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| number = ML15120A570 | | number = ML15120A570 | ||
| issue date = 04/30/2015 | | issue date = 04/30/2015 | ||
| title = | | title = NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000443/2015001 (January 1 - March 31, 2015) | ||
| author name = Dentel G | | author name = Dentel G | ||
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB3 | | author affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB3 | ||
| addressee name = Curtland D | | addressee name = Curtland D | ||
| addressee affiliation = NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC | | addressee affiliation = NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC | ||
| docket = 05000443 | | docket = 05000443 | ||
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=Text= | =Text= | ||
{{#Wiki_filter: | {{#Wiki_filter: UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | ||
SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000443/2015001 | ==REGION I== | ||
2100 RENAISSANCE BLVD., SUITE 100 KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713 April 30, 2015 Mr. Dean Curtland Site Vice President - Seabrook Station NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC c/o Mr. Michael Ossing 626 Lafayette Rd. | |||
Seabrook, NH 03874 SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000443/2015001 | |||
==Dear Mr. Curtland:== | ==Dear Mr. Curtland:== | ||
On March 31, 2015, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on April 16, 2015, with Mr. Ralph Dodds, Plant General Manager, and other members of your staff | On March 31, 2015, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on April 16, 2015, with Mr. Ralph Dodds, Plant General Manager, and other members of your staff. | ||
Sincerely,/RA/ Glenn T. Dentel, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-443 License No: NPF-86 | The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. | ||
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. | |||
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified. | |||
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). | |||
Sincerely, | |||
/RA/ | |||
Glenn T. Dentel, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-443 License No: NPF-86 | |||
===Enclosure:=== | ===Enclosure:=== | ||
Inspection Report No. 05000443/2015001 w/ | Inspection Report No. 05000443/2015001 w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information | ||
== | REGION I== | ||
Docket No.: 50-443 License No.: NPF-86 Report No.: 05000443/2015001 Licensee: NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC Facility: Seabrook Station, Unit No.1 Location: Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 Dates: January 1, 2015 through March 31, 2015 Inspectors: P. Cataldo, Senior Resident Inspector C. Newport, Resident Inspector E. Burket, Emergency Preparedness Inspector Approved by: Glenn T. Dentel, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure | |||
=SUMMARY= | |||
IR 05000443/2015001; 01/01/2015-03/31/2015; Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1; Routine | |||
Integrated Inspection Report. | |||
This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by regional inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 5. | |||
No findings were identified. | |||
=REPORT DETAILS= | =REPORT DETAILS= | ||
Summary of Plant Status | |||
===Summary of Plant Status=== | |||
Seabrook operated at full power for the quarter, with the exception of a down-power to 94 percent on January 16, 2015, for performance of main turbine control valve testing. Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are listed in the Attachment. | |||
==REACTOR SAFETY== | ==REACTOR SAFETY== | ||
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity | Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity | ||
{{a|1R01}} | {{a|1R01}} | ||
==1R01 Adverse Weather Protection== | ==1R01 Adverse Weather Protection== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.01|count=2}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.01|count=2}} | ||
Line 49: | Line 69: | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
on January 8 to 9, 2015, and a winter storm on January 27 - 28, 2015. The inspectors reviewed the implementation of adverse weather preparation procedures before the onset of and during these adverse weather conditions. The inspectors walked down the essential switch gear and non-essential switch gear rooms, switch yard, cooling tower (CT) general area, supplemental emergency power system (SEPS), demineralized | The inspectors reviewed NextEras preparations and response to extreme cold weather on January 8 to 9, 2015, and a winter storm on January 27 - 28, 2015. The inspectors reviewed the implementation of adverse weather preparation procedures before the onset of and during these adverse weather conditions. The inspectors walked down the essential switch gear and non-essential switch gear rooms, switch yard, cooling tower (CT) general area, supplemental emergency power system (SEPS), demineralized water tank, and the refueling water storage tank area to ensure system availability. The inspectors verified that operator actions defined in NextEras adverse weather procedure maintained the readiness of essential systems. The inspectors discussed readiness and staff availability for adverse weather response with operations and work control personnel. | ||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings were identified. | No findings were identified. {{a|1R04}} | ||
{{a|1R04}} | |||
==1R04 Equipment Alignment== | ==1R04 Equipment Alignment== | ||
Line 60: | Line 79: | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems: | The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems: | ||
'B' emergency feedwater (EFW) pump return to service on February 22, 2015 A control building air handling system during B train filter maintenance on March 23, 2015 | |||
'A' emergency diesel generator (EDG) while 'B' EDG out of service for maintenance on March 31, 2015 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), technical specifications (TSs), work orders (WOs), condition reports (CRs), and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether NextEra staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the corrective action program (CAP)for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization. | |||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
Line 72: | Line 93: | ||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings were identified. | No findings were identified. {{a|1R05}} | ||
{{a|1R05}} | ==1R05 Fire Protection== | ||
==1R05 Fire Protection | |||
