Information Notice 1988-61, Control Room Habitability - Recent Reviews of Operating Experience: Difference between revisions

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| issue date = 08/11/1988
| issue date = 08/11/1988
| title = Control Room Habitability - Recent Reviews of Operating Experience
| title = Control Room Habitability - Recent Reviews of Operating Experience
| author name = Rossi C E
| author name = Rossi C
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
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| page count = 12
| page count = 12
}}
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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555August 11, 1988NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-61: CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY -RECENT REVIEWSOF OPERATING EXPERIENCE
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES
 
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 11, 1988 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-61:   CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY - RECENT REVIEWS
 
OF OPERATING EXPERIENCE


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
:All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear powerreactors.
:
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
 
reactors.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
:This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to potentialproblems resulting from design or analysis deficiencies identified in controlroom ventilation systems. It is expected that recipients will review theinformation for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, asappropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained inthis information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, nospecific action or written response is required.
:
This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to potential
 
problems resulting from design or analysis deficiencies identified in control
 
room ventilation systems. It is expected that recipients will review the
 
information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as
 
appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in
 
this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no
 
specific action or written response is required.


==Description of Circumstances==
==Description of Circumstances==
:The NRC has received several construction deficiency and licensee eventreports pertaining to safety systems that are used to ensure control roomhabitability. These reports identified potential safety concerns resultingfrom design deficiencies, which were attributed to inadequate analysis andan inability to justify those conditions that were assumed in previous evalu-ations of plant design and operation. These reports are summarized below.Comanche Peak 1 and 2:On January 15, 1988, the permit holder determined that radiation doses tocontrol room operators for some postulated radiological accidents couldexceed the limits of General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50.This determination was attributed to an inadequate analysis of control roomhabitability systems for postulated radiological accidents. Particular ac-cident scenarios that were incompletely analyzed included a fuel handlingaccident and a rupture of a radioactive gaseous waste tank. To correctthis situation, the licensee is developing new calculations, upgrading theexisting control room intake radiation monitors and associated cables tosafety-related Class 1E requirements, and installing two additional safety-related Class 1E radiation monitors, one in each control room intake.88850248 '
:
IN 88-61August 11, 1988 Quad Cities:on November 25, 1987, the licensee's engineering department discovered thatdesign basis assumptions used in the control room habitability study wereinconsistent with technical specification requirements. The study was con-ducted to satisfy a requirement of the NRC's TMI Action Plan. The adsorptionefficiencies of the standby gas treatment system and control room HYAC systemwere assumed at 99 percent for organic iodide removal. The relevant technicalspecifications, however, require only an organic iodide removal efficiency morethan or equal to 90 percent. All the filters meet the technical specificationrequirements. Since December 31, 1984, tests of filter efficiencies indicatethat the relevant assumptions of the study were met with two exceptions. Thelicensee attributes the cause for this condition to be an inadequate review ofdesign and analysis during the development of the study.Vogtle 1 and 2:On July 2, 1987, plant engineering personnel identified an inadequacy in thedose analysis for control room operators. On receipt of a safety injectionsignal or a control room outside air intake high radiation signal, the controlroom heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) system is automaticallytransferred from the normal system units to the essential control room (ECR)fan-filter units in the emergency mode of operation. The ECR system consistsof two redundant and physically separated 100 percent capacity fan-filter unitsfor each side of the control room, associated with the corresponding reactorunit (four for the combined Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room (Figure 1)). Eachof the ECR units belongs to a different safety train, but portions of the out-side air intake ductwork and control room supply and return ductwork are commonto each of the units. On initiation of the ECR system, the associated motor-operated dampers for the essential units are automatically opened and thosefor the normal units are automatically closed.When both of the ECR fan-filter units are operating, loss of power to one ofthese units can reduce the amount of outside air available to pressurize thecontrol room. This can happen because the dampers losing power fail in the"as-is" position. At the time of the identification of the problem, no back-draft dampers were installed. This degrades the ECR HVAC system by establishingflowpaths through the common ductwork and the ductwork of the failed unit backto the suction of the operating unit, which could potentially reduce the outsideair flow to the control room and reduce the control room pressure below thedesign value. Maintenance of the design control room pressure is required tominimize unfiltered inleakage.The licensee concluded that the actual effect on control room pressure couldnot be calculated in the absence of test data and decided to modify the systemby installing backdraft dampers, as noted on Figure 1, for the ECR HVAC systemsof both Units 1 and IN 88-61August 11, 1988 On July 4, 1987, an additional condition was discovered that could have causedan insufficient control room pressure. All ECR systems share common outsideair supply ductwork. The common air supply ductwork has intakes from the out-side atmosphere associated with both Units 1 and 2. Redundant isolation dampersin series are provided for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 duct openings from the outsideatmosphere. During construction, the Unit 2 duct opening had been isolated bylocking the dampers closed. If one of the outside air isolation dampers forUnit 1 had closed as the assumed single failure of an active component, nosource of outside air would be available to the control room (shared by bothUnits) and the required pressure would not be maintained. Because the licenseehad removed chlorine gas sources from the site, the capability to isolate toxicgases was no longer needed. Thus, the licensee deactivated and tagged open theoutside air isolation dampers.For all these problems, the licensee concluded that the defective conditionswould have been discovered earlier with an adequate failure modes and effectsanalysis.Beaver Valley 2:On March 27, 1987, the permit holder determined that timers initiated by con-tainment isolation phase B signals were not served with uninterruptible poweras required. These timers are designed to actuate banks of compressed air tosupply the control room emergency pressurization system one hour after receiptof the isolation signal. They were powered from the respective fan controlcircuit energized by an emergency ac distribution panel fed from an emergencymotor control center. Loss of offsite power would interrupt power to the motorcontrol center. If a loss of power occurred after timer initiation, the timerswould reset to the beginning of the timing cycle and would not begin the cycleuntil power was restored to the emergency motor control center. The compressedair would thus not be supplied after one hour. To enhance the reliability ofthe safety systems, the licensee revised the circuitry to power the timers fromthe Class lE 125-V dc battery system.McGuire 1:On November 5, 1987, the licensee discovered during an 18-month surveillancetest of the control area ventilation and chilled water system that control roompressure was below the technical specification requirement. The licensee de-termined that the cause was leaking seals on seven control room doors. Thedoors were designed to seal by seating against sealing strips in the doorframes. Although not visibly deteriorated, the sealing material apparentlyhad been deformed and compressed over time from normal use of the doors. Thelicensee adjusted manual volume dampers to increase total train air flow andthe proportion of outside air flow to the maximum 60 percent allowed in the IIN 88-61August 11, 1988 test procedure. This action was effective in increasing control room pressureto meet the technical specification requirement. The licensee installed sealingtape around the seven doors and established a preventive maintenance program toinspect the seals on all control room doors every 6 months for a 1-year period.The licensee plans to determine an appropriate frequency for preventive mainte-nance of the door seals. The surveillance test of the control area ventilationand chilled water system will also be repeated every 6 months until sufficientinformation is obtained for determining an appropriate frequency.Farley 1:On June 5, 1987, the licensee discovered that none of four fire dampers in thecontrol room ventilation system would fully close and latch with or without airflow because they had not been exercised and/or lubricated or, in one case, be-cause a latch was damaged. In addition, investigation revealed that the damperswould not have received an actuation signal from a Firestat set to sense 1600Fin the control room ceiling because of installation errors. The licensee at-tributed the problems to three causes: a design deficiency pertaining to thefull closure and latching of the dampers, inadequate testing of the actuationcircuitry, and inadequate preventive maintenance of the dampers.Discussion:In addition to the above, the NRC has recently completed an engineering evalu-ation, "Design and Operating Deficiencies in Control Room Emergency VentilationSystems," AEOD/E802, April 1988 based on recent events that highlight singlefailure vulnerabilities in control room emergency ventilation systems.* TheNRC also has recently conducted a survey of control room habitability systemsat 12 operating plants. Numerous discrepancies were found between the analyzedand actual performance of these systems. For example, differences exist betweendesign, construction, operation, and/or testing of these systems and the de-scriptions and analyses provided in licensing documents, as for example in theassumptions used in the toxic gas and radiation dose calculations. In addition,analyses assumptions have not always been consistent with technical specifi-cation requirements. The NRC has issued several information notices relatedto this subject (see Attachment '2). Resolution of Generic Issue 83: ControlRoom Habitability is also ongoing.*A copy of the report is available in the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 hStreet, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20555, for inspection and copyin IN 88-61August 11, 1988 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the techni-cal contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriateregional office.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contacts: Vern Hodge, NRR(301) 492-1169Charles R. Nichols, NRR(301) 492-0854
The NRC has received several construction deficiency and licensee event
 
