ML101590390

2007-301 Simulator Scenarios (Section 4)

ML101590390
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	03/28/2010
From:	NRC/RGN-II
To:
References
Download: ML101590390 (131)

Text

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:

Turkey Point Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: 2007-301 Examiners:

Candidates:

US RO BOP Initial Conditions:

Mode 1, 75% Power, MOL, Awaiting permission from plant management to increase power back to 100%. 3-GOP-301 in use complete through step 5.96 for return to 100% power following a turbine valve test. Turnover:

Equipment OOS: 3B EDG due to failed fuel pump (OOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 in 4 hrs); B AFW Pump due to bearing failure (OOS 4 hrs; ETR 24 hrs; both trains verified operable);

3B CSP due to failed 1ST -low discharge pressure (OOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr) Perform 3C ICWP isolation valve cycling test per step 7.1.3 of 3-0SP-019.3.

Steps 7.1.1 & 7.1.2 for 3A and 3B ICWP are not scheduled for this shift. Known tube leak in 3A S/G (2 gpd) -unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-0NOP-071.2, Attachment

1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate. Event Event Type* Event Description No. 1 (N) SRO/BOP 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve cycling test per 3-0SP-019.3 step 7.1.3. 2 (I) RO/BOP Power range NI channel N-42 upper detector fails high. The crew responds TFN1P2AH = T per 3-0NOP-059.8. (TS,I) SRO 3 See event 4a PT-3-1604 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator TFS1ML3L = T below 0-7/4. 4 (C) BOP Loss of 3C 4kV bus. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-004.4.

TS are TFE2Z52S = T evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP. (C, TS) SRO 4a (R) SRO/BOP Automatic runback fails due to PT-3-1604 failure and requires manual action (I) RO to reduce power < 60 % to avoid reactor trip on s/g 10-10 level. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-089.

5 TYFACN3 = 0.1 (M) ALL Once reactor power stabilized

< 60% power, a 3C SG feed break occurs TFW98M=T inside containment.

A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level TCF1D09M = F drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is TFL2XASE = T performed.

The MOV-3-1409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving TFL2XBSE = T an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started. 6 (C) ALL C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup). The trip TAFXSRPC = can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam 6300.0 pressure from the 3C feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 TCF5MTC = T steam are prevented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed. SSGFW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead battery on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow < 345 gpm and is eventually required to initiate feed & bleed since all SGs < 32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.

.. (N)ormal, (R)eactlvlty, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor 1 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _1_ Page _1_ of _1_ Event

Description:

3C ICWP discharge isolation valve cycling test per 3-0SP-019.3 step 7.1.3. = Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs BOP to have NSO cycle 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve, 3-50-332 per 3-0SP-019.3, section 7.1. Directs BOP start 3B ICWP & sid 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3. BOP Obtains copies of 3-0SP-019.3, section 7.1 & 3-0P-019, section 5.3. Performs actions as follows: 1. Starts 3B ICWP & stops 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3 a. Verifies NSO understands ICWPs to be started/stopped

b. Directs NSO verify oil in 3B ICWP sightglass

& 3B ICWP discharge valve open c. Starts 3B ICWP & checks VPA ammeter> zero d. Directs NSO locally check 3B ICWP visible packing leakoff e. Stops 3C ICWP & checks VPA ammeter = zero f. Directs NSO locally do post-stop check 2. Has RO record 3C ICWP as inoperable.

3. Directs NSO perform steps 7.1.3.3 thru 7.1.3.6 NOTE: NSO has signoff procedure copy in field and will perform steps 7.1.3.3 thru 7.1.3.6 and will notify BOP when these steps are done. 4. Starts 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3 to verify operability.

a. Verifies NSO understands ICWPs to be started/stopped

b. Directs NSO verify oil in 3C ICWP sightglass

& 3C ICWP discharge valve open c. Starts 3C ICWP & checks VPA ammeter> zero d. Directs NSO locally check 3C ICWP visible packing leakoff 5. Has RO record 3C ICWP as back in service. 6. Since this is the last ICWP discharge valve to be cycled, stops 3B or 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3. a. Stops 3B or 3C ICWP & checks VPA ammeter = zero b. Directs NSO locally do post-stop check RO Records 3C ICWP OOS and return to service when advised by BOP. 1 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _2_ Page _1_ of _2_ Event

Description:

Power range NI channel N-42 upper detector fails high. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-059.8.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes

/ reports PRNI channel N-42 upper detector failed high.

• annunciator B-2/2, 3/6, 5/5, 6/1, 6/3, 6/4, 9/2 & G-5/1, 5/2

• N-42 power range channel indication on console fails high

• N-42 axial flux indication on console fails high

• N-42 upper detector indication on NIS racks fails high NOTE: There are no immediate actions for this failure N-42 US Directs response per 3-0NOP-059.8 RO/ Performs subsequent actions of 3-0NOP-059.8 as directed by US: BOP 1. Places dropped rod mode switch for N-42 in BYPASS. 2. Places right rod stop bypass switch to bypass N-42. 3. Transfers upper section comparator defeat switch to N-42. 4. Transfers lower section comparator defeat switch to N-42. 5. Transfers right power mismatch bypass switch to bypass N-42. 6. Transfers comparator channel defeat switch to N-42. 7. Pulls instrument power fuses from N-42 drawer B US Evaluates impact per TS 3.3.1. Table 3.3-1 units 2, 5, 6 & 17 apply. Actions 2 (6hr), 7 (1 hr)& 13 (6hr) all in effect. Conducts crew brief regarding effects of N-42 failure and of tripping bistables as directed in 3-0NOP-059.8 BOP Obtains keys, opens door to and trips following bistables in protection channel II, rack 11:

• BS-3-422B1 (OPilT trip)

• BS-3-422B2 (OPilT rod stop) It BS-3-422C1 (OTilT trip)

• BS-3-422C2 (OTilT rod stop) Closes protection rack door when done. 2 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _2_ Page .....L of _2_ Event

Description:

Power range NI channel N-42 u[2[2er detector fails high. The crew res[2onds

[2er 3-0NOP-059.8. , .... Dosition Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Monitors bistable status lights and annunciator panels for expected indications while bistables being tripped. US 1. Directs notification of I&e 2. Directs STA monitor QPTR per 3-0SP-059.1 0 (reactor power approx. 75%) 3. Directs wee generate clearance for tripped bistables 3

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: --l. Page _1_ of_1_ Event

Description:

PT-3-1604 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Acknowledges alarm D-7/4. Perform actions of 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4. 1. Recognizes/reports CV-3-2011 open and PT-3-1604 failed. 2. Determines no other automatic actions have occurred.

3. Determines reactor power increased due to CV-3-2011 failure but still < 100% 4. Determines SGFP suction pressure>

260 psig. 5. When directed by US, closes CV-3-2011.

6. Directs NSO verify CV-3-1900 closed. 7. Determines 2 HDPs running as required since turbine load> 450 MWe RO Reads 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator D-7/4 Observes decrease in Tavg & increase in reactor power due to CV-3-2011 failure US Directs closure of CV-3-2011 once it has been determined that SGFP suction pressure>

260 psig Determines effects of PT-3-1604 failure (e.g, no turbine runback on loss of SGFP). Conducts crew brief regarding effects of PT 1604 failure. Directs WCC have I&C investigate

/ fix PT-3-1604 failure. If QPTR directed in event 2, then allows power> 75% 4 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: 4/4a Page _1_ of 2 Event

Description:

Loss of 3C 4kV bus. 3B SGFP is lost. Automatic run back fails due to PT-3-1604 failure and requires manual action to reduce power < 60 % to avoid reactor trip on S/9 10-10 level. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-089 and 3-0NOP-004.4.

TS are evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP . .,.., I II I It:: Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports loss of 3B SGFP US BOP

• Annunciator D-6/2 (B SGFP low flow)

• Annunciators C-5/1 thru 5/3 (SG steam> feed flow)

• Annunciators D-6/1 thru 6/3 (SG level deviations)

• 3B SGFP breaker open indication with ammeter = 0

• Indicated feedwater flow < steam flow for all SGs

• Slowly dropping level in all SGs Notices absence of runback and takes 3B SGFP control switch to trip. Recognizes/reports failure of turbine to runback. Directs performance of immediate actions per 3-0NOP-089 including manual turbine runback to < 60% turbine load or as needed to reduce steam flow < available feedwater flow. Verifies automatic actions per 3-0NOP-089:

1. Manually reduces turbine load 2. Performs fast load reduction to < 60% turbine load or as needed to reduce steam flow < available feedwater flow. 3. Verifies condenser steam dumps open as necessary based on Tavg-Tref mismatch.

4. Verifies main FW regulating valves throttle as necessary to return SG level to program (60%). RO Verifies automatic actions per 3-0NOP-089:

1. Verifies auto rod insertion in response to turbine load reduction to reduce Tavg/Tref mismatch 2. Verifies PZR level & pressure control: a. Charging pump speed changes to maintain PZR level b. PZR heaters / normal spray function as needed to maintain PZR pressure approx 2235 psig 5 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: 4/4a Page _2_ of _2_ Event

Description:

Loss of 3C 4kV bus. 3B SGFP is lost. Automatic runback fails due to PT-3-1604 failure and reguires manual action to reduce 120wer < 60 % to avoid reactor tril2 on s/g 10-10 level. The crew resl20nds l2er 3-0NOP-089 and 3-0NOP-004.4.

TS are evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs subsequent actions per 3-0NOP-089.

BOP Performs remainder of subsequent actions per 3-0NOP-089.

1. Verifies SG levels and pressures stabilized

2. Verifies steam dumps closed. 3. Marks control room charts with date/time/cause of runback Performs remainder of subsequent actions per 3-0NOP-089.

RO 1. Verifies Tavg matches Tref 2. Verifies PZR level & pressure stabilized.

3. Marks control room charts with date/time/cause of runback BOP Determines loss of 3B SGFP due to loss of 3C 4kV bus US Directs actions per 3-0NOP-004.4 BOP Performs actions as directed by US per 3-0NOP-004.4:

1. Stabilizes plant following manual turbine run back 2. Determines 3A & 3B 4kV buses both energized

3. Determines 3C 4kV bus lockout tripped NOTE: Attempts made to reset lockout will be unsuccessful.

4. Directs FS/NSO locally investigate 3C 4kV bus US Directs WCC have Electrical maint. investigate 3C 4kV bus lockout. Determines no further actions per 3-0NOP-004.4 can be performed until 3C 4kV bus lockout reset. Directs SM to review 0-ADM-011 to see if ERT should be activated.

Directs System & DCS 0-ADM-115 notification about runback. Directs Chemistry notification to sample RCS (15% power change) Determines TS 3.7.1.6 Action a. (30 days) applies for A SSGFWP (if time permits this evaluation).

Conducts crew brief regarding effects of loss of 3C 4kV bus. 6 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: Pagelof_4_

Event

Description:

Once reactor [:2ower stabilized

< 60% [:2ower , a 3C SG feed break occurs inside containment.

A manual reactor tri[:2 is reguired before ani SG level dro[:2s < 10% since the automatic reactor tri[:2 is failed. 3-EOP-E-O is [:2erformed.

The MOV-3-1409 breaker tri[:2s & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving an uncontrolled feed [:2ath to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started . ..... , lillie Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes and reports dropping 3C SG levels and feedwater flows

• Annunciators C-5/1 thru 5/3 (SG steam> feed flow)

• Annunciators D-6/1 thru 6/3 (SG level deviations)

• Indicated feedwater flow < steam flow for all SGs

• Slowly dropping level in all SGs Recommends manual rx trip before any SG level drops < 10% NR. US Determines a loss of FW flow is occurring and directs RO to Critical manually trip the reactor before any SG level drops < 10% NR. Directs crew perform 3-EOP-E-0 immediate actions & foldout page. RO Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:

1. Verifies reactor trip

• Rod bottom lights on & RPls at zero

• Rx trip & bypass bkrs open

• Neutron flux decreasing

2. Determines SI eventually actuates on SG pressure LlP>1 00 psi BOP Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:

1. Verifies turbine tripped

• Turbine stop valves closed

• Closes MSR main steam stop MOVs

• Mid & East GCBs open 2. Verifies power to emergency 4kV buses 3. Determines both 3A & 3B 4kV buses energized with 3D 4kV bus energized from 3B 4kV bus RO Trips RCPs if subcooling

< 25[65]OF per 3-EOP-E-0 foldout page. 7 Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _5_ Page -2 of_4_ Event

Description:

Once reactor power stabilized

< 60% power, a 3C SG feed break occurs inside containment.

A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. E-O is performed.

The MOV-3-1409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started. e Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Performs 3-EOP-E-0 foldout page actions when directed by US 1. Isolates AFW to 3C (faulted)

SG 2. Opens ADVs on 3A & 3B SG to stabilize RCS hot leg temp. US Directs BOP verify prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment

3. Directs RO continue performance of 3-EOP-E-0 subsequent actions. BOP Verifies prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3: 1. Determines 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D & 3H 480V LCs energized

2. Determines status of MSIVs (still open) and closes them if any MS isolation signal actuated (should not be). 3. Verifies FW isolation:

a. Determines FCV-3-498 not closed. Attempts unsuccessfully to close valve using controller.

Determines other 2 main FW regulating valves closed. b. Determines all main FW regulating bypass valves closed. c. Closes MOV-3-1407

& 1408. Determines MOV-3-1409 has no power. Directs NSO to locally close valve. d. Determines A SSGFWP not available & B SSGFWP off. 4. Verifies at least 2 ICWPs running, POV-3-4882

& 4883 closed with ICW headers tied together.

5. Verifies 3 CCWHXs in service, 3A & 3B CCWPs running, CCW headers tied together & MOV-3-626 open. 6. Determines 2 ECCs & all 3 ECFs running. 7. Determines all 4 HHSIPs & 2 RHRPs running 8. Determines RCS pressure>

1600 psig (no HHSI flow) 9. Shuts down both unit 4 HHSIPs 10. Determines all containment isolation phase A valves closed. 8 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: Page -..2.. of Event

Description:

Once reactor power stabilized

< 60% power, a 3C SG feed break occurs inside containment.

A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. E-O is performed.

The MOV-3-1409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3: 11. Determines all SI valves in proper injection alignment

12. Resets SI & containment isolation phase A. 13. If RCPs running, opens MOV-3-1417

& 1418 then resets/starts all available NCCs. 14. Determines containment pressure remained < 20 psig. 15. Determines containment ventilation isolated and control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.

16. Directs NSO place PAHMS in service per 3-0P-094.

17. Verifies 3A & both U4 EDGs running (3B EDG is OOS). 18. Determines 3A, 3B & 3D 4kV buses still energized.

19. Notifies US that prompt action verification complete.

RO Performs subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-O as directed:

1. Determines no AFWPs will be running. a. A AFWP slowly losing steam supply as 3C SG depressurizes through the FW break into containment.

b. BAFWP OOS c. C AFWP started, increased speed but then mechanically tripped. Directs NSO investigate C AFWP and attempt to reset trip (3-0NOP-075 Att. 4 may be used for guidance).

2. Determines AFW valve alignment proper 3. Recognizes/reports SGs levels & AFW flow 4. Determines RCP thermal barrier alarms off. 5. Determines RCS temp dropping due to feed break. Limits AFW flow to =345 gpm if directed to reduce cooldown.

6. Determines PZR PORVs, normal spray, aux spray

& excess letdown isolation valves closed. 7. Stops RCPs if running & trip criteria met 8. Determines 3C SG faulted. 9 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _1_ Event No.: _5_

Event

Description:

Once reactor l20wer stabilized

< 60% l2ower, a 3C SG feed break occurs inside containment.

A manual reactor tril2 is reguired before SG level drol2s < 10% since the automatic reactor tril2 is failed. 3-EOP-E-O is l2erformed.

The MOV-3-1409 breaker tril2s & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving an uncontrolled feed l2ath to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US 1. If all SG levels < 6[32]% and AFW flow < 345 gpm at 3-EOP-E-O step 8, directs transition to 3-EOP-FR-H.1.

2. Determines 3C SG faulted 3. Directs STA monitor CSFSTs (red path on Heat Sink CSF) 4. Directs transition to 3-EOP-FR.H.1 10 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _ 1_ Event No.: _6 _ Page _1_ of --2... Event

Description:

C AFWP tril2s on oversl2eed I2rematurely at 6300 RPM (from setul2}. The tril2 can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam I2ressure from the 3C feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam are I2revented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed. SSGFW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead batte!y on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow < 345 gl2m and is eventually reguired to initiate feed & bleed since all SGs < 32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs response per 3-EOP-FR-H.1.

Performs actions per 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US: RCO 1. Determines RCS pressure>

intact SG pressure 2. Determines RCS Tavg >350°F BOP Performs actions per 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US: 1. Per step 2 Caution, informs US that all SG narrow range level < 32% US Since all narrow range SG levels < 32%, directs immediate transition to steps 11-19 of 3-EOP-FR-H.1.

Critical Directs initiation of feed & bleed per steps 11-19 of 3-EOP-FR-H.1. RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US: 1. Determines SI & containment isolation phase A already initiated Critical 2. Stops all running RCPs 3. Determines 2 HHSIPs running & SI valves in proper injection alignment

4. Determines PORV block MOVs open and energized Critical 5. Opens both PORVs for adequate RCS bleed path. 6. Determines CV-3-2803 open (IA to containment)

7. Determines SI & containment isolation phase A already reset. 8. Determines both unit 3 HHSIPs running & both unit 4 HHSIPs already stopped and in standby. 11 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: _6_ Page --L of --L Event

Description:

C AFWP tril2S on oversl2eed I2rematurely at 6300 RPM (from setul2). The tril2 can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts , but runs out of steam I2ressure from the 3C feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam are I2revented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed. SSGFW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead battery on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow < 345 gl2m and is eventually reguired to initiate feed & bleed since all SGs < 32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Performs actions of 3-EOP-FR-H.1 as directed by US: 1 . Reverifies SI & phase A equipment actuated using 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3 (performed with same results as in event 5). 2. Determines status of placing PAHMS in service (directed NSO to do this in event 5). Completes PAHMS alignment in control room per 3-0P-094 if NSO reports field actions complete.

US Determines RCS heat removal adequate.

TERMINATING Scenario terminated when feed & bleed alignment complete (3-CUE EOP-FR-H.1 step 22). 12 Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-O-1 Facility:

Turkey Point Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: 2007-301 Examiners:

Candidates:

US RO BOP Initial Conditions:

Mode 1, 75% Power, MOL, Awaiting permission from plant management to increase power back to 100%. 3-GOP-301 in use complete through step 5.96 for retum to 100% power following a turbine valve test. Tumover: Equipment OOS: 3B EDG due to failed fuel pump (OOS 2 days; next performance of O-OSP-023.3 in 4 hrs); B AFW Pump due to bearing failure (OOS 4 hrs; ETR 24 hrs); 3B CSP due to failed 1ST -low discharge pressure (OOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr) Perform 3C ICWP isolation valve cycling test per step 7.1.3 of 3-0SP-019.3.

Steps 7.1.1 & 7.1.2 for 3A and 3B ICWP were completed by the offgoing shift. Known tube leak in 3A S/G (2 gpd) -unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-0NOP-071.2, Attachment

1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate. Event Event Type* Event Description No. 1 (N) SRO/BOP 3C ICWP discharge isolation valve cycling test per 3-0SP-019.3 step 7.1.3. 2 (I) RO/BOP Power range NI channel N-42 upper detector fails high. The crew responds TFN1P2AH = T per 3-0NOP-059.8. (TS,I) SRO 3 See event 4a PT-3-1604 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator TFS1ML3L = T below 0-7/4. 4 (C) BOP Loss of 3C 4kV bus. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-004.4.

TS are TFE2Z52S = T evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP. (C, TS) SRO 4a (R) SRO/BOP Automatic runback fails due to PT-3-1604 failure and requires manual action (I) RO to reduce power < 60 % to avoid reactor trip on slg 10-10 level. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-089.

5 TVFACN3 = 0.1 (M) ALL Once reactor power stabilized

< 60% power, a 3C SG feed break occurs TFW98M=T inside containment.

A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level TCF1D09M = F drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is TFL2XASE =T performed.

The MOV-3-1409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving TFL2XBSE = T an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started. 6 (C) ALL C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup). The trip TAFXSRPC = can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam 6300.0 pressure from the 3C feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 TCF5MTC = T steam are prevented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed. SSGFW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead battery on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow < 345 gpm and is eventually required to initiate feed & bleed since all SGs < 32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions. (N)ormal, (R)eactlvity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor 1 TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Turkey Point 2007-301 Scenario #1 Event 1 -3C ICWP discharge isolation valve cycling test per 3-0SP-019.3 step 7.1.3 Event 2 -Power range NI channel N-42 upper detector fails high. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-059.8.

Event 3 -PT-3-1604 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator 0-7/4. Event 4 -Loss of 3C 4kV bus. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-004.4.

TS are evaluated for loss of the A SSGFWP. Event 4a -Automatic run back fails due to PT 1604 failure and requires manual action to reduce power < 60 % to avoid reactor trip on slg 10-10 level. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-089. Event 5 -Once reactor power stabilized

< 60% power, a 3C SG feed break occurs inside containment.

A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-0 is performed.

The MOV-3-1409 breaker trips & FCV-3-498 fails to close leaving an uncontrolled feed path to 3C SG if 3A SGFP started. Event 6 -C AFWP trips on overs peed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup). The trip can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam pressure from the 3C feed line fault. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam are prevented by AFSS-3-007 stuck closed. SSGFW can not be used due to loss of 3C 4kV bus and a dead battery on B SSGFWP. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.1 when AFW flow < 345 gpm and is eventually required to initiate feed & bleed since all SGs < 32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.

2 TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Scenario XXIII NRC 1 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup IC-16 (75% MOL) Place simulator in run Trigger lesson steps: SETUP -AUTO REACTOR TRIP FAIL (actuates TFL2XASE = T, TFL2XBSE = T, TFL2XASE = F when IML2CRXT & TFL2XBSE = F when IML2CRXT)

SETUP -3B EDG OOS (actuates TA05LRSB = OFF (0) & TA05B20P = RACKOUT (3)) SETUP -B AFWP OOS (actuates TAFK244 = 0.0, TAFK002 = 0.0, TAFF01B = 0.0, TCF5MTB = T) SETUP -3A SG 2 GPO LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.0000013)

SETUP -3B CSP OOS (actuates TAM1DPOB = RACKOUT (3) & TCM1D41 M = FALSE) SETUP -C AFWP OVERSPEED TRIP (actuates TAFXSRPC =6300.0, TCF5MTC = Twhen F50SlAFC EO 6290) Start 3A ICWP and stop 3B ICWP. (Leave 3A & 3C ICWP running).

Start train A chilled water and secure train B chilled water (CR HVAC panel). Acknowledge annunciators F-9/2 & F-9/5 (3B EDG) and place simulator in freeze. Place clearance info tags on 3B EDG normal start switch, B AFWP T& T valve control switch & 3B CSP control switch. Remove AFW train 2 orange tag from B AFWP tachometer just below ann. panel X. Provide shift turnover checklists and 3-0NOP-071.2 Att 1. Select 3A QSPDS to page 211 (SAT) and 3B QSPDS to page 212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA to Tavg/Tref (TAV) and at the RCO desk to ENVRN (ED3). Fill in blender & shutdown boron addition placards at console blender station. Data for each IC may be found in the ECC & Shutdown Guidelines Book in the simulator I/F. Event 1 -3C ICWP discharge isolation valve test Initiated from shift turnover immediately after shift turnover.

The crew will start 38 ICWP & stop 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3, then NSO begins performing 3-0SP-019.3 step 7.1.3. Respond as NSO if directed to perform pre-start checks for 3B ICWP & post-shutdown checks for 3C ICWP. Report all conditions normal. Step 7.1.3.1 -Done by securing 3C ICWP. Step 7.1.3.2 -Call as NSO and request RO log 3C ICWP inoperable.

Step 7.1.3.3 -Trigger lesson step EVENT 1 -REMOVE 3AD05 CLOSE CKT FUSES (actuates TFK2G05A = T) 3 TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Step 7.1.3.4 -Trigger lesson step EVENT 1 -CLOSE 3-50-332 (actuates TAKB332 = 0.0 on 60 sec ramp), then trigger lesson step EVENT 1 -OPEN 3-50-332 (actuates TAKB332 = 1.0 on 60 sec ramp). Step 7.1.3.5 -Trigger lesson step EVENT 1 -INSTALL 3AD05 CLOSE CKT FUSES (actuates TFK2G05A = F). Step 7.1.3.6 -NSO field verification of lights on 3AD05. Step 7.1.3.7 -Respond as NSO when directed to do pre-start checks on 3C ICWP and report pump ready. Respond as NSO when directed to do post-start checks and report pump running normally.

Step 7.1.3.9 -Respond as NSO when directed to perform post-shutdown checks on ICWP just shutdown.

Report pump shutdown satisfactorily.

Event 2 -PRNI N-42 upper detetctor fails high Once 3-0SP-019.3 step 7.1.3 complete, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 -PRNI N-42 UPPER DET FAILS HIGH (actuates TFN1 P2AH = T). This actuates annunciators 8-2/2, 3/6, 5/5, 6/1, 6/3, 6/4, 9/2 The crew responds per 3-0NOP-059.8 and takes PRNI N-42 out of service per steps 5.1.1.1 thru 5.1.1.7. Step 5. 1. 1. 1 actuates 8-8/4. Step 5.1.1.2 clears 8-6/3. Step 5.1.1.3 clears 8-2/2. Step 5. 1. 1.6 clears 8-6/4. Step 5.1.1.7.a

-Respond as AOM/I&C if asked whether or not to pull instrument fuses. Reply that fuses should be pulled. All annunciators clear except 8-6/1, 6/5 & 8/4. Step 5.1.1.7.c

-Tripping bistables actuates 8-3/5, 3/6 & ref/ash for 8-5/5. Step 5.1.1.8 -Respond as WCC/I&C when called regarding N-42 failure. Step 5.1.1.9 -Respond as Rx Engineering I STA when directed to perform a QPTR Step 5.1.1.10 -Not applicable.

Step 5.1.1.11 -Respond as WCC if directed to generate ECO for tripped bistables.

Event 3 -PT-3-1604 fails low After PRNI N-42 taken out of service, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 -PT-3-1604 FAILS LOW (actuates TFS1 ML3L = T). PT-3-1604 failure cause CV-3-2011 to automatically open and it is failed that way to prevent closure from the console control switch. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator 0-7/4. Respond as NSO if directed to verify CV-3-1900 closed. Click on FEEDWATER PRESS FW HEATERS & RHTR & HTR DRAIN CV-3-1900 position (see far right side of mimic). Crew should determine SGFP suction pressure>

260 psig with 2 HOPs running so fast load reduction is not required.

4 TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Event 4 -Loss of 3C 4kV bus The plant is stabilized following CV-3-2011 failure open, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 -LOSS OF 3C 4KV BUS (actuates TFE2Z52S = T). This causes a loss of 38 SGFP. The crew may take the 38 SGFP control switch to STOP which ordinarily would open the breaker and initiate automatic turbine runback. Since the PT-3-1604 failure in event 3 also defeats the automatic loss of SGFP turbine runback, the crew must manually run back power to < 60% per 3-0NOP-OS9.

