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: 1) uplands formed in loess and glacial till; and 2) floodplains along the Elkhorn and Missouri rivers (U.S. Department of Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Service [USDA NRCS], 2004). -In addition, the floodplains of the Missouri River are subdivided into the low bottom, which consists of a frequently flooded zone of meander scars and oxbow cutoffs, and the flood basin, which lies between the low bottom and the uplands. The flood basin is less frequently flooded than the low bottom.2.2.1 Site Soils The soils of the site are mapped by USDA NRCS (2004) as belonging to the following: " Haynie silt loam (coarse silty alluvium), 0 to 2 percent slopes, well drained, adjacent to the Missouri River* Wathena fine sandy loam (sandy alluvium), 0 to 2 percent slopes, moderately well drained* Onawa silty clay (clayey-loamy alluvium), 0 to 2 percent slopes, somewhat poorly drained" Albaton silty clay (clayey alluvium), 0 to 2 percent slopes, poorly drained" Onawa silty clay loam (clayey alluvium), 0 to 2 percent slopes, somewhat poorly drained" Judson silty clay loam (colluvium), 2 to 5 percent slopes (colluvium), well drained* Ida silt loam (loess), 5 to 11 percent slopes, well drained The site soils in the low bottom are derived from the Missouri River alluvial material. | : 1) uplands formed in loess and glacial till; and 2) floodplains along the Elkhorn and Missouri rivers (U.S. Department of Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Service [USDA NRCS], 2004). -In addition, the floodplains of the Missouri River are subdivided into the low bottom, which consists of a frequently flooded zone of meander scars and oxbow cutoffs, and the flood basin, which lies between the low bottom and the uplands. The flood basin is less frequently flooded than the low bottom.2.2.1 Site Soils The soils of the site are mapped by USDA NRCS (2004) as belonging to the following: " Haynie silt loam (coarse silty alluvium), 0 to 2 percent slopes, well drained, adjacent to the Missouri River* Wathena fine sandy loam (sandy alluvium), 0 to 2 percent slopes, moderately well drained* Onawa silty clay (clayey-loamy alluvium), 0 to 2 percent slopes, somewhat poorly drained" Albaton silty clay (clayey alluvium), 0 to 2 percent slopes, poorly drained" Onawa silty clay loam (clayey alluvium), 0 to 2 percent slopes, somewhat poorly drained" Judson silty clay loam (colluvium), 2 to 5 percent slopes (colluvium), well drained* Ida silt loam (loess), 5 to 11 percent slopes, well drained The site soils in the low bottom are derived from the Missouri River alluvial material. | ||
Soils of the flood basin are primarily derived from alluvial material but also include some colluvium and wash from the uplands, and soils of the uplands located along the south and southwest limits of the site are derived entirely from glacial till and loess.2.2.2 Geomorphic Features The notable geomorphic features of the site include the Missouri River channel, the meander scars and oxbow cutoffs of"the Miss0uiu-River floodplain, and the rolling hills consisting of glacial till with varying thickness of colian loess~deposits. | Soils of the flood basin are primarily derived from alluvial material but also include some colluvium and wash from the uplands, and soils of the uplands located along the south and southwest limits of the site are derived entirely from glacial till and loess.2.2.2 Geomorphic Features The notable geomorphic features of the site include the Missouri River channel, the meander scars and oxbow cutoffs of"the Miss0uiu-River floodplain, and the rolling hills consisting of glacial till with varying thickness of colian loess~deposits. | ||
2.3 Hydrologic Baseline FCS is situated directly along the Missouri River at River Mile (RM) 646, as shown in Figure 2-5.FCS is ncit protected by a levee and is therefore subject to flooding during extreme flood events. The average elevation of the FCS site is approximately 1004 ft. Table 2-3 presents data from USACE from its November 2003-report, "Upper:Mississippi River System Flow Frequency Study, Hydrology and Ilydraulics, Appefidix F, Missotpwifitver." According to these data, el. 1004 ft correlates to a flood recurrence interval of slightly..Pypr 25 years or an annual probability of flooding of 0.040. This differs from USAR-2.7, Hydrology, Where a stage of 1004.2 ft is reported as being a 0. 1 percent annual chance event (1000-year recu-rrence interval) (OPPD, April 29, 2011). USAR 2-7 acknowledges that multiple flow frequency studies have been performed by USACE subsequent to the development of the design peak flood stage. | |||
===2.3 Hydrologic=== | |||
Baseline FCS is situated directly along the Missouri River at River Mile (RM) 646, as shown in Figure 2-5.FCS is ncit protected by a levee and is therefore subject to flooding during extreme flood events. The average elevation of the FCS site is approximately 1004 ft. Table 2-3 presents data from USACE from its November 2003-report, "Upper:Mississippi River System Flow Frequency Study, Hydrology and Ilydraulics, Appefidix F, Missotpwifitver." According to these data, el. 1004 ft correlates to a flood recurrence interval of slightly..Pypr 25 years or an annual probability of flooding of 0.040. This differs from USAR-2.7, Hydrology, Where a stage of 1004.2 ft is reported as being a 0. 1 percent annual chance event (1000-year recu-rrence interval) (OPPD, April 29, 2011). USAR 2-7 acknowledges that multiple flow frequency studies have been performed by USACE subsequent to the development of the design peak flood stage. | |||
-+-.4 1 I-'pt iC , ..V. Idt AZ JUV Feet NW91IMMM 1 '.C*Location of FCS along Missouri River Fort Calhoun Station DATE OImaha P ob,~Pwer Disiricl Aug 2011 FIGURE Plant and Facility Geotechnical and Structural Assessment FIR 2-5 I l . | -+-.4 1 I-'pt iC , ..V. Idt AZ JUV Feet NW91IMMM 1 '.C*Location of FCS along Missouri River Fort Calhoun Station DATE OImaha P ob,~Pwer Disiricl Aug 2011 FIGURE Plant and Facility Geotechnical and Structural Assessment FIR 2-5 I l . | ||
Page 2-11 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 Table 2-3 -Missouri River Flood Recurrence Intervals at RM 646 (FCS)Recurrence Interval Probability Discharge Stage (years) (cfs) (ft)2 0.500 62,000 996.4 5 0.200 82,600 999.4 10 0.100 117,000 1003.0 25 0.040 127,000 1003.9 50 0.020 142-,,900 1005.1 100 0.010 168,700 1006.5 200 0.005 197,200 ..1008.0 500 0.002 238,800 1009.3 Source: USACE. November 2003. "Upper Mississippi River System Flow Frequency Study, Hydrology and Hydraulics, Appendix F, Missouri River." Data on historic floods and the 2011 flood are discussed below as are potential Missouri River flood impacts and damages at FCS.2.3.1 Historic Missouri River Flooding FCS went online in 1973 along the Missouri River At RM 646. Before FCS was constructed, the site likely experienced flooding in 1881 and 1883, and the site definitely experienced flooding in 1943 and 1952. Sincc it was constructed, FCS has experienced flood events in 1984, 1993, 1997, 2007, 2010, and 2011. Data on these historic floods on the Missouri River are presented in Table 2-4.Discharge and water surface elevations at USGS stream gage locations at Sioux City, Iowa, and at Decatur, Blair, and Omaha, Nebraska, are provided in Table 2-4. In addition, water surface elevations at FCS, which were estimated using stage information at Decatur, Blair, and Omaha, are included.Using the stage-discharge relationships.defined in the"Upper Mississippi River System Flow Frequency Study" (USACE, November 2003), a discharge of approximately 130,000 cfs results in a stage of 1004.0 fR at RM 646. As shown in Table 2-3, this is approximately a 25-year flood event.Again, this differs from the probability associated with el. 1004 ft as reported in USAR-2-7 (OPPD, April 29, 201.i). Although FCS has experienced flood events in 1984, 1993, 1997, 2007, 2010, and 2011, the data"'.sh6w that the Missouri"River water surface elevation exceeded the average site elevation of 1004 ft only once since construction, that being in 2011. The data also show that the water surface was within I ft of reaching the average site elevation during 1984 and 1993. | Page 2-11 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 Table 2-3 -Missouri River Flood Recurrence Intervals at RM 646 (FCS)Recurrence Interval Probability Discharge Stage (years) (cfs) (ft)2 0.500 62,000 996.4 5 0.200 82,600 999.4 10 0.100 117,000 1003.0 25 0.040 127,000 1003.9 50 0.020 142-,,900 1005.1 100 0.010 168,700 1006.5 200 0.005 197,200 ..1008.0 500 0.002 238,800 1009.3 Source: USACE. November 2003. "Upper Mississippi River System Flow Frequency Study, Hydrology and Hydraulics, Appendix F, Missouri River." Data on historic floods and the 2011 flood are discussed below as are potential Missouri River flood impacts and damages at FCS.2.3.1 Historic Missouri River Flooding FCS went online in 1973 along the Missouri River At RM 646. Before FCS was constructed, the site likely experienced flooding in 1881 and 1883, and the site definitely experienced flooding in 1943 and 1952. Sincc it was constructed, FCS has experienced flood events in 1984, 1993, 1997, 2007, 2010, and 2011. Data on these historic floods on the Missouri River are presented in Table 2-4.Discharge and water surface elevations at USGS stream gage locations at Sioux City, Iowa, and at Decatur, Blair, and Omaha, Nebraska, are provided in Table 2-4. In addition, water surface elevations at FCS, which were estimated using stage information at Decatur, Blair, and Omaha, are included.Using the stage-discharge relationships.defined in the"Upper Mississippi River System Flow Frequency Study" (USACE, November 2003), a discharge of approximately 130,000 cfs results in a stage of 1004.0 fR at RM 646. As shown in Table 2-3, this is approximately a 25-year flood event.Again, this differs from the probability associated with el. 1004 ft as reported in USAR-2-7 (OPPD, April 29, 201.i). Although FCS has experienced flood events in 1984, 1993, 1997, 2007, 2010, and 2011, the data"'.sh6w that the Missouri"River water surface elevation exceeded the average site elevation of 1004 ft only once since construction, that being in 2011. The data also show that the water surface was within I ft of reaching the average site elevation during 1984 and 1993. | ||
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The roof structure consists of metal deck spanning between steel joists.-The metal deck appears to be designed as a diaphragm. | The roof structure consists of metal deck spanning between steel joists.-The metal deck appears to be designed as a diaphragm. | ||
Lateral loads from--wind or earthquake--are carriedtoo the foundation by the roof deck diaphragm and are transferiýeI to the foundati£d through th steel columns.2.5.4.4 Building-Envelope Exterior walls are shownito-be precast aggregate concrete panels that form the main weather barriET with a masonry bio.tW&.all internal biner. There is no detail for the roofing material.,2.5.4.5 Pre-Flood Structural,Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were-not available in the referenced documentation. | Lateral loads from--wind or earthquake--are carriedtoo the foundation by the roof deck diaphragm and are transferiýeI to the foundati£d through th steel columns.2.5.4.4 Building-Envelope Exterior walls are shownito-be precast aggregate concrete panels that form the main weather barriET with a masonry bio.tW&.all internal biner. There is no detail for the roofing material.,2.5.4.5 Pre-Flood Structural,Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were-not available in the referenced documentation. | ||
2.5.5 Techhidal Support Center 2.5.5.1 Location, Description, and Function The Technical Support Center is a single-story administrative building located within the power block area immediately north of the Auxiliary Building and west of the Maintenance Shop.The original structure was designed in 1980, and there have been subsequent revisions accerding...p.a vailable documentation.. | |||
====2.5.5 Techhidal==== | |||
Support Center 2.5.5.1 Location, Description, and Function The Technical Support Center is a single-story administrative building located within the power block area immediately north of the Auxiliary Building and west of the Maintenance Shop.The original structure was designed in 1980, and there have been subsequent revisions accerding...p.a vailable documentation.. | |||
..The original building plan dimensions are shown as 54 ft by 78 ft, and an addition to the building was constructed in 1988 with nominal dimension of 40 ft by 68 ft to the east and 14 ft by 78 ft to the south. The grade floor elevation is 1005 ft, and the rooftop is at el. 1020 ft. | ..The original building plan dimensions are shown as 54 ft by 78 ft, and an addition to the building was constructed in 1988 with nominal dimension of 40 ft by 68 ft to the east and 14 ft by 78 ft to the south. The grade floor elevation is 1005 ft, and the rooftop is at el. 1020 ft. | ||
Page 2-38 Site History, Decripion, Baseline Cohdition | Page 2-38 Site History, Decripion, Baseline Cohdition | ||
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Interior non-bearing walls are supported from thickened-slab sections.2.5.5.4 Building Envelope , The roof is constructed of reinforced concrete-on metal deck~supported from steel joists and steel beams. Tapered insulation is located above the roo.f.-9lab.. | Interior non-bearing walls are supported from thickened-slab sections.2.5.5.4 Building Envelope , The roof is constructed of reinforced concrete-on metal deck~supported from steel joists and steel beams. Tapered insulation is located above the roo.f.-9lab.. | ||
Exterior walls are typically constructed of 12,in.-wide.reinforced concrete masonry units, with rigid insulation on the exterior side.of.the masonry,ýU:-part of theibuilding addition, exterior walls are shown to have a masoiiveneer finish. .2.5.5.5 Pre-Flood Strucdi Ieporting Pre-flood-structuralrfeports were nOt-available in the referenced documentation. | Exterior walls are typically constructed of 12,in.-wide.reinforced concrete masonry units, with rigid insulation on the exterior side.of.the masonry,ýU:-part of theibuilding addition, exterior walls are shown to have a masoiiveneer finish. .2.5.5.5 Pre-Flood Strucdi Ieporting Pre-flood-structuralrfeports were nOt-available in the referenced documentation. | ||
2.5.6 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation 2.5.6.1 Location, Description, and Function Thp.ldependent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) consists of spent fuel modules placed inrd6e 34-ft-thick reinforced concrete shield walls and ceiling, and an associated small Electrical Equip de.nt..Building, situated .to the northwest of the power block, adjacent to the New Warehouse. | |||
====2.5.6 Independent==== | |||
Spent Fuel Storage Installation 2.5.6.1 Location, Description, and Function Thp.ldependent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) consists of spent fuel modules placed inrd6e 34-ft-thick reinforced concrete shield walls and ceiling, and an associated small Electrical Equip de.nt..Building, situated .to the northwest of the power block, adjacent to the New Warehouse. | |||
The storage modules are concrete-box structures and are 9 ft 8 in. wide by 20 ft 8 in. long and 18 ft 6 in. tall, placed on a concrete mat foundation. | The storage modules are concrete-box structures and are 9 ft 8 in. wide by 20 ft 8 in. long and 18 ft 6 in. tall, placed on a concrete mat foundation. | ||
The ISFSI footprint is 42 ft by 211 ft in plan, and the Electrical Equipment Building is 13 ft 4 in. by 17 ft 4 in. in plan with an I I ft 2 in. cave height above grade.2.5.6.2 .Foundation The ISFSI foundation is a reinforced concrete mat foundation that is 2 ft thick. The Electrical Equipment Building foundation is shown as a I-ft-thick concrete mat/depressed slab with a floor elevation nominally 3.0 ft below grade, with concrete walls extending up to grade level. | The ISFSI footprint is 42 ft by 211 ft in plan, and the Electrical Equipment Building is 13 ft 4 in. by 17 ft 4 in. in plan with an I I ft 2 in. cave height above grade.2.5.6.2 .Foundation The ISFSI foundation is a reinforced concrete mat foundation that is 2 ft thick. The Electrical Equipment Building foundation is shown as a I-ft-thick concrete mat/depressed slab with a floor elevation nominally 3.0 ft below grade, with concrete walls extending up to grade level. | ||
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2.5.30.4 Building Envelope A building envelope is not applicable to this structure. | 2.5.30.4 Building Envelope A building envelope is not applicable to this structure. | ||
Page 2-61 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 2.5.30.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation. | Page 2-61 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 2.5.30.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation. | ||
2.6 Civil Baseline Civil infrastructure provides functional support for Priority I and Priority 2 structures at FCS.Underground utilities, electrical lines, and structures are essential components of facility operation. | |||
===2.6 Civil=== | |||
Baseline Civil infrastructure provides functional support for Priority I and Priority 2 structures at FCS.Underground utilities, electrical lines, and structures are essential components of facility operation. | |||
Many of these components were part of original plant construction and have'been modified when and where necessary, including for plant upgrades as well as repairs. As a resultnumerious plant drawings show underground utilities at the site. Drawing 25036-C-008 (File 60559) isja:aepmposite plan of existing (as of 2006) buried utilities, primarily those north of the.main FCS aMcess .,rad. This drawing and other existing available drawings were reviewed to identify&hie~xiSiig civil inifastructure relating to Priority I structures at FCS prior to the beginning of the flood. The 'following aspectswere targeted for each component: | Many of these components were part of original plant construction and have'been modified when and where necessary, including for plant upgrades as well as repairs. As a resultnumerious plant drawings show underground utilities at the site. Drawing 25036-C-008 (File 60559) isja:aepmposite plan of existing (as of 2006) buried utilities, primarily those north of the.main FCS aMcess .,rad. This drawing and other existing available drawings were reviewed to identify&hie~xiSiig civil inifastructure relating to Priority I structures at FCS prior to the beginning of the flood. The 'following aspectswere targeted for each component: | ||
U Underground Piping-Materials of Construction | U Underground Piping-Materials of Construction | ||
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The 2-in. stainless-steel pipeline is routed between the Turbiiný'ei ilding and 6te discharge tunnel of the Intake Structure. | The 2-in. stainless-steel pipeline is routed between the Turbiiný'ei ilding and 6te discharge tunnel of the Intake Structure. | ||
In November 2010, the EnercdiilPWORKSTM document identified I I segments for investigation subsequent to priority investigidions. | In November 2010, the EnercdiilPWORKSTM document identified I I segments for investigation subsequent to priority investigidions. | ||
2.6.2 Underground Electrical Utilities. | |||
====2.6.2 Underground==== | |||
Electrical Utilities. | |||
Underground electrical lines are loqa Mt1hroughout the FCS site. Electrical utilities are buried as direct buried cable, 'buned concrete duct bank, or prefabricated trench. A general description of each of t]ei-.mjor underground electrical systems is provided in Table 2-7. | Underground electrical lines are loqa Mt1hroughout the FCS site. Electrical utilities are buried as direct buried cable, 'buned concrete duct bank, or prefabricated trench. A general description of each of t]ei-.mjor underground electrical systems is provided in Table 2-7. | ||
Page 2-66 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 Table 2-7 -Underground Electrical Utilities Underground Electrical Materia.. | Page 2-66 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 Table 2-7 -Underground Electrical Utilities Underground Electrical Materia.. | ||
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Priority 1 Structures Page 5.7-11 Security Building Rev.. 2 If the degradation were to occur, the implications to the structure would likely be low. The combined consideration of the potential for degradation and the implications of that degradation to a structure of this type puts it in the "not significant" category. | Priority 1 Structures Page 5.7-11 Security Building Rev.. 2 If the degradation were to occur, the implications to the structure would likely be low. The combined consideration of the potential for degradation and the implications of that degradation to a structure of this type puts it in the "not significant" category. | ||
It is unknown whether these CPFMs have occurred or if they will occur in the future because the data at hand are not sufficient to rule out these CPFMs. Therefore, the confidence in the above assessment is low, which means more data or continued monitoring and inspections might be necessary to draw a conclusion. | It is unknown whether these CPFMs have occurred or if they will occur in the future because the data at hand are not sufficient to rule out these CPFMs. Therefore, the confidence in the above assessment is low, which means more data or continued monitoring and inspections might be necessary to draw a conclusion. | ||
5.7.5 Results and Conclusions The CPFMs evaluated for the Security Building are presented rating for the estimated significance and the level of confidenw Low Confidence | |||
====5.7.5 Results==== | |||
and Conclusions The CPFMs evaluated for the Security Building are presented rating for the estimated significance and the level of confidenw Low Confidence | |||
[(insufficient Data)=* 12a: z 7 ot 5.7.6 Recomr Clio follow 5 evail which shows theýn ce Rta)Continued monitoring ended to include a continuation of the elevation surveys of the previously identified targ n this structure and surrounding site. The purpose is to monitor for signs of structure distress and movement or changes in soil conditions around the structure. | [(insufficient Data)=* 12a: z 7 ot 5.7.6 Recomr Clio follow 5 evail which shows theýn ce Rta)Continued monitoring ended to include a continuation of the elevation surveys of the previously identified targ n this structure and surrounding site. The purpose is to monitor for signs of structure distress and movement or changes in soil conditions around the structure. | ||
The results of this monitoring will be used to increase the confidence in the assessment results. Elevation surveys should be performed weekly for 4 weeks and biweekly until December 31, 2011. At the time of the writing of this version of the Assessment Report, groundwater levels had not yet stabilized to nominal normal levels. Therefore, it is possible that new distress indicators could still develop. If new distress indicators are observed before December 31, 2011, appropriate HDR personnel should be notified immediately to determine if an immediate inspection or assessment should be conducted. | The results of this monitoring will be used to increase the confidence in the assessment results. Elevation surveys should be performed weekly for 4 weeks and biweekly until December 31, 2011. At the time of the writing of this version of the Assessment Report, groundwater levels had not yet stabilized to nominal normal levels. Therefore, it is possible that new distress indicators could still develop. If new distress indicators are observed before December 31, 2011, appropriate HDR personnel should be notified immediately to determine if an immediate inspection or assessment should be conducted. | ||
Revision as of 23:02, 12 October 2018
| ML13273A325 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 09/19/2013 |
| From: | Office of Information Services |
| To: | |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2012-0235 | |
| Download: ML13273A325 (278) | |
Text
GROUP B FOIA/PA NO: 2012-0235 RECORDS BEING RELEASED IN PART The following types of information are being withheld: Ex. 1 : Records properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 12,958 Ex. 2:F-1 Records regarding personnel rules and/or human capital administration Ex. 3T:- Information about the design, manufacture, or utilization of nuclear weapons[EInformation about the protection or security of reactors and nuclear materials E]Contractor proposals not incorporated into a final contract with the NRC E-Other Ex. 4:7 Proprietary information provided by a submitter to the NRC M_!Other Information that would decrease compliance and/or program effectiveness Ex. 5:[ODraft documents or other pre-decisional deliberative documents (D.P. Privilege)
D Records prepared by counsel in anticipation of litigation (A.W.P. Privilege) 7 Privileged communications between counsel and a client (A.C. Privilege)
D-1 Other Ex. 6:] Agency employee P11, including SSN, contact information, birthdates, etc.[,Third party P11, including names, phone numbers, or other personal information Ex. 7(A):f- Copies of ongoing investigation case files, exhibits, notes, ROI's, etc.Eli Records that reference or are related to a separate ongoing investigation(s)
Ex. 7(C): E-1 Special Agent or other law enforcement PII LI PII of third parties referenced in records compiled for law enforcement purposes Ex. 7(D):D-- Witnesses' and Allegers' PII in law enforcement records--LConfidential Informant or law enforcement information provided by other entity Ex. 7(E): [--1Law Enforcement Technique/Procedure used for criminal investigations
[--Technique or procedure used for security or prevention of criminal activity Ex. 7(F): rlni'formation that could aid.a terrorist or compromise security Other/Comments:
Smith, Chris From: Kirkland, John Sent: Tuesday, May 31, 2011 10:49 AM To: Clark, Jeff; Azua, Ray Cc: Smith, Chris; Melfi, Jim
Subject:
FW: River Level From: GUINN, DONNA K rmailto:dauinndoopd.com Sent: Tuesday, May 31, 2011 10:42 AM To: Kirkland, John; Wingebach, Jacob Cc: ACKER, RICHARD D; MATZKE, ERICK P; COOPER, MIKE
Subject:
FW: River Level FYI Donna Guinn, PMP Supervisor
-Regulatory Compliance dquinn@oppd.com (402) 533-7337[I(b)(6) ' :-fax (402) 533-7291 From: NELLENBACH, TIMOTHY R Sent: Monday, May 30, 2011-1:41 PM To: NuclearBusinessUnit Cc, REINHART, JEFFREY A; BANNISTER, DAVID J; GATES, GARY; HANSEN, ]ON T; DOGHMAN, MOHAMAD I; MINKS, ADRIAN 3; BURKE, TIMOTHY 3; EASTERLIN, EDWARD E
Subject:
FW: River Level Hello, As you all know we are experiencing some of the highest river levels in the station's history. The current level is 1001 feet 11 inches. It is impossible to predict how high the river will get because we don't know how much rain will fall;however, we do know that the Army Corps of Engineers is planning to increase outflows from Gavins Point dam to unprecedented levels over the next several weeks. We are preparing for the worst case, and we will be ready to handle It.We are currently implementing the following station procedures to deal with the high river level:-AOP-01, Acts of Nature, Section 1 for Flooding-PE-RR-AE-1001, Flood Barrier and Sandbag Staging and Installation We have also been reviewing our emergency plan procedures (EPIP-TSC-2, Catastrophic Flood Protection) in the event that they are needed to help mitigate the effects of the high river level.Items that we have either completed or started up to this point are:-Staged equipment at our sandpile to fill sandbags.-Filled more than 8,000 sandbags.-Sandbagged the necessary items in the Intake Structure and stored additional sandbags there in the event they are needed.-Staged sandbags in the Auxiliary Building.-Staged sandbags near the Main Station transformer, TI, for use to protect the Turbine Building and other assets in the Protected Area.1 Staged our metal flood barriers.-Sandbagged the Security Building doors.Commenced sandbagging in the Switchyard.
Had additional sand delivered to the site.-Making preparations to build a berm around our new demineralized water equipment near the Old Warehouse I sincerely appreciate the efforts by all station Personnel in aettina the above activities accomplished.
We still have a lot of work to do, and we will all need to pitch in during the next several weeks.Going forward please do the following: " The available parking has been reduced. Please be patient and do not park in standing water. Use the available dry spaces. If we run out of spaces additional parking and/or shuttle service will be provided to get the necessary people to work.0 Work with your supervision to make yourself available for sandbagging or other mitigation efforts." Do not despair. We will continue to be successful In protecting FCS so that we can return to power operation.
From a Nuclear Safety Culture perspective the below principles come to mind as they relate to our current situation.
Principle 1: Everyone is personally responsible for nuclear safety. (People and their professional capabilities, values, and experiences are regarded as the nuclear organization's most valuable assets. We will continue to successfully mitigate the effects of the high water because we have great people that can get the job done. We also have solid station procedures and the full backing of OPPD to get any necessary resources.
Principle 4: Conservative Decision Making (Decision making practices reflect the ability to distinguish between"allowable" choices and "prudent" choices.)
We will not startup the reactor until we know and understand the trends on river level.Principle 5: Nuclear Power is special and unique (Produces decay heat.) Our nuclear fuel is in a safe condition and will remain in a safe condition regardless of how high the river level gets. Our fuel is currently covered by more than 23 feet of water in both the Spent Fuel Pool and the Reactor Vessel. Our safety systems are fully able to remove decay heat and will continue to do so.If you have questions or concerns, don't hesitate to contact your supervisor or manager.Thank you.Tim Nellenbach Plant Manager Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station Omaha Public Power District Phone: (402) 533-6625 This e-mail contains Omaha Public Power District's confidential and proprietary information and is for use only by the intended recipient.
Unless explicitly stated otherwise, this e-mail is not a contract offer, amendment, nor acceptance.
If you are not the intended recipient you are notified that disclosing, copying, distributing or taking any action in reliance on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited.
2 Smith, Chris From: Wingebach, Jacob Sent: Wednesday, June 01, 2011 8:51 AM To: Clark, Jeff Cc: Melfi, Jim; Azua, Ray; Smith, Chris
Subject:
FW: Update on Flood Protection Actions From: GUINN, DONNA K [mallto:dguinnoopDd.com]
Sent: Wednesday, June 01, 2011 8:15 AM To: Kirldand, John; Wingebach, Jacob
Subject:
FW: Update on Flood Protection Actions FYI Donna Guinn, PMP Supervisor
-Regulatory Compliance dauinn@oppd.com (402) 533-7337 fox (402) 533-7291 From: REINHART, JEFFREY A Sent: Tuesday, May 31, 2011 6:52 PM To: NudearBusinessUnit Cc: HANSON, JEFFREY J; JONES, MICHAEL R; OPPD SENIOR MANAGEMENT
Subject:
Update on Flood Protection Actions All-Yesterday, Tim Nellenbach provided a detailed message regarding what we are doing to protect the plant from rising river levels. I wanted to provide an update on developments since then.Currently the river level is 1002.3 ft. and rising slowly. The plant is in a safe condition, with fuel reloaded into the core and greater than 23 ft. of water covering the fuel in the refueling cavity, and in the spent fuel pool.Our direction is to reinstall the upper guide structure, and then suspend reactor reassembly activities until we have reliable information that the river level trend will remain below 1004 ft. and stay on a lowering trend. It is possible that we will not meet these conditions until later this summer. We will not start up the reactor until it is safe to do so. Meanwhile, our safety systems remain available to remove decay heat, and our procedures and flood protection equipment will keep the plant protected.
Currently, we are tracking the release rates from Gavins Point and other upstream dams and correlating the release rates to the expected rise in river level. Based on current best estimate predictions, river level will likely rise another 2.5 feet to 4.5 feet over the next two weeks due to the planned higher discharges from the Missouri River dams. This is only an estimate, Per AOP-1 we will implement the Emergency Plan prior to river level exceeding 1004 feet. The decision on specifically when we will implement the Emergency Plan will be made by the Shift Manager based on river level, the rate of rise and predicted/actual precipitation levels. We will ensure that the Emergency plan is implemented before 1004 ft.In parallel with our actions to protect the plant from a nuclear safety perspective, we have also established a project team, led by John Brandeau, to ensure we take appropriate actions to protect OPPD assets that could be damaged by flood waters. Those assets include materials, equipment and buildings such as outage trailers, material stored on-site, the old Warehouse, the new Warehouse, the Administration Building, and the Training Center. By establishing a separate team for non-nuclear safety-related concerns, we enable the Operations Shift Manager and Plant Management to keep their primary focus on nuclear safety. The initial focus of the project team is to ensure we have an accurate and prioritized picture of the assets that need to be moved to higher ground or protected as river levels rise. We are also taking inventory of OPPD equipment available to Fort Calhoun Station, and ordering additional equipment as necessary to protect our OPPD assets. Our CEO, Gary Gates, and the OPPD senior management team remains committed to provide additional support to the FCS staff as we go forward, We will keep you informed of new developments on a daily basis. Thanks for all of your support and concern.Jeff Jeff Reinhart Site Vice President, Fort Calhoun Station Omaha Public Power District 402-533-6611 (office)402-533-7296 (fax)2 Robles, Jesse From: Robles, Jesse Sent: Friday, June 03, 2011 1:44 PM
Subject:
IOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Friday, June 3, 2011 NOTE: THIS
SUMMARY
IS OFFiCiAL USE ONLY***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR NRC INTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION.., DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE OF NRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): None OpE Forum Postings (COMMS): None Management Requests:
None Follow-up/Other Tasks: Five (5)[Note -The information In this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help lOEB staff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff]1) COOPER (INCL. FORT CALHOUN) -PROJECTED RISE IN MISSOURI RIVER LEVELS OVER NEXT TWO WEEKS (UPDATE)The following summary details potential impacts to NRC facilities due elevated Missouri River levels. Missouri River Flooding.
For Ft Calhoun at 1008 feet MSL, the transformers will be impacted resulting in the plant experiencing a loss of offsite power. The licensee's operational plan is to remain shutdown until the river crests and then recedes to below 1004 feet MSL with a decreasing trend. If the river level reaches 1004 ft and is expected to exceed 1006 ft, the licensee will transfer from the 4160 volt power to the Emergency Diesel Generators.
Forward to TRG Lead for Flood Protection/Missiles (Edward Smith) and EP (Eric Schrader):
assigqned to Russ Haskell.The US Army Corps of Engineers has indicated they will commence with staged water releases from upstream dams to manage rising Missouri River levels. Releases will be on the order of 80,000 to 150,000 cubic-feetlsecond (ft3/sec) between now and 6/15/2011.
Releases of this magnitude could result in water levels at Cooper Nuclear Station reaching the 899' 5" elevation (NOUE is 899') by 6/15/2011.
Station ALERT (SHUTDOWN) is 902'. The Army Corps of Engineers and National Weather Service are being consulted with regularly.
Forward to TRG Lead fgr Flood Protection/Missiles (Edward Smith) and EP (Eric Schrader):
assigned to Russ Haskell.Outside of Scope....................................
~ ~......
.o'trsID OF 5-,P" Outside of Scope Azua, Ray From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject Attachments:
Importance:
Howell, Linda Saturday, June 04, 2011 12:23 PM Borchardt, Bill; Virgilio, Martin; Weber, Michael; Collins, Elmo; Howell, Art; Wiggins, Jim;Satorius, Mark; Pederson, Cynthia; Boland, Anne; McDermott, Brian; Moore, Scott; Carpenter, Cynthia; Morris, Scott; Thaggard, Mark; Bush-Goddard, Stephanie; Weil, Jenny; Markley, Michael; Glitter, Joseph; Lewis, Robert Kennedy, Kriss; Pruett, Troy; Vegel, Anton; Caniano, Roy; Campbell, Vivian; Dricks, Victor;Uselding, Lara; Erickson, Randy; Maier, Bill; Browder, Rachel; Clark, Jeff; Azua, Ray; Gaddy, Vincent; Marshall, Jane; Gott, William; HOO Hoc; Hay, Michael; Lynch, James; Dickson, Billy Missouri River Flooding -Status of Potential Impacts on NRC Facilities and Agreement State Licensees OFFICIAL U3E ONLY -SENZITIVE INTERN.L INFOR.ATION Missouri River Flooding Potential Impact at NRC Facilities 6-4.docx High Attached is a status report on the current and projected impacts at NRC-licensed facilities and materials licensees located in impacted Agreement States. Updated information is highlighted.
We have removed the section on research and test reactors since there have been no impacts on these facilities and none is expected.
Should that change, the reported will be updated appropriately.
We anticipate publishing the next update to this report on Monday morning and will likely resume daily updates next week.Please noted that the report is now marked OFFICIAL USE ONLY. This is due to the level of detailed information concerning licensee actions. Please do not distribute outside NRC without letting us know. We want to ensure that information concerning planned actions that go beyond information in public records and plans is appropriately protected/controlled.
HOOS, should you receive a request for status information from DHS today, you may forward the same information provided on June.2-3.
Please contact me if you receive a request for update on Sunday to assure that we have the current status.If any recipient of this report believes others should be added to distribution, please let me know and the distribution list will be expanded accordingly.
V/R, Linda I?~LA nrFICIAL _USE ONL- .
I FORMATION Missouri River Flooding Potential Impact at NRC Facilities June 4, 2011 (Updated information is highlighted)
Due to greater than normal snow levels in the upper Missouri River Basin, the associated snowpack runoff and record level rainfall, the Missouri River Mainstern Reservoir System is experiencing flooding challenges.
Rainfall in the northern areas of the Basin in the past few weeks has equaled what typically falls during an entire year, and snowpack runoff is expected to be 140% of the normal volume. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has noted that this spring's flooding will be the most severe the region has seen since the reservoir system was constructed in the 1950's and 1960's. This has prompted USACE to release record volumes of water from each of the six major dams that make up the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir System. Based on information provided by USACE, the current modeling and release plan call for achieving a 150,000 cubic feet per second release rate for five of the six dams by mid-June and continuing at that level through mid-July, and possibly into August, in order to maintain reservoir storage capacity.
Missouri River levels are projected to crest as noted below and may remain at those levels through mid-July or into August.A summary of potential impacts is provided below for NRC facilities located in areas that are or may be impacted by flooding.
Region IV is coordinating with Agreement States in the flood impacted areas to verify the status of materials licensees.
-,Cooper Nuclear Station Plant Elevation:
903 feet mean sea level (MSL)Current river level: -895.7 feet MSL (5:45 am, CD T, June 4)Predicted max river level: 899.5 feet MSL predicted by mid-June (source is USACE)Potential Impacts on Plant Equipment:
There are no expected equipment impacts based on projected river levels. The licensee will commence a plant shutdown before the river level reaches 902 feet MSL at Cooper. At 898 feet MSL the flooding procedure directs licensee personnel to place sandbags on exterior cloors.PTý()(b()(F)
The licensee has entered its flooding procedure and is conducting enhanced monitoring of the river levels and traveling screens. The licensee is also preparing barriers to protect buildings and structures from flooding.
The licensee would declare a Notice of Unusual Event (NOUE) at 899 feet MSL. The licensee would declare an Alert at 902 feet MSL and initiate plant shutdown.Potential Impact on Evacuation Routes: A portion of the normal plant access road is now closed as a result of flooding.
The licensee has identified alternate routes that would allow OFriCIAL USE ~
IIhIAL US 0Nff -9lENSITI ITE l I P3IIIIRMA I '-access to and from the plant by personnel and diesel fuel delivery.
The licensee is preparing to buildup this access point to protect it from flooding.
There is currently no impact on evacuation routes.Fort Calhoun Station Plant Elevation:
1004 feet mean sea level (MSL)Current river level: -1003 feet MSL (5:15 am, CDT, June 4)Predicted max river level: 1006.4 feet MSL predicted by mid-June (source is USACE)Potential Impacts on Plant Equipment:
I(b)(4)X(b)(7)(F)
I(b)(4),(b)(7)(F)
I1ýV+b) -h- licensee would normally commence plant shutdown when the river level reacieis 1004 feet MSL at the Fort Calhoun Station. However, the licensee was nearing the end of a refueling outage. Currently the plant is shutdown with the core reloaded and flooded up to 23 feet above the vessel flange. The licensee's operational plan is to remain in this configuration-until the river crests and then recedes to below 1004 feet MSL with a decreasing trend (b)(4),(b)(7)(F)(b)(4),(b)(7)(F)
T The licensee has entered its flooding procedure and is conducting enhanced monitoring of the river levels. The licensee is leaning forward in completing actions prescribed in its flooding procedure and planned to have actions completed in advance of river levels reaching the trigger points identified in the flooding procedure.
The licensee has procured and is placing a 2000 foot long Aqua Berm (water-filled temporary levee) which is 6 feet tall and 16 feet wide at the base. This temporary berm will be installed at the perimeter of the protected area and is expected to protect up to a 1009 feet MSL level. The licensee is building earthen berms around the 161 KV and 345 KV switchyards and is planning to build them to a height to provide protection similar to the Aqua Berm. Additional berms and sandbags are being built or installed around the Training Center, Administration Building and the South Security Building.
These are intended to protect facilities important to site staff and communications equipment.
All offsite power sources (161 KV and 345 KV) are available and both primary emergency diesel generators (EDG) are operable and available.
The licensee is staging two additional fuel oil tanks within the Aqua Berm. These tanks will provide an additional two weeks of fuel (the fuel tanks presently onsite have a two week fuel capacity, resulting in a four week supply of fuel).The licensee is developing plans to replenish fuel oil if there is an anticipated need to run the EDGs greater than a four week period of time.hohteakvn.Teinsal p to 4-(b)(4,(b)()(F)
The licensee is also evaluating a process for refueling the tanks through the tank vents. The licensee also plans to errICIAL USE ONLY-SENSfTWIVEPILINAL INFRviIVA(IW
- stage an additional spare generator with an associated fuel tank and step-up transformer within the Aqua Berm.The licensee is staging additional equipment and supplies within the Aqua Berm including, dewatering pumps, sandbagging equipment and supplies, gasoline supplies, food and water.The licensee has procured satellite phones which will be distributed to key staff as backup communication devices.The licensee has ordered six boats for use onsite, if needed, since some parking areas are already under water. Offslte parking arrangements are in place for site staff, and the staff will be shuttled to and from the plant. The licensee is working with the National Guard to arrange for additional backup transportation provisions.
The licensee will declare a NOUE at 1004 feet MSL The licensee's Emergency Plan would not call for an Alert declaration until the river level reaches 1009 feet MSL. The licensee would not plan to activate its emergency response facilities if a NOUE is declared.
The licensee Is presently planning to manage onsite activities through an Incident Command System structure using a model Included in the OPPD Pandemic Plan as a template.
At the current time, the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is not expected to be challenged by flooding.The Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center are located within the Aqua Berm.Potential Impact on Evacuation Routes: The licensee has indicated that the only section of roadway that is projected to be impacted by rising river levels is a small section of Route 75 to the north of the town of Fort Calhoun (the actual river level at which this would occur is being researched at this time). The residents of Fort Calhoun have evacuation routes to the west and south that are expected to remain available.
Evacuation routes for the town of Blair and other communities to the north are expected to remain available to the north and west.Outside of Scope NRC Region IV Region IV staff continues to monitor the flooding conditions along the Missouri River and the potential impacts on Region IV plants and materials licensees located along the river. Region IV is monitoring potential impacts on evacuation routes and is coordinating with the power plant licensees, states and FEMA. Region IV has coordinated with the National Weather Service and USACE to confirm projected river levels.OFFIIAL USE OrL E9TV NEItA nUM~U O!FFICLA.
USEOL Region IV plans to augment the resident Inspector staff at Fort Calhoun Station on Monday, June 6. Region IV is establishing a schedule for daily conference calls with Fort Calhoun Station managers to monitor the licensee's preparations and potential impacts on the plant.Region IV plans to initiate routine, periodic calls with FEMA Region VII, the states and local response organizations early next week.NSIR has coordinated with FEMA Headquarters to ensure that they are aware of the potential impacts from river flooding at Fort Calhoun Station and Cooper Nuclear Station.--OrOrtUS~WL
~ -SMSITWE IENTER N AL INTO-RMAIILJN Elliott, Robert From: Elliott, Robert Sent: Monday, June 06, 2011 10:55 AM To: Anderson, Shaun; Bucholtz, Kristy; Grover, Ravinder; Hamm, Matthew; Hemphill, Khadijah;Richards, Karen; Schulten, Carl; Singletary, Melana; Waig, Gerald
Subject:
FW: Notes from Decision Makers' Conference Call -- NOUE Declaration at Ft Calhoun Due to River Water Level 0800 CDT 6 June 2011 FYI... Status at Fort Calhoun....
From: Brown, Frederick Sent: Monday, June 06, 2011 10:51 AM To: Ashley, MaryAnn; Cartwright, William; Elliott, Robert; Franovich, Rani; McHale, John; Shoop, Undine
Subject:
FW: Notes from Decision Makers' Conference Call -- NOUE Declaration at Ft Calhoun Due to River Water Level 0800 CDT 6 June 2011 FYI From: Thorp, John Sent: Monday, June 06, 2011 10:02 AM To: Leeds, Eric; Boger, Bruce; Grobe, Jack; Collins, Elmo; Skeen, David Cc: Brown, Frederick; Pruett, Troy; Howe, Allen; Ruland, William; Glitter, Joseph; Nelson, Robert; Cheok, Michael;McGinty, Tim; NRR_DIRS_IOEB Distribution; Kobetz, Timothy; Kirkland, John
Subject:
Notes from Decision Makers' Conference Call -- NOUE Declaration at Ft Calhoun Due to River Water Level 0800 CDT 6 June 2011 All, I just sat in on the blast dial conference call with the Senior Resident at Ft Calhouo, John Kirkland, to listen to John's status briefing and participate in the discussion among decision makers Bruce Boger and Elmo Collins on the licensee's declaration of a Notification of Unusual Event for high river water level at 0800 CDT.Other attendees on the call included NSIR Jane Marshall, and the HOO.At 0920 EDT the decision was reached to remain in normal mode, with continued enhanced oversight and follow-up with the licensee by NRC staff, which has been in progress in anticipation of the rising river water level.* The river water level as of the time of the call is 1003 feet, 2 inches. The plant is in Cold Shutdown, and does not plan to start up until the river water level (trend) is abated, and will not start up while they are in an Unusual Event (or higher) condition." The level at which an NOUE must be declared under the licensee's procedures (HU-1, EAL 5, Natural Phenomena Affecting the Protected Area) is 1004 feet." According to the Army Corps of Engineers, the river water level at the site should reach 1006 feet 6 inches in approximately 10 days.* The next decision making call will be held when river water level reaches 1006 feet. (This is the level at which there is a potential for offsite power to be threatened.)" At 1009 feet, the licensee's procedures call for declaration of an Alert, and this is the level at which a Shutdown is required if the plant were operating.