reports pertaining to safety systems that are used to ensure control room
 
habitability. These reports identified potential safety concerns resulting
 
from design deficiencies, which were attributed to inadequate analysis and
 
an inability to justify those conditions that were assumed in previous evalu- ations of plant design and operation. These reports are summarized below.
 
Comanche Peak 1 and 2:
On January 15, 1988, the permit holder determined that radiation doses to
 
control room operators for some postulated radiological accidents could
 
exceed the limits of General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50.
 
This determination was attributed to an inadequate analysis of control room
 
habitability systems for postulated radiological accidents. Particular ac- cident scenarios that were incompletely analyzed included a fuel handling
 
accident and a rupture of a radioactive gaseous waste tank. To correct
 
this situation, the licensee is developing new calculations, upgrading the
 
existing control room intake radiation monitors and associated cables to
 
safety-related Class 1E requirements, and installing two additional safety- related Class 1E radiation monitors, one in each control room intake.
 
88850248 '
 
IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 Quad Cities:
on November 25, 1987, the licensee's engineering department discovered that
 
design basis assumptions used in the control room habitability study were
 
inconsistent with technical specification requirements. The study was con- ducted to satisfy a requirement of the NRC's TMI Action Plan. The adsorption
 
efficiencies of the standby gas treatment system and control room HYAC system
 
were assumed at 99 percent for organic iodide removal. The relevant technical
 
specifications, however, require only an organic iodide removal efficiency more
 
than or equal to 90 percent. All the filters meet the technical specification
 
requirements. Since December 31, 1984, tests of filter efficiencies indicate
 
that the relevant assumptions of the study were met with two exceptions. The
 
licensee attributes the cause for this condition to be an inadequate review of
 
design and analysis during the development of the study.
 
Vogtle 1 and 2:
On July 2, 1987, plant engineering personnel identified an inadequacy in the
 
dose analysis for control room operators. On receipt of a safety injection
 
signal or a control room outside air intake high radiation signal, the control
 
room heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) system is automatically
 
transferred from the normal system units to the essential control room (ECR)
fan-filter units in the emergency mode of operation. The ECR system consists
 
of two redundant and physically separated 100 percent capacity fan-filter units
 
for each side of the control room, associated with the corresponding reactor
 
unit (four for the combined Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room (Figure 1)). Each
 
of the ECR units belongs to a different safety train, but portions of the out- side air intake ductwork and control room supply and return ductwork are common
 
to each of the units. On initiation of the ECR system, the associated motor- operated dampers for the essential units are automatically opened and those
 
for the normal units are automatically closed.
 
When both of the ECR fan-filter units are operating, loss of power to one of
 
these units can reduce the amount of outside air available to pressurize the
 
control room. This can happen because the dampers losing power fail in the
 
"as-is" position. At the time of the identification of the problem, no back- draft dampers were installed. This degrades the ECR HVAC system by establishing
 
flowpaths through the common ductwork and the ductwork of the failed unit back
 
to the suction of the operating unit, which could potentially reduce the outside
 
air flow to the control room and reduce the control room pressure below the
 
design value. Maintenance of the design control room pressure is required to
 
minimize unfiltered inleakage.
 
The licensee concluded that the actual effect on control room pressure could
 
not be calculated in the absence of test data and decided to modify the system
 
by installing backdraft dampers, as noted on Figure 1, for the ECR HVAC systems
 
of both Units 1 and 2.
 
IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 On July 4, 1987, an additional condition was discovered that could have caused
 
an insufficient control room pressure. All ECR systems share common outside
 
air supply ductwork. The common air supply ductwork has intakes from the out- side atmosphere associated with both Units 1 and 2. Redundant isolation dampers
 
in series are provided for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 duct openings from the outside
 
by
 
atmosphere. During construction, the Unit 2 duct opening had been isolated for
 
locking the dampers closed. If one of the outside air isolation   dampers
 
Unit 1 had closed as the assumed single failure of an active component, no
 
source of outside air would be available to the control room (shared by both
 
Units) and the required pressure would not be maintained. Because the licensee
 
had removed chlorine gas sources from the site, the capability to isolate toxic
 
the
 
gases was no longer needed. Thus, the licensee deactivated and tagged open
 
outside air isolation dampers.
 
For all these problems, the licensee concluded that the defective conditions
 
would have been discovered earlier with an adequate failure modes and effects
 
analysis.
 
Beaver Valley 2:
On March 27, 1987, the permit holder determined that timers initiated by con- tainment isolation phase B signals were not served with uninterruptible powerto
 
as required. These timers are designed to actuate banks of compressed air
 
supply the control room emergency pressurization system one hour after receipt
 
of the isolation signal. They were powered from the respective fan control
 
circuit energized by an emergency ac distribution panel fed from an emergency
 
motor control center. Loss of offsite power would interrupt power to the motor
 
control center. If a loss of power occurred after timer initiation, the timers
 
would reset to the beginning of the timing cycle and would not begin the cycle
 
until power was restored to the emergency motor control center. The compressed
 
air would thus not be supplied after one hour. To enhance the reliability of
 
the safety systems, the licensee revised the circuitry to power the timers from
 
the Class lE 125-V dc battery system.
 
McGuire 1:
On November 5, 1987, the licensee discovered during an 18-month surveillance
 
test of the control area ventilation and chilled water system that control room
 
pressure was below the technical specification requirement. The licensee de- termined that the cause was leaking seals on seven control room doors. The
 
doors were designed to seal by seating against sealing strips in the door
 
frames. Although not visibly deteriorated, the sealing material apparently
 
had been deformed and compressed over time from normal use of the doors. The
 
licensee adjusted manual volume dampers to increase total train air flow and
 
the proportion of outside air flow to the maximum 60 percent allowed in the
 
IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 test procedure. This action was effective in
 
to meet the technical specification requirement.increasing control room pressure
 
tape around the seven doors and established a       The licensee installed sealing
 
preventive     maintenance program to
 
inspect the seals on all control room doors every
 
The licensee plans to determine an appropriate       6  months  for a 1-year period.
 
nance of the door seals. The surveillance test   frequency    for  preventive mainte- and chilled water system will also be repeated of the control area ventilation
 
every 6 months until sufficient
 
information is obtained for determining an appropriate
 
frequency.
 
Farley 1:
  On June 5, 1987, the licensee discovered that
 
control room ventilation system would fully    none of four fire dampers in the
 
close and latch with or without air
 
flow because they had not been exercised and/or
 
lubricated or, in one case, be- cause a latch was damaged. In addition, investigation
 
would not have received an actuation signal                 revealed that the dampers
 
from   a Firestat   set to sense 1600 F
 
in the control room ceiling because of installation
 
tributed the problems to three causes: a design         errors.    The licensee at- full closure and latching of the dampers, inadequatedeficiency    pertaining  to the
 
circuitry, and inadequate preventive maintenance           testing  of  the actuation
 
of the dampers.
 
Discussion:
In addition to the above, the NRC has recently
 
ation, "Design and Operating Deficiencies in completed an engineering evalu- Systems," AEOD/E802, April 1988 based on recentControl Room Emergency Ventilation
 
failure vulnerabilities in control room emergencyevents that highlight single
 
NRC also has recently conducted a survey of controlventilation systems.* The
 
at 12 operating plants. Numerous discrepancies           room habitability systems
 
and actual performance of these systems. For       were    found between the analyzed
 
design, construction, operation, and/or testing example,    differences exist between
 
scriptions and analyses provided in licensing      of  these  systems and the de- documents, as for example in the
 
assumptions used in the toxic gas and radiation
 
analyses assumptions have not always been consistentdose calculations. In addition, cation requirements. The NRC has issued several           with technical specifi- to this subject (see Attachment '2). Resolution     information    notices related
 
Room Habitability is also ongoing.                of Generic Issue 83: Control
 
*A copy of the report is available in the NRC
 
Public
 
Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20555, for inspectionDocument Room, 1717 h
 
and copying.
 
IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
 
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the techni- cal contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate
 
regional office.
 
Charles E. Rossi, Director
 
Division of Operational Events Assessment
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical Contacts:   Vern Hodge, NRR
 
(301) 492-1169 Charles R. Nichols, NRR
 
(301) 492-0854 Attachments:
1. Figure 1. Schematic Air Flow Path Diagram of Essential Control Room
 
Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning System (ECP HVAC) at Vogtle.
 
Assumed Containment Isolation Signal for Unit 1 with Train B Failed.
 
2. List of Information Notices Related to Control Room Habitability Systems
 
3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
 
I OUTSIDE
 
OUTSIDE;
  L ,  AIR                                                                              AIR% v vv
 
OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY DUCT
 
(
                                                                                                            (
                                                                                                    cn    c
 
FIGURE 1. SCHEMATIC AIR FLOW PATH DIAGRAM OF ESSENTIAL CONTROL ROOM HEATING, VENTILATING, AND      LA CO 0~
                                                                                              AIR  > o    =
          CONDITIONING SYSTEM (ECR HVAC) AT VOGTLE. ASSUMED CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL FOR          -C
 
UNIT 1 WITH TRAIN B FAILED.
 
