ML103090717

OL - FW: Updated OI List

ML103090717
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	10/15/2010
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
References
Download: ML103090717 (104)

Text

WBN2Public Resource From: Poole, Justin Sent: Friday, October 15, 2010 12:00 PM To: Crouch, William D Cc: Garg, Hukam; WBN2HearingFile Resource

Subject:

FW: Updated OI List Attachments: 20101015 Open Items List Master Sent to TVA.docx See below Justin C. Poole Project Manager NRR/DORL/LPWB U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (301)4152048 email: Justin.Poole@nrc.gov From: Darbali, Samir Sent: Friday, October 15, 2010 11:55 AM To: Poole, Justin Cc: Garg, Hukam

Subject:

Updated OI List

Justin, Attached is the updated OI list to be sent out to TVA.

Thanks, Samir Darbali Electronics Engineer NRR/DE/EICB Room: O9D11 3014151360 1

Hearing Identifier: Watts_Bar_2_Operating_LA_Public Email Number: 141 Mail Envelope Properties (19D990B45D535548840D1118C451C74D6FD36BC37F)

Subject:

FW: Updated OI List Sent Date: 10/15/2010 12:00:02 PM Received Date: 10/15/2010 12:00:06 PM From: Poole, Justin Created By: Justin.Poole@nrc.gov Recipients:

"Garg, Hukam" <Hukam.Garg@nrc.gov>

Tracking Status: None "WBN2HearingFile Resource" <WBN2HearingFile.Resource@nrc.gov>

Tracking Status: None "Crouch, William D" <wdcrouch@tva.gov>

Tracking Status: None Post Office: HQCLSTR02.nrc.gov Files Size Date & Time MESSAGE 483 10/15/2010 12:00:06 PM 20101015 Open Items List Master Sent to TVA.docx 326246 Options Priority: Standard Return Notification: No Reply Requested: No Sensitivity: Normal Expiration Date:

Recipients Received:

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date 001 The Watts Bar Nuclear Plant FSAR red-line for Unit 2 12/15/2009 Presentation Slides Closed Closed ML093230343, 3/12/2010 NNC 11/19/09: The FSAR EICB (Carte)

(Agency wide Documents Access and Management Item No. 1 contains mostly description of System Accession Number ML080770366) lists This item was partially addressed during the Date: 3/15/2010 the function that the various TVA changes to the Unit 1 FSAR and depicts how Chapter December 15, 2009 meeting. systems must perform.

7 of the Unit 2 FSAR will appear at fuel load. Have RAI response received. Therefore this question was additional changes been made to Chapter 7 of the Unit TVA Letter Dated March 12, 2010 (Enclosure 1, asked to determine how the 2 FSAR beyond those indicated in ML080770366? Item No. 1 on Page 1 of 15): TVA responded to systems have been changed.

Which of the changes identified correspond to digital this request for additional Information.

instrumentation and controls (I&C) components and NNC 4/15/10: The response systems that have not been previously reviewed and addresses many systems and approved by the NRC? should be read by all EICB reviewers.

002 Are there I&C components and systems that have 12/15/2009 Presentation Slides Closed Closed ML093230343, 3/12/2010 NNC 11/19/09: The FSAR EICB (Carte) changed to a new or different digital technology Item No. 2 contains mostly description of without the change being reflected in the FSAR This item was partially addressed during the Date: 3/15/2010 the function that the various TVA markup? Are there any not-redlined I&C components December 15, 2009 meeting. systems must perform.

and systems that have been changed or replaced by TVA Letter Dated March 12, 2010 (Enclosure 1, RAI response received. Therefore this question was digital base technology since Unit 1 was approved? Item No. 2 on Page 2 of 15): TVA responded to asked to determine how the this request for additional Information. systems have been changed.

NNC 4/15/10: The response addresses many systems and should be read by all EICB reviewers.

003 Because a digital I&C platform can be configured and 12/15/2009 Presentation Slides Closed Closed ML093230343, 3/12/2010 NNC 11/19/09: The FSAR EICB (Carte) programmed for different applications, the review Item No. 3 contains mostly description of process can be divided between a review of the This item was partially addressed during the Date: 3/15/2010 the function that the various TVA platform and a review of the application. For planning December 15, 2009 meeting. systems must perform.

and scheduling reasons, it is important to know TVA Letter Dated March 12, 2010 (Enclosure 1, RAI response received. Therefore this question was beforehand which platform has been used in each Item No. 3 on Page 2 of 15): TVA responded to asked to determine how the digital component and system. What is the base this request for additional Information. systems have been changed.

platform of each unreviewed digital I&C component and system (e.g., Common Q)? NNC 4/15/10: The response addresses many systems and should be read by all EICB reviewers.

004 Please identify the information that will be submitted Responder: Webb 1/13/10 Public Meeting Open Open-NRC ML093230343, January 13, NNC 11/19/09: LIC-110 Rev. 1 EICB (Carte) for each unreviewed digital I&C system and Review Item No. 4 2010 Section 6.2.2 states: "Design component and the associated docketing schedule. TVA identified a schedule for docketing some Date: 3/15/2010 features and administrative Post Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Responsibility: NRC (All) and TVA to docket a March 12, programs that are unique to Unit documentation, and the new setpoint TVA (Hilmes) D3 analysis for the 2010 2 should then be reviewed in methodology. No other documentation was Common Q accordance with current staff discussed. TVA to address the question PAMS. June 30, 2010 positions.TVA will supply a of how a Foxboro IA common description of the changes Add: By letter dated June 30, 2010, TVA mode or complete failure NNC 8/19/10: TVA August 11, implemented at Unit 1 but have docketed WNA-LI-00058-WBT-P &-NP, "PAMS impacts the plant accident segmentation 2010 not been reviewed for Unit 2 by Licensing Technical Report." WNA-LI-00058- analysis as described in analysis has been the NRC technical staff...TVA will WBT-P Section 4.11 addressed CCF and BTP 7- Chapter 15 of the FSAR. received - NRC to October 5, also provide the applicable

19. (Demonstrate segments are review. 2010 portion of the FSAR and the independent and how a proposed TSs...In addition, the TVA Letter Dated March 12, 2010 (Enclosure 1, common mode or complete staff should review items that are Item No. 4 on Page 3 of 15): TVA responded to failure is prevented by power identical for WBN Units 1 and 2 this request for additional Information supply design and that have not previously been segmentation.) reviewed and approved by the Foxboro I/A Segmentation Analysis Calculation NRC staff. These items are DCSSEGMENT, Rev. 0 submitted on TVA letter NNC 8/19/10: The justification changes in the design and dated August 11, 2010. for not performing and D3 licensing basis for WBN Unit 1 analysis contained in the CQ that TVA has implemented

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date Data Storm Testing PAMS Licensing Technical without NRC prior approval Report is not acceptable. TVA under the 10 CFR 50.59 (a) Foxboro I/A Segmentation Analysis, to docket a D3 analysis for the process."

Calculation DCSSEGMENT, Rev. 0 submitted CQ PAMS. This will be NNC 4/15/10: The response on TVA letter to the NRC dated August 11, responded to in Item 64. addresses many systems and 2010 (Reference). should be read by all EICB NNC 8/25/10: The reviewers.

(b) Attachment contains Foxboro proprietary segmentation analysis has drawings 08F802403-SC-2001 sheets 1 been read. Please explain through 6. An affidavit for withholding and why it is believed that failure non-proprietary versions of the drawings will will not propagate over the be submitted no later than ___________. peer-to-peer network.

(c) Credible Mesh Network Failure Modes Looking for an architectural description of the network Attachment 42 contains the mesh network interconnections similar to the failure analysis. ICS overview, identification of credible failure modes caused (d) Refer to the response to item (c) above. by the mesh network and what component(s) prevent mesh network failures from disabling the entire system. What prevents a segment failure from propagating across the mesh network and affecting other segments.

005 7.1.3. By letter date February 28, 2008 (Agencywide Responder: Craig/Webb Closed Closed ML093431118, EICB (Garg) 1 Documents Access and Management System Item No. 5 (ADAMS) Accession Number ML080770366) TVA TVA Letter Dated February 5, 2010: TVA Date: 3/15/2010 FSAR AMD 100 provided a "red-lined" version of the FSAR for WBN provided the Unit 2 setpoint methodology (WCAP- Responsibility: NRC (Garg)

Unit 2. The purpose of this FSAR "red-line" version 177044-P Revision 0 - dated December). and TVA (Hilmes and Crouch) was to depict how the Unit 2 FSAR will appear at fuel load. This letter identified significant FSAR changes TVA Letter Dated March 12, 2010 (Enclosure 1, RAI response received. This and provided a X-REF number for each. Item No. 5 on Page 5 of 15): TVA responded to item is closed as this is this request for additional Information covered under item 154 later Change 7.3-1 refers to the following two Summary on.

Reports: This item is addressed as follows:

This item requires further TVA Letter, P. L. Pace to NRC, dated February.9, 1. FSAR Amendment 100 which was submitted discussion between TVA and 1998, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 - 10 CFR on TVA letter to the NRC dated August __, 2010 the staff concerning the 50.59(b)(2), Changes, Tests and Experiments incorporates as-found and as-left setpoint setpoint methodology Summary Report tolerance discussion into section 7.1.2.1.9, adds employed for WBN2.

EEB-TI-28, Setpoint Methodology to the section TVA Letter, P. L. Pace to NRC, dated September 30, 7.1 references and adds a reference to 7.1.2.1.9 See Item 8.

2005, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 - 10 CFR to section 7.2.1.1.10.

50.59, Changes, Tests and Experiments Summary Report" TSTF-493, Rev. 4 Option A has been incorporated into the Unit 2 Tech Spec submittal Please submit the 50.59 Evaluations for each of these dated February 2, 2010.

Summary Reports and identify which parts are relevant to the Unit 2 Setpoint Methodology.

006 Amendment 95 of the FSAR, Chapter 7.3, shows that By letter dated February 5, 2010: TVA provided Closed Closed ML093431118, NNC: WCAP-12096 Rev. 7 EICB (Garg) change 7.3-1 consists of updating a reference from the Unit 2 setpoint methodology (WCAP-177044- Item No. 6 (ML073460281) is in ADAMS.

revision 5 to revision 7 and making it applicable to Unit P Revision 0 - dated December 2009). This item is reviewed in FSAR 1 only, while adding a new reference, applicable only amendment 100 review. TVA to reference NNC: WCAP-12096 Rev. 8 is to Unit 2. TVA Letter Dated March 12, 2010 (Enclosure 1, TI-28 for as found the current revision for Unit 1.

Item No. 6 on Page 7 of 15): TVA responded to Date: 2/16/2010 and as left value.

Reagan, J. R., "Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology this request for additional Information. Also provide the TVA to docket Rev. 8 and for Protection Systems, Watts Bar Units 1 and 2, Eagle The Westinghouse Setpoint reference to FSAR identify that Rev. 8 is the current

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date 21 Version," WCAP-12096 Rev. 7, (Westinghouse a. TVA to docket Rev. 8 and identify that Rev. 8 is methodology document Section 7.1 for the revision for Unit 1. TVA to Proprietary Class 2). Unit 1 Only the current revision for Unit 1. TVA to identify any (WCAP-17044-P Revision 0) setpoint identify any NRC approval of NRC approval of Rev. 8. identifies that the intermediate methodology. Rev. 8.

WCAP Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for and source range calculations Protection System, Watts Bar Unit 2, Eagle 21 In accordance with item 2, below, there is no were performed by TVA (2- This is addressed TVA to describe how TVA Version, WCAP-17044-P. Unit 2 Only. change to the methodology, therefore revision 8 is NMD-092-0131). Please in FSAR calculations for Unit 2 are not included in this response. provide the intermediate and Amendment 100. different than Unit 1. If they are Please provide both setpoint methodology documents source range calculations the same, TVA to docket such identified above. Westinghouse letter WAT-D-10502 (Attachment performed by TVA (2-NMD- statement under oath and

1) describes the two changes to WCAP-12096 092-0131). Affirmation.

Revision. 8. The first change addresses the containment sump level transmitter replacement. The Westinghouse Setpoint This change was submitted under 50.59 summary methodology document report (ML073460444, Page 77). The second (WCAP-17044-P Revision 0) change is to delete the power range negative flux identifies that the undervoltage rate trip. This item was submitted as a Technical and underfrequency Specification change (ML073201052). The calculations were performed Technical Specification change was subsequently by TVA (2-27-068-0031).

approved. Please provide the undervoltage and The current revision of Unit 1 WCAP-12096 is underfrequency calculations Revision 9. Revision 9 was issued to make the performed by TVA (2-27-068-changes required by the Steam Generator 0031).

Replacement Project. Unit 2 is using the original steam generators, therefore the changes in Work with Item 7 for WCAP-Revision 9 are not applicable to Unit 2. 12906 issues.

b. TVA to describe how TVA calculations for Unit 2 are different than Unit 1. If they are the same, TVA to docket such statement under oath and Affirmation.

TVA response letter dated March 12, 2010, Enclosure 1, Item Number. 7 addressed this request; however, the March 12 letter was not submitted under oath and affirmation. This letter fulfills the oath and affirmation requirements for the previous response.

007 7.1.3. The setpoint methodology has been reviewed and TVA Letter Dated March 12, 2010 (Enclosure 1, Closed Closed ML093431118, TVA to provide Rev. 8 of the Unit EICB (Garg) 1 approved by the NRC staff in Section 7.1.3.1 of Item No. 7 on Page 7 of 15): TVA responded to This item is reviewed in FSAR Item No. 7 1 document (which is the current NUREG-0847 (ML072060490), NUREG-0847 this request for additional Information. 100 review. one) if there is a change in Supplement No.4 (ML072060524), and NUREG-0847 Same as Item 6 methodology and identify how Supplement No. 15 (ML072060488). a. TVA will submit WCAP-12096, Rev. 8 if there is Date: 1/13/2010 above the Unit 2 document differs from a change to the methodology. it.

Please describe all changes from the methodology RAI response received. NRC This is addressed that has been reviewed and approved by the staff. No change in methodology, therefore WCAP- to review response. in FSAR 12906, Revision 8 is not submitted. Amendment 100.

TVA will submit WCAP-12096,

b. TVA will supply the 50.59 letter for Rev. 8 Rev. 8 if there is a change to the methodology.

Westinghouse letter WAT-D-10502 (Attachment

1) describes the two changes to WCAP-12096 TVA will supply the 50.59 Revision. 8. The first change addresses the letter for Rev. 8 containment sump level transmitter replacement.

This change was submitted under 50.59 summary TVA to locate transmittal letter report (ML073460444, Page 77). The second that submitted Rev. 7.

change is to delete the power range negative flux rate trip. This item was submitted and approved TVA to determine the last as a Technical Specification change revision of WCAP-12096

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date (ML073201052). where there was a change in methodology.

c. TVA to locate transmittal letter that submitted Rev. 7. Work with Item 6 for WCAP-12906 issues.

Refer to response to Item 1. TVA responded to this request for additional Information in letter dated March 12, 2010, Enclosure 1, Item Number 6.

d. TVA to determine the last revision of WCAP-12096 where there was a change in methodology.

Previous revisions to WCAP-12096 have been due to hardware changes. The calculation methodology has not changed since revision 0.

008 7.3 There are several staff positions that provide guidance TVA Letter Dated March 12, 2010 (Enclosure 1, Closed Closed ML093431118, EICB (Garg) on setpoint methodology (e.g., Reg Guide 1.105, BTP Item No. 8 on Page 7 of 15): TVA responded to Item No. 8 7-12, RIS-2006-17 and TSTF-493 Rev. 4). Please this request for additional Information FSAR AMD 100.

identify how the Unit 2 setpoint methodology Closed as it will be addresses staff guidance. This item is addressed as follows: covered under item 154

1. FSAR Amendment 100 which was submitted on TVA letter to the NRC dated August __, 2010 incorporates as-found and as-left setpoint tolerance discussion into section 7.1.2.1.9, adds EEB-TI-28, Setpoint Methodology to the section 7.1 references and adds a reference to 7.1.2.1.9 to section 7.2.1.1.10.

2. TSTF-493, Rev. 4 Option A has been incorporated into the Unit 2 Tech Spec submittal dated February 2, 2010.

009 7.3.2 5.6, Change 7.3-2, identified in Watts Bar Nuclear Plant TVA Letter Dated March 12, 2010 (Enclosure 1, Closed Closed ML093431118, 3/12/10, EICB (Darbali) 6.3.5 FSAR red-line for Unit 2 (ADAMS Accession Number Item No. 9 on Page 8 of 15): TVA responded to Item No. 9 ML101680598, ML080770366), refers to the following Summary this request for additional Information Date: 3/15/2010 Item 9 Report: TVA Letter, P. L. Pace to NRC, dated Responsibility: NRC (Darbali)

September 20, 2002, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN)

Unit 1 - 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests and 50.59 evaluation was Experiments Summary Report" submitted in the RAI response. NRC to review.

Please provide the 50.59 Evaluation summarized in this Summary Report.

010 7.3 7.3 The original SER on Watts Bar (NUREG-0847) TVA Letter Dated March 12, 2010 (Enclosure 1, Closed Closed ML093431118, 3/12/10, EICB (Darbali) documents that the scope of the review of FSAR Item No. 10 on Page 8 of 15): TVA responded to Item No. 10 ML101680598, Section 7.3, Engineered Safety Features Actuations this request for additional Information. Replaced by OI Item 10 System, included: included single-line, function logic 314 and schematic diagrams, and descriptive information TVA Letter (ML073550386) dated FEB 26 1992:

for the ESFAS and those auxiliary supporting systems docketed WCAP-12374 Rev. 1 (ML080500664).

that are essential to the operation of either the ESFAS or the ESF systems. The review included the applicant's design criteria and design bases for the ESFAS and the instrumentation and controls of auxiliary supporting systems. The review also included the applicant's analyses of the manner in which the design of the ESFAS and the auxiliary supporting systems conform to the design criteria."

Please provide the information referred to in the

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date quotation and include a description of all changes since this information was reviewed and approved by the NRC staff.

If some parts of this information is included in the FSAR (e.g., Design Criteria) this information can be explicitly referenced in the response to this question.

011 7.3.2 5.6, NUREG-0847 Supplement No. 2 Section 7.3.2 TVA Letter Dated March 12, 2010 (Enclosure 1, Closed Closed ML093431118, ML101680598, EICB (Darbali) 6.3.5 includes an evaluation of a change in containment Item No. 11 on Page 13 of 15): TVA responded Item No. 11 Item 9 sump level measurement. Provide information to to this request for additional Information Date: 3/15/2010 demonstrate that Unit 2 implements the containment Responsibility: NRC (Darbali) sump level indication as described and evaluated in NUREG-0847 Supplement No. 2, Section 7.3.2, for Requested information was Unit 1. submitted in the RAI response.

012 7.4 7.4 The original SER on Watts Bar (NUREG-0847) TVA Letter Dated March 12, 2010 (Enclosure 1, Closed Closed ML093431118, ML101680598, EICB (Darbali) documents that the scope of the review of FSAR Item No. 12 on Page 13 of 15): TVA responded Item No. 6 Item 9 Section 7.4, "Systems Required for Safe Shutdown," to this request for additional Information Date: 3/15/2010 included single-line and schematic diagrams: "The scope of the review of the systems required for safe A revised response was included in the 7/30 letter TVA provided the following:

shutdown included the single-line and schematic that provides the requested information.

diagrams and the descriptive information for these 1. Description of what is systems and for the auxiliary systems essential for different from Unit 1 their operation."

2. Road map between Please provide the single-line and schematic diagrams functions listed in 7.4 and the for the systems required for safe shutdown that are FSAR section that describes applicable to Unit 2, and include a description of all the equipment that performs changes since these diagrams were reviewed and the function. Item Closed.

approved by the NRC staff.

013 7.1.3. Chapter 7 and Chapter 16 of Amendment 95 to the TVA Letter Dated March 12, 2010 (Enclosure 1, Closed Closed ML093431118, TS have been docketed.

EICB (Garg) 1 FSAR do not include any setpoint values. Please Item No. 13 on Page 14 of 15): TVA responded Item No. 13 describe how and when setpoint values (e.g., TS to this request for additional Information Date: 3/15/2010 This item is closed allowable values) will be provided for Unit 2. for chapter 7.

RAI response received. NRC will review Please describe the information that will be provided to Westinghouse is completing T.S. under justify the acceptability of these values. the setpoint calculations which different chapter.

will be completed by May 11, 2011. NRC to review response.

014 Provide the justification for any hardware and software Date: 4/27/10 Closed Closed ML093560019, NNC 4/30/10: Related to Eagle EICB (Carte) changes that have been made since the previous U.S. Responder: TVA Item No. 1 21; therefore Garg is Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff review for Date: 4/27/10 responsible.

Eagle 21 and other platforms By letter dated April 27, 2010: TVA responded to Responsibility: NRC (Carte) this request for information (Enclosure, Item No.

1) stated: "In discussion with the staff, TVA's NNC: I do not recall saying understanding is that the focus of this question is that the NRC is not interested the Eagle 21 system. Please refer to Reference 2 in changes in other platforms.

[TVA Letter Dated March 12, 2010], Question 10, Please provide a description and TVA letter to NRC dated August 25, 2008, of changes to other platforms

'Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) - Unit 2 - (e.g., SSPS).

Westinghouse Eagle 21 Process Protection System, Response to NRC I&C Branch request For Eagle 21, this response for additional information' (Reference 3 [TVA letter points to Open Item No. 10.

dated August 25, 2008]) for the discussion of changes to the Eagle 21 system." Response understood.

Additional material will be A listing of changes to other platforms was requested separately to provided in TVA letter dated April 27, 2010, understand the systems

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date Enclosure 1, items 21 and 23. described.

015 Verify that the refurbishment of the power range Date: 4/27/10 Closed Closed ML093560019, EICB (Garg) nuclear instrumentation drawers resulted in only like- Responder: TVA Item No. 2 for-like replacements. Date: 4/27/10 By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to Responsibility: NRC (Garg) this request for information (Enclosure, Item No.

2). Response acceptable. Close 016 Identify the precedents in license amendment requests Date: 4/27/10 Closed Closed ML093560019, EICB (Carte)

(LARs), if any, for source range monitors or Responder: TVA Item No. 3 intermediate range monitors. Date: 4/27/10 By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to Responsibility: NRC (Garg) this request for information (Enclosure, Item No.

3). Acceptable. Close 017 7.3.1 7.3.1, Identify precedents in LARs, if any, for the solid state Date: 4/27/10 Closed Closed ML093560019, ML101230248, 5.5.5, EICB protection system. Also, identify any hardware Item No. 4 Item 4 5.6 deviation from the precedent. By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to (Darbali) this request for information (Enclosure, Item No.

4).

018 Identify any changes made to any instrumentation and Date: 4/27/10 Closed Closed ML093560019, EICB (Garg) control (I&C) system based on prior knowledge of Responder: TVA Item No. 5 failures. Date: 4/27/10 By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to Responsibility: NRC (Garg) this request for information (Enclosure, Item No.

5). Acceptable. Close 019 Verify that the containment purge isolation radiation Date: 4/27/10 Closed Closed ML093560019, EICB (Garg) monitor is the same as used in Watts Bar Unit 1, or Item No. 6 identify any hardware changes. By latter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to Date: 4/27/10 NRC Review this request for information (Enclosure 1, Item No.

6) for the ratemeter.

A newer model, RD-52, of the RD-32 detector assembly used in Unit 1. The detector assembly replacement is due to obsolescence and improved reliability.

Clarify electronics are analog and the same as unit 1 and the only difference is the detector assembly.

020 Provide environmental qualification information Date: 4/27/10 Closed Closed ML093560019, NNC 4/30/10: SRP Section 7.0 EICB (Garg) pursuant to Section 50.49 of Title 10 of the Code of Responder: TVA Item No. 7 states: "The organization Federal Regulations (10 CFR) for safety-related Date: 4/27/10 responsible for the review of actuation transmitters. By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to Responsibility: NRC (EEEB) environmental qualification this request for information (Enclosure, Item No. reviews the environmental 7). Garg to coordinate with Weibi qualification of I&C equipment.

to ensure EEEB takes The scope of this review responsibility for this one. includes the design criteria and qualification testing methods and procedures for I&C equipment."

021 7.3 For the Foxboro Spec 200 platform, identify any Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed ML093560019, The resolution of this item will be EICB (Garg) changes in hardware from the precedent systems. The resolution of this item will Item No. 8 covered by OI#288..

Provide the design report and the equipment No vendor system description is available for the be covered by OI#288 qualification information. Foxboro Spec 200 system. The hardware description and qualification documents are Date: 5/24/10 provided on a component level basis. A TVA generated system description is provided to assist The understanding reached in the reviewer. The hardware differences from the the meeting on April 14, 2010, unit 1 systems are provided in the loop and card was that TVA should identify comparison documents. As agreed with the any changes, or state under reviewer, the component level documents are not oath and affirmation that there

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date required to be submitted at this time, but may be were no changes. If there required later based on the review of attached were no changes, then the documents. The following TVA generated NRC would confirm by documents are provided (Attachment 1): inspection.

1. Analog loop comparison A revised response was requested at the 5/24/10

2. Analog card comparison public meeting.

3. Analog system description Add a brief discussion of the Foxboro Spec 200 to the FSAR let Hukam know on Thursday which section we will add the discussion to.

022 7.3.2 5.6, Verify the auxiliary feedwater control refurbishment Date: 4/27/10 Closed Closed to open ML093560019, EICB (Darbali) 6.3.5 results in a like-for-like replacement, and identify any item 285 Item No. 9 changes from the identified precedents. By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to Date: 4/27/10 this request for information (Enclosure, Item No.

9). TVA should confirm if Woodward Governor is the The control function of the Auxiliary Feedwater only change.

(AFW) Flow for Steam Generator Level is the same as Unit 1. The controllers and signal See Item 285 for follow up modifiers/conditioners are Foxboro SPEC 200 question.

discrete analog modules as Unit 1 control loops.

The only different Unit 1 uses a 10-50ma signal and Unit 2 is using a 4-20ma. The SPEC 200 control modules operate with a 0-10mv system for both Unit 1 and Unit 2.

The differences between the Units that have a control function for the AFW system is the differential pressure control upstream of the motor driven AFW pumps 2A-A and 2B-B. Unit 1 still has the analog Bailey/GEMac controllers and signal conditioners. Whereas Unit 2 has converted the controllers and signal conditioners to Foxboro SPEC 200 discrete analog components. Both loops still maintain a Fisher modifier for valve control.

The four (4) control loops are described below:

2-P-3-122A This loop controls the differential pressure of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A-A by varying valve 2-PCV-3-122. Differential Pressure Indicating Controller 2-PdIC-3-122A (on panel 2-M-4) can be used either in manual mode or in automatic mode. This loop controls this valve from the Main Control Room when transfer switch 2-XS-3-122 (on panel 2-L-11A) is in the normal position.

2-P-3-122C This loop controls the differential pressure of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A-A by varying valve 2-PCV-3-122. Differential Pressure Indicating

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date Controller 2-PdIC-3-122C (on panel 2-L-10) can be used either in manual mode or in automatic mode. This loop controls this valve from the Auxiliary Control Room when transfer switch 2-XS-3-122 (on panel 2-L-11A) is in the auxiliary position.

2-P-3-132A This loop controls the differential pressure of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2B-B by varying valve 2-PCV-3-132. Differential Pressure Indicating Controller 2-PdIC-3-132A (on panel 2-M-4) can be used either in manual mode or in automatic mode. This loop controls this valve from the Main Control Room when transfer switch 2-XS-3-132 (on panel 2-L-11B) is in the normal position.

2-P-3-132C This loop controls the differential pressure of the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2B-B by varying valve 2-PCV-3-132. Differential Pressure Indicating Controller 2-PdIC-3-132C (on panel 2-L-10) can be used either in manual mode or in automatic mode. This loop controls this valve from the Auxiliary Control Room when transfer switch 2-XS-3-132 (on panel 2-L-11B) is in the auxiliary position.

Unit 2 controllers are Foxboro model N-250HM-M2NH-F; Signal Converters, current-voltage IN are model N-2AI-I2V, and voltage-current OUT are N-2AO-VAI; Control Card is model N-2AX+A4.

All components are supplied in accordance with requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix B and ASME NQA-1 as defined in Invensys Systems, Inc.

Corporate Quality Assurance Program Requirements, QMS, Revision S, dated October 26, 2007.

All components were manufactured with the same materials and processes as those qualified for Nuclear Class 1E Service per IEEE-323-1974 and IEEE-344-1975.

023 Provide environmental qualification (10 CFR 50.49) Date: 4/27/10 Closed Closed ML093560019, NNC 4/30/10: SRP Section 7.0 EICB (Garg) information for safety-related control transmitters and Responder: TVA Item No. 10 states: "The organization complete the deviation section of the table. Date: 12/22/09 responsible for the review of By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to Responsibility: NRC (EEEB) environmental qualification this request for information (Enclosure, Item No. reviews the environmental 10). Garg to coordinate with Weibi qualification of I&C equipment.

to ensure EEEB takes The scope of this review responsibility for this one. includes the design criteria and qualification testing methods and procedures for I&C equipment."

024 C B

(C Provide a schedule by the January 13, 2010, meeting During the January 13, 2010 meeting, TVA Closed Closed ML093560019, NNC 4/30/10: Carte to address art for providing information in accordance with I&C presented a schedule for completing various Item No. 11 response with respect to PAMS

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) 6. documents for the PAMS system. This schedule Date: 4/27/10 Closed to Item 43 and Darbali to address response did not support TVA's desired schedule. TVA was with respect to RM1000.

so informed and said they would work on The explanations provided by improving the schedule. TVA said that the TVA (that certain information TVA has agreed to submit the setpoint methodology would be provided shortly. is not required) are requested information on the No other systems of documentation was unacceptable. docket.

discussed.

NNC 8/18/10: The TVA By letter dated February 5, 2010 (see enclosure agreement in the Comments 1), TVA provided a list of documents and column conflicts with the TVA associated availability for PAMS. responses to other open items where TVA states that By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to information is available for this request for information (Enclosure, Item No. audit.

11).

By letter Dated June 18, 2010 (see Attachment 3)

TVA provided a table, "Watts Bar 2 - Common Q PAMS ISG-6 Compliance Matrix."

025 7.5.2 7.5.1 For the containment radiation high radiation monitor, Date: 4/27/10 Closed Closed ML093560019, ML101230248, EICB verify that the information provided by TVA is Item No. 12 Item 12 (Singh) consistent with the information provided with the By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to (See OI 300 for additional 4/27/2010 previously-approved license amendment request for this request for information (Enclosure, Item No. questions.)

the Duane Arnold plant or provide Phase 3 12).

information.

026 Provide environmental qualification (10 CFR 50.49) Date: 4/27/10 Closed Closed ML093560019, NNC 4/30/10: SRP Section 7.0 EICB (Garg) information for safety-related monitoring transmitters. Responder: TVA Item No. 13 states: "The organization Date: 12/22/09 responsible for the review of By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to Responsibility: NRC (EEEB) environmental qualification this request for information (Enclosure, Item No. reviews the environmental 13). Garg to coordinate with Weibi qualification of I&C equipment.

to ensure EEEB takes The scope of this review responsibility for this one. includes the design criteria and qualification testing methods and procedures for I&C equipment."

027 For Foxboro I/A provide information regarding Date: 4/27/10 Closed Closed ML093560019, EICB (Carte) safety/non-safety-related interaction, common cause Responder: TVA Item No. 14 failures, and communication with safety related Date: 4/27/10 equipment in accordance with ISG 4. By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to Responsibility: NRC (Carte) this request for information (Enclosure, Item No.

14): "There is no digital communications or interactions between Foxboro Intelligent Automation (IA) and any Safety-related system."

028 For the turbine control AEH system, verify that the Responder: Mark Scansen Closed Closed ML093560019, EICB (Garg) refurbishment results in a like-for-like replacement. Date: 4/27/10 Item No. 15 Provide 50.59 evaluation. Provide 50.59 By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to Response acceptable.

this request for information (Enclosure, Item No.

15).

The requested 50.59 is included in Attachment 1.

029 For the rod control system, verify that the Date: 4/27/10 Closed Closed ML093560019, EICB (Carte) refurbishment results in a like-for-like replacement. Responder: TVA Item No. 16 Date: 4/27/10 By letter dated April 27, 2010 (ML101230248) Responsibility: NRC (Carte)

TVA responded to this request for information (Enclosure, Item No. 16 & Attachment 5): TVA stated on a card by card basis that the

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date refurbished cards have the same form fit and function.

030 Regarding the refurbishment of I&C equipment, Responder: Clark Closed Closed ML093560019, EICB (Garg) identify any component digital upgrades and, if so, Item No. 17 provide the supporting design information. Date: 4/27/10 Date: 4/27/10 By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to Does not state if there are no this request for information (Enclosure, Item No. other upgrade which contain 17). imbedded digital processor.

Revised response acceptable.

There are no other I&C upgrades which contain an imbedded digital processor.

031 For the rod position indication system (CERPI), Date: 4/27/10 Closed Closed ML093560019, CERPI is non-safety related.

EICB (Carte) provide information in accordance with ISG 4. Need to Responder: TVA Item No. 18 Note: The issue of interlock with consider cyber-security issues. Date: 4/27/10 rod withdrawal system is By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to Responsibility: NRC (Carte) addressed in open item 301.

this request for information (Enclosure, Item No. (Singh Sept22, 2010) 18). Response acceptable.

032 For the process computer, need to consider cyber Date: 4/27/10 Closed Closed ML093560019, EICB will no longer consider EICB (Carte) security issues and emergency response data system Responder: TVA Item No. 19 cyber issues.

needs. Date: 4/27/10 By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to Responsibility: NRC (Carte) this request for information (Enclosure, Item No.

19).

033 For the loose parts monitoring system, provide Date: 4/27/10 Closed Closed ML093560019, The loose parts monitoring EICB (Carte) information regarding interactions with safety related Responder: TVA Item No. 20 system is not connected to any equipment. Date: 4/27/10 other system.

By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to Responsibility: NRC (Carte) this request for information (Enclosure, Item No.

20): Loose parts is not connected to any other TVA stated that there are no system. interactions.

034 2/4/2010 Responder: TVA Close Close EICB (Garg)

Awaiting NRC evaluation of In the December 15, 2009 public meeting, TVA listed By letter dated April 27, 2010 TVA responded to response. By Thursday the significant changes made since the Watts Bar Unit this request for information (Enclosure, Item No. 10/14 NRC to 1 Licensing (see below). For each of the following 21). close or provide significant changes: specific Remove all references to Elbow Tap Methodology clarification or

1) Is the change unique to Unit 2, or will it be the same from Unit 2 Licensing Bases. needed as whats currently installed in Unit 1? information

2) If its the same as Unit 1, was this change made under a license amendment or under a 50.59?

3) When do you plan to submit the detailed information regarding the changes?

034. EICB Chapter 7.1 - Introduction Close Close 1 (Garg/ Reactor Coolant System Flow Rate Measurement Singh) Design Basis Analysis Parameters Loose Parts Monitoring 034. Chapter 7.2 - Reactor Trip System Close Close EICB (Garg) 2 Deletion of Neutron Flux Negative Rate Trip Design Basis Analysis Parameters Alternate Method for Use of Condenser Steam Dump Reactor Coolant System Flow Rate Measurement

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date Foxboro I/A 034. 7.3 7.3 Chapter 7.3 - ESFAS Open Open-NRC 3 EICB Design Basis Analysis Parameters Review Alternate Method for Use of Condenser Steam (Darbali) Dump 034. 7.5.1. 7.5.2 Chapter 7.5 - Instrumentation Systems Important to Closed Closed N/A N/A Closed EICB (Marcus) 4 1 Safety Plant Process Computer Replacement RAI not required.

Containment Sump Level Transmitter Replacement Safety Injection Systems Cold Leg Accumulator For plant process computer see Level Items 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, Measurement System 198, 199, 203, 204, 206, 216, Common Q/PAMs This is closed by Norbert. and 224.

034. 7.5.1. 7.5.2 Chapter 7.6 - All Other Systems Required for Safety Closed Closed N/A N/A Closed EICB 5 1 7.6.7 Plant Process Computer Replacement 7.6.1 Loose Parts Monitoring System RAI not required.

(Marcus/Singh)

For plant process computer see Items 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 198, 199, 203, 204, 206, 216, and 224.

034. Chapter 7.7 Control Systems Open Open-NRC EICB (Singh/Darbali) 6 Alternate Means for Monitoring Control or Review Shutdown Rod Position Eliminate Pressurizer Backup Heaters on High Level Signal AMSAC Replacement Foxboro I/A WINCISE /Power Distribution Monitoring System (Beacon) 035 2/18/2010 Responder: Clark Closed Closed LIC-110 Section 6.2.2 states:

EICB (Singh)

Design features and Please provide a system description of the Digital TVA Letter dated March 12, 2010 Enclosure 1, Description provide is not of Att.2 to 10/5/2010 administrative programs that are Metal Impact Monitoring System that contains item 4 responded to this request for information. sufficient detail to allow a TVA letter unique to Unit 2 should be sufficient detail to support a review of this system regulatory determination. TVA provided the reviewed in accordance with the using current staff positions. Attachment contains the non-proprietary system to send the proprietary information. current staff positions. Unit 2 description which was developed from proprietary information for NRC review. FSAR Section 7.6.7, Loose Part Westinghouse Watts Bar Unit 2 DIMMS-DX At the 9-2 meeting G. Singh Monitoring (LPMS) system Operations and Maintenance Manual, 1TS3176 stated the system description Description, describes a system Rev.0 (Reference ). Westinghouse approved this provided was acceptable and design that is unique to Unit 2.

non-proprietary version for public release via the proprietary information letter WBT-D-2281 dated August 17, 2010 was not required at this time.