Resident Inspector Quarterly Walkdowns (71111.05Q - 5 samples) | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to assess the material condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified | The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to assess the material condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that NextEra controlled combustible materials and ignition sources in accordance with administrative procedures. The inspectors verified that fire protection and suppression equipment was available for use as specified in the area pre-fire plan, and passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition. The inspectors also verified that station personnel implemented compensatory measures for out of service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment, as applicable, in accordance with procedures. | ||
'A' electrical tunnel east end (ET-F-1A-A) on February 4, 2015 | 'A' electrical tunnel east end (ET-F-1A-A) on February 4, 2015 | ||
'A' electrical tunnel west end (ET-F-1B-A) on February 9, 2015 Primary auxiliary building 25 (PAB-F-2A-Z, PAB-F-2B-Z, PAB-F-2C-Z)on March 25, 2015 Non-essential switchgear (NES-F-1A-Z) on March 25, 2015 Control building battery room A/B/C/D (CB-F-1D-A, CB-F-1E-A, CB-F-1F-A, CB-F-1G-A) on March 30, 2015 | |||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings were identified. | No findings were identified. | ||
{{a|1R06}} | |||
{{a|1R06}} | |||
==1R06 Flood Protection Measures== | ==1R06 Flood Protection Measures== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.06|count=1}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.06|count=1}} | ||
Line 90: | Line 113: | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR, the site flooding analysis, and plant procedures | The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR, the site flooding analysis, and plant procedures to assess susceptibilities involving internal flooding. The inspectors also reviewed the CAP to determine if NextEra identified and corrected flooding problems and whether operator actions for coping with flooding were adequate. The inspectors focused on the mechanical penetration room to verify the adequacy of equipment seals located below the flood line, flood and water penetration seals, common drain lines and sumps, sump pumps, level alarms, control circuits, and temporary or removable flood barriers. | ||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings were identified. | No findings were identified. | ||
{{a|1R07}} | |||
{{a|1R07}} | |||
==1R07 Heat Sink Performance== | ==1R07 Heat Sink Performance== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.07A|count=1}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.07A|count=1}} | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
availability to perform its safety functions. The inspectors reviewed the design basis | The inspectors reviewed the A EDG heat exchanger to determine its readiness and availability to perform its safety functions. The inspectors reviewed the design basis for the component and verified NextEras commitments to NRC Generic Letter 89-13. | ||
The inspectors reviewed results discussed results of the most recent inspection with NextEra staff. The inspectors also verified that NextEra initiated appropriate corrective actions for identified deficiencies. | The inspectors reviewed results of previous inspections of the A EDG heat exchanger, reviewed performance data obtained during recent operation of the A EDG heat exchanger, observed the most recent inspection of the A EDG heat exchanger, and discussed results of the most recent inspection with NextEra staff. The inspectors also verified that NextEra initiated appropriate corrective actions for identified deficiencies. | ||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings were identified. | No findings were identified. | ||
{{a|1R11}} | {{a|1R11}} | ||
==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program== | ==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.11Q|count=2}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.11Q|count=2}} | ||
Line 113: | Line 137: | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The inspectors observed licensed operator simulator training on February 9, 2015, which included a steam generator tube rupture coincident with a loss of offsite power and the failure of select components to respond as required. The inspectors evaluated operator performance during the simulated event and verified completion of risk significant operator actions, including the use of abnormal and emergency operating procedures. The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications, implement-tation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plant conditions, and the oversight and direction provided by the control room supervisor. The inspectors verified the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification made by the shift manager and the TS action statements entered by the unit supervisor. Additionally, the inspectors assessed the ability of the crew and training staff to identify and document crew performance problems. | The inspectors observed licensed operator simulator training on February 9, 2015, which included a steam generator tube rupture coincident with a loss of offsite power and the failure of select components to respond as required. The inspectors evaluated operator performance during the simulated event and verified completion of risk significant operator actions, including the use of abnormal and emergency operating procedures. | ||
The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications, implement-tation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plant conditions, and the oversight and direction provided by the control room supervisor. The inspectors verified the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification made by the shift manager and the TS action statements entered by the unit supervisor. Additionally, the inspectors assessed the ability of the crew and training staff to identify and document crew performance problems. | |||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings were identified. | No findings were identified. | ||
===.2 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance in the Main Control Room | ===.2 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance in the Main Control Room=== | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The inspectors observed general control room activities on January 12, 2015, reactor control systems being placed in manual by operators, and containment air handling fan swaps on February 18, 2015, and control room shift turnover on March 4, 2015. | The inspectors observed general control room activities on January 12, 2015, reactor control systems being placed in manual by operators, and containment air handling fan swaps on February 18, 2015, and control room shift turnover on March 4, 2015. | ||
