ND-22-0104, ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC 2.6.09.06 (Index Number 647)

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ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC 2.6.09.06 (Index Number 647)
ML22049A071
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 02/18/2022
From: Yox M
Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
ND-22-0104
Download: ML22049A071 (6)
v • d • e


Text

Southern Nuclear Michael J. Vox Regulatory Affairs Director Vogtle 3 & 4 7825 River Road Waynesboro, GA 30830 706-848-6459 tel FEB 1 8 2022 Docket No.: 52-025 ND-22-0104 10CFR 52.99(c)(1)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 3 ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC 2.6.09.06 [Index Number 6471 Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(1), the purpose of this letter is to notify the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of the completion of Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) Item 2.6.09.06 [Index Number 647].

This ITAAC confirms that the vehicle barrier system will protect against the Design Basis Threat vehicle bombs based upon the stand-off distance of the system. The closure process for this ITAAC is based on the guidance described in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 08-01, "Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process Under 10 CFR Part 52," which was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.215.

Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) previously submitted ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC 2.6.09.06 [Index Number 647] ND-21-0386 [ML21288A162] dated October 15, 2021. This resubmittal supersedes ND-21-0386 in its entirety.

This letter contains no new NRC regulatory commitments. Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) requests NRC staff confirmation of this determination and publication of the required notice in the Federal Register per 10 CFR 52.99.

If there are any questions, please contact Kelli Roberts at 706-848-6991.

Respectfully submitted.

Michael J. Vox Regulatory Affairs Director Vogtle 3 & 4

Enclosure:

MJY/RLB/sfr Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 Completion of ITAAC 2.6.09.06 [Index Number 647]

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-22-0104 Page 2 of 3 To:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company/ Georgia Power Company Mr. Peter P. Sena III Mr. D. L. McKinney Mr. H. Nieh Mr. G. Chick Mr. S. Stimac Mr. P. Martino Mr. J. B. Williams Mr. M. J. Yox Mr. A. S. Parton Ms. K. A. Roberts Ms. J.M. Coleman Mr. C. T. Defnall Mr. C. E. Morrow Mr. K. J. Drudy Mr. J. M. Fisher Mr. R. L. Beiike Mr. S. Leighty Ms. A. C. Chamberlain Mr. J. C. Haswell Document Services RTYPE: VND.LI.L06 File AR.01.02.06 cc:

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ms. M. Bailey Mr. M. King Mr. G. Bowman Ms. A. Veil Mr. C. P. Patel Mr. G. J. Khouri Mr. C. J. Even Mr. B. J. Kemker Ms. N. C. Coovert Mr. C. Welch Mr. J. Gaslevic Mr. O. Lopez-Santiago Mr. G. Armstrong Mr. M. Webb Mr. T. Fredette Mr. C. Santos Mr. B. Davis Mr. J. Vasquez Mr. J. Eargle Mr. T. Fanelli Ms. K. McCurry Mr. J. Parent Mr. B. Griman Mr. V. Hall

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-22-0104 Page 3 of 3 Oqlethorpe Power Corporation Mr. R. B. Brinkman Mr. E. Rasmussen Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia Mr. J. E. Fuller Mr. 8. M. Jackson Dalton Utilities Mr. T. Bundros Westinahouse Electric Company. LLC Dr. L. OrianI Mr. D. 0. Durham Mr. M. M. CorlettI Mr. Z. 8. Harper Mr. J. L. Coward Other Mr. 8. W. Kline, Bechtel Power Corporation Ms. L. Matis, Tetra Tech NUS, Inc.

Dr. W. R. Jacobs, Jr., Ph.D., GDS Associates, Inc.

Mr. 8. Roetger, Georgia Public Service Commission Mr. R. L. Trokey, Georgia Public Service Commission Mr. K. C. Greene, Troutman Sanders Mr. 8. Blanton, Batch Bingham

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-22-0104 Enclosure Page 1 of 3 Southern Nuclear Operating Company ND-22-0104 Enclosure Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 Completion of ITAAC 2.6.09.06 [Index Number 647]

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-22-0104 Enclosure Page 2 of 3 ITAAC Statement Design Commitment

6. The vehicle barrier system is installed and located at the necessary stand-off distance to protect against the DBT vehicle bombs.

Inspections/Tests/Analvses Inspections and analysis will be performed for the vehicle barrier system.

Acceptance Criteria The vehicle barrier system will protect against the DBT vehicle bombs based upon the stand-off distance of the system.