0C
 
03
 
Attachment 2 IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 LIST OF INFORMATION NOTICES
 
RELATED TO CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY SYSTEMS
 
NO.        TITLE                                  DATE
 
86-76 Problems Noted in Control Room          August 28, 1986 Emergency Ventilation Systems
 
85-89 Potential Loss of Solid-State          November 19, 1985 Instrumentation Following Failure
 
of Control Room Cooling
 
83-62 Failure of Redundant and Toxic Gas      September 26, 1983 Detectors Positioned at Control Room
 
Ventilation Air Intakes
 
'-.dachment 3 IN 88-61 August 11. 4988 Page I of I
 
LIST OF RECENtLY ISSUED
 
NRCINFORMIATION NOTICES
 
InfTornation                                  Date of
 
Notice No.      Subject                        Issuance  Issued to
 
88-60          Inadeouste Design and          S/11B8    All holders of OLs
 
Installation of Watertight              or CPsfor nuclear
 
Penetration Seals                        power reactors.
 
B8-04.        Inadecuate Qualifitation      8/9/88    All holders of MLs
 
Supplerent I  and Documentation of Fire                or CPs for nuclear
 
Barrier Penetration Seals                power reactors.
 
88-59          Kain Steam Isolation Valve    819/88    All holders of OLs
 
Guide Rail Failure at                    or CFs for nuclear
 
Waterford Unit 3                          power reactors.
 
88-58          Potential Probiems with        8/8/E8    All holders of OLs
 
ASEABrown Boveri TE-S1L                  or CPs 'or nuclear
 
Time-COercurrent Pelays                  power oeactors.
 
88-57          Potential Loss of Safe        8/8/88    All holders of QLs
 
Shutccwn Eoulprent Due to                or CFs for nuclear
 
Premature Siliccr Controllee            power reactors.
 
Rectifier Failure
 
88-56          Potential Prcblems wtth        8/4/88    All holders of OLs
 
Siliccre Foam Fire Barrier              or CFs 'or nuclear
 
Penetration Seals                        power reactors.
 
88-55          Potential Problems Caused      8/3/18    All holders of CIs
 
by Sirgle Failure of an                  or CPs for nuclear
 
Engineered Safety Feature                power reactors.
 
Swing Bus
 
B8-54          Fajiure of Circuit Breaker    7/28/68    All holders of OLs
 
Following Installation of                or CPs for nuclear
 
Amptector Direct Trip                    power reactors.
 
Attactrent
 
88-S-          Licensee Violations of NRC      7/28es    All manufacturers and
 
Reculations. Whicn Leo to                distributcrs of radio- leoical Diagnostic                        ptarraceuticals for
 
misaoministrations                      huran use. nucledr
 
pharracies. ano
 
necical licensees.
 
OL
 
* Doeratino License
 
-T
 
CP
 
* Ccnstructicr. Permit
 
UNITED STATES                                                                                              FIRST CLASS MAIL
 
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION                                                                                        POSTAGE & FEES PAID
 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555                                                                                              USNAC
 
P£RMIT Ne. S67 OFFICIAL BUSINESS
 
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE. $300
 
IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
 
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the techni- cal contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate
 
regional office.
 
Charles E. Rossi, Director
 
Division of Operational Events Assessment
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical Contacts:  Vern Hodge, NRR
 
(301) 492-1169 Charles R. Nichols, NRR
 
(301) 492-0854 Attachments:
1. Figure 1. Schematic Air Flow Path Diagram of Essential Control Room
 
Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning System (ECR HVAC) at Vogtle.
 
Assumed Containment Isolation Signal for Unit 1 with Train B Failed.
 
2. List of Information Notices Related to Control Room Habitability Systems
 
3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
 
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
 
*C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR *PPMB:ARM
 
CHBerlinger      TechEd
 
08/G /88            05/31/88        04/05/88
*OGCB:DOEA:NRR *SPLB:DEST: NRR *A C SPLB:DEST:NRR  *SAD/DEST:NRR    *D/DEST:NRR
 
CVHodge        CRNichols      JWCraig              AThadani        LCShao
 
03/31/88        03/31/88      05/06/88            05/13/88        05/16/88
 
IN 88-XX
 
May xx, 1988 habitability systems at 12 operating plants. Numerous types of discrepancies
 
are described involving differences between (1) the design, construction, operation and/or testing of these systems and (2) corresponding technical
 
specifications when compared with the descriptions and analyses provided in
 
licensing basis documents, Including assumptions in the toxic gas and radiation
 
dose calculations.
 
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
 
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical
 
contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional
 
office.
 
Charles E. Rossi, Director
 
Division of Operational Events Assessment
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical Contacts:    Vern Hodge, NRR
 
(301) 492-1169 Charles R. Nichols, NRR
 
(301) 492-0854 Attachments:
1. Summaries of Recent Reports Concerning Control Room Habitability
 
2. Figure 1. Schematic Flow Path Diagram of Essential Control Room Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning System at Vogtle 1 and 2
3. List of References
 
4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
 
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
 
D/DOEA:NRR
 
C¢6 C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR  *PPMB:ARM
 
CERoss i            CHBerl inger    TechEd
 
05/ /88              O/n-/88          04/05/88
*OGCB:DOEA:NRR *SPLB:DEST:NRR *A/C/SPLB:DEST:NRR    SAD/DEST:NyJSp  D/DEST:N/I
 
CVHodge        CRNichols      JWCrai g            AThadani Al      LCShao
 
03/31/88        03/31/88        05/06/88            0 5 /y 8 8      05//88 A
 
IN 88-XX
 
May xx, 1988 control room habitability systems at 12 operating plants. Numerous types of
 
discrepancies are described between the design, construction, operation and
 
testing of these systems and corresponding technical specifications compared
 
with the descriptions and analyses provided in licensing basis documents, including assumptions in the toxic gas and radiation dose calculations. The
 
NRC plans to distribute the report to all holders of operating licenses or
 
construction permits for nuclear power reactors.
 
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
 
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical
 
contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional
 
office.
 
