NL-87-1192, Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1987

Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1987

ML20235A420
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	08/31/1987
From:	Little R, Karen Meyer SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT
To:	Martin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
NL-87-1192, NUDOCS 8709230298
Download: ML20235A420 (15)

Text

______ _ - _- _ _ _ _ _

4 0 AUGUST 1987 l

SUMMARY

OF PLANT OPERATIONS The plant was in cold shutdown for the entire month of August. The initial shutdown was due tc the December 26, 1985, loss of Integrated Control System power event.

PERSONNEL CHANGES REQUIRING REPORT There were two personnel changes which require reporting pursuant to Technical Specification Figure 6.2-2. Rancho Seco has a new Acting Nuclear Maintenance Superintendent, John Grimes, as well as an Acting Nuclear Electrical /I&C Superintendent, Don Yount.

Acting Nuclear Maintenance Superintendent John Grimes is a veteran of Southern California Edison where he served as the Supervisor of Plant Maintenance at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 and 3. He also served as the l

Maintenance Department Planning Supervisor and as Maintenance Supervisor. He holds certificates in Industrial Management and Supervision, and Electro-Motive Diesel Maintenance.

l Acting Nuclear Electrical /I&C Superintendent Don Yount has sixteen years experience with the District and has served as Assistant Nuclear Electrical Superintendent and Nuclear Electrical Supervisor. He has extensive experience as an electrician and has worked in communications and construction.

SUMMARY

OF CHANGES IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10 CFR 50.59 The plant staff accepted documentation packages in August 1987 for the facility changes described below. In addition, procedure changes from the last month are included. These changes were approved and reviewed by the Plant Review Committee (PRC) and the Management Safety Review Committee j (HSRC). There were no documentation packages completed for tests or experiments during August 1987.

1. Both Control Room / Technical Support Center (CR/TSC) Essential Condensing Units, U-545A and U-545B, were modified to provide cyclic operation of ,

the condenser cooling fans as a function of the outdoor ambient I temperature. Controls were provided to cycle two of the three condenser i cooling fans on each unit, on or off, in sequence, at predetermined temperature setpoints. A combination temperature element, temperature transmitter, and temperature switch for each unit were installed to accomplish the cycling control.

)

l R l 9,

a This facility change (ECN R-0769, Revision 1) was provided as an operational enhancement to the CR/TSC Essential HVAC System. The primary component affected in each train was the Essential Condensing Unit. The modification was confined to the air side and corresponding electrical control circuits of these units. This facility change was not a change to the facility as described in the USAR.

One new failure mode was introduced by this facility change. Failure of either train's temperature switch to close on a rise in ambient

! temperature will result in a failure to restart sufficient condenser cooling fans, and a corresponding rise in unit condensing pressure. This could lead to automatic shutdown of the train's Essential Condensing Unit if the compressor high pressure setpoint is reached; however, each train t alone is sufficient to accomplish the CR/TSC Essential HVAC System safety function. An unreviewed safety question is not involved. No adverse safety effects on the CR/TSC Essential HVAC System have been identified.

The Essential Condensing Units are Quality Class I, Seismic Category I, and environmentally qualified to IEEE 323/334. New controls, wiring, and electrical components are consistent with these requirements.

(Log No. 800)

2. Isolation switches and fuses were installed in control circuits for Electrical Distribution System (EDS) Train "A" circuit breakers and bus sequencers to provide alternative shutdown capability in the event of evacuation of the Control Room.

This facility change (ECN R-1128, Revision 2) was necessary to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.3.

The installed isolation switches isolate breaker control circuits emanating from the Control Room that could prevent breaker operation or cause maloperation due to hot shorts in the event of a Control Room fire. The installed fuses protect the breaker control circuits from fire-induced hot shorts without compromising continuous energization of control power.

For each circuit, a cable was installed to provide input to the computer for alarming the isolation switch status, either " ISOLATE" or

" DISCONNECT." In each case, the breaker control circuits were modified and fuses were installed in the remote control circuits.

The installations and modifications described above were performed under the following sub-ECNs:-

__ECN Description of Chanae j R-1128A, Isolation switch installed and internal wiring modified at [

Revision 0 4160V switchgear S4A2 compartment 4A204. Field cable installed from S4A204 to multiplexer cabinet H4CDAR7. ,

i R-1128B, Isolation switch and 10A fuse installed and internal  !

