Information Notice 1988-61, Control Room Habitability - Recent Reviews of Operating Experience: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES


COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 11, 1988 NRC INFORMATION


NOTICE NO. 88-61: CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 11, 1988 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-61:   CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY - RECENT REVIEWS


-RECENT REVIEWS OF OPERATING
OF OPERATING EXPERIENCE
 
EXPERIENCE


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
:
:
All holders of operating
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power


licenses or construction
reactors.
 
permits for nuclear power reactors.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
: This information
:
This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to potential


notice is being provided to alert addressees
problems resulting from design or analysis deficiencies identified in control


to potential problems resulting
room ventilation systems. It is expected that recipients will review the


from design or analysis deficiencies
information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as


identified
appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in


in control room ventilation
this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no


systems. It is expected that recipients
specific action or written response is required.


will review the information
==Description of Circumstances==
 
:
for applicability
The NRC has received several construction deficiency and licensee event
 
to their facilities
 
and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
 
However, suggestions
 
contained
 
in this information
 
notice do not constitute
 
NRC requirements;
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description
 
of Circumstances:
The NRC has received several construction
 
deficiency
 
and licensee event reports pertaining
 
to safety systems that are used to ensure control room habitability.
 
These reports identified
 
potential
 
safety concerns resulting from design deficiencies, which were attributed
 
to inadequate
 
analysis and an inability
 
to justify those conditions
 
that were assumed in previous evalu-ations of plant design and operation.
 
These reports are summarized
 
below.Comanche Peak 1 and 2: On January 15, 1988, the permit holder determined
 
that radiation
 
doses to control room operators
 
for some postulated
 
radiological
 
accidents
 
could exceed the limits of General Design Criterion
 
19 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50.This determination
 
was attributed
 
to an inadequate
 
analysis of control room habitability
 
systems for postulated
 
radiological
 
accidents.
 
Particular
 
ac-cident scenarios
 
that were incompletely
 
analyzed included a fuel handling accident and a rupture of a radioactive
 
gaseous waste tank. To correct this situation, the licensee is developing
 
new calculations, upgrading
 
the existing control room intake radiation
 
monitors and associated
 
cables to safety-related
 
Class 1E requirements, and installing
 
two additional
 
safety-related Class 1E radiation
 
monitors, one in each control room intake.88850248 '
IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 Quad Cities: on November 25, 1987, the licensee's
 
engineering
 
department
 
discovered
 
that design basis assumptions
 
used in the control room habitability
 
study were inconsistent
 
with technical
 
specification
 
requirements.
 
The study was con-ducted to satisfy a requirement
 
of the NRC's TMI Action Plan. The adsorption
 
efficiencies
 
of the standby gas treatment
 
system and control room HYAC system were assumed at 99 percent for organic iodide removal. The relevant technical specifications, however, require only an organic iodide removal efficiency
 
more than or equal to 90 percent. All the filters meet the technical
 
specification
 
requirements.
 
Since December 31, 1984, tests of filter efficiencies
 
indicate that the relevant assumptions
 
of the study were met with two exceptions.
 
The licensee attributes
 
the cause for this condition
 
to be an inadequate
 
review of design and analysis during the development
 
of the study.Vogtle 1 and 2: On July 2, 1987, plant engineering
 
personnel
 
identified
 
an inadequacy


in the dose analysis for control room operators.
reports pertaining to safety systems that are used to ensure control room


On receipt of a safety injection signal or a control room outside air intake high radiation
habitability. These reports identified potential safety concerns resulting


signal, the control room heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) system is automatically
from design deficiencies, which were attributed to inadequate analysis and


transferred
an inability to justify those conditions that were assumed in previous evalu- ations of plant design and operation. These reports are summarized below.


from the normal system units to the essential
Comanche Peak 1 and 2:
On January 15, 1988, the permit holder determined that radiation doses to


control room (ECR)fan-filter
control room operators for some postulated radiological accidents could


units in the emergency
exceed the limits of General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50.


mode of operation.
This determination was attributed to an inadequate analysis of control room


The ECR system consists of two redundant
habitability systems for postulated radiological accidents. Particular ac- cident scenarios that were incompletely analyzed included a fuel handling


and physically
accident and a rupture of a radioactive gaseous waste tank. To correct


separated
this situation, the licensee is developing new calculations, upgrading the


100 percent capacity fan-filter
existing control room intake radiation monitors and associated cables to


units for each side of the control room, associated
safety-related Class 1E requirements, and installing two additional safety- related Class 1E radiation monitors, one in each control room intake.


with the corresponding
88850248 '


reactor unit (four for the combined Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room (Figure 1)). Each of the ECR units belongs to a different
IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 Quad Cities:
on November 25, 1987, the licensee's engineering department discovered that


safety train, but portions of the out-side air intake ductwork and control room supply and return ductwork are common to each of the units. On initiation
design basis assumptions used in the control room habitability study were


of the ECR system, the associated
inconsistent with technical specification requirements. The study was con- ducted to satisfy a requirement of the NRC's TMI Action Plan. The adsorption


motor-operated dampers for the essential
efficiencies of the standby gas treatment system and control room HYAC system


units are automatically
were assumed at 99 percent for organic iodide removal. The relevant technical


opened and those for the normal units are automatically
specifications, however, require only an organic iodide removal efficiency more


closed.When both of the ECR fan-filter
than or equal to 90 percent. All the filters meet the technical specification


units are operating, loss of power to one of these units can reduce the amount of outside air available
requirements. Since December 31, 1984, tests of filter efficiencies indicate


to pressurize
that the relevant assumptions of the study were met with two exceptions. The


the control room. This can happen because the dampers losing power fail in the"as-is" position.
licensee attributes the cause for this condition to be an inadequate review of


At the time of the identification
design and analysis during the development of the study.


of the problem, no back-draft dampers were installed.
Vogtle 1 and 2:
On July 2, 1987, plant engineering personnel identified an inadequacy in the


