ML17142A429

2016 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Initial Licensed Operator Examination Proposed SRO Written Examination

ML17142A429
Person / Time
Site:	Monticello
Issue date:	05/18/2017
From:	David Reeser NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB
To:	NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB
Shared Package
ML15274A423	List: ML17142A415 ML17142A423 ML17142A425 ML17142A427 ML17142A429 ML17142A430 ML17156A043 ML17156A045
References
Download: ML17142A429 (74)

Text

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question 76 Points: 1.0 The plant was at rated conditions when a transient occurred that required a manual reactor scram. All control rods are fully inserted and plant conditions have been stabilized.

The OATC announced receipt of annunciator: 5-A-4 (SRM DOWNSCALE).

The OATC reported SRM indications as follows:

Channel 21 Channel 22 Channel 23 Channel 24 8 cps 7 cps 4 cps 6 cps Given the above reports and indications, which one of the following describes the recommended action(s)?

A. BYPASS SRM 23 then initiate a work order for SRM Channel 23.

B. Enter and initiate the actions of C.4-B.09.13.B (LOSS OF Y-20).

C. Enter and initiate the actions of C.4-B.09.11.A (LOSS OF A 24 VDC BUS).

D. Insert the SRM and IRM detectors per C.4-A Part A (REACTOR SCRAM).

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 1 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 76 Answer Explanation Proposed Answer: D DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect: Not required unless detectors are already driven in B. Incorrect: Drive power is on therefore Y-20 Ckt 5 is available C. Incorrect: These are not indications of a loss of detector power, lights are illuminated on the panel D. Correct: Step 9 of PART A of C.4-A directs the OATC to select drive in on the SRM-IRM detector drive control (on the SRM/IRM panel) to allow the detectors to be driven in. The detectors need to be in the core to more accurately monitor reactor power.

Question Background Tier: 1 Group: 1 K/A: (295006 SCRAM / 1) AA2.01 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to SCRAM: (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) Reactor power Importance Rating: 4.6 10 CFR Part 55: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13 10 CFR 55.43.b: 5 K/A Match: K/A is matched by testing the applicants ability to determine reactor power after a SCRAM has occurred and interpret what steps should be taken to get a better understanding of reactor power SRO Justification: involves both 1) assessing plant conditions (normal, abnormal, or emergency) and then 2) selecting a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate, recover, or with which to proceed Technical

References:

C.4-A, ARP 5-A-4, and M-8114L-001 Proposed references to be provided: Photo that was included in Question 77 of the 2009 Audit Exam (included above)

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 2 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 76 Learning Objective:

Cognitive Level: Higher X Lower _

Question Source: New _

Modified Bank _

Bank X Question History: Question 77 of 2009 Audit Exam Comments: Question modified slightly, but essentially the same question.

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 3 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question 77 Points: 1.0 The plant was operating at rated conditions when an event occurred that required IMMEDIATE Control Room evacuation IAW C.4-C (SHUTDOWN OUTSIDE CONTROL ROOM). Fifteen minutes after abandoning the Main Control Room, operators at the alternate shutdown panel are still attempting to stabilize plant conditions.

For the above conditions; which of the following describes: (1) the control board manipulations required to be taken prior to leaving the control room; and (2) the emergency classification for the event.

A. (1) Depress the manual scram pushbuttons and leave the Rx Mode Switch in RUN (2) declare an ALERT B. (1) Depress the manual scram pushbuttons and leave the Rx Mode Switch in RUN (2) declare a SITE AREA EMERGENCY C. (1) Depress the manual scram pushbuttons and place the Rx Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN, (2) declare an ALERT D. (1) Depress the manual scram pushbuttons and place the Rx Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN, (2) declare a SITE AREA EMERGENCY Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 4 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 77 Answer Explanation Answer B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS C-4-C states: IF immediate Control Room evacuation is required, THEN: Manually Scram the Reactor, Leave the mode switch in RUN, Obtain the ASDS keyset from the Shift Supervisors Office key cabinet, Proceed to the ASDS Panel on the 3rd floor of EFT Building.

Leaving the Mode Switch in Shutdown is plausible as this is done for all other scrams. However, this procedure requires it to be left in RUN.

Entry into C.4-C, Shutdown Outside the Control Room, for Control Room evacuation would require declaration of and ALERT but given that 15 minutes have elapsed and control has not been established at the alternate shutdown panel this inability to establish plant control from outside the Control Room will escalate this event to a SITE AREA EMERGENCY.

A. Incorrect, plausible but wrong EAL selection B. Correct C. Incorrect, plausible but wrong mode switch position and EAL selection D. Incorrect, plausible but wrong mode switch position Question Background Tier: 1 Group: 1 K/A: 295016 Control Room Abandonment 2.4.30 Knowledge of events related to system operation/status that must be reported to internal organizations or external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission system operator.

Importance Rating: 4.1 10 CFR Part 55: 41.10 10 CFR 55.43.b: 1, 5 Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 5 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 77 K/A Match: The KA is matched by having the applicant evaluate the actions to take prior to exiting the control room and classification of the event.

SRO Justification: Abnormal action determination and EAL declaration Technical

References:

Ops Man C.4-C A.2-101, Classification of Emergencies Proposed references to be provided: Form 5790-101-02, MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL MATRIX Learning Objective:

Cognitive Level: Higher X Lower _

Question Source: New _

Modified Bank X Bank _

Question History: 2010 MNGP ILT NRC Written Exam Q6, significantly modified to SRO level Comments:

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 6 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question 78 Points: 1.0 A plant cooldown is in progress using B RHR with #12 Reactor Recirculation pump in service. Given the following:

• At 1500: RPV pressure is 15 psig and steady

• At 1501: 16 Bus receives a lockout due to a bus fault

• At 1601: RPV pressure is 125 psig and rising slowly Which of the following represents the MINIMUM, Technical Specification REQUIRED ACTIONS, which must be performed for this event (Assume: loss of safety function does NOT exist)?

A. (1) LCO 3.4.7 REQUIRED ACTIONS A.1, A.2, AND A.3 (2) LCO 3.8.4 REQUIRED ACTIONS A.1, A.2, AND A.3 (3) LCO 3.8.7 REQUIRED ACTION A.1 B. (1) LCO 3.4.8 REQUIRED ACTION A.1 (2) LCO 3.4.9 REQUIRED ACTIONS A.1 AND A.2 (3) LCO 3.8.8 REQUIRED ACTION A.1 AND A.2 C. (1) LCO 3.4.9 REQUIRED ACTIONS A.1 AND A.2 (2) LCO 3.8.4 REQUIRED ACTIONS A.1, A.2, AND A.3 (3) LCO 3.8.7 REQUIRED ACTION A.1 D. (1) LCO 3.8.1 REQUIRED ACTIONS A.1, A.2, AND A.3 (2) LCO 3.8.4 REQUIRED ACTIONS A.1, A.2, AND A.3 (3) LCO 3.8.7 REQUIRED ACTION A.1 Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 7 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 78 ANSWER EXPLANATION Proposed Answer: C DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect: IAW LCO 3.0.6, LCO 3.4.7 Condition A is entered but the required actions are NOT require to be performed. Additionally, the allowable plat heat up rate is being exceeded (103F/hr) which requires entry into LCO 3.4.9 A also.

B. Incorrect: Plausibly correct if Mode 4 is used.

C. Correct: Allowed plant heat up is being exceeded (103F/hr) which requires entry into LCO 3.4.9 A. LCO 3.8.7 Condition A is entered due to the lockout of Bus 16, and Condition A also directs entry in LCO 3.8.4 Condition A D. LCO 3.8.1 is still being met, therefore no actions are require to be taken for this LCO.

Plausible if examinee believes that offsite sources are also inoperable due to the bus lockout. Additionally, the allowable plat heat up rate is being exceeded (103F/hr) which requires entry into LCO 3.4.9 A also.

QUESTION BACKGROUND Tier: 1 Group: 1 K/A: (295021 Loss of Shutdown Cooling / 4) 2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Importance Rating: 4.6 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12 10 CFR 55.43.b: 2 K/A Match: K/A is matched by testing the applicants ability to interpret and execute the technical specifications related to the present conditions, specifically the loss of SDC SRO Justification: Facility operating limitations in the TS and their bases Technical

References:

TS 3.0.4, 3.0.6, 3.4.9, 3.8.7, Steam Tables, and MT-OPS-ITS-002L Proposed references to be provided: TS 3.0, 3.4.7, 3.4.8, 3.4.9, 3.8.7, 3.8.8, and Steam Tables Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 8 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 78 Learning Objective:

Cognitive Level: Higher X Lower _

Question Source: New _

Modified Bank _

Bank X Question History: Question 79 of 2009 MNGP Audit exam Comments:

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 9 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question 79 Points: 1.0 A Loss of Coolant Accident has occurred and the following conditions are present:

• Drywell pressure is 32 psig and rising

• Drywell Temperature is 282° F and rising

• RPV pressure is 800 psig and lowering

• RPV water level is -50 inches and rising

• Torus water level is 2 feet and rising

• 16 Bus is locked out

• RHR is lined up for LPCI injection

• The Drywell Cooling Fan switches are in OFF

• The Recirc Pumps are tripped As the CRS, which of the following is the next action to be directed based on the above information?