Additionally, inspectors observed A' EDG operations, reactor coolant pump standpipe fill operations, control board chart recorder paper change-out, and main unit generator MVAR adjustment of line 369 on March 27, 2015, and general activities during the B EDG outage on March 31, 2015. During these control room observations, the inspectors verified that procedure use and adherence, general control room conduct, alarm response, test performance, and coordination of activities between work groups met established expectations and standards. | |||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings were identified. | No findings were identified. | ||
{{a|1R12}} | |||
{{a|1R12}} | |||
==1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness== | ==1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.12Q|count=2}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.12Q|count=2}} | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The inspectors reviewed the samples listed below to assess the effectiveness of maintenance activities on structure, system, and component (SSC) performance and reliability. The inspectors reviewed system health reports, CAP documents, maintenance WOs, and maintenance rule (MR) basis documents to ensure that NextEra was identifying and properly evaluating performance problems within the scope of the MR. For each sample selected, the inspectors verified that the SSC was properly scoped into the MR in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 and verified that the (a)(2) performance criteria established by NextEra staff was reasonable. As applicable, for SSCs classified as (a)(1), the inspectors assessed the adequacy of goals and corrective actions to return these SSCs to (a)(2). Additionally, the inspectors ensured that NextEra staff was identifying and addressing common cause failures that occurred within and across MR system boundaries. | The inspectors reviewed the samples listed below to assess the effectiveness of maintenance activities on structure, system, and component (SSC) performance and reliability. The inspectors reviewed system health reports, CAP documents, maintenance WOs, and maintenance rule (MR) basis documents to ensure that NextEra was identifying and properly evaluating performance problems within the scope of the MR. For each sample selected, the inspectors verified that the SSC was properly scoped into the MR in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 and verified that the (a)(2)performance criteria established by NextEra staff was reasonable. As applicable, for SSCs classified as (a)(1), the inspectors assessed the adequacy of goals and corrective actions to return these SSCs to (a)(2). Additionally, the inspectors ensured that NextEra staff was identifying and addressing common cause failures that occurred within and across MR system boundaries. | ||
Emergency air handling fan 5B bearing inspections on February 18, 2015 | Emergency air handling fan 5B bearing inspections on February 18, 2015 Primary close latch replacement activities associated with ABB breakers on March 9, 2015 | ||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings were identified. | No findings were identified. | ||
{{a|1R13}} | |||
{{a|1R13}} | |||
==1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control== | ==1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.13|count=5}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.13|count=5}} | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The inspectors reviewed station evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities listed below to verify that NextEra performed the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment for work. The inspectors selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that NextEra personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and that the assessments were accurate and complete. When NextEra performed emergent work, the inspectors verified that operations personnel promptly assessed and managed plant risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work and discussed the results of the assessment with the | The inspectors reviewed station evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities listed below to verify that NextEra performed the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment for work. The inspectors selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that NextEra personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and that the assessments were accurate and complete. When NextEra performed emergent work, the inspectors verified that operations personnel promptly assessed and managed plant risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work and discussed the results of the assessment with the stations probabilistic risk analyst to verify plant conditions were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the TS requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met. | ||
Startup feed pump maintenance on January 20, 2015 | Startup feed pump maintenance on January 20, 2015 | ||
'D' service water (SW) pump maintenance on February 3, 2015 Transfer to SW cooling tower (CT) operations on February 26, 2015 | |||
'A' EDG maintenance on March 9, 2015 | |||
'B' EDG maintenance on March 31, 2015 | |||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings were identified. | No findings were identified. | ||
{{a|1R15}} | |||
{{a|1R15}} | |||
==1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments== | ==1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.15|count=5}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.15|count=5}} | ||
Line 154: | Line 187: | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The inspectors reviewed operability determinations for the following degraded or non-conforming conditions: | The inspectors reviewed operability determinations for the following degraded or non-conforming conditions: | ||
Seismic supports for a SW pump and the control rod drive mechanisms, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Section XI compliance, on February 19, 2015 | B SW discharge tubing support corrosion on January 15, 2015 Seismic supports for a SW pump and the control rod drive mechanisms, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Section XI compliance, on February 19, 2015 Wetted insulation removal on RHR system piping on February 24, 2015 SEPS glycol level fluctuation on February 26, 2015 B vital battery cell cover cracks on March 30, 2015 The inspectors selected these issues based on the risk significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to assess whether TS operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TSs and UFSAR to NextEras evaluations to determine whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled by NextEra. The inspectors determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations. | ||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings were identified. | No findings were identified. | ||