===This degrades the ECR HVAC system by establishing===
dose analysis for control room operators. On receipt of a safety injection
flowpaths


through the common ductwork and the ductwork of the failed unit back to the suction of the operating
signal or a control room outside air intake high radiation signal, the control


unit, which could potentially
room heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) system is automatically


reduce the outside air flow to the control room and reduce the control room pressure below the design value. Maintenance
transferred from the normal system units to the essential control room (ECR)
fan-filter units in the emergency mode of operation. The ECR system consists


of the design control room pressure is required to minimize unfiltered
of two redundant and physically separated 100 percent capacity fan-filter units


inleakage.
for each side of the control room, associated with the corresponding reactor


The licensee concluded
unit (four for the combined Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room (Figure 1)). Each


that the actual effect on control room pressure could not be calculated
of the ECR units belongs to a different safety train, but portions of the out- side air intake ductwork and control room supply and return ductwork are common


in the absence of test data and decided to modify the system by installing
to each of the units. On initiation of the ECR system, the associated motor- operated dampers for the essential units are automatically opened and those


backdraft
for the normal units are automatically closed.


dampers, as noted on Figure 1, for the ECR HVAC systems of both Units 1 and 2.
When both of the ECR fan-filter units are operating, loss of power to one of


IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 On July 4, 1987, an additional
these units can reduce the amount of outside air available to pressurize the


condition
control room. This can happen because the dampers losing power fail in the


was discovered
"as-is" position. At the time of the identification of the problem, no back- draft dampers were installed. This degrades the ECR HVAC system by establishing


that could have caused an insufficient
flowpaths through the common ductwork and the ductwork of the failed unit back


control room pressure.
to the suction of the operating unit, which could potentially reduce the outside


All ECR systems share common outside air supply ductwork.
air flow to the control room and reduce the control room pressure below the


The common air supply ductwork has intakes from the out-side atmosphere
design value. Maintenance of the design control room pressure is required to


associated
minimize unfiltered inleakage.


with both Units 1 and 2. Redundant
The licensee concluded that the actual effect on control room pressure could


isolation
not be calculated in the absence of test data and decided to modify the system


dampers in series are provided for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 duct openings from the outside atmosphere.
by installing backdraft dampers, as noted on Figure 1, for the ECR HVAC systems


During construction, the Unit 2 duct opening had been isolated by locking the dampers closed. If one of the outside air isolation
of both Units 1 and 2.


dampers for Unit 1 had closed as the assumed single failure of an active component, no source of outside air would be available
IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 On July 4, 1987, an additional condition was discovered that could have caused


to the control room (shared by both Units) and the required pressure would not be maintained.
an insufficient control room pressure. All ECR systems share common outside


Because the licensee had removed chlorine gas sources from the site, the capability
air supply ductwork. The common air supply ductwork has intakes from the out- side atmosphere associated with both Units 1 and 2. Redundant isolation dampers


to isolate toxic gases was no longer needed. Thus, the licensee deactivated
in series are provided for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 duct openings from the outside


and tagged open the outside air isolation
by


dampers.For all these problems, the licensee concluded
atmosphere. During construction, the Unit 2 duct opening had been isolated for


that the defective
locking the dampers closed. If one of the outside air isolation  dampers


conditions
Unit 1 had closed as the assumed single failure of an active component, no


would have been discovered
source of outside air would be available to the control room (shared by both


earlier with an adequate failure modes and effects analysis.Beaver Valley 2: On March 27, 1987, the permit holder determined
Units) and the required pressure would not be maintained. Because the licensee


that timers initiated
had removed chlorine gas sources from the site, the capability to isolate toxic


by con-tainment isolation
the


phase B signals were not served with uninterruptible
gases was no longer needed. Thus, the licensee deactivated and tagged open


power as required.
outside air isolation dampers.


These timers are designed to actuate banks of compressed
For all these problems, the licensee concluded that the defective conditions


air to supply the control room emergency
would have been discovered earlier with an adequate failure modes and effects


pressurization
analysis.


system one hour after receipt of the isolation
Beaver Valley 2:
On March 27, 1987, the permit holder determined that timers initiated by con- tainment isolation phase B signals were not served with uninterruptible powerto


signal. They were powered from the respective
as required. These timers are designed to actuate banks of compressed air


fan control circuit energized
supply the control room emergency pressurization system one hour after  receipt


by an emergency
of the isolation signal. They were powered from the respective fan control


ac distribution
circuit energized by an emergency ac distribution panel fed from an emergency


panel fed from an emergency motor control center. Loss of offsite power would interrupt
motor control center. Loss of offsite power would interrupt power to the motor


power to the motor control center. If a loss of power occurred after timer initiation, the timers would reset to the beginning
control center. If a loss of power occurred after timer initiation, the timers


of the timing cycle and would not begin the cycle until power was restored to the emergency
would reset to the beginning of the timing cycle and would not begin the cycle


motor control center. The compressed
until power was restored to the emergency motor control center. The compressed


air would thus not be supplied after one hour. To enhance the reliability
air would thus not be supplied after one hour. To enhance the reliability of


of the safety systems, the licensee revised the circuitry
the safety systems, the licensee revised the circuitry to power the timers from


to power the timers from the Class lE 125-V dc battery system.McGuire 1: On November 5, 1987, the licensee discovered
the Class lE 125-V dc battery system.


during an 18-month surveillance
McGuire 1:
On November 5, 1987, the licensee discovered during an 18-month surveillance


test of the control area ventilation
test of the control area ventilation and chilled water system that control room


and chilled water system that control room pressure was below the technical
pressure was below the technical specification requirement. The licensee de- termined that the cause was leaking seals on seven control room doors. The


specification
doors were designed to seal by seating against sealing strips in the door


requirement.
frames. Although not visibly deteriorated, the sealing material apparently


The licensee de-termined that the cause was leaking seals on seven control room doors. The doors were designed to seal by seating against sealing strips in the door frames. Although not visibly deteriorated, the sealing material apparently
had been deformed and compressed over time from normal use of the doors. The


had been deformed and compressed
licensee adjusted manual volume dampers to increase total train air flow and


over time from normal use of the doors. The licensee adjusted manual volume dampers to increase total train air flow and the proportion
the proportion of outside air flow to the maximum 60 percent allowed in the


of outside air flow to the maximum 60 percent allowed in the
IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 test procedure. This action was effective in


I IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 test procedure.
to meet the technical specification requirement.increasing control room pressure


This action was effective
tape around the seven doors and established a        The licensee installed sealing


in increasing
preventive    maintenance program to


control room pressure to meet the technical
inspect the seals on all control room doors every


specification
The licensee plans to determine an appropriate      6  months  for a 1-year period.


requirement.
nance of the door seals. The surveillance test  frequency    for  preventive mainte- and chilled water system will also be repeated of the control area ventilation


The licensee installed
every 6 months until sufficient


sealing tape around the seven doors and established
information is obtained for determining an appropriate
 
a preventive
 
maintenance
 
program to inspect the seals on all control room doors every 6 months for a 1-year period.The licensee plans to determine
 
an appropriate
 
frequency
 
for preventive
 
mainte-nance of the door seals. The surveillance
 
test of the control area ventilation
 
and chilled water system will also be repeated every 6 months until sufficient
 
information
 
is obtained for determining
 
an appropriate


frequency.
frequency.


Farley 1: On June 5, 1987, the licensee discovered
Farley 1:
  On June 5, 1987, the licensee discovered that


that none of four fire dampers in the control room ventilation
control room ventilation system would fully    none of four fire dampers in the


system would fully close and latch with or without air flow because they had not been exercised
close and latch with or without air


and/or lubricated
flow because they had not been exercised and/or


or, in one case, be-cause a latch was damaged. In addition, investigation
lubricated or, in one case, be- cause a latch was damaged. In addition, investigation


revealed that the dampers would not have received an actuation
would not have received an actuation signal                  revealed that the dampers


signal from a Firestat set to sense 160 0 F in the control room ceiling because of installation
from   a Firestat   set to sense 1600 F


errors. The licensee at-tributed the problems to three causes: a design deficiency
in the control room ceiling because of installation


pertaining
tributed the problems to three causes: a design        errors.    The licensee at- full closure and latching of the dampers, inadequatedeficiency    pertaining   to the


to the full closure and latching of the dampers, inadequate
circuitry, and inadequate preventive maintenance          testing  of the actuation


testing of the actuation circuitry, and inadequate
of the dampers.


preventive
Discussion:
In addition to the above, the NRC has recently


maintenance
ation, "Design and Operating Deficiencies in completed an engineering evalu- Systems," AEOD/E802, April 1988 based on recentControl Room Emergency Ventilation


of the dampers.Discussion:
failure vulnerabilities in control room emergencyevents that highlight single
In addition to the above, the NRC has recently completed


an engineering
NRC also has recently conducted a survey of controlventilation systems.* The


evalu-ation, "Design and Operating
at 12 operating plants. Numerous discrepancies          room habitability systems


Deficiencies
and actual performance of these systems. For      were    found between the analyzed


in Control Room Emergency
design, construction, operation, and/or testing example,    differences exist between


Ventilation
scriptions and analyses provided in licensing      of  these  systems and the de- documents, as for example in the


Systems," AEOD/E802, April 1988 based on recent events that highlight
assumptions used in the toxic gas and radiation


single failure vulnerabilities
analyses assumptions have not always been consistentdose calculations. In addition, cation requirements. The NRC has issued several            with technical specifi- to this subject (see Attachment '2). Resolution      information    notices related


in control room emergency
Room Habitability is also ongoing.                of Generic Issue 83: Control


ventilation
*A copy of the report is available in the NRC


systems.*
Public
The NRC also has recently conducted


a survey of control room habitability
Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20555, for inspectionDocument Room, 1717 h
 
systems at 12 operating
 
plants. Numerous discrepancies
 
were found between the analyzed and actual performance
 
of these systems. For example, differences
 
exist between design, construction, operation, and/or testing of these systems and the de-scriptions
 
and analyses provided in licensing
 
documents, as for example in the assumptions
 
used in the toxic gas and radiation
 
dose calculations.
 
In addition, analyses assumptions
 
have not always been consistent
 
with technical
 
specifi-cation requirements.
 
The NRC has issued several information
 
notices related to this subject (see Attachment
 
'2). Resolution
 
of Generic Issue 83: Control Room Habitability
 
is also ongoing.*A copy of the report is available
 
in the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 h Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20555, for inspection


and copying.
and copying.


IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 No specific action or written response is required by this information
IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.


notice.If you have any questions
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the techni- cal contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate


about this matter, please contact one of the techni-cal contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator
regional office.


of the appropriate
Charles E. Rossi, Director


regional office.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
Division of Operational Events Assessment


===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Technical
Technical Contacts:  Vern Hodge, NRR


Contacts:
(301) 492-1169 Charles R. Nichols, NRR
Vern Hodge, NRR (301) 492-1169 Charles R. Nichols, NRR (301) 492-0854 Attachments:
1. Figure 1. Schematic


Air Flow Path Diagram of Essential
(301) 492-0854 Attachments:
1. Figure 1. Schematic Air Flow Path Diagram of Essential Control Room


Control Room Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning
Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning System (ECP HVAC) at Vogtle.


System (ECP HVAC) at Vogtle.Assumed Containment
Assumed Containment Isolation Signal for Unit 1 with Train B Failed.


Isolation
2. List of Information Notices Related to Control Room Habitability Systems


Signal for Unit 1 with Train B Failed.2. List of Information
3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


Notices Related to Control Room Habitability
I OUTSIDE


Systems 3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
OUTSIDE;
  L ,  AIR                                                                              AIR% v vv


Notices
OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY DUCT


I OUTSIDE L , AIR OUTSIDE;AIR% v vv OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY DUCT ((cn c LA CO 0~FIGURE 1. SCHEMATIC
(
                                                                                                            (
                                                                                                    cn   c


AIR FLOW PATH DIAGRAM OF ESSENTIAL
FIGURE 1. SCHEMATIC AIR FLOW PATH DIAGRAM OF ESSENTIAL CONTROL ROOM HEATING, VENTILATING, AND      LA CO 0~
                                                                                              AIR  > o    =
          CONDITIONING SYSTEM (ECR HVAC) AT VOGTLE. ASSUMED CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL FOR          -C


CONTROL ROOM HEATING, VENTILATING, AND AIR > o =CONDITIONING
UNIT 1 WITH TRAIN B FAILED.