The crew should also respond per 3-0NOP-004.4 due to loss of the 3C 4kV bus. TS are evaluated for the loss of the A SSGFWP. Respond if called as NSO to investigate 3C 4kV bus. After 1-3 min, report that the lockout relay has actuated and the bus enclosure smells of overheated insulation.

If directed to reset 3C 4kV bus lockout relay, report that the lockout will not reset. Respond if called as WCC/Electrical to investigate 3C 4kV bus lockout. Do not fix this malfunction before the end of the scenario.

Respond if called as System & Duty Call Supervisor per O-ADM-115.

Respond if called as SM to review O-ADM-011 regarding need for an ERT. Respond if called as Chemistry about RCS sampling following a > 15% power change. Respond as NSO if directed to cross-tie E MCCs per 3-0P-007 sect 7.1. No further action required during this scenario.

Event 5 -3C SG main feed line failures After the plant is stabilized

< 60% power, at lead examiner direction, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 -3C FW LINE FAIL (actuates TVFACN3 = 0.1, TFVV98M = T & TCF1D09M = F). A main feed break occurs on 3C feed line inside containment.

A manual reactor trip is required before any SG level drops < 10% since the automatic reactor trip is failed. 3-EOP-E-O is performed.

The MOV-3-1409 breaker trips & FCV-3-49S fails to close. This creates a feed path to the faulted 3C SG should feed be restored.

5 TP-2007-301 Scenario #1 Event Description Events 6 -Loss of AFW I Heat sink Entered upon completion of 3-EOP-E-O steps 1-4. C AFWP trips on overspeed prematurely at 6300 RPM (from setup). The trip can not be reset. B AFWP is OOS. A AFWP starts, but runs out of steam pressure from the feed line fault on 3C feed line. Efforts to realign A AFWP to train 2 steam is prevented by AFSS-3-007 being stuck closed. SSGFW can not be used due to a dead battery on B SSGFWP (A SSGFWP not available due to loss of 3C 4kV bus). The crew transitions to 3-EOP-FR-H.

1 when AFW flow < 345 gpm and is eventually required to initiate feed & bleed since SG levels are < 32% narrow range with adverse containment conditions.

If asked as NSO to locally reset C AFWP overspeed trip (3-0NOP-075 Attachment 4), respond that the C AFWP overspeed trip can not be reset. If asked as NSO to align train 2 steam to the A AFWP by opening AFSS-3-007, report that AFSS-3-007 will not open. Request mechanical maintenance assistance.

Respond as WCC/Mechanical Maintenance if asked to troubleshoot/fix C AFWP mechanical trip and AFSS-3-007.

Respond as NSO if asked to locally close MOV-3-1409 or 3-20-333.

Delay local closure of these valves until after feed & bleed initiated then trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -LOCALLY CLOSE MOV-3-1409 (actuates TFFVV09C = T) and report when complete.

3A SGFP should not be started since an uncontrollable feed path exists to 3C SG. With level < [33%J wide range, feed flow must be limited to 100 gpm to the faulted SG (3-EOP-FR-H.

1 step 4 caution 2). Respond as NSO when directed to place PAHMS in service on unit 3. After 8-12 minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -PLACE U3 PAHMS IN SERVICE (actuates TAC2V02A = 1.0, TAC2V02B = 1.0, TAAAV21 = 1.0, TAAAV22 = 1.0 & TACA005 = 0.0). Report when complete.

6 I NRC-I ... '"

1>O l OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT :t ..s;, .. "Olear 1.'\0 ONCOMING CREW ASSIGNMENTS Shift Mgr: Inside SNPO: Field Supv.: Outside SNPO: Admin RCO: ANPO: Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit Supv.: Unit Supv.: RCO: RCO: NPO: NPO: Plant Status Unit 3 Unit 4 Mode: 1 Mode: 1 Power: 75 Power: 100 MWe: 557 MWe: 759 Gross Leakrate:

0.03 Gross Leakrate:

0.04 RCS Boron Cone: 825 RCS Boron Cone: 600 Operational Concerns:.i<

.**... .' .. ..f!: APWP OOS (bearing failure; OOS 4 hr; ETR 24 hr) 3B EDG OOS (fuel pump failed; OOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 in 4 hr) 3B CSP OOS (failed IST -low discharge pressure; OOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr) Train A is protected 2 gpd tube leak in 3A S/G -unchanged for past week (Chemistry sampling per 3-0NOP-071.2, Attachment 1.) U3 Anticipated LCO Actions: Current: B APWP -TS 3.7.1.2 Action 3 (trains verified operable just before turnover; 30 days to repair) 3B EDG -TS 3.S.1.1.b.l Actions b & d (0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 every S hr; 3/4-0SP-023.1 start of other EDGs not req'd; 3-0P-023 sect 7.7 due next shift ifOOS > 72 hr; repair in 14 days) 3B CSP-TS 3.6.2.1 Action a (Pix in 72 hr) Anticipated:

None Train A is protected.

OLRM is green (CDP = 2.06E-6; LERP = 9.2SE-S).

U4 Anticipated LCO Actions: Current: B APWP -TS 3.7.1.2 Action 3 (trains verified operable just before turnover; 30 days to repair) 3B EDG -TS 3.S.1. i .b.l Actions b & d (0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 every S hr; 3/4-0SP-023.1 start of other EDGs not req' d; fix in 14 days) Anticipated:

None Train A is protected.

OLRM is green (CDP = 2.00E-6; LERP = 9.2SE-S).

Results of Offgoing Focus Area: See :\0 s\Common\0900 g p Unit 3 Status Reactor Operator Mode: 1 RCS Leakrate Accumulator Ref Levels Power: 75 Gross: 0.03 gpm A 6615 MWe: 557 Unidentified 0.02 gpm B 6640 Tavg: 567 Charging Pps: 0.01 gpm C 6625 RCS Pressure:

2235 RCS Boron Cone: 825 ,.Abbd'r.ll1al.Ahli

! '.' \ \ ".1

• . " It:; '. ';'.,::;.'!:,!'

• • '::!!( *. \.,;

• ..***

Annunciator:

F 9/2 -3B EDG OOS Comp Actions: O-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 due in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. 3/4-0SP-023.1 not required.

3-0P-023 sect 7.7 due next shift. Annunciator:

F 9/5 -3B EDG OOS Comp Actions: O-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 due in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. 3/4-0SP-023.1 not required.

3-0P-023 sect 7.7 due next shift. Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Current Tech Spec Action Statements: (Does Not Include "For Trackin2 Only Items" T.S.A.S / Component:

3.7.1.2 Action 3/ B AFWP Reason: Bearing failed Entry Date: XX/Xx/XX (Previous shift) T.S.A.S / Component:

3.8.1.1 Actions b & d / 3B EDG Reason: Fuel pump failed Entry Date: XX/XX/XX (2 days ago) T.S.A.S / Component:

3.6.2.1 Action a / 3B CSP Reason: Failed 1ST -low discharge pressure Entry Date: XX/Xx/XX (Yesterday)

T.S.A.S / Component:

3.4.3 Action

a / 3B PZR backup heaters Reason: 14 day due to 3B EDG OOS Entry Date: Xx/Xx/XX (2 days ago) T.S.A.S / Component:

3.5.2 Action

f / 3B HHSIP Reason: 14 day due to 3B EDG OOS Entry Date: Xx/XX/XX (2 days ago) T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason: 'j Entry Date:

Unit 3 Status Changes to Risk S!gnificant Equipment:

B AFWP OOS (Bearing replacement) 3B EDG OOS (Fuel pump repair) 3B CSP OOS (Failed 1ST -low discharge pressure)

Unit 3 Risk is GREEN. Main contributor is B AFWP. Upcoming Reactivity Management Activities:

Dilute to maintain 75% power until management permission received to complete increasing power back to 100%. Upcoming Major POD Activities:

Return to 100% power if/when management permission received to increase power back to 100%. Upcoming ECOs to Hang and lor Release: None ""'-Evolutions or Compensatory Actions in Progress:

-In process of returning power back to 100% from turbine valve test. Currently on hold at 75% awaiting management permission to continue power increase.

3-GOP-301 in use completed through step 5.97. -After shift turnover, perform 3C ICWP isolation valve cycling test per step 7.1.3 of 3-0SP-019.3 (steps 7.1.1 & 7.1.2 for 3A and 3B ICWP are not scheduled for this shift). -Known tube leak in 3A S/G (2 gpd) -unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-0NOP-071.2, Attachment

1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains energized at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate. OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 for 3B EDG OOS due in 4 hrs. 3-0SP-023.1 not required since 3B EDG OOS due to support system failure. 3-0P-023 sect 7.7 due next shift to allow 3B EDG OOS > 72 hr. General Information, Remarks, and Operator Work Around Status: See evolutions

& compensatory actions listed above. Train A is protected.

Appendix D . Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:

Turkey Point Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: 2007-301 Examiners:

.. Candidates:

US RO BOP Initial Conditions:

Mode 1, 50% Power, MOL. Power on hold at 50% following inadvertent trip of 3B SGFP while investigation in progress.

Turnover:

Equipment OOS: 3B EDG due to failed fuel pump (OOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 in 4 hrs); B AFW Pump due to bearing failure (OOS 4 hrs; ETR 24 hrs; both trains verified operable);

3B CSP due to failed 1ST -low discharge pressure (OOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr) Need to swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-0P-005 section 7.4 after shift turnover to support possible emergent maintenance on 3A CCW pump (vibration increase last shift). Known tube leak in 3A S/G (2 gpd) -unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-0NOP-071.2, Attachment

1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate. Event Event Type* Event Description No. 1 (N) SRO/BOP Swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-0P-005 section 7.4. 2 (I) BOP/RO First stage impulse pressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew responds TFS1MABL=T (TS,I) SRO per 3-0NOP-028 to stop inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-0NOP-049.1.

3 (C) ALL 120VAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT TFE6X06F = T also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized.

The crew responds per 3-0NOP-003.9.

TCE6DI1C =T 3P09 is swapped over to the spare inverter per 3-0NOP-003.9 Attachment

1. 4 TFCMM2A4 =T (M) ALL The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-19 fails to respond. TVHHSGA= (I) SRO/BOP The crew responds per 3-0NOP-071.2 0.002 (TS) SRO 4a (R) ALL A load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-0NOP-071.2 5 TVHHSGA= (M) ALL The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture. The 0.4 (cont'd from reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed.

MOV-3-1433 fails to close TFSW33C=T event 4) requiring manual isolation of MSIVs. 6 (C) ALL When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startup TFQ5A20A = T transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG output breaker TAQ5LRSB =T is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.

Only 3A & 3D TFP1S38S = T 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is performed to cooldown and depressurize the RCS to stop primary-secondary leak flow. .. (N)ormal, (R)eactlvlty, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor 1 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _1_ Page _1_ of _1_ Event

Description:

Swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-0P-005 section 7.4. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs BOP to transfer 3D 4kV bus supply from 3B 4kV bus to 3A 4kV bus per 3-0P-005 section 7.4. Directs BOP start 3A ICWP & sid 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3. BOP Obtains copies of 3-0P-005, section 7.4 & 3-0P-019, section 5.3. Performs actions as follows: 1. Starts 3A ICWP & stops 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3 a. Verifies NSO understands ICWPs to be started/stopped

b. Directs NSO verify oil in 3A ICWP sightglass

& 3A ICWP discharge valve open c. Starts 3A ICWP & checks for amperage on VPA ammeter d. Directs NSO locally check 3A ICWP visible packing leakoff e. Stops 3C ICWP & checks zero amperage on VPA ammeter f. Directs NSO locally do post-stop check 2. Opens 3AB19 and then 3AD06 NOTE: 3C CCWP & 3C ICWP are OOS while 3D 4kV bus is deenergized TS 3.7.2 -7 day action statement

& TS 3.7.3 -30 day action statement.

3. Closes 3AD01 and then 3AA 17 4. Directs NSO to locally check 3D 4kV bus voltage 3744-4576 volts on cubicle 3AD08. 5. Starts 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3 to verify operability.

a. Verifies NSO understands ICWPs to be started/stopped

b. Directs NSO verify oil in 3C ICWP sightglass

& 3C ICWP discharge valve open c. Starts 3C ICWP & checks for amperage on VPA ammeter d. Directs NSO locally check 3C ICWP visible packing leakoff 6. At SM direction, stops 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 section 5.3. a. Stops 3C ICWP & checks zero amperage on VPA ammeter b. Directs NSO locally do post-stop check RO Assists BOP as directed by US. 1 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: -2... Event No.: _2_ Page _1_ of _2_ Event

Description:

First stage iml2ulse I2ressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew resl20nds l2er 3-0NOP-028 to stOI2 inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-0NOP-049.1.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports ch III first stage impulse pressure PT-3-446 failed low.

• annunciators C-6/1, 6/2, 6/3 (due to change in SG level program setpoint from 60% to 50%)

• C-7/1, 7/2, 7/3 steam line hi flow & C-8/3 stm dump due to failure

• PI-3-446 indication on VPA fails low

• Control rods inserting in automatic RO Recognizes/reports control rods inserting in automatic When PT-3-446 failure recognized, performs immediate action of 3-ONOP-028 for continuous insertion of an RCC control bank: Places rod control in MANUAL and verifies rods stop moving. US Directs response per 3-0NOP-028 RO Performs subsequent actions of 3-0NOP-028 as directed by US: 1. If directed, withdraws control rods to restore Tavg = Tref 2. Determines rods above RIL from VPA recorder (or PCB section VII figure 3). 3. Determines PRNI N-44 did not fail 4. After PT-3-447 selected for 1 st stage pressure control, places rods back in auto 5. Determines TM-408 median Tavg selector not failed BOP Performs subsequent actions of 3-0NOP-028 as directed by US: 1. If directed, reduces turbine load to restore Tavg = Tref 2. Selects Channel Select First Stage Control to ch IV (PT-3-447)

US Directs WCC notify I&C of PT-3-446 failure. Directs response per 3-0NOP-049.1 2

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: _2_ Page-Lof_2_

Event

Description:

First stage impulse pressure channel PT 446 fails low. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-028 to stop inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-0NOP-049.1.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Performs actions of 3-0NOP-049.1 as directed by US: 1. Determine PT-3-446 failed by comparison to PT-3-447, PT-3-1604 and expected value based on turbine load. 2. Verifies PT-3-447 selected for 1 st stage impulse pressure control 3. Verifies PT-3-447 reading normally US Evaluates impact per TS: 3.3.1. Table 3.3-1 units 12 &17b apply. Actions 6 (6hr) & 7 (1hr) in effect. 3.3.2. Table 3.3-2 units 1f & 4d. Action 15 (6hr) applies. Conducts crew brief regarding effects of PT 446 failure and of tripping bistables as directed in 3-0NOP-049.1 Attachment 4 BOP Continues performing actions of 3-0NOP-049.1 as directed by US: Obtains keys, opens door to and trips following bistables in protection channel III, rack 16:

• BS-3-446-1 (Turbine power >10% input to P-7)

• BS-3-446-2 (70% turb load limit run back permissive)

• BS-3-474 (SG A hi steam flow)

• BS-3-484 (SG B hi steam flow)

• BS-3-494 (SG C hi steam flow) Closes protection rack door when done. Places Steam Dump to Condenser Mode switch in MANUAL RO Monitors bistable status lights and annunciator panels for expected indications while bistables being tripped. US 1. Directs NSO bypass power 1 on AMSAC per Attachment 5 2. Directs notification of I&C 3. Directs WCC generate clearance for tripped bistables 3

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: .L Event No.: Page _1_ of_3_ Event

Description:

120VAC Qower Qanel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swaQ to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized.

The crew resQonds Qer 3-ONOP-003.9.

3P09 is swaQQed over to the sQare inverter Qer 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment

1. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes 1 reports loss of 3P09 120VAC vital inst bus

• Annunciator F-1/2

• Loss of all ch IV instrumentation (yellow labels)

• Loss of controller for B SG FRV RO Recognizes 1 reports loss of 3P09 120VAC vital inst bus

• Annunciators B-6/5 & B-7/1

• Loss of all ch IV instrumentation (yellow labels)

• Loss of controllers for PZR pressure, level & spray valves

• Letdown isolation Determines a reactor trip has not occurred US Directs performance of 3-0NOP-003.9 Determines unit operating in mode 1 Directs FS/NSO to restore power to 3P09 per Attachment 1 & RO restore PZR pressure and level control per Attachment

4. RO Performs actions of 3-0NOP-003.9 as directed by US: 1. Places rods in MANUAL 2. Reduces charging flow to minimum req'd for seal injection using a charging pump in manual speed control 3. Determines PORVs closed 4. Maintains Tavg, rx power, PZR pressure & PZR level in normal control bands BOP Performs actions of 3-0NOP-003.9 as directed by US: 1. Determines steam dump to condenser mode already in MAN 2. Determines 3B SG in auto lockup. Increases 3B SG blowdown flow as necessary to control 3B SG level. 3. Maintains SG levels in normal control band 4 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: Page-l., of Event

Description:

120VAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized.

The crew responds per 3-ONOP-003.9.

3P09 is swapped over to the spare inverter per 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment

1. II. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Performs 3-0NOP-003.9 Attachment 4 when directed by US: 1. Determines PORVs closed 2. Directs FS/NSO go to rack 46 & press/hold in relay LC459CX 3. Manually operate PZR heaters to return pressure to normal. 4. Restores letdown a. Determines B CCW header flow normal. b. Determines letdown orifice isolation valves closed c. Opens CV-3-204 then opens LCV-3-460

d. Manually controls PCV-3-145 to control letdown pressure e. Opens letdown orifice isolation valve(s) for desired flow US Briefs crew on effects of loss of 3P09 using Enclosure

1. Evaluates TS impact: 3.B.3.1.j applies. Action c. (2hr to reenergize; 24 hr to reenergize from inverter).

BOP Coordinates with FS/NSO to restore 3P09 per 3-0NOP-003.9 Att 1. 1. Informs FS/NSO that DS inverter not currently in use 2. When informed that 3P09 about to be reenergized, turns off both groups of PZR backup heaters 3. Observes components reenergizing as 3P09/3P24 breakers closed in 4. Relays notification from FS/NSO that all 3P09/3P24 breakers closed in NOTE: Auto/Manual controllers should not be returned to AUTO until vital power completely restored.

When power is restored to an Auto/Manual station, the AUTO light will turn on for approx. 15 sec after which the MANUAL light turns on indicating that manual control is now available.

5 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: L Event No.: -L Page 2 of_3_ Event

Description:

120VAC Qower Qanel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swaQ to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized.

The crew resQonds Qer 3-ONOP-003.9.

3P09 is swaQQed over to the sQare inverter Qer 3-ONOP-003.9 Attachment

1. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Restores auto controls on Encl 1 as 3P09 breakers are closed in: 1. Restores auto PZR pressure control per Att 4 section 2 a. Directs NSO release LC459CX b. Restore charging pumps, PZR heaters & spray valves to auto control 2. Determines annunciators indicate correctly for plant conditions

3. Returns rods to auto once PRNI N-44 reenergized BOP Restores auto controls on Ene! 1 as 3P09 breakers are closed in: 1. Returns 3B SG level control to automatic

a. Manually control FCV-3-488 to return SG level to 60+/-5% and match feed flow = steam flow b. Places 3B SG level control in auto 2. Places steam dump to condenser mode selector to RESET and then to AUTO 3. Determines annunciators indicate correctly for plant conditions 6

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: -.£.. Event No.: --L Page _1_ of _1_ Event

Description:

The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 R-3-19 fails to res(2ond.

The crew res(2onds (2er 3-0NOP-071.2.

I Ti...,,, Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports increase in 3A SG tube leak rate

• Annunciator H-1/4 (PRMS hi radiation)

• R-3-15 SJAE effluent PRMS rising/alarming

• SJAE SPING RAD-3-6417 rising/alarming (see ERDADS) NOTE: R-3-19 is failed as is RO Recognizes/reports increase in 3A SG tube leak rate

• Annunciator H-1/4 (PRMS hi radiation)

• Slight increase in charging flow to maintain PZR level

• Chg/letdn flow mismatch approx. 2 gpm (see ERDADS) US Directs performance of 3-0NOP-071.2 Directs Chemistry notification to sample SGs & main steam lines for activity per 0-NCAP-1 04 Directs HP notification to take rad readings on mn stm & blowdown BOP Performs actions of 3-0NOP-071.2 as directed by US: 1. Determines R-3-15 alarm valid (> alarm setpoint & operable)

2. Performs notifications as directed by US. RO Performs actions of 3-0NOP-071.2 as directed by US: 1. Determines PZR level stable 2. Determines charging pump suction remains aligned to VCT 3. Determines SG tube leak rate 2 gpm using VCT level trend, RCS leak rate calculation and/or SJAE/R-3-15 activity vs. SG tube leakage curves (PCB section 5 figures 14/15) US Determines unit should be in mode 3 in 3 hr Ensures load dispatcher notified of load decrease.

7 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4a Page _1 of L Event

Description:

A load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-ONOP-071.2.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Conducts crew brief per 3-0NOP-071.2 foldout page:

• Specifies load reduction rate

• Target power level = offline

• Specifies tube leak rate and affected slg

• Covers actions required after unit is offline

• Specifies method of reactivity control including boration amount & rate

• Covers E-O transition criteria

• Solicits crew questions

& input Notifies SM to review EPlan, 0-ADM-115 and make required notifications inlcuding verifying NRC Resident notification BOP When directed per 3-0NOP-071.2:

RO 1. Notifies load dispatcher of load reduction when directed by US 2. Makes plant page announcement regarding load reduction

3. When leaking slg identified, closes & deenergizes affected slg AFW steam supply MOV per Att 2 (may be done by RO depending on when this action directed)

When directed, initiates boration per 3-0NOP-071.2:

1. Places Rx MIU Selector Switch to BORATE 2. Places Rx MIU Control Switch to START 3. Sets FC-3-113A pot setting = 8.0 4. Sets BA Totalizer to amount directed (power reduction to 25% at 85 gal per 10% = 213 gal.) 5. Returns CVCS mlu to auto when boration complete BOP Reduces turbine load per 3-0NOP-1 00 at rate directed by US. 8 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: L Event No.: 4a Page-..£ of L Event

Description:

A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-ONOP-100.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO NOTE: Extent to which 3-0NOP-071.2 actions performed depend on point when SGTR inserted When directed per 3-0NOP-071.2:

1. Verifies load reduction rate & auto rod insertion maintaining T avg-T ref per expected value as discussed in crew brief NOTE: Rods < RIL not expected at this power level 2. Checks PZR level following program. If not increases charging flow and/or places an additional letdown orifice in service 3. Determines NRHX CCW flow already increased (from setup) 4. Energizes PZR backup heaters. 5. Verifies condenser steam dumps operating properly 6. Places station service loads on U3 SUT 7. Verifies blowdown isolated from leaking s/g 8. Directs NSO align aux steam from U4 per Attachment 6 9. Determines turbine load < 570MW & verifies non-running SGFP recirc valve open 10. Determines only one HDP & SGFP running 11. Verifies both HDPs stopped < 300 MWe 12. Stops 1 condensate pump < 275 MWe 13. Opens SGFP recirc valves on running SGFP < 200 MWe 14. Opens turbine drain valves < 150 MWe 9 Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 ScenariQ No.: .L Event No.: Page -.1Q.. of Event

Description:

The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 g[2m into a rU[2ture.

The reactor is tri[2[2ed and 3-EOP-E-0

[2erformed.

MOV-3-1433 fails to close reguiring manual isolation of MSIVs. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes

/ reports falling PZR levels and rising charging flows US Determines an increase in SG tube leak rate is occurring and directs response per 3-0NOP-071.2 foldout page RO Responds per 3-0NOP-071.2 to dropping PZR level: 1. Starts 3 rd charging pump and establishes maximum flow rate 2. Isolates letdown flow 3. Determines PZR level still dropping 4. Recommends reactor trip due to inability to maintain PZR level US Directs RO to manually trip the reactor per 3-0NOP-071.2 due Critical to inability to maintain PZR level. Directs crew perform immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0.

RO Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:

1. Verifies reactor trip

• Rod bottom lights on & RPls at zero

• Rx trip & bypass bkrs open

• Neutron flux decreasing

2. Actuates SI & phase A due PZR level not maintained

<12% BOP Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:

1. Verifies turbine tripped

• Turbine stop valves closed

• Attempts closing MSR main steam stop MOVs. Critical Recognizes MOV-3-1433 failed to close & closes MSIVs

• Mid & East GCBs open 2. Verifies power to emergency 4kV buses

• Determines both 3A & 3B 4kV buses energized

• Determines 3D 4kV bus energized from 3B 4kV bus 10 Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _2_ Event No.: _5_ Page of_3_ Event

Description:

The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture. The reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed.

MOV-3-1433 fails to close requiring manual isolation of MSIVs. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs BOP verify prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment

3. Directs RO continue with performance of 3-EOP-E-0 subsequent actions. BOP Verifies prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3: 1. Determines 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D & 3H 480V LCs energized

2. Determines MSIVs all closed 3. Verifies FW isolation:

a. Places running SGFP switch in STOP. b. Determines all main FW regulating

& bypass valves closed. c. Closes FW isolation valves. d. Determines both SSGFWPs off. 4. Verifies 3A & 3B ICWPs running, POV-3-4882

& 4883 closed with ICW headers tied together.

5. Verifies 3 CCWHXs in service, 3A & 3B CCWPs running, CCW headers tied together & MOV-3-626 open. 6. Determines 2 ECCs & all 3 ECFs running. 7. Determines all 4 HHSIPs & 2 RHRPs running 8. Checks for HHSI flow if RCS pressure < 1600 psig 9. Shuts down both unit 4 HHSIPs 10. Determines all containment isolation phase A valves closed. 11. Determines all SI valves in proper injection alignment

12. Resets SI & containment isolation phase A. 13. If RCPs running, opens MOV-3-1417

& 1418 then resets/starts all available NCCs. 14. Determines containment pressure remained < 20 psig. 15. Determines containment ventilation isolated and control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.

11 Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _2_ Event No.: _5_ Page of Event

Description:

The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture. The reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed.

MOV-3-1433 fails to close requiring manual isolation of MSIVs. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3: 16. Directs NSO place PAHMS in service per 3-0P-094.

17. Verifies 3A & both U4 EDGs running (3B EDG is OOS). 18. Determines 3A, 3B & 3D 4kV buses still energized.

19. Notifies US that prompt action verification complete.

RO Performs foldout page actions of 3-EOP-E-0 as directed:

Critical 1. Trips RCPs if RCS subcooling

< 25°F with HHSIP running and S I flowpath verified 2. Identifies 3A SG level increasing in an uncontrolled manner >6% and isolates all FW flow to 3A SG Performs subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-0 as directed 1. Determines 2 AFWPs (A & C) running. 2. Determines AFW valve alignment proper 3. Determines at least 3A SG level> 6%. Controls AFW flow to intact SGs (3B & 3C) to maintain levels 15-50% 4. Determines annunciators A-1 /1,1/2 & 1/3 all off. 5. Determines Tc stable. 6. Determines PORVs, normal spray, aux spray

& excess letdown isolation valves closed 7. Trips RCPs if RCS subcooling

< 25°F with HHSIP running and SI flowpath verified 8. Determines no SGs depressurized or depressurizing

9. Determines SG tube ruptured (R-3-15 alarm & 3A SG level) US Based on SG tube rupture: 1. Directs STA monitor CSFSTs (red path on Heat Sink CSF) 2. Directs transition to 3-EOP-E-3.