A. Lower Torus level B. Initiate Drywell Sprays C. Initiate a Blowdown due to exceeding 281°F in the Drywell D. Initiate a Blowdown due to exceeding Pressure Suppression Pressure Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 10 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 79 Answer Explanation Answer B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS Initial operator actions must be taken to place drywell sprays in service, Torus sprays may already be in service, the decision as to whether or not conditions can stay within the PSP or D/W temp can be restored should not be made until drywell sprays are placed in service and an evaluation can be made as to the expected response.

A. Incorrect, as the flow chart steps must be prioritized and torus level cannot be lowered quickly because MO-2032 (MCC-142) does not have power.

B. Correct C. Incorrect, as the ability to restore and maintain cannot be evaluated prior to initiating sprays. Additionally Blowdown is not required until it is determined that DW Temperate cannot be restored and maintained below 338°F.

D. Incorrect, as the ability to maintain below the limit cannot be evaluated prior to initiating sprays.

Question Pedigree Tier: 1 Group: 1 K/A: 295024 High Drywell Pressure EA2.01 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE: Drywell pressure.

Importance Rating: 4.2 10 CFR Part 55: 41.10 10 CFR 55.43.b: 5 Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 11 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 79 K/A Match: The KA is matched by having the applicant evaluate the plant conditions and select a proper action during accident conditions.

SRO Justification: The SRO must have detailed knowledge of actions required by the EOP flowchart, based on given conditions, the action required to be performed is above the RO knowledge level.

Technical

References:

C.5-1100 and C.5-1200 Proposed references to be provided: C.5-1100 and 1200 with entry conditions blanked out.

Learning Objective:

Cognitive Level: Higher X Lower _

Question Source: New _

Modified Bank _

Bank X Question History: MNGP bank 1972 Comments:

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 12 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question 80 Points: 1.0 A loss of off-site power occurred resulting in the following plant conditions:

• Drywell pressure is 2.0 psig and slowly rising

• Drywell temperature is 150F and increasing

• RPV water level is 55 inches and stable

• RPV pressure is 500 psig and slowly rising

• Suppression pool temperature is 100F and stable

• Suppression pool level is 2.4 inches and stable Given the above conditions, select the mitigating strategy from the below list, that will have the most immediate effect towards mitigating the event.

A. Start Torus Sprays.

B. Start Drywell Sprays.

C. Depressurize the RPV.

D. Start all available drywell cooling.

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 13 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 80 Answer Explanation Proposed Answer: B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A loss of off-site power will result in a reactor trip (manual or automatic depending on timing), loss of both Recirc Pumps, Loss of Circ Water/Vacuum and Main Turbine trip, loss of normal feed, and loss of Drywell Cooling. SRVs will likely cycle but will shut once HPCI and RCIC inject and knock down pressure. HPCI and RCIC will trip/shutdown on high RPV water level and RPV level will likely rise due to heating then stabilize until RPV pressure or operator action is taken to reopen SRVs.

A. Incorrect; required by Containment Control EOP before DW pressure reaches 12 psig, but Drywell pressure increase is simply due to loss of cooling and therefore spraying the Torus would have a negligible effect.

B. Incorrect; required only if unable to maintain DW pressure below 12 psig by other mitigating methods (e.g., restoring DW cooling).

C. Incorrect; depressurizing the RPV would add heat to the suppression pool (condenser is not available) and therefore the Drywell. Cooling of the suppression pool would have a delayed effect.

D. Correct; Restoring DW cooling would have an immediate effect.

Question Background Tier: 1 Group: 1 K/A: (295028 High Drywell Temperature / 5) EA2.01 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to HIGH DRYWELL TEMPERATURE: (CFR: 41.10 /

43.5 / 45.13) Drywell temperature Importance Rating: 4.1*

10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13 10 CFR 55.43.b: 5 K/A Match: K/A is matched by testing the applicants ability to interpret the drywell temperature as a high drywell temperature and EOP-entry condition; the applicant must demonstrate ability to distinguish this from other potential EOP parameters.

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 14 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 80 SRO Justification: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Technical

References:

Proposed references to be provided: None Learning Objective:

Cognitive Level: Higher X Lower _

Question Source: New X Modified Bank _

Bank _

Question History:

Comments:

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 15 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question 81 Points: 1.0 Given the following plant conditions:

• The unit is operating at rated power

• 4-B-4, SUPPRESSION WATER LEVEL HI/LOW is received

• LI-2996 is reading -0.5 and lowering Which one of the following completes the statements below?

The conditions assumed for suppression pool water level in the safety analyses __(1)__.

If water level were to lower until the downcomer lines were uncovered __(2)__ would be lost.

A. (1) are met (2) pressure suppression function B. (1) are met (2) Torus cooling capability C. (1) are NOT met (2) pressure suppression function D. (1) are NOT met (2) Torus cooling capability Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 16 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 81 Answer Explanation Answer C DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS The suppression pool volume ranges between 68,000 ft3 at the low water level limit of - 4.0 inches and 72,910 ft3 at the high water level limit of + 3.0 inches. Suppression pool water level must be maintained within the limits specified so that the safety analysis remains valid.

With suppression pool water level outside the limits, the conditions assumed for the safety analyses are not met. If water level is below the minimum level, the pressure suppression function still exists as long as downcomer lines are covered; HPCI and RCIC turbine exhausts are covered, and S/RV quenchers are covered. If suppression pool water level is above the maximum level, protection against overpressurization still exists due to the margin in the peak containment pressure analysis and the capability of the Drywell Spray System.

A. Incorrect, plausible but wrong if the applicant evaluates the alarm condition and level and concludes that the level is within the T.S. limits.

B. Incorrect, plausible but wrong if the applicant evaluates the alarm condition and level and concludes that the level is within the T.S. limits and does not recognize that at the normal flow rates associated with one loop of pool cooling that vortex limits are not exceeded until Torus level drops to -4.5 feet (approximately a foot below the bottom of the downcomer lines.

C. Correct D. Incorrect, plausible but wrong if the applicant does not recognize that at the normal flow rates associated with one loop of pool cooling that vortex limits are not exceeded until Torus level drops to -4.5 feet (approximately a foot below the bottom of the downcomer lines.

Question Background Tier: 1 Group: 1 K/A: 295030 Low Suppression Pool Wtr Lvl 2.4.31 Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures.

Importance Rating: 4.1 10 CFR Part 55: 41.10 10 CFR 55.43.b: 2 Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 17 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 81 K/A Match: The KA is matched by having the applicant evaluate an alarm condition and plant indications and apply this information to determine the potential impact on safety analyses SRO Justification: This is an SRO level question because the candidate must have knowledge of TS bases and is beyond above the line knowledge Technical

References:

C.6-004-B-04 Technical Specifications and Bases Proposed references to be provided: None Learning Objective: M-8107L-044, LO 10b Cognitive Level: Higher X Lower _

Question Source: New X Modified Bank _

Bank _

Question History:

Comments:

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 18 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question 82 Points: 1.0 The plant is in a refueling outage with the following conditions present:

• The RPV head is removed

• RPV water level is two-feet (2) above the reactor vessel flange

• 1027 elevation radiation levels are 2 mrem/hr

• Secondary containment is NOT established A leak occurs in the East Shutdown Cooling room thats confirmed by the Reactor Building Operator and plant conditions changed as follows:

• RPV water level lowered BY 224 inches

• 1027 elevation radiation levels rises to 18 mrem/hr

• 12 minutes after the start of the leak, it was isolated and RPV water level was restored to the flange Given the above information, Figure 28 from Operation Manual B.01.01-06 [following page], and the provided Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Emergency Action Level Matrix; Which of the following E-plan classifications, if any, should be declared?

A. Notification of Unusual Event B. Alert C. Site Area Emergency D. No Classification required Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 19 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 82 Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 20 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 82 Answer Explanation Proposed Answer: A DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Correct: The plant is in Mode 5 and a VALID water level lowering is observed. Reactor water level lowers by 224 resulting in indicated water level reading of approximately -25 (applicant must view Figure 28 below, note an original level of approximately 655+2=679, then subtract 224 from that to arrive at 455, which is approximately 25 above the Low-Low Level trip (-47) = -22. An UNPLANNED VALID Area Radiation Monitor rises as indicated by the 1027 elevation rad monitors (however, the rise is not enough to trip an alarm or in an area where continuous occupancy is required). These observations would meet the requirement of RU2.1 in the EAL Matrix.