(Reference )

036 7.5.2 7.5.1 February 18, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed ML093560019, NNC: Unit 2 FSAR Section EICB (Carte)

Responder: Clark Item No. 11 7.5.1, Post Accident Monitoring Please provide a system description of the Post Date: 2/18/2010 Instrumentation, describes a Accident Monitoring System that contains sufficient In previous letters TVA has provided the Common Responsibility: TVA system design that is unique to detail to support a review of this system using current Q documents that address this item: Unit 2. LIC-110, "Watts Bar Unit staff positions. 2 License Application Review,"

states: "Design features and administrative programs that are unique to Unit 2 should then be reviewed in accordance with the current staff positions."

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date 037 7.5.1. 7.5.2 2/18/2010 Responder: Clark Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed N/A N/A FSAR Section 7.5, EICB (Marcus) 1 09/16/10 Instrumentation System Is the plant computer a safety-related display system? As identified in TVA letter dated March 12, 2010, August 19, 2010 - TVA to Important to Safety, consists of Enclosure 1, item 2, the plant computer system is submit markup of FSAR two major subsections: 7.5.1, non-safety related. Amendment 100. Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation (PAM), and FSAR section 7.5 describes both safety and non- FSAR Amendment 100 states 7.5.2, Plant Computer System.

safety related devices and systems. FSAR Plant computer system is non-section 7.1.1.2 is revised in FSAR Amendment safety related. Regulatory Guide 1.70, 100 submitted to the NRC on TVA letter to the Standard format and content of NRC dated September 1, 2010. Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 3 dated November 1978 states (see Section 7.1.1): List all instrumentation, control, and supporting systems that are safety-related including alarms, communication, and display instrumentation. FSAR Section 7.1.1.2, Safety-Related Display Instrumentation, describes, in the first paragraph, the PAM system, and the second paragraph states: All other safety-related instrumentation is discussed in Section 7.5.

Therefore, to be consistent with the preceding paragraph, the FSAR states that the plant computer system is safety related.

Contrary to the FSAR the slides presented at the December 15, 2010 meeting indicate that the plant process computer is not safety-related. Therefore the docketed material is inconsistent and needs to be clarified.

RAI not required 038 7.5.1. 7.5.2 2/18/2010 Responder: Clark Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed TBD TBD The slides presented at the EICB (Marcus) 1 December 15, 2010 meeting Please provide a description of the interfaces between: FSAR sections 7.1.1.2 and 7.5.2 are revised to August 19, 2010 - TVA to NRC issue formal (ML093520967) indicate that the (1) the Safety Parameter Display System and (2) the address this comment in FSAR Amendment 100 submit markup of FSAR RAI. plant process computer has Technical Support Center and Nuclear Data Links with submitted to the NRC on TVA letter to the NRC Amendment 100. been replaced.

the plant control and safety systems. This Description dated September 1, 2010.

should contain sufficient detail to support a review of NRC confirmed FSAR RAI 19 being drafted these interfaces using current staff positions. Amendment 100 provides details on interfaces.

039 January 13, 2010 Responder: Clark Date: Closed Closed The equation for the calculation EICB (Garg) 5/25/10 of the estimated average hot leg Please describe the change to the calculation of the Date: 1/13/2010 temperature on page 7.2-13 of estimated average hot leg temperature (see FSAR Refer to revised equations in FSAR amendment Responsibility: TVA Revision WBNP-96 of the Unit 2 Section 7.2.1.1.4, page 7.2-14 Version WBNP-96) in 98. FSAR is different than the sufficient detail to support a review of this system NRC staff will review calculation of the average hot leg using current staff positions. temperature shown at the top of page 7.2-14 of version WBNP-1 of the UNIT 1 FSAR.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date 040 January 13, 2010 Responder: Clark Date: Closed Closed The equation for the calculation EICB (Garg) 5/25/10 of the power fraction on page Please describe the change to the calculation of the Date: 1/13/2010 7.2-14 of Revision WBNP-96 of power fraction (see FSAR Section 7.2.1.1.4, page 7.2- Refer to revised equations in FSAR amendment Responsibility: TVA the Unit 2 FSAR is different than 13 Version WBNP-96) in sufficient detail to support a 98. the calculation of the power review of this system using current staff positions. NRC staff will review fraction shown at the top of page 7.2-14 of version WBNP-1 of the UNIT 1 FSAR.

041 7.5.2 7.5.1 2/19/2010 Responder: WEC Open Open-NRC ML093560019, 12/31/10 See also Open Item Nos. 226 &

EICB (Carte)

Review Item No. 11 270.

Please provide the following Westinghouse Items (1) and (2) were docketed by TVA letter The SysRS and SRS documents: dated April 8, 2010. incorporate requirements from TVA to docket (1) WNA-DS-01617-WBT Rev. 1, "PAMS System many other documents by information Requirements Specification" Item (3) will be addressed by Revision 2 of the reference. indentified in (2) WNA-DS-01667-WBT Rev. 0, "PAMS System Licensing Technical Report. Due 12/3/10 ISG6.

Design Specification" NNC 8/25/10: (3) An earlier (3) WNA-CD-00018-GEN Rev. 3, "CGD for QNX Item (4) will be addressed by Westinghouse version of this report was TVA to provide version 4.5g" developing a WBN2 Specific Test Plan to docketed for the Common Q date when Please provide the following Westinghouse documents compensate for the fact that the NRC topical report; therefore, there information will be or pointers to where the material was reviewed and disapproved WNA-PT-00058-GEN during the should be no problem to docketed.

approved in the CQ TR or SPM: original Common Q review. Due 12/7/10 docket this version. (4) Per (4) WNA-PT-00058-GEN Rev. 0, "Testing Process for ML091560352, the testing Common Q Safety systems" Item (5) WNA-TP-00357-GEN is superseded by process document does not (5) WNA-TP-00357-GEN Rev. 4, "Element Software the SPM compliance matrix in the Licensing address the test plan Test Procedure" Technical Report next revision 1 Due 10/22/10 requirements of the SPM.

Please provide a test plan that implements the requirements of the SPM.

042 February 25, 2010: Telecom Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed The drawing provided did not EICB (Carte)

Responder: Clark have the identification numbers On December 16, 2009: EICB stated to DORL: "I am Date: 2/25/2010 as in the FSAR.

having trouble reading the drawings in the binder that Attachment 2 provides a drawing cross reference Responsibility: TVA was given to me. Is it possible to produce a set of full list for FSAR Chapter 7 and electronic copies of size drawing that are in the FSAR?" the fully legible current drawings previously TVA provided readable submitted in full size hard copies. drawings.

On February 23, 2010: EICB received a set of enlarged Chapter 7 FSAR pages (drawings) that are still unreadable.

Please provide readable drawings 043 7.5.2 7.5.1 2/19/2010 Responder: WEC Date: 5/25/10 Open Open-NRC NNC 8/25/10: A CQ PAMS ISG6 EICB (Carte)

Review compliance matrix was docketed The PAMS ISG6 compliance matrix supplied as The PAMS ISG6 compliance matrix supplied as Revised compliance matrix is on: (1) February, 5 12010, (2)

Enclosure 1 to TVA letter dated February 5, 2010 is a Enclosure 1 to TVA letter dated February 5, 2010 unacceptable. TVA to docketed March 12, 2010, & (3) June 18, first draft of the information needed. The shortcomings is a first draft of the information needed. requested 2010. The staff has expressed of the first three lines in the matrix are: NNC 8/12/10: It is not quite material. issued with all of these By letter dated April 8, 2010 TVA provided the enough to provide all of the compliance evaluations. The Line 1: Section 11 of the Common Q topical report did PAMS Licensing Technical Report provided documents requested. There TVA to provide staff is still waiting for a good include a commercial grade dedication program, but additional information. are two possible routs to date when compliance evaluation.

this program was not approved in the associated SE. review that the NRC can information will be Westinghouse stated that this was the program and it Attachment 3 contains the revised Common Q undertake: (1) follow ISG6, docketed.

could now be reviewed. The NRC stated that TVA PAMS ISG-6 Compliance Matrix, dated June 11, and (2) follow the CQ SPM.

should identified what they believe was previously 2010, that addresses these items (Reference 13). The TVA response that was reviewed and approved. originally pursued was to By letter Dated June 18, 2010 (see Attachment 3) follow ISG6, but some of the Line 2: TVA stated the D3 analysis was not applicable TVA provided a table, "Watts Bar 2 - Common Q compliance items for ISG6 to PAMS, but provided no justification. The NRC PAMS ISG-6 Compliance Matrix." were addressed by asked for justification since SRP Chapter 7.5 identified referencing the SPM. The SRM to SECV-93-087 Item II.Q as being SRP This item will be addressed in the next NRC approved the CQ TR and

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date acceptance criteria for PAMS. revision of the Licensing Technical Report associated SPM; it may be Rev. 1 Due 10/22 more appropriate to review the Line 3: TVA identified that the Design report for WBN2 PAMS application to for computer integrity was completed as part of the adherence to the SPM that to common Q topical report. The NRC noted that this ISG6. In either path chosen, report is applicable for a system in a plant, and the CQ the applicant should provide topical report did no specifically address this PAMS documents and a justification system at Watts Bar Unit 2. for the acceptability of any deviation from the path NRC then concluded that TVA should go through and chosen. For example, it provide a more complete and thorough compliance appears that the matrix. Westinghouse's CDIs are commercial grade dedication plans, but Westinghouse maintains that they are commercial grade dedication reports; this apparent deviation should be justified or explained.

044 7.5.2 7.5.1 February 25, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed EICB (Carte)

Responder: Clark The PAMS system described in Section 7.5 of the Date: 2/25/2010 FSAR is implemented in various manners. TVA By letter Dated June 18, 2010 (see Enclosure 1 Responsibility: TVA should identify: Item 6) TVA provided information requested.

(1) Those variables that are implemented identical to what was reviewed and approved for Unit 1.

(2) Those variable that are implemented identical to Unit 1, but that have been changed (e.g., under 50.59) and not reviewed by the NRC.

(3) Those variables that are implemented in a manner that is unique to Unit 2 (e.g., using Common Q).

TVA should supply supporting information appropriate to the manner of implementation.

045 February 25, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed EICB (Carte)

Responder: Clark For each system implemented using a digital Date: 2/25/2010 technology, please identify any communications There are no communications between divisions. Responsibility: TVA between divisions, or between safety-related The response includes the description of equipment and non-safety-related equipment. Please communications and isolation between the TVA provided information by describe the implementation of the associated Common Q PAMS, Eagle 21 and RM-1000 letter dated July 30, 2010 communications isolation. radiation monitors and non safety systems. (ML102160349) - See Enclosure 1 Item No. 4.

046 February 25, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed EICB (Carte)

Responder: Clark The Watts Bar Unit 1 Ser (Section 7.2.1, page 7-3) Date: 2/25/2010 identifies that the RTS includes a trip from the "general FSAR amendment 98, Section 7.2.2.2, page 7.2- Responsibility: TVA warning alarm". Please identify where this trip is 29 second paragraph states:

described in the current FSAR, or what SSER approved its removal. "Auxiliary contacts of the bypass breakers are connected into the SSPS General Warning Alarm System of their respective trains such that if either train is placed in test while the bypass breaker of the other train is closed, both reactor trip breakers and both bypass breakers will automatically trip."

047 7.5.2 7.5.1 4/8/2010 Responder: WEC/Hilmes Date: 5/25/10 Open Open 10/22/10 EICB (Carte) The PAMS System Requirements Specification The licensing basis for WBN Unit 2 is Regulatory TVA provided information by Revised response (SysRS) references RG 1.97 Rev. 3 where the FSAR Guide 1.97 Revision 2. The Common Q PAMS letter dated July 30, 2010 is acceptable.

References Rev. 2. Please explain. system was designed to Regulatory Guide 1.97 (ML102160349) - See

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date Revision 3, which is why the basis for the System Enclosure 1 Item No. 5. Awaiting Requirements Specification references revision 3. Corrective action In order to resolve this discrepancy an NNC 8/9/10: There are two report engineering evaluation of the Common Q PAMS aspects of this issue. The first was performed. aspect has been addressed by the response. The second Attachment 2 contains an engineering evaluation aspect is: How could of the Common Q PAMS design against the Westinghouse Design, and requirements of Reg. Guide 1.97 Rev. 2. The TVA approve a design to the evaluation concluded that the Common Q PAMS wrong requirement?

meets all requirements of Reg Guide 1.97 Rev. 2.

This evaluation will be added to design criteria WB-DC-30-7, Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation by October 1, 2010.

TVA Revised Response:

The difference in revisions of Reg. Guide 1.97 was not identified during the contract review process. Therefore Westinghouse designed the system to the Common Q standard design which is revision 3. When the design work was assigned to a new engineer, the difference in revisions was not identified as an issue. When the issue was identified by the NRC, it was entered into the TVA Corrective Action Process as WBPER233598 (Attachment 3) 048 7.5.2 7.5.1 April 8, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed EICB (Carte)

Responder: WEC Reference 16 of the PAMS System Requirements Date: 4/8/2010 Specification (SysRS) is the Unit 1 precautions To ensure technical fidelity with the Unit 1 ICCM- Responsibility: TVA Limitations and Setpoints document. When and how 86 system, the Unit 1 PLS was used as an input will the transition to the unit 2 document be made? to the Common Q PAMS System Requirements Requested information was Specification. This was done to ensure the Unit 2 provided.

PAMS had at a minimum the same capabilities and accuracy as the unit 1 system.

The Unit 2 Common Q PAMS PLS section was developed based on the actual Common Q PAMS system design as reflected in the System Requirements Specification. As such, the Common Q PAMS PLS section is an output of the Common Q PAMS System Requirements Specification. Therefore, no transition from the Unit 1 to the Unit 2 PLS is required.

The Unit 2 PLS is scheduled to be issued December 13, 2010.

049 7.5.2 7.5.1 4/8/2010 Responder: WEC Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed EICB (Carte)

Please provide 00000-ICE-30156 Rev. 6. The PAMS Per Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2024 (Reference This information must be on SysRS incorporates sections of this document by 7), this document is available for audit at the the docket.

reference. Westinghouse Rockville office.

This document was submitted on September 2, 2010.

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No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date 050 7.5.2 7.5.1 4/8/2010 Responder: WEC Date: 5/25/10 Open Open 12/31/10 EICB (Carte)

How should the "shall" statements outside of the These sections are descriptive text and not TVA response is inconsistent TVA to revise bracketed requirements in Common Q requirements requirements. The next revision of the Watts Bar (e.g., WNA-DS-01667-WBT response or other documents be interpreted? Unit 2 PAMS System Requirements Specification Rev. 1 page 1-1, Section 1.3.1 documentation.

will remove shall from the wording in those implies that "SysRS Section sections. A date for completing the next revision ###" has requirements. See TVA to provide of the System Requirements Specification will be also SDS4.4.2.1-1 on page 4- date when provided no later than August 31, 2010. 32). information will be docketed.

The System Requirements Specification will be Is there a requirement on the revised by September 30, 2010 and submitted shall referenced above??

within two of receipt from Westinghouse.

Get a date for SysRS revision from Westinghouse and update this item SysDS.

Should be 10/22 for all documents confirm with Andy.

051 April 15, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed NA NA Review addressed by another EICB (Garg)

Responder: Craig/Webb Open Item, NRC staff has issued RIS 2006-17, to provide Date: 4/15/2010 This item is closed guidance to the industry regarding the instrument This item is addressed as follows: Responsibility: TVA as it will be setpoint methodology which complies with reviewed under 10CFR50.36 requirements. The staff has requested 1. FSAR Amendment 100 which was submitted This item is to be worked with item 154. FSAR all the licensees for the existing license to demonstrate on TVA letter to the NRC dated August __, 2010 item 108. AMD 100 how they meet the guidance provided in this RIS. The incorporates as-found and as-left setpoint staff consider WBN 2 as a license amendment for all tolerance discussion into section 7.1.2.1.9, adds the setpoints in the TS. Provide the information on EEB-TI-28, Setpoint Methodology to the section how WBN 2's setpoint methodology meets the 7.1 references and adds a reference to 7.1.2.1.9 guidance of RIS 2006 -17. You may also consider the to section 7.2.1.1.10.

guidance provided in TSTF - 493, rev.4 as a basis for meeting the RIS 2006 -17 guidance. 2. TSTF-493, Rev. 4 Option A has been incorporated into the Unit 2 Tech Spec submittal dated February 2, 2010.

3. Refer to TVA to NRC letter dated August 25, 2008.

052 7.5.2 7.5.1 April 19, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed EICB (Singh)

Responder: Slifer Please identify the systems that will use the RM-1000 Date: 4/19/2010 radiation monitors. As identified in TVA letter dated March 12, 2010, Responsibility: NRC Enclosure 1, item 3 the RM-1000 radiation monitors are used for the Containment High Range Post Accident Monitors.

053 7.5.2 7.5.1 April 19, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed EICB Responder: Slifer (Singh) Please identify all FSAR sections that apply to the RM- Date: 4/19/2010 1000. The containment high range post accident Responsibility: NRC

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date radiation monitors are discussed in FSAR amendment 98 sections 7.5 and 12.3.

054 7.5.2 7.5.1 4/19/2010 Responder: Slifer Date: 5/25/10 Open Open-TVA 10/14/10 EICB (Singh)

Please describe all the different environments in which The only safety-related application for the RM- Identify source of the RM-1000 will be required to operate. Please group 1000 is the Containment High Range radiation reference 3.

these environments into two categories (a) Harsh monitors. The Containment High Range radiation environment, per 10 CFR 50.49, and (b) Mild monitors will be installed in the Main Control Environment. Room, a mild environment. The detectors will be installed remotely in the containment.

For WBN Unit 2, a mild environment is defined as:

A defined room or building zone where (1) the temperature, pressure, or relative humidity resulting from the direct effects of a design basis event (DBE) (e.g., temperature rise due to steam release) are no more severe than those which would occur during an abnormal plant operational condition, (2) the temperature will not exceed 130°F due to the indirect effects of a DBE (e.g.,

increased heat loads from electrical equipment),

(3) the event radiation dose is less than or equal to 1 x 104 rads, and (4) the total event plus the 40 year TID (total integrated dose) is less than or equal to 5 x 104 rads. (Reference 3).

What is Reference 3???

055 7.5.2 7.5.1 4/19/2010 Responder: Slifer Date: 5/25/10 Open Open-TVA 10/14/10 EICB (Singh)

The "Qualification Test Report Supplement, RM-1000 The detectors for these loops will be located in a Identify source of Upgrades," Document No. 04508905-1SP Rev. A harsh environment (inside containment). The RM- reference 3.

states that the qualification was done in accordance 1000 will be located in the main control room, with IEEE 323-1974 and -1983. Please describe and which is a mild environment. The RM-1000 and justify all differences in this qualification methodology associated I/F converters have been tested to the and that endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.209. requirements present in IEEE Std. 323-1983 and -

Specifically address EMI and RFI 1974, as well as the System Requirements including EPRI TR 102323 (Sept. 94) in the design basis.

Electro-Magnetic-Interference and Radio Frequency Interference (EMI-RFI) testing was performed (the results of the testing are included in the Equipment Qualification Test Report submitted under TVA letter dated March 12, 2010, Reference 4). Since RG 1.209 was not issued until 2007, General Atomics test reports do not reference it.

For WBN Unit 2, a harsh environment is defined as:

A defined room or building zone where either (1) the temperature, pressure, and relative humidity resulting from the direct effects of a DBE (e.g.,

temperature rise due to steam release) are more severe than those which would occur during an abnormal plant operational condition, (2) the

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date temperature will exceed 130°F due to the indirect effects of DBE (e.g., increased heat loads from electrical equipment), (3) the event radiation dose is greater than 1 x 104 rads, or (4) the total event plus the 40-year TID is greater than 5 x 104 rads.

(Reference 3)

What is Reference 3??

056 April 19, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed Sorrento Radiation Monitoring EICB (Singh)

Responder: Slifer The "RM-1000 Version 1.2 Software Verification and Date: 4/19/2010 Validation Report," Document No. 04508006 Rev. A, is The initial draft Software Verification and Responsibility: NRC an incremental report. That is to say it addresses the Validation (V&V) report document, version 1.0, verification an validation for changes that resulted in was never issued. TVA provided the requested Version 1.2; therefore, the NRC has not received a Software V&V Report.

software verification and validation report for all other Attachment 4 contains the latest complete aspects of the software. Please provide the last proprietary version 1.1 Software V&V report complete verification and validation report, and all (04508005). The non-proprietary version and incremental reports after the complete report. withholding affidavit will be submitted by July 14, 2010. Submittal of the non-proprietary version and withholding affidavit is tracked by Responses to Licensee Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval item 119.

The latest proprietary version is 1.2, (an incremental report that addresses the differences from the version 1.1 report) was submitted by TVA Letter dated March 12, 2010 (Reference 4).

Submittal of the non-proprietary version and withholding affidavit is tracked by Responses to Licensee Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval item 101, due June 30, 2010.

057 7.5.2 7.5.1 4/19/2010 Responder: TVA I&C Staff Date: Closed Closed EICB (Singh) 5/25/10 Please describe the ability to change the software of Requested information Closed by the RM-1000 at site, including all required equipment Firmware/software changes are done by provided. NRC to review. 10/5/2010 TVA and administrative controls (e.g., temporary digital connecting a laptop to a port on the front of the Further Information letter (Item 11 of connections). RM-1000 and placing the Operate/Calibrate Requested: Please confirm letter).

switch in the Calibrate position. The first physical that the laptop is secure and barrier to access is the location of the RM-1000 in access to this laptop is the main control room which has limited access. commensurate with the The RM-1000 Operate/Calibrate switch is located access to the equipment for behind the hinged front panel. The front panel which it will be used. Is the must be opened (held closed by two laptop dedicated for calibration thumbscrews) to access the switch. This provides of radiation monitors? If the a physical barrier to inadvertent switch operation. laptop is used for more than The system malfunction alarm is visible locally one application then please and will annunciate on the control board when the describe the equipment for switch is in the Calibrate position. which the laptop may be used.

In addition please explain how Administrative control of software/firmware software security is assured updates is in accordance with TVA Standard and that only the software Specification SS-E18.15.01, Software intended for the specific Requirements for Real-Time Data Acquisition and application is used. Is the Control Computer Systems, and TVA procedures connection to the radiation SPP-9.3, Plant Modifications and Engineering monitors made via a special Change Control, and SPP-2.6, Computer cable/connectors? Please Software Control. Approved changes to confirm that the RS-232 software/firmware are implemented utilizing the communication port of the TVA work order process. radiation monitors will only be

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date used for calibration purposes.

(1) A laptop is not used to calibrate the monitor. Also please confirm that the All TVA in-house activities (calibration, alarm radiation monitor will not be in setpoint adjustment, etc.) are performed using the operation during the touchpad on the monitor. An external computer calibration mode. In addition (laptop etc.) is only used to perform software or please confirm that password firmware updates. TVA does not perform protection is provided for software or firmware updates using in-house logging on to the laptop prior resources therefore no TVA computer is ever to start of calibration.

connected to the monitor. If software or firmware updates are required, they are approved via the TVA design change process previously described and implemented by a vendor representative under the TVA work order and Quality Assurance processes.

(2) A laptop is not used to calibrate the monitor.

(3) See the response to Item 1.

(4) See the response to Item 1.

(5) No. The connection between the computer and the RM-1000 is made via a standard RS-232 cable.

(6) The RS-232 connection on the RM-1000 is used to upload new software versions and is not for calibration.

(7) A physical control switch is located behind the front panel on the front edge of the Output Board to change between Operate and Calibration modes on the RM-1000. Placing the switch in the Calibrate position makes the monitor inoperable.

(8) See the response to Item 1.

058 7.5.0 7.5 April 19, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed ML101940236, EICB (Singh)

Responder: Slifer Encl 1, Item 13 Please describe all digital communications used in the Date: 4/19/2010 installed configuration. There are no digital communications between the Responsibility: NRC RM-1000 and any other plant system or component. Requested information provided. NRC to review.

059 7.5.2 7.5.1 April 19, 2010 Date: Closed Closed EICB (Singh)

Responder: Slifer Previously TVA provided the "RM-1000 Digital Date: 4/19/2010 Radiation Processor Technical Manual," Document (a) The technical manual is applicable to versions Responsibility: NRC No. 04508100-1TM Revision C dated October 2003. 1.1 and 1.2 of the software.

The "RM-1000 Version 1.2 Software Verification and Requested information Validation Report," Document No. 04508006 Rev. A is (b) Version 1.2 was implemented April 1, 2008 provided. NRC to review.

dated April 2008. (a) What software version does the technical manual address? (b) When was Version 1.2 implemented?

060 7.5.2 7.5.1 April 19, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed NA NA Addressed by Open Item No. 47 EICB Responder: Clark (Carte) The PAMS System Requirements Specification Date: 4/19/2010 (SysRS) references RG 1.97 Rev. 3 where the FSAR Duplicate of Item 47 Responsibility: NRC References Rev. 2. Please explain.

061 7.5.2 7.5.1 April 19, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed NA NA Addressed by Open Item No. 48

( Responder: Clark EICB (Carte) Reference 16 of the PAMS System Requirements Date: 4/19/2010 C Specification (SysRS) is the Unit 1 precautions Duplicate of Item 48. Responsibility: NRC Limitations and Setpoints document. When and how a

will the transition to the unit 2 document be made.

062 7.5.2 7.5.1 April 19, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed NA NA Addressed by Open Item No. 49

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date Responder: Clark Please provide 00000-ICE-30156 Rev. 6. The PAMS Date: 4/19/2010 SysRS incorporates sections of this document by Duplicate of Item 49 Responsibility: NRC reference.

063 7.5.2 7.5.1 April 19, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed NA NA Addressed by Open Item No. 50 EICB Responder: Clark (Carte) How should the "shall" statements outside of the Date: 4/19/2010 bracketed requirements be interpreted? Duplicate of Item 50 Responsibility: NRC 064 7.5.2 7.5.1 By letter dated March 12, 2010 TVA stated that the Responder: Webb Date: 4/8/2010 Open Open-NRC NA 10/22/10 No question was asked. Open EICB (Carte) target submittal date for the D3 Analysis was April 2, Review item was opened to track 2010. The WBN2 Common Q PAMS provides TVA provided roughly a page comm8ittment made by redundant signal processing and indication of two of description as to why a D3 TVA to provide applicant.

RG-1.97 Type A variables: Core-Exit analysis is not required. The requested Temperature (CET) and Subcooled Margin. In the NRC requires additional information.

event of a common-cause failure of the Common information to determine the Q PAMS, instrumentation diverse from Common acceptability of this response.

TVA to provide Q is available for these two variables. Wide date when Range (WR) Hot Leg Temperature indication is Included in Rev. 1 of the information will be specified as a diverse variable for CET in the Licensing Technical Report. docketed.

Post-Accident Monitoring Design Criteria, WB-DC-30-7 (Attachment ). WR Hot Leg Temperature indication from all four hot legs is available on control board indicators and plant computer displays.

Temperature and pressure saturation margin calculations are also performed in the plant computer independently of Common Q utilizing different hardware and software. Isolated outputs from the Eagle 21 protection system are provided to the plant computer for four WR Hot Leg Temperature channels and four WR RCS Pressure channels. The temperature channels and two of the pressure channels are the same as those used in the Common Q saturation margin calculations.

The plant computer temperature saturation margin is calculated as the difference in the maximum temperature input and the saturation temperature of the minimum pressure input. The temperature saturation margin is displayed as point ID U0987.

The plant computer pressure saturation margin is calculated as the difference in the minimum pressure input and the saturation pressure of the maximum temperature input. The pressure saturation margin is displayed as point ID U0984.

Reactor Vessel Level Indication (RVLIS) is defined as a Type B1 variable. Redundant indication for this variable is provided by the core exit thermocouples/Thot and reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure. So long as the RCS pressure is greater than the saturation pressure for the temperature indicated by the core exit thermocouples/Thot, there is reasonable assurance that a steam void has not formed in the

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date core and the vessel is full. This is indicated by the subcooled margin monitor/plant computer previously discussed.

065 7.5.2 7.5.1 By letter dated March 12, 2010 TVA stated that the Responder: WEC Date: 5/25/10 Open Open-NRC NA No question was asked. Open EICB (Carte) target submittal date for the FMEA was August 31, Review item was opened to track 2010. Attachment 37 contains the proprietary version of FMEA provided in 10/5 comm8ittment made by the Common Q PAMS FMEA and the affidavit for letter. applicant.

withholding. A non-proprietary version will be provided at a later date.

066 7.5.2 7.5.1 By letter dated March 12, 2010 TVA stated that the Responder: WEC Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed NA No question was asked. Open EICB (Carte) target submittal date for the "Watts Bar 2 PAMS item was opened to track Software Design Description (two documents, one for Per Westinghouse letter WBT-D-1961 (Reference Regulations require that the comm8ittment made by flat panel display and one for AC160)" was March 31, 8), these items are available for audit at the NRC review be based on applicant.

2010. Westinghouse Rockville office. docketed material. The SRP directs that reviewer to review

• WNA-SD-00250-WBT Rev. 0 (AC160) was the Software Design submitted on TVA letter to the NRC dated August Specification (sometimes 20, 2010 (Reference 7). called an SDD).

• WNA-SD-00248-WBT, Rev. 0 (FPDS) was submitted on TVA letter to the NRC dated SEPT NNC 8/25/10: By letter dated 2, 2010 (Reference 8). august 20, 2010, one (Reference 7) SDD has been provided.

067 7.5.2 7.5.1 By letter dated March 12, 2010 TVA stated that the Responder: WEC Date: 5/25/10 Open Open NA 12/3/10 No question was asked. Open EICB (Carte) target submittal date for the "Commercial Grade item was opened to track Dedication Instructions for AI687, AI688, Upgraded PC The following status is from the revised WB2 This item is addressed in Rev. TVA to provide comm8ittment made by node box and flat panels." was September 28, 2010. Common Q PAMS ISG-6 Compliance Matrix 2 of the Licensing Technical requested applicant.

submitted in response to Item 43: Report information.

a. AI687, AI688 - Scheduled for September 28, TVA to provide 2010 date when information will be

b. Upgraded PC node box and flat panel displays docketed.

- Per Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2024 (Reference 7), these items are available for audit at the Westinghouse Rockville office.

c. Power supplies - Per Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2035 (Reference 12), these items are available for audit at the Westinghouse Rockville office.

To be addressed during 9/20-9/21 audit 068 7.5.2 7.5.1 By letter dated March 12, 2010 TVA stated that the Responder: WEC Date: 5/25/10 Open Open NA 12/3/10 No question was asked. Open EICB (Carte) target submittal date for the "Summary Report on item was opened to track acceptance of AI687, AI688, Upgraded PC node box, The following status is from the revised WB2 This item is addressed in Rev. TVA to provide comm8ittment made by flat panels, and power supplies." was September 28, Common Q PAMS ISG-6 Compliance Matrix 2 of the Licensing Technical requested applicant.

2010. submitted in response to Item 43: Report information.

a. AI687, AI688 - Scheduled for September 28, TVA to provide 2010 date when information will be

b. Upgraded PC node box - Per Westinghouse docketed.

letter WBT-D-2024 (Reference 7), this item is available for audit at the Westinghouse Rockville office.

c. Flat panel displays - Per Westinghouse letter

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date WBT-D-2024 (Reference 7), this item is available for audit at the Westinghouse Rockville office.

d. Power supplies - Per Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2035 (Reference 12), these items are available for audit at the Westinghouse Rockville office.

To be addressed during 9/20-9/21 audit 069 7.5.2 7.5.1 By letter dated March 12, 2010 TVA stated that the Responder: WEC Date: 5/25/10 Open Open NA No question was asked. Open EICB target submittal date for the "Watts Bar 2 PAMS item was opened to track (Carte) Specific FAT Report" was October 2010. Awaiting for document to be Due 2/18/11 comm8ittment made by docketed by TVA. applicant.

070 7.5.2 7.5.1 By letter dated March 12, 2010 TVA stated that the Responder: WEC Date: 5/25/10 Open Open-TVA to NA 12/21/10 No question was asked. Open EICB (Carte) target submittal date for the "Concept and Definition provide revised item was opened to track Phase V&V Report" was March 31, 2010. Per Westinghouse letter WBT-D-1961, Regulations require that the document. comm8ittment made by (Reference 8) this document is available for audit NRC review be based on applicant.

at the Westinghouse Rockville office. docketed material. Awaiting for document to be docketed WNA-VR- 00283-WBT, Rev 0 was submitted on by TVA.

TVA letter to the NRC dated August 20, 2010 (Reference 7). NNC 8/25/10: Requirements Phase SVVR provided by TVA The submitted V&V did not address the letter dated 8/20/10.

Requirements Traceability Matrix and did not summarize anomalies. At the September 15th public meeting, Westinghouse agreed to include the Concept and Definitions Phase Requirements Traceability Matrix (RTM) in the next IV&V report along with partial Design Phase updates to the RTM.

071 7.5.2 7.5.1 By letter dated March 12, 2010 TVA stated that the Responder: Clark Date: 5/25/10 Open Open NA 12/21/10 No question was asked. Open EICB target submittal date for the "Design Phase V&V item was opened to track (Carte) Report" was July 30, 2010. Verify schedule dates for the next submittal of this Awaiting for document to be Due 12/21/10 comm8ittment made by matrix against update WEC schedule. docketed by TVA. applicant.

072 7.5.2 7.5.1 By letter dated March 12, 2010 TVA stated that the Responder: Clark Date: 5/25/10 Open Open NA 12/21/10 No question was asked. Open EICB target submittal date for the "Implementation Phase item was opened to track (Carte) V&V Report" was September 30, 2010. Verify schedule dates for the next submittal of this Awaiting for document to be Due 12/21/10 comm8ittment made by matrix against update WEC schedule. docketed by TVA. applicant.

073 7.5.2 7.5.1 By letter dated March 12, 2010 TVA stated that the Responder: Clark Date: 5/25/10 Open Open NA 12/31/10 No question was asked. Open EICB target submittal date for the "Integration Phase V&V item was opened to track (Carte) Report" was October 29, 2010. Verify schedule dates for the next submittal of this Awaiting for document to be Due 12/31/10 comm8ittment made by matrix against update WEC schedule. docketed by TVA. applicant.

074 7.5.2 7.5.1 By letter dated March 12, 2010 TVA stated that the Responder: Clark Date: 5/25/10 Open Open NA No question was asked. Open EICB target submittal date for the "Final V&V Report" was item was opened to track (Carte) November 30, 2010. Verify schedule dates for the next submittal of this TVA to provide due date. Due comm8ittment made by matrix against update WEC schedule. applicant.

075 7.5.2 7.5.1 By letter dated March 12, 2010 TVA stated that the Responder: Clark Date: 5/25/10 Open Open NA 11/24/10 No question was asked. Open EICB target submittal date for the "Watts Bar 2 PAMS item was opened to track (Carte) Specific FAT Procedure" was September 30, 2010. Verify schedule dates for the next submittal of this Awaiting for document to be Due 11/24/20 comm8ittment made by matrix against update WEC schedule. docketed by TVA. applicant.

076 7.5.2 7.5.1EIC By letter dated March 12, 2010 TVA stated that the Responder: Clark Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed to OI 71 NA No question was asked. Open B

(Cart target submittal date for the "Watts Bar 2 PAMS and 41(4) item was opened to track e)

Specific Processor Module Software Test" was August Verify schedule dates for the next submittal of this Awaiting for document to be comm8ittment made by

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date 31, 2010. matrix against update WEC schedule. docketed by TVA. applicant.

077 7.5.2 7.5.1 By letter dated March 12, 2010 TVA stated that the Responder: WEC Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed NA 10/22/10 No question was asked. Open EICB (Carte) target submittal date for seven other documents was item was opened to track "TDB". Please provide a schedule for the docketing of The availability dates for these documents are Open comm8ittment made by the remaining documents. included in the revised WBN2 Common Q ISG-6 applicant.

Compliance Matrix submitted in response to item Regulations require that the

43. As stated in the March 12, 2010 letter NRC review be based on (Reference 4), the dates in the matrix are the docketed material. Awaiting dates the documents will be available to TVA to for document to be docketed prepare for submittal or being Available for by TVA.

Audit. They do not reflect the dates the documents will be submitted to the NRC.

Expected submittal date is two weeks after TVA receives the document.

Note: There is a typo in the matrix in line item 33.

The power supply entry date says TBD. Per Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2035 (Reference 12) this item is complete and the documents are available for audit at the Westinghouse Rockville office.

The Licensing Technical Report now includes a SPM compliance matrix. Submit a revised response.

078 4/26/2010 Responder: Clark Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed to OI323 EICB (Garg)

FSAR Section 7.1.2.1.8 adds a reference 6 to the (Q1) The cross reference information is corrected Awaiting TVA response. FSAR AMD 100 FSAR. However, Reference 6 is for instrument in FSAR Amendment 100 submitted to the NRC SSER 13 for unit 1 setpoint and has nothing to do with the diversity on TVA letter to the NRC dated August __, 2010 references rev. 1 discussion on the FSAR Section. We believe the TVA (Reference 2). of WCAP 13869.

wants to add reference 7 which is the diversity Rev. 2 is used for document, WCAP 13869, "Reactor Protection System (Q2) WCAP-13869 revision 1 was previously Unit 2. Identify all Diversity in Westinghouse Pressurized Water reviewed under WBN Unit 1 SER SSER 13 the differences Reactors." Please confirm this and add commitment (Reference 8). Unit 2 references revision 2. A between Rev.1 to revise FSAR to correct the reference. (Q1) Also, review to identify the differences and justify their and Rev.2 and confirm whether this WCAP has been reviewed by acceptability will be performed by September 30, justify their NRC, if yes, provide reference and if not, then submit 2010 and submitted to the NRC no later than acceptability.

the WCAP to NRC. (Q2) Also provide the justification November 15, 2010.

for this reference to WBN2. (Q3)

(Q3) Westinghouse confirmed the applicability of this WCAP to Watts Bar Unit 2 in letter WBT-D-1321, Final Response to WBT-TVA-0713 Unit 2 WCAP Reviews, dated December 2, 2009 (Reference 10).