Licensee actions thus far:* Over past week, Ft Calhoun has been preparing for the rising river level, and has put in place sandbagging and flood gates to protect the site up to 1007 feet river level." The licensee has materials staged to support protection up to 1014 feet, and they have procured and by end of day today will have installed an "aqua-berm" (design is similar to a large inner tube filled with water) to protect the entire protected area (with exception of the intake structure) up to 1012 feet of river level.* The licensee is procuring another aqua-berm to allow protection of the Training Building and the simulator facility in that building.During the days/weeks leading up to today's call, Region IV has been engaged and interacting with the licensee, FEMA, and state and local authorities, and the Region IV staff will continue with enhanced oversight and engagement with the licensee for this event, which has come about due to a combination of snow melt and heavy rains upriver, and attendant water releases from the associated dams.Access to the site is thus far unaffected.
Due to some of the employee parking lot already covered by water, the licensee is bussing in most employees, with essential employees in shift crews (and NRC residents) still able to drive in and use available parking, until parking on site is no longer available.
Egress and evacuation routes remain available to the site. The Senior Resident Inspector and the Resident Inspector plan to make photos of the conditions at the site, currently only on their local network drives, available to NRC staff via a SharePoint link, when they are able to.Please let me know if I've made any errors of fact or if I've omitted anything; I'll be happy to re-issue this status e-mail with any corrections.
John Thorp NRR Daytime Emergency Officer 301-415-8508 Daytime EO ClL (6) ((Personal Cell: (b)._)John Thorp Chief, Operating Experience Branch NRR/DIRS/IOEB Tracking: 2 Recipient Anderson, Shaun Bucholtz, KrIsty Grover, Ravinder Hamm, Matthew Hemphill, Khadijah Richards, Karen Schulten, Cad Singletary, Melana Waig, Gerald Read Read: 6/6/2011 10:59 AM Read: 6/7/2011 7:40 AM Read: 6/6/2011 10:55 AM Read: 6/6/2011 10:55 AM Read: 6/6/2011 10:56 AM Read: 6/6/2011 12:22 PM Read: 6/6/2011 10:55 AM 3ý I Robles, Jesse From: Bemardo, Robert, Sent: Monday, June 06, 011 3:03 PM
Subject:
IOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Monday, June 6, 2011 NOTE: THIS
SUMMARY
IS ***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR NRC INTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION*'
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE OF NRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): None OpE Forum Postings (COMMS): None Management Requests:
None Follow-uplOther Tasks: Nine (9)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help IOEB staff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff]1) FORT CALHOUN -PROJECTED RISE IN MISSOURI RIVER LEVELS OVER NEXT TWO WEEKS A Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) was declared for the site.-The river water level as of the time of the call is 1003 feet, 2 inches. The plant is in Cold Shutdown, and does not plan to start up until the river water level (trend) is abated, and will not start up while they are in an Unusual Event (or higher) condition.-The level at which an NOUE must be declared under the licensee's procedures (HU-1, EAL 5, Natural Phenomena Affecting the Protected Area) is 1004 feet.-According to the Army Corps of Engineers, the river water level at the site should reach 1006 feet 6 inches in approximately 10 days.'The next decision making call will be held when river water level reaches 1006 feet. (This is the level at which there is a potential for offsite power to be threatened.)-At 1009 feet, the licensee's procedures call for declaration of an Alert, and this is the level at which a Shutdown is required if the plant were operating.
Licensee actions thus far: 'Over past week, Ft Calhoun has been preparing for the rising river level, and has put in place sandbagging and flood gates to protect the site up to 1007 feet river level.'The licensee has materials staged to support protection up to 1014 feet, and they have procured and by end of day today will have installed an "aqua-berm" (design is similar to a large inner tube filled with water) to protect the entire protected area (with exception of the intake structure) up to 1012 feet of river level.'The licensee is procuring another aqua-berm to allow protection of the Training Building and the simulator facility in that building.During, the days/weeks leading up to today's call, Region IV has been engaged and interacting with the licensee, FEMA, and state and local authorities, and the Region IV staff will continue with enhanced oversight and engagement with the licensee for this event, which has come about due to a combination of snow melt and heavy rains upriver, and attendant water releases from the associated dams.
Access to the site is thus far unaffected.
Due to some of the employee parking lot already covered by water, the licensee is bussing in most employees, with essential employees in shift crews (and NRC residents) still able to drive in and use available parking, until parking on site is no longer available.
Egress and evacuation routes remain available to the site. The Senior Resident Inspector and the Resident Inspector plan to make photos of the conditions at the site, currently only on their local network drives, available to NRC staff via a SharePoint link, when they are able to. Forward to TRG Lead for Flood Protection/Missiles (Edward Smith)and EP (Eric Schrader);
Assigned to Jesse Robles.2 QUTS~te or ScoPE Outside of Scope 3 DLrFr`6(I6 0F :5coPF Attendees at Screening Meeting: Bob Bernardo Jesse Robles Adakou Foli Rebecca Sigmon Steve Pannier Jay Patel -(NRO)Mary Wegner- (RES) -by phone 4............................................-..-.-..--..-----
'-.--...-.-------...-~'.....'-.~--...~-..-......
I I Robles, Jesse From: Thorp, John (W Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2011 10:23 AM To: NRRDIRS_IOEB Distribution
Subject:
FW: Missouri River Flooding -Status of NRC and Agreement State Licensees
-0FFfehAL-I SEOLY -SENai iN TFuAL iNFORM/A I IUI Attachments; Missouri River Flooding Potential Impact at NRC Facilities 6-7.docx Importance:
High FYI, more plant specific info on the Missouri river flooding situation at Ft Calhoun and Cooper Stations.(Mark, Note the 'sensitive internal information" nature of this document.
I don't recommend putting a lot of this information, especially that which causes it to be sensitive internal info, into the Daily Screening Summary, but OK to discuss at the screening meeting and for use by our ET Briefer. A lot of what's in here has already been documented in the screening summary of yesterday, that used my EO summary report as an input.)Thanks, John From: Pruett, Troy \lV Sent: Tuesday, June'0'7, 2011 9:55 AM To: Brown, Frederick; Thorp, John
Subject:
FW: Missouri River Flooding -Status of NRC and Agreement State Licensecs-L UNLY -SENSIT1VI INTZRNAL IMMA-T-TfeN Importance:
High FYI. Second report periodically provided by R4 with much more specific plant information on river level and impact.From: Howell, Linda \ t-4 Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2011 9:47 AM To: Borchardt, Bill; Virgilio, Martin; Weber, Michael; Collins, Elmo; Howell, Art; Wiggins, Jim; Satorius, Mark; Pederson, Cynthia; Boland, Anne; McDermott, Brian; Morris, Scott; Thaggard, Mark; Carpenter, Cynthia; Lewis, Robert; Bush-Goddard, Stephanie; Weil, Jenny; Markley, Michael; Glitter, Joseph; Evans, Michele; Williams, Kevin Cc: Kennedy, Kriss; Pruett, Troy; Vegel, Anton; Caniano, Roy; Campbell, Vivian; Dricks, Victor; Uselding, Lara; Erickson, Randy; Maier, Bill; Browder, Rachel; Clark, Jeff; Azua, Ray; Gaddy, Vincent; Marshall, Jane; Gott, William; MOO Hoc; Hay, Michael; Elkmann, Paul; Dickson, Billy; R4RCB
Subject:
Missouri River Flooding -Status of NRC and Agreement State Licensees OFFCAUSNL-ENSITIVE IN1ERA Importance:
High Attached is the June 7 update on the Missouri River flooding.
Ft. Calhoun Station remains in a NOUE and the agency remains in NORMAL mode. Please note that the attached document is marked OFFICIAL USE ONLY due to the level of detailed information concerning licensee actions. Please do not distribute outside NRC without letting us know.Please let me know if you wish to have additional staff/managers added to this distribution list.
Missouri River Flooding Potential Impact at NRC Facilities June 7, 2011 (Updated information is highlighted)
Due to greater than normal snow levels in the upper Missouri River Basin, the associated snowpack runoff and record level rainfall, the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir System is experiencing flooding challenges.
Rainfall in the northern areas of the Basin in the past few weeks has equaled what typically falls during an entire year, and snowpack runoff is expected to be 140% of the normal volume. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has noted that this spring's flooding will be the most severe the region has seen since the reservoir system was constructed in the 1950's and 1960's. This has prompted USACE to release record volumes of water from each of the six major dams that make up the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir System. Based on information provided by USACE, the current modeling and release plan call for achieving a 150,000 cubic feet per second release rate for five of the six dams by mid-June and continuing at that level through mid-July, and possibly into August, in order to maintain reservoir storage capacity.
Missouri River levels are projected to crest as noted below and may remain at those levels through mid-July or into August.A summary of potential impacts is provided below for NRC facilities located in areas that are or may be impacted by flooding.
Region IV is coordinating with Agreement States in the flood impacted areas to verify the status of materials licensees.
INFORMATIQIN nrricTAL II~T ~Cy -~Fm;Tlvfl
!T~!TFiflNAi.
1NFflRM.A.TIflf~
111111, -131..... ° .... v..utside of Scope I .Fort Calhoun Station Plant Elevation:
1004 feet mean sea level (MSL)Current river level: -1003.8 feet MSL (6:00 am, CDT)Predicted max river level: 1006.5 feet MSL predicted by mid-June (source is USACE)Potential Impacts on Plant Equipment:
At 1008 feet MSL, the transformers will be impacted resulting in the plant experiencing a loss of offsite power. Barring any actions by the licensee, the raw water pumps will also be lost at this river level. The licensee would normally commence plant shutdown when the river level reaches 1004 feet MSL at the Fort Calhoun Station. However, the licensee was nearing the end of a refueling outage. Currently the plant is shutdown with the core reloaded and flooded up to 23 feet above the vessel flange. The licensee's operational plan is to remain in this configuration until the river crests and then recedes to below 1004 feet MSL with a decreasing trend. If the river level reaches 1004 ft and is expected to exceed 1006 ft, the licensee will transfer from the 4160 volt power to the Emergency Diesel Generators.
The licensee has entered its flooding procedure and is conducting enhanced monitoring of the river levels. The licensee is leaning forward in completing actions prescribed in its flooding procedure and planned to have actions completed in advance of river levels reaching the trigger points identified In the flooding procedure.
With a few exceptions, actions to protect vital structures to 1007 feet MSL have been completed.
The exceptions involve actions that are "on hold" until needed for personnel safety reasons. These actions will be completed when the river level reaches 1006 feet MSL.Installation of a 2000 foot long Aqua Berm around the perimeter of the power block (with exception of the intake structure) is complete, This temporary water-filled berm is 8 feet tall and 16 feet wide at the base. This berm will provide protection for up to 6 feet of water (equates to 1010 feet MSL). The majority of the switchyard is protected by an earthen berm to a level of approximately 1011 feet MSL. This does not include the 161 KV structures which are currently being protected by sandbag berms to a level of approximately 1009 feet MSL. The licensee is working to enhance protection of the 161 KV structure through a combination of earthen and sandbag berms. The intake structure is currently protected to a level of approximately 1007.5 feet, and with additional actions, can be protected to a level of 1014. The ISFSI is built at a level of 1009 feet, no additional protective measures have been taken at this time.Additional berms and sandbags are being built or installed around the Training Center, Administration Building and the South Security Building.
These are intended to protect facilities important to site staff, the simulator and communications equipment.
Once actions to protect vital structures are fully completed, the licensee plans to install Aqua Berms around theseUSEt UNLY =- :i3iIL N TFRAL ;NFGRFM1.T.,ON
...............
~...
O.-FrICIAL USE ONL.Y IvL facilities.
The licensee is brining additional overhead power lines to these facilities as a backup to underground power supplies.All offsite power sources (161 KV and 345 KV) are available and both primary emergency diesel generators (EDG) are operable and available.
The licensee is staging two additional fuel oil tanks Within the Aqua Berm. These tanks will provide an additional two weeks of fuel (the fuel tanks presently onsite have a two week fuel capacity, resulting in a four week supply of fuel).The licensee is developing plans to replenish fuel oil If there is an anticipated need to run the EDGs greater than a four week period of time. Refueling hookups for the fuel tanks are located at an elevation above the anticipated flood level (-1006 feet MSL). The licensee is also evaluating a process for refueling the tanks through the tank vents. The licensee also plans to stage an additional spare generator with an associated fuel tank and step-up transformer within the Aqua Berm.The licensee is staging additional equipment and supplies within the Aqua Berm including, dewatering pumps, sandbagging equipment and supplies, gasoline supplies, food and water.The licensee has procured satellite phones which will be distributed to key staff as backup communication devices.The licensee has ordered six boats for use onsite, if needed, since some parking areas are already under water. Offsite parking arrangements are in place for site staff, and the staff will be shuttled to and from the plant. The licensee is working with the National Guard to arrange for additional backup transportation provisions.
The licensee's procedures and Emergency Plan call for the declaration of a NOUE at 1004 feet MSL. At 0800 CDT on June 6, the licensee declared a NOUE, in advance of the river level reaching 1004 feet MSL. The licensee's Emergency Plan would not call for an Alert declaration until the river level reaches 1009 feet MSL. A response mode decision making conference call was held following the NOUE declaration with Region IV, NRR and NSIR managers present.The agency currently remains in NORMAL mode, This response mode decision will be re-visited if river levels approach 1006 feet MSL or if the licensee's protective actions are challenged or fail and systems are at risk of flooding.The licensee is presently planning to manage onsite activities through an Incident Command System structure using a model included in the OPPD Pandemic Plan as a template.
At the current time, the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is not expected to be challenged by flooding.
The Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center are located within the Aqua Berm.Potential Impact on Evacuation Routes: Currently, there are no impacts on evacuation routes. The licensee has indicated that the only section of roadway that is projected to be impacted by rising river levels is a small section of Route 75 to the north of the town of Fort Calhoun (the actual river level at which this would occur is being researched at this time). The residents of Fort Calhoun have evacuation routes to the west and south that are expected to remain available.
Evacuation routes for the town of Blair and other communities to the north are expected to remain available to the north and west.-r:ILL~ LJ ,.~NS',T;VE i'TE i iLN IryiNFFviA-TtON 1OFRCAL USE ONL SENSIT I NFORMATION Materials Licensees Rill and RIV are coordinating with affected Agreement States to monitor potential impacts on materials licensees.
There are currently no known impacts on NRC or Agreement State materials licensees.
The Agreement States have provisions in place to maintain contact with their licensees as conditions change. Region III and Region IV will continue to coordinate with affected NRC licensees and the affected Agreement States to monitor potential impacts on materials licensees and update this section of the report as appropriate.
NRC Region IV Region IV staff continues to monitor the flooding conditions along the Missouri River and the potential impacts on Region IV plants and materials licensees located along the river. Region IV is monitoring potential impacts on evacuation routes and is coordinating with the power plant licensees, states and FEMA. Region IV has coordinated with the National Weather Service and USACE to confirm projected river levels.Region IV has augmented the resident inspector staff to provide 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> coverage at Fort Calhoun Station. Region IV is conducting daily conference calls with Fort Calhoun Station managers to monitor the licensee's preparations and potential impacts on the plant. Region IV has conducted an initial coordination call with FEMA Region VII and plans to establish coordination calls with FEMA Region VII, states and local response organizations early next week.NSIR has coordinated with FEMA Headquarters to ensure that they are aware of the potential impacts from river flooding at Fort Calhoun Station and Cooper Nuclear Station.jrFi~..IML uSE CNL~ SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFflRMATION Robles, Jesse From: King, Mark N M Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2011 2:08 PM
Subject:
lOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Tuesday, June 7, 2011 NOTE: THIS
SUMMARY
IS OFFICIAL USE- ONL,(***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE!
PROPRIETARY OR NRC INTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION***
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE OF NRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): None OpE Forum Postings (COMMS): None Management Requests:
None Follow-uplOther Tasks: Five (5)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help 10E8 staff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff]1) EN 46929 -FORT CALHOUN -UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO RIVER LEVEL See EN Text. Send to TRG Lead for EP (Eric Schrader) and Missiles/Flood Protection (Ed Smith). Assigned to Jesse Robles.2) PNO-IV-11-003
-FORT CALHOUN STATION -PNO REGARDING DECLARATION OF A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO HIGH RIVER LEVEL See PNO Text. Send to TRG Lead for EP (Eric Schrader) and Missiles/Flood Protection (Ed Smith). Assigned to Jesse Robles.3) FORT CALHOUN -ALERT DECLARED DUE TO FIRE IN SWITCHGEAR ROOM, NRC IN MONITORING MODE From the HOO: At about 0940 CDT on 6/7/11, Ft. Calhoun declared an Alert emergency condition based on a fire in a switchgear room (not the flooding).
The unit remains in cold shutdown.
The agency entered Monitoring Mode at 1056 EDT to respond to this event. We will follow with more information after we get the report from the licensee.
Continue to follow. Pass to TRG Lead for Electrical Power (Roy Mathew), EP (Eric Schrader), Fire Protection (Brian Metzger).
Assigned to Jesse Robles.*utside of Scope i OUTS 1t& oF sweeC Attendees at Screening Meeting: Bob Bernardo Jesse Robles Mark King Steve Pannier Jay Patel -(NRO).I OcrS b saýc Mary Wegner- (RES) -by phone 3 Elliott, Robert From: Brown, Frederick I Sent Wednesday, June 08, 2011 11:20 AM To: Elliott, Robert; Franovich, Rani; Kobetz, Timothy; McHale, John; Shoop, Undine; Thorp, John Cc: Pruett, Troy; Kennedy, Kriss; Croteau, Rick: Holahan, Patricia; Andersen, James; Cartwright, William; Ashley, MaryAnn; Westreich, Barry; Bahadur, Sher, Blount, Tom; Cheok, Michael;Evans, Michele; Ferrell, Kimberly; Galloway, Melanie; Glitter, Joseph; Giwines, Mary; Hiland, Patrick; Holian, Brian; Howe, Allen; Lee, Samson; Lubinski, John; McGinty, Tim; Nelson, Robert; Ruland, William; Skeen, David; Thomas, Brian
Subject:
FW: REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE We got this as a cc:, but if you have inspector qualified or nearly qualified folks available to support Region IV, you can probably contact the BCs listed below.We should also be thinking about support for the Browns Ferry 95003 (likely the late summer/early fall time frame) and potentially also a Ft. Calhoun 95003 (depending on the final conclusion about the RPS coils finding).Undine, I assume that you are already talking with Gene Guthrie about the safety culture piece for BF. Please let me/Troy/Jim know how the status of the NEI guidance fits into this picture.Thanks, Fred From: Kennedy, Kriss Sent: Wednesday, Junk, 2011 10:41 AM To: Miller, Chris; Roberts, Darrell; Croteau, Rick; Munday, Joel; West, Steven; Reynolds, Steven Cc: Vegel, Anton; Clark, Jeff; Gaddy, Vincent; Brown, Frederick; Pruett, Troy
Subject:
REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE Esteemed Colleagues, Region IV has an emergent ne es to support inspection activities at Fort Calhoun Station and potential inspection activities at outside of Scope S-FOrt Calhoun ..On June 6, Fort Calhoun declared a NUE due to rising river level on the Missouri River. We have established 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> site coverage to assess licensee preparations (extensive) for the flooding and monitor the impact of flooding on the plant.In order to support round the clock site coverage, I am requesting any support you can provide between now and mid-August.
Your BCs can contact Jeff Clark directly at 817-860-8147 to discuss specific needs and timeframes.
Dutside of Scope ,3 .0 "
Thanks for your consideration of this request.Kriss 2 I I Robles, Jesse n 1i From: K Ing, Marl<Sent: Tuesday, Juhe 14, 2011 2:27 PM
Subject:
IOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Tuesday, June 14, 2011 NOTE: THIS
SUMMARY
IS OFFAU Q***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR NR ENAL USE ONLY INFORMATION**
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSID OF1PFRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROMI ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): None OpE Forum Postings (COMMS): None Management Requests:
None Follow-up/Other Tasks: Fifteen (15)Iý I
- 4) COOPER AND FORT CALHOUN -PROJECTED RISE IN MISSOURI RIVER LEVELS OVER NEXT TWO WEEKS (UPDATE)*-* (6/14/2011)
- The recent breech in a Missouri River levee located at Hamburg, Iowa (see photos) has.resulted in a one (1) foot drop in river level at the Cooper Nuclear Station (currently 896' 1"). This will not impact State Route 136 which is an evacuation route for the station. Sections of Interstate 1-29 close to Hamburg, Iowa may be closed due to this breech condition.
River levels at the Fort Calhoun Station have risen 1 inch since breech (currently at 1005' 7"). (Station remains in a NOUE condition due to flooding).
Forward to TRG Lead for Flood Protection/Missiles (Edward Smith) and EP (Eric Schrader);
assigned to Russ Haskell.)utside of Scope V, 7) LER 2852011003R01
-FORT CALHOUN: INADEQUATE FLOODING PROTECTION DUE TO INEFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT See LER update. During identification and evaluation of flood barriers in response to the NRC issued white finding (See OpE COMM item, this issue is being reviewed under IFR 2011-01), several unsealed through-wall penetrations were identified on the intake structure to be below the licensing basis flood elevation.
During an extreme flooding event, water inflow could have affected the operability of both trains of safety related raw water pumps (ultimate heat sink). This revision adds several other penetrations that were discovered as a result of the review in the intake structure, auxiliary building, and chemistry and radiation protection buildings.
EN 46590, EN 46594, EN 46716, EN 46690, EN 46741. Pass tq TRG Lead for Flood Protection (Ed Smith), and .SW/UHS (Gerard Purciarello).
Assigned to Jesse Robles.2 OLrr$~De?
oF' 6coP~3.I
&JSIC-0P Scope 5) LER 2852011003R01
-FORT CALHOUN: INADEQUATE FLOODING PROTECTION DUE TO INEFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT 6) LER 2852011502R00
-FORT CALHOUN: INADEQUATELY COMPENSATED UNATTENDED OPENING OUS 06OV2 5C0pe'N Outside of Scope 1 I Attendees at Screening Meeting: Bob Bernardo -by phone Russ Haskell Steve Pannier Adakou Foli Jesse Robles Mark King Ryan Craffey -(NRO)Mary Wegner- (RES) -by phone Mark King Senior Reactor Systems Engineer NRR/ADRO/DIRS/IOEB Operating Experience Branch 301-415-1150 Mark. Kinq~cinrc.gov 5
Azua, ,Ray" From: Clark, Jeff Sent: Tuesday, June 14, 2011 8:24 AM To: Kennedy, Krss; Howell, Linda; Alexander, Ryan; Alferink, Beth; Azua, Ray
Subject:
FW: Daily Status at Fort Calhoun FYI From: BERCK, ALLEN rmallto:aberck@oppd.coml Sent: Tuesday, June 14, 2011 7:22 AM To: 'pott.ema@pottcounty.com';
Bill Pook; Dan; Eric Plautz; Clark, Jeff; Jeff Theulen; Jon Schwarz; Kathy Stodola;Kirkland, John; Larry Oliver; Laurel Ryan; Paul Johnson; Whitney Shipley Cc: GEBERS, STEVEN W; DEANGELIS, PETER A; HANKINS, RHONDA R; MOELLER, CHRISTOPHER J; RELLER, MARK H;SILKE, DEENA L
Subject:
Daily Status at Fort Calhoun Fort Calhoun Flooding Status 1. Reactor Status: Shutdown 2. Reactor is covered with > 23-ft of cooling water 3. Offsite power and Emergency Diesel Generators are available.
Both vital buses are energized at this time.4. Spent Fuel Pooling cooling is in service and protected.
- 5. Shutdown cooling is in service and protected 6. Current river level is 1005' 6".7. Current Blair gauge level is 31.53-ft with the current projection at 31.8-ft at about 19:00 on June 18, 2011.8. The site has implemented procedures to protect power supplies and vital equipment.
Water is onsite, and flood barriers are protecting vital equipment.
- 9. No release of radioactivity has occurred.10. Fort Calhoun has declared a Notification of Unusual Even at 08:00 6/6/11.11. Backup evacuation route onsite is inundated however the primary route onsite is passable and not expected to be affected.12. Power was removed from siren 257 and 260 in Pottawattamie Co. IA, which is just on the edge of the 10-mile EPZ south east of the plant. Siren 75, 76 in Desoto National Wildlife Refuge have no power. Currently the refuge is closed due to flooding.
Siren 142 in Harrison Co. has no power which is north of Loveland IA -9.5 miles from the plant. Siren 1 east of Fort Calhoun on county road 34 between Fort Calhoun and Boyer Chute Recreational Area is without power. This area is closed due to flooding.13.At this time no known major evacuation routes are affected.
Interstate 29 in both directions:
from Exit 55 North 25th Street to Exit 75 (Missouri Valley): 1-680 road closed to traffic because of flooding -follow the detour signs. Interstate 680 in both directions:
from before Exit 1 130th Street to Exit 62: 1-29; Old Mormon Bridge Road --- road closed because of flooding.
All in Pottawattamie Co, IA.Requested Information from states and counties: 1. When offsite evaluation routes are affected please contact emergency planning.2. When the Blair Water plant is affected please contact emergency planning.
/1
- 3. Authprized power outages that affect or could affect siren operability, please contact emergency planning.The river flow rate has been relatively constant at Blair NE, however the river level continues to rise.The Corp of Engineers is releasing at Gavins Point dam at 145,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) and is expected to increase to 150,000 cfs today.Emergency Planning Contacts at FCS: Steve nharr.'Pager: F6J e X Work Phone: 402-533-7308 Cell Phone: Allen B rck: Pager: 7(b)(6) "- -V Work PEone: 402-636-2836 Cell phone:1-)6
.Allen D. Berck Supervisor
-Emergency Planning Fort Calhoun Station Omaha Public Power District phone: 402-533-6064 pager: 1(b)(6)email: aberckeoppd.com This e-mail contains Omaha Public Power District's confidential and proprietary information and is for use only by the intended recipient.
Unless explicitly stated otherwise, this e-mail is not a contract offer, amendment, nor acceptance, If you are not the intended recipient you are notified that disclosing, copying, distributing or taking any action in reliance on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited.
2 Robles, Jesse.1 From: Sent:
Subject:
King, Mark \Wednesday, June 15, 2011 1:59 PM IOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Wednesday, June 15, 2011 NOTE: THIS SUM M ARY IS ERNALJ SEOL***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR N ERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION**'
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSID -G~RC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION F M ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): None OpE Forum Postings (COMMS): None Management Requests:
None Follow-uplOther Tasks: Eleven (11)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help lOEB staff communicate and. track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff.]4) COOPER AND FORT CALHOUN -PROJECTED RISE IN MISSOURI RIVER LEVELS OVER NEXT TWO WtEKS (UPDATE)... (6/15/2011)
-See daily Flooding Report. Forward to update to TRG Lead for Flood Protection/Missiles (Edward Smith) and EP (Eric Schrader):
assicined to Russ Haskell.f;/
017¶3,vg OF scclpe Outside of Scope 2 Outside of Scope 3 I-7 Outside of Scope Attendees at Screening Meeting: Bob Bemardo Russ Haskell Rebecca Sigmon Adakou Foli Jesse Robles Mark King Ryan Craffey -(NRO)Mary Wegner- (RES) -by phone 4 or--eflCLLUfl N Et iz iIR A~ Q 1 IN-Missouri River Flooding Potential Impact at NRC Facilities June 16, 2011 (Updated information is highlighted)
Due to greater than normal snow levels in the upper Missouri River Basin, the associated snowpack runoff and record level rainfall, the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir System is experiencing flooding challenges.
Rainfall in the northern areas of the Basin in the past few weeks has equaled what typically falls during an entire year, and snowpack runoff is expected to be 140% of the normal volume. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has noted that this spring's flooding will be the most severe the region has seen since the reservoir system was constructed in the 1950's and 1960's. From Gavin's Point Dam near Yankton, South Dakota to Rulo, Nebraska, the Missouri is expected to reach the highest levels seen since 1952. This has prompted USACE to release record volumes of water from each of the six major dams that make up the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir System. Based on information provided by USACE, five of the six dams are at or near the planned maximum release rate of 150,000 cubic feet per second. These release rates will continue at that level through mid-July, and possibly into August, in order to maintain reservoir storage capacity.
The Missouri River levels are projected to crest as noted below and may remain at those levels through mid-July or into August. USACE has noted that flood crest stages on the Missouri River at Blair, Nebraska may exceed levels projected earlier, but currently the predicted crest at Fort Calhoun Station remains the same.A summary of potential impacts is provided below for NRC facilities located in areas that are or may be impacted by flooding.
Region IV is coordinating with Agreement States in the flood impacted areas to verify the status of materials licensees.
Outside of Scope OV~FICIAI Y I IOtlV -
,ff3,M U-j" w..c; -UAW Outside of Scope Fort Calhoun Station Plant Elevation:
1004 feet mean sea level (MSL)Current river level: 1005 feet 6 inches MSL (-7:00 am, CDT, source is licensee measurement)
Predicted max river level: 1006.4 feet MSL predicted by mid-June (source is USACE)Potential Impacts on Plant Equipment: j(b)(4),(b}(7}(F)
I(b)(4),(b)(7)F)
/The licensee would normally commence plant shutdown when the river level reaches 1004 feet MSL at the Fort Calhoun Station. However, the licensee was nearing the end of a refueling outage when river levels were predicted to reach this level. Currently the plant is shutdown with the core reloaded and flooded up to 23 feet above the vessel flange. The licensee's operational plan is to remain in this configuration until the river crests and then recedes to below 1004 feet MSL with a decreasing trend. The licensee's abnormal operating Procedure for acts of nature (AOP-! has been modified.f b)(4}'{b)(7)(F}
I 5 k (b)(4),(b)(7)(F)I , (b)(4),(b)(7)(F)
[The modified AOP-1 now calls for transfer to the Emergency Diesel Generators if loss of offsite power is imminent.The licensee has entered its flooding procedure and is conducting enhanced monitoring of the river levels. The licensee is leaning forward in completing actions prescribed in its flooding procedure and planned to have actions completed in advance of river levels reaching the trigger OFFICiAttS!-/OtY SBN64PWE'INTERNAL -points identified in the flooding procedure.
With a few exceptions, actions to protect vital structures to 1007 feet MSL have been completed.
The exceptions involve actions that are "on hold" until needed for personnel safety reasons. These actions will be completed when the river level reaches 1006 feet MSL.Installation of a 2000 foot long Aqua Berm around the perimeter of the power block (with exception of the intake structure) is complete.
This temporary water-filled berm is 8 feet tall and 16 feet wide at the base. This berm will provide protection for up to 6 feet of water (equates to 1010 feet MSL). The majority of the switchyard is protected by an earthen berm to a level of approximately 1011 feet MSL. This does not include the 161 KV structures which are currently being protected by sandbag and earthen berms to a level of approximately 1009 feet MSL. The intake structure is currently protected to a level of approximately 1007.5 feet, and with additional actions, can be protected to a level of 1014. The ISFSI is built at a level of 1009 feet, no additional protective measures have been taken at this time.Additional berms and sandbags have been installed around the Training Center, Administration Building and the South Security Building.
These are intended to protect facilities important to site staff, the simulator and communications equipment.
The licensee has completed installation of additional Aqua Berms for some of these facilities and is working to complete protective measures for all three buildings.
The licensee has installed additional overhead power lines to these facilities as a backup to underground power supplies.
The licensee has erected additional protective "walls" around transformers to protect them from water.Some water intrusion and leakage under the Aqua Berm has been noted in areas where the ground surface is not level and in areas where there are conduits and storm drains. The licensee is managing the leakage using portable dewatering pumps.All offsite power sources (161 KV and 345 KV) are available and both primary EDGs are operable and available.
The licensee is staging two additional fuel oil tanks within the Aqua Berm. These tanks will provide an additional two weeks of fuel (the fuel tanks presently onsite have a two week fuel capacity, resulting in a four week supply of fuel). The licensee is developing plans to replenish fuel oil if there is an anticipated need to run the EDGs greater than a four week period of time. ()4()7(F!b):(4).(b)(7)(F)
I~e licensee is also evaluating a process tor refueling the tanks through the tank vents. e icensee also plans to stage an additional spare generator with an associated fuel tank and step-up transformer within the Aqua Berm.The licensee is staging additional equipment and supplies within the Aqua Berm including dewatering pumps, sandbagging equipment and supplies, gasoline supplies, food and water.The licensee has procured satellite phones which have been distributed to key staff as backup communication devices.The licensee has ordered six boats for use onsite, if needed, since parking areas are alre.ady under water. Offsite parking arrangements are in place for site staff, and the staff will be shuttled to and from the plant. The licensee is working with the National Guard to arrange for additional backup transportation provisions.
...... +R~~t; USEONL--SMSTWENTRNL.+FORM~..
--
O-GFICIAL USU XLY -SENSFRWE.Jt'TERNAL 1-8-FffleATI3.The licensee's procedures and Emergency Plan call for the declaration of a NOUE at 1004 feet MSL. At 0800 CDT on June 6, the licensee declared a NOUE, in advance of the river level reaching 1004 feet MSL. The licensee's Emergency Plan would not call for an Alert declaration until the river level reaches 1009 feet MSL. A response mode decision making conference call was held following the NOUE declaration with Region IV, NRR and NSIR managers present.The agency currently remains in NORMAL mode. This response mode decision will be re-visited if river levels approach 1006 feet MSL or if the licensee's protective actions are challenged or fail and systems are at risk of flooding.The licensee is presently managing onsite activities through an Incident Command System structure using a model included in the OPPD Pandemic Plan as a template.
At the current time, the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is not expected to be challenged by flooding.
The Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center are located within the Aqua Berm.Potential Impact on Evacuation Routes and Sirens: Currently, there are no impacts on major evacuation routes. The licensee has indicated that a small section of Route 75 to the north of the town of Fort Calhoun (the actual river level at which this would occur is being researched at this time) may become impacted by rising water. The residents of Fort Calhoun have evacuation routes to the west and south that are expected to remain available.
Evacuation routes for the town of Blair and other communities to the north are expected to remain available to the north and west. Some areas of Interstate 29 and Interstate 680 have been closed with detours established by the state. A portion of this section of highway runs along the southeast border of the emergency planning zone, but the proposed detours would be accessible.
Power was removed from sirens 257 and 260 in Pottawattamie County, Iowa, which is just on the edge of the emergency planning zone to the southeast of the plant. Sirens 75 and 76 in the Desoto National Wildlife Refuge have no power, but the Refuge is currently closed due to flooding.
Siren 142 in Harrison County, -9.5 miles from the plant, is also without power. Siren 1, east of Fort Calhoun, is without power but the area is closed due to flooding.Outside of Scope/NRC Re-aion IV Region IV staff continues to monitor the flooding conditions along the Missouri River and the potential impacts on Region IV plants and materials licensees located along the river. Region Orr~I,~ L.~E I~lL ~C4tIIV MA- t~~ANfeRMAT40bl
-SENSWT.YE INTERNALFi RNtIrION.
-'.IV is monitoring potential impacts on evacuation routes and is coordinating with the power plant licensees, states and FEMA. Region IV has coordinated with the National Weather Service (NWS) and USACE to confirm projected river levels.Region IV has augmented the resident inspector staff to provide 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> coverage at Fort Calhoun Station. Region IV is conducting daily conference calls with Fort Calhoun Station managers to monitor the licensee's preparations and potential impacts on the plant. Region IV has conducted an initial coordination call with FEMA Region VII and plans to establish coordination calls with FEMA Region VII, states and local response organizations next week.A conference call will be conducted later today with the states, FEMA Region VII, Cooper Nuclear Station, Fort Calhoun Station, the NWS and USACE to review weather and river level predictions.
USACE is expected to update the stakeholders on any changes to predicted river crest and results of their validations of river flow, breadth of the river and how these might impact the current river level predictions.
NSIR has coordinated with FEMA Headquarters to ensure that they are aware of the potential impacts from river flooding at Fort Calhoun Station and Cooper Nuclear Station.--OI"0AI:IJSt-ONL-Y
-'SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION~
Robles, Jesse From: Haskell, Russell (Sent: Friday, June 17, 2011 2:26 PM
Subject:
IOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Friday, June 17, 2011 Follow Up Flag: Follow up Flag Status: Completed NOTE: THIS SUMMAR.'**MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETA3,X-c1R NRC INTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION***
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OJJT SDE OF NRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): None OpE Forum Postings (COMMS): None Management Requests:
None Follow-uplOther Tasks: Three (3)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help IOEB staff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff.]1) EN 46965 -FORT CALHOUN -ADDITIONAL PENETRATION IDENTIFIED FOR MITIGATION DURING WALKDOWN (Additional Information)
Penetration of concern was due to the (motor-driven) 1A Fire Pump pressure relief discharge line traveling up through Intake structure which houses the Raw Water pumps. Penetration has been sealed. Residents following up. Forward to TRG Leads for Flood Protection/Missiles, SSW/UHX. Fire Protection:
assiQned to Russ Haskell.*1 Outside of Scope/Attendees at Screening Meeting: Russ Haskell Dave Garmon Adakou Foli John Thompson Joe Giantelli Mary Wegner (RES) -phone Ryan Craffey (NRO).4,-.3 Azua, Ray From: Sent: To: Cc:
Subject:
Attachments:
Clark, Jeff Friday, June 17,2011 7:51 AM Kennedy, Kriss; Howell, Linda Azua, Ray FYI: Briefing/Talking Points for FCS Talking Points 6-17-1 1,doc Kriss/Linda, Attached are the updated briefing notes from Sunday, and the talking points I used yesterday for the NSIR brief. The only "iffy' item is the licensee's priorities for today: this comes from our notes from yesterday.
We get updated an this about 9:00 am. I will send you another e-mail when we get that info.Jeff Briefing Notes from (Sun) 6/12/2011
{updated for 6/17(2011)(changes noted in RED)1. River level and forecast for river crest -RCB 2. Plant conditions (b)(4),(b)(7)(F)
- 3. Licensee priorities
- 1) Monitoring of flood barriers and pumps, 2) complete temp modifications for alternate power to various loads, 3) forensics of the 1 B4A bus, followed by RCA and extent of cause 4) exploring alternate sources of water in case Blair city water is lost (installing reverse osmosis water treatment equipment).
- 4. NRC concerns Uo R9~ euiai aonrge, SO a@8u Ram 0 iuR a 6iOR r EOFio +9 AVi :'o)-, 19 (COMProccor Aree) and 20 (ElectricAl PorotAtion-86 RcomR Bacamont), lookogo post the Wakeft cwtructur roll up door, 9W8ct!one regarding f19ood99t06 to e6WKthgoar rcOAm, mobility around Gito for omorgonray rocponco, and corptinuod Continued operation of 1B4 electrical equipment until cause and extent of condition fully known; operation of barriers and pumping stations against in leakage; industrial and personal safety.5. Impacts on evacuation routes or ERO activation No changes. 1-680 between exit 1 in Nebraska to 1-29 in Iowa, and 1-29 between exits 55 and 71 in Iowa. This impacts the posted evacuation routes. Detour signs are in place.6. Update on cause of electrical fault on June 7 and repair activities Sargent & Lundy came in Friday to begin an investigation.
However, the licensee and they determined they could not perform an adequate analysis.
The licensee contracted ESI (same company that did FMEA for the RPS M2 contactor).
They were onsite Wednesday.
They indicated they would likely need to bring in an expert from St. Louis. The licensee still has not determined the cause of the loss of the 1 B3A bus. The licensee provided a list of the other Square D breakers that were installed (new) in 2009. Both the 1 B4A breaker (faultedtfire) and the 1 B3A breaker that had improper operation were among these replacements.
The licensee also reported that operators smelled an acrid odor in the West Switchgear Room for the two days prior to the fault/fire.
Other notes: There is a pretty elaborate walkway between the training and admin buildings-They have provided a walkway to the "king tut" barriers so it is dry from the bus drop off to the security building.
The understanding with the boats is that they are for emergency use only. This appears wise as there are quite strong flow currents developing.
Briefing Notes from (Thu) 6116/2011 (Questions from NSIR, responses noted in RED)1. What is the design basis elevation for flooding at Ft. Calhoun Station?The DB level is 1014 feet MSL. Nuclear safety is maintained below 1014 feet, although certain plant equipment, such as non-safety equipment and offsite power would be lost at lower levels (offsite power likely to be lost at about 1009 feet). Aquadam in protected area is not Installed for nuclear safety, but for"economic" reasons (protect licensee property).
- 2. Has the licensee considered a "what if' scenario?Yes. The licensee is considering things they can do beyond design basis. If they can still supply power (i.e. vital busses not lost, or power can be supplied directly to equipment) the extra 1500 kw diesel onsite can provide when EDGs lost.Ultimate defense is supplying water inventory to both the reactor vessel and the SFP. The licensee is currently reviewing alternate paths to gain access to the containment (at 1011 they would begin impacting normal access through the auxiliary building) for this operation.
Access to the SFP is not a problem as access points are available at higher levels. Inventory methods would use B.5.b pumps.3. What happens if river level were near the top of Aquadam, then it was breached or failed?As stated in #2, the Aquadam is not installed to ensure nuclear safety. It would make things a lot easier onsite if it remained intact (to 1009 or 1010), but other features, such as the floodgates installed in the intake and auxiliary building doorways, are designed to protect to 1014 feet.4. If the entire site were flooded, no AC power, how much time would they have to restore before boiling occurred in the reactor cavity and the SFP?(b)(4).(b)(7)(F)
- 5. How would FCS gain access to the containment and SFP buildings to add water?What pumps and what water sources?(b)(4).As discussed in #2. access to the SFP does not aear to be a oroblemb IW7)I 7K ( )(4),(b)(7)(F)
.
Additional questions were asked regarding security.
Mike Hay briefed that a security inspector was onsite last week and reviewed the licensee's problems, challenges, and compensatory measures.
He stated we did not have any current concerns.Scott Morris asked if there were any other problems we had not discussed.
I mentioned the difficulty getting around site, the personal safety hazards, and the increased monitoring required.
I stated (as you and I discussed) the licensee is continually monitoring these things. They have taken additional steps to have additional people staged, modify entryways, and conduct safety briefings.
Azua, Ray From: Clark, Jeff Sent: Saturday, June 18, 2011 7:39 AM To: Kennedy, Kriss; Howell, Linda Cc: Azua, Ray
Subject:
FW: Daily event status at Fort Calhoun FYI---Original Message----
From: BERCK, ALLEN [mailto:aberckQoppd.com1 Sent: Saturday, June 18, 2011 7:10 AM To: Bill Pook; Dan; Eric Plautz; Clark, Jeff, Jeff Theulen; Jon Schwarz; Kirkland, John; Larry Oliver; Laurel Ryan; Paul Johnson; Whitney Shipley; 'Rasmusson, Melanie';
pott.ema(cDoottcounty.com Cc: GEBERS, STEVEN W; DEANGELIS, PETER A; HANKINS, RHONDA R; MOELLER, CHRISTOPHER J;RELLER, MARK H; SILKE, DEENA L; BERCK, ALLEN
Subject:
Daily event status at Fort Calhoun Fort Calhoun Flooding Status (changes from yesterday's report are in bold)1. Reactor Status: Shutdown 2. Reactor is covered with > 23-ft of cooling water 3. Offsite power and Emergency Diesel Generators are available.
Both vital buses are energized at this time.4. Spent Fuel Pooling cooling is in service and protected.
- 5. Shutdown cooling is in service and protected 6. Current river level is 1005' 8" -a rise of 2" in the last 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.7. Current Blair gauge level is 31.8 ft. Although no appreciable rise is forecasted (by the NWS/USACE) within the next 5 days, river conditions continue to change and rain is forecasted in the watershed area. Additionally, heavy rain was received in the area over night. The USACE also advised us that we should be prepared for a 3-6 inch rise in river level over the next week. We are continuously monitoring river conditions.
- 8. The site has implemented procedures to protect power supplies and vital equipment.
Water is onsite, and flood barriers are protecting vital equipment.
- 9. No release of radioactivity has occurred.10. Fort Calhoun has declared a Notification of Unusual Event at 08:00 6/6/11.11. Backup evacuation route onsite is inundated however the primary route onsite is passable and not expected to be affected.
- 12. Power was removed from siren 257 and 260 in Pottawattamie Co. IA, which is just on the edge of the 10-mile EPZ south east of the plant. Siren 75, 76 in Desoto National Wildlife Refuge have no power. Currently the refuge is closed due to flooding.
Siren 142 in Harrison Co. has no power which is north of Loveland IA -9.5 miles from the plant. Siren 1 east of Fort Calhoun on county road 34 between Fort Calhoun and Boyer Chute Recreational Area is without power. This area is closed due to flooding.13. At this time no known-major evacuation routes are affected without contingency actions planned. Interstate 29 in both directions:
from Exit 55 North 25th Street to Exit 75 (Missouri Valley): 1-680 road closed to traffic because of flooding -- follow the detour signs for the evacuation route to Bellevue.