12 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _2_ Event No.: _6_

Event

Description:

When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startu(2 transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the out(2ut breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG out(2ut breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.

Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is (2erformed to cooldown and de(2ressurize the RCS to stO(2 (2rimarv-secondary leak flow. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports LOOP causing loss of all AC power:

• 3A 4kV bus deenergized.

3A EDG did not start .

• 3B 4kV bus deenergized.

3B EDG OOS . US Determines loss of all AC power exists and directs performance of 3-EOP-ECA-O.O beginning with step 3 1. Determines reactor & turbine already tripped per 3-EOP-E-0

2. Determines RCS Tavg >350°F RCO Performs actions per 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 as directed by US: 1. Determines PORVs closed, letdown & excess letdown isolated 2. Determines SI reset BOP Performs actions per 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 as directed by US: 1. Determines 2 AFWPs running 2. Increases AFW flow to 345 gpm to intact SGs 3. Verifies 4kV bus stripping using Attachments 1 & 2. 4. Determines 3A & 3B 4kV buses both deenergized with lockout relays reset 5. Determines 3A EDG lockout reset & 3B EDG OOS 6. Determines 3A EDG running, 3A 4kV bus stripped & SI reset Critical 7. Manually closes 3AA20 and energizes 3A 4kV bus BOP Determines 3D 4kV bus energized from 3A 4kV bus 13 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _2_ Event No.: _6_ Page20f_4_

Event

Description:

When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startul2 transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the outl2ut breaker does not automaticalll::

close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG OUtl2ut breaker is manualll::

closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.

Onll:: 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is l2erformed to cooldown and del2ressurize the RCS to stOI2 I2rimarv-secondary leak flow. i. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RCO/BOP Restarts ECCS loads on 3A EDG as directed by US: Critical

• Energizes 3A, 3C & 3H 480V LC

• 3A & either U4 HHSIP, 3A RHRP

• 3A & 3C CCWPs, 3A & 3C ICWPs

• 3B & 3C ECCs, 3B & 3C ECFs US Directs monitoring of CSFs for implementation.

Directs transition to and performance of 3-EOP-E-3.

Defers performance of 3-0NOP-004.3 since there is no source of power and stopping pri-sec leak is higher priority Determines from 3-0NOP-071.2 (event 4) that 3A SG is ruptured.

RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-3 as directed by US: 1. Determines RCPs not running BOP Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-3 as directed by US: 1 . Adjusts 3A SG steam dump to atmosphere setpoint to 1060 psig and determines CV-3-1606 closed 2. Determines 3A SG level> 6% and FW flow to 3A SG isolated 3. Determines AFWSS train 1 from 3C SG & train 2 from 3B SG Critical 4. Verifies MOV-3-1403 closed & deenergized (may be performed previously in event 4a) 5. Determines CV-3-6275A closed 6. Verifies aux steam supplied from U4 directed per 3-0NOP-071.2

7. Determines 3A MSIV & MOV-3-1427/1426/1425 already closed 8. Determines no s/g's faulted 9. Controls AFW flow to intact SGs to maintain NR level 15-50% 14 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _2_ Event No.: _ 6_

_ Event

Description:

When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startuQ transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the outQut breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG outQut breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.

Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is Qerformed to cooldown and deQressurize the RCS to stOI2 I2rimarv-seconda!y leak flow . ..... , lillie Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US: 1. Determines power to one PORV block MOV available, PORVs closed & both PORV block MOVs open 2. Verifies SI & phase A reset 3. Determines RCS pressure>

250 psig & stops 3A RHRP BOP Continues performing actions of 3-EOP-E-3 as directed by US: 1. Determines CV-3-2803 open & IA pressure>

95 psig 2. Determines no offsite power available to 3A1B/D 4kV buses due to U3 SUT lockout 3. Determines 3A SG pressure>

500 psig US Determines required CET temperature for cooldown based on 3A SG pressure per 3-EOP-E-3 step 11a table. BOP Fully opens 3B & 3C steam dumps to atmosphere.

Critical RO Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US: 1 Starts 3A or 3C charging pump, stops RCS makeup, takes running charging pump speed to maximum & adjusts HVC-3-121 for proper seal injection flow. 2. Opens LCV-3-115B

& directs NSO locally close MOV-3-115C

3. Informs US when CET temperature

< value from step 11 a table 4. Determines RCS CET subcooling

> 50°F BOP Continues performance of 3-EOP-E-3 actions as directed by US: 1 . Closes 3B & 3C SG steam dump to atmosphere when CET temperature

< value from step 11a table 2. Determines 3A SG pressure stable/increasing.

15 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _ 2_ Event No.: _6 _

Event

Description:

When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-O to 3-EOP-E-3, the startu(2 transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the out(2ut breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG out(2ut breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.

Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is (2erformed to cooldown and de(2ressurize the RCS to sto(2 (2rimarv-secondaCi leak flow . ..,.. Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 111110:; US Depressurizes RCS to stop primary-secondary leak per 3-EOP-E-3

1. Determines normal spray not available Critical 2. Opens one PORV. Closes PORV when RCS pressure < SG pressure with PZR level> 17% OR PZR level> 71% OR RCS CET subcooling

<30°F. Determines RCS pressure increasing

3. Determines SI termination criteria met. Stops 3A & U4 HHSIPs. TERMINATION SI terminated after stopping primary-secondary leak. CUE 16 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:

Turkey Point Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: 2007-301 Examiners:

Candidates:

US RO BOP Initial Conditions:

Mode 1, 50% Power, MOL, Turnover:

Equipment OOS: 3B EDG due to failed fuel pump (OOS 2 days; next performance of O-OSP-023.3 in 4 hrs); B AFW Pump due to bearing failure (OOS 4 hrs; ETR 24 hrs); 3B CSP due to failed 1ST -low discharge pressure (OOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr) Need to swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-0P-005 section 7.4 after shift turnover to support upcoming emergent maintenance on 3A CCW pump. Known tube leak in 3A S/G (2 gpd) -unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-0NOP-071.2, Attachment

1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate. Event Event Type* Event Description No. 1 (N) SRO/BOP Swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-0P-005 section 7.4. 2 (I) BOP/RO First stage impulse pressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew responds TFS1MABl = T (TS,I) SRO per 3-0NOP-028 to stop inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-0NOP-049.1.

3 (C) ALL 120VAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT TFE6X06F = T also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized.

The crew responds per 3-0NOP-003.9.

TCE6DllC =T 3P09 is swapped over to the spare inverter per 3-0NOP-003.9 Attachment

1. 4 TFCMM2A4 =T (M) ALL The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-19 fails to respond. TVHHSGA= (I) SRO/BOP The crew responds per 3-0NOP-071.2 0.002 (TS) SRO 4a (R) ALL A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-0NOP-100 5 TVHHSGA= (M) ALL The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture. The 0.4 (cont'd from reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed.

MOV-3-1433 fails to close TFSW33C =T event 4) requiring manual isolation of MSIVs. 6 (C) ALL When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not TF05A20A = T automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered.

3A EDG output breaker TA05lRSB = T is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3.

Only 3A & 3D TFP1S38S = T 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is performed to cooldown and depressurize the RCS to stop primary-secondary leak flow. .. (N)ormal, (R)eactlvlty, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor 1 TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Turkey Point 2007-301 Scenario #2 Event 1 -Swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-0P-005 section 7.4. Event 2 -First stage impulse pressure channel PT-3-446 fails low. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-028 to stop inward rod movement by taking rod control to manual and then 3-0NOP-049.1. Event 3 -120VAC power panel 3P09 normal inverter fails. The auto swap to the CVT also fails leaving 3P09 deenergized.

The crew responds per 3-0NOP-003.9.

3P09 is swapped over to the spare inverter per 3-0NOP-003.9 Attachment

1. Event 4 -The 3A steam generator tube leak grows to 2 gpm. R-3-19 fails to respond. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-071.2.

Event 4a -A fast load reduction from 50% power is initiated and performed per 3-0NOP-100.

Event 5 -The 3A steam generator tube leak grows from 2 gpm into a rupture. The reactor is tripped and 3-EOP-E-0 performed.

MOV-3-1433 fails to close requiring manual isolation of MSIVs. Event 6 -When transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-3, the startup transformer locks out. 3A EDG starts but the output breaker does not automatically close, and 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 is entered. 3A EDG output breaker is manually closed and the crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-3. Only 3A & 3D 4kV bus are now available from 3A EDG. 3-EOP-E-3 is performed to cooldown and depressurize the RCS to stop primary-secondary leak flow. 2 TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Scenario XXIII NRC 2 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup IC-2 (50% MOL) Place simulator in run. Trigger lesson steps: SETUP -3B EDG OOS (actuates TAQ5LRSB = OFF (0) & TAQ5B20P = RACKOUT (3>> SETUP -B AFWP OOS (actuates TAFK244 = 0.0, TAFK002 = 0.0, TAFF01 B = 0.0, TCF5MTB = T) SETUP -3A SG 2 GPO LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.0000013)

SETUP -3B CSP OOS (actuates TAM1DPOB = RACKOUT (3) & TCM1D41 M = FALSE) SETUP -3P09 AUTO SWAP TO CVT FAIL (actuates TFE6X06F = T) SETUP -R-3-19 FAIL AS IS (actuates TFCMM2A4 = T) SETUP -MOV-3-1433 FAIL AS IS (actuates TFSVV33C = T) SETUP -3A EDG BKR AUTO CLOSE FAIL (actuates TFQ5A20A = T then = F when IMQ5A20C)

Select channel III as the 1 st stage turbine impulse pressure controlling channel on VPA. Start train A chilled water and secure train B chilled water (CR HVAC panel). Acknowledge any alarms (B-2/2, B-2/3, 0-6/2 & E-2/5 normal for 50% power; F-9/2 & F-9/5 due to 3B EDG OOS) and place simulator in freeze. Place clearance info tags on 3B EDG normal start switch, B AFWP T&T valve control switch & 3B CSP control switch. Remove AFW train 2 orange tag from B AFWP tachometer just below ann. panel X. Provide shift turnover checklists and 3-0NOP-071.2 Att 1. Select 3A QSPDS to page 211 (SAT) and 3B QSPDS to page 212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA to Tavg/Tref (TAV) and at the RCO desk to ENVRN (ED3). Fill in blender & shutdown boron addition placards at console blender station. Data Jor each IC may be found in the ECC & Shutdown Guidelines Book in the simulator IIF. 3 TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 1 -Swap 3D 4kV bus to 3A 4kV bus Initiated by crew per shift turnover using 3-0P-005 sect 7.4. Crew must start 3A ICWP and secure 3C ICWP per 3-0P-019 .. Respond if directed as NSO to perform pre-start checks for 3A ICWP and shutdown checks for 3C ICWP. Report all conditions normal. Respond if directed to locally verify voltage on 3D 4kV bus. Click on POWER

& 480V 4KV voltage indicated on 3D bus mimic. As SM, direct crew to leave 3A & 38 ICWPs in service Respond if directed as NSO to perform pre-start checks for 3C ICWP and shutdown checks for 3C ICWP. Report all conditions normal. Event 2 -PT 446 (channel III 1 st stage impulse pressure) fails low Following transfer of 3D 4kV bus to 3A 4kV bus, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 -PT-3-446 FAILS LOW (actuates TFS1MABL = T). Crew will respond per 3-0NOP-02B and take rod control to manual to stop inward rod movement.

Then the crew will respond to the instrument fai/ure per 3-0NOP-049.

1. Respond if directed as NSO to reset AMSAC trouble. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 -BYPASS AMSAC POWER 1 (actuate TCL4P1BA = T then TCL4P1BB = T after 30 sec and TCL4RST = T after an additional 30 sec). Resets annunciator 0-716. Report when complete.

Respond if directed as wee to initiate PWO and notify I&C. Also respond as wee if directed to generate a clearance for bistables tripped for PT 446 failure. Annunciator C-BI3 alarms when PT-3-446 fai/s. Annunciators C-611, 612 & 613 alarm until ch IV 1 st stage impulse pressure selected for control. Annunciators C-711, 712, 713 alarm due to tripping bistables.

4 TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 3 -Loss of 3P09 After crew brief for PT-3-446 failure, at lead examiner direction, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 -LOSS OF 3D INV/3P09 (actuates TCE6DI1C = T). This deenergizes 3D inverter.

Since the auto transfer to CVT was fai/ed at setup, 120V vital instrument panel 3P09 is deenergized.

The crew responds per 3-0NOP-003.

9 and reenergizes 3P09 from the OS inverter.

Respond as FS/NSO when directed to check out 3P09 & 3D inverter.

After 1-3 min, report 3P09 deenergized with no other unusual conditions and 3D inverter DC input breaker CB1 tripped. Respond as WCC if directed to have Electrical check out 3P09 for reenergization.

After 8-12 min, report 3P09 okay to reenergize from OS inverter.

When directed as FS/NSO to reenergize 3P09 from OS inverter, wait 1-3 min then trigger the following lesson steps per 3-0NOP-003.9 Att. 1: Step 1: EVENT 3 -OPEN 3D INVERTER CB6 (actuates TCEDI4C ::: F) Step 2a: EVENT 3 -OPEN ALL 3P09 BREAKERS (actuates TCE6217S:::

T) Step 2b: EVENT 3 -OPEN ALL 3P24 BREAKERS (actuates TCC2DLM3 ::: F, TCC2DLM ::: F, TCM2DX3M:::

F, TCC2DLE:::

F, TCC2DPE = F, TCF1DA3M:::

F, TCK72407:::

F, TCCMP248:::

F, TCN1409M=F, TCN1410M:::F&TCN1411M:::F)

Step 5a: EVENT 3 -3P09A SWITCH TO ALTERNATE (actuates TAE6X34 ::: ALTERNATE)

Step 6: Call as NSO & request RO take both groups of PZR backup heaters to OFF. Step 7: EVENT 3 -CLOSE 3P09 MAIN/13/o2 (actuates TCE6DS4C ::: T, TCF1DA2M:::

T after 5 sec & TCH 1902M ::: T after 1 0 sec) Step 8: EVENT 3 -CLOSE OTHER 3P09 BREAKERS (actuates TCE6DP2C:::

T, TCE6DP3C ::: T after 5 sec, TCE6DP4C ::: T after 10 sec, TCM2D95M:::

T after 15 sec, TCE6DP5C ::: T after 20 sec, TCE6DP6C ::: T after 25 sec, TCE6DP7C ::: T after 30 sec, TCCMDRE:::

T after 35 sec, TCE6DP8C:::

T after 40 sec, TCN1911M:::

T after 45 sec, TCN1912M = T after 50 sec, TCCMDRE3 = T after 55 sec, TCB2M915 ::: T after 60 sec, TCE6D58C ::: T after 65 sec, TCD2MCCL = T after 70 sec, TCE6DP9C ::: T after 75 sec, TCM2D9TM ::: T after 80 sec & TCE6D56C ::: T after 85 sec) Step 9: EVENT 3 -CLOSE 3P24 BREAKERS (actuates TCC2DLM3 ::: F, TCC2DLM ::: F after 5 sec, TCM2DX3M:::

F after 10 sec, TCC2DLE:::

F after 15 sec, TCC2DPE:::

F after 20 sec, TCF1DA3M ::: F after 25 sec, TCK72407:::

F after 30 sec, TCCMP248:::

F after 35 sec, TCN1409M ::: F after 40 sec, TCN1410M:::

F after 45 sec & TCN1411 M ::: F after 50 sec) Step 10: EVENT 3 -3Y07B SWITCH TO BACKUP OS INVERTER (actuates TAE6X24 ::: ALTERNATE)

Step 12: Call as NSO and report Att.1 complete.

Respond as NSO if directed to depress and hold relay LC459X to allow restoration of letdown and PZR pressurellevel control. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 3-PRESS I HOLD LC459CX (actuates TCH2459C ::: T). When directed to release LC459CX, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 -RELEASE LC459CX (actuates TCH2459C = F). Annunciator F-112 remains in due to failure of 3D inverter.

Annunciator 8-711 will remain on until PRNI N-44 rod stop bypass switch is taken to reset. 5 TP-2007-301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 4/4a -3A SG 2 gpm tube leak Once the process of 3P09 restoration has begun (crew brief complete), trigger lesson step EVENT 4 -3A SG 2GPM TUBE LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.002) Crew should see increase in R-3-15 & SJAE SPING readings and respond per 3-ONOP-071.2.

Annunciator H-1/4 alarms soon after leak rate increase.

Due to the R-3-19 failure entered at setup, actions triggered by R-3-19 high radiation alarm must be performed manually/locally.

The crew should initiate a fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-100 to remove the unit from service. Respond as NSO if asked to check unit 3 condenser air inleakage.

Report 0 scfm. Respond as Chemistry when directed to sample SGs and MS lines per 0-NCAP-1 04. After 15-20 min, identify elevated activity in the 3A SG. Respond as HP when directed to perform rad readings on MS & blowdown lines. After 10-15 min, report radiation slightly>

background on 3A MS line. HP may also be directed to survey Turbine Deck around SJAE effluent & rope off contaminated areas. Respond as NSO when directed to realign aux steam to Unit 4 per 3-0NOP-071.2 Att. 3. After 2-4 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 -ALIGN AUX STEAM FROM U4 (actuates TAFF075 = 0.0, TAFF02 = 1.0 after 60 sec & TAFF007 = 0.0 after 120 sec). Report when complete.

Annunciator 0-4/6 will alarm during this process. Respond as NSO when directed to locally check CV-3-1500

& bypass valve 3-20-014.

After 1-3 min, report both valves closed. Respond as System when notified that Unit 3 is to be removed from service. Respond as SM when notified to refer to 0-EPIP-201 01 & 0-ADM-115.

Event 5 -3A SGTR I Reactor trip I Safety injection At evaluator direction after 5-10% power reduction (in any case before reaching 25% power), trigger lesson step EVENT 5 -3A SG TUBE RUPTURE (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.4). The crew should recognize the increase in tube leakage to > charging pump capacity.

Per 3-0NOP-071.2, the crew should trip the reactor and enter 3-EOP-E-0.

MSR main steam stop MOV-3-1433 failure to close requires manual closure of all MSIVs. PZR level < 12% requires manual safety injection.

Respond as NSO when directed to place PAHMS in service on unit 3. After 8-12 minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 -PLACE U3 PAHMS IN SERVICE (actuates TAC2V02A = 1.0, TAC2V028 = 1.0, TAAAV21 = 1.0, TAAAV22 = 1.0 & TACA005 = 0.0). Report when complete.

6 TP-2007 -301 Scenario #2 Event Description Event 6 -Loss of offsite power I 3A EDG auto start fails Immediately after entry into 3-EOP-E-3, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -U3 SUT LOCKOUT I LOOP (actuates TFP1S38S = T) A spurious lockout on the unit 3 SUT combined with 3A EOG output breaker auto close failure (from setup) and 38 EOG OOS (also from setup) causes a momentary loss of al/ AC power. 3-EOP-ECA-O.O is entered and the 3A EOG output breaker is manually closed after which the crew returns to 3-EOP-E-3 to complete response to the SGTR. Respond as NSO if directed to check the condition of the 3A EOG. After 1-3 min, report 3A EOG running unloaded, otherwise nothing unusual. If asked to monitor 3A EOG after manual output breaker closure, report EOG running satisfactorily.

Respond as System/SAO if asked about U3 SUT lockout. Report that personnel are being dispatched to check out the transformer (switchyard still available).

Respond as U4 RO when directed to perform 3-EOP-E-0 Att 1 to align U4 HHSIPs to U3 RWST. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -ALIGN U4 HHSIP TO U3 RWST (actuates TAMH1V41 = 1.0, TAMH1V46 = 1.0 after 1 min delay, TAMH1V37 = 0.0 after 2 min delay, TAMH4856 = 0.0 after 3 min delay). Report when complete.

Respond as NSO when directed to locally verify phase A valves MOV-3-1417

& 1418 closed (in the U3 Pipe & Valve Room). After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -CLOSE MOV-3-1417

& 1418 (actuates TFKV417C = T & TFKV418C = T after 1 min delay). Report when complete.

Respond as NSO when directed to locally close LCV-3-115C.

After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -LOCALLY CLOSE LCV-3-11SC (actuates TFBVC62 = T). Report when complete.

When directed as FS/NSO to deenergize MOV-3-1403 by opening bkr 4001-28, after 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -DEENERGIZE MOV-3-1403 (actuates TCF5MB28 = F). Report when complete.

If directed to verify MOV-3-1403 closed, after 1-3 min, report that this is the case. If directed to align auxiliary steam supply from U4, either report that this is already done or after 2-4 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 -ALIGN AUX STEAM FROM U4 (actuates TAFF075 = 0.0, TAFF02 = 1.0 after 60 sec & TAFF007 = 0.0 after 120 sec). Report when complete.

Annunciator 0-4/6 will alarm during this process. If asked as NSO to locally verify MOV-3-1425 closed, after 1-3 min, report that this is the case. The crew may try to reenergize 38 4kV bus using 3-0NOP-004.3.

Since 38 EOG is OOS and the U3 SUT is locked out, such attempts will be unsuccessful.

7 OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT ONCOMING CREW ASSIGNMENTS Unit 3 Plant Status Unit 3 AFWP OOS (bearing failure; OOS 4 hr; ETR 24 hr) 3B EDG OOS (fuel pump failed; OOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 in 4 hr) 3B CSP OOS (failed IST -low discharge pressure; OOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr) Train A is protected.

Unit 4 Unit 4 NRC-2 Swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-0P-005 section 7.4 to support possible emergent maintenance on 3A CCWP (vibration increase last shift). 2 gpd tube leak in 3A S/G -unchanged for past week (Chemistry sampling per 3-0NOP-07l.2, Attachment 1.) Power on hold at 50% foIl . inadvertent 3B SGFP . while' . U3 Leo Current: U4 B AFWP -TS 3.7.1.2 Action 3 (trains verified operable just before turnover; 30 days to repair) 3B EDG -TS 3.8.l.1.b.1 Actions b & d (0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 every 8 hr; 3/4-0SP-023.1 start of other EDGs not req'd; 3-0P-023 sect 7.7 due next shift ifOOS > 72 hr; repair in 14 days) 3B CSP -TS 3.6.2.1 Action a (Fix in 72 hr) None . OLRM is = 2.06E-6* LERF = 9.28E-8 Current: B AFWP -TS 3.7.1.2 Action 3 (trains verified operable just before turnover; 30 days to repair) 3B EDG -TS 3.8.1.1.b.1 Actions b & d (0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 every 8 hr; 3/4-0SP-023.1 start of other EDGs not req'd; fix in 14 days) None Unit 3 Status .'-Reactor Operator Mode: 1 RCS Leakrate Accumulator Ref Levels Power: 50 Gross: 0.03 gpm A 6615 MWe: 348 Unidentified 0.02 gpm B 6640 Tavg: 559 Charging Pps: 0.01 gpm C 6625 RCS Pressure:

2235 RCS Boron Cone: 907 Abn()r,mal AIihtinciafors:

' . . : .':;,,< ',i)'::'.':'i!,,!I:'; , *.

!.,

\i:::!i,".:;'7

• • ' .. ';:!?\*C:

.... ) Annunciator:

F 9/2 -3B EDG OOS Comp Actions: O-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 due in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. 3/4-0SP-023.1 not required.

3-0P-023 sect 7.7 due next shift. Annunciator:

F 9/5 -3B EDG OOS Comp Actions: O-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 due in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. 3/4-0SP-023.1 not required.

3-0P-023 sect7.7 due next shift. Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator:

.. Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Current Tech Spec Action Statements: (Does Not Include "For Tracking Only Items" T.S.AS / Component:

3.7.1.2 Action 3/ B AFWP Reason: Bearing failed Entry Date: Xx/Xx/XX (Previous shift) T.S.AS / Component:

3.8.1.1 Actions b & d /3B EDG Reason: Fuel pump failed Entry Date: XX/XX/XX (2 days ago) T.S.AS / Component:

3.6.2.1 Action a / 3B CSP Reason: Failed 1ST -low discharge pressure Entry Date: XX/XX/XX (Yesterday)

T.S.A.S / Component:

3.4.3 Action

a / 3B PZR backup heaters Reason: 14 day due to 3B EDG OOS Entry Date: XX/Xx/XX (2 days ago) T.S.AS / Component:

3.5.2 Action

f /3B HHSIP Reason: 14 day due to 3B EDG OOS Entry Date: XX/XX/XX (2 days ago) T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason: I Entry Date:

Unit 3 Status Changes to Risk Significant Equipment: " B AFWP OOS (Bearing replacement) 3B EDG OOS (Fuel pump repair) 3B CSP OOS (Failed 1ST -low discharge pressure)

Unit 3 Risk is GREEN. Main contributor is B AFWP. Upcomin9_

Reactivity Management Activities:

Dilute to maintain 50% power until 3B SGFP inadvertent trip cause evaluated and management permission received to return 3B SGFP to service and commence power increased to 100%. Upcoming Major POD Activities:

Return to 100% power if/when management permission received to commence power increase.

Upcoming ECOs to Hang and lor Release: None Evolutions or Compensatory Actions in Progress:

-Awaiting permission to restart 3B SGFP and commence power increase to 100%. Power on hold at 50% following inadvertent trip of 3B SGFP while investigation in progress.

-After shift turnover, swap 3D 4kV bus power supply to 3A 4kV bus per 3-0P-005 section 7.4 after shift turnover to support possible emergent maintenance on 3A CCW pump (vibration increase last shift). -Known tube leak in 3A S/G (2 gpd) -unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-0NOP-071.2, Attachment

1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains energized at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate. OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 for 3B EDG OOS due in 4 hrs. 3-0SP-023.1 not required since to 3B EDG OOS due to support system failure. 3-0P-023 sect 7.7 due next shift to allow 3B EDG OOS > 72 hr. General Information, Remarks, and Operator Work Around Status: See evolutions

& compensatory actions listed above. Train A is protected.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:

Turkey Point Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: 2007-301 Examiners:

Candidates:

US RO BOP Initial Conditions:

Mode 1, 75% Power, MOL, Awaiting permission from plant management to increase power back to 100%. 3-GOP-301 in use complete through step 5.96 for return to 100% power following a turbine valve test. Turnover:

Equipment OOS: 3B EDG due to failed fuel pump (OOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 in 4 hrs); B AFW Pump due to bearing failure (OOS 4 hrs; ETR 24 hrs; both trains verified operable);

3B CSP due to failed 1ST -low discharge pressure (OOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr) Perform monthly surveillance on 3A ECC per 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1 immediately after shift turnover.

1ST and remote valve position verification not required.

Known tube leak in 3A S/G (2 gpd) -unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-0NOP-071.2, Attachment

1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate. Event Event Type* Event Description No. 1 (N) BOP 3A ECC monthly surveillance performed per 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1. 3A TFKV905A = T ECC inlet valve CV-3-2905 fails to open and 3A ECC is declared OOS. (N,TS) SRO 2 (I) SRO/RO TM-3-408C (Tavg input to rod control) fails high. Crew responds per 3-TFL1T8CH = T ONOP-028 and takes rods to manual to stop continuous inward rod movement.

