ML24326A364
| ML24326A364 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 11/21/2024 |
| From: | Mary Woods NRC/OGC |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| SECY RAS | |
| References | |
| RAS 57201, 50-269-SLR-2, 50-270-SLR-2, 50-287-SLR-2 | |
| Download: ML24326A364 (0) | |
Text
November 21, 2024 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC (Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3)
Docket No. 50-269-SLR-2, 50-270-SLR-2, 50-287-SLR-2 NON-PUBLIC ATTACHMENTS A-D As stated in the NRC Staffs November 21, 2024, motion, the NRC Staff is providing updated Non-Public Attachments A-D, with redactions applied.
Respectfully submitted,
/Signed (electronically) by/
Mary Frances Woods Counsel for NRC Staff Mail Stop: O-14-A44 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Telephone: (301) 287-3514 E-mail: Mary.Woods@nrc.gov Dated in North Bethesda, MD this 21st of November 2024
Non-Public Attachment A November 21, 2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY In the Matter of
)
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
) Docket Nos. 50-269/270/287 SLR-2 Oconee Nuclear Station,
) April 29, 2024 Units 1, 2 & 3
)
HEARING REQUEST AND PETITION TO INTERVENE BY BEYOND NUCLEAR AND SIERRA CLUB I.
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY
OF CONTENTIONS Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f), the hearing notice published at 89 Fed. Reg. 10,107 (Feb. 13, 2024), and the Commissions Order of March 28, 2024, Petitioners Beyond Nuclear, Inc. (Beyond Nuclear) and the Sierra Club, Inc. (Sierra Club) hereby petition to intervene and request the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) to grant a hearing on the NRCs Draft Site-Specific Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, Supplement 2, Second Renewal Regarding Subsequent License Renewal for Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2 and 3 (Feb. 2024) (Draft SEIS). The NRC prepared the Draft SEIS to support Duke Energy Corp.s (Dukes) application for subsequent license renewal (SLR) of the operating license for the Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3 nuclear power plant. If Dukes application is granted, it will be allowed to operate Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3 for an additional twenty years beyond its current renewed operating license term, or until 2053-54.1 Petitioners contend that the NRC should not approve subsequent renewal of Dukes operating license because the Draft SEIS is inadequate to satisfy the requirements of the National 1 The NRC issued operating licenses for Oconee Units 1, 2, and 2 in 1973 and 1974, and renewed those licenses in 2000. Environmental Report at 1-1. Currently, the operating licenses for Units 1 and 2 will expire in 2033, and the operating license for Unit 3 will expire in 2034. Id.
2 Environmental Policy Act for a hard look at the environmental consequences of re-licensing the Oconee reactors.2 This Hearing Request is supported by the attached declaration and Expert Report of Jeffrey T. Mitman. See Declaration of Jeffrey T. Mitman in Support of Beyond Nuclears and Sierra Clubs Hearing Request (April 29, 2024) (Mitman Declaration) (Attachment 1 to this Hearing Request); and Mr. Mitmans Expert Report, NRC Relicensing Crisis at Oconee Nuclear Station: Stop Duke From Sending Safety Over the Jocassee Dam: Updated Analysis of Neglected Safety, Environmental and Climate Change Risks (April 2024) (Mitman Report or Expert Report) (Exhibit 1 to Mitman Declaration). Mr. Mitmans expert report updates an expert he filed on behalf of Petitioners in the first SLR proceeding for the Oconee reactors in 2021.3 II.
PETITIONERS HAVE STANDING TO REQUEST A HEARING.
Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(d), a request for a hearing must address: (1) the nature of the petitioners right under the Atomic Energy Act to be made a party to the proceeding, (2) the nature and extent of the petitioners property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding, and (3) the possible effect of any order that may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioners interest. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) has summarized these standing requirements as follows:
In determining whether a petitioner has sufficient interest to intervene in a proceeding, the Commission has traditionally applied judicial concepts of standing. Contemporaneous judicial standards for standing require a petitioner to demonstrate that (1) it has suffered or will suffer a distinct and palpable harm that constitutes injury-in-fact within the zone of interest arguably protected by the governing statutes (e.g., the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969); (2) the injury can fairly be traced to the challenged actions; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable 2 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989).
3 See Mitman Report at 1.
3 decision. An organization that wishes to intervene in a proceeding may do so either in its own right by demonstrating harm to its organizational interests, or in a representational capacity by demonstrating harm to its members. To intervene in a representational capacity, an organization must show not only that at least one of its members would fulfill the standing requirements, but also that he or she has authorized the organization to represent his or her interests.4 As demonstrated below, each of the Petitioners has standing by virtue of organizational interests that fall within the zone of interests protected by the Atomic Energy Act and NEPA. By intervening in this proceeding, Petitioners seek to protect their members health and safety, as well as protection of the environment. They wish to ensure that Dukes operating license is not approved for a second renewal term unless and until Duke demonstrates full compliance with NEPAs requirements for protection of public health and the environment.
In addition, as also demonstrated below, each Petitioner organization has members and/or staff who live within 50 miles of Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3, whose interests in protecting their own health and the health of the environment would be adversely affected by extended operation of Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3 under an additional SLR term, and who have authorized Petitioners to represent their interests in this proceeding. Therefore, Petitioners have presumptive standing by virtue of the location of their members residences and property within 50 miles of the Oconee reactors.5 A. Standing of Beyond Nuclear Beyond Nuclear is a nonprofit, nonpartisan membership organization that aims to educate and activate the public about the connections between nuclear power and nuclear weapons and 4 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-02-23, 56 N.R.C. 413, 426 (2002), petition for review denied, CLI-03-12, 58 N.R.C. 185 (2003).
5 Diablo Canyon, 56 N.R.C. at 426-27 (citing Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-01-06, 53 N.R.C. 138, 146, affd, CLI-01-17, 54 N.R.C. 3 (2001)).
4 the need to abolish both to protect public health and safety, prevent environmental harms, and safeguard our future. Beyond Nuclear advocates for an end to the production of nuclear waste and for securing the existing reactor waste in hardened on-site storage until it can be permanently disposed of in a safe, sound, and suitable underground repository. For more than fifteen years, Beyond Nuclear has worked toward its mission by regularly intervening in NRC licensing, relicensing, and other proceedings related to nuclear safety matters.
Beyond Nuclears representational standing to participate in this proceeding is demonstrated by the attached Declaration of Gordon Crain (April 26, 2024) (Attachment 2A);
Declaration of Ken Marsh (April 28, 2024) (Attachment 2B); Declaration of Jane F. Powell (April 24, 2024) (Attachment 2C); and Declaration of Frank M. Powell (April 24, 2024)
(Attachment 2D).
B. Standing of the Sierra Club Founded in 1892, the Sierra Club is a national environmental organization with 3.8 million members across the United States. The purposes of the Sierra Club are to explore, enjoy, and protect the wild places of the earth; to practice and promote the responsible use of the earths ecosystems and resources; to educate and enlist humanity to protect and restore the quality of the natural and human environment; and to use all lawful means to carry out these objectives.
The Sierra Clubs representational standing to participate in this proceeding is demonstrated by the attached declarations of its members: Declaration of Rosellen Aleguire (April 24, 2024)
(Attachment 2E); Declaration of Eunice Lehmacher (April 28, 2024) (Attachment 2F);
attachment of Kathy Crain (April 26, 2024) (Attachment 2G); and Declaration of Frank M.
Powell (April 24, 2024) (Attachment 2H).
5 III. PETITIONERS CONTENTIONS Below, Petitioners present their contentions challenging the adequacy of the NRCs Draft SEIS for subsequent renewal of the operating licenses for the Oconee reactors. As required by 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(vi), these contentions provide sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant/licensee on a material issue of law or fact, including references to specific portions of the Draft SEIS that Petitioners dispute, as well as specific citations to documents that support Petitioners disputes with the Draft SEIS.
Contention 1: Erroneous, Incomplete and Misleading Information Regarding Whether Duke Has Provided the Oconee reactors with Adequate Protection From Failure of the Upstream Jocassee Dam A. Statement of Contention The NRC Staffs conclusion that accident impacts of continuing to operate the Oconee reactors are insignificant, i.e., SMALL (Draft SEIS at F-5), is based on the assertion that Duke has provided the Oconee reactors with adequate protection from accident risks caused by external events, such as failure of the upstream Jocassee Dam. In support of this assertion, the Draft SEIS relies heavily on a description of the scope, nature and outcome of the NRC Staffs review of seismic and flooding risks (i.e., external hazards) to Oconee, conducted between 2012 and 2020 in response to the catastrophic 2011 Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident in Japan. As stated in the Draft SEIS:
In Section 4.15.1.2.1, Design-Basis Accidents, of its ER, Duke Energy summarized the site-specific requirements needed to operate a nuclear power facility, such as the Oconee Station safety analysis report (Duke Energy 2020-TN9001). The Oconee Station safety analysis report presents the design criteria and design information for Oconee Station. The Oconee Station safety analysis report also discusses various hypothetical DBAs and the safety features designed to prevent and mitigate accidents. A number of the postulated accidents are not expected to occur during the life of the plant but are evaluated to establish the design basis for the preventive and mitigative safety systems of the facility. The acceptance criteria for DBAs are described in 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 100. The
6 NRC has reviewed Oconees design basis on several occasions following the issuance of the initial operating licenses.
[An] example of NRCs review of Oconee Station design-basis is its review of external hazards information for all operating power reactors, including Oconee, as ordered by the Commission following the Fukushima accident. On November 17, 2020, the NRC staff completed its review for Oconee Station and concluded that no further regulatory action (sic) were needed to ensure adequate protection or compliance with regulatory requirements, including site-specific external hazards information, re-confirming the acceptability of Oconee Stations design basis (NRC 2020-TN8995).6
- 1. Reliance on erroneous, incomplete and misleading information The Draft SEIS assertion is based on erroneous, incomplete and misleading information.
Therefore, because the Draft SEIS bases its conclusion of insignificant environmental impacts on an unsupported claim that the reactors are adequately protected against flooding risks caused by failure of the Jocassee Dam, the Draft SEIS is inadequate to satisfy NEPAs requirement for a hard look at the environmental impacts of the proposed second license renewal decisions.7 In addition, the Draft SEIS fails to satisfy NEPA because it omits any discussion of the environmental significance of an outstanding 2011 Safety Evaluation establishing a minimum flood height that safety equipment must be protected against and also prescribed measures for 6 Draft SEIS at F F-4 (citing letter from R.J. Bernardo, NRC to J.E. Burchfield, Jr., Duke re:
Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 - Documentation of the Completion of Required Actions Taken in Response to the Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident (Nov.
17, 2020) (ML20304A369) (NRC 2020-TN8995) (NRC 11/17/20 Letter)).
7 Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349. The hallmarks of a hard look are thorough investigation into environmental impacts and forthright acknowledgment of potential environmental harms.
National Audubon Society v. Dept of Navy, 422 F.3d 174, 185 (4th Cir. 2005). The analysis must address both the probabilities of potentially harmful events and the consequences if those events come to pass. State of New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d 471, 479, 482 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(rejecting environmental analysis of spent fuel pool fire risks because it did not consider consequences as well as probability of fires in spent fuel storage pools). Impacts must be quantified if possible, but may be addressed qualitatively, with consideration of uncertainties.
Limerick Ecology Action, 869 F.2d at 744 (lack of quantifiability does not necessarily preclude further consideration under NEPA.).
7 providing adequate protection against a flood caused by failure of the Jocassee Dam.8 The 2011 Safety Evaluation remains effective because the NRC has not repudiated the safety findings or requirements in the Safety Evaluation based on an evaluation of whether adequate protection of public health and safety can be provided without those safety findings or measures. While the NRC Staff claims to have closed the issues raised by the 2011 Safety Evaluation, the document relied on by the Staff for this purported closure does not use adequate protection language and therefore does not demonstrate that the NRC believes public health and safety is adequately protected in the absence of the requirements of the 2011 Safety Evaluation. 9 Because the Draft SEIS bases its conclusion of insignificant environmental impacts on an unsupported claim regarding adequate protection from flooding risks caused by failure of the Jocassee Dam, the Draft SEIS is inadequate to satisfy NEPA.
The Draft SEIS assertion that adequate protection of the Oconee reactors from external hazards is ensure[d] invokes Section 182(a) of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a),
requiring the [NRC] to ensure that the utilization or production of special nuclear material will 8 Mitman Report, § 2.6.4 (quoting Letter from Eric J. Leeds, NRC, to Preston Gillespie, Duke, re: Staff Assessment of Dukes Response to Confirmatory Action Letter Regarding Dukes Commitments to Address External Flooding Concerns at the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 (ONS) (TAC Nos. ME3065, ME3066, and ME3067) and Enclosed Safety Evaluation (Jan.
28, 2011) (ML103490330) (2011 Safety Evaluation). Petitioners note that the 2011 Safety Evaluation was previously posted on ADAMS but was recently removed from ADAMS.
Petitioners rely on quotations and paraphrasing of the 2011 Safety Evaluation as presented in documents that remain publicly available, such as Mr. Mitmans report and the ASLBs decision in LBP-22-01, 95 N.R.C. 49 (2021). See, e.g., 95 N.R.C. at 72-73.
9 Letter from Catherine Haney, NRC to Scott Batson, Duke re: Oconee Nuclear Station -
Confirmatory Action Letter Followup Inspection Report 050000269/2016009, 050000270/2016009, 05000287/2016009 (June 16, 2016) (ADAMS Accession No. ML16168Al76) (Haney Letter).
8
... provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public.10 Adequate protection is the primary statutory standard relating to the [NRCs] mandate to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants.11 Thus, use of that phrase conveys a clear message that accident risks have been reduced to a level that is both acceptable under the Atomic Energy Act and insignificant or SMALL under NEPA.12 Under the Atomic Energy Act, no further action to reduce that acceptable level of risk is required; and under NEPA, the only required additional actions are disclosure of the impacts and consideration of alternatives to manage or avoid the residual risk of these unlikely accidents.13 Here, the Draft SEIS claim that the adequate protection standard has been satisfied with respect to flooding protection from external events such as Jocassee Dam failure is erroneous because it is not supported by any safety analysis of whether that statutory standard has been satisfied. Further, the Draft SEIS ignores the Staffs own documents that have concluded that failure of the Jocassee Dam is a credible accident that must be addressed by safety measures in order to provide adequate protection to public health and safety. Finally, by claiming that continued operation of the Oconee reactors satisfies the adequate protection standard, without 10 Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 824 F.2d 108, 109 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2232(a)).
11 Id., 824 F.2d at 109.
12 See Limerick Ecology Action v. NRC, 869 F.2d 719, 730 (3rd Cir. 1989) (noting overlap between concerns of Atomic Energy Act and NEPA); Citizens for Safe Power v. NRC, 524 F.2d 1291, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Atomic Energy Act requirements may not be viewed separate and apart from NEPA considerations). See also Final Rule, Revisions to Environmental Review for Renewal of Nuclear Power Plant Operating Licenses, 78 Fed. Reg. 37,282, 37,289 (June 20, 2013) (noting that the License Renewal GEIS is not the primary vehicle the NRC uses to address and regulate risks from severe accidents. The NRCs regulations and regulatory practices employ safety standards in the design, construction, and operation of nuclear power plants as well as risk models to ensure the public is adequately protected on an ongoing basis.
13 78 Fed. Reg. at 37,289.
9 acknowledging that the multiple documents it relies on provide no such conclusion, the NRC misleads other agencies, state and local governments, and the general public, lulling them into a false sense of security.
- a. Incorrect claims with respect to design-basis review, legal effect of the 50.54(f) letter, and adequate protection findings Design-basis review. In the Draft SEIS, the NRC Staff cites the NRC 11/17/20 Letter for the proposition that the Staff reviewed the Oconee Station design-basis.14 But the NRC 11/17/20 Letter itself does not discuss or even refer to a design-basis review with respect to external flooding events at Oconee. And there is no evidence in the record of the NRCs post-Fukushima actions that such a review was done.
Submittal of external hazards information purportedly ordered by the Commission. The 50.54(f) letters cited in the Draft SEIS did not order the submittal of external hazards information. The information was request[ed] and therefore submittal was discretionary.15 Adequate Protection. The Draft SEIS also states that in the NRC 11/17/20 Letter, the NRC concluded that no further regulatory action (sic) were needed to ensure adequate protection or compliance with regulatory requirements.16 But the words adequate protection do not appear anywhere in the NRC 11/17/20 Letter, nor does the Letter address the question of whether the Oconee reactors comply with regulatory requirements for provision of adequate 14 Draft SEIS at F-4.
15 Letter from NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees and Construction Permit Holders re: Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1.2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident (March 12, 2012) (ML12053A340).
16 Id.
10 protection from flooding risks posed by failure of the Jocassee Dam. Nor do the references cited by the NRC 11/17/20 Letter contain any findings regarding adequate protection or compliance with regulations required for adequate protection. For instance:
At pages 8-10, the NRC 11/17/20 Letter contains a discussion of Dukes reevaluation of the flooding hazard to the Oconee reactors, which was requested by a 50.54(f) letter sent to all licensees on March 12, 2012.17 In this discussion, the NRC states that the local intense precipitation, rivers and streams, and dam failure flood-causing mechanisms were not bounded by the CDB [current design basis]. Therefore, additional assessments of these flood-causing mechanisms were required.18 According to the Letter:
The NRC staff used a graded approach to determine if this site would need to perform an IA [flooding integrated assessment] for the reevaluated flooding hazard, or if an FE [focused evaluation] would suffice. Based on the graded approach, Oconee completed an FE (Reference 6.20) to ensure appropriate actions were identified and taken to protect the plant from the reevaluated flood hazard.
The NRC staff conducted a regulatory audit (Reference 6.22), completed its review of the FE, and concluded in the staff assessment (Reference 6.21) that the licensee provided sufficient information in response to the 50.54(f) letter. Audit results were summarized in the staff assessment.19 Based on this information, the NRC concluded that: [n]o further regulatory actions are required related to the flood hazard reevaluations.20 This portion of the NRC 11/17/20 Letter does not support the Draft SEIS, because the words adequate protection appear nowhere in the discussion of the flooding reevaluation. Instead, the NRC simply stated that Duke had provided sufficient information in response to the 50.54(f) letter.21 17 See NRC 11/17/20 Letter at 1.
18 NRC 11/17/20 Letter at 9.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
11 Nor do the words adequate protection appear in the Staff reference documents cited by the NRC 11/17/20 Letter in support of its conclusion that no further regulatory actions are required for Oconee.22 o For instance, Ref. 2.61, a Staff Assessment... Related to the Focused Evaluation for Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 as a Result of the Reevaluated Flooding Hazard Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 contains the following
==
Conclusion:==
The NRC staff has concluded that the licensee performed the Oconee FE in accordance with the guidance described in NEI 16-05, Revision 1, as endorsed by JLD-ISG-2016-01, and that the licensee has demonstrated that effective flood protection exists from the reevaluated flood hazards.23 This conclusion does not state that flood protection is adequate to protect health and safety as the term is used in the Atomic Energy Act and the Draft SEIS -- only that it is effective. And the term effective is undefined.
o Similarly, Ref. 2.65, an NRC letter reporting on the NRC Staffs treatment of reevaluated flood hazard information, states that Oconee is included in Category 1, which:
Corresponds to sites where no additional regulatory action is warranted. This category includes sites that have all the flood hazard mechanisms bounded by the current design basis, or sites where the licensee has demonstrated that effective or feasible flood protection will address the unbounded reevaluated hazards. This means that both licensees and staff are finished with the 50.54(f) letter flooding reevaluation assessments and backfit decisions for these sites. 24 22 Id. at 9 (citing Refs. 6.21 and 6.25).
23 Letter from Juan F. Uribe, NRC to Ed. Burchfield, Jr., Duke, re: Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 - Staff Assessment of Flooding Focused Evaluation (CAC Nos. MG0265, MG0266, MG0267, and EPID L-2017-JLD-0029), Enclosed Staff Assessment at 10 (June 18, 2018) (ML1814A755).
24 Letter from Mary Jane Ross-Lee, NRC to The Licensees of Operating Power Reactors re:
Treatment of Reevaluated Flood Hazard Information Provided Under Title 10 of the Code of
12 Ref. 2.65 contains no representations regarding adequate protection of public health and safety from flooding hazards posed by failure of the Jocassee Dam. Again, the terms effective and feasible are undefined.
In fact, in the entire post-Fukushima review record for Oconee, no NRC document can be found that makes adequate protection findings with respect to the risk of flooding from failure of the Jocassee Dam or measures necessary to provide adequate protection from those risks. The only adequate protection findings relate to the adequacy of mitigation measures.25
- b. Disregard of the Staffs own documents that have concluded that failure of the Jocassee Dam is a credible accident that must be addressed by safety measures in order to provide adequate protection to public health and safety.
The Draft SEIS also disregards a number of important facts and legal determinations that bear on the environmental impacts of re-licensing the Oconee reactors, including:
The fact that when the Oconee reactors were initially licensed by the NRC, neither Duke nor the NRC considered that failure of the Jocassee Dam was credible; and therefore, the NRC Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident, Encl. 1 at 4 (Aug. 20, 2019)
(ML19067A247).
25 The 11/17/20 Letter does make a finding that Duke complied with certain post-Fukushima orders, such as Order EA-12-049 for mitigation of beyond-design-basis events and Order EA 051 for spent fuel instrumentation. Id. at 5. And for each of these compliance findings, the NRC cited a safety evaluation. See Letter from Tony Brown, NRC, to Thomas D. Ray, Duke, re:
Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 -- Safety Evaluation Regarding Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Related to Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051 (CAC Nos. MF0782, MF0783, MF0784, MF0785, MF0786, and MF0787) (Aug.
30, 2017) and enclosed Safety Evaluation (August 30, 2017) (M17202U791). But these safety findings are unrelated to the question of whether adequate protection has been demonstrated with respect to flooding risk due to failure of the Jocassee Dam.
13 did not require Duke to protect the reactors safety equipment against a flood caused by dam failure.26 The fact that in 2008, even before the Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident, the Staff had already issued a Section 50.54(f) letter to Duke, stating that while Duke was relying on -
walls constructed around the two ground-level entrances to the SSF [Standby Shutdown Facility] to provide sufficient protection against floods, an Inundation Study prepared by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) had predicted that a failure of the Jocassee Dam could result in a flood height of above grade.27 The fact that in 2009, the NRC remain[ed] concerned that Duke had not demonstrated that the Oconee units will be adequately protected in the event of a Jocassee Dam failure.28 The Staff also stated that Jocassee Dam failure is a credible event and needs to be addressed deterministically. 29 The fact that in 2011, the Staff issued a Safety Evaluation concluding that the flood depth at the Oconee reactors needed to be raised to in order to ensure adequate protection.30 26 Mitman Report, § 2.3.2.
27 Letter from Joseph G. Giitter, NRC to Dave Baxter, Duke, re: Information Request Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Related to External Flooding, Including Failure of the Jocassee Dam at Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 (TAC Nos. MD8224, MD8225, and MD8226) (Aug. 15, 2008)
(ML081640244). See also Mitman Report, § 2.6.2.
28 Id.
29 Letter from Joseph G. Giitter, NRC to Dave Baxter, Duke, re: Evaluation of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke) September 26, 2008, Response to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Letter Dated August 15, 2008, Related to External Flooding at Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 (Oconeee) (TAC Nos. MD8224, MD8225, and MD8226) at 2 (April 30, 2009)
(ML09057077).
30 Mitman Report, § 2.6.4 (quoting 2011 Safety Evaluation).
14 The fact that as a result of the post-Fukushima review, the NRC has now approved lowering the flood depth to i.e., reducing the flood depth against which the SSF must be protected by
- and that the NRC has made no finding that this new flood depth (i.e.,
will provide adequate protection to public health and safety. 31 Yet, the Draft SEIS asserts that adequate protection of public health and safety from external hazards will be ensured during the proposed continued operation of the Oconee reactors.32 By relying on purported adequate protection findings to assert that the environmental impacts of continued operation of the Oconee reactors are SMALL, without actually demonstrating that any such findings were made, the NRC violates the cardinal rule that a NEPA analysis must show consideration of all relevant environmental concerns. State of New York, 681 F.3d at 476. Nothing in the record provided by the NRC here is relevant to the assertions of adequate protection that are made in support of the proposed finding that the environmental impact of reactor accidents are SMALL. As discussed in the attached Mitman Declaration, these errors, omissions, and misleading statements have enormous safety and environmental significance because they obscure the fact that the NRC has failed to provide the basic level of protection to the Oconee reactors that is required by the Atomic Energy Act.33 31 Letter from Scott L. Batson, Duke to NRC re: Supplemental Information Regarding NRC 2008 and 2012 Requests for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Pertaining to External Flooding at Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS), Enclosure, Table D at 7 (March 6, 2015) 32 Draft SEIS at F-5.
33 These issues are discussed at length in the introduction to Mr. Mitmans report and in Sections 2, 3.1 and 4.
15
- 2. Omission of discussion of relevant factor affecting outcome of environmental analysis: abandonment of 2011 Safety Evaluation without making new adequate protection findings In addition, the Draft SEIS fails to satisfy NEPA because it omits any discussion of the environmental significance of the outstanding 2011 Safety Evaluation establishing a minimum flood height that safety equipment must be protected against and also prescribed measures for providing adequate protection against a flood caused by failure of the Jocassee Dam.34 This is a relevant environmental concern, State of New York, 681 F.3d at 476, because the NRC relies on its safety reviews for nuclear reactor licensing decisions as the basis for its environmental findings. See discussion above in Subsection 1.
The 2011 Safety Evaluation remains effective because the NRC has not repudiated the safety findings or requirements in the Safety Evaluation based on an evaluation of whether adequate protection of public health and safety can be provided without those safety findings or measures.35 Because the NRC has not repudiated the 2011 Safety Evaluation or made new adequate protection findings for the reduced flood height and altered measures for responding to that flood height, the 2011 Safety Evaluation remains an open and unresolved safety issue for which the NRC is unable to vouch for the adequate protection of the Oconee reactors from accident risks. The effect of that significant gap or deficit in the NRCs safety-based regulatory program on the NRCs ability to make a finding that the environmental impacts of accidents are insignificant or SMALL must be addressed in the Draft SEIS.
34 Mitman Report, § 2.6.4 (quoting 2011 Safety Evaluation).
35 As discussed above, while the NRC Staff claims to have closed the issues raised by the 2011 Safety Evaluation, the document relied on by the Staff for this purported closure does not use adequate protection language and therefore does not demonstrate that the NRC believes public health and safety is adequately protected in the absence of the requirements of the 2011 Safety Evaluation. See Haney Letter.
16 B. Basis Statement The documents and authorities on which Petitioners rely for this contention are set forth in the contention itself. They include the Mitman Report, the documentary record of the NRCs safety review and post-Fukushima reviews for Oconee, the statements made by the NRC in the Draft SEIS, the Atomic Energy Act, NEPA, and implementing case law.
C. Demonstration that the Contention is Within the Scope of the Proceeding This contention is within the scope of this proceeding because it challenges the adequacy of the Draft SEIS compliance with NEPA, a requirement for approval of Dukes SLR application.
D. Demonstration that the Contention is Material to the Findings NRC Must Make to Renew Dukes Operating License This contention is material to the findings NRC must make to renew Dukes operating license because NEPA requires that the NRC must make findings regarding the impacts of the proposed re-licensing action and reasonable alternatives to the proposed action.
E. Concise Statement of the Facts or Expert Opinion Supporting the Contention, Along with Appropriate Citations to Supporting Scientific or Factual Materials The facts and expert opinion on which Petitioners rely are set forth in the Statement of Contention above and in the expert report of Jeffrey Mitman.
CONTENTION 2: Draft SEIS Risk Estimates Fail to Meet NEPA Requirements for Rigor, Accuracy, Completeness, and Consideration of Uncertainties A. Statement of Contention In addition to the deficiencies described above in Contention 1, the Draft SEIS is deficient in other significant respects, which result in the significant understatement of accident risk. These deficiencies, as set forth in Section 3.2 of Mr. Mitmans expert report, include an inaccurate all hazards core damage frequency (CDF) estimate (Section 3.2.1), significantly underestimating the
17 probability of a large containment failure from fire (Section 3.2.2), making an unsupported assumption regarding the margin for population dose due to seismic events (Section 3.2.3),
underestimating risk by failing to aggregate changes in risk (Section 3.2.4), and relying on an invalid assumption that studies of boiling water reactors and Westinghouse pressurize water reactors are applicable to the Oconee reactors (Section 3.2.5). In addition, the Draft SEIS fails to address uncertainties, in violation of NEPA and NRC guidance for probabilistic risk assessments.
See Limerick Ecology Action, 869 F.2d at 744 and NRC guidance cited in Mitman Report, Section 3.3.
B. Basis Statement Petitioners rely for this contention on Mr. Mitmans Declaration and expert report, as well as the requirements set forth in note 7 above for a hard look at environmental impacts of a proposed action.
C. Demonstration that the Contention is Within the Scope of the Proceeding This contention is within the scope of this proceeding because it challenges the adequacy of the Draft SEIS compliance with NEPA, a requirement for approval of Dukes SLR application.
D. Demonstration that the Contention is Material to the Findings NRC Must Make to Renew Dukes Operating License This contention is material to the findings NRC must make to renew Dukes operating license because NEPA requires that the NRC must make findings regarding the impacts of the proposed re-licensing action and reasonable alternatives to the proposed action.
E. Concise Statement of the Facts or Expert Opinion Supporting the Contention, Along with Appropriate Citations to Supporting Scientific or Factual Materials The facts and expert opinion on which Petitioners rely are set forth in the Statement of Contention above and in the expert report of Jeffrey Mitman.
18 CONTENTION 3: Draft SEIS fails to address the effects of climate change on accident risk.
A. Statement of Contention The Draft SEIS fails to satisfy NEPA or NRC implementing regulation 10 C.F.R. § 51.71 because it does not address the effects of climate change on accident risk. As set forth in Section 3.4 of Mr. Mitmans expert report, increased frequency and severity of extreme weather events is inevitable, as agreed by multiple federal agencies. And therefore, climate change will inevitably affect the likelihood and severity of reactor accidents.
Consideration of climate change effects is particularly important for Oconee, which was never designed to withstand a significant flood from failure or overtopping of the Jocassee Dam.
Because climate change effects are reasonably foreseeable and potentially significant, they must be considered. State of New York, State of New York, 681 F.3d at 476. While the NRC asserts that it plans to address climate change risks in the future (Draft SEIS at 3 3-36), this does not excuse the agency from addressing the risks of climate change in this licensing decision as they are understood at this time. Only if the NRC can say that the effects of climate change are so small as to be remote and speculative can it avoid addressing those effects in its environmental review.36 B. Basis Statement Petitioners rely for this contention on Section 3.4 of Mr. Mitmans expert report, the authorities cited in his report, and State of New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d at 478.
36 681 F.3d at 478.
19 C. Demonstration that the Contention is Within the Scope of the Proceeding This contention is within the scope of this proceeding because it challenges the adequacy of the Draft SEIS compliance with NEPA, a requirement for approval of Dukes SLR application.
D. Demonstration that the Contention is Material to the Findings NRC Must Make to Renew Dukes Operating License This contention is material to the findings NRC must make to renew Dukes operating license because NEPA requires that the NRC must make findings regarding the impacts of the proposed re-licensing action and reasonable alternatives to the proposed action.
E. Concise Statement of the Facts or Expert Opinion Supporting the Contention, Along with Appropriate Citations to Supporting Scientific or Factual Materials The facts and expert opinion on which Petitioners rely are set forth in the Statement of Contention above and in the expert report of Jeffrey Mitman.
IV.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners Hearing Request and Petition to Intervene should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
__/signed electronically by/___
Diane Curran Harmon, Curran, Spielberg, & Eisenberg, L.L.P.
1725 DeSales Street N.W., Suite 500 Washington, D.C. 20036 240-393-9285 dcurran@harmoncurran.com April 29, 2024
20 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY In the Matter of
)
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
) Docket Nos. 50-269/270/287 SLR Oconee Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1, 2 & 3
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on April 29, 2024, I posted on the NRCs Electronic Information Exchange HEARING REQUEST AND PETITION TO INTERVENE BY BEYOND NUCLEAR AND SIERRA CLUB, including:
(Declaration of Jeffrey T. Mitman) o Exhibit 1 to Mr. Mitmans Declaration (his Expert Report, NRC Relicensing Crisis at Oconee Nuclear Station: Stop Duke From Sending Safety Over the Jocassee Dam (September 2021))
o Exhibit 2 to Mr. Mitmans Declaration (curriculum vitae)
Attachments 2A through 2H (standing declarations).
___/signed electronically by/__
Diane Curran
ATTACHMENT 1 Declaration of Jeffrey T. Mitman
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY In the Matter of
)
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
) Docket Nos. 50-269/270/287 SLR-2 Oconee Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1, 2 & 3
)
DECLARATION OF JEFFREY T. MITMAN IN SUPPORT OF BEYOND NUCLEAR AND SIERRA CLUB HEARING REQUEST Under penalty of perjury, I, Jeffrey T. Mitman declare:
- 1. My name is Jeffrey T. Mitman. By education and experience, I am a nuclear engineer, with a significant level of expertise in risk analysis. As set forth in my attached Curriculum Vitae (Exhibit 1), I have more than 40 years of experience in the nuclear industry and 16 years as a regulator with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
- 2. My experience includes 16 years on the technical staff of the NRC as a Reliability and Risk Analyst. For 15 of those years, I served as Senior Reliability and Risk Analyst, with significant responsibility for managing a number of risk analysis projects and teams.
- 3. As a result of my work experience in the nuclear industry and NRC, I am very familiar with NRC regulations and guidance regarding nuclear power plant safety, and with the application of risk analysis to reactor safety analysis. I am also generally familiar with the NRCs conceptual approach to the analysis of Severe Accident Mitigation (SAMA) alternatives in the context of reactor license renewal.
- 4. As an NRC Staff member, I participated in some NRC safety reviews and performed risk analysis of the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 (Oconee), including reviews related to the risk to Oconee posed by potential failure of the upstream Jocassee Dam. I also participated in a generic study by NRC of dam failure risk, with particular application to Oconee.
- 5. In 2021, on behalf of Beyond Nuclear and the Sierra Club, I submitted a declaration and expert technical report in the first NRC proceeding for review of an application submitted by Duke Energy Corp. (Duke) for subsequent license renewal (SLR) of the Oconee operating licenses. My expert report, entitled NRC Relicensing Crisis at Oconee Nuclear Station: Stop Duke From Sending Safety Over the Jocassee Dam Sept. 2021), evaluated the safety and environmental risks posed by the proposed re-licensing of the Oconee reactors and the inadequacy of Dukes Environmental Report to address those risks.
