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{{#Wiki_filter:CONTROL BL 0 0CK: 1 8 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE.L REQUIRED INFORtJ..:.TIONJ o I -I o Io Io Io I O I 0 I O 101 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 101 I I G LICENSE NUMBER 2!:> 2G LICENSE. TYPE 30 :S C.:..T :,8 l V I A Is I p I s I 2 101 0 LICENSEE CODE 14 1~
{{#Wiki_filter:CONTROL BL 0CK:
L!:_JG) 1 o I s I o I o I o 1 2 1 s I o 101 o I 7 11 I 8 I s I o l(v I o I 7 I 3 I 1 1 s Io 10 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 7:, REPORT DATE BD EVENT .DESCRIPTION AND F'ROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@
0 1~      8                     (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE.L REQUIRED INFORtJ..:.TIONJ l V I A Is I p I sI 2 101 0
I Westinghouse LOCA-ECCS reanalysis indicates that a residual penalty of O .007 i=-FQ exists 9 from the fuel rod burst model. The error in the fuel clad burst model was rep:rted 11-26-79 in Unit 1 LERNO. 79-032/0lT-0.
              ~        LICENSEE CODE            14      1~
As a result, the FQ Limit (T.S.3.12.~.l) must be reduced. This is reportable as per T.S. 6.6.2.a.8.
oI - I o Io Io Io I O I 0 I O 101 LICENSE NUMBER                           2!:>     2G 4  11 11 11 11 101 LICENSE. TYPE     30 I      IG
8 9 6 SYSTEM CODE I RIC I@ 9 10 CAUSE CAUSE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE Lu@ L!J@ IFjUjEjLjXj x1@ 11 12 13 18 COMP, SUBCODE L:J 19 C SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT r.::;,. LER/RO EVENT YEAR . REPORT NO, CODE TYPE \'..:./N"i;~~~~
:S C.:..T :,8
Is I 0 1 I I 1° 1° I 9 1 1.....--1 lo l 1! L!J . 21 Xl 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 VALVE SUBCODE w@ 20 31 ?.EVISION NO. w 32 80 ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN @ ATTACHMENT NPR0-4 TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM .SUB. l..u@L!J@  
                    ~:~~~ L!:_JG) 1oI                s I o Io I o12 1s I o 101 o I 7                         11   I 8 I sI o l(v I oI 7 I 3 I 1 1s Io 10 60           61             DOCKET NUMBER               68     69         EVENT DATE             74     7:,       REPORT DATE         BD EVENT .DESCRIPTION AND F'ROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@
~(§) L2J 10 10 I Oj 01 l2..J ~ PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER COMPONENT MANUFACTURER 33 34 36 3 7 40 41 42 ~@) I wJ 1 I 2 Io I@ CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND_CORRECTIVE ACTIONS@ 43 0 I The* fuel clad burst error wa~ caused .by :a reduction in clad heatup rate which shifts the }] !fuel clad burst curve and results in earlier clad burst. The FQ.lirnit will be TI _ladrninistratively controlled at 2.18 pending NRC evaluation of the Fuel Clad burst* model 3 jand possible LOCA-ECCS Reanalysis.
I   Westinghouse LOCA-ECCS reanalysis indicates that a residual penalty of O .007 i=- FQ exists from the fuel rod burst model.                         The error in the fuel clad burst model was rep:rted 11-26-79 in Unit 1 LERNO. 79-032/0lT-0.                                     As a result, the FQ Limit (T.S.3.12.~.l) must be reduced.           This is reportable as per T.S. 6.6.2.a.8.
4 B 9 FACILITY . ,.;;;.. METHOD OF A <17 BO STATUS %POWER S/ OTHERSTATUS  
8     9                                                                                                                                                                       80 SYSTEM               CAUSE       CAUSE                                                             COMP,            VALVE CODE                CODE       SUBCODE                   COMPONENT CODE                       SUBCODE          SUBCODE 9                          I RIC I@ Lu@ L!J@                                       IFjUjEjLjXj                     x1@ L:J                        w@
\:SI 5 l.&#xa3;J@ IO IO j ~@)!RepTaee\Tient outage j 8 A2flVITY C~~TENT 12 1J 44 DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION i&. ~@ .... I _N_o_t_i_f_i_c_a_t_i_o_n_f_r_o_m
6                        9          10          11           12               13                                 18           19               20 SEQUENTIAL                               OCCURRENCE             REPORT                     ?.EVISION r.::;,. LER/RO   EVENT YEAR                             . REPORT NO,                                   CODE                 TYPE                       NO.
__ N_s_s_s _________
            \'..:./N"i;~~~~
----1 ~5 46 80 RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY @ J GJ@) ~@I NA 8 9 . 10 1~1:--------------..J PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 4-4 NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION@
                        . CIs21 I   01 Xl I
NA LOCATION OF RELEASE @ 45 80 NA Q I o I o Io l021W@ I 8 9 11 12 1::3:----------------------------------------~
23 I     1&deg; 1&deg; I 24 91 26 1.....--1 27 lo l 28 1!
PERSONNEL INJURIES BO NUMBER DESCRIPTION@  
29 L!J 30             31 w