3 (C) RO/BOP Loss of 3H 480V LC. Also takes 3C charging pump, 3B ECC, 3B ECF & 3D TFE3D37A = T (C,TS) SRO NCC OOS. Requires starting another charging pump or securing the in TFE3D38T = T service 60 gpm orifice. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciators F-9/6, A-5/4, 1-9/3 or 1-9/4. 4 TAKPXA1=10.0 (C) SRO/BOP 3A 1 Intake screen high Llp. Crew responds per 3-0NOP-011.

3A 1 CWP is TAKPXA2 = 4.0 secured. 4a (R) ALL 3A2 Intake screen high Llp. Fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-100 to 60% for TAKPXA2 = 1.0 the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavg failure. 5 TAHUVBSB=22 (M) ALL 3B RCP high vibration.

The crew responds per 3-0NOP-041.1.

Once TAHUVBMB=

6 vibration reaches the trip setpoint, the crew manually trips the reactor and immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0 are performed.

6 (M) ALL When 3B RCP is tripped, 38 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs. TFE2Z51S = T (cont'd from An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment TVHHCLB = 0.1 event 5) must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to TFQ634AF =T (C) ALL applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.

6a Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange path exists. 6b (C) SRO/RO 3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is TFM1D3AT=T running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1.

Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.

.. (N)ormal, (R)eactlvlty, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor Ii; 1 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _1_ Page _1_ of _1_ Event

Description:

3A EGG monthly surveillance performed per 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1. 3A EGG inlet valve GV-3-2905 fails to open and 3A EGG is declared OOS. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Obtains SM permission and directs BOP to perform 3A EGG monthly operability test per 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1 beginning at step 7.1.6. BOP Obtains copy of 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1. Performs actions as follows beginning at step 7.1.6: 1. Places 3A EGG switch to STOP 2. Determines GV-3-2905, GV-3-2814

& GV-3-2908 all closed. 3. Determines steps 7.1.10, 11 & 13 n/a since 1ST & remote position verification not required.

4. Starts 3A EGG & records start time on Att. 1 5. Directs NSO perform steps 7.1.14 & 15 to measure current 6. Recognizes

& reports GV-3-2905 did not open 7. Stops 3A EGG fan & records time on Att.1 NOTE: May leave switch in STOP rather than return to AUTO since 3A . ECC OOS with GV-3-2905 failed closed 8. Determines GV-3-2814 open & GV-3-2908 closed 9. Determines GGW flow on FI-3-1470 is zero & records on Att. 1 10. Notifies US 3A EGG failed test due to GV-3-2905 failure to open US Notifies SM 3A EGG OOS Directs WGG have Mechanical investigate/fix GV-3-2905.

Determines TS 3.6.2.2 action a. applies (72 hr) May directs WGG place 3A EGG under EGO 1 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 2 Page_1_ of 1 Event

Description:

TM-3-408C (Tavg inl2ut to rod control} fails high. Crew resl20nds l2er 3-ONOP-028 and takes rods to manual to stOI2 continuous inward rod movement.

I Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes/reports control rods inserting in automatic Performs immediate action of 3-0NOP-028 for continuous insertion of an RCC control bank: Places rod control in MANUAL and verifies rods stop moving. US Directs response per 3-0NOP-028 RO Performs subsequent actions of 3-0NOP-028 as directed by US: 1. If directed, withdraws control rods to restore Tavg = Tref 2. Determines rods above RIL from VPA recorder (or PCB section VII figure 3). 3. Determines PRNI N-44 did not fail 4. Determines RCS Tavg TI-3-412D, 422D & 432D not failed BOP Performs subsequent actions of 3-0NOP-028 as directed by US: 1. If directed, reduces turbine load to restore Tavg = Tref 2. Determines PT-3-446 & 447 did not fail US Directs WCC notify I&C of rod control failure. Directs WCC hang caution tag on rod control selector to leave switch in MANUAL Performs applicable actions of 3-0NOP-049.1 if TM-3-408 failure suspected

1. Determines RCS Tavg TI-3-412D, 422D & 432D not failed 2. Determines no control switches require transfer 3. Evaluates no impact per TS 4. Determines no bistable switches require tripping per Att 4, no AMSAC-related channels failed and PT-3-446/447 did not fail 5. Conducts crew brief regarding effects of rod control failure 2 Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _3_ Page_1 _ of _ 2_ Event

Description:

Loss of 3H 4BOV LC. Also takes 3C charging l2uml2, 3B ECC, 3B ECF & 3D NCC OOS. Reguires starting another charging l2uml2 or securing the in service 60 gl2m orifice. The crew resl20nds l2er 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciators F-9/6, A-5/4, 1-9/3 or 1-9/4. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports annunciator F-9/6, X-2/6 & X-5/1. Recognizes/reports both 3H 4BOV LC feeder breakers open indicating loss of power to that LC. RO Recognizes/reports annunciator 1-9/3, 1-9/4, J-7/1 & J-B/1 (later A-5/4) Directs actions from 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator F-9/6 Recognizes/reports loss of 3C charging pump, 3B ECC, 3B ECF, 3D NCC and 3D 4BOV MCC. BOP Performs actions per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator F-9/6 1. Determines 3H 4BOV LC auto bus transfer failed 2. Determines 3C & 3D 4BOV LC both energized US Directs WCC have Electrical investigate loss of 3H 4BOV LC BOP Directs 3-0NOP-041.6 entry from 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator A-9/3 US Directs response per 3-0NOP-041.6 RO Performs actions per 3-0NOP-041.6 as directed by US: 1. Starts standby (3B) charging pump US Evaluates TS 3.B.3.1.a or b as applicable (c from U4 point of view) On U3 -Action a. applies (B hr) On U4 -Table 3.B-2 72 hr action since 4A2/4B2 battery chargers not required by 3.B.2.1.c or d Evaluates TS 3.6.2.2.b as applicable requiring plant 1 hr shutdown since only 1 ECC left operable Conducts crew brief regarding effects of loss of 3H 4BOV LC & 3D 4BOV MCC and requirement to commence action to shutdown plant. 3 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: ..+/-. Page _1_ of _1_ Event

Description:

3A 1 Intake screen high 1\p. Crew responds per 3-0NOP-011.

3A 1 CWP is secured . ..,.... lillie Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports rising 1\p on 3A 1 CWP Reports annunciator 1-3/3 when it alarms US Directs performance of 3-0NOP-011 BOP Performs actions of 3-0NOP-011 as directed by US: 1. Verifies 2 screen wash pumps running 2. Directs NSO monitor & report screen wash pump basket strainers 1\p 3. Directs NSO verify all traveling screens operating in high gear & all rotating 4. Directs NSO to monitor & report presence of traveling screen waterfall, debris carryover, screen wash water pressure (> 60 psig)'and nozzle spray over entire screen NOTE: If a waterfall is reported or 3A 1 traveling screen f1p pegged high, crew should skip ICW/CCW & ICWITPCW checks and go to step 7 to check for conditions to stop a CWP. 5. Directs NSOs report: a. ICW flows to CCWHXs & basket strainer 1\p's b. ICW flows to TPCWHXs & basket strainer 1\p's US Determines 3A 1 traveling screen 1\p still well above normal Loops between steps 1 & 7 until 3A 1 traveling screen waterfall height reported>

2.5 ft When 3A 1 traveling screen waterfall reported>

2.5 ft, directs shutdown of 3A1 CWP BOP Continues performing actions of 3-0NOP-011 as directed by US: 6. Stops 3A 1 CWP when directed by US in response to report of waterfall>

2.5 ft 7. Determines ICWP secured in 3A 1 intake well US Directs FS/wCC coordinate performance of Att. 1 to clean 3A 1 intake well. Notifies plant management.

4 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: Page of _2_ Event

Description:

3A2 intake screen high Llp. Fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-1 00 to 60% for the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavg failure. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes I reports rising 3A2 traveling screen Llp US Determines that conditions will soon require securing 3A2 CWP and directs performance of a fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-1 00 to <60% to allow shutdown of the 2 nd CWP. Contacts FS/wCC and determines 3A 1 intake well cleaning not complete so 3A 1 CWP can not be started. Conducts crew brief per 3-0NOP-100 Attachment 3:

• Provides reason (2 gpm tube leak requiring plant sid)

• Target power level = offline

• Specifies load reduction rate

• Specifies boration amount & rate

• Covers plant control parameters

& contingency actions

• Covers E-O transition criteria

• Reviews req'd actions from 3-0NOP-071.2

• Solicits crew questions

& input Ensures load dispatcher notified of load decrease.

RO When directed, initiates boration per 3-0NOP-100:

1. Sets BA Totalizer to amount directed 2. Sets FC-3-113A pot setting = 8.0 3. Places Rx M/U Selector Switch to BORATE 4. Places Rx M/U Control Switch to START BOP When directed per 3-0NOP-100:

1. Notifies load dispatcher of load reduction when directed by US 2. Makes plant page announcement regarding load reduction 5

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 4a Page .£ of --1. Event

Description:

3A2 intake screen high b.12. Fast load reduction l2er 3-0NOP-1 00 to 60% for the I2Ur120Se of securing 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavg failure. I Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO When directed, continues fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-100:

1. Checks for Tavg reduction from boration 2. Sets FC-3-113A for BA flow rate as directed BOP Reduces turbine load per 3-0NOP-100 at rate directed by US. RO When directed, continues fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-100:

1. Manually inserts rods in response to turbine load reduction.

NOTE: Rods < RIL not expected at this power level US Per 3-0NOP-100, notifies SM to review 0-EPIP-20101

& O-ADM-115 and ensure required notifications made RO When directed per 3-0NOP-1 00 1. Checks PZR level following program. If not increases charging flow and/or places an additional letdown orifice in service 2. Determines NRHX CCW flow already increased (from setup) 3. Verifies load reduction rate & manual rod control maintaining Tavg-T ref per expected value as discussed in crew brief 4. Energizes PZR backup heaters. 5. Determines turbine load < 570MW & verifies non-running SGFP recirc valve open 6. When directed by US (<:: 60% power), secures boration:

a. Places rx m/u selector switch in AUTO b. Sets FC-3-113A potentiometer to directed value c. Places RCS m/u control switch to START 7. Stops one HDP when < 450MWe US Determines that transferring station service loads to SUT and aligning aux steam to unit 4 not required due to stabilization of reactor power at 50-60%. 6 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: -L Event No.: Page L of_1_ Event

Description:

3B RCP high vibration.

The crew res[2onds

[2er 3-0NOP-041.1.

Once vibration reaches either shaft or motor tri[2 set[2oint, the crew manually tri[2s the reactor and immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0 are [2erformed. lillie Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes I reports annunciator F-1/1 alarming Determines rising shaft & motor vibration on 3B RCP US Directs response per 3-0NOP-041.1 foldout page Critical Directs RO to manually trip the reactor per 3-0NOP-041.1 due to RCP motor vibration>

5 mils or shaft vibration>

20 mils. RO Performs 3-0NOP-041.1 foldout page actions as directed by US: 1. Reports when either motor vibration>

5 mils or shaft vibration>

20 mils Critical 2. Trips the reactor when directed US Directs crew perform immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0.

RO Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:

1. Verifies reactor trip

• Rod bottom lights on & RPls at zero

• Rx trip & bypass bkrs open

• Neutron flux decreasing

2. Actuates SI & phase A due PZR level not maintained

<12% BOP Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:

1. Verifies turbine tripped

• Turbine stop valves closed

• Closes MSR main steam stop MOVs.

• Mid & East GCBs open 2. Verifies power to emergency 4kV buses

• Determines both 3A & 3B 4kV buses energized

• Determines 3D 4kV bus energized from 3B 4kV bus 7 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: _6_ Page _1 of _3_ Event

Description:

When 3B RCP is tril2l2ed, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs. An automatic SI occurs but train A seguencerfails.

Train A ECCS eguil2ment must be manually started. The crew coml2letes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to al2l2licable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1 . ...,.., Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Secures 3B RCP Recognizes

/ reports rapidly falling RCS pressure and automatic SI NOTE: RO may manually actuate SI & phase A in response to train A sequencer failure. BOP Recognizes

/ reports loss of 3B 4kV bus with 3B EDG OOS. US Directs BOP restore 3D 4kV bus per step 3c RNO then verify prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-O Attachment

3. Directs RO continue performing 3-EOP-E-0 subsequent actions. BOP Restores 3D 4kV bus per 3-EOP-E-O step 3c RNO: 1. Determines no lockout on 3D 4kV bus 2. Verifies 3C CCWP & 3C ICWP breakers open Critical 3. Opens 3AB19 & 3AD06 4. Closes 3AD01 & 3AA17 Verifies prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-O Attachment 3: 1. Determines only 3A & 3C 480V LCs energized

2. Determines MSIVs all closed (on hi-hi containment pressure)

3. Verifies FW isolation:

a. Places both SGFP switches in STOP. b. Determines all main FW regulating

& bypass valves closed. c. Closes FW isolation valves MOV-3-1408

& 1409. Directs NSO locally close MOV-3-1407.

d. Determines both SSGFWPs off. Critical 4. Determines no ICWP running and starts 3A & 3C ICWP 5. Determines POV-3-4882

& 4883 closed with ICW headers tied together.

8 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: _6_ Page -2... of_3_ Event

Description:

When 3B RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs. An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-O and transitions to applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.

I Time Position BOP Critical Critical Applicant's Actions or Behavior Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-0 Att. 3: 6. Determines only 3A CCWP running and starts 3C CCWP. 7. Verifies 3 CCWHXs in service, CCW headers tied together & MOV-3-626 open (no power). 8. Determines no ECC or ECF running. Starts 3C ECC & 3C ECF. No power available to start a 2 nd ECC or ECF. NOTE: May start 3A HHSIP but not required at this point. 9. Determines only the U4 HHSIPs & no RHRPs running. Starts 3A RHRP. 10. Determines adequate HHSI flow present, but no RHR flow present even though RCS pressure < 250[650] psig. 11. Starts 3A HHSIP. Shuts down either unit 4 HHSIP. Directs U4 RO realign U4 HHSIP suction to U3 RWST per Att. 1. 12. Determines not all containment isolation phase A valves closed. Directs NSO to locally verify phase A valves MOV-3-1417,1418,1425

& 381 closed 13. Determines train A SI valves in proper injection alignment

14. Resets SI & containment isolation phase A. Determines containment isolation phase B actuated.

Resets phase B when containment pressure < 20 psig. 15. Determines no RCPs running (should have been tripped by RO due to inadequate RCS subcooling)

16. Determines containment pressure>

20 psig. a. Manually starts 3A CSP. Determines MOV-3-880A open. b. Directs NSO to locally verify phase B valves MOV-3-626, 716B & 730 closed c. Verifies all RCPs stopped 17. Determines containment ventilation isolated and verifies control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.

9 Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: _6_ Page of _3_ Event

Description:

When 3B RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs. An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-O and transitions to applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3: 18. Directs NSO place PAHMS in service per 3-0P-094.

19. Verifies 3A & both U4 EDGs running (3B EDG is OOS). 20. Determines 3A & 3D 4kV buses still energized.

21. Notifies US that prompt action verification complete.

RO Performs foldout page actions of 3-EOP-E-0 as directed:

1. Determines containment conditions adverse (>180°F) 2. Trips RCPs since RCS subcooling

< 25[65tF with U4 HHSIPs running and SI flowpath verified Performs subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-0 as directed 1. Determines 2 AFWPs (A & C) running. 2. Determines AFW valve alignment proper except that MOV-3-1404 did not open. 3. Determines SG levels < 6[32]%. Controls AFW flow> 345 gpm until level > 6[32]% then maintains levels 15-50%. 4. Determines annunciators A-1/2 and/or 1/3 on. If RCP seal return temps all < 235°F, verifies SI reset then starts 3A charging pump at minimum speed and adjusts HCV-3-121 for proper seal injection flow 5. Determines Tc trend. If decreasing, reduces AFW flow to:::: 345 gpm until any SG level> 6[32]%. 6. Determines PORVs, normal spray, aux spray

& excess letdown isolation valves closed 7. Verifies RCPs tripped (tripped earlier on foldout page) 8. Determines no SGs depressurized or depressurizing

9. Determines no SG tube ruptures 10. Determines ReS not intact; containment radiation, pressure & sump level all not normal. 10 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _ 3_ Event No.: Page_1 _ of -.L Event

Description:

Once CSFSTs are monitored for imQlementation, if containment r2ressure is still above 20 Qsig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange r2ath exists . ..,..., lillie Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Directs monitoring of CSFs for implementation.

US If any RCS cold leg temperature drops below 320°F (orange) or 290°F (red) transitions to and directs response per 3-EOP-FR-P.1 Performs actions per 3-EOP-FR-P.1 as directed by US: RO 1. Determines RCS pressure < 250[650] psig with> 1000 gpm RHR flow (indication of LBLOCA) Transitions out of 3-EOP-FR-P.1 (due to LBLOCA indication)

US If containment pressure>

20 psig, CSFSTs are being monitored for implementation and no higher red or orange path exists, transitions to and directs response per 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 as directed by US: 1. Determines all RCPs secured. 2. Stops any running NCCs 3. Determines containment isolation phases A & B already verified 4. Determines containment ventilation isolated and verifies control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.

US Determines no RHRP available.

If 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 entered, determines number of CSPs required from 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 and skips to step 9. RO Continues performing 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 actions as directed by US: 1. Determines RWST level> 155000 gal & MOV-3-864NB open 2. Determines 3A CSP running & 3B CSP OOS 3. Determines MOV-3-880A open & MOV-3-880B closed/ deenergized under ECO 4. Determines 3 CCWHX in service & 2 CCWP running (3A & 3C) 5. Determines only 3C ECC running (no power to other two) with associated bypass, inlet & outlet open. 6. Determines only 3C ECF running (no power to other two) 11 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: Page 2 of 2 Event

Description:

Once CSFSTs are monitored for imQlementation, if containment Qressure is still above 20 Qsig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange Qath exists. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Performs actions of 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 as directed by US: 1. Directs NSO verify CSP suction & discharge valves open. 2. Determines MSIVs closed 3. Determines no SGs faulted US Directs return to procedure and step in effect 12 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.: --2L Page _1_ of --.L Event

Description:

3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is running. transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1.

Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.

Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs transition to and performance of 3-EOP-E-1.

NOTE: Performance of 3-0NOP-004.3 is optional since there is no source of power and EOP actions are higher priority.

Conducts crew brief. RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-1 as directed by US: 1. Determines RCPs not running 2. Determines power to one PORV block MOV available, PORVs closed & both PORV block MOVs open 3. Verifies SI reset 4. Determines only 3A charging pump has power available and pump is running at minimum speed for seal injection.

5. Places RCS makeup control switch to stop 6. Establishes maximum flow using 3A charging pump 7. Opens LCV-3-115B

& directs NSO locally close MOV-3-115C.

BOP Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-1 as directed by US: 1. Determines SGs not faulted. 2. Controls AFW flow> 345 gpm until level> 6[32]% then maintains levels 15-50%. 3. Directs Chemistry sample SGs for activity & check DAM-1 4. Directs HP take radiation readings on main steam lines 5. Verifies containment isolation phase A & B reset. 6. Verifies CV-3-2803 open & IA pressure>

95 psig US Determines SI can not be terminated (inadequate subcooling, RCS pressure & PZR level) 13 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.:--.illL Page --L of 3 Event

Description:

3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1.

Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Continues performing 3-EOP-E-1 actions as directed by US. 1. Determines 3A CSP should continue running since containment temperature>

122°F. 2. Determines RCS pressure < 250[650] psig. Recognizes/reports 3A RHRP tripped with RHR flow < 1000 gpm 3. Determines RCS pressure stable/decreasing BOP Continues performing 3-EOP-E-1 actions as directed by US: 1. Determines SG pressures stable 2. Determines 3A 4kV bus on offsite power & 3B 4kV bus deenergized

3. Directs U4 RO verify one computer room chiller running 4. Stops 3A EDG. Directs NSO complete shutdown per 3-0P-023.

Directs U4 RO stop U4 EDGs and have them placed in standby. US Determines no RHRP available.

Directs transition to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 Conducts EOP transition crew brief RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 as directed by US: 1. Determines RWST level> 60000 gallons 2. Determines cold leg recirc capability not available Critical 3. Aligns makeup to U3 RWST a. Determines CVCS makeup stopped b. Directs NSO verify 3-356 closed, then open 3-365A & B c. Places FCV-3-113A in AUTO, FCV-3-114A in OPEN, FCV-3-113B & 114B in CLOSE d. Determines MOV-3-350 closed. e. Places FCV-3-113A

& 114A controllers in MANUAL f. Places RCS makeup selector switch to BORATE g. Sets BA totalizer to maximum and starts makeup h. Adjusts PW & BA flow for max flow at 1.5:1 blend 14 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _3_ Event No.:

of _3_ Event

Description:

3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP tri(2s. Since neither RHRP is running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1.

Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Perform actions of 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 as directed by US. 1. Controls AFW flow> 345 gpm until level> 6[32]% then maintains levels 15-50%. US Determines RCS cooldown rate has exceeded 1 OO°F/hr and no additional forced cooldown required RO Continues performing 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 actions as directed by US: 1. Determines only 1 ECC running & available.

a. Determines phase A reset b. Directs NSO open MOV-3-1417

& 1418 c. Resets & starts 2 available NCCs 2. Directs U4 RO verify at least 1 computer room chiller running US Determines CSP suction aligned to RWST. Directs running CSP secured if containment pressure < 14 psig. RO Continues performing 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 actions as directed by US: 1. Determines 2 HHSIPs running (3A & one U4 pump) 2. Verifies SI reset Critical 3. Stops 1 HHSIP 4. Determines RCS pressure < 250[650] psig, RHR flow < 1000 gpm and no RHRPs available

5. Determines no recirc sump suction lines open. Closes MOV-3-862A (no power to 862B) US 1. Determines RCS subcooling inadequate for RCP start & 51 termination.

Critical 2. Determines minimum 51 flow per Figure 1. Directs NSO throttle running HHSIP discharge to achieve minimum 51 flow TERMINATING Scenario is complete when HHSI flow is reduced to minimum. CUE 15 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:

Turkey Point Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: 2007-301 Examiners:

Candidates:

US RO BOP Initial Conditions:

Mode 1, 75% Power, MOL, Awaiting permission from plant management to increase power back to 100%. 3-GOP-301 in use complete through step 5.96 for retum to 100% power following a turbine valve test. Turnover:

Equipment OOS: 3B EDG due to failed fuel pump (OOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 in 4 hrs); B APN Pump due to bearing failure (OOS 4 hrs; ETR 24 hrs; both trains verified operable);

3B CSP due to failed 1ST -low discharge pressure (OOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr) Perform monthly surveillance on 3A ECC per 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1 immediately after shift turnover.

1ST and remote valve position verification not required.

Known tube leak in 3A S/G (2 gpd) -unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-0NOP-071.2, Attachment

1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate. Event Event Type* Event Description No. 1 (N) BOP 3A ECC monthly surveillance performed per 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1. 3A TFKV905A=T ECC inlet valve CV-3-2905 fails to open and 3A ECC is declared OOS. (N,TS) SRO 2 (I) SRO/RO TM-3-408C (Tavg input to rod control) fails high. Crew responds per 3-TFL1T8CH = T ONOP-028 and takes rods to manual to stop continuous inward rod movement.

3 (C) RO/BOP Loss of 3H 480V LC. Also takes 3C charging pump, 3B ECC, 3B ECF & 3D TFE3D37A =T (C,TS) SRO NCC OOS. Requires starting another charging pump or securing the in TFE3D38T = T service 60 gpm orifice. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciators F-9/6, A-5/4, 1-9/3 or 1-9/4. 4 TAKPXA1=10.0 (C) SRO/BOP 3A 1 Intake screen high t:.p. Crew responds per 3-0NOP-011.

3A 1 CWP is TAKPXA2 = 4.0 secured. 4a (R) ALL 3A2 Intake screen high t:.p. Fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-100 to 60% for TAKPXA2 = 1.0 the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavg failure. 5 TAHUVBSB=22 (M) ALL 3B RCP high vibration.

The crew responds per 3-0NOP-041.1.

Once TAHUVBMB=

6 vibration reaches the trip setpoint, the crew manually trips the reactor and immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0 are performed.

6 (M)ALL When 3B RCP is tripped, 3B 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs. TFE2Z51S = T (cont'd from An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment TVHHCLB = 0.1 event 5) must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to TFQ634AF=T (C) ALL applicable FRPs followed by 3-EOP-E-1.

6a Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange path exists. 6b (C) SRO/RO 3-EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is TFM1D3AT = T running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1.

Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.

.. (N)ormal, (R)eactlvlty, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor 1 TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Turkey Point 2007-301 Scenario #3 Event 1 -3A ECC monthly surveillance performed per 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1. 3A ECC inlet valve CV-3-2905 fails to open and 3A ECC is declared Event 2 -TM-3-408C (Tavg input to rod control) fails high. Crew responds per 3-0NOP-028 and takes rods to manual to stop continuous inward rod movement.

Event 3 -Loss of 3H 480V LC. Also takes 3C charging pump, 38 ECC, 38 ECF & 3D NCC Requires starting another charging pump or securing the in service 60 gpm orifice. The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciators F-9/6, A-5/4, 1-9/3 or 1-9/4. Event 4 -3A 1 intake screen high Crew responds per 3-0NOP-011.

3A 1 CWP is secured. Event 4a -3A2 intake screen high Fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-100 to 60% for the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP. Manual rod control must be used due to rod control Tavg failure. Event 5 -38 RCP high vibration.

The crew responds per 3-0NOP-041.1.

Once vibration reaches either shaft or motor trip setpoint, the crew manually trips the reactor and immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0 are performed.

Event 6 -When 38 RCP is tripped, 38 4kV bus is lost and a large break LOCA occurs. An automatic SI occurs but train A sequencer fails. Train A ECCS equipment must be manually started. The crew completes 3-EOP-E-0 and transitions to applicable FRPs followed by E-1. Event 6a -Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.1 if no higher red or orange path exists. Event 6b EOP-E-1 is entered after which 3A RHRP trips. Since neither RHRP is running, transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1.

Measures are taken to minimize the loss of RWST inventory.

2 TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Scenario XXIII NRC 3 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup IC-16 (75% MOL) Place simulator in run Trigger lesson steps: SETUP -3B EDG ODS (actuatesTAQ5LRSB

= OFF & TAQ5B20P = RACKOUT) SETUP -B AFWP ODS (actuates TAFK244 = 0.0, TAFK002 = 0.0, TAFF01B = 0.0, TCF5MTB = T) SETUP -3A SG 2 GPD LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.0000013)

SETUP -3B CSP ODS (actuates TAM1DPOB = RACKOUT (3) & TCM1D41M = FALSE (0>> SETUP -TRAIN A SEQUENCER FAIL (actuates TFQ634AF = T) Acknowledge annunciators F-9/2 & 9/5 (3B EDG Start train A chilled water and secure train B chilled water (CR HVAC panel). Place simulator in freeze. Place clearance info tags on 3B EDG normal start switch, B AFWP T& T valve control switch & 3B CSP control switch. Remove AFW train 2 orange tag from B AFWP tachometer just below ann. panel X. Provide shift turnover checklists, 3-0NOP-071.2 Att 1 and a copy of 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1 & Attachment 1 filled out thru step 7.1.5. 3-0SP-055.1 is being performed without quarterly 1ST or remote position verification required.