079 4/26/2010 Responder: Clark Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed EICB (Garg)

FSAR Section 7.1.2.1.9, Trip Setpoints, adds (Q1) WBN Unit 2 is licensed based on WBN Unit This item is closed reference to 3, 4, and 5. However, reference 3 was 1. The WBN Unit 1 licensing basis is ISA-DS- as it will be deleted by FSAR amendment 81. Reference 4 has 67.04-1982. Therefore this methodology is used reviewed under been changed to ISA-DS-67.04-1982. Justify for the same SSDs for WBN Unit 2. This item 154. FSAR applicability of this standard for WBN 2.(Q1) Why the maintains consistency in the licensing bases for AMD 100 latest ISA standard endorsed by NRC has not been both units.

used? (Q2) Also reference 5 is a topical report for Eagle 21, system. Please confirm that this topical (Q2) Please refer to the response to Q1.

report also discusses the setpoint for Eagle 21 system and whether it meets the recent guidance for the (Q3) FSAR Reference 4 is the Eagle 21 Topical setpoint issued by the staff. (Q3) Also, W setpoint Report. FSAR Reference 5, WCAP-17044,

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date methodology do not provide discussion on the AS Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Found Tolerance and As left value determination and Protection Systems Watts Bar Unit 2 submitted how these values are used for the instrument under TVA letter to the NRC dated February 12, operability, therefore, add the discussion of these 2010 (Reference 11) discusses the setpoint topics in the FSAR. (Q4) and add reference to other methodology used for Eagle 21 loops.

documents if it is discussed in some other document.

(Q5) Provide this document to the staff for review and (Q4) (Q4) FSAR Amendment 100 which was approval. (Q6) submitted on TVA letter to the NRC dated September 1, 2010 (Reference 2) incorporates as-found and as-left setpoint tolerance discussion into section 7.1.2.1.9, adds EEB-TI-28, Setpoint Methodology to the section 7.1 references and adds a reference to 7.1.2.1.9 to section 7.2.1.1.10.

(Q5) Please refer to the response to Q4.

(Q6) EEB-TI-28, Setpoint Methodology was submitted in TVA letter to the NRC dated May 13, 2010 (Reference 12).

080 4/26/2010 Responder: WEC Closed Closed EICB (Singh) FSAR Table 7.1-1, Note 12 has been added to the A revised note was included in the 7/30 letter NRC review table but it's justification has not been provided to the along with justification for the note. complete.

staff for review and approval.

081 7.5.2 7.5.1 5/6/2010 Responder: Merten/WEC Open Open 12/31/10 EICB (Carte)

The PAMS Licensing Technical Report (WNA-LI- The codes and standards documents listed in ML101600092 Item No.1: TVA to provide 00058-WBT Rev. 0, Dated April 2010), in Section 7, Section 7 of the Common Q PAMS Licensing There are three sets of requested lists codes and standards applicable to the Common Q Technical Report are the documents that the regulatory criteria that relate to information.

PAMS. This list contains references to old revisions of Common Q platform was licensed to when the a Common Q application (e.g.

several regulatory documents, for example: NRC approved the original topical report and WBN2 PAMS): TVA to provide (1) RG 1.29 - September 1978 vs. March 2007 issued the approved SER. The WBN Unit 2 (a) Common Q platform date when (2) RG 1.53 - June 1973 vs. November 2003 Common Q PAMS is designed in accordance with components - Common Q TR information will be (a) IEEE 379-1994 vs. -2000 the approved Common Q topical report and (b) Application Development docketed.

(3) RG 1.75 - September 1975 vs. February 2005 approved SER and the codes and standards on Processes - Common Q SPM (a) IEEE 384-1992 vs. -1992 which the SER was based. Since the current (c) Application Specific -

(4) RG 1.100 - June 1988 vs. September 2009 versions referenced are not applicable to WBN current regulatory criteria (a) IEEE 344-1987 vs. -2004 Unit 2, there is no basis for a comparison review. The Common Q Topical (5) RG 1.152 - January 1996 vs. January 2006 Report and associated (a) IEEE 7-4.33.2-1993 vs. -2003 Bechtel to develop a matrix and work with appendices primarily (6) RG 1.168 - September 1997 vs. February 2004 Westinghouse to provide justification. addressed (a) and (b). The (a) IEEE 1012-1986 vs. -1998 Common Q SER states:

(b) IEEE 1028-1988 vs. -1997 (7) IEEE 279-1991 vs. 603-1991 Appendix 1, Post Accident (8) IEEE 323-1983 vs. -1974 (RG 1.89 Rev. 1 June Monitoring Systems, provides 1984 endorses 323-1974) the functional requirements However, LIC-110, "Watts Bar Unit 2 License and conceptual design Application Review," states: "Design features and approach for upgrading an administrative programs that are unique to Unit 2 existing PAMS based on should then be reviewed in accordance with the Common Q components current staff positions." Please identify all differences (page 58, Section 4.4.1.1, between the versions referenced and the current staff Description)On the basis positions. Please provide a justification for the of the above review, the staff acceptability PAMS with respect to these differences. concludes that Appendix 1 does not contain sufficient information to establish the generic acceptability of the proposed PAMS design (page

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date 56, Section 4.4.1.3, PAMS Evaluation)

The NRC did not approve the proposed PAMS design.

Section 6, References, and Section 7, Codes and Standards Applicable to the Common Q PAMS, of the PAMS Licensing Technical Report contain items that are not the current regulatory criteria.

Please provide an explanation of how the WBN2 PAMS conforms with the application specific regulatory criteria applicable to the WBN2 PAMS design. For example IEEE Std. 603-1991 Clause 5.6.3, Independence Between Safety Systems and Other Systems, and Clause 6.3, Interaction Between the Sense and Command Features and Other Systems, contain application specific requirements that must be addressed by a PAMS system.

Awaiting TVA Response.

082 7.5.2 7.5.1 5/6/2010 Responder: WEC Date: Open Open EICB (Carte) 6/18/10 The PAMS Licensing Technical Report (WNA-LI- Regulations require that the Revision 1, Due 00058-WBT Rev. 0, Dated April 2010), in Section 2.3, These components can be found in the Summary NRC review be based on 10/22/10 lists hardware/software changes to the Common Q Qualification Report Of Hardware Testing For docketed material. Awaiting PAMS previously reviewed by the NRC. However the Common Q Applications, 00000-ICE-37764, Rev for document to be docketed Common Q ISG-6 Compliance Matrix does not contain 3 and by TVA.

activities that address qualification of all changes TWICE Qualification Status Report, WNAQR-specifically: 00011-SSP Per Westinghouse letter WBT-D- NNC 8/9/10: per telephone 2024, (Reference __) dated June 9, 2010, these conversation on 8/5/10, it is documents are available for audit at the not clear how Westinghouse Westinghouse Rockville Office. Commercial Grade Dedication Plans and Reports for Digital TVA provided information by letter dated July 30, I&C. Westinghouse agree to 2010 (ML102160349) - See Enclosure 1 Item No. present to the NRC in a public

7. meeting on August 17, 2010, and explanation of how their Revision 1 of the Licensing Technical Report system addresses regulatory provides additional detail on the platform specific criteria for both commercial to WBN2 and references to the evaluation grade dedication and documentation. equipment qualification.

NNC 8/25/10: In the August 17, 2010 public meeting Westinghouse stated that the CDI were the plans. The NRC

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date requested that the plans and associated reports be docketed.

083 7.5.2 7.5.1 May 6, 2010 Date: 6/18/10 Closed Closed EICB (Carte)

Responder: WEC Please identify all FPGAs in the new or changed Date: 5/6/2010 PAMS hardware. The FPGAs used in the Common Q PAMS Responsibility: TVA AC160 module are listed in Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2166, (Attachment 5), which provides both the proprietary and non-proprietary information. Attachment 6 (provided by Reference 11) contains the affidavit for withholding for WBT-D-2166-P-Attachment (contained in Attachment 5)..

Additionally, Westinghouse states in, Westinghouse Letter WBT-D-2170, (Reference

10) that their review of Flat Panel displays and PC Node Boxes concluded that they do not contain any FPGAs.

084 7.5.2 7.5.1 May 6, 2010 Date: 6/18/10 Closed Closed EICB (Carte)

Responder: Clark Please provide: TVA Design Criteria WB-DC-30-7 Date: 5/6/2010 Rev. 22, Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation. Attachment 5 contains Design Criteria WB-DC Responsibility: TVA 7 Rev. 22, Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation. Document received 085 7.5.2 7.5.1 5/6/2010 Responder: WEC Open Open 11/24/10 EICB (Carte)

Please provide a detailed description of the PAMS Is the WEC ISG4 evaluation inadequate? A response will be provided by Hardware is in MTP data link to the plant computer. This description 10/31/10 Rev. 1 of the should identify all equipment (model & version) and Operation of the MTP as a barrier device. MTP Licensing describe the functions that each piece of equipment Fails as a barrier device. Describe what prevents NNC 8/11/10: Design Technical Report performs. This description should be of sufficient a MTP failure from propagating to the AC160? information should be due 10/22.

detail for the NRC to independently evaluate the available now. By letter dated statements made in WNA-LI-00058-WBT Rev. 0, Node loss on the bus? Bus loss? July 30, 2010 (ML102160349) NNC 8/25/10:

Section 5.3. TVA stated that the MTP was Disagree with path Revise the ISG4 section of the Licensing connected to a Red Hat Linux forward input by Technical Report (Rev. 2) to provide a more Server (see Enclosure 1, Item TVA above. An detailed description of the MTP as a barrier No. 14 part b.). It is presumed explanation is device. that this server is not safety- about the design is related. IEEE 603-1991 needed.

Clause 5.6.3(1) states, "Isolation devices used to FAT test affect a safety system procedure to boundary shall be classified as include data part of the safety system." storm testing of the MTP interface Please describe how the MTP due 11/24/10 serves as the isolation device.

086 7.5.2 7.5.1 5/6/2010 Responder: WEC Date: 5/24/10 Open Open 12/31/10 EICB (Carte)

The PAMS Licensing Technical Report (WNA-LI- The regulatory documents listed in the Common TVA to address with item OI TVA to provide 00058-WBT Rev. 0, Dated April 2010), in Section 6, Q PAMS Licensing Technical Report are the 81. requested lists references applicable to the Common Q PAMS. documents that the Common Q platform was information.

This list contains references to old revisions of several licensed to when the NRC approved the original regulatory documents, for example: topical report and issued the approved SER. The TVA to provide (1) DI&C-ISG04 - Rev. 0 (ML072540138) vs. Rev. 1 WBN Unit 2 Common Q PAMS is designed in date when (ML083310185) accordance with the approved Common Q topical information will be However, LIC-110, "Watts Bar Unit 2 License report and approved SER and the regulatory docketed.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date Application Review," states: "Design features and documents on which the SER was based. Since administrative programs that are unique to Unit 2 the current versions referenced are not applicable should then be reviewed in accordance with the to WBN Unit 2, there is no basis for a comparison current staff positions." Please identify all differences review.

between the versions referenced and the current staff positions. Please provide a justification for the Rev 0 of the Licensing Technical Report acceptability PAMS with respect to these differences. references Rev. 1 of ISG4 087 7.5.2 7.5.1 May 6, 2010 Date: 5/24/10 Closed Closed EICB Responder: Slifer (Singh) Regarding the Sorrento RM-1000 Digital Radiation Date: 5/6/2010 Processor: Please identify the model and version to be The rate meter is model RM-1000. The software Responsibility: TVA installed. Please include explicit identification of is version 1.2 software version.

088 7.5.2 7.5.1 May 6, 2010 Date: 5/24/10 Closed Closed EICB Responder: Slifer (Singh) Regarding the Sorrento RM-1000 Digital Radiation Date: 5/6/2010 Processor: Please provide prior software V&V reports. See response to item 56 Responsibility: TVA The latest report only addresses Version 1.2.

089 5/6/2010 Responder: Clark Closed Closed NNC: Docketed response states EICB (Carte) that the applicable FSAR What FSAR functions are implemented using Foxboro The list of FSAR functions is listed in TVA letter Sections are:

Intelligent Automation (IA)? dated March 12, 2010, Enclosure 1, item 12 5.6 -

7.2.2.3.2 - Garg FSAR Section 7.7.11 will add a discussion of the 7.2.2.3.3 - Garg DCS. 7.2.2.3.4 - Garg 7.2.2.3.5 - Garg See item 4 for questions on failure modes and 7.2.3 - Garg mesh network. 7.6.8 -

7.7.1.6 -

7.7.1.7 -

7.7.1.8 -

9.3.4.2.1.C -

10.4.7.2 -

090 5/6/2010 Responder: Clark Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed EICB (Carte)

What FSAR Systems are implemented using Foxboro The list of FSAR functions is listed in TVA letter Intelligent Automation (IA)? dated March 12, 2010, Enclosure 1, item 12 FSAR Section 7.7.11 will add a discussion of the DCS.

See item 4 for questions on failure modes and mesh network.

091 7.4 7.4 May 20, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed EICB (Darbali)

Responder: Clark TVA to submit excerpts of EDCRs 52421, 52987, Two EDCRs have been Item is Closed and 52321, 52351 and 52601 1. Attachment 6 contains the EDCR 52421 submitted. TVA has agreed to replaced by items excerpt submit the remaining EDCRs. 103, 104 and 118.

2. Attachment 7 contains the EDCR 52987 excerpt

3. EDCR 52321 is scheduled to be issued Oct 13, 2010. Submittal of EDCR 52321 excerpts is tracked by Responses to Licensee Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval item 103 due October 31,2010.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date

4. EDCR 52351 is scheduled to be issued November 30, 2010. Submittal of EDCR 52351 excerpts is tracked by Responses to Licensee Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval item 104 due December 15, 2010.

5. Attachment 8 contains the EDCR 52601 (RVLIS) excerpt. The RVLIS EDCR has been split into two EDCRs. The second EDCR is 55385. Submittal of EDCR 55385 excerpts is tracked by Responses to Licensee Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval item 118 due November 15, 2010.

092 5/20/2010 Responder: Hilmes Open Open DORL (Poole) TVA to review Licensee Open Item list and determine Next review due 6/18/10 Continuous review which items are proprietary. as items are added 093 May 20, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed EICB (Garg)

Responder: Knuettel TVA to submit a letter committing to include setpoint methodology discussion in the FSAR no later than Letter Sent 5/25/10 amendment 100.

094 5/20/2010 Responder: Clark Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed EICB (Garg) TVA to locate and provide information on the TMI This item is described in FSAR amendment 98, NRC staff will review.

action item to add an anticipated reactor trip on turbine Section 7.2.1.1.2 item 6 page 7.2.9, and Table trip to the design bases in the FSAR 7.2-1 item 14, page 7.2-39.

095 7.8.1, XX May 20, 2010 Date: Closed Closed EICB (Darbali)

7.8.4 Responder

TVA to review SER supplements 5 and 14 item 7.8.1 Response is satisfactory. Item and supplement 4 item 7.8.4 and confirm if they are Q1: Monitoring of the reactor coolant system relief Closed.

identical to Unit 1. If not provide differences. valve position is the same as Unit 1.

Q2: The reactor trip on turbine trip is the same as Unit 1.

096 7.7.5 XX 5/20/2010 Responder: Closed Closed OI 283 EICB (Darbali)

TVA to provide information on implementation of IEN IEN 79-22 is not specifically listed or discussed in Response provided. NRC 79-22 and how it is addressed in the FSAR the WBN Unit 1 UFSAR or Unit 2 FSAR. IEN 79- staff to review response.

22 is one of the precursors to 10CFR50.49 environmental qualification. The initial SQN and See Follow up question 283.

WBN Unit 1 response was developed prior to TVA implementing 10CFR50.49. As such, the discussion of safety-related actuations is no longer valid. In implementing 10CFR50.49, TVA upgraded susceptible safety-related devices located in harsh environments to fully qualified devices. For WBN Unit 2, only fully qualified safety-related devices are installed in areas susceptible to a high energy line break. The non-safety-related device/systems within the scope of IEN 79-22 are:

1. Steam generator power operated relief valve

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date control system

2. Pressurizer power operated relief valve control system

3. Main feedwater control system

4. Automatic rod control system.

Failure of these systems/devices due to a high energy line break is fully addressed in Chapter 15, Accident Analysis of the WBN Unit 2 FSAR.

097 7.4.2 7.4 May 20, 2010 Date: Closed Closed EICB (Darbali)

Responder:

TVA to review SER Supplement 7 item 7.4.25 Response is satisfactory.

deviation on Aux Control Room display of RCS cold The deviation to not have RCS cold leg leg temperature for applicability to Unit 2. temperature displayed in the Auxiliary Control Room was approved as part of the WBN Unit 1 initial license. WBN Unit 2 complies with the WBN Unit 1 Licensing bases and this deviation is applicable to Unit 2.

098 7.4.2 7.4 May 25, 2010 Date: Closed Closed EICB Responder:

Unit 1 SER Supplement 7, RCS Cold Leg Response is satisfactory.

(Darbali) Temperature instrumentation. How does Unit 2 Refer to the response to Item 13 11 above.

address this change?

099 April 12, 2010 Date: Close Closed Closed to Item 129 DORL (Bailey)

Responder: WEC TVA will provide non-proprietary versions of the following Common Q attached proprietary documents and the affidavits for the proprietary documents by June 30, 2010.

1. System Design Specification WNA-DS-01667-WBT, Rev. 1

2. System Requirements Specification WNA-DS-01617-WBT, Rev. 1

3. Watts Bar 2 - Common Q PAMS ISG-6 Compliance Matrix dated March 4, 2010

4. Watts Bar Unit 2 (WBN2) Post Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Licensing Technical Report LTR-RCPL-10-XX

5. Software Requirements Specification WNA-SD-00239-WBT, Rev. 1 100 5/20/2010 Responder: WEC Closed Closed NA No question was asked. Open EICB (Carte) item was opened to track The following Common Q proprietary documents listed The documents, and affidavits for withholding for TVA has not yet docketed all comm8ittment made by in the response and the affidavits for the proprietary the listed documents were submitted to the NRC items requested. applicant.

documents will be provided by April 9, 2010. on TVA letter to the NRC dated April 8, 2010.

1. System Design Specification WNA-DS-01667-WBT, Rev. 1

2. System Requirements Specification WNA-DS-01617-WBT, Rev. 1

3. Watts Bar 2 - Common Q PAMS ISG-6 Compliance Matrix dated March 4, 2010

4. Watts Bar Unit 2 (WBN2) Post Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) Licensing Technical Report LTR-RCPL-10-XX

5. Software Requirements Specification WNA-SD-00239-WBT, Rev. 1 101 DOR 4/12/2010 Responder: Slifer Open Open-NRC 10/14/10 TVA is working with the vendor L

(Poo Review to meet the 6/30 date, however le)

The non-proprietary versions of the following RM- The documents, and affidavits for withholding for there is the potential this will slip

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date 1000, Containment High Range Post Accident the listed documents were submitted to the NRC Confirm receipt. to 7/14.

Radiation Monitor documents will be provided by June on TVA letter to the NRC dated July 15, 2010.

30, 2010.

1. V&V Report 04508006A

2. System Description 04508100-1TM

3. Qualification Reports 04508905-QR, 04508905-1 SP, 04508905-2SP, 04508905-3SP

4. Functional Testing Report 04507007-1TR 102 May 24, 2010 Date: 5/24/10 Closed Closed NA NA Request for schedule not EICB (Carte)

Responder: WEC information.

Provide a schedule for resolution of items 80, 82 and Date:

83 Item 80 - no later than July 23, 2010 Responsibility:

Item 82 - no later than July 23, 2010 Item 83 - no later than July 23, 2010 103 7.4 7.4 5/27/2010 Responder: Ayala Date: 5/27/10 Open Open Submittal date is based on EICB (Darbali) current EDCR scheduled issue TVA to submit excerpts of EDCR 52321 Attachment ?? contains the draft Scope and EDCR is scheduled for issue Due 10/31/10 date.

Intent, Unit Difference and Technical Evaluation. 10/13/10 The final documents will be submitted within two weeks of when the EDCR is issued. (Ayala to provide the documents) 104 7.4 7.4 5/27/2010 Responder: Merten Date: 5/27/10 Open Open Submittal date is based on EICB (Darbali) current EDCR scheduled issue TVA to submit excerpts of EDCR 52351 Attachment ?? contains the draft Scope and EDCR is scheduled for issue Due 10/31/10 date.

Intent, Unit Difference and Technical Evaluation. 11/30/10 The final documents will be submitted within two weeks of when the EDCR is issued. (Merten to provide the documents) 105 April 29, 2010 Date: Closed Closed EICB (Garg)

Responder: Langley Provide As-Found/As-Left methodology procedure Date: 5/27/10 Submitted copy of TI-28 May 14/2010. Responsibility: NRC Replaced with new open item 176.

106 May 6, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed EICB (Singh)

Responder: Davies Confirm that the Unit 1 and Unit 2 CERPI systems Date:

utilize the same processor (AC110 or AC160). Westinghouse Unit 2 Drawing 6D31420, Watts Responsibility:

Bar 2- CERPI AC160 Chassis Configuration, Rev. 2, shows the processors are model AC160, which are the same that are utilized for Unit 1, as shown on Westinghouse drawing 2D82995 Rev.

0, Watts Bar CERPI AC 160 Chassis Configuration.

107 May 6, 2010 Date: 5/28/10 Closed Closed EICB Responder: Clark (Singh) Describe any control functions associated with the Requested information See RM-1000 radiation monitors. The RM-1000 radiation monitors do not provide provided. NRC to review. ML101940236, any control functions. Encl 1, Item 29.

108 May 6, 2010 Date: 5/25/10 Closed Closed EICB (Garg)

Responder: Webb/Hilmes We are requested to docket the fact that the This item is to be worked with This item is closed appropriate sections of chapter 7 of the FSAR will be This item is addressed as follows: item 51. as it will be updated to include references to: reviewed under 109. FSAR Amendment 100 which item 154. FSAR

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date

a. TI-28 to address as-found/as-left issues was submitted on TVA letter to the NRC AMD 100

b. RISC 2006-17 dated August __, 2010 incorporates as-found and as-left setpoint tolerance discussion into section 7.1.2.1.9, adds EEB-TI-28, Setpoint Methodology to the section 7.1 references and adds a reference to 7.1.2.1.9 to section 7.2.1.1.10.

2. TSTF-493, Rev. 4 Option A has been incorporated into the Unit 2 Tech Spec submittal dated February 2, 2010.

109. 5/6/2010 Responder: NA Closed Closed NA NA Duplicate of another open Item.

b EICB (Carte) The reviewer was unable to identify the sections of the TVA Provided response J. Wiebe accepted this action. NRC Action FSAR that correspond to the standard review plan sections7.9.

109. 7.8 XX 5/6/2010 Responder: NA Closed Closed a EICB The reviewer was unable to identify the sections of the TVA Provided response J. Wiebe accepted this action. NRC Action (Darbali) FSAR that correspond to the standard review plan sections 7.8.

110 May 6, 2010 Date: Closed Closed EICB (Garg)

Responder: Clark The reviewer was unable to locate the Eagle 21 WCAPs 12374 and 12375 for review within the NRC These items were docketed under ML073550386 records. We agreed to provide the ADAMS numbers for the submittal.

111 May 6, 2010 Date: 5/28/10 Closed Closed NA NA Request to help find, not a EICB (Carte)

Responder: Clark request for information.

The reviewer was unable to locate information (SER) Date:

on the plant computer or annunciator systems and The annunciator system is not described in the Responsibility:

asked us to provide the location within the FSAR WBN Unit 1 UFSAR. As such it is not included in where these systems are described. the WBN Unit 2 FSAR.

With the exception of the ERFDS functions in section 7.5, the plant computer is not described in the WBN Unit 1 UFSAR. As such it is not included in the WBN Unit 2 FSAR.

112 June 1, 2010 Date: Close Closed EICB Responder: Clark (Garg) What are the differences between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Eagle 21 Systems? This information is included in TVA letter dated March 12, 2010, Enclosure 1, Item 10.

113 6/1/2010 Responder: Clark Closed Closed EICB (Garg) Are the new model Eagle 21 power supplies installed Yes. Attachment 9 provides a work order excerpt Attachment 9 does not show in Unit 1? and unit difference form. the vendor and model no. of Revised attachment provided on 7/30 letter. the Power Supply.

114 7.2 7.2 6/1/2010 Responder: WEC Open Open-TVA 10/31/10 EICB (Garg)

Provide the resolution of the Eagle 21 Rack 5 lockup The following non-proprietary response was TVA to provide justification The write-up on update issue. developed from proprietary Westinghouse letter that there are no more shows that there WBT-D-2027 (Reference 11), which provided the surprises. was differences resolution of this issue. Westinghouse approved between Unit 1 this non-proprietary response via e-mail from A. and 2 but was not Drake to M. Clark on June 15, 2010. identified to NRC in earlier As documented in WBT-D-1917, Eagle-21 Rack response. Are

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date 5 LCP Diagnostic Failures, (Reference 14), there any more during the factory acceptance testing for the Unit surprises like this?

2 Eagle-21 System, Westinghouse noted an occasional diagnostic failure while performing the parameter update function on Rack 5.

Subsequently, TVA provided to Westinghouse for testing and examination, a Loop Control Processor (LCP) board removed by TVA from Unit 1 Rack 5 for life cycle-based preventive maintenance. TVA personnel familiar with Unit 1 had indicated they had not experienced problems when performing parameter updates on Unit 1 Rack 5.

Based on Westinghouse examination and testing, a difference in hardware was identified between the Unit 1 LCP shipped to Westinghouse, the new Unit 2 Rack 5 LCP, and an older LCP (older than the Unit 1 LCP) from the Westinghouse Eagle 21 test bed. Installed on the Unit 1 LCP was a different version of an 80287 math coprocessor chip (80287 XL).

This version of the 80287 had an improved specification for calculation speed. Use of this chip on both the Unit 2 LCP and the test bed LCP allowed proper performance of the LCP when making parameter updates using the Unit 1/Unit 2 Rack 5 software. Also, use of the slower 80287 on any of the three LCP boards caused failure in parameter update with the Unit 1/Unit 2 Rack 5 software.

Through investigation of historical records, Westinghouse found that the 80287 XL chip had been evaluated and used by its former Process Control Division (now Emerson) for this application, but the current Westinghouse documentation had not been updated. This part has now been evaluated, and the Westinghouse documentation and drawing have been revised to allow use of the 80287 XL coprocessor. The 80287 XL coprocessor has been installed on the Unit 2 Rack 5 LCP, and the appropriate factory acceptance testing has been successfully conducted using this updated board. Additionally, the LCP boards in the balance of the Unit 2 racks have been updated with the 80287 XL coprocessor.

115 2/25/2010 Responder: Clark Closed Closed EICB (Carte)

Provide a list of digital 1E systems that have a digital Response states that Eagle21 and the CQ PMAS The CQ PAMS SysRS (WNA-communications path to non safety related systems MTP have communications links to non-safety- DS-01617-WBT Rev. 1 Figure and if it has: related systems.. 2..1-1) shows that the OM has

a. Been reviewed before for unit 1 a TCP interface to non-safety.

b. Or installed in unit 1 under 50.59, or The original design allowed printing from both the Please provide a list of ALL

c. Is unique to unit 2 Operator Module (OM) and Maintenance and Test digital communications paths Panel (MTP) via the plant computer. This to non-safety-related systems.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date required both to be connected to the plant computer. Westinghouse did not perceive this as NNC 8/12/10: The staff an issue, because the standard Common Q pointed out this inconsistency PAMS design includes both the flat panel displays to TVA. The staff could and individual control panel indicators. The consider PAMS Licensing Westinghouse Common Q team did not realize Technical Report to be a that WBN does not use the individual control correction if TVA specifically panel indicators. As a result, the original design identified the inconsistency to documents provided by Westinghouse included the staff, or identified where the connection from the OM to the plant the error in the SysRS, SRS, computer. & SDS had already been identified. This appears to be The TVA team did not realize that the a feature in the CQ TR Westinghouse design relied on the OM and MTP appendix that was carried to be qualified isolation devices that protected the forward to WBN2 PAMS AC160 functions and individual control panel inappropriately indicators from interference from the plant computer. It was not until a meeting was held with TVA, Westinghouse and Bechtel to discuss the design of the OM that the issues came to light. That was when Westinghouse understood that the OM was the PAMS display and WBN did not use individual control panel indicators and TVA/Bechtel understood that the OM was being credited as the qualified isolation device. It became apparent at the meeting to both TVA/Bechtel and Westinghouse that the original design was not acceptable. The team then agreed to delete the OM connection to the plant computer.

116 6/3/2010 Responder: WEC Closed Closed Letter sent to Westinghouse EICB (Garg) requesting the basis information The Eagle 21 boards originally had a conformal The response to this RAI was submitted in TVA How is the tin and documentation for submittal coating. However, the new boards do not. Provide letter to the NRC dated June 21, 2010. whisker issue is to the NRC.

the basis for deletion of the conformal coating. addressed. I think As previously stated the technical reason for the conformal coating coating was to ensure performance at high was credited to humidity, with the major concern being the effects protect against tin of humidity on low level analog circuitry. whisker issue.

Westinghouse letter (WBT-D-2036, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2, Basis for Removal of Conformal Coating Requirement on Eagle 21 Boards (Reference 7) does not credit the conformal coating as addressing the tin whisker issue.

As addressed in Resolution of Generic Safety Issues: Issue 200: Tin Whiskers (NUREG-0933, Main Report with Supplements 1-33),

CONCLUSION The low number of reported events associated with this issue, the lack of any increasing trend, the lack of any apparent decrease in reliability of systems or components due to tin whiskers, the existence of applicable regulatory requirements and programs (i.e., 10 CFR Part 21, the maintenance rule requirements, and the Reactor

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No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date Oversight Program), and the issuance of Information Notice 2005-251878 to alert licensees collectively indicated that tin whiskers did not meet the requirements of NRC Management Directive 6.4. "Generic Issues Program," for further pursuit. Based on the considerations discussed above, RES recommended that the issue be returned to the originator to be evaluated for other possible options. As a result, the issue was DROPPED from further pursuit.1879 Based on the preceding NRC position no further discussion of the tin whisker issue is required.

117 7.1 7.1 6/3/2010 Responder: Webb/Powers Open Open-TVA 10/31/10 EICB (Garg)

Does TVA use a single sided or double sided Reactor Protection System (RPS) (comprised of TVA needs to methodology for as-found and as-left instrument Reactor Trip (RPS) and Engineered Safety address that trip setpoint values. (RIS2006-7) Features Actuation System (ESFAS)) setpoint setpoint and values are monitored by periodic performance of allowable value surveillance tests in accordance with Technical uncertainties are Specification requirements. TVA uses double- not reduced by the sided as-found and as-left tolerances for Reactor reduction factor for Trip and ESFAS trip setpoint surveillance tests as the single sided described in FSAR amendment 100. reduction factor.

TVA response not acceptable. TVA need to clarify if single sided methodology has been used in calculating trip setpoint and allowable value and if it is used then provide justifications.

118 7.4 7.4 6/8/2010 Responder: Merten Open Open Submittal date is based on EICB (Darbali) current EDCR scheduled issue TVA to submit excerpts from EDCR 55385 Attachment ?? contains the draft Scope and TVA has agreed to submit the Due 10/31/10 date. Note: The RVLIS EDCR Intent, Unit Difference and Technical Evaluation. EDCR by 11/15/10. has been split into two EDCRs.

The final documents will be submitted within two The first EDCR is 52601 (Open weeks of when the EDCR is issued. (Merten to Item 91) The second EDCR is provide the documents) 55385.

119 June 10, 2010 Date: Closed Closed EICB (Singh)

Responder:

Submit the non-proprietary version of Sorrento/GA software V&V report version 1.1 04508005 and Provided 7/15/2010 Date: 07/29/10 withholding affidavit Responsibility: NRC TVA provided the non-proprietary version of V&V report version 1.1 04508005 and the withholding affidavit via TVA letter dated July 15, 2010.

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No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date 120 5/6/2010 Responder: Hilmes/Merten/Costley Closed Closed EICB (Carte)

In reviewing the Maintenance Test Panel (MTP) link to TVA responded by letter dated July 30, 2010 NNC 8/9/10: By letter dated the plant computer, the reviewer noted that the MTP (ML102160349) - See Enclosure 1 Item No. 14: July 30, 2010 (ML102160349) software is not purely one directional in that it does Detailed discussion is provided including technical - See Enclosure 1 Item No. 14 allow low level handshaking to support the information on the data diode.

communications protocol. M. Merten/S. Hilmes See Item 85. TVA not crediting the data diode.

a. The reviewer stated that this was a potential a. TVA stated no new concern and requested additional information on how information was found in the MTP was protected from feedback from the plant Westinghouse documentation computer. and that this information would be addressed in the V&V reports, and that the final hardware drawing will be provided. Neither of these two documents will contain the information requested. Please provide a detailed description of the MTP hardware connections and the software that perform the communications.

b. The reviewer stated that in the Oconee review, it b. The information provided was found that the non-safety related data diode was indicates that the MTP is easier to credit than a software barrier. It was connected directly to a non-suggested we look at changing our position to credit safety-related Red Hat Linux the data diode provided it provided a physical barrier Server which is then to feedback. Need OWL Information SAH connected to the data diode devices. Please describe the secure development and operational environment of these Red Hat Linux Servers.

c. During this discussion, the reviewer asked if we had c. The answer is not complete.

information from Westinghouse that demonstrated the A chattering node is one of the ability of Common Q PAMs to withstand a data storm. failure modes of an Ethernet A verbal response was that this was required by link. The MTP is connected to contract as part of the Factory Acceptance Test and a Linux server over an would not be available until the FAT was completed. Ethernet link. What prevents Need to docket the verbal response and provide a this link from locking up the date the information will be available. Believe we MTP by a data storm?

stated this in the Tech Report. SAH 121 5/6/2010 Responder: Webb/Webber Closed Closed EICB (Carte)

If not previously provided, provide the requested The information in the letter provides references information in items a, b and c for changes to all to previous submittals and a cross reference for platforms between Unit 1 and 2. (Specific request for the Foxboro I/A system.

information on Foxboro IA). D. Webb/H. Webber

a. Describe the hardware differences between unit 1 and unit 2

b. Identify which systems have been transferred to the Foxboro Spec 200 system that utilize a different platform in Unit 1.

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No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date

c. Identify the functions (ensure all control functions are addressed) that have been transferred to the Foxboro Spec 200 system that utilize a different platform in Unit 1.

122 June 14, 2010 Date: Closed Closed EICB Responder: WEC (Carte) Provide a date for completing the next revision of the Common Q PAMS System Requirements This is a duplicate of NRC RAI Matrix Item 50 and Specification. is considered closed.

123 7.7.3 7.4.1, 6/14/2010 Responder: Closed Closed ML101720589, EICB (Darbali) 9.3.4. RAIs 21 and 22, 2.4 Safety Evaluation(SE) Section 7.7.3 Volume Control 1. The devices in the Volume Control Tank Level Follow up question is to 6/25/10 Tank Level Control System Control System have been replaced. The Volume request a logic diagram 284.

Control Tank Level Indication and Control

1. Confirm whether or not any Instrumentation & functions have been relocated to the Foxboro IA Control (I&C) systems or equipment have been system. The transmitters and indicators have changed in the Volume Control Tank Level Control been replaced with 4-20mA technology and the System. transmitters have been changed to Rosemount.

2. In the original Safety Evaluation(SE), NUREG-0847 2. Upscale failure of LT-62-129A: Flow is diverted (ML072060490), Section 7.7.3, the staff addressed a to the holdup tank but makeup continues to concern that was raised by Westinghouse regarding maintain level and alarms alert the operator.

an adverse control and protection system interaction.

(a single random failure in the VCT level control Upscale failure of LT-62-130A: Unlike Unit 1, the system could cause the letdown flow to be diverted to makeup control system uses inputs from both LT-the liquid holdup tank). Based on your responses to 62-130A and LT-62-129A. This results in a more the staffs questions related to this concern, the staff robust design that eliminates a single point of considered the issue resolved. Confirm that your failure for LT-62-130A. If transmitter LT-62-130A responses are applicable to Unit 2. fails >20mA, the system disregards the input and uses the LT-62-129A signal for control. If transmitter LT-62-130A is high but <20 mA, the deviation between the two causes an alarm, and the diverter valve loop and makeup control both use the last good value of the average. Once the level goes high or low, alarms on LT-62-129A alert the operator to take action to mitigate.

124 7.7.5 XX 6/14/2010 Responder: Closed Closed ML101720589, EICB (Darbali)

Item No. 23, SE Section 7.7.5 IE Information Notice 79-22 Duplicate of item 96 6/25/10

1. In the original SE, Section 7.7.5, the staff determined that Information Notice 79-22 was resolved based on your statement that the control and logic functions of the Watts Bar plant were identical to the Sequoyah plant, thus making the Sequoyah evaluation applicable to Watts Bar. Confirm that your statements regarding the control and logic functions are applicable to Unit 2s control and logic functions or describe any changes and why they are acceptable.

125 7.7.8 7.7.1. 6/14/2010 Responder: Closed Closed ML101720589, EICB (Darbali) 12 Item No.s 24 SE Section 7.7.8 AMSAC 1. The AMSAC system was not previously and 25, 6/25/10 installed in Unit 2. EDCR 52408 installs the

1. Confirm whether or not any I&C systems or system. Attachment 3 contains excerpts from the equipment have been changed in the AMSAC? EDCR that describe the Unit 2 system and how it Describe the changes, if any. differs from the Unit 1 system.