B. Incorrect: radiation levels on the 1027 elevation would have to reach the alarm setpoint of 20 mrem to meet the requirements of RA2.1, in this case the rad monitors stay <20 mrem at 18mrem.

C. Incorrect: Plausible as secondary containment is NOT established however water level has not gone below - 53 in order to meet CS2.1.

D. Incorrect: Plausible if Hot EALs are used or if CU2.1 is used and less than 15 minutes is not recognized.

Question Background Tier: 1 Group: 1 K/A: (295031 Reactor Low Water Level / 2) EA2.01 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to REACTOR LOW WATER LEVEL: (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 /

45.13) Reactor water level Importance Rating: 4.6*

10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13 10 CFR 55.43.b: 5 K/A Match: K/A is matched by testing the applicants ability to interpret the water level decrease and its application to a low water level reading, then use that information to apply it to a EAL classification SRO Justification: E-Plan EAL Determination Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 21 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 82 Technical

References:

Ops Man B.01.01-06 Figure 28, E-Plan EAL Matrix, and M-8107L-028 (Reactor Vessel And Assembly) Rev. 15 Proposed references to be provided: Ops Man B.01.01-06 Figure 28 and E-Plan EAL Matrix Learning Objective:

Cognitive Level: Higher X Lower _

Question Source: New _

Modified Bank _

Bank X Question History: Question 80 2010 MNGP ILT and Question 79 of 2009 MNGP ILT - with minor editorial changes and a change to the duration the water level is below the flange (from 14 mins to 12 mins) so there is more margin from the EAL threshold Comments:

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 22 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question 83 Points: 1.0 A transient occurred resulting in the following conditions:

• Drywell pressure is 58 psig and slowly rising

• Torus water level is 10 ft. and steady

• Drywell temperature is 320°F and slowly rising

• Drywell radiation is 10 R/hr and slowly rising, significant fuel damage is anticipated

• Attempts to spray the drywell have been unsuccessful You have determined that it is necessary to vent the Primary Containment in accordance with C.5-3505, Venting Primary Containment.

Given the above information, which one of the following choices identifies: (1) the recommended vent path; and (2) the desired strategy for controlling Primary Containment pressure?

A. (1) SBGT through the 18 inch torus vent (C.5-3505 PART C)

(2) Venting should be limited to ONLY the volume required to maintain pressure below the DW pressure limit B. (1) SBGT through the 18 inch torus vent ((C.5-3505 PART C)

(2) Venting may be extended, provided Drywell pressure remains positive, ECCS NPSH margins are maintained, radioactive release rates remain relatively unchanged.

C. (1) Hard Pipe Vent (C.5-3505 PART A)

(2) Venting should be limited to ONLY the volume required to maintain pressure below the DW pressure limit D. (1) Hard Pipe Vent (C.5-3505 PART A)

(2) Venting may be extended, provided Drywell pressure remains positive, ECCS NPSH margins are maintained, radioactive release rates remain relatively unchanged.

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 23 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 83 Answer Explanation Answer D DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS The preferred method for venting Primary Containment is through the Torus and SBGT so that the discharge will be filtered, scrubbed and elevated. However, if SBGT ductwork is in jeopardy of rupturing due to high pressure in containment, >2.9 psig, then the Hard Pipe Vent should be used to minimize potential impacts on Reactor Building equipment from postulated ductwork failure.

Early or extended Primary Containment pressure reduction to limit radioactivity release may be appropriate if: Significant fuel damage is anticipated. Reducing primary containment pressure while the primary containment atmosphere is still relatively clean increases the capacity of the containment to retain fission products. Later releases, after core damage has progressed, may thereby be avoided.

A. (1) Incorrect, due to potential to impacts on reactor building equipment (2) Incorrect, plausible as in general pressure should only be reduced to maintain below the DW pressure limit, but with significant fuel damage anticipated early or extended releases increase the capacity of containment to retain fission products.

B. (1) Incorrect, see A (1)

(2) Correct C. (1) Correct (2) Incorrect, see A (2)

D. (1) Correct (2) Correct Question Background Tier: 1 Group: 2 K/A: 295010 High Drywell Pressure AA2.03 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE : Drywell radiation levels...

Importance Rating: 3.6 Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 24 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 83 10 CFR Part 55: 41.10 10 CFR 55.43.b: 5 K/A Match: This question satisfies the K/A statement by asking the applicant to determine which procedure part to use to vent containment based on anticipated fuel damage and that extended venting is warrented SRO Justification: The SRO must have detailed knowledge of procedure parts to determine which vent path is appropriate for the given conditions, this level of procedure knowledge is above the RO knowledge level.

Technical

References:

C.5-3505 C.5-1200 C.5.1-1200 Proposed references to be provided: None Learning Objective:

Cognitive Level: Higher X Lower _

Question Source: New X Modified Bank _

Bank _

Question History:

Comments:

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 25 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question 84 Points: 1.0 A Reactor startup, from cold shutdown, is in progress with the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) out of service (bypassed). A second licensed operator is present at C-05 to verify the movement of control rods. Reactor Power is currently at 5 x 103 cps on the SRMs.

Due to an administrative error with the Reactivity Maneuvering Steps, several Control Rods have been withdrawn that are inconsistent with the Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence (BPWS).

If a control rod drop accident (CRDA) were to occur under these conditions, which one of the below answer choices correctly completes the following two statements?

Receipt of alarm (1) will indicate termination of the power excursion resulting from the CRDA.

Termination of the power excursion (2) ensure that significant fuel damage is prevented.

A. (1) IRM HI HI/INOP (2) WILL B. (1) IRM HI HI/INOP (2) WILL NOT C. (1) APRM UPSC/INOP TRIP (2) WILL D. (1) APRM UPSC/INOP TRIP (2) WILL NOT Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 26 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 84 ANSWER EXPLANATION Proposed Answer: B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS The power transient will be terminated when sufficient negative reactivity is added to compensate for the positive reactivity added by the dropped rod. The Doppler reactivity coefficient will initially act to limit the power rise, but control rod insertion is necessary to shut down the reactor.

A. Incorrect; the IRM HI HI/INOP scram will terminate the power excursion, but because the BPWS sequence rules were not followed there is no assurance the significant fuel damage will not occur.

B. Correct; IRM HI will generate a control rod withdrawal block only. Because the BPWS sequence rules were not followed there is no assurance the significant fuel damage will not occur.

C. Incorrect; since the initial power level is in the Source Range the IRM HI HI/INOP scram will terminate the power excursion before the APRM UPSC trip. If power starts out in the upper ranges of the IRM where there may be significant overlap with the APRMs, the APRM UPSC trip may terminated the power excursion before the IRM HI HI trip. Additionally, because the BPWS sequence rules were not followed there is no assurance the significant fuel damage will not occur.

D. Incorrect; see C QUESTION BACKGROUND Tier: 1 Group: 2 K/A: (295014 Inadvertent Reactivity Addition / 1) 2.4.46 Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant conditions. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.12)

Importance Rating: 4.2 10 CFR Part 55: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.12 10 CFR 55.43.b: 2 Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 27 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 84 K/A Match: K/A is matched by testing the applicants ability to verify that the inadvertent reactivity addition (rod drop accident) leads to consistent alarms. The applicant must understand the current situation and make the determination of what alarms would be expected if a rod drop accident were to occur, given the RWM is INOP thus a larger reliance on the operators observations.

SRO Justification: Knowledge of USAR CRDA and/or TS bases are required to select the correct answer.

Technical

References:

Monticello USAR Section 14.7.1; TS BASES; Ops Man B.05.02-05.G.2, B.05.01.02-03, C.1, ARP 5-A-13; M-8107L-001 (Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM)) Rev. 12 Proposed references to be provided: None Learning Objective: 7.a of M-8107L-001 (Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM)) Rev. 12 Cognitive Level: Higher X Lower _

Question Source: New X Modified Bank _

Bank _

Question History: Used Question 83 from MNGP 2009 ILT as starting point - significantly changed; distractors were rewritten to include annunciator alarms Comments: Question 83 of MNGP 2009 ILT pertained to thermal limits and was an SRO-only question, so with the addition of annunciator alarms this question seems to satisfy SRO-only requirements.

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 28 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question 85 Points: 1.0 The plant was operating at rated power when a seismic event occurred.

The following conditions exist:

• RPV water level is -100 and slowly lowering

• RPV pressure is 600 psig and slowly lowering

• HPCI is injecting at rated flow

• Both trains of Drywell Sprays are in operation.

• Torus level is +3 and stable

• CST level is +3 and stable Given the above conditions, which one of the following Torus Level mitigating actions is currently required to be implemented by in accordance with C.5-1200, Primary Containment Control?