Select 3A QSPDS to page 211 (SAT) and 3B QSPDS to page 212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA to TavglTref (TAV) and at the RCO desk to ENVRN (ED3). Fill in blender & shutdown boron addition placards at console blender station. Data for each IC may be found in the ECC & Shutdown Guidelines Book in the simulator IIF. Event 1 -3A ECC asp failure Initiated at crew direction based on shift turnover beginning at step 7.1.6. Immediately after CV-3-2905 closes in response taking 3A ECC to STOP, trigger lesson step EVENT 1 -3A ECC INLET FAIL AS IS (actuates TFKV905A = T). The crew performs 3-0SP-055.1 sect. 7.1 to test 3A ECC beginning at step 7.1.6. Quarterly 1ST and remote position verification are not required.

Inlet valve GV-3-2905 fails to open. 3A EGG is stopped and declared Respond as NSO for steps 7.1.14 & 7.1.15. Indicate that he has portable ammeter in hand. When directed to measure 3A ECC fan current at 3B MCC (bkr 30650), report 22 amps indicated.

3 TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Respond as NSO if asked to locally check Train A ECC CCW flow on FI-3-1472.

After 1-3 minutes, report that flow indicates zero. Respond as WCC when directed to have Mechanical maintenance investigate failure of CV-3-2905 to open. Respond as WCC if directed to take 3A ECC breaker 30650 to OFF and place it under clearance.

After 8-12 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 1 -3A ECC BKR TO OFF (actuates TCC1DMG = F) Event 2 -TM-3-408C Tavg input to rod control fails high Once 3A ECC stopped and declared 005, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 -TM-3-408C FAILS HIGH (actuates TFL 1T8CH = T). This fails Tavg input to rod control high causing maximum speed control rod insertion.

The operators respond per 3-0NOP-028 and take rod control to manual to stop inward rod movement.

This failure does not fail median Tavg for other control purposes. Tref recorder TR-3-408 continues to function.

Respond as WCC when directed to have I&C investigate failure of rod control. Respond as WCC if directed to generate a caution tag to be hung on the rod control selector switch Event 3 -Loss of 3H 480V LC After 3A2 CWP secured, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 -LOSS OF 3H LC (actuates TFE3D37A = T, then TFE3D38T = T after a 5 sec delay). This causes a loss of 3H 480V LG and along with it 3G charging pump, 38 EGG, 38 EGF&3DNGG.

The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.

GR for annunciators F-916, 1-913, 1-914 or A-514 and may enter 3-0NOP-041.

6. Since 3G charging pump was running, 38 charging pump is started per 3-0NOP-041.6.

Failure also puts plant in a 1hr shutdown plant action statement per TS 3.6.2.2.b since only 1 EGG is left operable.

Respond if directed to check out 3H 480V LC. After 1-3 min, report bkr 35001 feeder from 3D 480V LC tripped open with scorch marks and a burnt insulation smell. 35007 doesn't appear to have closed in (still open). Report no evidence of fire. Respond as WCC when directed to have electrical check into the loss of 3H LC. After 8-12 min, call as WCC and relay recommendation from Electrical maintenance that 3H 480V LC remain deenergized until further evaluation of the LC can be performed.

4 TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Respond as NSO if directed to do pre-start

& post-start checks on 3B charging pump. Report all conditions normal. Respond as NSO if directed to locally control CCW to NRHX flow to maintain letdown temperature.

Click on Schema-tCOMMON SERVICES-tCOMPONENT COOLING-t valve 834-tTAKA834 BYP AROUND TCV-144-tadjust value as desired and INSERT. Respond as WCC/Mechanical if asked about status of 3A ECC since plant is now in 1 hr shutdown action statement.

Report mechanics are investigating the CV-3-2905 failure. Event 4/4a -3A1/3A2 intake screen clogging I Fast load reduction Upon completion of TM-3-408C crew brief, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 -3A1/3A2 INTAKE CLOGGING (actuates TAKPXA1 = 10.0 & TAKPXA2 = 4.0). The crew responds per 3-0NOP-011.

First 3A 1 CWP is secured per 3-0NOP-011.

When directed as NSO to check screen wash pump basket strainer Llp, click on AREA & SCREEN strainer Llp's in lower right corner of intake area & screen wash system mimic. Value reported should be < 10 psid. When directed as NSO to report status of unit 3 traveling screens, report that they are operating in high gear, are rotating.

Specific data such as waterfall height, screen Llp and screen wash pressure can be determined from the intake area & screen wash system mimic accessed earlier. ICW to CCWITPCW flows and basket strainer Llp's can be determined by clicking on requested parameters shown on the ICW system mimic. Notify BOP when waterfall height in the 3A1 intake well reaches 2.5 feet as determined by subtracting 3A 1 intake well level from indicated intake level as shown on the intake area & screen wash system mimic. Respond if called as FS/WCC regarding issuance of an ECO and manual cleaning of on 3A1 traveling screen. To take 3A1 traveling screen out of service, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 -3A1 TRAVELING SCREEN OOS FOR CLEANING (actuates TCKPD24M = F). To return 3A1 traveling screen to service, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 -3A1 TRAVELING SCREEN RETURN TO SERVICE (actuates TCKPD24M = T). Immediately after 3A1 CWP secured, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 -3A2 INTAKE REDUCED CLOGGING (actuates TAKPXA2 = 2.0). The crew reduces power per 3-0NOP-100 from 75% to <60% for the purpose of securing 3A2 CWP. 5 TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description In view of the slowly increasing on 3A2 traveling screen, crew should elect to perform a fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-1 00. At lead examiner direction, prompt this decision if necessary by calling as SM and asking for status to help crew understand problem is not going away. Additionally, call as NSO at intake structure and report debris still coming down intake canal collecting mostly around the canal banks. Respond as NSO if directed to close 3-30-002 & 3-30-004 to allow stopping the 3A2 CWP. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 -CLOSE 3-30-002/004 (actuates TAFB002 = 0.0 then TAFB004 = 0.0 30 sec later.) Report when complete.

Respond as NSO if directed to listen for seal well solenoid valve closure. Event 5 -38 RCP high vibration I Reactor trip After a 5-10% power change, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 -3B RCP HIGH VIBRATION (actuates TAHUVBSB = 22.0 on 5 min ramp & TAHUVBMB = 6.0 on 5 min ramp). The crew responds per 3-0NOP-041.

1. Once motor & shaft vibration reach the trip setpoint, the crew manually trips the reactor and immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-O are performed.

Respond if notified as system engineer of increasing vibration on 38 RCP motor & shaft. Event 6 -Large break LOCA I Loss of emergency coolant recirculation Tripping 3B RCP auto triggers lesson step EVENT 6 -LARGE BREAK LOCA (actuates TVHHCLB = 0.1 when H20L09G) and EVENT 6 -3B 4KV BUS LOCKOUT (actuates TFE2Z51S = Twhen H20L09G).

The crew performs 3-EOP-E-O and must manually start train A ECGS loads due to failure of 3A sequencer entered at setup. 3A 4kV bus remains on offsite power. Respond as NSO when directed to locally close MOV-3-1407.

After 4-6 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -CLOSE MOV-3-1407 (actuates TFVV07C = F). Report when complete.

Respond as NSO if directed to locally open MOV-3-8438.

After 1-3 min., trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -OPEN MOV-3-843B (actuates TFMVV020 = T). Report when complete.

Respond as U4 RO when directed to perform 3-EOP-E-0 Att 1 to align U4 HHSIPs to U3 RWST. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -ALIGN U4 HHSIP TO U3 RWST (actuates TAMH1V41 = 1.0, TAMH1V46 = 1.0 after 1 min delay, TAMH1V37 = 0.0 after 2 min delay, TAMH4856 = 0.0 after 3 min delay). Report when complete.

Respond as NSO when directed to locally verify phase A valves MOV-3-1417, 1418, 1425 & 381 closed (all of which are in the U3 Pipe & Valve Room). After 1-3 min, 6 TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -CLOSE PHASE A ISOL VALVES (actuates TFKV417C = T, TFKV418C = T after 1 min delay, TFBV60 = T after 2 min delay & TFSWVM5B = T after 3 min delay). Report when complete.

Respond as NSO when directs to locally verify phase B valves MOV-3-626, 716B & 730 closed(all of which are in the U3 Pipe & Valve Room). After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -CLOSE PHASE B ISOL VALVES (actuates TFKv626C = T, TFKV16BC = T after 1 min delay & TFKv730C = T after 2 min delay). Report when complete.

Respond as NSO when directed to place PAHMS in service on unit 3. After 8-12 minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -PLACE U3 PAHMS IN SERVICE (actuates TAC2V02A = 1.0, TAC2V02B = 1.0, TMAV21 = 1.0, TAAAV22 = 1.0 & TACA005 = 0.0). Report when complete.

Transition is made from 3-EOP-E-O to 3-EOP-FR-P.

1 which is quickly exited due to the presence of low head SI flow in response to the LBLOCA. Event 6a -Respond to High Containment Pressure Once CSFSTs are monitored for implementation, if containment pressure is still above 20 psig, the crew immediately transitions to 3-EOP-FR-Z.

1 if no higher red or orange path exists. Respond as NSO if directed to check CSP suction & discharge valves open. After 1-3 min., report that 3A CSP suction & discharge valves are open while 3B CSP suction & discharge valves are closed and under an ECO. Event 6b -Respond to LBLOCA with no emergency coolant recirc The crew transitions to 3-EOP-E-1 and then to 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 after it is determined that neither RHRP is available to support cold leg recirculation After 3-EOP-E-1 is entered, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b -3A RHRP TRIP (actuates TFM1D3AT = T). Respond as NSO when directed to investigate loss of 3A RHRP. After 1-3 min., report back motor very hot especially at bottom of motor casing (failed bearing).

Respond as Chemistry when directed to sample SGs for activity & check DAM-1 and as HP when directed to perform radiation readings on main steam lines. After 10-15 min. report no signs of activity or radiation levels above background.

Respond as NSO when directed to locally close 3-297 AlBIC. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b -LOCALLY CLOSE 3-297 AlBIC (actuates TAHN97A = 0.0, TAHN97B = 0.0 1 min. later & TAHN97C = 0.0 2 min. later.). 7 TP-2007-301 Scenario #3 Event Description Respond as NSO when directed to locally close LCV-3-115C.

After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b -LOCALLY CLOSE LCV-3-115C (actuates TFBVC62 = T). Report when complete.

Respond as U4 RO when directed to start one train of chilled water for computer room cooling. Respond as U4 RO when directed to shutdown U4 EDGs. Respond as NSO when directed to complete shutdown of 3A, 4A & 48 EDGs per 3/4-0P-023.

Respond as NSO when directed to verify 3-356 closed, then open 3-365A & 8. After 1-3 min., trigger lesson step EVENT 6b -ALIGN CVCS M/U TO RWST (actuates TABM365B = 1.0). Report when complete.

Respond as NSO when asked to verify MOV-3-350 closed. After 1-3 min., report valve closed. Respond as NSO when directed to locally open MOV-3-1417

& 1418. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 6b -OPEN CCW TO NCCs (actuates TFKV417C = F, TFKV418C = F, TFKV4170 = T after 5 sec delay & TFKV4180 = T after 65 sec delay). Report when complete.

Respond as NSO when directed to locally throttle discharge of the running HHSIP (most likely 3A using valve 8888). Click on Schema-+SAFETY SYSTEM-+SAFETY INJECTION PROC-+click on 888 valve for running HHSIP-+ TAMH8888(C or D) 8888(C or D) VALVE PORT AREA-+adjust value consistent with ordered flow rate from 3-EOP-ECA-1.1 Figure 1 then INSERT. Repeat as necessary to achieve desired flow as shown at F943 on SAFETY INJECTION PROC system mimic. 8 OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT Unit 3 Unit 4 Plant Status Unit 3 Unit 4 AFWP OOS (bearing failure; OOS 4 hr; ETR 24 hr) JB EDG OOS (fuel pump failed; OOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 in 4 hr) 3B CSP OOS (failed 1ST -low discharge pressure; OOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr) Train A is protected NRC-3 2 tube leak in 3A S/G 0NOP-071.2 Attachment 1 Current: U4 B AFWP -TS 3.7.1.2 Action 3 (trains verified operable just before turnover; 30 days to repair) 3B EDG -TS 3.8.1.1.b.1 Actions b & d (0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 every 8 hr; 3/4-0SP-023.1 start of other EDGs not req'd; 3-0P-023 sect 7.7 due next shift ifOOS > 72 hr; repair in 14 days) 3B CSP -TS 3.6.2.1 Action a (Fix in 72 hr) None = 2.06E-6* LERF = 9.28E-8 Current: B AFWP -TS 3.7.1.2 Action 3 (trains verified operable just before turnover; 30 days to repair) 3B EDG -TS 3.8.1.1.b.1 Actions b & d (0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 every 8 hr; 3/4-0SP-023.1 start of other EDGs not req' d; fix in 14 days) None OLRM is = 2.00E-6* LERF = 9.28E-8 Unit 3 Status -, Reactor Operator Mode: 1 RCS Leakrate Accumulator Ref Levels Power: 75 Gross: 0.03 gpm A 6615 MWe: 557 Unidentified 0.02 gpm B 6640 Tavg: 567 Charging Pps: 0.01 gpm C 6625 RCS Pressure:

2235 RCS Boron Cone: 825 .. AlnlorfuaI A:tiitirncia1:ors:

i,I', "I "'/1': '/;:"\";:"ii,h;i:U.;Y:ili,"i;n'r'i

.. ': i', ......... .*. ,:iJi .. ? .. /.';"" ""'."", , , I, .* i i Annunciator:

F 9/2 -3B EDG OOS Comp Actions: O-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 due in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. 3/4-0SP-023.1 not required.

3-0P-023 sect 7.7 due next shift. Annunciator:

F 9/5 -3B EDG OOS Comp Actions: O-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 due in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. 3/4-0SP-023.1 not required.

3-0P-023 sect 7.7 due next shift. Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Current Tech Spec Action Statements: (Does Not Include "For Tracking Only Items" T.S.AS / Component:

3.7.1.2 Action 3/ B AFWP Reason: Bearing failed Entry Date: XX/Xx/XX (Previous shift) T.S.AS / Component:

3.8.1.1 Actions b & d / 3B EDG Reason: Fuel pump failed Entry Date: XX/XX/XX (2 days ago) T.S.AS / Component:

3.6.2.1 Action a / 3B CSP Reason: Failed 1ST -low discharge pressure Entry Date: XX/Xx/XX (Yesterday)

T.S.AS / Component:

3.4.3 Action

a / 3B PZR backup heaters Reason: 14 day due to 3B EDG OOS Entry Date: XX/XX/XX (2 days ago) T.S.AS / Component:

3.5.2 Action

f / 3B HHS1P Reason: 14 day due to 3B EDG OOS Entry Date: XX/XX/XX (2 days ago) T.S.AS / Component:

Reason: I Entry Date:

Unit 3 Status to Risk Significant Equipment:

B AFWP OOS (Bearing replacement) 3B EDG OOS (Fuel pump repair) 3B CSP OOS (Failed 1ST -low discharge pressure)

Unit 3 Risk is GREEN. Main contributor is B AFWP. Upcoming Reactivity Management Activities:

Dilute to maintain 75% power until management permission received to complete increasing power back to 100%. Upcoming Major POD Activities:

Return to 100% power if/when management permission received to increase power back to 100%. Upcoming ECOs to Hang and lor Release: None --Evolutions or Compensatory Actions in Progress:

-In process of returning power back to 100% from turbine valve test. Currently on hold at 75% awaiting management permission to continue power increase.

3-GOP-301 in use completed through step 5.97. -After shift turnover, perform monthly surveillance on 3A ECC per 3-0SP-055.1 section 7.1 immediately after shift turnover.

1ST and remote valve position verification not required.

-Known tube leak in 3A S/G (2 gpd) -unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-0NOP-071.2, Attachment

1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains energized at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate. OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 for 3B EDG OOS due in 4 hrs. 3-0SP-023.1 not required since to 3B EDG OOS due to support system failure. 3-0P-023 sect 7.7 due next shift to allow 3B EDG OOS > 72 hr. General Information, Remarks, and Operator Work Around Status: See evolutions

& compensatory actions listed above. Train A is protected.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:

Turkey Point Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: 2007-301 Examiners:

Candidates:

US RO BOP Initial Conditions:

Mode 1, 100% Power, MOL. Just completed power increase last shift. Turnover:

Equipment OOS: 3B EDG due to failed fuel pump (OOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 in 4 hrs); B AFW Pump due to bearing failure (OOS 4 hrs; ETR 24 hrs; both trains verified operable);

3B CSP due to failed 1ST -low discharge pressure (OOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr) Secure 60 gpm orifice (CV-3-200B) and shutdown 1 charging pump using 3-0P-047 section 7.11. Leave 1 charging pump and 45 gpm orifice (CV-3-200A) in service. Known tube leak in 3A S/G (2 gpd) -unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-0NOP-071.2, Attachment

1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate. Event Event Type* Event Description No. 1 (N) ALL Close CV-3-200B and secure 1 charging pump. Shift from 2 charging pumps I 2 letdown orifices to 1 charging pump I 1 letdown orifice lineup using 3-0P-047 section 7.11. 2 (C) SRO/RO PC-3-145 fails high in auto, PCV-3-145 closes until manual control taken and TFB1PIN5 = T letdown restored.

The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator A-5/5. 3 TVFCLK1 = 0.2 (C) SRO/BOP Loss of condenser vacuum. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-014.

3a TVFCLK1 = 0.0 (R)ALL Fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-1 00 until condenser vacuum leak located and isolated.

4 (I) RO/BOP L T 459 failed low. Crew responds per 3-0NOP-041.6 to restore letdown TFH1TV59 = T and 3-0NOP-049.1 to take L T 459 out of service. (I,TS) SRO 5 TVHPBOTL (M) RO/BOP RCS leak inside containment coincident with L T-3-459 failure. The crew = 0.00004 initially responds per 3-0NOP-041.3

& 3-0NOP-067.

Once RCS leakage (2gpm) (M,TS) SRO = 0.006 exceeds charging pump capacity, the crew unsuccessfully attempts to (300gpm) manually trip the reactor and immediate transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to TFL2XASE =T TFL2XBSE = T 3-EOP-FR-S.1.

6 TFL4AF = T (C) ALL AMSAC and SI fail to automatically actuate. AFW must be manually started TFL3SIA1 = T by opening AFWSS MOVs. Manual SI is deferred until after crew transitions TFL3SIA2 = T back to 3-EOP-E-0.

The auto start of the 2 nd CCWP on SI closes MOV-3-626 TFKV626C = T which must be opened manually if RCP seal return temperatures permit. The TVHPBOTL = crew transitions from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-1 to address the SBLOCA. 0.01 .. (N)ormal, (R)eactlvlty, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor 1 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _1_ Page _1_ of _1_ Event

Description:

Close CV-3-200B and secure 1 charging pump. Shift from 2 charging pumps / 2 letdown orifices to 1 charging pump / 1 letdown orifice lineup using 3-0P-047 section 7.11.

Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs RCO to shift from 2 charging pumps /2 letdown orifices to 1 charging pump /1 letdown orifice per 3-0P-047 section 7.11 RCO Obtains copy of 3-0P-047 section 7.11. Performs actions as follows: 1. Notifies HP of intent to change letdown flow 2. Directs NSO adjust CCW flow to NRHX to maintain letdown flow within 5°F of VCT temp 3. Determines 2 charging pumps running 4. If directed by US, takes TCV-3-143 to VCT DIVERT 5. Determines step 7.11.2.3 n/a 6. Takes manual control & maintains demand> 20% on running charging pumps. 7. Places PCV-3-145 in MANUAL and adjusts letdown pressure to approx. 300 psig NOTE: BOP should assist while closing CV-3-200B

8. Closes CV-3-200B and controls PCV-3-145 to maintain letdown pressure>

150 psig 9. Adjusts PCV-3-145 to put letdown pressure in normal (green) band then places PCV-3-145 in AUTO NOTE: When PCV-3-145 is returned to auto is when the malfunction of PC-3-145 in automatic is inserted.

Subsequent steps in this event may be delayed or not performed due to response to event 2. 10. Directs NSO adjust 3-834 to maintain stable letdown temperature

11. Reduces demand to 20-25% on charging pump to be shutdown then secures charging pump 12. Controls running charging pump demand to put PZR level = program then places running charging pump speed control in AUTO 13. Verifies TCV-3-143 in DEMIN NORMAL 1 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 2 Page _1_ of _1_ Event

Description:

PC-3-145 fails high in auto, PCV-3-145 closes until manual control taken and letdown restored.

The crew resQonds Qer 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator A-5/5. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes/reports annunciator A-5/5 alarms briefly Recognizes/reports loss of letdown flow and PC-3-145 failed high BOP Directs response per 3-ARP-097.CR annunciator A-5/5 for a letdown high pressure condition RO Performs actions of 3-ARP-097.CR annunciator A-5/5 as directed by BOP: 1. Determines PCV-3-145 not operating properly 2. Places PCV-3-145 in MAN and restores letdown pressure to normal (green) band & letdown flow to expected value for orifice in service US Directs WCC notify I&C of PCV-3-145 failure to operate in auto Directs placing info tag on PCV-3-145 to leave in MANUAL Evaluates no impact per TS Conducts crew brief regarding effects of failure 2 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 3/3a Page _1_ of _3_ Event

Description:

Loss of condenser vacuum. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-014.

Fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-100 until condenser vacuum leak located and isolated.

PV;:,ilivll Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes/reports lowering condenser vacuum. Directs 3-0NOP-014 immediate operator action: Directs NSO place SJAE hogging jet in service US Directs performance of 3-0NOP-014 BOP Performs actions per 3-0NOP-014 as directed by US 1. Directs NSO close hogging jet drain 2. Directs NSO verify 2 nd set of SJAEs in service 3. Determines vacuum still slowly lowering US Determines vacuum> 3-0NOP-014 Enclosure 1 Directs performance of fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-1 00 Conducts crew brief per 3-0NOP-1 00 Attachment 3:

• Provides reason (2 gpm tube leak requiring plant sid)

• Target power level = offline

• Specifies load reduction rate

• Specifies boration amount & rate

• Covers plant control parameters

& contingency actions

• Covers E-O transition criteria

• Reviews req'd actions from 3-0NOP-071.2

• Solicits crew questions

& input Ensures load dispatcher notified of load decrease.

RO When directed, initiates boration per 3-0NOP-1 00: 1. Sets BA Totalizer to amount directed 2. Sets FC-3-113A pot setting = 8.0 3. Places Rx M/U Selector Switch to BORATE 4. Places Rx M/U Control Switch to START 3 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: --+/--Event No.: 3/3a Page 2. of -.l Event

Description:

Loss of condenser vacuum. The crew resl20nds l2er 3-0NOP-014.

Fast load reduction l2er 3-0NOP-1 00 until condenser vacuum leak located and isolated.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP When directed per 3-0NOP-100:

1. Notifies load dispatcher of load reduction when directed by US 2. Makes plant page announcement regarding load reduction When directed per 3-0NOP-014, directs NSO to identify cause of lowering vacuum per step 5.5. RO When directed, continues fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-100:

1. Checks for T avg reduction from boration 2. Sets FC-3-113A for BA flow rate as directed BOP Reduces turbine load per 3-0NOP-1 00 at rate directed by US. RO When directed, continues fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-1 00: 1. Verifies auto rod insertion in response to turbine load reduction.

2. Verifies rods> RIL US Per 3-0NOP-100, notifies SM to review 0-EPIP-20101

& O-ADM-115 and ensure required notifications made RO When directed per 3-0NOP-1 00 1. Checks PZR level following program. If not increases charging flow and/or places an additional letdown orifice in service. Controls PCV-3-145 as necessary to return letdown pressure to normal (green) band. 2. Directs NSO adjust NRHX CCW flow if needed for increased charging flow. 3. Verifies load reduction rate & auto rod control maintaining T avg-T ref per expected value as discussed in crew brief 4. Energizes PZR backup heaters. BOP Relays report that cause of lowering vacuum has been found and isolated.

Reports vacuum increasing.

4 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: -L Event No.: 3/3a Page 2. of -.l Event

Description:

Loss of condenser vacuum. The crew resl20nds l2er 3-0NOP-014.

Fast load reduction l2er 3-0NOP-1 00 until condenser vacuum leak located and isolated.

ime Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs stabilization of reactor power following report that loss of vacuum corrected RO When directed by US (2: 60% power), secures boration:

a. Places rx m/u selector switch in AUTO b. Sets FC-3-113A potentiometer to directed value c. Places RCS m/u control switch to START US Exits 3-0NOP-100 Directs completion of actions per 3-0NOP-0 14 BOP Completes performing actions of 3-0NOP-014 as directed by US: 1. When condenser vacuum recovers>

26"Hg, directs NSO secure SJAE hogging jet 2. Directs NSO monitor 1 report North & South hotwell levels 3. Directs Chemistry report hotwell dissolved oxygen levels 4. Directs NSO verify condenser air inleakage

< 20"H 2 O US Evaluates reported North & South hotwell levels Determines from SM that both sets of SJAEs to remain in service Directs WCC contact Mechanical to initiate repairs to failed condenser component causing vacuum loss 5 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: Page ..1.. of --L Event

Description:

L T 459 failed low. Crew res(2onds (2er 3-0NOP-041.6 to restore letdown and 3-0NOP-049.1 to take L T-3-459 out of service. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RCO Recognizes

/ reports failure of L T-3-459 low and loss of letdown. Performs immediate actions of 3-0NOP-041.6:

1. Places CHANNEL SELECT PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL switch to the ch 2 & 3 position.

2. With PZR level ch 2 & 3 in service, determines PZR level follows program US Directs performance of actions per 3-0NOP-041.6.

RCO Performs actions per 3-0NOP-041.6 as directed by US: 1. Determines running charging pump can maintain PZR level on program. 2. Places CHANNEL SELECT PRESSURIZER LEVEL RECORDER switch to the ch 2 or ch 3 position NOTE: BOP may assist with restoration of letdown 3. Re-establishes letdown flows as follows: a. Throttles PCV-3-145 to approximately 50% open b. Manually controls PCV-3-145 to limit pressure spike c. Opens LCV-3-460, then opens CV-3-200A

d. Determines PCV-3-145 must remain in MANUAL 4. Restores PZR heaters to automatic operation US Directs performance of actions per 3-0NOP-049.1.

RCO Performs actions per 3-0NOP-049.1 as directed by US: 1. Determines L T-3-459 failed while L T-3-460/461 remain in service 2. Determines PZR level control switches already transferred US Determines TS 3.3.1 Table 3.3-1 Unit 9 affected.

Action 6 applies (6 hr to trip bistables)

Determines BS-3-459A 1 & A2 must be tripped Briefs crew regarding tripping bistables and effects of failure. 6 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: Page 2. of --.£ Event

Description:

L T 459 failed low. Crew res[2onds

[2er 3-0NOP-041.6 to restore letdown and 3-0NOP-049.1 to take L T-3-459 out of service. e Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE: Subsequent steps may not be performed if annunciator G-5/3 alarms indicating leakage in containment>

1 gpm. This annunciator may cause the crew to stop performance of 3-0NOP-049.1 and enter 3-0NOP-041.3 per event 5. BOP Obtains keys and opens protection rack 1 Trips bistables BS-3-459A 1 & BS-3-459A2 RCO Checks correct bistable status lights energized in response to tripping bistables (LC459A 1 & LC459A2).