Interstate 680 in both directions:
from before Exit 1 130th Street to Exit 62: 1-29; Old Mormon Bridge Road -- road closed because of flooding.
All in Pottawattamie Co, IA.14. On 6/14, Washington County issued evacuation to approximately 75 residents northeast of Blair east of county road 33 to the Burt County line.Requested Information from states and counties: 1. When offsite evaluation routes are affected please contact emergency planning.2. When the Blair Water plant is affected please contact emergency planning.3. Authorized power outages that affect or could affect siren operability, please contact emergency planning.The river flow rate and level have been relatively constant at Blair NE. The Corp of Engineers is releasing Gavin's Point dam at 150,000 cubic feet per second (cfs).Emergency Planning Contacts at FCS: Steve Gebers: PageJ(b)(6) e.<'<Work Phone: 402-533-7308 Cell Phone (b)(6)Allen Berck-Pager: b)(6) e Work P`one: 402-63 628 Cell phone:[b)(6)
'Allen D. Berck Supervisor
-Emergency Planning Fort Calhoun Station Omaha Public Power District phone: 402-533-6064 pager: 1 , email: aberck a.oppd.com This e-mail contains Omaha Public Power District's confidential and proprietary information and is for use only by the intended recipient.
Unless explicitly stated otherwise, this e-mail is not a contract offer, amendment, nor acceptance.
If you are not the intended recipient you are notified that disclosing, copying, distributing or taking any action in reliance on the contents of this information is strictly prohibited.
2 Robles, Jesse From: King, Mark ( (/ " Sent: Tuesday, June '1, 2011 2:25 PM
Subject:
lOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Tuesday, June 21, 2011 NOTE: THIS
SUMMARY
IS*"*MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR ýNTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION**'
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSID NRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION F ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): None OpE Forum Postings (COMMS): None Management Requests:
None Follow-uplOther Tasks: Thirteen (13)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help lOEB staff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff]Outside of Scope 0 V LJ--~
Outside of Scope 3) PNO-IV-11-003A
-FORT CALHOUN -PNO-IV-11-003A
-(UPDATE) FORT CALHOUN STATION DECLARATION OF A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO HIGH RIVER LEVEL See PNO text: Forward to TRQ Leads for Flood Protection/Missiles (Edward Smith), EP (Eric Schrader);
assianed to Russ Haakell.
QUTh~G $'
D ripr6 bW -5 Pe Outside of Scope OL-rjP6 OF SCOPEAl ....uuisiae of Scope Attendees at Screening Meeting: Russ Haskell Bob Bernardo Adakou Foil Mark King Mary Wegner (RES) -by phone Al Issa -(NRO)5 Azua, Ray From: Clark, Jeff Sent: Tuesday, June 21, 2011 8:59 AM To: Kennedy, Kriss; Howell, Linda Cc: Azua, Ray; Alexander, Ryan; Alferink, Beth; Kirkland, John
Subject:
FYI: Daily Update -FCS Flooding <6/21>Kriss/Linda, Current river level is 1006 feet 1 inch. The area had severe thunderstorms last night, and was in a tornado watch. No appreciable damage to the site. Big Bend Reservoir received over 5 inches of rain last night.Licensee continues to monitor flooding and in leakage. They are bringing in several experts for the switchyard berm and the PA Aquadam, regarding undercutting and sand boils.The licensee received 15 new pumps (various sizes) for pumping stations.
They are doing some thinking ahead and staging pumps at higher elevations in the event of Aquadam failure.John and I had a meeting with Tim Nellenbach (Plant Mgr) and Susan Baughn (Licensing Mgr) yesterday afternoon regarding communications.
This was at their request. They felt the observations and discussions we were having with FCS staff (such as incident commander, pumping crews, and operators) was not filtering up to them. Tim indicated there were examples (e.g. the boat accidents and tornado missiles) where he was finding out about our issues some time after the fact. I believe this is indicative of their interior communications.
John and I plan to meet briefly with them each weekday afternoon to go over the items we have raised to their staff. T-. "7-(b)(4),(b)(7)(F)
Licensee priorities:
maintain flooding protection by pumping and walkdowns; get experts in for erosion and sand boil reviews; extend elevated walkways; pour additional aqua-blocks in switchyard to reduce in leakag Jeff V., 1i Robles, Jesse From: King, Mark Sent: Wednesday, June 22, 2011 2:10 PM
Subject:
1OEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Wednesday, June 22, 2011 NOTE: THIS
SUMMARY
IS-*MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY 0O C INTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION**
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSID NRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION F ORIGINATOR" Issues for Resolution (IFR): None OpE Forum Postings (COMMS): None Management Requests:
None Follow-up/Other Tasks: Seven (7)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help IlEB staff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff.]Outside of Scope 3) FORT CALHOUN -PROJECTED RISE IN MISSOURI RIVER LEVELS OVER NEXT TWO WEEKS (UPDATE)***6/22/2011***
The river level at Fort Calhoun Station is currently 1006 ft 5 inches (6/22); FCS remains in a NOUE due to flooding.
The Army Corps of Engineers has communicated its intent to increase the release rate of the upstream Gavin's Point dam to 160k cubic-feet/sec (currently 150K cfs). This move is due to recent rain activity in the Northern Missouri River basin. Increases are expected to be in place by Thursday (6/23).Increases in release rates typically influence site river levels within 2 days. FCS river levels are anticipated to rise over the next several days due to these events. Forward update to TRG Leads for Flood Protection/Missiles (Edward Smith), EP (Eric Schrader):
assigned to Russ Haskell.2 0jiI3';D OP~ SCOP/Attendees at Screening Meeting: Russ Haskell Bob Bernardo Adakou Foli Mark King Jesse Robles Mary Wegner (RES) -by phone Al Issa -(NRO)3 Robles, Jesse A1 From: Sent:
Subject:
Haskell, Russell t\% ') t .Monday, June 27, 2011 3:26 PM lOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Monday, June 27, 2011 NOTE: THIS
SUMMARY
IS --MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR NRC-INTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION...
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE.GF`FRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION
!eRORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): None OpE Forum Postings (COMMS): None Management Requests:
None Follow-up/Other Tasks: Twelve (12)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help lOEB staff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff,]I Outside of Scope 12) PNO-IV-I 1-003B (UPDATE) -FORT CALHOUN -Fort Calhoun Station Declaration of a Notification of Unusual Event Due to High River Level See PNO text (ML1 11770003).
Forward update to TRG Leads for Flood Protection/Mis§iles (Edward Smith), EP (Eric Schrader):
assiqned to Russ Haskell.New Reactors Items: None Research (RES) Items; None Clrrslw o scop eO Outside of Scope Attendees at Screening Meeting: Russ Haskell Dave Garmon Adakou Foli John Thompson Joe Giantelli Mary Wegner (RES) -phone Ryan Craffey (NRO)3 Robles, Jesse From: Haskell, Russell Sent: Tuesday, June 2A, 2011 3"12 PM.To: Smith, Edward; Schrader, Eric
Subject:
iOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Tuesday, June 28, 2011 NOTE: THIS
SUMMARY
IS-OFF-C1 AL USEONLY***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR11RC INTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION'*
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE`OF NRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FR6M ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): None OpE Forum Postings (COMMS): None Management Requests:
None Follow-uplOther Tasks: Two (2)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help lOEB staff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff]1) PNO-IV-11-003C
-FORT CALHOUN -PNO-IV-1 1-003C (UPDATE) -FORT CALHOUN STATION DECLARATION OF A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO HIGH RIVER LEVEL See PNO text: (ML1 11780547).
Forward update PNO to TRG Leads for Flood Protection (Edward Smith), EP (Eric Schrader):
assigned to Russ Haskell.Outside of Scope Vil O~yt5PC- OF ScOP&Outsi de of Scope Attendees at Screening Meeting: Russ Haskell Joe Giantelli Dave Garmon (phone)Jesse Robles Mary Wegner (RES) (phone)Ryan Craffey (NRO)John Thompson 2 UILý i rSEGt-Y-SENSIIWE-INThRNAL4N9FORMATION--
Missouri River Flooding Potential Impact at NRC Facilities June 28, 2011 (Updated .Information is:highlighted.
Older information that has not changed has been removed and can be reviewed-in prior reports.)Due to greater than-normal snow levels in the upper Missouri River Basin, the associated snowpack runoff and record level rainfall, the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir System is experiencing flooding challenges.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has noted that this spring's flooding will be the most severe the region has seen since the reservoir system was constructed in the 1950's and 1960's. From Gavins Point Dam near Yankton, South Dakota to Rulo, Nebraska, the Missouri is expected to reach the highest levels seen since 1952. This has prompted USACE to release record volumes of water from each of the six major dams that make up the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir System. The release rates from these dams have remained steady over the past few days at the current maximum predicted levels with some minor adjustments to balance the system. USACE has reported that these release rates are expected to continue until August and that no additional releases are planned at this time.Region IV will continue to work with USACE to assure that any updates to the USACE predictions are incorporated in this report In Nebraska, some decrease in water levels occurred from Brownsville to Kansas City along the Missouri River due to breeches in levees and outflow into flood plains.A slight chance of thunderstorms is predicted for Nebraska.A summary of potential impacts is provided below for NRC facilities located in areas that are or may be impacted by flooding.
Region IV is coordinating with Agreement States in the flood impacted areas to verify the status of materials licensees.
Outside of Scope OF'IIALUS~
Y-SN~JIyE1IE~rAL ,Nt~flMTI, OnLuOLY -SENSIIWE INTERNALiNP6RMAXT.O...., I IIII"I " Outside of Scopet NLY -SENS1TTVE INTERNAL iWRUATION
-Qýý.DNLY.--SENSRWE INTERNAMPM1071!
ON-Fort Calhoun Station Plant Elevation:
1004 feet mean sea level (MSL)Design Basis for Flooding:
1014 feet MSL Current river level: 1006 feet 5 inches MSL (-7:00 am, CDT, source is licensee measurement)
Predicted max river level: 1006 -1008 feet MSL (source is USACE)Current Plant Conditions:
The plant is shutdown with the reactor cavity flooded such that more than 23 feet of water is covering the fuel. Both shutdown cooling and spent fuel pool cooling are in service. The vital buses are being supplied by the 345 kV power source; the 161 kV power source and both diesel generators are available.
Only one 480 volt bus remains de-energized (1 B4A, the faulted bus).Fort Calhoun Station declared a Notice of Unusual Event (NOUE) on June 6 in advance of river level reaching 1004 feet MSL, The site remains in a NOUE.Potential Impacts on Plant Equipment:
The licensee is implementing its flooding procedure and is conducting enhanced monitoring of the river levels. Procedure actions to protect vital structures have been completed for river levels in excess of what is currently observed at the site.On June 26, 2011, at approximately 1:25 a.m. CDT, the 2000 foot long Aquadam that had been providing supplemental protection to structures and equipment within the power block failed as a result of site activities.
As a result, floodwaters have reached an elevation of 1006 feet 4 inches MSL around the auxiliary and containment buildings.
Those buildings are protected by design to a floodwater elevation of 1014 feet MSL. The licensee is currently focusing on controlling floodwaters to protect vital equipment and systems by placing additional sandbags and barriers where needed and pumping water to protect structures and systems where needed.The Aquadam vendor was onsite on June 26 to perform physical inspections of the deflated Aquadam. The initial assessment and vendor recommendation is that a new Aquadam be installed.
A team consisting of site personnel and vendor representatives is developing a plan for replacement of the Aquadam. A new unit has been ordered and is expected to arrive onsite on July 5. The licensee currently estimates that the new unit will be installed on orabout July'S.The majority of the switchyard is protected by an earthen berm to a level of approximately 1009-1010 feet MSL. Some equipment associated with the 161 kV offsite power is being protected by sandbags and earthen berms to a level of approximately 1009 feet MSL.OFFIGAIA USE- O*SUSTLELNrEN 4fqý cr;~ALU~l M -SENSITMV INTERNAL INFORMAION~--
'The ISFSI is built at a level of 1009 feet,MSL, no additional protective measures have been taken at this time.Aquadams have been installed around the Training Center, Administration Building and the South Security Building.
These are intended to protect facilities where site staff are working, the simulator and communications equipment.
The licensee has installed additional overhead power lines to these facilities as a backup to underground power supplies.Existing diesel fuel tanks have been topped and two additional fuel oil tanks are staged within the Aqua Berm. With the addition of these tanks, the licensee estimates there is sufficient fuel onsite to run the EDGs for approximately 17 days. The licensee is developing plans to replenish fuel oil if there is an anticipated need to run the EDGs for a greater period of time.An additional spare generator with an associated fuel tank and step-up transformer has been staged within the Aqua Berm.The licensee has procured satellite phones which have been distributed to key staff as backup communication devices.In accordance with the licensee's Emergency Plan, an Alert would be declared if the river level reaches 1009 feet MSL. At the current time, the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is not expected to be challenged by flooding.
The Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center are located within the Aqua Berm.)utside of Scope NRC Region IV Following the failure of the Aquadam, a response mode decision call was conducted early on June 26 with Region IV, NRR and NSIR. A decision was made to enter Monitoring Mode with Region IV in the lead. Region IV has activated its Incident Response Center and a response team is currently monitoring licensee activities with the onsite team of inspectors and through routine briefings with licensee managers.Region IV staff continues to monitor the flooding conditions along the Missouri River and the potential impacts on Region IV plants and materials licensees located along the river. Region IV is monitoring potential impacts on evacuation routes and is coordinating with the power plant licensees, states and FEMA. Region IV has coordinated with the National Weather Service (NWS) and USACE to confirm projected river levels._FF!IiAI I SF LY -SEN UVTI'JE.IfERNAL IFORMlA I L, E,&AL4.QNLY
-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION.Region IV will continue to provide 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> coverage with resident inspectors and supplemental inspection staff at Fort Calhoun Station.Region IV has conducted coordination calls with FEMA Region VII and the states and local response organizations.
Collectively, the stakeholders have established "triggers" which would prompt scheduling future conference calls-J',tAcalIwas, -conducted ,Wth m -etLm stakeholders this rioa..lmgRsIpticipated liN di c rence 6c spOonsaoredl b UStACE and provid.6d ah.,ud~t,.eon Sthe s do op uea S~nadFr ~ hoi Station,.-NOFUiC0L1USE ONLY- SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMA.TPON-.,4
- t~tf3SE-9NLY
-SENSITIVE INTERNAbINFORMA-TION.
Missouri River Flooding Potential Impact at NRC Facilities June 30, 2011 (Updated onri. high0lighted..
- Ofder inform.ation, thatas, 6 d al i mtha haed* 0 h ...i g .... j-g.....and ca~n b~ ~evrev ed, n prior reportS.)Due to greater than normal snow levels in the upper Missouri River Basin, the associated snowpack runoff and record level rainfall, the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir System is experiencing flooding challenges.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has noted that this spring's flooding will be the most severe the region has seen since the reservoir system was constructed in the 1950's and 1960's. From Gavins Point Dam near Yankton, South Dakota to Rule, Nebraska, the Missouri is expected to reach the highest levels seen since 1952. This has prompted USACE to release record volumes of water from each of the six major dams that make up the Missouri River Mainstem Reservoir System. The release rates from these dams have remained steady over the past few days at the current maximum predicted levels with some minor adjustments to balance the system. The release rate at Gavins Point dam remains at 160,000 cubic feet per second. USACE has reported that these release rates are expected to continue until August and that no additional increase in release rates are planned at this time.Region IV will continue to work with USACE to assure that any updates to the USACE predictions are incorporated in this report The next substantial precipitation in the Missouri River Basin is forecast for July 1, 2011.A summary of potential impacts is provided below for NRC facilities located in areas that are or may be impacted by flooding.
Region IV is coordinating with Agreement States in the flood impacted areas to verify the status of materials licensees.
Outside of Scope ,OFkG!Ab4E ONL- SFNSIIVE INTERNAL-INFORMATTO"-
-Of ICIAL USE ONLY -SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMKR-N----
[ [1 II 1I I I II I I l '" " I I l Outside of Scope.OLT'iUAL USE ONLV -SENSITIVE iii ~RiiAL ~WruKM~
OFFICI3L'MINtY
¶SEN'S5IVE-4?4NERNALNN Fort Calhoun Station Plant Elevation:
1004 feet mean sea level (MSL)Design Basis for Flooding:
1014 feet MSL Current river level: 1006 feet'Alinches MSL (-7:00 am, CDT, source is licensee measurement)
Predicted max river level: 1006 -1005 feet MSL (source is USACE)Current Plant Conditions:
The plant is shutdown with the reactor cavity flooded such that more than 23 feet of water is covering the fuel. Both shutdown cooling and spent fuel pool cooling are in service. The vital buses are being supplied by the 345 kV power source; the 161 kV power source and both diesel generators are available.
Only one 480 volt bus remains de-energized (1 B4A, the faulted bus).Fort Calhoun Station declared a Notice of Unusual Event (NOUE) on June 6 in advance of river level reaching 1004 feet MSL. The site remains in a NOUE.Potential Impacts on Plant Equipment:
The licensee is implementing its flooding procedure and is conducting enhanced monitoring of the river levels. Procedure actions to protect vital structures have been completed for river levels in excess of what is currently observed at the site.On June 26, 2011, at approximately 1:25 a.m. CDT, the 2000 foot long Aquadam that had been providing supplemental protection to structures and equipment within the power block failed as a result of site activities.
As a result, floodwaters have reached an elevation of 1006 feet 4 inches MSL around the auxiliary and containment buildings.
Those buildings are protected by design to a floodwater elevation of 1014 feet MSL. The licensee is currently focusing on controlling floodwaters to protect vital equipment and systems by placing additional sandbags and barriers where needed and pumping water to protect structures and systems where needed.The Aquadam vendor was onsite on June 26 to perform physical inspections of the deflated Aquadam. The initial assessment and vendor recommendation is that a new Aquadam be installed.
A team consisting of site personnel and vendor representatives is developing a plan for replacement of the Aquadam. A new unit has been ordered and is expected to arrive onsite on July 5, Installation of the new unit will begin next week.The majority of the switchyard is protected by an earthen berm to a level of approximately 1009-1010 feet MSL. Some equipment associated with the 161 kV offsite power is being protected by sandbags and earthen berms to a level of approximately 1009 feet MSL. TheV c.pretelearrier oM .......', .., ". ; .-QFre!AL USE GWL-%SWN-RN6"tA.QL.
LIMPICIAT ITCIlllIY-SENSIT4VB4NERNAMNF The ISFSI is built at a level of 1009 feet,MSL, no additional protective measures have been taken at this time.The failure oItfhhe Apua:m resuItedin loss d rd e {W cooing ser servi.ng the~ ~ ~~p. swthga room. The Ii.enspie hacooI' ~ugt add onal unftsto-assureadequate
". cd *o felebtfiCa
'ý o Unii" °- '010supphesAtorear.b1h systems.Aquadams have been installed around the Training Center, Administration Building and the South Security Building.
These are intended to protect facilities where site staff are working, the simulator and communications equipment.
The licensee has installed additional overhead power lines to these facilities as a backup to underground power supplies.Existing diesel fuel tanks have been topped and two additional fuel oil tanks are staged within the Aqua Berm. With the addition of these tanks, the licensee estimates there is sufficient fuel onsite to run the EDGs for approximately 17 days. The license' "ontinues to sample fuel and monitor for water content because- bth existjng'fuel tanks are ýnderground and extensions have been added to fillin-gconnectors to ke6p them abovew. "wr. The licensee is developing plans to replenish fuel oil if there is an anticipated need to run the EDGs for a greater period of time. An additional spare generator with an associated fuel tank and step-up transformer has been staged within the Aqua Berm.In accordance with the licensee's Emergency Plan, an Alert would be declared if the river level reaches 1009 feet MSL. At the current time, the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is not expected to be challenged by flooding.
The Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center are located within the Aqua Berm.Outside of Scope NRC Region IV Following the failureo..f.the.Aquadam, .on June.26,a decision wasý made.to enter the Monitoring Mod.e of the agency Plan ,with ,.Region IV in V At 1.:501 (CDT) on Ju. e 201, .theiNl r .etpredi ,to Normal Mode and deacthato d the Region IV Incident Repn~:Cetr~I'heis sbqodn6. ddtioris are S Are..being a~~ed -n~t~~qb W00qLff VIA' Pimes'bnh "Itob fptv pr~t~ting'pt~f st~tties.
ysti np0en p.nI ýM, iVcniRw~ rht, h--IFICIAI "SE ONLY -SENSITIVE 4TERNAL INFORMAQN-t..
"FrlaMi UWIrQNLY -SENS94VE INTERNALANFORMATION licensee's response and the plant with additional inspectors at the sitewho.areproviding round-the-clock .coverage.
Region IV staff continues to monitor the flooding conditions along the Missouri River and the potential impacts on Region IV plants and materials licensees located along the river. Region IV is monitoring potential impacts on evacuation routes and is coordinating with the power plant licensees, states and FEMA. Region IV has coordinated with the National Weather Service (NWS) and is participating daily in USACE conference briefings to confirm projected river levels.Region IV has conducted coordination calls with FEMA Region VII and the states and local response organizations.
Collectively, the stakeholders have established "triggers" which would prompt scheduling future conference calls'-9EtL UU_ SNLY SfNSFTq'E INTE*RN~LIIr4F RMAT:oN r Robles, Jesse From: Giantelli, Joseph 1I Sent: Friday, July 01, 2011 2:42 PM
Subject:
IOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Friday, July 01, 2011 NOTE: THIS
SUMMARY
I Y.***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR NRC I AL USE ONLY INFORMATION'*
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE OF ITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM GINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): None OpE Forum Postings (COMMS): None Management Requests:
None Follow-up/Other Tasks: Five (5)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help lOEB staff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff]3) PNO-IV-1 I -003D -FORT CALHOUN -PNO-IV-1 1 -003D (UPDATE) -FORT CALHOUN STATION DECLARATION OF A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO HIGH RIVER LEVEL See PNO text: PNO-IV-11-003D (ML111810950)
Forward to TRG Leads for Flood Prot ection (Edward Smith): EP (Eric Schrader).
assigned to Russ Haskell.
J. .errISiAL USE ONL'Y SE~fISHTW1 RELAED WIRMr-fl1A:16I UNITED STATE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 612 EAST LAMAR BLVD. SUITE 400 ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4125 July 1, 2011 7;z-, ML111822555
MEMORANDUM TO: THRU: FROM: Elmo E. Collins Regional Administrator Anton Ve9el, Director Division of Reactor Safety David P. Loveless Senior Reactor Analyst IRN FlWA
SUBJECT:
PROPOSED ADEQUATE PROTECTION BACKFIT EXCEPTION O~~~flCIAL~~~
AJEOL f-11I~I M~AE IfRAL WM
, OFFICIAL USE ONLY -SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION PROPOSED ADEQUATE PROTECTION BACKFIT EXCEPTION AT FORT CALHOUN Requlatorv Authority 10 CFR 50.109, Backfitting," describes the methods available to the Commission to require that licensees modify or add structures, components, or design of a facility.
Section (a)(4)(ii) states that a backfit analysis is not required where the staff finds and declares with an appropriately documented evaluation, that regulatory action is necessary to ensure that the facility provides adequate protection to the health and safety of the public.Management Directive 8.4, 'Management of Facility-Specific Backfitting and Information Collection, states that the Regional Administrator has the authority to develop, update and maintain the backtit procedures and administrative controls for nuclear power plants.PG 0901.6, 'Facility-Specific Backfit and Information Collection Procedure," states that NRC staff positions may be Identified as potential backfits by the staff. When the staff invokes a backfit exception, the RA must provide a documented evaluation that Includes a statement of the objectives, reasons for the modification, and the basis for the backfit exception.
Additionally, 10 CFR 50.54(f) permits the Commission to request a licensee submit under oath or affirmation, to enable the Commission to determine whether or not the license should be modified, suspended, or revoked. If this information is not sought to verify licensee compliance with the current licensing basis for that facility, the NRC must prepare the reason for each information request.(b)(4),(b)(5),(b)(7)(F) Enclosure 1
OFIC. 1i -SONLY -SEGMRITY-RELATED.INFORMATION orrIGAl- U66 ONLY- REUN;*T R66%TMoNRrMATION.'
[ b)(4). (b) (5), (b)(7)(F)*L.
OF-ICI49ft WUL 1 MV S3eMMURI 1 RAEbWE M~FORMPMO (b)(4),Cb)(6),(b)(7)(F) Enclosure 1
(b) (4). (b)(5). (b) (7)(F)
-OFrIMAHWIu ora'W SEcUnRFRAERML1D F~OPSATRON (b)(4),(b)(5),(b)(7)(F)
O0FF -ALUSE-OWtr-SECOURflY-REIATLI INPDftNTIOF4--
-I.-Enclosure 2.... m m UFIlUAL U.L W4L~ ~IXLJJII7 IILLATL13 tT~FUflMATIU!~
-OFFICIALUSE ONLY -SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION-
-....(b)(4),(b)(5),(b)(7)(F)
I I£GAAJ~i.'ONLY
-SECUtRifY-=RftATED-INFORMATION al 111-NOIIWWI IJIi&w.z~~I-L f~~- i -~nI.I.In
..,OFFI~Itf.USE ONLY -SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION 0 U,, I.I I.--1-OFFIC"IL U.E 'tY"-SEeURITY-RELATED INFORMATION
-
Robles, Jesse From: Sent:
Subject:
Bernardo, Robert ý I1'Wednesday, July 27, 2011 2:25 PM lOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Wednesday, July 27, 2011 NOTE: THIS
SUMMARY
IS OFFICIAL- -ONLX-***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR NRC INRNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION***
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE OF WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM GINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): None OpE Forum Postings (COMMS): None Management Requests:
None Follow-up/Other Tasks: Seven (7)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help lOEB staff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff.]Outside of Scope V7 3) PNO.IV-1 1-003E -(UPDATE) FORT CALHOUN STATION DECLARATION OF A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO HIGH RIVER LEVEL See PNO Text. Based on an assessment that conditions in and around the facility have remained stable, the NRC has made the decision to suspend the augmented 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a-day coverage at the plant beginning on July 30, 2011. The resident inspectors will continue to provide 7 day coverage onsite. Forward to TRG Leads for Flood Protection (Ed Smith) and EP (Eric Schrader).
Assigned to Rebecca Siomon.I Outside of Scope 2
/Outside of Scope Attendees at Screening Meeting: Bob Bernardo /Rebecca Sigmon Steve Pannier John Thompson Ryan Craffey (NRO)Chris Lamb (NSIR)Mary Wegner (RES) -by phone/3 Robles, Jesse From: King, Mark 1i)(/ tL Sent: Tuesday, August 23, 2011 2:01 PM
Subject:
IQEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Tuesday, August 23, 2011 NOTE: THIS
SUMMARY
IS OFfIC .Y***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR RNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION"**
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE O.tiRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM.ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): None OpE Forum Postings (COMMS): None Management Requests:
None Follow-uplOther Tasks: Three (3)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary Is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help lOEB staff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff.]tside of Scope 2) EN 46893 -FORT CALHOUN -POTENTIAL FLOODING PATH DISCOVERED (RETRACTED)
See EN text: (8/2212011; 1142 EDT) Following additional review of the reported condition, it has been determined that the Raw Water pumps are adequately protected during flooding conditions and that the open penetrations would not impact the ability of the Raw Water pumps to perform their design accident mitigation functions.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Haire). Forward retraction to TRG Leads for Flood Protection/Missiles (Edward Smith), SSW/UHS (Gerard Purciarello):
assigned to Russ Haskell.
CKMID6 4)F aC4Lk5 Outside of Scope I 1) EN 46893 -FORT CALHOUN -POTENTIAL FLOODING PATH DISCOVERED (RETRACTED) uutside of scope Attendees at Screening Meeting: Bob Bernardo Jesse Robles Mark King Russ Haskell Ryan Craffey (NRO)Mary Wegner (RES) -by phone 2 Robles, Jesse From: King, Mark Sent: Tuesday, August 30, 2011 3:16 PM
Subject:
IOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Tuesday, August 30, 2011 NOTE: THIS
SUMMARY
IS OFFIC1A'Lq
- MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR NRC IJERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION-DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE OF N ITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM5R1GINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): None OpE Forum Postings (COMMS): None -[Note: NRO COMM assignments are provided in the link listed in the New Reactor Items section]Management Requests:
None Follow-up/Other Tasks: Four (4)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help IOEB staff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff.]1) EN 46929 -FORT CALHOUN -UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO RIVER LEVEL (NOUE TERMINATED)
See EN Text. Send to TRG Leads for EP (Eric Schrader) and Missiles/Flood Protection (Ed Smith). Assigned to Russ Haskell.I oLmT5II'c OFz 2) EN 46929 -FORT CALHOUN -UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO RIVER LEVEL (NOUE TERMINATED)
- 3) EN 47202 -FORT CALHOUN -TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER UNAVAILABLE FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE (COMPENSATORY ACTIONS IN PLACE)Outside of ScopelAttendees at Screening Meeting: Mark King Bob Bernardo Russ Haskell Steve Pannier Larry Criscione (RES)Ryan Craffey (NRO)Al Issa (NRO)Doug Copeland (NRO)Bob Beall (NRO)2
,b6r(--<,Pr aF --q--ee6F'Jay Patel (NRO)Dave Harmon (R-II/DCI/CIB3)
-by phone Jonathan Kent (R-II/DCP/CPB4)
-by phone Denise Edwards (R-II/DCP/CPBI)
-by phone Chelsea Smith-Standberry (R-II/DCI/CIB1)
-by phone 3 Robles, Jesse From: Sent:
Subject:
K~ing, Mark ýýv Wednesday, August 31, 2011 2:01 PM 1OEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Wednesday, August 31, 2011 NOTE: THIS
SUMMARY
IS QFFICIAL USF Ht -*`*MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVEI PROPRIETARY OR N USE ONLY INFORMATION***
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSID J3P1FRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION F ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): None OpE Forum Postings (COMMS): None Management Requests:
None Follow-up/Other Tasks: Seven (7)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help lOEB staff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff.]4) PNO-IV-11-003F-FORT CALHOUN -PNO-IV-11-003F -DECLARATION OF A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT -(UPDATE)See PNO text: Forward to TRG Leads for Flood Protection (Ed Smith) and EP (Eric Schrader).
Assigned to Russ Haskell.I comieas: r 'c-pc 2 4OT;fr 4-P F c Outside of ScoOe Attendees at Screening Meeting: Mark King Bob Bernardo Russ Haskell Steve Pannier Larry Criscione (RES) -by phone Ryan Craffey (NRO)3 Al II, A;l 16l From: Mizuno, Geary Sent: Monday, September 26, 2011 4:37 PM To: Albert, Michelle; Benowitz, Howard
Subject:
RE: LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx (b)(5)GearyFrom. Albert, Michelle Sent: Monday, September 26, 2011 2:49 PM To: Mizuno, Geary; Benowitz, Howard
Subject:
FW: LOVELESS Dam Backflt.docx 1 ~ I ~a-J FYI -This is the technical document that prompted the creation of the backfit panel regarding Fort Calhoun.From: Blount, Tom Sent: Monday, September 26, 2011 2:45 PM To: Albert, Michelle Cc: Loveless, David ' : -k-
Subject:
FW: LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx Michelle -As requested....
Tom B.From: Mehrhoff, Vivian Sent: Monday, September 26, 2011 1:42 PM To: Blount, Tom
Subject:
LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx V/I A9
.:Albert, Michelle From: Sent: "r^% -Mizuno, Geary 06c Monday, September 26, 2011 4:37 PM Alhf~rt RP~nnwit7
Subject:
RE: LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx (b)(5)Geary Ilk Cleo, From: Albert, Michelle 2k Sent: Monday, September 26, 2011 2:49 PM To: Mizuno, Geary- Benowitz, Howard
Subject:
FW: LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx J FYI -This is the technical document that prompted the creation of the backfit panel regarding Fort Calhoun.From: Blount, Tom Sent: Monday, September 26, 2011 2:45 PM To: Albert, Michelle Cc: Loveless, David
Subject:
FW: LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx Michelle -As requested....
Tom B.817-860-8146 From: Mehrhoff, Vivian Sent: Monday, September 26, 2011 1:42 PM To: Blount, Tom
Subject:
LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx y/
i4bert Michelle ,'-,f F., Outside of Scope ATTORNEY-CLIENTIAT'ORNEY WORK-PRODUCT DOCUMENT -NOT FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
- From: Harrison, Deborah Sent: Friday, September 23, 2011 6:25 PM To: Jones, Bradley
Subject:
Dam Backfit Panel Charter Letter for Your Concurrence This is an updated letter for you to concur on for Mr. Tom Biount and he asked that you provide your concurrence by next Wednesday, September 28, 2011. Thank you.
-Albert, Michelle 4 From: Sent: To: Cc:
Subject:
.Attachments:
Blount, Tom'V-\'Monday, September 26, 2011 2:45 PM Albert, Michelle Loveless, David FW: LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx Michelle -As requested....
Tom R.I(b)(6) , From: Mehrhoff, Vivian~....................
Sent: Monday, September 26, 2011 1:42 PM To: Blount, Tom
Subject:
LOVELESS Dam Backfit.docx 1
, ,ert, Michelle From: To: Cc:
Subject:
Blount, Tom'--ls.Tuesday, September 27, 2011 4:30 PM Albert, Michelle Jones, Bradley; Biggins, James; Mizuno, Geary; Williamson, Edward; Spencer, Mary RE: RIV Ft Calhoun Backflt Panel Charter -OGC/RMR Comments Thanks Michelle -We will incorporate your comments, and coordinate with Ed's Division as you recommended.
Thanks for the quick turnaround.
Tom-ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED INFORMATION, ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT, AND/OR PREDECISIONAL INFORMATION
-DO NOT DISCLOSE WITHOUT COMMISSION APPROVAL **From: Harrison, Deborah " Sent: Friday, September 23, 2011 6:25 PM To: Jones, Bradley
Subject:
Dam Backflt Panel Charter Letter for Your Concurrence
,! 1 This is an updated letter for you to concur on for Mr. Tom Blount and he asked that you provide your concurrence by next Wednesday, September 28, 2011. Thank you.I OR Rinnina Jam~ A From: Sent To: Cc: Subject Blount Tom'rbn " Wednesday, September 28, 2011 9:10 AM Williamson, Edward Jones, Bradley; Biggins, James; Mizuno, Geary; Spencer, Mary; Albert, Michelle RE: RIV Ft. Calhoun Backfit Panel Charter -OGCIRMR Comments\/Thanks Ed....(b)(5)JOffZTaure'9Iy--Attomey-Client Privileged
/ Attorney Work Product Rule (b)(5)
(b)(6)ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED INFORMATION, ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT, AND/OR PREDECISIONAL INFORMATION
-DO NOT DISCLOSE WITHOUT COMMISSION APPROVAL f-A From: Harrison, Sent: Friday, September 23, 2011 6:25 PM ..To: Jones, Bradley
Subject:
Dam Backfit Panel Charter Letter for Your Concurrence This is an updated letter for you to concur on for Mr. Tom Blount and he asked that you provide your concurrence by next Wednesday, September 28, 2011. Thank you.2 Jones, Bradley, From: Markley, Michael Sent: Thursday, September 29, 2011 12:16 PM To: Jones, Bradley Cc: Lyon, Fred; Hall, Randy; Mizuno, Geary; Harrison, Donnie; Murphy, Martin; Khanna, Meena;Blount, Tom; Wilkins, Lynnea
Subject:
RE: Ft. Calhoun Bradley, Thank you. These insights will be very helpful as this issue/review progresses.
Mike From: ]ones, Bradley \Sent: Thursday, September 29, 2011 11:56 AM To: Markley, Michael Cc: Lyon, Fred; Hall, Randy; Mizuno, Geary; Harrison, Donnie; Murphy, Martin; Khanna, Meena; Blount, Tom
Subject:
Ft. Calhoun~-y,~Outside of Scope From: Markley, Michael Sent: Thursday, September 29, 2011 11:02 AM To: Wilkins, Lynnea Cc: Lyon, Fred; Hall, Randy; Mizuno, Geary; Harrison, Donnie; Murphy, Martin; Khanna, Meena; Blount, Tom
Subject:
FW: Ft Calhoun Upstream Dam failure Backfit Panel I vnn@.#Outside of Scope RIV is considering an adequate protection backfit for Fort Calhoun. Please see the attached.Please consult Geary Mizuno who is the OGC legal expert and Fred Lyon and Randy Hall who are the DORL subject matter experts. The cognizant technical division for this is EMCB. Please handle expeditiously.
Below is the applicable guidance.MID 8.4: http://www.intemal.
nrc.,ov/ADM/DAS/ca.q/Management Directives/rmd8.4.
pdf The NRR Office Instruction is LIC-202, http://nrrlO.nrc.qov/nrr-office/webapps/O/docs/ML092010045.pdf DORL Handbook Links: http://nrrl0.
nrc.,qov/nrr-office/DORLHandbook/Backfds.html Mike Bradley W. Jones Jones, Bradley From: Mizuno, Geary Sent: Thursday, September 29, 2011 11:48 AM To: Albert, Michelle Cc: Jones, Bradley
Subject:
FW: Ft Calhoun Upstream Dam failure Backfit Panel Attachments:
FW: LOVELESS Dam Backflt.docx; Emailing:
Dam Backfit Panel Charter.docx "0C Outside of Scope From: Markley, Michael Sent: Thursday, September 29, 2011 11:02 AM To: Wilkins, Lynneao Cc: Lyon, Fred; Hall, Randy; Mizuno, Geary; Harrison, Donnie; Murphy, Martin; Khanna, Meena; Blount, Tom
Subject:
FW: Ft Calhoun Upstream Dam failure Backfit Panel Lynnea, RIV is considering an adequate protection backfit for Fort Calhoun. Please see the attached.Please consult Geary Mizuno who is the OGC legal expert and Fred Lyon and Randy Hall who are the DORL subject matter experts. The cognizant technical division for this is EMCB. Please handle expeditiously.
Below is the applicable guidance.MD 8.4: http://www.intemal.nrc..ov/ADM/DAS/cag/Manacgement Directives/md8.4.pdf The NRR Office Instruction is LIC-202, http://nrrl0.
nrc.gov/nrr-office/webapips/0l/docs/ML092010045.pdf DORL Handbook Links: http://nrrl0.
nrc.qov/nrr-office/DORLHandbooklBackfits.
html Mike From: Blount, Tom, .Sent: Thursday, September 29, 2011 9:27 AM To- Markley, Michael; M Marti, na.in Cc: Howe, Allen; Lund, Louise; Hiland, Patrick; Loveless, David; Vegel, Anton
Subject:
Ft Calhoun Upstream Dam failure Backflt Panel Mike / Marty- we are putting together a "Backfit Panel" to consider a proposed "Adequate Protection Backfit Exception" analysis done by one of our SRA's, Dave Loveless.
We are seeking a NRR panel member. I seem to recall some discussion that Meena Khanna was on the Oconee panel (?). In any case we are seeking an NRR representative for the panel. I have included information I have at this time; hopefully this will assist in your decision making. Included is the Charter, which I am seeking your concurrence on, assuming the inclusion of your named representative.
Any questions, please call me....Thanks in advance for your support....
Tom Bfount 1D.
Smith, Chris From, Sent: To: Cc:
Subject:
Kirkland, John Wednesday, October 12, 2011 11:04 AM Clark, Jeff Wingebach, Jacob; Smith, Chris; Willoughby, Leonard; Farnhollz, Thomas Manhole Outside of Scope John Kirkland Senior Resident Inspector, Fort Calhoun Station 9610 Power Lane Blair, NE 68008 402-426-9612 402-426-9613 (fax)I
,!ir, Christopher
__, Irem: Haire, Mark Sent: Wednesday, October 12, 2011 5:33 PM To: Wilkins, Lynnea; Mensah, Tanya; Smith, Edward; LI, Yong; Uribe, Juan; Holian, Brian;Rosenberg, Stacey; Goel, Vijay; DLRCalendar Resource; Hoang, Dan; Hair. Christopher; Wilson, George; Markley, Michael; Murphy, Martin Subject SECURITY RELATED INFORMATION ATTACHED:
RE: Continuation:
Internal PRB Meeting: G20110492/G20110506
-Fort Calhoun/Cooper Petitions Re: Flooding (ME6622 & ME6681)SECURITY RELATED INFORMATION ATTACHED Thanks.On our last call I mentioned that RIV had been looking internally at the flooding danger at FCS with regard to upstream dam failures.
Attached is the Memo to the RIV RA from one of our SRA's regarding an analysis of flooding risk associated with FCS dam failure (the memo is in ADAMS, and is Security-Related Info).M FCS Proposed Adequate Protect...
SECURITY RELATED INFORMATION ATTACHED M41,f'X //114P1 From: Wilkins, Lynnea\.Sent: Wednesday, October 12, 2011 12:55 PM To: Mensah, Tanya; Smith, Edward;ULl, Yong; Uribe, Juan; Haire, Mark; Holian, Brian; Rosenberg, Stacey; Goel, Vijay;DLRCalendar Resource; Hoang, Dan; Hair, Christopher; Wilson, George; Markley, Michael; Murphy, Martin
Subject:
RE: Continuation:
Internal PRB MeeUng: G20110492/G20110506
-Fort Calhoun/Cooper Petitions Re: Flooding (ME6622 & ME6681)All, Please see the attached for tomorrow's meeting. I've update the Internal PRB notes based on our last meeting. I've also attached a "thumbnail" of Mr. Saporito's concerns as expressed in the teleconference (MLI 1256A036).
Thanks Lynnea<< File: Cooper Internal PRB Notes -G20110506.doc
>> << File: Fort Calhoun Internal PRB Notes -G20110492 .doc >><< File: Saporito Concerns From Transcript-August 29.docx >>----- Original Appointment--
From: Mensah, Tanya Sent: Friday, September 2.,, 2011 4:22 PM
-To: Mensah, Tanya; Wilkins, Lynnea; Smith, Edward; Li, Yong; Uribe, Juan; Haire, Mark; Holian, Brian; Rosenberg, Stacey; Goel, Vijay; DLRCalendar Resource; Hoang, Dan; Hair, Christopher; Wilson, George; Markley, Michael; Murphy, Martin
Subject:
Continuation:
Internal PRB Meeting: G20110492/G20110506
-Fort Calhoun/Cooper Petitions Re: Flooding (ME6622 & ME6681)When: Thursday, October 13, 2011 2:45 PM-3:30 PM (GMT-05:00)
Eastern Time (US & Canada).Where: HQ-OWFN-11B02-12p When: Thursday, October 13, 2011 2:45 PM-3:30 PM (GMT-05:00)
Eastern Time (US & Canada).Where: HQ-OWFN-11B02-12p Note: The GMT offset above does not reflect daylight saving time adjustments.
Purpose: The PRB will continue its internal discussion to make the initial recommendation to accept/reject the petition for review. Due to the schedules of the Various PRB members and advisors (i.e, training, travel, AL), the earliest time to permit PRB participation from is 10/13/11.Handouts:
Will be provided by Lynnea via separate email.Dial-In: Will Be Provided Tanya Mensah, 2.206 Coordinator 301-415-3610 2
Robles, Jesse From: Robles, Jesse Sent: Friday, October 21-l, 2011 2:D7 PM
Subject:
IOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Friday, October 21, 2011 NOTE: THIS
SUMMARY
IS OFFICIAL USE ONLY***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR NRC INTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION***
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE OF NRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM ORIGINATOR Issues for Resolution (IFR): None OpE Forum Postings (COMMS): One (1)V
- 3) EN 47359 -FORT CALHOUN -FLOOD BARRIER PENETRATIONS NOT WATER TIGHT See EN Text. Pass to TRG Lead for AFW (Stanley Gardocki) and Electrical Power lRoy Mathew). Assigned to Jesse Robles.Outside of Scope 2 OU--16OF 6Cae NOTE: H{ItS
SUMMARY
I6S OFFICIAL USE 0tEY4-.S** *VM Y C O N TAP rVitFt, ýM TA R Y 0 R N R C IN I -RN A L U 1 1 N LY ',ii N FG R M A T WN *- *DO-NOT-FORWARD ANY FORTIONS OUTSIDE or ,-C WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERM+ISION FR.M-ORIGINA-OR Attendees at Screening Meeting: Jesse Robles Eric Thomas Rebecca Sigmon Bob Bernardo (by phone)Jay Patel (NRO -by phone)Mary Wegner (RES -by phone)3 Smith, Chris From: Kirkland, John Sent: Friday, October 21, 2011 10:26 AM To: Clark, Jeff Cc: Smith, Chris; Azua, Ray
Subject:
Flood Penetrations Conduits in the affected pull boxes are supposed to have a water proof sealant in them. It was described to me as a "liquid asphalt that hardens.!
