow to a component (per 3-ARP<97.CR for high flow alarm).

Per 3-ARP97.CR for annunciator A-1i3, RCP THERMALBARR COOLING WATER LO FLOW (this alarm is received ~weneev MOV-3<26 goes closed), "JF MOV-3W26 has closed due to a spurious high f!ow condition, THEN open MOV-3426." This is performed without checking for the presence of seal injection. Three steps down in the ARF, the ARF states "lp low flow eontflflon eontinnes YHRN verify proper RCF seal injection flow rates" (AFFRR reopening of MOV-3426 is attempted). The next ARP step ~te directs the operator to refer to 3-ONOPW41.1.

Ifthis spurious high flow condition were to occur during safety injection (a situation that would meet the exact conditions of the question-mode 3, no seal injection), the guidance of 3-EOP-E-0 step 9.d.RNO would direct you to re-open MOV-3426 despite the loss of RCP seal injection and without checking RCP seal leakoff temperatures.

, A spurious phase B could cause MOV-3426 to occur. The nature of the logic of the phase B circuit (needs high and high-high containment pressure signals or 2jj2 pushbuttons) makes this failure unlikely. Phase B was not specifled as the cause of the spurious failure on the exam question. A spurious phase B would, per the ARP, require use of the RCP ONOP (3-ONOP-041.1) to correct.

Any other failure of MOV-3426 causing it to close would not allow usc of the ARP guidance and require use of the ONOP (unless E was in use).

The ONOP answer ("c") remains correct since thc entty conditions for 3-ONOPM I. I are met and the conditions given in the question, when applied to ONOP441.1, will(afler reading 13 substeps) result in reaching the answer listed in

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QUESTION: 011 (1.00) a~ Plausible, because MOV-3-626 from VPB if seal injection'was maintained opening is okay, but not correct because with a loss of seal injection throttling of 626 is required.

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b. Plausible because ifseal injection was maintained opening MOV-3-626 Gom VPBisokay and the correct method deenergizes 626, but not correct because with a loss of seal injection throttling of 626 is required.

d0 Plausible because the overall method is correct, but not correct because the allowed cooldown rate is 1'F/minute.

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NRC RESOLUTION OF FACILITY POST-EXAMINATION COMMENTS SRO Question f28: Recommendation accepted. Answer "a" is also accepted as a correct response to the question. The intent of the question was to test candidate understanding of proper restoration of cooling water to the reactor coolant pump lower bearing following loss of seal injection. Under certain conditions, as specified in the annunciator and emergency operating procedures, it is permissible and desired to immediately restore seal cooling following spurious isolation.

SRO Question 856: Recommendation accepted. Answer "b" is also accepted as (RO Question f46) a correct response to the question. The intent of the question was to test -candidate understanding of functional recovery procedure actions when one of two containment isolation valves for the Instrument Air Bleed system failed to close during a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) with concurrent high radiation levels in containment. Distractor "b" was plausible because the action is procedurally directed, but considered to be incorrect because the containment was inaccessible due to the LOCA conditions and high radiation levels.

However. during validation, the examiners did not recognize there are alternative methods outside containment (e.g. failing instrument air to the valve)

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for closing the valve.

ENCLOSURE 5

"KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITIES CATALOG FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATORS: PRESSURIZED WATER REACTOR" NUREG-1122, REVISION 1, PROBLENS During the course of examination development, the NRC informed the Turkey Point lead examination developer of known errors in NUREG-1122. -Knowledge and Abilities Catalog for Nuclear Power Plant Operators: Pressurized Water Reactors," Revision 1, and warned of the probable presence of other problems.

Recognizing the possible impact of catalog errors on the validity of the written examination, the licensee's examination team commenced a detailed review of the catalog.

As documented in the following pages, the lead facility examination developer identified over 450 problems with NUREG-1122, Revision 1. On April 1, 1998, the findings of the lead examination developer's review were communicated to the NRC. This initiative and effort significantly contributed to the NRC issuing Revision 2 of NUREG-1122 in June, 1998.

ENCLOSURE 6

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