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32 ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD                  HOURS
TYPE DESCRIPTION 43 I] t2J@ . NA 60 NA 8 9 10 PUBLICITY r.;,.. 80 0 ~/ J!l,.. ,ssurnr,;:;\
                                                                                                @         ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPR0-4 FORM .SUB.
DESCRIPTION~
PRIME COMP.            COMPONENT MANUFACTURER SUPPLIER l..u@L!J@
8 o 4, o , j a J l NJ0:--;;-10
33            34
___________
                                          ~(&sect;)
_.:N~A:....._
                                          ~
_________
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__j I I 1 ! 1 I i I II I I I~ 68 69 BO NRC I.Ee ONLY (804) 357-3181'..
                                                                                                                              ~
ru:,ME OF PREPARER J. L. Wilson oun ... ,r.
42
ATTACHI-IENT 1 *SURRY POWER STATION DOCKET NO: 50-281
                                                                                                                                                  ~@)
* REPORT NO: 80-009 /0lT-0 EVENT DATE: 7-14-80 TITLE OF EVENT : FQ LIMIT RESTRICTION
43 I wJ     1 I 2 Io I@
: 1. Description of Event: On November 9, 1979, VEPCO was notified of an unreviewed safety question by Westinghouse Electric Corporation.
                                                                                                                                                                                    <17 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND_CORRECTIVE ACTIONS@
The unreviewed safety question concerned a potential non-conservative feature of the Westinghouse ECCS large break evaluatio~
0       I The* fuel         clad burst error wa~ caused                       .by :a     reduction in clad heatup rate which shifts the
model which could affect the peak clad temperature calculated for the tOCA. transient, specificly in the fuel clad burst model. Westinghouse,in evaluating their fuel Clad Burst model,has recommended a conservative, interim limit 'Be 9-pplied--to*  
}] !fuel clad burst curve and results in earlier clad burst.                                                               The FQ.lirnit will be TI     _ladrninistratively controlled at 2.18 pending NRC evaluation of the Fuel Clad burst* model 3       jand possible LOCA-ECCS Reanalysis.
~the. mode.1--pending  
4 B     9                                                                                                                                                                         BO FACILITY .
*NRG approval of their new Fuel Clad Burst model. Westinghouse analysis (with the interim**
S/
limits) of Surry Unit 1 indicated that sufficient margin existed in the FQ-limit, but for Surry Unit 2, there existed a ,_ residual penalty of O. 007 in Fq based on the present Fq "limit of 2*:.19. ' This event is reportable in accordance wit:h Technical Specification 6.6.2.a.8.
                                                                            ,.;;;..
: 2. Prob ab le Consequences/Status of Redundant Sys terns-: The Westinghouse evaluation revealed that heatup rates could be <25&deg;F/second During the LOCA transient, the fuel clad burst curve establishes the time of clad burst and the post-burst conditions of the c.lad. The fu~l clad burst curve is dependent on the clad heatup rate prior to burst, and a reduction in clad heatup rate causes earlier cla~ burst, Since Surry Unit 2 has not operated since this event was reported, the health and safety of the general public have not been affected.
                                                                            \:SI        METHOD OF                                                               A STATUS               %POWER                         OTHERSTATUS               DISCOVERY                                DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION        i&.
5       l.&#xa3;J@ IO IO j                   ~@)!RepTaee\Tient outage                     j     ~@I. . _N_o_t_i_f_i_c_a_t_i_o_n_f_r_o_m__N_s_s_s_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _                    ----1 8                                    12 A2flVITY          C~~TENT                    1J                              44      ~5           46                                                                       80 RELEASED OF RELEASE                           AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY     @                                                     LOCATION OF RELEASE          @
J GJ@) ~@I 8     9         .       10 NA 1~1:--------------..J NA 45                                                                                80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES                                               4-4 NUMBER       ~ TYPE           DESCRIPTION@
Q I o I o Io 11l021W@
I8 9                             12 NA 1::3:----------------------------------------~