2. NUREG-0847, Supplement 14 (ML072060486), 2. EDCR 52408 incorporates the AMSAC system

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date documents the staffs review of FSAR Amendment 81 into the Unit 2 drawings.

that found that the AMSAC automatic initiation signal

[to start the turbine-driven and motor-driven AFW pumps] was not added to the logic diagram for the AFW system shown in FSAR Figure 7.3-3, Sheet 2.

The issue was resolved in Amendment 88. Confirm that this signal has been incorporated in the Unit 2 drawings.

126 7.8 7.8 June 14, 2010 Date: Closed Closed ML101720589, EICB (Darbali)

Responder: Item No. 26, SE Section 7.8 NUREG-0737 Items 6/25/10 No I&C components or systems are affected by

1. In the SER Cross Reference To FSAR table (06 this change.

09), section 7.8.5 Confirm Existence of Anticipatory Reactor Trip Upon Turbine Trip (II.K.3.12) has the following scope of change:

Common Station Service Transformers (CSST) A and B, eight (8) vital inverters vs. four, fifth DG will be removed from FSAR, Double breaker, double breaker scheme of the new Watts Bar 500kV switchyard.

Is any I&C system or component affected in the scope of this change?

127 7.2 7.2 6/16/2010 Responder: WEC/Clark Closed Closed EICB (Garg)

Provide the status of the Eagle 21 Rack 2 RTD The following non-proprietary response was accuracy issue. developed from proprietary Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2034 (Reference 15), which provided the details of this issue. Westinghouse approved this non-proprietary response via e-mail from A. Drake to M. Clark on June 16, 2010.

During the Watts Bar Unit 2 Eagle 21 Factory Acceptance Test (FAT) of Rack 2 it was discovered that the narrow range Resistance Temperature Detector (RTD) temperature inputs were consistently reading about 0.2 °F higher than expected. Investigation revealed that these inputs are configured in the Loop Calculation Processor software as a shared RTD. This is incorrect. Rack 2 RTD's are not shared. Racks 6, 10 and 13 RTD's are. Configuration as a shared RTD input alters the equation used for the temperature calculation. Watts Bar Unit 1 uses identical software to Unit 2.

Further investigation by Westinghouse showed this configuration error causes the Narrow Range Temperatures for only Division I to read 0.2 to 0.27 °F higher over the Narrow Range span of 510-650 °F. The 0.2 °F shift affects Thot and Tcold equally and thus will not affect the indication of Delta T. Tavg will indicate high by 0.2 °F which will decrease the Over temperature and Overpower set points; which is in the conservative direction.

128 7.2 7.2 C B

(G 6/18/2010 Responder: WEC Drake /TVA Craig Open Open - TVA to TVA Unit 1 has to address first ar provide response and Unit 2 will follow Unit 1.

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No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date Submit the report on the final resolution of the Eagle 21 Rack 2 RTD input issue Due 10/31/10 129 6/12/2010 Responder: WEC Open Open-NRC NA NA DORL (Poole)

Review TVA will provide non-proprietary versions of the The documents, and affidavits for withholding for following Common Q attached proprietary documents the listed documents were submitted to the NRC Confirmation by and the affidavits for the proprietary documents by on TVA letter to the NRC dated July 14, 2010. 10/14/108 June 30, 2010.

1. System Design Specification WNA-DS-01667-WBT, Rev. 1

2. System Requirements Specification WNA-DS-01617-WBT, Rev. 1

3. Software Requirements Specification WNA-SD-00239-WBT, Rev. 1 130 6/28/2010 Responder: Clark Open Open-NRC DORL Review (Poole) TVA committed to revise in Amendment 100: table 4.3- FSAR Amendment 100 submitted to the NRC on 1 to add ID and OD nomenclature to thimble guide TVA letter to the NRC dated September 1, 2010 Confirmation by tube dimensions . added the ID and OD nomenclature. 10/14/10 131 6/28/2010 Responder: Clark Open Open-NRC DORL Review (Poole) TVA committed to revise in Amendment 100: FSAR FSAR Amendment 100 submitted to the NRC on 3.10 references to eliminate (LATER) for document TVA letter to the NRC dated September 1, 2010 Confirmation by numbers. updated the reference document number 10/14/10 information.

132 6/28/2010 Responder: Clark Open Open-NRC DORL Review (Poole) TVA committed to revise in Amendment 100: FSAR FSAR Amendment 100 submitted to the NRC on 3.10 to correct differences between the list on page TVA letter to the NRC dated September 1, 2010 Confirmation by 3.10-4 and the numbering referenced by the text below corrected the numbering in the text. 10/14/10 the list.

133 6/28/2010 Responder: Clark Open Open-NRC DORL (Poole)

Review TVA committed to revise in Amendment 100: FSAR FSAR Amendment 100 submitted to the NRC on 3.10 to remove references to IEEE 344-1987. TVA letter to the NRC dated September 1, 2010 Confirmation by removed the reference to IEEE 344-1987. 10/14/10 134 6/28/2010 Responder: Clark Open Open-NRC DORL Review (Poole) TVA committed to revise in Amendment 100: FSAR FSAR Amendment 100 submitted to the NRC on Table 1.3-3 to reflect modifications to WBN2 . TVA letter to the NRC dated September 1 2010 Confirmation by updated the table to reflect the WBN2 10/14/10 modifications.

135 7.3.1 7.3.1 6/30/2010 Responder: Clark Closed Closed EICB TVA committed to add in Amendment 100 a reference FSAR Amendment 100 submitted to the NRC on Amendment 100 received.

(Darbali) to 7.3.1.1.1 in 6.2.5.2.b. TVA letter to the NRC dated Sept 1, 2010 added the reference.

136 7.3.2, 7.4, 6/30/2010 Responder: Clark Closed Closed EICB (Darbali) 7.4 5.6, 6.3.5 TVA committed to replace in Amendment 100 the FSAR Amendment 100 submitted to the NRC on Amendment 100 received.

terms "service water" and "emergency raw cooling TVA letter to the NRC dated Sept 1, 2010 water" where they are used incorrectly with "Essential updated the "service water" and "emergency raw Raw Cooling Water" in sections 7.4, 6.2.1, Table 3.7- cooling water" nomenclature as required to read 25, Table 9.3-3, Table 15.4-14, 1.9.2.7, 7.3.2.2.5 and essential raw cooling water.

( 11.2.4.

137 Several WBN2 PAMS documents contain a table titled, Responder: WEC Closed Closed ML101650255, C

a

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No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date Document Traceability & Compliance. Item No. 1 (a) The table is to show the document hierarchy Carte accepted this response (a) Please explain the purpose of this table. (i.e., what documents are predecessors to the 9/1 document in relationship to the design life cycle).

(b) Please describe how this table is different than a reference list. (b) This table is showing a hierarchical relationship between documents. These (c) What does it mean for a document to be listed in documents are also in the reference list along this table? with other documents that have no hierarchical relationship with the document.

(c) This question is similar to (a). It is to identify the documents that are predecessors to this document in relationship to the design life cycle.

138 By letter dated February 3, 2010, Westinghouse This item is used to track all Commercial Open Open - TVA ML101650255, EICB (Carte) informed TVA that certain PAMS documentation has Grade Dedication issues. Item No. 2 been completed. To be addressed by Rev. 2 of the (a) The draft ISG6 states that a commercial grade Licensing dedication plan should be provided with an application Technical Report for a Tier 2 review. due 12/3.

By letter dated February 5, 2010, TVA stated that the Due 12/3/10 commercial grade dedication plan was included in the Common Q Topical Report Section 11, Commercial Grade Dedication Program. Section 11 includes a description of the Common Q Commercial Grade Dedication Program, and states: A detailed review plan is developed for each Common Q hardware or software component that requires commercial grade dedication.

Please provide the commercial grade dedication plans for each Common Q hardware or software component that has not been previously reviewed and approved by the NRC.

(b) The draft ISG6 states that a commercial grade dedication report should be provided within 12 months of requested approval for a Tier 2 review.

(i) Please provide 00000-ICE-37722 Rev. 0, Commercial Grade Dedication Report for the QNX Operating System for Common Q Applications.

(ii) Please provide WNA-CD-00018-GEN Rev. 3, Commercial Dedication Report for QNX 4.25G for Common Q Applications.

139 The WBN2 PAMS System Requirements Specification Responder: WEC Closed Closed ML101650255, WBN2 PAMS System EICB (Carte)

(WBN2 PAMS SysRS) contains a table (see page iii) Item No. 3 Requirements Specification titled, Document Traceability & Compliance, which The table is to show the document hierarchy (i.e.,

states that the WBN2 PAMS SysRS was created to what documents are predecessors to the TVA docketed WNA-DS-01617-support no documents. Please explain. document in relationship to the design life cycle). WBT Rev. 1, RRAS Watts Bar 2 The table purpose is to provide references to NSSS Completion Program I&C internal Westinghouse documents and is not Projects Post Accident intended to reference TVA documents. Monitoring System- System Requirements Specification, dated December 2009.

(

140 The first requirement in the WBN2 PAMS SysRS (i.e., Responder: Clark Open Open - TVA ML101650255, WBN2 PAMS System C

a

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No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date R2.2-1) states: The PAMS shall be capable of Item No. 4 Requirements Specification operation during normal and abnormal environments WBN Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 100 Section To be addressed and plant operating modes. The rational for this 7.5.1.8 by Rev. 2 of the TVA docketed WNA-DS-01617-requirement is that it is necessary to meet Regulatory Licensing WBT Rev. 1, RRAS Watts Bar 2 Guide (RG) 1.97. Technical Report NSSS Completion Program I&C due 12/3. Projects Post Accident What document specifies which RG 1.97 variables are Monitoring System- System implemented in the Common Q based WBN2 PAMS? Due 12/3/10 Requirements Specification, dated December 2009.

141 Deleted by DORL Date: Closed Closed ML101650255, WBN2 PAMS System EICB (Carte)

Responder: Item No. 5 Requirements Specification TVA docketed WNA-DS-01617-WBT Rev. 1, RRAS Watts Bar 2 NSSS Completion Program I&C Projects Post Accident Monitoring System- System Requirements Specification, dated December 2009.

142 The applicable regulatory guidance for reviewing the Responder: WEC Open Open - TVA ML101650255, WBN2 PAMS System EICB (Carte)

WBN2 PAMS SysRS would be IEEE 830 as endorsed Item No. 6 Requirements Specification by Regulatory Guide 1.172 and BTP 7-14 Section This item is used to track all traceability To be addressed B.3.3.1, Requirements Activities - Software issues with the Software Requirements by Revision of TVA docketed WNA-DS-01617-Requirements Specifications. IEEE 830-1994 Section Specification (SRS). the RTM, SRS, WBT Rev. 1, RRAS Watts Bar 2 4.3.8, Traceable, states: A [requirements SysRS, and NSSS Completion Program I&C specification] is traceable of the origin of each of its At the September 15 public meeting in Rockville, SysDS. Projects Post Accident requirements is clear the following actions were agreed to. These Monitoring System- System items address the traceability concerns with the Due 12/31/10. Requirements Specification,

1. How did TVA ensure the traceability of each Software Requirements Specification. dated December 2009.

requirement in the WBN2 PAMS SysRS.

1. Westinghouse will perform completed a

2. Explain the source(s) of the requirements present review of the Requirements Traceability in the Post Accident Monitoring Systems Matrix(RT), using the issues identified at the Software Requirements Specification. To clarify, 9/15 public meeting as a guide (documented many documents have requirements that are below) and update the RTM as required.

incorporated by reference into the SRS, but what served to direct the author to include those 2. The next issue of the IV&V report will include various documents in the SRS or, if the the Requirements phase review of the RTM requirement is based on the System and a partial review for the Design phase.

Requirements Specification, what directed the author to include the requirement there? 3. Westinghouse will add a comments column in the Requirements Traceability Matrix (RTM)

3. Clarify whether the unnumbered paragraphs in the to address items not in the SRS or SysRS.

Post Accident Monitoring Systems Software Requirements Specification, such as in the 4. IEEE 830 says you shouldnt have planning section headings, or are all such sections simply information in the SRS. Westinghouse has considered to be informative? agreed to remove this information.

Does the same apply to documents referenced by 5. IEEE 830 says you shouldnt have process the SRS? Such as WCAP-16096-NP-A, Rev. 1A, requirements in the SRS. Westinghouse has Software Program Manual for Common Q agreed to remove these requirements.

Systems, which is incorporated by reference in requirement R2.3-2 in the SRS. 6. Westinghouse will perform and document an evaluation of the SRS to ensure compliance R2.3-2 [The PAMS software shall comply with with Reg. Guide 1.172 and justify any the requirements and guidelines defined in WCAP- deviations.

16096-NP-A, Software Program Manual for Common Q Systems (reference 5).] 7. 25 issues identified by V&V where some requirements have not been included in the

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No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date If any requirements are expressed in such SDS (14) and SRS (11) at the revisions unnumbered paragraph form instead of reviewed by V&V. Have these been individually identified requirements, please list addressed? Yes. The next revisions of the them, describe why they satisfy the fundamental SDS and SRS address these issues.

requirement of unambiguity, and describe how they were verified. 8. Some hardware requirements are contained in the SRS instead of the System Design

4. Are there any sources of requirements in parallel Specification (SDS). These will be removed with the Post Accident Monitoring Systems from the SRS and incorporated into the next Software Requirements Specification? Meaning revision of the SDS.

does the SRS contain, explicitly or by reference, all the requirements that were used in the design 9. RTM item R4.2-2 protection class software phase for the application specific software, or do set to 0. Needs to be fixed internally write software design phase activities use requirements CAPs to revise the application restrictions found in any other source or document? If so, document on AC160.

what are these sources or documents?

10. Westinghouse to improve the traceability of

5. References 12, 27, 29, and 31-44 in the Post the tests that are performed with the function Accident Monitoring Systems Software enable (FE) switch in the ENABLE position.

Requirements Specification are various types of Reusable Software Element. 11. Westinghouse to revise documents to be consistent with referring to the FE switch in These references are used in the body of the the ENABLE position SRS, for example:

12. The flow of information is from the SysRS to R5.3.14-2 [The Addressable Constants CRC error the SDS (hardware) and SRS (software).

signal shall be TRUE when any CAL CRC's Describe how the documents are used.

respective ERROR terminal = TRUE (WNA-DS- Describe in 1.1 of the SysRS. Need a good 00315-GEN, "Reusable Software Element write up of how the process works.

Document CRC for Calibration Data" [Reference 12]).] 13. Westinghouse and TVA will develop a revised schedule for document submittals and provide They are also included via tables such as found in it to the NRC no later than 9/30/10 requirement R7.1.2-1

14. TVA will update the Procurement Requisition

[The Watts Bar 2 PAMS shall use the application- Resolution Matrix and submit it to show how specific type circuits and custom PC elements the Common Q PAMS design meets the listed in Table 7.1-1.] contract requirements.

Do the referenced reusable software element 15. Westinghouse to add the Software Design documents include requirements not explicitly stated in Descriptions to the RTM the SRS? If so what is their origin?

16. Westinghouse to clarify how requirements or documents are incorporated by reference into the Common Q PAMS requirements.

17. Westinghouse to review the use of shall outside of numbered paragraphs in requirements documents to ensure that all requirements are captured and clearly identified.

18. Westinghouse to resolve the following questions concerning SDDs

a. Is the SDD a standalone document or will it incorporate the generic SDD by reference?

b. What are the SDDs?

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No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date

c. PAMS is a delta document so how do we capture all the generic requirements for traceability.

For Reusable Software Elements, Westinghouse to describe as qualified libraries by following the SPM and qualified using the Software Elements Test procedure under Appendix B program.

Provide a summary of RSEDs generic WCAP.

Westinghouse to determine if the WCAP was docketed under the AP1000 RSED concept is not in the SPM. WCAP-15927 AP-1000 does not discuss RCEDs. WCAP process was acceptable.

RSEDs are listed in the SDD References.

143 The WBN2 PAMS Software Requirements Responder: WEC Open Open - TVA ML101650255, WBN2 PAMS System EICB (Carte)

Specification (WBN2 PAMS SRS - ML101050202) Item No. 7 Requirements Specification contains a table (see page iii) titled, Document Addressed in the 9/15 public meeting and 9/20 - To be addressed Traceability & Compliance, which states that the 9/21 audit. A detailed explanation will be by Revision of TVA docketed WNA-DS-01617-WBN2 PAMS SRS was created to support the three provided. the RTM, SRS, WBT Rev. 1, RRAS Watts Bar 2 documents identified (one of which is the WBN2 SysRS, and NSSS Completion Program I&C PAMS SysRS). Section 1.1, Overview, of the WBN2 SysDS. Projects Post Accident PAMS SRS states: This document describes Monitoring System- System requirements for the major software components Due 12/31/10. Requirements Specification, dated December 2009.

(a) Please list and describe each of the major software components. Please include a description of any NRC review for each of these components.

(b) Please list and describe each of the other software components. Please include a description of any NRC review for each of these components.

(c) What other documents contain the requirements for the other software components?

The WBN2 PAMS System Design Specification (WBN2 PAMS SDS) contains a table (see page iii) titled, Document Traceability & Compliance, which states that the WBN2 PAMS SysRS was created to support the WBN2 PAMS SysRS. Section 1.1, Purpose, of the WBN2 PAMS SDS states: The purpose of this document is to define the hardware design requirements (c) Do the WBN2 PAMS SRS and SDS, together, implement all of the requirements in the WBN2 PAMS SysRS?

(d) Please briefly describe all of the documents that implement the WBN2 PAMS SysRS.

144 The WBN2 PAMS Software Requirements Responder: WEC Open Open - NRC ML101650255, WBN2 PAMS Software EICB (Carte)

Specification (WBN2 PAMS SRS) contains a table Review Item No. 8 Requirements Specification (see page iii) titled, Document Traceability & (a) The purpose of NABU-DP-00014-GEN NRC Review and WEC to Compliance, which states that the WBN2 PAMS SRS document is to define the process for system level complete response. Responses to By letter dated April 8, 2010 was created to support the three documents identified design, software design and implementation, and items a and e (ML10101050203), TVA (two of these documents have been provided on the hardware design and implementation for Common b-d to be addressed at public provided. Need docketed WNA-SD-00239-WBT, docket). Q safety system development. This document meeting and audit. Will response to b-d. Revision 1, "RRAS Watts Bar 2 supplements the Common Q SPM, WCAP-16096- require information to be NSSS Completion Program I&C

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No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date (a) Please describe the third document (i.e., NABU- NP-A. The scope of NABU-DP-00014-GEN docketed. Projects, Software Requirements DP-00014-GEN Revision 2, Design Process for includes the design and implementation Specification for the Post Common Q Safety Systems). processes for the application development. For a Accident Monitoring System, fuller description of the design process described dated February 2010 (b) Please describe the flow of information between in NABU-DP-00014-GEN please refer to the (ML101050202).

these three documents. Design Process for AP1000 Common Q Safety Systems, WCAP-15927 on the AP1000 docket.

(c) Does the PAMS SRS implement the requirements Since this is a Westinghouse process document in these three documents? that is not specifically referenced in the SRS, it will be removed in the next revision of the (d) Please describe if and how these three documents document.

are used in the development of the PAMS Software Design Description. (b) - Closed to items 142 and 145 (e) Do the WBN2 V&V activities include verification (c) - Closed 142 ML101650255, that the requirements of these three documents have Item No. 6 been incorporated into the WBN2 PAMS SRS. (d) - Closed to Item 142 (e) WBN2 PAMS Software Requirements Specification (WNA-SD-00239-WBT, Rev. 1) refers to Document Traceability & Compliance table on page iii. This table has three entries; Design Process for Common Q Safety Systems (NABU-DP-00014-GEN, Rev. 2), RRAS Watts Bar 2 NSSS Completion Program I&C Projects Post Accident Monitoring System - System Requirements Specification (WNA-DS-01617-WBT, Rev. 1), and RRAS Watts Bar 2 NSSS Completion Program I&C Projects Post Accident Monitoring System - System Design Specification (WNA-DS-01667-WBT, Rev. 1).

IV&V performed a Requirements Traceability Assessment during which it reviewed Software Requirements Specification (WBN2 PAMS SRS, WNA-SD-00239-WBT, Rev. 1) against System Requirements Specification (WNA-DS-01617-WBT, Rev. 1) and System Design Specification (WNA-DS-01667-WBT, Rev. 1). Requirements within Software Requirements Specification that are referring to NABU-DP-00014-GEN, Rev 2, Design Process for Common Q Safety Systems, have also been reviewed for traceability and compliance. During IV&V's RTA effort the anomaly reports V&V-769 and V&V- 770 have been initiated and reported in the IV&V Phase Summary Report for the System Definition Phase, WNA-VR-00283-WBT, Rev. 0.

IV&V has verified that the requirements in SRS are derived from the specified documents listed in the Document Traceability and Compliance Table of WBN2 PAMS SRS.

145 The WBN2 PAMS System Design Specification Responder: WEC Open Open - TVA ML101650255, WBN2 PAMS System Design EICB (Carte)

(WBN2 PAMS SDS) contains a table (see page iii) Item No. 9 Specification titled, Document Traceability & Compliance, which This item is used to track all traceability To be addressed states that the WBN2 PAMS SDS was created to issues with the System Design Specification by Revision of TVA docketed WNA-DS-01667-support the WBN2 PAMS SysRS. (SDS). the RTM, SRS, WBT Rev. 1, RRAS Watts Bar 2 SysRS, and NSSS Completion Program I&C

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No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date (a) Does the WBN2 PAMS SDS implement all of the At the September 15 public meeting in SysDS. Projects Post Accident hardware requirements in the WBN2 PAMS SysRS? Rockville, the following actions were agreed Monitoring System- System to. These items partially address the Due 12/31/10. Design Specification, dated (b) Please briefly describe all of the documents that traceability concerns with the System Design December 2009.

implement the hardware requirements of the WBN2 Specification. This item will be updated with PAMS SysRS. the results of the September 20 and 21 Commercial Grade Dedication and SDS RTM audit.

1. Westinghouse will perform completed a review of the Requirements Traceability Matrix(RT), using the issues identified at the 9/15 public meeting as a guide (documented below) and update the RTM as required.

2. Some hardware requirements are contained in the SRS instead of the System Design Specification (SDS). These will be removed from the SRS and incorporated into the next revision of the SDS.

3. 25 issues identified by V&V where some requirements have not been included in the SDS (14) and SRS (11) at the revisions reviewed by V&V. Have these been addressed? Yes. The next revisions of the SDS and SRS address these issues.

4. TVA will update the Procurement Requisition Resolution Matrix and submit it to show how the Common Q PAMS design meets the contract requirements.

5. The next issue of the IV&V report will include the Requirements phase review of the RTM and a partial review for the Design phase.

6. Westinghouse to provide the generic AC160 and flat panel specifications.

7. Westinghouse and TVA to develop a schedule of licensing document submittals that can be met by the project team.

8. The flow of information is from the SysRS to the SDS (hardware) and SRS (software).

Describe how the documents are used.

Describe in 1.1 of the SysRS. Need a good write up of how the process works.

146 6/17/2010 Responder: Closed Closed ML101650255, PAMS System Requirements EICB (Carte)

Item No. 10 Specifications Deleted by DORL WBN2 PAMS documents reference generic PAMS documents, for example: WBN2 PAMS SysRS

References:

00000-ICE-30156 Rev. 6, System Requirements

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No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date Specification for the Common Q Post Accident Monitoring System, and 00000-ICE-30155, Rev. 9, System Requirements Specification for the Common Q Generic Flat Panel Display 147 6/17/2010 Responder: Closed Closed ML101650255, PAMS System Requirements EICB (Carte)

Item No. 11 Specifications Deleted by DORL WBN2 PAMS documents reference generic PAMS documents, for example: WBN2 PAMS SysRS

References:

00000-ICE-30156 Rev. 6, System Requirements Specification for the Common Q Post Accident Monitoring System, and 00000-ICE-30155, Rev. 9, System Requirements Specification for the Common Q Generic Flat Panel Display 148 6/17/2010 Responder: Closed Closed ML101650255, PAMS System Requirements EICB (Carte)

Item No. 12 Specifications Deleted by DORL WBN2 PAMS documents reference generic PAMS documents, for example: WBN2 PAMS SysRS

References:

00000-ICE-30156 Rev. 6, System Requirements Specification for the Common Q Post Accident Monitoring System, and 00000-ICE-30155, Rev. 9, System Requirements Specification for the Common Q Generic Flat Panel Display 149 7.2 7.2 FSAR Section 7.1.1.2(2), Overtemperature delta T and Responder: Tindell Close Close ML101720589, EICB (Garg)

Overpressure delta T equations have been simplified Item No. 1 and many values are removed from the FSAR. In FSAR amendment 96 the equations were In FSAR amendment 96, the TVA to provide Provide the justification for this change. revised to agree with the Unit 1 UFSAR which is values of the constants have date when the basis document for the Unit 2 FSAR. This been moved to TS or plant information will be resulted in the equations being simplified and the procedures. Need to docketed. TVA removal of the values for the constants. The document the basis for this need to identify equations were revised to match those used in change. when Unit 1 the Technical Specifications. The values for the UFSAR was constants are contained in the Technical Response is acceptable. revised with this Specifications and were removed as redundant. information.

Additional changes were made in FSAR amendments 98 and 99 to correct typographical errors found during FSAR review.

TVA Revised Response:

This change was incorporated in the Unit 1 FSAR in Amendment 0 as part of FSAR change package 1473.

150 7.2 7.2 C B

(G Many of the changes were based on the Responder: Clark Close Close ML101720589, ar Westinghouse document N3-99-4003. Provide this Item No. 2

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No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date document for staffs review so the staff can determine System description N3-99-4003, Reactor the basis for these changes. Protection System is contained in Attachment 3.

151 7.2 7.2 Provide the EDCR 52378 and 54504 which discusses Responder: Clark Close Close ML101720589, EICB the basis for many changes to this FSAR section. Item No 3 (Garg) EDCR 54504 has been voided and replaced with EDCR 52378 which is contained in Attachment 4 and EDCR 52671 is contained in Attachment 5.

152 7.2 7.2 Deleted portion of FSAR section 7.2.3.3.4 and moved Responder: Merten/Clark Open Open-NRC ML101720589, EICB (Garg) to FSAR section 7.2.1.1.5. However, the FSAR Review 10/21 Item No. 4 section 7.2.1.1.5 does not include the discussion of The text was revised to match the Unit 1 UFSAR.

ambient temperature and also on the calibration of the The Unit 1 text was modified in Amendment 1 by TVA to confirm if sealed reference leg system. No justification was FSAR Change Package 1553 S00 which is this description is provided for deleting this discussion. Please explain contained in Attachment 30. The basis for the the same as for the bases for deletion of this information. change in the change package is: Unit 1. If it is same as Unit 1 16 The update to Section 7.2.1.1.5 is taken from then why this was text in Section 7.2.2.3.4 with clarifications and shown as change editorial changes. The relocated discussion of the in redline version pressurizer water level instrumentation Is more of FSAR appropriately included in this section than Section Amendment 96.

7.2.2.3.4, which deals with control and protection system interaction. The changes to 7.2.1.1.5 are TVA to provide based on a general description of the date when Westinghouse pressurizer level design, channel information will be independence, and actual installation attributes docketed. When found on TVA physical drawings. Also, the Unit 1 UFSAR was hydrogen gas entrainment issue documented in revised.

NRC Information Bulletin No. 92-54, Level Instrumentation Inaccuracies Caused by Rapid Depressurization, is retained and clarified. Similar clarification is made to Reactor Protection System Description N3-9g.4003 Section 3.1.1.2(d). The original text in 7.2.2.3.4 provides some information that is too detailed and is not pertinent to the subject of discussion. It also includes a statement that the error effect on the level measurement during a blowdown accident would be about one inch. The basis for this value is not known; however, the worst case reference leg loss of fill error due to a rapid RCS depressurization event Is no more than 12 inches elevation head. This value is based on the relative elevation difference between the condensing chamber and the reference leg sensor bellows.

The Westinghouse Owners Group response to this issue is found in RIMS # L44930216800. The channel error value discrepancy is documented in WBPER980417. The remaining text in 7.2.2.3.4 is revised to clarify the control and protection system interaction discussion.

TVA Revised Response:

This change was incorporated in the Unit 1 UFSAR in Amendment 1.

153 7.2 7.2 FSAR section 7.2.1.1.7 added the reference to FSAR Responder: Craig/Webb Open Open - NRC ML101720589, EICB section 10.4.4.3 for exception to P-12. However, Review Item No. 5 (Garg) FSAR section 10.4.4.3 states bypass condition is not EDC E50952-A added an alternate method of displayed and it is not automatically removed when RCS cooldown using additional steam dump

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No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date conditions for bypass are no longer met. Provide the valves after entering Mode 4, by disabling the P- TVA will send basis for this. 12 Interlock. Operators use additional condenser 50.59.

dump valves to aid in maintaining a cooldown rate closer to the administrative limit established by TVA to provide operating procedure. date when information will be Refer to Unit 1 UFSAR Amendment 3 Change docketed. TVA Package 1676 S00 (Attachment 6) for the safety did not address evaluation and basis for this change. why bypass condition is not The 50.59 for the change is included in the displayed.

Change Package.

NRC Review The process is controlled by the procedures used 10/21/10 to shutdown and then restart the plant. These procedures install the bypass and then ensure that it is removed prior to starting the plant. The shutdown procedure GO-6 uses Appendix F to bypass the P-12 interlock. One of the steps in GO-6 Appendix F says PLACE Caution Order on 1-HS-1-103A, 1-HS-1-103B, AND 1-PIC-1-33 indicating that P-12 interlock is disabled. This provides indication to the operators that the P-12 interlock is bypassed.

154 7.2 7.2 FSAR section 7.2.1.1.10, setpoints: NRC staff has Responder: Craig/Webb Open Open - TVA ML101720589, EICB (Garg) issued RIS 2006-17 to provide guidance to the Item No. 6 industry regarding the instrument setpoint (Q1) Refer to the response to letter item 13, RAI FSAR AMD 100.

methodology which complies with 10 CFR 50.36 Matrix Item 51. Since all the requirements. Provide the information on how the setpoint and WBN2 setpoint methodology meets the guidance of (Q2) EEB-TI-28's single sided methodology allowable value for RIS 2006-17 and include this discussion in this conforms with WBN's design basis commitment to Unit 2 is calculated section. Also, by letter dated May 13, 2010, TVA ensure that 95% of the analyzed population is and added to TS, provided Rev. 7 of EEB-TI-28 to the staff. The staff covered by the calculated tolerance limits as TVA needs to noted that section 4.3.3.6 of EEB-TI-28 discusses the defined in NRC Reg Guide 1.105, Revision 2, address the latest correction for setpoints with a single side of interest. It 1986 that was in affect during WBN Unit 1 criteria and that should be noted that the staff has not approved this licensing. The single sided methodology is not include 95/95 aspect of setpoint methodology for Unit 1. The staff used for any TSTF-493 setpoints that use TI-28 criteria. Why the finds this reduction in uncertainties is not justified methodology. last sentence has unless it can be demonstrated that the 95/95 criteria is been modified by met. Therefore, either remove this reduction factor for TVA Revised Response: adding TI-28. It single sided uncertainties or justify how you meet the was NRCs 95/95 criteria given in RG 1.105. (Q1) WBN 2 implementation of TSTF-493, understanding that Rev. 4, Option A includes addition of a all setpoints have discussion of the WBN setpoint to meet TI-28 methodology in FSAR section 7.1.2.1.9.

(Q2) EEB-TI-28's single-sided methodology conforms to WBN's design basis commitment to ensure that 95% of the analyzed population is covered by the calculated tolerance limits as defined in NRC Reg Guide 1.105, Revision 2, 1986, which was in effect during WBN Unit 1 licensing. Single-sided multipliers are not used for any TSTF-493 setpoints.

(Q3) Discussion on 95 Hi Confidence.

155 7.2 7.2 EIC Summary of FSAR change document section 7.2 Date: Closed Closed ML101720589, B

(Gar g) states that sections 7.2.1.1.9 and 7.2.2.2(4) are Responder: Stockton Item No. 7 changed to show that these activities will occur in TVA to provide

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No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date future. However, no changes were made to the FSAR The change package summary were the changes date when sections. Please explain. recommended by Engineering. TVA Licensing is information will be responsible for the actual submittal and elected docketed not to incorporate these recommendations. The activities are complete and the text in Amendment 99 of the FSAR is correct.

156 7.2 7.2 FSAR section 7.2.2.1.1 states that dashed lines in Responder: WEC Open Open-TVA ML101720589, Response on hold pending EICB (Garg)

Figure 15.1-1designed to prevent exceeding Item No. 8 Westinghouse review.

121% of power.The value of 121% is changed Per Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2340, TVA to provide from 118%. The justification for this change states TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS date when that this was done to bring the text of this section in BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 FSAR Markups information will be agreement with section 4.3.2.2.5, 4.4.2.2.6 and table Units I and 2 118% vs. 121 % and Correction to docketed 4.1-1. However, Table 4.1-1 and section 4.3.2.2.5 still RAI Response SNPB 4.3.2-7, (Reference 17) the 10/31/10 show this value as 118%. Justify the change. 118% value should be 121%. Depending on the Resolution Date use in the FSAR either 118% or 121% are the correct values. As a result of the question, Westinghouse reviewed all locations where either 118% or 121% are used and the context of use and provided a FSAR markup to reflect the correct value at the specific location. These changes will be incorporated in a future FSAR amendment.

157 7.2 7.2 FSAR section 7.2.2.1.1, fifth paragraph was deleted Responder: Tindell Open Open-TVA ML101720589, EICB (Garg) except for the last sentence. The last sentence states Response Acceptable Due Date 10/31 Item No. 9 that, The P-8 interlock acts essentially as a high The condition is defined in the preceding nuclear power reactor trip when operating in this discussion as operating with a reactor coolant TVA to provide condition. This sentence is confusing because the pump out of service and core power less than date when condition is not defined. Please clarify this 25%. information will be discrepancy. docketed 158 7.2 7.2 FSAR section 7.2.2.1.1, paragraph six was changed to Responder: Tindell Closed Closed ML101720589, EICB (Garg) state that the design meets the requirements of Item No. 10 Criterion 23 of the 1971 GDC instead of the Criterion FSAR Amendment 99 reflects the change to 21 of the GDC. The Criterion 21 is about protection Criterion 23.

system reliability and testability, while Criterion 23 is about protection system failure modes. Since this paragraph deals with the evaluation of design with respect to common-mode failure, the staff believes that Criterion 23 is the right reference for this paragraph. Please clarify.

159 7.2 7.2 FSAR section 7.2.2.1.2 discusses reactor coolant flow Responder: Craig Open Open-TVA ML101720589, EICB (Garg) measurement by elbow taps. However, it further Response Acceptable Due 10/31 Item No. 11 states that for Unit 2, precision calorimetric flow For the purposes of measuring reactor coolant TVA to provide measurement methodology will be used. If elbow taps flow for Reactor Protection functions, elbow taps date when are not used for Unit 2, then why does this section are used for both Unit 1 and 2. The discussion information will be discuss this methodology? It is the staffs and equation are valid for establishing the docketed understanding that TVA plans to use elbow taps nominal full power flow which is used to establish methodology in the future for Unit 2. Please revise this the Reactor Protection System low flow trip section to describe the current plant setpoint. However the method used to verify design/methodology. reactor coolant flow, as required by the Technical Specifications, is not the same. Unit 1 uses a simplified methodology based on elbow tap P measurements correlated with precision calorimetric data over several cycles of operation as described in Reference 17, WCAP-16067, Rev 0, RCS Flow Measurement Using Elbow Tap Methodology at Watts Bar Unit 1. The plan is for Unit 2 to transition to this method after sufficient data is obtained. Pending this transaction, 7.2.2.1.2 will be revised as follows:

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No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date From:

Nominal full power flow is established at the geginning of each fuel cycle by either elbow tap methodology or, performance of the RCS calorimetric flow measurement, (For Unit 1 elbow tap methodology is implemented for RCS flow measurement (Reference [17]) and Unit 2 may implement elbow tap methodology at a future date) the results of which are used to normalize the RCS flow indicators. This provides a reference point for the low flow reactor trip setpoint, and also provides a relatively simple method for periodic verification of the thermal design flow assumed in the safety analysis, as required by the Technical Specifications.

Accuracy and repeatability of the flow measurement instrumentation are considered in establishment of the low flow setpoint and the minimum required flow and are adequate for these functions. This is for Unit 1 only. For Unit 2, the precision calorimetric flow measurement methodology will be used.

To:

Nominal full power flow is established at the beginning of each fuel cycle by either elbow tap methodology or, performance of the RCS calorimetric flow measurement. Unit 1 utilizes elbow tap methodology Reference [17]. Unit 2 utilizes the RCS calorimetric flow measurement.

The results are used to normalize the RCS flow indicators and provide a reference point for the low flow reactor trip setpoint.

160 7.2 7.2 FSAR section 7.2.2.2(7) deleted text which has Responder: Tindell Open Open-NRC ML101720589, EICB (Garg) references 12 and 14. These references are not Review 10/21 Item No. 12 included in the revised text. Provide the basis for the The text was revised to match the Unit 1 UFSAR.

deletion of these references. Also, the revised text The Unit 1 text was modified in Amendment 1 by TVA to provide states that typically this requirement is satisfied by FSAR Change Package 1553 S00 which is date when utilizing 2/4 logic for the trip function or by providing a contained in Attachment 30. The basis for the information will be diverse trip. Provide any exception to this and their change in the change package is: docketed 10/31 basis for acceptability.

23. (page 7.2-24): Portions of the discussion of control and protection system interaction are revised to clarify the requirement. The discussion of how the SG low-low water level protective function and the control system Median Signal Selector satisfy this requirement is deleted since it Is redundant to the information provided In Section 7.2.2.3.5. Reactor Protection System Description N3-99-4003 is also revised to move and clarify the discussion of the requirements for control and protection system Interaction from Section 3.1.1.2 to Section 2.2.11, where the Issue is also discussed.