SYSTEM (ECR HVAC) AT VOGTLE. ASSUMED CONTAINMENT
0C


ISOLATION
03


SIGNAL FOR -C UNIT 1 WITH TRAIN B FAILED.0C 03 Attachment
Attachment 2 IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 LIST OF INFORMATION NOTICES


2 IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 LIST OF INFORMATION
RELATED TO CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY SYSTEMS


NOTICES RELATED TO CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY
NO.        TITLE                                  DATE


SYSTEMS NO.86-76 85-89 83-62 TITLE DATE Problems Noted in Control Room Emergency
86-76 Problems Noted in Control Room         August 28, 1986 Emergency Ventilation Systems


Ventilation
85-89 Potential Loss of Solid-State          November 19, 1985 Instrumentation Following Failure


Systems Potential
of Control Room Cooling


Loss of Solid-State
83-62 Failure of Redundant and Toxic Gas      September 26, 1983 Detectors Positioned at Control Room


Instrumentation
Ventilation Air Intakes


Following
'-.dachment 3 IN 88-61 August 11. 4988 Page I of I


Failure of Control Room Cooling Failure of Redundant
LIST OF RECENtLY ISSUED


and Toxic Gas Detectors
NRCINFORMIATION NOTICES


Positioned
InfTornation                                  Date of


at Control Room Ventilation
Notice No.      Subject                        Issuance  Issued to


Air Intakes August 28, 1986 November 19, 1985 September
88-60          Inadeouste Design and          S/11B8    All holders of OLs


26, 1983
Installation of Watertight              or CPsfor nuclear
'- .dachment


3 IN 88-61 August 11. 4988 Page I of I LIST OF RECENtLY ISSUED NRC INFORMIATION
Penetration Seals                        power reactors.


===NOTICES InfTornation===
B8-04.         Inadecuate Qualifitation      8/9/88   All holders of MLs
Notice No. Subject 88-60 Inadeouste


Design and Installation
Supplerent I  and Documentation of Fire                or CPs for nuclear


of Watertight
Barrier Penetration Seals                power reactors.


Penetration
88-59          Kain Steam Isolation Valve    819/88    All holders of OLs


Seals B8-04. Inadecuate
Guide Rail Failure at                    or CFs for nuclear


===Qualifitation===
Waterford Unit 3                          power reactors.
Supplerent


I and Documentation
88-58          Potential Probiems with        8/8/E8    All holders of OLs


of Fire Barrier Penetration
ASEABrown Boveri TE-S1L                  or CPs 'or nuclear


Seals 88-59 Kain Steam Isolation
Time-COercurrent Pelays                  power oeactors.


Valve Guide Rail Failure at Waterford
88-57          Potential Loss of Safe        8/8/88    All holders of QLs


Unit 3 88-58 88-57 88-56 88-55 B8-54 88-S-Potential
Shutccwn Eoulprent Due to                or CFs for nuclear


Probiems with ASEA Brown Boveri TE-S1L Time-COercurrent
Premature Siliccr Controllee            power reactors.


Pelays Potential
Rectifier Failure


Loss of Safe Shutccwn Eoulprent
88-56          Potential Prcblems wtth        8/4/88    All holders of OLs


Due to Premature
Siliccre Foam Fire Barrier              or CFs 'or nuclear


===Siliccr Controllee===
Penetration Seals                        power reactors.
Rectifier


Failure Potential
88-55          Potential Problems Caused      8/3/18    All holders of CIs


Prcblems wtth Siliccre Foam Fire Barrier Penetration
by Sirgle Failure of an                  or CPs for nuclear


Seals Potential
Engineered Safety Feature                power reactors.


Problems Caused by Sirgle Failure of an Engineered
Swing Bus


Safety Feature Swing Bus Fajiure of Circuit Breaker Following
B8-54          Fajiure of Circuit Breaker     7/28/68    All holders of OLs


Installation
Following Installation of                or CPs for nuclear


of Amptector
Amptector Direct Trip                    power reactors.


===Direct Trip Attactrent===
Attactrent
Licensee Violations


of NRC Reculations.
88-S-          Licensee Violations of NRC     7/28es    All manufacturers and


===Whicn Leo to leoical Diagnostic===
Reculations. Whicn Leo to               distributcrs of radio- leoical Diagnostic                       ptarraceuticals for
misaoministrations


Date of Issuance S/11B8 8/9/88 819/88 8/8/E8 8/8/88 8/4/88 8/3/18 7/28/68 7/28es Issued to All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of MLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CFs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs 'or nuclear power oeactors.All holders of QLs or CFs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CFs 'or nuclear power reactors.All holders of CIs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All manufacturers
misaoministrations                      huran use. nucledr


and distributcrs
pharracies. ano


of radio-ptarraceuticals
necical licensees.


for huran use. nucledr pharracies.
OL


ano necical licensees.-T OL
* Doeratino License


* Doeratino
-T


License CP
CP


* Ccnstructicr.
* Ccnstructicr. Permit


Permit UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
UNITED STATES                                                                                               FIRST CLASS MAIL


COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION                                                                                       POSTAGE & FEES PAID


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 OFFICIAL BUSINESS PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE. $300 FIRST CLASS MAIL POSTAGE & FEES PAID USNAC P£RMIT Ne. S67 IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 No specific action or written response is required by this information
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555                                                                                               USNAC


notice.If you have any questions
P£RMIT Ne. S67 OFFICIAL BUSINESS


about this matter, please contact one of the techni-cal contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE. $300


of the appropriate
IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.


regional office.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the techni- cal contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate


===Events Assessment===
regional office.
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Technical
Charles E. Rossi, Director


Contacts: Vern Hodge, NRR (301) 492-1169 Charles R. Nichols, NRR (301) 492-0854 Attachments:
Division of Operational Events Assessment
1. Figure 1. Schematic


Air Flow Path Diagram of Essential
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Control Room Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning
Technical Contacts:  Vern Hodge, NRR


System (ECR HVAC) at Vogtle.Assumed Containment
(301) 492-1169 Charles R. Nichols, NRR


Isolation
(301) 492-0854 Attachments:
1. Figure 1. Schematic Air Flow Path Diagram of Essential Control Room


Signal for Unit 1 with Train B Failed.2. List of Information
Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning System (ECR HVAC) at Vogtle.