Revision 0 wiring modified at 480V load center S3A2 compartment S3A202. Field cable installed from S3A202 to multiplexer cabinet H4CDAR7.

R-1128C, Isolation switch and two 10A fuses installed and internal Revision 0 wiring modified at 4160V switchgear S4A2 compartment S4A207. Field cable installed from S4A27 to a mux cabinet.

R-1128D, Isolation switch installed and internal wiring modified Revision 0 in each 4160V switchgear S4A2 compartments 4A203 and 4A201 (fuses added as needed). Field cables installed from S4A203 and S4A201 to a mux cabinet. j R-ll28E, Isolation cwitch installed and internal wiring modified Revision 1 in each 4160V switchgear S4A compartments 4A01 and 4A00 (fuses added as required). Field cables installed from S4A01 and S4A00 to a mux cabinet. Removal of existing isolation switch device 43 in 4160V switchgear S4A cubicle 4A08. Installation and rewiring of new isolation switch (no fuse required).

These facility changes enhance the Fire Protection System by providing l

isolation switches and other modifications needed for alternative shutdown l- capability for five EDS breakers in the event of Control Room fire or evacuation. A change or addition to the Technical Specifications is not required. This change is bounded by the Licensing Design Basis but will require an update of the UFHAR/USAR. An unreviewed safety question is not involved. (Log No. 887, Revision 2).

3. The purpose of facility change ECN R-1000, Revision 1, was to improve the operator's ability to, in a timely manner, identify the condition and i determine the cause of diesel generator breakers 4A08 and 4B11 being blocked from closing onto their associated 4160V Nuclear Service Buses.

A 125V de control voltage monitoring relay was added to the control circuitry of each diesel generator breaker, 4A08 and 4B11. The existing Control Room annunciator circuits for Annunciator Panel H2ES windows 92 and 93, which indicated "D/G Auto Start Inoperable / Loss of Remote Control," were enhanced to include annunciation on:

a) Loss of 125V de control voltage to the generator breaker.

b) Protection lockout of the diesel generator breaker due to a fault related to the associated normal supply breaker.

I l

l

-  ; p i -

L c) Protection lockout of th'e diesel generator breaker due to' a fault T related to the . associated standby supply breaker.

^'

yl . } .i y A new indicating light, with associated circuits, was added to each local W' Diesel Generator Control Panel (H2DGA and H2DGB) indicating "Switchgear 0 Trouble." This light is to be initiated whenever the diesel generator breaker on the associated train is being blocked from closing by the following conditions:

a) Loss of control voltage for the generator breaker, b) Generator breaker lockout from the protection relay for the l associated normal supply breaker.

c) Generator breaker lockout from the protection relay for the associated standby supply breaker.

d) Generator breaker lockout from the protection relay of the generator breaker itself.

l Minor human factors enhancements at the local Diesel Generator Control The lens of the existing Panels H2DGA and H2DGB were also implemented.

lights relating to "Not Ready for Auto Start" were replaced with amber.

l Other indicating lights and control devices that status the diesel generator inoperable for auto start were highlighted with red tape.

This modification enhances the ability of the existing "D/G Auto Start Inoperable" annunciators in performing their intended function. As an operational enhancement, this facility change improves the, operator's 4 ability to identify the condition and determine the cause of diesel y generator breaker 4A08 and 4B11 being blocked from closing on their associated buses. It is not a change to the facility as described in the USAR. A change or addition to Technical Specifications is not required.

This change is bounded by Licensing Design Basis. An unreviewed safety

.p question is not involved. This modification does not impact the Fire F Protection Program because necessary train separation is maintained, and a safe shutdown and associated circuits evaluation has determined that requisite safe shutdown capability is maintained. This modification does" not impact equipment qualification because the breaker centrol circuitry is in a mild environment. (Log No. 864, Revision 0).

4. The turbocharger and spring drive gear on each Bruce-GM Emergency Diesel Generator (G-886A & G-886B) were replaced with upgraded components from the manufacturer.

': The diesel subshaft and bracket assembly and No. 1 idler gear for each  !

