ML20207F581

Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1986

ML20207F581
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	09/30/1986
From:	Colombo R SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT
To:	Martin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
RWC-86-600, NUDOCS 8701060140
Download: ML20207F581 (10)

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SEPTEMBER 1986

SUMMARY

OF PLANT OPERATIONS The plant has been in cold shutdown for the entire month of September 1986. The initial shutdown was due to the December 26,1985 loss of ICS power event.

PERSONNEL CHANGES REOUIRING REPORT Several personnel changes which require reporting pursuant to Technical Specification Figure 6.2-2 were made during September 1986. Rancho Seco has a new Deputy Manager of Nuclear Operations, Robert G. Croley; acting Engineering and Quality Control Superintendent.

Robert P. Wichert, and; Chemical Section Superintendent, Eric Yochheim.

Mr. Croley has over nineteen years of engineering, licensing, project management, training, and plant operations experience in commercial nuclear power generation with Babcock &

i Wilcox, Westinghouse, South Carolina Electric and Gas Company, and Sacramento Municipal Utility District. He has a Bachelor of Science and a Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering from University of Tennessee and Kansas State University respectively. He was certified at the SR0 Level by Westinghouse on the Zion Station. Mr. Croley has a progressive background in managing several hundred technical people.

Mr. Wichert has over nine years of commercial nuclear industry experience, all gained at Rancho Seco during increasing responsibilities as an engineer with the Maintenance and Technical Support Groups. He is a degreed, Registered Professional Engineer by examination in California. His duties at Rancho Seco included acting as ShiftTechnical Advisor; preparing plant transient reports; preparing responses to NRC Notices and Circulars; supervision of a technical staff; work request review for engineering requirements; disposition of Nonconforming Reports; and responsibilities as specified by the Rancho Seco Emergency Plan

as the Assembly Point Coordinator and as the Engineering and Quality control Coordinator.

Mr. Yochheim has over twelve years of commercial nuclear industry experience, with almost twenty years overall since graduating with a Bachelor of Science in Chemistry in 1%7. His commercial nuclear experience is exclusively in the radiochemistry issues of the six nuclear _

plants he was working at prior to joining the District. Mr. Yochheim, for the last three years managed the Hope creek Generating Station chemistry program including persontel qualifications, spare parts, chemical equipment operation, procedures, quality control, training, analytical sampling and analyses, chemical equipment testing, corrective and preventive maintenance, and water quality limits.

SUMMARY

OF CHANGES IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10 CFR PART 50 59 l t

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% The finaldocumentation nackane for the following facility and procedure changes were W

o8 completed in September 1986. These changes were subjected to the review and approval of the Plant Review Committee (PRC) and the Management Safety Review Committee (MSRC). There O

were no documentation packages completed for tests, or experiments during September 1986.

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o m: 1. To provide a local indication and manual control of the Reactor Coolant Pumps Seal

• Injection Flow to meet 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R requirements for plant shutdown in o .

OQ the event of a Control Room evacuation due to fire, the District made the following  !

~i - o modifications: 1) A side mounted handwheel on the pneumatic activator on Reactor o n. Coolant Pump Seal Injection Flow Control Valve PV-23606 was installed. 2) A differential 4 pressure gage was connected, including isolation valves, to the existin , sensing line for j flow transmitter FT-23606, to provide local indication for Reactor Coolant Pump Seal i Injection Flow .

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The addition of the side mounted handwheel to the pneumatic actuator of PV-23606 does not change the failure mode of the valve since the handwheelis administratively controlled in the neutral position at all times, unless it is actually being used per special operating procedures so that the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report was not increased. The addition of the local indicator will not affect the failure mode of the system since it will be valved out of the system untilit is needed while the plantis shutdown.Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis

- report was not created. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification was increased by providing the capability to control RCP seal injection independent of the Control Room. (Log Number 538, Revision 0).