Checks correct annunciators on in response to tripping bistables (A-8/3, A-8/4 & J-7/4). US Directs WCC initiate PWO & notify I&C Directs generation of ECO for tripped bistables 7

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: l Page!L of _2_ Event

Description:

RCS leak inside containment conincident with L T-3-459 failure. The crew initially resl20nds l2er 3-0NOP-041.3

& 3-0NOP-067.

Once RCS leakage exceeds charging l2uml2 cal2acity.

the crew unsuccessfully atteml2ts to manually tril2 the reactor and immediate transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-FR-S.1.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes

/ reports rising charging flow while maintaining PZR level on program Recognizes

/ reports annunciator G-5/3 alarming BOP Recognizes

/ reports rising containment sump level on recorder Recognizes

/ reports R-3-11/12 slowly rising US Directs performance of actions per 3-0NOP-041.3 Directs STA perform 3-0SP-041.1 to determine RCS leak rate Identifies leak as inside containment but not isolable RO Performs actions of 3-0NOP-041.3 as directed by US: 1. Determines RCS inventory being maintained with 1 charging pp 2. Estimates RCS leak rate from charging/letdown mismatch 3. Closes CV-3-2819/2826 and CV-3-2821/2822 US Determines RCS leak rate> unidentified leak limit of TS 3.4.6.2.b requiring action within 4hr or commence shutdown of unit Notifies SM to refer to 0-EPIP-201 01 Directs HPSS conduct local radiation surveys & post accordingly Determines leak not isolated Directs performance of actions per 3-0NOP-067 as time permits BOP Performs actions of 3-0NOP-067 as directed by US: 1. Determines

/ reports status of R-3-11 /12 alarms. If alarming:

a. Determines reading> alarm setpoint b. Verifies containment/control rm ventilation per Att 1 c. Directs NSO silence alarm on R-3-11/12 RM-80 skid d. Directs HP verify activity inside containment 8

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: 2-Page 2 of--L Event

Description:

RCS leak inside containment con incident with L T-3-459 failure. The crew resl20nds l2er 3-0NOP-041.3

& 3-0NOP-067.

Once RCS leakage exceeds charging l2uml2 the crew atteml2ts to tril2 the reactor and immediate transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-FR-S.1.

Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Continues performing actions of 3-0NOP-067 as directed by US: 2. Directs NSO report status of R-3-11/12 RM-80 monitor light 3. Determines effluent radiation monitor alarms clear, effluent release not in progress RO Recognizes I reports sudden decrease in PZR level and increase in charging pump demand US Directs performance of actions per 3-0NOP-041.3 in response to leak rate increase RO Performs actions of 3-0NOP-041.3 as directed by US: 1. Starts 2 standby charging pumps and establishes maximum charging flow 2. Closes CV 200A to isolate letdown 3. Recognizes I reports PZR level continuing to drop US Determines RCS leak rate> maximum charging flow with letdown isolated Directs reactor trip Directs crew perform immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0.

RO Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:

1. Attempts reactor trip at console & VPB. Reports unable to trip reactor with reactor power> 5% US Directs STA monitor CSFs using 3-EOP-F-0 Directs transition to 3-EOP-FR-S.1 9

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _4_ Event No.: _6_ Page.L of l Event

Description:

AMSAC and SI fail to automatically actuate. AFW must be manually started by opening AFWSS MOVs. Manual SI is deferred until after crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-0.

The auto start of the 2 nd CCWP on SI closes MOV-3-626 which must be opened manually if RCP seal return temperatures permit. The crew transitions from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-1 to address the SBLOCA. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs performance of 3-EOP-FR-S.1 RO Performs actions per 3-EOP-FR-S.1 as directed by US: Critical BOP Critical 1. Since reactor does not respond to manual trip, verifies control rod insertion in auto or manual 2. Initiates emergency boration:

a. Determines all 3 charging pumps running. Verifies control for one of those in MANUAL. b. Stops CVCS makeup system c. Starts 1 BATP d. Opens MOV-3-350

& HCV-3-121

e. Determines CV-3-301A open f. Establishes emergency boration flow> 60 gpm on FI-3-110 with charging flow> 45 gpm on FI-3-122 3. Determines PZR pressure < 2335 psig 4. Determines containment purge exhaust & supply fans off and isolation dampers closed. Verifies CV-3-2819

& 2826 closed. 5. Determines reactor subcritical with reactor power < 5% and IR SUR negative Performs actions per 3-EOP-FR-S.1 as directed by US: 1. Manually trips turbine & determines turbine stop valves closed 2. Closes MSR main steam stop MOVs 3. Opens AFWSS MOVs to start AFW pumps 4. Directs FS/NSO locally trip rx trip breakers and MG set input/output breakers 5. Verifies turbine trip & Mid/East GCBs open 10 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _4_ Event No.: _6_ Page.£ of _6_ Event

Description:

AMSAC and SI fail to automatically:

actuate. AFW must be manually:

started by: oQening AFWSS MOVs. Manual SI is deferred until after crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-0.

The auto start of the 2 na CCWP on SI closes MOV-3-626 which must be oQened manually:

if RCP seal return temQeratures Qermit. The crew transitions from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-1 to address the SBLOCA. I Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior U5 Does not allow manual 51 until after return to 3-EOP-E-O Determines reactor subcritical and proceeds from step 8 to step 17 Directs transition back to and performance of 3-EOP-E-0 RO Performs actions per 3-EOP-E-0 as directed by U5: 1. Recognizes

/ reports rx tripped with rod bottom lights on, RPI at zero & neutron flux decreasing (rx trip breakers still closed). NOTE: Automatic SI will not function.

Crew must manually SI. Critical 2. Determines PZR level < 12[50]%. Manually initiates

51. BOP Performs actions per 3-EOP-E-0 as directed by US: 1. Determines turbine stop valves & MSR steam stop MOVs closed with Mid/East GCBs open. 2. Determines 3A & 3B 4kV buses energized from offsite power with 3D 4kV bus aligned to 3B 4kV bus US Directs RO continue with performance of 3-EOP-E-0 subsequent actions while BOP verifies prompt actions per Attachment

3. BOP Verifies prompt actions per 3-EOP-E-0 Attachment 3: 1. Determines 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D & 3H 480V LCs energized

2. Determines MSIVs open with no active MSIS 3. Verifies FW isolation:

a. Places both SGFP switches in STOP. b. Determines all main FW regulating

& bypass valves closed. c. Closes FW isolation valves MOV-3-1407, 1408 & 1409. d. Determines both SSGFWPs off. 4. Determines 2: 2 ICWP running POV-3-4882

& 4883 closed with ICW headers tied together.

11 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _4_ Event No.: _6_ Page --L of _6_ Event

Description:

AMSAC and SI fail to automatically actuate. AFW must be manually started by opening AFWSS MOVs. Manual SI is deferred until after crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-0.

The auto start of the 2 nd CCWP on SI closes MOV-3-626 which must be opened manually if RCP seal return temperatures permit. The crew transitions from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-1 to address the SBLOCA. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Continues prompt action verification per 3-EOP-E-O Att. 3: Critical 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. Determines 3 CCWHXs in service, 2 CCWPs running and CCW headers tied together Determines MOV-3-626 closed, containment isolation phase B not actuated & R-3-17 AlB normal. If RCP #1 seal leak-off temperature

< 235°F, manually opens MOV-3-626 Determines 2 ECC & ECF running. Determines both U3 HHSIPs & RHRPs running. Determines RCS pressure <1600[2000]

psig but >250[650]

psig with adequate HHSI flow present. Determines both U3 HHSIPs running. Shuts down both U4 HHSIPs. Determines all containment isolation phase A valves closed. Determines SI valves in proper injection alignment Resets SI & containment isolation phase A. Determines containment isolation phase B not actuated.

Determines no RCPs running (should have been tripped by RO due to inadequate RCS subcooling)

16. Determines containment pressure < 20 psig. 17. Determines containment ventilation isolated and verifies control room ventilation in proper emergency recirculation alignment.

18. Directs NSO place PAHMS in service per 3-0P-094.

19. Verifies 3A & both U4 EDGs running (3B EDG is OOS). 20. Determines 3A, 3B & 3D 4kV buses still energized.

21. Notifies US that prompt action verification complete.

12 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _4_ Event No.: _6_ Page of l Event

Description:

AMSAC and SI fail to automatically actuate. AFW must be manually started by opening AFWSS MOVs. Manual SI is deferred until after crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-0.

The auto start of the 2 nd CCWP on SI closes MOV-3-626 which must be opened manually if RCP seal return temperatures permit. The crew transitions from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-1 to address the SBLOCA. Time Position RO Critical Applicant's Actions or Behavior Performs foldout page actions of 3-EOP-E-0 as directed:

1. Determines containment conditions adverse (>180°F) 2. Trips RCPs if RCS subcooling

< 25[65]OF with U4 HHSIPs running and SI flowpath verified Performs subsequent actions of 3-EOP-E-0 as directed 1. Determines 2 AFWPs (A & C) running. 2. Determines AFW valve alignment proper. 3. Determines SG levels < 6[32]%. Controls AFW flow> 345 gpm until level > 6[32]% then maintains levels 15-50%. 4. Determines annunciator A-1/3 on & verifies RCPs tripped if MOV-3-626 still closed. In that case, if RCP seal return temps all < 235°F, verifies SI reset then starts 3A charging pump at minimum speed and adjusts HCV-3-121 for proper seal injection flow 5. Determines Tc slowly dropping with RCS pressure.

Determines steam dumps & steam flow not cause for Tc decrease.

Limits total AFW flow to 345 gpm until any SG level> 6[32]%. 6. Determines PORVs, normal spray, aux spray & excess letdown isolation valves closed 7. Verifies RCPs tripped if RCS subcooling

< 25[65tF with U4 HHSIPs running and SI flowpath verified 8. Determines no SGs depressurized or depressurizing

9. Determines no SG tube ruptures 10. Determines RCS not intact (containment radiation, pressure & sump level all not normal). US Directs transition to and performance of 3-EOP-E-1.

Conducts crew brief. 13 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _4_ Event No.: _6_

Event

Description:

AMSAC and SI fail to automatically actuate. AFW must be manually started by oQening AFWSS MOVs. Manual SI is deferred until after crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-0.

The auto start of the 2 na CCWP on SI closes MOV-3-626 which must be oQened manually if RCP seal return temQeratures Qermit. The crew transitions from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-1 to address the SBLOCA. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-1 as directed by US: 1. Verifies RCPs tripped if RCS subcooling

< 25[65]OF with U4 HHSIPs running and SI flowpath verified 2. Determines power to both PORV block MOVs available, PORVs closed & both PORV block MOVs open 3. Verifies SI reset 4. Determines at least one charging pump is running with CVCS makeup stopped. 5. Starts any standby charging pumps and establishes maximum flow 6. Verifies charging pump suction transfers to RWST. BOP Performs actions of 3-EOP-E-1 as directed by US: 1 . Determines SGs not faulted. 2. Controls AFW flow> 345 gpm until level> 6[32]% then maintains levels 15-50%. 3. Directs Chemistry sample SGs for activity & check DAM-1 4. Directs HP take radiation readings on main steam lines 5. Verifies containment isolation phase A & B reset. 6. Verifies CV-3-2803 open & IA pressure>

95 psig US Determines SI can not be terminated (inadequate subcooling, RCS pressure & PZR level) RO Continues performing 3-EOP-E-1 actions as directed by US. 1. Determines 3A CSP should continue running since containment temperature>

122°F. 2. Determines RCS pressure>

250[650] psig and RHR flow < 1000 gpm. Verifies SI reset and stops RHRPs. 3. Determines RCS pressure stable/decreasing 14 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301*

Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: _6_ Pagelofl Event

Description:

AMSAC and SI fail to automatically actuate. AFW must be manually started by oQening AFWSS MOVs. Manual SI is deferred until after crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-O.

The auto start of the 2 na CCWP on SI closes MOV-3-626 which must be oQened manually if RCP seal return temQeratures Qermit. The crew transitions from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-1 to address SBLOCA. ..,... lillie Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Determines LOCA exists since RCS pressure stable/decreasing and continues past step 14 in 3-EOP-E-O.

TERMINATING Scenario is terminated upon completion of 3-EOP-E-1 beyond step CUE 14. 15 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:

Turkey Point Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: 2007-301 Examiners:

Candidates:

US RO BOP Initial Conditions:

Mode 1, 100% Power, MOL. Just completed power increase last shift. Turnover:

Equipment OOS: 3B EDG due to failed fuel pump (OOS 2 days; next performance of O-OSP-023.3 in 4 hrs); B AFW Pump due to bearing failure (OOS 4 hrs; ETR 24 hrs); 3B CSP due to failed 1ST -low discharge pressure (OOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr) Secure 60 gpm orifice (CV-3-200B) and shutdown 1 charging pump using 3-0P-047 section 7.11. Leave 1 charging pump and 45 gpm orifice (CV-3-200A) in service. Known tube leak in 3A S/G (2 gpd) -unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-0NOP-071.2, Attachment

1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains open at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate. Event Event Type* Event Description No. 1 (N) ALL Close CV-3-200B and secure 1 charging pump. Shift from 2 charging pumps I 2 letdown orifices to 1 charging pump I 1 letdown orifice lineup using 3-0P-047 section 7.11. 2 (C) RO PC-3-145 fails high in auto, PCV-3-145 closes until manual control taken and TFB1PIN5 = T (C) SRO letdown restored.

The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator A-5/5. 3 (C) BOP Loss of condenser vacuum. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-014.

TVFCLK1 = 0.2 (C) SRO 3a TVFCLK1 = 0.0 (R) ALL Fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-100 until condenser vacuum leak located and isolated.

4 (I) RO/BOP L T-3-459 failed low. Crew responds per 3-0NOP-041.6 to restore letdown TFH1TV59 = T and 3-0NOP-049.1 to take L T-3-459 out of service. (TS,I) SRO 5 TVHPBOTL (M) ALL RCS leak inside containment coincident with L T-3-459 failure. The crew = 0.00004 initially responds per 3-0NOP-041.3

& 3-0NOP-067.

Once RCS leakage (2gpm) (TS) SRO = 0.006 exceeds charging pump capacity, the crew unsuccessfully attempts to (300gpm) manually trip the reactor and immediate transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to TFL2XASE = T TFL2XBSE = T 3-EOP-FR-S.1.

6 TFL4AF = T (C) BOP/RO AMSAC and SI fail to automatically actuate. AFW must be manually started TFL3SIA1 = T (C)SRO by opening AFWSS MOVs. Manual SI is deferred until after crew transitions TFL3SIA2 = T back to 3-EOP-E-0.

The auto start of the 2 nd CCWP on SI closes MOV-3-626 TFKV626C = T which must be opened manually if RCP seal return temperatures permit. The TVHPBOTL = crew transitions from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-1 and then to 3-EOP-ES-1.2 for 0.01 post-LOCA cooldown & depressurization.

.. (N)ormal, (R)eactlvlty, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor 1 TP-2007-301 Scenario #4 Event Description Turkey Point 2007-301 Scenario #4 Event 1 -Close CV-3-200B and secure 1 charging pump. Shift from 2 charging pumps / 2 letdown orifices to 1 charging pump / 1 letdown orifice lineup using 3-0P-047 section 7.11. Event 2 -PC-3-145 fails high in auto, PCV-3-145 closes until manual control taken and letdown restored.

The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator A-5/5. Event 3 -Loss of condenser vacuum. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-014.

Event 3a -Fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-1 00 until condenser vacuum leak located and isolated.

Event 4 -L T-3-459 failed low. Crew responds per 3-0NOP-041.6 to restore letdown and 3-ONOP-049.1 to take L T-3-459 out of service. Event 5 -RCS leak inside containment conincident with L T-3-459 failure. The crew initially responds per 3-0NOP-041.3

& 3-0NOP-067.

Once RCS leakage exceeds charging pump capacity, the crew unsuccessfully attempts to manually trip the reactor and immediate transition is made from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-FR-S.1.

Event 6 -AMSAC and SI fail to automatically actuate. AFW must be manually started by opening AFWSS MOVs. Manual SI is deferred until after crew transitions back to 3-EOP-E-0.

The auto start of the 2 nd CCWP on SI closes MOV-3-626 which must be opened manually if RCP seal return temperatures permit. The crew transitions from 3-EOP-E-0 to 3-EOP-E-1 to address the SBLOCA. 2 TP-2007-301 Scenario #4 Event Description Scenario XXIII NRC 4 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup IC-1 (100% MOL) Place simulator in run Trigger lesson steps: SETUP -3B EDG OOS (actuates TAQ5LRSB = OFF & TAQ5B20P = RACKOUT) SETUP -B AFWP OOS (actuates TAFK244 = 0.0, TAFK002 = 0.0, TAFF01B = 0.0, TCF5MTB = T) SETUP -3A SG 2 GPO LEAK (actuates TVHHSGA = 0.0000013)

SETUP -3B CSP OOS (actuates TAM1 DPOB = RACKOUT (3) & TCM1 D41 M = FALSE (0)) SETUP -A TWS (actuates TFL2XASE = T & TFL2XBSE = T) SETUP -AMSAC FAIL (actuates TFL4AF = T) SETUP -AUTO SI FAIL (actuates TFL3SlA1 = T & TFL3SlA2 = T) SETUP -MOV-3-626 CLOSE ON SI (actuates TFKV626C = Twhen K10A12R) Start 3B charging pump & place associated controller in auto. Open CV-3-200B.

Allow plant to stabilize.

Adjust valve 834 on CCW system mimic as needed to stabilize letdown temp within 5°F of VCT temp. Setting parameter TAKA834=0.63 puts CCW flow up to 800 gpm and will stabilize/reduce letdown temp after CV-3-200B is open. Start train A chilled water and secure train B chilled water (CR HVAC panel). Acknowledge alarms F-9/2 & 9/5 (3B EDG OOS) and place simulator in freeze. Place clearance info tags on 3B EDG normal start switch, B AFWP T& T valve control switch & 3B CSP control switch. Remove AFW train 2 orange tag from B AFWP tachometer just below ann. panel X. Provide shift turnover checklists and 3-0NOP-071.2 Att 1. Select 3A QSPDS to page 211 (SAT) and 3B QSPDS to page 212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA to TavglTref (TAV) and at the RCO desk to ENVRN (ED3). Fill in blender & shutdown boron addition placards at console blender station. Data for each IC may be found in the ECC & Shutdown Guidelines Book in the simulator IIF. Event 1 -Shift to 1 charging pump & 1 letdown orifice Initiated at crew direction in response to shift turnover.

The crew will secure one of the letdown orifices and shutdown one charging pump using 3-0P-047 section 7.11 Respond as HP when notified of reduction in letdown flow. 3 TP-2007-301 Scenario #4 Event Description Respond as NSO when directed to adjust CCW flow to NRHX to maintain letdown temp within 5°F of VCT temp. or to maintain stable letdown temp. Click on COMMON TAKA834 BYP AROUND desired value then INSERT. Flow is indicated above valve 777. TAKA834=0.15 sets CCW flow to 220 gpm and should stabilize letdown temp. If asked as SM, tell crew that it is not necessary to bypass CVCS demineralizers.

Crew should mark step 7.11.2.3 as nla and perform step 7. 11.2.4 to reduce letdown flow. Respond as NSO if directed to do post-shutdown checks on the charging pump secured in this event. . Event 2 -PC-3-145 fails high in auto When PCV-3-145 is returned to auto after closing CV-3-200B, trigger lesson step EVENT 2 -PC-3-145 FAILS HIGH IN AUTO (actuates TFB1PIN5 = T). PC-3-145 failing high in auto also fails PCV-3-145 closed causing letdown to be lost initially causing annunciator A-515 to briefly alarm. The crew should restore proper letdown flow by manually operating PC-3-145 to throttle PCV-3-145.

3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator A-515 should be referenced to do this. Respond as WCC if directed to have I&C troubleshoot PT-3-145.

Respond as NSO if directed to check the condition of PCV-3-145.

After 1-3 min., report valve full open with no obvious malfunctions.

Event 3/3a -Loss of condenser vacuum 1 Fast load reduction Upon restoration of letdown with charging & letdown flows balanced, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 -CONDENSER VACUUM LEAK 0.2 (actuates TVFCLK1 = 0.2). The crew should respond using 3-0NOP-014 to place the hogging jet in service and investigate the cause of the condenser vacuum loss. Respond as NSO when directed to place the hogging jet in service, wait 1-3 min then trigger lesson step EVENT 3 -PLACE HOGGING JET IN SERVICE (actuates TAFB072 = 1.0 then TAFB010 = 1.0 15 sec later) and EVENT 3 -CONDENSER VACUUM LEAK 0.1 (actuates TVFCLK1 = 0.1). Report when done. The loss of condenser vacuum should force the crew to initiate a fast load reduction per 3-0NOP-100.

4 TP-2007-301 Scenario #4 Event Description Modulate condenser vacuum leak as needed to keep condenser vacuum above minimum vacuum (22"Hg) for generator load> 531 MWe as shown on 3-0NOP-014 Enclosure

1. Click on node TVFCLK1 3E7B SHELL LEAK PORT new selected value then INSERT. Respond as NSO when directed to close hogging jet drain 3-30-045 and place the standby set of SJAEs in service. No simulator action necessary.

After 2-4 min, report complete.

Respond as FS/NSO when directed to identify cause of low condenser vacuum per 3-ONOP-014 step 5.5. Once load has been reduced 5-10%, identify leak source as a broken condenser loop seal sight glass. Trigger lesson step EVENT 3 -ISOLATE CONDENSER VACUUM LEAK (actuates TVFCLK1 = 0.0), then report sight glass isolated.

Respond as System when notified of the fast load reduction.

Respond as SM referring to 0-EPIP-201 01 & 0-ADM-115 for fast load reduction Respond as NSO if directed to remove the hogging jet from service (vacuum> 26"Hg & cause of vacuum loss corrected) per 3-0NOP-014 step 5.6. After 1-3 min, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 -SECURE HOGGING JET (actuates TAFB010

= 0.0 then TAFB072 = 0.015 sec later). Report when complete.

Respond as NSO if directed to check for deviation between North & South hotwell levels. Click on then read hotweilleveis shown under each B WATER BOX. Report any deviation to the crew. Respond as NSO if directed to report condenser air inleakage.

Respond < 21.1 scfm. Respond as Chemistry if directed to report condenser hotwell dissolved O 2 levels. If asked as SM whether to place one set of SJAE in standby, reply that the crew should leave both sets in service until the sight glass is repaired.

Event 4 -L T 459 fails low After condenser vacuum leak isolated, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 -LT-3-459 FAILS LOW (actuates TFH1TV59 = T) and lesson step EVENT 5 -2 GPM PZR SURGE LINE LEAK (actuates TVHPBOTL = 0.00004).

This causes letdown isolation and alarms on annunciators A-8/4, 9/3, 9/4, 8-3/1. The crew should respond per 3-0NOP-041.6 and restore letdown once L T-3-459 is selected out as a controlling channel. The crew should also respond per 3-0NOP-049.

1 but may delay taking L T-3-459 OOS to address the ReS leak issue requiring entry into event 5. This leak will cause G-5/3 alarm in about 25 minutes. 5 TP-2007-301 Scenario #4 Event Description Respond as wee when directed to initiate a PWO and notify I&e of the failure. Once letdown is reestablished and PZR level control restored, annunciators A-9/3 & 9/4 wi/! turn off. Restoring PZR control group heaters will turn off annunciator 8-9/3. After bistables are tripped, the only annunciators remaining on due this failure are A-8/3, 8/4 and J-7/4. Event 5 -RCS leak in containment Once the crew exits 3-0NOP-049.1 either after tripping bistables or early due to detection of the leak, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 -5 GPM PZR SURGE LINE LEAK (actuates TVHPBOTL = 0.00011).

This will increase the leak rate from 2 to 5 gpm actuate annunciator G-5/3 if it not already on. Once the leak becomes evident, the crew should respond using 3-0NOP-041.3.

3-0NOP-067 may also be entered when R-3-11/12 alarm due to the leak. Once the decision has been made to shutdown based on leak rate> TS limits, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 -PZR SURGE LINE LEAK GREATER THAN CHARGING (actuates TVHPBOTL = 0.006). This will increase RCS leak rate to 300 gpm requiring a reactor trip per 3-0NOP-041.3 since the leak exceeds charging pump capacity.

Respond as SM when notified to refer to 0-EPIP-201

01. Respond as HP when notified to conduct local radiation surveys & post radiation areas. Respond as System if notified of the decision to trip the reactor. Respond as NSO if directed to check status of RM-80 green monitor light. After 1-3 min., report green light on. If directed to silence the local alarm and check for abnormal indications, after 1-3 min., report alarm silenced and RM-80 otherwise normal. Respond as ehemistry/HP is directed to verify actual activity inside containment Events 6 -A TWS/Small break LOCA The crew unsuccessfully attempts to trip the reactor and immediately transitions from 3-EOP-E-O to 3-EOP-FR-S.1.

ATWS & AMSAC failures were entered at setup. The crew needs to manually trip the turbine and open AFWSS MOVs to initiate AFWflow. Upon entry into 3-EOP-FR-S.1, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -PZR SURGE LINE LEAK REQUIRING SI (actuates TVHPBOTL = 0.01) to drop PZR pressure below the SI setpoint.

Although PZR pressure may be below the SI setpoint, SI will not automatically actuate due to failures entered at setup. The crew should not manually SI until after transition made back to 3-EOP-E-0.

6 TP-2007-301 Scenario #4 Event Description Respond as NSO when directed to locally trip rx trip breakers and MG set input & output breakers.

After this direction has been given and emergency boration has been established, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -LOCAL TRIP MG SET BREAKERS (actuates TCE6DQ7C = F, TCE6DQ8C = F after 10 sec delay, TAE3108L = TRIP after 20 sec delay, TAE3401L = TRIP after 30 sec delay). Report when complete and report both reactor trip breakers stuck in the closed position.

Manual SI results in an auto start of the 3A CCWP. This triggers closure of MOV-3-626 from setup. Once MOV-3-626 closes, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -ALLOW MANUAL OPEN MOV-3-626 (actuates TFKV626C = F when IMK19380).

When MOV-3-626 control switch is taken to OPEN, the closure fai/ure clears and the valve opens. Respond as NSO when directed to place PAHMS in service on unit 3. After 8-12 minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -PLACE U3 PAHMS IN SERVICE (actuates TAC2V02A = 1.0, TAC2V02B = 1.0, TAAAV21 = 1.0, TMAV22 = 1.0 & TACA005 = 0.0). Report when complete.

The crew completes 3-EOP-E-O and transitions to 3-EOP-E-1 to address the SBLOCA. Respond as Chemistry when directed to sample SGs for activity & check DAM-1 and as HP when directed to perform radiation readings on main steam lines. After 10-15 min. report no signs of activity or radiation levels above background.

After maximum charging flow has been established, trigger lesson step EVENT 6-INCREASE RCS LEAKAGE (actuates TVHPBOTL = 0.02) to cause stable/decreasing RCS pressure when 3-EOP-E-1 step 14 is reached. If necessary insert additional leakage as needed (use any RCS leak node to ensure RCS pressure is stable/decreasing at that point). Respond as NSO/FS when directed to close in cold leg recirc breakers.