PERSONNEL INJURIES                                                                                                                                                 BO NUMBER             DESCRIPTION@
'O8 9I o I o I o11I@,;--;2;---------------------------'=---------------------J NA 60 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY@
TYPE           DESCRIPTION                   43 I] t2J@                                         .                             NA 8     9             10 PUBLICITY
      ,ssurnr,;:;\ DESCRIPTION~
r.;,..          80 0 8 o 4, o ,~/ aJ!l,..                                                                              NRC I.Ee ONLY BO Jl j
NJ0:--;;-10_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.:N~A:.....__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___j                                                                        I I 1! 1I    i I   II I I I~
68     69 J. L. Wilson                                                                      (804) 357-3181'..
ru:,ME OF PREPARER                                                                                     oun ... ,r.
* ATTACHI-IENT 1
*SURRY POWER STATION DOCKET NO:     50-281 REPORT NO:     80-009 /0lT-0 EVENT DATE:     7-14-80 TITLE OF EVENT :           FQ LIMIT RESTRICTION
: 1. Description of Event:
On November 9, 1979, VEPCO was notified of an unreviewed safety question by Westinghouse Electric Corporation. The unreviewed safety question concerned a potential non-conservative feature of the Westinghouse ECCS large break evaluatio~ model which could affect the peak clad temperature calculated for the tOCA. transient, specificly in the fuel clad burst model.
Westinghouse,in evaluating their fuel Clad Burst model,has recommended a conservative, interim limit 'Be 9-pplied--to* ~the. mode.1--pending *NRG approval of their new Fuel Clad Burst model.
Westinghouse analysis (with the interim** limits) of     Surry Unit 1 indicated that sufficient margin existed in the FQ- limit, but     for Surry Unit 2, there existed a ,_ residual penalty of O. 007 in Fq based on   the present Fq "limit of 2*:.19. ' This event is reportable in accordance wit:h   Technical Specification 6.6.2.a.8.
: 2. Prob ab le Consequences/Status of Redundant Sys terns-:
The Westinghouse evaluation revealed that heatup rates could be <25&deg;F/second During the LOCA transient, the fuel clad burst curve establishes the time of clad burst and the post-burst conditions of the c.lad.       The fu~l clad burst curve is dependent on the clad heatup rate prior to burst, and a reduction in clad heatup rate causes earlier cla~ burst, Since Surry Unit 2 has not operated since this event was reported, the health and safety of the general public have not been affected.
: 3. Cause The potential non-conservative feature of the Westinghouse large break ECCS evaluation utilized a model which uses a curve that represents fuel clad burst conditions for clad heatup rates of > 25&deg;F /second .. The* fuel clad burst curve is dependent on the clad heatup rate prior to burst and a redu*ction in heatup rate causes earlier clad burst.' A shift in clad burst time can affect the peak clad temperature (PCT) calculated for the LOCA-transient.
: 3. Cause The potential non-conservative feature of the Westinghouse large break ECCS evaluation utilized a model which uses a curve that represents fuel clad burst conditions for clad heatup rates of > 25&deg;F /second .. The* fuel clad burst curve is dependent on the clad heatup rate prior to burst and a redu*ction in heatup rate causes earlier clad burst.' A shift in clad burst time can affect the peak clad temperature (PCT) calculated for the LOCA-transient.
: 4. Immediate Corrective Actions: Since the current Surry LOCA-ECCS analyses exhibited heatup rates less than 25&deg;F/sec., a specific reanalysis was performed to ascertain the effect on PCT for the Surry Unit 2 analysis.
: 4. Immediate Corrective Actions:
The Fq limit will be administratively restricted to 2.18 as an interim measure until NRC fuel +9d burst mpdeling co~c~rns_are r~9 o~ye9. ~lJ ijo~ ~hannel factor surveillance will be analyzed based *on this interim li:r.n.t.
Since the current Surry LOCA-ECCS analyses exhibited heatup rates less than 25&deg;F/sec., a specific reanalysis was performed to ascertain the effect on PCT for the Surry Unit 2 analysis. The Fq limit will be administratively restricted to 2.18 as an interim measure until NRC fuel +9d burst mpdeling co~c~rns_are r~ 9 o~ye9. ~lJ ijo~ ~hannel factor surveillance will be analyzed based *on this interim li:r.n.t.
: 5. Scheduled Corrective Action: Once the Fuel Rod Burst model concerns are -resolved-, the model will be evaluated for Surry to determine if LOCA-ECCs analysis and possible Technical Specifications changes will be required.
: 5. Scheduled Corrective Action:
for present Fq limits.
Once the Fuel Rod Burst model concerns are -resolved-, the model will be evaluated for Surry to determine if LOCA-ECCs analysis and possible Technical Specifications changes will be required. for present Fq limits.
 
