ML18139B369: Difference between revisions

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=Text=
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{{#Wiki_filter:----. -*---* *----. -*.' e CONT'F,!OL.
{{#Wiki_filter:CONT'F,!OL. SL.OCJ<;
SL.OCJ<; !-! _..._ ____ .._...., ___ .-:!l 0 !(Pl.EASE PRINT CR TYPe Al.l REQUIRED INFORMATIONl IO IV I A I s I p I s I 2 101 0 I O l .,., 0 I 01 01 01 01 -! 010 *IG)/ 4 11 11 1111101 I I&#xa9; ii 9 L.ICENSE:
                                                                          -- --. -*---*
COOE 1, ?S . L.ICENSi N.UMBER _ * .. * . 2S -25 L.ICENSE 'iYPE JO S7 C,.l.T SB ; CON-:" -I . -ITTD ; s  
                                                !-!_ . . . __ _ _ _. . _ . . . . ,_ _ _  .-:!l 0
~I 01 Sl 01 01 0121 8j:,l(Dl 01 s,.a, 2*1sr11@1016 IO 121 s 111@ 60 61 COCKET NUMBER -68 69 * -EVENT CATE -74 7S REPORT CATE SC EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEOUENCES-@*''  
                                                                                                        *--- - . -*.'                                    e
,. * .. I On May 2, 1981,. following return to power on April 28th, leakage monitoring valve, 2-I CV-12, was found open and the downstream .p.ipe .. cap .missing.
                                                                                                                      !(Pl.EASE PRINT CR TYPe Al.l REQUIRED INFORMATIONl IO ii IV I A I s I p I s I 2 1,101 0 I O l .,., 0 I 01 01 9        L.ICENSE: COOE                          ?S                     .           L.ICENSi N.UMBER 01    01
This is contrary to T. S. [&sect;JI] 1 3.8.A.l and is reportable per T.S. 6.6.2.b.(2).
_ *.. *
In this condition the outboard contain-I
                                                                                                                                  -! .
[]JI] ment isolation valve, TV-CV-250B, was *ineffective as a barrier. However, the inboard I isolation valve, TV~CV-250A, would have been effective and was verified operable.
010 *IG)/ 4 11 2S   - 25 11 1111101S7 I I&#xa9; L.ICENSE 'iYPE       JO         C,.l.T SB
[ill] Therefore; the health and safety of the public were not affected.
                                                                                                            ;
ill!] 7 8 9 C&sect;:0 : 7 8 I SYSTEM CODE 1 8 IA I@ 9 10 LERIRO [:VENT YE-":R REPORT j8 11 I NUMBER . :Zt :z:z CAUSc CAUSE COMP. VALVE cooe suscooe COMPONcNT cocE suscccE suscoDe !E...J@ w@ 'v rA, L 'v 'E, x ,e l!L..1 .. l!LJ@. 12 13 1B 19 20 11 ScOUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REPORT NO. CODE TYPE I I 1&deg;1 2 1 9 1 ,,...., t 0 13 I L.2::J I j :z:. 24 2& 27 28 ::zg 30 31 REVISION NO. CCMPONEN~
CON-:"                                                                                                 - I   .           -
80 ACTION l'U'T\JRE EFi=:CT . SHUTOOWN t.::\ ATTACHMENT NPRO. -PRIME C:OMP. TAKEN ACTION CN Pl.ANT METHOD -. HOURS @ SUBMITTED-. ', FORM i;us. .. SUPPUER LE....l@L1LI@
ITTD
LL! LI .o .J,O !*O IO j O I t.!l* L!J: .... J.:~J@ MANUFACTURER 3:l :I" 3S :l6 . 37 40 ,,
;       s
* 42 * -*,_. 43 .. , G 12 j 5 j7 I CAUSE DESCRIPTION ANO CORRECTIVE ACTIONS @ ,1 Lill] j The* cause of the event was due to inadequate procedure*~*
                    ~~~~;        ~ I 01 Sl 01 60                61 01 0121 COCKET NUMBER 8j:,l(Dl
The valve was closed and o::::IIJ j the p *i pe cap-replaced.
                                                                                                          -    68    69 01       s,.a,
o:::m ITII]'...._
                                                                                                                              * - EVENT CATE 2*1sr11@1016 IO 121 s 111@
________________________________________
                                                                                                                                                  -         74        7S      REPORT CATE             SC EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEOUENCES-@*'' ,. * . .
..... &#xa3;IE] 7 8 9 FACJLl'TY STATUS 'JI. POWER OTHER STATUS \.::::J tJE L&#xa3;.j@ !1_ jo lo )@)! ______ NA ____ __ 1 a 9 10 12 n ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVl'TY [ill] w @ ~@I NA . , a 9 10 -,,-----------""" METHOD OF DISCOVERY Cl5eOVERY DESCRIPTION
I On     May 2, 1981,. following return to power on April 28th, leakage monitoring valve, 2-
'5, l!J@:DI Operational event 45 <16 80 NA .LOCATlON OF ReL.EASE  80 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES I"!::\ NUMBER t,;:;\ T'Yl'E cesCRIPTtON IIIT] p l O I O 1'8~~~--*N_A