Bruce-GM diesel were replaced with upgraded components from the i manufacturer. Seven additional holes in the crankcase were drilled and I tapped. f Components used in the modifications (ECN R-0770A and R-0770B, Revision )

0) are QA Class 1. The changes do not affect-the operation or function

, of the generators. The DBR states the components installed by this ECN '

are better suited for diesel generators than the original components.

_______z---

j  !

s ,g-

. . 4 Since the change is replacement of part only, the change sill not lead tol _

a failure which has not.been previously analyzed. Redundancy of the- .

diesels is: maintained. . A single failure can only disable one generator. '

(Log Nos. 804A &.8048). .

5. Synchronizing check relays were added to the control circuitry'of both the Emergency Diesel Generator breakers (4A08, 4A202,.4B11, and 4B202)-

and the normal. 4160V supply breakers (4A01, 4A207, 4B01, and 48203).

N The' purpose of th'is facility change (ECN R-04158) is to reduce the possibility of paralleling errors. Even though qualified personnel I perform the wurk, the possibility of out of. phase paralleling exists.

Providing an additional assurance that manual paralleling of non-synchronized 4160V bus sources does not occur is an operational enhancement to the Emergency Generator System (EGS) and the 4160V

' Auxiliary System.

Two failure modes are introduced by this facility change.

The first, a relay failure, prevents synchronizing through the affected l

breaker; however, in this case,- the associated 4160V bus is energized, and thus the failure has no impact on the associated train's electrical i supply and distribution. The consequences of a hot short in the normal I

supply breaker control circuitry caused by the added rela) are equivalent to this case: no impact on the associated train's electrical supply and distribution.

The second mode, a hot short of the breaker control circuit caused by the added relay, could result in preventing closure of the diesel geaerator supply breaker when called upon. The consequences of this failure are not more severe than the consequences of other, previously-analyzed single failures within the EGS. The consequences of this failure, the loss of one train of emergency onsite power, are mitigated by the proper functioning of the other train of electrical power supply. Each train of the EGS, and onsite power distribution, alone is sufficient to accomplish.

the safety function. An unreviewed safety question is not involved.

(Log No. 743B)

6. The District completed the refurbishment of POV HV-35070 (: team trap isolation) as part of the M0V program performed in response to IE Bulletin 85-03 (ECN R-0968AO).

The program was outlined to the NRC in letters dated June 16, 1986 and November 5, 1986. The overall engineering package wu implemented to '

prevent the valves from failing on demand in a' common mode due to '-

improper switch settings as described in IE Bulletin 85-03. (Log ho.

849 Revision 2). ,

l

7. A time delay relay was installed in the control circuitry.of each of the four emergency diesel generator breakers (4A202, 48202, 4A08, and 4Bil) to delay reclosure following a manual trip.

y v ~ .

g

.c, -

m_ ..

'f ,..

f * } 6 .

1 One'new failure ebde'.is;introdced by this facility change. A hot short-of tae. control Efrevit causedib' yt the added: relay could result in a - j m failure to close a' diesel generator breaker when called upon. The k; conwiluenc B ottsr, prees oli this, failure a~re viously-analyzed notfailures single mom severa than within the the consequences EGS. Each EGS of trcitalone' is sufficient tq accomplish. the;on-site emergency power -

7 supply safely funct!pr.. An barnviewed safety question is not involved.

This. mooffication is ^an cperatf,onal enhancement to~ the EGS. It provides l' a the dblay in the controiXircuitry of all 'four diesel generator breakers to prevent immediate breaker reclosure following a manual trip.

It provides an improved metnod for performing required surveillance 4 pursuant to Technical Specification 4.6.2.B. It is a change to the.

K, , facility at described in the USf4R. A change'or addition to Technical i e Specif' cations is'not required.. One new failure mode has been introduced and determined to be bonnded by the Licensing Design Basis. An  !

unreviewed safety question is not involved.