A. Stop RPV injection from the HPCI system B. Drain Torus Water to Radwaste C. Perform Emergency RPV Depressurization D. Stop Drywell Sprays and prepare to vent the RPV Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 29 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 85 Answer Explanation Answer B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS When the HPCI System is initiated, the pump suction is automatically taken from the condensate storage tank and can be manually or automatically transferred to the suppression pool. The system is initially aligned to take suction from the condensate storage tanks; a preferred source because of improved water quality. The lineup permits faster Reactor restarts following non-accident injections into the reactor vessel. The pump suction will automatically transfer to the suppression pool when the level in the condensate storage tank (as measured from tank bottom) drops below 2-8 in either tank, or if the water in the suppression pool rises 2 above the normal level.

Restore and maintain torus level below +3.0 inches Efforts to restore torus water level to the normal band should be continued while the need for further action is evaluated. Procedure C.5-3402 (DRAINING TORUS WATER TO RADWASTE) provides instructions for reducing torus water level by transferring water to Radwaste through RHR. If torus water level cannot be restored and maintained below 3.7 feet, a blowdown will ultimately be required.

A. Incorrect; Torus level has exceeded the swap over level to align the HPCI suction to the torus, therefore HPCI is no longer taking suction from a source outside the Containment.

B. Correct; Torus water level is above 3 but is relatively stable at 3 and being maintained below 3.7.

C. Incorrect; Torus water level is currently being maintained below 3.7, therefore Blowdown in not required.

D. Incorrect; Torus water level currently being maintained at approximately 3, therefore level is well below the threshold (4.2) for the specified action.

Question Background Tier: 1 Group: 2 K/A: 295029 High Suppression Pool Wtr Lvl EA2.01 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to HIGH SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL : Suppression pool water level...

Importance Rating: 3.9 10 CFR Part 55: 41.10 10 CFR 55.43.b: 5 Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 30 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 85 K/A Match: The applicant is given plant conditions where based on high torus water level auto swap over of HPCI has occurred and operators are required to use EOPs to mitigate the high level event.

SRO Justification: The SRO must have detailed procedure knowledge to select the appropriate procedure to address high suppression pool water level.

Technical

References:

C.5.1-1200 B.03.02-01 C.5-3402 Proposed references to be provided: None Learning Objective:

Cognitive Level: Higher X Lower _

Question Source: New X Modified Bank _

Bank _

Question History:

Comments:

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 31 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question 86 Points: 1.0 The plant has been operating at rated conditions for several months.

On July 6th at 0900 it is discovered that SR 3.5.1.1, with a required frequency of 31 days, has NOT been completed since June 2th at 0800 for the A RHR/LPCI injection subsystem.

Given only the above statement, when is the LATEST the surveillance can be completed for the system status to remain in compliance with Technical Specifications? (Technical Specification Section 3.0 is provided.)

A. July 7th at 0900 B. July 11th at 0200 C. August 6th at 0900 D. August 14th at 0200 Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 32 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 86 ANSWER EXPLANATION Proposed Answer: B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A and C are incorrect: plausible due to incorrect application of SR 3.0.3: A is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after discovery and C is 31 days after discovery (these options would be permitted assuming the applicant believed the surveillance was not completed within the specified frequency), but as of July 6th at 0900 it is still within the specified frequency time (with application of the SR 3.0.2 grace period).

D is incorrect: plausible for incorrect combination of SR 3.0.2 and 3.0.3 B is correct: As the conditions state, it has been 34 days since the last successful completion of SR 3.5.1.1. SR 3.5.1.1 has 31 day frequency; however, with the SR 3.0.2 grace period, the required completion date is extended 7.75 days. As such, the surveillance must be completed by 0200 on July 11th.

QUESTION BACKGROUND Tier: 2 Group: 1 K/A: (203000 RHR/LPCI: Injection Mode) 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

Importance Rating: 4.1 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 41.10 / 45.13 10 CFR 55.43.b: 2 K/A Match: K/A is matched by testing the applicants knowledge of the surveillance procedures, specifically the SR 3.0 section and its application to TS 3.5.1 (RHR/LPCI injection)

SRO Justification: Facility operating limitations in the TS and their bases; Application of generic Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) requirements (LCO 3.0.1 thru 3.0.7; SR 3.0.1 thru 3.0.4)

Technical

References:

SR 3.0.2, SR 3.0.3, TS 3.5.1, and M-8107L-023 (RHR System) Rev. 20 Proposed references to be provided: SR 3.0.1 thru SR 3.0.4 Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 33 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 86 Learning Objective:

Cognitive Level: Higher X Lower _

Question Source: New _

Modified Bank X Bank _

Question History: Used Question 96 from 2013 MNGP ILT and Question 2073 from Exam BANK as the starting point but question is significantly modified from those and likely considered NEW Comments: Distractor D is relatively weak; another date could be listed and considered plausible due to applicants miscalculation and/or incorrect use of TS 3.5.1 Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 34 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question 87 Points: 1.0 Given the following plant conditions:

• The plant is operating at 100% power

• At 1215 on November 1st, the 11 core spray pump tripped while being run for quarterly testing, the control switch was placed in PULL-TO-LOCK

• At 2300 on November 3rd, the 12 core spray pump becomes INOPERABLE

• At 0115 on November 4th, the 11 core spray pump was declared OPERABLE Including any extensions that are permitted by technical specifications and using references provided, which ONE of the following describes the LATEST time and date the unit must be placed in mode 3 if the 12 core spray pump remains INOPERABLE? [Reference provided T.S. 3.5.1]

A. 1215 on November 8th B. 1215 on November 9th C. 2300 on November 10th D. 2300 on November 11th Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 35 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 87 ANSWER EXPLANATION Answer B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect, Refer to correct answer explanation. This answer is plausible if the pumps were associated with the same train in which case the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> extension time would not be applicable.

B. Correct. In accordance with Section 1 of TS (use and application), when a subsequent train, subsystem, or component expressed in the condition is discovered inoperable or not within limits, the completion time may be extended provided two criteria are met: the subsequent inoperability must exist concurrent with the first inoperability and must remain inoperable or not within limits after the first inoperability is resolved. In this case the more limiting time must be used.

C. Incorrect, This time corresponds with the second inoperability which is the less restrictive time and therefore cannot be used D. Incorrect, This time corresponds with the second inoperability plus the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> extension, which is another improper application.

QUESTION BACKGROUND Tier: 2 Group: 1 K/A: 209001 LPCS A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Pump trips Importance Rating: 3.4 10 CFR Part 55: 41.5 10 CFR 55.43.b: 2 K/A Match: This question satisfies the K/A statement by asking the applicant to use T.S. and determine the required time to be in mode 3 based on equipment availability.

SRO Justification: Technical Specification application of required actions in accordance with the rules of application requirements (section 1)

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 36 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 87 Technical

References:

T.S. 3.5.1, T.S. rules of application requirements section 1 Proposed references to be provided: T.S. Section 1.0, USE AND APPLICATION T.S. Section 3.5.1, EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM (RCIC), pages 3.5.1-1 to 3.5.1-4 Learning Objective: M-8107L-005 LO 9, 10b Cognitive Level: Higher X Lower Question Source: New X Modified Bank _

Bank _

Question History:

Comments:

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 37 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question 88 Points: 1.0 The plant is in MODE 3 making preparations for a reactor re-start. All required surveillances are complete for entry into Mode 2. Given the following events:

• During the plant shutdown, IRM Channel 15 was bypassed due to output failing to zero.

• Just moments ago, it was determined that the range switch for IRM Channel 17 was malfunctioning.

Choosing from the following list:

1. Repair/Replace the malfunctioning range switch.

2. Place IRM Channel 17 in the trip condition

3. Manually insert a half scram on RPS Channel A

4. Manually insert a half scram on RPS Channel B What action(s) will allow the Mode switch to be placed in STARTUP/HOT STANDBY.

A. 1 ONLY B. 1 OR 2 ONLY C. 1 OR 2 OR 3 ONLY D. 1 OR 2 OR 4 ONLY Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 38 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 88 Answer Explanation Proposed Answer: D DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Is incorrect: will permit mode switch, BUT 2 and 4 are also allowed B. is incorrect: will permit mode switch, BUT 4 is also allowed.

C. is incorrect: 3 is not allowed because IRM 15 and IRM 17 are associated with RPS CH B D. is correct: There are 8 IRM channels, 4 in each RPS channel. Per TS 3.3.1.1, 3 IRM channel are required per channel, so given the above conditions that 2 channels within a RPS channel are INOP this LCO is NOT met, thus Condition A must be entered. A Range Switch is in each IRM channel and it allows the operator to follow power when in the IRM range. Switching the range switch upscale too early or too far will result in a downscale trip and rod block. Switching upscale too late or inadvertently switching downscale may result in Hi-Hi scram trip. With a faulty range switch, it must be addressed with actions other than a bypass (if the IRM is bypassed, the range switch must be ranged up to allow bypassing the SRM interlocks). If the Range switch is faulty, no matter high or low, it must be addressed before moving up in Mode. 1, 2, & 4 will all allow indefinite operation per LCO 3.0.4.a.