Beyond Nuclear and Sierra Club Hearing Request 2
- 6. In February 2024, the NRC published a draft environmental impact statement (EIS) regarding Dukes SLR application for the Oconee reactors, Site-Specific Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, Supplement 2, Second Renewal, Regarding Subsequent License Renewal for Oconee Station Units 1, 2, and 3 (NUREG-1437, Supp. 2) (referred to hereinafter as Draft SEIS). Beyond Nuclear and the Sierra Club retained me to evaluate the adequacy of the Draft SEIS to address the environmental risks posed by continued operation of the Oconee reactors in an SLR term.
- 7. As a result of my participation in the 2021 proceeding and this proceeding, I am familiar with correspondence between Duke and the NRC regarding Oconees design and operation, including NRC Staff technical reports. I am also familiar with the Environmental Reports submitted by Duke in connection with its initial license renewal application in 1998, and its subsequent license renewal (SLR) application in June 2021.
And I am familiar with more recent environmental documents regarding Oconee: Dukes revised Environmental Report, submitted in November 2022; and the Draft SEIS.
- 8. I have revised my expert technical report to address the Draft SEIS, as well as new information that has arisen since the 2021 proceeding. My revised expert report, entitled NRC Relicensing Crisis at Oconee Nuclear Station: Stop Duke From Sending Safety Over the Jocassee Dam, Updated Analysis of Neglected Safety, Environmental and Climate Change Risks (April 2024), is attached to my declaration as Exhibit 2.
- 9. The factual statements in my expert report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, and the opinions stated therein are based on my best professional judgment.
Executed in Accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 2.304(d) by Jeffrey T. Mitman Date: April 29, 2024
Mitman Declaration: Exhibit 1
CURRICULUM VITAE FOR JEFFREY T. MITMAN Poolesville, MD November 2023 QUALIFICATIONS Reliability and risk analyst with more than 40 years experience in the nuclear industry. Skills include evaluation of probabilistic risk analyses (PRA) and management of PRA projects and teams. Highly experienced in low power and shutdown (LPSD) risk modeling issues. Solid record of bringing projects in on schedule and budget.
MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS Transitioned NRC to detailed PRA models for LPSD significance determinations process evaluations.
Guided development of and managed industrys first configuration risk management software tool.
Obtained regulatory approval of EPRIs risk informed in-service inspection (RI-ISI) methodology.
Managed first PRA of bolted spent fuel storage cask.
EXPERIENCE PRIVATE CONSULTANT (Poolesville, MD)
Nuclear risk Analyst 2021-Present Reviewed Oconee Subsequent License Renewal application and prepared technical report on adequacy of environmental and safety analyses to address flooding risks.
Reviewed and submitted comments on NRCs draft (2023) Generic Environmental Impact Statement (NUREG-1437 Revision 2).
US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (Rockville, MD) 2005 - 2021 Senior Reliability and Risk Analyst (NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation)
Conducted Significance Determination Process (SDP) evaluations of reactor events including development and/or modification of required risk models.
Served as lead analyst for low power and shutdown event issues and concerns.
Guided development of shutdown Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) models.
Conducted extensive Human Reliability Analysis (HRA).
Evaluated external event risk from dam failures.
Served on NRCs Japan Team (part of USAID disaster assistance response team for Fukushima Daiichi accident), providing technical advice and support through the U.S. Ambassador to Japanese government.
Participated in post NRCs Fukushima Near Term Task Force (NTTF) flooding guidance development.
Developed NRCs guidance on crediting FLEX in risk-informed regulatory applications.
Advised NRC National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 team on issues related to shutdown fire risk.
Performed evaluations of risk informed license applications.
Reliability and Risk Analyst (NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research)
Project Manager for the development of shutdown SPAR models ERIN ENGINEERING AND RESEARCH, INC. (Walnut Creek, CA) 2004 - 2005 Lead Senior Engineer Prepared configuration risk management evaluation of at-power fire risk.
Prepared configuration risk management evaluation of loss of offsite power.
ABE STAFFING SERVICES (Palo Alto, CA) 2003 - 2005 Consultant to EPRI Brought project and team to closure involving Dry Cask Storage PRA involving Transnuclear bolted cask containing PWR fuel.
EPRI (Palo Alto, CA) 1998 - 2003
J e f f r e y T M i t m a n P a g e l 2 Project Manager Outage Risk Assessment and Management (ORAM-Sentinel)
- Grew first of a kind software application for performing configuration risk management in nuclear power plants.
Conducted research in low power and shutdown risk; shutdown initiating event and event frequency derivation.
Delivered multiple versions (including alpha, beta & production), testing and full documentation.
Administered utility user group, marketing, contract preparation, technology transfer, technical report publication and training.
Actively managed both development and application contracts with multiple suppliers and customers.
Managed annual $1M budget.
Dry Cask Storage PRA: Initiated innovative analysis of Transnuclear cask containing PWR fuel.
Managed unique team with diverse experience in both cask design and PRA backgrounds.
Risk Informed In-service Inspections Project (RI-ISI): Lead team in obtaining regulatory approval of methodology to safely reduce piping weld inspection requirements using combination of probabilistic and degradation analysis.
Responsible for methodology finalization and acceptance by industry and U.S. NRC.
Conducted marketing, sales, contract preparation, technology transfer, training and technical report publication.
Actively managed both development and application contracts with both suppliers and customers.
Managed annual $1M budget.
Human Reliability Analysis Project: Managed project to bring consistency on industry use of HRA methods.
Responsible for EPRI HRA area, including development of HRA Calculator software and establishment of associated users group.
ERIN ENGINEERING AND RESEARCH, INC. (Palo Alto, CA) 1992 - 1998 Lead Senior Engineer Collaborated with EPRI ORAM-SENTINEL Project Manager in project development and administration, user group administration, contract preparation, technology transfer workshops, technical report generation and editing. Performed ORAM analysis of the Diablo Canyon plant. Performed ORAM Probabilistic Analysis of Perry spent fuel pool. Drafted and edited ORAM V2.0 Users Manual. Assisted in ORAM-SENTINEL software design, performed software debugging. Principle researcher and author of BWR outage contingency report. Prepared marketing and training, materials.
ABB IMPELL CORPORATION (King of Prussia, PA) 1990 - 1992 Lead Senior Engineer Design Basis Documentation: directed team of three engineers to review PECO Feedwater System Design. Wrote Design Basis Documentation reports for Limerick and Peach Bottom power plants, identifying licensing and design concerns by reviewing the system design as documented in drawings, calculations, vendor manuals, Technical Specifications, UFSAR, SER, SRP, 10CFR50.59 safety evaluations etc. and by interfacing with utility engineering personnel. Prepared Engineering Change Requests as necessary.
Shift Outages: during Limerick Nuclear Power Plant refueling / maintenance outage. Coordinated all shift maintenance work and testing. Collaborated with all groups in power plant, allocating resources as needed to maintain schedule and reporting to senior plant outage management. Performed system reviews prior to placing them back in service. Conducted shift outage meetings. Tracked work group performance against schedule. Advised utility management on techniques for schedule and outage organizational improvements.
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY (San Jose, CA)
Experience Prior to 1990 Startup-Test Engineer
J e f f r e y T M i t m a n P a g e l 3 Shift Startup Engineer: During power ascension phase coordinated all system testing on shift and startup interface with operations. During preoperational phase, acted as operations shift supervisor responsible for coordinating all system testing and flushing on shift from main control room. Updated senior utility management daily on testing status.
Additional positions: Shift Technical Advisor, Test Engineer, Lead QC / Welding Inspector.
EDUCATION / PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT BSE, Nuclear Engineering, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.
Introductory VBA class, University of California, Berkeley, CA.
Misc. business courses at various colleges and universities.
Senior Reactor Operator Certified.
GE Station Nuclear Engineering.
Effective Utilization of PSA, ERIN Engineering & Research, Walnut Creek, CA.
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS American Nuclear Society (ANS) member since 1978.
ANS Nuclear elected member of Installation Safety Division Executive Committee 2015 to 2021.
ANS Risk Informed Standards Committee (RISC).
ANS/ASME Risk Informed Standards Writing Group on Shutdown PRA Standard.
ASME Section XI, Working Group on Implementation of Risk Based Examination.
MIT Professional Summer Programs Guest Lecturer at Risk-Informed Operational Decision Management Course.
PAPERS
- 1. Technical Challenges Associated with Shutdown Risk when Licensing Advanced Light Water Reactors, PSAM 12 2014. Co-author.
- 2. Comparing Various HRA Methods to Evaluate Their Impact on the results of a Shutdown Risk Analysis during PWR Reduced Inventory, PSAM11 2012. Co-author.
- 3. Uncertainty Analysis for Large Dam Failure Frequencies Based on Historical Data, PSAM11 2012. Co-author.
- 4. An Assessment of Large Dam Failure Frequencies Based on US Historical Data, PSA 2011. Co-author.
- 5. Development of PRA Model for BWR Shutdown Modes 4 and 5 Integrated in SPAR Model, to be presented at PSAM10 2010. Co-author.
- 6. Development of Standardized Probabilistic Risk Assessment Models for Shutdown Operations Integrated in SPAR Level 1 Model, PSAM9 2008. Co-author.
- 7. Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Bolted Dry Spent Fuel Storage Cask, Presented at ICONE12. 2004. Co-author.
- 8. Low Power and Shutdown Risk Assessment Benchmarking, Presented at PSA 02 2002. Co-author.
- 10. Derivation of Shutdown Initiating Event Frequencies, Presented at PSAM5 2000. Co-author.
- 11. Quantitative Assessment of a Risk Informed Inspection Strategy for BWR Weld Overlays, Presented at ICONE 8 2000. Co-author.
- 12. EPRI RI-ISI Methodology and the Risk Impacts of Implementation, Presented at SMiRT 11 1999. Co-author.
- 13. Application of Markov Models and Service Data to Evaluate the Influence of Inspection on Pipe Rupture Frequencies published. PVP 1999. Co-author.
- 14. Progress in Risk Evaluation of Outages, International Conference on the Commercial and Operational Benefits of PSA. 1997. Co-author.
- 15. Control of Reactor Vessel Temperature/Pressure during Shutdown, GE SIL 357. June 1981. Co-author
J e f f r e y T M i t m a n P a g e l 4 SOFTWARE 1.
HRA Calculator Version 2.0, EPRI 2003. 1003330. Project Manager (PM).
2.
ORAM-Sentinel Version 3.4, EPRI 2001. 1002958. PM and co-author.
REPORTS / STANDARDS 1.
Requirements for Low Power and Shutdown PRA - ANS/ASME-58.22-2014 (Trial Use Standard).
2.
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of Bolted Storage Casks: Quantification and Analysis Report, EPRI 2003. 1002877. PM.
3.
Low Power and Shutdown Risk Assessment Benchmarking Study, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA and U.S. DOE.
2002. 1003465. PM and principal investigator.
4.
Dry Cask Storage PRA Scoping Study, EPRI 2002. 1003011. PM.
5.
Guidance for Incorporating Organizational Factors into Nuclear Power Plant Risk Assessments: Phase 1 Workshop. EPRI and U.S. DOE 2002. 1003322. PM.
6.
An Analysis of Loss of Decay Heat Removal Trends and Initiating event Frequencies (1989-2000):
7.
Piping System Failure Rates and Rupture Frequencies for Use in Risk Informed In-service Inspection Applications: TR-111880-NP, EPRI 2000. 1001044. PM 8.
Application of Risk-Informed Inservice Inspection Alternative Element Selection Criteria. EPRI, Charlotte NC: 2000. TE-11482. PM.
9.
Revised Risk-Informed Inservice Inspection Evaluation Procedure, EPRI 1999. TR-112657 Revision B-A. PM & co-author.
- 10. Piping System Failure Rates and Rupture Frequencies for Use in Risk Informed In-service Inspection Applications, EPRI 1999. TR-111880. PM
- 11. Comparison between EDF and EPRI of Pipe Inspection Optimization Methods, EPRI Palo Alto, CA; Electricite de France, Paris, France: 1999. TR-113315. PM.
- 13. Evaluation of Pipe Failure Potential via Degradation Mechanism Assessment, EPRI Palo Alto, CA:
1998. TR-110157. PM.
- 15. Piping System Reliability Models and Database for used in Risk Informed Inservice Inspection Applications, EPRI 1998. TR-110161. PM.
- 18. Survey on the Use of Configuration Risk and Safety Management Tools at NPPs, EPRI, 1998. TR-102975. PM.
- 25. Outage Risk Assessment and Management Implementation at Fermi 2, EPRI 1997. TR-109013. Co-author.
TR-102973. Principal investigator.
- 27. Generic Outage Risk Management Guidelines for BWRs, EPRI 1993. TR-102971. Co-principal investigator.
Mitman Declaration: Exhibit 2
i NRC Relicensing Crisis at Oconee Nuclear Station:
Stop Duke from Sending Safety Over the Jocassee Dam Updated Analysis of Neglected Safety, Environmental and Climate Change Risks1 Jeffrey T. Mitman April 2024 Submitted to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission on Behalf of Beyond Nuclear, Inc.
and The Sierra Club, Inc.
In Subsequent License Renewal Proceeding for Oconee Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3 1 Authors note: This report updates and revises my September 2021 report, NRC Relicensing Crisis at Oconee Nuclear Station: Stop Duke from Sending Safety over the Jocassee Dam (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Agencywide Data Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML21270A250). This report updates the information and analyses provided in my 2021 report and adds my evaluation of the NRCs accident analysis in the NRCs Draft NUREG-1437, Site-Specific Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants Supplement 2, Second Renewal Regarding SLR for Oconee Nuclear Station (February 2024) (ML24033A298).
ii Contents 1.
INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................................... 1 2.
BACKGROUND....................................................................................................................................... 3 2.1 Integrated Design and Operation of Oconee Nuclear Reactors and Upstream Dams................. 3 2.2 Jocassee and Keowee Dam Characteristics.................................................................................. 4 2.3 Oconee Nuclear Plant Design and Construction........................................................................... 4 2.3.1 Design and Construction of Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3........................................................... 5 2.3.2 Post-construction addition of Safe Shutdown Facility.......................................................... 5 2.4 Flood Risk Studies......................................................................................................................... 6 2.4.1 1983 Flood Study for FERC and Construction of Wall around SSF........................................ 6 2.4.2 NSAC-60 Probabilistic Risk Assessment................................................................................ 6 2.4.3 IPE/IPEEE for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities...................................................................... 7 2.4.4 1992 Flood Study for FERC.................................................................................................... 8 2.5 Initial Oconee License Renewal and Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives Analysis.............. 9 2.6 Updated Dam Failure and Flood Routing Evaluations and Related Regulatory Actions............ 11 2.6.1 NRC 2006 Significance Determination Process on Oconee Flooding Issue........................ 11 2.6.2 2008 NRC 50.54(f) Letter Regarding a Jocassee Dam Failure............................................. 11 2.6.3 Dukes Response to 2008 50.54(f) Letter Regarding a Jocassee Dam Failure.................... 14 2.6.4 2011 NRC Safety Evaluation................................................................................................ 15 2.7 Fukushima - Lessons Learned 2012 50.54(f) Letter and Staff Assessment................................ 18 2.8 Dukes 2021 Subsequent License Renewal Application and SAMA Analysis.............................. 20 2.9 Duke Supplemental Environmental Report................................................................................ 21 2.10 Draft SEIS..................................................................................................................................... 21 2.10.1 Power Uprate Information (Section F.3.4 of 2024 Draft ONS SEIS).................................... 22 2.10.2 Higher Fuel Burnup Information (Section F.3.5 of 2024 Draft ONS SEIS)........................... 22 2.10.3 Additional Sensitivity as it Relates to Population Dose Risk and the Jocassee Dam SAMA (Section F.4.1 of 2024 Draft ONS SEIS)............................................................................................... 22 2.10.4 Summary and Conclusions (Section F.4.2 of 2024 Draft ONS SEIS).................................... 23 3.
ANALYSIS............................................................................................................................................. 23 3.1 Failure to Ensure Adequate Protection from Failure of the Jocassee Dam or to Adequately Evaluate Environmental Flooding Risks.................................................................................................. 23 3.1.1 Mischaracterization of the scope of the environmental review......................................... 24 3.1.2 Inadequate consideration of flooding risks from Jocassee Dam Failure............................ 25 3.1.3 Important conclusions to be drawn from the flooding risk analyses for Oconee.............. 32
iii 3.2 Other Deficiencies in the Draft SEISs Risk Analysis.................................................................... 34 3.2.1 PWR All Hazards CDF Comparison...................................................................................... 34 3.2.2 Fire Events........................................................................................................................... 34 3.2.3 Seismic Events..................................................................................................................... 35 3.2.4 Underestimating Risk by Failing to Aggregate Changes in Risk.......................................... 35 3.2.5 Invalid assumption that studies of BWR and Westinghouse PWR is applicable to Oconee reactors. 37 3.3 Failure to Address Uncertainties................................................................................................. 37 3.4 Inadequate Discussion Effects of Climate Change on Accident Risk.......................................... 39 4.
CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................................... 45
iv LIST OF ACRONYMS AC Alternating Current AEC Atomic Energy Commission BWR Boiling Water Reactor B&W Babcock & Wilcox CCDP Conditional Core Damage Probability CCFP Conditional Containment Failure Probability CDF Core Damage Frequency CFR Code of Federal Regulations DEIS Draft Environmental Impact Statement ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System EAP Emergency Action Plan EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EIS Environmental Impact Statement EPRI Electric Power Research Institute FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission FOIA Freedom of Information Act GDC General Design Criterion GEIS Generic Environmental Impact Statement GL Generic Letter HEC-RAS U.S. Army Corps of Engineers River Analysis System IEF Initiating Event Frequency IPE Individual Plant Examination IPEEE Individual Plant Examination for External Events kv kilovolt LERF Large Early Release Frequency LOCA Loss Of Coolant Accident LPI Low Pressure Injection MSL Mean Sea Level
v MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSAC Nuclear Safety Analysis Center NTTF Near Term Task Force ONS Oconee Nuclear Station ORNL Oak Ridge National Laboratory PMP Probable Maximum Precipitation PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment PWR Pressurized Water Reactor RFI Request for Information ROP Reactor Oversight Process SAMA Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives SDP Significance Determination Process SG Steam Generator SEIS Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement SLR Subsequent License Renewal SSF Safe Shutdown Facility UCB Upper Confidence Bound
1
- 1. INTRODUCTION This purpose of this report is to explain and provide the basis for my expert opinion, as a nuclear engineer and risk analyst, regarding the safety and environmental impacts of Duke Energy Corporations (Dukes) current operation of Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS) Units 1, 2 and 3, and its proposal to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to extend the reactors operating license terms by 20 years until 2053 (Units 1 and 2) and 2054 (Unit 3).
This report updates my September 2021 report, NRC Relicensing Crisis at Oconee Nuclear Station: Stop Duke from Sending Safety over the Jocassee Dam (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Agencywide Data Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML21270A250). This report updates my analysis of Dukes and the NRCs failure to demonstrate or even assert that lowering the flood height for the failure of the Jocassee Dam from a previously established limit will provide adequate protection to public health and safety. This updated report also supplies my evaluation of the NRCs accident analysis in the NRCs Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (Draft SEIS) for the proposed subsequent renewal of the operating licenses, as well as Dukes Environmental Report and Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives (SAMA) Analysis that the NRC used to prepare the Draft SEIS.2 Finally, this updated report addresses the NRCs failure to address the potential effects of Climate Change on accident risk in the Draft SEIS.
The report is based in significant part on my experience as a nuclear engineer and safety regulator with the NRC, including evaluation of Oconees safety in relation to potential failure of the upstream Jocassee Dam.
In my expert opinion, and as discussed in more detail below, Oconees current operation, and proposed operation under an additional twenty-year subsequent license renewal (SLR) term, pose an unacceptable risk to public health and safety and the environment, due to Dukes failure to protect ONS from the flood identified by the NRC in its 2011 Safety Evaluation.3 The NRC deemed those flood protection measures necessary to provide adequate protection 2 NUREG-1437, Site-Specific Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants Supplement 2, Second Renewal Regarding SLR for ONS Draft Report for Comment (February 2024)
(ML24033A298) (Draft SEIS); 2021.06.07, Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Application for Subsequent License Renewal, Appendix E (ML21158A196) (2021 Environmental Report and 2021 SAMA Analysis); 2022.11.07 Supplemental Environmental Report (ML22311A036) (Supplemental Environmental Report).
3 2011.01.28, Safety Evaluation on Confirmatory Action Letter to Address External Flooding Concerns, (ML110280153) (2011 NRC Safety Evaluation Letter). As of 2024.04.26, this document is not in public ADAMS. It appears to have been removed sometime between a Beyond Nuclear FOIA request (FOIA 2022-000210) involving this document on 2022.07.28 and 2024.04.26. All quotes from this Safety Evaluation in this report were made in my previous report (ML21270A250) dated 2021.09.27 which is still publicly available in ADAMS.
2 against a core melt accident in the event the Oconee site becomes inundated by failure of the Jocassee Dam.
While the NRC has not enforced the flood height established by the 2011 Safety Evaluation or forced Duke to implement the flood protection measures it deemed necessary for adequate protect of the Oconee reactors against flooding, neither has it withdrawn or repudiated the 2011 Safety Evaluation in which it found those measures were necessary to provide adequate protection to public health and safety. Instead, the NRC has lowered the flood height and changed the measures required to address the new flood height, without making any finding that the Oconee reactors are adequately protected against flooding risks. This raises a serious concern because the adequate protection standard, as set forth in Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act, (42 U.S.C. § 2232(a), sets a floor for minimum safety requirements. A nuclear reactor for which the NRC is unable or unwilling to make adequate protection findings does not provide the basic level of safety required by the Act.
In addition, my report discusses the concern that NRC has failed consider the impact on Oconee from Climate Change. While NRC has looked extensively on Oconees impact on Climate Change, it has refused to consider Climate Changes impact on safe operation on Oconee. Given that Climate Change is now generally considered to be reasonably foreseeable, and in light of recent criticisms by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Draft SEIS failure to address climate change is a serious deficiency. 4 Finally, the accident risk analysis in the Draft SEIS is seriously defective, and thereby fails to support the NRC Staffs conclusion that the environmental impacts of re-licensing the Oconee reactors are insignificant or SMALL.5 These deficiencies include inconsistent and unsupported estimates of core damage frequency (CDF) and lack of uncertainty analysis.
Now that Dukes SLR application has come before the NRC and the NRC has issued its Draft SEIS, it is time for the agency to break its silence and address the significant safety, environmental and Climate Change issues raised by Dukes bid for another 20 years of unprotected operation. The NRC should not accept Dukes erroneous and outdated risk assessment. Instead, it should require Duke to provide a thorough and accurate estimate of the core melt risk. In addition, the NRC should require Duke to implement the flood protection measures required thirteen years ago by the NRC.
A note about secrecy: A significant portion of the information relied on in this report was not available publicly until members of the public forced NRC to release it by requesting it under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). I am grateful to Jim Riccio for FOIA Request FOIA/PA-2012-0325 (submitted on behalf of Greenpeace) and Dave Lochbaum for FOIA Request 4 2024.04, Government Accountability Office, NRC Should Take Actions to Fully Consider the Potential Effects of Climate Change, GAO-24-106326 (GAO-24-106326), Page 34.
5 Draft SEIS Page F-4 Line 39, F-9 Line 4.
3 FOIA/PA-2018-0010 (submitted on behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists), which generated some of the key information relied on this report. The NRC never attempted to justify withholding this critical, damming, and now-public safety information from the public eye, nor is any justification evident.
While Duke and the NRC have continued to withhold some information relevant to this report, and has even withdrawn several documents that formerly were released under FOIA (see note 4), the information now in the public record is more than sufficient to show that Duke has failed to provide the public with an accurate, up-to-date, and thorough risk analysis of the potential for a serious core melt accident at Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3 during the second license renewal term. In addition, publicly available information is more than sufficient to show that for the past ten years, the NRC has considered the risk of a core melt accident caused by Jocassee Dam failure to implicate the adequacy of protection to public health and safety and require significant measures to prevent catastrophe. By assembling this information into a single document, the author seeks to ensure a measure of accountability by Duke and the NRC that they previously eluded through secrecy.
Finally, while some nonpublic documents are cited in the footnotes to this report, the report does not rely directly on the content of any of those nonpublic documents. Citations of those documents are provided for completeness of the record, not for their content. When the content of nonpublic document is described in this report, that description is taken from descriptions in publicly available documents.
- 2. BACKGROUND 2.1 Integrated Design and Operation of Oconee Nuclear Reactors and Upstream Dams Duke Energy Corp.s three-unit Oconee Nuclear Station is located in the mountains of northwestern South Carolina, at the confluence of the Keowee and Little Rivers. Licensed by the NRC in 1973 and 1974, Oconee is uniquely designed as part of a pumped storage facility: at the same time the reactors were built, Duke also built two upstream dams, for the purpose of generating additional hydro-powered electricity. When demand for electricity from the reactors was low, the plant could be used to pump water into Jocassee Lake behind the Jocassee Dam.
When demand was high, Duke would then allow flow through hydroelectric generators in the dam generating power.
The Jocassee Dams tailwaters were dammed by the Keowee Dam, below which Duke built the Oconee reactor complex. The crest of the Keowee Dam is at 815 feet mean sea level (MSL). Plant grade at ONS is 796 feet MSL. Thus, ONS plant grade is two feet below normal Lake Keowee level. Two hydroelectric generators, built into the side of the Keowee Dam, were designed to provide the nuclear plant with an emergency power supply in the event of a loss of offsite power. The Oconee design did not and does not include diesel-powered emergency generators, which are at every other U.S. nuclear power plants.
4 Thus, the Jocassee Dam and the Keowee Dam, as well as the lakes behind them, constitute an integral part of the Oconee nuclear power plant, including its backup emergency power supply.
2.2 Jocassee and Keowee Dam Characteristics Completed in 1971 and licensed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the Keowee Dam is a 170 foot-high rock-filled earthen dam about 3,500 feet in length. The Oconee nuclear power plant complex is built into the side of the dam, which contains two hydroelectric generators with a combined output of about 150 MW.6 These hydroelectric generators provide emergency power to Oconee.
The Keowee Dam lies about 14 miles downstream of the Jocassee Dam. It impounds about one million acre-feet of water and has a surface area of about 18,000 acres. The top of the dam is at 815 feet above MSL. Full pond or normal operating level of Keowee Lake is at 800 ft.
Construction of the Keowee Dam was completed in 1971.
Completed in 19751 and also licensed by FERC, Jocassee Dam is a rock-filled earthen dam 385 feet high and about 1,000 feet long. It also impounds about a million acre-feet of water in the Jocassee Lake at normal lake operating level, with an area of 7,565 acres. The lakes pumped storage capability is supplied by four hydroelectric turbines that can be reversed to pump water from below the Jocassee Dam to above the dam.
The top of the Jocassee dam is at 1,125 ft. full pond operating level of Jocassee Lake (i.e.,
normal operating level) is 1,110 ft.
2.3 Oconee Nuclear Plant Design and Construction NRC Safety Requirements for Nuclear Plant Design and Construction All nuclear power plants constructed after 1973 are required to meet 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 Appendix A General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, including Criterion 2 - Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena. General Design Criterion (GDC) 2 states in part:
Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches without loss of capability to perform their safety functions....
5 Oconee was built prior to 1973 and therefore was not required to meet GDC 2; but it was required to meet a similar draft version of the criterion. The pre-GDC 2 version for Oconee provided that:
Those systems and components of reactor facilities which are essential to the prevention of accidents which could affect the public health and safety or to mitigation of their consequences shall be designed, fabricated, and erected to performance standards that will enable the facility to withstand, without loss of the capability to protect the public, the additional forces that might be imposed by natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, flooding conditions, winds, ice, and other local site effects. The design bases so established shall reflect: (a) appropriate consideration of the most severe of these natural phenomena that have been recorded for the site and the surrounding areas and (b) an appropriate margin for withstanding forces greater than those recorded to reflect uncertainties about the historical data and their suitability as a basis for design.7 It is understood that the intent of GDC 2 and its predecessors was to ensure that the emergency core cooling systems and the associated electrical power systems were protected against credible external hazards.
2.3.1 Design and Construction of Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3 During initial Oconee licensing, Duke convinced the Atomic Energy Commission (predecessor to the NRC) that a Jocassee Dam failure was not credible. Duke has repeatedly stated that they believe a Jocassee Dam failure is not credible.8 Thus, at the earliest point of design and construction, the NRC did not require Duke to protect Oconee from a Jocassee Dam failure. For instance, the turbine building, located at a grade of 796 feet mean sea level MSL), houses portions of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and other safety related and important to safety systems, including the service water systems and the 4kv emergency buses. But the NRC did not require Duke to build the turbine building as a watertight structure. As a result, 2.3.2 Post-construction addition of Safe Shutdown Facility Sometime prior to 1983, in order to address other Oconee design weakness not related to flooding, Duke decided to install additional equipment to improve Oconees safety. Duke 7 2021.12.31, Duke Energy Company Oconee Nuclear Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, (ML22180A123) at Section 3.1.2 Criterion 2 - Performance standards (Category A) Page 3.1-8.
8 2008.09.26, Duke Response to 50.54(f) Request (ML082750106), (2008 Duke 50.54(f) Response Letter) Attachment 2, Page 6. 2009.04.30, NRC Letter to Duke Evaluation of Duke Responses to NRC Letter Dated August 15, 2008, Related to External Flooding at Oconee (ML090570779), Page 2.
6 completed the installation of the safe shutdown facility (SSF) prior to 1983. The SSF is designed to address events including fire, sabotage, turbine building floods, station blackouts and tornado missile events. It contains a single diesel generator capable of supplying sufficient power only for the SSF equipment. It contains pumps capable of supply water to the steam generators and to the reactor coolant systems of all three units and a service water pump only capable of cooling the SSF loads. None of this equipment is safety related, single failure proof or redundant. It is manually controlled and operated locally from the SSF itself. The SSF is at a grade of 796 ft.9 because the SSF was not intended to be used for external floods, it was not protected from them. However, the SSF diesel and several of its pumps are below grade.
2.4 Flood Risk Studies 2.4.1 1983 Flood Study for FERC and Construction of Wall around SSF In a 1983 hydrological analysis, Duke evaluated the impacts of a postulated sunny-day failure of the Jocassee Dam and determined as follows:
The results of the study indicated an estimated peak flood elevation of
) MSL at Keowee Dam, and a resulting ONS powerblock flood depth of
). In order to reduce the risk of flooding, the licensee erected walls around the entrances to the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) with average wall height of
(
. The construction of the walls was not part of the design-basis.10 Thus, by 1983 Duke recognized that external flooding was possible and that if Oconee experienced a flood above grade, the flood would incapacitate the ECCS. In that event, Duke would have no way to mitigate the flood.
2.4.2 NSAC-60 Probabilistic Risk Assessment In the late 1970s and early 1980s Duke initiated one of the first industry-conducted nuclear power plant probabilistic analyses (PRA). The study was prepared by the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center 11 and was called NSAC-60. NSAC-60 was a full-scope PRA, meaning it included both internal hazards such as loss of coolant accidents (LOCA) and external events such as earthquakes. It included an analysis of core damage frequency (referred to as a Level 1 9 2018.06.18 NRC Staff Assessment Related to Focused Evaluation for Oconee, Page 3 (ML18141A755).
10 2016.04.14 NRC Staff Assessment by the Office of NRR Related to flooding Hazard Reevaluation Report NTTF Recommendation 2.1 Oconee (ML16273A128).
11 NSAC initially was a separate legal entity, collocated with the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI).
About 1990 it was folded into EPRI.
7 analysis), containment failure frequency (referred to as a Level 2 analysis), and impacts on the surrounding population (referred to as a Level 3 analysis).
The NSAC-60 analysis included contributions to core melt frequency by failures of the Jocassee and Keowee Dams.12 As described by Duke, the study determined the failure frequency for the Jocassee Dam by compiling data for dams with similar attributes. It considered three time periods and derived three median annual failure frequencies for causes other than earthquakes and overtopping:
- 1900 to 1981 2.3x10-5 per year
- 1940 to 1981 1.6x10-5 per year
- 1960 to 1981 1.4x10-5 per year13 2.4.3 IPE/IPEEE for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities In 1988 the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 88-20, requesting all reactor licensees submit a systematic examination in order to identify any plant-specific vulnerabilities to severe accidents and report the results to the Commission.14 Initially, GL-88-20 requested licensees to analyze only internal events such as loss of coolant accidents (LOCA) and transients. The NRC subsequently issued 5 revisions. Among other changes, the revisions, expanded the scope to include external events such as tornados, seismic events and external floods.
In response, in December 1990, Duke submitted an Individual Plant Examination (IPE) that evaluated internal events.15 In December 1995, Duke submitted an Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) that evaluated external events.16 In 1997, in a nonpublic document, Duke updated the IPE and IPEEE and resubmitted the results.17 In the 1995 IPEEE, Duke considered whether and how to evaluate the risks of external flooding at Oconee. First, Duke considered evaluating the risk of a probable maximum precipitation 12 Nuclear Safety Analysis Center, NSAC-60, A Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Oconee Unit 3, June 1984.
13 US NRC Information Notice 2012-02, Potentially Nonconservative Screening Value for Dam Failure Frequency in PRA, March 5, 2012, Page 2, (ML090510269).
14 1988.11.23, NRC Generic Letter 88-20, Individual Plant Examinations for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities.
15 1990.12, Duke IPE (nonpublic). As discussed above in my Note on Secrecy, the IPEE is cited here for purposes of identification. This report does not rely directly on the content of the IPEEE, or any other nonpublic document. When the content of the IPEEE or any other nonpublic document is described in this report, it is taken from descriptions in publicly available documents.
16 1995.12.21, Duke IPEEE (nonpublic).
17 1996.12, Duke Oconee Nuclear Station PRA Revision 2 Summary Report (ML080780111) (nonpublic).
8 (PMP) event at the Oconee site, i.e., a large storm in the direct vicinity of the plant. But Duke screened out a PMP event based on the size of the reservoirs above the Keowee and Jocassee Dams.
Duke also considered whether to evaluate a Jocassee Dam failure in the IPEEE. In making this evaluation, Duke focused on three types of dam failures: seismic dam failure, random (i.e.,
sunny day) dam failure, and a dam failure caused by a PMP above the Jocassee Dam that overtopped the dam (i.e., a dam breach caused by water flowing over the top of the dam).