Wait 1-3 min, then trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -CLOSE CL RECIRC BKRS (actuates TCM2D06M = T, TCM1 D09M = T after 5 sec delay, TCM2D04M = T after 15 sec delay, TCM1 D11 M = T after 20 sec delay, TCM1 D03M = T after 30 sec delay, TCM1 D04M = T after 35 sec delay, TCM1 D10M = T after 45 sec delay, TCM2D05M = T after 50 sec delay, TCM1 D12M = T after 60 sec delay & TCM2D03M = T after 65 sec delay). Respond affirmatively as NSO when asked to verify containment spray & charging pump room doors closed. Respond as HP when directed to survey pipe & valve and electrical penetration rooms for radiation.

Respond as Chemistry when directed to align PASS for on-line sampling/analysis of the RCS. 7 OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT REW ASSIGNMENTS Unit 3 Unit 4 Plant Status Unit 3 Unit 4 AFWP OOS (bearing failure; OOS 4 hr; ETR 24 hr) 3B EDG OOS (fuel pump failed; OOS 2 days; next 0-OSP-023.3 in 4 hr) 3B CSP OOS (failed 1ST -low discharge pressure; OOS 12 hr; ETR 36 hr) Train A is protected NRC-4 2 tube leak in 3A S/G 0NOP-071.2 Attachment 1 U3 Current: B AFWP -TS 3.7.1.2 Action 3 (trains verified operable just before turnover; 30 days to repair) 3B EDG -TS 3.8. 1. 1.b.1 Actions b & d (0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 every 8 hr; 3/4-0SP-023.1 start of other EDGs not req'd; 3-0P-023 sect 7.7 due next shift ifOOS > 72 hr; repair in 14 days) 3B CSP -TS 3.6.2.1 Action a (Fix in 72 hr) None . OLRM is = 2.06E-6* LERF = 9.28E-8 Current: B AFWP -TS 3.7.1.2 Action 3 (trains verified operable just before turnover; 30 days to repair) 3B EDG -TS 3.8.1.1.b.1 Actions b & d (0-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 every 8 hr; 3/4-0SP-023.1 start of other EDGs not req'd; fix in 14 days) None OLRM is = 2.00E-6* LERF = 9.28E-8 Unit 3 Status Reactor Operator Mode: 1 RCS Leakrate Accumulator Ref Levels Power: 100 Gross: 0.03 gpm A 6615 MWe: 760 Unidentified 0.02 gpm B 6640 "tavg: 574 Charging Pps: 0.01 gpm C 6625 RCS Pressure:

2235 RCS Boron Cone: 750 Abl1'ormg.l

• .

Annunciator:

F 9/2 -3B EDG OOS Comp Actions: O-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 due in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. 3/4-0SP-023.1 not required.

3-0P-023 sect 7.7 due next shift. Annunciator:

F 9/5 -3B EDG OOS Comp Actions: O-OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 due in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. 3/4-0SP-023.1 not required.

3-0P-023 sect 7.7 due next shift. Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator:

-Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Current Tech Spec Action Statements: (Does Not Include "For Trackin2 Only Items" T.S.A.S / Component:

3.7.1.2 Action 3 / B AFWP Reason: Bearing failed Entry Date: XX/XX/XX (Previous shift) T.S.A.S / Component:

3.8.1.1 Actions b & d / 3B EDG Reason: Fuel pump failed Entry Date: XX/XX/XX (2 days ago) T.S.A.S / Component:

3.6.2.1 Action a / 3B CSP Reason: Failed 1ST -low discharge pressure Entry Date: XX/Xx/XX (Yesterday)

T.S.A.S / Component:

3.4.3 Action

a / 3B PZR backup heaters Reason: 14 day due to 3B EDG OOS Entry Date: XX/XX/XX (2 days ago) T.S.A.S / Component:

3.5.2 Action

f / 3B HHSIP Reason: 14 day due to 3B EDG OOS Entry Date: Xx/XX/XX (2 days ago) T.S.A.S / Component:

Reason: I Entry Date:

Unit 3 Status Changes to Risk Significant Equipment:

8 AFWP OOS (8earing replacement) 38 EDG OOS (Fuel pump repair) 38 CSP OOS (Failed 1ST -low discharge pressure)

Unit 3 Risk is GREEN. Main contributor is 8 AFWP. Upcoming Reactivity Management Activities:

Dilute to maintain 100% power. Upcoming Major POD Activities:

Continue to repair OOS equipment.

Upcoming ECOs to Hang and lor Release: None Evolutions or Compensatory Actions in Progress:

-Just returned power back to 100% last shift. -After shift turnover, secure 60 gpm orifice (CV-3-2008) and shutdown 1 charging pump using 3-0P-047 section 7.11. Leave 1 charging pump and 45 gpm orifice (CV-3-200A) in service. -Known tube leak in 3A S/G (2 gpd) -unchanged for last week. Chemistry samples are being taken per 3-0NOP-071.2, Attachment

1. The current sample, just completed indicates no significant change in leak rate. MOV-3-1403 remains energized at management direction due to small size and stability of tube leak rate. OSP-023.3 Att 1 & 9 for 38 EDG OOS due in 4 hrs. 3-0SP-023.1 not required since to 38 EDG OOS due to support system failure. 3-0P-023 sect 7.7 due next shift to allow 38 EDG OOS > 72 hr. General Information, Remarks, and Operator Work Around Status: See evolutions

& compensatory actions listed above. Train A is protected.

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-O-1 Facility:

Turkey Point Scenario No.: 5 Op Test No.: 2007-301 Examiners:

Candidates:

US RO BOP Initial Conditions:

Mode 2,4% power, MOL. Turbine rolling at 1800 RPM ready to sync generator to grid. Increase load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold power at 30% for a flux map. Turnover:

Equipment OOS: None significant Place unit on line and increase power per 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.3 Event Event Type* Event Description No. 1 (N) ALL Place unit on line per 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.3. Increase load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold power at 30% for a flux map. 1a TFFXOILB;T (TS) SRO Once feed regulating valves are placed in automatic, an NSO calls in that the B AFWP governor has an oil leak. 2 !rvKD001X; 1.0 I (C) SRO/BOP 3A (running)

TPCWP bearing failure. Failure of 3B (standby)

TPCWP to 2 min ramp automatically start following trip of running pump. The crew responds per 3-TFK3B11S;T ONOP-008 and manually starts the 3B TPCWP. 3 (I) BOP 3B s/g controlling feed flow transmitter FT-3-487 fails high causing 3B FRV TFF1M86H; T (I,TS) SRO (FCV-3-488 to fail closed). Manual operator action is required to control 3B s/g level and avoid a reactor trip. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-049.1.

4 (R) SRO/BOP PT-3-1608 fails high. CV-3-1608 fails open and increases steam flow 3-4%. TFS1MREH; T (C)RO The crew responds per 0-ADM-200 for a secondary plant transient.

Manual turbine load reduction is required to return reactor power to 30%. Once power TFSVV13A; T is stabilized at 30%, the CV-3-1608 isolation valve is closed, but some ADV steam leakage still exists. 5 (C) ALL Main generator exciter air coolers TPCW flow is partially blocked resulting in TVUJINF ; 0.95 (M) ALL a high air temperature condition.

The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for TVUJINFB;0.95 annunciator E-9/4. The crew manually trips the reactor when exciter hot gas TVUJINFC;0.95 temperature exceeds 90°C and performs the actions of 3-EOP-E-0.

Once the reactor is tripped, the switch yard relays out. 3B EDG starts but fails to TVUJINFD;0.95 automatically load 3B 4kv bus due to a bus stripping failure. 3A EDG fails to start and can not be manually started. 6 TFP8SWYD ;T (C) ALL The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-0.0.

MOV-3-1405 fails to open and with B TFQ5GAFS ;T AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to supply both units. Manual TFQ6XABF ;T bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B TPCWP breaker 3AB11 TFK3B11S ;T which has a blown control power fuse and can not be opened from VPA. 3A TFFXM05; T 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO tie from unit 4. Then 3AB11 is locally K30P11BG; F opened allowing 3B EDG to reenergize 3B & 3D 4kV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam leak. K30P11BR; F 6a The crew stabilizes the plant using 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 since PZR level < 17[50]% or SI actuated due to the effects of the steam leak. .. (N)ormal, (R)eactlvlty, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)aJor 1 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: _1_ Page_1_of Event

Description:

Place unit on line per 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.3. Increase load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold power at 30% for a flux map. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs RO, BOP & SG (surrogate operator) place unit on line and increase power to 30%. BOP Performs actions of 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.3: 1. Verifies exciter DC regulator is in full lower (10% indicated)

2. Closes exciter field breaker & verifies exciter ammeter = 50-90 amps 3. Verifies all 3 generator voltmeters

= 11-17 kV 4. Slowly increases DC regulator until exciter ammeter = 100-130 amps & all 3 generator voltmeters

= 21.5-22.5 kV. 5. Places voltage regulator control in TEST 6. Adjusts AC regulator control to null AC-DC regulator mismatch 7. Places voltage regulator control in ON 8. Places East GCB sync switch to MANUAL 9. Adjusts turbine speed using governor until synchroscope rotating slowly in FAST direction

10. Adjusts AC regulator control to equalize incoming & running voltage 11. Verifies steam dumps set up per Enclosure 2 RO Manually controls rod position to control Tavg per Enclosure 2 Commences performance of Attachment 4 when directed by US BOP Continues performing actions of 3-GOP-301 as directed by US: 12. Performs auto synchronization

a. Places East GCB sync switch to AUTO b. Above synchroscope, determines East GCB white light flashes at 12 o'clock & inadvertent protection scheme armed amber light lit. c. Before synchroscope reaches 11 o'clock, depresses

& holds auto sync pushbutton and observes East GCB closure d. Places East GCB sync switch to OFF e. Matches flags on East GCB switch f. Determines inadvertent protection scheme armed amber light off 1 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _1_

Event

Description:

Place unit on line Qer 3-GOP-301 beginning with steQ 5.52.3. Increase load, Qlace the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold Qower at 30% for a flux maQ. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Increases turbine load to 40 MWe in 5-10 MWe increments.

US Directs monitoring automatic control program values per PCB Section IV Figure 5. Notifies SM of any unexpected deviations.

BOP Verifies atmospheric steam dumps close per Enclosure

2. US When turbine load sufficiently increased, directs SG operator open FW isolation valves, transfer SG level controls from FW bypass to main FW control valves and place SG level controls in auto. NOTE: Once SG level control in auto, SG operator (surrogate operator) will leave the simulator floor. BOP Continues performing actions of 3-GOP-301 as directed by US: 13. Verifies SG level being controlled 50+/-5% 14. Verifies Main FW control valves in auto & FW bypass valves closed RO Continues performing actions of 3-GOP-301 as directed by US: 1. When reactor power> 10% a. Determines Power Above P-10 VPA status light ON & At Power Trips Blocked VPA status light OFF b. Presses & holds Intermed Range Trip Manual Block A & B logic console pushbuttons 2-4 seconds c. Determines Inter Rng Trip Blocked VPA status light ON d. Presses & holds Power Lo Range Trip Manual Block A & B logic console push buttons 2-4 seconds e. Determines Pwr Rng Trip Blocked VPA status light ON BOP Continues performing actions of 3-GOP-301 as directed by US: 15. Determines NIS IR & Lo PR Trips blocked on DDPS 16. Notifies Chemistry to sample RCS per TS 3.4.8 17. Places Mid GCB sync switch to MANUAL 18. Verifies incoming = running voltage & synchroscope

@ 12 o'clock 2 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: Event No.: _1_

Event

Description:

I ..... , lillie Position Place unit on line per 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.3. Increase load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold power at 30% for a flux map. Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Continues performing actions of 3-GOP-301 as directed by US: 19. When both sync lights out, closes Mid GCB 20. Places Mid GCB sync switch to OFF 21. Adjusts generator MVARs as directed by System 22. Places GCM in service a. Verifies generator H2 pressure = 65-75 psig b. Directs NSO verify local filter oil free & set H2 gas flow = 16 c. Verifies VPA power light ON d. Presses Alarm Reset PB & Manual Start Only PB if lit e. Verifies Auto Sampler Ready light ON & printer stamping between 0.75-1.0; marks date & time 23. Directs NSO complete 3-0P-072 section 5.0 & commence MSR purge at 70 MWe per 3-0P-072.1 section 5.1 24. Verifies Feedwater Pump Turbine Runback switch in DEFEAT 25. Places Steam Dump Control Switch to ON. Places Steam Dump Mode Selector Switch in RESET then to AUTO 26. When atmospheric steam dumps closed, adjusts setpoints to 1000 psig & verifies controls in AUTO 27. At 130 MWe, transfers house loads from SUT to Aux Transformer

a. Places 3A 4kV bus Aux Xfmr synch switch to ON b. Verifies incoming:::::

running voltage & synchroscope

12 o'clock c. Places & holds Aux Xfmr to 3A 4kV bus bkr sw in CLOSE, verifies red light on, SUT to 3A 4kV bus current decreases

& Aux Xfmr to 3A 4kV bus current increases.

d. Releases Aux Xfmr to 3A 4kV bus bkr sw, verifies SUT bkr trips, SUT to 3A 4kV bus current = 0 & Aux Xfmr to 3A 4kV bus current increases.

e. Matches flags on SUT to 3A 4kV bus f. Places 3A 4kV bus Aux Xfmr synch switch to OFF g. Repeats with 3B 4kV bus power supply. 3 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.:.2....

Event No.: _1_ Page-+/-. of Event

Description:

Place unit on line per 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.3. Increase load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold power at 30% for a flux map. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Coordinates with RO to increase & stabilize turbine load =:: 225 MWe When NSO reports MSR drains to condenser restricting orifice open, opens MSR purge valves CV-3-2910/2911/2912/2913 and directs NSO check for purge line steam flow. At approximately 150 MWe:

• Closes Turbine Drain Valves

• Directs local closure of turbine stop valve drains

• Verifies SG blowdown aligned for at power operation per 3-0P-071

• Directs NSO verify PSS voltmeter reading 0 +/- 1 Volt. Once exciter & bus voltages determined stable, places PSS control switch to ON At approximately 200 MWe, begins placing MSRs in service per 3-0P-072.1 section 5.2:

• Verifies MSR steam supply timing cam installed correctly with follower set at CLOSED position & follower stop set at 95%

• Places MSR steam supply timing control valves switch to ON

• Monitors MSR outlet temp rate of change < 100°F/hr RO Coordinates with BOP to increase & stabilize reactor power = 30% using control rods & dilution per 0-OP-046.

Verifies control rods maintaining AFD per 0-OP-059.9 Verifies IR High Level Rod Stop bistable status light at 20% power. Verifies IR High Level Trip bistable status light at 25% power. 4 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: -1.§.. Page _1_ of _1_ Event

Description:

Once feed regulating valves are I2laced in automatic, an NSO calls in that the B AFWP governor has an oil leak. e Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Relays report from NSO of oil leak on B AFWP governor US Declares B AFWP out of service Determines TS 3.7.1.2 action statement 3 applies:

• Verify two operable independent AFW trains in 4 hr

• Fix B AFWP in 30 days Directs wee have Mechanical troubleshoot

& fix B AFWP Directs wee generate & hang EeO on B AFWP 5 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: l Event No.: _2_ Page_1 _ of _ 1_ Event

Description:

3A (running}

TPeWp bearing failure. Failure of 3B (standby}

TPeWp to automatically start following tri(2 of running (2um(2. The crew res(2onds (2er 3-0NOP-008 and manually starts the 3B TPeWp . ...... , lillie Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Recognizes/reports annunciator 1-5/1, 5/2 & 5/4 alarms US Directs response per 3-0NOP-008 BOP Performs actions of 3-0NOP-008 as directed by US: 1. Determines annunciator 1-5/1 & 5/2 alarmed 2. Determines 3A TPeWp tripped & 3B TPeWp did not auto start 3. Determines offsite power is available and starts 3B TPeWp 4. Determines 1 TPeWp now running & annunciator 1-5/4 no longer alarming 5. Determines SI not actuated and POV-3-4882

& 4883 open 6. Determines annunciator 1-5/5 not alarming 7. Directs NSO locally check TPeW supply header temp < 110°F and stable/decreasing

8. Directs NSO locally verify TPeW basket strainer IIp < 1.5 psid 9. Determines all generator-related temperature alarms all OFF 10. Determines all SGFP, cond pp & HDP bearing temp alarms OFF 11. Determines all TPeW alarms OFF 12. Directs NSO check TPeW cooled components temperature stable/decreasing US Directs wee have Electrical

& Mechanical maintenance investigate 3A TPeWp failure Directs wee generate EeO and take 3A TPeWp out of service 6 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 2.. Event No.: Page -1 of _1_ Event

Description:

3B slg controlling feed flow transmitter FT 487 fails high causing 3B FRV (FCV-3-488 to fail closed). Manual o(2erator action is reguired to control 3B slg level and avoid a reactor tri(2. The crew res(2onds (2er 3-ONOP-049.1.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes 1 reports failure of FT-3-487 low and loss of FW to 3B SG (FCV-3-488 closed). Takes manual control of FCV-3-488 and restores 3B SG level to program US Directs performance of actions per 3-0NOP-049.1.

BOP Performs actions per 3-0NOP-049.1 as directed by US: 1. Determines FT-3-487 failed while FT-3-486 remains in service 2. Transfers controlling FW flow channel for 3B SG to ch IV NOTE: Operator may also take controlling steam flow channel for 38 SG to ch IV as well US Determines TS 3.3.1 Table 3.3-1 Unit 12 affected.

Action 6 applies (6 hr to trip bistables)

Determines BS-3-488B1, B2 & C must be tripped Briefs crew regarding tripping bistables and effects of failure. BOP Obtains keys and opens protection rack 18 Trips bistables BS-3-488B1, BS-3-488B2

& BS-3-488C RCO Checks correct bistable status light energized in response to tripping bistables (FC488B1).

Checks correct annunciators on in response to tripping bistables (C-4/2 & C-5/2). US Directs WCC initiate PWO & notify I&C Directs generation of ECO for tripped bistables Directs local reset of AMSAC trouble alarm (annunciator D-7/6) if actuated 7 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: ...L Event No.: _4_ Page_1_ of _1_ Event

Description:

PT-3-160B fails high. CV-3-160B fails ol2en and increases steam flow 3-4%. The crew resl20nds l2er 0-ADM-200 for a secondarY I2lant transient.

Manual turbine load reduction is reguired to return reactor 120wer to 30%. Once 120wer is stabilized at 30%, the CV-3-160B isolation valve is closed, but some ADV steam leakage still exists. T;,..., .... Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior II ... BOP Recognizes/reports lowering generator MW Recognizes/reports PT-3-160B fails high & CV-3-160B failed open RO Recognizes/reports 4-5% reactor power increase Recognizes/reports Tavg < Tref US Determines CV-3-160B failure open caused Tavg-Tref deviation Directs taking manual control of CV-3-160B.

When informed of CV-3-160B failure, directs local isolation of CV-3-160B BOP Consistent with 0-ADM-200 section 5.4.3 guidance for response to secondary pant transient:

1. Reduces turbine load to match Tavg = Tref 2. Attempts manual closure of CV-3-160B

& determines CV-3-160B failed open 3. Directs NSO locally investigate CV-3-160B

4. Relays report from NSO of steam coming from unit 3 silencer 5. Directs NSO locally close CV-3-160B isolation valve 6. Relays report from NSO that steam flow not completely stopped with isolation valve closed. 7. Adjusts turbine load as necessary to match Tavg = Tref US Determines CV-3-160B isolation valve leaking by Directs WCC have Mechanical maintenance investigate CV-3-160B Directs caution tag generated for CV-3-160B in manual 8 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Main generator exciter air coolers TPCW flow is Qartially:

blocked resulting in a high air temQerature condition.

The crew resQonds Qer 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator E-9/4. The crew manually:

triQs the reactor when exciter hot gas temQerature exceeds 90°C and Qerforms the actions of 3-EOP-E-0.

Once the reactor is triQQed, the switchy:ard relay:s out. 3B EDG starts but fails to automatically:

load 3B 4kv bus due to a bus striQQing failure. 3A EDG fails to start and can not be manually:

started. e Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognizes 1 reports annunciator E-9/4 alarming RO Reads actions for 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator E-9/4 BOP Performs actions consistent with 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator E-9/4 as read by RO 1. Verifies alarm using recorder R-3-347 (VPA) 2. Monitors exciter air temperature closely 3. If hot air temp 2: 8rC reduce MVAR while maintaining grid voltage 2: 232 kV 4. If hot air temp 2: 8rC with MVAR=O, maintain grid voltage 2: 232 kV & reduce generator load using 3-0NOP-100 until hot air temp < 8rC 5. If hot air temp 2: 8rC & increasing due to unknown cause advises US to consider tripping reactor & turbine 6. If hot air temp> 90°C & no expectation of fast recovery advises US to tripping reactor & turbine and enter 3-EOP-E-0 US Determines hot air temp> 90°C & no expectation of fast recovery Directs reactor trip Directs crew perform immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0.

RO Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:

1. Verifies reactor trip

• Rod bottom lights on & RPls at zero

• Rx trip & bypass bkrs open

• Neutron flux decreasing 9

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 2-Event No.: 2-Event

Description:

Main generator exciter air coolers TPCW flow is blocked resulting in a high air temQerature condition.

The crew resQonds Qer 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator E-9/4. The crew triQs the reactor when exciter hot gas temQerature exceeds 90°C and Qerforms the actions of 3-EOP-E-0.

Once the reactor is triQQed, the out. 3B EDG starts but fails to load 3B 4kv bus due to a bus striQQing failure. 3A EDG fails to start and can not be started. Time Time Time BOP Performs immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0:

1. Verifies turbine tripped

• Turbine stop valves closed

• Closes MSR main steam stop MOVs

• Mid & East GCBs open 2. Verifies power to emergency 4kV buses

• Determines neither 3A or 3B 4kV buses energized

• Attempts emergency start of 3A EDG and recognizes/

reports start failure.

• Recognizes/reports 3B EDG running, but output breaker not closed US When determines that 3A EDG does not respond to emergency start & 3B EDG running but output breaker did not close, directs transition to 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 step 1 10 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: _ 6_ Page _1 of _5 _ Event

Description:

The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-0.0.

MOV-3-1405 fails to ol2en and with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak reguires C AFWP to SUl2l2ly both units. Manual bus stril2l2ing is l2erformed with the excel2tion of 3B TPCWP breaker 3AB11 which has a blown controll2ower fuse and can not be ol2ened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is rel20wered via the SBO tie from unit 4. Then 3AB11 is locally ol2ened allowing 3B EDG to reenergize 3B & 3D 4kV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam leak. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs performance of 3-EOP-ECA-O.O RO Performs actions per 3-EOP-ECA-O.O as directed by US: 1. Verifies reactor trip

• Rod bottom lights on & RPls at zero

• Rx trip & bypass bkrs open 2. Determines PZR PORVs closed Critical 3. Verifies letdown isolation valves closed 4. Determines excess letdown isolated 5. Verifies SI reset BOP Performs actions per 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 as directed by US: Critical 1. Verifies turbine tripped

• Already verified turbine stop valves & MSR main steam stop MOVs closed

• Determines Mid & East GCBs open 2. Determines only one AFWP running for both units. Establishes 270 gpm to Unit 3. 3. Verifies 3A 4kV bus stripped.

Determines 3B 4kV bus stripping failed and verifies 3B 4kV bus stripped with the exception of 3AB11 (3B TPCWP) which can not be tripped. 4. Sends NSO to investigate 3AB11 5. Determines neither 3A & 3B 4kV buses energized 11 Appendix 0 Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _ 5_ Event No.: _6 _ Page --.£ of _5_ Event

Description:

The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-0.0.

MOV-3-1405 fails to oQen and with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak reguires C AFWP to sUQQly both units. Manual bus striQQing is Qerformed with the exceQtion of 3B TPCWP breaker 3AB11 which has a blown control Qower fuse and can not be oQened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is reQowered via the SBO tie from unit 4. Then 3AB11 is locally oQened allowing 3B EDG to reenergize 3B & 3D 4kV bus.Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam leak.

Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Continues performing actions per 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 as directed by US: 6. Determines 3A & 3B 4kV bus lockout relays reset. 7. Determines 3A EDG locked out. Attempts unsuccessfully to reset 3A EDG lockout then relays report from NSO of EDG failure. Determines 3B EDG not locked out. 8. Determines 3A EDG can not be manually started 9. Determines 3B EDG running, but output breaker not closed due to failure of 3AB11 to open. US Determines neither 3A or 38 4kV bus energized.

Critical Directs 80P work to restore power to 3A or 38 4kV buses

• 3A 4kV bus from S80 tie bkr per 3-0NOP-004.2

• 38 4kV bus from 38 EDG when 3A811 opens Directs RO continue performing 3-EOP-ECA-O.O RO Continues performing actions per 3-EOP-ECA-O.O as directed by US: Critical 6. Places non-running equipment switches to pull-to-Iock or off (U3 HHSIPs, CSPs, ECCs, ECFs, RHRPs & CCWPs) /-" 7. Determines from U4 RO that U4 HHSI aligned to U4 CCW 8. Determines PZR level cannot be maintained>

17% 9. Directs NSO locally open MOV-3-843A or B 10. Starts a U4 HHSIP 11. Directs NSO locally close 3-297 AlBIC, MO\t-3-381

& MOV-3-626 12 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _S_ Event No.: _6_

Event

Description:

The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-0.0.

MOV-3-140S fails to oQen and with 8 AFWP OOS with an oil leak reguires C AFWP to sUQQly both units. Manual bus striQQing is Qerformed with the exceQtion of 38 TPCWP breaker 3A811 which has a blown control Qower fuse and can not be oQened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is reQowered via the S80 tie from unit 4. Then 3A811 is locally oQened allowing 38 EDG to reenergize 38 & 3D 4kV bus.Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam leak. Time Position Applicant's Actions or 8ehavior RO NOTE: How many steps are actually performed by the RO depends on when power is restored across the SBO x-tie by the BOP. Continues performing actions per 3-EOP-ECA-O.O as directed by US: 12. Determines MSIVs & bypasses closed, main FW & bypass control valves closed and SG blowdown isolation valves closed 13. Determines leak on 3C SG (thru CV-3-1608)

14. Verifies SI reset Critical 15. Isolates AFW to 3C SG. 16. Directs NSO open AFSS-3-007 to restore A AFWP. Once this is done, increases AFW flow to 34S gpm to 3A & 38 SG. 17. Directs NSO open breaker for MOV-3-140S

18. Verifies SG sample lines isolated 19. Determines CV-3-1608 failed open & local isolation valve closed but leaks by. 20. Controls AFW flow to 3A & 38 SGs gpm until either SG level> 6[32]% 21. Determines no SG tubes ruptured (R-3-1S, R-3-19 & DAM-1). Directs HP confirm by local surveys on MS lines. NOTE: 3A 4kV bus can only be powered from the SBO x-tie using 3-ONOP-004.2.

3B 4kV bus can be restored by opening 3B TPCWP breaker 3AB11 which will allow reenergization from 3B EDG. This will occur after the crew has repowered 3A 4kV bus from the SBO x-tie. 13 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _5_ Event No.: _6_ Page -.1. of Event

Description:

The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-0.0.