2. Procedure AP.305-4 was changed to remove the requirement that the Shift Supervisor sign-off a Radiation Work Permit (RWP) which does not specifically involve an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety. The RWP supplement sheet was changed to reflect this revision.The requirement that the ,

Shift Supervisor close-out all Radiation Work Permits was instituted so that the Shift Supervisor would be apprised of the completion of the work specified on the RWP. It became apparent that this step is unnecessarily redundant since the Shift Supervisor knows from the information contained in the RWP when i the job will be complete. The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previousl7 in the safety analysis report was not created. The Shift Supervisor may also be apprised of the status of the job due to its being controlled under the Work Request System (AP.3). therefore the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification was not reduced. (Log Number 827. Revision 0)

3. Procedures A.16. " Coolant Radvaste System: and A.17. " Miscellaneous Liquid Radwaste System" were revised to reflect the present configuration and operating philosophy of the coolant radwaste and miscellaneousliquid radwaste systems.

Various tanks, lines, and pumps were re-numbered and/or are now used in a different manner than their original design. The "A" Coolant Waste Holdup Tank (T-610A) is now designated the "C" Miscellaneous Waste Concentrates Tank '

(T-67sC) and is used for long term storage of concentrated liquid wastes from the part of the coolant radraste sy:: tem. T-679C is now considered part of the miscellaneous liquid radwaste system. A new line was installed which conects the "A" and "B" miscellaneous waste concentrates tank via miscellaneous waste concentrates pump (P-694A) to the newly designated T-679C tank. Normal valve positions were reset to line-up the "C" tank with the miscellaneous liquid ,

radwaste system and isolate the tank from the coolant radwaste system. A 6 possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report was not created.

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Originally there were two coolant vaste holdup tank pumps (P-611 A and P-611B) and one miscellaneous waste concentrates pump (P-694). Now, there are two miscellaneous vaste concentrates pumps (P-694A & B) and only one coolant vaste holdup tank pump (P-611). The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfur.ction of equipment important to safety l previously evaluated in the safety analysis report (Log Number 297. ECN A-3266. l Revision 1) decreased since unneeded RCS Coolant storage capacity was )

transferred to the Miscellaneous Waste Concentrates System. The additional 60.000 gallons in the Miscellaneous Waste System reduces the number of solidification operations which need to be performed. The design of the transfer piping and the pumps are compatible with the material they contain, and the design pressure they will see in operation. The changes to procedures A.16 and A.17 work to enhance the plant's ability to handle and process liquid radwastes. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification was not reduced. (Log Number 823. Revision 0)

4. The Districtinstalled a hydrogen monitorin the Auxiliary Building to provide continuousindication of hydrogen gas concentration presentin the containment. This was done to meet requirements of NUREG-0737, Item II.F.1, and Enclosure 3. Attachment 6: Regulatory Guide 1.97: NUREG-0578: NRC letter dated September 13,1979. Attachment 3. Item 32:and NUREG clarification letter dated October 30,1979. This was done to provide information for the operating staff to assistin reducing the consequences of an accidentor malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report.

All equipment is seismically and environmentally qualified and qualified as Class IE. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report due to this new monitor was not created. A single failure of the electrical system or equipment will not impair the ability to provide an indication of hydrogen gas concentration. This is a monitoring system only, without any control or automatic action beina initiated by it. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technics! specification was not changed. (Log Number 213.

Revision 1) 5 Using the Abnormal Tag procedure, a temporary hydrazine feed supply line was connected to the Decay Heat System (DHS) through valve DHS-524 (Work Request

• 115012). The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or L , malfunction of equipmentimportant to safety previously evaluated in the safety t - analysis report was not increased. High sulfate levels in the reactor coolant t

system (RCS) is a result of oxidation of sulfur due to previously high levels of I

. oxygen in the RCS. The Purification and Letdown System was out-of-service i during the period. Feeding hydrazine into the RCS through the DHS decreased the oxygen concentration and aided in reducing the high sulfate concentration in the RCS. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical

specification is increased by this modification.

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4 The temporary hydrazine feed system vill be monitored full time by an operator while hydrazine is being pumped into the DHS. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report could not be postulated. Any leak can be isolated manually or remotely. Casualty Procedure C.12. " Loss of Decay HeatRemoval System," will be used if a failure of DHS-524 and a failure of the hard piping of the temporary hydrazine feed system should occur. Temporary procedure revision to AP.12, the work request, and maintenance instruction adequately addresses the safety issues concerning hydrazine and the hydrazine feed i

system operation. (Les Number 785, Revision 8)