The IPEEE found that a seismic failure of Jocassee Dam was a dominant contributor to the total Oconee CDF, and calculated the contribution to core damage frequency from a seismic failure of Jocassee at 7.2E-6 per year (i.e., 20% of the total seismic CDF of 3.6E-5).18 In evaluating a random or sunny day failure, the IPEEE found a CDF of 7.0E-6 per year.19 In making this estimate, Duke used a dam failure frequency of 1.3E-5 per year, an insignificant decrease from the values derived and used in NSAC-60. 20 With respect to a PMP-induced Jocassee Dam failure, Duke concluded that such a failure was not credible.21 Therefore, Duke did not evaluate a PMP-induced Jocassee Dam failure.
2.4.4 1992 Flood Study for FERC In 1992, Duke performed an inundation study to meet a FERC requirement for formulating an emergency action plan in the event that the Jocassee Dam failed. This study showed that approximately of water would inundate the yard area surrounding the SSF (i.e., the SSF yard is at elevation 796 ft MSL as previously discussed), thereby rendering inoperable Oconees all systems necessary to shut down and maintain all three units in a safe and stable condition.22 18 1995.12.05, Oconee IPEEE Submittal Report (nonpublic). See also 2008 Duke 50.54(f) Response Letter; 1996.07.08, NRC Letter: Draft Reports Related to the Keowee Hydro Station Emergency Electrical System Supply to Oconee (ML15118A442). Total seismic CDF is 3.6E-5 per year (see Page 106) while 20% of this is from a Jocassee Dam failure (Page 107), i.e., 3.6E-5 x 0.2 = 7.2E-6 per year.
19 2000.03.15, NRC Letter: Oconee Review of IPEEE (ML003694349), Staff Evaluation Page 2.
20 FOIA Response 2012-0325 Page 17 of 308, (ML15156A702) (FOIA Response 2012-0325). See also 1996.07.08, NRC Letter: Draft Reports Related to the Keowee Hydro Station Emergency Electrical System Supply to Oconee (ML15118A442), Page 110.
21 1996.07.08, NRC Letter: Draft Reports Related to the Keowee Hydro Station Emergency Electrical System Supply to Oconee (ML15118A442) Section 6.4.1, Page 110. See also FOIA Response 2012-0325.
22 While the inundation study is not a public document, the NRC described it in its 2011 NRC Safety Evaluation Letter (ML110280153 Page 1).
9 2.5 Initial Oconee License Renewal and Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives Analysis In July 1998, Duke submitted a license renewal application to NRC, requesting an extension of the Oconee reactors licenses terms by 20 years. The NRC renewed Dukes licenses in May 2000.23 Dukes Environmental Report for the license renewal application included a Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives (SAMA) analysis, containing a review of potential design alternatives along with any procedural, non-hardware, alternatives. 24 For its risk estimates, the SAMA analysis relied on the IPE/IPEEE risk analyses, as well as a non-public revised IPE/IPEEE submitted in December of 1997, also referred to as Oconee PRA Revision 2 and Oconee PRA/IPE Revision 2.25 The SAMA analysis started with the total core damage frequency from the IPE/IPEEE of 8.9E-5 per year, with 2.6E-5 per year (29%) from internal events and 6.3E-5 per year (71%) from external events. The external events were broken down as follows:
CDF from External Events26 Frequency (per reactor-year)
Initiating Events Seismic 3.9E-05 Tornado 1.4E-05 External Flood 5.9E-06 Fire 4.5E-06 Total External 6.3E-05 The following Table 1 shows these values in comparison to the 2021 Environmental Report and the Draft SEIS:
23 2000.05.23, NRC Renews License of Oconee for an Additional 20 Years (ML003718834).
24 1998.04, Environmental Report, Application for Renewed Operating Licenses, Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Attachment K, Page 1 (1998 SAMA Analysis).
(https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications/oconee/exhibitd.pdf) 25 1998 SAMA Analysis Pages 4, 9, 10.
26 1998 SAMA Analysis, Page 10.
10 Table 1 Core Damage Frequency (CDF) for External Events CDF for Internal & External Events (per reactor year)
Initiating Events 1998 SAMA27 SEIS 199828 License Amendment 2021 SAMA29 2024 Draft SEIS30 Internal Events 6.3E-5 2.6E-5 2.4E-5 2.4E-5 Internal Flood 9.5E-631 9.5E-6 1.9E-6 1.6E-6 Seismic 3.9E-05 3.9E-5 5.7E-532 3.3E-5 3.3E-5 Tornado 1.4E-05 1.4E-5 1.7E-5 3.3E-5 External Flood 5.9E-06 5.6E-6 2.5E-7 2.5E-7 Fire 4.5E-06 4.5E-6 6.0E-533 4.6E-5 5.1E-5 Total External 6.3E-05 6.3E-5 9.7E-5 9.7E-5 Total Internal & External 8.9E-5 8.9E-5 1.2E-4 1.3E-4 The SAMA analysis considered flooding hazards from a Jocassee Dam failure, apparently in reliance on the NSAC-60 and IPEEE studies.34 The discussion about a Jocassee Dam failure describes it in the context of random failures.35 Based on this statement, it is reasonable to assume that Duke only considered random sunny-day dam failures, ignoring seismic and overtopping, failures. This approach of excluding seismic and overtopping-related dam failures was consistent with the IPEEE.
But the 1998 SAMA analysis differed from the IPEEE in the respect that it estimated the external flooding contribution at 5.9E-6 per year, whereas the IPEEE estimated the external flooding contribution at 7E-6. The 1998 SAMA analysis did not address or explain this difference. The 1998 SAMA analysis evaluated two alternatives that would impact Jocassee Dam failure consequences. The first alternative was to staff the SSF continuously with a trained operator, and the second was to increase the height of the -
wall protecting the SSF from 27 1998 SAMA Analysis Page 10.
28 1999.12, Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants Supplement 2, Regarding Oconee, NUREG-1437, at Table 5-3 Page 5-6.
29 2021.06.07, Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Application for Subsequent License Renewal, Appendix E - Applicants Environmental Report, (ML21158A196) (2021 Environmental Report). CDF values come from Table 4.15-2 Pages 4-89 to 4-109. These are the averages of the Unit 1, 2 & 3 values.
30 2024 Draft SEIS from Table F-5 Page F-15.
31 The internal flood value of 9.5E-6 from the 1998 SAMA is already included in the total value of 6.3E-5 for Total Internal Events in the previous row for 1998 values only.
32 2024 Draft SEIS from Table F-8 Page F-22.
33 2024 Draft SEIS from Table F-7 Page F-18.
34 1998 SAMA Analysis Pages 7, 15, 19.
35 1998 SAMA Analysis Page 15.
11 floods to
.36 But Duke determined these alternatives were not cost-effective.37 Duke also identified a third alternative: strengthening the Jocassee Dam and thus lowering the random failure frequency. But Duke rejected this alternative without evaluating it, on the ground that the cost would far exceed the benefit of core damage frequency reduction.38 The NRC reviewed the SAMA analysis and concluded: Based on its review of SAMAs for ONS (Oconee Nuclear Station), the staff concurs that none of the candidate SAMAs are cost beneficial.39 This included the two evaluated alternatives addressing a Jocassee Dam failure.
2.6 Updated Dam Failure and Flood Routing Evaluations and Related Regulatory Actions 2.6.1 NRC 2006 Significance Determination Process on Oconee Flooding Issue In November 2006, the NRC completed a Significance Determination Process (SDP) evaluation related to a performance deficiency involving a missing covering in the wall protecting the SSF.40 NRC characterized the missing flood barrier as a violation and determined its significance as a White finding.41 After Dukes appeals of the finding, the NRC affirmed the finding.42 Dukes repeated appeals prompted the NRC to re-evaluate the flooding risk at Oconee from a Jocassee Dam failure. While Duke had previously estimated the dam failure rate in the range of 2.3E-5 to 1.4E-5 per year (NSAC-60) and had revised it to 1.3E-5 per year (IPEEE), the NRC found these estimates of failure frequency of the Jocassee dam were too low. In the SDP appeal process the NRC calculated a Jocassee Dam failure rate of 1.8E-4 per year.43 2.6.2 2008 NRC 50.54(f) Letter Regarding a Jocassee Dam Failure In 2008, in light of its new understanding from the previously discussed SDP that the Jocassee Dam failure frequency was significantly larger than what Duke had previously represented, NRC 36 1998 SAMA Analysis Page 16.
37 1998 SAMA Analysis Page 28.
38 1998 SAMA Analysis Page 15.
39 1999.12, Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants Supplement 2, Regarding Oconee, NUREG-1437, Page 5-19.
40 2006.11.22, NRC Final Significance Determination for White Finding and Violation (ML063260282)
(2006 NRC White Finding). The SDP is part of the NRCs reactor oversight process (ROP). The ROP is the NRCs program to inspect, measure and assess the safety performance of operating plants. The SDP is the NRCs process for assessing the significance of findings identified in the ROP.
41 2006 White Finding, Page 1.
42 2007.11.20, NRC Reconsideration of Final Significance Determination Associated with SSF Flood Barrier White Finding, (ML073241045) (2007 NRC Reconsideration of Significance Determination).
43 2007 NRC Reconsideration of Significance Determination, Page 1.
12 issued Duke a 10CFR50.54(f) letter requesting additional information.44 First, the 50.54(f) letter laid out the regulatory requirements applicable to Oconee, and described the status of Dukes flood protection measures:
Section 3.1.2 of the UFSAR, Criterion 2 - Performance Standards (Category A), states, Those systems and components of reactor facilities which are essential to the prevention of accidents which could affect public health and safety or to mitigation of their consequences shall be designed, fabricated and erected to performance standards that will enable the facility to withstand, without loss of the capability to protect the public, the additional forces that might be imposed by natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, flooding conditions, winds, ice, and other local site effects. The current UFSAR discusses walls that are used for flood protection at the SSF.
However, it does not include the effects of a Jocassee Dam failure, nor does it include the flood protection features to mitigate the consequences of such an event. We further note that in the mid-1990s, the UFSAR was revised by removing the reference to the Jocassee Dam failure and postulated wave height of in the yard at the Oconee site.45 The letter also references the flood heights calculated from the 1992 FERC analysis. This letter characterizes the 1992 FERC analysis as
,46 while the previous discussion of the FERC analysis characterized the same analysis as having a flood height.47 In addition, the NRCs letter requested Duke to address three specific issues:
- 1) Explain the bounding external flood hazard at Oconee and the basis for excluding consideration of other external flood hazards, such as those described in the Inundation Study, as the bounding case.
- 2) Provide your assessment of the Inundation Study (the 1992 study conducted for FERC) and why it does or does not represent the expected flood height following a Jocassee Dam failure.
- 3) Describe in detail the nuclear safety implications of floods that render unavailable the SSF and associated support equipment with a concurrent loss of all Alternating Current power.48 In subsequent discussions with Duke, the NRC compared the Jocassee Dam hazard with other hazards considered in the design and licensing basis. It observed that a Jocassee Dam failure frequency of about 2E-4 per year was less than the hazard from general transients, losses of 44 2008.08.15, NRC letter to Duke: Information Request Pursuant to 10CFR50.54(f) Related to External Flooding Including Failure of the Jocassee Dam at Oconee (ML081640244) (2008 NRC 50.54(f) Letter).
45 2008 NRC 50.54(f) Letter, Page 1, 9 (emphasis added).
46 2008 NRC 50.54(f) Letter, Page 2.
47 2011 Safety Evaluation Letter, Safety Evaluation, Page 1.
48 2008 NRC 50.54(f) Letter, Page 2.
13 offsite power, etc., but greater than the hazard from medium and large break LOCAs (see Figure 1 below).49 It should be noted here that for all of the other hazards listed, Oconee -- as well as every other US nuclear power plant -- is required to have safety grade, fully redundant, single failure proof ECCS capable of responding. For the Jocassee Dam failure, Oconee had the SSF which is non-safety grade, has no redundancy, is not single failure proof and is not part of the ECCS. Even if the original Jocassee Dam failure rate of 1.3E-5 was correct, this is still an order of magnitude greater than the large LOCA rate of 2E-6 per year which is in the design basis and requires the ECCS to protect the public. At this point in time (2008) the SSF was protected from a Jocassee Dam failure by a wall that Duke from its previous analysis knew was inadequate because the 1992 analysis for FERC showed that there was a potential for over of water at the SSF.
Figure 1 Oconee Hazard (or Initiating Event) Frequency Comparison Credible Events 50 49 2008.08.28, NRC Presentation Oconee Flood Protection and Jocassee Dam Hazard (2008 NRC Presentation Oconee), Slide 8 (ML082550290).
50 2008 NRC Presentation Oconee), Slide 8 (strike through text in original).
14 2.6.3 Dukes Response to 2008 50.54(f) Letter Regarding a Jocassee Dam Failure Duke responded to NRCs 50.54(f) letter that: Duke considers a random sunny day failure of the Jocassee dam not credible because of the nature of its design, its construction, the inspections conducted during its construction, and those periodic inspections that have occurred, and continue to occur, since its construction.51 Duke further argued that the higher flood elevations posited by NRC in the 50.54(f) letter were not applicable to Oconee, because they came from the 1992 study Duke had conducted for FERC to establish an Emergency Action Plan (EAP) for the population downstream of Jocassee, and thus was intended to provide a worst case analysis rather than credible flood levels.52 After considerable discussion with Duke, the NRC sent a letter in the spring of 2009. This letter states in part: The NRC staffs position is that a Jocassee Dam failure is a credible event and needs to be addressed deterministically.53 The letter clearly articulates that the NRC is concerned about adequate protection. For example, it states: When the inundation study and sensitivity analyses are completed, the NRC staff will evaluate the results to determine whether further regulatory actions are necessary to ensure there is adequate protection against external flooding at Oconee.54 Finally, the NRC states its expectation of receiving analyses which would establish an adequate licensing basis for external flooding...55 In response to the NRCs concerns, and after further analysis, Duke decided to raise the wall height protecting the SSF by to a total height of
. It completed this work in February of 2009.56 Duke also responded to the NRCs inquiries by performing an additional hydrological analysis of the failure of Jocassee Dam and propagating the resulting flood onto the Keowee Lake and Dam and then onto Oconee. Building on the model in the 1992 study for FERC, Duke modified it and increased the level of detail. Duke reported its preliminary results to the NRC in a presentation 51 2008.09.26, Duke Letter in Response to 10CFR50.54(f) Request, Attachment 2 Page 3 (ML082750106)
(2008 Duke 50.54(f) Response Letter).
52 2008 Duke 50.54(f) Response Letter, Attachment 2 Page 3.
53 2009.04.09, NRC letter to Duke Evaluation of Duke September 26, 2008, Response to NRC Letter Dated August 15, 2008, Related to External Flooding at Oconee (ML090570779), Page 2 (2009 NRC External Flooding Letter).
54 2009 NRC External Flooding Letter, Page 3.
55 2009 NRC External Flooding Letter, Page 3.
56 2009.05.11, Duke Presentation on Oconee External Flood (ML091380424).
15 on October 28, 2009.57 Duke had expected the flood heights to decrease by using the new software and model. However, flood heights increased. The new model, using a conservative but not worst-case scenario, predicted a flood height at the SSF of about 58 To resolve this adequate protection issue, NRC required Duke to re-perform the Jocassee Dam failure analysis using conservative input parameters (i.e., assumptions) and methods.59 Using a conservative approach would supply margin and account for uncertainty, as is the norm for design basis and licensing basis issues -- which this adequate protection issue had become.
NRC issued a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) on June 22, 2010. This letter confirms commitments made by Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (the licensee) in your June 3, 2010, letter.
Specifically, the June 3, 2010, letter listed compensatory measures the licensee will implement at the Oconee Site and Jocassee Dam to mitigate potential external flooding hazards resulting from a potential failure of the Jocassee Dam.60 In response, Duke revised its 1D and 2D analysis. And Duke committed to protecting the SSF based on results from its revised analysis.61 Protective measures would include increasing the height of the flood barriers protecting the site, protecting an offsite power line from the expected flood conditions and other improvements.62 2.6.4 2011 NRC Safety Evaluation In January of 2011, the NRC transmitted to Duke a Safety Evaluation confirming Dukes approach to the issue resolution. This safety evaluation concluded:
The NRC staff evaluated the information provided by Duke in their August 2, 2010, letter. The unmitigated Case 2 dam breach parameters that were used in the flooding models, provided by Duke for the ONS site, demonstrated that the licensee has included conservatisms of the parameters utilized in the dam breach scenario. These conservatisms provide the staff with additional assurance that the above Case 2 scenario will bound the inundation at ONS, therefore providing reasonable assurance for the overall flooding scenario at the site. This new flooding 57 2009.10.28, Duke Presentation on Oconee External Flood with Initial HEC-RAS Results (ML093080034)
(2009 Duke Presentation with Initial HEC-RAS Results).
58 2009 Duke Presentation with Initial HEC-RAS Results, Slide 26.
59 2010.01.29, NRC letter Evaluation of Duke Response to Related to External Flooding at Oconee (ML100271591), See Enclosure.
60 2010.06.22, NRC Letter to Duke, CAL - ONS Commitments to Address External Flooding Concerns, (ML12363A086), Page 1.
61 2009 Duke Presentation with Initial HEC-RAS Results. Duke had presented examples of these preliminary results in its previous meeting with NRC.
62 2010.11.29, Duke Letter: Oconee Response to CAL, Page 2 (ML103490330).
16 scenario is based on a random sunny-day failure of the Jocassee Dam. This Case 2 scenario will be the new flooding basis for the site.63 The NRCs Safety Evaluation required Duke to protect the Oconee site from random sunny day failures of the Jocassee Dam to a flood depth of in order to ensure adequate protection.64 The requirement was based on conservative deterministic analysis.65 However, the Safety Evaluation was silent with respect to other relevant Jocassee Dam failure mechanisms including seismic and overtopping even though these mechanisms had been constantly discussed both internally within the NRC and with Duke. As the text indicates, this also established a new flooding basis for the site.
Dukes initial response to the CAL is contained in an April 29, 2011 letter to the NRC. As stated in that letter, Dukes purpose in writing it was to respond to the NRCs request, as noted in the Confirmatory Action Letter dated June 22, 2010... for a list of all modifications necessary to adequately protect the Oconee site from the impact of a postulated failure of the Jocassee Dam.66 Those proposed changes were summarized in a table (unnumbered by Duke).67 The table is reproduced below. For purposes of this report, I have numbered it Table 2. As can be seen from Table 2, proposed adequate protection measures included substantial additional flood walls on the North, East and South sides of the ONS.
63 2011 NRC Safety Evaluation Letter (emphasis added).
64 2011 NRC Safety Evaluation Letter, Page 12.
65 2011 NRC Safety Evaluation Letter.
66 2011.04.29, Duke Letter: Oconee Response to Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 2-10-003 (ML111460063), Page 2.
67 2011.04.29, Duke Letter: Oconee Response to Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 2-10-003 (ML111460063), Attachment Page 2.
17 Table 2 Modifications Necessary to Adequately Protect Oconee In 2010, NRC finalized its own generic dam failure frequency analysis for the Jocassee Dam.68 The staff estimated generic dam failure rates for large rock-fill dams, which it considers applicable to the Jocassee Dam, as 2.8E-4 per year.69 The authors of that analysis and other members of the NRC Staff subsequently performed additional analyses exploring and confirming those results.70 68 2010.03.15, Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam (ML13039A084). The NRCs generic analysis was published internally and subsequently released via a Freedom of Information Act request.
(2010 Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam). (I am a coauthor of this report.)
69 2010 Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam, Page 6.
70 2013.07.17, Uncertainty Analysis for Large Dam Failure Frequencies Based on Historical Data (ML13198A170); Ferrante, et al., An Assessment of Large Dam Failure Frequencies Based on Us Historical Data ANS PSA 2011 International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Analysis, March 13-17, 2011, Wilmington, NC, USA. (I am a coauthor of this report.)
18 In 2012, because the demonstrably erroneous NSAC-60 dam failure rate was widely referenced and used throughout the nuclear industry at that time, the NRC issued an information notice warning of the inadequacies in the dam failure rate found in the NSAC-60 report.71 According to Information Notice 2012-02, NSAC-60 provide(d) an insufficient basis for estimating site-specific dam failure frequency.72 In 2019, in a more detailed study commissioned by the NRC, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) stated:
NRC has estimated the likelihood of failure of Jocassee dam, upstream of the Oconee Nuclear Station in South Carolina, at approximately 2.8x10-4 per year. This estimate aligns with historical dam failure rates found in literature.73 If the Jocassee Dam fails but the flood does not inundate the SSF, the SSF is the first of two lines of defense (the second is the FLEX equipment). It should be noted that Dukes own risk analysis calculated that the SSF had a failure probability of about 0.27 or 27%.74 This is a very high failure probability, orders of magnitude greater than the failure probability estimated by Duke for safety related equipment found in the ECCS.
Thus, the outcome of the multi-year NRC safety evaluation was to increase the flood protection from a Jocassee Dam failure from approximately to a new licensing basis height of about Thirteen years later, the 2011 Safety Evaluation and the safety requirements it imposed remains the only NRC safety evaluation on the issue. Duke has not appealed the 2011 Safety Evaluation, nor has the NRC retracted or repudiated it. Yet, Duke has completed the modifications described in the table above to protect the plant to a flood depth of
. Nor has the NRC sought to ensure its completion.
2.7 Fukushima - Lessons Learned 2012 50.54(f) Letter and Staff Assessment In 2011, the Fukushima Dai-chi disaster occurred, with waves as high as 45 feet, leading to core damage and containment failures at three of the six nuclear power plants on the site. A year later, in 2012, the NRC issued 10CFR50.54(f) letters to all licensees including Duke for ONS, requesting them to reevaluate the flooding hazards at their sites against present-day 71 NRC Information Notice 2012-2.
72 NRC Information Notice 2012-02, Page 4.
73 2019.12.14, Current State-of-Practice in Dam Safety Risk Assessment, https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1592163/.
74 FOIA Response 2012-0325 Pages 110, 115 of 308.
19 regulatory guidance and methodologies being used for early site permits and combined license reviews.75 One of the tasks requested by these letters was to perform a Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report (FHRR). Duke submitted an FHRR in 201376 and a revised response in 2015.77, 78 The flood heights at the SSF appear to be in redacted material in the public version of the revised FHRR.79 At the same time that Duke submitted their revised FHRR, they submitted a second letter also supplying what appears to be a condensed version of the FHRR Revision results. While some material is also redacted from this document, the flood height at the SSF from a Jocassee Dam failure is not redacted. The flood height from a Jocassee Dam failure is given as t MSL or a flood depth of
.80 Presumably, this is the flood height identified in redacted material in the FHRR Rev. 1.
The NRC evaluated the ONS FHRR Rev. 1 and issued a Staff Assessment accepting the FHRR Rev. 1 results.81 Many of the flooding parameters including the flood heights from a Jocassee Dam failure are also redacted from this document. Presumably, the redacted flood heights in the Staff Assessment agree with both the FHRR Rev.1 and the Duke letter supplying Supplemental Information re External flooding, i.e., a flood height of at the SSF.
By titling the document a Staff Assessment rather than a Safety Evaluation, the NRC Staff indicated that the document did not have the regulatory equivalence of safety findings. Safety 75 2012.03.12 Letter from NRC to all Power Reactor Licensees and Construction Permit Holders re:
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION PURSUANT TO TITLE 10 OF THE CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 50.54(f)
REGARDING RECOMMENDATIONS 2.1.2.3, AND 9.3, OF THE NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE REVIEW OF INSIGHTS FROM THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI ACCIDENT (ML12053A340), Enclosure 2, Page 1 (NRC Post-Fukushima 50.54(f) Letter).
76 2013.03.12 Flooding Hazard Reevaluation Report Enclosure 1 (ML13240A016). As of 2024.04.26 this document is not in ADAMS. It appears to have been removed sometime between a Beyond Nuclear FOIA request (FOIA 2022-000210) involving this document on 2022.07.28 and 2024.04.26.
77 2015.0.06 Duke letter re Revised Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report per NRCs Request for Additional Information, (ML15072A106).
78 2015.003.06, Enclosure 1 Revision 1 to Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report Oconee Nuclear Station (ML16272A217) (FHRR Rev. 1).
79 FHRR Rev. 1 Pages 48, 52 - 54.
80 2015.03.06, Duke letter re Supplemental Information Regarding NRC 2008 and 2012 Requests for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Pertaining to External Flooding at ONS, (ML16272A219), Table 4 Page 7 of 13 of the letters enclosure (Duke letter Supplemental Information re External Flooding).
81 2016.04.14, NRC letter re Oconee Staff Assessment of Response to Request for Information Pursuant to 50.54(f) Flood-Causing Mechanisms Reevaluation (ML15352A207), enclosing NRC Staff Assessment by the Office of NRR Related to flooding Hazard Reevaluation Report NTTF Recommendation 2.1 (M16273A128) (2016 NRC Letter re 50.54(f) Response). A redacted version of this document was released in Interim Response 3 to FOIA-2018-0010 on October 26, 2017.
20 Evaluations are one NRC means of documenting Atomic Energy Act and the Administrative Procedure Acts basis for its actions and the associated required findings of reasonable assurance that operation of the facility can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of public and will not be inimical to the health and safety of the public (e.g., 10CFR 50.57(a).82 To my knowledge NRC Staff Assessments are not procedurally controlled and do not make the required findings.
And indeed, the conclusions of the Staff Assessment do not measure Dukes submittal against the NRC safety standard of reasonable assurance of adequate protection or no undue risk.
Instead, the Staff measured Dukes submittal against an undefined reasonableness standard.
The Staff, for instance, found that [s]eismically-induced failure of the Jocassee Dam is not a reasonable mode of failure based on current information, present-day methodologies and regulatory guidance.83 Similarly, the Staff found that [o]vertopping-induced failure of the Jocassee Dam is not reasonable model of failure based on current information, present-day methodologies and regulatory guidance. 84 The NRC also approved Dukes conclusion that a random sunny-day failure was an unlikely, although reasonable, failure mode.85 These documents do not explain what criteria the NRC used to judge reasonableness. It could be just about anything. Thus, the standard appears to be weaker than the Atomic Energy Act-based regulatory standard of reasonable assurance that the licensee has achieved a minimum level of protection that is adequate to protect health and safety.
Because the Staff Assessment did not repudiate, replace or supersede the 2011 Safety Evaluations conclusions, because it applied the distinctly different and weaker (albeit undefined) standard of reasonableness rather than reasonable assurance of adequate protection, and because it did not even purport to be a Safety Evaluation, the Staff Assessment cannot be compared to the 2011 Safety Evaluation or presumed to override it in any way. The 2011 Safety Evaluation remains on the docket as the only NRC safety determination addressing the acceptability of flooding from a Jocassee Dam failure for purposes of establish compliance with the Atomic Energy Act.
2.8 Dukes 2021 Subsequent License Renewal Application and SAMA Analysis In June 2021, Duke submitted a subsequent license renewal application to NRC, requesting an extension of each of the three Oconee reactors operating licenses terms by an additional 20 years. Like Dukes initial license renewal application in 1998, the Environmental Report in Dukes SLR application relied on its PRA to look for insights into whether there was new and 82 2020.08.03 LIC-101 License Amendment Review Procedures (ML19248C539) at Appendix B Page 15.
83 2016 NRC Letter re 50.54 Response, Enclosure 2, Page 3.
84 2016 NRC Letter re 50.54 Response, Enclosure 2, Page 3.
85 2016 NRC Letter re 50.54 Response, Enclosure 2, Page 3.
21 significant information that would provide a significantly different picture of the impacts from severe accidents during the second license renewal period.86 2.9 Duke Supplemental Environmental Report On November 7, 2022, following a decision by the NRC requiring new analyses for subsequent license renewal, Duke submitted a supplemental Environmental Report for subsequent license renewal of the Oconee operating licenses. The Environmental Report asserted that continued operation of the Oconee reactors did not pose significant environmental impacts, i.e., that they were SMALL.87 The Environmental Report also stated:
On November 17, 2020 (NRC 2020), the NRC completed its review of [updated external hazards information for all operating power reactors (as ordered by the Commission following the Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident] and concluded that no further regulatory actions were needed to ensure adequate protection or compliance with regulatory requirements, including site-specific external hazards information, re-confirming the acceptability of ONSs design basis.88 2.10 Draft SEIS In February 2024, the NRC issued the Draft SEIS, repeating Dukes assertion in the Environmental Report that the environmental impacts of accidents at the Oconee reactors are insignificant or SMALL.89 In addition, like the Environmental Report, the Draft SEIS stated:
On November 17, 2020, the NRC staff completed its review for Oconee Station and concluded that no further regulatory actions were needed to ensure adequate protection or compliance with regulatory requirements, including site-specific external hazards information, re-confirming the acceptability of Oconee Stations design basis. (NRC 2020-TN8995).90 Thus, both the Environmental Report and the Draft SEIS each stated that the environmental impacts of accidents during continued operation of the Oconee reactors would be insignificant and that the reactors were adequately protected from accidents caused by external events such as flooding and earthquakes.
86 2021 Environmental Report Page 4-75.
87 Id. Page 100.
88 2022 ER Appendix E Supplement 2 Page 101. NRC 2020 is a letter from R.J. Bernardo, NRC to J.E.
Burchfield, Jr., Duke re: Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 - Documentation of the Completion of Required Actions Taken in Response to the Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident (Nov.
17, 2020) (ML20304A369).
89 Draft SEIS Page F-4 Line 39, F-9 Line 4.
90 Draft SEIS Page F-4 Lines 10-14. NRC 2020-TN8995 is the same NRC letter cited in footnote 3 above.
22 2.10.1 Power Uprate Information (Section F.3.4 of 2024 Draft ONS SEIS)
This section hypothesizes the impact of a potential power uprate on risk. It uses and explores a power uprate up to 30% and an average uprate of 10% and concludes that this uprate would not impact the conclusions of the 1996 or 2013 license renews GEISs.
2.10.2 Higher Fuel Burnup Information (Section F.3.5 of 2024 Draft ONS SEIS)
This section discusses increasing PWR fuel burnup to 42 to 75 gigawatt days per metric ton of uranium and that could increase population dose risk by 38 percent. But concludes that this dose risk would be bounded by the 95% UCB values in the 1996 GEIS.
2.10.3 Additional Sensitivity as it Relates to Population Dose Risk and the Jocassee Dam SAMA (Section F.4.1 of 2024 Draft ONS SEIS)
This section responds to a scoping comment on the impact of a SAMA regarding raising the height of the flood barrier wall around the SSF. It states in part:
The Oconee Station SAMA evaluated a SAMA potential improvement to increase the height of the Safe Shutdown Facility flood barrier to address the PRA sequence relating to a random failure of Jocassee Dam exceeding the
(
) Safe Shutdown Facility (SSF) flood barrier.91 It concludes that the overall effect of an increase by 30 times of the total population dose risk during the SLR period of extended operation does not result in significant environmental impacts.
In fact, Duke raised the height of the SSF from in circa 2010.92 This basic fact is discussed in many of the document relating to the Jocassee Dam failure and was at least at one point in time well understood by the NRC. It appears that the NRC no longer understands the basic of the issue. In any case, it is unclear what this NRC sensitivity case is attempting to illustrate. In any case, the comments author (this writer) was attempting to show the risk benefit of protecting Oconee from a Jocassee Dam failure, I was not proposing a wall around the SSF. This sensitivity analysis did not address the concern.
23 2.10.4 Summary and Conclusions (Section F.4.2 of 2024 Draft ONS SEIS)
This section makes the following conclusion: No new and significant information regarding Oconee Station was identified that was above the values previously evaluated in the 1996 LR GEIS.93
- 3. ANALYSIS In Sections 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 below, I will provide my analysis of the safety and environmental risks posed by continued operation of the Oconee reactors for an additional twenty years past their expiration dates of 2033 (Units 1 and 2) and 2034 (Unit 3). In Section 3.1, I will address the accident risk posed by failure of the Jocassee Dam. In Section 3.2, I will address other deficiencies in the Draft SEIS accident risk analysis. In Section 3.3, I will address the lack of uncertainty analysis in the Draft SEIS. And in Section 3.4, I will address the Draft SEIS failure to consider the environmental impacts of Climate Change.
3.1 Failure to Ensure Adequate Protection from Failure of the Jocassee Dam or to Adequately Evaluate Environmental Flooding Risks.
In my expert opinion as a nuclear engineer and risk analyst, Duke is now operating Oconee at an unacceptable risk to public health and safety, due to flooding risks identified by the regulatory process leading up to the 2011 Safety Evaluation. The NRC deemed those flood protection measures necessary to protect against a core melt accident with subsequent containment failure in the event the Oconee site becomes inundated by failure of the Jocassee Dam. The NRC has not sought to force Duke to implement those measures, and it has lowered the flood level to which safety equipment must be protected. Yet, the NRC has not withdrawn or repudiated the 2011 Safety Evaluation in which it found those measures were necessary to provide adequate protection to public health and safety. Nor has the NRC made any finding that the flood height and mitigation measures that were determined to be appropriate in the NRCs post-Fukushima review are adequate to protect public health and safety.
In my years as a NRC senior risk analyst, this is one of the most serious safety issues I have encountered. Yet, the NRC regulations for license renewal exclude it from the scope of safety issues that may be reviewed, because it does not relate to the aging of Oconees safety equipment. However, the NRC must also review Dukes SLR application under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which requires NRC to fully evaluate the environmental impacts of its proposed actions, including the environmental impacts of reasonably foreseeable accidents. NEPA also requires Duke to evaluate the relative costs and benefits of Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives (SAMAs). I have applied my knowledge as a risk analyst to evaluate whether Duke has taken into account all relevant data regarding the likelihood and consequences of a core melt accident caused by failure of the Jocassee Dam. My analysis also
24 includes Dukes most recent revision to its Environmental Report and SAMA Analysis as well as the Draft SEIS.
3.1.1 Mischaracterization of the scope of the environmental review.
The Draft SEIS makes a bold statement that as part of its post-Fukushima review the staff re-confirm[ed] the acceptability of Oconee Stations design basis."94 But I cannot find any support for this assertion in the Draft SEIS or in the post-Fukushima documentation. According to the Draft SEIS, the post-Fukushima analysis focused on several areas including but not limited to: 1) Beyond design basis external events under Order (EA-12-049), and 2) Requests for information (RFI) (under 10 CFR 50.54(f)) of seismic and flooding hazards.