{{a|1R18}} | |||
{{a|1R18}} | |||
==1R18 Plant Modifications== | ==1R18 Plant Modifications== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.18|count=1}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.18|count=1}} | ||
Line 164: | Line 198: | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The inspectors evaluated a modification to install a primary chemistry zinc injection skid | The inspectors evaluated a modification to install a primary chemistry zinc injection skid implemented by Engineering Change 280335, Primary System Zinc Addition. The inspectors verified that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the affected systems were not degraded by the modification. In addition, the inspectors conducted walkdowns and reviewed modification documents associated with the upgrade and design change, including associated engineering changes, calculations, communication with the vendor, and industry operating experience. | ||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings were identified. | No findings were identified. | ||
{{a|1R19}} | |||
{{a|1R19}} | |||
==1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing== | ==1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.19|count=7}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.19|count=7}} | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests for the maintenance activities listed below to verify that procedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional capability. The inspectors reviewed the test procedure to verify that the procedure adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by the maintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in the procedure was consistent with the information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and | The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests for the maintenance activities listed below to verify that procedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional capability. The inspectors reviewed the test procedure to verify that the procedure adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by the maintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in the procedure was consistent with the information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and that the procedure had been properly reviewed and approved. The inspectors also witnessed the test or reviewed test data to verify that the test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions. | ||
Containment enclosure ventilation fan, EAH-FN-5B, vibration isolator replacement on January 6, 2015 | Containment enclosure ventilation fan, EAH-FN-5B, vibration isolator replacement on January 6, 2015 RH-FCV-610 thermal overload protection relay replacement on January 13, 2015 B steam generator atmospheric steam dump supply air solenoid valve replacement on January 30, 2015 Emergency air handling fan, EAH-FN-5A, maintenance on February 19, 2015 Replacement of B RHR flow switch F-611 on February 24, 2015 Pressurizer backup heater supply breaker trip latch replacement on March 3, 2015 A EDG temperature control valve rebuild on March 18, 2015 | ||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings were identified. | No findings were identified. | ||
{{a|1R22}} | |||
{{a|1R22}} | |||
==1R22 Surveillance Testing== | ==1R22 Surveillance Testing== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.22|count=7}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71111.22|count=7}} | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The inspectors observed performance of surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of selected risk-significant SSCs to assess whether test results satisfied TSs, the UFSAR, and NextEra procedure requirements. The inspectors verified that test acceptance criteria were clear, tests demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design documentation, test instrumentation had current calibrations and the range and accuracy for the application, tests were performed as written, and applicable test prerequisites were satisfied. Upon test completion, the inspectors considered whether the test results supported that equipment was capable of performing the required safety functions. The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance tests: | The inspectors observed performance of surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of selected risk-significant SSCs to assess whether test results satisfied TSs, the UFSAR, and NextEra procedure requirements. The inspectors verified that test acceptance criteria were clear, tests demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design documentation, test instrumentation had current calibrations and the range and accuracy for the application, tests were performed as written, and applicable test prerequisites were satisfied. Upon test completion, the inspectors considered whether the test results supported that equipment was capable of performing the required safety functions. The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance tests: | ||
'A' SW CT agastat relay time delay testing on January 15, 2015 | |||
'A' solid state protection system Mode 1 actuation logic test on January 22, 2015 | |||
'A' SW valve quarterly in-service test on February 10, 2015 (IST) | |||
Auctioneered reactor coolant system average temperature calibration on February 18, 2015 SEPS monthly availability surveillance on March 23, 2015 B train emergency cleanup filter surveillance testing on March 24, 2015 RCS steady state leak rate calculation on March 27, 2015 (RCS) | |||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings were identified. | No findings were identified. | ||
===Cornerstone:=== | ===Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness=== | ||
{{a|1EP4}} | {{a|1EP4}} | ||
==1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes== | ==1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes== | ||
Line 201: | Line 241: | ||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings were identified. | No findings were identified. | ||
{{a|1EP6}} | |||
{{a|1EP6}} | |||
==1EP6 Drill Evaluation== | ==1EP6 Drill Evaluation== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71114.06|count=1}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71114.06|count=1}} | ||
Line 208: | Line 249: | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