~            I CV-12,         was found open and the downstream .p.ipe .. cap .missing. This is contrary to T. S.
________________________
[&sect;JI]         3.8.A.l and is reportable per T.S. 6.6.2.b.(2). In this condition the outboard contain-I 1
____. , a 9 11 :2 1:i PERSONNEi.
ment isolation valve, TV-CV-250B, was *ineffective as a barrier. However, the inboard
INJURIES C\ l'JUMSER CESCl'Ul'TlON~
[]JI]
DI] j 0,1 O IO I@ NA , a 9 11 "'",:z~------------------------------------
  ~          I isolation                valve, TV~CV-250A, would have been effective and was verified operable.
....... eo LOSS CF OR OAMAGE TC F~I.JTV ~3 TYPE CESCRIPTlON o::JIJ W@ . ' A 80 , a 9 10 PUBLJC.l'TY Di ISSUEt)t,;:;\
Therefore; the health and safety of the public were not affected.
CESCl'IIP'TlON  
[ill]
\!;I NRC use ONt. y .. Cil2J wei N 1 , 1 , , , , , , , , , , 1 7 a i **1 ~o~-'J:-=-~":""6---
ill!]
...... :....---------------------------:&a eg so ; 91. n 6 05 .ME OF CIO;?AF!E;:!
7       8 9                                                                                                                                                                                                         80 SYSTEM               CAUSc                CAUSE                                                                    COMP.            VALVE CODE                cooe              suscooe                          COMPONcNT cocE                          suscccE            suscoDe C&sect;:0 7      8 18 9
J'. L. Wilson ci ... o~!!:: (804) 357-3184 &deg; so
IA 10 I@ 11!E...J@ w@                 12
* ATTACHMENT 1, PAGE 1 OF 1 SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 2 DOCKET NO: 50-281 REPORT NO: 81-029/03L-O EVENT DATE:
                                                                                                            'v rA, L'v 'E, x,e 13                                  1B l!L..1 . l!LJ@.
* 05-02-~1 TITLE OF EVENT: 2-CV-12 LEFT OPEN 1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT: On May 2, 1981, following return to power on April 28th, a higher than normal tainment vacuum pump discharge flow rate was noted. Subsequent investigation vealed that leakage monitoring valve, 2-CV-12, was open and the downstream pipe cap was missing. This is contrary to Tech. Spec. 3.8.A.1 and is reportabl~
19               20 ScOUENTIAL                                     OCCURRENCE               REPORT                         REVISION
per Tech. Spec. 6.6.2.b. (2). 2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES AND STATUS OF REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT:
              ~      LERIRO [:VENT YE-":R                                              REPORT NO.                                        CODE                   TYPE                             NO.
With 2-CV-12 open and pipe cap removed, the two barrier design criteria for ment isolation cannot be met. Specifically, the outboard containment isolation valve, TV-CV-250B, was ineffective as a barrier. However, the inboard isolation valve, TV-CV-250A, would have been effective and was verified operable.
              ~      REPORT NUMBER j8
Therefore, the health and *safety of the public were not affected.
                                      . :Zt 11 I :z:z        I:z:. I              1&deg;1 2 19 1                     ,,....,           t 0 13 ::zgI            L.2::J           I     j       ~
: 3. CAUSE: The cause of. this event was improper administrative control over design change testing. The valve had been opened and the pipe cap removed to facilitate testing .of components that had been installed for a TMI design change. The valve and pipe cap were.*n.ot, returned to their normal status following*
24                   2&         27               28                       30               31           ~
the design change implementaf::-.i.;., i ion. Investigation of this event revealed that an approved procedure, for the manip-*
ACTION     l'U'T\JRE                 EFi=:CT .         SHUTOOWN                                       t.::\     ATTACHMENT           NPRO.           - PRIME C:OMP.             CCMPONEN~
* ulation of .2-CV-12, was not utilized or referenced by the design change. 4: IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: The immediate corrective action was to close the valve and replace the pipe cap. 5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: None required.