They are injected into the conduit from ports on the conduit, located a few inches from the end of the conduit. Then the end of the conduit is sealed with a more "beeswax" type material, that hardens and keeps the asphalt type material inside of the conduit.When they inspecte them before, they saw the beeswax and assumed that the entire pnetration was installed correctly.
1(b)(5)John KIrland Senior Resident Inspector, Fort Calhoun Station 9610 Power Lane Blair, NE 68008 402-426-9612 402-426-9613 (fax)I Ailbert, Michelle From: Albert, Michelle Sent: Friday, October 28, 2011 11:23 AM To: Williamson, Edward; Spencer, Mary Cc: Jones, Bradley; Biggins, James L. i
Subject:
FW: FCS Backfit Panel Attachments:
G0901-6 Facility-Specific Backfit.doc A j?1P 0iI FYI From: Albert, Michelleu'L-Sent: Friday, October 28, 2011 10:56 AM To: Jones, Bradley; Biggins, James; Mizuno, Geary; Benowitz, Howard
Subject:
FW: FCS Backfit Panel FYI From: Blount, Tom °e e -Sent: Friday, October 21, 2011 1:19 PM To: Kellar, Ray; Farnholtz, Thomas; Clark, Jeff; Albert, Michelle; Wilson, George Cc: Fuller, Karla; Mehrhoff, Vivian; Loveless, David
Subject:
FCS Backfit Panel Hello everyone -I wanted to provide an update on our efforts to put together the "Backfit Panel" for the Ft Calhoun Upstream Dam Failure Issue. You may be aware Elmo Collins (R-IV RA) authorized the Panel Charter this past week (10/19). During his review, Elmo took a more "global" perspective of other activities associated with the "Flooding" issues that the agency is currently engaged in, and had questions regarding impact/influence of other agency activities.
With the ongoing efforts regarding the Fukushima Near-Term task force and the soon to be issued Generic Issue, GI-204 for Flooding, taking action that has the potential for unintended consequences affecting a larger agency effort would not be appropriate.
After some dialogue with various folks, including Ben Beasley (RES), Dave Skeen (NRR) and George Wilson (NRR), I'm convinced we can proceed, while ensuring communications/coordination with the other programs, and I advised Elmo of the.same, which supported his decision to go forward with the panel.At this juncture I think we need an initial meeting, with the primary purpose of aligning on what our outcome will need to be, and defining a path to get there. With that in mind I will try to find a time that supports everyone's calendar. (ACTION: Vivian, please arrange conference call with phone,# and passcode).
The ADAMS accession
- for the Charter and the Dave L. analysis is: MLI 1293A 19P -Charter EML111822555fc-Analysis
'. , The link to Management Directive 8.4 "Management of Facility-specific Backfitting and Information Collection" is http://www.internal.nrc.-qov/ADM/DAS/cacq/Mana-qement Directives/md8.4.pdf I have also attached the Regional Policy Guide for Facility -Specific backfits to this e-mail for your awareness.
Thank you for your willingness to support this panel. I look forward to our productive efforts as we move this to completion.
Tom Bf1ount Dep. DRS R-JV l~b) 6 L.UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 612 EASTLAMAR BLVD, SU M 400 ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4125 PG 0901.6 -October 31, 2008 FACILITY-SPECIFIC BACKFIT AND INFORMATION COLLECTION PROCEDURE EFFECTIVE:
Immediately SUPERSEDES PG 0901.5 CONTACT: Regional Counsel DISTRIBUTION:
Standard APPROVAL: IRA/Elmo Collins, Regional Administrator REVISION:
THIS PG HAS BEEN REVISED TO REQUIRE INTERIM TRAINING UNTIL PERMANENT FORMAL TRAINING IS DEVELOPED AND TO CHANGE THE REGIONAL BACKFIT PROGRAM ASSESSMENTS FROM ANNUALLY TO TRIENNIALLY.
ALSO, THE REVISION CONTAINS MINOR EDITORIAL CHANGES AND REVISIONS ARE IN BOLD.A. Purposelbiscussion This policy guide provides guidance for implementing NRC's backfit and information collection regulations, and M.D. 8.4, Management of Facility-specific Backfldting and Information Collection, relating to power reactors and certain materials facilities.
Neither generic backfitting, nor test, research, nor training reactors are covered by this policy guide. M.D. 8.4 is the principal reference for this Regional Office Policy Guide (ROPG).
Enclosures:
Enclosures:
RIV Coordinator, DEDO (MS:16E15)
C. Carpenter, DE SUNSI Review Completed:
KDF_ ADAMS: c Yes X No Initials:
KDF_o Publicly Available o Non-Publicly Available o Sensitive 7 Non-Sensitive NAME: R: %ROPG\PG 0901.6Facil -Specifc Backfit and Information Collection Procedure.doc KDFuller WBJones ATHoweil DDChamberlain RJCaniano IRA/ IRA/ IRAJ /RA/ IRA 10/27/08 10/27108 10/28/08 10/28108 10/29/08 CACasto EECollPns/RA/ /RA/10/30108 10/31/081 OFF(CIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax PG 0901.6-2-Backfitting is the process by which NRC decides whether to impose new or revised regulatory requirements or staff positions on NRC-licensed nuclear power reactors or certain materials facilities.
Backfitting for nuclear power reactors is defined in 10 C.F.R. 50.109 as the modification of or addition to systems, structures, components, or design of a facility; or the design approval or manufacturing license for a facility; or the procedures or organization required to design, construct, or operate a facility.
Any of the aforementioned may result from a new or amended provision in the Commission rules or the imposition of a regulatory staff position interpreting the Commission rules that is either new or different from a previously applicable staff position.
The backf-tting definitions in 10 C.F.R. Parts 70, 72, and 76 are slightly different.
NRC staff positions may be identified as potential backfits either by the staff or a stakeholder (e.g., a licensee).
In the case of a licensee claimed backfit, the licensee must submit the backfit claim in writing to the Regional Administrator (RA) for disposition.
Generally, there are three types of backfits.
They are (1) compliance, (2) adequate protection'(including defining and redefining the level of adequate protection), and (3) a cost-justified substantial increase in safety. See M.D. 8.4, Figure 1. Enclosure 1 provides examples of backfit situations.
The first two types of backfits (i.e., a backfit to bring a facility into compliance with the license, rules, Commission orders, or written commitments by the licensee, or one imposed to ensure that the facility provides adequate protection of public health and safety or common defense and security) are termed as exceptions, and do not require findings of substantial safety improvements.
Economic costs may not be considered in defining or refining what is an adequate level of protection or in ensuring that an adequate level of protection is achieved or maintained or requiring compliance with regulations that ensure adequate protection.
Neither of these two types of backfits requires a backfit analysis.
The third, cost justified backfit, does require a backfit analysis.B. Action 1. The Backfit Process When the staff invokes a backfit exception, the RA must provide a documented evaluation that includes a statement of the objectives, reasons for the modification, and the basis for the backfit exception.
The documented evaluation should be issued with the backfit except when an immediately effective agency action is necessary because the safety or security implications are urgent, and full documentation cannot be completed.
in those cases, the documentation may follow the backfrt imposition.
For more guidance on preparing the documented evaluation, see M.D. Handbook 8.4, Part II, pps. 9-13.This refers to adequate protection of public health and safety or common defense and security.,
PG 0901.6-3-For backfits other than the compliance or adequate protection varieties (i.e., a cost-justified substantial increase in safety), the staff must perform a backfit analysis 2 and may be required to prepare a re-aulatory analysis 3 to show that certain improvements in safety or security are justified on the basis of the associated costs. Often only one analysis is performed to meet both the backfit and regulatory analysis requirements.
For more guidance on backflt and regulatory analyses, see Handbook 8.4, Part I1, pps. 15-17 and Exhibit 2, Guidance for Performing a Combined Backfit and Regulatory Analysis.The RA shall review and approve any documented evaluations, backfit analyses, and/or regulatory analyses developed as a part of the backfit process.Additionally, the RA will determine if a staff position is a backfit (whether staff or licensee identified), whether the proposed backfit should be imposed on the licensee, and any appeals to the region of backfit decisions.
In order to make these determinations, the RA may elect to use a panel as described in Enclosure
- 2. The RA will consult and coordinate with the applicable program offices (NRR, NMSS, or NSIR [for all security-related backfits]), OGC, and OE, as appropriate, in making these determinations.
After the RA has approved the supporting regulatory analysis, and/or backfit analysis, and after this documentation has been forwarded for information to the EDO, the cognizant Division Director will issue the backfit determination along with the supporting evaluation or analyses to the licensee.
The licensee may choose to implement or appeal any backfit.Implementation is normally accomplished on a schedule negotiated between the licensee and the NRC. The staff should consult OE and OGC for establishing the schedule.2 The backfit rules require a demonstration that "there is a substantial increase in the overall protection of the public health and safety or the common defense and security to be derived from the backfit and that the direct and indirect costs of implementation for that facility are justified in view of this increased protection." See 10 C.F.R. 50.109(a)(3) and Handbook 8.4, Part II, p. 14.a regulatory analysis helps to ensure that NRC decisions are based on adequate information concerning the need for and consequences of proposed actions;appropriate alternative approaches are identified and analyzed; and no clearly preferable alternative is available to the proposed action.
PG 0901.6-4-2. Backfit Appeal Process There are two types of backfit appeal processes:
- a. Appeal to the Region to modify or withdraw a proposed backfit for which a regulatory analysis has been prepared and transmitted to the licensee; or b. Appeal to the Region to reverse a denial of a prior licensee claim that a staff position, not identified by the NRC as a backfit, is one, or that a backfit which staff believes falls within one of the exceptions from the requirement for a regulatory analysis, does not.For all appeals, licensees should address the appeal to the RA with a copy to the EDO. (A copy of all security related appeals will be provided to the Director of NSIR and will be coordinated with NSIR as appropriate.)
The RA will report to the EDO within 90 days after receipt of the appeal, the plan for resolving the issue. The licensee should also be promptly and periodically informed in writing regarding the status of the issue. The RA will decide the appeal and inform the licensee in writing with a copy to the EDO. If dissatisfied with the RA's decision, the licensee may appeal to the EDO, unless resolution is achieved at a lower management level. If after losing an appeal, the licensee does not agree to implement the backfit, it may be imposed by order. See Handbook 8.4, Part II, pp. 23-24.In the first type of appeal, the staff should reconsider the supporting regulatory analysis, and other information that is relevant and material to the proposed backfit. In the second type of appeal, the appeal should take into account the staff's evaluation, the licensee's response, and other information that is relevant and material.
Backfit claims and resultant staff determinations that are re-evaluated in response to an appeal, and that are again determined by the NRC not to be backfits, or are exempt from the requirement for a regulatory analysis, are not to be treated further in the context of this procedure.
- 3. Record Keeping and Reporting The Regional Counsel (RC) will administratively manage each proposed facility-specific backfit by maintaining records related to it, including requests, positions, statements, panel minutes, and summary reports. The RC will provide these records to the RA's secretary for inclusion in ADAMS with recommendations coordinated with the staff concerning whether the documents should be placed in PG 0901.6-5-the public or non-public section. Additionally, the RC will keep a RIV backfit status log for tracking purposes.
6 Enclosure 3 is a copy of the log.4. Training The Office of Human Resources is developing backfit training modules and refresher courses for the staff, some of which may be available online. The Division Directors will ensure that regional inspection staff and any other personnel who may be involved in backfit issues take the initial or refresher backflt training annually once it is developed.
In the interim, all technical staff will be required to perform a read and sign of this policy guide annually that will be tracked as a Regional Administrator action item.5. Information Collection (See Handbook 8.4. Part I11, pps. 26-28.)The RA will authorize requests for information from power reactor licensees in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(f) (and from certain material licensees under 70.22(d), 72.62(d), and 76.70(e)).
Requests under 10 C.F.R. 50.54(f) must be justified by a supporting analysis which finds that the burden to be imposed is justified in view of the potential safety significance of the issue to be addressed in the requested information.
The division requesting the information (e.g., DRS, DRP, or DNMS) will prepare the supporting analysis for the RA's review. Refer to Handbook 8.4, Part Ill, pps. 26-28, for guidance on preparing the supporting analysis and exceptions to providing a supporting analysis.6. Audits DRS will conduct an assessment triennially of the implementation of the regional backfit program in the same year as the update to this policy guide.7.
References:
See pps. 12-13 of M.D. 8.4.4 Classified and safeguards information should not be placed in ADAMS, and proprietary and sensitive information should be excluded from the public domain in ADAMS.5 The time needed to complete an initial backfit issue or backfit appeal may vary depending on the complexity of the backfit claim. As a guideline, however, the following time line is suggested:
- Inform EDO and licensee of an initial backfit determination within 90 calendar days after receipt of the claim and resolve the issue within 180 calendar days after receipt of the claim.* Keep the licensee informed of the backfit or backfit appeal status no less than quarterly.
- Inform the EDO of the plan for resolving an appeal by the 80t' calendar day after receiving the appeal, and resolve the backfit appeal within 180 calendar days.
PG 0901.6 LIC-202, Procedures for Managing Plant-Specific Backfits and 50.54(f)Information Requests* NMSS Policy and Procedure Letter (P&P) 1-84, May 2004 PG 0901.6 BACKFIT EXAMPLES 1. The Region considered whether the NRC staff imposition of a 10 C.F.R. 50.73 reportability requirement of a licensee-identified Technical Specification 6.12 violation on the Wolf Creek plant was a backfit. The issue involved the reporting of high radiation area control violations by use of the licensee event report requirements of 10 C.F.R.50.73. A regional panel determined that it was a plant-specific (Wolf-Creek) backfit..
It was a compliance backflt, since it would have been a backfit to bring Wolf Creek into compliance with 10 C.F.R. 50.73, an NRC regulation.
The matter was also referred to NRR and it determined that future violations of T.S. 6.12 shall be reported in accordance with 10 C.F.R. 50.73.2. NRC issued a 10 C.F.R. 50.59 violation to TXU Electric (Comanche Peak) June 11, 1997, associated with NRC Inspection Report 50-445;446/97-12, for failure to perform written safety evaluations to provide the basis for concluding that four changes to drawings contained in the safety analysis report did not involve unreviewed safety questions.
The licensee requested the NRC to perform a backfit analysis to evaluate the apparent change in staff position from that given in NRC Inspection Report 50-445;446/93-32 dated October 13, 1993 to that expressed in NRC Inspection Report 50-445;446/97-12.
The 1993 report stated in reference to an issue unrelated to the subject four changes: This temporary modification should have been identified as a "trivial" type change. That is, a change having "no potential safety impact (e.g., affecting safe shutdown or the safety of operations)." In each of the four examples of the violation, the licensee invoked Category 7 "trivial" change (minor changes which had no potential safety impact) from its procedure, "10 CFR 50.59 Review Guide," Revision 4, to disposition the associated design change notices as not requiring safety evaluations.
In the 1993 inspection report, the inspectors provided statements that appeared to accept the licensee's guidance on this issue. The staff found during the backfit analysis that because the statements in the 1993 inspection report were misleading, the reversal of the previous position, which accepted the licensee's interpretation of "trivial" changes, constituted a change in the staff's position and a compliance backfit, because the change was necessary to assure compliance with the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 50.59.3. A Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) was issued to the Oconee Nuclear Station on September 8, 2000. The licensee requested the NOED as a result of its inability to comply with Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.1.9.a which provides for annual verification of voltage and frequency response of the Keowee Hydro Units (KHUs). Specifically, the licensee could not meet upper voltage and frequency limits that had been incorporated into the TS by the staff when Oconee TSs-1I-ENCLOSURE 1
PG 0901.6 were converted to Improved Technical Specifications (ITSs). In the background section of the NOED, the staff discussed the September 4, 1998, approved amendment (Nos.232, 232 and 231) for Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3. Under this amendment, the relevant portion of the SR (then referenced as SR 3.7.1.11) was that the annual test verifies each KHU can attain rated speed and voltage within 23 seconds of an emergency start signal.No limits existed on speed or votage. During the conversion of the Oconee TSs to ITSs (December 16, 1998), limits were incorporated on the upper and lower frequency and voltage, and the present SR 3.8.1.9.a limits (which the licensee could not meet) were adopted. An NRC staff member claimed that the inclusion of limits on the upper and lower frequency and voltage in the TS was a backfit. The region determined that it was a backfit, because the staff modified the licensee's surveillance, procedure by incorporating new limits where none had previously existed. It appears to have been a compliance bacMdt because the modification was made for consistency with the ITS Writer's Guide and ITS convention program. (This backfit issue later became moot due to the submission of a request for an amendment.)
- 4. [NOTE: Although not a facility-specific backfit, the following is an example of an adequate protection backflt.J The NRC addressed the issues of reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head penetration leakage and the potential for degradation of the low-alloy steel head by boric acid corrosion through a 2003 order and a 2004 revised order. The orders required PWR licensees to determine the degradation susceptibility category of their reactor and to implement specific inspections of the RPV head and associated penetration nozzles.The staff believed that the orders were not appropriate regulatory tools for long-term regulation in this area. Therefore, it pursued rulemaking activities to incorporate the inspection requirements of the orders into 10 C.F.R. 50.55a. Although a strict codification of the requirements in the orders would not be a backfit, because the staff expected that the requirements may be modified as a result of the rulemaking, it treated the rulemaking as a backfit necessary for adequate -protection of public health and safety.-2"" ENCLOSURE 1
PG 0901.6 BACKFIT REVIEW PANEL A. Purpose: To define a review panel to consider potential items relative to the backfit rules.B. Discussion:
ROPG 0901.6, "FACILITY-SPECIFIC BACKFIT AND INFORMATION COLLECTION PROCEDURE," defines the procedures to be followed for consideration and processing of NRC-imposed changes having a potential for falling under the provisions of M.D. 8.4, MANAGEMENT OF FACILITY-SPECIFIC BACKFITTING AND INFORMATION COLLECTION.
The decision to prepare a Regulatory Analysis is assigned by this ROPG to the appropriate Division Director.As an aid to the Division Directors, and to assure consistent application of the backfit rule within the region, a panel is hereby commissioned to consider potential backfit items and to recommend the need for a Regulatory Analysis if judged necessary to comply with the above requirements.
The panel will be composed of the following or their designated alternate:
Division Director (of the relevant division appropriate to the issue, e.g., DRP, DRS, or DNMS): Panel Chairman Enforcement Officer Branch Chief, DNMS (Primary Materials Contact), Branch Chief, DRP (Primary Reactor Contact)Branch Chief, DRS (Primary Reactor Contact)C. Action: 1. The above panel will meet when convened by the Chairman.2. Items to be considered by the panel will be identified by the Chairman/Division Director assigned to the panel.3. Copies of applicable documentation will be distributed by the Chairman to each panel member in advance of a meeting to consider potential backfit items.4. Minutes of each panel meeting will be kept by the Chairman to reflect the items considered and the panel recommendations.
D. Backfit Appeal Panel Composition The backfit appeal panel will function similarly to the initial backfit panel. The backfit appeal panel should consist of the Regional Counsel as Chairman and the two technical Division Directors who did not participate in the initial panel (i.e., DNMS, DRP, or DRS)as members for independence purposes.
Also, one member of the appeal panel should ENCLOSURE 2
PG 0901.6 be a technical expert from an organization outside of the region (e.g., NRR, NMSS, RES, EDO, OGC, NSIR, etc.). The appeal panel chairman will provide minutes and decision documents from the appeal panel to the RA's secretary for inclusion in ADAMS and include the decision in the regional backflt status table.-2-ENCLOSURE 2
PG 0901.6 ENCLOSURE 3, ML032940098 (redacted) and ML 032940104 (redacted)
RIV BACKFIT STATUS DATE LICENSEE ISSUE STATUS 4/99 River Bend Station (RBS) Change to the calculated loss-of-coolant CLOSED accident offsite doses at RBS (b)(5)3/99 Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Appendix R Compliance Issue 10/97 Comanche Peak (CP) Failure to perform safety evaluation for CLOSED-3i27100 configuration changes in FSAR 7/92 Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Security Issue in re X-ray devices CLOSED -unnecessary backfit 12/90 Wolf Creek (WC) Part 50.73 reportabilily issue in re Sec. 6 of CLOSED Tech Specs 5/89 Wolf Creek (WC) Emergency action levels employed at WC CLOSED -no backflt 5/89 Wolf Creek (WC) Security Compensation measures beyond CLOSED -no backfit what was required imposed by NRC 4/88 ARKANSAS Nuclear One (ANO) Safeguards related matter at ANO CLOSED -no backfit 3/88 Wolf Creek (WVC) Safeguards related matter at WC CLOSED- no backfit PG 0901.6 ENCLOSURE 3, ML032940098 (redacted) and ML 032940104 (redacted)
RIVBACKFIT STATUS DATE LICENSEE ISSUE STATUS 1/87 Wolf Creek (WC) Change in interpretation of 73.71 CLOSED -no backfit 7/86 Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) Safeguards related issue at FCS CLOSED -no backfit 5/13/98 South Texas Project 10 C.F.R. 50.59-Unreviewed safety question CLOSED-8/4/00 (Due to new w/o NRC review & approval rule & minor significance, backfit consideration canceled)217101 Callaway-AMEREN/UE SDP-ALARA-Occupational Radiation Safety CLOSED-no backfit 5/4101 9/28/01 ANO Manual actions & 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. R, CLOSED-no backfit 4/15/02 III.G.2 Boyer, Rachel From: Collins, Elmo Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2011 11:10 AM To: Borchardt, Bill Cc: Virgilio -Disabled 5-4-2012 per 574504, Martin; Leeds, Eric
Subject:
FW: FYI -Fort Calhoun Station update Bill Here is the e-mail sent to Commission TAs to update on status of Ft Calhoun Elmo From: Castleman, Patrick Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2011 10:58 AM To: Franke, Mark; Hipschman, Thomas; Marshall, Michael; Gilles, Nanette; Orders, William; Franovich, Mike Cc: Collins, Elmo; Bowman, Gregory; Brock, Kathryn
Subject:
RE: FYI -Fort Calhoun Station update Thanks, Mark.From: Franke, Mark Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2011 10:57 AM To: Hipschman, Thomas; Marshall, Michael; Castleman, Patrick; Gilles, Nanette; Orders, William; Franovich, Mike Cc: Collins, Elmo; Bowman, Gregory; Brock, Kathryn
Subject:
FYI -Fort Calhoun Station update Good Morning -The following is as update on Fort Calhoun Station, which has been shutdown since April for a refueling outage. The outage was extended due to flooding along the Missouri River. Fort Calhoun Station is currently in Column 4 of the Reactor Oversight Program response matrix.On September 2, 2011, Region IV issued a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) to Fort Calhoun regarding post-flooding recovery actions needed prior to restart, including tests and inspections.
- Fort Calhoun is beginning a review and assessment in preparation for NRC supplemental inspections (IP 95003) associated with their Column 4 status.* Region IV is implementing Manual Chapter (MC) 0351 to address Performance Indicator and Baseline Inspection program impacts due to the plant's extended shutdown period.* Based on several additional performance issues identified during recent NRC inspections, Region IV is working with NRR to consider MC 0350.* Region IV formed a back-fit panel to consider what actions are appropriate to address an Army Corps of Engineers report regarding the impact of dam failures on the Missouri River system.Please give me a call if you have any questions.
Thanks, S*-"----.--~-
-.----.- -~.
Mark (b)~(6) blckberry) p~2 BBoyer Rachel From:. Wiggins, Jim Sent: Monday, December 05, 2011 3:49 PM To: Borchardt.
Bill Cc: Virgilio -Disabled 5-4-2012 per 574504, Martin Subject. ACTION: NEED TO SPEAK TO YOU THIS WEEK ABOUT FT. CALHOUN Want to discuss the fact that RIV and NRR are recommending entry into the 0350 process for Ft Calhoun. By tomorrow, Ill have a brief write-up on the rationale.
For now, suffice it to say that I'm unaware we've seen a set of performance results like we're seeing at Ft Calhoun since the start ".0.2%L- Calhoun is firmly in -.3 Column 4 with potentially 3 Degraded Cornerstones (IE, MS and Secuitt(b)(5) L RlV staff indicates that It's not clear that the licensee has Its arms around the problems and wha11Ufwn mnowd to address them.Going to 0350 will be a way to make the licensee face the Issues,,..
though likely it would result in the restart date for the facility being later than what the licensee Is telling Itself (March) and more like what the Region thinks is realistic (June).I tend to agree with the Region and NRR.More to come.Don't know if you or Marty have had any discussions on this with the Chairman or the Commissioners.
I Uibe, Juan From: Wang, Wejun Sent: Thursday, Decohnber 15, 2011 1:42 PM To: Xi, Zuhan; Candelano, Luissette; Uribe, Juan
Subject:
FW: Fort Calhoun Flooding This is one of the earliest e-mail communication regarding the Fort Calhoun site flooding.7114"n From: Wang, WeUun I Sent: Tuesday, Septenfltý.06, 2011 12:37 PM To: Williams, Megan; Wilson, George Cc: Manoly, Kamal; Cook, Christopher
Subject:
RE: Fort Calhoun Flooding Megan: I am not sure whether we have regulatory authority to ask the licensee to monitor cracks -Kamal may know more.Regarding the soil types and properties, you may want to get the soil profile and soil properties to see if there are clayey soil and cemented sandy soil because the clayey soil may cause additional long term settlement if it became saturated from unsaturated state for a while, and the cemented sandy soil may greatly reduce its strength when becomes saturated (non-cemented sand does not have this issue, saturation only reduce the effective stress and it should be considered during design).By the way, usually cracking is an indication of differential settlement.
If the cracks continue increasing, then local foundation failure is possible.Please let me know if you have any questions.
Thanks.From: Williams, Megan (At Sent: Tuesday, Septembrr 0, 2011 1i:53'AM To: Wang, Weijun; Wilson, George Cc: Manoly, Kamal; Cook, Christopher
Subject:
RE: Fort Calhoun Flooding Thank you, Weijun. This is most helpful.We are seeing many cracks in concrete walls in the turbine building (below grade), which have been leaking water since the flood started. I am trying to find out the Structures Monitoring Program owner, to see if they had a baseline inspection documentation (they should have completed for license renewal -2004) indicating what cracks were evident before the flood, and their size, etc.)(5)R1, Megan From: Wang, WeiJun Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2011 9:56 AM To: Williams, Megan; Wilson, George Cc: lanoly, Kamal; Cook, Christopher Subject, RE: Fort Calhoun Flooding Megan: Without knowing much details, I'd like to suggest the follows: 1. Get documents to see how the hydraulic loading was considered during the original structure and foundation design. If the actual flood level is higher than the original design, then the additional lateral pressure and uplift force may cause some damage to the foundation walls and foundation floor concrete slabs, and also may have negative impact on the stability of foundation soils.2. Regardless the flood levels considered in the original design, you may still need to inspect the structure and foundation to see if there is any damages caused by flooding, such as cracks and settlement.
The GPR is a good method to detect voids and the licensee should also perform additional NDT testing to inspect the integrity of the foundation walls and floor concrete slabs or mats, should cracks be discovered.
- 3. Pay attention to settlements, both in vertical and horizontal directions.
Flood normally will reduce the strength of foundation soil, especially if the water did not dissipate for a longer period of time. For certain type of soils and drainage conditions, as well as the actual foundation condition after the flood, the additional settlement caused by flood may continue for certain period of time, and therefore the settlement monitoring should be kept for a longer time until no detectible settlement increase is observed.The above just for your reference.
Please let me know if you have questions.
Thanks.(301)415-1175 From: Williams, Megan Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2011 9:44 AM .&A To: Wilson, George Cc: Manoly, Kamal; Wang, Weijun; Cook, Christopher
Subject:
RE: Fort Calhoun Flooding Good morning, I am at Fort Calhoun this week, and trying to get some details from the contractors on their approach to evaluating subgrade conditions at the site, now that most of the water has receded.In reviewing the USAR, certain structures had hydraulic loading designs based on different flood levels (Class I versus Class I1, and several references to 2.7.1.2 for design peak flood elevation, which itself references 2
multiple different flood elevations within its paragraphs).
Is it possible to get documentation that we have regarding this hydraulic loading design?I am trying to get information on the GPR they are using to look for voids. Are there any other specific questions or things you all can think of that I should look at while on site?Thank you, Megan Williams RIV From: Wilson, George Sent: Tuesday, August 23, 2011 5:53 AM To: Williams, Megan Cc: Manoly, Kamal; Wang, WeiJun; Cook, Christopher
Subject:
RE: Fort Calhoun Flooding Megan use Kamal Manoly as your reference person he will get assistance from Weijun Wang in NRO From: Williams, Megan Sent: Friday, August 19, 2011 12:28 PM To: Wilson, George
Subject:
Fort Calhoun Flooding Hey, Mr. Wilson, I left you a voicemail, and understand you are out of the office until next week, but I thought I would also send you an email, since I will be out of the office next week on inspection.
We are beginning to engage in reviewing the licensee's efforts for restart at the plant after extensive flooding this spring/summer.
You probably know a large portion of the plant is still under water, but they have engaged a consultant to start assessing geotechnical conditions around the site. I am looking for resources that can help us know what to look for in these assessments
-do we have any history of plants in the agency recovering from this sort of water conditions?
Do you know of any references that would tell us what kinds of tests of studies should be completed to assess the condition of the soils, etc.?I appreciate -any guidance you have-in-this area.M nl, Megan Williams 3 Uribe, Juan From: Sent: To:
Subject:
Attachments:
Wang, Weijun ý 0 C.Thursday, December 15, 2011 1:44 PM Xl, Zuhan; Candelario, Luissette; Uribe, Juan FW: Fort Calhoun Flooding Picture 001.jpg; Picture 002.jpg; Picture 003.jpg; Picture 004.jpg; Picture 005.jpg; Picture 006.jpg; Picture 007.jpg; FCS settled column.jpg FYI.WCO"u From: Williams, Megan (1V Sent: Wednesday, SeptetlArO7, 2011 4:48 PM To: Wang, Weijun; Wilson, George Cc. Manoly, Kamal; Cook, Christopher
Subject:
RE: Fort Calhoun Flooding W'tez ýý-Good afternoon.
I wanted to let you know about developments today.We met with HDR (geotechnical investigation sub to the licensee) to discuss their approach, tasks to date, etc.They are in the process of getting us a good amount of requested information, such as ori inal desian documents, etc. They have yet to characterize the current condition of the soil; (b)(5)(b)(5) I -1 As they remove mud/sit from the site with bobcats, an exterior walkway slab showed settlement in one comer, and also a large void where the concrete completely gave way. (see attached), There is also a column that has settled, and it is taking the adjacent masonry walls with it (stepped cracking)
-you may have seen this photo before.Again, I will pass along information as I receive it, but if you think of anything I should be asking for or looking at, I appreciate any guidance you can provide.R/, megan From: Williams, Megan '(ZW Sent: Tuesday, Septembe" r 06, 2011 10:53 AM To: Wang, Weijun; Wilson, George Cc. Manoly, Kamal; Cook, Christopher
Subject:
RE: Fort Calhoun Flooding Cf ..~. d., ~ 4 Thank you, Weijun. This is most helpful.We are seeing many cracks in concrete walls in the turbine building (below grade), which have been leaking water since the flood started, I am trying to find out the Structures Monitoring Program owner, to see if they had a baseline inspection documentation (they should have completed for license renewal -2004) indicating what cracks were evident before the flood, and their size, etc.I R/, Megan From: Wang, Weljun Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2011 9:56 AM To: Williams, Megan; Wilson, George Cc: Manoly, Kamal; Cook, Christopher Subject- RE: Fort Calhoun Flooding Megan: Without knowing much details, I'd like to suggest the follows: 1. Get documents to see how the hydraulic loading was considered during the original structure and foundation design. If the actual flood level is higher than the original design, then the additional lateral pressure and uplift force may cause some damage to the foundation walls and foundation floor concrete slabs, and also may have negative impact on the stability of foundation soils.2. Regardless the flood levels considered in the original design, you may still need to inspect the structure and foundation to see if there is any damages caused by flooding, such as cracks and settlement.
The GPR is a good method to detect voids and the licensee should also perform additional NDT testing to inspect the integrity of the foundation walls and floor concrete slabs or mats, should cracks be discovered.
- 3. Pay attention to settlements, both in vertical and horizontal directions.
Flood normally will reduce the strength of foundation soil, especially if the water did not dissipate for a longer period of time. For certain type of soils and drainage conditions, as well as the actual foundation condition after the flood, the additional settlement caused by flood may continue for certain period of time, and therefore the settlement monitoring should be kept for a longer time until no detectible settlement increase is observed.The above just for your reference.
Please let me know if you have questions.
Thanks.(301)415-1175 From: Williams, Megan Sent: Tuesday, September 06, 2011 9:44 AM To, Wilson, George.Cc: Manoly, Kamal; Wang, Weijun; Cook, Christopher
!.*L.. .. 1 ( -LA)
Subject:
RE: Fort Calhoun Flooding Good morning, 2 I am at Fort Calhoun this week, and trying to get some details from the contractors on their approach to evaluating subgrade conditions at the site, now that most of the water has receded.In reviewing the USAR, certain structures had hydraulic loading designs based on different flood levels (Class I versus Class 11, and several references to 2.7.1.2 for design peak flood elevation, which itself references multiple different flood elevations within its paragraphs).
Is it possible to get documentation that we have regarding this hydraulic loading design?I am trying to get information on the GPR they are using to look for voids. Are there any other specific questions or things you all can think of that I should look at while on site?Thank you, Megan Williams RIV From: Wilson, George Sent: Tuesday, August Z3, 2011 5:53 AM To: Williams, Megan Cc: Manoly, Kamal; Wang, Weijun; Cook, Christopher
(-
Subject:
RE: Fort Calhoun Flooding Megan use Kamal-Manoly as your reference person he will get assistance from Weijun Wang in NRO From: Williams, Megan Sent: Friday, August 19, 2011 12:28 PM To: Wilson, George Subject- Fort Calhoun Flooding~J)Hey, Mr. Wilson, I left you a voicemail, and understand you are out of the office until next week, but I thought I would also send you an email, since I will be out of the office next week on inspection.
We are beginning to engage in reviewing the licensee's efforts for restart at the plant after extensive flooding this spring/summer.
You probably know a large portion of the plant is still under water, but they have engaged a-consultant to-start assessing-geotechricat conditions around the-site.
-am looking -for resources-that can help us know what to look for in these assessments
-do we have any history of plants in the agency recovering from this sort of water conditions?
Do you know of any references that would tell us what kinds of tests of studies should be completed to assess the condition of the soils, etc.?I appreciate any guidance you have in this area.r/, Megan Williams 3 1/5112 Brief to Sr. Mngmnt on FCS Geotechnical work Outside of Scope Cite 3 failures on site: 1. Increased groundwater flow into turbine sump pump 2. Pavement failure and sinkhole development in utility corridor between service building and intake structure 3. Column settlement in maintenance shop Turbine Building Sump pump: Subsurface piping of soil material due to the sump operation and seepage/flow into the drainage system pipe is occurring; voids are significant and interconnected.
Voids, soft zones, and associated groundwater and piping flow paths will continue to enlarge and extend out from the system unless the flow of water is stopped. The most significant and closely connected voids are on the west wall, adjacent to the auxiliary building.
Eleven of the voids occur at or below the bottom elevation of the pile caps.,Outside of Scope Additionally, two other CPFMs, 3a (Undermining and settlement of shallow foundation/slab/surfaces (due to pumping) and undermined buried utilities (due to pumping), both from subsurface erosion/piping, associated with this KDI have the potential to keep affecting structures other than the Turbine Bldg: TSC, FP, Raw Water line, BBREs, Maint shop, U/G cable system, Waste disposal piping, Blair Water system, demin water, TB S. SY, FOT&P, PA drives, San Sewer, and Condensate Storage Tank buried utilities.
Th'e fact that the initial condition (broken pipes) has been occurring for many years, makes the hypothesis that the voids could extend beyond the turbine bldg more plausible.
Recommendations:
block the drainage system pipes; then 1) abandon the system and replace w/ above-stab system or trench cut for new system; or 2) replace existing system. Either will need to address the voids created. HDR is currently researching and interviewing expert grouting companies for possible solutions.
Outside of Scope A 4 Iz, Outside of Scope It Mizuno,_Gea:y From: Sent: To: Cc:
Subject:
Mizunio, Geary-OýC.
Thursday, January 19, 2012 9:01 AM Spencer, Mary Williamson, Edward; Biggins, James; Jones, Bradley FW: Ft Calhoun Status...
and my suggestions for covering the on-going issues there Mary: (b)(5)Geary-From: King, Mark ý,y " Sent: Wednesday, January 18, 2012 11:32 AM To: Tomrn, John Cc: Cartwdght, William; Chemoff, Harold
Subject:
Ft Calhoun Status...
and my suggestions for covering the on-going issues there John.(b)(5)1............ ...... L ........... ...........
........
(b)(5)2 (b)(5)FYI, for your consideration.
Mark Mark King Senior Reactor Systems Engineer NRR/ADRO/DIRS/IOEB Operating Experience Branch 301-415-1150 NRC- One Mbsdan -One Team 3--.---
From: Mizuno, Geary Sent: Monday, January 30, 2012 9:53 AM To: Spencer, Mary Cc: Biggins, James
Subject:
FW: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged in for review-Commission Paper -FW: AO Report for OGC Second Review and NLO Mary.-!Geary From: Martin, Circe On Behalf Of RidsOgcMalUCenter Resource Sent: Friday, January 27, 2012 4:08 PM To: Rothschild, Trip; Jones, Bradley; Mayberry, Theresa; Lora, Kimberly; Mizuno, Geary
Subject:
OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged in for review-Commission Paper -FW: AO Report for OGC Second Review and NLO From: Pope, Tia'ý\Sent: Friday, January 27, 2012 3:43 PM To: RidsOgcMailCenter Resource Cc: Mizuno, Geary; Bush-Goddard, Stephanie
Subject:
AO Report for OGC Second Review and NLO/
MizunD, Geary From: Sent: To: Cc:
Subject:
Mizuno, Geary 0(2.C, Thursday, February 02, 2012 11:05 AM Chidakel, Susan Biggins, James; Jones, Bradley RE: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged in for review-Commission Paper -FW: AO Report for OGC Second Review and NLD &(b)(5)I -From: Chidakel, Susan Sent: Thursday, February 02, 2012 10:56 AM To: Mizuno, Geary Cc: Biggins, James Subject- RE: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged in for review-Commission Paper --- FW: AO Report for OGC Second Review and NLO k J (b)(5)1-1 From: Tomon, John Sent: Wednesday, February 01, 2012 4:58 PM To: Chidakel, Susan Cc Bush-Goddard, Stephanie; Lewis, Doris; Biggins, James; Mizuno, Geary
Subject:
RE: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged in for review-Commission Paper -- FW: AO Report for OGC Second Review and NLO Susan (b)(5)-I ~Thanks so much!V/r John J. Tomon, CHP Health Physicist RES/DSA/HEB (301) 251-79D4 (Office)1(b)(6) (cell)CSB-3C23 Mail Stop CSB- C3AO7M., cl_From: Chidakel, Susan UJV" Sent: Wednesday, February 01, 2012 8:12 AM To: Tomon, John Cc, Bush-Goddard, Stephanie; Lewis, Doris
Subject:
RE: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged in for review-Commlsslun Paper -- FW: AO Report for OGC Second Review and NLO 1
- 1*From: Tomon, John Sent: Wednesday, February 01, 2012 7:57 AM To: Chidakel, Susan Cc: Bush-Goddard, Stephanie; Lewis, Doris
Subject:
RE: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged In for review-Commission Paper -FW: AO Report for OGC Second Review and NLO Susan iF "', Jt~ ;Thanks so much!V/r John J. Tomon, CHIP Health Physicist RES/DSA/HEB (301) 251-7904 (Office)()6 ctell)top CSB- C3AO7M From: Chidakel, Susan,'-"'
Sent Wednesday, February 01, 2012 7:47 AM To: Tomon, John Cc: Mizuno, Geary
Subject:
RE: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged in for review-Commission Paper --- FW: AO Report for OGC Second Review and NLO/'.7 1. rA..(b)(5)-}From: Tomon, John "." Sent: Tuesday, January 31, 2012 4:59 PM To: Mizuno, Geary; Pope, Tia Cc: Spencer, Mary; Chidakel, Susan; Biggins, James; Bush-Godddrd, Stephanie; Lewis, Doris
Subject:
RE: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged in for review-Commission Paper -- FW: AO Report foi OGC Second Review and NLO 2
-Geary Good afternoon!
I incorporated the changes that Mary Spencerand you provided into the document in ADAMS. I hav been in training this week and I am checking and answering my e-mails either before or after the training is finished for the day. I have received e-mails from Susan regarding some of the medical issues in the draft report and I tried to carbon copy you on my responses to her. I will continue to converse with regarding her concerns with the medical issues and hope to have her concerns adequately addressed as soon as possible.F'JlI.,,§Thanks and have a great day!Vir John J. Tomon, CHP Health Physicist RES/DSA/HEB (301) 251-7904 (Office)1(b)(6) Icell)CSB-3C23 Mail Stop CSB- C3AO7M X4L z 0 From: Mizuno, Geary Sent: Tuesday, January 31, 2012 10:20 AM To: Tomon, John; Pope, Tlia Cc Spencer, Mary; Chldakel, Susan; Biggins, James
Subject:
FW: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged in for review-Commission Paper -FW: AO Report for OGC Second Review and NLO John: (b)(5)If Al~- '.~r i .Geary From: Spencer, Mary Sent: Monday, January 30, 2012 3:35 PM To: Mlzuno, Geary
Subject:
RE: OGC ticket No. 2012-0215 logged In for review-Commission Paper -- FW: AO Report for DGC Second Review and NLO ( , IS Geary, &71"C'110 Mary-OffiP. e-n' torney-Client Privilege/Attorney Work Product 3 Robles, Jesse From: Sent:
Subject:
King, Mark V Monday, Fe a 3, 2012 3:02 PM IOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Monday, February 13, 2012 NOTE: THIS
SUMMARY
IS e L "*`*MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR NRC INT RNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION***
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSIDE OF NR.WI HOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FROM OR GINATOR Follow-uplOther Tasks: Twelve (12)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help IOEB staff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff.]Outside of Scope TA 2) EN 47658 -FORT CALHOUN -UNANALYZED CONDITION
-GUIDANCE NOT ADEQUATE TO MITIGATE A DESIGN BASIS FLOOD During review of the flood protection procedures, inspectors identified deficiencies in the guidance to mitigate a design basis flood event where river level would reach 1014 feet mean sea level. Pass to TRG Lead for Flooding/Missiles (Ed Smith). Assigned to Jesse Robles.Ii L~L~
O Tbt4D OF -cO4 ntT~tP& eFP sczP 7-1 Outside of Scope 2) EN 47658 -FORT CALHOUN -UNANALYZED CONDITION
-GUIDANCE NOT ADEQUATE TO MITIGATE A DESIGN BASIS FLOOD Outside of Scope 3 Domim OF SCOPC Attendees at Screening Meeting;Jesse Robles -by phone Bob Bemardo- by phone Mark King Doug Bollock, NRO Mary Wegner, RES -by phone 4 Robles, Jesse _ n From: King, Mark (/I[Sent: Thursday, FiUrua ry16, 2012 2:37 PM
Subject:
IOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary. for Thursday, February 16, 2012 NOTE: THIS
SUMMARY
IS***MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR N TERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION***
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSID QFIRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION FB ORIGINATOR Atside of Scope V
- 6) LER 2852011003R02
-FORT CALHOUN: INADEQUATE FLOODING PROTECTION DUE TO INEFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT.
See LER update. Pass to TRG Lead for Flood Protection (Ed Smith), and SW/UHS (Gerard Purciarello).
Assigned to Jesse Robles.7) LER 2852011003R03
-FORT CALHOUN: INADEQUATE FLOODING PROTECTION DUE TO INEFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT.
See LER update. Pass to TRG Lead for Flood Protection (Ed Smith), and SW/UHS (Gerard Purciarello).