~

o 1 m-b '-

8. Normal Instrument Air nystem (IAS) supply tubing to TBV control valves

, PV-20561, PV-20563, PV-20564, and'PV-20566, from root values IAS-581,

.' 582, 583, and 584 to the valve actuators, ano up to and including SCIAS root valves IAS-1044, 1045, 1042, and 1043 was installed.

h The modifications arca safet9 Ampre$ melit to the IAS which is bounded by 1

the 1,1 censing Design Basis. ThL probability of occurrence of the.

leasequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to fafety will not be increased bccause the modifications are a safety

%provement that providet haLkyp instrument air in the case of the loss

. .. tif normal and diesel driven compressed air. The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type (failure of the backup

. system) will not be cret.ted due to orovisions in backup air system design e that mitigates the' failure of the pressure reduciag station by built-in

.pr. essure relief vanes. There ne currently no lechnical Specifications jse's Proposed Amendment No.152) jmpacted by the addition of the backup i air system. Surveillance requirements.for t h backup air system have been identif4ed and will be hand!edfunner revisions to existing plant

)'

procerNres; therefore, no impact opinuclear safety and no unreviewed safety question is involved witn the4 modifications described in ECN

- R CM9; Revision 3. /

9. 'The powTr source of vital 120V ac bus SID was changed from Auxiliary Building inderter to NSES inverter SID2.

e, ,

a* A regulc ting ' transformer, stati: transfer switch and independent vital 480% ac Fackup source to each NSEB irsertFri were added to increase the 7 antlability of the vital 120V ac ini4rter Lus. ,

A manual bypan switch was added to the NSEB inverter to make the vital 120V ac bus opirible during inverter / static. switch outage or maintenance.

[

m '

y s

-4 ,_

s ~Y

+ . ,

y s ( -

y s Y '%' M JJ- - .= 1

ECN R-0955 does not change the assignments of individual loads on their respective inverter buses. It changes only the power sources to the Auxiliary Building inverter buses. The design change and the associated calculations verify that adequate power is available at the assigned sources and acceptable voltage levels are maintained feeding either from the inverters or the backup sources. This design change improves the availability and reliability of the power supplied to the Auxiliary Building inverter buses without any detrimental effects on the power supplied to the NSEB inverter buses. This design will provide two paths of standby ac power to each inverter bus backed with the second diesel generator of the same train. One path is through the standby battery charger, vital 125V dc bus and inverter; the second path is through the voltage regulating transformer to the vital 120V ac bus. Additionally, a systems interaction study of the "Two Diesel Generator Electrical Train Design (ERPT-E0179)" was performed and results confirm that there is very good "intratrain load separation" of electrical loads. No unacceptable system interactions were noted in casos where plant systems are supplied by both diesel generators in an electrical train.

10. Surveillance Test Procedure STP.785, Revision 1, was approved by the PRC. It will measure the Reactor Protection System (RPS) reactor trip time response from the initiation of a step change at the input to the RPS cabinets to the loss of UV coil voltage. Additionally, baseline data will be for the Anticipation Reactor Trip System (ARTS).

Performance of RPS Time Response Test STP.785, Revision 1, is in accordance with USAR Section 7.1.2.3.4 and will be performed with the plant shut down. The probability of occurrences or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated is not increased because the response time testing is performed during plant shut down and the testing will verify acceptable operation of the RPS cabinet. This test does not change the function, design, or trip setpoints of the RPS.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis of any lechnical Specification is not reduced, because this testing is in addition to the testing specified in Technical Specifications 3.5.1 and 4.1. This testing provides additional assurance of the proper functioning of the RPS. STP.785, Revision 1, does not involve an Unreviewed Safety Question. (Log No. 1037)

11. Surveillance Procedure SP.319A & B was approved to test the Diesel l Generator SFAS and loss of offsite power loading scheme. This procedure is intended to satisfy the requirements of proposed Technical Specification 4.6.3.c, which is included in Proposed Amendment 147.

Operations cannot take credit for demonstrating the operability of D/G i loading sequencing using these procedures until the NRC approves Proposed 4 Amendment 147. (Log No. 760)

i MAJOR ITEMS OF SAFETY-RELATED MAINTENANCE l

1. The District completed surveillance testing and flow balancing of the 'B' NSCH loop and declared the 'A' Decay Heat Loop operable.

2. Per Surveillance Procedure SP.203.07, the District completed surveillance testing of the Nuclear Raw Hater System.

3. ECN R-1951, Revision 1, added a 1" drain connection with 1" globe valve and capped nipple as close as practicable to the downstream side of stop check valve CCH-194 in line 46820-3"-HD fcr LLRT of penetration 33.

4. ECN R-1300B, Revision 0, modified the plant radio system by relocating and modifying the repeater station. In case of emergency, the radio channel can be monitored in the Technical Support Center, and any single fire in the Control Room, Communication Room, or any other fire area will not cause total loss of onsite/offsite communication.