Question Background Tier: 2 Group: 1 K/A: (215003 IRM) A2.06 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the INTERMEDIATE RANGE MONITOR (IRM) SYSTEM ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6) Faulty range switch Importance Rating: 3.2 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 41.5 / 45.6 10 CFR 55.43.b: 2 (Facility operating limitations in the TS and their bases)

K/A Match: K/A is matched by testing the applicants ability to predict the impacts a faulty range switch will have on the IRM system and based on those impacts determine whether a mode switch is permitted in accordance with LCO 3.0.4 SRO Justification: Application of generic Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) requirements (LCO 3.0.1 thru 3.0.7)

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 39 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 88 Technical

References:

TS 3.3.1.1, LCO 3.0.4a, and B.05.01.01-01, -02, and -05 Proposed references to be provided: TS 3.3.1.1 and LCO 3.0.4a Learning Objective:

Cognitive Level: Higher X Lower _

Question Source: New _

Modified Bank _

Bank X Question History: Question 87 of 2009 MNGP AUDIT Written Exam - slightly modified question stem to explicitly incorporate faulty range switch Comments: There are relatively easy modification that can be made to this question in order to declare it significantly modified (e.g., changing the IRM channels that are INOP, making bypass an option, etc.).

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 40 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question 89 Points: 1.0 A plant startup, following a refueling outage was being performed IAW procedure 2167 [Plant Startup]. At 0400, conditions were established with RPV pressure being controlled at 150 psig on the MPR and one Turbine Bypass Valve approximately 80% open, to support HPCI, RCIC and SRV testing.

HPCI and SRV testing was completed satisfactorily.

During the surveillance test, the maximum flow rate that could be achieved by the RCIC pump was 350 gpm. Select the statement below that correctly implements the requirements of Technical Specification LCO 3.5.3 RCIC System. Refer to the attached copy of TS LCO 3.5.3.

A. RPV pressure must be maintained 150 psig, and the Reactor Mode switch must be placed in SHUTDOWN before 1600.

B. The RCIC system must be capable of meeting the requirements of SR 3.5.3.3 before 1600, or the plant must be shutdown. Until then, plant heat-up and pressurization beyond 165 psig is prohibited.

C. Plant heat-up and pressurization to 920 psig may continue since the HPCI system testing was completed satisfactorily, but entry into MODE 1 is prohibited until the RCIC system is capable of meeting the requirements of SR 3.5.3.2.

D. Plant heat-up and pressurization to 920 psig may continue, and entry into MODE 1 is permitted, since the HPCI system testing was completed satisfactorily, but the RCIC system must be capable of meeting the requirements of SR 3.5.3.2 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of entering MODE 1.

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 41 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 89 ANSWER EXPLANATION Answer B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS The flow tests for the RCIC System are performed at two different pressure ranges such that system capability to provide rated flow against a system head corresponding to reactor pressure is tested both at the higher and lower operating ranges of the system. Adequate reactor steam pressure must be available to perform these tests. Additionally, adequate steam flow must be passing through the turbine bypass valves to continue to control reactor pressure when the RCIC System diverts steam flow. Therefore, sufficient time is allowed after adequate pressure and flow are achieved to perform these SRs. Reactor steam pressure must be 950 psig to perform SR 3.5.3.2 and 150 psig to perform SR 3.5.3.3. Adequate steam flow is represented by at least one turbine bypass valve 80% open. The 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> allowed for performing the flow test, after the required pressure and flow are reached, is sufficient to achieve stable conditions for testing and provides reasonable time to complete the SRs.

A. Incorrect; Startup procedure 2167 implies a limit of 150 psig, but SR 3.5.3.3 allows pressure to be raised up to 165 psig for performing the test. MODE 3 entry is not required unless RCIC operability cannot be restored within 14 days. Plausibe since TS LCO 3.5.3 is not met and Required Actions B.1 and B.2, while not applicable specify placing plant in MODE 3 and limiting RPV pressure to 150 psig.

B. Correct; SR 3.5.3.3 (and associated bases) specifies that the surveillance requirement must be met within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of achieving the conditions necessary to perform the test. With TS LCO 3.5.3 not being met, heat up and pressurization beyond 150 psig (except as permitted to perform SR 3.5.3.3) is not permitted until the test is completed satisfactorily.

C. Incorrect, see B. Plausible if applicant believes that successful completion of the surveillance test is not required. LCO 3.5.3 would not be met and there is no allowance to enter a higher mode of applicability (RPV pressure > 150 psig) without the LCO being met D. Incorrect, LCO 3.5.3 would not be met and there is no allowance to enter a higher mode of applicability (RPV pressure > 150 psig) without the LCO being met.

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 42 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 89 Question Background Tier: 2 Group: 1 K/A: 217000 RCIC A2.11 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM (RCIC); and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Inadequate system flow Importance Rating: 3.2 10 CFR Part 55: 41.5 10 CFR 55.43.b: 2 K/A Match: The applicant is given plant conditions which have RCIC in service to confirm continued operability, the system does not meet S.R. requirements for system flow.

IAW TSs the plant startup to 920 psig is not permitted.

SRO Justification: The questions requires the applicant to understand and apply T.S. S.R. 3.0.2 to determine the latest time the RCIC surveillance must be completed to meet its specified frequency, and if startup actions can continue with the surveillance not being met, LCO 3.0.4.b is not permitted by T.S. 3.5.3 Technical

References:

Technical Specifications 2167 [plant startup]

Proposed references to be provided: Technical Specifications Section 3.5.3 RCIC System Learning Objective: M-8107L-003: 8, 10(b)

Cognitive Level: Higher X Lower Question Source: New X Modified Bank _

Bank _

Question History:

Comments:

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 43 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question 90 Points: 1.0 Reactor power was 11% with a plant startup in progress, when a loss-of-signal to the in-service Level Control Valve occurred. Approximately 30 seconds later alarm 5-B-24 (REACTOR WATER LEVEL HI/LO) is received.

Complete the following sentence.

RPV water level has __(1)__ and the CRS should direct the crew to __(2)__.

(1) (2)

A. Risen Attempt to reset the locked up level control valve then return the M/A station to AUTO.

B. Risen initiate a MANUAL Reactor SCRAM; AND throttle the FW block valves C. Lowered initiate a MANUAL Reactor SCRAM; AND take LOCAL manual control of the valve D. Lowered take LOCAL manual control of the valve ONLY Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 44 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 90 ANSWER EXPLANATION Proposed Answer: D DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS AOP C.4-B.05.07.A (Loss of Reactor Water Level Control), is written with the assumptions that the Main Feed Regulating Valves (MFRV) are in service and that some level of feed flow will be maintained and therefore the rate of change in RPV water level will be slow. The procedure also four generalized methods (FW low flow valve, RWCU reject, Recirc pump speed adjustment, and throttling of FW block valves MO-1133 and MO-1134) to control Reactor water level if control with the MFRV cannot be restored.

A. Incorrect: At the specified power level the Low Flow Feed Regulating Valve (LFRV) will be in service. The LFRV fails shut on loss-of-signal; RPV level will lower. This choice is plausible if the applicant thinks that one of the Main Feed Regulating Valves is in service, and fails to recall that MFRV fail as-is on loss of signal.

B. Incorrect: At the specified power level the Low Flow Feed Regulating Valve (LFRV) will be in service. The LFRV fails shut on loss-of-signal; RPV level will lower. This choice is plausible if the applicant thinks that one of the Main Feed Regulating Valves is in service, and fails to recall that MFRV fail as-is on loss of signal.

C. Correct: The FW Low Flow Reg Valves are used up to approximately 17-20% of rated FW flow, then B.05.07-05.D would be followed to transfer to the Main FW reg valves. Thus, based on the above conditions, the FW Low Flow Reg Valve is expected to be in AUTO when the loss of control signal to CV-6-13 occurs. When the loss of electrical control signal occurs, the low flow reg valve fails closed and, as a result, Rx water level drops. Even though this valve is equipped with a hand-wheel, to position the valve if all other control has failed, RPV water level will quickly (at rate of approximately 10 inches/minute) approach the Low RPV water setpoint, necessitating a manual reactor trip as well as taking manual LOCAL control.

D. Incorrect: Plausible if the applicant believes that manual LOCAL control of the valve can be established before the Low RPV Water Level SCRAM.