Charles E. Rossi, Director
 
Division of Operational Events Assessment
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical Contacts:  Vern Hodge, NRR
 
(301) 492-1169 Charles R. Nichols, NRR
 
(301) 492-0854 Attachments:
1. Summaries of Recent Reports Concerning Control Room Habitability
 
2. Figure 1. Schematic Flow Path Diagram of Essential Control Room Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning System at Vogtle 1 and 2
3. List of References
 
4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
 
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
 
D/DOEA:NRR          C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR *PPMB:ARM
 
CERoss i            CHBerlinger      TechEd
 
5/ /88              05/ /88          04/05/88
*OGCB:DOEA:NRR *SPLB:DEST:NRR , /8PLB:DEST:NRR      SAD/DEST:NRR    D/DEST:NRR
 
CVHodge        CRNichols        {Craig            AThadani        LCShao
 
03/31/88      03/31/88                            05/ /88          05/ /88
 
IN 88-XX
 
March xx, 1988 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
 
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical
 
contact below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional office.
 
Charles E. Rossi, Director
 
Division of Operational Events Assessment
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical Contacts:    Vern Hodge
 
(301) 492-1169 Charles R. Nichols, NRR
 
(301) 492-0854 Attachments:
1. Summaries of Recent Events Concerning Control Room Habitability


===Attachments:===
2. Figure 1. Schematic Flow Diagram of Control Room Essential Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning System at Vogtle 1 and 2
1. Figure 1. Schematic Air Flow Path Diagram of Essential Control RoomHeating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning System (ECP HVAC) at Vogtle.Assumed Containment Isolation Signal for Unit 1 with Train B Failed.2. List of Information Notices Related to Control Room Habitability Systems3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices I OUTSIDEL , AIROUTSIDE;AIR% v vvOUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY DUCT((cn cLA CO 0~FIGURE 1. SCHEMATIC AIR FLOW PATH DIAGRAM OF ESSENTIAL CONTROL ROOM HEATING, VENTILATING, AND AIR > o =CONDITIONING SYSTEM (ECR HVAC) AT VOGTLE. ASSUMED CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL FOR -CUNIT 1 WITH TRAIN B FAILED.0C03 Attachment 2IN 88-61August 11, 1988 LIST OF INFORMATION NOTICESRELATED TO CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY SYSTEMSNO.86-7685-8983-62TITLEDATEProblems Noted in Control RoomEmergency Ventilation SystemsPotential Loss of Solid-StateInstrumentation Following Failureof Control Room CoolingFailure of Redundant and Toxic GasDetectors Positioned at Control RoomVentilation Air IntakesAugust 28, 1986November 19, 1985September 26, 1983
3. List of References
'- .dachment 3IN 88-61August 11. 4988Page I of ILIST OF RECENtLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMIATION NOTICESInfTornationNotice No. Subject88-60 Inadeouste Design andInstallation of WatertightPenetration SealsB8-04. Inadecuate QualifitationSupplerent I and Documentation of FireBarrier Penetration Seals88-59 Kain Steam Isolation ValveGuide Rail Failure atWaterford Unit 388-5888-5788-5688-55B8-5488-S-Potential Probiems withASEA Brown Boveri TE-S1LTime-COercurrent PelaysPotential Loss of SafeShutccwn Eoulprent Due toPremature Siliccr ControlleeRectifier FailurePotential Prcblems wtthSiliccre Foam Fire BarrierPenetration SealsPotential Problems Causedby Sirgle Failure of anEngineered Safety FeatureSwing BusFajiure of Circuit BreakerFollowing Installation ofAmptector Direct TripAttactrentLicensee Violations of NRCReculations. Whicn Leo toleoical DiagnosticmisaoministrationsDate ofIssuanceS/11B88/9/88819/888/8/E88/8/888/4/888/3/187/28/687/28esIssued toAll holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.All holders of MLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.All holders of OLsor CFs for nuclearpower reactors.All holders of OLsor CPs 'or nuclearpower oeactors.All holders of QLsor CFs for nuclearpower reactors.All holders of OLsor CFs 'or nuclearpower reactors.All holders of CIsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.All manufacturers anddistributcrs of radio-ptarraceuticals forhuran use. nucledrpharracies. anonecical licensees.-TOL


* Doeratino LicenseCP
4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


* Ccnstructicr. PermitUNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555OFFICIAL BUSINESSPENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE. $300FIRST CLASS MAILPOSTAGE & FEES PAIDUSNACP£RMIT Ne. S67 IN 88-61August 11, 1988 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the techni-cal contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriateregional office.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contacts:Vern Hodge, NRR(301) 492-1169Charles R. Nichols, NRR(301) 492-0854
D/DOEA:NRR          C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR   PPMB:ARM


===Attachments:===
CERossi              CHBerlinger      TechEd
1. Figure 1. Schematic Air Flow Path Diagram of Essential Control RoomHeating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning System (ECR HVAC) at Vogtle.Assumed Containment Isolation Signal for Unit 1 with Train B Failed.2. List of Information Notices Related to Control Room Habitability Systems3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES08/G /88NRR *A C SPLB:DEST:NRRJWCraig05/06/88*C/OGCB:DOEA:NRRCHBerlinger05/31/88*SAD/DEST:NRRAThadani05/13/88*PPMB:ARMTechEd04/05/88*D/DEST:NRRLCShao05/16/88*OGCB:DOEA:NRRCVHodge03/31/88*SPLB:DEST:CRNichols03/31/88 IN 88-XXMay xx, 1988 habitability systems at 12 operating plants. Numerous types of discrepanciesare described involving differences between (1) the design, construction,operation and/or testing of these systems and (2) corresponding technicalspecifications when compared with the descriptions and analyses provided inlicensing basis documents, Including assumptions in the toxic gas and radiationdose calculations.No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technicalcontacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regionaloffice.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contacts:Vern Hodge, NRR(301) 492-1169Charles R. Nichols, NRR(301) 492-0854