5. ECN R-1295, Revision 0, reworked existing raceways and relocated power cables that were routed in instrument raceways, thus eliminating possible effect on the signal circuit of PT21092.

6. ECN R-0694, Revision 0, provided identification for unidentified terminal blocks, wire numbers, and auxiliary current transformers and clarified device identification in panel H2SFB.

7. ECN A-5441, Revision 0, re-identified numbers on specified drawings, cables, and panels. The duplicate / erroneous numbers were re-identified for uniqueness / correction.

8. ECN R-09040, Revision 0, modified the 120 volt ac control wiring between the temperature switches in the control room and liquid line solenoid valves to the cooling coil sections in the Essential Air Handling Units.

This provides closer incremental control of the air handling unit cooling coils as the cooling load varies in the CR/TSC Essential HVAC.

9. ECN R-1452, Revision 0, replaced and rerouted certain cables used for measuring dew point temperature. A new raceway system was provided for parts of this modification.

10. ECN R-ll18, Revision 1, modified the flow switch for the TSC electric heater EDH-Y507. Previously, the flow switch would not shut the heater off when there was no airflow through the heater during CR/TSC Essential HVAC System operation.

11. ECN A-4312, Revision 2, allowed for installation of the weather station strip chart recorders and new radiation monitor's recorders.

l I

12. ECN R-0619, Revision 1, provided drawing identification for three variable and six auxiliary current transformers. The current i transformers were labeled per their associated ammeter and terminal block.

13. ECN A-5546 Revision 0, removed six obsolete radiation dose rate instruments and six obsolete radiation dose rate sensors that were installed as interim equipment per NUREG-0578(2.1.8.b) requirements.

Removal of equipment was done in accordance with NUREG-0737(II.F.1).

14. ECH A-4251, Revision 0, provided coaxial and telephone cables for additional computer terminals installed as the second phase of MIMS/CICS Systems.

15. ECN R-0876, Revision 0, upgraded the trend recorders in the H1C0 console to provide more readable and selectable recording. A second recorder was added to provide backup indication on the loss of Non-Nuclear Instrumentation (NNI) indication.

16. ECN R-1157, Revision 1, installed multiple-pole disconnect switches in the top-hat section of ten MCCS. This modification will prevent manually tripped MCC circuit breakers from making subsequent breaker trip alarms.

17. ECN R-10878, Revision 0, provided a hotwell tie-in of condensate return sources from the condenser. This will provide isolation at the condenser and allow the installation of a condensate return system during plant operation.

18. ECN R-0957, Revision 1, provided compressor running status indication in the IDADS by installing new low oil pressure switches between the oil supply and oil return on the compressor.

19. ECN A-5564, Revision 1, constructed a temporary distribution system for full load testing and qualification of the 3500kW diesel generators without impacting normal plant operation. The construction for the test will also be removed under this ECN.

20. ECN A-5060, Revision 0, provided permanent communication and remote terminal unit operation between the downtown dispatcher's office and PV-1 (photovoltaic station).

21. ECN R-0890, Revision 0, replaced the existing fiberglass heat shield that protected the stator end turns on the generator bearing end of generators GEA and GEB from direct radiant heat from space heaters. The fiberglass was replaced with similarly dimensioned 16 gauge 304 stainless steel sheets. This ECN also replaced the damaged Square-D terminal block in the GEA CT connection block and the damaged terminal blocks in H2DGA section L2 cabinet. All points in both blocks were too small to accommodate reworked lugs.

1

)

1 Q___- _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ 1

22. ECN. R-0182, Revision 1, provided proper instrument grounding for radiation monitors R-15701 and R-15702. The ECN also replaced all cables between RE-15702 and RY-15702 and rerouted the signal and high voltage cables together as pairs in the flex conduit at R-15702 detector assembly.

23 ECN R-0869, Revision 0, assessed numerous Plant Security System failures by studying Security System requirements for UPS and vendor information, providing as-built information for panel schedules of UPS, balancing loads on panels, and determining capability of each UPS to take total load of both Security UPS Systems.

24. ECN R-1399, Revision 0, modified the negative and spring discharge interlocks and provided alignment adjustment on Power VAC breakers supplied by General Electric (S4A2, S4B2). This corrected the breaker racking and negative interlock problem.