}.TTACHHENT 2
}.TTACHHENT 2
* e 6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:
: 6.
No other action will be necessary to prevent recurrence.
* Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:
e No other action will be necessary to prevent recurrence.
: 7. Generic Implications This event was a Westinghouse identified generic item and was reported under LER No. 79-032/0lT-0 for Surry Unit 1 and 2.}}
: 7. Generic Implications This event was a Westinghouse identified generic item and was reported under LER No. 79-032/0lT-0 for Surry Unit 1 and 2.}}

Revision as of 03:27, 21 October 2019

LER 80-009/01T-0:on 800718,Westinghouse LOCA ECCS Reanalysis Indicated Error in Fuel Clad Burst Model.Caused by Reduction in Clad Heatup Rate Which Shifts Fuel Clad Burst Curve & Results in Earlier Clad Burst.Limit Will Be Controlled
ML18139A610
Person / Time
Site: Surry Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 07/31/1980
From: Joshua Wilson
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML18139A609 List:
References
LER-80-009-01T, LER-80-9-1T, NUDOCS 8008040118
Download: ML18139A610 (3)
v • d • e


Text

CONTROL BL 0CK:

0 1~ 8 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE.L REQUIRED INFORtJ..:.TIONJ l V I A Is I p I sI 2 101 0

~ LICENSEE CODE 14 1~

oI - I o Io Io Io I O I 0 I O 101 LICENSE NUMBER 2!:> 2G 4 11 11 11 11 101 LICENSE. TYPE 30 I IG

S C.:..T :,8

~:~~~ L!:_JG) 1oI s I o Io I o12 1s I o 101 o I 7 11 I 8 I sI o l(v I oI 7 I 3 I 1 1s Io 10 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 7:, REPORT DATE BD EVENT .DESCRIPTION AND F'ROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@

I Westinghouse LOCA-ECCS reanalysis indicates that a residual penalty of O .007 i=- FQ exists from the fuel rod burst model. The error in the fuel clad burst model was rep:rted 11-26-79 in Unit 1 LERNO. 79-032/0lT-0. As a result, the FQ Limit (T.S.3.12.~.l) must be reduced. This is reportable as per T.S. 6.6.2.a.8.

8 9 80 SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP, VALVE CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE 9 I RIC I@ Lu@ L!J@ IFjUjEjLjXj x1@ L:J w@

6 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20 SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT  ?.EVISION r.::;,. LER/RO EVENT YEAR . REPORT NO, CODE TYPE NO.

\'..:./N"i;~~~~

. CIs21 I 01 Xl I

23 I 1° 1° I 24 91 26 1.....--1 27 lo l 28 1!

29 L!J 30 31 w

32 ACTION TAKEN FUTURE ACTION EFFECT ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS

@ ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED NPR0-4 FORM .SUB.

PRIME COMP. COMPONENT MANUFACTURER SUPPLIER l..u@L!J@

33 34

~(§)

~

L2J 10 10 I 36 37 Oj 01 l2..J 40 41

~

42

~@)

43 I wJ 1 I 2 Io I@

<17 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND_CORRECTIVE ACTIONS@

0 I The* fuel clad burst error wa~ caused .by :a reduction in clad heatup rate which shifts the

}] !fuel clad burst curve and results in earlier clad burst. The FQ.lirnit will be TI _ladrninistratively controlled at 2.18 pending NRC evaluation of the Fuel Clad burst* model 3 jand possible LOCA-ECCS Reanalysis.

4 B 9 BO FACILITY .

S/

,.;;;..