The inspectors observed a simulator training evolution for licensed operators on February 9, 2015 which required emergency plan implementation by an operations crew. NextEra planned for this evolution to be evaluated and included in performance indicator data regarding drill and exercise performance. The inspectors observed event classification and notification activities performed by the crew. The inspectors also attended the post- performance and ensure that NextEra evaluators noted the same issues and entered them into the CAP. | The inspectors observed a simulator training evolution for licensed operators on February 9, 2015 which required emergency plan implementation by an operations crew. | ||
NextEra planned for this evolution to be evaluated and included in performance indicator data regarding drill and exercise performance. The inspectors observed event classification and notification activities performed by the crew. The inspectors also attended the post-evolution critique for the scenario. The focus of the inspectors activities was to note any weaknesses and deficiencies in the crews performance and ensure that NextEra evaluators noted the same issues and entered them into the CAP. | |||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
Line 217: | Line 260: | ||
==4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification== | ==4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71151}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71151}} | ||
Unplanned Scrams, Unplanned Power Changes, and Unplanned Scrams with Complications (3 samples) | Unplanned Scrams, Unplanned Power Changes, and Unplanned Scrams with | ||
===Complications (3 samples)=== | |||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
Cornerstone performance indicators for the period of January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2014: | The inspectors reviewed NextEras submittals for the following Initiating Events Cornerstone performance indicators for the period of January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2014: | ||
Unplanned scrams per 7,000 critical hours (IE01) | |||
Unplanned power changes per 7,000 critical hours (IE03) | |||
Unplanned scrams with complications (IE04) | |||
To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7. The inspectors also reviewed NextEras operator narrative logs, event reports, performance indicator submittals, and NRC integrated inspection reports to validate the accuracy of the submittals. | |||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings were identified. | No findings were identified. {{a|4OA2}} | ||
{{a|4OA2}} | |||
==4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution== | ==4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution== | ||
{{IP sample|IP=IP 71152}} | {{IP sample|IP=IP 71152}} | ||
Line 230: | Line 278: | ||
====a. Inspection Scope==== | ====a. Inspection Scope==== | ||
the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that NextEra entered issues into the CAP at an appropriate threshold, gave adequate attention to timely corrective actions, and identified and addressed adverse trends. In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the CAP and periodically attended condition report screening meetings. | As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that NextEra entered issues into the CAP at an appropriate threshold, gave adequate attention to timely corrective actions, and identified and addressed adverse trends. In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the CAP and periodically attended condition report screening meetings. | ||
====b. Findings==== | ====b. Findings==== | ||
No findings were identified. | No findings were identified. | ||
{{a|4OA5}} | |||
==4OA5 Other Activities== | |||
Administrative Corrections to NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000443/2014005 Two samples associated with section 1R12, Maintenance Effectiveness, inspections of | |||
: (1) MR program assessment on November 20, 2014, and | |||
: (2) cumulative review of breaker maintenance and retests on December 8, 2014, were inadvertently omitted from the final inspection report issued February 6, 2015. | |||
One sample associated with section 1R19, Post-Maintenance Testing, inspection of safety injection pump 6A static baker testing on September 9, 2014, was included in error in the final inspection report issued February 6, 2015. | |||
{{a|4OA6}} | {{a|4OA6}} | ||
==4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit== | ==4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit== | ||
On April 16, 2015, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Ralph Dodds, Plant General Manager, and other members of the Seabrook Station staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report. | On April 16, 2015, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Ralph Dodds, Plant General Manager, and other members of the Seabrook Station staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report. | ||
Line 249: | Line 303: | ||
===Licensee Personnel=== | ===Licensee Personnel=== | ||
: [[contact::D. Curtland]], Site Vice President | : [[contact::D. Curtland]], Site Vice President | ||
: [[contact::R. Dodds]], Plant General Manager | : [[contact::R. Dodds]], Plant General Manager | ||
: [[contact::V. Brown]], Senior Licensing Engineer | : [[contact::V. Brown]], Senior Licensing Engineer | ||
: [[contact::D. Currier]], Emergency Planning Manager | : [[contact::D. Currier]], Emergency Planning Manager | ||
: [[contact::K. Douglas]], Maintenance Director | : [[contact::K. Douglas]], Maintenance Director | ||
: [[contact::D. Flahardy]], Radiation Protection Manager | : [[contact::D. Flahardy]], Radiation Protection Manager | ||
: [[contact::M. Haidul]], Nuclear Engineer | : [[contact::M. Haidul]], Nuclear Engineer | ||
: [[contact::M. Ossing]], Licensing Manager | : [[contact::M. Ossing]], Licensing Manager | ||
: [[contact::D. Ritter]], Site Operations Director | : [[contact::D. Ritter]], Site Operations Director | ||
: [[contact::D. Robinson]], Chemistry Manager | : [[contact::D. Robinson]], Chemistry Manager | ||
==LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED== | ==LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED== | ||
===Opened/Closed=== | ===Opened/Closed=== | ||
None | |||
== | ===Opened=== | ||
None | |||
== | ===Closed=== | ||
None | |||
== | ==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED== | ||
}} | }} |
Latest revision as of 05:31, 20 December 2019
ML15120A570 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Seabrook ![]() |
Issue date: | 04/30/2015 |
From: | Glenn Dentel Reactor Projects Branch 3 |
To: | Dean Curtland NextEra Energy Seabrook |
dentel, gt | |
References | |
IR 2015001 | |
Download: ML15120A570 (23) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
2100 RENAISSANCE BLVD., SUITE 100 KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713 April 30, 2015 Mr. Dean Curtland Site Vice President - Seabrook Station NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC c/o Mr. Michael Ossing 626 Lafayette Rd.