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 45 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 90 QUESTION BACKGROUND Tier: 2 Group: 1 K/A: (259002 Reactor Water Level Control) 2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Importance Rating: 4.6 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12 10 CFR 55.43.b: 5 K/A Match: K/A is matched by testing the applicants ability to interpret the water level response due to the loss of controller to the Low Flow valve and execute procedural steps to mitigate the abnormal condition SRO Justification: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Technical

References:

B.05.07-05, AOP C.4-B.05.07.A, and M-8107L-046 (Reactor Level Control)

Rev. 12 Proposed references to be provided:

Learning Objective: 6 and 7.e of M-8107L-046 (Reactor Level Control) Rev. 12 Cognitive Level: Higher X Lower _

Question Source: New _

Modified Bank X Bank _

Question History: Question 78 of 2005 MNGP - significantly modified (question stem reworded and part (2) of distractors B and C altered)

Comments:

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 46 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question 91 Points: 1.0 The plant was operating at RTP with the #12 RHR pump operating in Torus cooling mode when a transient occurred resulting in the following indications:

Time RWL RPV Pressure Drywell pressure Torus Temperature 1004 -50 inches 1020 psig 1.0 psig 75°F 1021 -55 inches 800 psig 1.8 psig 78°F 1023 -60 inches 600 psig 1.9 psig 83°F 1025 -70 inches 700 psig 2.0 psig 90°F ADS actuation was inhibited.

Based on the above conditions, At Time 1021 the #12 RHR pump __(1)__ be operating in the torus cooling mode.

As the CRS, at Time 1025, you should direct Control Room personnel to __(2)__.

A. (1) will (2) Prevent ALL injection from CS and LPCI B. (1) will (2) Transfer A and B RHR from LPCI to Torus Cooling C. (1) will NOT (2) Prevent ALL injection from CS and LPCI D. (1) will NOT (2) Transfer A and B RHR from LPCI to Torus Cooling Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 47 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 91 ANSWER EXPLANATION Answer D DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A LPCI Initiation Signal on Low Low reactor water level for 15 minutes becomes active at 1019, this sends a signal to close MO-2007 and MO-2009 [torus cooling valves] so a path for torus cooling is no longer aligned. After the ECCS actuation, Torus temperature begins to rise at an increasing rate and at 1025 Torus Temperature has reached a value requiring use of all available Torus Cooling. EOP C.5-1100 also directs that CS and LPCI injection not needed for core cooling be prevented. The examinee must balance the need for increased injection and the need for Torus Cooling.

A. (1) Incorrect, MO- 2007 and 2009 received a closed signal at 1019, the flow path for torus cooling is no longer aligned (2) Incorrect, with RPV level continuing to decrease additional injection is needed; preventing injection from all low pressure ECCS sources would not be appropriate.

B. (1) Incorrect, MO- 2007 and 2009 received a closed signal at 1019, the flow path for torus cooling is no longer aligned (2) Correct; see above.

C. (1) Correct (2) Incorrect, with RPV level continuing to decrease additional injection is needed; preventing injection from all low pressure ECCS sources would not be appropriate.

D. (1) Correct (2) Correct; see above.

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 48 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 91 Question Background Tier: 2 Group: 2 K/A: 219000 RHR/LPCI: Torus/Pool Cooling Mode A2.14 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the RHR/LPCI:

TORUS/SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING MODE ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Loss of coolant accident Importance Rating: 4.3 10 CFR Part 55: 41.5 10 CFR 55.43.b: 5 K/A Match: The applicant is given a set of plant conditions that indicate a LOCA is occurring, the plant will reconfigure with the LOCA signal, the applicant must evaluate the effect of this on torus cooling and then mitigate the accident conditions by evaluating plant Parameters and selecting the appropriate procedure.

SRO Justification: see screening for SRO only linked to 10CFR55.43(b)(5)

Technical

References:

C.5-1100, C.5-1200, B.03.04-05, B.03.04-02 Proposed references to be provided: None Learning Objective: M-8107L-023, LO 8 Cognitive Level: Higher X Lower _

Question Source: New X Modified Bank _

Bank _

Question History:

Comments:

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 49 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question 92 Points: 1.0 Shortly after completing a full core off-load, an event occurred resulting in a leak in the reactor cavity bellows seals. Additionally, plant operators have been unable to open CST-32 (Inlet to Skimmer Surge Tank).

• SFP Level is currently 36 feet.

• SFP Level is dropping at approximately 9 inches-per-hour In addition to installing the Fuel Pool to Reactor Cavity gates, which one of the following provides the appropriate directions for mitigating the current conditions?

A. Establish makeup using the Filter/Demineralizer Backwash connection, then restore the Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System to operation.

B. Establish makeup using RHRSW via the Residual Heat Removal System, then lineup and operate RHR in the Fuel Pool Cooling Mode.

C. Restore the Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System to operation, then establish makeup using the Filter/Demineralizer Backwash connection.

D. Lineup and operate RHR in the Fuel Pool Cooling Mode, then establish makeup using RHRSW via the Residual Heat Removal System.

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 50 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 92 ANSWER EXPLANATION Proposed Answer: A DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. CORRECT: Per AOP C.4-B.02-01.A the bottom of the weir is 373 at which point no water will be returning to the surge tanks. The SFP low level alarm (4-B-33) occurs at 367 and a short time later the Fuel Pooling Cooling pump(s) will trip on low surge tank level or low suction pressure. Pumps will not be able to be restarted until after SFP is restored to the point that water overflows to the surge tanks. Makeup using the Filter/Demineralizer Backwash connection preferred over RHRSW via RHR since the makeup source is the CST rather than river water. Per B.02.01-05, at >24.75 ft (SFP level > 10 ft above fuel racks) adequate radiation shielding is available. Thus, current conditions show adequate radiation shielding to the spent fuel assembly is present and access to the refuel floor is still available. EOP C.5-1300 entry is required below 367 SFP level and if level cannot be restored and maintained above 367 alternate SFP makeup shall be used, such as Condensate Service Water hose connection and RHRSW through RHR. The preferred normal makeup method (CST-32) is not available but the alternate method using the Filter/Demineralizer Backwash connection is available.

B, C, and D are incorrect but plausible variations of ARP, AOP and EOP mitigating strategies of a low SFP level.

B. Incorrect; makeup source is the river rather than the CST. Operating RHR in the Fuel Pool Cooling mode would be acceptable if Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup could not be restored.

C. Incorrect; SFP level must be restored before restoring Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup system to operation.

D. Incorrect; SFP level must be restored before operating RHR in the Fuel Pool Cooling Mode, and the CST is the preferred makeup source.

QUESTION BACKGROUND Tier: 2 Group: 2 K/A: (233000 Fuel Pool Cooling/Cleanup) A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the FUEL POOL COOLING AND CLEAN-UP ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 /

45.6) Low pool level Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 51 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 92 Importance Rating: 3.3 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 41.5 / 45.6 10 CFR 55.43.b: 4 and 5 K/A Match: K/A is matched by testing the applicants ability to predict the impacts a low SFP level will have on FPCC system and based on those impacts what procedures or operations should be used to mitigate those consequences. Specifically, the question is testing the applicants understanding of the impacts a low SFP level will have to potential operations and the ability to determine what procedural steps are required to address the low SFP level.

SRO Justification: Radiation hazards that may arise during normal and abnormal situations, including maintenance activities and various contamination conditions; Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations Technical

References:

Ops Man B.02.01-03 and -05, ARP 4-B-33, C.4-B.02.01.A, C.5-1300, and M-8107L-022 (Fuel Pool Cooling And Cleanup) Rev. 14 Proposed references to be provided: None Learning Objective: 9 of M-8107L-022 (Fuel Pool Cooling And Cleanup) Rev. 14 Cognitive Level: Higher X Lower _

Question Source: New X Modified Bank _

Bank _

Question History:

Comments:

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 52 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question 93 Points: 1.0 Loop A RHR is operating in Shutdown Cooling and reactor coolant temperature is 120°F, with the mode switch in shutdown. The Control Room Supervisor (SRO) has been directed to continue a plant startup IAW procedure 2167 [Plant Startup].

The status of the RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation is as follows:

• Drywell Floor Drain Sump Monitoring System is Inoperable

• Drywell Equipment Drain Sump Monitoring System is Operable

• Drywell Floor Drain Sump is NOT overflowing to the Drywell Equipment Drain Sump Given the above information, can the unit be taken to MODE 2, Startup; why or why not? (T.S.

3.4.5 is provided)

A. TS LCO 3.4.5 is NOT met and MODE 2 may NOT be entered.

B. TS LCO 3.4.5 is met and MODE 2 may be entered with NO additional requirements.

C. TS LCO 3.4.5 is NOT met, but MODE 2 may be entered because of a previously NRC approved exception as specified by applicability of TS LCO 3.0.4.c.

D. TS LCO 3.4.5 is NOT met, but MODE 2 may be entered because the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation for an unlimited period of time.

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 53 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 93 ANSWER EXPLANATION Answer C DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Incorrect, LCO 3.0.4.c is applicable, so entry is permitted into the mode of applicability.