161 7.2 7.2 FSAR section 7.2.2.3 states that changes to the Responder: Clark Closed Closed ML101720589, EICB control function description in this section are expected Item No. 13 (Garg) to be required after vendor design of the Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 99 reflects the changes Foxboro IA design is complete. Provide the schedule associated with the Foxboro I/A system design.

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No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date for the completion of the design and when this information will be available to the staff for review and approval.

162 7.2 7.2 FSAR section 7.2.2.2(14) states that bypass of a Responder: Tindell Closed Closed ML101720589, EICB protection channel during testing is indicated by an Item No. 14 (Garg) alarm in the control room. Explain how this meets RG The Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication 1.47. System (BISI) compliance with Reg. Guide 1.47 is described in detail in FSAR Section 7.5.2.2.

163 7.2 7.2 C B

(G Deleted by DORL Date: Closed Closed ML101720589, ar Responder: Item No. 15 164 7.2 7.2 FSAR section 7.2.2.2(20) has been revised to include Responder: Perkins Closed Closed ML101720589, Item No. 8 is being drafted EICB (GarglMarcus) 7.5.1. the plant computer as a means to provide information Item No. 16 1 read out for all signals which can cause a reactor trip. The primary purpose of the plant computer is to TVA letter dated 10/5/10 NRC to issue Justify the use of the plant computer for this function. present plant process and equipment status Response 44 provided formal RAI to TVA Include the discussion on the effect of plant computer information to the control room operators to assist information.

failure on the system functions. them in the normal operations of the unit, and inform them of any abnormal conditions. The plant computer obtains real-time plant parameter information via Data Acquisition Systems(DAS)(multiplexers, etc.) by scanning preassigned analog, pulse, and contact sensors located throughout the plant. The computer is not defined as being primary safety-related and it is not required to meet the single failure criterion or be qualified to IEEE criteria for Class 1E equipment.

The plant computer system acquires, processes, and displays all data to support the assessment capabilities of the Main Control Room (MCR). To help ensure that reactor trip and other information presented to the Operations staff is reliable:

• The data undergoes several validation steps before being presented to the operators. When redundant sensors are used, the data received by the computer can be processed by software to determine if the quality of one or more points is questionable.

• Any software associated with the computer and the DAS must meet the quality requirements of plant procedure SPP-2.6, Computer Software Control which is based on requirements in NUREG/CR-4640, the Watts Bar Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan, and SS-E18.15.01 - Software Requirements for Real-Time Data Acquisition and Control Computer Systems, which complies with IEEE Std. 279-1971 Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.

The computer software is controlled by a Software Quality Assurance Plan.

• One of the requirements in 10 CFR 50, Appendix A states that Appropriate controls shall be provided to maintain variables monitored and systems within prescribed operating ranges.

Periodic maintenance and calibration will be performed on the computer and DAS. In addition,

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No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date calibration procedures for instrumentation which is used for input to the computer include verification of the computer input signal at the DAS and as displayed on the display stations.

• The software and associated hardware undergoes a detailed Factory Acceptance Test prior to installation in the plant. After installation in the plant, a Site Acceptance Test (SAT) will be conducted. The SAT will include several tests:

computer accuracy, analog input accuracy, calculated value accuracy, computer performance, system response times, all input/output (from termination strip to display stations/printers), all data ports, and computer power supplies.

• In order to minimize the possibility of bad sensor inputs to the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and/or inaccurate SPDS display of sensor inputs, routine instrument loop calibration of sensors that provide input to the SPDS will include verification that the SPDS-displayed values are correct. WBN's instrument surveillance instructions will incorporate these verifications.

Effect of plant computer failure on system functions The WBN Unit 2 is designed on the basis that it can still operate when the plant computer is inoperable. The computer is not required for safe shutdown of the plant during external design basis events such as tornadoes, floods, rain, and transportation accidents. Operators are trained to respond to accidents both with and without the computer information available. The control room instrumentation provides the operators with the information necessary for safe reactor operations under normal, transient, and accident conditions.

The DAS is mechanically and electrically isolated from the safety systems to avoid degradation of the systems should the computer and/or DAS fail.

The computer is not expected to perform any nuclear safety-related function, therefore, the computer need not be designed to meet nuclear safety-related Class 1E, single-failure criteria.

The computer is not designed to safety system criteria and therefore is not to be used to perform functions essential to the health and safety of the public.

165 7.2 7.2 FSAR section 7.2.2.3.2, last paragraph of this section Responder: Clark Closed Closed ML101720589, EICB (Garg) has been deleted. The basis for this deletion is that Item No. 17 discussion regarding the compliance with IEEE-279, The reference to Section 7.2.2.2 for the general 1971 and GDC 24 is covered in section 7.2.2.2. discussion for control and protection interactions However, there is no reference to this section in is provided in Section 7.2.2.3. The reference in 7.2.2.3.2 to direct the reader to 7.2.2.2. Please revise Section 7.2.2.3 is applicable to all Sub-Section 7.2.2.2 accordingly. paragraphs, including 7.2.2.3.2. An additional

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No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date reference in this section is not necessary and would be redundant to the Section 7.2.2.3 reference.

166 7.2 7.2 Changes to FSAR section 7.2.2.2(20) are justified Responder: Clark Closed Closed ML101720589, EICB based on the statement that the integrated computer Item No. 18 (Garg) system is implemented through EDCR 52322. Provide EDCR 52322 is contained in Attachment .

a copy of EDCR 52322 for staff review.

167 7.2 7.2 FSAR section 7.2.2.4, provide an analysis or reference Responder: Clark Open Open-NRC ML101720589, EICB (Garg) to chapter 15 analysis which demonstrate that failure Review 10/21 Item No. 19 of rod stop during a rod withdrawal event will not affectContinuous rod withdrawal events are analyzed in the safety limit. FSAR sections 15.2.1 and 15.2.2. While the rod stops a mentioned, they are not credited in the analysis.

168 7.2 7.2 FSAR table 7.2-4, item 9 deleted loss of offsite power Responder: Clark Open Open-NRC ML101720589, EICB (Garg) to station auxiliaries (station blackout) based on the Review 10/21 Item No. 20 fact that station blackout is not listed in AAPC events. This change is in accordance with the Unit 1 Explain what are AAPC events and how it justifies UFSAR. The change was made by FSAR deleting this accident from the list. Change Package 1553 S00 (Attachment 30). The justification for the change is:

38 (Table 7.2-4): This table lists the reactor trips and the various accident analyses for which each trip could provide protection. The intent of the table is to demonstrate the diversity of and comprehensive protection provided by the reactor trip system against various postulated events and to correlate the trip functions with the analyses in which they may be utilized, either as a primary or secondary protective function. Chapter 15, along with the Accident Analysis Parameters Checklist, WB-OC-40-70, provides the accident analysis discussion and identifies the protection system functions which provide accident mitigation. The additions and deletions to the table are made for consistency with the safety analyses of record as reflected in the design and licensing basis and do not represent analysis changes or protection system changes. Therefore. they are considered to be non-significant as discussed at the beginning of this section. Neutron Monitoring System Description N3-85-4003 Table 2 is also revised for consistency with WB-DC-40-70.

169 6/18/2010 Responder: Clark Closed Closed EICB (Garg)

Describe the design changes which were made to Unit This is a duplicate of items 2, 10, 11 and 44 1 by 10CFR50.59 process and which significantly affect the instrumentation and controls systems discussed in FSAR Chapter 7.

170 6/17/2010 Responder: Clark Closed Closed EICB (Garg)

TVA needs to document that Arnold Magnetics power This is a duplicate of item 113.

supplies have been used and environmentally qualified at Unit 1 and therefore meet the licensing basis for Unit 2. If these power supplies are not used and qualified in Unit 1, then TVA will have to discuss the qualification of these power supplies based on the guidance provided in RG 1.209 (Open Item # 2 of Eagle 21 audit.)

(

171 7.2 7.2 G 6/17/2010 Responder: Craig Open Open TVA

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date Response 10/20 An external unidirectional communications interface The external Eagle 21 unidirectional was installed between the Eagle 21 test subsystem communications interface will be tested prior to TVA to provide and the plant process computer. TVA should confirm WBN Unit 2 fuel load date when that testing has demonstrated that two way information will be communication is impossible with the described docketed configuration. (Open Item # 3 of Eagle 21 audit) 172 6/17/2010 Responder: Craig Closed Closed EICB (Garg)

During a FAT diagnostic test, the Loop Calculation This is a duplicate of the rack 5 update issue item Processor (LCP) failed while performing a parameter 114.

update. TVA should identify the cause and fix for the problem encountered. (Open Item # 1 of Eagle 21 audit) 173 7.1 7.1 6/17/2010 Responder: Craig/Webb/Powers Closed Closed to OI 154 EICB (Garg)

EEB-TI-28 discusses the correction for setpoints with a Please see the revised response to letter item 3 TVA to provide single side of interest. The staff finds this correction (I&C Matrix Item 154) question (Q1). date when factor is not justified. TVA should justify this correction information will be factor and demonstrate that, with this correction, factor docketed 95/95 criteria identified in RG 1.105 is met.

174 6/28/2010 Responder: Hilmes/Craig Closed Closed EICB (Garg)

Placeholder: The staff has identified questions Duplicate of 171 regarding unidirectional communications interface.

The staff will keep this item open until TVA confirms testing has demonstrated that two way communication is impossible with the described configurations.

175 June 28, 2010 Responder: Closed Closed EICB (Garg)

Placeholder: The staff has identified questions WCAP-13869 rev.2. is submitted in response to In FSAR amendment 98, This item is regarding diversity. The staff will keep this item open item reference 6 added a new covered under until TVA provides the related WCAP to the staff for its WCAP-13869 rev.2. Has this item 78.

review and approval. WCAP been reviewed by the staff. If not then provide the TVA to provide copy of WCAP for staff review. date when information will be docketed.

176 7.1 7.1 6/28/2010 Responder: Craig/Webb Closed Closed to OI 154 EICB (Garg)

Placeholder: The staff has identified questions Setpoint methodology questions are addressed in TVA to provide regarding instrument setpoints. The staff will keep the the revised response to letter item 3 (I&C Matrix date when instrument setpoint methodology issue open until TVA Item 154). information will be provides additional information regarding RIS 2006-17 docketed and single sided correction factor for uncertainty determination.

177 7.5.2. 7.5.1 7/15/2010 Responder: Clark Closed Closed N/A N/A RAI not required EICB (Marcus) 1 FSAR Amendment 99 Section 7.5.1.2 states: "Type A The type A variables are the same in Unit 1 and August 19, 2010 - TVA to 09/16/10 Variables Those variables that provide primary Unit 2. See calculation WBNOSG4047 Rev. 4 submit calculation.

information to the MCR operators to allow them to take (Attachment )

preplanned manually controlled actions for which no Review of Unit 2 FSAR automatic action is provided and that are required for confirms Unit 1 and Unit 2 safety systems to accomplish their safety functions for Type A variables are the Chapter 15 design basis events. Primary information is same.

information that is essential for the direct accomplishment of specified safety functions." Not necessary to docket

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date WBNOSG4047.

Clarify whether Unit 2 has the same Type A variables as Unit 1.

178 7.5.2. 7.5.1 7/15/2010 Responder: Clark Closed Closed N/A N/A RAI not required EICB (Marcus) 1 Please provide WBN-OSG4-047, "PAM Type A See response to item 177 above. August 19, 2010 - TVA to 09/16/10 Variable Determination." submit calculation.

Review of Unit 2 FSAR confirms Unit 1 and Unit 2 Type A variables are the same.

Not necessary to docket WBOSG4047.

179 An emphasis is placed on traceability in System Responder: WEC Closed Closed ML101650255, EICB (Carte)

Requirements Specifications in the SRP, in the Item No. 6 unmodified IEEE std 830-1993, and even more so Steve Clark to look at how to combine traceability given the modifications to the standard listed in items.

Regulatory Guide 1.172, which breaks with typical NRC use of the word should regarding backwards Was addressed to during the 9/15 meeting and traceability to say Each identifiable requirement in an 9/20 - 9/21 audit.

SRS must be traceable backwards to the system requirements and the design bases or regulatory Closed to Item 142.

requirements that is satisfies Discuss how TVA has ensured that there is traceability (and particularly backward traceability) for each requirement. If requirements are not traceable, please explain how the SRS complies with the regulations that underlie the SRP.

180 The SRP, BTP 7-14, Section B.3.3.1 states that Responder: WEC Closed Closed ML101650255, EICB (Carte)

Regulatory Guide 1.172 endorses, with a few noted Item No. 6 exceptions, IEEE Std 830-1993. IEEE Steve Clark to look at how to combine traceability TVA to provide Recommended Practices for Software Requirements items. date when Specifications. information will be Will be addressed to during the 9/15 meeting and docketed Clarify whether the WBU2 Post Accident Monitoring 9/20 - 9/21 audit.

Systems Software Requirements Specification adheres to IEEE std 830-1993 as modified by Closed to Item 142.

Regulatory Guide 1.172?

If yes, please provide an evaluation that includes an identification and description of all differences proposed from the modified standard. Please describe how the alternatives provide an acceptable method of complying with those regulations that underlie the corresponding SRP acceptance criteria.

If no then please provide an evaluation that includes an identification and description of all differences proposed from the acceptance criteria given in SRP ,

BTP 7-14, Section B.3.3.1. Please describe how the alternatives provide an acceptable method of complying with those regulations that underlie the corresponding SRP acceptance criteria.

181 C B

(C An emphasis is placed on traceability in System Responder: WEC Closed Closed ML101650255, art Requirements Specifications in the SRP, in the Item No. 6

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date unmodified IEEE std 830-1993, and even more so Steve Clark to look at how to combine traceability given the modifications to the standard listed in items.

Regulatory Guide 1.172, which breaks with typical NRC use of the word should to say Each identifiable Will be addressed to during the 9/15 meeting and requirement in an SRS must be traceable backwards 9/20 - 9/21 audit.

to the system requirements and the design bases or regulatory requirements that is satisfies Closed to Item 142.

Explain the source(s) of the requirements present in the Post Accident Monitoring Systems Software Requirements Specification. To clarify, many documents have requirements that are incorporated by reference into the SRS, but what served to direct the author to include those various documents in the SRS or, if the requirement is based on the System Requirements Specification, what directed the author to include the requirement there?

182 Characteristics that the SRP states that a Software Responder: WEC Closed Closed ML101650255, EICB (Carte)

Requirements Specifications should have include Item No. 6 unambiguity, verifiability, and style, part of the latter is Steve Clark to look at how to combine traceability that Each requirement should be uniquely and items.

completely defined in a single location in the SRS.

Will be addressed to during the 9/15 meeting and Clarify whether the unnumbered paragraphs in the 9/20 - 9/21 audit.

Post Accident Monitoring Systems Software Requirements Specification, such as in the section Closed to Item 142.

headings, or are all such sections simply considered to be informative?

Does the same apply to documents referenced by the SRS? Such as WCAP-16096-NP-A, Rev. 1A, Software Program Manual for Common Q Systems, which is incorporated by reference in requirement R2.3-2 in the SRS.

R2.3-2 [The PAMS software shall comply with the requirements and guidelines defined in WCAP-16096-NP-A, Software Program Manual for Common Q Systems.]

If any requirements are expressed in such unnumbered paragraph form instead of individually identified requirements, please list them, describe why they satisfy the fundamental requirement of unambiguity, and describe how they were verified.

183 7/15/2010 Responder: WEC Open Open TVA SRS EICB (Carte)

Revision due An emphasis is placed on traceability in System The generic Software Requirements Specification 10/22/10 Requirements Specifications in the SRP, in the applies except as modified by the WBN Unit 2 unmodified IEEE std 830-1993, and even more so System Requirements Specification.

given the modifications to the standard listed in Regulatory Guide 1.172, which breaks with typical NRC use of the word should to say Each identifiable requirement in an SRS must be traceable backwards to the system requirements and the design bases or regulatory requirements that is satisfies On page 1-2 of the Post Accident Monitoring Systems Software Requirements Specification in the

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date background section, is the sentence Those sections of the above references that require modification from the generic PAMS are defined in the document referring purely to the changes from WNA-DS-01617-WBT Post Accident Monitoring System-System Requirements Specification or is it saying that there are additional changes beyond those and that the SRS defines them?

If there are additional changes, what is their origin?

184 7/15/2010 Responder: WEC Closed Closed ML101650255, EICB (Carte)

Item No. 6 The NRC considers that a System Requirements Steve Clark to look at how to combine traceability Specification is the complete set of requirements used items.

for the design of the software, whether it is contained within one document or many. In order to evaluate an Will be addressed to during the 9/15 meeting and SRS against the guidance in the SRP the staff needs 9/20 - 9/21 audit.

access to all the requirements.

Closed to Item 142.

Are there any sources of requirements in parallel with the Post Accident Monitoring Systems Software Requirements Specification? Meaning does the SRS contain, explicitly or by reference, all the requirements that were used in the design phase for the application specific software, or do software design phase activities use requirements found in any other source or document? If so, what are these sources or documents?

185 7/15/2010 Responder: WEC Open Open EICB (Carte)

SRS R1 due 10/22 An emphasis is placed on the traceability of Steve Clark to look at how to combine traceability requirements in Software Requirements Specifications items.

in the SRP, in the unmodified IEEE std 830-1993, and even more so given the modifications to the standard Was addressed to during the 9/15 meeting and listed in Regulatory Guide 1.172, which breaks with 9/20 - 9/21 audit.

typical NRC use of the word should to say Each identifiable requirement in an SRS must be traceable backwards to the system requirements and the design bases or regulatory requirements that is satisfies Also the NRC considers that the SRS is the complete set of requirements used for the design of the software, whether it is contained within one document or many. In order to evaluate an SRS against the guidance in the SRP the staff needs access to all the requirements.

References 12, 27, 29, and 31-44 in the Post Accident Monitoring Systems Software Requirements Specification are various types of Reusable Software Element.

These references are used in the body of the SRS, for example:

R5.3.14-2 [The Addressable Constants CRC error signal shall be TRUE when any CAL CRC's respective ERROR terminal = TRUE (WNA-DS-00315-GEN, "Reusable Software Element Document CRC for Calibration Data" [Reference 12]).]

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date They are also included via tables such as found in requirement R7.1.2-1

[The Watts Bar 2 PAMS shall use the application-specific type circuits and custom PC elements listed in Table 7.1-1.]

Do the referenced reusable software element documents include requirements not explicitly stated in the SRS? If so what is their origin?

186 7.7.8 7.7.1. 7/15/2010 Responder: Perkins/Clark Open Open-NRC EICB (Darbali) 12 Review Along with Amendment 96, TVA submitted a list of No. The previous wording reflected operation of Response is satisfactory.

Bechtel changes for each section. Change number 45 the computer based AMSAC system. The Issue date of Amendment 101 TVA to state that addresses a change to section 7.7.1.12, AMSAC, change reflects the operation of the relay logic is not yet determined. no further FSAR however, the Justification column states This change based system that replaced the original computer changes are is not included. EDCR 52408 installs the AMSAC in based system in Unit 1. Unit 2 is installing a planned.

Unit 2. It does not have a trouble alarms. The existing similar relay logic based system, so the change to words better reflect the operation of the system. the Unit 1 wording is applicable to Unit 2. Due Date 10/31/10 Even thought this change was not included in EDCR 52408 Summary Amendment 96, will it be included in a future amendment? A Purchase Order was issued to Nutherm International to provide a Unit 2 cabinet with the Also, please submit a summary of EDCR 52408. same functions as the current Unit 1 AMSAC.

EDCR 52408 will install the cabinet and route/install cabling to provide the necessary inputs/outputs for/from the AMSAC cabinet.

In the Main Control Room, three cables will be installed for the AMSAC handswitch on 2-M-3 and AMSAC NOT ARMED and AMSAC ACTUATED annunciator windows.

In the Turbine Building, two pressure transmitters will be installed in two local panels to sense turbine pressure. Cables will be routed to the transmitters to provide the signal and power. Four cables will be routed to a local panel to provide steam generator level signals.

In the Control Building, three cables will be routed to separation relays which will provide the start signal for the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, and initiate a Turbine Trip. Additionally, a cable will be routed to Unit 2 ICS for AMSAC NOT ARMED and AMSAC ACTUATED log points.

This EDCR is intended to configure Unit 2 AMSAC like Unit 1 when possible.

Add a statement that there are no further changes to the FSAR 187 EIC By letter dated June 18, 2010, TVA docketed Responder: Clark Open Open-TVA to ML101970033, Are these connections already B

(Cart responses to NRC requests for information. Revise Response Item No. 1 & 2 docketed?

e)

1) The original design was to allow printing from NNC 8/25/10: Why did TVA 12/31

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date

1) Enclosure 1, Item No. 33 of the TVA letter dated both the Operator Module (OM) and Maintenance not catch this on the review of and Test Panel (MTP) via the plant computer.

June 18, 2010, did not identify any connection from the the PAMS SysRS or SRS?

PAMS Operator Modules (OMs) to the plant computer This required both to be connected to the plant Does TVA check that the CQ and printers; however, Figure 2.1-1 of the PAMS computer. Westinghouse did not perceive this as PAMS system meets the System Requirements Specification (WNA-DS-01617- an issue, because the standard Common Q requirements in its purchase WBT Rev. 1 - ML101680578) shows a TCP PAMS design includes both the flat panel displays specifications?

connection from the OMs to the plant computer and and individual control panel indicators. The printer. Please explain. Westinghouse Common Q team did not realize that WBN does not use the individual control

2) Please clarify whether any digital safety-related panel indicators. As a result, the original design systems or components have a digital communications documents provided by Westinghouse included path to non-safety-related systems or with safety the connection from the OM to the plant related systems in another division. If so, NRC staff computer.

will need these paths identified on the docket.

The TVA team did not realize that the Westinghouse design relied on the OM and MTP to be qualified isolation devices that protected the AC160 functions and individual control panel indicators from interference from the plant computer. It was not until a meeting was held to discuss the design of the OM that the issues came to light. That was when Westinghouse understood that the OM was the PAMS display and WBN did not use individual control panel indicators and TVA understood that the OM was being credited as the qualified isolation device.

It became apparent at the meeting to both TVA and Westinghouse that the original design was not acceptable. The team then agreed to delete the OM connection to the plant computer.

2) This is a duplicate of closed RAI Matrix Item 45.

188 By letter dated June 30, 2010, TVA docketed, Responder: Clark Closed Closed to Open ML101970033, EICB (Carte)

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Watts Bar Unit 2 Item 187 Item No. 3 & 4 (WBN2) - Post-Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) 1) The original design was to allow printing from NNC 08/25/10: See Open Item Licensing Technical Report, (Document Number both the Operator Module (OM) and Maintenance No. 187.

WNA-LI-00058-WBT- P, Revision 0, June 2010) and Test Panel (MTP) via the plant computer.

(Westinghouse Proprietary Class 2). This required both to be connected to the plant computer. Westinghouse did not perceive this as

1) Figure 2.2-1 of the PAMS Licensing Topical Report an issue, because the standard Common Q does not show any connection between the Operators PAMS design includes both the flat panel displays Modules and the plant computer or printer; however, and individual control panel indicators. The Figure 2.1-1 of the PAMS System Requirements Westinghouse Common Q team did not realize Specification (WNA-DS-01617-WBT Rev. 1 - that WBN does not use the individual control ML101680578) shows a TCP connection from the panel indicators. As a result, the original design OMs to the plant computer and printer. Please documents provided by Westinghouse included explain. the connection from the OM to the plant computer.

2) Section 5.3, Response to individual criteria in DI&C-ISG-04, of the PAMS Licensing Topical Report The TVA team did not realize that the does not address the TCP connection between the Westinghouse design relied on the OM and MTP OM and non-safety components depicted in Figure to be qualified isolation devices that protected the 2.1-1 of the PAMS System Requirements Specification AC160 functions and individual control panel (WNA-DS-01617-WBT Rev. 1 - ML101680578). indicators from interference from the plant Please explain. computer. It was not until a meeting was held to discuss the design of the OM that the issues came to light. That was when Westinghouse understood that the OM was the PAMS display

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date and WBN did not use individual control panel indicators and TVA understood that the OM was being credited as the qualified isolation device.

It became apparent at the meeting to both TVA and Westinghouse that the original design was not acceptable. The team then agreed to delete the OM connection to the plant computer.

2) This is a duplicate of closed RAI Matrix Item 45.

189 7.6.7 7/20/2010 Responder: Clark Closed Closed EICB (Singh) FSAR Section 7.6.7States: Conformance with This is a typographical error. The correct NNC 8/25/10: Acceptable By FSAR Regulatory Guide 1.133, Revision 1 is discussed in reference is Table 7.1-1. The reference will be response. Amendment 100, Table 7.1-7. FSAR Chapter 7 does not contain any corrected in FSAR Amendment 100. page 7.6-4.

such numbered table. Please explain.

190 7.9 FSAR Table 7.1-1 states: Regulatory Guide 1.133, Responder: Clark Open Open NRC ML101970134, EICB (Singh)

May 1981 Loose-Part Detection Program for the Item Nos. 1-4 Primary System of Light-Water Cooled Reactors, 1) TSR 3.3.6.3 specifies 18 months as the TVA letter of Revision 1 (See Note 12)Note 12 Conforms except calibration frequency. 10/5/2010, as noted belowPositi[o]ns C.3.a.(3) and C.5.c. Attachment 2 recommend a channel calibration be performed at 2) Per the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) provided the least once pe[r] 18 months. In lieu of this Bases 3.3.6 (Attachment 9) the surveillance system recommendation, the DMIMS will be calibrated at the requirements and frequency are provided in description. Staff frequency stated in subsection TSR 3.3.6.3 of TR Regulatory Guide 1.133, "Loose-Part Detection has noticed 3.3.6 (Loose-Part Detection System). Program for the Primary System of Light-Water- missing Cooled Reactors." information in the

1) Clarify what frequency is specified in TSR 3.3.6.3. system description

3) TRM section 3.3.6 and its bases are contained when compared to

2) Please explain why the stated calibration frequency in Attachment 9 to the 10/5/10 response letter. FSAR Amendment is adequate for meeting regulatory requirements. 100. Item stays Need to open. Staff is in

3) Please provide sufficient documentation for the the process of NRC to independently evaluate the conformance identifying the claims stated in the FSAR. missing or discrepant information.

191 7.9 NUREG-0800 Chapter 7, Section 7.9, "Data Responder: Jimmie Perkins Closed Closed ML10197016, EICB (Carte)

Communication Systems" contains review criteria for Item Nos. 1-3 data communication systems. The WBN2 FSAR did WBN Unit 2 is in compliance with the regulatory NNC 8/25/10: Information not include any description of data communications requirements for data communications systems received, and read.

systems. as described in Attachment 34 (Data

1) Please identify all data communications systems. Communications Systems Description and

2) Please describe each data communications system Regulatory Compliance Analysis).

identified above.

3) Please provide a regulatory evaluation of each data communications system against the applicable regulatory criteria.

192 7.5.1. 7.5.2 The NRC Staff is using SRP (NUREG-0800) Chapter 7 Responder: Clark Closed Closed Item No. 1 sent EICB (Marcus) 1 Section 7.5, Instrumentation Systems Important to to DORL Safety, to review the WBU2 FSAR Section 7.5, 1. At WBN Unit 1 and 2, there is a single August 19, 2010 - NRC to NRC to issue 7/20/2010 Instrumentation Systems Important to Safety. The computer system named the Integrated review TVA response. formal RAI to TVA. ML102010034.

following requests are for information that the SRP Computer System or ICS. That system is directs the reviewers to evaluate. sometimes described as the Plant Computer TVA letter dated10/5/10 System, the Process Computer, the Technical Response 57 provided The role of the EICB Technical reviewer is to Support Center Data System (TSCDS) or the information.

determine if there is reasonable assurance that the Emergency Response Facility Data System

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date equipment will perform the required functions. The (ERFDS). At one time, the TSCDS and ERFDS WBU2 FSAR, Section 7.5.2, Plant Computer System, were separate computers on Unit 1 but their does not contain any description of the equipment that functions were all incorporated into the ICS when performs the functions described in the section. it was installed.

Enclosure 1 Item 3 of letter dated March 12, 2010, TVA stated that the platform of the Process 2. The Watts Nuclear Plant ICS is a non-safety Computer was, Hewlett Packard RX2660 and Dell related system, is designed as a single, large-Poweredge R200 servers with RTP Corp 8707 I/O. In scale nuclear plant computer system which addition TVA provided (a) two pages of marketing integrates balance of plant (BOP) monitoring with literature by DELL on the Poweredge R200 Server, (b) extensive nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) the HP Integrity rx2660 Server Unser Service Guide, application software into a comprehensive and (c) the Integrated Computer System Network computer based tool for plant operations. The Configuration Connection Diagram (2-45W2697-1-1 system is comprised of the following major dated 8/27/09). This provided information is not components:

sufficient for evaluating whether the equipment will,

• Remote multiplexers in the Computer Room, with reasonable assurance, perform the functions Auxiliary Instrument Room and 480V Board described in the FSAR. rooms.

• Redundant Central Processing Units (CPUs)

1) Is the Plant Computer System another name for

• Data Storage Devices the Process Computer?

• Man-Machine Interfaces (MMI) - Satellite Display Stations (SDS) terminals in the Main

2) Please provide an architectural description of the Control Room (MCR), Technical Support Center Plant Computer System. (TSC) and Computer Room.

• Networking equipment including switches,

3) Please describe the relationship between the Plant firewalls and terminal servers Computer System and the Integrated Computer

• Printers System.

• Data Links to other plant computer devices (serial and network)- These systems or devices include but are not limited to:

o System Foxboro I/A Systems (unit 2 only) o Areva Beacon core monitoring systems o Multi-pen recorders o Landis & Gyr switchyard monitoring system o Computer Enhanced Rod Position Indication (CERPI) o Eagle 21 o Ronan Annunciator o Leading Edge Flow Meter (LEFM) o Bentley-Nevada vibration monitoring system o Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor (ICCM) (unit 1 only) o Common Q (unit 2 only) o WINCISE (unit 2) o Plant Engineering Data System (PEDS)

In support of normal plant operations, each units ICS:

• Scans and converts analog and digital plant process inputs to engineering units for displaying, alarming and reporting.

• Receives analog and digital inputs as pre-processed values from other digital systems for displaying, alarming, archiving, and reporting.

• Performs data validity checking.

• Performs calculations to obtain parameters such as difference, flows, and rates.

• Displays alarms when data point value exceeds predefined set points.

• Displays alarms received from the digital

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date Annunciator system.

• Generates periodic station logs and pre-selected special logs.

• Performs BOP and NSSS related calculations.

• Provides graphical and digital trending displays of plant data.

• Provides graphical P&ID type displays of plant data.

In support of emergency plant operations each units ICS:

• Provides plant emergency support with the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) functions based upon the Westinghouse Owners Group CSF status trees and historical data collection, storage, and retrieval functions required to support NUREG-0737 and NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 category 1 variables (except for containment isolation).

• Provides SPDS and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) data to the Emergency Offsite Facilities via PEDS.

• Provides BISI functions (not including operating and trip bypasses of RPS and ESFAS).

• Provides continuous monitoring of RHR system performance when RHR is in use.

ICS is not required to be safety-related and is not required to meet IEEE single-failure criteria for Class 1E equipment.

3. The Plant Computer System and the Integrated Computer System are the same system.

193 7.5.1. 7.5.2 The WBU2 FSAR, Section 7.5.2, Plant Computer Responder: Clark Closed Closed Item No. 2 sent EICB (Marcus) 1 System, contains three subsections, to DORL 7.5.2.1, Safety Parameter Display System There is a single set of hardware that TVA letter dated 10/5/10 NRC to issue 7/20/2010 7.5.2.2, Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication incorporates the functionality of Safety Parameter Responses 58 and 67 formal RAI to TVA. ML102010034 System (BISI) Display System (SPDS), Bypass and Inoperable provided information.

7.5.2.3, Technical Support Center and Nuclear Data Status Indication System (BISI) and the Technical Links Support Center (TSC).

Are there three separate sets of hardware that Also refer to the response to item 59 (RAI Matrix implement these functions, or are these three Item 193).

functions that are implemented on a single set of hardware? The function of the Nuclear Data Links or Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) is actually provided by the TVA Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) which acts as the Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF) for all of TVAs nuclear units. Plant data will be sent on a periodic basis from the ICS to the CECC via the Plant Engineering Data System (PEDS). That data is then available to be sent from the CECC to the NRC.

194 7.5.1. 7.5.2. The WBU2 FSAR Section 7.5.2.1, Safety Parameter Responder: Costley/Norman Closed Closed Item No. 3 sent 1.1 1 EICB Display System, contains a description of the Safety to DORL Parameter Display System. The principal purpose and function of the SPDS is TVA letter dated 10/5/10 NRC to issue 7/20/2010 (Marcus) to aid control room personnel during abnormal Response 59 provided formal RAI to TVA. ML102010034 SRP Section 7.5, Subsection II, Acceptance Criteria and emergency conditions in determining the information.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date states: safety status of the plant and in assessing if Requirements applicable to the review of SPDS10 abnormal conditions require corrective action by CFR 50.55a(a)(1), Quality Standards. the operators to avoid a degraded core. It also operates during normal operations, continuously Please provide a description of how SPDS meets this displaying information from which the plant safety regulatory requirement. status can be readily and reliably accessed.

To ensure quality, the design, testing, and inspection of the SPDS is controlled by qualified personnel and by using TVA procedure SPP-2.6, Computer Software Control. The procedure details controls and processes required for the development, modification, and configuration management of computer software used to support the design, operation, modification, and maintenance of TVAs nuclear power plants consistent with the Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan.

This ensures that the design and operation of the SPDS complies with the 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(1) quality standards requirements. The controls and processes outlined in the procedure provide assurance that the SPDS will perform its intended function correctly.

The plant Integrated Computer System(ICS) provides the SPDS for WBN. Any changes to the SPDS software must be documented and controlled using a Software Service Request(per SPP-2.6) and must be implemented under the engineering design change process(Design Change Notice, DCN). Controls in SPP-2.6 guide the development and testing of the SPDS changes.

Other controls put in place by this procedure to further maintain quality standards are:

• Changes to SPDS software from remote locations is prohibited.

• The application custodian implements controls to prevent unauthorized changes to the software.

• Changes are made in a non-production environment and validation testing takes place before the change is installed on the ICS.

• Once validation testing begins, the source code is placed under configuration control.

• When the modifications are installed on the ICS, an operability test is performed to demonstrate that the software is installed correctly and is functioning correctly in its operating environment.

• All documentation related to the SPDS software changes are QA records.

• The software source code is kept in a physically secure, environmentally controlled space to prevent inadvertent changes.

• Cyber security considerations are also considered in the storage environment.

The data goes through several validation steps

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date before being presented to the operators. When redundant sensors are used, the data received by the computer can be processed by software to determine if the quality of one or more points is questionable.

195 7.5.1. 7.5.2. Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication (BISI) Responder: Costley/Norman Closed Closed Item No. 4 sent EICB (Marcus) 1.2 2 to DORL The WBU2 FSAR Section 7.5.2.2, Bypassed and The BISI system is a computer based system that TVA letter dated 10/5/10 NRC to issue 7/20/2010 Inoperable Status Indication System (BISI), contains a provides automatic indication and annunciation of Response 60 provided formal RAI to TVA. ML102010034 description of the Bypassed Inoperable Status the abnormal status of each ESFAS actuated information.

Indication System (BISI). component of each redundant portion of a system that performs a safety-related function.

SRP Section 7.5, Subsection II, Acceptance Criteria states: To ensure quality, the design, testing, and Requirements applicable to bypassed and inoperable inspection of the BISI system is controlled by status indication 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(1), Quality qualified personnel and by using TVA procedure Standards. SPP-2.6, Computer Software Control. The procedure details controls and processes required Please provide a description of how BISI meets this for the development, modification, and regulatory requirement. configuration management of computer software used to support the design, operation, modification, and maintenance of TVAs nuclear power plants consistent with the Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan.

This ensures that the design and operation of the BISI System complies with the 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(1) quality standards requirements. The controls and processes outlined in the procedure provide assurance that the BISI system will perform its intended function correctly.

The plant Integrated Computer System(ICS) provides the BISI system for WBN. Any changes to the BISI software must be documented and controlled using a Software Service Request(per SPP-2.6) and must be implemented under the engineering design change process(Design Change Notice, DCN). Controls in SPP-2.6 guide the development and testing of the BISI changes.

Other controls put in place by this procedure to further maintain quality standards are:

• Changes to BISI software from remote locations is prohibited.

• The application custodian implements controls to prevent unauthorized changes to the software.

• Changes are made in a non-production environment and validation testing takes place before the change is installed on the ICS.

• Once validation testing begins, the source code is placed under configuration control.

• When the modifications are installed on the ICS, an operability test is performed to demonstrate that the software is installed correctly and is functioning correctly in its operating environment.

• All documentation related to the BISI software changes are QA records.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date

• The software source code is kept in a physically secure, environmentally controlled space to prevent inadvertent changes.

• Cyber security considerations are also considered in the storage environment.

196 7.5.1. 7.5.2. Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication (BISI) Responder: Costley/Norman Closed Closed Item No. 5 sent EICB (Marcus) 1.2 2 to DORL The NRC staff is performing its review in accordance Section C of the Regulatory Guide lists the TVA letter dated 10/5/10 NRC to issue 7/20/2010 with LIC-110, Rev. 1, Watts Bar Unit 2 License following six regulatory positions for guidance to Response 61 provided formal RAI to TVA ML102010034 Application Review. LIC-110 directs the staff to satisfy the NRC requirements with respect to the information.

review systems unique to Unit 2 in accordance with bypassed and inoperable status indication(BISI) current staff guidance. Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.47 for nuclear power plant safety systems:

Revision 1, Bypassed and Inoperable Status indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems, is 1. Administrative procedures should be the current regulatory guidance for BISI. Please supplemented by an indication system that provide a regulatory evaluation of BISI against the automatically indicates, for each affected safety current RG. system or subsystem, the bypass or deliberately induced inoperability of a safety function and the systems actuated or controlled by the safety function. Provisions should also be made to allow the operations staff to confirm that a bypassed safety function has been properly returned to service.

