NL-89-444, Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1989 for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station

Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1989 for Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station

ML20247A790
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	04/30/1989
From:	Crunk S, Mueller M SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT
To:	Knighton G NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NL-89-444, NUDOCS 8905230275
Download: ML20247A790 (9)

Text

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• Y: SMUD' SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT O 6201 S Street, P.O. Box 15830, Sacramento CA 95852 1830,(916) 452-3211 r .

AN ELECTRIC SYSTEM SERVING THE HEART O. F CALIFORNIA NL 89-444 o

MAY 15 1989 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Hashington, DC 20555 Docket No. 50-312 Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station License No. DPR-54 OPERATING PLANT STATUS REPORT Attention: George Knighton Enclosed is the April 1989 Monthly Operating Plant Status Report for the Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station. The District submits this report pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.3.

Sincerely, Steve L. Crunk Manager Nuclear Licensing Enci (5) cc: J. B. Martin, NRC, Halnut Creek A. D'Angelo, NRC, Rancho Seco INP0 R. Twilley, Jr.

8905230275 89043o  :

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{DR ADOCK 05000312 PDC i g RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION O 14440 Twin Cities Road, Herald, CA 95638-9799;(209) 333-2935

APRIL 1989 ,

SUPNARY OF PLANT OPERATIONS Rancho Seco was in hot shutdown until it was brought critical at 2237 hours0.0259 days <br />0.621 hours <br />0.0037 weeks <br />8.511785e-4 months <br /> on April 7. Power production began at 0516 hours0.00597 days <br />0.143 hours <br />8.531746e-4 weeks <br />1.96338e-4 months <br /> on April 8. On April 9 the plant reached the 60% power level and remained there until power was increased to the 75% level, reached at 1510 hours0.0175 days <br />0.419 hours <br />0.0025 weeks <br />5.74555e-4 months <br /> on April 16. Power was reduced to 65%

on April 22 (reached at.0329 hours0.00381 days <br />0.0914 hours <br />5.439815e-4 weeks <br />1.251845e-4 months <br />) due to voltage oscillation in the main generator. By 1807 that same day the plant was back at the 75% power level.

On April 25 power was increased, reaching the 91% level at 2355 hours0.0273 days <br />0.654 hours <br />0.00389 weeks <br />8.960775e-4 months <br />. Rancho Seco remained at 91% power through month's end.

SUPNARY OF CHANGES IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10 CFR 50.59 I The plant staff accepted documentation packages in April 1989 for the facility l- changes, procedure changes and test described below which required detailed safety analyses. These changes were reviewed in accordance with the Technical Specifications by the Plant Review Committee (PRC) and the Management Safety Review Committee (MSRC).

1. DCP R89-0015 replaced four open head nozzles in the auxiliary feedwater (AFH) pump area deluge suppression system with closed head frangible bulb water spray nozzles. This change will prevent water spray in the event that the fire suppression deluge valve is inadvertently actuated.

This modification was limited to replacement of the existing open head spray nozzles in the AFH pump area suppression system with closed head water spray nozzles. The type of nozzle used in the suppression system in the AFH pump area is not credited or discussed in the analysis of an accident previously evaluated in the USAR. The use of closed head nozzles will prevent inadvertent actuation of the suppression system from spraying water on the redundant AFH pumps in accordance with General Design Criterion 3. The replacement of the normally open spray nozzles with normally closed spray nozzles does not affect the suppression capability of the AFH System. Should a fire occur at an AFH pump or motor, the flame detectors are expected to alarm and initiate water flow to fill the system piping. Hater spray will be initiated if the area temperature increases to the melting point of the nozzle mechanism. This modification did not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the USAR, nor was the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR created.

This modification impacts only the fire suppression system installed in the AFH pump area. It does not reduce the margin of safety as the flow capacity and discharge characteristics of the nozzles being installed are the same as those of the nozzles replaced. This thange did not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.

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, SUM 4ARY OF CHANGES IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10 CFR 50.59 (Continued)

2. DCP R69-0051 separated the power supplies of both main feedwater (MFH) controllers by moving the power supply for the 'B' MFH controller from panel SOE to panel SOF.

The' equipment used to furnish power to the 'B' MFH controller is not safety-related. The accidents. analyzed in the USAR are not affected by the change in power supply. This modification did not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously. evaluated in the USAR, nor was'the possibility for an accident or malfmetion of a different type than'any evaluated previously in the USAR' created. This modification did not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.

3. Environmental Monitoring and Emergency Preparedness Procedure HPIP-2070, Revision 0, "REMP Routes and Sample Locations," provides descriptions and directions to Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) sample

~1ocations. This procedure assigns the REMP responsibilities to the Environmental Monitoring & Emergency Preparedness Department.