===Attachments:===
03/ /88              03/ /88          03/ /88 OGCB:DOEA:NRR  SPLB:DEST:NRR  A/C/SPLB:DEST:NRR    SAD/DEST:NRR      D/DEST:NRR
1. Summaries of Recent Reports Concerning Control Room Habitability2. Figure 1. Schematic Flow Path Diagram of Essential Control Room Heating,Ventilating, and Air Conditioning System at Vogtle 1 and 23. List of References4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES*OGCB:DOEA:NRRCVHodge03/31/88*SPLB:DEST:NRRCRNichols03/31/88D/DOEA:NRRCERoss i05/ /88*A/C/SPLB:DEST:NRRJWCrai g05/06/88C¢6C/OGCB:DOEA:NRRCHBerl ingerO/n-/88SAD/DEST:NyJSpAThadani Al05/y88*PPMB:ARMTechEd04/05/88D/DEST:N/ILCShao05//88A IN 88-XXMay xx, 1988 control room habitability systems at 12 operating plants. Numerous types ofdiscrepancies are described between the design, construction, operation andtesting of these systems and corresponding technical specifications comparedwith the descriptions and analyses provided in licensing basis documents,including assumptions in the toxic gas and radiation dose calculations. TheNRC plans to distribute the report to all holders of operating licenses orconstruction permits for nuclear power reactors.No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technicalcontacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regionaloffice.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contacts:Vern Hodge, NRR(301) 492-1169Charles R. Nichols, NRR(301) 492-0854


===Attachments:===
CVHodge        CRNichols      JWCraig              AThadani          LCShao
1. Summaries of Recent Reports Concerning Control Room Habitability2. Figure 1. Schematic Flow Path Diagram of Essential Control Room Heating,Ventilating, and Air Conditioning System at Vogtle 1 and 23. List of References4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES*OGCB:DOEA:NRRCVHodge03/31/88D/DOEA:NRRCERoss i5/ /88*SPLB:DEST:NRR , /8PLB:DEST:NRRCRNichols {Craig03/31/88C/OGCB:DOEA:NRRCHBerlinger05/ /88SAD/DEST:NRRAThadani05/ /88*PPMB:ARMTechEd04/05/88D/DEST:NRRLCShao05/ /88 IN 88-XXMarch xx, 1988 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technicalcontact below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional office.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contacts:Vern Hodge(301) 492-1169Charles R. Nichols, NRR(301) 492-0854


===Attachments:===
03/31/88        034X /88        03/ /88              03/ /88          03/ /88}}
1. Summaries of Recent Events Concerning Control Room Habitability2. Figure 1. Schematic Flow Diagram of Control Room Essential Heating,Ventilating and Air Conditioning System at Vogtle 1 and 23. List of References4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information NoticesOGCB:DOEA:NRRCVHodge03/31/88D/DOEA:NRRCERossi03/ /88A/C/SPLB:DEST:NRRJWCraig03/ /88C/OGCB:DOEA:NRRCHBerlinger03/ /88SAD/DEST:NRRAThadani03/ /88SPLB:DEST:NRRCRNichols034X /88PPMB:ARMTechEd03/ /88D/DEST:NRRLCShao03/ /88}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 03:50, 24 November 2019

Control Room Habitability - Recent Reviews of Operating Experience
ML031150218
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date: 08/11/1988
From: Rossi C
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-88-061, NUDOCS 8808050248
Download: ML031150218 (12)
v • d • e


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 11, 1988 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-61: CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY - RECENT REVIEWS

OF OPERATING EXPERIENCE

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to potential

problems resulting from design or analysis deficiencies identified in control

room ventilation systems. It is expected that recipients will review the

information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as

appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in

this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no

specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

The NRC has received several construction deficiency and licensee event

reports pertaining to safety systems that are used to ensure control room

habitability. These reports identified potential safety concerns resulting

from design deficiencies, which were attributed to inadequate analysis and

an inability to justify those conditions that were assumed in previous evalu- ations of plant design and operation. These reports are summarized below.

Comanche Peak 1 and 2:

On January 15, 1988, the permit holder determined that radiation doses to

control room operators for some postulated radiological accidents could

exceed the limits of General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50.

This determination was attributed to an inadequate analysis of control room

habitability systems for postulated radiological accidents. Particular ac- cident scenarios that were incompletely analyzed included a fuel handling

accident and a rupture of a radioactive gaseous waste tank. To correct

this situation, the licensee is developing new calculations, upgrading the

existing control room intake radiation monitors and associated cables to

safety-related Class 1E requirements, and installing two additional safety- related Class 1E radiation monitors, one in each control room intake.

88850248 '

IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 Quad Cities:

on November 25, 1987, the licensee's engineering department discovered that

design basis assumptions used in the control room habitability study were

inconsistent with technical specification requirements. The study was con- ducted to satisfy a requirement of the NRC's TMI Action Plan. The adsorption

efficiencies of the standby gas treatment system and control room HYAC system

were assumed at 99 percent for organic iodide removal. The relevant technical

specifications, however, require only an organic iodide removal efficiency more

than or equal to 90 percent. All the filters meet the technical specification

requirements. Since December 31, 1984, tests of filter efficiencies indicate

that the relevant assumptions of the study were met with two exceptions. The

licensee attributes the cause for this condition to be an inadequate review of

design and analysis during the development of the study.

Vogtle 1 and 2:

On July 2, 1987, plant engineering personnel identified an inadequacy in the

dose analysis for control room operators. On receipt of a safety injection

signal or a control room outside air intake high radiation signal, the control

room heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) system is automatically

transferred from the normal system units to the essential control room (ECR)

fan-filter units in the emergency mode of operation. The ECR system consists

of two redundant and physically separated 100 percent capacity fan-filter units

for each side of the control room, associated with the corresponding reactor

unit (four for the combined Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room (Figure 1)). Each

of the ECR units belongs to a different safety train, but portions of the out- side air intake ductwork and control room supply and return ductwork are common

to each of the units. On initiation of the ECR system, the associated motor- operated dampers for the essential units are automatically opened and those

for the normal units are automatically closed.

