ML18139A829: Difference between revisions

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=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:C FO~Mj,66 .CENSEE EVENT REPORT U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
{{#Wiki_filter:C FO~Mj,66 .CENSEE EVENT REPORT U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
: 77) , . e CONTROL BLOC K:j L.. _J...---1,..
: 77) , . e CONTROL BLOC K:j L.. _J...---1,..
_ _.____...__.._l  
_ _.____...__.._l  
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{";-i~ ----; ... ,;* !.=...K=:.  
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..:..:~1:*.  
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==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
MOMENTARY LOSS OF EMERGENCY BUS 1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT With the plant at 100% Reactor Power and Stable, Turbine Building floor ration was in progress for design change 77-19B. A Jackhannner breached the reserve station Service duct bank.and came in contact with an energized ductor. Breakers 15Fl and 262 opened clearing the fault and deenergizing the Unit 1 "H" emergency bus and the Unit 1 "J: emergency bus. EDG 1 and 3 started and loaded. The momentary loss of vital bus 2-lV caused the "C" feed REG Valve to Revert to manual and initiated a Turbine Runback. The ensuing high level on "C" Stearn Generator caused a 'I\,rbine trip and subsequent reactor trip. This event is reportable per T.S.6.6.2.a.(2).  
MOMENTARY LOSS OF EMERGENCY BUS 1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT With the plant at 100% Reactor Power and Stable, Turbine Building floor ration was in progress for design change 77-19B. A Jackhannner breached the reserve station Service duct bank.and came in contact with an energized ductor. Breakers 15Fl and 262 opened clearing the fault and deenergizing the Unit 1 "H" emergency bus and the Unit 1 "J: emergency bus. EDG 1 and 3 started and loaded. The momentary loss of vital bus 2-lV caused the "C" feed REG Valve to Revert to manual and initiated a Turbine Runback. The ensuing high level on "C" Stearn Generator caused a 'I\,rbine trip and subsequent reactor trip. This event is reportable per T.S.6.6.2.a.(2).
: 2. *PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES  
: 2. *PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES  
& STATUS OF REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT This*event initiated an transient on the Emergency Power system however, the Emergency Diesel Generator performed their designed functions.
& STATUS OF REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT This*event initiated an transient on the Emergency Power system however, the Emergency Diesel Generator performed their designed functions.
Unit.No. 1 was in 2. CSD soncli.:.ion .and defuej_ed, hence there was no affect on the safety of Unit No. 1. Therefore the health and safety of the public were not affected.  
Unit.No. 1 was in 2. CSD soncli.:.ion .and defuej_ed, hence there was no affect on the safety of Unit No. 1. Therefore the health and safety of the public were not affected.
: 3. CAUSE The location of the conductor was not accurately determined during the .design phase of Design Change 77-19B. 4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION Ensured the Emergency Diesel G:enerators hadstarted  
: 3. CAUSE The location of the conductor was not accurately determined during the .design phase of Design Change 77-19B. 4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION Ensured the Emergency Diesel G:enerators hadstarted  
& assumed their normal loads. 5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION The "F" transfer bus was fed from the Switchyard through "lC" Station Service Transformer pending repairs to the cables. The affected cables are currently being replaced.  
& assumed their normal loads. 5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION The "F" transfer bus was fed from the Switchyard through "lC" Station Service Transformer pending repairs to the cables. The affected cables are currently being replaced.
: 6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECCURANCE Requirements for* a specific ,release to drill or chip concrete .structural surfaces will be established.  
: 6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECCURANCE Requirements for* a specific ,release to drill or chip concrete .structural surfaces will be established.
: 7. Generic Implications None}}
: 7. Generic Implications None}}

Revision as of 11:02, 25 April 2019

LER 80-035/01T-0:on 801101,electrical Transient Tripped Breaker & Two Emergency Generators Started & Loaded.Caused by Contact of Jackhammer with Power Cable.Emergency Diesel Generators Verified Operating & Supplying Emergency Buses
ML18139A829
Person / Time
Site: Surry Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 11/13/1980
From: WILSON J L
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML18139A827 List:
References
LER-80-035-01T, LER-80-35-1T, NUDOCS 8011180618
Download: ML18139A829 (2)


Text

C FO~Mj,66 .CENSEE EVENT REPORT U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

77) , . e CONTROL BLOC K:j L.. _J...---1,..

_ _.____...__.._l

---:I 8 , 6 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

ID I VI A Is Ip Is I 2 1010 8 9 LICENSEE.