This was an administrative change. This administrative change does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the USAR, nor was'the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR created. This change did not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.

4. Routine Test RT-IAS-007, " Appendix R Spare Bottle Pack Pressure Verification, Semi-Annual," Revision 0, prescribes the test to verify that the spare bottle packs dedicated to the Appendix R Back-Up Air System contain the minimum pressure required to support 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> of back-up air to the atmospheric dump valves.

This test procedure will be used to verify the pressure in the bottle packs stored at the warehouse. There is no interface with plant components or systems for the performance of this test. This procedure does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the USAR, nor was the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR created. This test does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.

5. Special Test Procedure STP.1213 " Turbine Bypass n e Cold Functional Test," was conducted to perform initial setup and opv ational verification of the AFH pump turbine K-308 Hoodward governor and mechanical overspeed trip device. No test deficiencies were identified during the performance of STP.1213.

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, SUMMA,RY OF CHANGES IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10 CFR 50.59 (Continued)

STP.1213 ensures proper operation of the K-308 governor and overspeed trip mechanism and enhances the availability of pump P-318. Failure of P-318 would have been mitigated by P-319; however, the failure of P-318 is already evaluated in the USAR. This test did not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the USAR, nor was the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR created. This test did not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.

6. Temporary Modification 89-24 removed jumper between terminals 3 and 4 of TB-2 (mounted within terminal box on panel AH-A0-2). Strip heaters are not normally used due to computer room area heat load. Heater use can cause computer equipment damage and initiate halon dump.

The Administration Building computer area heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system is not a factor in any of the accidents discussed in Chapter 14 of the USAR. The Administration Building HVAC is a Class 3 system and is not related in any way to power block systems; thus, this modification did not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the USAR, nor was the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the USAR created. This modification did not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.

7. PDQ 88-1929, Revision 0, documents the need to revise a USAR drawing to match field installed flex hoses rather than the hard pipe currently shown on the drawing.

The flex hoses are part of the radwaste system and would not affect equipment important to safety. Any failure of this component and subsequent release would be collected in the sumps and is bounded by evaluated accidents. The use of flex hoses does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the USAR, nor is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type that any evaluated previously in the USAR created. This change does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question.

MAJOR SAFETY-RELATED MAINTENANCE, TESTS MD MODIFICATIONS NOT REQUIRING DETAILED SAFETY ANALYSES

1. Maintenance, tests and modifications during April 1989 included quarterly scheduled maintenance on the Haste Gas System; routine maintenance on the

'A' TDI diesel generator, steam driven AFH pump and the small boiler; surveillance on the MFH pump system; and tuning of the Integrated Control System. Also, data collecting instrumentation was attached to the 'B' MFH pump control circuitry.

MAJOR SAFETY-RELATED MAINTENANCE, TESTS AND MODIFICATIONS NOT REQUIRING

'DETAI' LED SAFETY ANALYSES (Continued)

2. ECN A-5017 provided dried air for the pneumatic control line on FV-91007 (instrument air dryers A and 8 transfer valve) by disconnecting the control line tap from the service-header line and connecting it to the output of instrument air dryers Y-910A and B.

3. DCP R89-0049 replaced the 200 ohm 1/2 watt voltage dropping resistors in the 10-50 Ma loops in the Non-Nuclear Instrumentation (NNI) system with 200 ohm 2 watt resistors. The use of 2 watt resistors in these loops does not change any design functions of the the NNI and allows for over-ranging of transmitters.

4. DCP R89-0054 added barrier bars in an HVAC duct to provide additional resistance to access of a Vital Area.

5. DCP R89-0058 installed a time delay relay in the automatic power transfer circuit for inverter H2TFPAI of the Lovejoy MFH pump control system for the 'A' MFH pump. This time delay will prevent the Lovejoy controls from transferring back to their inverter during inverter power-up, thus preventing saturation and lock up of the Lovejoy controls.

6. DCP R89-0065 installed a time delay relay in the automatic power transfer circuit for inverter H2TFPBI of the Lovejoy HFH pump control system for the 'A' HFH pump. This time delay will prevent the Lovejoy controls from-transferring back to its inverter during inverter power-up, thus preventing saturation and lock up of the Lovejoy controls.

7. Special Test Procedure STP.1219, " Nitrogen Purge for the Condensate Storage Tai.a functional Test," was conducted to verify that the modification to the nitrogen purge to the condensate storage tank (CST) completed under DCP R89-001? prevents backflow of water into the purge line and adequately provide.i nitrogen purge to the CST.