Response: The BISI system provides indication(displays and annunciation) that a functional path for each train of a safety system or support system has been rendered in a state which could cause inoperability. The BISI system monitors and provides system level alarms for these plant safety-related systems:

• Main and Aux Feedwater

• Safety Injection

• Residual Heat Removal

• Containment Spray

• Emergency Gas Treatment

• Essential Raw Cooling Water

• Chemical and Volume Control

• Ventilating

• Component Cooling

• Control Air( including Aux Control Air)

• Standby Diesel Generator The system level displays/indicating lights indicate the status of each systems train functional path as well as the status of any support system that might put the system in an inoperable or bypassed condition.

The BISI system software runs on the Integrated Computer System(ICS) and it provides the capability to monitor in real time the parameters required to provide a BISI system as described in the Reg Guide.

The system level display or indicating lights indicate NORMAL status when a previously

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date bypassed system returns to normal operational status. The Operations staff will determine the impact of each alarm on the process flow path indication during plant modes of operation. The final decision of system operability is left up to the Operations staff to determine per Technical Specifications.

2. The indicating system for BISI should also be activated automatically by the bypassing or the deliberately induced inoperability of any auxiliary or supporting system that effectively bypasses or renders inoperable a safety function and the systems actuated or controlled by the safety function.

Response: The Integrated Computer System(ICS) obtains real-time plant parameter information system by continuously scanning pre-assigned analog, pulse, and contact sensors located throughout the plant to provide status information to the BISI system and automatically displays that information on the BISI terminals in the Main Control Room. Alarms are also initiated to gain the Operations staffs attention.

3. Annunciating functions for system failure and automatic actions based on the self-test or self-diagnostic capabilities of digital computer-based I&C safety systems should be consistent with Positions 1 and 2.

Response: The data goes through several validation steps before being presented to the operators. When redundant sensors are used, the data received by the computer can be processed by software to determine if the quality of one or more points is questionable.

4. The bypass and inoperable status indication system should include a capability for ensuring its operable status during normal plant operation to the extent that the indicating and annunciating functions can be verified.

Response: The BISI system is designed to operate during all normal plant modes of operations including startup, shutdown, standby, refueling, and power operation. The ICS is designed to provide a very high degree of reliability and the accuracy of the displayed data is not significantly less than the accuracy of comparable data displayed in the Main Control Room.

5. Bypass and inoperable status indicators should be arranged such that the operator can determine whether continued reactor operation is permissible. The control room of all affected units should receive an indication of the bypass of

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date shared system safety functions.

Response: A system level display via the BISI display or indicating lights is provided to the operators to indicate the status of the systems being monitored as well as any support systems.

If an alarm condition exists, additional detailed information is provided to the operations staff so as to allow determination of the abnormal condition. The information provided will identify to the Operations staff the exact nature of the initiating condition for the abnormal alarm. Each BISI system point will allow the user to access a detailed system screen.

These indicators and alarms will provide critical information to help the operations staff determine whether continued reactor operation is/is not permissible. As stated previously, the final decision of system operability/inoperability is left to the Operations staff to determine per Technical Specifications.

6. Bypass and inoperable status indicators should be designed and installed in a manner that precludes the possibility of adverse effects on plant safety systems. The indication system should not be used to perform functions that are essential to safety, unless it is designed in conformance with criteria established for safety systems.

Response: The BISI system is not designed to safety system criteria and therefore is not to be used to perform functions essential to the health and safety of the public, nor are operator actions based solely on BISI indications.

Appropriate electrical and physical isolation from safety-related equipment to the non-safety system is provided to meet the requirements identified in the FSAR. The ICS is independent of existing sensors and equipment in safety-related systems.

Independence is achieved through qualified safety-related Class 1E isolators. The ICS is also isolated to preclude electrical or electronic interference with existing safety systems.

Inputs and outputs are isolated from the plant inputs such that normal faults on the plant side of the loops will have no adverse impact on the ICS other than loss of the one circuit with the fault.

The inputs/outputs meet the isolation requirements of Watts Bar Design Criteria WB-DC-30-4, Separation/Isolation, which defines the design requirements for electrical separation/isolation of the distribution equipment and wiring for Class 1E electrical systems and components in the plant.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date 197 X Open Item 197 was never issued. Closed Closed 198 7.5.1. 7.5.2. SRP Section 7.5, Subsection III, Review Procedures Responder: Costley/Norman Closed Closed Item No. 6 sent EICB (Marcus) 1.2 2 states: Recommended review emphasis for BISI to DORL F. Scope of BISI indications - As a minimum, BISI F. The scope of the WBN BISI indications are TVA letter dated 10/5/10 NRC to issue 7/20/2010 should be provided for the following systems: based on engineering calculation Response 62 and formal RAI to TVA ML102010034

- Reactor trip system (RTS) and engineered safety WBPEVAR8807025 Rev. 7 (Attachment 10). This Attachments 10 and 35 features actuation system (ESFAS) - See SRP calculation has not been updated for Unit 2. The provided information.

Appendix 7.1-B subsection 4.13, Indication of calculation does include Common and Unit 2 Bypasses, and SRP Appendix 7.1-C subsection 5.8.3, equipment required to support Unit 1 operation.

Indication of Bypasses. G. Compliance to Regulatory Guide 1.47 is

- Interlocks for isolation of low-pressure systems from described in design criteria document WB-DC the reactor coolant system - See SRP BTP 7-1. 29 Rev. 8, Integrated Computer System

- ECCS accumulator isolation valves - See SRP BTP (submitted under TVA letter dated August 11, 7-2. 2010 (Reference 1)) which is a design input to

- Controls for changeover of residual heat removal calculation WBPEVAR8807025 Rev. 7.

from injection to recirculation mode - See SRP BTP 7- H. Design criteria document WB-DC-30-29 Rev.

6. 8, Integrated Computer System submitted under G. Conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.47, TVA letter dated August 11, 2010 (Reference 1))

Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication for section 3.4.1, BISI Design and Operation states:

Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems. The BISI shall not be designed to safety related H. Independence - See SRP Appendix 7.1-B system criteria and therefore is not to be used to subsection 4.7, Control and Protection System perform functions essential to the health and Interaction, and SRP Appendix 7.1-C subsections 5.6, safety of the public. Class 1E isolation is required, Independence, and 6.3, Interaction Between the however, to maintain the independence of safety Sense and Command Features and Other Systems. related equipment and systems.

The indication system should be designed and I. Development of the Bypassed and Inoperable installed in a manner that precludes the possibility of Status Indication (BISI) application of the adverse effects on plant safety systems. Failure or Integrated Computer System (ICS) is performed bypass of a protective function should not be a in accordance with NPG SPP 2.6, Computer credible consequence of failures occurring in the Software Control, Rev. 12 (Attachment 35). The indication equipment, and the bypass indication should development process starts with classifying the not reduce the required independence between application depending on how the output of the redundant safety systems. software will be used. BISI software is currently I. Use of digital systems - See SRP Appendix 7.0-A classified as category C in accordance with .

and Appendix 7.1-D. Appendix B which defines Category C as:

Please provide a description of how BISI meets each Application Software Categories item above, or provide appropriate justification for not Category Description doing so.

C Software and data which are an integral part of a quality-related but not safety-related plant system or component and are essential to the performance of that function.

Software, portions of software, and data essential to the implementation of quality-related programs listed in Section 5.1.B of the Nuclear Quality Assurance Plan, including software used to implement regulatory physical security requirements.

Software and data which implements NQAP requirements but not specifically identified as an augmented quality-related program as defined in Section 5.1.B of the NQAP.

Software, not associated with a specific plant system, which stores, maintains, controls, distributes or manages data which can be used

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date without further verification in activities which affect safety- or quality- related plant structures, systems, and components.

Software, portions of software, and data which are an integral part of a non safety-related, non-quality related plant system or component whose failure would significantly impact plant operations.

Software used in the design of non quality-related, non safety-related plant structures, systems, and components Based on category C classification, SPP 2.6, Annex C defines the documentation that is required for the software..

For BISI, a Software Requirements Specification (SRS) based on the engineering calculation will be generated along with a Software Design Description. A Software Verification and Validation Report (SVVR) consisting of a Validation Test and results and an Operability Test and results will be prepared. User documentation for BISI will be incorporated into the overall ICS user documents.

Future changes to BISI will be driven foremost by changes to the engineering calculation that defines the overall functionality of the system.

Any changes to the engineering calculation will cause a Software Services Request (SSR) to be generated. Depending on the scope of the change, the various documents (SRS, SDD, SVVR and user documentation) will be updated or re-issued.

199 7.5.1. 7.5.2. The WBU2 FSAR Section 7.5.2.3, Technical Support Responder: Costley/Norman Closed Closed Item No. 7 sent Related SE Section 7.5.5.3 EICB (Marcus) 1.3 3 Center and Nuclear Data Links, contains a description to DORL of the Technical Support Center and Nuclear Data The Technical Support Center is intended to be TVA letter dated 10/5/10 NRC to issue 7/20/2010 Links. an accident mitigation support center and Response 63 provided formal RAI to TVA ML102010034 provides Satellite Display Stations (SDS) capable information.

SRP Section 7.5, Subsection II, Acceptance Criteria of displaying information on plant systems for Unit states: 1, Unit 2 or the Simulator. Stations in the TSC Requirements applicable to the review ofERF receive data from the plant Integrated Computer information systems, and ERDS information systems System (ICS) over the ICS network. Separate 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(1), Quality Standards. PCs receive data from the simulator computer over the WBN site network to support drills and Please provide a description of how the nuclear data training exercises. Those PCs can also access links meets this regulatory requirement. the Plant Engineering Data System (PEDS) as a backup to ICS. The TSC also has a separate computer that connects to the CECC to allow additional access to meteorological station.

The ICS data is also transmitted from the PEDS server through the PEDS Firewall over the WBN Site Network to the CECC computers (Chattanooga). The CECC computers transmit the data over the TVA Corporate Network, through the TVA Firewall (provided by NRC),

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date through the NRC Firewall to the NRC.

Transmission of this data from the ICS and Meteorological Station over data link (High Speed Communications Link) to the CECC and NRC meet the requirements of NUREG-0696, Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities and NUREG-1394, Emergency Response Data System Implementation.

• 7.2 7/21/2010 Responder: Clark

• Open Open EICB (Carte) 7.3 The statement in SER Section 7.5.1 is supported TVA to provide 7.5 Amendment 99 of the Watts Bar Unit 2 FSAR Section by the following: Amendment 101 7.7 7.5, Instrumentation Systems Important to Safety,

• I&C Systems for Normal Operation FSAR NRC Review does not include any description of instrumentation for Section normal operation; therefore, Section 7.5 of the FSAR

• Eagle 21 7.2 does not support statements made in the SER Section

• Neutron Monitoring 7.2 7.5; compare SER (ML072060490) Section 7.5.1 and

• Foxboro Spec 200 7.3 (List of other FSAR Amendment 99 Section 7.5. Please identify sections in attachment 34) where, in the docketed material, information exists to

• Foxboro I/A 7.7.11 (new section will be support the statements in the SER Section 7.5.1. added by amendment 101) (other sections have been previously provided)

• Plant Computer 7.5.2

• Rod Control 7.7.1.2

• CERPI 7.7.1.2

• Control Rod Drive 7.7.1.1

• Incore Neutron Monitoring 7.7.1.9

• Lose Part Detection/Monitoring 7.6.7

• Vibration Monitoring RCP 5.5.1.2

• Control Boards 7.1.1.10

• RVLIS 7.5, 5.6 201 7.7.1. 7/21/2010 Responder: Webb Open Open EICB (Carte) 1.1 Amendment 99, FSAR Section 7.7.1.1.1, "Reactor These functions are within the scope of the TVA to docket Control Input Signals (Unit 2 Only)," contains a Foxboro I/A system. Section 7.7.11 will be added amendment 101.

description of functions performed uniquely for Unit 2. to the FSAR in amendment 101 to provide a Please describe the equipment that performs this discussion of the DCS.

function (in sufficient detail to support a regulatory evaluation), and evaluate this equipment against the appropriate regulatory criteria.

202 7.5.2 7/22/2010 Responder: WEC Open Open EICB (Carte)

The letter (ML0003740165) which transmitted the Revision 1 of the Licensing Technical Report will Licensing Safety Evaluation for the Common Q topical report to provide more detailed information on the changes Technical Report Westinghouse stated: "Should our criteria or to the platform. R2 Due 12/3 regulations change so that our conclusions as to the acceptability of the report are invalidated, CE Nuclear Rev. 2 of the Licensing Technical Report will TVA to respond or Power and/or the applicant referencing the topical include the applicability of guidance. provide proposed report will be expected to revise and resubmit their date of response.

respective documentation, or submit justification for continued applicability of the topical report without revision of the respective documentation." Question No 81 identified many criteria changes; please revise the respective documentation or submit justification for continued applicability of the topical report.

203 7.5.1. 7.5.2 7/26/2010 Responder: Clark Closed Closed Item No. 9 is being drafted 1 EICB By letter dated April 27, 2010 (ML101230248), TVA The plant computer system is one set of TVA letter dated 10/5/10 NRC to issue (Marcus) stated (Enclosure Item No.19): "The WBN Unit 2 hardware. The Safety Parameter Display Response 67 provided formal RAI to TVA Integrated Computer System(ICS) modification System, Bypassed and Inoperable Status information.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date merges the ERFDS and plant computer into a single Indication System (BISI), Technical Support computer network." Center and Nuclear Data Links are all functions of the Plant Computer System. Historically the FSAR Section 7.5.2, "Plant Computer System," has Westinghouse P2500 Plant Process Computer three subsections: and Emergency Response Facilities Data System 7.5.2.1, "Safety Parameter Display System" (ERFDS) were individual systems but were 7.5.2.2, "Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication merged together with the implementation of DCN System (BISI)" 39911-A, implemented for WBN Unit 1 in 7.5.2.3, "Technical Support Center and Nuclear Data December 1998, to become the Plant Integrated Links" Computer System (ICS). A similar system is being This arrangement implies that the each of these installed for WBN Unit 2 based on the same function are part of the plant computer, and not a software with more modern hardware.

separate sets of equipment. Please describe the equipment for each function and identify any The ICS is composed of a number of pieces of equipment common to more than one function. hardware, all utilized as a system, to provide the functions listed in the FSAR sections 7.5.2.1, 7.5.2.2 and 7.5.2.3. This hardware includes but is not limited to Hewlett Packard (HP) servers (CPU), DELL servers (CPU), Fiber Optic Panels, Fiber Optic Converters, Switches, Firewalls, Network Taps, Multiplexors (RTP), LCD displays and fiber optic and copper Ethernet cables. As all the applicable hardware make up the system it is all common to more than one function and there is no separate set of equipment for any of the functions referenced in FSAR Section 7.5.2.1 and 7.5.2.2.

The Nuclear Data Link and EOF functions described in 7.5.2.3 are provided by the CECC in Chattanooga. In order for the CECC to have access to ICS data, both the PEDS and the data diode isolating the PEDS from the ICS must be operational.

Meteorological data from the Environmental Data Station (EDS) is gathered by the Unit 1 ICS.

That data is sent over to the unit 2 ICS via the inter-unit firewall.

204 7.5.1. 7.5.2 7/26/2010 Responder: Costley/Norman Open Open Item No. 10 is being drafted EICB (Marcus) 1 By letter dated March 12, 2010 (ML101680577) TVA 1. Three data diodes. 10/5/10 TVA letter Response NRC to issue provided drawing No. 2-45W2697-1-1, "Integrated 2. Two provide an interface between train A and B 68 provided information. formal RAI to TVA Computer System Network Configuration Connection of Common Q.

Diagram," that depicts three "Data Diodes. Please a. These are identical systems consisting of the provide a detailed description of the equipment, following:

software, and configurations of each "Data Diode". i. Dual DELL R200 computers ii. Red Hat Enterprise Linux software that is locked down by CTI iii. 55 Mbs Owl cards iv. Fiber optic Ethernet interface to trained Maintenance test panel

b. Software is configured to allow only specific traffic from the MTP to pass through to the ICS

c. The secure side of the data diode will initiate the connection to the MTP, so there will be a bidirectional connection between the secure side of the data diode and the MTP. There will be no

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date bidirectional data flow from the ICS to the MTP since the diode will block all incoming traffic from the ICS.

3. The third data diode is placed between the two ICS systems and the two PEDS computer systems.

a. Hardware is identical to that used by TVA in other plants

i. Dual HP DL360GS computers ii. Red Hat Enterprise Linux software that is locked down by CTI iii. 155 Mbs OWL cards iv. RJ45 Ethernet to PEDS network

b. Diode is configured to allow certain types of data to flow from the ICS network to the PEDS network. This includes but is not limited to the following:

i. Once per second current values and qualities for all points ii. History data archived by the ICS iii. Data files

c. The data diode does not allow any data to be transferred between the PEDS network and the ICS network.

205 7/26/2010 Responder: Clark Open Open Question B related to prior NRC EICB (Garg) approval of this system or 50.59 Regarding the Foxboro Spec 200 system installed at As discussed at the August 3 and 4 meeting in TVA to respond or information. This question will Unit 2: Knoxville between TVA and the NRC, the provide proposed be addressed in the August plant Foxboro Spec 200 is not a system. The Foxboro date of response. visit.

a- Is it similar to Unit 1? If not, identify the differences Spec 200 analog hardware is used to replace the 10/14 and evaluation of the acceptability of these existing obsolete hardware with the same differences. functions. There are no interconnections between the analog loops unless such interconnections b- deleted existed prior to the replacement. This is strictly an analog to analog upgrade due to equipment c- For each system which is discussed in the FSAR obsolescence. The Foxboro hardware is installed and utilizes the Spec 200 system, please provide the in existing cabinets which require modifications to instrument logic diagram, loop/block diagram with accept the Foxboro hardware racks.

reference to where the system is discussed in the FSAR. a- A listing of the replacements and differences was previously provided as Attachment 1 to TVA letter to the NRC dated June 18, 2010. Within Unit 1, only portions of the AFW controls were replaced. In Unit 2 all safety-related analog loops were replaced. The Foxboro Spec 200 is a fully qualified industry standard for replacement of obsolete analog instrument and control loop hardware.

b- deleted c- c- The Foxboro Spec 200 hardware has not been installed. Therefore the revised drawings have not been issued. Based on this, EDCR excerpts for the logic diagrams and loop/logic drawings were provided as attachments to TVA letter to the NRC dated July 30, 2010. The cross reference between the functions upgraded as part of the Foxboro Spec 200 change is contained in

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date Attachment 33.

206 7.5.1. 7.5.2 7/27/2010 Responder: Clark Open Open Item No. 11 is being drafted.

EICB (Marcus) 1 The NRC Requested a description of the plant (1) The Plant Computer is not just a computer WB-DC-30-29 Rev. 8 is NRC to issue computer and TVA provided: but is a system and is designated the Integrated Enclosure 1 of TVA letter formal RAI to TVA.

(1) Dell marketing literature for Dell Poweredge R200 Computer System or ICS. The ICS is composed dated August 11, 2010 Server, which can be found on the internet of multiple computer CPUs, LCD displays, RTP (ML102240382 letter and (http://www.dell.com/downloads/global/products/pedge Multiplexer Assemblies, network fiber optic ML102240383 Enclosure 1).

/en/pe_R200_spec_sheet_new.pdf), and panels, fiber optic converters, Ethernet switches (2) HP Integrity rx2660 Server User Service guide and network taps previously described in items 10/5/10 TVA letter Response (edition 6), which has not yet been found on the 71, 81 and 82 above. For a detailed discussion of 70 provided information.

internet, but many other editions have been found. the ICS functions refer to design criteria This information is not adequate for answering the document WB-DC-30-29 Rev. 8, Integrated question. (Note: TVA also provided a network Computer System submitted under TVA letter configuration connection diagram, which is necessary dated August 11, 2010.

but not sufficient.)

(2) As previously discussed in item 82, there is no Please provide a description of the plant computer: unique set of hardware for any specific function.

(1) Please include sufficient detail so that an evaluation can be made against the SRP acceptance criteria in SRP Section 7.7.

(2) Please identify the equipment (hardware and software) that performs each function described in the FSAR.

207 EIC July 27, 2010 Date: Closed Closed B

(Cart Responder:

e)

Deleted by DORL 208 7.5.2. 7.5.1 7/27/2010 Responder: Clark Open Open - NRC Item No. 12 is being drafted.

EICB (Marcus) 1 Review and issue By letter dated June 18, 2010 (ML101940236), TVA The notes provided with the table include the 10/5/10 TVA letter Response formal RAI to TVA responded to an NRC request for additional change to the variable under 10 CFR 50.59. For 71 provided information.

information. Enclosure 1 Item No. 6 of this letter ease of review, the other note references have identified, for each PAM variable whether the variable been deleted for these variables and only the note was: (1) implemented identically to Unit 1 and dealing with the Unit 1 change has been retained reviewed by the NRC, (2) implemented identically to in the Notes column of the table excerpt. The Unit 1 but modified under 10 CFR 50.59 after it was applicable notes are highlighted in the notes list.

reviewed by the NRC, and (3) implemented in a manner that is unique to Unit 2. There were sixteen variables modified under 10 CFR 50.59; please describe the changes that were performed under 50.59.

209 7.5.2. 7.5.1 7/27/2010 Responder: Clark Open Open - NRC Item No.13 is being drafted.

EICB (Marcus) 1 Review and issue By letter dated June 18, 2010 (ML101940236), TVA The first eight variables in question are primary !0 /5/10 TVA letter Response formal RAI to TVA responded to an NRC request for additional chemistry parameter. The parameters are the 72 provided information.

information. Enclosure 1 Item No. 6 of this letter same for both units, but in Unit 1, the sample is identified, for each PAM variable whether the variable obtained via the post accident sampling system, was: (1) implemented identically to Unit 1 and while in Unit 2 the sample is obtained using a reviewed by the NRC, (2) implemented identically to grab sample via the normal sample system.

Unit 1 but modified under 10 CFR 50.59 after it was reviewed by the NRC, and (3) implemented in a The last variable was somewhat difficult to manner that is unique to Unit 2. There were nine characterize. The method of detection and the variables that were identified as both Unique to Unit 2 hardware manufacturer is the same in both units.

and identical to what was reviewed and approved on However, due to obsolescence some of the parts Unit 1. Please explain. are different than what is installed in Unit 1. The

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date differences are described in Note 21 of the original response.

210 7.5.2. 7.5.1 7/27/2010 Responder: Clark Open Open - NRC Item No. 14 is being drafted.

EICB (Marcus) 1 Review and issue By letter dated June 18, 2010 (ML101940236), TVA The design basis for Unit 2 is to match Unit 1 as 10/5/10 TVA letter Response formal RAI to TVA responded to an NRC request for additional closely as possible. This includes incorporating 73 provided information.

information. Enclosure 1 Item No. 6 of this letter changes made to Unit 1 after licensing under 10 identified, for each PAM variable whether the variable CFR 50.59. The changes in question fall into this was: (1) implemented identically to Unit 1 and category and are described in the Notes for each reviewed by the NRC, (2) implemented identically to variable in the original submittal.

Unit 1 but modified under 10 CFR 50.59 after it was reviewed by the NRC, and (3) implemented in a manner that is unique to Unit 2. There were seven variables that were identified as both identical to Unit 1 and changed under 10 CFR 50.59. Please explain.

211 7.5.1. 7/27/2010 Responder: Clark Open Open Relates to SE Sections:

EICB (Carte) 1 TVA to Docket 7.5.5, Plant Computer 7.5.2 FSA Table 7.1-1 shows: "The extent to which the The WBN 2 FSAR Section 7.5 defines the Amendment 101 7.6.10, Loose Part Monitoring 7.6.1 recommendations of the applicable NRC regulatory following systems as important to safety 7.7.1, Control System 7.7.1 guides and IEEE standards are followed for the Class Description 7.7.2 1E instrumentation and control systems is shown 1. Post Accident Monitoring including: 7.7.2, Safety System Status 7.7.4 below. The symbol (F) indicates full compliance. a. Common Q Post Accident Monitoring System Monitoring System 7.9 Those which are not fully implemented are discussed (Safety-Related) 7.7.4, PZR & SG Overfill in the referenced sections of the FSAR and in the i. Reactor Vessel Level 7.9, Data Communications footnotes as indicated." ii. Core Exit Thermocouples iii. Subcooling Margin Monitor Please describe how systems that are important to b. Eagle 21 indications (Safety-Related) safety, but not 1E, comply with 10 CFR 50.55a(a)1: c. Foxboro Spec 200 indications (Safety-Related)

"Structures, systems, and components must be d. Neutron Monitoring (Source and Intermediate designed, fabricated, erected, constructed, tested, and Range) (Safety-Related) inspected to quality standards commensurate with the e. Radiation Monitors (Safety-Related) importance of the safety function to be performed." f. Unit 1 and Common shared indications (Safety-Related)

g. Foxboro I/A indications (Non-Safety-Related)

h. Radiation Monitors (Non-Safety-Related)

i. CERPI (Non-Safety-Related)

j. Integrated Computer System (Non-Safety-Related)

k. Unit 1 and Common shared indications (Non-Safety-Related)

Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Design Criteria, WB-DC-30-7, Rev. 22, Appendix A provides the minimum quality requirements for each Category (1, 2 or 3) of variable. By definition, no Category 1 variable can be non-safety-related. Therefore, non-safety-related variables and the source equipment are limited to category 2 or 3. Since some variables are designated as having more than 1 category, the requirements of the highest category apply.

Additional design criteria information for specific systems is contained in:

g. Foxboro I/A - Site-Specific Engineering Specification WBN Unit 2 NSSS and BOP Controls Upgrade Specification Rev. 1 (Attachment 23)

h. CERPI - Rod Control System Description, N3-

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date 85-4003, Rev. 12 Section 2.2, Design Requirements

i. Radiation Monitors - Design Criteria Document WB-DC-40-24, Radiation Monitoring - (Unit 1 /

Unit 2), Rev. 21

j. Integrated Computer System - Design Criteria Document WB-DC-30-29 Plant Integrated Computer System (ICS), Rev. 8 (Submitted under TVA to NRC letter dated August __, 2010)

2. Plant Computer (Integrated Computer System)

- See Item j above.

The WBN 2 FSAR Section 7.6, defines the following non-safety-related systems as other systems required for safety

1. Foxboro I/A - While not specifically described, functions performed by the system are described in this section. The qualify requirements are described above.

2. Lose Part Monitoring System - Design Criteria Document WB-DC-30-31, Loose Parts Monitoring System, Rev. 4, provides the quality requirements for this system. A description of the distributed control system will be added as FSAR section 7.7.1.11 in FSAR Amendment 101.

Installation is performed in accordance with the quality requirements of either the Bechtel or TVA work order processes based on the quality classification of the equipment being installed.

Vendor testing is performed in accordance with procurement specification requirements which are based on the type and quality classification of the equipment. Preoperational testing is performed in accordance with Chapter 14 of the FSAR.

212 7.5.2 7/27/2010 Responder: WEC Open Open EICB (Carte)

Due Date 12/31 By letter dated June 18, 2010 (ML101940236) TVA Application specific requirements for testing. This stated (Enclosure 1, Attachment 3, Item No. 3) that the cannot be addressed in a topical report. TVA to respond or PAMS system design specification and software Evaluation of how the hardware meets the provide proposed requirements specification contain information to regulatory requirements. date of response.

address the "Design Report on Computer Integrity, Test and Calibration..." The staff has reviewed these WEC to provide the information and determine documents, and it is not clear how this is the case. where the information will be located.

(1) Please describe how the information provided demonstrates compliance with IEEE 603-1991 Clauses 5.5, 5.7, 5.10, & 6.5.

(2) Please describe how the information provided demonstrates conformance with IEEE 7-4.3.2-2003 Clauses 5.5 & 57.

213 7.5.2 7/27/2010 Responder: WEC Open Open EICB (Carte)

Due Date 12/31 By letter dated June 18, 2010 (ML101940236) TVA Carte to review and revise this stated (Enclosure 1, Attachment 3, Item No. 3) that the question after LTR R1is TVA to respond or PAMS system design specification and software received. provide proposed requirements specification contain information to date of response.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date address the "Theory of Operation Description." The staff has reviewed these documents, and it is not clear how this is the case. The docketed material does not appear to contain the design basis information that is required to evaluate compliance with the Clause of IEEE 603.

(1) Please provide the design basis (as described in IEEE 604 Clause 4) of the Common Q PAMS.

(2) Please provide a regulatory evaluation of how the PAMs complies with the applicable regulatory requirements for the theory of operation.

For example: Regarding IEEE 603 Clause 5.8.4 (1)

What are the manually controlled protective actions?

(2) How do the documents identified demonstrate compliance with this clause?

214 7/27/2010 Responder: WEC Open Open EICB (Carte)

SRS Revision By letter dated June 18, 2010 (ML101940236) TVA According to "The Software Program Manual for WEC References Common Q Due10/22 stated (Enclosure 1, Attachment 3, Item No. 10) that Common Q Systems," WCAP-16096-NP-1A, the PAMS preliminary hazards the approved Common Q Topical Report contains Software Safety Plan only applies to Protection analysis is referenced in the TVA to respond or information to address the "Safety Analysis." The class software and PAMS is classified as SRS. WEC to delete. provide proposed Common Q SPM however states that a Preliminary Important-to-safety. Exhibit 4-1 of the SPM date of response.

Hazards Analysis Report and the V&V reports shows that PAMS is classified as Important-to-document the software hazards analysis. Please Safety Provide these documents.

215 7/29/2010 Responder: WEC Closed Closed DORL (Poole)

By letter dated June 18, 2010, TVA provided a table Close this item showing the documents that had been completed and were available for staff review. In a conference call on July 27, 2010, TVA agreed to submit the requested documents on the docket. Please provide the schedule for submitting the documents.

216 7.5.1. 7.5.2 7/29/2010 Responder: Clark Open Open - NRC Item No. 15 is being drafted.

EICB (Marcus) 1 Review By letter dated March 12, 2010 (ML101680577), TVA 1) EDCR 52322 is contained in Attachment 7. 10/5/10 TVA letter Response stated that it would provide five documents to describe 5) The design change referred to is the addition of 76 and Attachment 7 provided NRC to confirm the Process computer: (1) EDCR 52322 Rev. A a data diode. This has not been incorporated into information. by 10/20/10 in excerpts, (2) HP RX2660 Users Guide AB419-9002C- the drawing. Please see the response to letter 10/5 letter.

ed6, (3) Dell Poweredge R200 Server sheet November item 88 (RAI Matrix Item 224).

2007, (4) RTP Corp 8707 I/O Brochure RTP 8707-02, NRC to issue 2004, and (5) Integrated Computer System Drawing. formal RAI to TVA.

217 7/6/2010 Responder: Clark Close Close EICB (Garg)

Provide copies excerpts of the EDCRs and DCNs that Attachment 7 contains excerpts of the following provide the block and logic diagrams for the Foxboro change documents:

Spec 200 implementation.

DCN 52376 Note: These changes are scheduled to be implemented after Unit 2 Fuel Load DCN 52641 NOTE: DCN 52376 and 52641 impact loops already in service for Unit 1 and as such are implemented under 10CFR50.59.

EDCR 52343 EDCR 52427

(

218 G 7/6/2010 Responder: Clark Closed Closed

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date Provide copies excerpts of the EDCRs and DCNs that The excerpt of work order WO 08-813412-000 Attachment 8 contains the provide the block and logic diagrams for the Foxboro provided with the June 18 letter did not contain required correct work order Spec 200 implementation. the information showing that the new type excerpt.

(Arnold) power supplies had been installed in the Unit 1 Eagle 21 system. Please provide the necessary pages of the work order to verify the installation of Arnold power supplies in the Unit 1 Eagle 21 System.

219 8/4/2010 Responder: TVA Licensing Closed Closed EICB (Garg)

Transmit copy of February 8, 2008 FSAR Red-Line for A copy was hand carried by Mr. W. Crouch and Check what sent by Terry Unit 2 letter with attachments [CD]. delivered to Stewart Bailey at the August 17 missing attachments.

meeting at NRC headquarters.

TVA Revised Response:

Attachment 6 contains the redline FSAR with attachments.

220 8/4/2010 Responder: Ayala Closed Closed EICB (Garg)

For Safety Related SSPS, submit letter justifying delta The Westinghouse ARLA latch attachment is Are there any open issues? TVA to respond or between U1 [utilizing ARs] & U2 [utilizing ARs and obsolete. In order to provide a latching relay for Docket plant specific provide proposed MDRs]. [Requires TS change ???] Unit 2 Solid State Protection System (SSPS), a responses to the individual. date of response.

MDR latching relay must be used. MDR relays are currently in use and shown to be reliable as SSPS Slave Relays in other Westinghouse plants.

The Technical Specification (TS) Bases was updated in Amendment B to indicate acceptability of testing MDR ESFAS Slave relays on an 18-month interval based on the assessment done in WCAP-13878-P-A, Revision 2, Reliability Assessment of Potter & Brumfield MDR Series Relays.

An initial Unit 2 ESFAS SSPS Slave Relay Service Life and Contact Load study similar to that done in Unit 1 has been completed to show that Unit 2 satisfies the conditions of WCAP-13877-P-A, Revision 2, Reliability Assessment of Westinghouse Type AR Relays used as SSPS Slave Relays, and WCAP-13878, Revision 2, Reliability Assessment of Potter & Brumfield MDR Series Relays. The Contact Load study also identifies locations in which MDR relays are not acceptable for use.

221 7.7.1. 7.7.1. 8/4/2010 Responder: Trelease Open Open - NRC Item No. 16 is being drafted.

EICB (Marcus) 2 3 Review Submit EDCR Technical Evaluation for the source and The EDCR 52421 Source and Intermediate 10/5/10 TVA letter Response intermediate range updated electronics for Unit 2 Range, Scope and Intent, Unit Difference and 78 and Attachment 31 NRC to confirm Technical Evaluations are contained in provided information. by 10/20/10 in Attachment 31 to 10/5 letter. 10/5 letter.

NRC to issue formal RAI to TVA.

(

222 G 8/4/2010 Responder: Clark Close Close

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date Submit updated list for Foxboro Spec 200 The updated listing of Foxboro Spec 200 loop

[replacement of Bailey and Robert-Shaw electronics functions is contained in Attachment 33.

223 8/4/2010 Responder: Clark Closed Closed EICB (Garg)

Submit EDCR Technical Evaluation for Foxboro I/A Duplicate of item 233.

replacing obsolete non-safety related Foxboro H-Line analog electronics with a digital CDS. [selected single point failures being addressed in design]

224 7.5.1. 7.5.2 8/4/2010 Responder: Norman (TVA CEG) Open Open - NRC Item No. 17 is being drafted.

EICB (Marcus) 1 Review Mike Norman [TVA Computer Eng. Group] will check The Data diode to isolate the WBN Unit 1 and 10/5/10 TVA letter Response status of DCN/50.59 for Integrated Computer System Unit 2 ICS computers from the WBN PEDS 80 provided information. NRC to confirm upgrade that will install the data diode between the computers will be installed in PIC 56278 as part of by 10/20/10 in WBN PEDS and the Unit 1 and Unit 2 ICS. DCN 54971. This DCN is scheduled for 10/5 letter.

implementation in Spring 2011. This date was included in the Cyber Security Plan NRC to issue Implementation Schedules submitted to the NRC formal RAI to on July 23. TVA.

225 8/4/2010 Responder: Scansen Close Close EICB (Garg)

Provide EDCR Technical Evaluation Justify/explain The requested information is contained in the updated hardware [functionally equivalent to Unit 1] for Scope and Intent, Unit Difference and Technical the RCP and Turbine Generator vibration monitoring Evaluations for EDCRs 52420 (Attachment 11) equipment. and 53559 (Attachment 12) 226 8/4/2010 Responder: TVA Licensing Closed Closed See also Open Item Nos. 41 &

EICB (Singh) 270.

Submit the Foxboro I/A segmentation analysis and ICS These documents were submitted under TVA NNC 8/25/10: Segmentation Design Criteria documents on an expedited separate letter dated August 11, 2010. analysis has been received letter. Provide a date when the Segmentation analysis and read. Please describe will be revised based on discussions at the meeting. why a failure or error will not propagate over the -peer-to-peer network, and cause more than one segment to fail.

227 8/4/2010 Responder: Clark Close Close EICB (Garg)

Provide copies of 50.59s for the following Unit 1 A. CERPI, initial installation DCN 51072 and changes 2009 upgrade DCN 52957 (Attachment Upgrade of RCP, TG and FW pumps

a. CERPI (initial installation and 2009 upgrade) vibration monitoring to Bentley-Nevada 3300,

b. Vibration monitoring (RCP, TG and FW pumps to DCN 39242, DCN 39506, DCN 39548, and Bentley-Nevada 3300) DCN 50750 (Attachment )

c. Containment Sump Level Transmitter replacement B. Containment Sump Level Transmitter

d. Turbine Servo Control Valve Card replacement replacement, DCN 39608 (Attachment )

e. Pressurizer Heater deletion of Backup Heaters on C. Turbine Servo Control Valve Card for PZR High Level replacement, DCN 38993 (Attachment )

f. AMSAC D. Pressurizer Heater deletion of Backup

g. Significant ESFAS changes Heaters on for PZR High Level, DCN 51102 (Attachment )

E. AMSAC DCN 50475 (Attachment )

F. Significant ESFAS changes

i. Relocate containment isolation valve function and relocate the 6.9KV Shutdown Boards Emergency Feeder Breaker Trip function from K626 and K602, respectively, to minimize disruption on plant operation. DCN 38238 (Attachment )

ii. Revise OTT and OPT turbine

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date runback setpoints, DCN 38842 (Attachment )

iii. Install Integrated Computer System (ICS) Stages 4 and 5, DCN 50301 (Attachment )

228 8/4/2010 Responder: Clark Closed Closed EICB (Carte) Submit rod control system description N3-85-4003 The Rod Control System Description N3-85-4003 is contained in Attachment 21.