25. The District completed the refurbishment of the following MOVs as part of the MOV program performed in response to IE Bulletin 85-03. (All valves are part of Mixed Bed Demineralized Influent D-330A.)

ECN Number flow Control Valve R-0976K, Revision 1 FV-33011A R-0976L, Revision 1 FV-33011B R-0976N, Revision 1 FV-330110 R-0976Q, Revision 1 FV-33011F R-0976R, Revision 1 FV-33011G R-0976S, Revision 1 FV-330llH R-0976U, Revision 1 FV-33012A R-0976V, Revision 1 FV-33012B R-0976H, Revision 1 FV-33012C R-0976X, Revision 1 FV-33012D R-0976Z, Revision 1 FV-33012F R-0976AA, Revision 1 FV-33012G {'

R-0976AB, Revision 1 FV-33012H

26. The existing tachometer relay on the 'B' GE Emergency Diesel Generator manufactured by Dynalce has been replaced with a compatible Synchro -

Start tachometer relay manufactured by Morrison-Knudsen. The existing power converter manufactured by Dynalco and its associated wiring has been removed. The Synchro - Start tachometer relay required 125 Vdc and has only one SPDT contact available for each speed setting as opposed to i the Dynalco which required 24 Vdc and has two DPDT contacts available for each speed setting. The converter on panel H2 DEA (B) was not utilized. I (ECN R-1108, Revision 1).

27. The District revised its design drawings to reflect the existing electrical configuration of the Bruce GM diesel generator "B". This was  !

done to resolve inconsistencies between the Bruce GM diesel generators.

(ECN R-1898, Revision 0).

28. The EDG starting air relief valves were replaced with the same type of I valve which has a soft seat material (viton) instead of the existing brass-to-brass seat surfaces. This was done to reduce seat failure of these valves, increasing system reliability. (ECN R-1778, Revision 0).

1

. 1 l

REFUELING INFORMATION REQUEST

1. Name of Facility Rancho Seco Unit 1

2. Scheduled date for next refueling shutdown: Seotember 15. 1988 I

._\, 3. Scheduled date for restart following refueling: January 15. 1989

4. Technical Specification change or other license amendment required: .

l a) Change to Rod Index vs Power Level Curve (TS 3.5.2) b) Change to Core Imbalance vs Power Level Curve (TS 3.5.2) c) Tilt Limits (TS 3.5.2)

5. Scheduled date(s) for submitting proposed licensing action: March 15. 1988

6. Important licensing considerations associated with refueling: N/A

[

7. Number of fuel assemblies:

a) In the core: 177 b) In the Spent Fuel Pool: 316

8. Present licensed spent fuel capacity: 1080

9. Projected date of the last refueling that can be discharged to the Spent Fuel Pool: December 3. 2001 9

. AVERAGE D.'ILY' UNIT POWER LEVEL l: DOCKET NO. 50-312

. UNIT. Rancho Seco Unit 1 l-l DATE 8/31/87 COMPl.ETED BY R. Little TELEPHONE (916) 452-3211 MONTH Auaust 1987 DAY AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL DAY AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Net) (MHe-Net) 1 0- 17 0-2 0 18 0

.3 0 19 0 4 0 20 0 5 0 21 0 6 0' 22 0 l

7 0 23 0 8 0 24- 0

'9 0 25 0 10 0 26 0 11 0 27 0 12 0 28 0 13 0 29 0 14 0 30 0 15' 0 31 0 16 0 INSTRUCTIONS On this-format, list'the average daily unit power level in MWe-Net for each day in the reporting month. Compute to the nearest whole megawatt.

l

e OPERATING DATA REPORT DOCKET N0. 50-312 DATE 8/31/87 COMPLETED BY R. Little TELEPHONE (916) 452-3211 OPERATING STATUS

1. Unit Name: Rancho Seco Unit 1 Notes

2. Reporting Period: August 1987

3. Licensed Thermal Power (MHt): 2.772

• Error detected in the

4. Nameplate Rating (Gross MWe): 963 January 1984 report

5. Design Electrical Rating (Net MWe): 918

6. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Gross MWe): 917

7. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Net MWe): 873

8. If changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (Items Number 3 Through 7) Since Last Report, Give Reasons: N/A