Notices Related to Control Room Habitability
Assumed Containment Isolation Signal for Unit 1 with Train B Failed.


Systems 3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
2. List of Information Notices Related to Control Room Habitability Systems


Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


08/G /88 NRR *A C SPLB:DEST:NRR
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES


JWCraig 05/06/88*C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
*C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR *PPMB:ARM


CHBerlinger
CHBerlinger     TechEd


05/31/88*SAD/DEST:NRR
08/G /88            05/31/88         04/05/88
*OGCB:DOEA:NRR *SPLB:DEST: NRR *A C SPLB:DEST:NRR  *SAD/DEST:NRR    *D/DEST:NRR


AThadani 05/13/88*PPMB:ARM TechEd 04/05/88*D/DEST:NRR
CVHodge        CRNichols      JWCraig              AThadani         LCShao


LCShao 05/16/88*OGCB:DOEA:NRR
03/31/88        03/31/88      05/06/88            05/13/88        05/16/88


CVHodge 03/31/88*SPLB:DEST:
IN 88-XX
CRNichols 03/31/88 IN 88-XX May xx, 1988 habitability


systems at 12 operating
May xx, 1988 habitability systems at 12 operating plants. Numerous types of discrepancies


plants. Numerous types of discrepancies
are described involving differences between (1) the design, construction, operation and/or testing of these systems and (2) corresponding technical


are described
specifications when compared with the descriptions and analyses provided in


involving
licensing basis documents, Including assumptions in the toxic gas and radiation


differences
dose calculations.
 
between (1) the design, construction, operation
 
and/or testing of these systems and (2) corresponding
 
technical specifications
 
when compared with the descriptions
 
and analyses provided in licensing
 
basis documents, Including


assumptions
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.


in the toxic gas and radiation dose calculations.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical


No specific action or written response is required by this information
contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional


notice.If you have any questions
office.


about this matter, please contact the technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator
Charles E. Rossi, Director


of the appropriate
Division of Operational Events Assessment


regional office.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Technical
Technical Contacts:   Vern Hodge, NRR
 
Contacts: Vern Hodge, NRR (301) 492-1169 Charles R. Nichols, NRR (301) 492-0854 Attachments:
1. Summaries
 
of Recent Reports Concerning
 
===Control Room Habitability===
2. Figure 1. Schematic
 
Flow Path Diagram of Essential
 
Control Room Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning
 
===System at Vogtle 1 and 2 3. List of References===
4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
 
*OGCB:DOEA:NRR


CVHodge 03/31/88*SPLB:DEST:NRR
(301) 492-1169 Charles R. Nichols, NRR


CRNichols 03/31/88 D/DOEA:NRR
(301) 492-0854 Attachments:
1. Summaries of Recent Reports Concerning Control Room Habitability


CERoss i 05/ /88*A/C/SPLB:DEST:NRR
2. Figure 1. Schematic Flow Path Diagram of Essential Control Room Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning System at Vogtle 1 and 2
3. List of References


JWCrai g 05/06/88 C¢6 C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


CHBerl inger O/n-/88 SAD/DEST:NyJSp
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES


AThadani Al 0 5/y 8 8*PPMB:ARM TechEd 04/05/88 D/DEST:N/I
D/DOEA:NRR


LCShao 05//88 A
C¢6 C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR  *PPMB:ARM


IN 88-XX May xx, 1988 control room habitability
CERoss i            CHBerl inger    TechEd


systems at 12 operating
05/ /88              O/n-/88          04/05/88
*OGCB:DOEA:NRR *SPLB:DEST:NRR *A/C/SPLB:DEST:NRR    SAD/DEST:NyJSp  D/DEST:N/I


plants. Numerous types of discrepancies
CVHodge        CRNichols      JWCrai g            AThadani Al      LCShao


are described
03/31/88        03/31/88        05/06/88            0 5 /y 8 8      05//88 A


between the design, construction, operation
IN 88-XX


and testing of these systems and corresponding
May xx, 1988 control room habitability systems at 12 operating plants. Numerous types of


technical
discrepancies are described between the design, construction, operation and


specifications
testing of these systems and corresponding technical specifications compared


compared with the descriptions
with the descriptions and analyses provided in licensing basis documents, including assumptions in the toxic gas and radiation dose calculations. The


and analyses provided in licensing
NRC plans to distribute the report to all holders of operating licenses or


basis documents, including
construction permits for nuclear power reactors.


assumptions
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.


in the toxic gas and radiation
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical


dose calculations.
contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional


The NRC plans to distribute
office.


the report to all holders of operating
Charles E. Rossi, Director


licenses or construction
Division of Operational Events Assessment


permits for nuclear power reactors.No specific action or written response is required by this information
notice.If you have any questions
about this matter, please contact the technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator
of the appropriate
regional office.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Technical
Technical Contacts: Vern Hodge, NRR
 
Contacts: Vern Hodge, NRR (301) 492-1169 Charles R. Nichols, NRR (301) 492-0854 Attachments:
1. Summaries
 
of Recent Reports Concerning
 
===Control Room Habitability===
2. Figure 1. Schematic


Flow Path Diagram of Essential
(301) 492-1169 Charles R. Nichols, NRR


Control Room Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning
(301) 492-0854 Attachments:
1. Summaries of Recent Reports Concerning Control Room Habitability


===System at Vogtle 1 and 2 3. List of References===
2. Figure 1. Schematic Flow Path Diagram of Essential Control Room Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning System at Vogtle 1 and 2
4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
3. List of References


Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


*OGCB:DOEA:NRR
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES


CVHodge 03/31/88 D/DOEA:NRR
D/DOEA:NRR          C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR *PPMB:ARM


CERoss i 5/ /88*SPLB:DEST:NRR , /8PLB:DEST:NRR
CERoss i             CHBerlinger      TechEd


CRNichols
5/ /88              05/ /88          04/05/88
*OGCB:DOEA:NRR *SPLB:DEST:NRR , /8PLB:DEST:NRR      SAD/DEST:NRR    D/DEST:NRR


{Craig 03/31/88 C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
CVHodge        CRNichols        {Craig             AThadani        LCShao


CHBerlinger
03/31/88      03/31/88                            05/ /88          05/ /88


05/ /88 SAD/DEST:NRR
IN 88-XX


AThadani 05/ /88*PPMB:ARM TechEd 04/05/88 D/DEST:NRR
March xx, 1988 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.


LCShao 05/ /88 IN 88-XX March xx, 1988 No specific action or written response is required by this information
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical


notice.If you have any questions
contact below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional office.


about this matter, please contact the technical contact below or the Regional Administrator
Charles E. Rossi, Director


of the appropriate
Division of Operational Events Assessment


regional office.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Technical
Technical Contacts:   Vern Hodge
 
Contacts: Vern Hodge (301) 492-1169 Charles R. Nichols, NRR (301) 492-0854 Attachments:
1. Summaries
 
of Recent Events Concerning
 
===Control Room Habitability===
2. Figure 1. Schematic
 
Flow Diagram of Control Room Essential
 
Heating, Ventilating
 
and Air Conditioning
 
===System at Vogtle 1 and 2 3. List of References===
4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information


Notices OGCB:DOEA:NRR
(301) 492-1169 Charles R. Nichols, NRR


CVHodge 03/31/88 D/DOEA:NRR
(301) 492-0854 Attachments:
1. Summaries of Recent Events Concerning Control Room Habitability


CERossi 03/ /88 A/C/SPLB:DEST:NRR
2. Figure 1. Schematic Flow Diagram of Control Room Essential Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning System at Vogtle 1 and 2
3. List of References


JWCraig 03/ /88 C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


CHBerlinger
D/DOEA:NRR          C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR  PPMB:ARM


03/ /88 SAD/DEST:NRR
CERossi              CHBerlinger      TechEd


AThadani 03/ /88 SPLB:DEST:NRR
03/ /88             03/ /88          03/ /88 OGCB:DOEA:NRR  SPLB:DEST:NRR  A/C/SPLB:DEST:NRR    SAD/DEST:NRR      D/DEST:NRR


CRNichols 034X /88 PPMB:ARM TechEd 03/ /88 D/DEST:NRR
CVHodge        CRNichols       JWCraig              AThadani          LCShao


LCShao 03/ /88}}
03/31/88        034X /88        03/ /88              03/ /88          03/ /88}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 03:50, 24 November 2019

Control Room Habitability - Recent Reviews of Operating Experience
ML031150218
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date: 08/11/1988
From: Rossi C
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-88-061, NUDOCS 8808050248
Download: ML031150218 (12)
v • d • e


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 11, 1988 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-61: CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY - RECENT REVIEWS

OF OPERATING EXPERIENCE

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to potential

problems resulting from design or analysis deficiencies identified in control

room ventilation systems. It is expected that recipients will review the

information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as

appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in

this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no

specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

The NRC has received several construction deficiency and licensee event

reports pertaining to safety systems that are used to ensure control room

habitability. These reports identified potential safety concerns resulting

from design deficiencies, which were attributed to inadequate analysis and

an inability to justify those conditions that were assumed in previous evalu- ations of plant design and operation. These reports are summarized below.

Comanche Peak 1 and 2:

On January 15, 1988, the permit holder determined that radiation doses to

control room operators for some postulated radiological accidents could

exceed the limits of General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50.

This determination was attributed to an inadequate analysis of control room

habitability systems for postulated radiological accidents. Particular ac- cident scenarios that were incompletely analyzed included a fuel handling

accident and a rupture of a radioactive gaseous waste tank. To correct

this situation, the licensee is developing new calculations, upgrading the

existing control room intake radiation monitors and associated cables to

safety-related Class 1E requirements, and installing two additional safety- related Class 1E radiation monitors, one in each control room intake.

88850248 '

IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 Quad Cities:

on November 25, 1987, the licensee's engineering department discovered that

design basis assumptions used in the control room habitability study were

inconsistent with technical specification requirements. The study was con- ducted to satisfy a requirement of the NRC's TMI Action Plan. The adsorption

efficiencies of the standby gas treatment system and control room HYAC system

were assumed at 99 percent for organic iodide removal. The relevant technical

specifications, however, require only an organic iodide removal efficiency more

than or equal to 90 percent. All the filters meet the technical specification

requirements. Since December 31, 1984, tests of filter efficiencies indicate

that the relevant assumptions of the study were met with two exceptions. The

licensee attributes the cause for this condition to be an inadequate review of

design and analysis during the development of the study.

Vogtle 1 and 2:

On July 2, 1987, plant engineering personnel identified an inadequacy in the

dose analysis for control room operators. On receipt of a safety injection

signal or a control room outside air intake high radiation signal, the control

room heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) system is automatically

transferred from the normal system units to the essential control room (ECR)

fan-filter units in the emergency mode of operation. The ECR system consists

of two redundant and physically separated 100 percent capacity fan-filter units

for each side of the control room, associated with the corresponding reactor

unit (four for the combined Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room (Figure 1)). Each

of the ECR units belongs to a different safety train, but portions of the out- side air intake ductwork and control room supply and return ductwork are common

to each of the units. On initiation of the ECR system, the associated motor- operated dampers for the essential units are automatically opened and those

for the normal units are automatically closed.