TAKEN     ACTION                   CN Pl.ANT             METHOD -             .             HOURS     @           SUBMITTED- . ', FORM i;us. .. SUPPUER                         MANUFACTURER LE....l@L1LI@ 3SLL!
3:l          :I" LI
:l6
                                                                                          .o   .J,O !*O
                                                                                                . 37 IO   jO  40 I ,,t.!l*
* 42L!J:             *        ~
                                                                                                                                                                        .... J.:~J@
                                                                                                                                                                    - *,_. 43
                                                                                                                                                                                            .. , G 12       j 5 j7   I
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    ,1 CAUSE DESCRIPTION ANO CORRECTIVE ACTIONS                                             @
Lill] j The* cause of the event was due to inadequate procedure*~* The valve was closed                                                                                                             and o::::IIJ     j the p *i pe cap- replaced.
o:::m ITII]'...._________________________________________.....
&#xa3;IE]
7     8     9                                                                                                                                                                                                     80 FACJLl'TY                                                                               ~          METHOD OF                                                                      ~
STATUS               'JI. POWER                           OTHER STATUS               \.::::J                                                                                   '5, tJE         L&#xa3;.j@           !1_     jo lo           )@)!______NA_ _ _ ___
DISCOVERY l!J@:DI          Operational event Cl5eOVERY DESCRIPTION 1       a   9               10                   12       n                                                   45          <16                                                                                80 ACTIVITY       CONTENT                                                               ~
AMOUNT OF ACTIVl'TY ~
[ill]
,      a w @ ~@I RELEASED OF RELEASE 9               10 NA
                                                -,,-----------"""
                                                                      .                                                            NA
                                                                                                                                                          .LOCATlON OF ReL.EASE 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES                                         I"!::\
NUMBER           t,;:;\ T'Yl'E ~ cesCRIPTtON ~
IIIT] p l O I O 1'8~~~--*N_A_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____.
,       a   9                 11           :2           1:i                                                                                                                                                     80 PERSONNEi. INJURIES                         C\
l'JUMSER                   CESCl'Ul'TlON~
DI]         j 0,1 O     IO I@                                   NA
,       a   9                 11           "'",:z~------------------------------------.......                                                                                                                     eo LOSS CF OR OAMAGE TC F~I.JTV ~3 TYPE         CESCRIPTlON o::JIJ W@                               .                 '         A
,       a   9           10 so PUBLJC.l'TY                   Di ISSUEt)t,;:;\ CESCl'IIP'TlON       \!;I                                                                                                                                     NRC use ONt. y               ..
Cil2Ja 7
wei ~o~-'J:-=-~":""6---.. .N.:....---------------------------:&a i **1 1 , 1 , , , , , , , , , ,
eg                                so ;
1
: 91. n 6 05 .ME OF                         CIO;?AF!E;:!           J'. L. Wilson                                                                   ci ... o~!!::       (804) 357-3184                               &deg;
 