8. Special Test Procedure STP.1223, " Auxiliary Feedwater Piping Leak Test,"

was conducted to verify the integrity of AFH piping that was overpressurized on January 31, 1989. The test was satisfactorily completed.

9. Special Test Procedure STP.1234, " Main Feed Pump Operation Disturbance Test," was performed to determine the cause of the March 28, 1989 feedpump transient and resultant trip. It was concluded from this test that SOE bus grounds, area lighting upsets and portable radio operation in the area of the feedpumps were not the cause of the plant trip.

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REFUELING INFORMATION REQUEST

1. Name of Facility Rancho Seco

.1

2. Scheduled date for next refueling shutdown: Seotember 14. 1989 1

3. Scheduled date for restart fol!owing refueling: December 13. 1989

4. Technical Specification change or other license amendment required:

a) Removal of Cycle Specific Core Limits and Approval of Core Operating Limits Report - submitted as Proposed Amendment 179 on March 31, 1989.

b) Reactor Vessel Level - To be submitted as Proposed Amendment 178 on July 1, 1989.

5. Scheduled date(s) for submitting proposed licensing action: Item 4.b - 7/1/89

6. Important licensing considerations associated with refueling: Technical Specification change recuired for reactor vessel level

7. Number of fuel assemblies:

a) In the core: 177 b) In the Spent fuel Pool: 316

8. Present licensed spent fuel capacity: 1080

9. Projected date of the last refueling that can be discharged to the Spent Fuel Pool: __Dg.cember 3. 2001

. . 1 AVERAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LEVEL DOCKET NO. 50-312 l

UNIT Rancho Seco DATE 4/30/89 COMPLETED BY Marla Mueller TELEPHONE (916) 452-3211 j (i

MONTH Aoril 1989 DAY AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL DAY AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Net) (MHe-Nit) 1 0 17 688 2 0 18 683 3 0 19 656 4 0 20 686 5 0 21 690 6 0 22 637 7 0 23 691 8 190 24 692 9 476 25 708 10 536 26 825 11 540 27 823 12 553 28 817 j i

13 586 29 818 14 389 30 820 15 580 31 _

16 630 INSTRUCTIONS On this format, list the average daily unit power level ist MWe-Net for each day I l

in the reporting month. Compute to the nearest whole megawatt.

• '% ' i OPERATING DATA REPORT. .

DOCKET NO. 50-312-DATE 4/30/89-COMPLETED BY Maria Hueller TELEPHONE. 1916) 452-3211 l

' OPERATING STATUS

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.l. Unit Name: Rancho Seco Notes:

2. Reporting Period: Aoril 1989

3. , Licensed Thermal Power (MHt): 2.772 l

.4. Nameplate Rating (Gross MWe): 963

5. -Design Electrical Rating (Net HHe)

918

6. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Gross MHe): 917

7. ' Maximum Dependable Capacity (Net MWe): 873

8. If changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (Items Number 3 Through 7) Since Last Report, Give Reasons: N/A

.9. Power Level to Hhich Restricted, If Any (Net MWe): N/A

. 10. Reasons for Restrictions, If Any: N/A This Month Yr-to-Date Cumulative

11. Hours in Reporting Period 719 2.879 123.047

'12. Number of' Hours Reactor Has Critical 552.4 1.455.0 61.320.8-

13. Reactor Reserve' Shutdown Hours 36 36.0 10.336.2

14. Hours Generator On-Line 545.7 1.317.9 56.911.5

15. Unit Reserve Shutdown Hours 36.0 36.0 1.246.2

16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated (MHH) 1.085.333 2.828.645 140.157.473

17. Gross Electrical Energy Generated (MHH) 381.818 965.886 45.614.111 Net Electrical Energy Generated (MHH) 352.236 875.404 41.919.287 -

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18. . Unit Service Factor 75.9% 45.8% 46.3%-  !

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20. Unit Availability Factor 80.9% 47.0% 47.3%

21. Unit Capacity Factor (Using MDC Net) 56.1% 34.8% 39.0%

22. Unit Capacity Factor (Using DER Net) 53.4% 33.1% 37.1%

23. Unit Forced Outage Rate 20.1% 53.6% 43.1%

' 24. Shutdowns Scheduled Over Next 6 Months (Type, Date, and Duration of Each): 1 Refuelina shutdown scheduled to beain Seotember 14. 1989.

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' 25. If Shut Down At End Of Report Period, Estimated Date of Startup:

26. Units In Test Status (Prior to Commercial ' Operation): Forecast Achieved i INITIAL CRITICALITY N/A N/A INITIAL ELECTRICITY N/A N/A COMMERCIAL OPERATION N/A N/A 4

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