When both of the ECR fan-filter units are operating, loss of power to one of

these units can reduce the amount of outside air available to pressurize the

control room. This can happen because the dampers losing power fail in the

"as-is" position. At the time of the identification of the problem, no back- draft dampers were installed. This degrades the ECR HVAC system by establishing

flowpaths through the common ductwork and the ductwork of the failed unit back

to the suction of the operating unit, which could potentially reduce the outside

air flow to the control room and reduce the control room pressure below the

design value. Maintenance of the design control room pressure is required to

minimize unfiltered inleakage.

The licensee concluded that the actual effect on control room pressure could

not be calculated in the absence of test data and decided to modify the system

by installing backdraft dampers, as noted on Figure 1, for the ECR HVAC systems

of both Units 1 and 2.

IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 On July 4, 1987, an additional condition was discovered that could have caused

an insufficient control room pressure. All ECR systems share common outside

air supply ductwork. The common air supply ductwork has intakes from the out- side atmosphere associated with both Units 1 and 2. Redundant isolation dampers

in series are provided for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 duct openings from the outside

by

atmosphere. During construction, the Unit 2 duct opening had been isolated for

locking the dampers closed. If one of the outside air isolation dampers

Unit 1 had closed as the assumed single failure of an active component, no

source of outside air would be available to the control room (shared by both

Units) and the required pressure would not be maintained. Because the licensee

had removed chlorine gas sources from the site, the capability to isolate toxic

the

gases was no longer needed. Thus, the licensee deactivated and tagged open

outside air isolation dampers.

For all these problems, the licensee concluded that the defective conditions

would have been discovered earlier with an adequate failure modes and effects

analysis.

Beaver Valley 2:

On March 27, 1987, the permit holder determined that timers initiated by con- tainment isolation phase B signals were not served with uninterruptible powerto

as required. These timers are designed to actuate banks of compressed air

supply the control room emergency pressurization system one hour after receipt

of the isolation signal. They were powered from the respective fan control

circuit energized by an emergency ac distribution panel fed from an emergency

motor control center. Loss of offsite power would interrupt power to the motor

control center. If a loss of power occurred after timer initiation, the timers

would reset to the beginning of the timing cycle and would not begin the cycle

until power was restored to the emergency motor control center. The compressed

air would thus not be supplied after one hour. To enhance the reliability of

the safety systems, the licensee revised the circuitry to power the timers from

the Class lE 125-V dc battery system.

McGuire 1:

On November 5, 1987, the licensee discovered during an 18-month surveillance

test of the control area ventilation and chilled water system that control room

pressure was below the technical specification requirement. The licensee de- termined that the cause was leaking seals on seven control room doors. The

doors were designed to seal by seating against sealing strips in the door

frames. Although not visibly deteriorated, the sealing material apparently

had been deformed and compressed over time from normal use of the doors. The

licensee adjusted manual volume dampers to increase total train air flow and

the proportion of outside air flow to the maximum 60 percent allowed in the

IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 test procedure. This action was effective in

to meet the technical specification requirement.increasing control room pressure

tape around the seven doors and established a The licensee installed sealing

preventive maintenance program to

inspect the seals on all control room doors every

The licensee plans to determine an appropriate 6 months for a 1-year period.

nance of the door seals. The surveillance test frequency for preventive mainte- and chilled water system will also be repeated of the control area ventilation

every 6 months until sufficient

information is obtained for determining an appropriate

frequency.

Farley 1:

On June 5, 1987, the licensee discovered that

control room ventilation system would fully none of four fire dampers in the

close and latch with or without air

flow because they had not been exercised and/or

lubricated or, in one case, be- cause a latch was damaged. In addition, investigation

would not have received an actuation signal revealed that the dampers

from a Firestat set to sense 1600 F

in the control room ceiling because of installation

tributed the problems to three causes: a design errors. The licensee at- full closure and latching of the dampers, inadequatedeficiency pertaining to the

circuitry, and inadequate preventive maintenance testing of the actuation

of the dampers.

Discussion:

In addition to the above, the NRC has recently

ation, "Design and Operating Deficiencies in completed an engineering evalu- Systems," AEOD/E802, April 1988 based on recentControl Room Emergency Ventilation

failure vulnerabilities in control room emergencyevents that highlight single

NRC also has recently conducted a survey of controlventilation systems.* The

at 12 operating plants. Numerous discrepancies room habitability systems

and actual performance of these systems. For were found between the analyzed

design, construction, operation, and/or testing example, differences exist between

scriptions and analyses provided in licensing of these systems and the de- documents, as for example in the

assumptions used in the toxic gas and radiation

analyses assumptions have not always been consistentdose calculations. In addition, cation requirements. The NRC has issued several with technical specifi- to this subject (see Attachment '2). Resolution information notices related

Room Habitability is also ongoing. of Generic Issue 83: Control

  • A copy of the report is available in the NRC

Public

Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20555, for inspectionDocument Room, 1717 h

and copying.

IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the techni- cal contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate

regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Vern Hodge, NRR

(301) 492-1169 Charles R. Nichols, NRR

(301) 492-0854 Attachments:

1. Figure 1. Schematic Air Flow Path Diagram of Essential Control Room

Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning System (ECP HVAC) at Vogtle.

Assumed Containment Isolation Signal for Unit 1 with Train B Failed.

2. List of Information Notices Related to Control Room Habitability Systems

3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

I OUTSIDE

OUTSIDE;

L , AIR AIR% v vv

OUTSIDE AIR SUPPLY DUCT

(

(

cn c

FIGURE 1. SCHEMATIC AIR FLOW PATH DIAGRAM OF ESSENTIAL CONTROL ROOM HEATING, VENTILATING, AND LA CO 0~

AIR > o =

CONDITIONING SYSTEM (ECR HVAC) AT VOGTLE. ASSUMED CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL FOR -C

UNIT 1 WITH TRAIN B FAILED.