Assigned to Jesse Robles.Outside of Scope 2 outside6 oF ScoP Outside of Scope svrs4C ti- ~Outside of Scope Attendees at Screening Meeting: Jesse Robles Bob Bernardo
[Dave Goatnrflo M-arv K039 oCWt oougBoll( ?.I PVOfl tMeh'di Fe1slaBV .5 Ft C;Ihoun oversight
-February 14, 2012 Recap history* 2010 -'yellow' finding for Inadequate strategies and procedures to protect the site up to 1014' (ricenslng basis)* 2010 -White' finding for inadequate control of SGI* April 2011 -FCS shuts down for refueling outage* June 2011 -ACE projects water levels at FCS up to 1007' (3 ft above site grade level)* June 2011 -NOUE with water approaching 1004'* June 2011 -Alert for fire In safety-related switchgear room* July 2011 -water reaches about 1006' 11l* July 2011 -public meeting on restart plan commitments" August 2011 -NRC finalized a 'white' finding for inadequate actions to evaluate and fix a RPS coil -it was ultimately found failed in unsafe condition," August 2011 -CAL issued containing restart commitments (flood related)* September 2011 -FCS oversight move to Column IV (a repetitive degraded cornerstone)
-facility considered safe to operate -licensee plans to complete their preparations for 95003 inspection after startup" September 2011 -water <1004'" September 2011 (b)(5)*-,~* December 2011 -MC 0350 oversight applied. MC 0350 aimed to handle situations where multiplelsignificant examples of frontline equipment degradation andlor a significant operational event have substantially reduced safety margins or have the potential to Indicate a substantial reduction in safety margins.-r.,r Ft Calhoun Oversight
-CGnsitive rre-61onulFbr1,0 February 14, 2012 Analysis: The August 2011 CAL addressed actions to Inspect, test, and resolve system, structure or component issues resulting from the site grade level being underwater for 60+ days.Column IV of action matrix addresses site-wide performance Issues, but the facility is considered safe to operate. The site's original strategy to do their 95003 preps after startup was viable, but in essence meant that their site-wide assessment of identifying and addressing the causes of the she-wide performance issue was not going to happen until after startup.In MC 0350, this strategy is no longer viable.MC 0350 aimed to handle situations where multiple/significant examples of frontline equipment degradation and/or a significant operational event have substantially reduced safety margins or have the potential to indicate a substantial reduction in safety margins.Both exist at Ft. Calhoun.Also, MC 0350 gives the flexibility to formulate inspection/assessment mechanisms for long periods of shutdown where performance indicators are not valid and the baseline inspection program cannot be completed.
The icensee has two significant cause evaluations underway:
- 1) Corrective Action Program'broke' and 2) Lack of Organizational Effectiveness (need to confirm the problem statements).
- 1 and #2 combined with multiple/significant examples of frontline safety equipment degradation dictate the need to 3) determine, before plant restart, the causes (called key attributes in IP 95003), extent of causes, and extent of the degradation of structures, systems, and components; and, how the issues have or will be addressed.
NRC will use the results of #3 are needed to inform the restart checklist.
Ultimately we plan to revise the CAL that is in place to include items from restart check list.NRC is Interacting with site leadership to understand how actions will accomplish
- 3.5)Consider the oversight/governance employed to ensure Board Is meaningfully apprised of relevant site performance issues.
Fi Calhoun Oversight
-_senlive re- ec aionai February 14,2012 Key Points for OPPD Board of Directors Good morning. My name is Bill Borchardt.
I am the Executive Director for Operations for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
With me is Elmo Collins, whom some of you have met, the Regional Administrator for NRC Region IV.Thank you for taking the time to talk to us about NRC's assessment of the safety performance of Ft. Calhoun Station.The purpose of our requesting this meeting Is to ensure, by communicating at all levels of the OPPO organization that the Issues are understood and the commitment and resources to resolve the issues are being applied.Most recently on December, 13, 2011, we communicated to you that we had placed Ft. Calhoun Station Into a special category of NRC's inspection and assessment processes, described In our Inspection Manual Chapter 0350, and one that Is designed to provide for Increased verification of safety for situations where a nuclear power plant is shutdown for an extended period of time for performance issues stemming from a significant operational event.Specifically, Ft. Calhoun Station was shutdown in April 2011 for a refueling outage. The station remained shut down when high levels of Missouri River water covered the site grade level for an extended period of time, and remains shutdown today.On June 7, a fire had occurred in safety-related electrical switchgear that impacted both trains of safety-related equipments.
Subsequently, Ft. Calhoun Station review and NRC inspection determined that cause for the fire traced its roots back to a design modification that had been performed about two years ago, This modification introduced an unreliable configuration and the potential for high electrical resistance connections on 12 safety-related breakers.Preliminary evaluations show that this configuration combined with poor maintenance practices caused the failure and that this event and configuration were risk significant.
To put this special category of NRC oversight into perspective, NRC has not needed to use It for almost a decade.Accordingly, we are meeting with you to ensure that you have full recognition of the issues that need to be resolved, their significance, and that you understand the substantial level of support and commitment that will be needed from the Board of Directors to resolve these problems.
FtCalhoun Oversight
-SenmttuLm-ErfDecisional-February 14, 2012 Ft Calhoun Station performance has reached the point that a thorough, comprehensive review of site equipment performance and organizational effectiveness must be completed before plant restart is warranted.
The most relevant Items for safety from this review will need to be resolved prior to plant restart.These items will be included in a modified NRC Confirmatory Action Letter and form what we call the 'restart" checklist, NRC will inspect these items before plant restart.The results of the equipment and organizational reviews will also Inform your long-term, Integrated performance Improvement plan/business plan.Where Is Ft. Calhoun today? This comprehensive review has not been done and an integrated plan Is currently being developed, putting us at the very front end of developing the restart checklist.
Accordingly, NRC will continue to meet with station managers to understand the scope of the integrated plans and the results of the review when completed and incorporate the appropriate items into the *restarr checklist.
The NRC emphasizes that:# These problems did not emerge quickly and will not be quickly resolved.
A significant amount of work has yet to be completed to determine the extent of problems, and extent of causes of problems.
As a result, there is a high amount of uncertainty surrounding the level of effort/resources that will be needed to accomplish the needed actions.* The site is still In discovery.
Expect more performance Insights and more items needing corrective action to be identified.
- It is Imperative that site reviews and actions be thorough, probing, and challenging.
The preliminary results from the flooding Inspection indicate that site preparation and actions fell short in that it took NRC inspection to uncover a potential unanalyzed condition illustrating that the site still needs to consider the full range equipment and actions to protect the facility to its licensing basis 1014 feet.@ Your ultimate goal needs to be to establish a long term, sustainable high level of safety performance at Ft. Calhoun Station.We welcome your comments and we will elaborate on any of our comments as needed.
Narrative
-Commission Meeting Ft. Calhoun Station -February 22, 2012 Thank you Bill. Mr. Chairman, NRC Commissioners, good morning.Slide 4 This morning I plan to briefly recap the sequence of events and regulatory actions with respect to Ft. Calhoun Station that have preceded this meeting and summarize Ft. Calhoun Station's safety performance.
Slide 5 -there were several important actions preceding the CAL that are important In 2010, NRC finalized a finding of 'yellow" significance for an inadequate strategy for protecting the facility to the licensing basis of 1014 feet.In 2011 the licensee was doing the review and corrective action necessary for NRC to conduct the 95002 Inspection.
Twice the inspection was scheduled, and twice the licensee reported that their self-assessments showed that they were not yet ready. Finally the 95002 Inspection was scheduled for June 2012.In May 2012 however, the licensee and the NRC learned that release rates from the upstream dams in the Missouri River system were going to reach unprecedented levels, raising the water at Ft. Calhoun Station.On June 6, the licensee declared an Unusual Event as waters reached the grade level of 1004 feet Note that on June 7, the licensee declared an alert for a fire In safety-related 480 volt switchgear.
Later that day the licensee secured from the alert.In advance of the rising waters, the licensee took substantial actions to protect the facility, including a number of actions that had been formulated in response to the "yellow" flood protection finding Region IV also responded, providing 24/7 onslte coverage, with inspector assistance from the other three regions during the emergency response period.With the station and NRC in emergency response, and with Missouri River levels rising to above site grade, NRC deferred the 95002 Inspection.
By this time, the site had already entered into the 50 calendar quarter with a degraded cornerstone.
The Missouri River reached a peak level of 1006' 11' in July 2012.
r in late July and August, the licensee formulated a plan to recover the site from the high water levels. This plan was submitted to NRC and key items from this plan were formalized as commitments in a confirmatory action letter In August 2012.During the same period of time, NRC finalized another white finding associated with the reactor protection system. Combined with the previous "yellow* finding, In September 2012 the NRC assessed Ft. Calhoun Station's safety performance as needing the highest level of oversight called for by the reactor oversight process, Column IV. Accordingly, Region IV added a branch to the Division of Reactor Projects to provide specific oversight for Ft. Calhoun Station.Once the Missouri River receded and the licensee exited emergency response modes, NRC initiated an onsite review of the June 7 fire. NRC found performance deficiencies during this inspection, and while NRC's inspection report is in final draft and the final significance has yet to be determined, NRC has concluded that this fire was a significant operational event.Beginning in October, with the facility shutdown for over 6 months, NRC's normal Pis losing their efficacy and an inability to meaningfully complete the baseline inspecion program, NRC evaluated Ft. Calhoun station performance, and existing guidance to determine the appropriate level of NRC inspection and engagement Already in Column IV, Manuel Chapters 0350 and 0351 were considered.
In December 2012, Region IV determined, In consultation with the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and the Executive Director for Operations, that Manual Chapter 0350 entry criteria were met and that this level of regulatory oversight and engagement was appropriate to provide added verification of safety of the facility prior to plant restart. This NRC decision was communicated in a December 13, 2012 letter to the licensee.Of))r Murphy, Martin From: Murphy, Martin Sent: Friday, March 09, 2012 2:52 PM To: Uribe, Juan
Subject:
RE: Emailing:
Fort Calhoun Station Timeline of Events.docx This is great.I have to read the GL and response before I would want to talk---Original Message--From: Uribe, Juan Sent: Friday, March 09, 2012 2:44 PM To: Murphy, Martin
Subject:
RE: Emailing:
Fort Calhoun Station Timeline of Events.docx As stated in the USAR, the 1009.3' msl (not 1009.5'msl) is the probable maximum flood (pmf) resulting from the runoff from a maximum probable rain storm over the area below Gavins Point dam, which is the first dam upstream of FCS. Failure of Fort Randall dam (2nd upstream)
OR Oahe dam (4th upstream) has been analyzed by USACE and determined to be 1014' msl. Keep in mind FCS does not consider credible the failure of either dam.The 2003' msl data did not include dam failures.
The licensee was using the 1 000yr flood to correlate with probable maximum flood, which is 1009.3 in the original design basis and determined the elevation to be the aforementioned 1010.5' msl.Consequently, they updated their external flood analysis in 2005 to reflect these analyses but to my knowledge, did nothing else. This is based on the premise that there is no actual requirement for them to update their FSAR on 3rd party info. The region, in terms of regulatory space, could not pursue a violation down this road and therefore ended up citing the failure of adequate procedures since 1967. It could be argued that if the licensee found this study as part on a license renewal effort, it was information sought on their behalf and therefore could fall under 50.71(e).
But the Region analyzed this and determined it wasn't the way to go.Hope this helps, keep in mind we can also talk to George Gerond today and he has the best insights into this issue.----- Original Message---
From: Murphy, Martin Sent: Friday, March 09, 2012 2:22 PM To: Uribe, Juan
Subject:
RE: Emailing:
Fort Calhoun Station Timeline of Events.docx What is the FEMA information?
The last section states that there is a TS level of 1009.5. The design basis is 1014. Is this correct? The 2003 data was at 1010.5 -this exceeds the TS limit. What did they do?----- Original Message-From: Uribe, Juan Sent: Friday, March 09, 2012 1:42 PM To: Murphy, Martin
Subject:
FW: Emailing:
Fort Calhoun Station Timeline of Events.docx
./1 w/ comments from RIV inspector---Original Message--
, From: George, Gerond jL \Sent: Friday, March 09, 2012 1:38 PM To: Uribe, Juan
Subject:
Emailing:
Fort Calhoun Station Timeline of Events.docx With changes Gerond A. George NRC Region IV R1 7 *7nn r~Rq"q, erondqeo ,pe¢Qnrc.gov 2
Fort Calhoun Station Timeline of Events 1967" As part of licensing, FCS gets estimate of 1009'msl design basis flood level from USACE" It is determined that a dam failure is an incredibte event.* However, DB flood concurrent with dam failure is required by NRC" This is the 1014' msl DB flood level specified in USAR." This is the level that the procedures in place at FCS fail to adequately protect." This is the basis for the yellow finding and violation in 2010.1993* NRC issues GL 88-20. Specifically, supplement 4 asks licensees to look for external events and verify the inherent risk of these events to the site. It requests a systematic individual plant examination for severe accidents initiated by external events (IPEEE).* FCS obtains info from USACE as part of IPEEE to answer GL.
in GR 2002* USACE levels provided include dam failure and are stated to be 1029' msl.* FCS determines that, as stated in USAR, dam failure in NOT credible scenario and therefore DB flood levels remain at 1014' msl.* IPEEE talke-about theuses 1993 flood data provided by USACE to determine event frequencies and risk* FIS ..I. A " SAR _an..g- in Janm-'r 2"08 2002-2003__As part of LR efforts, FCS evaluates the FEMA information and 1993 USACEanalysis performed in 1993 to verify adequacy." A need to evaluate this information in entered into the CA Program.90ummmtedCondition Report-nCýR 2002-1296 documents discrepancies between the USAR flood levels, the FEMA. and USACE information.
- Licensee determined that design basis remained unchanged from this evaluation
- Licensee Identifies more recent information from USACE and documents it In separate Condition ReportGR 2003-2664.A. need to c'Waluat.
thic info...t..n.in..ntgr.d into the CA pro..a FCS submits USAR chanae in January 2008.---.--- Formatte : tdent: Left 0.5', No bllets or numbering 2004" Latest info is titled 2004 study 'Upper Mississippi River System Flow Frequency Study"* As action from CR 2003-2664, FCS PRA group evaluated the new information and completed new external flood analysis in August 2005." New flood elevations were 3' higher for each flooding frequency.
- When 2003 data was extrapolated to 1000 year flood frequency, it was found to be 1010.5' msl. This was higher than original probable maximum flood and TS value of 1009.5 msl.Sito it protGctod to 101A', mel.* ThUeofor;, the site AS Still p~eterld.Result of the 2005 evaluation results in an action to change the IPEEE and probatistic risk assessment.
No action was developed to evaluate the design basis,* Licensee did NOT develop corrective action plan to evaluate potential change to DB and operating procedures.
- 2005 external flood analysis was NOT mentioned in USAR change done in January 2008.
Robles, Jesse From: Sent:
Subject:
King, Mark I ýL Monday, Aprl 3A2012 2:41 PM IOEB Clearinghouse Screening Summary for Monday, April 30, 2012 NOTE: THIS
SUMMARY
IS"*'MAY CONTAIN SENSITIVE/
PROPRIETARY OR INTERNAL USE ONLY INFORMATION**'
DO NOT FORWARD ANY PORTIONS OUTSID NRC WITHOUT FIRST OBTAINING PERMISSION F M ORIGINATOR Follow-up/Other Tasks: Eighteen (18)[Note -The information in this part of the Summary is often preliminary in nature and is provided to help IOEB staff communicate and track noteworthy items being followed up by either the Regions or HQ staff.]Outside of Scope I)6) LER 2852012001 ROO -FORT CALHOUN: INADEQUATE FLOODING PROTECTION PROCEDURE.
See LER text. This issue was screened in as IFR 2011-01 earlier. Pass to TRG Lead for Flood Protection (Ed Smith) and SW/UHS (Gerard Purciarello).
Assigned to Jesse Robles.Outside of Scope I Os-ryf-nre OF, sccp65 edoos so Bpisino 2 Cu-rstce oP' coi Dutside of Scope Attendees at Screening Meeting: Mark King -by phone Jesse Robles-by phone Bob Bernardo-by phone Eric Thomas- by phone Russ Haskell John Thompson Mehdi Reisi-Fard (RES)- by phone Doug Bollock (NRO) -by phone 3 11-17 Biggins, James ( /From: Mizuno, GearyO.-'L C Sent: Thursday, May 10, 2012 2:20 PM To: Matharu, Gurcharan Cc: Scott, Catherine; Safford, Carrie; Benowitz, Howard; Biggins, James; Jones, Bradley
Subject:
RE: Fort CalhounU (b)(5),-, ...... '10...Geary From: Matharu, Gurcharan Sent: Thursday, May 10, 2012 7:21 AM To: Mizuno, Geary
Subject:
RE: Fort Calhoun OK thanks, It seems that the licensee gave us 'inadequate information when the application to change the wording as per STS was submitted.
Singh From: Mizuno, Geary Sent: Wednesday, May 09, 2012 5:33 PM To: Matharu, Gurcharan
Subject:
RE: Fort Calhoun/-I (b)(5)From: Matharu, Gurcharan
\'" Sent: Wednesday, May 09, 2012 5:18 PM To: Mizuno, Geary
Subject:
Fort Calhoun Geary, Fort Calhoun is currently shutdown and have been liberally removing BOTH their EDGs out of service as they claim that the TS allows operation of RHR with offsite power alone when the RCS is below 300F.The attached SE made subtle changes in their TS that allows them to operate in this manner.What would it take for us to retract this change?Singh I 2S NRR -@DECommunity Page I of 5 1 earc.h I How to Subscribe ILoin'Conlmnual Leprivng Through K'nowledge Briaring 3une 19, 2012 OE Homr > Forum > All Communications Information Security Reminder Information Security Reminder:
OpE COMMs contain preliminary Information In the Interest of timely internal communication of operating experience.
OpE COMMs may be pre-decisional and may contain sensitive Information.
They are not intended for distribution outside the agency.Page: 1 3qsse Robles (2/6/2012 9:Z6.56 am)o,,,..dtn 1.? 1 :05:39 emT FORT CALHOUN -NOUE DECLARED DUE TO HIGH RIVER LEVELS AND ALERT DECLARED DUE TO FIRE IN SWITCHGEAR ROOM ISSUES -SITE PLACED UNDER IMC 0350 OVERSIGHT Summary On June 6, 2011, while shutdown for a refueling outage, elevated river levels prompted Fort Calhoun to declare a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE). On June 7 while still in the NOUE, an Alert was declared due to evidence of a possible fire in a switchgear room. Due to the previous significant performance issues in addition to these events, Fort Calhoun Station was placed under IMC 0350 -"Oversight of Reactor Facilities In a Shutdown Condition Due to Significant Performance and/or Operational Concerns." The switchgear room fire issue was subsequently determined to be a finding of high safety significance (a RED finding).Event Description See Public Webpaqe on Special NRC Oversight at Fort Calhoun Station and FCS Oversight SharePoint Website.Outside of Scope Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) had entered a scheduled refueling outage on April 9, 2011. When indications of imminent flooding were received, the site entered Abnormal Operating Procedure 1 (AOP-1), Acts of Nature, on May 22, 2011 and commenced preparation for the rising river level. The site began sandbagging procedures and installation of flood gates to protect the site up to 1007 feet river level. Site staff staged materials to support flood protection up to 1014 feet, and installed an AquaDam/aqua-berm (design is similar to a large inner tube filled with water, see AquaDam website) to protect the entire protected area (with exception of the Intake structure) up to 1012 feet of river level. A NOUE was declared on June 6, 2011 due to the river level expected to exceed the 1004 feet NOUE threshold (see EN 46929, and PNO-]V- 1]-003).http://nrrIO.nrc.gov/fonnm/tbrumtopic.cfm?selectedForuMI Outsiade of p;cope 1 6/19/7012 NRR -@OECommunity I Page 2 of 5 Fort Calhoun Arnal Picture of Flooding The NRC Operating Experience Branch'gave a presentation at an International conference regarding the Fort Calhoun flooding event response which includes more photographs of the site and Includes lessons learned and other insights.
See slides.Fire Event On June 7, 2011, while the plant was In Mode 5 and the site was in a NOUE due to the high river level, fire alarms were received In the control room and the Halon system discharged for the Bus 184A switchgear room.A safety related 480 volt AC load center supply breaker had failed. The fire brigade responded to the alarm and found the room filled with smoke, but no active fire, During the event, both trains of class 1E Direct Current (DC) grounded due to extensive damage inside cubicle 1B4A, which resulted In numerous control room alarms that are fed from the DC circuits.
At 0930 CDT electrical buses were de-energized to aid In mitigating damage.This resulted in both trains of spent fuel pool cooling to be de-energized.
At 0940 CDT the site declared an Alert due to a fire affecting the operability of plant safety systems required to establish of maintain safe shutdown (see EN 46932 and PNO-IV-11-004).
During the event, the local fire department responded to the site, At 1147 CDT, power was restored to one train of spent fuel pool cooling. The spent fuel pool temperature rose approximately 3 degrees Fahrenheit while cooling was out of service. Shutdown cooling was not affected and remained in service during the event. The site exited the Alert at 1313 CDT after confirming that the fire was extinguished and the area was ventilated to restore access. At 1056 EDT, the NRC entered the Monitoring Mode as a result of the event, and exited at 1439 EDT after SFP cooling was restored (see P_-O.N1V-.Q
.), An fl 8.3 evaluation was performed for this event, and a Special Inspection Team was dispatched to the site.UPDATE: On April 10, 2012 press release IV-12-012 was issued: NRC ISSUES FORT CALHOUN STATION INSPECTION FINDING OF HIGH SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE (Red Finding].
See Enforcement Action notification (EA 12-023).Failure of the Aqua Berm Outside of Scope http://nrr I 0.nrc.gov/forum/forumtopic.cfm.?selectcdForum!
Outside of Scope 6119/2012 NRR o SECommunityo Page 3 of 5 Outside of Scope L.Cause of the Breaker Failure The original 1B4A supply breaker (model General Electric (GE) AK-50) had been replaced with a Square D breaker in 2009 due to aging Issues and a lack of available spare parts (a total of twelve breakers were replaced at that time). These were not a direct replacement for the GE breaker; therefore a cradle assembly was used to match up the Square D equipment with the GE switchgear.
The cradle consists of finger clusters that engage the bus bars at the back of the GE swltchgear, and had stabs on the circuit breaker side of the cradle to accept the breaker finger clusters.
The circuit breaker cradle fingers were longer than the original AK-50 breakers, and they engaged the bus bar in a contact area of hardened grease and copper oxide build-up, This caused a high resistance connection at the stab to finger Interface.
The high resistance connection overheated the finger cluster resulting in bus grounding and phase-to-phase shorting.Other contributing causes to failure of the breaker Included-9 An acrid odor that existed for three days preceding the bus fire was not adequately communicated to engineering, maintenance, or management.
FCS engineering had limited knowledge of GE AKD-5 switchgear resulting in overreliance on vendor knowledge and skill.* An FCS modification procedure lacks requirements to Identify and compare critical design characteristics of equipment being modified.
Additionally, this procedure has weak requirements for the use of operating experience criteria.* Maintenance procedures that govern 480 V bus cleaning are Inadequate.
Also, access to the bus side of the GE AKD-5 switchgear is difficult limiting the selection of Inspection/testing methods.* As-left resistance readings from the line to load side of the switchgear following circuit breaker replacement were not confirmed.
See 1-ER 285201 lO08R0l for more information on the failure of supply breaker 1B4A.Previous Performance Issues and Transition into IMC 0350 http://nrr I O.nrc.gov/forum/forumtopic.cfm?selectedForumr Outside of Scope 1 6/19012 NRR -@OECommunity Page 4 of 5 Fort Calhoun Station's has had several performance issues In recent years that have resulted in increased NRC oversight.
These issues are described below." On October 6, 2010, the NRC issued a Yellow Finding (substantial safety significance) to Fort Calhoun Station due to Inadequate flood protection strategies.
This finding Is the subject of OpE Issue for Resolution (IFR) 2011-001 and associated ODE COMM." On July 18, 2011, The NRC Issued a White Findinq (low to moderate safety significance) to Fort Calhoun for the failure to preclude shading coils from repetitively becoming loose material In the M2 reactor trip contactor.
The loose parts In the trip contactor can become an obstruction and cause the failure of the contactor.
This issue was Included in the OpE COMM Contribution of Corrective Action Program Deficiencies to GMeater-than-Green Inspection Findinas and IFR 2011- 01 due to the repetitive nature of the condition.
- Fort Calhoun Station transitloned to Column IV of the Reactor Oversight Process CROP) Action Matrix in September 2011 due to the Mitigating Systems cornerstone being degraded for more than four consecutive quarters (due to the Yellow Finding), with an additional input to the action matrix (due to the White Finding).
See the Mid-Cycle Performance Review.Restart of the facility has been delayed by performance concerns Involving electrical fire and inadequate train separation, in addition to flood recovery.
Following the plant shutdown, additional performance issues were Identified that required additional NRC oversight, including:
v Incomplete high energy line break and environmental qualification analyses." The breaker failure and fire described above." Inadequate communications with state and local officials following the declaration of an ALERT following the fire event.The NRC issued Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 4-11-003 (ML1.12490164) on September 2, 2011 to confirm the actions FCS planned to take In Its submitted Post-Flooding Recovery Action Plan (ML112430102).
Due to these past performance issues in addition to the flood and fire events, Fort Calhoun was placed in IC 0350, "Oversight of Reactor Facilities in a Shutdown Condition Due to Significant Performance and/or Operational Concerns" (see Notification of Chanqe to Regulatory Oversight of Fort Calhoun Station (ML1 13470721) and Fort Calhoun IMC 0350 Charter (ML120120661.)), Operating Experience Flooding Issues IN 87-49 -Deficiencies in Outside Containment Flooding Protection IN 94-27 -Facility Operating Concerns Resulting from Local Area Flooding inspection Procedure 71111.06 -Flood Protection Measures-Breaker Issues Outside of Scope htip://nrrIO.nrc.gov/forum/forumtopic.ctm?selecledForumutsieo pe 6/19/2012 L NRR -@OECoemunily Page 5 of 5 Outside of Scope 3'Fr questions or concerns related to this OpE COMM, contact Jesse Robles (jesse.roblesienre.mov), Os 1-415-2940.
Outside of Scope,-I Page: 1 http://nrrl O.nrc.gov/forumnforumtopic.cfm?selectedFonm
° Outside of Scope t! 6/19/2012.-j Boyer, Rachel From: Collins, Elmo Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2011 8:59 AM To: Rnrrhnr~l Rill Cc: I(b)(5)
Subject:
Ft Calhoun Bill (b)(5)(C --(.~ y~ *~~1 I NRl -@OECommunity Page I of 5 1 N-Search I How to Subscribe I Iggin Con0nual Leariomng Through Ktnowledge Bharin June 19, 2012 OE Home > Forum > All Communications Information Security Reminder Information Security Reminder:
OpE COMMs contain preliminary Information in the interest of timely internal communication of operating experience.
OpE COMMs may be pre-decisional and may contain sensitive Information.
They are not Intended for distribution outside the agency.Page: 1 Jesse Robles (2/6/2012 9:26:56 am)Rov.,w.'iond,/I9,'2t912 11:05:3)9 am FORT CALHOUN -NOUE DECLARED DUE TO HIGH RIVER LEVELS AND ALERT DECLARED DUE TO FIRE IN SWITCHGEAR ROOM ISSUES -SITE PLACED UNDER IMC 0350 OVERSIGHT Summary On June 6, 2011, while shutdown for a refueling outage, elevated river levels prompted Fort Calhoun to declare a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE). On June 7 while still in the NOUE, an Alert was declared due to evidence of a possible fire In a switchgear room. Due to the previous significant performance issues in addition to these events, Fort Calhoun Station was placed under IMC 0350 -"Oversight of Reactor Facilities in a Shutdown Condition Due to Significant Performance and/or Operational Concerns." The switchgear room fire Issue was subsequently determined to be a finding of high safety significance (a RED finding).Event Description See Public WebPaqe on Special NRC Oversight at Fort Calhoun Station and FCS Oversiqht SharePoint Website.Outside of Scope F Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) had entered a scheduled refueling outage on April 9, 2011. When Indications of imminent flooding were received, the site entered Abnormal Operating Procedure 1 (AOP-1), Acts of Nature, on May 22, 2011 and commenced preparation for the rising river level. The site began sandbagging procedures and Installation of flood gates to protect the site up to 1007 feet river level. Site staff staged materials to support flood protection up to 1014 feet, and Installed an AquaDam/aqua-berm (design is similar to a large inner tube filled with water, see ApuaDarn website) to protect the entire protected area (with exception of the intake structure) up to 1012 feet of river level. A NOUE was declared on June 6, 2011 due to the river level expected to exceed the 1004 feet NOLJE threshold (see EN 46929, and PNO-]V-11-003), http://nrr IO.nrc.gov/forum/ftrumtopic.ciim?selectedFonumi uutsicie ot bcope 6 92 1 6/19/201 2 NRR. -OECommunityPae2o Page 2 of 5 Fort Calhoun Arial Picture of flooding The NRC Operating Experience Branch gave a presentation at an international conference regarding the Fort Calhoun flooding event response which includes more photographs of the site and Includes lessons learned and other insights.
See slides.Fire Event On June 7, 2011, while the plant was In Mode 5 and the site was In a NOUE due to the high river level, fire alarms were received In the control room and the Halon system discharged for the Bus 1B4A switchgear room.A safety related 480 volt AC load center supply breaker had failed. The fire brigade responded to the alarm and found the room filled with smoke, but no active fire. During the event, both trains of class 1E Direct Current (DC) grounded due to extensive damage inside cubicle 1B4A, which resulted In numerous control room alarms that are fed from the DC circuits.
At 0930 CDT electrical buses were de-energized to aid In mitigating damage.This resulted in both trains of spent fuel pool cooling to be de-energized.
At 0940 CDT the site declared an Alert due to a fire affecting the operability of plant safety systems required to establish of maintain safe shutdown (see EN 46932 and PNO-IV-11-004).
During the event, the local fire department responded to the site. At 1147 CDT, power was restored to one train of spent fuel pool cooling. The spent fuel pool temperature rose approximately 3 degrees Fahrenheit while cooling was out of service. Shutdown cooling was not affected and remained in service during the event. The site exited the Alert at 1313 CDT after confirming that the fire was extinguished and the area was ventilated to restore access. At 1056 EDT, the NRC entered the Monitoring Mode as a result of the event, and exited at 1439 EDT after SFP cooling was restored (see PNO.IV-II-.Q.4A).
An MD 8.3 evaluation was performed for this event, and a Soecial InsoectionTeam was dispatched to the site.UPDATE: On April 10, 2012 press release IV-.2-01t2 was issued: NRC ISSUES FORT CALHOUN STATION INSPECTION FINDING OF HIGH SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
[Red Finding].
See Enforcement Action notification (EA Failure of the Aqua Berm SOutside of Scope http://nrrf0.nrc.gov/forum/forumtopic.cfm?selectedForum1 rai1__ 6/19/2012 NRR -@S ECommunity Page 3 of 5 Outside of Scope The original 154A supply breaker (model General Electric (GE) AK-50) had been replaced with a Square 0 breaker In 2009 due to aging Issues and a lack of available spare parts (a total of twelve breakers were replaced at that time), These were not a direct replacement for the GE breaker; therefore a cradle assembly was used to match up the Square D equipment with the GE switchgear.
The cradle consists of finger clusters that engage the bus bars at the back of the GE swltchgear, and had stabs on the circuit breaker side of the cradle to accept the breaker finger clusters.
The circuit breaker cradle fingers were longer than the original AK-50 breakers, and they engaged the bus bar in a contact area of hardened grease and copper oxide build-up.
This caused a high resistance connection at the stab to finger Interface.
The high resistance connection overheated the finger cluster resulting In bus grounding and phase-to-phase shorting.Other contributing causes to failure of the breaker Included:@ An acrid odor that existed for three days preceding the bus fire was not adequately communicated to engineering, maintenance, or management.
- FCS engineering had limited knowledge of GE AKD-5 switchgear resulting in overreliance on vendor knowledge and skill,@ An FCS modification procedure lacks requirements to identify and compare critical design characteristics of equipment being modified.
Additionally, this procedure has weak requirements for the use of operating experience criteria.v Maintenance procedures that govern 480 V bus cleaning are Inadequate.
Also, access to the bus side of the GE AKD-5 switchgear Is difficult limiting the selection of Inspection/testing methods.* As-left resistance readings from the line to load side of the switchgear following circuit breaker replacement were not confirmed.
See LER 285201 1008R01 for more information on the failure of supply breaker 154A.Previous Performance Issues and Transition Into INC 0350'p/n ng/omouoicme e oum of http://nrrlO'.nrc'govlforum/forumtopic'cfm~seiectedForum]Otsd ofScpe' 6/19/2012 NRR -@OECommunity Page 4 of" 5 Fort Calhoun Station's has had several performance Issues in recent years that have resulted in increased NRC oversight.
These issues are described below.* On October 6, 2010, the NRC issued a Yellow Finding (substantial safety significance) to Fort Calhoun Station due to Inadequate flood protection strategies.
This finding Is the subject of OpE Issue for Resolution (IFR) 2011-001 and associated OpE COMM." On July 18, 2011, The NRC Issued a White Finding (low to moderate safety significance) to Fort Calhoun for the failure to preclude shading coils from repetitively.
becoming loose material In the M2 reactor trip contactor.
The loose parts In the trip contactor can become an obstruction and cause the failure of the contactor.
This Issue was Included In the OpE COMM Contribution of Corrective Action Program Deficiencies to Greater-than-Green Inspection Findings and ]FR 2011- 010 due to the repetitive nature of the condition." Fort Calhoun Station transitloned to Column IV of the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) Action Matrix in September 2011 due to the Mitigating Systems cornerstone being degraded for more than four consecutive quarters (due to the Yellow Finding), with an additional input to the action matrix (due to the White finding).
See the Mid-Cycle Performance Review.Restart of the facility has been delayed by performance concerns Involving electrical fire and inadequate train separation, in addition to flood recovery.
Following the plant shutdown, additional performance Issues were identified that required additional NRC oversight, Including: " Incomplete high energy line break and environmental qualification analyses," The breaker failure and fire described above." Inadequate communications with state and local officials following the declaration of an ALERT following the fire event.The NRC Issued Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 4-11-003 (MLt 1242Q164) on September 2, 2011 to confirm the actions FCS planned to take in its submitted Post-Flooding Recovery Action Plan (ML1 12430102).
Due to these past performance Issues in addition to the flood and fire events, Fort Calhoun was placed in Imc 0350, "Oversight of Reactor Facilities in a Shutdown Condition Due to Significant Performance and/or Operational Concerns" (see Notification of Changg to Regulatory Oversight of Fort Calhoun Station (ML1 13470721) and Fort Calhoun JMg 0350 Charter (ML120120661.)).
Operating Experience Flooding Issues IN 87-49 -Deficiencies in Outside Containment Flooding Protection IN 94-27 -Facility Operating Concerns Resulting from Local Area Flooding Procedure 71111.06 -Flood Protection Measures Outside of Scope http://mrrl 0.nrn.gov/forum/forumtopic.cfm?selectedForurnl utside o P 6cope 1 6/19/2012 NRR -@OECopneunily Page 5 of 5 Outside of Scope[For questlons or concerns related to this OpE COMM, contact 3esso Robles (lesse.robles@nrc.gov), 1-.1415-2940, Outside of Scope J '- )Page: 1.. .. .. "'%, , http://nffO.nrc.gov/fonm/forumtopic.cfm?selectedFor Outside of Scope i 6/19/2012 NRR -@OECommunity Page j of 3 mm Continual Learning Through Knowledge Sharin" Search I How to Subscribe I 191_1n June 20, 2012 QE Home > Forum > New Reactors Information Security Reminder Information Security Reminder:
OpE COMWs contain preliminary information in the interest of timely internal communication of operating experience.
OpE COMMs may be pre-decislonal and may contain sensitive information.
They are not intended for distribution outside the agency.Page: 1 Jay Patel (5/2/2011 12:29:43 pm)Revised on 4/19/2012 1:23:41 pm INADEQUATE DESIGN CHANGE IMPLEMENTATION INVOLVING ABANDONED IN PLACE EQUIPMENT Summary: This COMM intends to raise awareness of underlying issues associated with two recent events caused by inadequate design change Implementation Involving abandoned in place equipment.
The two events highlight the Importance of properly performing and implementing design change packages associated with abandoned in place systems, structures, and components (SSCs)...Discussion:
outside of Scope The second event, reported by the Fort Calhoun Station on February 27, 2011, identified unsealed through wall penetrations in the intake structure that were below the licensing basis flood elevation.
These penetrations had been installed during the original installation of the plant security system and were abandoned when the security system was replaced In 1985. The penetrations for the new security system were sealed, however, the http://nrrl 0.nrc.gov/forumlforumtopic.cfm?selectedForum=03&forumld=NEWREACTORS&topicld=3381 6/20/2012 NRR -@OECommunity Page 2 of 3 old penetrations were abandoned in place and never sealed, thus making the intake structure vulnerable to water inflow during an extreme flooding event. The unsealed penetrations could have Jeopardized the ability of the raw water pumps (located In the intake structure) to perform their design basis function during an accident.A configuration change was later developed and permanent seals were installed In the subject conduit penetrations.
The cause of the event pertinent to this COMM was an inadequate design change process that did not require abandoned in place penetrations below the flood line to be sealed thus invalidating design assumptions and placing the plant In an unanalyzed condition.
Construction Experience Insights: The following valuable Insights can help avoid latent problems during the design and construction of nuclear facilities similar to the ones caused by these two events: 1. Engineering changes made to one system should not adversely affect other safety systems or Invalidate design assumptions.
Refer to IP 35007, Section A3.04.01, Item D for guidance.2. The applicant/licensee work control process and inspection program should verify that the as-built configuration in the field is consistent with design requirements.
Refer to Criterion V and X of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. In addition, IP 65001.A, Section 02.01 and IP 37051, Section 02.01 provide specific related guidance for the construction of 10 CFR Part 52 plants and 10 CFR Part 50 plants respectively.
Existing Reactors Insiahts: To avoid latent problems associated with inadequate design changes or abandoned in place equipment reviews for existing facilities, various Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) inspection procedures such as: IP 71111.18"Plant Modifications," IP 71111.21 "Component Design Bases Inspection," or IP 71152 "Problem Identification and Resolution" are in place to provide the necessary guidance.
Inspectors should be aware of the type of issues described in this COMM and look to Identify them during their plant walkdowns and follow-up as necessary during their normal Inspection reviews, Selected Related Information:
Outside of Scope http://nrr]O.nrc.gov/forum/forumtopic .cfm?selectedForum=03&forumId=NE WREACTORS&topicld=33 81 6/120/2012 NRR -@OECommunity Page 3 of 3 Outside of Scope*****Update 10/21/11*****
- 8) FORT CALHOUN -FLOOD BARRIER PENETRATIONS NOT WATER TIGHT (EN 47359). During follow-up inspections of flood barrier penetrations, it was determined some of the water tight conduit fittings were not filled with the material required to make them water tight.*****Update 11/08/11*****
Outside of Scope Page: 1 http://nrrl O.nrc.gov/forumlforumtopic.cfm?selectedForum=03&forumld=NEWREACTORS&topicld=3381 6/20/2012 SECTION 2.0.'ýdITE HIS'TORY F FSC N AND(LOND' kiN AN, a ,.',,'.'
Page 2-1 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition*
Rev. 2 2.0 SITE HISTORY, DESCRIPTION, AND BASELINE CONDITION 2.1 Geologic Setting The surficial geology of the FCS site consists primarily of Missouri River alluvium deposited during the Holocene Epoch after Late Pleistocene, Wisconsin glaciation (Miller, 1964.). Because it is thought that the Missouri River did not occupy its current position during the Wisconsin glaciation (Miller, 1964), a sequence of erosion of the Missouri River channel and deposition of the present Holocene alluvium is the sequence that has developed the current site stratigraphy.
Post Wisconsin glacial event (Late Pleistocene) to Holocene alluvium overlies the Wintersel.
Member of the Dennis Formation Limestone of the Pennsylvanian Kansas City Group at the site. Glacial and alluvial deposits of Quaternary Age (less than 1.6 million years) are less than 100 fl:tbiok at'the site but vayE,:rom 300 to less than 100 ft thick within a 5-mile radius of the site (Burchette, et4aL,1975).
Limestoine of the Kansas City Group is described as dark gray to light gray, very thpily bedded to massive, argillaceous, fossiliferous, and containing some pyrite crystals and mica (Burcheitte, dal,, 1975). Bedrocki.
ot exposed at the site. A more specific description of soil and bedrock conditioins at the site is pr'esented in Section 2.4, Geotechnical Baseline Condition.
Regional geologic structure includes a gentle dip of bedrock bedcg&i:'othe west (Me ee, 2003).Faults within a 100-mile radius of the site are limited to basem. structures such as the Nemaha Fault Zone, do not offset Pennsylvanian strata, and are not recognizd..:as active (McBee, 2003).2.1.1 Historical Seismicity HDR conducted an inventory of reef" U-.istorical sts ttccurred at a magnitude of 2.0 or greater within 100 miles of F location of eaem;,ts magnitude, and its distance from the site are shown 2-1.
of the istorical seismicity was conducted using the Advanced ic System (ANSS) at http://www.ncedc.org/anss/catalog-search.htp4l.o;he ANSS is a wo!de earthquake catalog created by merging the master earthquake catalogs ot.the contributing ANSA Ginber network and can be queried by geographic location.Table 2-1 -Historical SJ icity Within 100 Miles of Fort Calhoun Station Latitude : Longitude Distance from (decimal ,i-'i, (decimal Magnitude Site-d.. degrees) (kilometers) 4 1. 0,:,, -97.00 5.0 99 1902 ..,. 42 ., -97.60 4.5 140 1935 -96.20 4.7 136 1981 .:4.-iJ-20
-97.630 2.7 132 1995 ,40.51 -94.95 3.1 145 1997 41.79 -97.18 3.4 100 2004 40.63 -95.55.. 3.5 .106 2009 40.41 -95.86 3.6 124 2010 41.35 -97.01 3.3 83 Source: U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). October 26, 2009. "2008 National Seismic Hazard Maps -Fault Parameters." Earthquake Hazards Program. Retrieved September 20, 2011.http://geohazards.usgs.gov/cfusion/hazfaultssearch/hf_searchmain.cfm.
Page 2-2 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 2.1.2. Regional Seismicity and Faulting FCS is located within the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) as delineated by the U.S.Geological Survey (USGS) (Crone and Wheeler, 2000). The CEUS experiences minimal seismic activity with the exception of specific zones such as the New Madrid Seismic Zone and Mears Fault Zone not located in proximity to FCS (Petersen et al., 2008). In conjunction with many local and state agencies, USGS maintains a database of Quaternary faults for the U.S. (USGS, October 26, 2009).These include known faults that are estimated to have undergone movemenitin the past 1.6 million years (within the Quaternary Period), or since late Cenozoic A" fil1ass Bifaulli.
Active faults generally include Holocene Age faults that have undergone mo1- i.ent in the past- 5,000 years. For this study, the database was searched for all fault classificationý.s B, C, and D). 'Th.USGS fault classifications are as follows:* Class A -Geologic evidence demonstrates the existence of a Qwufatiary fault (within the@past 1.6 million years) of tectonic origin." Class B -Geologic evidence demonstrates the existence .Q~fQuaternary deformation, but either 1) the fault might not extend deeply enough to be a ,lOi~e t rce of signi earthquakes, or 2) the currently available geologic evidence is toostrofig to dently assign the feature to Class C but not strong enough to assign it to Class A.* Class C -Geologic evidence is insufficient to demonstrate.
ijthe existence of tectonic faulting, or 2) Quaternary slip or deformation associated with the feai.ie." Class D -Geologic evidence demonrq..te thai the feat&'#his not a teot onic fault or feature; this.category includes features such as j_`i#Is landslides, erd&bnal or fluvial scarps, or other landforms resembling fault scarps but of "o , -able non-tectoirigim. ,Y.No Class A or B fault.exis8..4within a 4DI0.Ile radius of FCýS! losest Class A or B fault is the Cheraw fault,wi '0- the so itwest i southeastern Colorado.
The closest fault system is the Ord ed&1r*ient, 9,ximateiy 15"miles west of FCS. This fault system is a Class C associated w~it 'h aic procesi,#pd was determined by Machette et al. (1998) as not Quaternary movem'en:-e USGS-d "ase contains no Class D faults within a 400diilý radius of FCS. %2.1.3 ic Hazard Assessmeni ic hazard is ba b p the earthquake characteristics and the causative fault associated wit"h hqua haractestis include magnitude of maximum earthquake, distane hfrom rthqua' e T :/distance from the "tothe c4 e" fault, fault length, and activity of the fault. The effects of site soil conditions and the h' of faulting are accounted for in the attenuation relationships.