CODE 14 15 o I -I o I o I o I o I o I -I o I o 10! Ll LICENSE. NUMS£R 25 26 I, I, I, I 1 101 I I G) LICE.NSE TYPE :30 57 CAT 56 lN'T :;:~~~ W©l o Is lo lo In b Is I 1 1011 I 1 Io I 1 Is Io 101 1 1 I 1 I 3 I s Io 10 60 61 DOCKET NUMBEE 63 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@

El 8 IT) I On Novanber 1,1980, with the Unit at JQQ>?: p:rwer, wbiJe orewri-na the hase:nent qf" TIJI L -~un::*.::

1::..0 t=-.:1::..:.~0::..:.*

.:::l_:;:'D:.::ur:::..:b:::in~e::__:h.l~=il~d:.::::in::.!:::qL..::f:.::o:'.:r~t::::!h~e'"---111=*

!,.£!S.,::t:Eal"""'°la!:awt==i~o

... n...._.o""f!,,......nu:es=,;,~eq~1_Juj4pn,WJ.s;P::;.n..i.;t....,_

..... a;:i__e1-jaa.1..c~k--...1.bJ.<:amrnlCUL.~O;:.'r.__

__ _ EJ ITJ ill m m came in contact with a rower cable from 'C' Reserve Station Servjce Transfonner to t.11e 'F' tra.11.sfer bus. This resulte::3.

in an electrical trarisient which triopaj breaker 1 5 Fl, . started and loade::3.

No.1&3 Emergency Generators.

The Erneraency power system performed it's designed fu..11.ction, therefore the healt.ri and safetv of the p.ililic were not affecte:i.

This event is reportable per T.S. 6.6.2.a. (2). 8 £' SYSTEM CODE [E l.zi, I@ 9 10 CAUSE CAUSE CODE SUBCODE w@ ~@ 11 *1;; 1-r I . COMPONENT CODE Ir. ,~ le lo COMP. VALVE SUBCODE SUBCODE 11\i jE) w@ LzJ@ 18 19 20 SEOUEr,,_1 11...:.:..

REPORT NC. OCCURRENCE

  • REPORT CODE TYPE 1--1 l.._J Io l 3 is l 1,,...-1 lo I 1 I CTJ L=J :ic :?~ .;. .. , 3 *, .!...r"~J'.""s F'.17::::..;.
  • _-::;:~_-~-:-

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FOR~.'. ~UE. PRIME. C::,*.~=: . SL!Fr'LI::;:

W@ CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (Z'.) REVISION NO. LQJ 80 lThe location of the conductor was noi: accurately determined during the design pnase o~ II] !design change 77-19B. The enerqencv diesel oenerators were verif"ie;:I operatin~

1 ~, ! 1 and supplying t.rieir resf)2Ctive e:nergency buses. ID El 8 9 FAC!L,T'*

STAIU~ ', F-0~'.'E;::..

r:::.'. r.'ETH OD o= r:;::;-, 80 DJ I ~1@ *111 0/ Ol@)I OTHE? s,,:,u~ \.:._..,*

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DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 0 N/A ~@ ..... ! __ o_r:ie:r=--

_~_a_to_r_O_b...;..s_e....rv_a_t_i_o_n

_______ __, SC LOC,!,TION OF RELEASE@ NA so N A 6C. NIA E: N/A NRC USE ONLY .~ 1 ciEi~F;::~,,,1o:.@

s o 11 1 so,,,. j ' l!IJl!jljJJ!Jc E 6E-6~ E: ;:; !'JLr .... ~. nc: DC::P,,O~O J. L. Wilson (804) 357-3184 0

" . ATTACHMENT 1 SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 2 DOCKET NO: 50-281 REPORT NO: 80-035/0lT-O EVENT DATE: 11-01-80 *

SUBJECT:

MOMENTARY LOSS OF EMERGENCY BUS 1. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT With the plant at 100% Reactor Power and Stable, Turbine Building floor ration was in progress for design change 77-19B. A Jackhannner breached the reserve station Service duct bank.and came in contact with an energized ductor. Breakers 15Fl and 262 opened clearing the fault and deenergizing the Unit 1 "H" emergency bus and the Unit 1 "J: emergency bus. EDG 1 and 3 started and loaded. The momentary loss of vital bus 2-lV caused the "C" feed REG Valve to Revert to manual and initiated a Turbine Runback. The ensuing high level on "C" Stearn Generator caused a 'I\,rbine trip and subsequent reactor trip. This event is reportable per T.S.6.6.2.a.(2).

2. *PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

& STATUS OF REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT This*event initiated an transient on the Emergency Power system however, the Emergency Diesel Generator performed their designed functions.

Unit.No. 1 was in 2. CSD soncli.:.ion .and defuej_ed, hence there was no affect on the safety of Unit No. 1. Therefore the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE The location of the conductor was not accurately determined during the .design phase of Design Change 77-19B. 4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION Ensured the Emergency Diesel G:enerators hadstarted

& assumed their normal loads. 5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION The "F" transfer bus was fed from the Switchyard through "lC" Station Service Transformer pending repairs to the cables. The affected cables are currently being replaced.

6. ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECCURANCE Requirements for* a specific ,release to drill or chip concrete .structural surfaces will be established.
7. Generic Implications None