Order EA-12-049 is an investigation into beyond design basis external events and is by simple logic not about the design basis and therefore cannot confirm it. And the review of seismic and flooding hazards (as requested by the RFI) does not constitute a review of the entire design basis. In addition, the staff made no Atomic Energy Act assessments what-so-every regarding the seismic and flood hazards at Oconee or any other plant in regards to design basis hazards. It is accurate that the NRC did not change the Oconee (or any other licensed reactors) design basis because of these reviews but that is not the same as reviewing the entire design basis.
Hopefully, the staff in preparation of this analysis, has a better understanding of what has and has not been done, then illustrated in this claim.
Thus, the NRCs characterization of the NRCs post-Fukushima analysis is incorrect. The primary focus of the NTTF analysis was on two external hazards, i.e., flooding and seismic. While the mitigating strategies orders required protection against other beyond design basis external hazards, e.g., high winds, it in no way confirmed the existing design basis. Thus, any statement claiming that the NRC re-confirmed the ONSs design basis is wrong. The NRC did write a Safety Evaluation but as the subject of the letter and the Safety Evaluation indicate they addressed only the acceptability of the referenced orders responses.95 94 2024 Draft ONS SEIS Page F-4 Lines 13 - 14. Duke makes a similar statement in the Supplemental Environmental Report:
On November 17, 2020 (NRC 2020), the NRC completed its review of such information as to ONS and concluded that no further regulatory actions were needed to ensure adequate protection or compliance with regulatory requirements, including site-specific external hazards information, re-confirming the acceptability of ONSs design basis.
2022 ER Appendix E Supplement 2Page 101.
95 2017.08.30, NRC letter ONS Safety Evaluation Regarding Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Related to Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051, (ML17202U791).
25 3.1.2 Inadequate consideration of flooding risks from Jocassee Dam Failure.
I have also found that neither Duke nor the NRC has adequately addressed the risk of flood-related accidents at the Oconee reactors. A significant problem is that Duke supplied no flooding hazard information in its 2021 Environmental Report or SAMA analysis. It simply referred back to the 1998 SAMA, which in turn refers back to the IPEEE. (And as the history shows, the NRC found via the RFI process initiated in 200896 inadequate.) And as discussed below, the IPEEE does not supply an adequate flooding analysis. And the 2022 Supplemental Environmental Report and Draft SEIS do not supply the missing information.
I will begin with Dukes risk analysis in its Environmental Report of 2021, as supplemented in 2022.
Level 1 PRA is used to evaluate the frequency of severe accidents while Level 2 and 3 PRA are used to evaluate the consequences. To perform the Level 1 analysis the basic PRA Equation is used:
CDF (/yr.)
=
IEF (/yr.)
X CCDP 97
[Eq. 1]
Where CDF is the core damage frequency (in events per year), IEF is the initiating event frequency (in events per year) and CCDP is the conditional core damage probability (all probabilities are unit-less). PRA is always intended to be a best estimate analysis.
Typical PRA start with evaluation of IEF. In the case of external flooding, a thorough analysis would include flooding from all sources. Each hazard (e.g., local intense storms (LIP), dam failures, etc.) would be characterized with a hazard curve that supplies a range of intensities (e.g., flood height and flood inundation timing) and the corresponding frequency (in some reports it is characterized as annual exceedance probabilities). An example (not Oconee) of a detailed flooding hazard curve is shown in Figure 2. The horizontal axis shows the annual exceedance probability or how often will a flood occur. The vertical axis shows the flood depth.
For example, the 1E-2 (or once in a hundred years) exceedance flood would reach a flood depth of about 510 feet. The dashed lines indicated the 90% confidence range. Again, for the 1E-2 flood the 90% confidence ranges from 507.5 feet to 511 feet. The graph gives the frequency of a flood for the range of floods between a frequency of about once every 100 years (1E-2) to once every million years (1E-6) with the uncertainty for each flood frequency. Finally, the red dashed lines indicate flood elevations where cliff edge effects. In this example a flood exceeding a height of 517 feet which is ground elevation. Again, this graph does not apply to Oconee but is an example of thorough flood hazard analysis conveying critical information regarding 96 2008 NRC 50.54(f) Letter 97 Oconee Nuclear Site Adequate Protection Backfit Documented Evaluation (circa 2010), Page 6 (ML14058A015).
26 flooding. For a plant as vulnerable to flooding as Oconee is, this is the type of analysis that could and should have been performed.
Figure 2 Best Estimate and Approximate 90% Uncertainty Bounds of Peak River Level on the Kankakee River at the Nuclear Plant Site 98 As discussed above, Duke supplied no flooding hazard information in its 2021 Environmental Report. It simply referred back to the 1998 SAMA, which in turn refers back to the IPEEE. The 1998 SAMA, however, supplied a single value, in contrast to more detailed example hazard curve illustrated in Figure 2. The single value supplied is for a Jocassee Dam failure with a rate of 1.3E-5 per year.99 That is the only information supplied by Duke about flooding initiating events. But this one data point is insufficient information to obtain any insights from the likelihood of dam failure events.
Equally important, the limited initiating event information provided in Dukes SAMA analysis is wrong. While Duke presents a Jocassee Dam failure rate of 1.3E-5 per year, NRC calculated a best generic failure rate for Jocassee of 2.8E-4 per year - more than twenty times greater.100 This information is well-known to Duke, because NRC shared its conclusions with Duke in 2008 98 2014.08 EPRI Riverine Probabilistic Flooding Hazard Analysis, Figure 8-10, Page 8-9 (3002003013).
99 FOIA Response 2012-0325 Page 17 of 308.
100 Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam.
27 and followed up with an Information Notice to alert the industry in 2012.101 This differs from the Duke value by over a factor of 20.
A middle ground between a single point estimate and a comprehensive analysis for each flood hazard would derive a range of flood hazards that would explore the possible spread of risks.
Duke could have (but did not) evaluate the range that would capture the spread of postulated outcomes as follows in Table 3:
Table 3 Oconee Flood Heights versus Impacts Flood Height (MSL)
Flood Impacts
- 1.
<796 Flood depths that do not come above grade (796 MSL) have the least impact and there is the probability that much of the ECCS will be available for mitigation
- 2.
Flood depths that come above grade but stay below the top of the protective SSF wall have an intermediate mitigation impact as the ECCS will be incapacitated but SSF should survive and then assigned a random failure probability based on the best available equipment database
- 3.
Flood depths that rise above the SSF (
) wall have the most severe impact as these floods incapacitate all permanently install mitigation equipment, i.e., the balance of plant equipment, the ECCS and the SSF The flood impacts are well known to the NRC, as demonstrated by the following statement in the NRCs staff assessment of Dukes Flooding Focused Evaluation:
The licensee stated in its FE [Focused Evaluation] that during the LIP [local intense precipitation]
event and dam failure event, flood waters are expected to inundate lower elevations of many buildings onsite including the auxiliary building and the turbine building. The licensee made the assumption that the inundation of these buildings will have the effect of disabling the SG [steam generator] feedwater systems and the high pressure injection systems, and will cause a loss of electrical power.102 After deriving IEF information, thorough PRA practices evaluate a range of mitigating capabilities for each and every previously identified initiating event sequence. In PRA terminology these mitigating strategies are characterized as conditional core damage probabilities (CCDP). The CCDP evaluates the failure probabilities of each combination of equipment available to cope with the associated hazard. For example, for a large LOCA the associated CCDP would evaluate the failure probabilities of both division of low pressure 101 NRC Information Notice 2012-2.
102 2018.06.18, NRC Letter ONS Staff Assessment of Flooding Focused Evaluation (ML18141A755) Page 4.
28 injection (LPI). It would cover all the combinations that would fail both trains. A few examples combinations that would fail both trains of LPI are:
Table 4 Example Equipment Failures causing Train Failures Combination LPI Train 1 Fails LPI Train 2 Fails
- 1.
Train 1 pump fails Train 2 injection valve fails
- 2.
Train 1 pump motor fails Train 2 pump suction valve fails
- 3.
Train 1 power fails Train 2 injection valve fails If Duke had evaluated the scenarios described in Table 3 above, it would have derived CCDPs for each scenario. For the first scenario, with Jocassee flooding below grade, Duke could have evaluated the failure probability of the ECCS, the SSF and any other equipment that might be available. For the middle scenario where the flood waters come above grade but not to the top of the SSF wall, the ECCS fails (and is given a failure probability of 1.0), but the SSF would not be incapacitated by the flood and thus would be assigned a failure probability based on historical data. In the final scenario where the flood water come above the SSF wall, the SSF also fails and it would also be given a failure probability of 1.0.
Neither the SAMA Analysis in Dukes 2021 Environmental Report nor its 1998 SAMA analysis supplied any information about mitigating equipment failure probabilities. In fact, neither SAMA analysis supplies any CCDP information at all.
However, a minimal amount of CCDP information can be extracted from the limited amount of information that Duke supplied. Equation 1 from above (reproduced below) can be used as a starting point to extract the composite CCDP.
CDF (/yr.)
=
IEF (/yr.)
X CCDP
[Eq. 1]
Solving for the CCDP gives us Equation 2:
= CDF (/yr.)
/
IEF (/yr.)
[Eq. 2]
From the 1998 SAMA analysis, we know that Duke used a flooding external event IEF value of 1.3E-5103 per year. The corresponding external event flooding CDF is also supplied by the 1998 SAMA analysis in the table reproduced below (this is a duplicate of Table 1 above):
Plugging the external flooding IEF and CDF (from the 1998 SAMA in Table 1) into Equation 2 allows us to find the associated CCDP:
= CDF (/yr.)
/
IEF (/yr.)
[Eq. 3]
103 FOIA Response 2012-0325 Page 17 of 308.
29 4.5E-1
=
5.9E-6
/
1.3E-5 Thus, Dukes CCDP for external flooding is 4.5E-1 (based on the 1998 results).
If we assume this composite CCDP is correct, we can calculate a corrected best estimate CDF for external flooding events using this CCDP and the NRCs best estimate IEF of 2.8E-4 per year and Equation 1.104 CDF (/yr.)
=
IEF (/yr.)
X CCDP
[Eq. 4]
1.3E-4
=
2.8E-4 X
4.5E-1 Thus, a corrected external flooding event CDF has value of 1.3E-4 per year (again based on the 1998 SAMA), which is more than 20 times higher than Dukes wrong value of 5.9E-6 per year. It should be noted that the data used as input into the NRCs generic Jocassee Dam failure rate calculation does include failures from seismic and overtopping. Thus, my calculation includes seismic and overtopping contributions.
But the CDF of 1.3E-4 per year assumes that the CCDP of 4.5E-1 derived from the Duke analysis is appropriate. However, in 2008, Duke told the NRC that based on the 1992 inundation study, if the dam fails:
[T]he predicted flood would reach ONS in approximately
, at which time the SSF walls are overtopped. The SSF is assumed to fail, with no time delay, following the flood level exceeding the height of the SSF wall. The failure scenario results are predicted such that core damage occurs in about following the dam break and containment failure in about
. When containment failure occurs, significant dose to the public would result.105 Hidden in this statement is the fact that even Duke believes that if the SSF walls are overtopped, all mitigation fails, including the SSF -- thus resulting in core damage and containment failure. In other words, Duke is saying that the conditional core damage probability (CCDP) given a Jocassee Dam failure which overtops the SSF wall is a given, or has a value of 1.0, not the value of 4.5E-1. If we use this CCDP, i.e., a value of 1.0 then the CDF from a Jocassee Dam failure is equal to the Jocassee Dam failure rate or from Equation 1:
CDF (/yr.)
=
IEF (/yr.)
X CCDP
[Eq. 5]
2.8E-4
=
2.8E-4 X
1.0 104 Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam.
105 2008 Duke 50.54(f) Response Letter, Attachment 2.
30 Revisiting the Jocassee Dam failure rate, we can compare it to other initiating events. The NRC calculated a Jocassee Dam failure rate of 2.8E-4 per year. This value is in the range of LOCAs.
Even the Duke value of 1.3E-5 per year is larger than the value for large LOCA (see Figure 1 above).
Therefore, a reasonable best estimate CDF from a Jocassee Dam failure is 2.8E-4 per year based on the available PRA information, i.e., information supplied by Duke and NRC that is on the docket. This CDF is larger than the total CDF from all Oconee internal and external events of 8.9E-5 per year reported to NRC in 1999.106 It is also larger than the total CDF values reported by both Duke and NRC in their 2021 and 2024 reports respectively (see Table 1). Dukes 2008 Duke 50.54(f) Response letter supplied the following insights regarding LERF:
(T)he predicted flood would reach ONS in approximately h at which time the SSF walls are overtopped. The SSF is assumed to fail, with no time delay, following the flood level exceeding the height of the SSF wall. The failure scenario results are predicted such that core damage occurs in about following the dam break and containment failure in about
. When containment failure occurs, significant dose to the public would result.107 This Duke statement is telling the NRC that given a flood from a Jocassee Dam failure in which the flood heights overtop the SSF walls containment failure is inevitable. Duke did not say the containment might fail, nor did it estimate the probability of containment failure. Duke told the NRC that the Conditional Containment Failure Probability (CCFP) given a flood induced core damage event was 1.0. This is PRA language for a LERF multiplier of 1.0. Multiplying the CDF by the LERF multiplier gives us the LERF. With a LERF multiplier of 1.0, the LERF is equal to the CDF.108 Thus, not only is the CDF from an external flooding event 2.8E-4 per year but the LERF from an external flooding event is 2.8E-4 per year.
All of the preceding impact discussion is based on Dukes 2008 conclusion of core damage in and a flood height at the SSF between which comes from the 1992 inundation analysis performed for FERC.109 However, the NRC required Duke to perform a new dam failure and flood routing analyses. Dukes new analysis increased the flood height at the SSF to about 10 The PRA values in Dukes 2021 Environmental Report and SAMA updates substantially changed, in a manner that calls into question the technical validity of Dukes CDF values for flooding.
106 1998 SAMA Analysis Page 10 (2.6E-5 + 6.3E-5 = 8.9E-5).
107 2008 NRC 50.54(f) Response Letter (emphasis added).
108 2013.09.23 NRC letter, NMP1 Integrated Inspection Report and Preliminary Greater than Green.
Finding, Page A-8 (ML13266A237).
109 2008 NRC 50.54(f) Letter, Page 1.
110 2011 NRC Safety Evaluation Letter, Page 12.
31 Table 1 supplies both the 1998 and 2021 SAMA results (see the table for all of the relevant references). One result that is not explained within the SAMA update is a ten-fold increase in the fire results from 4.5E-6 to 4.6E-5. This one hazard contributes more than all of the internal events combined.
Of more relevance to this discussion is the change in external flooding risk. Duke believes that this hazard risk drops to a value of 2.5E-7. According to the 1998 SAMA external flooding comprised 9% of the total external event risk (= 5.9E-6 / 6.3E-5). The 2021 SAMA shows a decrease to less than 1% of total external event risk (= 2.5E-7 / 9.7E-5). It should be noted that total external event risk has increased by 54% (= 1 - 9.7E-5 / 6.3E-5) primarily from the afore mentioned ten-fold increase in fire risk. Based on my search of the records, I find no documentation of a peer reviewed analysis or a licensing application that justifies these flood calculational reductions.
Large early release frequency (LERF) information can be extracted from the 2021 SAMA. Those extracted values are shown in Table 5 below.
Table 5 LERF and CCFP from 2021 SAMA111 LERF Values (per year)
(From Table 4.15-2)
Conditional Containment Failure Probabilities (CCFP)1 (Calculated from Table 4.15-2)
Hazard Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Average Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Average Internal Events 4.8E-7 4.8E-7 4.8E-7 4.8E-07 2.0E-2 2.0E-2 2.0E-2 2.0E-2 High winds 2.9E-7 3.2E-7 2.9E-7 3.0E-07 1.8E-2 1.7E-2 1.7E-2 1.7E-2 External flood
<1E-11
<1E-11
<1E-11
<1E-11
<4.1E-5
<4.1E-5
<4.1E-5
<4.1E-5 Fire 4.5E-6 4.3E-6 2.8E-6 3.9E-06 8.8E-2 7.9E-2 8.4E-2 8.4E-2 Seismic 1.4E-5 1.4E-5 1.4E-5 1.4E-05 4.2E-1 4.2E-1 4.2E-1 4.2E-1 Total external events 1.8E-5 1.8E-5 1.7E-5 1.8E-05 1.8E-1 1.7E-1 2.0E-1 1.9E-1 Total Base 1.9E-5 1.9E-5 1.7E-5 1.8E-05 1.5E-1 1.4E-1 1.6E-1 1.5E-1 Table Note 1: The CCFPs are calculated by dividing the LERF by the corresponding CDF value (CCDF = LERF / CDF). The CDF values come from Table 1 (which are also from 2021 SAMA).
In the above discussion regarding the 2008 Duke 50.54(f) Response Letter (Attachment 2), Duke indicated that in the postulate flood scenario LERF was equal to CDF or as previously discussed, the CCFP was equal to 1.0. I previously estimated CDF at 2.8E-4 and thus LERF is also equal to 2.8E-4. While the 2008 scenario was based on a Jocassee Dam failure, we dont know what flood scenarios are contained in the 2021 SAMA flood analysis. None the less, the decrease is astounding. LERF drops to <1E-11. This LERF value is over four orders of magnitude lower than any other internal or external event LERF! All other LERF values are in a range of 2.9E-7 to 111 2021 Environmental Report, Table 4.15-2, Pages 4-89 to 4-109.
32 1.4E-5. I have derived Conditional Containment Failure Probabilities (CCFP) from the data in Dukes 2021 SAMA Table 4.15-2 by manipulating Equation 6.
LERF (/yr.)
=
CDF (/yr.)
X CCFP
[Eq. 6]
As we know the values for each hazards CDF and LERF from the 2021 SAMA (see Tables 1 & 5 respectively). CCFP can be calculated by equation 7.
CCFP
=
LERF (/yr.)
/
CDF (/yr.)
[Eq. 7]
The derived CCFP values are also shown in Table 5 above. The CCFP values for internal events and high winds are typical of large dry pressurized water reactor (PWR) containments like Oconee. The fire value is substantially elevated and the value for seismic is larger than the value for boiling water reactors (BWRs), which are understood to have substantially weaker (i.e.,
more failure prone) containments. But the derived value for Oconee flooding is more than three orders of magnitude better. This is astounding and not correct. It illustrates that the entire flooding PRA is questionable at best.
The Draft SEIS parrots Dukes flooding CDF values (see Table 1) without supplying any explanation. It cites no audit reports or internal verification calculations, it simply repeats Dukes values.
3.1.3 Important conclusions to be drawn from the flooding risk analyses for Oconee.
As discussed above, the 1998 SAMA analysis considered flooding hazards from a Jocassee Dam failure, apparently in reliance on the NSAC-60 and IPEEE studies.112 Duke in its 2021 SAMA radically revised downward the earlier estimates and the NRCs 2024 Draft SEIS apparently accepted these new estimates without a basis. It should be noted that the discussion about a Jocassee Dam failure describes it in the context of random failures.113 Based on this statement, it is reasonable to assume that Duke only considered random sunny-day dam failures, ignoring seismic and overtopping, failures. This approach of excluding seismic and overtopping-related dam failures was consistent with the IPEEE. The omission is significant, with potentially huge implications for flooding risk at Oconee.
It is helpful to put these flooding results into perspective. Dukes August 2010 analysis indicated a peak flow across the Keowee Dam and significantly onto the Oconee site, of between 2.3 and 2.8 million cubic feet per second (cfs) and a peak flow across the Oconee intake canal structure 112 1998 SAMA Analysis Pages 7, 15, 19.
113 1998 SAMA Analysis Page 15.
33 of between 0.7 and 0.8 million cfs.114 As a point of reference, the average flow of the Mississippi River at New Orleans is approximately 0.6 million cfs.115 The 2010 Duke analysis also tells us that the flood height at the Keowee Dam is to an elevation between MSL.116 Bear in mind that the top of the Keowee Dam and the intake dike are at 815 feet MSL, thus the dam is overtopped by some
.117 This is a lot of water on the Oconee site, a site that was never designed to handle any water on site. Instead, Oconee was designed as a dry site, i.e., a plant that would expect no water on site.
These significantly higher CDFs and LERFs indicate a significantly higher risks to the public and the environment than Duke and the NRC acknowledge. Yet, there is no evidence that Dukes 2021 Environmental Report has considered this new and significant flooding hazard information, the information from the more current dam failure and flood routing study that concluded with the flood depth or how this would impact the corresponding CDFs or LERFs. Nor has it considered the significant uncertainty on the timing, flood heights and flows, which should be part of any thorough risk assessment. Section F.4.1 of the Draft SEIS attempts to address the issue with a sensitivity case. It does not review the risk results from a Jocassee Dam failure nor address why the results should or should not be incorporated into the NEPA analysis. [Diane, is weak but NRC can now claim they have addressed. Any thoughts on how to punch this up?]
As previously discussed, Dukes Environmental Report does not resolve or adjudicate the extensive work done in the Jocassee Dam failure and flood routing analysis, even though this work has supplied significant insights into possible additional severe accident mitigating strategies. For instance, although the NRC required significant flood control measures in the 2011 Safety Evaluation, Duke does not mention them at all - either to take credit for them or, if they have not been installed, to explain why not. Nor does the NRCs 2024 Draft SEIS. Duke has also failed to mention some other obvious ways to reduce the flood hazard from Oconee, such as preemptively shutting down the reactors when reservoir water levels get too high, lowering the water levels in the lake behind the Jocassee and Keowee Dams, or lowering the crest elevation of some of the surround Jocassee Dam earthworks such that they overtop before the Jocassee Dam proper, thus lowering the flood impacts at ONS. PRA is a valuable tool for identifying vulnerabilities (and suggesting associated corrective measures), evaluating the costs and benefits of these measures, and also prioritizing them for their effectiveness.
Unfortunately, the public has not benefited from a thorough and comprehensive external events flooding PRA.
114 2010.08.02 Duke letter Oconee Response to CAL, Attachment 1, Table 1, Page 4 (ML102170006)
(2010.08.02 Duke Oconee Response to CAL).
115 National Park Service, Mississippi River Facts, https://www.nps.gov/miss/riverfacts.htm 116 2010.08.02 Duke Oconee Response to CAL, Attachment 1, Table 2, Page 9.
117 2011 NRC Safety Evaluation Letter, Page 12.
34 Another significant shortcoming of Dukes Environmental Report and NRCs Draft SEIS is their failure to consider other Jocassee Dam failure mechanisms besides random sunny-day failures.
Both Duke and the NRC ignore seismic failures and overtopping failures, although they are both comparable contributors to public and environmental risk. Seismic failure could cause the dam to fail faster and overtopping failures would include additional water volumes behind the Jocassee Dam and potentially the Keowee Dam both scenarios could increase the flood volumes and heights at Oconee. The NRC should update its Draft SEIS to consider these significant contributors to accident risk. And ask discussed in below, that discussion should include the effects of increased frequency and intensity of flooding on overtopping risks.
3.2 Other Deficiencies in the Draft SEISs Risk Analysis.
In addition to the deficiencies described above, the Draft SEIS risk analysis is deficient in other significant respects.
3.2.1 PWR All Hazards CDF Comparison.
In Section F.3.2 of the Draft SEIS, Table F-4 presents a PWR All Hazards (Full Power) CDF Comparison. The accompanying text states the Oconee all hazards CDF is less than the highest estimated Internal Events CDF from the 1996 LR GEIS (Indian Point 2) at a value of 8.90E-5. But this value is not the known current all hazard value for Oconee -- which is 1.3E-4 per year.
The discussion goes on to state:
Although the Combined CDF (All Hazards) increased to 1.26 x 10-4 per reactor-year, the Oconee Station All Hazards CDF is still less than the highest estimated internal events CDF (Indian Point 2 is 3.5 x 10-4 per reactor-year) used in the 1996 LR GEIS.118 But again, this comparison is not based on the latest available information. The Draft SEIS shows that the Oconee all hazards CDF of 1.3E-4 is about twice as high as the mean PWR &
BWR all hazards values of 6.1E-5 and 6.6E-5 mean and median values.119 In this respect, the Draft SEIS significantly understates accident risks.
3.2.2 Fire Events In Section F.3.2.1, the Draft SEIS discusses how the Duke used an external events multiplier to calculate the estimated population dose risk.120 It states that the external events multiplier is 118 2024 Draft ONS SEIS Page F-15 Lines 11 - 13.
119 2024.02, Generic EIS for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants Technical Appendices Volume 3 Revision 2 (ML23201A226) (2024 Draft GEIS) Table E.3-12 Page E-36.
120 Id., Page F-19 (starting at Line 4).
35 obtained by dividing the all-hazards CDF by the internal events CDF. But an examination of the Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) data supplied in Table 4.15-2 (and reproduced here in Table 5) shows that the LERF values for fire are disproportionally larger for fire then for internal events. This can be seen by deriving the Conditional Containment Failure Probability (CCFP). A discussion on CCFP derivation is given below. The CCFP for internal events is about 2E-2 while the value for fire is 8.4E-2 (see Table 5 below for these values). Thus, using an external events multiplier (based on a ratio of all hazards to internal events CDF) underestimates the impact of a significantly larger containment failure probability for fire. This process leads to unrepresentatively low population dose by a factor of four for fire and fire is the largest external event contributor to risk.
3.2.3 Seismic Events In Section F.3.2.2, the Draft SEIS states:
[G]iven the significant margin between the cumulative population dose risk results from the Oconee Station license renewal SAMA Analysis and the cumulative 95th percentile UCB [upper confidence bound] population dose risk results from the 1996 LR GEIS (factor of 266), the Oconee SLR ER [Environmental Report] FCDFs [fire core damage frequencies] do not challenge the 95th percentile estimates used in the 1996 LR GEIS.121 Presumably, this comparison relies upon the same external event multiplier discussed above.
But this same fallacy exists here as with the fire results: the seismic CDF values that the multiplier relies upon depend only on the CDF values and do not take into consideration the difference in the containment failure probabilities. In the seismic case the CCFP is 4.2E-1 or 42%
(see Table 5 below). Thus, it is far from clear that the assumed margin in the population dose exists.122 3.2.4 Underestimating Risk by Failing to Aggregate Changes in Risk The Draft SEIS evaluates changes in impact for various accident/risk scenarios (e.g., changes in fire CDF, changes in seismic CDF) to see how each affects the conclusions of the 1996 GEIS regarding accident risk. The Draft SEIS then compares these changes with the margin between Oconee SAMA and the 1996 LR GEIS. Thus, the Draft SEIS states:
Given the significant margin between the cumulative population dose risk results from the Oconee Station SAMA and the cumulative 95th percentile UCB population dose risk results (factor of 266) 121 Draft SEIS Page F-19, Lines 16 through 18.
122 Draft SEIS Page F-20 at lines 22-23 there is an editorial error when the text states: lie in the range of 10 x 10-4 per year to 10 x 10-4 per year
36 from the 1996 LR GEIS, the reevaluated Oconee Station SCDF does not 95th percentile estimates used in the 1996 LR GEIS.123 Each time that the Draft SEIS does this the NRC concludes that there are large margins between the risk results derived by the 95th-percentile UCB and the scenario being evaluated (see example above). But there is a fundamental problem with this approach, which causes the NRC to seriously underestimate the total risk increase from the aggregate of the scenario. The NRC is evaluating each scenario in isolation, without examining their compounding effects. The NRC thereby seriously underestimates the change in risk.
Instead of looking at each scenario in isolation, Ill aggregate the increased risk posed by the multiple scenarios which the NRC evaluates individually. I accept, only for the purposes of this illustration, the NRC risk impact calculations on each individual scenario.
Table 6 - Aggregation of Changes in Risk Scenario SAMA 1998 (CDF)
Risk Factor Change Comment Fire124 4.5E-6 6.0E-5 13 factor change in CDF Seismic125 3.9E-5 5.7E-5 1.5 factor change in CDF Power Uprate126 1.3 factor change in LERF Higher Burnup Fuel127 1.38 factor change in population dose risk LPSD128 2
factor change in CDF Jocassee Dam Failure129 30 factor change in population dose risk Total Impact 2098 The total impact of this aggregation is a factor of over 2000 risk increase. This total is the simple product of the individual values supplied by the NRC and shown in the risk factor change column of the table. As can be seen from the table the supposed margin between the potential change in seismic risk and the 1996 SAMA is a factor of 266. But the risk aggregation of these 123 2024 Draft SEIS Page F-21 Lines 38 - 41 (emphasis added).
124 2024 Draft SEIS Table F-18 Page F-18.
125 2024 Draft SEIS Table F-8 Page 22.
126 2024 Draft SEIS Page F-24 Lines 41.
127 2024 Draft SEIS Page F-25 Lines 17.
128 2024 Draft SEIS Page F-25 Lines 41 - 42.
129 2024 Draft SEIS Page F-29 Line 46.
37 six issues has a factor of over 2,000. Thus, the risk aggregation swamps the seismic factor of 266.
In providing this estimate, I recognize that the mathematical aggregation of these individual risks in this table is inaccurate because they multiply relate to different elements of a risk analysis that may not be compared directly to achieve an accurate result. For instance, three of the results are changes in core damage frequency, two are in population dose risk and the final is in large early release frequency. However, it is legitimate to aggregate these numbers in order to illustrate the scale on which the NRC is underestimating the effect of individual CDF changes on overall risk. I would note that it is possible to conduct a mathematically correct aggregation, but the available data in the various sources (i.e., 1996 GEIS, 1998 Oconee SEIS, 1998 Oconee ER, 2013 GEIS Rev. 1, 2021 Oconee ER and Draft Oconee SEIS) are simply insufficient to the task. The NRC should provide the necessary data and conduct the analysis in order to provide a reasonable estimate of how changes in CDF estimates for multiple scenarios affect overall risk.
3.2.5 Invalid assumption that studies of BWR and Westinghouse PWR is applicable to Oconee reactors.
In Section F.3.2.2, the Draft SEIS also discusses the State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analysis (SOARCA) work. As stated in the text, the SOARCA work was performed on a BWR and two Westinghouse PWRs.130 But Oconee, as a Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) PWR -- with once through steam generators (SG) in contrast to more common u-tube steam generators -- is significantly different than the SOARCA plants.
In addition to the differences in reactor design, Oconee has other unique features. It is the only plant in the nation without emergency diesel generators (EDG) as the required source of onsite emergency power, relying instead on the Keowee hydro units. SOARCA identified losses of offsite power (LOOP) as the dominant contributor to population dose. With a completely different approach to addressing LOOPs, it is unclear whether the SOARCA insights do or do not apply to Oconee absent the EDGs. Oconee also, does not have main steam isolation valves (MSIV) between the SG and the turbine. MSIV have an impact on population dose. Without additional analysis it is unclear how any useful insights obtained from the SOARCA work is relevant to Oconee.
3.3 Failure to Address Uncertainties In Section F.3.9, the Draft SEIS discusses uncertainty in the 1996 GEIS. It states that the 1996 GEIS uses the very conservative 95th-percentile, UCB estimates for environment impact.131 130 Draft SEIS page F-22.
131 2024 Draft ONS SEIS, Page F-29 Line 1.
38 These estimates are of the total population dose. But using the 95th percentile of the final results does not constitute comprehensive uncertainty analysis.
The NRCs PRA Policy Statement states: The Commission's safety goals for nuclear power plants and subsidiary numerical objectives are to be used with appropriate consideration of uncertainties in making regulatory judgments on the need of proposing and backfitting new generic requirements on nuclear power plant licensees.132 Consideration of uncertainties is an integral component of PRA133 and it is also an NRC-required component.134 The NRCs NUREG-1855 Rev. 1 supplies extensive guidance on how to perform uncertainty analysis and how to use uncertainty analysis in risk-informed decision making.135 This is because the uncertainties show the degree to which the NRC can have confidence in its predictions.136 With respect to PRAs, the NRC expects that appropriate consideration of uncertainties will be given in the analyses used to support the decision and the interpretation of the findings of those analyses.137 Because PRAs are integral to reactor risk analyses in Environmental Impact Statements (EIS),138 the requirement for uncertainty analysis is equally important to an environmental analysis as to a safety analysis.
To illustrate this point: NRC Regulatory Guide 1.174, Rev. 1, An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis, states that if total CDF is considerably greater than 1E-4 per reactor year, the NRCs focus in considering licensing actions should be on finding ways to decrease rather than increase the risk.139 As Dukes own SAMA results indicate (see their results in Table 1) the CDF values at 1.2E-4 for Oconee are above the RG 1.174 thresholds. Likewise, the LERF values of 132 Final Policy Statement, Use of PRA Methods in Nuclear Regulatory Activities, 60 Fed. Reg. 42,622 (Aug. 16, 1995) (emphasis added).
133 American Society of Mechanical Engineers /American Nuclear Society Standard ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications, Addendum A to RA-S-2008, ASME, Feb. 2009.
134 NRC Regulatory Guide 1.200 Rev. 3 Dec. 2020 (ML120238B871). See Table 2 Summary of Technical Characteristics and Attributes of a Level 1, Internal Events PRA for the At-Power Operating Mode Page 17 and Section C.1.2.11 Technical Elements for the Interpretation of Results (Including Uncertainty Analysis) Page 34.
135 NUREG-1855, Rev. 1, Guidance on the Treatment of Uncertainties Associated with PRAs in Risk-Informed Decision Making, March 2017 (ML17062A466).
136 Id. at 1.
137 Id. at iii.
138 See Standard Review Plans for Environmental Reviews for Nuclear Power Plants, Supp. 1, Operating License Renewal at 5-3, 5-5, 5-7 (NUREG-1555, Supp. 1, Draft for Comment, Feb. 2023).
139 2018.01, An Approach for Using PRA In Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis, Revision 3 (ML17317A256) (RG 1.174) Page 28.
39 1.9E-5 (Oconee Units 1 & 2) and 1.7E-5 (for Unit 3) exceed the RG 1.174 thresholds of 1E-5.140 This is precisely the type of situation where uncertainty information should be taken into consideration. Based on my years of experience, it is reasonable to suspect that the 90 percent uncertainty confidence bands around the external hazards of fire, flood and seismic are around two or event three orders of magnitude. These deficiencies deserve serious consideration.
An adequate probabilistic risk analysis would include parametric uncertainty data on all input parameters and calculate the corresponding CDF and LERF with uncertainty bounds (e.g. a CDF or LERF of 1E-5 per year with a 90% confidence band of 1E-6 to 5E-5 per year). The analysis would then propagate those CDF and LERF values with their uncertainty bands through the Level 2 and Level 3 PRA evaluations ending with estimates of both prompt and latent cancer fatalities with uncertainty bands. Finaly, the analysis would compare that calculated values with their corresponding uncertainties against the decision thresholds, i.e., safety goals. But the Draft SEIS deficient and unacceptable as it never calculates probabilistic uncertainties.