\:SI METHOD OF A STATUS %POWER OTHERSTATUS DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION i&.

5 l.£J@ IO IO j ~@)!RepTaee\Tient outage j ~@I. . _N_o_t_i_f_i_c_a_t_i_o_n_f_r_o_m__N_s_s_s_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ----1 8 12 A2flVITY C~~TENT 1J 44 ~5 46 80 RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY @ LOCATION OF RELEASE @

J GJ@) ~@I 8 9 . 10 NA 1~1:--------------..J NA 45 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 4-4 NUMBER ~ TYPE DESCRIPTION@

Q I o I o Io 11l021W@

I8 9 12 NA 1::3:----------------------------------------~

PERSONNEL INJURIES BO NUMBER DESCRIPTION@

'O8 9I o I o I o11I@,;--;2;---------------------------'=---------------------J NA 60 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY@

TYPE DESCRIPTION 43 I] t2J@ . NA 8 9 10 PUBLICITY

,ssurnr,;:;\ DESCRIPTION~

r.;,.. 80 0 8 o 4, o ,~/ aJ!l,.. NRC I.Ee ONLY BO Jl j

NJ0:--;;-10_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __.:N~A:.....__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___j I I 1! 1I i I II I I I~

68 69 J. L. Wilson (804) 357-3181'..

ru:,ME OF PREPARER oun ... ,r.

  • ATTACHI-IENT 1
  • SURRY POWER STATION DOCKET NO: 50-281 REPORT NO: 80-009 /0lT-0 EVENT DATE: 7-14-80 TITLE OF EVENT : FQ LIMIT RESTRICTION
1. Description of Event:

On November 9, 1979, VEPCO was notified of an unreviewed safety question by Westinghouse Electric Corporation. The unreviewed safety question concerned a potential non-conservative feature of the Westinghouse ECCS large break evaluatio~ model which could affect the peak clad temperature calculated for the tOCA. transient, specificly in the fuel clad burst model.

Westinghouse,in evaluating their fuel Clad Burst model,has recommended a conservative, interim limit 'Be 9-pplied--to* ~the. mode.1--pending *NRG approval of their new Fuel Clad Burst model.

Westinghouse analysis (with the interim** limits) of Surry Unit 1 indicated that sufficient margin existed in the FQ- limit, but for Surry Unit 2, there existed a ,_ residual penalty of O. 007 in Fq based on the present Fq "limit of 2*:.19. ' This event is reportable in accordance wit:h Technical Specification 6.6.2.a.8.

2. Prob ab le Consequences/Status of Redundant Sys terns-:

The Westinghouse evaluation revealed that heatup rates could be <25°F/second During the LOCA transient, the fuel clad burst curve establishes the time of clad burst and the post-burst conditions of the c.lad. The fu~l clad burst curve is dependent on the clad heatup rate prior to burst, and a reduction in clad heatup rate causes earlier cla~ burst, Since Surry Unit 2 has not operated since this event was reported, the health and safety of the general public have not been affected.

3. Cause The potential non-conservative feature of the Westinghouse large break ECCS evaluation utilized a model which uses a curve that represents fuel clad burst conditions for clad heatup rates of > 25°F /second .. The* fuel clad burst curve is dependent on the clad heatup rate prior to burst and a redu*ction in heatup rate causes earlier clad burst.' A shift in clad burst time can affect the peak clad temperature (PCT) calculated for the LOCA-transient.
4. Immediate Corrective Actions:

Since the current Surry LOCA-ECCS analyses exhibited heatup rates less than 25°F/sec., a specific reanalysis was performed to ascertain the effect on PCT for the Surry Unit 2 analysis. The Fq limit will be administratively restricted to 2.18 as an interim measure until NRC fuel +9d burst mpdeling co~c~rns_are r~ 9 o~ye9. ~lJ ijo~ ~hannel factor surveillance will be analyzed based *on this interim li:r.n.t.

5. Scheduled Corrective Action:

Once the Fuel Rod Burst model concerns are -resolved-, the model will be evaluated for Surry to determine if LOCA-ECCs analysis and possible Technical Specifications changes will be required. for present Fq limits.

}.TTACHHENT 2

6.
  • Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

e No other action will be necessary to prevent recurrence.

7. Generic Implications This event was a Westinghouse identified generic item and was reported under LER No. 79-032/0lT-0 for Surry Unit 1 and 2.
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