B. Incorrect, plausible distractor if the applicant does not evaluate the information in the stem correctly.

C. Correct, entry into mode 2 is permitted because there is an allowance stated in the specification that LCO 3.0.4.c is applicable.

D. Incorrect, TS 3.4.5 Action A has a 30 time clock; therefore LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable.

QUESTION BACKGROUND Tier: 2 Group: 2 K/A: 268000 Radwaste 2.2.38 Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license.

Importance Rating: 4.5 10 CFR Part 55: 55.41.7 10 CFR 55.43.b: 1, 2 K/A Match: KA is matched by having the applicant evaluate the operability of a portion of the liquid radwaste system and determine if a mode change is permitted in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

SRO Justification: This question can only be answered by applying generic LCO requirements.

Technical

References:

Technical Specifications Proposed references to be provided: T.S. 3.4.5 Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 54 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 93 Learning Objective: M-8107L-101 9, 10b Cognitive Level: Higher X Lower _

Question Source: New X Modified Bank _

Bank _

Question History: Significant modification from MNGP bank question 1391 Comments:

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 55 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question 94 Points: 1.0 The plant was operating at 100% power when a Loss of Coolant Accident occurred in the Drywell. The following conditions now exist:

• Div II RHR pumps are providing Torus and Drywell sprays at a combined flow of 8000 gpm.

• Div I RHR pumps are providing Torus Cooling at a combined flow of 7000 gpm.

• Div I and II Core Spray Pumps are injecting to the RPV with a flowrate of 3500 gpm each.

• NO high pressure injection sources are available.

• RPV water level is minus 60 (-60) inches and rising slowly.

• Drywell pressure is 1.8 psig and lowering.

• Torus water level is minus 1 (-1) foot and steady.

• Torus water temperature is 150°F and slowly lowering.

• Discharge pressure and flow from low pressure ECCS pumps have begun to oscillate.

Given the above conditions, select the action plan from summaries below, that should be directed to mitigate the events while preserving ECCS equipment availability.

A. Stop all RPV injection from Core Spray; AND Secure all containment Sprays; AND Maximize RPV injection from all available RHR pumps.

B. Stop all RPV injection from Core Spray; AND Secure all containment sprays; AND Place Div II RHR pumps in the LPCI injection mode at combined flow of 7000 gpm.

C. Reduce the RPV injection flow from both Core Spray pumps to 1500 gpm each; AND Reduce the flow (containment sprays) of the Div II RHR pumps to a combined flow of 7000 gpm; AND Maintain the Torus Cooling flow provided by Div 1 RHR at a combined flow of 7000 gpm.

D. Reduce the RPV injection flow from both Core Spray pumps to 1500 gpm each; AND Secure all containment sprays; AND Maintain the Torus Cooling flow provided by Div 1 RHR at a combined flow of 7000 gpm.

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 56 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 94 Answer Explanation Proposed Answer: B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS Given the stated initial conditions, the operators are implementing actions in accordance with C.5-1100 (RPV Control) and C.5-1200 (Primary Containment Control) to maintain core cooling and primary containment integrity.

A. Incorrect; Maximizing RHR injection does not mitigate the inadequate NPSH concern and will likely result in damage to one or more RHR pumps.

B. Correct; Stopping the Core Spray pumps will prevent damage to the pumps from inadequate NPSH; pumps could remain running but flow would have to be reduced to approximately 1500 gpm per pump to comply with the NPSH curves. Drywell pressure is well below the value necessitating sprays; therefore Div II RHR pumps can be realigned for LPCI injection to compensate for the lost Core Spray injection while Div I RHR pumps are used to continue Torus cooling. Limiting the RHR loop flows to 7000 gpm will ensure compliance with the RHR NPSH curves. Additionally, the Div II LPCI injection will not only ensure adequate core cooling it will also help cool the containment (as long as HXs remain in service) as flow is returned via the Torus.

C. Incorrect; the proposed lineups will not ensure adequate core cooling. Cutting the injection flow by half will not provide enough flow ensure continued core coverage.

D. Incorrect; the proposed lineups will not ensure adequate core cooling. Cutting the injection flow by half will not provide enough flow ensure continued core coverage.

Question Background Tier: 3 Group: 1 K/A: 2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation. (CFR:

41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13)

Importance Rating: 4.7 10 CFR Part 55: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13 10 CFR 55.43.b: 5 K/A Match: K/A is matched by testing the applicants ability to evaluate the plant conditions/performance and make an operational judgment SRO Justification: Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 57 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 94 Technical

References:

C.5-1100, C.5-1200, C.5.1-1000, C.5.1-1200 Proposed references to be provided: C.5-1100 and C.5-1200 with the entry conditions redacted OR the associated NPSH and Vortex Limit curves Learning Objective:

Cognitive Level: Higher X Lower _

Question Source: New _

Modified Bank _

Bank X Question History: Question 93 of 2003 MGNP ILT Comments: Distracters have been modified, to be more descriptive and to increase the level of difficulty, but not enough for the question to be considered significantly modified.

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 58 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question 95 Points: 1.0 The plant was at rated conditions when Drywell pressure begins to slowly rise. The operators are executing C.4-B.04.01.F (LEAK INSIDE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT). The CRS has briefed the crew that a manual Reactor Scram will be inserted when Drywell pressure reaches 1.6 psig.

Using FP-OP-COO-15 (CONSERVATIVE DECISION MAKING) Attachment 3, determine what level of decision making the CRS has employed for this situation?

A. Tier 1 B. Tier 2 C. Type 1 ODMI D. Type 2 ODMI Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 59 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 95 ANSWER EXPLANATION Correct Answer: B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS JUSTIFICATION: An example of Tier 2 Decision Making is Establishing conservative values for operation, at what point action will be taken prior to reaching an automatic set point. In this case the automatic setpoint would be 1.84 psig which will initiate an automatic reactor scram.

A, C and D are incorrect: Plausible decision making levels found in Attachment 3.

QUESTION BACKGROUND TIER: 3 GROUP: 2.1 K/A: 2.1.39 Knowledge of conservative decision making practices.

Importance Rating: SRO 4.3 10 CFR: 55.43b(1)

SRO ONLY JUSTIFICATION: SRO Only task for Conservative Decision Making

REFERENCE:

FP-OP-COO-15 REFERENCE PROVIDED DURING EXAM: FP-OP-COO-15 Attachment 3 OBJECTIVE: M8108L-038, 2 COG LEVEL: 3 SPR QUESTION SOURCE: BANK -- 2015 MNGP ILT NRC Written Exam DIFFICULTY: 2 Comments:

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 60 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question 96 Points: 1.0 Which of the following conditions would SOLELY render a supported system no longer capable of performing its intended safety function? Refer to the provided Section 3.0 of MNGP Technical Specifications and associated Bases.

A. One or more snubbers are not capable of providing their associated support function(s), to more than one subsystem of a multiple subsystem supported system, for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

B. One or more snubbers are not capable of providing their associated support function(s), to a single subsystem of a multiple subsystem supported system, or to a single subsystem supported system, for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.

C. One or more barriers, required to support operability of a supported system, are not capable of performing their related support function(s) for 24 days.

D. A support system is inoperable, and a required system - redundant to the system(s) supported by the inoperable support system - is also inoperable.

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 61 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 96 Answer Explanation Proposed Answer: D DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A and B are incorrect: the times stated are NOT long enough for the supported system to be declared INOP; LCO 3.0.8 states that the supported system is considered to remain capable of performing its intended safety when one or more snubbers are not capable of performing their associated supported function(s) for a specific allowed time - 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for a multiple subsystem supported system and 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> for a single subsystem supported system or to a single subsystem supported system.

C is incorrect: the time stated is NOT long enough for the supported system to be declared not capable of performing its safety function; LCO 3.0.9 states that the supported system is not considered INOP solely due to required barriers not being able to perform their related support function(s). 30 days is allowed before declaring the supported system(s) incapable of performing the safety function.

D is correct: According to LCO 3.0.6, and TS 5.5.10, a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and a required system redundant to system(s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable.

For example, based on the Tech Spec BASES example (EXAMPLE B 3.0.6-1), considering the figure below: If System 2 of Division A is inoperable and System 5 of Division B is inoperable, a loss of safety function exists in supported System 5.

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 62 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 96 Question Background Tier: 3 Group: 2 K/A: 2.2.37 Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment.

(CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Importance Rating: 4.6 10 CFR Part 55: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12 10 CFR 55.43.b: 5 K/A Match: K/A is matched by testing the applicants ability to determine the operability of a safety related equipment by using the motherhood LCOs.

SRO Justification: Application of generic LCO requirements Technical

References:

OWI-03.05 Rev. 5, LCO 3.0.6, 3.0.8, and 3.0.9, TS 5.5.10 Proposed references to be provided: TS Section 3.0 and associated Bases Learning Objective:

Cognitive Level: Higher X Lower _

Question Source: New X Modified Bank _

Bank _

Question History:

Comments:

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 63 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question 97 Points: 1.0 A flowchart change to C.5-1200 is being developed in accordance with 4-AWI-08.16.01 [Monticello emergency operating procedure and beyond-design-basis guideline maintenance program] due to a recent change in the BWROG EPGs.