ITAAC Determination Basis Inspections and analysis of the vehicle barrier system (VBS, as defined by NUREG-2203) were performed to ensure the system is installed and located at the necessary stand-off distance to protect against the Design Basis Threat (DBT) vehicle bombs. The inspections and analysis confirmed the VBS will protect against the DBT vehicle bombs based upon the stand-off distance of the VBS and satisfy the applicable VBS stand-off distance requirements of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 and Unit 4 Physical Security Plan associated with 10CFR 73.55(e)(10). The VEGP Unit 3 Plant Security System ITAACs only cover the Unit 3 plant security system design commitment scope.

The design, construction, and installation of the VBS is based upon analyses of the minimum safe stand-off distance (MSSD) required to provide adequate protection of the personnel, equipment, and systems necessary to prevent significant core damage and spent fuel pool sabotage against the effects of the DBT of radiological sabotage land vehicle bomb assault. The Unit 3 MSSD is established by standard plant analysis (Reference 1), as supplemented by site specific MSSD analyses (References 2 and 3). Site specific VBS analysis (Reference 4) and mobile bullet resistant enclosure (MBRE) blast analyses (Reference 5) provide additional analysis details which further demonstrate the requirements of 10CFR 73.55(e)(10) are met.

ITAAC Technical Report SV3-SES-ITR-800647 (Reference 6) documents the inspections and analyses performed to confirm the VBS is installed at stopping distances equal to or greater than the MSSDs established by analyses (References 1 through 5). The inspection also confirmed that the as-built VBS installation is consistent with the VBS design and installation analyses assumptions described in References 1 through 5.

The VBS DBT inspection and analysis results are documented in References 1 through 6 and confirm the vehicle barrier system will protect against the DBT vehicle bombs based upon the stand-off distance of the VBS.

References 1 through 6 are available for NRG inspection as part of the Unit 3 ITAAC 2.6.09.06 Completion Package (Reference 7).

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-22-0104 Enclosure Page 3 of 3 ITAAC Finding Review In accordance with plant procedures for ITAAC completion, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) performed a review of all findings pertaining to the subject ITAAC and associated corrective actions. This review determined that one such finding, listed below, has been identified:

1.

Failure to demonstrate that the ITAAC 647 Acceptance Criteria was metSpecifically, this finding was related to incomplete design basis information being available to support confirmation that the vehicle barrier system will protect against Design Basis Threat vehicle bombs. To address this concern, the following corrective action was taken: The incomplete design basis information was finalized and approved, and an inspection of this approved design performed, to demonstrate that the vehicle barrier system will protect against Design Basis Threat vehicle bombs.

The corrective actions for this finding have been completed. The ITAAC completion review is documented in the ITAAC Completion Package for ITAAC 2.6.09.06 (Reference 7) and is available for NRC review.

ITAAC Completion Statement Based on the above information, SNC hereby notifies the NRC that ITAAC 2.6.09.06 was performed for VEGP Unit 3 and that the prescribed acceptance criteria was met.

Systems, structures, and components verified as part of this ITAAC are being maintained in their as-designed, ITAAC compliant condition in accordance with approved plant programs and procedures.

References (available for NRC inspection)

1. APP-XV01 -ZOC-001, AP1000 Vehicle Barrier System Standoff Distances for a Range of Blast Scenarios, Rev 0 (Safeguards Information)
2. DOEJ-V34-LAR-18-008-SEC001, Minimum Safe Standoff Distance (MSSD) Evaluation of the Transitional Vehicle Barrier System Between Plant Vogtle Units 3 & 4 With Respect to Equipment Required for Safe Shutdown, Equipment Required for Security Response, and Security Force Response Personnel, Version 1.0 (Safeguards Information)
3. ABS Consulting Calculation ID 4212670-C-103, VBIED Blast Effects Assessment of Security Assets, Rev 0 (Safeguards Information)
4. SVO-SES-ZOR-800000, Vogtle Plant Security System Vehicle Barrier System Analysis, Rev 1 (Safeguards Information)
5. Thornton Tomasetti Calculation ID SCAL-001, Kontek MBRE Blast Analyses, Rev 1 (Security Related Information)
6. SV3-SES-ITR-800647, Unit 3 ITAAC 647 Vehicle Barrier System Inspection: ITAAC 2.6.09.06, Rev 1 (Security Related Information)
7. 2.6.09.06-U3-CP-Rev1, ITAAC Completion Package
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