MOV-3-1405 fails to ol2en and with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak reguires C AFWP to SUl2l2ly both units. Manual bus stril2l2ing is l2erformed with the excel2tion of 3B TPCWP breaker 3AB11 which has a blown controll2owerfuse and can not be ol2ened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is rel20wered via the SBO tie from unit 4. Then 3AB11 is locally ol2ened allowing 3B EDG to reenergize 3B & 3D 4kV bus.Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam leak. lillie Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Performs actions from 3-0NOP-004.2 when directed by US: 1. Determines 3A 4kV bus stripped but not yet energized

2. Determines 3A 4kV bus lockout reset 3. Verifies SI reset 4. Determines 3A 4kV bus lockout has tripped and can not be reset 5. Determines U3 SUT potential white light on VPA is OFF 6. Determines U4 SUT potential white light on VPA is OFF 7. Determines 3B 4kV bus deenergized.

Determines from U4 RO both 4A & 4B 4kV buses energized.

8. Determines 3D 4kV bus lockout reset Critical 9. Realigns 3D 4kV bus to 3A 4kV bus.

• Opens 3AB19 & 3AD06

• Closes 3AD01 & 3AA17 10. Determines 3AD07 blue light on 11. Determines from U4 RO that 4D 4kV bus energized from 4B 4kV bus which is on the 4B EDG. 12. Directs U4 RO place non-running safeguards equipment in P-T -L or OFF on 4B 4kV bus 13. Closes 3AD07 then directs U4 RO close 4AD07. 14. Determines 3A 4kV bus energized

& SI reset US Directs transition to 3-EOP-ECA-O.O step 32. Directs BOP restore 3B 4kV bus using 3-0NOP-004.3 14 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _5_ Event No.: _6_

Event

Description:

The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-0.0.

MOV-3-1405 fails to oQen and with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak reguires C AFWP to sUQQly both units. Manual bus striQQing is Qerformed with the exceQtion of 3B TPCWP breaker 3AB11 which has a blown control Qower fuse and can not be oQened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is reQowered via the SBO tie from unit 4. Then 3AB 11 is locally oQened allowing 3B EDG to reenergize 3B & 3D 4kV bus.Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam leak. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior RO Performs actions of 3-EOP-ECA-O.O as directed by US: 1. Determines CET < 1200°F 2. Determines 3A 4kV bus powered from U4 via SBO x-tie and both 4A & 4B 4kV buses powered from respective EDGs 3. Determines 3A & 3B SG ADVs controlling in auto at 1000 psig with 3C SG ADV failed open with leaking isolation valve. 4. Closes breakers 3AA08 & 3M 14 to energize 3A & 3C 480V LC. Verifies 3H 480V LC energized.

If 3B 4kV bus energized, verifies 3B & 3D 380V LC energized.

5. Directs U4 RO perform steps 35b-e. 6. Verifies one aux bldg exhaust fan & SFP exhaust fan running. 7. Directs NSO start SFP cooling water pump 8. Directs Chemistry verify U3 SFP, plant vent & SJAE SPINGs running BOP Performs actions of 3-0NOP-004.3 when directed by US: 1. Receives/relays report that 3AB 11 being opened 2. Determines 3B 4kV bus stripping complete 3. Determines 3B 4kV bus lockout relay reset 4. Verifies SI reset 5. Determines 3B EDG lockout reset & 3B EDG running 6. Determines 3B sequencer operable 7. Manually synchronizes 3B EDG to 3B 4kV bus 8. Reports 3B 4kV bus now energized US Determines PZR level < 17%. Directs transition to 3-EOP-ECA-O.2.

15 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: _5_ Event No.: Page _1_ of _2_ Event

Description:

The crew stabilizes the plant using 3-EOP-ECA-O.2 since PZR level < 17[501% or S I actuated due to the effects of the steam leak. Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior US Directs performance of actions per 3-EOP-ECA-O.2 NOTE: Starting loads on 3A130 4kV bus & 3A13C13H 480V LC requires coordination with the U4 RO for 48 EOG load management.

Loads started on 38 4kV bus & 38130 480V LC requires one operator to watch 38 EOG load while the other operates the load's control switch. RO Performs 3-EOP-ECA-O.2 actions as directed by US: Critical 1. 2. 3. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Verifies SI reset Determines RWST level> 155,000 gal Manually aligns ECCS valves for proper SI alignment (SI valve amber lights all bright) Determines no CCWP running Determines 3 CCWHX in service Starts 2 CCWPs Determines CCW headers tied together Starts 3A & 38 HHSIP. Stops the running U4 HHSIP. Starts 3A & 3B RHRP. Starts 2 ECCs & 2 ECFs 10. Manually actuates containment isolation phase A & verifies associated white lights on VPB all bright. 11. Determines containment purge exhaust & supply fans OFF 12. Verifies CR ventilation in proper emergency recirc alignment

13. Determines containment spray not required (pressure

< 20 psig) 14. Determines RWST level> 155,000 gal 15. Places both CSPs in standby 16. Determines RCP seal injection isolated 16 Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2007-301 Scenario No.: 5 Event No.: Page2of2 Event

Description:

The crew stabilizes the giant using 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 since PZR level < 17[50]% or SI actuated due to the effects of the steam leak. i Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Performs 3-EOP-ECA-O.2 actions as directed by US: Critical 1. Determines no ICWPs running. Starts 2 ICWPs. 2. Verifies POV-3-4882

& 4883 closed. 3. Determines ICW headers tied together 4. Directs NSO place PAHMs in service per 3-0P-094 5. Controls AFW flow to 3A & 3B SGs gpm until either SG level > 6[32]%. Then maintains 3A & 3B SG levels 15-50%. US Directs transition to and performance of 3-EOP-E-1 TERMINATING Scenario is terminated upon completion of 3-EOP-ECA-O.2 CUE 17 Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-O-1 Facility:

Turkey Point Scenario No.: 5 Op Test No.: 2007-301 Examiners:

Candidates:

US RO 80P Initial Conditions:

Mode 2, 4% power, MOL. Turbine rolling at 1800 RPM ready to sync generator to grid. Increase load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold power at 20% for a flux map. Turnover:

Equipment OOS: None significant Place unit on line and increase power per 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.3 Event Event Type* Event Description No. 1 (N) ALL Place unit on line per 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.3. Increase load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold power at 20% for a flux map. 1a TFFXOILB =T (TS) SRO Once feed regulating valves are placed in automatic, an NSO calls in that the 8 AFWP governor has an oil leak. 2 TVKD001 x = 1.0 I (C) SRO/80P 3A (running)

TPCWP bearing failure. Failure of 38 (standby)

TPCWP to 2 min ramp automatically start following trip of running pump. The crew responds per 3-TFK3B11S = T ONOP-008 and manually starts the 38 TPCWP. 3 (I) 80P 38 slg controlling feed flow transmitter FT-3-487 fails high causing 38 FRV TFF1M86H = T (I,TS) SRO (FCV-3-488 to fail closed). Manual operator action is required to control 38 slg level and avoid a reactor trip. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-049.1.

4 (R) SRO/80P PT-3-1608 fails high. CV-3-1608 fails open and increases steam flow 3-4%. TFS1MREH = T (C) RO The crew responds per 0-ADM-200 for a secondary plant transient.

Manual turbine load reduction is required to return reactor power to 30%. Once power TFSW13A=T is stabilized at 30%, the CV-3-1608 isolation valve is closed, but some ADV steam leakage still exists. 5 (C) ALL Main generator exciter air coolers TPCW flow is partially blocked resulting in TVUJINF = 0.95 (M) ALL a high air temperature condition.

The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for TVUJINFB=0.95 annunciator E-9/4. The crew manually trips the reactor when exciter hot gas TVUJINFC=0.95 temperature exceeds 90°C and performs the actions of 3-EOP-E-0.

Once the reactor is tripped, the switchyard relays out. 38 EDG starts but fails to TVUJINFD=0.95 automatically load 38 4kv bus due to a bus stripping failure. 3A EDG fails to start and can not be manually started. 6 TFP8SWYD=T (C) ALL The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-0.0.

MOV-3-1405 fails to open and with 8 TFQ5GAFS =T AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to supply both units. Manual TFQ6XABF =T bus stripping is performed with the exception of 38 TPCWP breaker 3A811 TFK3B11S = T which has a blown control power fuse and can not be opened from VPA. 3A TFFXM05 = T 4kV bus is repowered via the S80 tie from unit 4. Then 3A811 is locally K30P11BG = F opened allowing 38 EDG to reenergize 38 & 3D 4kV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam leak. K30P11BR = F 6a The crew stabilizes the plant using 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 since PZR level < 17[50]% or SI actuated due to the effects of the steam leak. .. (N)ormal, (R)eactlvlty, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent. (M)aJor 1 TP-2007-301 Scenario #5 Event Description Turkey Point 2007*301 Scenario #5 Event 1 -Place unit on line per 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.3. Increase load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold power at 20% for a flux map. Event 1 a -Once feed regulating valves are placed in automatic, an NSO calls in that the B AFWP governor has an oil leak. Event 2 -3A (running)

TPCWP bearing failure. Failure of 3B (standby)

TPCWP to automatically start following trip of running pump. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-008 and manually starts the 3B TPCWP. Event 3 -3B slg controlling feed flow transmitter FT-3-487 fails high causing 3B FRV (FCV-3-488 to fail closed). Manual operator action is required to control 3B slg level and avoid a reactor trip. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-049.1.

Event 4 -PT-3-1608 fails high. CV-3-1608 fails open and increases steam flow 3-4%. The crew responds per 0-ADM-200 for a secondary plant transient.

Manual turbine load reduction is required to return reactor power to 30%. Once power is stabilized at 30%, the CV-3-1608 isolation valve is closed, but some ADV steam leakage still exists. Event 5 -Main generator exciter air coolers TPCW flow is partially blocked resulting in a high air temperature condition.

The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator E-9/4. The crew manually trips the reactor when exciter hot gas temperature exceeds 90°C and performs the actions of 3-EOP-E-0.

Once the reactor is tripped, the switchyard relays out. 3B EDG starts but fails to automatically load 3B 4kv bus due to a bus stripping failure. 3A EDG fails to start and can not be manually started. Event 6 -The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-0.0.

MOV-3-1405 fails to open and with B AFWP OOS with an oil leak requires C AFWP to supply both units. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 3B TPCWP breaker 3AB11 which has a blown control power fuse and can not be opened from VPA. 3A 4kV bus is repowered via the SBO tie from unit 4. Then 3AB11 is locally opened allowing 3B EDG to reenergize 3B & 3D 4kV bus. Transition is made to ECA-0.2 due to the effects of the steam leak. Event 6a -The crew stabilizes the plant using 3-EOP-ECA-0.2 since PZR level < 17[50]% or SI actuated due to the effects of the steam leak. 2 TP-2007-301 Scenario #5 Event Description Scenario XXIII NRC 5 Simulator Operating Instructions Setup IC-20 (4% MOL, Ready to sync generator to grid) or IC-115 (7% MOL with atmospheric dump valves CV-3-1606 in auto @ 30%, CV-3-1607 in auto closed & CV-3-1608 in manual @ 50%, ready to sync generator to grid) , Place simulator in run Trigger lesson steps: SETUP -3B TPCWP AUTO START FAIL (actuatesTFK3B11S

=Tthen Fwhen IMK3RB11)

SETUP -3A EDG START FAIL (actuates TFQ5GAFS = T) SETUP -3B 4KV BUS STRIPPING FAIL (actuates TFQ6XABF = T) SETUP -B AFWP GOV OIL LEAK (actuates TFFXOILB = T) SETUP -MOV-3-1405 FAILS TO OPEN (actuates TFFXM05 = T) Ensure ADV setup per 3-GOP-301 Enclosure 2 with reactor power & Tavg stable, Start train A chilled water and secure train B chilled water (CR HVAC panel). Acknowledge any alarms and place simulator in freeze. Provide shift turnover checklists

& copy of 3-GOP-301 completed thru step 5.52.2. The crew is to place the unit on line and increase power to 30% for a flux map. Select 3A QSPDS to page 211 (SAT) and 3B QSPDS to page 212 (RVL). Set ERDADS on VPA to Tavg/Tref (TAV) and at the RCO desk to ENVRN (ED3). Fill in blender & shutdown boron addition placards at console blender station. Data for each IC may be found in the ECC & Shutdown Guidelines Book in the simulator IIF. Event 1/1a -Place unit on line 1 B AFWP out of service Initiated by crew based on shift turnover.

The crew performs 3-GOP-301 beginning at step 5.52.3 to synchronize generator to grid, increase power and swap s/g level control to main feed reg valves controlling in automatic.

Note that a surrogate operator will be required to maintain SG level. Respond if asked as SM that auto synchronization is to be used for placing the main generator on line. (Step 5.54 is n/a) Respond as System if notified of placing Unit 3 on the grid and increasing power to 20% (135 MWe). If asked about VARS, request 100 MVAR out at 100% power. Respond as Chemistry when notified to sample for 15% power change (TS 3.4.8) 3 TP-2007-301 Scenario #5 Event Description Once feed regulating valves are placed in automatic, call in as a turbine bldg. NSO and report that the B AFWP governor has an oil leak (oil leak entered at setup). Respond as NSO if directed to mechanically trip B AFWP. Click on FIW

-LOA AFW TURB B MECH TRIP TRUE then INSERT. Report when complete.

Respond as NSO if directed to verify GCM filter free of oil & set H2 gas flow at 16. After 2-4 min., report complete.

Respond as NSO if directed to complete 3-0P-072 section 5.0 to place steam traps in service. After 7-10 min. report complete.

Respond as NSO if directed to perform local actions to initiate MSR tube bundle purge per 3-0P-072.1.

Respond as NSO if directed to check Bently-Nevada for turbine vibration alarm. Reset expected turbine eccentricity alarm. Click on TURBOVISORY TCUFRST -TURBINE BENTLY-NEVADA ALARM RESET TRUE then INSERT. Respond as SM if asked about transferring main turbine load from the governor to the load limit. Direct crew to wait until after power reaches 30% power before doing this. Respond as NSO if directed to check PSS voltmeter inside the voltage regulator cabinet. Report back that meter reads zero volts. Respond if asked as Chemistry to verify SGs are within 0-NCOP-002 limits. As chemistry request power be held at or below 30% until SG chemistry verified within limits. As Reactor Engineering, request power be held at 30% until flux map complete.

Respond as SM/FS if asked to verify 3-0SP-089 step 7.1.2 completed during turbine startup. Report that this surveillance requirement met satisfactorily.

Respond as FS/NSO if asked about status of hydrogen gas dryer. Report that it is in service. Respond as FS/NSO if asked to begin placing MSRs in service per 3-0P-072.1.

Power should be stabilized at 30%, Tavg = 554.5 of & turbine load = 225 MWe. 4 TP-2007-301 Scenario #5 Event Description Event 2 -3A TPCWP bearing failure Once steam dumps have been realigned for normal at power operation (or as directed by lead examiner), trigger lesson step EVENT 2 -3A TPCWP BEARING FAILURE (actuates TVKD001X = 1.0 on 2 min ramp). Annunciators 1-5/1, 5/2 & 5/4 all alarm when 3A TPCWP trips. The crew responds per 3-ONOP-008.

The 80P will need to start 38 TPCWP manually since the auto start function was failed at startup. Respond as NSO if directed to locally check 3A TPCWP. Report back that the inboard motor bearing is smoking and very hot. If directed to do post-start checks on 3B TPCWP, report back that the pump is running normally.

Respond as NSO when directed to locally check TPCW supply temp (TI-3-1432)

<110°F and stable/decreasing.

Click on TURBINE PLANT TPCW HEAT EXCHANGERS.

TPCW supply header temperature at top of page. Respond as NSO when directed to locally verify TPCW basket strainer From TPCW HEAT EXCHANGERS system mimic page, click on FROM ICW PUMPS.

on basket strainers downstream of POV-4882 & 4883. Respond as NSO when directed to check temperature of components cooled by TPCW. After 8-10 min., report all temperatures stable. When requested as OCC, after 8-10 min rack out breaker 3AA11 by triggering lesson step EVENT 2 -RACK OUT BKR 3AA11 (actuates TAK3A11P = RACKOUT(3)).

If it is desired to skip events 1& 2 and begin the scenario here, reset to IC-125 Event 3 -FT 487 fails high After CV-3-1608 isolated, trigger lesson step EVENT 3 -FT-3-487 FAILS HIGH (actuates TF1 M87H = T). This causes FT-3-487 to fail high which causes FCV-3-488 to fail closed. To avoid automatic reactor trip on 38 slg low level, the operator must take manual control of FCV-3-488 and restore feed flow and return slg level back to program. The crew responds per 3-0NOP-049.

1 and takes FT-3-487 out of service. 38 s/g level control is returned to automatic using FT-3-486 for control. Respond as WCC if directed to initiate a PWO and contact I&C. Also respond as WCC if directed to generate an ECO for the bistables tripped per 3-0NOP-049.1.

Respond as FS/NSO if directed to reset the AMSAC TROUBLE alarm (D-7/6) at the AMSAC panel in the Cable Spreading Room. After 2-4 min., trigger lesson step EVENT 3 -RESET AMSAC TROUBLE (actuates TCL4RST = T). Report when complete.

5 TP-2007-301 Scenario #5 Event Description Event 4 -PT-3-1608 fails high I CV-3-1608 fails open After FT-3-487 bistables tripped & 3B SG level control returned to automatic, trigger lesson step EVENT 4 -PT-3-1608 FAILS HIGH I CV-3-1608 FAILS OPEN (actuates TFS1MREH = T & TFSVV49D=0.1 then TFSW13A = T 5 sec later). CV-3-1608 fails open and increases steam flow. Without operator action, power will eventually stabilize at 34-35%. Consistent with 0-ADM-200 sect. 5.4.3 for a secondary plant transient, manual turbine load is reduced to return reactor power to 30%. If crew is slow to take action, call as reactor engineering and ask why power is so far over the 30% hold which was supposed to be in progress.

Respond as NSO if directed to close the air isolation valve and bleed air off the CV-3-160B operator.

This will have no effect. Report steam continues to come out of the silencer with the greatest noiselvibration on eV-3-160B.

Once power is stabilized at 30%, CV-3-1608 can be locally isolated.

When directed as NSO, wait 2-4 min then trigger lesson step EVENT 4 -LOCALLY ISOLATE CV-3-1608 (actuates TASBV003 = 0.0 on 1 min ramp). When complete, report that with the valve closed, although much less than before, some steam flow is still visible out the silencer.

Respond if called as the wee to get Mechanical assistance in isolating 3e SG ADV. Event 5 -Exciter air cooler TPCW blockage I Reactor trip After FT-3-487 failure crew brief, trigger lesson step EVENT 5 -EXCITER AIR COOLER TPCW BLOCKAGE (actuates TVUJINF = 0.98, TVUJINFB = 0.98, TVUJINFC = 0.98 & TVUJINFD = 0.98 all on 1 min ramp). This will cause exciter air temperature to increase.

The crew responds per 3-ARP-097.CR for annunciator E-9/4. When exciter hot gas temperature reaches 90"C, the crew manually trips the reactor and 3-EOP-E-0 immediate actions performed.

Events 6 -Loss of all AC power After the immediate actions of 3-EOP-E-0 are complete, trigger lesson steps EVENT 6 -3AB11 STUCK CLOSED (actuates TFK3B11S = T), then EVENT 6 -LOSS OF SWITCHYARD (actuates TFP8SWYD = T, K30P11 BG = F, K30P11 BR = F, TCE2Eon = T & TCE2E07T = T). This causes a loss of AC power from the startup transformer.

38 EDG starts but fails to automatically load 38 4kv bus due to a bus stripping failure. 3A EDG fails to start and can not be manually started. The crew transitions to 3-EOP-ECA-0.0.

MOV-3-1405 failure to open (entered at setup) with 8 AFWP OOS (from event 1) requires C AFWP to supply both units. Manual bus stripping is performed with the exception of 38 TPCWP breaker 3A811 which has a blown breaker trip circuit control power fuse and can not be opened from VPA. Prior to closure of the S80 tie from unit 4, 3A8 11 is locally opened allowing 38 6 TP-2007-301 Scenario #5 Event Description EDG to reenergize 38 & 3D 4kV bus. Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA-O.

10r ECA-O.2 depending on plant conditions at that time. Respond as NSO if directed to locally trip 3B1 & 3B2 CWP breakers 3AB16 & 3AB18. Trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -TRIP 3A816 AND 3A818 (actuates TCK4CC = F then TCK 4DC = F 1 min later). Report when complete.

If called as NSO to investigate breaker 3AB11, report that the breaker is closed, the blue & white lights are on while the red & green lights are off (indicative of a blown trip circuit fuse -reference PTN EWD 5613-E-27 sheet 1 B). Respond as NSO if asked to locally reset 3A EDG start failure relay by pressing alarm reset pushbutton.

Report back that the 3A EDG turbocharger suffered catastrophic failure with considerable damage to EDG exhaust piping. Respond as NSO if asked to check which unit CCW is supplying U4 HHSIPs. Report that U4 CCW is supplying U4 HHSIPs. Respond as NSO if asked to locally open MOV-3-843A or B. After 2-4 min., trigger either lesson step EVENT 6 -LOCALLY OPEN MOV-843A (actuates TFMVV010 = T) or EVENT 6 -LOCALLY OPEN MOV-8438 (actuates TFMVV020 = T). Report when complete.

Respond as NSO if asked to locally isolate RCP seals by closing 3-297 AlBIC, MOV-3-381 & MOV-3-626.

Trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -LOCALLY ISOLATE RCP SEALS (actuates TAHN97A = 0.0, TAHN978 = 0.0 after 1 min delay, TAHN97C = 0.0 after 2 min delay, TF8VC60 = T after 3 min delay & TFKV626C = T after 4 min delay). Report when complete.

Respond as NSO if directed to open AFSS-3-007 to restore train 2 steam flow to C AFWP. After 1-3 min., trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -OPEN AFSS-3-007 (actuates TAFF07 = 1.0 on 30 sec ramp). Report when complete.

Respond as NSO if directed to deenergize and close MOV-3-1405.

After 1-3 min., trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -DEENERGIZE MOV-1405 (actuates TCF5MA27 = F). Respond as NSO if asked about status of steam from the 3C SG AOV CV-3-1608.

Report that steam is still coming out of the silencer on the unit 3 main steam platform.

Respond as U4 RO when status of U4 4kV buses is requested.

Report that 4A & 4B 4kV buses are both on their respective EDGs and 40 4kV bus is aligned to 4B 4kV bus. Respond as U4 RO when requested to place 4B 4kV bus non-running ESF loads in T-L or OFF. Trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -48 4KV ESF LOADS PTL (actuates TCE2E24T = T, TCE2E20T = T & TCE2E27T = T). If 4B HHSIP is not running, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -48 HHSIP PTL (actuates TFM2D48S = T & V80H30 = T). After 1-3 min., report complete.

7 TP-2007-301 Scenario #5 Event Description Respond as U4 RO when requested to close 4AD07. Trigger lesson step EVENT 6-CLOSE 4AD07 (actuates TCE2E33C = T). Respond as U4 RO when asked about 4B EDG loading. Click on POWER &

DIESEL LOGIC & PROT 4A & 4B

• and report MW reading under breaker 4AB21. After 3A 4kV bus energized from the SBO x-tie, between steps 32 & 35 of 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 call as NSO and tell crew that 3AB11 is being opened locally. Trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -LOCALLY OPEN 3AB11 (actuates TFK3B11S = F followed by TCK3B11C = F 5 sec later). Respond as U4 RCO if directed to perform steps 35b-e of 3-EOP-ECA-0.0.

Respond as NSO when directed to start SFP cooling water pump. Tell RO just before starting, then trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -START SFPCWP (actuates TCC4CL 15 = T). Event 6a -Loss of all AC power recovery This event entered when 3-EOP-ECA-0.0 completed.

Transition is made to 3-EOP-ECA

0.2 since

SI is required (based on PZR level <17%) due to the leak on 3C SG ADV CV-3-1608. Respond as NSO if directed to check if MOV-3-1426

& 1427 are closed. After 1-3 min., report that these valves are closed. Note that it is not required to close MOV-3-6386 since MOV-3-381 is closed in the same line. Respond as NSO when directed to place PAHMS in service on unit 3. After 8-12 minutes, trigger lesson step EVENT 6 -PLACE U3 PAHMS IN SERVICE (actuates TAC2V02A = 1.0, TAC2V02B = 1.0, TAAAV21 = 1.0, TAAAV22 = 1.0 & TACA005 = 0.0). Report when complete.

8 J NRC-5 OPERATIONS SHIFT TURNOVER REPORT ONCOMING CREW ASSIGNMENTS Shift Mgr: Inside SNPO: Field Supv.: Outside SNPO: Admin RCO: ANPO: Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit Supv.: Unit Supv.: RCO: RCO: NPO: NPO: Plant Status Unit 3 Unit 4 Mode: 2 Mode: 1 Power: 4 Power: 100 MWe: 549.5 MWe: 759 Gross Leakrate:

0.03 Gross Leakrate:

0.04 RCS Boron Cone: 1244 RCS Boron Cone: 600

',') ,'1l;:::{:t;,\:\

',\}i"J

-'Train A is protected Turbine rolling at 1800 RPM ready to sync generator to grid. Increase load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold power at 30% for a flux map. Place unit on line and increase power per 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.3 U3 Anticipated LCO Actions: , Current: None Anticipated:

None Train A is protected.

OLRM is green (CDF = 1.42E-6; LERF = 9.28E-8).

U4 Anticipated LCO Actions: Current: None Anticipated:

None Train A is protected.

OLRM is green (CDF = 1.42E-6; LERF = 9.28E-8).

Results of OffgoingFocus Area: See g:\Ops\Common\0900 Unit 3 Status Reactor Operator Mode: 2 RCS Leakrate Accumulator Ref Levels Power: 4 Gross: 0.03 gpm A 6615 MWe: 0 Unidentified 0.02gpm B 6640 Tavg: 549.5 Charging Pps: 0.01 gpm C 6625 RCS Pressure:

2235 RCS Boron Cone: 1244 i:;;}\,fi'fi lal ** ;",,'l

..

Annunciator:

None abnormal Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator: Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Annunciator:

Comp Actions: Current Tech Spec Action Statements: (Does Not Include "For Trackim! Only Items" T.S.A.S ! Component:

None Reason: Entry Date: T.S.A.S ! Component:

Reason: Entry Date: T.S.A.S ! Component:

Reason: Entry Date: T.S.A.S! Component:

Reason: Entry Date: T.S.A.S ! Component:

Reason: Entry Date: T.S.A.S ! Component:

Reason: Entry Date:

Unit 3 Status Changes to Risk Significant Equipment:

Unit 3 Risk is GREEN. Upcoming Reactivity Management Activities:

Sync generator to grid. Increase load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold power at 30% for a flux map. Upcoming Major POD Activities:

Sync generator to grid. Increase load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold power at 30% for a flux map. Upcoming ECOs to Hang and lor Release: None ,-Evolutions or Compensatory Actions in Progress:

Turbine rolling at 1800 RPM ready to sync generator to grid. Place unit on line and increase power per 3-GOP-301 beginning with step 5.52.3. Increase load, place the feed regulating valves in automatic and hold power at 30% for a flux map. General Information, Remarks, and Operator Work Around Status: See evolutions

& compensatory actions above. Train A is protected.