6. R4dasavas applied to battery racks where necessary to assure that all rack-to-cell spacings are within the battery vendor seismic calculation assumptions (ECN R-0616). The Plant Review Committee previously approved the Safety Analysis in Log Number 763 for the disposition of NCR S-5447. That disposition called for all out-of-specification rack-to-cell gaps to be brought within the vendor spacing specifications. Ethdassis a vendor recommended filler material for reducing gap sizes. Filling of the battery-to-rack gaps with Rhdasavas approved by the Equipment Seismic Review Group. Fire Protection Control Report 86-00258-NE states that it is acceptable to install Rhdassfor spaces in the battery racks as long as no more than 1000 cubic feet of Rhdassis used in either Fire Area 30 or 33. The addition of Redammvill increase the fire loading in the two fire areas, but the work requires much less than 1000 cubic foot of R4dosa The probability of occurrence or the

consequences of a fire-related accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report was not increased.

An environmental qualification review of the Design Change Notice authorized by ECN R-0616 concludes that this activity did not impact environmental qualification assumptions. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification was not reduced. (Les Number 770, Revision 0)

, MA10R TIrut QF SAFEITFT ATED MAIhrTENANCE

1. Continue evaluations of decay heat system pipe support discrepancies.

l 2. Continued Class I snubber testing and seal replacement effort. .

l l 3. Continued Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System "Y" work and "A" Safety

, features testins.

4. Diesel Generator "A" bi-annual surveillance was completed. Diesel Generator "A"was returned to service.

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5. UTSG sleeving / tube end rolling operations completed. The total number of tubes inspected was 1772 in OISG "A." and 3657in OTSG "B." The details of the tubes plugged are listed below:

l OTSG"A" % TW(D) LOCATION UTSG"B" % TW(D) LOCATION 80-25 40 9thTSP 14-75 45 15thTSP 150-22 42 10thTSP 32-106 51 5thTSP 35-108 36 UISF + 7.8" 59-1 58 8th TSP 120-30 38 15th TSP + 21.8" 70-19 41 UTSF + 1.2" 148-19 39 4thTSP 81-64 41 UTSF + 1.2" 148-25 33 15thTSP 70-21 45 UTSF + 0.6" 77-17 N/A Improperlover roll 70-22 52 UTSF + 02" 76-68 36 3rdTSP + 38.7" TW(D): Through Wall Defect,if percentage is greater than 40 TSP: Tube SupportPlate UTSF: UpperTube SheetSecondaryFace

6. Continued working on Makeup Pump rotating reassembly.

7. Continued Post Accident Sampling System upgrades.

8. Continued Control Room / Technical Support Center Essential HVAC testing and investigations.

9. Continued 10-yearISI efforts.

10. Worked on resolution of operating problem with power operated relief valve.

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REFUELING INFORMATION REQUEST

1. Name of Facility Rancho Seco Unit 1

2. Scheduled date for next refueling shutdown: _S! Dtember 15. 1988

3. Scheduled date for restart following refueling: January 15. 1989

4. Technical Specification change or other license amendment required:

a) Change to Rod Index_vs Power Level Curve (TS 3.5.2) b) Change to Core Imbalance vs Power Level Curve (TS 3.5.2) c) Tilt Limits (TS 3.5.2)

5. Scheduled date(s) for submitting proposed licensing action: March 15.1988 6.- Important licensing considerations associated with refueling: N/A

7. Number of fuel assemblies:

a) In the core: 177 b) In the Spent Fuel Pool: 316

8. .Present licensed spent fuel capacity: 1080

9. Projected date of the last refueling that can be discharged to the Spent Fuel Pool: December 3. 2001 b,

, AVERAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LEVEL  ;

- DOCKET NO. 50-312 UNIT Rancho Seco Unit 1 DATE 09-30-86 COMPLETED BY R. Colombo TELEPHONE (916) 452-3211 MONTH September 1986 DAY- AVERAGE DAILY 10WER LEVEL DAY AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Nt1) (MWe-Net) 1 0 17 0 2 0 18' 0 3 0 19 0 4 0 20 0 5 0_ -21 0 6 0 22 0 7 0 23 0 8 0 24 0 9 0 25 0 10 0 26 0

-11 0 27 0 12 0 28 0 13 0 29 0 14 0 30 0 15 0 31 {

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.16 0 INSTRUCTIONS' l

On this format, list the average daily unit power level in MWe-Net for each day  !

in the reporting month. Compute to the nearest whole megawatt.