The probabilistic strong gro0nd-motion values were developed from USGS gridded databases, developed by Frankel, et al. (1996 and 2002), and with most recently developed Next Generation Attenuation (NGA) relationships by Petersen, et al. (2008). These values were queried from USGS-maintained databases located at http://gldims.cr.usgs.gov/website/nshmp2008/viewer.htm and https://geohazards.usgs.gov/deaggint/2008/.
The results of this analysis are presented in Attachment 1, Deaggregation Plots. Attachment I illustrates the regional probabilistic strong ground motion for the 10 percent probability of exceedance in 50 years, 2 percent probability of exceedance in 50 years, 2 percent probability of exceedance in 100 years, and 2 percent probability of exceedance in 200 years.Estimated peak ground acceleration (PGA) is summarized in Table 2-2.
Page 2-3 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 Table 2-2 -Peak Ground Acceleration as Percentacie for Various Return Periods Earthquake Return Approximate Probability of Peak Ground Period (years) Exceedance in 50 years (%) AccelerationA 500 10 0.0142 g 2500 2 0.0431 g 5000 1 0.0669 g 10,000 0.5 , 0.1020 g A Peak ground acceleration is measured by the acceleration due _t..gravity W .: .4 Source: USGS. July 21, 2011. "2008 Interactive Deaggregatio e(Beta)" Ge.giqgHazards Science Center. Retrieved September 20, 2011. https://geoha r .usgs.gov/deagg""2008/.
I 2.1.4 Site Geologic Hazards Several geologic hazards have been identified at the FCS site and discussed inprevious design reports by Dames & Moore (1968) and Gibbs, Hill, Durham, and Richardson (1967). These hazards include the existence of karst features associated with dissolution.
of the Winterset Member of the Dennis Formation Limestone, liquefaction of the loose poorly- gaded sands identified at the'-ite, bank slope stability adjacent to the Missouri River, and scour:and erosion of near-surface soils.2.1.4.1 Karsti; .::.-Dames & Moore (1968) identifiedit least two sigin.4ant karst features in the Winterset Member of the Dennis Forinfiom;I.imestone that pwently have developed along existing fractures.
The features to be as mu .ftwide, 16 ft deep, and 45 ft long and consist of'inMj1ler 1.5- to 3-t#bid and a lower zonetof decomposed limestone and detri~tt 0 ..f te locati.oh o, ese features Is shown in Figure 2- I, Geotechnical Area'Aihd Cross-Sec , 'octions.
views of the geologic setting are presented 61iF, ires 2-2 and 2-3. Sect2 J4 , shows where these karst features intersect the i ,urface secuw" at FCS for th-.@optaiment, Auxilary Building, Turbine Building, and Intake'S fo' *h pti* e'.Axi'iar 3-We was designed to pene any overlying layer of limestone that covers the karst feaf:tand to found the pile on'-soaund rock at the bottom of these features.
The potential Jnflueni*'O Ahese karst features.on foundation stability is considered minimal. It is likely that addition Cfeaturesq AS -,across the site, but the overlying alluvial cover of a minimum of 6 1 ft offers-bu, er to of these features on any structure.
Further dissolution of limestone is an i' process given that the limestone is in contact with groundwater.
The most aggressive ition of limestone by groundwater occurs in the vadose zone (Mylroie, 1984). The fact that the karst features at the FCS site are covered by approximately 60 ft of alluvial material and are in contact with groundwater that has experienced some subsurface residence time didates that the rate of karst feature development (limestone dissolution) is low.In addition, the karst features encountered in the 1967 Dames & Moore drilling program were primarily filled with decomposed limestone and detritus.
The volume of space needed to allow significant collapse of overlying soils is not present. Therefore, within the expected service life of FCS, the process of limestone dissolution is not significant.
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03i110 900 so110 .90. "VOZ I RONVAE ItV0M 2101 v 001M 4111 ELEVATION 2-10-10 YE9710k SCALE -A~ W AM101 WjA0 ls Section B-B Fort Calhoun Station 0411 Seo 2D'I Plant and Fadjity Geoloclinical and SItructural AssesITeilI Page 2-7 Site History, Desciption, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 A further understanding of the karst features at the FCS site would require drilling and installation of sampling wells to sample water near the limestone and soil contact in order to assess the chemical characteristics of the groundwater at this interface.
This effort is not considered necessary as part of this Assessment Report because the plant has functioned without evidence of foundation subsidence due to karst feature collapse and resulting collapse of overlying soil prior lo and during the 2011 flood.2.1.4.1 Liquefaction of Non-Cohesive Soils Liquefaction studies have been performed by others for the FCS site using post-construction conditions.
The assumptions used in performing the liquefaction anaoyses and results of those studies have not been reviewed by HDR, but it is believd.tdhat the largely non-cohesive, saturated soil materials at the site would be subject to liqdfikti..qijgiven sufficient seismic loading. The pertinent question for this study is whether thie %ntial exists that I flood changed the saturation and soil density sufficiently to increie ."~ faction potentfl4der;te maximum credible earthquake (MCE). Ongoing site explorationO~'-iftquantify the co-nitron 0 the site soils where drilling is accessible.
2.1.4.2 Bank Slope Stability The site has slopes along the Missouri Rjive"that could e i ,stability problems due to river-level increase and then rapid drawdowpi, resultin&-.n-exces'vy..pore pressures in the slopes of the river bank that, are adjao'ent to6anii of I s strucl. M The mostly non-cohesive nature of the soils will fallow dratn.And dissipion of pore pressure without significant effects on channe Once river Iles have re.ed, inspection of the Missouri River banks site will provd' ,,yt.J.sessment of this potential slope stability hazard. In addition, f1eiechnometers were. 01 tio monitor bank slope stability.ScOur and Etosion T ii+lundation of the sitehi.the potential to-scour and erode the existing grade and remove*;dii material from around aid4Oneath structures that are founded near the ground surface. The-cohesive nature of the sit6ýils indicates scour potential given sufficient water velocity R. apacity to carry 2.2 G' :" hology and Physiqgtýphic Setting FCS is located i$ihkbeastern W hngton County, Nebraska, approximately 4 miles southeast of Blair, Nebraska.
in es-iin-the Central Lowland portion of the Interior Plains Physiographic Province, as shown Gn,ý.SS, 2003). More specifically, the site is classified as par of the Dissected Till Plains, a s ti~sion of the aforementioned province, a region covered by Pleistocene glacial events that depositetill during glacial advance as well as during glacial retreat. The till has since been partially covered with eolian (wind-deposited) loess deposits and dissected by erosion cadsed by the Missouri River and its-ttibutaries.
-...
M In n e s 0 1 a a uot ha CENTRAL LOWLAND WESTERN LAKE* .. ..GREAT PLAINS HIGH PLAINS N e b r a s k a 0 0.1.,.CENTRAL L9.#AN TILL P'LAINS M i s 0 U r i K CENTRAL LOWLAND OSAGE PLAINS 0 30 60=Miles I OZARK PLATEAUS SPRINGFIELD-SALEM PLATEAUS Omaha Public Power =imirict I Physiographic Setting of Interior Plains Region Fort Calhoun Station Plant and Facility Geotechnical and Structural Assessment Page 2-9 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 Washington County is also recognized as having two distinct physiographic divisions:
- 1) uplands formed in loess and glacial till; and 2) floodplains along the Elkhorn and Missouri rivers (U.S. Department of Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Service [USDA NRCS], 2004). -In addition, the floodplains of the Missouri River are subdivided into the low bottom, which consists of a frequently flooded zone of meander scars and oxbow cutoffs, and the flood basin, which lies between the low bottom and the uplands. The flood basin is less frequently flooded than the low bottom.2.2.1 Site Soils The soils of the site are mapped by USDA NRCS (2004) as belonging to the following: " Haynie silt loam (coarse silty alluvium), 0 to 2 percent slopes, well drained, adjacent to the Missouri River* Wathena fine sandy loam (sandy alluvium), 0 to 2 percent slopes, moderately well drained* Onawa silty clay (clayey-loamy alluvium), 0 to 2 percent slopes, somewhat poorly drained" Albaton silty clay (clayey alluvium), 0 to 2 percent slopes, poorly drained" Onawa silty clay loam (clayey alluvium), 0 to 2 percent slopes, somewhat poorly drained" Judson silty clay loam (colluvium), 2 to 5 percent slopes (colluvium), well drained* Ida silt loam (loess), 5 to 11 percent slopes, well drained The site soils in the low bottom are derived from the Missouri River alluvial material.
Soils of the flood basin are primarily derived from alluvial material but also include some colluvium and wash from the uplands, and soils of the uplands located along the south and southwest limits of the site are derived entirely from glacial till and loess.2.2.2 Geomorphic Features The notable geomorphic features of the site include the Missouri River channel, the meander scars and oxbow cutoffs of"the Miss0uiu-River floodplain, and the rolling hills consisting of glacial till with varying thickness of colian loess~deposits.
2.3 Hydrologic
Baseline FCS is situated directly along the Missouri River at River Mile (RM) 646, as shown in Figure 2-5.FCS is ncit protected by a levee and is therefore subject to flooding during extreme flood events. The average elevation of the FCS site is approximately 1004 ft. Table 2-3 presents data from USACE from its November 2003-report, "Upper:Mississippi River System Flow Frequency Study, Hydrology and Ilydraulics, Appefidix F, Missotpwifitver." According to these data, el. 1004 ft correlates to a flood recurrence interval of slightly..Pypr 25 years or an annual probability of flooding of 0.040. This differs from USAR-2.7, Hydrology, Where a stage of 1004.2 ft is reported as being a 0. 1 percent annual chance event (1000-year recu-rrence interval) (OPPD, April 29, 2011). USAR 2-7 acknowledges that multiple flow frequency studies have been performed by USACE subsequent to the development of the design peak flood stage.
-+-.4 1 I-'pt iC , ..V. Idt AZ JUV Feet NW91IMMM 1 '.C*Location of FCS along Missouri River Fort Calhoun Station DATE OImaha P ob,~Pwer Disiricl Aug 2011 FIGURE Plant and Facility Geotechnical and Structural Assessment FIR 2-5 I l .
Page 2-11 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 Table 2-3 -Missouri River Flood Recurrence Intervals at RM 646 (FCS)Recurrence Interval Probability Discharge Stage (years) (cfs) (ft)2 0.500 62,000 996.4 5 0.200 82,600 999.4 10 0.100 117,000 1003.0 25 0.040 127,000 1003.9 50 0.020 142-,,900 1005.1 100 0.010 168,700 1006.5 200 0.005 197,200 ..1008.0 500 0.002 238,800 1009.3 Source: USACE. November 2003. "Upper Mississippi River System Flow Frequency Study, Hydrology and Hydraulics, Appendix F, Missouri River." Data on historic floods and the 2011 flood are discussed below as are potential Missouri River flood impacts and damages at FCS.2.3.1 Historic Missouri River Flooding FCS went online in 1973 along the Missouri River At RM 646. Before FCS was constructed, the site likely experienced flooding in 1881 and 1883, and the site definitely experienced flooding in 1943 and 1952. Sincc it was constructed, FCS has experienced flood events in 1984, 1993, 1997, 2007, 2010, and 2011. Data on these historic floods on the Missouri River are presented in Table 2-4.Discharge and water surface elevations at USGS stream gage locations at Sioux City, Iowa, and at Decatur, Blair, and Omaha, Nebraska, are provided in Table 2-4. In addition, water surface elevations at FCS, which were estimated using stage information at Decatur, Blair, and Omaha, are included.Using the stage-discharge relationships.defined in the"Upper Mississippi River System Flow Frequency Study" (USACE, November 2003), a discharge of approximately 130,000 cfs results in a stage of 1004.0 fR at RM 646. As shown in Table 2-3, this is approximately a 25-year flood event.Again, this differs from the probability associated with el. 1004 ft as reported in USAR-2-7 (OPPD, April 29, 201.i). Although FCS has experienced flood events in 1984, 1993, 1997, 2007, 2010, and 2011, the data"'.sh6w that the Missouri"River water surface elevation exceeded the average site elevation of 1004 ft only once since construction, that being in 2011. The data also show that the water surface was within I ft of reaching the average site elevation during 1984 and 1993.
Page 2-12 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condifion Rev. 2 Table 2.4- Historic Flood Events on the Missouri River at Fort Calhoun Station, RM 646 USGS Gage Historic Flood EventsA Location on Datu 1881' 1883 1943 195211984 1993 1997 2007 2010 2011 DatumL2ctI 2 the Missouri 'River Sioux Cityc 1056.98 Discharge 212,000 441,000 104,000 72,000 100,000 42,100 86,600 192,000.(cfs)...WSEL (ft) 1095.69 1101.29 1087.88 1084.28 1082.48 1075.58 1082.48 1092.23 Decatur 1010.00 Discharge 76,400 100,000 46,800 80,600 191,000 (cfs) ]I ..WSEL(ft) 105350 1042.20 1042.00 1035.40 1041.40 1050,24 Blair 977.58 Discharge ,.______ _(cfs)WSEL(ft) .1005.08 1004.98 1002.48 998.08 1004.48 1010.31 FCS WSEL (ft) >1004 1 >1004 ' >:1004 >1004 1003.3 1003,3 10007 996.6 1002.7 1006.85 Omaha 948.24 Discharge 200,000 396,000 1 15,000 110,000 86,100 103,000 216,000 WSEL 98846 97724 978 54 974.64 974.74 97584 98453 Instantaneous peaks/stages ftom USGS.B. 1881 discharge of 370,000 cfs estimated at St. Joseph, Missouri.
Information from this table was used to estirnate stage at FCS.C. Sioux City gage datum was 20 ft higher in 1943 and 1952,.WSEL water surface elevation.
Page 2-13 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 A stage recorder located at the FCS Intake Structure documented water surface elevations during the 2011 flood event. These data indicate that the maximum stage occurred on June 25, 2011, at el. 1006.85 ft. In addition, the staff gage on the landward side of the FCS Intake Structure (observed on July 12, 2011) showed a high water mark at around cl. 1007.1 ft.2.3.2 2011 Missouri River Basin Flood Massive flooding in the Missouri River basin, shown in Figure 2-6, occurred in 2011 because of a combination of above-normal snowpack in the plains in the Northern U.S., above-normal snowpack in the mountains above Fort Peck Dam on the Missouri River, and excessive upstream spring rains in eastern Montana and North and South Dakota. USACE's forecast on November 1, 2011, estimated that in 2011, runoff into the Missouri River above Sioux City would be nearly 61 MAF. This is the highest amount since 1898, eclipsing the previous high runoff of 49 MAF.At the end of February 2011, the plains snowpack contained as much as 6 to 8 inches (in.) of equivalent water across parts of Montana, North Dakota, and Soulh Dakota. At the end of March, the mountain snowpack above Foil Peck Dam was close to the 30-year historic average. However, by May 2,2011, the total snowpack was 141 percent of the 30-year historic average. During May 201 I.the snowmelt combined with 10 to 15 in. of precipitation centered in Southern Montana and 6 to 10 in.of precipitation across the remainder of the watershed above Sioux City to produce record runoff amounts.USACE began releasing record discharges from Gavins Point Dam in late May 2011. The release was increased to 160,000 cfs by June 26, 2011, and remained at this level until mid-August.
Beginning on August 19, 2011, USACE began reducing releases daily in 5,000 cfs increments, reaching 90,000 cfs on August 30, 2011. Further reductions began on September.
18, 201 1,..reaching 40,000 cfs on October 2, 20 11. USACE has indicated that the 40,000 cfs release will be maintained until at least mid-December, When winter weather conditions set in and the risk of ice jams increases.
Fort Peck Missouri RMver 0 200 400 Missouri River Basin i i Fort Calhoun Station.... .v .. g. , V. ,.ODmna Public Pc.e, Dslrin Plant and Facility Geolechnical and Structural Assessment Page 2-15 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 2.3.3 Missouri River Flood Impact at FCS Because FCS is located along the Missouri River (see Figure 2-5), as the releases at Gavins Point Dam were increased, floodwater encroached on the FCS site. Figure 2-7 presents the water surface elevations as surveyed on site at RM 646 and the flow rate as predicted by USACE and interpolated to RM 646 by HDR. As discussed previously, the peak water surface elevation at FCS occurred on June 25, 2011, at an elevation of 1006.85 ft.Ft. Calhoun- River Mile 646 1008.0 1007.5 __" 200.000 E 1007.0 ..... ....1 006.5 3006.0 180,000)0 04 3004.0 A O 1003.5 A~ d.0 M 1003.0 0 1002.5 0 o ..O]4000 1002.0 300100 o .......120,000 1000.0 ._ '. .: -. .1000.0 0 "100.000',., .,, ,..Id .zj ~0 Surveyed Elevations at intake at RM 646 A USACE Flow Figure 2-7 -Flow and Water Surface Elevations (June through August)for Fort Calhoun Station, RM 646 The I I years in which flooding occurred on the Missouri River at Omaha from 1928 to 2011 are compared visually in Figure 2-6. Each plot starts on January 1 and finishes on December 3 I. The Omaha gage has the longest and most complete period of record of Missouri River discharges of any gage near FCS. Though this gage is 30 miles downstream from FCS, the data are applicable to the FCS site in the context of comparing flood durations.
The rating curves used to estimate the Missouri River stage for a given discharge have adjusted significantly over the past 70 years. For example, using USACE's "Missouri River Stage Trends" technical report (2010) as a reference, at the Omaha gage since 1940, the rating curve adjustment range is on the order of plus or minus 2 ft for river stage at discharges of 100,000 cfs. The FCS site initially becomes flooded at an elevation of 1004 ft, and applying this same 4-ft range in stage at FCS (1006 to 1002 ft) translates to a discharge of 180,000 to 130,000 cfs (see Figure 2-7). This discharge range is bracketed in Figure 2-8 to define the range of Page 2-16 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 flows that flooded the site in 2011. Of the five flood events at the FCS site (1929, 1943, 1949, 1952, and 2011), the firstfour all receded from the site within 7 to 14 days. The 2011 event covered The FCS site for almost 75 days.450,000 1929 400,000 1943 1949 350,000 -1952..... 1950 300,000 Z :1993 250,000 1993.C -1997 E 200.000 2007 0 2010 M Historically
-Range of, 150,000 dliSc.a' tcue -2011 , ,I initiul site flooding at FCS U)V, 100,00W£ % '-. ..- -%',-_ , -50,00040 10 .100 0 250 300 350 D. (IStarting on )an 1)Figure 2-8 -Comparlisn of Discharges on the Missouri River at Omaha in Years w Nern Flooding Occurred (1928 to 2011)As a result.. flood flows, additional c~annel degradation and bank erosion have occurred in the vicinity.of FCS... A detailed evaluati~ilof changes in the stage-discharge rating curves applicable to the Missouri Rivetie ar FCS is beingp~ddkmed at this time. USGS surveyed the river in the vicinity of FCS in fall 2008 and again on Ju1y25, 2011. The survey in 2008 was performed in National Geodetic Vertical Datum of 1929 (NGVD 29), and the survey in 2011 was performed in North American Vertical Datum of 1988 (NAVD 88) and converted to NGVD 29. Figure 2-9 shows the locations of the surveyed hydraulic cross sections, and Figure 2-1 0 shows a comparison of the channel bathymetry throughout the surveyed reach between 2008 and 2011 at Stations 4+10 and 6+65. Figures 2-11,2-12, and 2-13 provide comparisons of the remaining surveyed hydraulic.cross sections.
It is clear that the channel has degraded by 10 ft or more across most of the channel. This is true in all the cross sections from station 4* 10 to 21 ]+44.
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--+ 0- --:-'-.2 0 .00'. -..... .... ....9.. ..100 0 ARE LOOKING UPSTREAM I .* -Stations 18.91 Oct 20114 (PLANT NORTH)..-~Fort ClonStation FGR' .n PbIc : w IOr ;ri I 01141I ulc vvlOsrc Plant and Facility Geotechnical 13[ and Structural Assessment Page 2-22 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 On July 12, 2011, personnel from HDR visited FCS to observe and investigate the impact of floodwater on FCS. Photos I and 2 are images of floodwater at FCS. Flow paths and velocities through FCS as observed are shown in Figure 2-14. A figure depicting the high water elevations as surveyed is provided in Figure 2-15.T* T ...J ... .......PhOoA -Floodwater at FCS,;,Looking North from the Administration Building toward the Old Warehouse Site History, Description, and Baselihe Condition Page 2-23 Rev. 2..iPhoto 2 -FIoOdOwater at FCS, Looking East toward the Containment 1.C*j I,-1 Be~in'-*1 t.'%-4 ft'high-560 cfs-200 cft-400 cfs-160 cfs, 4 fps l Gap a S"2 fps" I 4; 4~, toll WI at WE C" I 7S .'*A A IT 0 200 400 r~Feel r~i Surface Water Flow Path Onulha Public Power DrSrict Flow Paths on July 12, 2011 Fort Calhoun Station Aug 2011 FIGURE N1 Plant and Facility Geotechnical and Structural Assessment fm 2-14 I A
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- z, ? u " .,. ..-.O .Fe,' e. l = -. uu o ." tn * -.ý. * -,:A ' .. .: " ....*0 6 3 ' ' ,Surveyed High Water Line DAT] Survey Point =z- z- .Fort Calhoun Station Sep 2011 High.Wat.r.M.r Lne ... -Surveyed by Lamp Rynerson & Ass. 9/112011 FIGURE* igh ater ark ine Dmaha Publir Power Dlilrlrt o iPlant and Facility Geotechnical 2-15 N, and Structural Assessment Page 2-26 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 2.3.4 Potential Flood Damages at FCS The FCS site was inundated by floodwater for nearly 3 months (see Figure 2-7, Flow and Water Surface Elevations (June through August) for Fort Calhoun Station, RM 646) by approximately 3 ft of water as a result of 2011 flooding.
Buildings and property at FCS have been subject to a variety of forces as a result of Missouri River floodwater.
Hydrostatic and buoyancy forces due to inundation.
hydrodynamic forces due to moving water, scour and erosion around building foundations, and to a lesser extent, wave forces and forces imparted by the impact of moving debris such as large trees, are described as follows (FEMA, 2008).2.3.4.1 Hydrostatic Forces A hydrostatic load is imparted to the walls and foundation of a structure when floodwater builds up along a structure.
A hydrostatic force acts laterally or vertically (if the structure is submerged).
Hydrostatic forces can become strong enough to cause deflection when there is a substantial difference in water elevation on opposite sides of the structure.
2.3.4.2 Buoyancy Forces As floodwater rises, a structure can experience a'buoyant force that has to be Counteracted by the weight of the structure and any anchorage forces.2.3.4.3 Hydrodynamic Forces Water flowing around a structure during a flood event imparts a load on the affected structure.
The load is the combination of the force imposed by the moving floodwater hitting the frontal area of the structure, the drag-forces imparted along'.ih:.wAlIs of the structure, and the negative pressure acting Op..the downstream, side of the structure.
The negative pressure is located in the wake .zone created by flow separation as the floodwater moves past the structures.
If a structure is not rigid, there is also a lift force imparted on the structure by the moving floodwater.
.-.2.3.4.4 Scour and Erosion Hih- velocities from water flowing across a flooded area can cause soil erosion if the soil or mateiWal.at the ground surface does not have a greater resistive force than the shear stress impartedit the ground surfaceby the floodwater.
Local scour is also possible at or along structure foundations.
As.floodwater impacts a structure, the water is forced downward and around the structure.
The resulting increase in velocity and turbulence characteristics can result in localized scour. The magnitude of scour and erosion depends on flood velocity, depth, soil characteristics, ground characteristics, flow direction in relation to the structure, and structure type and dimensions.
2.3.4.5 Waves With a substantial wind fetch, structures can experience additional hydrodynamic loading by the impact of waves against the structure walls and foundations.
Page 2-27 Site History, Descdption, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 2.3.4.6 Debris Impact Floodwater carries debris ranging from large branches and trees to storage tanks and mobile homes. Debris that impacts a structure imparts a load on the structure that depends on the weight of the debris object, the velocity of the floodwater, the location on the structure where impact occurs, and the duration of the impact.2.4 Geotechnical Baseline 2.4.1 In-Situ Soil Characteristics Dames & Moore conducted a site subsurface investigation in 1967. A total of t89-borings were drilled during this field investigation to assess the properties of the site soih; and..'bedrock, as Show in Figure 2-16. Dames & Moore published the results of their 1 967 field.work in a 1968 report titled"Foundation Studies, Fort Calhoun Station Number One, Near Fort Cahotun, Nebraska," in which they drew the following general conclusions regarding the subsurface soil chara.cteristics:
r The surficial soils consist of loose fine sands with varying amounts of silt to-approximately 10 ft.* Depths from 10 ft to approximately 30 to 35 ft generally consist of loose to compact (dense) fine sand.* A 5- to 10-ft layer of compact (dense) fine sand lies below the loosa.to dense fine sand.* Below the dense layer is a less compact (denseý)layer of poorly graded..towell-graded sand with thin layers of silty clay and some gravel.Based on laboritory-determined relative densities, the relative densityofihe subsurface soils ranged from 47 to 82 percent. The field investigation involved stiidard penetration tests (SPTs) and the recording of N values for the soils. ThenN value, reported in blows.per foot, is the number of blows required to drive .the sampler for the last 1 ft of the sampling interval.
There is no indication as to whether the values are normalized N60 values.(corrected to 60 percent of the theoretical energy SPT safety hamnier) or are uncorrected values, so the values are assumed to be In addition, a standardSPT sampler-nd the Dames & Moore Type U soil samplcr were used torecord N values. and a 300-pound hammer ait ,a24-in. fall and a 140-pound hammer at a 30-in.fall\ wer-used to impart the energy todrive the samplers.
The net effect on N values is not documen&dIL N values are depicted infigure 2-2, Section A-A, and Figure 2-3, Section B-B.These findii'ný.igeneralized to represent overall site conditions, but localized variations are presented in and 2-3. Thfe locations of the section lines and the approximate plan view location of the kbbxvnkarst features are presented in Figure 2-], Geotechnica]
Areas and Cross-Section Locations.
Much of the upper 10 to 15 ft of in-situ material was actually logged as low-plasticity silt with varying amounts of sand. N values from this zone were generally lower than 10. The zone below this, described by Dames & Moore (1968) as loose to dense fine sand 30 to 35 ft thick, is shown as poorly graded sand (SP) in Figuit s 2-2 and 2-3. This zone appears -t be consistent across the FCS site;however, the zone of dense fine sand is not as consistent as the Dames & Moore report implies.N values in borings B-27 and B-I 08 range from 79 to 125 at depths ranging from 35 1o 50 ft from existing (at the time of the exploration) ground surface, while borings B-29 and B-28 show N values of 14 to 48 for a comparable depth range less than 100 ft away from borings B-27 and B- 108.
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i w ] " ,,3.'/ ' .' : " '1 M -O I l . LL .Il Cv N ,, "P ., .i "' l ,,L 0 , 12 ..250. ", / ," ' -- LO '- ... ...........
.... ... ". / --.Z ....L.O ,: F ..ee ...t AV"O...W";
.. ...... .. -", ' ". ..' .. ..... i -M -'° " :/ ' " " .D! TF Mo W el Lo ato Omah NMI Powe ,L ..: .Districtinsrti n " ..., ,.P l n a n F a ilt G e t c h i a *2. --,4 m"' ..:.. , .". 9 ,I., ..m.... ... ., .w ,,,/ , ; ..l r.k .and S t u tu a A s..... & 1 .1 Page 2-29 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 The zone of less dense, poorly graded to well-graded fine sand with varying amounts of sill and some gravel is generally consistent across the site and makes up the 15 to 20 ft of alluvial material on top of bedrock.Limited laboratory testing was completed for soil samples and includes particle size analyses.
Particle size analyses showed predominantly fine sands with minor fractions of silt and medium-grained sand.2.4.2 Rock Mass Characteristics According to the Dames & Moore (1968), bedrock was encounteredvat depthsranging from 58 to 67 fi and varied from el. 931 to 935 ft. The rock encountered was idejitified as the Wintersei Member of the Dennis Formation Limestone of the Pennsylvanian Kansas Tb6ebedrock at the site was described as having an upper zone 4to 8 ft thick and consisting 6f.mifassive, gray, thidkly bedded, medium- to fine-grained oolitic limestone.
Below this zone was a .i~oe of light gray, thinly to moderately bedded, fine-grained limestone (referred to as aphaniticin-the Dames & MooTe report)having 0.5- to 2-in.-thick shale layers. Karst features were found ifn thislIdwer "aphanitic" layer. as briefly discussed in Section 2.1.4.1, Karst, above, but also included part ofih6 overlying oolitic limestone as recorded in borings B- 104 and B- 104B. Figure 2-2;-Section A-A,.and Figure 2-3, Section B-B, present representative subsurface depth and thickness iof the site bedrock. The locations of the section lines and the approximate plan view locition of the',ki'&wn karst featureisare presented in Figure 2-1, Geotechnical Areas and Cross-Section Locations.
The rock mass was logged as "unweathered"'-("fresh" .S. Bu Reclamation Engineering Geology Field Manual) and and rock Ola'ty designati (RQD) values ranged from 97 to 100 percent with few exceptions reted to solution, res (kapt TSpecific findings were as follows: -* A zone of mg, derate .,y to jtensely weiered limestone in ' nng B-1 16 was logged at the bottom of the oolitic.ýlimnestone-6 into the undlierlying fine-grained limestone, and an RQD value of 40 percehrt was recorded withiii.tihs zone. Thiswas a solution feature that had not yet, through chemiical dissolution of the lirn.etone, developed into a void and a zone of completely decomposed lhmstone.* iA~i,*ge solution feature was inter eied by borings B-104, B-104A, and B-104B from depths of(el. 932.3 to 916.2 ft);f had an upper 2 to 3 fl of void and the remaining lower orti'iýW with decomposed liH4 ,ne.* Borings?2jthrough B-72H wpr&drilled to define the extent of a large solution feature that ranged in deplifraom 65.6 to 7.1.~it (el. 932.1 to 920.0 ft)." Borings B-30 through B-30Q-were drilled to define the extent of a solution feature that ranged in depth from 67 to 8-.ft 7 to 913.7 ft).' .. ...i.ý "L ,?* Borings B-103 and B-103A encountered a more limited but possibly connected zone of dissolution that ranged from el. 93t.5 to 936 ft.* A zone of increased weathering, RQD values ranging from 42 to 55 percent, and a 1.5-ft void were encountered in boring B-141 from depths of 70 to 77 ft (el. 926 to 919 ft). -." Boring B-108 drilled through a cavity from depths of 65.7 to 75.0 ft (el. 928.8 to 919.5 ft).These noted solution features were recognized by Dames & Moore as following predominant fracture sets that were reportedly mapped at a local quarry. The orientation of these fracture sets is reportedly N5OE and N58W.
Page 2-30 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 The potential for the enlargement of solution features (karst) in the bedrock portion of the foundation to be a foundation failure mechanism due to flooding events is minimal. The pile design for the Containment, Auxiliary Building, Turbine Building, and Intake Structure called for pile installation past any weathered zone to the bottom of any known or encountered solution feature. In addition, the limestone bedrock is covered by a minimum of 61 ft of soil cover, so acidicatmospheric water is not likely to reach the karst features.
The only plausible mechanisms for continued karst development are 1) a connection to the river bottom that allows chemically aggressive (acidic and not saturated with respect to calcium) water into a karst feature, and 2) a scenario in which the overlying soils do not alter the chemistry of the groundwater so that it maintains the potential to dissolve the limestone.
These mechanisms take significant time relative to the operating life of the FCS structures and are not significantly related to a plausible failure mechanism.
2.4.3 Groundwater
Prior to construction.
groundwater was described by Gibbs, Hill, Durham, and Richardson (1967) as generally within 2 ft of the surface at the site and sloping gently to.:tbe east toward the Missouri River.Groundwater elevations and river elevations prior to the 2011 flood event and after the onset of the flood event are presented in Table 2-5. An increase in groundwater elevation.on the order of 10 ft has been recorded as a result of the 2011 flood. The data do not-include.
groundwater elevations at the peak flood elevation of 1006.85 ft because groundwater measuretients were not recorded during peak flood levels, Groundwater and river elevations forDecember 10 ,2010, and June 4, 2011, are shown in Figure 2-2, Section A-A, in order to present the general response of groundwater elevations relative to the increased river elevations, The effect of pore pressure changes due to ..a water level elevation across the site of approximately 1006.85 ft compared to the pre-flood.,rot."dwater elevatib6n.-.of approi-ciately 990 ft must be evaluated with respect to each structure, -.'. -Table 2-5 -Groudndwater and River Level Elevations Date .12/1012010 31/22/2011 6/4/2011 9/1/2011 River,Elevaton 993.994 995.33 1002.86 1002.18 SMonJibing Well ID 'Groundwater Elevation (ft _-:MW-]A 990.7.6 1 989.15 998.7 999.55.MW-IB 990o.14..
989.12 998.7 999.54 IMqW-2A 991.18 : 990.12 998.55 998,9)SW-2B 991 .23' .990.14 998.74 999.2 MW-3A 990,933' 990.82 998.25 998.77 MW-3B 990,i07 1 990.77 998.15 998.68 MW-4A .991.5 990.85 999.75 1000.4__ ..MW-4B _991.48 990.73 999.63 1000.23 MW-5A 991.88 99.18 1000,15 1000.67 MW.5B 991 R1 991 14 1000 12) 1000 6..-~- I MW-6 MW-7 MW-9 MW-10 MW-lI 991.71 992.08 1000.45 1001.13 991.32 990.89 -999.26 §99.98 990.82 989.28 998.68 999.49 991.16 999.53 998.98 999.83 991.21 989.93 998.88 999.48 A -River elevations include FCS data and interpolated stages between Omaha and Blair and between Omaha and Decatur, Nebraska.
Page 2-31 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition
-Rev. 2 2.4.4 Ground Improvement Methods 2.4.4.1 Pile Installation According to OPPD records, a total of 951 piles were installed under the footprint of the Containment, Auxiliary Building, Turbine Building, Intake Structure, Service Building, and Circulating Water System. Each pile was installed to bedrock (Winterset Member of the Dennis Formation Limestone), and some were installed through voids in the limestone to a competent rock bottom. Figure Section A-A, and Figt-e 2-3, SectiqoB-:b, show the general location and depth of the pile installation.
Piles iWere installed-from existing ground elevation, and excavation progressed around the piles to.target elevations. .ijia] cutting and capping of the piles was completed when target excavatiolaevel was reach~di: Figure 2-1, Geotechnical Areas and Cross-Section Locations-shows the area of pile installation.
Pile as-built records showing actual installati6n depthls-haave not been located for this study', so the design proposed in the Dames & Moore 1968 report was used as the basis for pile installation depth....,..,,..- ~ ~. 4 ...., , ..2.4.4.2 Soil Densification Using The design criteria for the Containment, Atpio4iary Buifging, anciake Structure required an average relative density of 85 perc entand 9,' nimmu_ ative d.is ..'Of 70 percent for the foundation soils. As documentedl:b.Gibbs
& Hil 'report titIt "Summary of Vibroflotation," dated January 27,1 972, the procJRf vibroflotaiion was used to densify soils between the foundation piles in the areas under th&?ontainmment and the Intake Structure.
Vibroflotation involves inserting a vibrating probe irto'fb&iround while introducing gravel into the void that is created around the probe. This process densifies the surrounding soil, forms a vertical column of dense gravel, and increases the overall strength of the in-situ material.o..61lowing the vibroflotatior-densification prricc~ss, a total of 83 SPT borings were completed by-.:,.--,e contractor to assess the effdeti~veness of densifying the fine-grained sand and fine-grained
.:"iltysand.
The Gibbs & Hill 1 ipor states that a 96.6 percent confidence level was attained that thei Verage relative density was'riot less than 85 percent. SPT data from these test borings inditaed that the soil densifi.t4,on was moderately successful when compared to the SPT N values frobm1967 exploratoi.:borings at the site. SPT values recorded after the vibroflotation for successfullsoil densification generally ranged from 12 to 91 blows per foot, which indicated that relative densities ranging from 70 to I 10 percent were achieved in these soils. However, some zones of riati&e.nsity ranging from 35 to 68 percent remained after the vibroflotation.
as noted in verification borings V-42, V-46, V-68, V-70, V-7 1, and V-76. Therefore, existing soil density conditions should be noted as having average relative density not less than 85 percent but as also having notable zones of relative density significantly lower than the average and lower than the minimum relative density requiremeni of 70 percent. A plan view showing the post-vibroflotation verification borings is not in the construction records.
Page 2-32 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 2.4.5 Excavation and Backfill Based on the Dames & Moore 1968 report titled "Foundation Conditions," preliminary excavation depths for each structure were targeted to the folloiing elevations:
- Intake Structure-el. 963 ft* Auxiliary Building -el. 981 ft* Containment
-el. 983 ft* Turbine Building -el. 987 ft" Turbine Generator Mat -el. 982 ft As-built drawings record excavation depths that vary somewhat torn the premioigly Iisted target excavation elevations, as follows:* Intake Structure (sluice intake) -el. 966.7 ft; approximate Intake Structure foundation
-.el. 963 ft (Intake Structure Building Panels and Intake Details, Drawing Number 11405-A-281)" Auxiliary Building -el. 965.5 ftI (Auxiliary Building Sections, Drawing Number 11405-S-64)
- Containment
-approximateel.
975.5 ft (Primary Plant. ection A-A, Drawving Number GHDR 1 1405-A-13)
The properties of fill material have been documente4.:by boring7.ath!t were completed after construction.
Borings were completed by Geolechn.igl Servic., Inc. forth-.foundation assessments for the Maintenance Building Addition (1977), Security Building (I 977), and the New Security Building (1987). Fill material is composed of silty clay, clI ey silt, pofly graded sand with silt, and sandy silt. SPT N values range from5 to,20 within the fill~iiaterial.
Documentation of the fill material, placement densities, thickness,arnd extent adjacet1 to6strutures built within excavated areas is not available for analysis.2.5 Structural Baseline" The straf",Iiral baseline was estabil4.h41for Priority ..and Priority 2 structures based on the review of existing documentation, including condition reports"des'ign basis documents, the original design drawmigs,.'and structural assessments...The condition reports and structural assessments together are referred'to.1Ispre-flood structural repo~ts,.
A list of OPPD documents used in establishing the structural baseline fobfeach structure is provided 'asAttachment
- 2. Dimensions presented in the structural ba eln .it issio. .,are'.:2.
gene `,i baseline dsussaonTare generally expressed in decimal feet. The term "structure" may refer to a specific building; such as the Turbife'eBuilding, or may refer to a group of independent non-building structures, such as the Turbine:Btiiding South Switchyard.
The location of each structure is shown in Figure 2-17, Site Plan:Overview.
Met Tower 1"sele.,l 0 rlý,rx,Switch Yard 345 Bldg (vv), 345 Btdg (E)Ll:)Lao.t ."'%.4-Bldg S4!* ~.jI q 1 j 7.A.I I* ; j Sewer. Lt.~.*., oo 0 175 350 f!%ii Feet a a 9 C'N Fence Priority 1 r' Priority 2 r" Protected Area Boundaries Onaha Public Power Disirici Site Plan Overview Fort Calhoun Station Plant and Facility Geotechnical and Structural Assessment Sep 2011 FIGURE 2-17 Page 2-34 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 2.5.1 Intake Structure 2.5.1.1 Location, Description, and Function The Intake Structure is a Class I structure located adjacent to the Missouri River and directly east of the Service Building.
The major functions of the Intake Structure are to provide water from the Missouri River that is required for component cooling and fire fighting at FCS, and to provide the structural support and environmental protection necessalyto ensure the functional integrity of the Critical Quality Element (CQE) systems and compon4-idnder all operational and environmental conditions.
Specifically, the Intake Structure must!,.plrqNpriately protect against the effects of projectiles that may result from equipment failioes and:fom events and conditions outside the nuclear power unit.From the bottom of the foundation mat at el. 960.8 ft to el. 1014.5 ft, the Intake Structure consists of large, heavy, reinforced-concrete-box-type construction With internal bracing provided by the dividing walls that form the water passages.
This in a massive rigid structure set mostly below grade, which is inherentlyresistant to scismic.and tornado activity, Without special provisions, the Intake Structure-is designed to accommodat&:fltod levels up to el. 1004.5 ft without water entering the structure.
For higher flood levels up to the maximum probable flood of el. 1009.3 ft, protection is provided by steel floodbarriers equipped with seals that provide protection to el. 1009.5 ft. These flood barriers istored adjacent to the openings that they protect and areput-in place whei:he river level-Teaches certain elevations.
When the water level of the Missouri River exceed&the elevation-of the operating floor (1007.5 ft), it is necessary to close the sluice gates..ioprevent water from flowing in around the tops of the traveling screens and flooding the lnlake"trcture.
2.5.1.2 Foundation
..The intake Structure is amu.ti-floored stru.tuere below operating floor el. 1007.5 ft. From the..bottom of the foundation matrat el. 960.8 fti6"l. 101 4.5 ft, the Intake Structure consists of* ..arge, heavy, reinforced-concfete~box-type construction.
A mat foundation on steel pipe piles driVen to bedrock supports the intake Structure.
2.5.1'1 Structural Frame From el.'10t14.5 ft to the roof el. 1035.6 ft, the Intake Structure is a braced-steel frame clad with Ar-lite sandwich panels supported from a system of horizontal steel girts. The roof is a multi-layer built-up roof supported by metal decking spanning between open-web steel joists. The structural steel frame supports equipment necessary for building operation, including an overhead bridge crane on steel crane girders.2.5.1.4 Building Envelope-The structure is clad with concrete sandwich panels supported from a system of horizontal steel girts and the primary structural frame members. The panels forn a parapet at the top of the building wall at roof level. The roof is a multi-layer built-up roof supported by metal decking spanning between open-web steel joists.
Page 2-35 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 2.5.1.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting There are structural condition reports, prepared by OPPD, with drawings marked, available from the years 1996, 1999, 2002, and 2009. These reports document minor structural phenomena such as minor cracks in walls and ceilings, cracks that radiate from corners in square concrete openings, and minor spalling.2.5.2 Auxiliary Building 2.5.2.1 Location, Description, and Function The Auxiliary Building is a Class I structure located adjaent to and west.of. he Turbine Building, with the Technical Support Center attached t6ofhemnorth*all.
The.Auxiliary Building has an irregular shape in plan, with maximum ground floor 'dh.en~ions of 224 by 243 ft and envelopes the Containment on the east, north, and west sid&e"'Ti Auxiliary Buildinghas multiple flat roofs at different elevations, and all are lower' tan"e of of the Containiien't.
Ground floor elevation is 1007 ft with a maximumr.ofdelevation of M083Aft. The building has one full floor level below grade at 989 ft and a~partial floor~level at 971 ft.2.5.2.2 Foundation
,. -, The foundation of the Auxiliary Building d8fihsts of rei.. ed concrete mat supported by steel pipe piles. The-.iles are spaced-." ' 'roximatel,9 to69 ft on center and driven to bedrock that ranges in elevati6o om 931 to 935 ft. The dra gs show that the foundation walls below grade are 3 ft thi6.k, dbvered with wateiproofing dnd'keyed at the top and bottom joints with water stops.2.5.2.3 iStructural Frame T-,eAuxiliary Building tconsists of reinforced concrete moment frame on the exterior elevations with architectural resin precast-concrete panels as infill between the moment frames. Interior J-Wwalls are reinforced concrete qMnging in thickness from 8 to 48 in., with shield walls at select dopr openings.The:flors and roof deck consist-of 6-in. deck with a 2-in. concrete topping. The 8 in. of-1 .(. ....' & .concrete&are composite to the tejifforced concrete beams, the dimensions of which are based on the spanalid-floor loading...
2.5.2.4 Building Envelope The exterior concrete moment frame is exposed and has a rubbed concrete surface. The resin precast concrete panels have an architectural finish and form the primary weather barrier.There is no detail available for the roof material...
Page 2-36 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition -Rev. 2 2.5.2.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Structural assessments of the Auxiliary Building were conducted by OPPD in 1996, 1999, 2004, and 2008. Based on the documents reviewed, the inspections indicate mostly fine cracks and peeling paint of concrete elements such as walls, floors, and ceilings.
All reports indicated that there was no significant structural deterioration of elements inspected.
2.5.3 Containment
2.5.3.1 Location, Description, and Function The Containment is a Class I structure located west of thq. Turbine BuXildiq;an.d enveloped on three sides by the Auxiliary Building.
The Containmentis cylindrical with-a nominal outside diameter of 120 ft and a nominal top of dome height of 140.fti. .Ground floor elevation ranges from 1007 to 1013 ft with a lower level of 976.5 ft. The eaveele'vation at the domed roof eave is 1119 ft. The grade around the building, based on the design documents, is 1004 ft.The Containment houses a substantial amount of mechanical and electrical~equipment, and there are a number of mechanical piping and electrical penetrations through the Containment.