Seabrook, NH 03874 SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000443/2015001
Dear Mr. Curtland:
On March 31, 2015, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on April 16, 2015, with Mr. Ralph Dodds, Plant General Manager, and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Glenn T. Dentel, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-443 License No: NPF-86
Enclosure:
Inspection Report No. 05000443/2015001 w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION I==
Docket No.: 50-443 License No.: NPF-86 Report No.: 05000443/2015001 Licensee: NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC Facility: Seabrook Station, Unit No.1 Location: Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 Dates: January 1, 2015 through March 31, 2015 Inspectors: P. Cataldo, Senior Resident Inspector C. Newport, Resident Inspector E. Burket, Emergency Preparedness Inspector Approved by: Glenn T. Dentel, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY
IR 05000443/2015001; 01/01/2015-03/31/2015; Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1; Routine
Integrated Inspection Report.
This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by regional inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 5.
No findings were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Seabrook operated at full power for the quarter, with the exception of a down-power to 94 percent on January 16, 2015, for performance of main turbine control valve testing. Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are listed in the Attachment.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed NextEras preparations and response to extreme cold weather on January 8 to 9, 2015, and a winter storm on January 27 - 28, 2015. The inspectors reviewed the implementation of adverse weather preparation procedures before the onset of and during these adverse weather conditions. The inspectors walked down the essential switch gear and non-essential switch gear rooms, switch yard, cooling tower (CT) general area, supplemental emergency power system (SEPS), demineralized water tank, and the refueling water storage tank area to ensure system availability. The inspectors verified that operator actions defined in NextEras adverse weather procedure maintained the readiness of essential systems. The inspectors discussed readiness and staff availability for adverse weather response with operations and work control personnel.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Partial System Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems:
'B' emergency feedwater (EFW) pump return to service on February 22, 2015 A control building air handling system during B train filter maintenance on March 23, 2015
'A' emergency diesel generator (EDG) while 'B' EDG out of service for maintenance on March 31, 2015 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), technical specifications (TSs), work orders (WOs), condition reports (CRs), and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether NextEra staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the corrective action program (CAP)for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Full System Walkdown
a. Inspection Scope
On March 3, 2015, the inspectors performed a complete system walkdown of accessible portions of the residual heat removal (RHR) system to verify the existing equipment lineup was correct. The inspectors reviewed operating procedures, surveillance tests, drawings, equipment line-up check off lists, and the UFSAR to verify the system was aligned to perform its required safety functions. The inspectors also reviewed electrical power availability, component lubrication and equipment cooling, hanger and support functionality, and operability of support systems. The inspectors performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related CRs and WOs to ensure NextEra appropriately evaluated and resolved any deficiencies.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
Resident Inspector Quarterly Walkdowns (71111.05Q - 5 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to assess the material condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that NextEra controlled combustible materials and ignition sources in accordance with administrative procedures. The inspectors verified that fire protection and suppression equipment was available for use as specified in the area pre-fire plan, and passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition. The inspectors also verified that station personnel implemented compensatory measures for out of service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment, as applicable, in accordance with procedures.
'A' electrical tunnel east end (ET-F-1A-A) on February 4, 2015
'A' electrical tunnel west end (ET-F-1B-A) on February 9, 2015 Primary auxiliary building 25 (PAB-F-2A-Z, PAB-F-2B-Z, PAB-F-2C-Z)on March 25, 2015 Non-essential switchgear (NES-F-1A-Z) on March 25, 2015 Control building battery room A/B/C/D (CB-F-1D-A, CB-F-1E-A, CB-F-1F-A, CB-F-1G-A) on March 30, 2015
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
Internal Flooding Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR, the site flooding analysis, and plant procedures to assess susceptibilities involving internal flooding. The inspectors also reviewed the CAP to determine if NextEra identified and corrected flooding problems and whether operator actions for coping with flooding were adequate. The inspectors focused on the mechanical penetration room to verify the adequacy of equipment seals located below the flood line, flood and water penetration seals, common drain lines and sumps, sump pumps, level alarms, control circuits, and temporary or removable flood barriers.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the A EDG heat exchanger to determine its readiness and availability to perform its safety functions. The inspectors reviewed the design basis for the component and verified NextEras commitments to NRC Generic Letter 89-13.