ATTACHMENT 1, PAGE 1 OF 1 SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 2 DOCKET NO:   50-281
* REPORT NO:   81-029/03L-O EVENT DATE:
* 05-02-~1 TITLE OF EVENT:     2-CV-12 LEFT OPEN
: 1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:
On May 2, 1981, following return to power on April 28th, a higher than normal con-tainment vacuum pump discharge flow rate was noted. Subsequent investigation re-vealed that leakage monitoring valve, 2-CV-12, was open and the downstream pipe cap was missing. This is contrary to Tech. Spec. 3.8.A.1 and is reportabl~ per Tech.
Spec. 6.6.2.b. (2).
: 2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES AND STATUS OF REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT:
With 2-CV-12 open and pipe cap removed, the two barrier design criteria for contain-ment isolation cannot be met. Specifically, the outboard containment isolation valve, TV-CV-250B, was ineffective as a barrier. However, the inboard isolation valve, TV-CV-250A, would have been effective and was verified operable. Therefore, the health and *safety of the public were not affected.
: 3. CAUSE:
The cause of. this event was improper administrative control over design change testing. The valve had been opened and the pipe cap removed to facilitate testing
  .of components that had been installed for a TMI design change. The valve and pipe cap were.*n.ot, returned to their normal status following* the design change implementaf::-.i.;., i ion. Investigation of this event revealed that an approved procedure, for the manip- *
* ulation of .2-CV-12, was not utilized or referenced by the design change.
4: IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
The immediate corrective action was to close the valve and replace the pipe cap.
: 5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
None required.
: 6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:
: 6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:
Design changes will be reviewed to ensure that the testing of containment tions,as required, will be performed and documented using approved procedures.
Design changes will be reviewed to ensure that the testing of containment penetra-tions,as required, will be performed and documented using approved procedures.
Personnel involved with testing of this nature have been re-instructed in the importance of returning systems to a normal configuration.  
Personnel involved with testing of this nature have been re-instructed in the importance of returning systems to a normal configuration.
]. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:
]. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:
This was a random event and therefore not generic.}}
This was a random event and therefore not generic.}}