2.5.3.2 Foundation The primary foundation mat of the Containment consists of 10 t6.i21;t 9 17 reinforced concrete supported by 20-in.-diameter stee1q"pe piles placed in a radial pa tei.iand spaced at about 10 ft around the perimeter, with spaci"ig decreasing to about 5 ft near:,the center of the structure.
The primary mat is topped with a3-flZ..o 4-fi-6-in.-thick
'einforced c'Oncrete mat.2.5.3.3 Structural Frame The Teinforced concrete -shell of the Containment is shown to be keyed into the mat foundation at&.tbe base. The shell has ianqinal waltIhickness of about 8 ft at the base and 12 ft at the.e-_ve-to-dome transition.
Mififmum thickness.is about 3 ft 10.5 in. The shell is post-tensioned
"..With access to the cables by rfen of a removable stainless steel panel at the roof eave and a small access gallery located b~lo' el. 979 ft and under the primary base mat foundation.
2.5'3-.4 Building Envelope The exterior concrete of the Containment is rubbed concrete with a 22-ft-wide band of architectural steel panels at the eave. The available drawings do not show the type of roofing membrane.2.5.3.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Structural assessments of the Auxiliary Building were conducted in 2009 and 2010. The inspections reports indicated no significant structural deterioration of the elementsinspected.
Page 2-37 Site History, Description, and Ba§'eline Condition Rev. 2 2.5.4 Rad Waste Building 2.5.4.1 Location, Description, and Function The Rad Waste Building is a single-story building with internal mezzanine levels, drive-in truck bay, and depressed area to store waste drums. It is located next to and west of the Auxiliary Building and power block area. The design drawings indicate that the building was.constructed after 1987. The building plan dimensions are shown as.73 ft by 175 ft. The floor slab finish elevation ranges from 1002 to 1007 ft. The flat roof higb.point is shown to be at el.1045 ft.2.5.4.2 Foundation The design drawings available indicate thai the Rad Waste Building is on a reinf6rced concrete floating mat foundation with a ground-floor elevation of 1007 ft and the lowest top/co.ncrete elevation at 1002 ft in the drum storage area. A foundation curb extends up to el. I 01i"fA, and the drawings indicate that openings below 1010 ft are flood protected.
The thickness of the mat was not provided in the available documentation.
2.5.4.3 Structural Frame The drawings indicate that the Rad Waste Building is a-pre-engineered steel-braced frame with precast aggregate concrete panels to match sthe:existing,-Auxiliaryý'BUiling.
The roof structure consists of metal deck spanning between steel joists.-The metal deck appears to be designed as a diaphragm.
Lateral loads from--wind or earthquake--are carriedtoo the foundation by the roof deck diaphragm and are transferiýeI to the foundati£d through th steel columns.2.5.4.4 Building-Envelope Exterior walls are shownito-be precast aggregate concrete panels that form the main weather barriET with a masonry bio.tW&.all internal biner. There is no detail for the roofing material.,2.5.4.5 Pre-Flood Structural,Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were-not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.5 Techhidal
Support Center 2.5.5.1 Location, Description, and Function The Technical Support Center is a single-story administrative building located within the power block area immediately north of the Auxiliary Building and west of the Maintenance Shop.The original structure was designed in 1980, and there have been subsequent revisions accerding...p.a vailable documentation..
..The original building plan dimensions are shown as 54 ft by 78 ft, and an addition to the building was constructed in 1988 with nominal dimension of 40 ft by 68 ft to the east and 14 ft by 78 ft to the south. The grade floor elevation is 1005 ft, and the rooftop is at el. 1020 ft.
Page 2-38 Site History, Decripion, Baseline Cohdition
Rev. 2 2.5.5.2 Foundation The original Technical Support Center foundation is a reinforced concrete mat foundation,.which varies in thickness from 2 to 4 ft. The original mat foundation was constructed with top-of-concrete el. 1004 ft and either concrete fill or false floor built up to el. 1005 ft. The 1988 addition slab-on-grade elevation was 1005 ft. The building addition has spread footings bearing approximately 4 ft below grade.2.5.5.3 Structural Frame The original construction consists of cast-in-place concrete'walls to roof. The addition was constructed of concrete masonry units. Walls extend ffob.the top of the foundation to the top of the parapet wall.The floor slab is located at grade level and is constructed of reififorced concrete.
Interior non-bearing walls are supported from thickened-slab sections.2.5.5.4 Building Envelope , The roof is constructed of reinforced concrete-on metal deck~supported from steel joists and steel beams. Tapered insulation is located above the roo.f.-9lab..
Exterior walls are typically constructed of 12,in.-wide.reinforced concrete masonry units, with rigid insulation on the exterior side.of.the masonry,ýU:-part of theibuilding addition, exterior walls are shown to have a masoiiveneer finish. .2.5.5.5 Pre-Flood Strucdi Ieporting Pre-flood-structuralrfeports were nOt-available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.6 Independent
Spent Fuel Storage Installation 2.5.6.1 Location, Description, and Function Thp.ldependent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) consists of spent fuel modules placed inrd6e 34-ft-thick reinforced concrete shield walls and ceiling, and an associated small Electrical Equip de.nt..Building, situated .to the northwest of the power block, adjacent to the New Warehouse.
The storage modules are concrete-box structures and are 9 ft 8 in. wide by 20 ft 8 in. long and 18 ft 6 in. tall, placed on a concrete mat foundation.
The ISFSI footprint is 42 ft by 211 ft in plan, and the Electrical Equipment Building is 13 ft 4 in. by 17 ft 4 in. in plan with an I I ft 2 in. cave height above grade.2.5.6.2 .Foundation The ISFSI foundation is a reinforced concrete mat foundation that is 2 ft thick. The Electrical Equipment Building foundation is shown as a I-ft-thick concrete mat/depressed slab with a floor elevation nominally 3.0 ft below grade, with concrete walls extending up to grade level.
Page 2-39 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 2.5.653 Structural Frame Information on the structural frame was not available for the ISFSI storage modules, which are supported by the concrete mat foundation.
The Electrical Equipment Building has reinforced masonry block wails extending from the top of the foundation walls at grade to the underside of the roof slab, I I ft 2 in. above the top of grade wall.The roof structure consists of a concrete slab on metal d masonry walls, sloped 0.5 in. per foot from the center of the structure ave in dimension of the structure.
2.5.6.4 Building Envelope The ISFSJ building envelope is as discussed in Section 2.2.5.6.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not avai labI eMdocumen 2,5.7 Seourity Building I(b)(4)'(b)(7)(F) 2.5,8 Turbine Building 2.5.8.1 Location, Description, and Fi The Turbine Building was desi 96Whe uc Build oted as a major appurtenant facility.
It is siuc connec-ed Service ding to the east, adjacent to a contained exterior transfo itchyard (tran T I A2, TI A3, and TI A4) to the south, adjacent to the A uiding to th acent to the Maintenance Sho;to the e il c room that is'approximately 90 ft in height above d approximate across in column to main column. The building rint is 122 ft by 227 imensio twin turbines on separate pedestal-type undations.
Floor and imp levationms e as follows: e 1 : 1004. 5 Rl+/* ent: 990.0 ft*Me Vl STop of cra3.9 Rt (+66,5 ft +/- above floor)2.5.6.2 Founda on The top of the basement floor is at el. 990.0 it. The top of the pile caps is el. 989.4 ft. The typical cap for each major building column is 6.0 ft thick and is supported by a cluster of steel pipe piles. Main equipment such as the turbine/generator is also supported on mat/cap foundations and pipe piles of similar diameter and depth as the building piles.P Page 2-41 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 2.5,8.3 Structural Frame The Turbine Building structure is a structural steel moment-resisting engineered frame with tapered steel sections and is approximately 90 ft tall with three interior floors, Building columns are supported on reinforced-concrete wall piers. The top of the wall pier is at el.1007.5 ft. Wall piers extend down to pile caps in the basement and are approximately 17,5 ft in height, 2.5.8.4 Building Envelope The building envelope consists of exterior walls suppo tl athed with insulated resin panels, Panels arc fire-rated from grad ox, ove grade in height. The building roof is constructed with similar m sUP open-web steel joists spanning between main building frames. The t of the rod centerine ridge, which runs north-south, is el, 1095.4 ft at top of st of steel at west ends (low points) is el. 1092.9 ft. I 2.5,8.5 Pre-Flood Structural Report Periodic inspections of the Turbine Build was instituted in 1997 to perform visual Turbine Building, OPPD inspected the s tIng in chedul years.ion and ctur in 01 0 ,Xp proccdure co.n tion of the)7, and 2010.In the 1997 rport, no superstru s ic eel and e ado items) were listed as a concern. Several cracks i isture seepa ere note he poured reinforced concrete walls (below grad e cracks were to be of significant structural deterioration.
A crack in the corbel at the mr, el. 1000.0 ft, of the He eid TB- ted an Enginee ssistance Request for repair.report mdi a revi initiated to determine the repair process for the I item above. I that h ration is only surficial.
Thcrm was no reported ence of other signific tural det ion, 004 report does not indi ny significant findings of structural deterioration.
epo does not .di ny significant findings of structural deterioration but lists sev or minor rep as repainting or re-application of protective coating, The 2010 es cate any significant findings of structural deterioration but mentions tb aulking on the Turbine Building is aging.2,5.9 Security Barrlcaom f(b)(4),(b)(7)(F)
I Ballistic Resistant Enclosures Page 2-42 Rev. 2 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition (b)(4),(b)(7)(F)
.1 Location, nn, an o Turbine Building South hyard is I ed south of the Turbine Building and consists veral transformers, trans n structures, and an underground duct bank.TheT fo s for the co nts of the Turbine Building South Switchyard are as follows:-Transfi approximately 12 ft by 25 ft in plan dimension.
-The foun for TI is a l-ft-6-in.-thick mat, 14 ft by 34 ft, supported on piles.-T/Mat foundation is el. 1005,5 ft." Dead End/16] Structure-Two-column frame is approximately 27 ft in height with interconnecting cross beam.-There are two foundations for each octagonal column. The piers have a 5 ft 0 in. by 5 ft 0 in, by 3 fl 0 in. height. Top of pier is el. 1004.0 ft.-T/Foundation cap is el, 1001.0 ft. Each cap is 4 fl 0 in. thick, 7 ft 0 in. by 20 ft 0 in. in plan dimensions, supported by piles, Page 2-43 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2" Underground Duct Bank-Underground duct bank is 7 ft 0 in. wide, running east-west just south of main Turbine Building.-Duct details are shown in Drawing 11405-E-315." Trench System-Main collector trench runs east-west with branches between electrical units TI A-2, TIA-3, and TIA-4; locations are shown in Drawing 11405ý.E-314.
-Grounding grid is established circling all transformers ill sfchyaxd.-The conduit trench is a cast-in-place U-shaped trexihtWith removable covers. Trench walls have drain holes throughout.
The west enWs a drain.pipe through the slab with buried perforated pipe labeled as "to storm sewer~iianhole.-
- Transformers TIA-I and TIA-2-The foundations for TIA-1 and TIA-2 area l-ft-6-4n)thikmat, 5 ft by 8 ft, supported on piles.-T/Mat foundation is el. 1005.5 ft.* Transformers TIA-3 and TIA-4-The foundations for TI A-3 and TI A-4 are a I -f-6-in. thick mat, 8 ft by 13 ft, supported on piles.-T/Mat foundation is el. 1005.5 ft.* Transformer TIC-3B1-The foundation for TIC-3IB is an 8-in.-thick mat, 4 ft by..6 ft 8 in., supported on piles.-T/Mat foundation is'e;,!.004.8 ft." Enclosure Wall-The structures are enclosed by an 8-in.-thick cast-in-place concrete wall cast in insulated wall forms up to el. 1005,.0 ft.2.5.10.3 Structural Frame."_." End/] 61 Structure 0" 1 ctrcists of two bents, approximately 27 ft in height, with iriterc6inecting cross beam.2.5.10.4 :Building A building envelope is.not applicable to this structure.
2.5.10.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.11 Condensate Storage Tank 2.5.11.1 Location, Description, and Function The I 50,000-gallon plate-steel Condensate Storage Tank is located east of the power block and south of the Intake Structure.
The tank is nominally 30 ft tall by 30 ft in diameter.
Page 2-44 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 Tank drawings indicate that the design is in accordance with all the applicable paragraphs of the American Water Works Association standard D100-65 for welded steel standpipe-type tank. Tank design shall be for atmospheric pressure plus a full tank of water.2.5.11.2 Foundation The tank foundation is a 2-ft-minimum-thickness concrete mat supported on 13 IOBP42 steel piles driven to bedrock at approximate el. 934 ft. The top-of-concrete elevation is 1005 ft 6 in.This concrete slab is approximately 41 ft in diameter, resulting in a~w.alkway around the tank.This slab is cast within a steel sheet pile system that is driven into thietbfnk to el. 944 ft 9 in., which is approximately 10 ft above bedrock.2.5.11.3 Structural Frame A structural frame is not applicable to this structure.
2.5.11.4 Building Envelope A building envelope is not applicable to this structure.
2.5.11.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.12 Demineralized Water Tank, Pump House, and RO Unit 2.5.12.1 Location, Description.
and Function The Dexnineralized Water System provides demineralized water to the Containment and Building and:makeup water to the Turbine Building and Service Building, supplying watc" to various loads. The demineralized water is produced with a reverse osmosis (RO) unit in t.e Old Warehouse as bot iaerated and ri'bn-aerated watcr supplies.
The non-aerated water Supply is stored in the primai~y-storage tank.The Demineralized Water Storage Tank is adjacent to the Missouri River at the southeast corner:of the power block.The Dnemineralized Water Storage Tank is a 33-fit-inside-diameter storage tank that extends approximately 31 ft above grade. This tank is located to the north of the Old Warehouse and to the west of the PA.The Pump House is a small pre-engineered metal building adjacent to the Demineralized Water Storage Tank.The RO Unit resides in the northern section of the Old Warehouse.
The Old Warehouse i-s a pre-engineered metal building supported on a cast-in-place slab and perimeter stem wall on continuous footings that extend below frost depth.
Page 2-45 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 2.5.12.2 Foundation The Demineralized Water Storage Tank is. supported around its perimeter on a continuous cast-in-place concrete ring wall that is 1 ft 2 in. wide by 2 ft tall. The interior of the tank bears on a layer of sand on top of a geotextile filter fabric, which in turn is on top of a free-draining crushed limestone aggregate.
The crushed limestone aggregate is drained by three 1.5-in.-diameter foundation drains spaced equally around the concrete ring wall.The Pump House is supported on a 6-in slab on grade.The entire tank footprint, including the concrete ring waflland the interior crushed rock along with the Pump House slab, is supported on a rammed piers soil improvement system.There is no foundation documentation available for the Oiidarehouse 2.5.12.3 Structural Frame -: The Demineralized Water Storage Tank is fabricated of stainless steel to meet the requirements of the API Standard 650.The Pump House is a pre-engineered metal building consisting of rigid steel moment frames.The building is clad with corrugated metal roofing and wall panels.The Old Warehouse is a pre-engineered metal buil4dijg consisting of rigid steel moment frames.The structure is braced to the frameý.' wjth tension only cable bracing. The building is clad with corrugated etal roofing and 1 panels.,: ._,o.., ro fn an ... el...2.5.12.4 Building Envelope ,.A building envelope is not-applicable to'this structure.
.2.5.12.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting-, Pre-flood structural reports werie ot available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.13 Tower 2.5.13.1 Location, Description, and Function The Met Tower is a 360-;ft -tall triangular guyed structure designed for 100-mile-per-hour wind and radial ice on all fixtures of 1.0 in. The tower is located approximately 2800 ft north of the power block. Thereis a small masonry structure adjacent to the Met Tower for instrumentation storage and protection.
The onsile meteorological monitoring system provides observations of wind speed, wind direction, precipitation, barometric pressure, temperature, and temperature change with height.The system is operated continuously.
The Met Tower is an essential part of the meteorological data collection system, allowing sensors to be placed at varying heights above ground so that observations can be acquired at elevations important to facility operations.
Page 2-46 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 The Met Tower incorporates an inside climbable ladder with a safety climbing device and has Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) marking and lighting and a lightning and transient voltage protection system. Meteorological instruments are mounted at various levels on the tower, with sonic instruments mounted on booms extending laterally from the tower.2.5.13.2 Foundation The base footing for the Met Tower is 7-fi-0-in.-
by 7-ft-0-in.-
by 4-ft-6-in.-thick reinforced concrete, The tower is guyed at several locations along its height, with the guys extending in a triangular pattern at 120 degrees to one another. The guy wires are collected at points 145 and 290 ft from the tower base and anchored to concrete deadmen at grade level. The deadnien are reinforced concrete 4 ft 0in. by 8 ft 0 in. by 3 ft thick Wvith4 ft 0 in. of concrete fill above the footing at the three 145-ft guy anchor locations and 6-ft-On-.i.rby'8-ft-0-in.-
by 4-ft-0-in.-thick reinforced concrete%
vWi4 ft 0 in. of concrete fill above the footing at the three 2904ft guy anchor locations.
2.5.13.3 Structural Frame The Met Tower is constructed of a bolted tubular steel frame with a nominal plan dimension of 3 ft 0 in. between the three vertical frame members. The tower has the same cross section for the entire height, with guys fastened to the frame at various, intervals of the structure height to provide vertical stability to the structure.
2.5.13.4 Building Envelope (Instrumentation Shelter)An instrumentation shelter is located adjacent to theabase of~the.ower.
This building is nominally I I ft 4 in. by l ft 4in.,:constructed of 8- filph lly reinforced concrete masonry unit walls,9ft 2 in. high, supported by a reinforced co iir rte base slab with thickened footings alongftbeperimeter. ,The roof is constructed of precast concrete planks spanning between the exterior walls.2..5.13.5 Pre-Flood Structu6ral Reporting'Pre-;flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.14 Original Steam Generator Storage Building 2.5.14.1 Location, Description, and Function The OSGS houses the. original steam generator, designed by Bechtel in 2007. The OSGS is located to the west of the plant, north of the main plant entry drive.2.5.14.2 Foundation The foundation is a reinforced concrete rmat which is shown in the drawings to be placed in two phases with a horizontal construction or cold joint between the separate concrete placements.
The top of the mat slab is shown in the documents as cl. 1022 ft. Dowels are shown extending up from the top of slab into the wall above, No documentation is available for the plan layout.dimensions, or details above the top of slab.
Page 2-47 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 2.5.14.3 Structural Frame Information on the structural frame was not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.14.4 Building Envelope Information on the building envelope was not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.14.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.15 Switchyard 2.5.15 1 Location, Description, and Function The Switchyard comprises the 161 kilovolt (kV) switchyard and 345 kV switchyard.
There are three enclosed buildings in the Switchyard.
However, there is no documentation that details the aboveground superstructure for these three buildings.
There are numerous stands for equipment (e.g., switches, bus supports) as welU.as equipment that is directly supported by a reinforced con'6rete foundation, but there is no documentation that details any of the aboveground superstructure:
161 kV Control and Switchgear Building-Built in 1990, located west of 345 kV switchyard
-One-story enclosure, approximately 30 ft by,70-ft overall plan dimension-Floor.and important elevations:'0045'ft +/-Basement:
N8tVapphicable Floor: 1005.6 ..* 345 kV East Control Building-Built in 1968, located east of 161 kV switchyard
-One-story enclosure, approximately 32 ft by 40 ft ovcrall plan dimension-Floor and important elevations:
Grade: 1004.5 ft +/-Basement:
Not applicable Floor: 1.007.5 ft 345 kV West Control Building-'Built in 1998, located east of 161 kV switchyard
-One-story enclosure, approximately 35 ft by 85 ft overall plan dimension-Floor and important elevations:
Grade: 1004.5 ft +/-Basement:
Not applicable Floor: 1005.75 ft Page 2-48 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 2.5.15.2 Foundations There are three enclosed buildings in the Switchyard.
The following succinctly summarizes the foundations provided for these three buildings as well as the numerous stands for equipment (e.g., switches, bus supports) and equipment that is directly supported on a reinforced concrete foundation:
- Building Foundations
-161 kV Building Foundation Pcrimeter wall footing, 3 ft 0 in. wide, approximately 5 ft below grade and top of wall to bottom of footing is 6 ft 0 in.Floor slab is at el. 1005.6 ft, constructed of 5-in. reinforced concrete supported on 6 in. of compacted sand over compacted soil-345 kV East Control Building Foundation Perimeter wall trench footing, 8 in. wide and 6 ft 6 in. from top of wall to bottom of footing Floor slab is at el. 1007.5 ft, constructed of 4-in. reinforced concrete supported on 4 in. of Styrofoam above topof 6 in. of compacted soil-345 kV.West Control Building Foundation Perimeter wall footing, 4 ft 0 in-wide and 5;ft 6 in. from top of wall to bottom of footing Floor slab at el. 1005.75 ft, constructed.of-5-in.
reinf6rced concrete supported on 6 in. of compacted rock over compacted soil 0 Equipment Foundations
-161kV Transformer Foundations T- ]'Transformer foundations Built in 1968 3 ft 0 in. thick by'9 ft 0 in by 9 ft 0 in. mat supported by 11 14-in.-diameter reinforced-concrete piles T-2 Transformer foundations Built in 1990 2 fA 0 in. thick by 0 Oft 0 in. by 18 ft 0 in. mat supported by I I 18-in.-diameter reinforced-concrete piles 161kV Breaker Foundations Built in 1968 6 fl 6 in. by 26 ft 0 in. mat supported by six 2-ft-0-in.-diameter piers with 42-in.bells, 4 ft 6 in. deep Breakers I and 2 foundations Built in 1993 1 ft 6 in. thick by 9 ft 0 in. by 9 ft 0 in. mat supported by four shallow reinforced-concrete piers, approximately 1 8 in. in diameter, 5 fi 0 in. deep Page 2-49 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 Breaker Station Service Emergency R foundations Built in 1990 16 in. thick by.5 ft 0 in. by 10 ft 0 in. mat supported by four 6-in. reinforced-concrete piles Breaker Station Service Normal Y foundations Built in 1990 16 in. thick by 5 ft 0 in. by 6 ft 0 in. mat supported by four 6-in. reinforced-concrete piles 3 ft 0 in. in overall length Breaker Station E and F foundations Built in 1990 I ft 6 in. thick by 9 ft 0 in. by 9 ft 0 in. mat supported, fO"ur. 12-in. reinforced-concrete piles Typical 161 kV circuit breaker foundations Built in 1990 2 ft 0 in. thick by 6 ft 6 in. by 8 ft 0 in. mat supported by opposite-end ratwalls 18 in. thick and 4 ft 0 in. deep 161kV Equipment Foundations Line Terminal Structure foundations-Built in 1968 7 ft 0 in. thick by 7 ft 0 in. bl.16 ft 0 in. mat su 'oitejd by ten reinforced-concrete piles.Switch Structure foundations Built in 1968 2-ft-0-in.-diameter,;pier with 42-in.bell, 6 ft 0 in..in overall length Bus Support and Pot; Tr'ans. foundations Built.in 1968 3-ft-.O-in.-diameier:ipi&,.7 ft 0 in. in overall length 9 ft 6 in. arid 10{ft 6 in. Q.V. Bus Support Stand foundations Built in 1990:.....
2-ft-6-in.-diieter pier, 19 ft 0 in. in overall length 17 ft 6 in. and 18 !2in. S.W. Bus Support Stand foundations Buili in 1990 <-" 3/42-ft-6-in.-diame1te4)ier, 25 ft 0 in. in overall length 9 ft 0 in. N, NI Svwil MStand foundations Built in 1990.":'2-ft-6-in.-djiameter pier, 19 ft 0 in. in overall length 17 ft 0 in. H Switch Stand foundations Built-in 1.990 2-ft-6"-in.-diameter pier, 25 ft 0 in. in overall length L.A. and CCVT K, U Stand foundations Built in 1990 2-ft-0-in.-diameter pier, 12 ft 0 in. in overali length Pothead G foundations Built in 1990 2-ft-0-in.-diameter pier, 6 ft 0 in. in overall length Page 2-50 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 CVT foundation Built in 1993 Single 2-ft-0-in.-diameter by 12-ft-0-in.-deep reinforced concrete pier Bus Support Stand foundation Built in 1993 Single 2-ft-6-in.-diameter by 25-fl-0-in.-deep reinforced concrete pier Dead End Tower L foundations Built in 1990 6-ft-.0-in.-diameter pier, 40 ft 0 in. in overall length 345kV Breaker Foundations 345 kV Power Circuit Breaker foundation Built in 1968 Two parts: four 2-ft-0-in.-diameter piers, 7 ft 0 in. in overall length;1 -ft-6-in.-thick mat supported by four I -ft-0-in.-diameter piers, 5 ft 0 in. in overall length Top-of-mat el. 1006.75 ft CB-6 Breaker foundation Built in 1968 2 ft 0 in. thick by 6 ft 0 in. by-]8 ft 0 in mat Supported by four shallow reinforced-concrete piers Cir Switcher foundation Built in 1968 Single 5-ft-0-in.-diameter by 8-ft-6-in.-deep reinforced concrete pier Top-of-pier el.1005.75 ft Switch Structure fodntlations
- Built in 1968 2-ft-0-in.--diameter pier with 4 2-in. bell, 6 ft 6 in. in overall length CCVT Built in 1968 Single 2-ft-0-in.-diameter by 7-ft-0-in.-deep reinforced-concrete pier Pot Trans and Cap.0Pot Device foundations Built in 1968 2-ft-0-in.-diameteiper with 42-in. bell, 6 ft 6 in. in overall length CB-2, -4 and -5 BreIer foundations Built in 1993 I 2 ft 0 in. thick by 6 ft 0 in. by 18 ft 0 in. mat supported by four shallow reinforced-concrete piers 345kV Foundations 345 kV T3 and T4 Transformer foundations Built in 1998 3 ft 6 in. thick by 16 ft 0 in. by 28 ft 0 in. mat supported by I1 16-in. reinforced auger-casi concrete piles, 50 ft in overall length 345 kV FCS Spare GSU Transformer foundation Built in 2002 3 ft 6 in. thick by 14 ft 0 in. by 34 ft 0 in. mat supported by ten I 6-in. reinforced-concrete piles Page 2-51 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 Line Terminal Structure foundations Built in 1968 6 ft 0 in. thick by 14 ft 0 in. by 30 ft 0 in. mat supported by 13 unknown-diameter reinforced-concrete piles 345 kV Shunt Reactor foundation Built in 1968 3 ft 0 in. thick by 9 ft 0 in. by 12 ft 0 in. mat supported by four 14-in. reinforced.-
concrete piles 345 kV Station Service foundations Built in 1968 8 in. thick by 4 ft by 9 ft mat supported by four I -ft-0-in.
reinforced concrete piles 2.5.15.3 Structural Frame Information on the structural frame was not available in thereferenced documentation.
2.5.15.4 Building Envelope A building envelope is not applicable to this si cture.2.5.15.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.16 Transmission Towers 2.5.16.1 Location, Description, and Function The Transmission Towers' are defined as a system of structures supporting lines 70 and 76 from.the plant dead end to the _tibstation dead-.end.west of the plant, and lines 66, 146, 148, and 165.beyond the substation to theý-.est within fence.There is no documentation avaitible for the structures above grade, and partial documentation is:available for the foundations-su.porting the structures.
2.5.16.2 Foundation There are foundation drawings dated May 26, 2004, that indicate an augered pier foundation for line 76, and a drawing that indicates varying configurations of pile-supported pile cap foundations identified for the 345 kV line, but the pile foundations are not correlated to the line numbers available in other documents.
The pier foundations are 5 ft 6 in. in diameter to 6 ft 6 in. in diameter, with design depths up to 35 ft 6 in. The piers are designed as reinforced concrete piers with 'varying anchor bolt arrangements for different transmission tower structures.
The pile foundations are shown as 6-, 7-, 8-. 9-, or I 0-pile foundations with pile caps of reinforced concrete varying in thickness from 3 ft 0 in. to 3 ft 3 in. Reinforced concrete piers Page 2-52 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 are supported by the pile caps that extend above grade and have a structural steel column stub extending out of the pier.2.5.16.3 Structural Frame Information on the structural frame was not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.16.4 Building Envelope A building envelope is not applicable to this structure.
2.5.16.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-Ilood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.17 New Warehouse 2.5.17.1 Building Location, Description, and Function The New Warehouse is located adjacent to the river and north.,of the power block. Drawings indicate it was built in 1987. The current building is approximately 322 ft by 126 ft in overall plan with a parking area to the north. The floor slab is sho~wntt6obe 4 to 6 in. thick, depending on the location, with thickened concrete undcr interiorCMU partition walls. Exterior grade is shown as being approximately 1003.71f1, and the finish'floor is shown at 1007.70 ft. There is a full building expansion joint loct ed between colurn grid lines.G and H; the expansion joint is located approximately 40 pqereo'bf the building length as measured from the east wall line. A cast-in-place concrete manliflMH-17 is shown betf"tb61uin grid lines L.3 and M in the east-west direction and betweei.:nd 2.3 in the nortf h"otirection 2.5.17.2 Foundation, Reinforced concrete spread footings are located under columns with continuous reinforced concrete footings at the wall-prireter.
Details indicate the use of both reinforced concrete and reinforced masonry foundatiori'alls.
The soil under the building was over-excavated down to 9$04 ft, and engineered fill wasg1aced to finish grade.2.5.17.3.
Structural Frame.;,..
.: .'The structural frame on the'building indicates the use of steel columns. Further details were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.17.4 Building Envelope Complete information on the building envelope was not available in referenced documentation.
Details on the foundation drawings indicate precast panels may form the building walls.2.5.17.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.
Page 2-53 Rev, 2 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition 2.5.18 Service Building 2.5.18.1 Building Location, Description, and Function The Service Building is to the east of and adjoins the Turbine building.
Drawings indicate it was built in 1967. The current building is approximately 50 ft by 224 ft in overall plan dimension.
The structure is a two-story ridged steel frame constructed on deep foundations.
The roof is metal deck with insulation and three-ply roofing. Grade is shown to be 1004 ft; the ground-floor level is approximately 3.5 ft above grade at el. 1007.5 ft and the second is at el. 1019.5 ft.2.5.18.2 Foundation The foundation is shown as deep pile foundation with reinforced pile caps placed to 10 ft below the top-of-foundation elevation at 1006.5 ft. Reinforced grade beams span between pile caps and support reinforced concrete slab with a thickness ranging from 6 to 12 in. Exterior columns and walls are on continuous grade beams.2.5.18.3 Structural Frame The structural frame is a rigid steel moment:'frme.
2.5.18.4 Building Envelope The roof is shown as a metal deck with insulation and three-ply roofing. lnformaiion on the walls was not available in the-referenced documentation.
2.5.18.5 Pre7-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structura repotts:were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.19:C.GARP Building.2.5.19.1 Building Location p!DQ.escription, and Function The:Chemistry/Radiation Protjtbion (CARP) Building was originally built in 1988 and adjoins the Auxiliary Building and T.e.ohical Support Center to the south and the Maintenance Building-to the cast. The weslt.all forms an exterior wall with an asphalt paved area immediatelywest of the-biiil"Iding.
A cafeteria composing the full east-west length of the CARP Buildingv,*as.addld-d1ater and is separated from the CARP Building by a two-hour fire rated masonry i31odiyafi.
The current CARP Building is approximately L-shaped, 112 ft 6 in.(north-south) by 24-ft 8 in. (east-west) in overall plan dimension, surrounding the Technical Support Center to the southeast, which is approximately 60 ft (north-south) by 125 fA (east-west). Exterior grade is shown as elevation 1004 ft with the first-floor level at 1007 ft.2.5.19.2 Foundation Interior and exterior building columns are supported on shallow spread-fooling foundations.
Exterior columns and walls are on continuous wall footings, constructed in a manner similar to that of the interior building columns.
I Page 2-54 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 2.5,19.3 Structural Frame The CARP Building is a single-story steel framed structure, with a partial mezzanine level in the southern half. Typical structural bays are approximately 25 fl by 25 ft.2.5.19.4 Building Envelope Details for walls are varied but generally consist of concrete masonry construction.
The roof is single-ply membrane over rigid insulation.
2.5,19.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.20 Maintenance Shop 2.5.20.1 Building Location, Description, and Function The Maintenance Shop was originally built in 1978 and adjoins the Service and Turbine Buildings to the south in the PA. Thc current~building is approximately 120 fl~ty 150 ft in overall plan dimension.
The original building was a rectangular-shaped structure with dimensions of 60 ft (north-south) by 150 ft (east-west)..
The structure consisted of a pre-engineered metal building with a mezzanine level. The main-floor level is at el. 1007.5 ft, which is approximately 3 ft above exterior grade. A rectangular-shaped addition was made to the northern portion of the Maintenance Shop in 1987. The approximate size of the addition was 60 ft (north-south).by
!5.0 ft:(east-west).
Theaddition structure consisted of a pre-engineered metal building witt.aparlial mezzanine The Maintenance Shop is bordered on the north and east by concrete paved areas.2.5.20.2 Foundation lifterior and exterior building columns are supported on shallow spread footings, and exterior columns and walls are on continuous wall footings.2.;.20.3 Structural Frame The structural frame is a single.-story steel framed structure with an added mezzanine level in the souther-'nhalf.
Typical _dpysware approximately 20 ft by 20 ft.4 -'-,:.:Q ..-2.5.20.4 Buiding Envelope The building envelope is shown to be an insulated wall system with metal siding on girls for supporting both and interior and exterior wall system. The roof is shown as a standing seam metal roof on purlins with ball type insulation held in place by a finished interior wall panel that was not identified from the information available..
" 2.5.20.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting There are two reported incidence of column settlements (Column TE- 15) within the Maintenance Shop building.
The first report, CR-2010-4755, occurred before the 2011 Flood Page 2-55 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 and notes that Column TE-l 5 had settled approximately one plus (1+) inches. The second report, CR-2011-5895, occurred in July 2011, and notes that Column TE-15 had settled additionally.
The settlement was reported to be a sudden, dramatic settlement, approximately one plus (I +) inches, with accompanying cracking noises and following dust. A follow-up investigation by Ground Penetrating Radar Systems, Inc., in August 2011, using ground penetrating radar (GPR), discovered that there was a possible void beneath the adjacent.column; however, the exact thickness of the void was not determined but reported as a minor.2.5.21 Maintenance Fabrication Shop 2.5.21.1 Building Location, Description, and Function The Maintenance Fabrication Shop is located to the west of the CARP and 'afete~da building.Documents indicate the Maintenance Fabrication Shop was builti fn 1987. The building is shown to be approximately 20 ft by 36 ft in overall plan dimension.and is 12 ft in height with a low slope roof. ":".2.5.21.2 Foundation Exterior building columns are supported on reinforced concrete shallow foundations (spread footings) placed 3.5 ft below grade and integ..al with a continuous reinforced concrete foundation wall on spread footings.
The floor slab is 8 in. thick reinforced concrete and approximately 2 in. above grade.2.5.21.3 Structural Frame The structural framing is a open-spanirigid fraimne steel structure with braced bays on the exteribor walls..2.5.21 .4 Building Envelope The building envelope is shownt.-o consist ofa double-sided insulated wall panel and roof.panels. The material skin on thle.,building panel is not identifiable.
Openings include one 8 ft.by.8 ft overhead door and two man doors.2.521i-.5 Pre-Flood Structura'l Reporting Pre-flood'slructural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.22 Maintenance Storage Building 2.5.22.1 Building Location, Description, and Function Information on the building was not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.22.2 Foundation Information on the foundation was not available in the referenced documentation.
Page 2-56 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 2.5.22.3 Structural Frame Information on the structural frame was not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.22.4 Building Envelope Information on the building envelope was not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.22.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documenitiation.
2.5.23 Old Warehouse 2.5.23.1 Building Location, Description, and Function The Old Warehouse is located approximately 160 ft west of ihc power block. The current building is approximately 300 fA by 60 ft inI overall plan. The floor slab is about 4 in. thich based on areas where the floor had core samples taken.2.5.23.2 Foundation Information on the foundation was not available in the referenced do urnentation.
............
.........
.-....
2.5.23.3 Structural Frame Information on the structure-was'not available in. the ieferenced documentation.
2.5.23.4 BuiidingiEnvelope Information on the building envelope was not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.23.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Plre-,flood structural reports wete.,ot available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.24 Training Center 2.5.24.1 Building Location, Description, and Function The Training Centeris a single-story administrative building located southwest of the power block area and next to the plant access road. The original structure was built after 1987 based on the design documents.
The preconstruction building plan dimensions provided in the referenced documentation indicate plan dimension of 10 ft by 370 ft. The preconstruction finished floor elevation is 1008.5 ft with the cafeteria and auditorium depressed to 1007 ft. The original site grade within the building area ranges from el. 1000 to 1003 ft.
Page 2-57 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 2.5.24.2 Foundation The Training Center foundation was original recommended to be reinforced concrete spread footing placed at a minimum depth necessary for frost protection.
2.5.24.3 Structural Frame The preconstruction referenced documentation indicates that the building has a steel frame with precast wall panels. No information is provided on the roofstructure, 2.5.24.4 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.25 Administration Building 2.5.25.1 Building Location, Description, and Function The Administration Building was built in 1989 and is located southwest of the PA. It is a two-story, steel framed structure, ] 72 ft by 308 ft overall.plan-dimension.
The Administration Building is bordered on the north by parking lots, on the south by wastewater treatment lagoons, on the east by chemical stabilization lagoons and marshý, iand on the west by the Training Center. Floor and important elevations are as follows:,,,.
- Grade: 1007 ft +/-* No basement* First floor: 1007.0 ft ".There..als0iS aloading-dock on ofii-'silde.
with slightly lower elevation of 1004 ft with low retaiiing;walls.
2.5.25.2 Foundation Interior building columns are supported on individual spread footings constructed on top of a 2-fi4hick layer of new engineered fill above native soils. Exterior columns and walls are on coniinuous.wall footings, constructed in a manner similar to that of the interior building columns.The site is on the west bank0 of the Missouri river flood plain approximately 600 ft from the riverbank.
Bedrock was reported at 60 to 75 ft below existing grade before development.
The entire building site has been raised 3 ft to 5 ft to place the floor elevations above flood plain.The site was preloaded with 7 ft of fill to compress softer layers of soils and reduce long-term settlements.
2.5.25.3 Structural frame The structural framing is a two-story steel framed structure.
Interior columns are located on a grid, typically 34 ft by 34 ft.
Page 2-58 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 2.5.25.4 Building Envelope Information on the building envelope was not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.25.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.26 Hazardous Material Storage Building 2.5.26.1 Building Location, Description, and Function The Hazardous Material Storage Building (Hazmal Shed) is located adjacent to and west of the Old Warehouse.
Documents indicate this structure was built in 1987. The building is shown to be approximately 20 ft by 36 ft in overall plan dimension and is 12 ft in height with a low slope roof.2.5.26.2 Foundation Exterior building columns are supported on reinforced concrete shallow foundations (spread footings) placed 3.5 fi below grade and integral with a continuous reinforced concrete foundation wall on spread footings.
The flo.or slab is 8-in.-thick.reinforced concrete and shown approximately 2 in. above the .adjacent.grade elevation.
2.5.26.3 Structural Frame The structural framing is a singl.erory, open-span, nsgidtaifie'gteel structure with braced bays on the exterior walls. -, 2.5.26.4-Building Envelope The building envelope is shown to consist of a. double-sided insulated wall panel and roof panels The material that forms the building panel is not identifiable on the documents.-Openings include one 8 ft by 8 ft overhead door and two man doors.2 5.26 5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.27 Maintenance Garage 2.5.27.1 Building Location, Description, and Function The Maintenance Garage is located approximately 250 ft west of the southern end of the Old Warehouse.
According to the documentation-available, the Maintenance Garage was built in 2005, and documents indicate the foundation was originally built for the Head Assembly Facility (HAF) used for the steam generator project.
Page 2-59 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 2.5.27.2 Foundation The reinforced concrete foundation is shown to be a 2-ft-thick reinforced mat foundation with the top-of-concrete place approximately at grade with thickened haunches at the perimeter extending 2 ft 6 in. below grade.2.5.27.3 Structural Frame The information available indicates the structure is a steel semicircular bent frame. Details on the member shape and space were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.27.4 Building Envelope The building envelope is identified on the documentation as a fabric cover over the steel frame.2.5.27.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in thereferenced documentation.
2.5.28 Tertiary Building 2.5.28.1 Building Location, Description, and Function The Tertiary Building (Boat Storage),was 6ýit- in 1984.originally.as.a neutralization building as indicated in the geotechnical repot. The building ihown to be;.pproximately 24 ft by 20 ft in plan. The structure is a one-story prefabricated batffing on shallow foundations with a reinforced concrete floating Tslb placed at 1001. ] shgrgdeshown as 1000.5 ft. The building covers a submerged taiikltbat sits on a reinffiercMl'.cncrete mat placed approximately 12 ft below grade.2.5.28.2 Foundation
.The foundation consists of reinforced grade walls extending approximately 4 ft below grade.2.5,28.3 Structural Frame The steel structural frame consists of a prefabricated steel braced frame.2.5.28.4 'Building Envelope Information on the"-bi;iiding envelope was not available in the referenced documentation.
2.5.28.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.
Page 2-60 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition
.Rev. 2 2.5.29 Spare Transformer Pads 2.5.29.1 Building Location, Description, and Function The Spare Transformer Pads are located just off the main plant entrance road and south of the Switch Yard. Drawings indicate that one pad was buill in 2002 and another in 2005. One pad consists of reinforced concrete cap supported on ten l-ft-6-in.
reinforced concrete piles, which are placed to 73 ft below grade, and is located between the second pad and the Maintenance Garage. The second pad is a 1 -ft-thick reinforced concrete mat 50 ft by 52 ft in plan with a hauched perimeter thickness of 2 ft and a top-of-concrete elevation of 1006 ft.2.5.29.2 Foundation See Section 2.5.29.1.2.5.29.3 Structural Frame A structural frame is not applicable to this structure.
2.5.29.4 Building Envelope A building envelope is not applicable to this.structure.
2.5.29.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports wy re not available in thetreferenced documentation.
2.5.30 Shooting Range 2.5.30.1 Building Location, Description, and Function The Shooting range is located 400 ft north of the PA and approximately 750 ft west of the river and separated from the rivert a wooded patch of land. The land area for the firing range is approximately 100 ft wide by 150:ft deep. A shelter on the southern end of the range spans the full, 100-ft width of the range. The shooting range is surrounded by a berm on three sides and, thb entire area of the range from. .rest-of-berm to crest-of-berm is approximately 225 ft by 200 ft.2.5.30.2 Fotundation A foundation is not applicable to this structure.
2.5.30.3 Structural Frame A structural frame is not applicable to this structure.
2.5.30.4 Building Envelope A building envelope is not applicable to this structure.
Page 2-61 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 2.5.30.5 Pre-Flood Structural Reporting Pre-flood structural reports were not available in the referenced documentation.
2.6 Civil
Baseline Civil infrastructure provides functional support for Priority I and Priority 2 structures at FCS.Underground utilities, electrical lines, and structures are essential components of facility operation.
Many of these components were part of original plant construction and have'been modified when and where necessary, including for plant upgrades as well as repairs. As a resultnumerious plant drawings show underground utilities at the site. Drawing 25036-C-008 (File 60559) isja:aepmposite plan of existing (as of 2006) buried utilities, primarily those north of the.main FCS aMcess .,rad. This drawing and other existing available drawings were reviewed to identify&hie~xiSiig civil inifastructure relating to Priority I structures at FCS prior to the beginning of the flood. The 'following aspectswere targeted for each component:
U Underground Piping-Materials of Construction
-Range of Sizes-Bedding Type" Underground Electrical
"-Type of Burial-Range of Sizes ..-Bedding Type (if applicable)
In addition to these underground componr'e~ts, the civil FCS includes some aboveground structures,.including the CameraTowers and High Mast Lighting, fencing, the Met Tower, and the Transmission Towers.Data obtained are discussed and/or referenced throughout this civil baseline description.