Therefore, it does not have a basis for confidence in its risk estimates for purposes of assessing environmental risk or compliance with safety goals.
3.4 Inadequate Discussion Effects of Climate Change on Accident Risk All of the above discussion on risk, including flooding risks, are based on past assumptions regarding external hazards. The authors of those previous analysis (e.g., 1983 FERC, NSAC-60, IPE/IPEEE studies) were unaware of the significant changes in the likelihood and severity of extreme weather events that are occurring today and will inevitably increase as a result of Climate Change. Consistent with GDC 2, the discussion of risk in these documents are based on natural phenomena which are historically reported for sites and their surrounding areas.
While GDC 2 required the consideration of sufficient margin, there was never any consideration that future hazards could be worse than anticipated from the past ones.
However, the NRC knows that Climate Change is inevitable and that it will substantially impact both the frequency and severity of weather-related hazards including Local intense precipitation (LIP), probably maximum precipitation (PMP) and other severe weather effects.
In describing the local environment, the Draft SEIS states that nuclear power plant structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety are designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena, such as flooding, without loss of capability to perform safety functions.
And the Draft SEIS states that if new information about changing environmental conditions becomes available, the NRC will evaluate the new information to determine if any safety-related changes are needed.141 However, the Draft SEIS does not address the fact that the Oconee reactors were not designed to withstand a flood caused by failure of the Jocassee Dam, 140 RG 1.174 Page 28.
141 Draft SEIS Pages 3 3-36.
40 and it does not discuss the environmental risks caused by inevitable increases in the frequency and severity of severe storms as a result of Climate Change.
Instead, the NRC has arbitrarily decided:
The impacts of natural phenomena, including seismic hazards, on nuclear power plant systems, structures, and components are outside the scope of the NRCs license renewal environmental review.142 In making this statement, the NRC has ignored guidance from the Council on Environmental Quality which states:
[A]gencies should consider increased risks associated with development in floodplains, avoiding such development wherever there is a practicable alternative, as required by Executive Orders 11988 and 13690. Agencies also should consider the likelihood of increased temperatures and more frequent or severe storm events over the lifetime of the proposed action... For example, an agency considering a proposed development of transportation infrastructure on a coastal barrier island should consider Climate Change effects on the environment and, as applicable, consequences of rebuilding where sea level rise and more intense storms will shorten the projected life of the project and change its effects on the environment.143 Focusing on the NRC, a recent report by the Government Accountability Office states:
Nuclear power plants can be affected by natural hazardsincluding heat, drought, wildfires, flooding, hurricanes, sea level rise, and extreme cold weather eventssome of which are expected to be exacerbated by climate change144 However, the GAO concludes that:
NRCs actions to address risks to nuclear power plants from natural hazards in its licensing, license renewal, and inspection processes do not fully consider the potential increased risks from natural hazards that may be exacerbated by Climate Change.145 142 Draft SEIS Page 3-30, Lines 12 - 14.
143 2023.01.09, Federal Register Notice, National Environmental Policy Act Guidance on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Climate Change, Page 1207 Section V (footnote omitted).
144 GAO-24-106326, Page 1.
145 2024.04, Government Accountability Office, NRC Should Take Actions to Fully Consider the Potential Effects of Climate Change, GAO-24-106326 (GAO-24-106326), Page 34.
41 In fact, this report goes on to briefly address license renewals. It also states:
Without incorporating the best available information into its licensing and oversight processes, it is unclear whether the safety margins for nuclear power plants established during the licensing periodin most cases over 40 years agoare adequate to address the risks that Climate Change poses to plants.146 I agree with the GAO that Climate Change will inevitably affect the safety of nuclear reactors, including Oconee -- and therefore should be considered by the NRC in the SEIS. If anything, the GAO Report is not strong enough because it missed the hazards associated with high winds and tornadoes and the impact of Climate Change on them. These hazards are incorporated into most if not all nuclear power plants PRAs including Oconees. At Oconee the calculated CDF from high winds is 1.6E-5 per year (see Table 1 above). This CDF is more than 50% of the CDF from all internal events. Climate Change will increase the frequency and severity of these events too. In any case, Im going to focus on Climate Changes impact on flooding.
I agree with the GAO report when it observes that climate change has driven increases in the frequency and severity of some extreme weather events.147 The NRC has focused on two types of flooding events at Oconee. The first is Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP) falling on the watershed both upstream and adjacent to the plant. Filling the watershed beyond its capacity can cause flooding the plant and causing core damage and containment failure. The second is Local Intense Precipitation (LIP). LIP is essentially a PMP event immediately on top of the plant. The concern with LIP events is that they drop large quantities of rain directly on the plant proper without filling the watershed. If the plant is not designed to handle this event (i.e., sufficient site drainage capability), there is the potential again for water to enter the plant cause damage including core damage and containment failure. Keep in mind that Oconee was designed and built as a dry site, it was never intended and cannot deal with large quantities of water on site.
Dukes Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report address both of these hazards. Table 13 of this document identifies the flood heights associated with both. It should be noted that the flood height associated with dam failures is redacted in this version.148 The associated NTTF evaluations look at these flood hazards but none addressed Climate Change.
This omission constitutes a significant deficiency in the Draft SEIS because Climate Change demonstrably affects the frequency and intensity of some external events and therefore has the potential to significantly increase accident risks. Moreover, the frequency and intensity of 146 GAO-24-106326, Page 39.
147 GAO-24-106326, Page 13, Footnote 21.
148 FHRR Rev. 1 at Table 13 on Page 58.
42 Climate Change effects are increasing over time. Given that the NRC is proposing to rely on the Draft SEIS for decisions that could affect reactor safety decades from now, the Draft SEIS must address these changing effects over the entire licensed lifetime of reactors, which may end 4 decades from now.
Climate change has already started to increase the frequency and intensity of these events.149 As discussed above in, the Draft SEIS is already inadequate as a general matter for making broad generalizations about external event CDF based on extrapolations from internal event CDF values and limited actual plant-specific values for external event impact on population dose.
The NRC is well-aware of the issues of Climate Change and its impact on nuclear plant safety.
After the Fukushima meltdowns, the NRC Office of Research initiated a research program to develop tools to assist in probabilistic and deterministic assessments of external hazards including seismic, high winds and flooding with a consideration of Climate Change.150 In addition, Climate Change has been a topic of discussion at the NRCs Regulatory Information Conference (RIC) in recent years.151 The effects of Climate Change on accident risk are and will continue to be site-specific and not subject to generalization. For example, the three reactors at the Oconee plant -- for which the NRC is now considering an application for subsequent license renewal -- lie downstream of two large dams. The design of the dams includes consideration of the maximum probable flood induced by the maximum probable precipitation (i.e., storm). The assumption in all past FERC and NRC required studies, assumes that neither the Jocassee or Keowee Dams will be overtopped by a PMP event on their respective watershed. Climate change has the potential to significantly increase the amount of precipitation falling on watersheds above the dams. But 149 See, for example, Effects of climate change on probable maximum precipitation: A sensitivity study over the Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa River Basin, April 13, 2017, Journal of Geophysical Research:
Atmospheres, https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/2016JD026001 (Effects of Climate Change on PMP); Climate change is probably increasing the intensity of tropical cyclones, March 31, 2021 NOAA, https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-probably-increasing-intensity-tropical-cyclones; Climate Change Indicators: Weather and Climate, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/weather-climate; Global Warming and Hurricanes, NOAA Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, April 11, 2023, https://www.gfdl.noaa.gov/global-warming-and-hurricanes/.
150 See NRC Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment Research Program Overview, February 22 - 25, 2021 (ML21064A418) and Potential Impacts of Accelerated Climate Change, PNNL-24868, May 2016 (ML16208A282)).
151 See Climate Change Impact on the Safety of Nuclear Installations, March 8-10, 2022 (ML22140A312)) & Observations on Extreme Weather and Impacts on Nuclear Power Plants, EPRI ML22140A320, 2022).
43 with Climate Change will the respective reservoirs have sufficient capacity to handle a Climate Change exacerbate PMP? The NRC seems uninterested.
Climate change affects risk in two ways. First, it increases the likelihood or initiating event frequency of events. For example, increased storm frequency can lead to higher initiating event frequency for losses of offsite power (LOOPs). Second, Climate Change can increase the probability of failure of design features or mitigation equipment. A 2020 severe windstorm at the Duane Arnold plant (ML21139A091) illustrates this phenomenon. While the storm may or may not be directly attributable to Climate Change, it is a reasonable example of the type of severe weather effects that Climate Change can cause today and will cause in the future. In that case, a severe windstorm caused a loss of offsite power (LOOP). As a result of the LOOP, debris accumulated at the suction of the service water systems, which are necessary to cool the emergency diesel generators (EDGs) and the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) heat exchangers. The NRCs risk analysis of the event showed an increase in the failure probabilities of the service water system, the EDGs and the ECCS due to this climate-related external event.
Consideration of these risks in an EIS would provide important information regarding climate-related accident risk as well as identification of mitigation measures to address those risks.
A third way that Climate Change affects risk analysis, which is unique to flooding risk, is the cliff edge effect. With most hazards if the severity is increased slightly, the stress on the system is increased somewhat proportionately. However, with many flood-related issues, a small increase in the hazard can cause a dramatic and often overwhelming impact on a structure. For example, a small increase in wave height could raise the flood height sufficiently to overtop a floodwall inundating the equipment the floodwall is designed to protect. Risk analyses for climate change-related flooding must look carefully at this cliff-edge phenomenon.
PMP is a significant input into the design of critical infrastructure such as dam and reactor safety analysis directly and indirectly through its impact on probable maximum flood (PMF).
The National Academies under sponsorship of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has started a project to modernize the probable maximum precipitation (PMP) methodology.152 The NRC is well aware of this effort as they have already participated in at least one of the initial project workshops. PMP and PMF also impact reactor safety directly via their impact on local intense precipitation (LIP). This project will consider approaches for estimating PMP in a changing climate, with the goal of recommending an updated approach, appropriate for decision-maker needs. This project is clear evidence that the Federal Government and the NRC understands the significance and severity of Climate Change on critical infrastructure. Waiting for the project completion is unnecessary and inappropriate.
Climate change is here, the NRC and the licensee know it, steps should be taken now to protect the plant and the public from its effects.
44 As an example of what Climate Change has the potential to do let me use the example of Duane Arnold. The Duane Arnold plant in Iowa was prematurely and permanently shuttered after being hit with a Derecho with wind speeds exceeding 100mph. Climate change has been implicated in the severity of this extreme weather event (Hints of a derecho-climate change link, ten years after 2012 storm, Washington Post, June 29, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2022/06/29/derecho-climate-change-severe-storm/)
So how could a Climate Change exacerbated flood impact Oconee? If water levels rise above grade, systems need to protect the plant during transients and accident will begin to fail. The first cliff edge, when water rises essentially above grade it will flow impeded into the turbine building and its below grade levels. These levels contain safety related and other risk significant equipment including high pressure service water, low pressure service water and emergency feedwater. The loss of these systems will impact other emergency equipment dependent on them. If water level reaches approximately not already impacted by the loss of cooling water. Finaly (the third cliff edge), if water level overtops the wall protecting the SSF it too will fail. The SSF is the last line of permanently installed equipment potentially capable of dealing with the flood. If the SSF fails all that remains is the untried FLEX equipment.
The Jocassee Dam has about of freeboard during a PMP according to the currently evaluations. See Figure 11, Jocassee PMP hydrographs in FHRR Rev.1.153 This hydrograph shows a maximum flood elevation behind Jocassee Dam of
. MSL and the top of the dam is at MSL, leaving freeboard of approximately The PMP event causes the lakes elevation to rise from a level of in less than 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> (the hydrograph indicates rising water level starting at 2000 minutes into the analysis and hitting its maximum at about 2400 minutes. Overtopping in the current analysis of record is prevented by only significant pre-flood events (lowering the water level based on warning starting at time 0 in the hydrograph by utilizing grid dependent hydro-generators) and during the event by utilizing the tainter gates and the hydro-generators. Each additional foot of elevation behind the Jocassee Dam contains about 1% extra capacity. Thus, the extra of freeboard is about 3% extra capacity. Will a Climate Change exacerbated PMP consume that 3% of freeboard? The previously reference paper on the Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa River Basin (slightly to west of the Jocassee and Keowee basin) finds that:
Our results showed that PMP driven by projected future climate forcings is higher than 1981-2010 baseline values by around 20% in the 2021-2050 near-future and 44% in the 2071-2100 far-future periods (emphasis added).154 153 FHRR Rev. 1 Figure 11, Page 31.
154 Effects of Climate Change on PMP, see Abstract on Page 4808 (emphasis added).
45 Maybe, the NRC should look into it.
As discussed above Climate Change will make this type of event more likely, increasing the associated CDF, LERF and population dose values. Climate Change will also increase the intensity of storms increasing the likelihood (and speed of such events) that if the event occurs plant equipment will be impacted.
In summary, in my professional opinion, the Draft SEIS does not reflect a complete or adequately rigorous evaluation of all external hazards, does not consider uncertainties and does not address the reasonably foreseeable effects of Climate Change on the risks of accidents at Oconee. In simply does not perform the NEPA required hard look at environmental impacts.
The GAO certainly agrees that the NRC has not looked hard enough at Climate Change. Given these serious deficiencies, the NRC cannot claim to have a reasonable basis for concluding that the environmental impacts of accidents during a license renewal term are SMALL.
- 4. CONCLUSION The history of the NRCs regulation of the Oconee reactors presents grave concerns in several significant respects.
First and foremost, from a regulatory perspective, it is unacceptable that the NRC has allowed Duke to operate for the past ten years without completing flood protection measures that NRC required ten years ago in 2011 to protect the public from the undue risk of a core melt accident caused by failure of the Jocassee Dam.
Second, the NRCs silence on this matter for the past ten years is inexcusable. The NRC should stand by its judgment, which it has never repudiated or withdrawn, that protection of public health and safety requires installation of substantial additional flood protection measures.
Third, the NRCs risk analysis in the Draft SEIS is seriously deficient in other respects, including incomplete and misleading evaluations of CDF and lack of uncertainty analysis.
Fourth, the Draft SEIS fails to consider the real threat of climate change on reactor safety and environmental risks. These impacts are inevitable and significant.
Finally, Duke has consistently downplayed the severity of the risk posed by the Jocassee Dam, to the point that it now seeks approval of a second license term for its three Oconee reactors, based on flood risk estimates that are demonstrably incorrect, incomplete, and poorly conducted. Duke has ignored data in its own possession showing that the risk of a core melt accident with subsequent containment failure caused by Jocassee Dam failure is significantly higher than Duke asserts. Duke has also ignored significant additional contributors to core damage frequency, including seismically induced dam failure, overtopping, and outages. Of course, Climate Change will only make the flood results and effects worse.
46 SLR Proceeding: a moment of crisis and opportunity: The NRCs SLR proceeding provides the agency with an opportunity to restore public confidence in its commitment to ensure public health and safety, by ending its silence regarding the crucially important 2011 Safety Evaluation, and by requiring Duke to complete the flood protection measures required ten years ago. The NRC should prepare a new environmental risk analysis that uses correct, complete, and up-to-date methods and data. Finally, Duke should account for its failure to implement measures required by the NRC ten years ago for adequate protection, and now ignored in Dukes SLR application.
ATTACHMENT 2 Standing Declarations A: Declaration of Gordon Crain (April 26, 2024) B: Declaration of Ken Marsh (April 28, 2024) C: Declaration of Jane F. Powell (April 24, 2024) D: Declaration of Frank M. Powell (April 24, 2024) E: Declaration of Rosellen Aleguire (April 24, 2024) F: Declaration of Eunice Lehmacher (April 28, 2024) G: Declaration of Kathy Crain (April 26, 2024) H: Declaration of Frank M. Powell (April 24, 2024)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY In the Matter of
)
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
) Docket Nos. 50-269/270/287 SLR-2 Oconee Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1, 2 & 3
)
DECLARATION OF GORDON CRAIN Under penalty of perjury, Gordon Crain declares as follows:
- 1) My name is Gordon Crain. I am a member of Beyond Nuclear, Inc. (Beyond Nuclear).
- 2) I live at 105 Melody Lane, Seneca, SC 29678.
- 3) My home is located within the 50-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) of the Oconee Nuclear Power Station, for which Duke Energy Carolinas LLC (Duke) has submitted an application to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the Subsequent License Renewal (SLR) of its operating license. All three Oconee units have previously received a 20-year license extension on their original 40-year operating licenses.
- 4) Based on the historical experience of nuclear power stations, I believe that these facilities are inherently dangerous. Continued operations of Oconee Nuclear Power Station for an additional 20 years beyond the three reactors current license expiration dates could cause a severe nuclear accident in the reactor(s) and/or irradiated fuel storage pool(s) thereby causing death, injury, illness, dislocation, and economic damage to me and my family. It could also cause devasting environmental damage.
- 5) I believe that Dukes application to extend operations of Oconee Nuclear Station from 60 to 80 years is inadequate to reasonably assure the protection of my health, safety and the environment. Therefore, I have authorized Beyond Nuclear to represent my interests in this proceeding.
Executed in Accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 2.304(d) by Gordon Crain Date: April 26, 2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY In the Matter of
)
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
) Docket Nos. 50-269/270/287 SLR-2 Oconee Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1, 2 & 3
)
DECLARATION OF KEN MARSH Under penalty of perjury, Kenneth S. Marsh declares as follows:
- 1) My name is Kenneth S. Marsh. I am a member of Beyond Nuclear, Inc. (Beyond Nuclear).
- 2) I live at 509 Anna Maria Blvd., Clemson, SC 29631.
- 3) My home is located within the 50-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) of the Oconee Nuclear Power Station, for which Duke Energy Carolinas LLC (Duke) has submitted an application to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the Subsequent License Renewal (SLR) of its operating license. All three Oconee units have previously received a 20-year license extension on their original 40-year operating licenses.
- 4) Based on the historical experience of nuclear power stations, I believe that these facilities are inherently dangerous. Continued operations of Oconee Nuclear Power Station for an additional 20 years beyond the three reactors current license expiration dates could cause a severe nuclear accident in the reactor(s) and/or irradiated fuel storage pool(s) thereby causing death, injury, illness, dislocation, and economic damage to me and my family. It could also cause devasting environmental damage.
- 5) I believe that Dukes application to extend operations of Oconee Nuclear Station from 60 to 80 years is inadequate to reasonably assure the protection of my health, safety and the environment. Therefore, I have authorized Beyond Nuclear to represent my interests in this proceeding.
- 6) As a scientist who has studied and spoken on climate change, I recognize that many of the predictions have been underestimated, so hazards exist beyond those anticipated by current projections.
Executed in Accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 2.304(d) by Ken Marsh Date: April 28, 2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY In the Matter of
)
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
) Docket Nos. 50-269/270/287 SLR-2 Oconee Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1, 2 & 3
)
DECLARATION OF JANE F. POWELL Under penalty of perjury, Jane F. Powell declares as follows:
- 1) My name is Jane F. Powell. I am a member of Beyond Nuclear, Inc. (Beyond Nuclear).
- 2) I live at 1098 Doug Hollow Road, Seneca, SC 29672.
- 3) My home is located within the 50-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) of the Oconee Nuclear Power Station, for which Duke Energy Carolinas LLC (Duke) has submitted an application to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the Subsequent License Renewal (SLR) of its operating license. All three Oconee units have previously received a 20-year license extension on their original 40-year operating licenses.
- 4) Based on the historical experience of nuclear power stations, I believe that these facilities are inherently dangerous. Continued operations of Oconee Nuclear Power Station for an additional 20 years beyond the three reactors current license expiration dates could cause a severe nuclear accident in the reactor(s) and/or irradiated fuel storage pool(s) thereby causing death, injury, illness, dislocation, and economic damage to me and my family. It could also cause devasting environmental damage.
- 5) I believe that Dukes application to extend operations of Oconee Nuclear Station from 60 to 80 years is inadequate to reasonably assure the protection of my health, safety and the environment. Therefore, I have authorized Beyond Nuclear to represent my interests in this proceeding.
Executed in Accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 2.304(d) by Jane F. Powell Date: April 24, 2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY In the Matter of
)
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
) Docket Nos. 50-269/270/287 SLR-2 Oconee Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1, 2 & 3
)
DECLARATION OF FRANK M. POWELL Under penalty of perjury, Frank M. Powell declares as follows:
- 1) My name is Frank M. Powell. I am a member of the Sierra Club and Beyond Nuclear, Inc.
- 2) I live at 1098 Doug Hollow Road, Seneca, SC 29672.
- 3) My home is located within the 50-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) of the Oconee Nuclear Power Station, for which Duke Energy Carolinas LLC (Duke) has submitted an application to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the Subsequent License Renewal (SLR) of its operating license. All three Oconee units have previously received a 20-year license extension on their original 40-year operating licenses.
- 4) Based on the historical experience of nuclear power stations, I believe that these facilities are inherently dangerous. Continued operations of Oconee Nuclear Power Station for an additional 20 years beyond the three reactors current license expiration dates could cause a severe nuclear accident in the reactor(s) and/or irradiated fuel storage pool(s) thereby causing death, injury, illness, dislocation, and economic damage to me and my family. It could also cause devasting environmental damage.
- 5) I believe that Dukes application to extend operations of Oconee Nuclear Station from 60 to 80 years is inadequate to reasonably assure the protection of my health, safety and the environment. Therefore, I have authorized the Sierra Club and Beyond Nuclear to represent my interests in this proceeding.
Executed in Accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 2.304(d) by Frank M. Powell Date: April 24, 2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY In the Matter of
)
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
)
Docket Nos. 50-269/270/287 SLR-2 Oconee Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1, 2 & 3
)
DECLARATION OF ROSELLEN ALEGUIRE Under penalty of perjury, Rosellen Aleguire declares as follows
- 1) My name is Rosellen Aleguire. I am a member of Sierra Club.
- 2) I live at 145 Gladys Circle, Fair Play, SC 29643.
- 3) My home is located within the 50-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) of the Oconee Nuclear Power Station, for which Duke Energy Carolinas LLC (Duke) has submitted an application to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the Subsequent License Renewal (SLR) of its operating license. All three Oconee units have previously received a 20-year license extension on their original 40-year operating licenses.
- 4) Based on the historical experience of nuclear power stations, I believe that these facilities are inherently dangerous. Continued operations of Oconee Nuclear Power Station for an additional 20 years beyond the three reactors current license expiration dates could cause a severe nuclear accident in the reactor(s) and/or irradiated fuel storage pool(s) thereby causing death, injury, illness, dislocation, and economic damage to me and my family. It could also cause devasting environmental damage.
- 5) I believe that Dukes application to extend operations of Oconee Nuclear Station from 60 to 80 years is inadequate to reasonably assure the protection of my health, safety and the environment. Therefore, I have authorized Sierra Club to represent my interests in this proceeding.
Executed in Accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 2.304(d) by Rosellen Aleguire Date: April 24, 2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY In the Matter of
)
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
) Docket Nos. 50-269/270/287 SLR-2 Oconee Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1, 2 & 3
)
DECLARATION OF EUNICE LEHMACHER Under penalty of perjury, Eunice Lehmacher declares as follows:
- 1) My name is Eunice Lehmacher. I am a member of Sierra Club.
- 2) I live at 232 Kings Way, Clemson, SC 29631
- 3) My home is located within the 50-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) of the Oconee Nuclear Power Station, for which Duke Energy Carolinas LLC (Duke) has submitted an application to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the Subsequent License Renewal (SLR) of its operating license. All three Oconee units have previously received a 20-year license extension on their original 40-year operating licenses.
- 4) Based on the historical experience of nuclear power stations, I believe that these facilities are inherently dangerous. Continued operations of Oconee Nuclear Power Station for an additional 20 years beyond the three reactors current license expiration dates could cause a severe nuclear accident in the reactor(s) and/or irradiated fuel storage pool(s) thereby causing death, injury, illness, dislocation, and economic damage to me and my family. It could also cause devasting environmental damage.
- 5) I believe that Dukes application to extend operations of Oconee Nuclear Station from 60 to 80 years is inadequate to reasonably assure the protection of my health, safety and the environment. Therefore, I have authorized Sierra Club to represent my interests in this proceeding.
Executed in Accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 2.304(d) by Eunice Lehmacher Date: April 28, 2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY In the Matter of
)
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
) Docket Nos. 50-269/270/287 SLR-2 Oconee Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1, 2 & 3
)
DECLARATION OF KATHY CRAIN Under penalty of perjury, Kathy Crain declares as follows:
- 1) My name is Kathy Crain. I am a member of the Sierra Club.
- 2) I live at 105 Melody Lane, Seneca, SC 29678.
- 3) My home is located within the 50-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) of the Oconee Nuclear Power Station, for which Duke Energy Carolinas LLC (Duke) has submitted an application to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the Subsequent License Renewal (SLR) of its operating license. All three Oconee units have previously received a 20-year license extension on their original 40-year operating licenses.
- 4) Based on the historical experience of nuclear power stations, I believe that these facilities are inherently dangerous. Continued operations of Oconee Nuclear Power Station for an additional 20 years beyond the three reactors current license expiration dates could cause a severe nuclear accident in the reactor(s) and/or irradiated fuel storage pool(s) thereby causing death, injury, illness, dislocation, and economic damage to me and my family. It could also cause devasting environmental damage.
- 5) I believe that Dukes application to extend operations of Oconee Nuclear Station from 60 to 80 years is inadequate to reasonably assure the protection of my health, safety and the environment. Therefore, I have authorized the Sierra Club to represent my interests in this proceeding.
Executed in Accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 2.304(d) by Kathy Crain Date: April 26, 2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY In the Matter of
)
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
) Docket Nos. 50-269/270/287 SLR-2 Oconee Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1, 2 & 3
)
DECLARATION OF FRANK M. POWELL Under penalty of perjury, Frank M. Powell declares as follows:
- 1) My name is Frank M. Powell. I am a member of the Sierra Club and Beyond Nuclear, Inc.
- 2) I live at 1098 Doug Hollow Road, Seneca, SC 29672.
- 3) My home is located within the 50-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ) of the Oconee Nuclear Power Station, for which Duke Energy Carolinas LLC (Duke) has submitted an application to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the Subsequent License Renewal (SLR) of its operating license. All three Oconee units have previously received a 20-year license extension on their original 40-year operating licenses.
- 4) Based on the historical experience of nuclear power stations, I believe that these facilities are inherently dangerous. Continued operations of Oconee Nuclear Power Station for an additional 20 years beyond the three reactors current license expiration dates could cause a severe nuclear accident in the reactor(s) and/or irradiated fuel storage pool(s) thereby causing death, injury, illness, dislocation, and economic damage to me and my family. It could also cause devasting environmental damage.
- 5) I believe that Dukes application to extend operations of Oconee Nuclear Station from 60 to 80 years is inadequate to reasonably assure the protection of my health, safety and the environment. Therefore, I have authorized the Sierra Club and Beyond Nuclear to represent my interests in this proceeding.
Executed in Accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 2.304(d) by Frank M. Powell Date: April 24, 2024
Non-Public Attachment B November 21, 2024
Corrected May 1, 2024 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY In the Matter of
)
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
) Docket Nos. 50-269/270/287 SLR-2 Oconee Nuclear Station,
) April 29, 2024 Units 1, 2 & 3
)
HEARING REQUEST AND PETITION TO INTERVENE BY BEYOND NUCLEAR AND SIERRA CLUB I.
INTRODUCTION Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f), the hearing notice published at 89 Fed. Reg. 10,107 (Feb. 13, 2024), and the Commissions Order of March 28, 2024, Petitioners Beyond Nuclear, Inc. (Beyond Nuclear) and the Sierra Club, Inc. (Sierra Club) hereby petition to intervene and request the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) to grant a hearing on the NRCs Draft Site-Specific Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, Supplement 2, Second Renewal Regarding Subsequent License Renewal for Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2 and 3 (Feb. 2024) (Draft SEIS). The NRC prepared the Draft SEIS to support Duke Energy Corp.s (Dukes) application for subsequent license renewal (SLR) of the operating license for the Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3 nuclear power plant. If Dukes application is granted, it will be allowed to operate Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3 for an additional twenty years beyond its current renewed operating license term, or until 2053-54.1 Petitioners contend that the NRC should not approve subsequent renewal of Dukes operating license because the Draft SEIS is inadequate to satisfy the requirements of the National 1 The NRC issued operating licenses for Oconee Units 1, 2, and 2 in 1973 and 1974, and renewed those licenses in 2000. 2021 Environmental Report (ML121158A196) at 1-1. Currently, the operating licenses for Units 1 and 2 will expire in 2033, and the operating license for Unit 3 will expire in 2034. Id.
2 Environmental Policy Act for a hard look at the environmental consequences of re-licensing the Oconee reactors.2 This Hearing Request is supported by the attached declaration and Expert Report of Jeffrey T. Mitman. See Declaration of Jeffrey T. Mitman in Support of Beyond Nuclears and Sierra Clubs Hearing Request (April 29, 2024) (Mitman Declaration) (Attachment 1 to this Hearing Request); and Mr. Mitmans Expert Report, NRC Relicensing Crisis at Oconee Nuclear Station: Stop Duke From Sending Safety Over the Jocassee Dam: Updated Analysis of Neglected Safety, Environmental and Climate Change Risks (April 2024) (Mitman Report or Expert Report) (Exhibit 1 to Mitman Declaration). Mr. Mitmans expert report updates an expert he filed on behalf of Petitioners in the first SLR proceeding for the Oconee reactors in 2021.3 II.
PETITIONERS HAVE STANDING TO REQUEST A HEARING.
Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(d), a request for a hearing must address: (1) the nature of the petitioners right under the Atomic Energy Act to be made a party to the proceeding, (2) the nature and extent of the petitioners property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding, and (3) the possible effect of any order that may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioners interest. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) has summarized these standing requirements as follows:
In determining whether a petitioner has sufficient interest to intervene in a proceeding, the Commission has traditionally applied judicial concepts of standing. Contemporaneous judicial standards for standing require a petitioner to demonstrate that (1) it has suffered or will suffer a distinct and palpable harm that constitutes injury-in-fact within the zone of interest arguably protected by the governing statutes (e.g., the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969); (2) the injury can fairly be traced to the challenged actions; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable 2 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989).
3 See Mitman Report at 1.
3 decision. An organization that wishes to intervene in a proceeding may do so either in its own right by demonstrating harm to its organizational interests, or in a representational capacity by demonstrating harm to its members. To intervene in a representational capacity, an organization must show not only that at least one of its members would fulfill the standing requirements, but also that he or she has authorized the organization to represent his or her interests.4 As demonstrated below, each of the Petitioners has standing by virtue of organizational interests that fall within the zone of interests protected by the Atomic Energy Act and NEPA. By intervening in this proceeding, Petitioners seek to protect their members health and safety, as well as protection of the environment. They wish to ensure that Dukes operating license is not approved for a second renewal term unless and until Duke demonstrates full compliance with NEPAs requirements for protection of public health and the environment.
In addition, as also demonstrated below, each Petitioner organization has members and/or staff who live within 50 miles of Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3, whose interests in protecting their own health and the health of the environment would be adversely affected by extended operation of Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3 under an additional SLR term, and who have authorized Petitioners to represent their interests in this proceeding. Therefore, Petitioners have presumptive standing by virtue of the location of their members residences and property within 50 miles of the Oconee reactors.5 A. Standing of Beyond Nuclear Beyond Nuclear is a nonprofit, nonpartisan membership organization that aims to educate and activate the public about the connections between nuclear power and nuclear weapons and 4 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-02-23, 56 N.R.C. 413, 426 (2002), petition for review denied, CLI-03-12, 58 N.R.C. 185 (2003).
5 Diablo Canyon, 56 N.R.C. at 426-27 (citing Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-01-06, 53 N.R.C. 138, 146, affd, CLI-01-17, 54 N.R.C. 3 (2001)).
4 the need to abolish both to protect public health and safety, prevent environmental harms, and safeguard our future. Beyond Nuclear advocates for an end to the production of nuclear waste and for securing the existing reactor waste in hardened on-site storage until it can be permanently disposed of in a safe, sound, and suitable underground repository. For more than fifteen years, Beyond Nuclear has worked toward its mission by regularly intervening in NRC licensing, relicensing, and other proceedings related to nuclear safety matters.
Beyond Nuclears representational standing to participate in this proceeding is demonstrated by the attached Declaration of Gordon Crain (April 26, 2024) (Attachment 2A);
Declaration of Ken Marsh (April 28, 2024) (Attachment 2B); Declaration of Jane F. Powell (April 24, 2024) (Attachment 2C); and Declaration of Frank M. Powell (April 24, 2024)
(Attachment 2D).
B. Standing of the Sierra Club Founded in 1892, the Sierra Club is a national environmental organization with 3.8 million members across the United States. The purposes of the Sierra Club are to explore, enjoy, and protect the wild places of the earth; to practice and promote the responsible use of the earths ecosystems and resources; to educate and enlist humanity to protect and restore the quality of the natural and human environment; and to use all lawful means to carry out these objectives.
The Sierra Clubs representational standing to participate in this proceeding is demonstrated by the attached declarations of its members: Declaration of Rosellen Aleguire (April 24, 2024)
(Attachment 2E); Declaration of Eunice Lehmacher (April 28, 2024) (Attachment 2F);
attachment of Kathy Crain (April 26, 2024) (Attachment 2G); and Declaration of Frank M.
Powell (April 24, 2024) (Attachment 2H).
5 III. PETITIONERS CONTENTIONS Below, Petitioners present their contentions challenging the adequacy of the NRCs Draft SEIS for subsequent renewal of the operating licenses for the Oconee reactors. As required by 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(vi), these contentions provide sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant/licensee on a material issue of law or fact, including references to specific portions of the Draft SEIS that Petitioners dispute, as well as specific citations to documents that support Petitioners disputes with the Draft SEIS.