The inspectors reviewed results of previous inspections of the A EDG heat exchanger, reviewed performance data obtained during recent operation of the A EDG heat exchanger, observed the most recent inspection of the A EDG heat exchanger, and discussed results of the most recent inspection with NextEra staff. The inspectors also verified that NextEra initiated appropriate corrective actions for identified deficiencies.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
.1 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification Testing and Training
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed licensed operator simulator training on February 9, 2015, which included a steam generator tube rupture coincident with a loss of offsite power and the failure of select components to respond as required. The inspectors evaluated operator performance during the simulated event and verified completion of risk significant operator actions, including the use of abnormal and emergency operating procedures.
The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications, implement-tation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plant conditions, and the oversight and direction provided by the control room supervisor. The inspectors verified the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification made by the shift manager and the TS action statements entered by the unit supervisor. Additionally, the inspectors assessed the ability of the crew and training staff to identify and document crew performance problems.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance in the Main Control Room
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed general control room activities on January 12, 2015, reactor control systems being placed in manual by operators, and containment air handling fan swaps on February 18, 2015, and control room shift turnover on March 4, 2015.
Additionally, inspectors observed A' EDG operations, reactor coolant pump standpipe fill operations, control board chart recorder paper change-out, and main unit generator MVAR adjustment of line 369 on March 27, 2015, and general activities during the B EDG outage on March 31, 2015. During these control room observations, the inspectors verified that procedure use and adherence, general control room conduct, alarm response, test performance, and coordination of activities between work groups met established expectations and standards.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the samples listed below to assess the effectiveness of maintenance activities on structure, system, and component (SSC) performance and reliability. The inspectors reviewed system health reports, CAP documents, maintenance WOs, and maintenance rule (MR) basis documents to ensure that NextEra was identifying and properly evaluating performance problems within the scope of the MR. For each sample selected, the inspectors verified that the SSC was properly scoped into the MR in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 and verified that the (a)(2)performance criteria established by NextEra staff was reasonable. As applicable, for SSCs classified as (a)(1), the inspectors assessed the adequacy of goals and corrective actions to return these SSCs to (a)(2). Additionally, the inspectors ensured that NextEra staff was identifying and addressing common cause failures that occurred within and across MR system boundaries.
Emergency air handling fan 5B bearing inspections on February 18, 2015 Primary close latch replacement activities associated with ABB breakers on March 9, 2015
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed station evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities listed below to verify that NextEra performed the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment for work. The inspectors selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that NextEra personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and that the assessments were accurate and complete. When NextEra performed emergent work, the inspectors verified that operations personnel promptly assessed and managed plant risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work and discussed the results of the assessment with the stations probabilistic risk analyst to verify plant conditions were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the TS requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.
Startup feed pump maintenance on January 20, 2015
'D' service water (SW) pump maintenance on February 3, 2015 Transfer to SW cooling tower (CT) operations on February 26, 2015
'A' EDG maintenance on March 9, 2015
'B' EDG maintenance on March 31, 2015
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed operability determinations for the following degraded or non-conforming conditions:
B SW discharge tubing support corrosion on January 15, 2015 Seismic supports for a SW pump and the control rod drive mechanisms, American Society of Mechanical Engineers,Section XI compliance, on February 19, 2015 Wetted insulation removal on RHR system piping on February 24, 2015 SEPS glycol level fluctuation on February 26, 2015 B vital battery cell cover cracks on March 30, 2015 The inspectors selected these issues based on the risk significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to assess whether TS operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TSs and UFSAR to NextEras evaluations to determine whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled by NextEra. The inspectors determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
Permanent Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated a modification to install a primary chemistry zinc injection skid implemented by Engineering Change 280335, Primary System Zinc Addition. The inspectors verified that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the affected systems were not degraded by the modification. In addition, the inspectors conducted walkdowns and reviewed modification documents associated with the upgrade and design change, including associated engineering changes, calculations, communication with the vendor, and industry operating experience.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests for the maintenance activities listed below to verify that procedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional capability. The inspectors reviewed the test procedure to verify that the procedure adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by the maintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in the procedure was consistent with the information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and that the procedure had been properly reviewed and approved. The inspectors also witnessed the test or reviewed test data to verify that the test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions.