When both of the ECR fan-filter units are operating, loss of power to one of

these units can reduce the amount of outside air available to pressurize the

control room. This can happen because the dampers losing power fail in the

"as-is" position. At the time of the identification of the problem, no back- draft dampers were installed. This degrades the ECR HVAC system by establishing

flowpaths through the common ductwork and the ductwork of the failed unit back

to the suction of the operating unit, which could potentially reduce the outside

air flow to the control room and reduce the control room pressure below the

design value. Maintenance of the design control room pressure is required to

minimize unfiltered inleakage.

The licensee concluded that the actual effect on control room pressure could

not be calculated in the absence of test data and decided to modify the system

by installing backdraft dampers, as noted on Figure 1, for the ECR HVAC systems

of both Units 1 and 2.

IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 On July 4, 1987, an additional condition was discovered that could have caused

an insufficient control room pressure. All ECR systems share common outside

air supply ductwork. The common air supply ductwork has intakes from the out- side atmosphere associated with both Units 1 and 2. Redundant isolation dampers

in series are provided for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 duct openings from the outside

by

atmosphere. During construction, the Unit 2 duct opening had been isolated for

locking the dampers closed. If one of the outside air isolation dampers

Unit 1 had closed as the assumed single failure of an active component, no

source of outside air would be available to the control room (shared by both

Units) and the required pressure would not be maintained. Because the licensee

had removed chlorine gas sources from the site, the capability to isolate toxic

the

gases was no longer needed. Thus, the licensee deactivated and tagged open

outside air isolation dampers.

For all these problems, the licensee concluded that the defective conditions

would have been discovered earlier with an adequate failure modes and effects

analysis.

Beaver Valley 2:

On March 27, 1987, the permit holder determined that timers initiated by con- tainment isolation phase B signals were not served with uninterruptible powerto

as required. These timers are designed to actuate banks of compressed air

supply the control room emergency pressurization system one hour after receipt

of the isolation signal. They were powered from the respective fan control

circuit energized by an emergency ac distribution panel fed from an emergency

motor control center. Loss of offsite power would interrupt power to the motor

control center. If a loss of power occurred after timer initiation, the timers

would reset to the beginning of the timing cycle and would not begin the cycle

until power was restored to the emergency motor control center. The compressed

air would thus not be supplied after one hour. To enhance the reliability of

the safety systems, the licensee revised the circuitry to power the timers from

the Class lE 125-V dc battery system.

McGuire 1:

On November 5, 1987, the licensee discovered during an 18-month surveillance

test of the control area ventilation and chilled water system that control room

pressure was below the technical specification requirement. The licensee de- termined that the cause was leaking seals on seven control room doors. The

doors were designed to seal by seating against sealing strips in the door

frames. Although not visibly deteriorated, the sealing material apparently

had been deformed and compressed over time from normal use of the doors. The

licensee adjusted manual volume dampers to increase total train air flow and

the proportion of outside air flow to the maximum 60 percent allowed in the

IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 test procedure. This action was effective in

to meet the technical specification requirement.increasing control room pressure

tape around the seven doors and established a The licensee installed sealing

preventive maintenance program to

inspect the seals on all control room doors every

The licensee plans to determine an appropriate 6 months for a 1-year period.

nance of the door seals. The surveillance test frequency for preventive mainte- and chilled water system will also be repeated of the control area ventilation

every 6 months until sufficient

information is obtained for determining an appropriate

frequency.

Farley 1:

On June 5, 1987, the licensee discovered that

control room ventilation system would fully none of four fire dampers in the

close and latch with or without air

flow because they had not been exercised and/or

lubricated or, in one case, be- cause a latch was damaged. In addition, investigation

would not have received an actuation signal revealed that the dampers

from a Firestat set to sense 1600 F

in the control room ceiling because of installation

tributed the problems to three causes: a design errors. The licensee at- full closure and latching of the dampers, inadequatedeficiency pertaining to the

circuitry, and inadequate preventive maintenance testing of the actuation

of the dampers.

Discussion:

In addition to the above, the NRC has recently

ation, "Design and Operating Deficiencies in completed an engineering evalu- Systems," AEOD/E802, April 1988 based on recentControl Room Emergency Ventilation

failure vulnerabilities in control room emergencyevents that highlight single

NRC also has recently conducted a survey of controlventilation systems.* The

at 12 operating plants. Numerous discrepancies room habitability systems

and actual performance of these systems. For were found between the analyzed

design, construction, operation, and/or testing example, differences exist between

scriptions and analyses provided in licensing of these systems and the de- documents, as for example in the

assumptions used in the toxic gas and radiation

analyses assumptions have not always been consistentdose calculations. In addition, cation requirements. The NRC has issued several with technical specifi- to this subject (see Attachment '2). Resolution information notices related

Room Habitability is also ongoing. of Generic Issue 83: Control

  • A copy of the report is available in the NRC

Public

Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20555, for inspectionDocument Room, 1717 h

and copying.

IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the techni- cal contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate

regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Vern Hodge, NRR

(301) 492-1169 Charles R. Nichols, NRR

(301) 492-0854 Attachments:

1. Figure 1. Schematic Air Flow Path Diagram of Essential Control Room

Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning System (ECP HVAC) at Vogtle.

Assumed Containment Isolation Signal for Unit 1 with Train B Failed.

2. List of Information Notices Related to Control Room Habitability Systems

3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

I OUTSIDE

OUTSIDE;

L , AIR AIR% v vv

OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY DUCT

(

(

cn c

FIGURE 1. SCHEMATIC AIR FLOW PATH DIAGRAM OF ESSENTIAL CONTROL ROOM HEATING, VENTILATING, AND LA CO 0~

AIR > o =

CONDITIONING SYSTEM (ECR HVAC) AT VOGTLE. ASSUMED CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL FOR -C

UNIT 1 WITH TRAIN B FAILED.