Targeted aspects that were not found during the,%cOurse of thedita review are noted as unknown. Drawings showing civil infrastructure are identified herein for reference purposes.2.6.1 Underground Piping Utilities'l:."'-.:
OPPD's ProaAirBasis Document (Pgb) 28, "Buried Piping and Components Program," was developed to esi'alrlish and maintaj.fiCa program that will detect, monitor and mitigate corrosion in plant buried piping and components." PBD-28 outlines program objectives, including the following:
- Identifying susceptible buried piping* Examining piping components
- Evaluating components to determine degradation
- Establishing pjping/cromponent replacemeni CriterTa :* Reducing system degradation Page 2-62 Rev. 2 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition In 2010, as part of PBD-28, Enercon delivered to OPPD the "Forl Calhoun Buried Pipe Program BPWORKSTM Document" (PBD-28, Attachment D). The Enercon BPWORKSTM document details"the risk ranking of buried pipe segments a, the Fort Calhoun Station using EPRI's BPWORKSrM software in support of the (Nuclear Energy Institute)
NEI Initiative." The intent of the Enercon BPWORKSTM document was to develop priorities for future inspection as part of the FCS program for mitigating issues with buried piping.Underground piping utilities are located throughout the FCS site. A general description of each of the major underground systems is provided in Table 2-6.Table 2-6 -Underground Piping Utilities
'Buried Piping System Piping MaterialA Range of Sizes BeddingType.
Drawing...B P S P Siz Reference Auxiliary Feedwater Carbon steel 4 in., 10 in. Unknown Unknown Auxiliary Steam Carbon steel 3 in. Unknown- Unknown Auxiliary Steam Fuel Oil Carbon steel I in., 1.5 in. U nknown Unknown 93-590-2-199.
Up to 8 ,ft 6.-in;.by 11405-S-299 Circulating Water Cast-in-place tunnel .pto8, 6 in'. Pile .11 405-S-300_"_"-__ , I 1405-S-301 Compressed Air Carbon steel 3 in. ..Unknown Unknown Condensate Carbon steel .i,.2 in.-' A.Uxiknown Unknown Carbon stedl'-l'.
3 iE... Unknown Unknown Demineralized.
Water PVC. " _ 8%ai. .Unknown Unknown Ductile and qkA iron 6 to:1-2in'
.Unknown E-4182 Fire Protection Asbestos cement 6 to 12 in.; Unknown 1405-M-313 11405-M-312 Fuel Oil Carbon steel 3 in. Unknown 11405-M-314 Instruxment Air Copper 1.5 in. Unknown Unknown Ehrhart Griffin& Associates, PVC 6 to 8 in. Unknown Sheets-.__.:-_"_.___:_.___._
__ C- I through C-7 FRP w 1.5 in. I 304 staialis steel 2 in. Unknown 11 405-M-312 Carbon:steel 1.5 in. Unknown.Copper 0.75 to 2 in. Unknown I 1405-M-3]
2 11405-M-313 Raw Water Carbon steel 6 in., 20 in. Concrete encased I1405-M-313 I 1405-M-314 11405-M-315 Ductile and cast iron PVC 4 in.4 to 6 in.4 to 15 in.2 2 2 I 1405-S-402 VCP Sanitary and Storm Sewer CMP (Storm only) 8 in.-HDPE (Storm only) 15 in. + 2 1 1405-M-312 1 1405-M-331 E-4014 E-4096 7753-03-A-20 SKE-09-05-01I RCP (Storm only)12 to 24 in.2 L/
Page 2-63 Site'History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 Table 2-6 -Underground Piping Utilities I Te 8 Drawing Buried Piping System Piping MaterialA Range of Sizes Bedding Type Reference Copper 3 in. 2 Service Water Carbon steel 0.75 to 3 in. 2 -l405-M-3t2 Vents and Drains Carbon steel 6 in. Unknown 1l1405-M-312 1 1405-M-313 Waste Disposal 304 stainless steel 2 in. Concrete encased_)1405-M-314 A PVC = polyvinyl chloride FRP fiberglass reinforced plastic VCP = vitrified clay pipe CMP = corrugated metal pipe" CHDPE = corrugated high density polyethylene RCP reinforced concrete pipe ......__.-Bedding types for underground piping utilities are listed below, and the sources are given in parentheses:..
I. Pipe placed on 3 in. of sand fill and backfilled with 3 in. of sand, followed'by' common fill up to grade and compacted to 95 percent of maximum density: gradation is unknown. (Drawing H1405-M-312; American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) standard.for compaction is not known.)2. Pipe placed on compacted subgrade in 24-in.-wide-trench, back-filled-with I ft Select Fill Type A Coarse Stone (0.75 in. minimurn size), common fill up to fiiMniedgiad( Pdaýed in 12-in. loose lifts and compacted to 95 percent of maximum density; rAation is unliown. (Drawig E-4093 Sheet 2; ASTM standard for compaction is not known.) _ _._,_,__.._,_.........
During development of the Enercon BP.WPORKSTM docurmerlt, soil sam'les were taken from six locations throughout the FCS site to de te= me the soil o be entered into the BPWORKS T M software.
The assumptions associatedd!,ith using a represe `tativesample were not considered in developing the civil baseline descriptiofisobelow.
Rather, bedding specifications and/or details for buried utilities were researched for inclu~ionjn the baseline descriptions.
Specifications and/or details that were foudaare listed under Bedding Tpe-in Table 2-6, above- Bedding Type is listed as"Unknown".'for systems that did not have trenching or bedding details included in available documentation.
Underground systems identified as Priofity I systems are discussed below.2.6.1.1T Circulating WaterSjtem is directed : dom the Intake Structure to the Turbine Building and from the Turbine Buid.g to the rireithrough cast-in-place concrete tunnels that are up to 8 ft 6 in. by 8 ft 6 in. in sizi;',Pipinig and instrumentation diagrams (P&ID) as well as a general flow diagram are show.ninDrawings I 1405-M-257 (File 44336) and 93-590-2-199 (File 2512), respectively.
In November 2010, the Enercon BPWORKSTM document identified the Circulating Water System for inspection subsequent to priority inspections.
Page 2-64 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 2.6.1.2 Demineralized Water System Dernineralized water piping is routed to the Service Building from a new water treatment system near the Old Warehouse.
Blair Water provided HDR with information about this piping system. However, the Enercon BPWORKSTM document identifies the piping as 3-in. steel and 8-in. PVC. In November 2010, five segments of demineralized water piping were identified as priority segments for investigation and one segment for subsequent investigation.
2.6.1.3 Fire Protection System Piping The fire protection system piping is a buried loop around the main buildings, intended to provide water for fire suppression.
Original construction of the loop' was 6-.to 12-in. asbestos-cement piping. Eight yard hydrants are located around the site along with multiple isolation valves. In addition to external fire protection, there are connections from the loop to interior fire protection piping for the following FCS structures:
- Intake Structure* Rad Waste Building* Security Building" Turbine Building" New Warehouse* Service Building* Maintenance Shop* Maintenance Fabrication Shop" Old Warehouse Since originalconstruction of FCS, several sections of asbestos-cement piping have been replacedwith ductile iron piping. Not all locations of replaced piping could be determined from lhe-information -available.
Drawing E-4182 notes that 20 ft of asbestos cement piping (also.known in the industry as.transite piping) were replaced with ductile iron pipe, located approximately from I 170N/2212W to I 190N/2212W (using coordinates shown in Drawing E-4]82). The Maintenance Shop and the Chemical/Radiation Protection (CARP) Building were constructed over a section of abandoned fire main. This section of fire protection systemlocated approximately 35Rft south of the north wall of the CARP and extending fiom 75 ftwes.i of the CARP to approximately 10 ft east of the Maintenance Shop, was abandoned in place; a-new section was c6dnstructed between the New Warehouse and the CARP Building, with addiiiorial sections extending to the north side of the New Warehouse.
In November 2010, the Enercon BPWORKSTM document identified the fire protection piping as a priority for inspection.
2.6.1.4 Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Piping Three diesel generator fuel-oil tanks and associated piping are on site within the PA._-Tanik FO-I is located south of the Auxiliary Building.
Two 2-in. steel pipes connect the. tank to the fuel pump located within the building.
Tank FO-1 0 is located between the Intake Structure and the Service Building.
Piping for FO-10 is not shown in the drawings available.
FO-27 is an aboveground tank located adjacent to the west wall of the Intake Structure.
The Enercon BPWORKSTM document identifies this piping as 3-in. steel. Additionally, FO-32 (security Page 2-65 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 back-up tank, located south of the New Warehouse) and FO-43 (aboveground gas tank, located at the northeast corner of the PA) are within the PA but not listed as Priority I structures.
In November 2010, the Enercon BPWORKSTM document identified 35 segments of fuel-oil water piping as priority segments for investigation.
2.6.1.5 Potable Water In 1993, approximately 4800 ft of 8-in. PVC water main was installed to provide a new connection between the City of Blair Water System and the main FCS buildings.
In addition, approximately 1000 ft of 6-in. water service line off the 8-in. main were installed to serve the southern area of FCS, including the Administration Building.
The priinary.fumction of the new water main is to serve the reverse osmosis water treatmeht.sys~tem for demineralized water production.
The new water main is shown in detail in the 1993 drawings by Ehrhart Griffin &Associates titled "OPPD FCS Water Plant Tie-In to Blair W6ier System." 2.6.1.6 Raw Water Raw water piping is routed between the Intake Struciture and the Auxiliary Building through two steel pipelines.
Both pipes have a 20-in. diameter.
Near Auxiliary Building penetrations, the piping is routed through 28-in.-diameter sleeves; sleeve material is unknown. To the west of the Intake Structure, a 6-in.-diameter raw-water line extends off of the main line to water-treatment equipment located in the Service Building.In November 2010, the EnerconBPWORKSTm document identified 21 segments of raw water piping as priority segments fOr investigation and sVen. segments for subsequent investigation.
2.6.1.7 WasteDisposal.
Waste disposal pipinig:.is shbwn in Sheet 11405-M-313.
The 2-in. stainless-steel pipeline is routed between the Turbiiný'ei ilding and 6te discharge tunnel of the Intake Structure.
In November 2010, the EnercdiilPWORKSTM document identified I I segments for investigation subsequent to priority investigidions.
2.6.2 Underground
Electrical Utilities.
Underground electrical lines are loqa Mt1hroughout the FCS site. Electrical utilities are buried as direct buried cable, 'buned concrete duct bank, or prefabricated trench. A general description of each of t]ei-.mjor underground electrical systems is provided in Table 2-7.
Page 2-66 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 Table 2-7 -Underground Electrical Utilities Underground Electrical Materia..
I Conduit Size" Bedding Drawing Reference Utility Type 9364-C-0106 See Files 46459, 46463, Underground Cable Trench Precast concrete W: 60 to 84 S4-(Trenwa) trench D: 22 to 38 in. 2.6.i.] 49 , 476 7, 2.6.2.1 49669-70, 49717, 49750-54 4 in. D-4353, Sheet I (6 ft by 6ft) 11405-E-319 Main Underground Cable Concrete encased Unknown 13007.01-EE-3F Bank 8 to ]6 i'n. 1405-M-3 12 E-4096 11405-S-41]
Duct Bank (Abandoned)
Concrete encased Unknown Unknown I 1405,S,-41 0 PVC Conduit PVC 4.to5,in.
Unknown CE-79-2 13.8 kV Distribution Duct Concrete encased ' Varies- Unknown 'D-4353, Sheet Bank _ _ _ __ _.-.. .D irect Three 1/0 15kV Direct Buried Cable NA Diet D-4353, Sheet I......._.... Bury Three 1/0 #2-15kV EMP AL Cable* A Direct I 1405-S-3 19 (Abandoned)
C b e......_ Bury I1405-S-319 2989 & Communications
-(Abandoned)
Unknown U .knowAn Unknown I 1405-E-3 19 2/C #6 (Abandoned)
Unknown Unknown Unknown 1 1405-S-4 10 C-333 Underground Power Line Cable Unknown Unknown Ehrhart Griffin &:..___ "-Associates Sheets C-3 Thr. 500 MCM AL 600V "sAl.umintm Unknown Unknown I 1405-E-3 19 4-(Abandoned)" : ""Direct 480VDirect Buried Cable Cable NA 11405-M-312
...._ ,'_._Bury 4-in. VCP (Abandoned)
VCP 4 in. Unknown 11405-S-402 CE-79-1 Telephone Cable Unknown Unknown Unknown Ehrhart Griffin &Associates Sheets C-3 Underground Electric Unknown Unknown Unknown F-4001 SH.]One 32SM Fiber Cable Fiber cable Unknown Unknown CE-79-1 ISFSI Cable Trench Precast concrete Unknown Unknown 59058-EE-6A
& -6B trench A -PVC = polyvinyl chloride VCP = vitrified clay pipe 0
- NA = Not applicable Page 2-67 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev: 2 For four of the major systems listed in Table 2-7, additional details were available and are provided as follows.2.6.2.1 Underground Cable Trench The Underground Cable Trench is a Trenwa, Inc., trench system that contains the site cabling for FCS.. The Underground Cable Trench (Trenwa) is a precast concrete cable trench that follows the PA perimeter.
The Trenwa varies between 60 and 84 in. wide and is between 22 and 38 in. deep, depending on location.
Drain holes to subgrade are interspersed along the Trenwa alignment.
In areas with poor drainage soil, the Trenwa was recoininended to be installed over a perforated drain pipe below the Trenwa. However, the ,actual installation method could not be determined because the available drawings were nature. The Trenwa is covered with precast lids. Al traffic crossings, lids are in place to allow vehicular traffic to cross the Trenwa. The Trenwa section is inbdified for these locations; such modifications include a thicker base and uni-strut inserts aftboth legs. Trenwa bedding at typical road crossings was specified to be compacted subgrade and blckfill, with a 95 percent minimum dry density per American Society for Testing and MateriiBs (ASTM) Dl 557.Trenwa bedding is compacted subgrade soil. Per the drawing notes, engineered bedding was not specified except at particular locations.
Soil compaction beneath the Trenwa was to be equal to the undisturbed average soil, with minimum compaction of 4000 pounds per square foot (psf). Pedestrian crossings and drain-pipe crossings includeda-minimum bedding of 3 in.of crushed rock underlain with geotettile fabric. Dr4aA.ings 88-185-1 and 9364-C-0012, files 47643 and 46463, respectively, inblade notes and det~ils for Trenwa bedding and subgrade.2.6.2.2 Main Underground.C.able Bank The Main Underground Cable Bakis aligned inside and outside of the PA through 6-.t-by-6-fl concrete-encased duct bank. Six eledin.ca, manholes (MH-l through MH-5 and MH-31) along thealignment of the Main Undergroundi Cazble Bank are labeled in Sheet I 1405-E-319.
One additional manhole on the Main Underg"roid Cable Bank alignment is located north of MH-1,.just east of the Control Building..
2.6-2-3 13.8 kV Power Distribution Mei ?-.voltage (13.8 kV) poWer is distributed throughout the site through buried duct bank and conduýit.
Drawing D-4353shows a plan of the power distribution, focusing on the areas closest to the PA. A 13.8 kV'Switchgear at the north end of the Old Warehouse distributes power through a concrete-encased duct bank that extends east and PVC conduits that extend to the north and south.2.6.2.4 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation The ISFSI, located northwest of the New Warehouse, includes underground trenching and conduit for electrical power, temperature, and instrumentation systems between the ISFSI, the Electrical Equipment Building at the southeast corner of the ISFSI and the New Warehouse.
Drawing 59058-EE-6A shows the ISFSI cable trench and raceway plan. The cable trench is similar to the Underground Cable Trench discussed in Section 2.6.2. 1. Additional buried conduit is located on the north, west, and south sides of the ISFSI for the High Mast Lighting.
Page 2-68 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. 2 2.6.3 Underground Structures 2.6.3.1 Lift Stations and Sewage Lagoons Four lift stations are located on site and are shown in drawing E-4093: SD-10, SD- 1I, SD-16, and the Administration Buildine Lifi Station. Lift station SD-10, located south ofthe Security Building near the Missouri River, has been abandoned in place. Lift station SD-1 6 is located just north of SD- 10.Lift station SD-II is located inside of the PA near the Nlew Warel6tise.
A 4-in.-diameler PVC force main conveys sanitary flow from SD-l I around the Oid Warehouseto the sewage lagoons located south of the Administration Building.
The:Administr'atioin:,B5uilding Lift Station conveys flow to the Sanitary Lagoon Intake/Splitter StrucMte located-south of the Administration Building.The sewage lagoons, shown in Drawing 579J-M-2, provide treatment for the domestic wastewater generated on site. The new lagoon is a two-cell lagoon with a berm elevation of 1007.00, high water elevation of 1004.00, and bottom elevation (at deepest point) of 996.50.Drawings 579J-M-1, -2, -3, and -4 show additional details of the sewage lagoon and associated structures.
2.6.3.2 Septic Tank An underground septic tank, shown in DraWing E-4093., is locatednear the south end of the Old Warehouse.
Additional drawings and details were.not available for use in establishing the civil baseline for the post-flood assessment.
2.6,3.3 Sanitary and Storm Sewer Manholes Numerous sanitary anfd storm sewer maaiholes are located throughout the FCS site. Five sanitiary sewer manholes'are;iocated within-the PA. Drawing E-4093, Sheet 1, shows the location of known manholes-a.nd.,other strtiettres throughout the site. Drawing E-4093, Sheet 2, which was to contain various details for sanitary and storm sewers and manholes, was not available for use in establishing the civil baseline for the post-flood assessment.
Drawing 25036-C-008.
Buried Utilities Composite Plan, shows additional components of the sanitary and storm systems. A storm drainage catch basin (noted as "New" in Drawing 25036-C-008) is located at the far north end of the PA. No other existing catch basins were identified in the available drawings.
Page 2-69 Site History, Description, and Baseline Condition Rev. i 2.6.4 Aboveground Structures Civil infrastructure located aboveground at the FCS site includes the following: " Camera towers and high mast lighting are located throughout the site. These are components of the site security system and, due to security requirements, are not shown in any drawings." Fencing is located throughout the site as part of the overall security system. Fenced areas include the PA, the Original Steam Generator Storage Bv;ildiqrpt.$GS), the Switchyard, and the perimeter of the site. Other fencing might existat.FCS, but it was not immediately identified in available drawings or other information.
- Weather Tower ME- 1, known as the Met Tower, is shown in Drawing F-4000. The Met Tower is a 1 10-meter weather tower, located approximately 2600 ft north of the PA.Direct-buried fiber optic cable is routed from MH-30 at the northeast comer of the PA, along the east road to an access road to the weather buil~diijjIýoted at the base of the Met Tower. Power and communication cabling is routed in trenchi'uth of the Met Tower toward the northeast corner of the Switchyard w.Iaeye.iit transitiofi' Ito-aboveground cabling.The building near the base of the Met Tower is'a;12-f4tb.y-]2-ft concrete block building for housing tower instrumentation.
." Transmission towers for 161 kV and 345 kW power are.!ocaed throughout the site. The towers support 161 kV and 345 kV power transmission ca1I1gbetween the Turbine Building and Switchyard and into the electrical distribution g.-d, These are shown in Figure 2-18, Sheets I through 3. The towers Hie foundations shown in Drawing E-4600..., ,: .
N. -1 1 2 p 14'A Iv ,ev Mar P-7T S #i 155 1ý61 kV.'P'STS #18.4 161 kV ,ý..-..ST o16.S N25ýSTS #18-3 r-~11 kv,'a 0 LI.U)U U-U, 11; m" 400 Fe]el L~~J ..-~- ___________
-6 D.0,.3 0~N D Owner Controlled Property Boundary.l"414" 11 Transmission Towers Fort Calhoun Station Plant and Facility Geotechnical and Structural Assessment DAT E Sep 2011 FIGURE 2-18 i a Met Tower~t.rrL 11 I PRH1O 27L 09 08 STS #10 345kV Tower 161 kV STS #14 ,'161 kV STS #11-1 161 kV 0.,.".161 kV 345kVTower 161 kV a.kV 161 kV-H 3 kV ,~345kV.Tower
-.161 kV 16kV.. 7Tower 1 S .. ... .. ,,.......11 Owner Controlled Property Boundary I Omawha Power Orsiricl Transmission Towers Fort Calhoun Station Plant and Facility Geotechnical and Structural Assessment 2 j5 161 kV 9~MaD 7 161 kV Pa.161 kV 2-q.L 3 -I-1/4400 A* n r D" (= Owner Controlled P B orpet Boundary Omawha Pubim Puwe: Oisinr Transmission Towers Fort Calhoun Station Plant and Facility Geotechnical and Structural Assessment Sep 2011 FIGURE 2-18 hq-l& S & A Section 5.7 ii Priority 1 Structures Security Building Page 5.7-1 Rev. 2 Priodty I Structures Security Building Page 5.7-2 Rev. 2 G~ 'Ni F /
Priority I Structures Security Building Page 5.7-3 Rev. 2 (b)(4),(b)(7)(F) 5.7.4.1 Potential Failure Modes Ruled Out Prior to the Completion of the Detailed Assessment The ruled-out CPFMs reside in the Not Significant/High Confidence category and for clarity will not be shown in the Potential for Failure/Confidence matrix.
Priority 1 Structures Security Building Page 5.7-4 Rev. 2/- .... Triggering Mechanism 2 -Surface Erosion CPFM 2a -Undermining shallow foundation/slab/surfaces Reason for ruling out:* It was evident from HDR's site inspection that no surface erosion occurred in the vicinity of the Security Building.Triggering Mechanism 5 -Hydrodynamic Loading CPFM 5a -Overturning CPFM 5b -Sliding CPFM 5c -Wall failure in flexure CPFM 5d -Wall failure in shear CPFM 5e -Damage by debris CPFM 5f -Excess deflection Reason for ruling out: The Security Building was protected froi floodwater flowed over the site in the A Triggering Mechanism 6 -Buoyancy, j CPFM 6b -Cracked slab, loss CPFM 6c -Displaced struc en Reasons for ruling out:* Altbai *1fi force of the Forc Isupl geu, Lters migi' occurred on the Security etural support of the slabs was not observed at the efifd~f the Foding to the Sy uplift of 1007 ft, which Rev 6).nent, the building is designed for a hydrostatic maximum flood level (SDBD-STRUC-504
's inspection of the a to recede below th rces was at its hiE ity Building was completed shortly after the floodwaters had ximum elevation.
Therefore, distress related to buoyancy or ,otential prior to the inspection, and signs of distress would T he Ic buoyanc'flooding inn Filding footings does not allow a net uplift pressure due to Conditions in conjunction with maximum gross uplift forces from aximum flood elevation did not cause observable distress.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.7-5 Security Building Rev. 2 Triggering Mechanism 7 -Soil Collapse (first time wetting)CPFM 7a -Cracked slab, differential settlement of shallow foundation, loss of structural support CPFM 7b -Displaced structure/broken connections CPFM 7c -General site settlement Reasons for ruling out:* Due to the elevation of the Security Building slab (100 a I roximity of the building to the river, this was not the first time wetti its uilding.* The peak flood elevation prior to 2011 was docum n 1993 ft, which would indicate that soils below and surrounding the buildi s e.Triggering Mechanism 10 -Machine/Vibration-Induc faction CPFM I0a -Cracked slab, differential settlement of dation, loss support CPFM 1Ob -Displaced structure/broken connec, Reason for ruling out: The Security Building has not been su ed to ma 'brations t could induce liquefaction of soils. Therefore, machi r vib ndu faction failures are not possible.Triggering Mechanism 11 f Soil Stren ue to St iquefaction or Upward Seepage CPFM -racked sla ntial settleme foundation, loss of structural n for rilina ut cosidlobservations the maluodiints indicate no structure movement.
ofeefoe, baries.uTheefor , smutlelsuements benTetdbyte21hlodwscnieredore, dation that can be a d to this CPFM did not occur.Tr Mchanism 1 rec-Corrosion .ctural elements Reason for ut, TeSecurity ng has not been subjected to corrosive circumstances that would be considered beyd d the normal conditions.
The building was kept dry by the use of HESCO barriers.
Therefore, structural elements being wetted by the 2011 flood was considered in the original designa of the facility.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.7-6 Security Building Rev. 2 Triggering Mechanism 14 -Frost Effects CPFM 14a -Heaving, crushing, or displacement Reasons for ruling out:* The Security Building's foundation system is below frost level, and the interior of the building is a heated structure.
The building will not be subjected to freeze/thaw cycles.Therefore, frost effects have been discredited.
- Flooding did not change the frost and foundation condi s. has always been subjected to freezing temperatures with moist t ed 5.7.4.2 Detailed Assessment of Credible Potent ilure The following CPFMs arte te only CPFMs carred forws giled asse remo the Security Building as a result of the 2011 o This detatt Ls pro i Triggering Mechanism 3 -Subsurface Erosion/Pip.ig CPFM 3a -Undermining and settlement of sbdto/ e (due to pumping)During the flood, continual pumping was red in t s o tem rot and in the knownity Buildug tbecause l large amount aterhn da.ndetrmine fesit beforHss ite TrgeingsMecthon.s n n =The _sobs stress indicators and other data that would increase or epotentia alati with this CPFM for the Security Building.dvrs (Deg rdto ,loowa`" Favorable (Degradation/Direct
.Impact More ,Floodwater Impact Less Likely)elocations for an extend rod. Security Building are noted to have granular fill PronSecurnity p discovered No current signs of settlement or structure Ssoft spots Jb earby pavement, distress.whic coldsub'surface erosion.Data Gaps:*The extent omf surface erosion and potential adverse impacts on the Security Building are not known due to a lack of geophysical and geotechnical data&During the infiltration of the Trenwa system, observations of the water flow into the system to determine if soil was being deposited was not completed because it occurred before HDR's site inspection.
Priority I Structures Page 5.7-7 Security Building Rev. 2 Conclusion Significance Potentialfor Degradation/Direct Floodwater Impact Subsurface erosion is expected to have occurred at the site due to groundwater pumping in Trenwas and manholes in or adjacent to the Security Building.
If 1surface erosion is significant, it could materially and negatively impact the int n function of the structure.
It is believed that if subsurface erosion were o g ctures, signs would be visible during the inspections.
Because no si distres en observed at this time, it is believed that the potential for degradatio W.Implication The occurrence of this CPFM on a large scale could neg capacity footings supporting the building.
This could lead to excessive fou movement, ever, settlements are expected to occur at a slow rate a It in sud building collapse.Should foundation movement be detected, ould be ted to keep the building functional.
The settlements s ot nega act the i or intended function of the Security Building.
Theref e impli otential gradation for this CPFM is low.Confidence The extent of subsurface e d its potential t on ilding is not known due to the lack of data gathered on ce conditions.
s not enough information on the sub at ti nd the pupi ould have caused undermining r CPFM 3a, as discussed the poten for degradation is low because signs of distress not observed.
It is unlik s degradation would have caused enough erosion to impact.'ty or intended the structure.
The combined consideration of the potential fo ion and the s of that degradation to a structure of this type puts it in the"Cnot category.
] tacurrently collected are not sufficient to rule out this CPFM.. re, the icei the above assessment is low, which means more data or continued ng pections might be necessary to draw a conclusion.
Triggering Mechanism 3 -Subsurface Erosion/Piping CPFM 3d -Undermining and settlement of shallow foundation/slab (due to river drawdown)Floodwater elevations, at the time of HDR's inspection, were above finished floor elevations, and river levels were being lowered at a relatively slow pace. RPver elevations were still well above normal levels.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.7-8 Security Building Rev. 2 The Triggering Mechanism and CPFM could then occur as follows: the drop in elevation of the river is expected to occur at a higher rate than the drop in elevation of the groundwater.
This will result in an increased groundwater gradient.
This increase could allow for subsurface erosion to occur.The following table describes observed distress indicators and other data that would increase or decrease the potential for degradation associated with this CPFM for the Security Building.Adverse (Degradation/Direct Floodwater Fava Impact More Likely)The Security Building is in close proximity to the No di as er. s Elevated saturated soils and elevated flood levels Survey provide a water source. A potential path for the build water and soil migration can extend under the structure to the river, causing erosion.Date Gaps: 'M--W'.Effects of rapid drawdown may still initiate due to ,els. Tee conditions and welkhow they ma fetti PMaentwl neophysic technical data inteviiiy offt theeuity Buidin are nthisl!Conclusion Sigfnificance" Potential for Degradatio/
ioodwater I Riverceded ized at a leve onding to the nominal normal riverof Oct 011. The potential for degradation from drawdown is o10 e it has n bserve ctober 4, 2011. Rapid drawdown has been ed, and continu drawdo t expected to occur at a rate that would cause erining. Therefore, ntial de n for this CPFM is low.ence of this CPFM large scale could negatively impact the capacity of the footi rting the buil is could lead to gradual foundation movement.
However, settlem expected r at a slow rate and not result in sudden, total building collapse.Should fo mo e detected, appropriate repairs could be implemented to keep the building e settlements should not negatively impact the integrity or intended function of the uilding. Therefore, the implication of the potential degradation for this CPFM is low.Confidence The extent of current subsurface erosion and its potential impact on the building is not known due to the lack of data on subsurface conditions.
Unknown river drawdown rates in the future could also add to current subsurface erosion. River levels are such that this CPFM might not have occurred yet. Therefore, the confidence for this CPFM is low.
Priority 1 Structures Security Building Page 5.7-9 Rev. 2 Summary For CPFM 3d, as discussed above, the potential for degradation is low because river drawdown is controlled and is not expected to occur at a rate to initiate this CPFM. It is unlikely this degradation would have caused enough erosion to impact the integrity or intended function of the structure.
The combined consideration of the potential for degradation and the implications of that degradation to a structure of this type puts it in the "not significant" category.
It is unknown whether this CPFM has occurred or whether it will occt& the future because the data at hand are not sufficient to rule out this CPFM. he , e in the above assessment is low, which means more data or continued, rin ctions might be necessary to draw a conclusion.
Iih Triggering Mechanism 12 -Rapid Drawdown CPFM 12a -River bank slope failure and undermini srtructures CPFM 12b -Lateral spreading The Triggering Mechanism and CPFMs cou than pore water pressure in the soil can dis, dropping river level. The sloped bank oft saturated soil. At some point there is insu*saturated soils. At that point, the expi slope failures associated with ra d however, deeper failures can Floodwater e tions, at the I-DR'and riv g low aboE t) in rThe sa-r provjb the riv ops fasteris elev ye the I pressure upport for the de to support the en failure. Generally, d and shallow in nature;fVe s overn are , ively oc s finished floor elevations, Ltively slow pace. River elevations were still well of the river is expected to occur at a higher rate This will result in an increased groundwater erbank slope failure and/or lateral spreading.
!it. This increase se loc the time of Revision 0, thý4 ft). Field observation.dropped.level had dropped to a nominal normal level (roughly-river bank area has not been performed since the river The table desc erved distress indicators and other data that would increase or tion associated with these CPFMs for the Security Building.
Priority 1 Structures Security Building Page 5.7-10 Rev. 2 Adverse (Degradation/Direct Floodwater Favorable (Degradation/Direct Impact More Likely) -Floodwater Impact Less Likely)The Security Building is in close proximity to the No distress was observed at the time of HDR's river. site inspection.
Elevated saturated soils and elevated flood levels provide a water source. A potential path for water and soil migration can extend under the structure to the river, causing adverse effects attributed to river drawdown.Survey data to date do not identify movement of the building.Data Gaps:* Observations of the riverbank following drawdown to* Geophysical investigation data to address observed cons* Inclinometer readings that will provide an indication of s.Conclusion Significance Potential for Degradation/Direct Floodwa River stage level has receded and s river level at 40,000 cfs as of Octo low because it has not been obse controlled, and continued river these CPFMs. Since it is be not likely, these CPFMs ar, to the noxrninal normal on from drawdown is own has been that would initiate f the structure exists but is son a T le could negatively impact the capacity of the This co ! to gradual foundation movement but should or inten nction of the Security Building.
Therefore, s dation for these CPFMs is high.Revision 0, conditions required to trigger CPFMs 12a and 12b ervations and other investigation data required to evaluate this ide, and an evaluation cannot be made. Therefore, confidence for The data at hand are not sufficient to rule out these CPFMs or to lead to a conclusion that physical modification to ensure that river bank slope failure and lateral spreading will not occur. Therefore, the confidence in the above assessment is low, which means more data are necessary to draw a conclusion.
Summary For CPFMs 12a and 12b, as discussed above, the potential for degradation is low because river drawdown is controlled and is not expected to occur at a rate necessary to initiate these CPFMs.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.7-11 Security Building Rev.. 2 If the degradation were to occur, the implications to the structure would likely be low. The combined consideration of the potential for degradation and the implications of that degradation to a structure of this type puts it in the "not significant" category.
It is unknown whether these CPFMs have occurred or if they will occur in the future because the data at hand are not sufficient to rule out these CPFMs. Therefore, the confidence in the above assessment is low, which means more data or continued monitoring and inspections might be necessary to draw a conclusion.
5.7.5 Results
and Conclusions The CPFMs evaluated for the Security Building are presented rating for the estimated significance and the level of confidenw Low Confidence
[(insufficient Data)=* 12a: z 7 ot 5.7.6 Recomr Clio follow 5 evail which shows theýn ce Rta)Continued monitoring ended to include a continuation of the elevation surveys of the previously identified targ n this structure and surrounding site. The purpose is to monitor for signs of structure distress and movement or changes in soil conditions around the structure.
The results of this monitoring will be used to increase the confidence in the assessment results. Elevation surveys should be performed weekly for 4 weeks and biweekly until December 31, 2011. At the time of the writing of this version of the Assessment Report, groundwater levels had not yet stabilized to nominal normal levels. Therefore, it is possible that new distress indicators could still develop. If new distress indicators are observed before December 31, 2011, appropriate HDR personnel should be notified immediately to determine if an immediate inspection or assessment should be conducted.
Observation of new distress indicators might result in a modification of the recommendations for this structure.
Priority 1 Structures Page 5.7-12 Security Building Rev. 2 5.7.7 Updates Since Revision 0 Revision 0 of this Assessment Report was submitted to OPPD on October 14, 2011. Revision 0 presented the results of preliminary assessments for each Priority I Structure.
These assessments were incomplete in Revision 0 because the forensic investigation and/or monitoring for most of the Priority I Structures was not completed by the submittal date. This revision of this Assessment Report includes the results of additional forensic investigation and monitoring to date for this structure as described below.5.7.7.1 Additional Data Available The following additional data were available for the S Bil ions 1 and 2 of this Assessment Report:* Additional groundwater monitoring well and river s from OP* Field observations of the river bank (see Section 5.25).* Results of geophysical investigation by Geotec , Inc. (se ent 6).* Results of geotechnical investigation by Th Inc.(see ent 6).* Data obtained from inclinometers by Thi ec ttac* Results of continued survey by Lamp son and (see A ent 6).5.7.7.2 Additional Analysis The following analysis of addit h con s of the soy Building: tGroutdwater monito e rog n d river stage #PPD.Da T ne e holes water have returned to nominal normal levels.osrvatio bank No significance distresi th e 2011 r was observed.sults of geophysical inv, tion by Geotechnoiogy, Inc.
and S tests performed around the outside perimeter of the lo ck identified oonalies that could be gravel, soft clay, loose sand,tor posso Results ofI investigation by Thiele Geotech, Inc.Six test boingd Cere drilled, with continuous sampling of the soil encountered, to ground truth the Geotechnology, Inc. seismic investigation resultas part of the KDI #2 forensic investigation.
Test bore holes were located to penetrate the deep anomalies identified in the seismic investigation.
The test boring data did not show any piping voids or very soft/very loose conditions that might be indicative of subsurface erosion/piping or related material loss or movement.All of the SPT and CPT test results conducted for this Assessment Report were compared to similar data from numerous other geotechnical investigations that have been conducted Priority 1 Structures Security Building Page 5.7-13 Rev. 2 on the FCS site in previous years. This comparison did not identify substantial changes to the soil strength and stiffness over that time period. SPT and CPT test results were not performed in the top 10 feet to protect existing utilities.
Data from inclinometers to date, compared to the original baseline measurements, have not exceeded the accuracy range of the inclinometers.
Therefore, deformation at the monitored locations since the installation of the instrumentation has not occurred.Results of continued survey by Lamp Rynearson and cia4 Survey data to date compared to the original basel eys I accuracy range of the surveying equipment.
There efo locations, since the survey baseline was shot, has no Several CPFMs were identified in Revision 0. Since Rev*available that have clarified the significance and confiden or presents each of the previously identified CPFMs and the new inte significance and confidence based on the new dwdfil Triggering Mechanism 3 -Subsurface CPFM 3a -Undermining and settlem pumping)t of wat ltrated using su ,ions of o our During the flood, continual pure Security Building because a 1 9 have been carried with the from these areas it was possi underr jaround and in the nts. Soil deposits could If enough soil was removed adation and slabs would be rred at the site due to groundwater pumping in Trenwas and rity Building.
If subsurface erosion was significant, it could acted the integrity or intended function of the structure.
It is had occurred below the structures, signs would have been would be apparent from survey data. Because no signs of this time, it is believed that the potential for degradation is low.The occurrence of this CPFM on a large scale could negatively impact the capacity of the footings supporting the building.
This could lead to excessive foundation movement.
However, settlements are expected to occur at a slow rate and not result in sudden, total building collapse.Should foundation movement be detected, appropriate repairs could be implemented to keep the building functional.
The settlements should not negatively impact the integrity or intended function of the Security Building.
Therefore, the implication of the potential degradation for this CPFM is low.
PCority 1 Structures Security Building Page 5.7-14 Rev. 2'Confidence The extent of subsurface erosion and its potential impact on the building was not known at the time of Revision 0 due to the lack of data gathered on subsurface conditions.
Subsequent field inspections and a review of surveyed data indicate no structure movement.
Since the structure has been monitored and no signs of movement have been detected, the confidence in the assessment of degradation for this CPFM has increased.
If further structure monitoring reveals no further issues, the confidence of the assessment for this CPFM&Eomes high.Summary For CPFM 3a, as discussed above, the potential for degs were not observed.
It is unlikely this degradation woul the integrity or intended function of the structure.
The coT for degradation and the implications of that degradation tý"not significant" category.
The data collected since ReviýCPFM assuming the previously recommended monit E the confidence in the above assessment is high,M are necessary to draw a conclusion.
The da CPFM, which includes the geophysical, ge ical, an required.Triggering Mechanism 3 -E CPFM 3d -Undermining drawdown)A At the time o vision I of norma .994 wh" d foundai sfa'b (due to river to iurred gradua'[ýse did not allow fc sment Repo ,vel had dropped to a nominal observations o e river bank area were performed.els. The drop in elevation of the river to its current a I increase in the groundwater gradient.
This ero e observed on site.)odwater Impact ficance for DegradationrDih river e River lv low becaus controlled, an undermining.,el has ed !. stabilized at a level corresponding to the nominal normal ctober 4, 2011. The potential for degradation from drawdown is served as of October 4, 2011. Rapid drawdown has beenriver drawdown ,is not expected to occur at a rate that would cause , the potential for degradation is low.Implication The occurrence of this CPFM on a large scale could negatively impact the capacity of the footings supporting the building.
This could lead to gradual foundation movement.
However, settlements are expected to occur at a slow rate and not result in sudden, total building collapse.Should foundation movement be detected, appropriate repairs could be implemented to. keep -the building functional.
The settlements should not negatively impact the integrity or intended Priority 1 Structures Page 5.7-15 Security Building Rev. 2 i :function of the Security Building.
Therefore, the implication of the potential degradation for this CPFM is low.Confidence The extent of subsurface erosion and its potential impact on the building was not known at the time of Revision 0, due to the lack of data gathered on subsurface conditions.
Subsequent field inspections and a review of surveyed data indicate no structure mj ment. The groundwater elevation measured in the monitoring wells closely follow e ye the flood water receded. The data indicate that groundwater elevation w t the river level near the beginning of October 2011 and receded to the evel by tober 14, 2011.Therefore, the differential head created by the river dra. Ww o facilitate subsurface erosion. Since the structure has been monit signs ment and the monitoring well data did not indicate sufficient differe d which co e subsurface erosion, the confidence in the assessment of or this CPF increasing.
If further structure monitoring reveals no further iss confidence assessment for this CPFM is high.Summary For CPFM 3d, as discussed above, the po 1 for de w becaus river drawdown has been controlled thus far and is not ex to c a r ate this CPFM in the future. It is unlikely this degrada ou e enoug o impact the integrity r intenFeld o vtion of thecombin siderati ea potentie for degradation and the implicat nr eat degradat w graef this type put it in the "not significant" category.
It is that this CPF d due to a review of survey Poaetial for Derdatio/irc Flodatr mac Retag monivell ded fia s at n a v cevels. The currentoriver rierlevelat 4,0 a ofr Octobe 4, 21.Te potentwial fotocr dgation tefutrom e.doni low bhetb e a s osment is high, which means no additional data, kiin the previot oring, are necessary to draw a conclusion.
The prviously thought t uired this CPFM, which includes the geophysical, Otechnical, and inclinom are no lrer required.* ring Mechanism 12 -i dDrawdown 12a -. River bank, s ailure and undermining surrounding structures 2b-Lateral p Atte i vision....
e Assessment Report, the river level had dropped to a nominal norma Field observation of the river bank area was performed since the rierlve. The drop in elevation of the river to its current level occurred grdal eutn r' minimal increase in the groundwater gradient.
This increase did not allow for subsurface erosion to occur.Sienificance Potential for Degradation/Direct Floodwater Impact River stage level has receded and stabilized at a level corresponding to the nominal normal river level at 40,000 cfs as of October 4, 2011. The potential for degradation from drawdown is low because it has not been observed as of October 4., 2011. Rapid drawdown has been Priority I Structures Security Building Page 5.7-16 Rev. 2 controlled, and continued river drawdown is not expected to occur at a rate that would initiate these CPFMs. Since it is believed that a potential for degradation of the structure exists but is not likely, these CPFMs are considered low.//Implication The occurrence of this CPFM on a large scale could negatively impact the capacity of the footings supporting the building.
This could lead to gradual foun on movement but should not negatively impact the integrity or intended function of Se g. Therefore, the implication of the potential degradation for this CPF w.' %Confidence The groundwater monitoring well data and river level dat due to river drawdown had generally dissipated by about, of the river bank on October 20, 2011, did not identify de could be attributed to slope failure or lateral spreadin.lateral spreading occurred due to the 2011 flood signs of movement have been detected, the c Summary A hat exces ressures hhe Ri ver BV slope failure r monitored and no lherefor'PFM is'For CPFMs 12a and 12b, as disci drawdown has been controlled tl CPFM in the future. It is unliki would impact the integrity the potential for degradation puats it*ia t revia obse: as abo e p 1 for d is low because river nd ntot ted to 0 a rate to initiate this is degradatio uld e sed adverse effects that ed function o c e combined consideration of mplications o ation to a structure of this type It is believed is CPFM has not occurred due to a rv d current river levels. The current river elevations ,ate M will not occur in the future. Therefore, the-nt is hI ch means no additional data, other than the ring, are n ary to draw a conclusion:
The data previously is CPFM, which includes the geophysical, geotechnical, and Suired.udwater ele nce in the above iously recommended ght to be required to rule aometer data, are no lonI Priority 1 Structures Security Building Page 5.7-17 Rev. 2 5.7.7.1 Revised Results The CPFMs evaluated for the Security Building are presented in the following matrix, which shows the rating for the estimated significance and the level of confidence in the evaluation.
CPFMs 3a, 3d, 12a, and 12b for the Security Building are not associated with any Key Distress Indicators.
Results of survey data, ground well monitoring data, riverbank assessments, and field observations do not indicate signs of structure movement or other adverse effects that could be attributed to these CPFMs. The data currently collected sufficient to rule out these CPFMs due to the 2011 flood. Therefore, assuming that n identified through the monitoring program for the Security Build usse 5.7.6 and continuing until December 31, 2011), these CPFMs ar W to th of the matrix representing "No Further Action Recommended Relat e Low Confidence (Insufficient Data)nce CPFI-3d CPFM 12a CPFM 12b 0 z I 5.7.7.2 CU In the assessment e FCS Structures, the first step was to develop a list of all Triggering Mechanisms and PFMs that could have occurred due to the prolonged inundation of the FCS site during the 2011 Missouri River flood and could have negatively impacted these structures.
The next step was to use data from various investigations, including systematic observation of the structures over time, either to eliminate the Triggering Mechanisms and PFMs from the list or to recommend further investigation and/or physical modifications to remove them from the list for any particular structure.
Because all CPFMs for the Security Building other than CPFMs 3a, 3d, 12a, and 12b had been ruled out prior to Revision 1, and because CPFMs 3a, 3d, 12a, and 12b have been ruled out as a result of the Revision I findings, no Triggering Mechanisms and their associated PFMs remain credible for the Security Building.
Therefore, PrioritýSecuri I 1 Structures ty Building Page 5.7-18 Rev. 2 HDR has concluded that the 2011 Missouri River flood did not impact the geotechnical and structural integrity of the Security Building because the potential for failure of this structure due to the flood is not significant.