Contention 1: Erroneous, Incomplete and Misleading Information Regarding Whether Duke Has Provided the Oconee reactors with Adequate Protection From Failure of the Upstream Jocassee Dam A. Statement of Contention The NRC Staffs conclusion that accident impacts of continuing to operate the Oconee reactors are insignificant, i.e., SMALL (Draft SEIS at F-5), is based on the assertion that Duke has provided the Oconee reactors with adequate protection from accident risks caused by external events, such as failure of the upstream Jocassee Dam. In support of this assertion, the Draft SEIS relies heavily on a description of the scope, nature and outcome of the NRC Staffs review of seismic and flooding risks (i.e., external hazards) to Oconee, conducted between 2012 and 2020 in response to the catastrophic 2011 Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident in Japan. As stated in the Draft SEIS:
In Section 4.15.1.2.1, Design-Basis Accidents, of its ER, Duke Energy summarized the site-specific requirements needed to operate a nuclear power facility, such as the Oconee Station safety analysis report (Duke Energy 2020-TN9001). The Oconee Station safety analysis report presents the design criteria and design information for Oconee Station. The Oconee Station safety analysis report also discusses various hypothetical DBAs and the safety features designed to prevent and mitigate accidents. A number of the postulated accidents are not expected to occur during the life of the plant but are evaluated to establish the design basis for the preventive and mitigative safety systems of the facility. The acceptance criteria for DBAs are described in 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 100. The
6 NRC has reviewed Oconees design basis on several occasions following the issuance of the initial operating licenses.
[An] example of NRCs review of Oconee Station design-basis is its review of external hazards information for all operating power reactors, including Oconee, as ordered by the Commission following the Fukushima accident. On November 17, 2020, the NRC staff completed its review for Oconee Station and concluded that no further regulatory action (sic) were needed to ensure adequate protection or compliance with regulatory requirements, including site-specific external hazards information, re-confirming the acceptability of Oconee Stations design basis (NRC 2020-TN8995).6
- 1. Reliance on erroneous, incomplete and misleading information The Draft SEIS assertion is based on erroneous, incomplete and misleading information.
Therefore, because the Draft SEIS bases its conclusion of insignificant environmental impacts on an unsupported claim that the reactors are adequately protected against flooding risks caused by failure of the Jocassee Dam, the Draft SEIS is inadequate to satisfy NEPAs requirement for a hard look at the environmental impacts of the proposed second license renewal decisions.7 In addition, the Draft SEIS fails to satisfy NEPA because it omits any discussion of the environmental significance of an outstanding 2011 Safety Evaluation establishing a minimum flood height that safety equipment must be protected against and also prescribed measures for 6 Draft SEIS at F F-4 (citing letter from R.J. Bernardo, NRC to J.E. Burchfield, Jr., Duke re:
Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 - Documentation of the Completion of Required Actions Taken in Response to the Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident (Nov.
17, 2020) (ML20304A369) (NRC 2020-TN8995) (NRC 11/17/20 Letter)).
7 Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349. The hallmarks of a hard look are thorough investigation into environmental impacts and forthright acknowledgment of potential environmental harms.
National Audubon Society v. Dept of Navy, 422 F.3d 174, 185 (4th Cir. 2005). The analysis must address both the probabilities of potentially harmful events and the consequences if those events come to pass. State of New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d 471, 479, 482 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(rejecting environmental analysis of spent fuel pool fire risks because it did not consider consequences as well as probability of fires in spent fuel storage pools). Impacts must be quantified if possible, but may be addressed qualitatively, with consideration of uncertainties.
Limerick Ecology Action, 869 F.2d at 744 (lack of quantifiability does not necessarily preclude further consideration under NEPA.).
7 providing adequate protection against a flood caused by failure of the Jocassee Dam.8 The 2011 Safety Evaluation remains effective because the NRC has not repudiated the safety findings or requirements in the Safety Evaluation based on an evaluation of whether adequate protection of public health and safety can be provided without those safety findings or measures. While the NRC Staff claims to have closed the issues raised by the 2011 Safety Evaluation, the document relied on by the Staff for this purported closure does not use adequate protection language and therefore does not demonstrate that the NRC believes public health and safety is adequately protected in the absence of the requirements of the 2011 Safety Evaluation. 9 Because the Draft SEIS bases its conclusion of insignificant environmental impacts on an unsupported claim regarding adequate protection from flooding risks caused by failure of the Jocassee Dam, the Draft SEIS is inadequate to satisfy NEPA.
The Draft SEIS assertion that adequate protection of the Oconee reactors from external hazards is ensure[d] invokes Section 182(a) of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a),
requiring the [NRC] to ensure that the utilization or production of special nuclear material will 8 Mitman Report, § 2.6.4 (quoting Letter from Eric J. Leeds, NRC, to Preston Gillespie, Duke, re: Staff Assessment of Dukes Response to Confirmatory Action Letter Regarding Dukes Commitments to Address External Flooding Concerns at the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 (ONS) (TAC Nos. ME3065, ME3066, and ME3067) and Enclosed Safety Evaluation (Jan.
28, 2011) (ML103490330) (2011 Safety Evaluation). Petitioners note that the 2011 Safety Evaluation was previously posted on ADAMS but was recently removed from ADAMS.
Petitioners rely on quotations and paraphrasing of the 2011 Safety Evaluation as presented in documents that remain publicly available, such as Mr. Mitmans report and the ASLBs decision in LBP-22-01, 95 N.R.C. 49 (2021). See, e.g., 95 N.R.C. at 72-73.
9 Letter from Catherine Haney, NRC to Scott Batson, Duke re: Oconee Nuclear Station -
Confirmatory Action Letter Followup Inspection Report 050000269/2016009, 050000270/2016009, 05000287/2016009 (June 16, 2016) (ADAMS Accession No. ML16168Al76) (Haney Letter).
8
... provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public.10 Adequate protection is the primary statutory standard relating to the [NRCs] mandate to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants.11 Thus, use of that phrase conveys a clear message that accident risks have been reduced to a level that is both acceptable under the Atomic Energy Act and insignificant or SMALL under NEPA.12 Under the Atomic Energy Act, no further action to reduce that acceptable level of risk is required; and under NEPA, the only required additional actions are disclosure of the impacts and consideration of alternatives to manage or avoid the residual risk of these unlikely accidents.13 Here, the Draft SEIS claim that the adequate protection standard has been satisfied with respect to flooding protection from external events such as Jocassee Dam failure is erroneous because it is not supported by any safety analysis of whether that statutory standard has been satisfied. Further, the Draft SEIS ignores the Staffs own documents that have concluded that failure of the Jocassee Dam is a credible accident that must be addressed by safety measures in order to provide adequate protection to public health and safety. Finally, by claiming that continued operation of the Oconee reactors satisfies the adequate protection standard, without 10 Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 824 F.2d 108, 109 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2232(a)).
11 Id., 824 F.2d at 109.
12 See Limerick Ecology Action v. NRC, 869 F.2d 719, 730 (3rd Cir. 1989) (noting overlap between concerns of Atomic Energy Act and NEPA); Citizens for Safe Power v. NRC, 524 F.2d 1291, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Atomic Energy Act requirements may not be viewed separate and apart from NEPA considerations). See also Final Rule, Revisions to Environmental Review for Renewal of Nuclear Power Plant Operating Licenses, 78 Fed. Reg. 37,282, 37,289 (June 20, 2013) (noting that the License Renewal GEIS is not the primary vehicle the NRC uses to address and regulate risks from severe accidents. The NRCs regulations and regulatory practices employ safety standards in the design, construction, and operation of nuclear power plants as well as risk models to ensure the public is adequately protected on an ongoing basis.
13 78 Fed. Reg. at 37,289.
9 acknowledging that the multiple documents it relies on provide no such conclusion, the NRC misleads other agencies, state and local governments, and the general public, lulling them into a false sense of security.
- a. Incorrect claims with respect to design-basis review, legal effect of the 50.54(f) letter, and adequate protection findings Design-basis review. In the Draft SEIS, the NRC Staff cites the NRC 11/17/20 Letter for the proposition that the Staff reviewed the Oconee Station design-basis.14 But the NRC 11/17/20 Letter itself does not discuss or even refer to a design-basis review with respect to external flooding events at Oconee. And there is no evidence in the record of the NRCs post-Fukushima actions that such a review was done.
Submittal of external hazards information purportedly ordered by the Commission. The 50.54(f) letters cited in the Draft SEIS did not order the submittal of external hazards information. The information was request[ed] and therefore submittal was discretionary.15 Adequate Protection. The Draft SEIS also states that in the NRC 11/17/20 Letter, the NRC concluded that no further regulatory action (sic) were needed to ensure adequate protection or compliance with regulatory requirements.16 But the words adequate protection do not appear anywhere in the NRC 11/17/20 Letter, nor does the Letter address the question of whether the Oconee reactors comply with regulatory requirements for provision of adequate 14 Draft SEIS at F-4.
15 Letter from NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees and Construction Permit Holders re: Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1.2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident (March 12, 2012) (ML12053A340).
16 Id.
10 protection from flooding risks posed by failure of the Jocassee Dam. Nor do the references cited by the NRC 11/17/20 Letter contain any findings regarding adequate protection or compliance with regulations required for adequate protection. For instance:
At pages 8-10, the NRC 11/17/20 Letter contains a discussion of Dukes reevaluation of the flooding hazard to the Oconee reactors, which was requested by a 50.54(f) letter sent to all licensees on March 12, 2012.17 In this discussion, the NRC states that the local intense precipitation, rivers and streams, and dam failure flood-causing mechanisms were not bounded by the CDB [current design basis]. Therefore, additional assessments of these flood-causing mechanisms were required.18 According to the Letter:
The NRC staff used a graded approach to determine if this site would need to perform an IA [flooding integrated assessment] for the reevaluated flooding hazard, or if an FE [focused evaluation] would suffice. Based on the graded approach, Oconee completed an FE (Reference 6.20) to ensure appropriate actions were identified and taken to protect the plant from the reevaluated flood hazard.
The NRC staff conducted a regulatory audit (Reference 6.22), completed its review of the FE, and concluded in the staff assessment (Reference 6.21) that the licensee provided sufficient information in response to the 50.54(f) letter. Audit results were summarized in the staff assessment.19 Based on this information, the NRC concluded that: [n]o further regulatory actions are required related to the flood hazard reevaluations.20 This portion of the NRC 11/17/20 Letter does not support the Draft SEIS, because the words adequate protection appear nowhere in the discussion of the flooding reevaluation. Instead, the NRC simply stated that Duke had provided sufficient information in response to the 50.54(f) letter.21 17 See NRC 11/17/20 Letter at 1.
18 NRC 11/17/20 Letter at 9.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
11 Nor do the words adequate protection appear in the Staff reference documents cited by the NRC 11/17/20 Letter in support of its conclusion that no further regulatory actions are required for Oconee.22 o For instance, Ref. 2.61, a Staff Assessment... Related to the Focused Evaluation for Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 as a Result of the Reevaluated Flooding Hazard Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 contains the following
==
Conclusion:==
The NRC staff has concluded that the licensee performed the Oconee FE in accordance with the guidance described in NEI 16-05, Revision 1, as endorsed by JLD-ISG-2016-01, and that the licensee has demonstrated that effective flood protection exists from the reevaluated flood hazards.23 This conclusion does not state that flood protection is adequate to protect health and safety as the term is used in the Atomic Energy Act and the Draft SEIS -- only that it is effective. And the term effective is undefined.
o Similarly, Ref. 2.65, an NRC letter reporting on the NRC Staffs treatment of reevaluated flood hazard information, states that Oconee is included in Category 1, which:
Corresponds to sites where no additional regulatory action is warranted. This category includes sites that have all the flood hazard mechanisms bounded by the current design basis, or sites where the licensee has demonstrated that effective or feasible flood protection will address the unbounded reevaluated hazards. This means that both licensees and staff are finished with the 50.54(f) 22 Id. at 9 (citing Refs. 6.21 and 6.25).
23 Letter from Juan F. Uribe, NRC to Ed. Burchfield, Jr., Duke, re: Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 - Staff Assessment of Flooding Focused Evaluation (CAC Nos. MG0265, MG0266, MG0267, and EPID L-2017-JLD-0029), Enclosed Staff Assessment at 10 (June 18, 2018) (ML1814A755).
12 letter flooding reevaluation assessments and backfit decisions for these sites. 24 Ref. 2.65 contains no representations regarding adequate protection of public health and safety from flooding hazards posed by failure of the Jocassee Dam.
Again, the terms effective and feasible are undefined.
In fact, in the entire post-Fukushima review record for Oconee, no NRC document can be found that makes adequate protection findings with respect to the risk of flooding from failure of the Jocassee Dam or measures necessary to provide adequate protection from those risks. The only adequate protection findings relate to the adequacy of mitigation measures.25
- b. Disregard of the Staffs own documents that have concluded that failure of the Jocassee Dam is a credible accident that must be addressed by safety measures in order to provide adequate protection to public health and safety.
The Draft SEIS also disregards a number of important facts and legal determinations that bear on the environmental impacts of re-licensing the Oconee reactors, including:
The fact that when the Oconee reactors were initially licensed by the NRC, neither Duke nor the NRC considered that failure of the Jocassee Dam was credible; and therefore, the NRC 24 Letter from Mary Jane Ross-Lee, NRC to The Licensees of Operating Power Reactors re:
Treatment of Reevaluated Flood Hazard Information Provided Under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident, Encl. 1 at 4 (Aug. 20, 2019)
(ML19067A247).
25 The 11/17/20 Letter does make a finding that Duke complied with certain post-Fukushima orders, such as Order EA-12-049 for mitigation of beyond-design-basis events and Order EA 051 for spent fuel instrumentation. Id. at 5. And for each of these compliance findings, the NRC cited a safety evaluation. See Letter from Tony Brown, NRC, to Thomas D. Ray, Duke, re:
Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 -- Safety Evaluation Regarding Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Related to Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051 (CAC Nos. MF0782, MF0783, MF0784, MF0785, MF0786, and MF0787) (Aug.
30, 2017) and enclosed Safety Evaluation (August 30, 2017) (M17202U791). But these safety findings are unrelated to the question of whether adequate protection has been demonstrated with respect to flooding risk due to failure of the Jocassee Dam.
13 did not require Duke to protect the reactors safety equipment against a flood caused by dam failure.26 The fact that in 2008, even before the Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident, the Staff had already issued a Section 50.54(f) letter to Duke, stating that while Duke was relying on walls constructed around the two ground-level entrances to the SSF [Standby Shutdown Facility] to provide sufficient protection against floods, an Inundation Study prepared by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) had predicted that a failure of the Jocassee Dam could result in a flood height of above grade.27 The fact that in 2009, the NRC remain[ed] concerned that Duke had not demonstrated that the Oconee units will be adequately protected in the event of a Jocassee Dam failure.28 The Staff also stated that Jocassee Dam failure is a credible event and needs to be addressed deterministically.29 The fact that in 2011, the Staff issued a Safety Evaluation concluding that the flood depth at the Oconee reactors needed to be raised to in order to ensure adequate protection.30 26 Mitman Report, § 2.3.2.
27 Letter from Joseph G. Giitter, NRC to Dave Baxter, Duke, re: Information Request Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Related to External Flooding, Including Failure of the Jocassee Dam at Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 (TAC Nos. MD8224, MD8225, and MD8226) (Aug. 15, 2008)
(ML081640244). See also Mitman Report, § 2.6.2.
28 Id.
29 Letter from Joseph G. Giitter, NRC to Dave Baxter, Duke, re: Evaluation of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke) September 26, 2008, Response to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Letter Dated August 15, 2008, Related to External Flooding at Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 (Oconeee) (TAC Nos. MD8224, MD8225, and MD8226) at 2 (April 30, 2009)
(ML09057077).
30 Mitman Report, § 2.6.4 (quoting 2011 Safety Evaluation).
14 The fact that as a result of the post-Fukushima review, the NRC has now approved lowering the flood depth to
, i.e., reducing the flood depth against which the SSF must be protected by and that the NRC has made no finding that this new flood depth (i.e.,
will provide adequate protection to public health and safety. 31 Yet, the Draft SEIS asserts that adequate protection of public health and safety from external hazards will be ensured during the proposed continued operation of the Oconee reactors.32 By relying on purported adequate protection findings to assert that the environmental impacts of continued operation of the Oconee reactors are SMALL, without actually demonstrating that any such findings were made, the NRC violates the cardinal rule that a NEPA analysis must show consideration of all relevant environmental concerns. State of New York, 681 F.3d at 476. Nothing in the record provided by the NRC here is relevant to the assertions of adequate protection that are made in support of the proposed finding that the environmental impacts of reactor accidents are SMALL. As discussed in the attached Mitman Declaration, these errors, omissions, and misleading statements have enormous safety and environmental significance because they obscure the fact that the NRC has failed to provide the basic level of protection to the Oconee reactors that is required by the Atomic Energy Act.33 31 Letter from Scott L. Batson, Duke to NRC re: Supplemental Information Regarding NRC 2008 and 2012 Requests for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Pertaining to External Flooding at Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS), Enclosure, Table D at 7 (March 6, 2015) 32 Draft SEIS at F-5.
33 These issues are discussed at length in the introduction to Mr. Mitmans report and in Sections 2, 3.1 and 4.
15
- 2. Omission of discussion of relevant factor affecting outcome of environmental analysis: abandonment of 2011 Safety Evaluation without making new adequate protection findings In addition, the Draft SEIS fails to satisfy NEPA because it omits any discussion of the environmental significance of the outstanding 2011 Safety Evaluation establishing a minimum flood height that safety equipment must be protected against and also prescribed measures for providing adequate protection against a flood caused by failure of the Jocassee Dam.34 This is a relevant environmental concern, State of New York, 681 F.3d at 476, because the NRC relies on its safety reviews for nuclear reactor licensing decisions as the basis for its environmental findings. See discussion above in Subsection 1.
The 2011 Safety Evaluation remains effective because the NRC has not repudiated the safety findings or requirements in the Safety Evaluation based on an evaluation of whether adequate protection of public health and safety can be provided without those safety findings or measures.35 Because the NRC has not repudiated the 2011 Safety Evaluation or made new adequate protection findings for the reduced flood height and altered measures for responding to that flood height, the 2011 Safety Evaluation remains an open and unresolved safety issue for which the NRC is unable to vouch for the adequate protection of the Oconee reactors from accident risks. The effect of that significant gap or deficit in the NRCs safety-based regulatory program on the NRCs ability to make a finding that the environmental impacts of accidents are insignificant or SMALL must be addressed in the Draft SEIS.
34 Mitman Report, § 2.6.4 (quoting 2011 Safety Evaluation).
35 As discussed above, while the NRC Staff claims to have closed the issues raised by the 2011 Safety Evaluation, the document relied on by the Staff for this purported closure does not use adequate protection language and therefore does not demonstrate that the NRC believes public health and safety is adequately protected in the absence of the requirements of the 2011 Safety Evaluation. See Haney Letter.
16 B. Basis Statement The documents and authorities on which Petitioners rely for this contention are set forth in the contention itself. They include the Mitman Report, the documentary record of the NRCs safety review and post-Fukushima reviews for Oconee, the statements made by the NRC in the Draft SEIS, the Atomic Energy Act, NEPA, and implementing case law.
C. Demonstration that the Contention is Within the Scope of the Proceeding This contention is within the scope of this proceeding because it challenges the adequacy of the Draft SEIS compliance with NEPA, a requirement for approval of Dukes SLR application.
D. Demonstration that the Contention is Material to the Findings NRC Must Make to Renew Dukes Operating License This contention is material to the findings NRC must make to renew Dukes operating license because NEPA requires that the NRC must make findings regarding the impacts of the proposed re-licensing action and reasonable alternatives to the proposed action.
E. Concise Statement of the Facts or Expert Opinion Supporting the Contention, Along with Appropriate Citations to Supporting Scientific or Factual Materials The facts and expert opinion on which Petitioners rely are set forth in the Statement of Contention above and in the expert report of Jeffrey Mitman.
CONTENTION 2: Draft SEIS Risk Estimates Fail to Meet NEPA Requirements for Rigor, Accuracy, Completeness, and Consideration of Uncertainties A. Statement of Contention In addition to the deficiencies described above in Contention 1, the Draft SEIS is deficient in other significant respects, which result in the significant understatement of accident risk. These deficiencies, as set forth in Section 3.2 of Mr. Mitmans expert report, include an inaccurate all hazards core damage frequency (CDF) estimate (Section 3.2.1), significantly underestimating the
17 probability of a large containment failure from fire (Section 3.2.2), making an unsupported assumption regarding the margin for population dose due to seismic events (Section 3.2.3),
underestimating risk by failing to aggregate changes in risk (Section 3.2.4), and relying on an invalid assumption that studies of boiling water reactors and Westinghouse pressurize water reactors are applicable to the Oconee reactors (Section 3.2.5). In addition, the Draft SEIS fails to address uncertainties, in violation of NEPA and NRC guidance for probabilistic risk assessments.
See Limerick Ecology Action, 869 F.2d at 744 and NRC guidance cited in Mitman Report, Section 3.3.
B. Basis Statement Petitioners rely for this contention on Mr. Mitmans Declaration and expert report, as well as the requirements set forth in note 7 above for a hard look at environmental impacts of a proposed action.
C. Demonstration that the Contention is Within the Scope of the Proceeding This contention is within the scope of this proceeding because it challenges the adequacy of the Draft SEIS compliance with NEPA, a requirement for approval of Dukes SLR application.
D. Demonstration that the Contention is Material to the Findings NRC Must Make to Renew Dukes Operating License This contention is material to the findings NRC must make to renew Dukes operating license because NEPA requires that the NRC must make findings regarding the impacts of the proposed re-licensing action and reasonable alternatives to the proposed action.
E. Concise Statement of the Facts or Expert Opinion Supporting the Contention, Along with Appropriate Citations to Supporting Scientific or Factual Materials The facts and expert opinion on which Petitioners rely are set forth in the Statement of Contention above and in the expert report of Jeffrey Mitman.
18 CONTENTION 3: Draft SEIS fails to address the effects of climate change on accident risk.
A. Statement of Contention The Draft SEIS fails to satisfy NEPA or NRC implementing regulation 10 C.F.R. § 51.71 because it does not address the effects of climate change on accident risk. As set forth in Section 3.4 of Mr. Mitmans expert report, increased frequency and severity of extreme weather events is inevitable, as agreed by multiple federal agencies. And therefore, climate change will inevitably affect the likelihood and severity of reactor accidents.
Consideration of climate change effects is particularly important for Oconee, which was never designed to withstand a significant flood from failure or overtopping of the Jocassee Dam.
Because climate change effects are reasonably foreseeable and potentially significant, they must be considered. State of New York, State of New York, 681 F.3d at 476. While the NRC asserts that it plans to address climate change risks in the future (Draft SEIS at 3 3-36), this does not excuse the agency from addressing the risks of climate change in this licensing decision as they are understood at this time. Only if the NRC can say that the effects of climate change are so small as to be remote and speculative can it avoid addressing those effects in its environmental review.36 B. Basis Statement Petitioners rely for this contention on Section 3.4 of Mr. Mitmans expert report, the authorities cited in his report, and State of New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d at 478.
36 681 F.3d at 478.
19 C. Demonstration that the Contention is Within the Scope of the Proceeding This contention is within the scope of this proceeding because it challenges the adequacy of the Draft SEIS compliance with NEPA, a requirement for approval of Dukes SLR application.
D. Demonstration that the Contention is Material to the Findings NRC Must Make to Renew Dukes Operating License This contention is material to the findings NRC must make to renew Dukes operating license because NEPA requires that the NRC must make findings regarding the impacts of the proposed re-licensing action and reasonable alternatives to the proposed action.
E. Concise Statement of the Facts or Expert Opinion Supporting the Contention, Along with Appropriate Citations to Supporting Scientific or Factual Materials The facts and expert opinion on which Petitioners rely are set forth in the Statement of Contention above and in the expert report of Jeffrey Mitman.
IV.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners Hearing Request and Petition to Intervene should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
__/signed electronically by/___
Diane Curran Harmon, Curran, Spielberg, & Eisenberg, L.L.P.
1725 DeSales Street N.W., Suite 500 Washington, D.C. 20036 240-393-9285 dcurran@harmoncurran.com April 29, 2024 Corrected May 1, 2024
20 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY In the Matter of
)
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
) Docket Nos. 50-269/270/287 SLR Oconee Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1, 2 & 3
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on April 29, 2024, I posted on the NRCs Electronic Information Exchange HEARING REQUEST AND PETITION TO INTERVENE BY BEYOND NUCLEAR AND SIERRA CLUB, including:
Attachment 1 (Declaration of Jeffrey T. Mitman) o Exhibit 1 to Mr. Mitmans Declaration (his Expert Report, NRC Relicensing Crisis at Oconee Nuclear Station: Stop Duke From Sending Safety Over the Jocassee Dam (April 2024))
o Exhibit 2 to Mr. Mitmans Declaration (curriculum vitae)
Attachments 2A through 2H (standing declarations).
___/signed electronically by/__
Diane Curran
21 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY In the Matter of
)
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
) Docket Nos. 50-269/270/287 SLR Oconee Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1, 2 & 3
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on May 1, 2024, I posted on the NRCs Electronic Information Exchange:
ERRATA TO HEARING REQUEST AND PETITION TO INTERVENE BY BEYOND NUCLEAR AND SIERRA CLUB; a corrected version of HEARING REQUEST AND PETITION TO INTERVENE BY BEYOND NUCLEAR AND SIERRA CLUB; and NOTICE OF APPEARANCE FOR DIANE CURRAN
/signed electronically by/
Diane Curran
Non-Public Attachment C November 21, 2024
i NRC Relicensing Crisis at Oconee Nuclear Station:
Stop Duke from Sending Safety Over the Jocassee Dam Updated Analysis of Neglected Safety, Environmental and Climate Change Risks1 Jeffrey T. Mitman April 2024 Corrected May 15, 2024 Submitted to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission on Behalf of Beyond Nuclear, Inc.
and The Sierra Club, Inc.
In Subsequent License Renewal Proceeding for Oconee Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3 1 Authors note: This report updates and revises my September 2021 report, NRC Relicensing Crisis at Oconee Nuclear Station: Stop Duke from Sending Safety over the Jocassee Dam (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Agencywide Data Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML21270A250). This report updates the information and analyses provided in my 2021 report and adds my evaluation of the NRCs accident analysis in the NRCs Draft NUREG-1437, Site-Specific Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants Supplement 2, Second Renewal Regarding SLR for Oconee Nuclear Station (February 2024) (ML24033A298).
ii Contents
- 1.
INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................................... 1
- 2.
BACKGROUND....................................................................................................................................... 3 2.1 Integrated Design and Operation of Oconee Nuclear Reactors and Upstream Dams................. 3 2.2 Jocassee and Keowee Dam Characteristics.................................................................................. 4 2.3 Oconee Nuclear Plant Design and Construction........................................................................... 4 2.3.1 Design and Construction of Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3........................................................... 5 2.3.2 Post-construction addition of Safe Shutdown Facility.......................................................... 5 2.4 Flood Risk Studies......................................................................................................................... 6 2.4.1 1983 Flood Study for FERC and Construction of Wall around SSF........................................ 6 2.4.2 NSAC-60 Probabilistic Risk Assessment................................................................................ 6 2.4.3 IPE/IPEEE for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities...................................................................... 7 2.4.4 1992 Flood Study for FERC.................................................................................................... 8 2.5 Initial Oconee License Renewal and Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives Analysis.............. 9 2.6 Updated Dam Failure and Flood Routing Evaluations and Related Regulatory Actions............ 11 2.6.1 NRC 2006 Significance Determination Process on Oconee Flooding Issue........................ 11 2.6.2 2008 NRC 50.54(f) Letter Regarding a Jocassee Dam Failure............................................. 11 2.6.3 Dukes Response to 2008 50.54(f) Letter Regarding a Jocassee Dam Failure.................... 14 2.6.4 2011 NRC Safety Evaluation................................................................................................ 15 2.7 Fukushima - Lessons Learned 2012 50.54(f) Letter and Staff Assessment................................ 18 2.8 Dukes 2021 Subsequent License Renewal Application and SAMA Analysis.............................. 20 2.9 Duke Supplemental Environmental Report................................................................................ 21 2.10 Draft SEIS..................................................................................................................................... 21 2.10.1 Power Uprate Information (Section F.3.4 of 2024 Draft ONS SEIS).................................... 22 2.10.2 Higher Fuel Burnup Information (Section F.3.5 of 2024 Draft ONS SEIS)........................... 22 2.10.3 Additional Sensitivity as it Relates to Population Dose Risk and the Jocassee Dam SAMA (Section F.4.1 of 2024 Draft ONS SEIS)............................................................................................... 22 2.10.4 Summary and Conclusions (Section F.4.2 of 2024 Draft ONS SEIS).................................... 23
- 3.
ANALYSIS............................................................................................................................................. 23 3.1 Failure to Ensure Adequate Protection from Failure of the Jocassee Dam or to Adequately Evaluate Environmental Flooding Risks.................................................................................................. 23 3.1.1 Mischaracterization of the scope of the environmental review......................................... 24 3.1.2 Inadequate consideration of flooding risks from Jocassee Dam Failure............................ 25 3.1.3 Important conclusions to be drawn from the flooding risk analyses for Oconee.............. 32
iii 3.2 Other Deficiencies in the Draft SEISs Risk Analysis.................................................................... 34 3.2.1 PWR All Hazards CDF Comparison...................................................................................... 34 3.2.2 Fire Events........................................................................................................................... 34 3.2.3 Seismic Events..................................................................................................................... 35 3.2.4 Underestimating Risk by Failing to Aggregate Changes in Risk.......................................... 35 3.2.5 Invalid assumption that studies of BWR and Westinghouse PWR is applicable to Oconee reactors. 37 3.3 Failure to Address Uncertainties................................................................................................. 37 3.4 Inadequate Discussion Effects of Climate Change on Accident Risk.......................................... 39
- 4.
CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................................... 45
iv LIST OF ACRONYMS AC Alternating Current AEC Atomic Energy Commission BWR Boiling Water Reactor B&W Babcock & Wilcox CCDP Conditional Core Damage Probability CCFP Conditional Containment Failure Probability CDF Core Damage Frequency CFR Code of Federal Regulations DEIS Draft Environmental Impact Statement ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System EAP Emergency Action Plan EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EIS Environmental Impact Statement EPRI Electric Power Research Institute FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission FOIA Freedom of Information Act GDC General Design Criterion GEIS Generic Environmental Impact Statement GL Generic Letter HEC-RAS U.S. Army Corps of Engineers River Analysis System IEF Initiating Event Frequency IPE Individual Plant Examination IPEEE Individual Plant Examination for External Events kv kilovolt LERF Large Early Release Frequency LOCA Loss Of Coolant Accident LPI Low Pressure Injection MSL Mean Sea Level
v MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSAC Nuclear Safety Analysis Center NTTF Near Term Task Force ONS Oconee Nuclear Station ORNL Oak Ridge National Laboratory PMP Probable Maximum Precipitation PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment PWR Pressurized Water Reactor RFI Request for Information ROP Reactor Oversight Process SAMA Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives SDP Significance Determination Process SG Steam Generator SEIS Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement SLR Subsequent License Renewal SSF Safe Shutdown Facility UCB Upper Confidence Bound
1
- 1. INTRODUCTION This purpose of this report is to explain and provide the basis for my expert opinion, as a nuclear engineer and risk analyst, regarding the safety and environmental impacts of Duke Energy Corporations (Dukes) current operation of Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS) Units 1, 2 and 3, and its proposal to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to extend the reactors operating license terms by 20 years until 2053 (Units 1 and 2) and 2054 (Unit 3).
This report updates my September 2021 report, NRC Relicensing Crisis at Oconee Nuclear Station: Stop Duke from Sending Safety over the Jocassee Dam (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Agencywide Data Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML21270A250). This report updates my analysis of Dukes and the NRCs failure to demonstrate or even assert that lowering the flood height for the failure of the Jocassee Dam from a previously established limit will provide adequate protection to public health and safety. This updated report also supplies my evaluation of the NRCs accident analysis in the NRCs Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (Draft SEIS) for the proposed subsequent renewal of the operating licenses, as well as Dukes Environmental Report and Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives (SAMA) Analysis that the NRC used to prepare the Draft SEIS.2 Finally, this updated report addresses the NRCs failure to address the potential effects of Climate Change on accident risk in the Draft SEIS.
The report is based in significant part on my experience as a nuclear engineer and safety regulator with the NRC, including evaluation of Oconees safety in relation to potential failure of the upstream Jocassee Dam.
In my expert opinion, and as discussed in more detail below, Oconees current operation, and proposed operation under an additional twenty-year subsequent license renewal (SLR) term, pose an unacceptable risk to public health and safety and the environment, due to Dukes failure to protect ONS from the flood identified by the NRC in its 2011 Safety Evaluation.3 The NRC deemed those flood protection measures necessary to provide adequate protection 2 NUREG-1437, Site-Specific Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants Supplement 2, Second Renewal Regarding SLR for ONS Draft Report for Comment (February 2024)
(ML24033A298) (Draft SEIS); 2021.06.07, Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Application for Subsequent License Renewal, Appendix E (ML21158A196) (2021 Environmental Report and 2021 SAMA Analysis); 2022.11.07 Supplemental Environmental Report (ML22311A036) (Supplemental Environmental Report).
3 2011.01.28, Safety Evaluation on Confirmatory Action Letter to Address External Flooding Concerns, (ML110280153) (2011 NRC Safety Evaluation Letter). As of 2024.04.26, this document is not in public ADAMS. It appears to have been removed sometime between a Beyond Nuclear FOIA request (FOIA 2022-000210) involving this document on 2022.07.28 and 2024.04.26. All quotes from this Safety Evaluation in this report were made in my previous report (ML21270A250) dated 2021.09.27 which is still publicly available in ADAMS.
2 against a core melt accident in the event the Oconee site becomes inundated by failure of the Jocassee Dam.
While the NRC has not enforced the flood height established by the 2011 Safety Evaluation or forced Duke to implement the flood protection measures it deemed necessary for adequate protect of the Oconee reactors against flooding, neither has it withdrawn or repudiated the 2011 Safety Evaluation in which it found those measures were necessary to provide adequate protection to public health and safety. Instead, the NRC has lowered the flood height and changed the measures required to address the new flood height, without making any finding that the Oconee reactors are adequately protected against flooding risks. This raises a serious concern because the adequate protection standard, as set forth in Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act, (42 U.S.C. § 2232(a), sets a floor for minimum safety requirements. A nuclear reactor for which the NRC is unable or unwilling to make adequate protection findings does not provide the basic level of safety required by the Act.
In addition, my report discusses the concern that NRC has failed consider the impact on Oconee from Climate Change. While NRC has looked extensively on Oconees impact on Climate Change, it has refused to consider Climate Changes impact on safe operation on Oconee. Given that Climate Change is now generally considered to be reasonably foreseeable, and in light of recent criticisms by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Draft SEIS failure to address climate change is a serious deficiency. 4 Finally, the accident risk analysis in the Draft SEIS is seriously defective, and thereby fails to support the NRC Staffs conclusion that the environmental impacts of re-licensing the Oconee reactors are insignificant or SMALL.5 These deficiencies include inconsistent and unsupported estimates of core damage frequency (CDF) and lack of uncertainty analysis.