229 8/4/2010 Responder: Clark Closed Closed EICB (Carte) Submit Annunciator system description/design criteria Condition Status/Alarm Design Criteria Document WB-DC-30-21 is contained in Attachment 22.

230 8/4/2010 Responder: Webb Closed Closed EICB (Carte) Submit Foxboro I/A Procurement Specification The requested Foxboro I/A Procurement excerpts that provide system description information Specification is contained in Attachment 23.

231 8/4/2010 Responder: Clark Closed Closed EICB (Garg)

Update FSAR Amendment 100 Section 7.1.1.2 FSAR section 7.1.1.2 is revised in FSAR FSAR AMD 100 markup based on discussion with Hukam Garg. Amendment 100 submitted to the NRC on TVA letter to the NRC dated September 1, 2010 includes the requested clarifications.

232 8/4/2010 Responder: Clark Closed Closed EICB (Singh) Submit EDCR Technical Evaluation for LPMS EDCR The EDCR 52418 Lose Part Monitoring Scope TVA provided and Intent, Unit Difference and Technical information in Att.

Evaluations are contained in Attachment 24 to 24 of 10/5 letter.

10/5 letter.

233 8/4/2010 Responder: Clark Closed Closed EICB (Carte) Submit EDCR Technical Evaluation for Foxboro I/A Foxboro I/A EDCRs 52378 and 52671 Scope and EDCR Intent, Unit Difference and Technical Evaluations are contained in Attachment 25 to the 10/5 letter.

234 8/4/2010 Responder: Closed Closed EICB (Carte) Bechtel to perform D3 analysis for Common Q PAMS Duplicate of Item 64 which will be incorporated into Westinghouse Licensing Technical Report.

235 8/4/2010 Responder: TVA Licensing Closed Closed EICB (Garg) TVA to ensure Stewart Bailey is on cc: for all Chapter Stewart Bailey has been added to the standard 7 RAI response letters. response letter template used for Chapter 7 responses.

236 8/4/2010 Responder: Clark Close Close EICB (Garg)

Submit EDCR Technical Evaluation for Foxboro Spec Foxboro Spec 200 EDCRs 52343, 52427 and 200 EDCRs 52641, Scope and Intent, Unit Difference and Technical Evaluations are contained in Attachment 26 to 10/5 letter.

237 8/4/2010 Responder: Clark Closed Closed EICB (Carte) Submit EDCR Technical Evaluation for Annunciator The Annunciator EDCR 52315 Scope and Intent, EDCR Unit Difference and Technical Evaluations are contained in Attachment 27 to 10/5 letter.

238 EIC 8/4/2010 Responder: Webb/Hilmes Closed Closed B

(Cart e)

Discuss with TVA adding a description of the Foxboro Duplicate of item 201

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date I/A system to chapter 7 of the FSAR.

239 8/4/2010 Responder: Hilmes Closed Closed EICB (Carte) Plan a meeting with TVA the NRC and Westinghouse meeting held 8/17/10 to review Common Q PAMS documentation.

240 8/4/2010 Responder: Clark Close Close EICB (Garg)

Submit EDCR Technical Evaluation for Vibration The Scope and Intent, Unit Difference and Monitoring EDCR(s) Technical Evaluations for EDCRs 53559 and 52420 are contained in Attachment 28 of 10/5 letter.

241 8/4/2010 Responder: Davies Closed Closed EICB (Singh)

Review CERPI WCAPs for system description CERPI was designed after Westinghouse stopped TVA provided information to be submitted to the NRC. using WCAPs. The document that provides the information in Att.

most detailed information is the CERPI System 29 of 10/5 letter.

Requirements Specification WN-DS-00001-WBT Rev. 2. The proprietary version of this document and the affidavit for withholding are contained in Attachment 29.

242 8/4/2010 Responder: Hilmes Close Close EICB (Garg)

TVA to make firm decision on date of transfer (before The Unit 2 loops in service for Unit that are or after initial startup) of Unit 2 loops in service for Unit scheduled to be transferred to the Foxboro Spec 1 to new Foxboro Spec 200 hardware 200 hardware will be transferred prior to Unit 2 fuel load.

243 8/3/2010 Responder: WEC Closed Closed. ML101650255, EICB (Carte)

Item No. 6 Section 8.2.1 of the Common Q SPM (ML050350234) WEC to address at the 9/15 meeting TVA to respond or states that the System Requirements Specification provide proposed (SysRS) includes the system design basis. Section Closed to Item 142 date of response.

1.2, "System Scope," of the WBN2 PAM SysRS (ML101680578) includes a description of the PAMS design bases that does not meet the requirements of IEEE 603-199 Clause 4. Please provide a description of the PAMs design bases that conforms to the requirements of IEEE 603-1991 Clause 4.

244 8/3/2010 Responder: WEC Open Open TVA LIC-101 Rev. 3 Appendix B EICB (Carte)

SRS Revision due Section 4, "Safety Evaluation" Section 8.2.2 of the Common Q SPM (ML050350234) WEC agreed to remove process related items 10/22/10 states: "the information relied states that the Software Requirements Specification from all docs. Close to previous item and revise upon in the SE must be (SRS) shall be developed using IEEE 830 and RE previous item to include all documents. TVA to respond or docketed correspondence."

1.172. Clause 4.8, "Embedding project requirements provide proposed in the SRS," of the IEEE 830 states that an SRS date of response. LIC-101 Rev. 3 states: "The should address the software product, not the process safety analysis that supports the of producing the software. In addition Section 4.3.2.1 change requested should include of the SPM states "Any alternatives to the SPM technical information in sufficient processes or additional project specific information for detail to enable the NRC staff to the ...SCMP...shall be specified in the PQP. make an independent assessment regarding the Contrary to these two statements in the SPM, the acceptability of the proposal in WBN2 PAMS SRS (ML101050202) contains many terms of regulatory requirements process related requirements, for example all and the protection of public seventeen requirements in Section 2.3.2, health and safety."

"Configuration Control," address process requirements for configuration control.

Please explain how the above meets the intent of the approved SPM.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date 245 8/3/2010 Responder: WEC Open Open TVA LIC-101 Rev. 3 Appendix B EICB (Carte)

Test Plan due Section 4, "Safety Evaluation" Section 5.8 of the Common Q SPM (ML050350234) Relates to the commitment to provide the test 12/7/10 states: "the information relied identifies the required test documentation for systems plan and the SPM compliance matrix upon in the SE must be developed using the Common Q SPM. Please provide TVA to respond or docketed correspondence."

sufficient information for the NRC staff to provide proposed independently assess whether the test plan for WBN2 date of response. LIC-101 Rev. 3 states: "The PAMS, is as described in the SPM (e.g., Section safety analysis that supports the 5.8.1). change requested should include technical information in sufficient detail to enable the NRC staff to make an independent assessment regarding the acceptability of the proposal in terms of regulatory requirements and the protection of public health and safety."

246 8/3/2010 Responder: WEC Open Open LIC-101 Rev. 3 Appendix B EICB (Carte)

LTR R1 Due Section 4, "Safety Evaluation" Section 4.3.2.1, "Initiation Phase" of the Common Q There is a PQP and SPM compliance matrix will 10/22/10 states: "the information relied SPM (ML050350234) requires that a Project Quality be referenced in the Licensing Technical Report. TVA to respond or upon in the SE must be Plan (PQP) be developed. Many other section of the provide proposed docketed correspondence."

SPM identify that this PQP should contain information WEC to identify the elements of the SPM in the date of response.

required by ISG6. Please provide the PQP. If "PQP" compliance matrix LIC-101 Rev. 3 states: "The is not the name of the documentation produced, safety analysis that supports the please describe the documentation produced and change requested should include provide the information that the SPM states should be technical information in sufficient in the PQP. detail to enable the NRC staff to make an independent assessment regarding the acceptability of the proposal in terms of regulatory requirements and the protection of public health and safety."

247 8/8/2010 Responder: WEC Open Open (TVA) LIC-101 Rev. 3 Appendix B EICB (Carte)

LTR due 10/22/10 Section 4, "Safety Evaluation" As part of the Common Q topical report development The documents will be identified in Rev. 1 of the states: "the information relied effort, Westinghouse developed the Software Program Licensing Technical Report in the compliance TVA to respond or upon in the SE must be Manual for Common Q Systems (ML050350234) to matrix. WEC to make the documents available provide proposed docketed correspondence."

address software planning documentation. The NRC ASAP in Rockville. May require later submittal. date of response.

reviewed the SPM and concluded: the SPM specifies LIC-101 Rev. 3 states: "The plans that will provide a quality software life cycle safety analysis that supports the process, and that these plans commit to change requested should include documentation of life cycle activities that will permit the technical information in sufficient staff or others to evaluate the quality of the design detail to enable the NRC staff to features upon which the safety determination will be make an independent based. The staff will review the Implementation of the assessment regarding the life cycle process and the software life cycle process acceptability of the proposal in design outputs for specific applications on a plant- terms of regulatory requirements specific basis. Please identify the implementation and the protection of public documentation produced as a result of following the health and safety."

SPM, and state what information will be docketed.

248 8/8/2010 Responder: WEC Open Open LIC-101 Rev. 3 Appendix B EICB (Carte)

LTR due 10/22/10 Section 4, "Safety Evaluation" As part of the Common Q topical report development The documents will be identified in Rev. 1 of the TVA to respond or states: "the information relied effort, Westinghouse developed the Software Program Licensing Technical Report in the compliance provide proposed upon in the SE must be Manual for Common Q Systems (ML050350234) to matrix. WEC to make the documents available date of response. docketed correspondence."

address software planning documentation. The NRC ASAP in Rockville. May require later submittal.

reviewed the SPM and concluded: the SPM specifies LIC-101 Rev. 3 states: "The

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date plans that will provide a quality software life cycle safety analysis that supports the process, and that these plans commit to change requested should include documentation of life cycle activities that will permit the technical information in sufficient staff or others to evaluate the quality of the design detail to enable the NRC staff to features upon which the safety determination will be make an independent based. The staff will review the Implementation of the assessment regarding the life cycle process and the software life cycle process acceptability of the proposal in design outputs for specific applications on a plant- terms of regulatory requirements specific basis. Please identify the design outputs and the protection of public produced as a result of following the SPM, and state health and safety."

when what information will be docketed.

249 8/8/2010 Responder: WEC Closed Closed LIC-101 Rev. 3 Appendix B EICB (Carte)

Section 4, "Safety Evaluation" The SVVP in the SPM describes the V&V Close to previous items to provide the V&V states: "the information relied implementation tasks that are to be carried out. The Reports. upon in the SE must be acceptance criterion for software V&V implementation docketed correspondence."

is that the tasks in the SVVP have been carried out in their entirety. Documentation should exist that shows LIC-101 Rev. 3 states: "The that the V&V tasks have been successfully safety analysis that supports the accomplished for each life cycle activity group. Please change requested should include provide information that shows that the V&V tasks technical information in sufficient have been successfully accomplished for each life detail to enable the NRC staff to cycle activity group. make an independent assessment regarding the acceptability of the proposal in terms of regulatory requirements and the protection of public health and safety."

250 8/8/2010 Responder: WEC Open Open LIC-101 Rev. 3 Appendix B EICB (Carte)

LTR due 10/22/10 Section 4, "Safety Evaluation" The SPM describes the software and documents that Westinghouse develops Software Release states: "the information relied will be created and placed under configuration control. Reports/Records and a Configuration TVA to respond or upon in the SE must be The SCMP (e.g., SPM Section 6, Software Management Release Report. Describe the provide proposed docketed correspondence."

Configuration Management Plan) describes the documents and when they will be produced. date of response.

implementation tasks that are to be carried out. The Summarize guidance on how to produce these LIC-101 Rev. 3 states: "The acceptance criterion for software CM implementation records, focus on project specific requirements in safety analysis that supports the is that the tasks in the SCMP have been carried out in SPM etc. change requested should include their entirety. Documentation should exist that shows technical information in sufficient that the configuration management tasks for that detail to enable the NRC staff to activity group have been successfully accomplished. make an independent Please provide information that shows that the CM assessment regarding the tasks have been successfully accomplished for each acceptability of the proposal in life cycle activity group. terms of regulatory requirements and the protection of public health and safety."

251 8/8/2010 Responder: WEC Open Open LIC-101 Rev. 3 Appendix B EICB (Carte)

LTR due 10/22/10 Section 4, "Safety Evaluation" The SPM describes the software testing and Addressed by SPM Compliance matrix in Rev. 1 TVA to respond or states: "the information relied documents that will be created. The SPM also of the Licensing Technical Report. provide proposed upon in the SE must be describes the testing tasks that are to be carried out. Norbert is looking for guidance on how to ask for date of response. docketed correspondence."

The acceptance criterion for software test less.

implementation is that the tasks in the SPM have been LIC-101 Rev. 3 states: "The carried out in their entirety. Please provide safety analysis that supports the information that shows that testing been successfully change requested should include accomplished. technical information in sufficient detail to enable the NRC staff to make an independent assessment regarding the acceptability of the proposal in

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date terms of regulatory requirements and the protection of public health and safety."

252 8/8/2010 Responder: WEC Open Open LIC-101 Rev. 3 Appendix B EICB (Carte)

RTM Revision due Section 4, "Safety Evaluation" The SPM contain requirements for software Explain response to AP1000 audit report. Read ML091560352 12/31 states: "the information relied requirements traceability analysis and associated RTM docketed NRC awaiting V&V evaluation of TVA to respond or upon in the SE must be documentation (see Section 5.4.5.3, Requirements RTM. provide proposed docketed correspondence."

Traceability Analysis). Please provide information date of response.

that demonstrates that requirements traceability LIC-101 Rev. 3 states: "The analysis has been successfully accomplished. Check on this safety analysis that supports the Hilmes change requested should include technical information in sufficient detail to enable the NRC staff to make an independent assessment regarding the acceptability of the proposal in terms of regulatory requirements and the protection of public health and safety."

253 8/8/2010 Responder: Clark Closed Closed Related to Open Item no. 83.

EICB (Carte)

TVA provided information by letter dated July 30, 2010 All AC160 modules used for the Common Q TVA to respond or LIC-110 Rev. 1 Section 6.2.2 (ML102160349) - See Enclosure 1 Item No. 8 - that PAMS have been previously approved. The provide proposed states: "Design features and some AC160 module contain FPGAs. For those original response listed all FPGAs when the date of response. administrative programs that are modules that have not been previously approved, request was only for components that had not unique to Unit 2 should then be please provide information to address regulatory been previously approved. reviewed in accordance with criteria for FPGAs. current staff positions" LIC-101 Rev. 3 Appendix B Section 4, "Safety Evaluation" states: "the information relied upon in the SE must be docketed correspondence."

254 8/10/2010 Responder: WEC Closed Closed NA NA Request to make documents EICB (Carte) available for audit.

Please make the following available in Westinghouse's Documents are available for review in the Rockville office. Westinghouse Rockville office per WEC letter WBT-D-2268, NRC Access to Common Q WNA-PD-00056-WBT, Rev 1 Watts Bar Unit 2 Documents at the Westinghouse Rockville Office, NSSS Completion I&C Projects dated 8/16/10 (Reference 2).

As the indicated source of customer specific requirements for deliverables, as indicated in the project plan, this document may serve as one end of a thread audit, and may contain information relevant to evaluating the completeness of later requirements.

956080, Rev 1. Cabinet mounted electronics -

Inadequate core cool monitor (ICCM-86)

Believe this to be the source of the requirements or at least algorithms and justifications for RIVLIS.

NABU-DP-00014-GEN, rev 2 Design Process for Common Q Safety Systems. As it defines the scope of other documents we are reviewing, it may clarify what documents are expected to contain what information.

255 C B

(C 8/10/2010 Responder: WEC Closed Closed NA NA Request to make documents art available for audit.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date Please make the following available in Westinghouse's Documents are available for review in the Rockville office. Westinghouse Rockville office per WEC letter The Reusable Software Elements Documents. These WBT-D-2268, NRC Access to Common Q contain requirements for the software. Documents at the Westinghouse Rockville Office, WNA-DS-01564-GEN, Rev 1. ; WNA-DS-00315-GEN, dated 8/16/10 (Reference 2).

Rev. 2 ; WNA-DS-01715-GEN, Rev 2 ; WNA-DS-01838-GEN, Rev. 3 ; WNA-DS-01839-GEN, Rev. 3 ;

WNA-DS-01840-GEN, Rev 2. ; WNA-DS-01841, Rev

2. ; WNA-DS-01842-GEN Rev 2.; WNA-DS-01845-GEN Rev. 1. ; WNA-DS-01846-GEN Rev. 2 ; WNA-DS-01847-GEN Rev. 0 ; WNA-DS-01848 Rev. 1. ;

WNA-DS-01849-GEN Rev. 2. ; WNA-DS-01994-GEN Rev. 0 ; WNA-DS-00306-GEN Rev. 5 ; WNA-DS-02065-GEN Rev. 2 ; WNA-DS-01505-GEN Rev. 0 Further documentation for application-specific type circuits and custom PC elements are indicated by the SRS to be in 00000-ICE-3238, Rev 5 ; 00000-ICE-30140, rev 4 and 00000-ICE-30152, Rev. 5 256 8/10/2010 Responder: WEC Closed Closed NA NA Request to make documents EICB (Carte) available for audit.

Please make the following available in Westinghouse's Documents are available for review in the Rockville office. Westinghouse Rockville office per WEC letter WBT-D-2268, NRC Access to Common Q The following are documents that contain Documents at the Westinghouse Rockville Office, requirements used in the SRS which we incorporated dated 8/16/10 (Reference 2).

by reference within that document.

Coding Standards and Guidelines for Common Q Systems, 00000-ICE-3889, Rev. 10, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC.

Application Restrictions for Generic Common Q Qualification, WNA-DS-01070-GEN, Rev. 3, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC.

System Requirements Specification for the Common Q Generic Flat Panel Display 00000-ICE-30155, Rev.

9, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC.

Software Requirements Specification for the Common Q Generic Flat Panel Display Software, 00000-ICE-3239, Rev. 12, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC.

Common Q Software Configuration Management Guidelines, NABU-DP-00015-GEN, Rev. 2, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC, Standard General Requirements for Cyber security, WNA-DS-01150-GEN, Rev. 0, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC, 257 8/10/2010 Responder: WEC Closed Closed NA NA Request to make documents EICB (Carte) available for audit.

Please make the following available in Westinghouse's WEC Reviewing to ensure all documents are Rockville office. available in Rockville office.

The following are documents that contain requirements used in the SRS which we incorporated by reference within that document.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date AC160 CPU Loading Restrictions, AN03007Sp, ABB WBT-D-2268, 8/16/2010 Memo, ABB Process Automation Corporation, Software Design Description for the Common Q WEC still needs to make/confirm this document is Generic Flat-Panel Display Software, 00000-ICE- available.

30157, Rev. 16, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC.

System Requirements Specification for the Common WBT-D-2024, 6/9/2010 Q Post Accident Monitoring System, 0000-ICE-30156, Rev. 06, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC.

Software Requirements Specification for the WBT-D-2024, 6/9/2010 Common Q Post Accident Monitoring System 00000-ICE-3238, Rev. 5, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC.

WBT-D-2268, 8/16/2010 Commercial Dedication Report for QNX 4.25G for Common Q Applications, WNA-CD-00018-GEN, Rev.

3, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC, WBT-D-2268, 8/16/2010 Generic Common Q Software Installation Procedure, WNA-IP-00152-GEN, Rev. 7, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC.

258 8/10/2010 Responder: WEC Closed Closed NA NA Request to make documents EICB (Carte) available for audit.

Please make the following available in Westinghouse's WEC Reviewing to ensure all documents are Rockville office. available in Rockville office.

The IV&V Phase Summary Report, (WNA-VR-00283-WBT Rev . 0 ) indicated that the IV&V team had created some information that may facilitate the approval process. However the form the information may have taken was not indicated or referenced in the Phase Summary Report. Information requested for the Rockville office includes:

-The excel spreadsheet described in section 2.2.2 that verifies all low level requirements have a basis in a higher one, and that all higher level requirements decompose into a lower level.

-A review of the WBU2 SysRS, SDS, and SRS for clarity, completeness, correctness and compatibility

-Comparison of the WBU2 SysRS, SDS, and SRS to source level documents

-An evaluation, per section 2.2.3, of the baseline report

-a second party peer review for the source level documents 259 8/10/2010 Responder: WEC Closed Closed NA NA Request to make documents EICB (Carte) available for audit.

Please make the following available in Westinghouse's Documents are available for review in the Rockville office. Westinghouse Rockville office per WEC letter WBT-D-2268, NRC Access to Common Q As they may demonstrate that a number of issues Documents at the Westinghouse Rockville Office, raised by, or that will be raised by, the NRC staff are dated 8/16/10 (Reference 2).

already being resolved by the vendor, we would like to have access to V&V-769 and V&V-770 in the Exception Reports (ER) database for common Q systems.

260 C B

(C 8/10/2010 Responder: WEC Closed Closed NA NA Request to make documents art available for audit.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date Please make the following available in Westinghouse's WEC Reviewing to ensure all documents are Rockville office. available in Rockville office.

The Source level documents for the requirements WBT-D-2268, 8/16/2010 WBT-TVA-0070 Safety Related Digital Logic Cards Circuitry and Related Instrument Racks Restrictions WBT-D-0088 Transmittal Westinghouse comments on WBT-D-2268, 8/16/2010 TVA specification EDSR 52451 Contract Number 65717 Tennessee Valley Authority WBT-D-2268, 8/16/2010 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 NSSS Completion Project WEST-WBT-2008-25 TVA Contract Word Hilmes to determine if this document can be Authorization provided.

261 8/10/2010 Responder: WEC Closed Closed ML101650255, LIC-110 Rev. 1 Section 6.2.2 EICB (Carte)

Item No. 6 states: "Design features and Please provide the Requirements Traceability Matrix WEC to make available in Rockville ASAP. May TVA to respond or administrative programs that are for generic PAMS and/or any other RTMs applicable to require later submittal per 9/15 meeting. provide proposed unique to Unit 2 should then be WBN2 PAMS. Some requirements in the Software date of response. reviewed in accordance with Requirements Specification are simply not present in Closed to Item 142 current staff positions" the Watts Bar 2 PAMS specific RTM (WNA-VR-00279-WBT). LIC-101 Rev. 3 Appendix B Section 4, "Safety Evaluation" states: "the information relied upon in the SE must be docketed correspondence."

262 8/10/2010 Responder: WEC Closed Closed NA NA Request to make documents EICB (Carte) available for audit.

In order to facilitate visits to the Rockville office, please WEC Reviewing to ensure all documents are make the following documents available at the available in Rockville office.

Rockville office.

Watts Bar 2 PAMS licensing technical report 00000- WBT-D-1526, 01/28/10; WBT-D-2268, 8/16/10 ICE-37722 Rev. 0 (ML003733136)

Common Q Software Programming manual (ML050350234)

Common Q topical report. (ML031830959) 263 8/11/2010 Responder: WEC Closed Closed ML101650255, EICB (Carte)

Based on an examination of document available at the Item No. 2 Westinghouse Rockville offices (i.e., NA 7.4, WEC 7.2, Addressed in 9/20 - 9/21 audit.

WEC 7.3, CDI-3803, & CDI-3722) a CDI appears to identify the verification activities for each critical Combine with item 138 after audit.

characteristic. These activities appear to be documented on the associated dedication data sheets; therefore, it appears that the Westinghouse Commercial Grade Dedication Plan is called a CDI and the completed CDI data sheets are the commercial grade dedication Report. If so, please provide the CDI for each new (not previously approved) component and the associated completed dedication data sheets.

264 8/11/2010 Responder: WEC Closed Closed ML101650255, EICB Item No. 2 (Carte) Please provide a copy of the commercial grade After the 9/20 - 9/21 audit.

survey(s) applicable to each new (not previously approved) Common Q component. Combine with item 138 after audit.

(

265 8/11/2010 Responder: WEC Closed Closed ML101650255, C

a

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date Item No. 2 Please provide: After the 9/20 - 9/21 audit.

WNA-CD-00018-GEN Rev. 3 00000-ICE-35444 Rev. 1 Combine with item 138 after audit.

266 8/11/2010 Responder: Webb/Webber Open Open EICB (Carte)

TVA to Docket Please provide a high level description of the Foxboro FSAR section 7.7.1.11 will be added in Ammendment 101 IA equipment used at WBN2. This description should Amendment 101. In discussions with the NRC TVA to respond or be more detailed than a brochure on the product line reviewer on October 4, 2010 it was agreed that provide proposed (or available on the web), and less detailed than a the new FSAR section along with previously date of response.

technical manual on each field replaceable unit. It is submitted documents should be sufficient to expected that such literature already exists. address this request. The NRC reviewer will notify TVA if additional documentation is required.

267 8/11/2010 Responder: WEC Open Open TVA EICB (Carte)

LTR R1 due 10/22 By letter dated June 18, 2010 (ML101940236) TVA stated that the software safety plan (SSP) was not applicable to PAMS applications (see Watts Bar 2 -

Common Q PAMS ISG-6 Compliance matrix Item No.

10); however, reference No. 30 of the SRS (ML101050202) is: 00000-ICE-37727, Rev. 0, "Post Accident Monitoring System Software Preliminary Hazard Analysis for the Common Q PAMS Project." A Preliminary Hazard Analysis is required by the SSP.

Please explain.

268 8/19/2010 Responder: WEC Open Open TVA EICB (Carte)

Due 12/31 By letter dated March 12, 2010 (ML101680577), TVA Andy to see what can be done.

stated that the application specific hardware and HILMES Check on software architecture descriptions are addressed in the This WBN2 PAMS System Design Specification (ML101680579, ML102040481, & ML102040482) and Software Requirements Specification (ML101050202, ML102040486, & ML1022040487).

Neither of these documents contain a non-proprietary figure of the architecture that can be used in the SE.

Please provide a non-proprietary figure of the architecture.

269 Justi 8/20/2010 Responder: NRC Open OPEN n

DORL to send the Eagle-21 Audit Report to TVA.

270 8/23/2010 Responder: Clark Closed Closed See also Open Item Nod. 41 &

EICB (Carte) 245.

By letter dated June 18, 2009 (ML091560352) the Close to items 41 and 245 NRC informed Westinghouse that WNA-PT-00058-GEN (see pdf page 7 of 25) did not adequately address the test plan criteria of the Software Program Manual (ML050350234); however, by letter dated June 18, 2010 (ML101940236) TVA/Westinghouse stated that WNA-PT-00058-GEN addressed the test plan criteria of the SPM (pdf page 59 of 194, Item No. 12).

Please explain.

271 8/23/2010 Responder: WEC Closed Closed ML101650255, EICB (Carte)

Item No. 6 By letter dated August 20, 2010 TVA docketed a 9/15 meeting and 9/20 audit Requirements Traceability Matrix for the Common Q PAMS (Requirements Phase).This document does not Closed to Item 142 identify the source of each requirement. The Common

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date Q PAMS System Requirements Specification (SysRS -

ML101680578, ML102040483, & ML102040484) does not explicitly identify the origin of each requirement.

The SRP acceptance criteria for requirements specifications is that the origin of the requirements is know. Please explain how to trace each requirement in the SysRS to its origin.

272 7.5.2. 7.5.1 8/26/2010 Responder: Clark Open Open - TVA Item No. 20 is being drafted.

EICB (Marcus) 1 In WBN2 FSAR Table 7.5-2, "Regulatory Guide 1.97 The variable number will be changed to 19 in Response is acceptable Due 10/31/10 Variable List (Deviation and Justification for FSAR Amendment 101 as shown below:

Deviations)," (WBNP-96) for Variable 19, NRC to issue "Containment Hydrogen Concentration," Deviation 2 Table 7.5-2 formal RAI to TVA.

(page 19 of 41), the variable number is listed as 15.

The variable number should be listed as 19. DEVIATION 2 VARIABLE (1519)

Containment Hydrogen Concentration 273 7.5.2. 7.5.1 8/26/2010 Responder: Clark Closed Closed Item No. 18 is being drafted.

EICB (Marcus) 1 In WBN2 FSAR Table 7.5-2, "Regulatory Guide 1.97 Post accident samples will be obtained from the 10/5/10 TVA letter Response NRC to issue Variable List (Deviation and Justification for normal sample system. 95 provided information. formal RAI to TVA Deviations)," (WBNP-96) for Variable 97g, "Reactor Coolant Sample Activity," Deviation 5 (page 21 of 41),

the last two sentences of the Justification read, "TVA meets the intent of RG 1.97 recommended range by monitoring this variable using the gross activity analysis of primary coolant samples taken in the post accident sampling facility. Samples are obtained from the post accident sampling system in Unit 1 only."

Please describe how the samples are obtained for Unit 2.

274. 7.5.2. 7.5.1 8/26/2010 Responder: Clark Open Open - TVA Item No. 21 is being drafted.

EICB (Marcus) a 1 In WBN2 FSAR Table 7.5-2, "Regulatory Guide 1.97 The SC in the last sentence will be changed to Response is acceptable. Due 10/31/10 Variable List (Deviation and Justification for SG in FSAR Amendment 101 as shown below:

Deviations)," (WBNP-96) for Variable 82, "Steam NRC to issue Generator Level Wide Range," Deviation 10 (page 24 SG wide range level indication is utilized as a formal RAI to TVA.

of 41), in the last sentence, of the Justification, SC diverse variable to auxiliary feedwater (AFW) flow should be SG. for gross indication of flow to the SGs. The WBN AFW monitors are Types A1 and D2. WBN's position is that since SC SG wide range level is only used as a backup to redundant AFW flow monitors, it does not require redundancy 274. 8/26/2010 Responder: Clark Open Open - TVA EICB (Singh) b Loose Parts Monitoring System: TR 3.3 refers to The reference will be changed to FSAR section Due 10/31/10 section 4.4.6 of the FSAR for description of the loose 7.6.7 Loose Part Monitoring System (LPMS) parts monitoring system. However, this section of the System Description in next revision of the FSAR is not available. TVA to check the reference Technical Requirements Manual as shown below:

and respond.

1. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 7.6.7, Lose Part Monitoring System.

(Note: Bechtel I&C to submit TRM change package to TVA Licensing.)

275 (SB 8/27/2010 Responder: Clark Closed Closed in

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date Loose Parts Monitoring System: RG 1.133, sections C.1.a and C.1.c address sensor locations and channel separation respectively. TR 3.3, FSAR section 7.6.7 and the DMIMMS-DX System Description do not clearly explain the location or address channel separation per the guidance of RG 1.133. Please update the documents as needed.

276 7.6 7.6 8/27/2010 Responder: Webb Open TVA to Docket in EICB (Garg) 10/20 letter In order for the staff to review the effects of multi The NRC reviewer confirmed this question control systems failure, provide the summary of the applies to non-safety systems. TVA to provide analyses documenting the effect on the plant based on justification for the following events: (1) loss of power to all control (1) The DCS segmentation analysis non-safety system systems powered by a single power supply; (2) failure addressed the power supply arrangement other than DCS.

of each instrument sensor which provides signal to two for the NSSS/BOP control systems or more control systems; (3) Break of any sensor implemented with Foxboro I/A. The statement that impulse line which is used for sensors providing (2) Signals shared by more than one control failure of sense signals to two or more control systems; and (4) failure system are addressed in the DCS line whtre more of digital system based on the common cause segmentation analysis. than one software failure affecting two or more control systems. (3) Where feasible, the unit 2 design includes transmitter is For each of these events, confirm that the separate sense lines for redundant connected would consequences of these events will not be outside transmitters, eliminating a single point of be bounded by the chapter 15 analyses or beyond the capability of failure which is present in unit 1. In those failure of a single operators or safety systems. applications where separate sense lines transmitter does are not practicable, failure of a single not make sense.

sense line would be bounded by the failure of a single transmitter and would have the same effect as for unit 1.

(4) Limiting DCS failures were addressed in the segmentation analysis, supplemented by Fault Handling in the I/A Series System, Revision 1, submitted on TVA letter to NRC dated October 5, 2010, Attachment 42.

277 7.6 7.6.3 8/27/2010 Responder: Clark Open Open EICB (Garg)

TVA to draft Response TVA 10/31 NUREG 0847, "Safety evaluation report Related to the operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2."

has section 7.6.3 which discusses the, "Upper Head Injection Manual Control" system but has been removed from the FSAR. Please provide the information regarding when this system was removed, and the justification for the removal of the system and if the NRC staff has previously reviewed and accepted the removal of the system provide the reference to the staff's SE.

278 7.6 7.6.6 8/27/2010 Responder: Trelease Open Open EICB (Garg)

TVA to Docket in For FSAR Section 7.6.6, provide the justification for UFSAR section 7.6.6 does not identify control 10/20 letter adding valves FCV 63-8 and FCV 63-11, which require valves FCV-63-8 and -11 as part of a list of valves that power to be removed and will be administratively that are required to have their motive power controlled prior to use of RHR system for plant removed during specific operating modes. The cooldown. Provide the P & ID and block diagram Unit 1 General operating instructions GO-1 and showing the operation of these valves. GO-6 (which will be used as a guideline for unit 2) provide administrative instructions to remove power and restore power to these valves in mode

3. Also, U1 Emergency operating procedures (e.g ES-1.3) do not address the restoration of power to the valves as part of post LOCA

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date Mitigation activities.

Attachment 8 contains the control and logic diagrams, along with the applicable design changes to verify that the control schemes are similar to unit 1.

279 7.6 7.6.6 8/27/2010 Responder: Mather Open TVA to docket in EICB (Garg) 10/20 letter For FSAR Section 7.6.6, provide the justification for The FSAR change to include the valves as the exception to install protective covers which exceptions to the use of protective covers was operator has to remove before he can have access to made to match Unit 1 UFSAR change Pkg. No.

control switch to operate two additional valves FCV62- 1547 Safety Assessment Item 8. The change 98 and FCV62-99. package identified FCV-62-98 and 99 as exceptions to the use of protective covers. This change was based on WBPER980417 which removed the power from the valves and had them locked open. TVA will incorporate the same changes in Unit 2 as Unit 1. The Unit 1 changes are described in References 3 and 4.

280 7.6 7.6.6 8/27/2010 Responder: Trelease Open EICB (Garg)

TVA to issue by For FSAR Section 7.6.6, provide the justification for Historical DCN 38661 removes the requirement Response is acceptable. 10/20 the acceptability of removing FCV 63-5 from the list of that power be removed from FCV-63-5 during valves which has operating instructions specifying the normal operations, and notes that the valve does removal of power during specific modes of plant not have a shunt breaker to allow MCR position operation. indication with power removed. The Unit 2 system description has been updated to reflect the Unit 1 change to the system description, and the update of section 7.6.6 to remove the requirement of FCV-63-5 from the list of valves which has operating instructions specifying the removal of power during normal operations. This is supported by the failure modes and effects analysis for the safety injection system calculation EMP-SNM-043029 (which has been revised to be applicable to Unit 2), as well as the Unit 2 FSAR Table 6.3-8 both which state that spurious closure of FCV-63-5 is not credible. Spurious closure of FCV-63-5 is not credible because the MCR hand switch is provided with a protective cover to prevent operator error. In addition, the hand switch is wired with contacts on both sides of the motor contactor to prevent a single failure within the switch gear from spuriously closing the valve.

These features eliminate the need to remove power from FCV-63-5.

Attachment 10 contains the documentation associated with this response.

281 7.6 7.6.8 8/27/2010 Responder: Clark Open Tva to docket in EICB (Garg) 10/31 letter For FSAR Section 7.6.8 in amendment 96, redline TVA to provide draft response.

version has completely rewritten this section of the FSAR, however, the staff is not able to determine any changes made to the section. Explain what changes have been made to this FSAR Section.

282 7.6 7.6.9EIC 8/27/2010 Responder: Trelease Open B

(Gar g) TVA to issue by For FSAR Section 7.6.9 which discusses the switch The re-write for section 7.6.9 was to provide a Response is acceptable 10/20

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date over from injection to recirculation, and is a ESF more concise description of the instrumentation system, the compliance with IEEE 279 has been and controls. The section was too wordy, and removed from the FSAR. Justify this deletion. several topics were duplicated in section 7.3.

Wording is now more closely aligned to system description.

Compliance with IEEE 279 is not intended to be removed, merely the reference to the standard in that particular section. A statement is added that The automatic switchover of the RHR pumps from the injection to the recirculation Mode is part of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) discussed in chapter 7.3.

Chapter 7.3 includes a reference to IEEE Standard 279-1979. The reference in 7.6.9 was therefore considered unnecessary, and therefore removed.

Attachment 9 contains FSAR excerpts required to support this response.

283 7.7.5 XX 8/27/2010 Responder: Clark Open Open - TVA This item is a follow-up question EICB (Darbali) to item 96.

Follow-up to item 96 Due 10/31/10 On Open Item 96, regarding the implementation of IEN 79-22, part of TVAs response was:

The non-safety-related device/systems within the scope of IEN 79-22 are:

1. Steam generator power operated relief valve control system

2. Pressurizer power operated relief valve control system

3. Main feedwater control system

4. Automatic rod control system.

Failure of these systems/devices due to a high energy line break is fully addressed in Chapter 15, Accident Analysis of the WBN Unit 2 FSAR.

Please identify the sections of FSAR Chapter 15 that address the failures of these systems.