In accordance with the requirements of 4-AWI-08.16.01, which one of the following completes the statements below?

The performance of a 10CFR50.59 __(1)__ is required for all EOP changes.

EOP Verification and validation is required to be performed __(2)__ PORC review.

A. (1) screening (2) before B. (1) screening (2) after C. (1) evaluation (2) before D. (1) evaluation (2) after Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 64 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 97 Answer Explanation Answer A DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS 4-AWI-08.16.01 requires a 10CFR50.59 screening to be performed for all EOP changes and verification and validation SHALL be performed prior to submitting the flowchart revision to PORC for review.

A. Correct B. (1) Correct, (2) Incorrect, the verification and validation is required prior to PORC review to ensure technical accuracy and usability.

C. (1) Incorrect, screening is required by procedure (2) Correct D. (1) Incorrect, screening is required by procedure (2) Incorrect, the verification and validation is required prior to PORC review to ensure technical accuracy and usability.

Question Background Tier: 3 Group: N/A K/A: Equipment control 2.2.6 Knowledge of the process for making changes to procedures Importance Rating: 3.6 10 CFR Part 55: 41.10 10 CFR 55.43.b: 3 K/A Match: The applicant is asked to evaluate requirements to make changes to the EOPS IAW station procedures and to ensure regulatory requirements are met Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 65 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 97 SRO Justification: Knowledge of the process for changing plant procedures Technical

References:

4-AWI-08.16.01 Proposed references to be provided: None Learning Objective:

Cognitive Level: Higher _

Lower X Question Source: New X Modified Bank _

Bank _

Question History:

Comments:

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 66 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question 98 Points: 1.0 You are the CRS on a crew, which contains a female out plant operator. She declared her pregnancy during her 6th month of gestation. Her TEDE exposure, for the duration of her pregnancy thus far, was determined to be 475 mrem at the time the pregnancy was declared.

What are the administrative occupational exposure limits for the remainder of her pregnancy?

A. She cannot receive any further exposure.

B. She may receive up to 25 mrem for the remainder of the pregnancy.

C. She may receive up to 50 mrem for the remainder of the pregnancy.

D. She may receive up to 50 mrem per month, at a uniform exposure rate, for the remainder of the pregnancy.

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 67 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 98 Answer Explanation Proposed Answer: C DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A, B, and D are incorrect but plausible misconceptions of the exposure limits for a declared pregnant female employee. 450 mrem TEDE for the entire gestation period OR 50 mrem TEDE per month are the Administrative Dose Guideline but an exemption exists if 450 mrem is exceeded prior to pregnancy declaration.

C is correct: A declared pregnant worker shall NOT exceed 450 mrem TEDE during the entire gestation period OR 50 mrem for the remainder of the pregnancy if 450 mrem TEDE has been exceeded at the time of the declaration. Since she had exceeded 450 mrem when she declared the pregnancy, she may receive an addition 50 mrem.

Question Background Tier: 3 Group: 3 K/A: 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.

(CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.10)

Importance Rating: 3.7 10 CFR Part 55: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.10 10 CFR 55.43.b: 4 K/A Match: K/A is matched by testing the applicants knowledge of the radiation exposure limits under normal conditions for a pregnant worker SRO Justification: Analysis and interpretation of radiation and activity readings as they pertain to selection of administrative procedures.

Technical

References:

AWI-08.04.01 and M-8108L-002 Proposed references to be provided: None Learning Objective:

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 68 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 98 Cognitive Level: Higher _

Lower X Question Source: New _

Modified Bank X Bank _

Question History: Question 98 from 2007 MNGP ILT NRC Exam - modified with the inclusion of addition wording and slight changes to distractors C and D Comments:

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 69 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question 99 Points: 1.0 The reactor is at rated conditions with the HPCI QUARTERLY PUMP FLOW AND VALVE TEST (0255-06-IA-1) in progress as scheduled. During the test, average Torus water temperature reached 91°F.

Complete the following statement describing the correct action by the CRS as it pertains to the EOPs?

C.5-1200 (PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL)

A. IS NOT required to be entered as the limit is 100°F during testing that adds heat to the Torus.

B. IS NOT required to be entered as the temperature rise is directly attributable to a surveillance test.

C. IS required to be entered, but may be subsequently exited when it is determined that an emergency condition does not exist.

D. IS required to be entered, and may be exited ONLY when Torus temperature has been lowered to less than 90°F with RHR in Torus Cooling.

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 70 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 99 ANSWER EXPLANATION Correct Answer: C DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS JUSTIFICATION: EOPs must be entered any time the plant is not in cold shutdown or outage conditions and an entry condition occurs, even if the condition exists for only a short time and then clears. If an EOP entry was because of a pre-planned evolution, the EOPs may be exited when it is determined that an emergency does not exist.

A is incorrect: 100°F is the LCO Action entry requirement for Torus temperature with testing in progress, but entry into C.5-1200 is still required > 90°F.

B is incorrect: EOP entry is required even for pre-planned evolutions such as surveillance testing.

D is incorrect: EOPs may be exited if no emergency condition exists for pre-planned evolutions.

QUESTION BACKGROUND TIER: 3 GROUP: 4 CATEGORY: Emergency Procedures / Plan K/A: 2.4.14 Knowledge of general guidelines for EOP usage.

IMPORTANCE: SRO 4.5 10 CFR: 55.43b(1)

SRO ONLY JUSTIFICATION: EOP entry & exit requirements

REFERENCE:

C.5.1-1000 REFERENCE PROVIDED DURING EXAM: None LESSON PL: MT-ILT-EOP-001L OBJECTIVE: 4, 6 COG LEVEL: 1 P Question Source: ILT Bank (2015 NRC Audit)

Comments:

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 71 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question 100 Points: 1.0 Which of the following is an INITIAL Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) for a General Emergency Classification made in the Control Room NOT due to loss of containment barrier loss?

E. Evacuate a 2 mile radius and 2-5 mile down wind. All others monitor and prepare.

F. Evacuate a 2 mile radius and 2-10 mile down wind. All others monitor and prepare.

G. Contact the State Planning Chief or State Duty Officer if State EOC is not activated H. No protective action recommendation is appropriate when projected plume dose rates do NOT exceed 1000 mrem (TEDE) OR 5000 mrem (CDE) thyroid dose.

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 72 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 100 Answer Explanation Proposed Answer: A DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS A. Correct: According to A.2-204, declaration of a General Emergency requires timely initial protective action recommendations (PARs) to off-site agencies. Under these circumstances, NO dose projections are required for formulating the initial off-site protection action recommendation UNLESS there is a Rapidly Progressing Severe Accident. A Rapidly Progressing Severe Accident is a General Emergency (GE) with rapid loss of containment integrity (emergency action levels indicate containment barrier loss) and loss of ability to cool the core. Thus, since this GE is NOT due to loss of containment barrier per the EAL, the applicant shall conclude a GE exists WITHOUT a Rapidly Progressing Severe Accident. Figure 7.3.A of A.2-204 is used. The applicant should conclude the initial PAR is to Evacuate a 2 mile radius and 2-5 miles downwind. All others monitor and prepare.

B. Incorrect: 2-10 miles downwind is not the initial PAR distance if a Rapidly Progressing Severe Accident does NOT exist (there is not a loss of containment barrier)

C. Incorrect: this action is taken AFTER the recommendation is made D. Incorrect: Initial PARs for a General Emergency involving loss of physical control or core damage require immediate evacuation of the general public and are justified without dose projection; recommending off-site protective actions shall not be delayed.

Question Background Tier: 3 Group: 4 K/A: 2.4.44 Knowledge of emergency plan protective action recommendations. (CFR:

41.10 / 41.12 / 43.5 / 45.11)

Importance Rating: 4.4 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 41.10 / 41.12 / 43.5 / 45.11 10 CFR 55.43.b: 5 K/A Match: K/A is matched by testing the applicants knowledge of the emergency plan protective action recommendations, specifically after a General Emergency Classification is made. The applicants knowledge of PARs and the E-Plan are tested.

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 73 of 74 2016

EXAMINATION ANSWER KEY ILT NRC SRO WRITTEN EXAM Question Number: 100 SRO Justification: E-Plan Technical

References:

A.2-204, E-Plan Proposed references to be provided: None Learning Objective:

Cognitive Level: Higher _

Lower X Question Source: New _

Modified Bank X Bank _

Question History: Question 100 of 2007 MNGP ILT NRC - significantly modified by replacing distractor C and including more info in the question stem Comments:

Monticello NRC Written Exam Page: 74 of 74 2016