Now that Dukes SLR application has come before the NRC and the NRC has issued its Draft SEIS, it is time for the agency to break its silence and address the significant safety, environmental and Climate Change issues raised by Dukes bid for another 20 years of unprotected operation. The NRC should not accept Dukes erroneous and outdated risk assessment. Instead, it should require Duke to provide a thorough and accurate estimate of the core melt risk. In addition, the NRC should require Duke to implement the flood protection measures required thirteen years ago by the NRC.
A note about secrecy: A significant portion of the information relied on in this report was not available publicly until members of the public forced NRC to release it by requesting it under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). I am grateful to Jim Riccio for FOIA Request FOIA/PA-2012-0325 (submitted on behalf of Greenpeace) and Dave Lochbaum for FOIA Request 4 2024.04, Government Accountability Office, NRC Should Take Actions to Fully Consider the Potential Effects of Climate Change, GAO-24-106326 (GAO-24-106326), Page 34.
5 Draft SEIS Page F-4 Line 39, F-9 Line 4.
3 FOIA/PA-2018-0010 (submitted on behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists), which generated some of the key information relied on this report. The NRC never attempted to justify withholding this critical, damming, and now-public safety information from the public eye, nor is any justification evident.
While Duke and the NRC have continued to withhold some information relevant to this report, and has even withdrawn several documents that formerly were released under FOIA (see note 4), the information now in the public record is more than sufficient to show that Duke has failed to provide the public with an accurate, up-to-date, and thorough risk analysis of the potential for a serious core melt accident at Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3 during the second license renewal term. In addition, publicly available information is more than sufficient to show that for the past ten years, the NRC has considered the risk of a core melt accident caused by Jocassee Dam failure to implicate the adequacy of protection to public health and safety and require significant measures to prevent catastrophe. By assembling this information into a single document, the author seeks to ensure a measure of accountability by Duke and the NRC that they previously eluded through secrecy.
Finally, while some nonpublic documents are cited in the footnotes to this report, the report does not rely directly on the content of any of those nonpublic documents. Citations of those documents are provided for completeness of the record, not for their content. When the content of nonpublic document is described in this report, that description is taken from descriptions in publicly available documents.
- 2. BACKGROUND 2.1 Integrated Design and Operation of Oconee Nuclear Reactors and Upstream Dams Duke Energy Corp.s three-unit Oconee Nuclear Station is located in the mountains of northwestern South Carolina, at the confluence of the Keowee and Little Rivers. Licensed by the NRC in 1973 and 1974, Oconee is uniquely designed as part of a pumped storage facility: at the same time the reactors were built, Duke also built two upstream dams, for the purpose of generating additional hydro-powered electricity. When demand for electricity from the reactors was low, the plant could be used to pump water into Jocassee Lake behind the Jocassee Dam.
When demand was high, Duke would then allow flow through hydroelectric generators in the dam generating power.
The Jocassee Dams tailwaters were dammed by the Keowee Dam, below which Duke built the Oconee reactor complex. The crest of the Keowee Dam is at 815 feet mean sea level (MSL). Plant grade at ONS is 796 feet MSL. Thus, ONS plant grade is two feet below normal Lake Keowee level. Two hydroelectric generators, built into the side of the Keowee Dam, were designed to provide the nuclear plant with an emergency power supply in the event of a loss of offsite power. The Oconee design did not and does not include diesel-powered emergency generators, which are at every other U.S. nuclear power plants.
4 Thus, the Jocassee Dam and the Keowee Dam, as well as the lakes behind them, constitute an integral part of the Oconee nuclear power plant, including its backup emergency power supply.
2.2 Jocassee and Keowee Dam Characteristics Completed in 1971 and licensed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the Keowee Dam is a 170 foot-high rock-filled earthen dam about 3,500 feet in length. The Oconee nuclear power plant complex is built into the side of the dam, which contains two hydroelectric generators with a combined output of about 150 MW.6 These hydroelectric generators provide emergency power to Oconee.
The Keowee Dam lies about 14 miles downstream of the Jocassee Dam. It impounds about one million acre-feet of water and has a surface area of about 18,000 acres. The top of the dam is at 815 feet above MSL. Full pond or normal operating level of Keowee Lake is at 800 ft.
Construction of the Keowee Dam was completed in 1971.
Completed in 19751 and also licensed by FERC, Jocassee Dam is a rock-filled earthen dam 385 feet high and about 1,000 feet long. It also impounds about a million acre-feet of water in the Jocassee Lake at normal lake operating level, with an area of 7,565 acres. The lakes pumped storage capability is supplied by four hydroelectric turbines that can be reversed to pump water from below the Jocassee Dam to above the dam.
The top of the Jocassee dam is at 1,125 ft. full pond operating level of Jocassee Lake (i.e.,
normal operating level) is 1,110 ft.
2.3 Oconee Nuclear Plant Design and Construction NRC Safety Requirements for Nuclear Plant Design and Construction All nuclear power plants constructed after 1973 are required to meet 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 Appendix A General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, including Criterion 2 - Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena. General Design Criterion (GDC) 2 states in part:
Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches without loss of capability to perform their safety functions....
5 Oconee was built prior to 1973 and therefore was not required to meet GDC 2; but it was required to meet a similar draft version of the criterion. The pre-GDC 2 version for Oconee provided that:
Those systems and components of reactor facilities which are essential to the prevention of accidents which could affect the public health and safety or to mitigation of their consequences shall be designed, fabricated, and erected to performance standards that will enable the facility to withstand, without loss of the capability to protect the public, the additional forces that might be imposed by natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, flooding conditions, winds, ice, and other local site effects. The design bases so established shall reflect: (a) appropriate consideration of the most severe of these natural phenomena that have been recorded for the site and the surrounding areas and (b) an appropriate margin for withstanding forces greater than those recorded to reflect uncertainties about the historical data and their suitability as a basis for design.7 It is understood that the intent of GDC 2 and its predecessors was to ensure that the emergency core cooling systems and the associated electrical power systems were protected against credible external hazards.
2.3.1 Design and Construction of Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3 During initial Oconee licensing, Duke convinced the Atomic Energy Commission (predecessor to the NRC) that a Jocassee Dam failure was not credible. Duke has repeatedly stated that they believe a Jocassee Dam failure is not credible.8 Thus, at the earliest point of design and construction, the NRC did not require Duke to protect Oconee from a Jocassee Dam failure. For instance, the turbine building, located at a grade of 796 feet mean sea level MSL), houses portions of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and other safety related and important to safety systems, including the service water systems and the 4kv emergency buses. But the NRC did not require Duke to build the turbine building as a watertight structure. As a result, 2.3.2 Post-construction addition of Safe Shutdown Facility Sometime prior to 1983, in order to address other Oconee design weakness not related to flooding, Duke decided to install additional equipment to improve Oconees safety. Duke 7 2021.12.31, Duke Energy Company Oconee Nuclear Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, (ML22180A123) at Section 3.1.2 Criterion 2 - Performance standards (Category A) Page 3.1-8.
8 2008.09.26, Duke Response to 50.54(f) Request (ML082750106), (2008 Duke 50.54(f) Response Letter) Attachment 2, Page 6. 2009.04.30, NRC Letter to Duke Evaluation of Duke Responses to NRC Letter Dated August 15, 2008, Related to External Flooding at Oconee (ML090570779), Page 2.
6 completed the installation of the safe shutdown facility (SSF) prior to 1983. The SSF is designed to address events including fire, sabotage, turbine building floods, station blackouts and tornado missile events. It contains a single diesel generator capable of supplying sufficient power only for the SSF equipment. It contains pumps capable of supply water to the steam generators and to the reactor coolant systems of all three units and a service water pump only capable of cooling the SSF loads. None of this equipment is safety related, single failure proof or redundant. It is manually controlled and operated locally from the SSF itself. The SSF is at a grade of 796 ft.9 because the SSF was not intended to be used for external floods, it was not protected from them. However, the SSF diesel and several of its pumps are below grade.
2.4 Flood Risk Studies 2.4.1 1983 Flood Study for FERC and Construction of Wall around SSF In a 1983 hydrological analysis, Duke evaluated the impacts of a postulated sunny-day failure of the Jocassee Dam and determined as follows:
The results of the study indicated an estimated peak flood elevation of
) MSL at Keowee Dam, and a resulting ONS powerblock flood depth of
). In order to reduce the risk of flooding, the licensee erected walls around the entrances to the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) with average wall height of
(
. The construction of the walls was not part of the design-basis.10 Thus, by 1983 Duke recognized that external flooding was possible and that if Oconee experienced a flood above grade, the flood would incapacitate the ECCS. In that event, Duke would have no way to mitigate the flood.
2.4.2 NSAC-60 Probabilistic Risk Assessment In the late 1970s and early 1980s Duke initiated one of the first industry-conducted nuclear power plant probabilistic analyses (PRA). The study was prepared by the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center 11 and was called NSAC-60. NSAC-60 was a full-scope PRA, meaning it included both internal hazards such as loss of coolant accidents (LOCA) and external events such as earthquakes. It included an analysis of core damage frequency (referred to as a Level 1 9 2018.06.18 NRC Staff Assessment Related to Focused Evaluation for Oconee, Page 3 (ML18141A755).
10 2016.04.14 NRC Staff Assessment by the Office of NRR Related to flooding Hazard Reevaluation Report NTTF Recommendation 2.1 Oconee (ML16273A128).
11 NSAC initially was a separate legal entity, collocated with the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI).
About 1990 it was folded into EPRI.
7 analysis), containment failure frequency (referred to as a Level 2 analysis), and impacts on the surrounding population (referred to as a Level 3 analysis).
The NSAC-60 analysis included contributions to core melt frequency by failures of the Jocassee and Keowee Dams.12 As described by Duke, the study determined the failure frequency for the Jocassee Dam by compiling data for dams with similar attributes. It considered three time periods and derived three median annual failure frequencies for causes other than earthquakes and overtopping:
1900 to 1981 2.3x10-5 per year 1940 to 1981 1.6x10-5 per year 1960 to 1981 1.4x10-5 per year13 2.4.3 IPE/IPEEE for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities In 1988 the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 88-20, requesting all reactor licensees submit a systematic examination in order to identify any plant-specific vulnerabilities to severe accidents and report the results to the Commission.14 Initially, GL-88-20 requested licensees to analyze only internal events such as loss of coolant accidents (LOCA) and transients. The NRC subsequently issued 5 revisions. Among other changes, the revisions, expanded the scope to include external events such as tornados, seismic events and external floods.
In response, in December 1990, Duke submitted an Individual Plant Examination (IPE) that evaluated internal events.15 In December 1995, Duke submitted an Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) that evaluated external events.16 In 1997, in a nonpublic document, Duke updated the IPE and IPEEE and resubmitted the results.17 In the 1995 IPEEE, Duke considered whether and how to evaluate the risks of external flooding at Oconee. First, Duke considered evaluating the risk of a probable maximum precipitation 12 Nuclear Safety Analysis Center, NSAC-60, A Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Oconee Unit 3, June 1984.
13 US NRC Information Notice 2012-02, Potentially Nonconservative Screening Value for Dam Failure Frequency in PRA, March 5, 2012, Page 2, (ML090510269).
14 1988.11.23, NRC Generic Letter 88-20, Individual Plant Examinations for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities.
15 1990.12, Duke IPE (nonpublic). As discussed above in my Note on Secrecy, the IPEE is cited here for purposes of identification. This report does not rely directly on the content of the IPEEE, or any other nonpublic document. When the content of the IPEEE or any other nonpublic document is described in this report, it is taken from descriptions in publicly available documents.
16 1995.12.21, Duke IPEEE (nonpublic).
17 1996.12, Duke Oconee Nuclear Station PRA Revision 2 Summary Report (ML080780111) (nonpublic).
8 (PMP) event at the Oconee site, i.e., a large storm in the direct vicinity of the plant. But Duke screened out a PMP event based on the size of the reservoirs above the Keowee and Jocassee Dams.
Duke also considered whether to evaluate a Jocassee Dam failure in the IPEEE. In making this evaluation, Duke focused on three types of dam failures: seismic dam failure, random (i.e.,
sunny day) dam failure, and a dam failure caused by a PMP above the Jocassee Dam that overtopped the dam (i.e., a dam breach caused by water flowing over the top of the dam).
The IPEEE found that a seismic failure of Jocassee Dam was a dominant contributor to the total Oconee CDF, and calculated the contribution to core damage frequency from a seismic failure of Jocassee at 7.2E-6 per year (i.e., 20% of the total seismic CDF of 3.6E-5).18 In evaluating a random or sunny day failure, the IPEEE found a CDF of 7.0E-6 per year.19 In making this estimate, Duke used a dam failure frequency of 1.3E-5 per year, an insignificant decrease from the values derived and used in NSAC-60. 20 With respect to a PMP-induced Jocassee Dam failure, Duke concluded that such a failure was not credible.21 Therefore, Duke did not evaluate a PMP-induced Jocassee Dam failure.
2.4.4 1992 Flood Study for FERC In 1992, Duke performed an inundation study to meet a FERC requirement for formulating an emergency action plan in the event that the Jocassee Dam failed. This study showed that approximately of water would inundate the yard area surrounding the SSF (i.e., the SSF yard is at elevation 796 ft MSL as previously discussed), thereby rendering inoperable Oconees all systems necessary to shut down and maintain all three units in a safe and stable condition.22 18 1995.12.05, Oconee IPEEE Submittal Report (nonpublic). See also 2008 Duke 50.54(f) Response Letter; 1996.07.08, NRC Letter: Draft Reports Related to the Keowee Hydro Station Emergency Electrical System Supply to Oconee (ML15118A442). Total seismic CDF is 3.6E-5 per year (see Page 106) while 20% of this is from a Jocassee Dam failure (Page 107), i.e., 3.6E-5 x 0.2 = 7.2E-6 per year.
19 2000.03.15, NRC Letter: Oconee Review of IPEEE (ML003694349), Staff Evaluation Page 2.
20 FOIA Response 2012-0325 Page 17 of 308, (ML15156A702) (FOIA Response 2012-0325). See also 1996.07.08, NRC Letter: Draft Reports Related to the Keowee Hydro Station Emergency Electrical System Supply to Oconee (ML15118A442), Page 110.
21 1996.07.08, NRC Letter: Draft Reports Related to the Keowee Hydro Station Emergency Electrical System Supply to Oconee (ML15118A442) Section 6.4.1, Page 110. See also FOIA Response 2012-0325.
22 While the inundation study is not a public document, the NRC described it in its 2011 NRC Safety Evaluation Letter (ML110280153 Page 1).
9 2.5 Initial Oconee License Renewal and Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives Analysis In July 1998, Duke submitted a license renewal application to NRC, requesting an extension of the Oconee reactors licenses terms by 20 years. The NRC renewed Dukes licenses in May 2000.23 Dukes Environmental Report for the license renewal application included a Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives (SAMA) analysis, containing a review of potential design alternatives along with any procedural, non-hardware, alternatives. 24 For its risk estimates, the SAMA analysis relied on the IPE/IPEEE risk analyses, as well as a non-public revised IPE/IPEEE submitted in December of 1997, also referred to as Oconee PRA Revision 2 and Oconee PRA/IPE Revision 2.25 The SAMA analysis started with the total core damage frequency from the IPE/IPEEE of 8.9E-5 per year, with 2.6E-5 per year (29%) from internal events and 6.3E-5 per year (71%) from external events. The external events were broken down as follows:
CDF from External Events26 Frequency (per reactor-year)
Initiating Events Seismic 3.9E-05 Tornado 1.4E-05 External Flood 5.9E-06 Fire 4.5E-06 Total External 6.3E-05 The following Table 1 shows these values in comparison to the 2021 Environmental Report and the Draft SEIS:
23 2000.05.23, NRC Renews License of Oconee for an Additional 20 Years (ML003718834).
24 1998.04, Environmental Report, Application for Renewed Operating Licenses, Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Attachment K, Page 1 (1998 SAMA Analysis).
(https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications/oconee/exhibitd.pdf) 25 1998 SAMA Analysis Pages 4, 9, 10.
26 1998 SAMA Analysis, Page 10.
10 Table 1 Core Damage Frequency (CDF) for External Events CDF for Internal & External Events (per reactor year)
Initiating Events 1998 SAMA27 SEIS 199828 License Amendment 2021 SAMA29 2024 Draft SEIS30 Internal Events 6.3E-5 2.6E-5 2.4E-5 2.4E-5 Internal Flood 9.5E-631 9.5E-6 1.9E-6 1.6E-6 Seismic 3.9E-05 3.9E-5 5.7E-532 3.3E-5 3.3E-5 Tornado 1.4E-05 1.4E-5 1.7E-5 3.3E-5 External Flood 5.9E-06 5.6E-6 2.5E-7 2.5E-7 Fire 4.5E-06 4.5E-6 6.0E-533 4.6E-5 5.1E-5 Total External 6.3E-05 6.3E-5 9.7E-5 9.7E-5 Total Internal & External 8.9E-5 8.9E-5 1.2E-4 1.3E-4 The SAMA analysis considered flooding hazards from a Jocassee Dam failure, apparently in reliance on the NSAC-60 and IPEEE studies.34 The discussion about a Jocassee Dam failure describes it in the context of random failures.35 Based on this statement, it is reasonable to assume that Duke only considered random sunny-day dam failures, ignoring seismic and overtopping, failures. This approach of excluding seismic and overtopping-related dam failures was consistent with the IPEEE.
But the 1998 SAMA analysis differed from the IPEEE in the respect that it estimated the external flooding contribution at 5.9E-6 per year, whereas the IPEEE estimated the external flooding contribution at 7E-6. The 1998 SAMA analysis did not address or explain this difference. The 1998 SAMA analysis evaluated two alternatives that would impact Jocassee Dam failure consequences. The first alternative was to staff the SSF continuously with a trained operator, and the second was to increase the height of the wall protecting the SSF from 27 1998 SAMA Analysis Page 10.
28 1999.12, Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants Supplement 2, Regarding Oconee, NUREG-1437, at Table 5-3 Page 5-6.
29 2021.06.07, Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 Application for Subsequent License Renewal, Appendix E - Applicants Environmental Report, (ML21158A196) (2021 Environmental Report). CDF values come from Table 4.15-2 Pages 4-89 to 4-109. These are the averages of the Unit 1, 2 & 3 values.
30 2024 Draft SEIS from Table F-5 Page F-15.
31 The internal flood value of 9.5E-6 from the 1998 SAMA is already included in the total value of 6.3E-5 for Total Internal Events in the previous row for 1998 values only.
32 2024 Draft SEIS from Table F-8 Page F-22.
33 2024 Draft SEIS from Table F-7 Page F-18.
34 1998 SAMA Analysis Pages 7, 15, 19.
35 1998 SAMA Analysis Page 15.
11 floods to
.36 But Duke determined these alternatives were not cost-effective.37 Duke also identified a third alternative: strengthening the Jocassee Dam and thus lowering the random failure frequency. But Duke rejected this alternative without evaluating it, on the ground that the cost would far exceed the benefit of core damage frequency reduction.38 The NRC reviewed the SAMA analysis and concluded: Based on its review of SAMAs for ONS (Oconee Nuclear Station), the staff concurs that none of the candidate SAMAs are cost beneficial.39 This included the two evaluated alternatives addressing a Jocassee Dam failure.
2.6 Updated Dam Failure and Flood Routing Evaluations and Related Regulatory Actions 2.6.1 NRC 2006 Significance Determination Process on Oconee Flooding Issue In November 2006, the NRC completed a Significance Determination Process (SDP) evaluation related to a performance deficiency involving a missing covering in the wall protecting the SSF.40 NRC characterized the missing flood barrier as a violation and determined its significance as a White finding.41 After Dukes appeals of the finding, the NRC affirmed the finding.42 Dukes repeated appeals prompted the NRC to re-evaluate the flooding risk at Oconee from a Jocassee Dam failure. While Duke had previously estimated the dam failure rate in the range of 2.3E-5 to 1.4E-5 per year (NSAC-60) and had revised it to 1.3E-5 per year (IPEEE), the NRC found these estimates of failure frequency of the Jocassee dam were too low. In the SDP appeal process the NRC calculated a Jocassee Dam failure rate of 1.8E-4 per year.43 2.6.2 2008 NRC 50.54(f) Letter Regarding a Jocassee Dam Failure In 2008, in light of its new understanding from the previously discussed SDP that the Jocassee Dam failure frequency was significantly larger than what Duke had previously represented, NRC 36 1998 SAMA Analysis Page 16.
37 1998 SAMA Analysis Page 28.
38 1998 SAMA Analysis Page 15.
39 1999.12, Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants Supplement 2, Regarding Oconee, NUREG-1437, Page 5-19.
40 2006.11.22, NRC Final Significance Determination for White Finding and Violation (ML063260282)
(2006 NRC White Finding). The SDP is part of the NRCs reactor oversight process (ROP). The ROP is the NRCs program to inspect, measure and assess the safety performance of operating plants. The SDP is the NRCs process for assessing the significance of findings identified in the ROP.
41 2006 White Finding, Page 1.
42 2007.11.20, NRC Reconsideration of Final Significance Determination Associated with SSF Flood Barrier White Finding, (ML073241045) (2007 NRC Reconsideration of Significance Determination).
43 2007 NRC Reconsideration of Significance Determination, Page 1.
12 issued Duke a 10CFR50.54(f) letter requesting additional information.44 First, the 50.54(f) letter laid out the regulatory requirements applicable to Oconee, and described the status of Dukes flood protection measures:
Section 3.1.2 of the UFSAR, Criterion 2 - Performance Standards (Category A), states, Those systems and components of reactor facilities which are essential to the prevention of accidents which could affect public health and safety or to mitigation of their consequences shall be designed, fabricated and erected to performance standards that will enable the facility to withstand, without loss of the capability to protect the public, the additional forces that might be imposed by natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, flooding conditions, winds, ice, and other local site effects. The current UFSAR discusses walls that are used for flood protection at the SSF.
However, it does not include the effects of a Jocassee Dam failure, nor does it include the flood protection features to mitigate the consequences of such an event. We further note that in the mid-1990s, the UFSAR was revised by removing the reference to the Jocassee Dam failure and postulated wave height of in the yard at the Oconee site.45 The letter also references the flood heights calculated from the 1992 FERC analysis. This letter characterizes the 1992 FERC analysis as
,46 while the previous discussion of the FERC analysis characterized the same analysis as having a flood height.47 In addition, the NRCs letter requested Duke to address three specific issues:
- 1) Explain the bounding external flood hazard at Oconee and the basis for excluding consideration of other external flood hazards, such as those described in the Inundation Study, as the bounding case.
- 2) Provide your assessment of the Inundation Study (the 1992 study conducted for FERC) and why it does or does not represent the expected flood height following a Jocassee Dam failure.
- 3) Describe in detail the nuclear safety implications of floods that render unavailable the SSF and associated support equipment with a concurrent loss of all Alternating Current power.48 In subsequent discussions with Duke, the NRC compared the Jocassee Dam hazard with other hazards considered in the design and licensing basis. It observed that a Jocassee Dam failure frequency of about 2E-4 per year was less than the hazard from general transients, losses of 44 2008.08.15, NRC letter to Duke: Information Request Pursuant to 10CFR50.54(f) Related to External Flooding Including Failure of the Jocassee Dam at Oconee (ML081640244) (2008 NRC 50.54(f) Letter).
45 2008 NRC 50.54(f) Letter, Page 1, 9 (emphasis added).
46 2008 NRC 50.54(f) Letter, Page 2.
47 2011 Safety Evaluation Letter, Safety Evaluation, Page 1.
48 2008 NRC 50.54(f) Letter, Page 2.
13 offsite power, etc., but greater than the hazard from medium and large break LOCAs (see Figure 1 below).49 It should be noted here that for all of the other hazards listed, Oconee -- as well as every other US nuclear power plant -- is required to have safety grade, fully redundant, single failure proof ECCS capable of responding. For the Jocassee Dam failure, Oconee had the SSF which is non-safety grade, has no redundancy, is not single failure proof and is not part of the ECCS. Even if the original Jocassee Dam failure rate of 1.3E-5 was correct, this is still an order of magnitude greater than the large LOCA rate of 2E-6 per year which is in the design basis and requires the ECCS to protect the public. At this point in time (2008) the SSF was protected from a Jocassee Dam failure by a -
wall that Duke from its previous analysis knew was inadequate because the 1992 analysis for FERC showed that there was a potential for over of water at the SSF.
Figure 1 Oconee Hazard (or Initiating Event) Frequency Comparison Credible Events 50 49 2008.08.28, NRC Presentation Oconee Flood Protection and Jocassee Dam Hazard (2008 NRC Presentation Oconee), Slide 8 (ML082550290).
50 2008 NRC Presentation Oconee), Slide 8 (strike through text in original).
14 2.6.3 Dukes Response to 2008 50.54(f) Letter Regarding a Jocassee Dam Failure Duke responded to NRCs 50.54(f) letter that: Duke considers a random sunny day failure of the Jocassee dam not credible because of the nature of its design, its construction, the inspections conducted during its construction, and those periodic inspections that have occurred, and continue to occur, since its construction.51 Duke further argued that the higher flood elevations posited by NRC in the 50.54(f) letter were not applicable to Oconee, because they came from the 1992 study Duke had conducted for FERC to establish an Emergency Action Plan (EAP) for the population downstream of Jocassee, and thus was intended to provide a worst case analysis rather than credible flood levels.52 After considerable discussion with Duke, the NRC sent a letter in the spring of 2009. This letter states in part: The NRC staffs position is that a Jocassee Dam failure is a credible event and needs to be addressed deterministically.53 The letter clearly articulates that the NRC is concerned about adequate protection. For example, it states: When the inundation study and sensitivity analyses are completed, the NRC staff will evaluate the results to determine whether further regulatory actions are necessary to ensure there is adequate protection against external flooding at Oconee.54 Finally, the NRC states its expectation of receiving analyses which would establish an adequate licensing basis for external flooding...55 In response to the NRCs concerns, and after further analysis, Duke decided to raise the wall height protecting the SSF by to a total height of
. It completed this work in February of 2009.56 Duke also responded to the NRCs inquiries by performing an additional hydrological analysis of the failure of Jocassee Dam and propagating the resulting flood onto the Keowee Lake and Dam and then onto Oconee. Building on the model in the 1992 study for FERC, Duke modified it and increased the level of detail. Duke reported its preliminary results to the NRC in a presentation 51 2008.09.26, Duke Letter in Response to 10CFR50.54(f) Request, Attachment 2 Page 3 (ML082750106)
(2008 Duke 50.54(f) Response Letter).
52 2008 Duke 50.54(f) Response Letter, Attachment 2 Page 3.
53 2009.04.09, NRC letter to Duke Evaluation of Duke September 26, 2008, Response to NRC Letter Dated August 15, 2008, Related to External Flooding at Oconee (ML090570779), Page 2 (2009 NRC External Flooding Letter).
54 2009 NRC External Flooding Letter, Page 3.
55 2009 NRC External Flooding Letter, Page 3.
56 2009.05.11, Duke Presentation on Oconee External Flood (ML091380424).
15 on October 28, 2009.57 Duke had expected the flood heights to decrease by using the new software and model. However, flood heights increased. The new model, using a conservative but not worst-case scenario, predicted a flood height at the SSF of about
.58 To resolve this adequate protection issue, NRC required Duke to re-perform the Jocassee Dam failure analysis using conservative input parameters (i.e., assumptions) and methods.59 Using a conservative approach would supply margin and account for uncertainty, as is the norm for design basis and licensing basis issues -- which this adequate protection issue had become.
NRC issued a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) on June 22, 2010. This letter confirms commitments made by Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (the licensee) in your June 3, 2010, letter.
Specifically, the June 3, 2010, letter listed compensatory measures the licensee will implement at the Oconee Site and Jocassee Dam to mitigate potential external flooding hazards resulting from a potential failure of the Jocassee Dam.60 In response, Duke revised its 1D and 2D analysis. And Duke committed to protecting the SSF based on results from its revised analysis.61 Protective measures would include increasing the height of the flood barriers protecting the site, protecting an offsite power line from the expected flood conditions and other improvements.62 2.6.4 2011 NRC Safety Evaluation In January of 2011, the NRC transmitted to Duke a Safety Evaluation confirming Dukes approach to the issue resolution. This safety evaluation concluded:
The NRC staff evaluated the information provided by Duke in their August 2, 2010, letter. The unmitigated Case 2 dam breach parameters that were used in the flooding models, provided by Duke for the ONS site, demonstrated that the licensee has included conservatisms of the parameters utilized in the dam breach scenario. These conservatisms provide the staff with additional assurance that the above Case 2 scenario will bound the inundation at ONS, therefore providing reasonable assurance for the overall flooding scenario at the site. This new flooding 57 2009.10.28, Duke Presentation on Oconee External Flood with Initial HEC-RAS Results (ML093080034)
(2009 Duke Presentation with Initial HEC-RAS Results).
58 2009 Duke Presentation with Initial HEC-RAS Results, Slide 26.
59 2010.01.29, NRC letter Evaluation of Duke Response to Related to External Flooding at Oconee (ML100271591), See Enclosure.
60 2010.06.22, NRC Letter to Duke, CAL - ONS Commitments to Address External Flooding Concerns, (ML12363A086), Page 1.
61 2009 Duke Presentation with Initial HEC-RAS Results. Duke had presented examples of these preliminary results in its previous meeting with NRC.
62 2010.11.29, Duke Letter: Oconee Response to CAL, Page 2 (ML103490330).
16 scenario is based on a random sunny-day failure of the Jocassee Dam. This Case 2 scenario will be the new flooding basis for the site.63 The NRCs Safety Evaluation required Duke to protect the Oconee site from random sunny day failures of the Jocassee Dam to a flood depth of in order to ensure adequate protection.64 The requirement was based on conservative deterministic analysis.65 However, the Safety Evaluation was silent with respect to other relevant Jocassee Dam failure mechanisms including seismic and overtopping even though these mechanisms had been constantly discussed both internally within the NRC and with Duke. As the text indicates, this also established a new flooding basis for the site.
Dukes initial response to the CAL is contained in an April 29, 2011 letter to the NRC. As stated in that letter, Dukes purpose in writing it was to respond to the NRCs request, as noted in the Confirmatory Action Letter dated June 22, 2010... for a list of all modifications necessary to adequately protect the Oconee site from the impact of a postulated failure of the Jocassee Dam.66 Those proposed changes were summarized in a table (unnumbered by Duke).67 The table is reproduced below. For purposes of this report, I have numbered it Table 2. As can be seen from Table 2, proposed adequate protection measures included substantial additional flood walls on the North, East and South sides of the ONS.
63 2011 NRC Safety Evaluation Letter (emphasis added).
64 2011 NRC Safety Evaluation Letter, Page 12.
65 2011 NRC Safety Evaluation Letter.
66 2011.04.29, Duke Letter: Oconee Response to Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 2-10-003 (ML111460063), Page 2.
67 2011.04.29, Duke Letter: Oconee Response to Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 2-10-003 (ML111460063), Attachment Page 2.
17 Table 2 Modifications Necessary to Adequately Protect Oconee In 2010, NRC finalized its own generic dam failure frequency analysis for the Jocassee Dam.68 The staff estimated generic dam failure rates for large rock-fill dams, which it considers applicable to the Jocassee Dam, as 2.8E-4 per year.69 The authors of that analysis and other members of the NRC Staff subsequently performed additional analyses exploring and confirming those results.70 68 2010.03.15, Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam (ML13039A084). The NRCs generic analysis was published internally and subsequently released via a Freedom of Information Act request.
(2010 Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam). (I am a coauthor of this report.)
69 2010 Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam, Page 6.
70 2013.07.17, Uncertainty Analysis for Large Dam Failure Frequencies Based on Historical Data (ML13198A170); Ferrante, et al., An Assessment of Large Dam Failure Frequencies Based on Us Historical Data ANS PSA 2011 International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Analysis, March 13-17, 2011, Wilmington, NC, USA. (I am a coauthor of this report.)
18 In 2012, because the demonstrably erroneous NSAC-60 dam failure rate was widely referenced and used throughout the nuclear industry at that time, the NRC issued an information notice warning of the inadequacies in the dam failure rate found in the NSAC-60 report.71 According to Information Notice 2012-02, NSAC-60 provide(d) an insufficient basis for estimating site-specific dam failure frequency.72 In 2019, in a more detailed study commissioned by the NRC, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) stated:
NRC has estimated the likelihood of failure of Jocassee dam, upstream of the Oconee Nuclear Station in South Carolina, at approximately 2.8x10-4 per year. This estimate aligns with historical dam failure rates found in literature.73 If the Jocassee Dam fails but the flood does not inundate the SSF, the SSF is the first of two lines of defense (the second is the FLEX equipment). It should be noted that Dukes own risk analysis calculated that the SSF had a failure probability of about 0.27 or 27%.74 This is a very high failure probability, orders of magnitude greater than the failure probability estimated by Duke for safety related equipment found in the ECCS.
Thus, the outcome of the multi-year NRC safety evaluation was to increase the flood protection from a Jocassee Dam failure from approximately to a new licensing basis height of about Thirteen years later, the 2011 Safety Evaluation and the safety requirements it imposed remains the only NRC safety evaluation on the issue. Duke has not appealed the 2011 Safety Evaluation, nor has the NRC retracted or repudiated it. Yet, Duke has not completed the modifications described in the table above to protect the plant to a flood depth of Nor has the NRC sought to ensure their completion.
2.7 Fukushima - Lessons Learned 2012 50.54(f) Letter and Staff Assessment In 2011, the Fukushima Dai-chi disaster occurred, with waves as high as 45 feet, leading to core damage and containment failures at three of the six nuclear power plants on the site. A year later, in 2012, the NRC issued 10CFR50.54(f) letters to all licensees including Duke for ONS, requesting them to reevaluate the flooding hazards at their sites against present-day 71 NRC Information Notice 2012-2.
72 NRC Information Notice 2012-02, Page 4.
73 2019.12.14, Current State-of-Practice in Dam Safety Risk Assessment, https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1592163/.
74 FOIA Response 2012-0325 Pages 110, 115 of 308.
19 regulatory guidance and methodologies being used for early site permits and combined license reviews.75 One of the tasks requested by these letters was to perform a Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report (FHRR). Duke submitted an FHRR in 201376 and a revised response in 2015.77, 78 The flood heights at the SSF appear to be in redacted material in the public version of the revised FHRR.79 At the same time that Duke submitted their revised FHRR, they submitted a second letter also supplying what appears to be a condensed version of the FHRR Revision results. While some material is also redacted from this document, the flood height at the SSF from a Jocassee Dam failure is not redacted. The flood height from a Jocassee Dam failure is given as MSL or a flood depth of
.80 Presumably, this is the flood height identified in redacted material in the FHRR Rev. 1.