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OPERATING DATA REPORT DOCKET NO. 50-312 DATE 09/30/86 s

COMPLETED BY R. Colombo TELEPHONE (916) 452-3211 OPERATING STATUS

1. Unit Name: Rancho Seco Unit 1

2. Reporting Period: September 1986

3. Licensed Thermal Power (MWt): 2.772

-4. Nameplate Rating (Gross MWe): 963

5. Design Electrical Rating (Net MWe): 918

6. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Gross MWe): 917

7. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Net MWe): 873

8. If changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (Items Number 3 Through 7) Since Last Report, Give Reasons: N/A

9. Power Level to Which Restricted, If Any (Net MWe): 0

10. Reasons For Restrictions, If Any: NRC letter dated 12/26/85 This Month Yr-to-Date Cumulative

11. Hours in Reporting Period 720 6.551 100.416

12. Number of Hours Reactor Was Critical 0 0 54.322

13. Reactor Reserve Shutdown Hours 0 0 10.300.2

' 14. Hours Generator On-Line 0 0 50.363.8

15. Unit Reserve Shutdown Hours 0 0 1 .21 0.2

16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated (MWH) 0 0 127.861.688

17. Gross Electrical Energy Generated (MWH) 0 0 41.523.187

18. Net Electrical Energy Generated (MWH) -3.536 -31.007 38.299.095

19. Unit Service Factor 0.0% 0.0% 50.2%

20. Unit Availability Factor 0.0% 0.0% 51.4%

21. Unit Capacity Factor (Using MDC Net) 0.0% 0.0% 43.7%

22. Unit Capacity Factor (Using DER Net) 0.0% 0.0% 41.5%

23. Unit Forced Outage Rate 100.0% 100.0% 37.7%

24. Shutdowns Scheduled Over Next 6 Months (Type, Date, and Duration of Each):

N/A

25. If Shut Down At End Of Report Period, Estimated Date of Startup: Indefinite

26. Units In Test Status (Prior to Commercial Operation): Forecast Achieved INITIAL CRITICALITY N/A N/A INITIAL ELECTRICITY N/A N/A COMMERCIAL OPERATION N/A N/A l

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DOCKET NO. 50-312 ,

UNIT SHUTDOWNS AND POWER REDUCTIONS RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 UNIT NAME DATE 9/du/DD COMPLETED BY R. COLOMBO REPORT MONTH SEPTEMBER 1986 TELEPHONE (916) 45?-3711 w

":.: c 3g 3 }Y5 Licensee E*, g". Cause & Corrective

%. Date g 3g i; os& Fvent g'g Action to H

3: 5 j;jj g Report # mu g{ Prevent Recurrence E

1 85-12-26 F 720 A 3 85-25 C8 INSTRU RX TRIP ON HIGH PRESSURE.

PRECEDED BY A LOSS OF ICS POWER.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS BEING IMPLEMENTED.

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I 2 3 4 F Forced Reason: Method: Exhibit G Instructions S Scheduled A Equipment Failure (Explain) 1 Manual for Preparation of Data

, B Maintenance of Test 2 Manual Scram. Entry Sheets for Licensee C Refueling 3 Automatic Scram. Event Report (LE R) File INUREG.

D Regulatory Restriction 4-Other (Explain) 0161)

EOperator Training & License Examination F Administrative 5 G-Operational Error (Explain) Exhibit I - Same Source l'8/77) ll Other (Explain) i i

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,SMUD SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT C 6201 S Street. P.O. Box 15830 Sacramento CA 95852-1830,(916)452-3211 AN ELECTRIC SYSTEM SERVING THE HEART OF CALIFORNIA RWC 56-600 October 16 1956 J B MARTINREGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR REGION V OfTICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT U S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1450 MARIA LANE. SUITE 210 WALNUTCREEK,CA 945%

OPERATING PLANTSTATUS REPORT DOCKETN0.50-312 Enclosed is the September 1956 Monthly Operating PI: at Status Report for the Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station pursuant to Technica1 Specification 6.9.3 L e R. W.COLOMB0 REGULATORY COMPLIANCE SUPERINTENDENT Enct (5) cc: I&E Wash (12)

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