0C

03

Attachment 2 IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 LIST OF INFORMATION NOTICES

RELATED TO CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY SYSTEMS

NO. TITLE DATE

86-76 Problems Noted in Control Room August 28, 1986 Emergency Ventilation Systems

85-89 Potential Loss of Solid-State November 19, 1985 Instrumentation Following Failure

of Control Room Cooling

83-62 Failure of Redundant and Toxic Gas September 26, 1983 Detectors Positioned at Control Room

Ventilation Air Intakes

'-.dachment 3 IN 88-61 August 11. 4988 Page I of I

LIST OF RECENtLY ISSUED

NRCINFORMIATION NOTICES

InfTornation Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

88-60 Inadeouste Design and S/11B8 All holders of OLs

Installation of Watertight or CPsfor nuclear

Penetration Seals power reactors.

B8-04. Inadecuate Qualifitation 8/9/88 All holders of MLs

Supplerent I and Documentation of Fire or CPs for nuclear

Barrier Penetration Seals power reactors.

88-59 Kain Steam Isolation Valve 819/88 All holders of OLs

Guide Rail Failure at or CFs for nuclear

Waterford Unit 3 power reactors.

88-58 Potential Probiems with 8/8/E8 All holders of OLs

ASEABrown Boveri TE-S1L or CPs 'or nuclear

Time-COercurrent Pelays power oeactors.

88-57 Potential Loss of Safe 8/8/88 All holders of QLs

Shutccwn Eoulprent Due to or CFs for nuclear

Premature Siliccr Controllee power reactors.

Rectifier Failure

88-56 Potential Prcblems wtth 8/4/88 All holders of OLs

Siliccre Foam Fire Barrier or CFs 'or nuclear

Penetration Seals power reactors.

88-55 Potential Problems Caused 8/3/18 All holders of CIs

by Sirgle Failure of an or CPs for nuclear

Engineered Safety Feature power reactors.

Swing Bus

B8-54 Fajiure of Circuit Breaker 7/28/68 All holders of OLs

Following Installation of or CPs for nuclear

Amptector Direct Trip power reactors.

Attactrent

88-S- Licensee Violations of NRC 7/28es All manufacturers and

Reculations. Whicn Leo to distributcrs of radio- leoical Diagnostic ptarraceuticals for

misaoministrations huran use. nucledr

pharracies. ano

necical licensees.

OL

  • Doeratino License

-T

CP

  • Ccnstructicr. Permit

UNITED STATES FIRST CLASS MAIL

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION POSTAGE & FEES PAID

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 USNAC

P£RMIT Ne. S67 OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE. $300

IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the techni- cal contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate

regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Vern Hodge, NRR

(301) 492-1169 Charles R. Nichols, NRR

(301) 492-0854 Attachments:

1. Figure 1. Schematic Air Flow Path Diagram of Essential Control Room

Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning System (ECR HVAC) at Vogtle.

Assumed Containment Isolation Signal for Unit 1 with Train B Failed.

2. List of Information Notices Related to Control Room Habitability Systems

3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
  • C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR *PPMB:ARM

CHBerlinger TechEd

08/G /88 05/31/88 04/05/88

  • OGCB:DOEA:NRR *SPLB:DEST: NRR *A C SPLB:DEST:NRR *SAD/DEST:NRR *D/DEST:NRR

CVHodge CRNichols JWCraig AThadani LCShao

03/31/88 03/31/88 05/06/88 05/13/88 05/16/88

IN 88-XX

May xx, 1988 habitability systems at 12 operating plants. Numerous types of discrepancies

are described involving differences between (1) the design, construction, operation and/or testing of these systems and (2) corresponding technical

specifications when compared with the descriptions and analyses provided in

licensing basis documents, Including assumptions in the toxic gas and radiation

dose calculations.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Vern Hodge, NRR

(301) 492-1169 Charles R. Nichols, NRR

(301) 492-0854 Attachments:

1. Summaries of Recent Reports Concerning Control Room Habitability

2. Figure 1. Schematic Flow Path Diagram of Essential Control Room Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning System at Vogtle 1 and 2

3. List of References

4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

D/DOEA:NRR

C¢6 C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR *PPMB:ARM

CERoss i CHBerl inger TechEd

05/ /88 O/n-/88 04/05/88

  • OGCB:DOEA:NRR *SPLB:DEST:NRR *A/C/SPLB:DEST:NRR SAD/DEST:NyJSp D/DEST:N/I

CVHodge CRNichols JWCrai g AThadani Al LCShao

03/31/88 03/31/88 05/06/88 0 5 /y 8 8 05//88 A

IN 88-XX

May xx, 1988 control room habitability systems at 12 operating plants. Numerous types of

discrepancies are described between the design, construction, operation and

testing of these systems and corresponding technical specifications compared

with the descriptions and analyses provided in licensing basis documents, including assumptions in the toxic gas and radiation dose calculations. The

NRC plans to distribute the report to all holders of operating licenses or

construction permits for nuclear power reactors.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Vern Hodge, NRR

(301) 492-1169 Charles R. Nichols, NRR

(301) 492-0854 Attachments:

1. Summaries of Recent Reports Concerning Control Room Habitability

2. Figure 1. Schematic Flow Path Diagram of Essential Control Room Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning System at Vogtle 1 and 2

3. List of References

4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR *PPMB:ARM

CERoss i CHBerlinger TechEd

5/ /88 05/ /88 04/05/88

  • OGCB:DOEA:NRR *SPLB:DEST:NRR , /8PLB:DEST:NRR SAD/DEST:NRR D/DEST:NRR

CVHodge CRNichols {Craig AThadani LCShao

03/31/88 03/31/88 05/ /88 05/ /88

IN 88-XX

March xx, 1988 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Vern Hodge

(301) 492-1169 Charles R. Nichols, NRR

(301) 492-0854 Attachments:

1. Summaries of Recent Events Concerning Control Room Habitability

2. Figure 1. Schematic Flow Diagram of Control Room Essential Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning System at Vogtle 1 and 2

3. List of References

4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR PPMB:ARM

CERossi CHBerlinger TechEd

03/ /88 03/ /88 03/ /88 OGCB:DOEA:NRR SPLB:DEST:NRR A/C/SPLB:DEST:NRR SAD/DEST:NRR D/DEST:NRR

CVHodge CRNichols JWCraig AThadani LCShao

03/31/88 034X /88 03/ /88 03/ /88 03/ /88


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