0C

03

Attachment 2 IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 LIST OF INFORMATION NOTICES

RELATED TO CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY SYSTEMS

NO. TITLE DATE

86-76 Problems Noted in Control Room August 28, 1986 Emergency Ventilation Systems

85-89 Potential Loss of Solid-State November 19, 1985 Instrumentation Following Failure

of Control Room Cooling

83-62 Failure of Redundant and Toxic Gas September 26, 1983 Detectors Positioned at Control Room

Ventilation Air Intakes

'-.dachment 3 IN 88-61 August 11. 4988 Page I of I

LIST OF RECENtLY ISSUED

NRCINFORMIATION NOTICES

InfTornation Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

88-60 Inadeouste Design and S/11B8 All holders of OLs

Installation of Watertight or CPsfor nuclear

Penetration Seals power reactors.

B8-04. Inadecuate Qualifitation 8/9/88 All holders of MLs

Supplerent I and Documentation of Fire or CPs for nuclear

Barrier Penetration Seals power reactors.

88-59 Kain Steam Isolation Valve 819/88 All holders of OLs

Guide Rail Failure at or CFs for nuclear

Waterford Unit 3 power reactors.

88-58 Potential Probiems with 8/8/E8 All holders of OLs

ASEABrown Boveri TE-S1L or CPs 'or nuclear

Time-COercurrent Pelays power oeactors.

88-57 Potential Loss of Safe 8/8/88 All holders of QLs

Shutccwn Eoulprent Due to or CFs for nuclear

Premature Siliccr Controllee power reactors.

Rectifier Failure

88-56 Potential Prcblems wtth 8/4/88 All holders of OLs

Siliccre Foam Fire Barrier or CFs 'or nuclear

Penetration Seals power reactors.

88-55 Potential Problems Caused 8/3/18 All holders of CIs

by Sirgle Failure of an or CPs for nuclear

Engineered Safety Feature power reactors.

Swing Bus

B8-54 Fajiure of Circuit Breaker 7/28/68 All holders of OLs

Following Installation of or CPs for nuclear

Amptector Direct Trip power reactors.

Attactrent

88-S- Licensee Violations of NRC 7/28es All manufacturers and

Reculations. Whicn Leo to distributcrs of radio- leoical Diagnostic ptarraceuticals for

misaoministrations huran use. nucledr

pharracies. ano

necical licensees.

OL

  • Doeratino License

-T

CP

  • Ccnstructicr. Permit

UNITED STATES FIRST CLASS MAIL

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION POSTAGE & FEES PAID

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 USNAC

P£RMIT Ne. S67 OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE. $300

IN 88-61 August 11, 1988 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the techni- cal contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate

regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Vern Hodge, NRR

(301) 492-1169 Charles R. Nichols, NRR

(301) 492-0854 Attachments:

1. Figure 1. Schematic Air Flow Path Diagram of Essential Control Room

Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning System (ECR HVAC) at Vogtle.

Assumed Containment Isolation Signal for Unit 1 with Train B Failed.

2. List of Information Notices Related to Control Room Habitability Systems

3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
  • C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR *PPMB:ARM

CHBerlinger TechEd

08/G /88 05/31/88 04/05/88

  • OGCB:DOEA:NRR *SPLB:DEST: NRR *A C SPLB:DEST:NRR *SAD/DEST:NRR *D/DEST:NRR

CVHodge CRNichols JWCraig AThadani LCShao

03/31/88 03/31/88 05/06/88 05/13/88 05/16/88

IN 88-XX

May xx, 1988 habitability systems at 12 operating plants. Numerous types of discrepancies

are described involving differences between (1) the design, construction, operation and/or testing of these systems and (2) corresponding technical

specifications when compared with the descriptions and analyses provided in

licensing basis documents, Including assumptions in the toxic gas and radiation

dose calculations.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Vern Hodge, NRR

(301) 492-1169 Charles R. Nichols, NRR

(301) 492-0854 Attachments:

1. Summaries of Recent Reports Concerning Control Room Habitability

2. Figure 1. Schematic Flow Path Diagram of Essential Control Room Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning System at Vogtle 1 and 2

3. List of References

4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

D/DOEA:NRR

C¢6 C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR *PPMB:ARM

CERoss i CHBerl inger TechEd

05/ /88 O/n-/88 04/05/88

  • OGCB:DOEA:NRR *SPLB:DEST:NRR *A/C/SPLB:DEST:NRR SAD/DEST:NyJSp D/DEST:N/I

CVHodge CRNichols JWCrai g AThadani Al LCShao

03/31/88 03/31/88 05/06/88 0 5 /y 8 8 05//88 A

IN 88-XX

May xx, 1988 control room habitability systems at 12 operating plants. Numerous types of

discrepancies are described between the design, construction, operation and

testing of these systems and corresponding technical specifications compared

with the descriptions and analyses provided in licensing basis documents, including assumptions in the toxic gas and radiation dose calculations. The

NRC plans to distribute the report to all holders of operating licenses or

construction permits for nuclear power reactors.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Vern Hodge, NRR

(301) 492-1169 Charles R. Nichols, NRR

(301) 492-0854 Attachments:

1. Summaries of Recent Reports Concerning Control Room Habitability

2. Figure 1. Schematic Flow Path Diagram of Essential Control Room Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning System at Vogtle 1 and 2

3. List of References

4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR *PPMB:ARM

CERoss i CHBerlinger TechEd

5/ /88 05/ /88 04/05/88

  • OGCB:DOEA:NRR *SPLB:DEST:NRR , /8PLB:DEST:NRR SAD/DEST:NRR D/DEST:NRR

CVHodge CRNichols {Craig AThadani LCShao

03/31/88 03/31/88 05/ /88 05/ /88

IN 88-XX

March xx, 1988 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Vern Hodge

(301) 492-1169 Charles R. Nichols, NRR

(301) 492-0854 Attachments:

1. Summaries of Recent Events Concerning Control Room Habitability

2. Figure 1. Schematic Flow Diagram of Control Room Essential Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning System at Vogtle 1 and 2

3. List of References

4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR PPMB:ARM

CERossi CHBerlinger TechEd

03/ /88 03/ /88 03/ /88 OGCB:DOEA:NRR SPLB:DEST:NRR A/C/SPLB:DEST:NRR SAD/DEST:NRR D/DEST:NRR

CVHodge CRNichols JWCraig AThadani LCShao

03/31/88 034X /88 03/ /88 03/ /88 03/ /88


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