9. Power Level to Hhich Restricted, If Any (Net MWe): 0

10. Reasons For Restrictions, If Any: NRC letter dated 12/26/85 This Month Yr-to-Date Cumulative

11. Hours in Reporting Period 744 5.831 108.456

12. Number of Hours Reactor Was Critical 0 0 54.322

13. Reactor Reserve Shutdown Hours 0 0 10.300.2

14. Hours Generator On-Line 0 0 50.363.8

15. Unit Reserve Shutdown Hours 0 0 1.210.2

16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated (MHH) 0 0 127.861.688

17. Gross Electrical Energy Generated (MHH) 0 0 41.523.197*

18. Net Electrical Energy Generated (MWH) -4.301 -34.987 38.253.798

19. Unit Service Factor 0.0% 0.0% 46.4%

20. Unit Availability Factor 0.0% 0.0% 47.6%

21. Unit Capacity Factor (Using MDC Net) 0.0% 0.0% 40.4%

22. Unit Capacity Factor (Using DER Net) 0.0% 0.0% 38.4%

23. Unit Forced Outage Rate 100.0% 100.0% 41.6%

24. Shutdowns Scheduled Over Next 6 Months (Type, Date, and Duration of Each):

N/A

25. If Shut Down At End Of Report Period, Estimated Date of Startup: Indefinite

26. Units In Test Status (Prior to Commercial Operation): Forecast Achieved INITIAL CRITICALITY N/A N/A INITIAL ELECTRICITY N/A N/A COMMERCIAL OPERATION N/A N/A

t4 ro p N 2ott e e

(

1h ti) s e 3 cuL6 Ss s si l

- nn 1 C o nta nF 0au 9 Rl oa ce) 5RAR(

e hl iDiR tcfL u E e

i t

v c n

ga it r

ts nf(

orL o c e OMTBN EEYE e r h o Ino i ts o t

r r

r tor u t - r tae N AA D O on c o e p T t a Gah e E ND EH Co e iR t pSR K I T TE PEL &

eAn

't ct ey ub ib ipr n1 e

r yt )

CN L s e d h

x o tnv1 r e6 O P E v D U u

a e d EfEE0 MT C- P r pe .'

_ O id C re . 4 t cr ee rrw opo t p cp aiS erC RTI S .

N m O u I

r .

a )n r

T 7 e.3O t mci a C s aSl U 8 9

Ejgg n r

c px D 1 I Stc iaE E :l al a R m (r t

s donnt uu oe R u ht a a ut h E a *,3u B eMMAO W u E,gm C M1 234 O A P

D H /.

3 N T A N 5 S O e a 2 M e N s t t -

W T n nr 5 O R e e v op 8 ic E e D O L R T P U E H ~ R S

T

-.EiE i

I Q N Ijg )

U 3 i n

-_$jj a

- lp x n

_ E i o

(t 3sE e s ic t

_ D r e luT f t r

iao e ggE F e tnn c R y r

4 ea g

[i3d 4 mnel int o 7  : pt el at ninu o uif ge r u s qa e e p

,gH aEMRRO e - - - -

F RABCDEF 2

6

' 2 e -

ta 2 D 1

- d 5

8 d leu ed rceh o c F S 1 F5 V

i l!

k i

kSMUD SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT O P. O. Box 15830, Sacramento CA 95852-1830,(916) 452-3211 I AN ELECTRIC SYSTEM SERVING THE HEART OF CALIFORNIA NL 87-1192 l l

'9EP 15 em i

i U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: J. B. Martin, Regional Administrator Region V l Office of Inspection and Enforcement I 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210  !

Walnut Creek, CA 94596 t

DOCKET NO. 50-312 RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION  ;

LICENSE NO. DPR-54 1 OPERATING PLANT STATUS REPORT i 1

Dear Mr. Martin:

l Enclosed is the August 1987 Monthly Operating Plant Status Report for the Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station. The District submits this report pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.3.

Sincerely,  !

l Karl A. r Manager, Nuclear Lic sing E"

Enci (5)

Mw M ,

cc: I&E Hash (12)

F. J. Miraglia, NRR, Bethesda [e ggqLh l

~

MIPC (2) r, INP0 > #

9 c3 W

l RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION U 14440 Twin Cities Road, Herald, CA 95638-9799;(209) 33'3 2935