Revision as of 03:12, 21 October 2019

LER 81-029/03L-0:on 810502,leakage Monitoring Valve 2-CV-12 Found Open & Downstream Pipe Cap Missing Following Return to Power on 810428.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Valve Closed & Pipe Cap Replaced
ML18139B369
Person / Time
Site: Surry Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 06/02/1981
From: Joshua Wilson
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML18139B367 List:
References
LER-81-029-03L-01, LER-81-29-3L-1, NUDOCS 8106050426
Download: ML18139B369 (2)


Text

CONT'F,!OL. SL.OCJ<;

-- --. -*---*

!-!_ . . . __ _ _ _. . _ . . . . ,_ _ _ .-:!l 0

  • --- - . -*.' e

!(Pl.EASE PRINT CR TYPe Al.l REQUIRED INFORMATIONl IO ii IV I A I s I p I s I 2 1,101 0 I O l .,., 0 I 01 01 9 L.ICENSE: COOE ?S . L.ICENSi N.UMBER 01 01

_ *.. *

-! .

010 *IG)/ 4 11 2S - 25 11 1111101S7 I I© L.ICENSE 'iYPE JO C,.l.T SB

CON-:" - I . -

ITTD

s

~~~~; ~ I 01 Sl 01 60 61 01 0121 COCKET NUMBER 8j:,l(Dl

- 68 69 01 s,.a,

  • - EVENT CATE 2*1sr11@1016 IO 121 s 111@

- 74 7S REPORT CATE SC EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEOUENCES-@* ,. * . .

I On May 2, 1981,. following return to power on April 28th, leakage monitoring valve, 2-

~ I CV-12, was found open and the downstream .p.ipe .. cap .missing. This is contrary to T. S.

[§JI] 3.8.A.l and is reportable per T.S. 6.6.2.b.(2). In this condition the outboard contain-I 1

ment isolation valve, TV-CV-250B, was *ineffective as a barrier. However, the inboard

[]JI]

~ I isolation valve, TV~CV-250A, would have been effective and was verified operable.

Therefore; the health and safety of the public were not affected.

[ill]

ill!]

7 8 9 80 SYSTEM CAUSc CAUSE COMP. VALVE CODE cooe suscooe COMPONcNT cocE suscccE suscoDe C§:0 7 8 18 9

IA 10 I@ 11!E...J@ w@ 12

'v rA, L'v 'E, x,e 13 1B l!L..1 . l!LJ@.

19 20 ScOUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION

~ LERIRO [:VENT YE-":R REPORT NO. CODE TYPE NO.

~ REPORT NUMBER j8

. :Zt 11 I :z:z I:z:. I 1°1 2 19 1 ,,...., t 0 13 ::zgI L.2::J I j ~

24 2& 27 28 30 31 ~

ACTION l'U'T\JRE EFi=:CT . SHUTOOWN t.::\ ATTACHMENT NPRO. - PRIME C:OMP. CCMPONEN~

TAKEN ACTION CN Pl.ANT METHOD - . HOURS @ SUBMITTED- . ', FORM i;us. .. SUPPUER MANUFACTURER LE....l@L1LI@ 3SLL!

3:l :I" LI

l6

.o .J,O !*O

. 37 IO jO 40 I ,,t.!l*

  • 42L!J: * ~

.... J.:~J@

- *,_. 43

.. , G 12 j 5 j7 I

,1 CAUSE DESCRIPTION ANO CORRECTIVE ACTIONS @

Lill] j The* cause of the event was due to inadequate procedure*~* The valve was closed and o::::IIJ j the p *i pe cap- replaced.

o:::m ITII]'...._________________________________________.....

£IE]

7 8 9 80 FACJLl'TY ~ METHOD OF ~

STATUS 'JI. POWER OTHER STATUS \.::::J '5, tJE L£.j@ !1_ jo lo )@)!______NA_ _ _ ___

DISCOVERY l!J@:DI Operational event Cl5eOVERY DESCRIPTION 1 a 9 10 12 n 45 <16 80 ACTIVITY CONTENT ~

AMOUNT OF ACTIVl'TY ~

[ill]

, a w @ ~@I RELEASED OF RELEASE 9 10 NA

-,,-----------"""

. NA

.LOCATlON OF ReL.EASE 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES I"!::\

NUMBER t,;:;\ T'Yl'E ~ cesCRIPTtON ~

IIIT] p l O I O 1'8~~~--*N_A_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____.

, a 9 11 :2 1:i 80 PERSONNEi. INJURIES C\

l'JUMSER CESCl'Ul'TlON~

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ATTACHMENT 1, PAGE 1 OF 1 SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 2 DOCKET NO: 50-281

  • REPORT NO: 81-029/03L-O EVENT DATE:
  • 05-02-~1 TITLE OF EVENT: 2-CV-12 LEFT OPEN
1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On May 2, 1981, following return to power on April 28th, a higher than normal con-tainment vacuum pump discharge flow rate was noted. Subsequent investigation re-vealed that leakage monitoring valve, 2-CV-12, was open and the downstream pipe cap was missing. This is contrary to Tech. Spec. 3.8.A.1 and is reportabl~ per Tech.

Spec. 6.6.2.b. (2).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES AND STATUS OF REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT:

With 2-CV-12 open and pipe cap removed, the two barrier design criteria for contain-ment isolation cannot be met. Specifically, the outboard containment isolation valve, TV-CV-250B, was ineffective as a barrier. However, the inboard isolation valve, TV-CV-250A, would have been effective and was verified operable. Therefore, the health and *safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE:

The cause of. this event was improper administrative control over design change testing. The valve had been opened and the pipe cap removed to facilitate testing

.of components that had been installed for a TMI design change. The valve and pipe cap were.*n.ot, returned to their normal status following* the design change implementaf::-.i.;., i ion. Investigation of this event revealed that an approved procedure, for the manip- *

  • ulation of .2-CV-12, was not utilized or referenced by the design change.

4: IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The immediate corrective action was to close the valve and replace the pipe cap.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

None required.

6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

Design changes will be reviewed to ensure that the testing of containment penetra-tions,as required, will be performed and documented using approved procedures.

Personnel involved with testing of this nature have been re-instructed in the importance of returning systems to a normal configuration.

]. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

This was a random event and therefore not generic.