284 7.7.3 7.4.1 8/27/2010 Responder: Webber Open Open - TVA This item is a follow-up question EICB to item 123 Follow-up to item 123 Attachment 2 to the 10/20 letter contains the Due 10/31/10 (Darbali) electrical logic diagrams and required Drawing Please provide a readable electrical logic diagram of Change Authorizations (DRAs).

the Volume Control Tank Level Control System.

285 7.3.3 7.3 8/27/2010 Responder: Clark Open Open - TVA This item is a follow-up question EICB (Darbali) to item 22 Follow-up to item 22 Due 10/31/10 Do the control loops meet the requirements of IEEE-279? If not are they isolated from the circuit which meets the requirements of 279.

286 7.7.3 9.3.4. EICB 8/27/2010 Responder: Webber Open Open - TVA 2.4 (Darbal i) SE 7.7.3, Volume Control Tank Level Control System Low alarm is correct - the setpoint is above the Response is satisfactory. Due 10/31/10 low-low interlock that opens the isolation valve,

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date In FSAR section 9.3.4.2.4 a change was made to the mentioned earlier in the paragraph.

last paragraph of the Volume Control Tank description Editorial change to correct a typo.

(page 9.3-31 of the Amendment 97 redline), where the "low-low level alarm" was changed to "low level alarm".

Please explain if this deletion was an editorial change to correct a typo.

287 7.3 7.3-1 8/27/2010 The AMSAC start is not included based on Unit 1 Open Open - TVA ML102390538, EICB (Darbali)

UFSAR Change Package 1554S0 which states: Item No. 1, In Amendment 95 of FSAR section 7.3.2.3 Further Due 10/31/10 9/10/10 Considerations, the list of signals that would start the 20 (page 7.3-17. 18 and Table 7.3-1): The auxiliary feedwater motor driven and turbine driven initiating signals for Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pumps was moved to table 7.3-1 item 3, Auxiliary are moved from Section 7.3.2.3 to Table 7.3-1, Feedwater. However, item (6) AMSAC was not which lists ESF instrumentation. A reference included in table 7.3-1. to*the Table is added. This change also clarifies that the AFW pumps are started by tljp of both Please explain this omission or state your commitment Turbine-Driven Main Feedwater (MFW) pumps to correct this in a future amendment. rather than all MFW pumps as currently stated since trip of the Standby MFW pump does not initiate AFW. This is consistent with the description of the Auxiliary Feedwater System in Section 10.4.9. This change also deletes AMSAC from the list of AFW start signals. As described in Section 7.7.1.12, the AMSAC system is non-safety and provides a diverse means of initiating AFW and turbine trip under conditions indicative of an ATWS event. AMSAC was not designed as an Engineered Safety Feature and is not included in the ESFAS Technical Specification 3.3.2 for AFW start. Therefore, it does not belong in the Table which identifies ESF instrumentation. The change does not alter the AMSAC functions of AFW start and turbine trip. The Switchover from Injection to recirculation and the switchover initiating signals are also added to Table 7.3-1 since they are considered to be part of the ESFAS. The listing of switchover instrumentation is consistent with the description of the switchover function in Section 7.6.9. Also numbered the notes at the bottom of the Table.

288 7.3 9/2/2010 Responder: Clark Open Open - TVA EICB (Garg)

Can we add a section to chapter 7 giving a brief The Unit 1 FSAR does not contain a hardware Due 10/31/10 overview of the Foxboro Spec 200 in Section 7.3? description of the legacy Bailey/GMac instrumentation which the Foxboro Spec 200 hardware is replacing in Unit 2. The Spec 200 hardware is the same type of discrete analog loops as the Bailey/GMac hardware. The FSAR does not typically provide descriptions at this low level of detail; therefore, there does not seem to be justification to add a hardware description of the Foxboro Spec 200 equipment to FSAR section 7.

289 9/2/2010 Responder: Faulkner Open Open (TVA)

EICB (Singh) There are 4 Containment High Range Radiation Provide an ISG 2 diversity analysis for the containment Monitors (HRRMs) for WBN2, a pair in upper Staff has the high range accident monitors RM-1000. containment and a pair in lower containment. following

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date Each pair completely meets the requirements for comments on the safety related equipment including separation, proposed TVA independence, electrical isolation, seismic response:

qualification, quality requirements, etc. Each monitor channel is a standalone instrument loop Please explain any with traditional individual panel readout. They are actions or not a part of a Highly Integrated Control Room functions that may (HICR) as described in ISG-04 and there is no be based on diversity question relating to the HRRMs and any alarms or HICR infrastructure. Therefore, the response to indications in case this RAI will address the functional uses of the of total loss of all HRRMs and the alternate and diverse HHRMs.

instrumentation that could be used for those functions should a common mode software issue Please confirm render both trains of HRRMs non-functional. that the location for obtaining the The Containment HRRMs have no automatic RCS sample is actuation function. They only provide indication accessible after an as required by RG 1.97R2. They are used at accident.

WBN for 2 functions. They are used by the operators in Emergency Operating Instructions Please note that (EOI) as one of the indications of abnormal staff intended to containment conditions indicative of a Loss of use ISG2 and not Coolant Accident (LOCA) after a Reactor Trip and ISG4 for citing the Safety Injection and they are used in Emergency need to address Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP) to assist diversity. ISG4 is with event classification for events which involve an inadvertent fuel cladding degradation. error and it has been corrected to In the EOI procedures, there are several diverse ISG2.

indications of containment conditions that are used to detect a LOCA and they are Containment Otherwise, the Pressure, Containment Temperature, and response is Containment Sump Level. All of these instrument acceptable.

channels are diverse to the HRRMs in that they do not share a software platform or any integrated Due 10/31/10 information or control system features. The HRRMs functional through individual, self contained, microprocessor based instrument loops. Containment Pressure and Sump Level indications are provided through Eagle 21 equipment which is completely diverse from the HRRMs.. Containment Temperature is provided through Foxboro Spec 200 instrument channels which are completely diverse from the HRRMs.

All of these readouts are through traditional panel meters and are not part of any HICR infrastructure.

In the EPIPs, the HRRMs are used to indicate loss of fuel clad barrier and the potential loss of a containment barrier. Potential fuel clad damage can also be determined from samples taken from the Reactor Coolant System and from Incore Thermocouple readings. RCS sampling does not rely on plant instrumentation systems and the Incore Thermocouple System uses a Common Q software platform which is diverse from the HRRMs.

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date Therefore, there are diverse methods and equipment sets that can be used for any functions provided by the HRRMs should both channels become nonfunctional.

290 7.7 9/7/2010 Responder: Clark Closed Closed NA NA This item is a duplicate of item EICB 291.

(Carte) The equation at the bottom of Amendment 99 page This item is a duplicate of item 291.

7.7-3 is wrong. There are two ways that this equation is inconsistent with the text above it.

291 7.7 9/7/2010 Responder: Clark Open Open - TVA EICB (Carte)

The equation at the bottom of Amendment 100 page The errors in the terms within the equation for Due 10/31/10 7.7-3 is wrong. There are two ways that this equation total rod speed error [TE] will be corrected in is inconsistent with the text above it. FSAR Amendment 101 as shown below:

1 1 1 1 1 1

292 7.2.5 7.2 9/7/2010 The SG level transmitter reference legs are not Open Open - TVA EICB (Garg) insulated on Unit 1 and will not be insulated on FSAR Section 7.2, Steam Generator Reference Leg: Unit 2. The analysis provided for Unit 1 is also Due 10/31/10 By letter dated July 27, 1994, TVA had withdrawn its applicable to Unit 2. FSAR Section 7.2.1.1.2 (5) commitment on Unit 1 to insulate SG reference leg. indicates that the Low-Low steam generator water TVA had provided an analysis to justify this action level trip protects the reactor from loss of heat which was accepted by the staff. Confirm whether SG sink in the event of a loss of feedwater to one or reference leg in Unit 2 are insulated and if not then more steam generators or a major feedwater line confirm that the analysis which was submitted for Unit rupture outside containment. For a feedwater line 1 is also applicable to Unit 2. rupture inside containment the TVA analysis credits the high containment pressure Safety Injection signal. FSAR Section 15.4.2.2 has been revised accordingly.

Reference:

1. Watts Bar Unit 1 SER NUREG-0847, Supplement 14.

2. Westinghouse WCAP 13462, Revision 2 293 7.7.4 7.2.2. 9/8/2010 Responder: Craig Open Open - TVA Item No. 22 is being drafted.

EICB (Marcus) 3.5 FSAR Amendment 100, Section 7.2.2.3.5 discusses Steam Generator Overfill Due 10/31/10 Steam Generator Water Level and protection against FSAR Section 7.2 discusses reactor trip low water level. However, this section does not functions. Section 7.2.2.3.5 describes the Low- NRC to review and discuss protection against Steam Generator overfill. Low steam generator level reactor trip. The issue formal RAI Additionally, FSAR Section 7.2.2.3.4 discusses steam generator High-High level interlock (P-14) to TVA.

Pressurizer Water Level and provides minimal protects against steam generator overfill by information concerning Pressurizer overfill. Please initiating feedwater isolation and a turbine trip.

provide a discussion of protection against Pressurizer Reactor trip occurs indirectly as a result of the and Steam Generator overfill. turbine trip if power is above 50%, the P-9 interlock. This function is identified as ESFAS interlock P-14 in FSAR Section 7.3, Table 7.3-3.

The High-High level interlock is also discussed in FSAR Section 10.4.7.3. Section 15.2.10 analyzes the feedwater malfunction event which causes one or more feedwater control valves to fail to the fully open position.

Pressurizer Overfill

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No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date The High pressurizer water level reactor trip protects against pressurizer overfill. This trip is described in FSAR Section 7.2.1.1.2 (3). Section 7.2.2.3.4 discusses specific control and protection interactions related to pressurizer level control.

The high water level trip setpoint provides sufficient margin such that the undesirable condition of discharging liquid coolant through the safety valves is avoided. Pressurizer level is modeled in various Chapter 15 events to ensure that critical protection functions will function as required.

294 7.3 7.3.1. 9/9/2010 Closure of the main steam isolation valves is not Open Open - TVA ML102390538, EICB (Darbali) 1.1 included based on Unit 1 UFSAR Change Item No. 2, In Amendment 95 of FSAR section 7.3.1.1.1 Function Package 1896S0 which states: Due 10/31/10 9/10/10 Initiation, item (13) was arranged into paragraph form from what used to be a listing of items (a), (b) and (c). FSAR section 7.3.1.1.1 item 12 contains information which is incorrect and conflicts with The second bullet under item (c) was omitted in the information in the same chapter and other new paragraph. sections. Specifically, item 12 indicates that containment spray initiates Phase B containment Initiates Phase B containment isolation of the isolation and that Phase B initiates main steam following: line isolation. Actually, containment spray, Phase

• Closure of the main steam isolation valves (MSIV) B containment isolation, and main steam isolation are all actuated by high-high containment to limit reactor coolant system cooldown for breaks pressure as shown on Figures 7.3-3 Sheet 4 and downstream of the MSIVs. 6.2.4-21. Both of these figures depict the functional logic shown on configuration control Please explain this omission or state your commitment drawing 1-47W611-88-1. This logic is also to correct this in a future amendment. described in other sections, e.g., 6.2.1.3.10, 6.2.2.5, 6.2.4.2, 10.3.3. This change will clarify the information in 7.3.1.1.1 to resolve these inconsistencies.

295 7.3 7.3.1. 9/9/2010 References to section 7.6 and 7.7 are not Open Open - TVA ML102390538, EICB (Darbali) 1.2 included based on Unit 1 UFSAR Change Item No. 3, In Amendment 95 of FSAR section 7.3.1.1.2 Process Package 1554S0 item 5 which states: Due 10/31/10 9/10/10 Protection Circuitry, item (3), references to sections 7.6 and 7.7 were removed. 5 (page 7.3-4): Revise item 3 of Section 7.3.1.1.2 to simplify the discussion of valve position Please explain the reason for removal. information available during the post-LOCA recovery period.

296 7.3 7.3.1. 9/9/2010 The changes are based on Unit 1 UFSAR Open Open - TVA ML102390538, EICB (Darbali) 2.1 Change Package 1554S0 item 8 which states: Item No. 4, In Amendment 95 of FSAR section 7.3.1.2.1 Due 10/31/10 9/10/10 Generating Station Conditions, the new paragraph 8 (page 7.3-6): Revise the section summarizing was arranged from what used to be a listing of items the generating station conditions which require (1.b), (1.c), and (2.b), leaving out items (1.a) and (2.a).

protective action. The list is not intended to be a Even if the paragraph contains the word include, thecomplete list of the design basis events which the breaks in items (1.a) and (2.a) should be listed. protection system is designed to mitigate. The change simplifies the summary, adds feedwater Please explain this omission or state your commitment line break, and adds a reference to Chapter 15 for to correct this in a future amendment. identification of the conditions requiring protective action. System Description N3-99-4003 is similarly revised.

297 7.3 7.3.1.EIC 9/9/2010 The changes are based on Unit 1 UFSAR Open Open - TVA ML102390538, B

2.2 (Dar bali) Change Package 1554S0 item 9 which states: Item No. 5, In Amendment 95 of FSAR section 7.3.1.2.2 Due 10/31/10 9/10/10

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date Generating Station Variables, the following sentence 9 (page 7.3-7 and Table 7.3-2, item 3): Revise was erased: the summary of the generating station variables which are required for initiation of protective Post accident monitoring requirements and variables action by the ESFAS. The change simplifies the are given in Tables 7.5-1 and 7.5-2. summary, eliminates repetition, and adds steam generator level and reactor coolant temperature Please explain the reason for removal. (Tavg) as monitored variables. Low-Low SG level starts Auxiliary Feedwater. High-High SG level initiates Feedwater Isolation. Low Tavg coincident with a Reactor Trip also initiates Feedwater Isolation. Low Tavg with a note to identify the interlock with Permissive P-4 (reactor trip), is also added to Table 7.3-2, item 3, which lists the conditions that initiate Feedwater Isolation.

Addition of these variables is consistent with discussions of the Main and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems in Sections 10.4.7, 10.4.9, various Chapter 15 events (e.g., Sections 15.2.10,15.3.1,15.4.2), and Technical Specification Bases 3.3.2 for the P-4 interlock.

System Description N3-99-4003 is similarly revised to add steam generator level and reactor coolant temperature.

298 7.3 XX 9/9/2010 A review of the schematic diagrams for the Open Open - TVA ML102390538, EICB (Darbali)

WBN Unit 2 valves listed in SER 3 found the Item No. 6, IE Bulletin 80-06 calls for review of engineered safety following: Due 10/31/10 9/10/10 features with the objective of ensuring that no device will change position solely because of the reset (1) For feedwater isolation valves (FCV-3-33, action. FCV-3-47, FCV-3-87, and FCV-3-100),

feedwater check valve bypass valves (FCV-In Supplement 3 of NUREG-0847, section 7.3.5, the 3-185, FCV-3-186, FCV-3-187, and FCV staff approved the design modifications proposed by 188), and upper tap main feedwater the applicant that would allow certain devices to isolation valves (FCV 3-236, FCV-3-239, remain unchanged upon an ESF reset. The staff also FCV-3-242, and FCV-3-245), the Unit 2 found acceptable the applicants justification for some equivalent reset switch and a relay have safety-related equipment that does not remain in its been added for each steam generator loop.

emergency mode after an ESF reset. When the engineered safety feature (ESF) signal is reset, the individual valve will not Please confirm whether or not the equipment that was change state until both the loop and the determined in NUREG-0847 and its supplements to ESF train reset switches have been reset.

remain unchanged upon an ESF reset will still remain unchanged in Unit 2. (2) For steam generator blowdown isolation valves (FCV-43-54D, FCV-43-56D, FCV 59D, FCV-43-63D, FCV-43-55, FCV-43-58, FCV-43-61, and FCV-43-64), the ESF signal is sealed in by means of a seal in relay. The individual valve will not change state until a hand switch in the sample room is used to reopen the individual valve.

(3) For residual heat removal heat exchanger outlet flow control valves (FCV-74-16 and FCV-74-28), the ESF signal is sealed in by the limit switch. The Unit 2 equivalent reset switch has been added at the control room control board. When the ESF signal is reset, the individual valve will not change state until the individual reset switch has been reset.

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No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date 299 Provide Common Q Software Requirements Attachment 41 of the 10/5 letter contains the Closed Closed EICB Specification Post Accident Monitoring System 00000- Common Q Software Requirements Specification (Carte) ICE-3238 Rev. 5 Post Accident Monitoring System 00000-ICE-3238 Rev. 5 and the affidavit for withholding.

300 Need Radiation Monitoring System Description/Design Responder: Temples/Mather Open Open - TVA Criteria (1) The Radiation Monitoring Design Criteria Due 10/31/10 Are detectors different from Unit 1. Describe any Document, WB-DC-40-24, Revision 21 is differences. contained in Attachment 5 to letter dated October 31, 2010.

Are there any commercially dedicated parts in the RM-1000? If so, how are they dedicated? (2) Yes: General Atomics expects to provide the information by October 15. Forward to Please confirm that digital communication ports Justin when received.

available in RM-1000 are not used.

EICB (Singh)

(3) For safety-related applications, General Atomics Electronic Systems, Inc. supplies the RM-1000 module assembly as a Basic Component. This assembly does contain component parts that are Safety-Related Commercial Grade Items (SRCGI). Because these SRCGI components are assembled into the delivered Basic Component, they are dedicated to the assembly by virtue of the acceptance test of the full RM-1000 assembly. Provide C of C or Appendix B (4) The digital communications ports on the safety-related RM-1000 radiation monitors are not used.

301 TVA is requested to address the consequences of total Responder: Clark/Davies/WEC C. Morgan Open Open - TVA loss of CERPI. In addition, address how the actions stipulated in the plant Technical Specifications will be Due 10/31/10 taken when the CERPI system indications are lost.

Information notice IN 2010-10 (ML100080281) addresses the need to consider software failures and the actions required to assure that the plant will stay within its licensing basis. Provide FMEA in support of your response.

FSAR Table 7.7-1, Plant Control System Interlocks lists interlock C-11 to block automatic rod withdrawal EICB (Singh) when 1/1 Control Bank D rod position is above setpoint. This interlock capability would be lost in case of total loss of CERPI. How is the rod block assured for this event?

How is automatic rod withdrawal affected in case of total loss of signals from the CERPI to the ICS? Is this interlock fail safe?

FSAR chapter 15, Section 2.3.2.1states that the resolution of the rod position indicator channel is 5% of span (7.2 inches). The CERPI system accuracy specified in the CERPI System requirements Specification, WNDS-DS-00001_WBT, Rev. 2 is 12 steps or 5.19%. The specified system accuracy seems to be greater than the accuracy assumed in the FSAR Chapter 15. Please clarify this anomaly.

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No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date 302 7.5.2. 7.5.1 09/17/2010 Responder: Tindell Open Open - TVA Item No. 23 is being drafted.

1 EICB (Marcus)

Item 208 requested a description of the changes that Due 10/31/10 were performed under 10 CFR 50.59 for 16 Unit 1 PAM variables that were identified in Enclosure 1 Item NRC to issue No.6 of the letter dated June 18, 2010 formal RAI to TVA (ML101940236). Please identify the specific 10 CFR 50.59 documentation that applies to each of these 16 variables.

303 7.5.2. 7.5.1 09/17/2010 Responder: Tindell Open Open - TVA Item No. 24 is being drafted.

1 Enclosure 1 Item 6 of the letter dated June 18, 2010 Due 10/31/10 EICB (Marcus) included a column to indicate the Unit 2 variable source for each PAM variable and also if the variable NRC to issue was unique to Unit 2. For each variable that was formal RAI to TVA indicated as unique to Unit 2 and the Unit 2 variable source is (1) Foxboro Spec 200, (2) Common Q PAMS, or (3) Foxboro IA, identify the Unit 1 variable source.

304 7.5.2. 7.5.1 09/17/2010 Responder: Tindell Open Open - TVA Item No. 25 is being drafted.

EICB (Marcus) 1 Enclosure 1 Item 6 of the letter dated June 18, 2010 Due 10/31/10 indicated that the Unit 2 variable source for 14 PAM variables is Eagle 21. Please confirm that for each of NRC to issue these 14 variables the Unit 1 variable source is also formal RAI to TVA the Eagle 21.

305 7.5.2. 7.5.1 09/17/2010 Responder: Tindell Open Open - TVA Item No. 26 is being drafted.

EICB (Marcus) 1 Enclosure 1 Item 6 of the letter dated June 18, 2010 Due 10/31/10 indicated that the Unit 2 variable source for 2 PAM variables is the Integrated Computer System. Please NRC to issue confirm that for these 2 variables the Unit 1 variable formal RAI to TVA source was the Unit 1 plant computer system.

306 7.1 7.1 FSAR amendment 100, page 7.1-12 provides the Responder: Webb Open Open - TVA definition of Allowable value which is not consistent EICB (Garg) with TSTF-493 as allowable value is the value beyond The FSAR Allowable Value definition will be Due 10/31/10 which instrument channel is declared inoperable. revised to be consistent with the TSTF-493 in FSAR Amendment 101 as shown below:

ADD FSAR MARKUP or INCLUDE IN AN ATTACHMENT 307 7.1 7.1 (1) FSAR amendment 100, Section 7.1, page 7.1-12, Responder: Webb Open Open - TVA definition of Acceptable as found tolerance is not in accordance with TSTF-493 as AAF is the limit beyond (1) The Acceptable As Found (AAF) definition will Due 10/31/10 which the instrument channel is degraded but may be be revised to be consistent with TSTF-493 in operable and its operability must be evaluated. (2) FSAR Amendment 101 as shown below.

Also it states that AAF is based on measurable instrument channel uncertainties, such as drift, ADD FSAR MARKUP or INCLUDE IN AN EICB (Garg) expected during the surveillance interval. These ATTACHMENT wording should be revised to agree with the wording given in RIS2006-17 as these wordings are very (2) Additional detail on the AAF methodology was vague. (3) Also it states that RPS functions use double provided in sections 7.1.2.1.9.1, sided tolerance limits for the AAF. Since AAF is a Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology, and band it will always be double sided and therefore, this 7.1.2.1.9.2, TVA Setpoint Methodology.

clarification does not mean anything and it clouds the These sections will be revised to clarify the issue. AAF calculations in FSAR Amendment 101 as shown below. Also, see response to letter item 26 (NRC Matrix Item 309).

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No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date ADD FSAR MARKUP or INCLUDE IN AN ATTACHMENT (3) The statement about double sided limits addresses a TSTF requirement that the AAF tolerance consider errors in both the conservative and non-conservative directions and ensures that an as-found value which exceeds these limits, even in the conservative direction (away from the safety limit), will be evaluated.

ADD FSAR MARKUP or INCLUDE IN AN ATTACHMENT.

308 7.1 7.1 (1) FSAR Amendment 100, Section 7.1, page 7.1-13, Responder: Webb Open Open - TVA definition of Acceptable as left tolerance is not in accordance with TSTF-493 as it states that this may (1) Due 10/31/10 take calibration history into consideration. This is very he statement about using calibration history to vague and ambiguous. (2) Also it states that RPS determine the Acceptable As Left (AAL) will be EICB (Garg) functions use double sided tolerance limits. Since ALF deleted in FSAR Amendment 101 as shown is a band it will always be double sided and therefore, below:

this clarification does not mean anything and clouds the issue. ADD FSAR MARKUP or INCLUDE IN AN ATTACHMENT (2) See response to letter item 24 (NRC Matrix Item 307).

309 7.1 7.1.2. (1) FSAR amendment 100, Page 7.1-14, Responder: Webb Open Open - TVA 1.9.1 Westinghouse setpoint methodology, states that AAF is the algebraic sum of the .. This is not acceptable. (1) The AAF calculation for Westinghouse Due 10/31/10 EICB (Garg)

As algebraic sum is non conservative compared to the setpoint methodology calculations will be revised SRSS method and will mask the operability of the to SRSS method.

instrument channel and therefore, it is not acceptable to the staff. (2) It also make the statement that ALT (2) The statement about using calibration history may take calibration history into consideration which is to determine the AAL will be deleted.

vague and ambiguous.

310 7.1 7.1.2. (1) FSAR amendment 100, Page 7.1-14, TVA setpoint Responder: Webb Open Open - TVA 1.9.2 methodology, states that for AAF .and other measurable uncertainties as appropriate (i.e., those (1) The statement will be revised to say those Due 10/31/10 present during calibration.) should be changed to present during the surveillance interval in present during normal operation (2) Also on page FSAR Amendment 101 as shown below:

7.1-15, states that ALT may take calibration history EICB (Garg) into consideration which is vague and ambiguous. ADD FSAR MARKUP or INCLUDE IN AN ATTACHMENT (2) The statement about using calibration history to determine the Allowable As-Left (AAL) will be deleted in FSAR Amendment 101 as shown below:

ADD FSAR MARKUP or INCLUDE IN AN ATTACHMENT 311 7.1 7.1 Both Westinghouse and TVA setpoint methodology do Responder: Webb Open Open - TVA not have any discussion on single sided calculation.

EICB (Garg)

Please confirm that single sided calculation has not A statement that single-sided corrections are not Due 10/31/10 been used for all setpoints with TSTF-493 and provide used for TSTF-493 setpoints will be included in a statement to that effect in the FSAR. FSAR Amendment 101 as shown below:

ADD FSAR MARKUP or INCLUDE IN AN

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date ATTACHMENT 312 7.0 By letter dated September 10,2010, TVA provided the Responder: Stockton Open Open - TVA summary evaluation of 50.59 reports which were EICB (Garg) related to FSAR Chapter 7.0. However, these Amendment 8 is the current version of Unit 1 Due 10/31/10 evaluation only covers Amendments 0 thru 8. Provide UFSAR.

all other evaluation which have been done since these amendments and which forms the basis for FSAR Chapter 7.0 systems.

313 7.7.8 7.7.1. EDCR 52408 (installation of AMSAC in Unit 2) states Responder: Ayala Open Open - TVA 12 that Design Criteria WB-DC-40-57 needs to be modified to reflect AMSAC in Unit 2. (1) The review of WB-DC-40-57 for Unit 2 Due 10/31/10 applicability has been completed and included

1. Has WB-DC-40-57 been completed for Unit 2? If in Revision 4 of the document.

so, please submit.

(2) There are 17 open Watts Bar Nuclear Plant EICB (Darbali)

2. If WB-DC-40-57 has not been completed for Unit Unit 2 Startup Integration Task Equipment 2, please give an estimated date of completion List (WITEL) punch list items associated with and submittal. Revision 4 that require resolution. A list of the punch list items is contained in Attachment ??

3. Please submit WB-DC-40-57 for Unit 1 and of the 10/31 letter identify any changes to the Unit 2 version.

(3) Attachment ?? of the 10/31 letter contains TVA design criteria WB-DC-40-57, Revision 4, Anticipated Transients Without Scram Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) 314 7.3 7.3 The following 50.59 changes were listed in the March Responder: Stockton Open Open - TVA Related to OI 10 12 RAI response letter (item 10) but were not included in the September 9 submittal of 50.59 safety Attachment 7 contains the requested safety Due 10/31/10 evaluations. Please submit the 50.59 safety evaluations.

EICB (Darbali) evaluations for the following changes:

• DCN 38842 (Revise OTT and OPT turbine runback setpoints)

• DCN 50991 (Install Test Points)

• DCN 51124 (Eliminate spurious ICS alarms associated with the SSPS 315 7.5.3 7.5.3 IE Bulletin 79-27 required that emergency operating Responder: S. Smith (TVA Operations) Open Open - TVA procedures to be used by control room operators to attain safe shutdown upon loss of any Class IE or non While the WBN Unit 2 Emergency Operating Due 10/31/10 EICB (Garg)

Class IE bus are adequate. WBN1 has performed the Procedures (EOPs) have not been written, they review and documented their conclusion. Confirm that will be written the same as the Unit 1 EOPs.

WBN2 emergency procedures are adequate to WBN Unit 1 personnel will perform validations to achieve safe shutdown in the event of loss of any ensure that WBN Unit 2 EOPs will perform the Class IE or non-Class IE bus. required actions. The WBN Unit 2 EOPs will be written and validated prior to Unit 2 fuel load.

316 7.5.2. 7.5 TVA has provided various documents in support of Responder: Temples/Mather Open Open - TVA 3 RM-1000 high range monitors for WBN2.

Please clarify the following: TVA has confirmed that the Sequoyah documents Due 10/31/10 EICB (Singh)

RM-1000 v1.1 Software Verification Report are applicable to WBN Unit 2.

04508006 (Sequoyah)

RM-1000 v1.2 Software Verification Report 04508006 (Sequoyah)

RM-1000 System Verification Test Results (Sequoyah)

These documents were prepared for the Sequoyah

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date plant. IS the version provided applicable to WBN2?

Please confirm and explain if these documents are applicable to WBN 2 as provided or with differences?

317 7.5.2. 7.5 TVA has provided a proprietary and a non-proprietary Responder: Temples Open Open - TVA 3 version of Technical Manual for RM-1000 Digital Radiation Processor under ML101680582 and . These documents are applicable to WBN Due 10/31/10 ML101680587). Unit 2.

. This was an error in document (i) Are these documents applicable to WBN2 as preparation that occurred when EICB (Singh) provided (October 2003 version). attachments were assembled for a (ii) Why is DCN38993-A attached at the back of previous letter.

the proprietary version? It is for WBN1 . The Technical Manual is not intended to (iii) Staff is looking for high Turbine Governor Control Valve. include equipment requirements. level requirements for RM-(iii) This document does not state the Requirements would be found in the 1000 monitors. Pl. provide requirements for RM-1000 units. Please applicable TVA Specifications for the appropriate documents.

provide a document that states the contract.

requirements for the RM-1000 radiation monitors for WBN2. Include in the MR specifications for the RM-1000.

318 7.5.2. 7.5 TVA has provided the following documents for RM- Responder: Temples Open Open - TVA 3 1000 equipment qualification:

(i) Applicable to WBN Unit 2. 04508905-1QR is Note check 04508905-1QR Due 10/31/10 (i) Qualification Test Report for RM-1000 Processor applicable only in regards to the RM-1000, or QR. Staff version is QR Module and Current-To-Frequency Converter with the exception of re-qualification of only.

04508905-QR (January 2001) certain RM-1000 equipment differences (ii) Qualification Test Report Supplement, RM-1000 covered in the -1SP report. The Current-to-Upgrades 04508905-1SP (June 2006) Frequency (I-F) converter module (iii) Qualification Test Report Supplement, RM-1000 qualifications in the base report and the -

Upgrades 04508905-2SP (June 2008) 1SP report are not applicable to the RM-EICB (Singh)

(iv) Qualification Test Report Supplement, RM-1000 1000s, and will be used later as references Upgrades 04508905-3SP (May 2008) in the WBN Unit 2 specific qualification reports.

Please clarify whether all of these are fully applicable (ii) Applicable to WBN Unit 2.

to WBN2 or are they applicable with exceptions? If (iii) Not applicable to WBN Unit 2 with exceptions, then please clarify what those are. (iv) Not applicable to WBN Unit 2 Supplement 3 was issued one month prior to The 04508905-3SP report was prepared for supplement 2. Please explain the reason for the another TVA plant, as a monitor system-level same. report, where the system included equipment mostly based on the base report equipment items.

These two -2SP and -3SP supplement reports were essentially worked concurrently, but the -

2SP document review/release process resulted in the release time difference.

319 7.5.2. 7.5 TVA provided System Verification Test Results Responder: Temples Open Open - TVA 3 04507007-1TR (July 1999) for Sequoyah to support test verification. However, the document states (page See Response to letter item __ (RAI Matrix Due 10/31/10 v) that it is not applicable for high range monitors with Item 316) for non-applicability of 04507007-an action noted for fixing a problem with the high 1TR. The recorded anomaly was later EICB (Singh) range RM-1000 monitors on page vi. TVA to respond resolved through the verification of software to the following clarifications:

version 1.2, reported in RM-1000 v1.2 Has the anomaly noted on page vi been resolved for Software Verification Report 04508006.

the high range monitors?

The high range verification documents are Provide the high range verification document for the Sequoyah RM-1000 v1.1 Software WBN2. Verification Report 04508006 and RM-1000 v1.2 Software Verification Report 04508006.

320 Per Westinghouse letter WBT-D-2340, TENNESSEE Responder: Clark Open Open - TVA

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 FSAR Markups Units 1 and 2 118% vs The changes required by Westinghouse are Due 10/31/10 121 % and Correction to RAI Response SNPB 4.3.2-7, included in FSAR Amendment 101 as shown (Reference 17) the 118% value should be 121%. below:

Depending on the use in the FSAR either 118% or 121% is the correct value. As a result of the question, ADD FSAR MARKUP or INCLUDE IN AN Westinghouse reviewed all locations where either 118% or 121% are used and the context of use and ATTACHMENT provided a FSAR markup to reflect the correct value at the specific location. These changes will be incorporated in FSAR Amendment 101 321 For the purposes of measuring reactor coolant flow for Responder: Clark Open Open - TVA Reactor Protection functions, elbow taps are used for both Unit 1 and 2. The discussion and equation are The FSAR change package has been submitted Due 10/31/10 valid for establishing the nominal full power flow which to TVA Licensing for incorporation.

is used to establish the Reactor Protection System low flow trip setpoint. However the method used to verify reactor coolant flow, as required by the Technical Specifications, is not the same. Unit 1 uses a simplified methodology based on elbow tap P measurements correlated with precision calorimetric data over several cycles of operation as described in FSAR Reference 17, WCAP-16067, Rev 0, RCS Flow Measurement Using Elbow Tap Methodology at Watts Bar Unit 1. The plan is for Unit 2 to transition to this method after sufficient data is obtained. Pending this transition, 7.2.2.1.2 will be revised to read as follows:

Nominal full power flow is established at the beginning of each fuel cycle by either elbow tap methodology or, performance of the RCS calorimetric flow measurement. Unit 1 utilizes elbow tap methodology Reference [17]. Unit 2 utilizes the RCS calorimetric flow measurement. The results are used to normalize the RCS flow indicators and provide a reference point for the low flow reactor trip setpoint.

This change will be incorporated in FSAR Amendment 101 322 Section 7.7.1.11 will be added to FSAR Amendment Responder: Clark Open Open - TVA 101 to provide a discussion of the Distributed Control System The FSAR change package has been submitted Due 10/31/10 to TVA Licensing for incorporation.

323 WCAP-13869 revision 1 was previously reviewed Responder: Craig Open Open - TVA under WBN Unit 1 SER SSER 13 (Reference 8). Unit 2 references revision 2. An analysis of the differences Revision 2 changes to WCAP 13869 are analyzed Due 10/31/10 and their acceptability will be submitted to the NRC by below. I attached copies of R1 & R2 FYI.

November 15, 2010 WCAP 13869 was revised to address feedline breaks occurring inside containment. Revision 2 was a result of the TVA decision to not insulate the Steam Generator level transmitter reference legs (Reference TVA response to NRC RAI 15.4.2.2 Q4).

The WCAP 13869 Revision 2 Change Analysis is contained in Attachment ??.

324 The scope of the WBN BISI indications are based on Responder: Kepler Open February 14, 2011 Open - TVA

Agenda for Weekly Telecom with TVA (I&C Chapter 7 only) radD4B17.docx Open Items to be Resolved for SER Approval SE FSAR NRC Prop RAI Resp.

No. POC Issue TVA Response(s) Status/ Current Actions Resolution Path RAI No. & Date Comments Sec. Sec. Y/N Date engineering calculation WBPEVAR8807025 Rev. 7 (Attachment 10). This calculation has not been updated Due 10/31/10 for Unit 2. The calculation does include Common and Unit 2 equipment required to support Unit 1 operation.

The calculation will be submitted to the NRC by February 14, 2011 325 The Unit 2 loops in service for Unit 1 that are Responder: TVA Startup Olson Open Open - TVA scheduled to be transferred to the Foxboro Spec 200 hardware will be transferred prior to Unit 2 fuel load Working Due 10/31/10 Fuel Load 326 TVA uses double-sided methodology for as-found and Responder: Webb Open October 22, 2010 Open - TVA as-left Reactor Trip and ESFAS instrument setpoint values. The FSAR will be revised in a future Due 10/31/10 amendment to reflect this methodology 327 Attachment 36 contains Foxboro proprietary drawings Responder: Webber Open January 31, 2011 Open - TVA 08F802403-SC-2001 sheets 1 through 6. An affidavit for withholding and non-proprietary versions of the Due 10/31/10 drawings will be submitted by January 31, 2011.

328 7.5.2. 7.5 Provide the model number for the four containment Open Open EICB (Singh) 3 high range area monitors, RM-1000 and identify how the software V&V and qualification documents apply to them. If there is no specific model number then how is it ensured that the correct radiation monitor is received at the site and subsequently installed?

329 7.6.1 7.6.7 Section 7.6.7 of the FSAR (Amendment 100) states Open Open that, The DMIMS-DX' audio and visual alarm capability will remain functional after an Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE). All of the DMIMS-EICB (Singh)

DX' components are qualified for structural integrity during a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and will not mechanically impact any safety-related equipment.

TVA to clarify the seismic qualification of the loose parts monitoring system and include the appropriate information in Table 3.10 (or another suitable section) of the FSAR.

330 7.3 7.3 Related to Item 298 Open Open IE Bulletin 80-06 calls for review of engineered safety features with the objective of ensuring that no device will change position solely because of the reset action.

EICB (Darbali)

In Supplement 3 of NUREG-0847, section 7.3.5, the staff approved the design modifications proposed by the applicant that would allow certain devices to remain unchanged upon an ESF reset. The staff also found acceptable the applicants justification for some safety-related equipment that does not remain in its emergency mode after an ESF reset.

Please list for Unit 1 and Unit 2 the safety-related equipment that does not remain in its emergency mode after an ESF reset.