Containment enclosure ventilation fan, EAH-FN-5B, vibration isolator replacement on January 6, 2015 RH-FCV-610 thermal overload protection relay replacement on January 13, 2015 B steam generator atmospheric steam dump supply air solenoid valve replacement on January 30, 2015 Emergency air handling fan, EAH-FN-5A, maintenance on February 19, 2015 Replacement of B RHR flow switch F-611 on February 24, 2015 Pressurizer backup heater supply breaker trip latch replacement on March 3, 2015 A EDG temperature control valve rebuild on March 18, 2015
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed performance of surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of selected risk-significant SSCs to assess whether test results satisfied TSs, the UFSAR, and NextEra procedure requirements. The inspectors verified that test acceptance criteria were clear, tests demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design documentation, test instrumentation had current calibrations and the range and accuracy for the application, tests were performed as written, and applicable test prerequisites were satisfied. Upon test completion, the inspectors considered whether the test results supported that equipment was capable of performing the required safety functions. The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance tests:
'A' SW CT agastat relay time delay testing on January 15, 2015
'A' solid state protection system Mode 1 actuation logic test on January 22, 2015
'A' SW valve quarterly in-service test on February 10, 2015 (IST)
Auctioneered reactor coolant system average temperature calibration on February 18, 2015 SEPS monthly availability surveillance on March 23, 2015 B train emergency cleanup filter surveillance testing on March 24, 2015 RCS steady state leak rate calculation on March 27, 2015 (RCS)
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
a. Inspection Scope
NextEra implemented various changes to the Seabrook Emergency Action Levels (EALs), Emergency Plan, and Implementing Procedures. NextEra had determined that, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q)(3), any change made to the EALs, Emergency Plan, and its lower-tier implementing procedures, had not resulted in any reduction in effectiveness of the Plan, and that the revised Plan continued to meet the standards in 50.47(b) and the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.
The inspectors performed an in-office review of all EAL and Emergency Plan changes submitted by NextEra as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(5), including the changes to lower-tier emergency plan implementing procedures, to evaluate for any potential reductions in effectiveness of the Emergency Plan. This review by the inspectors was not documented in an NRC Safety Evaluation Report and does not constitute formal NRC approval of the changes. Therefore, these changes remain subject to future NRC inspection in their entirety. The requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(q) were used as reference criteria.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
Emergency Preparedness Training Observations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed a simulator training evolution for licensed operators on February 9, 2015 which required emergency plan implementation by an operations crew.
NextEra planned for this evolution to be evaluated and included in performance indicator data regarding drill and exercise performance. The inspectors observed event classification and notification activities performed by the crew. The inspectors also attended the post-evolution critique for the scenario. The focus of the inspectors activities was to note any weaknesses and deficiencies in the crews performance and ensure that NextEra evaluators noted the same issues and entered them into the CAP.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
Unplanned Scrams, Unplanned Power Changes, and Unplanned Scrams with
Complications (3 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed NextEras submittals for the following Initiating Events Cornerstone performance indicators for the period of January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2014:
Unplanned scrams per 7,000 critical hours (IE01)
Unplanned power changes per 7,000 critical hours (IE03)
Unplanned scrams with complications (IE04)
To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, the inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7. The inspectors also reviewed NextEras operator narrative logs, event reports, performance indicator submittals, and NRC integrated inspection reports to validate the accuracy of the submittals.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
Routine Review of Problem Identification and Resolution Activities
a. Inspection Scope
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that NextEra entered issues into the CAP at an appropriate threshold, gave adequate attention to timely corrective actions, and identified and addressed adverse trends. In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the CAP and periodically attended condition report screening meetings.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA5 Other Activities
Administrative Corrections to NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000443/2014005 Two samples associated with section 1R12, Maintenance Effectiveness, inspections of
- (1) MR program assessment on November 20, 2014, and
- (2) cumulative review of breaker maintenance and retests on December 8, 2014, were inadvertently omitted from the final inspection report issued February 6, 2015.
One sample associated with section 1R19, Post-Maintenance Testing, inspection of safety injection pump 6A static baker testing on September 9, 2014, was included in error in the final inspection report issued February 6, 2015.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On April 16, 2015, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Ralph Dodds, Plant General Manager, and other members of the Seabrook Station staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- D. Curtland, Site Vice President
- R. Dodds, Plant General Manager
- V. Brown, Senior Licensing Engineer
- D. Currier, Emergency Planning Manager
- K. Douglas, Maintenance Director
- D. Flahardy, Radiation Protection Manager
- M. Haidul, Nuclear Engineer
- M. Ossing, Licensing Manager
- D. Ritter, Site Operations Director
- D. Robinson, Chemistry Manager
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED
Opened/Closed
None
Opened
None
Closed
None