The NRC evaluated the ONS FHRR Rev. 1 and issued a Staff Assessment accepting the FHRR Rev. 1 results.81 Many of the flooding parameters including the flood heights from a Jocassee Dam failure are also redacted from this document. Presumably, the redacted flood heights in the Staff Assessment agree with both the FHRR Rev.1 and the Duke letter supplying Supplemental Information re External flooding, i.e., a flood height of at the SSF.
By titling the document a Staff Assessment rather than a Safety Evaluation, the NRC Staff indicated that the document did not have the regulatory equivalence of safety findings. Safety 75 2012.03.12 Letter from NRC to all Power Reactor Licensees and Construction Permit Holders re:
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION PURSUANT TO TITLE 10 OF THE CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 50.54(f)
REGARDING RECOMMENDATIONS 2.1.2.3, AND 9.3, OF THE NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE REVIEW OF INSIGHTS FROM THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI ACCIDENT (ML12053A340), Enclosure 2, Page 1 (NRC Post-Fukushima 50.54(f) Letter).
76 2013.03.12 Flooding Hazard Reevaluation Report Enclosure 1 (ML13240A016). As of 2024.04.26 this document is not in ADAMS. It appears to have been removed sometime between a Beyond Nuclear FOIA request (FOIA 2022-000210) involving this document on 2022.07.28 and 2024.04.26.
77 2015.0.06 Duke letter re Revised Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report per NRCs Request for Additional Information, (ML15072A106).
78 2015.003.06, Enclosure 1 Revision 1 to Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report Oconee Nuclear Station (ML16272A217) (FHRR Rev. 1).
79 FHRR Rev. 1 Pages 48, 52 - 54.
80 2015.03.06, Duke letter re Supplemental Information Regarding NRC 2008 and 2012 Requests for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Pertaining to External Flooding at ONS, (ML16272A219), Table 4 Page 7 of 13 of the letters enclosure (Duke letter Supplemental Information re External Flooding).
81 2016.04.14, NRC letter re Oconee Staff Assessment of Response to Request for Information Pursuant to 50.54(f) Flood-Causing Mechanisms Reevaluation (ML15352A207), enclosing NRC Staff Assessment by the Office of NRR Related to flooding Hazard Reevaluation Report NTTF Recommendation 2.1 (M16273A128) (2016 NRC Letter re 50.54(f) Response). A redacted version of this document was released in Interim Response 3 to FOIA-2018-0010 on October 26, 2017.
20 Evaluations are one NRC means of documenting Atomic Energy Act and the Administrative Procedure Acts basis for its actions and the associated required findings of reasonable assurance that operation of the facility can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of public and will not be inimical to the health and safety of the public (e.g., 10CFR 50.57(a).82 To my knowledge NRC Staff Assessments are not procedurally controlled and do not make the required findings.
And indeed, the conclusions of the Staff Assessment do not measure Dukes submittal against the NRC safety standard of reasonable assurance of adequate protection or no undue risk.
Instead, the Staff measured Dukes submittal against an undefined reasonableness standard.
The Staff, for instance, found that [s]eismically-induced failure of the Jocassee Dam is not a reasonable mode of failure based on current information, present-day methodologies and regulatory guidance.83 Similarly, the Staff found that [o]vertopping-induced failure of the Jocassee Dam is not reasonable model of failure based on current information, present-day methodologies and regulatory guidance. 84 The NRC also approved Dukes conclusion that a random sunny-day failure was an unlikely, although reasonable, failure mode.85 These documents do not explain what criteria the NRC used to judge reasonableness. It could be just about anything. Thus, the standard appears to be weaker than the Atomic Energy Act-based regulatory standard of reasonable assurance that the licensee has achieved a minimum level of protection that is adequate to protect health and safety.
Because the Staff Assessment did not repudiate, replace or supersede the 2011 Safety Evaluations conclusions, because it applied the distinctly different and weaker (albeit undefined) standard of reasonableness rather than reasonable assurance of adequate protection, and because it did not even purport to be a Safety Evaluation, the Staff Assessment cannot be compared to the 2011 Safety Evaluation or presumed to override it in any way. The 2011 Safety Evaluation remains on the docket as the only NRC safety determination addressing the acceptability of flooding from a Jocassee Dam failure for purposes of establish compliance with the Atomic Energy Act.
2.8 Dukes 2021 Subsequent License Renewal Application and SAMA Analysis In June 2021, Duke submitted a subsequent license renewal application to NRC, requesting an extension of each of the three Oconee reactors operating licenses terms by an additional 20 years. Like Dukes initial license renewal application in 1998, the Environmental Report in Dukes SLR application relied on its PRA to look for insights into whether there was new and 82 2020.08.03 LIC-101 License Amendment Review Procedures (ML19248C539) at Appendix B Page 15.
83 2016 NRC Letter re 50.54 Response, Enclosure 2, Page 3.
84 2016 NRC Letter re 50.54 Response, Enclosure 2, Page 3.
85 2016 NRC Letter re 50.54 Response, Enclosure 2, Page 3.
21 significant information that would provide a significantly different picture of the impacts from severe accidents during the second license renewal period.86 2.9 Duke Supplemental Environmental Report On November 7, 2022, following a decision by the NRC requiring new analyses for subsequent license renewal, Duke submitted a supplemental Environmental Report for subsequent license renewal of the Oconee operating licenses. The Environmental Report asserted that continued operation of the Oconee reactors did not pose significant environmental impacts, i.e., that they were SMALL.87 The Environmental Report also stated:
On November 17, 2020 (NRC 2020), the NRC completed its review of [updated external hazards information for all operating power reactors (as ordered by the Commission following the Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident] and concluded that no further regulatory actions were needed to ensure adequate protection or compliance with regulatory requirements, including site-specific external hazards information, re-confirming the acceptability of ONSs design basis.88 2.10 Draft SEIS In February 2024, the NRC issued the Draft SEIS, repeating Dukes assertion in the Environmental Report that the environmental impacts of accidents at the Oconee reactors are insignificant or SMALL.89 In addition, like the Environmental Report, the Draft SEIS stated:
On November 17, 2020, the NRC staff completed its review for Oconee Station and concluded that no further regulatory actions were needed to ensure adequate protection or compliance with regulatory requirements, including site-specific external hazards information, re-confirming the acceptability of Oconee Stations design basis. (NRC 2020-TN8995).90 Thus, both the Environmental Report and the Draft SEIS each stated that the environmental impacts of accidents during continued operation of the Oconee reactors would be insignificant and that the reactors were adequately protected from accidents caused by external events such as flooding and earthquakes.
86 2021 Environmental Report Page 4-75.
87 Id. Page 100.
88 2022 ER Appendix E Supplement 2 Page 101. NRC 2020 is a letter from R.J. Bernardo, NRC to J.E.
Burchfield, Jr., Duke re: Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 - Documentation of the Completion of Required Actions Taken in Response to the Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident (Nov.
17, 2020) (ML20304A369).
89 Draft SEIS Page F-4 Line 39, F-9 Line 4.
90 Draft SEIS Page F-4 Lines 10-14. NRC 2020-TN8995 is the same NRC letter cited in footnote 3 above.
22 2.10.1 Power Uprate Information (Section F.3.4 of 2024 Draft ONS SEIS)
This section hypothesizes the impact of a potential power uprate on risk. It uses and explores a power uprate up to 30% and an average uprate of 10% and concludes that this uprate would not impact the conclusions of the 1996 or 2013 license renews GEISs.
2.10.2 Higher Fuel Burnup Information (Section F.3.5 of 2024 Draft ONS SEIS)
This section discusses increasing PWR fuel burnup to 42 to 75 gigawatt days per metric ton of uranium and that could increase population dose risk by 38 percent. But concludes that this dose risk would be bounded by the 95% UCB values in the 1996 GEIS.
2.10.3 Additional Sensitivity as it Relates to Population Dose Risk and the Jocassee Dam SAMA (Section F.4.1 of 2024 Draft ONS SEIS)
This section responds to a scoping comment on the impact of a SAMA regarding raising the height of the flood barrier wall around the SSF. It states in part:
The Oconee Station SAMA evaluated a SAMA potential improvement to increase the height of the Safe Shutdown Facility flood barrier to address the PRA sequence relating to a random failure of Jocassee Dam exceeding the
) Safe Shutdown Facility (SSF) flood barrier.91 It concludes that the overall effect of an increase by 30 times of the total population dose risk during the SLR period of extended operation does not result in significant environmental impacts.
In fact, Duke raised the height of the SSF from in circa 2010.92 This basic fact is discussed in many of the document relating to the Jocassee Dam failure and was at least at one point in time well understood by the NRC. It appears that the NRC no longer understands the basic of the issue. In any case, it is unclear what this NRC sensitivity case is attempting to illustrate. In any case, the comments author (this writer) was attempting to show the risk benefit of protecting Oconee from a Jocassee Dam failure. I was not proposing a wall around the SSF. This sensitivity analysis did not address the concern.
91 2024 Draft SEIS at Page F-29 Lines 40-42.
92 FHRR Rev. 1, Enclosure 1 at Page 7.
23 2.10.4 Summary and Conclusions (Section F.4.2 of 2024 Draft ONS SEIS)
This section makes the following conclusion: No new and significant information regarding Oconee Station was identified that was above the values previously evaluated in the 1996 LR GEIS.93
- 3. ANALYSIS In Sections 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 below, I will provide my analysis of the safety and environmental risks posed by continued operation of the Oconee reactors for an additional twenty years past their expiration dates of 2033 (Units 1 and 2) and 2034 (Unit 3). In Section 3.1, I will address the accident risk posed by failure of the Jocassee Dam. In Section 3.2, I will address other deficiencies in the Draft SEIS accident risk analysis. In Section 3.3, I will address the lack of uncertainty analysis in the Draft SEIS. And in Section 3.4, I will address the Draft SEIS failure to consider the environmental impacts of Climate Change.
3.1 Failure to Ensure Adequate Protection from Failure of the Jocassee Dam or to Adequately Evaluate Environmental Flooding Risks.
In my expert opinion as a nuclear engineer and risk analyst, Duke is now operating Oconee at an unacceptable risk to public health and safety, due to flooding risks identified by the regulatory process leading up to the 2011 Safety Evaluation. The NRC deemed those flood protection measures necessary to protect against a core melt accident with subsequent containment failure in the event the Oconee site becomes inundated by failure of the Jocassee Dam. The NRC has not sought to force Duke to implement those measures, and it has lowered the flood level to which safety equipment must be protected. Yet, the NRC has not withdrawn or repudiated the 2011 Safety Evaluation in which it found those measures were necessary to provide adequate protection to public health and safety. Nor has the NRC made any finding that the flood height and mitigation measures that were determined to be appropriate in the NRCs post-Fukushima review are adequate to protect public health and safety.
In my years as a NRC senior risk analyst, this is one of the most serious safety issues I have encountered. Yet, the NRC regulations for license renewal exclude it from the scope of safety issues that may be reviewed, because it does not relate to the aging of Oconees safety equipment. However, the NRC must also review Dukes SLR application under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which requires NRC to fully evaluate the environmental impacts of its proposed actions, including the environmental impacts of reasonably foreseeable accidents. NEPA also requires Duke to evaluate the relative costs and benefits of Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives (SAMAs). I have applied my knowledge as a risk analyst to evaluate whether Duke has taken into account all relevant data regarding the likelihood and consequences of a core melt accident caused by failure of the Jocassee Dam. My analysis also 93 2024 Draft SEIS at Page F-30 Lines 28-30.
24 includes Dukes most recent revision to its Environmental Report and SAMA Analysis as well as the Draft SEIS.
3.1.1 Mischaracterization of the scope of the environmental review.
The Draft SEIS makes a bold statement that as part of its post-Fukushima review the staff re-confirm[ed] the acceptability of Oconee Stations design basis."94 But I cannot find any support for this assertion in the Draft SEIS or in the post-Fukushima documentation. According to the Draft SEIS, the post-Fukushima analysis focused on several areas including but not limited to: 1) Beyond design basis external events under Order (EA-12-049), and 2) Requests for information (RFI) (under 10 CFR 50.54(f)) of seismic and flooding hazards.
Order EA-12-049 is an investigation into beyond design basis external events and is by simple logic not about the design basis and therefore cannot confirm it. And the review of seismic and flooding hazards (as requested by the RFI) does not constitute a review of the entire design basis. In addition, the staff made no Atomic Energy Act assessments what-so-every regarding the seismic and flood hazards at Oconee or any other plant in regards to design basis hazards. It is accurate that the NRC did not change the Oconee (or any other licensed reactors) design basis because of these reviews but that is not the same as reviewing the entire design basis.
Hopefully, the staff in preparation of this analysis, has a better understanding of what has and has not been done, then illustrated in this claim.
Thus, the NRCs characterization of the NRCs post-Fukushima analysis is incorrect. The primary focus of the NTTF analysis was on two external hazards, i.e., flooding and seismic. While the mitigating strategies orders required protection against other beyond design basis external hazards, e.g., high winds, it in no way confirmed the existing design basis. Thus, any statement claiming that the NRC re-confirmed the ONSs design basis is wrong. The NRC did write a Safety Evaluation but as the subject of the letter and the Safety Evaluation indicate they addressed only the acceptability of the referenced orders responses.95 94 2024 Draft ONS SEIS Page F-4 Lines 13 - 14. Duke makes a similar statement in the Supplemental Environmental Report:
On November 17, 2020 (NRC 2020), the NRC completed its review of such information as to ONS and concluded that no further regulatory actions were needed to ensure adequate protection or compliance with regulatory requirements, including site-specific external hazards information, re-confirming the acceptability of ONSs design basis.
2022 ER Appendix E Supplement 2Page 101.
95 2017.08.30, NRC letter ONS Safety Evaluation Regarding Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Related to Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051, (ML17202U791).
25 3.1.2 Inadequate consideration of flooding risks from Jocassee Dam Failure.
I have also found that neither Duke nor the NRC has adequately addressed the risk of flood-related accidents at the Oconee reactors. A significant problem is that Duke supplied no flooding hazard information in its 2021 Environmental Report or SAMA analysis. It simply referred back to the 1998 SAMA, which in turn refers back to the IPEEE. (And as the history shows, the NRC found via the RFI process initiated in 200896 inadequate.) And as discussed below, the IPEEE does not supply an adequate flooding analysis. And the 2022 Supplemental Environmental Report and Draft SEIS do not supply the missing information.
I will begin with Dukes risk analysis in its Environmental Report of 2021, as supplemented in 2022.
Level 1 PRA is used to evaluate the frequency of severe accidents while Level 2 and 3 PRA are used to evaluate the consequences. To perform the Level 1 analysis the basic PRA Equation is used:
CDF (/yr.)
=
IEF (/yr.)
X CCDP 97
[Eq. 1]
Where CDF is the core damage frequency (in events per year), IEF is the initiating event frequency (in events per year) and CCDP is the conditional core damage probability (all probabilities are unit-less). PRA is always intended to be a best estimate analysis.
Typical PRA start with evaluation of IEF. In the case of external flooding, a thorough analysis would include flooding from all sources. Each hazard (e.g., local intense storms (LIP), dam failures, etc.) would be characterized with a hazard curve that supplies a range of intensities (e.g., flood height and flood inundation timing) and the corresponding frequency (in some reports it is characterized as annual exceedance probabilities). An example (not Oconee) of a detailed flooding hazard curve is shown in Figure 2. The horizontal axis shows the annual exceedance probability or how often will a flood occur. The vertical axis shows the flood depth.
For example, the 1E-2 (or once in a hundred years) exceedance flood would reach a flood depth of about 510 feet. The dashed lines indicated the 90% confidence range. Again, for the 1E-2 flood the 90% confidence ranges from 507.5 feet to 511 feet. The graph gives the frequency of a flood for the range of floods between a frequency of about once every 100 years (1E-2) to once every million years (1E-6) with the uncertainty for each flood frequency. Finally, the red dashed lines indicate flood elevations where cliff edge effects. In this example a flood exceeding a height of 517 feet which is ground elevation. Again, this graph does not apply to Oconee but is an example of thorough flood hazard analysis conveying critical information regarding 96 2008 NRC 50.54(f) Letter 97 Oconee Nuclear Site Adequate Protection Backfit Documented Evaluation (circa 2010), Page 6 (ML14058A015).
26 flooding. For a plant as vulnerable to flooding as Oconee is, this is the type of analysis that could and should have been performed.
Figure 2 Best Estimate and Approximate 90% Uncertainty Bounds of Peak River Level on the Kankakee River at the Nuclear Plant Site 98 As discussed above, Duke supplied no flooding hazard information in its 2021 Environmental Report. It simply referred back to the 1998 SAMA, which in turn refers back to the IPEEE. The 1998 SAMA, however, supplied a single value, in contrast to more detailed example hazard curve illustrated in Figure 2. The single value supplied is for a Jocassee Dam failure with a rate of 1.3E-5 per year.99 That is the only information supplied by Duke about flooding initiating events. But this one data point is insufficient information to obtain any insights from the likelihood of dam failure events.
Equally important, the limited initiating event information provided in Dukes SAMA analysis is wrong. While Duke presents a Jocassee Dam failure rate of 1.3E-5 per year, NRC calculated a best generic failure rate for Jocassee of 2.8E-4 per year - more than twenty times greater.100 This information is well-known to Duke, because NRC shared its conclusions with Duke in 2008 98 2014.08 EPRI Riverine Probabilistic Flooding Hazard Analysis, Figure 8-10, Page 8-9 (3002003013).
99 FOIA Response 2012-0325 Page 17 of 308.
100 Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam.
28 injection (LPI). It would cover all the combinations that would fail both trains. A few examples combinations that would fail both trains of LPI are:
Table 4 Example Equipment Failures causing Train Failures Combination LPI Train 1 Fails LPI Train 2 Fails
- 1.
Train 1 pump fails Train 2 injection valve fails
- 2.
Train 1 pump motor fails Train 2 pump suction valve fails
- 3.
Train 1 power fails Train 2 injection valve fails If Duke had evaluated the scenarios described in Table 3 above, it would have derived CCDPs for each scenario. For the first scenario, with Jocassee flooding below grade, Duke could have evaluated the failure probability of the ECCS, the SSF and any other equipment that might be available. For the middle scenario where the flood waters come above grade but not to the top of the SSF wall, the ECCS fails (and is given a failure probability of 1.0), but the SSF would not be incapacitated by the flood and thus would be assigned a failure probability based on historical data. In the final scenario where the flood water come above the SSF wall, the SSF also fails and it would also be given a failure probability of 1.0.
Neither the SAMA Analysis in Dukes 2021 Environmental Report nor its 1998 SAMA analysis supplied any information about mitigating equipment failure probabilities. In fact, neither SAMA analysis supplies any CCDP information at all.
However, a minimal amount of CCDP information can be extracted from the limited amount of information that Duke supplied. Equation 1 from above (reproduced below) can be used as a starting point to extract the composite CCDP.
CDF (/yr.)
=
IEF (/yr.)
X CCDP
[Eq. 1]
Solving for the CCDP gives us Equation 2:
= CDF (/yr.)
/
IEF (/yr.)
[Eq. 2]
From the 1998 SAMA analysis, we know that Duke used a flooding external event IEF value of 1.3E-5103 per year. The corresponding external event flooding CDF is also supplied by the 1998 SAMA analysis in the table reproduced below (this is a duplicate of Table 1 above):
Plugging the external flooding IEF and CDF (from the 1998 SAMA in Table 1) into Equation 2 allows us to find the associated CCDP:
= CDF (/yr.)
/
IEF (/yr.)
[Eq. 3]
103 FOIA Response 2012-0325 Page 17 of 308.
29 4.5E-1
=
5.9E-6
/
1.3E-5 Thus, Dukes CCDP for external flooding is 4.5E-1 (based on the 1998 results).
If we assume this composite CCDP is correct, we can calculate a corrected best estimate CDF for external flooding events using this CCDP and the NRCs best estimate IEF of 2.8E-4 per year and Equation 1.104 CDF (/yr.)
=
IEF (/yr.)
X CCDP
[Eq. 4]
1.3E-4
=
2.8E-4 X
4.5E-1 Thus, a corrected external flooding event CDF has value of 1.3E-4 per year (again based on the 1998 SAMA), which is more than 20 times higher than Dukes wrong value of 5.9E-6 per year. It should be noted that the data used as input into the NRCs generic Jocassee Dam failure rate calculation does include failures from seismic and overtopping. Thus, my calculation includes seismic and overtopping contributions.
But the CDF of 1.3E-4 per year assumes that the CCDP of 4.5E-1 derived from the Duke analysis is appropriate. However, in 2008, Duke told the NRC that based on the 1992 inundation study, if the dam fails:
[T]he predicted flood would reach ONS in approximately
, at which time the SSF walls are overtopped. The SSF is assumed to fail, with no time delay, following the flood level exceeding the height of the SSF wall. The failure scenario results are predicted such that core damage occurs in about following the dam break and containment failure in about When containment failure occurs, significant dose to the public would result.105 Hidden in this statement is the fact that even Duke believes that if the SSF walls are overtopped, all mitigation fails, including the SSF -- thus resulting in core damage and containment failure. In other words, Duke is saying that the conditional core damage probability (CCDP) given a Jocassee Dam failure which overtops the SSF wall is a given, or has a value of 1.0, not the value of 4.5E-1. If we use this CCDP, i.e., a value of 1.0 then the CDF from a Jocassee Dam failure is equal to the Jocassee Dam failure rate or from Equation 1:
CDF (/yr.)
=
IEF (/yr.)
X CCDP
[Eq. 5]
2.8E-4
=
2.8E-4 X
1.0 104 Generic Failure Rate Evaluation for Jocassee Dam.
105 2008 Duke 50.54(f) Response Letter, Attachment 2.
30 Revisiting the Jocassee Dam failure rate, we can compare it to other initiating events. The NRC calculated a Jocassee Dam failure rate of 2.8E-4 per year. This value is in the range of LOCAs.
Even the Duke value of 1.3E-5 per year is larger than the value for large LOCA (see Figure 1 above).
Therefore, a reasonable best estimate CDF from a Jocassee Dam failure is 2.8E-4 per year based on the available PRA information, i.e., information supplied by Duke and NRC that is on the docket. This CDF is larger than the total CDF from all Oconee internal and external events of 8.9E-5 per year reported to NRC in 1999.106 It is also larger than the total CDF values reported by both Duke and NRC in their 2021 and 2024 reports respectively (see Table 1). Dukes 2008 Duke 50.54(f) Response letter supplied the following insights regarding LERF:
(T)he predicted flood would reach ONS in approximately at which time the SSF walls are overtopped. The SSF is assumed to fail, with no time delay, following the flood level exceeding the height of the SSF wall. The failure scenario results are predicted such that core damage occurs in about following the dam break and containment failure in about
. When containment failure occurs, significant dose to the public would result.107 This Duke statement is telling the NRC that given a flood from a Jocassee Dam failure in which the flood heights overtop the SSF walls containment failure is inevitable. Duke did not say the containment might fail, nor did it estimate the probability of containment failure. Duke told the NRC that the Conditional Containment Failure Probability (CCFP) given a flood induced core damage event was 1.0. This is PRA language for a LERF multiplier of 1.0. Multiplying the CDF by the LERF multiplier gives us the LERF. With a LERF multiplier of 1.0, the LERF is equal to the CDF.108 Thus, not only is the CDF from an external flooding event 2.8E-4 per year but the LERF from an external flooding event is 2.8E-4 per year.
All of the preceding impact discussion is based on Dukes 2008 conclusion of core damage in and a flood height at the SSF between which comes from the 1992 inundation analysis performed for FERC.109 However, the NRC required Duke to perform a new dam failure and flood routing analyses. Dukes new analysis increased the flood height at the SSF to about 110 The PRA values in Dukes 2021 Environmental Report and SAMA updates substantially changed, in a manner that calls into question the technical validity of Dukes CDF values for flooding.
106 1998 SAMA Analysis Page 10 (2.6E-5 + 6.3E-5 = 8.9E-5).
107 2008 NRC 50.54(f) Response Letter (emphasis added).
108 2013.09.23 NRC letter, NMP1 Integrated Inspection Report and Preliminary Greater than Green.
Finding, Page A-8 (ML13266A237).
109 2008 NRC 50.54(f) Letter, Page 1.
110 2011 NRC Safety Evaluation Letter, Page 12.
31 Table 1 supplies both the 1998 and 2021 SAMA results (see the table for all of the relevant references). One result that is not explained within the SAMA update is a ten-fold increase in the fire results from 4.5E-6 to 4.6E-5. This one hazard contributes more than all of the internal events combined.
Of more relevance to this discussion is the change in external flooding risk. Duke believes that this hazard risk drops to a value of 2.5E-7. According to the 1998 SAMA external flooding comprised 9% of the total external event risk (= 5.9E-6 / 6.3E-5). The 2021 SAMA shows a decrease to less than 1% of total external event risk (= 2.5E-7 / 9.7E-5). It should be noted that total external event risk has increased by 54% (= 1 - 9.7E-5 / 6.3E-5) primarily from the afore mentioned ten-fold increase in fire risk. Based on my search of the records, I find no documentation of a peer reviewed analysis or a licensing application that justifies these flood calculational reductions.
Large early release frequency (LERF) information can be extracted from the 2021 SAMA. Those extracted values are shown in Table 5 below.
Table 5 LERF and CCFP from 2021 SAMA111 LERF Values (per year)
(From Table 4.15-2)
Condional Containment Failure Probabilies (CCFP)1 (Calculated from Table 4.15-2)
Hazard Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Average Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Average Internal Events 4.8E-7 4.8E-7 4.8E-7 4.8E-07 2.0E-2 2.0E-2 2.0E-2 2.0E-2 High winds 2.9E-7 3.2E-7 2.9E-7 3.0E-07 1.8E-2 1.7E-2 1.7E-2 1.7E-2 External "ood
<1E-11
<1E-11
<1E-11
<1E-11
<4.1E-5
<4.1E-5
<4.1E-5
<4.1E-5 Fire 4.5E-6 4.3E-6 2.8E-6 3.9E-06 8.8E-2 7.9E-2 8.4E-2 8.4E-2 Seismic 1.4E-5 1.4E-5 1.4E-5 1.4E-05 4.2E-1 4.2E-1 4.2E-1 4.2E-1 Total external events 1.8E-5 1.8E-5 1.7E-5 1.8E-05 1.8E-1 1.7E-1 2.0E-1 1.9E-1 Total Base 1.9E-5 1.9E-5 1.7E-5 1.8E-05 1.5E-1 1.4E-1 1.6E-1 1.5E-1 Table Note 1: The CCFPs are calculated by dividing the LERF by the corresponding CDF value (CCDF = LERF / CDF). The CDF values come from Table 1 (which are also from 2021 SAMA).
In the above discussion regarding the 2008 Duke 50.54(f) Response Letter (Attachment 2), Duke indicated that in the postulate flood scenario LERF was equal to CDF or as previously discussed, the CCFP was equal to 1.0. I previously estimated CDF at 2.8E-4 and thus LERF is also equal to 2.8E-4. While the 2008 scenario was based on a Jocassee Dam failure, we dont know what flood scenarios are contained in the 2021 SAMA flood analysis. None the less, the decrease is astounding. LERF drops to <1E-11. This LERF value is over four orders of magnitude lower than any other internal or external event LERF! All other LERF values are in a range of 2.9E-7 to 111 2021 Environmental Report, Table 4.15-2, Pages 4-89 to 4-109.
32 1.4E-5. I have derived Conditional Containment Failure Probabilities (CCFP) from the data in Dukes 2021 SAMA Table 4.15-2 by manipulating Equation 6.
LERF (/yr.)
=
CDF (/yr.)
X CCFP
[Eq. 6]
As we know the values for each hazards CDF and LERF from the 2021 SAMA (see Tables 1 & 5 respectively). CCFP can be calculated by equation 7.
CCFP
=
LERF (/yr.)
/
CDF (/yr.)
[Eq. 7]
The derived CCFP values are also shown in Table 5 above. The CCFP values for internal events and high winds are typical of large dry pressurized water reactor (PWR) containments like Oconee. The fire value is substantially elevated and the value for seismic is larger than the value for boiling water reactors (BWRs), which are understood to have substantially weaker (i.e.,
more failure prone) containments. But the derived value for Oconee flooding is more than three orders of magnitude better. This is astounding and not correct. It illustrates that the entire flooding PRA is questionable at best.
The Draft SEIS parrots Dukes flooding CDF values (see Table 1) without supplying any explanation. It cites no audit reports or internal verification calculations, it simply repeats Dukes values.
3.1.3 Important conclusions to be drawn from the flooding risk analyses for Oconee.
As discussed above, the 1998 SAMA analysis considered flooding hazards from a Jocassee Dam failure, apparently in reliance on the NSAC-60 and IPEEE studies.112 Duke in its 2021 SAMA radically revised downward the earlier estimates and the NRCs 2024 Draft SEIS apparently accepted these new estimates without a basis. It should be noted that the discussion about a Jocassee Dam failure describes it in the context of random failures.113 Based on this statement, it is reasonable to assume that Duke only considered random sunny-day dam failures, ignoring seismic and overtopping, failures. This approach of excluding seismic and overtopping-related dam failures was consistent with the IPEEE. The omission is significant, with potentially huge implications for flooding risk at Oconee.
It is helpful to put these flooding results into perspective. Dukes August 2010 analysis indicated a peak flow across the Keowee Dam and significantly onto the Oconee site, of between 2.3 and 2.8 million cubic feet per second (cfs) and a peak flow across the Oconee intake canal structure 112 1998 SAMA Analysis Pages 7, 15, 19.
113 1998 SAMA Analysis Page 15.
33 of between 0.7 and 0.8 million cfs.114 As a point of reference, the average flow of the Mississippi River at New Orleans is approximately 0.6 million cfs.115 The 2010 Duke analysis also tells us that the flood height at the Keowee Dam is to an elevation between MSL.116 Bear in mind that the top of the Keowee Dam and the intake dike are at 815 feet MSL, thus the dam is overtopped by some
.117 This is a lot of water on the Oconee site, a site that was never designed to handle any water on site. Instead, Oconee was designed as a dry site, i.e., a plant that would expect no water on site.
These significantly higher CDFs and LERFs indicate a significantly higher risks to the public and the environment than Duke and the NRC acknowledge. Yet, there is no evidence that Dukes 2021 Environmental Report has considered this new and significant flooding hazard information, the information from the more current dam failure and flood routing study that concluded with the flood depth or how this would impact the corresponding CDFs or LERFs. Nor has it considered the significant uncertainty on the timing, flood heights and flows, which should be part of any thorough risk assessment. Section F.4.1 of the Draft SEIS attempts to address the issue with a sensitivity case. It does not review the risk results from a Jocassee Dam failure nor address why the results should or should not be incorporated into the NEPA analysis.
As previously discussed, Dukes Environmental Report does not resolve or adjudicate the extensive work done in the Jocassee Dam failure and flood routing analysis, even though this work has supplied significant insights into possible additional severe accident mitigating strategies. For instance, although the NRC required significant flood control measures in the 2011 Safety Evaluation, Duke does not mention them at all - either to take credit for them or, if they have not been installed, to explain why not. Nor does the NRCs 2024 Draft SEIS. Duke has also failed to mention some other obvious ways to reduce the flood hazard from Oconee, such as preemptively shutting down the reactors when reservoir water levels get too high, lowering the water levels in the lake behind the Jocassee and Keowee Dams, or lowering the crest elevation of some of the surround Jocassee Dam earthworks such that they overtop before the Jocassee Dam proper, thus lowering the flood impacts at ONS. PRA is a valuable tool for identifying vulnerabilities (and suggesting associated corrective measures), evaluating the costs and benefits of these measures, and also prioritizing them for their effectiveness.
Unfortunately, the public has not benefited from a thorough and comprehensive external events flooding PRA.
114 2010.08.02 Duke letter Oconee Response to CAL, Attachment 1, Table 1, Page 4 (ML102170006)
(2010.08.02 Duke Oconee Response to CAL).
115 National Park Service, Mississippi River Facts, https://www.nps.gov/miss/riverfacts.htm 116 2010.08.02 Duke Oconee Response to CAL, Attachment 1, Table 2, Page 9.
117 2011 NRC Safety Evaluation Letter, Page 12.
34 Another significant shortcoming of Dukes Environmental Report and NRCs Draft SEIS is their failure to consider other Jocassee Dam failure mechanisms besides random sunny-day failures.
Both Duke and the NRC ignore seismic failures and overtopping failures, although they are both comparable contributors to public and environmental risk. Seismic failure could cause the dam to fail faster and overtopping failures would include additional water volumes behind the Jocassee Dam and potentially the Keowee Dam both scenarios could increase the flood volumes and heights at Oconee. The NRC should update its Draft SEIS to consider these significant contributors to accident risk. And ask discussed in below, that discussion should include the effects of increased frequency and intensity of flooding on overtopping risks.
3.2 Other Deficiencies in the Draft SEISs Risk Analysis.
In addition to the deficiencies described above, the Draft SEIS risk analysis is deficient in other significant respects.
3.2.1 PWR All Hazards CDF Comparison.
In Section F.3.2 of the Draft SEIS, Table F-4 presents a PWR All Hazards (Full Power) CDF Comparison. The accompanying text states the Oconee all hazards CDF is less than the highest estimated Internal Events CDF from the 1996 LR GEIS (Indian Point 2) at a value of 8.90E-5. But this value is not the known current all hazard value for Oconee -- which is 1.3E-4 per year.
The discussion goes on to state:
Although the Combined CDF (All Hazards) increased to 1.26 x 10-4 per reactor-year, the Oconee Station All Hazards CDF is still less than the highest estimated internal events CDF (Indian Point 2 is 3.5 x 10-4 per reactor-year) used in the 1996 LR GEIS.118 But again, this comparison is not based on the latest available information. The Draft SEIS shows that the Oconee all hazards CDF of 1.3E-4 is about twice as high as the mean PWR &
BWR all hazards values of 6.1E-5 and 6.6E-5 mean and median values.119 In this respect, the Draft SEIS significantly understates accident risks.
3.2.2 Fire Events In Section F.3.2.1, the Draft SEIS discusses how the Duke used an external events multiplier to calculate the estimated population dose risk.120 It states that the external events multiplier is 118 2024 Draft ONS SEIS Page F-15 Lines 11 - 13.
119 2024.02, Generic EIS for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants Technical Appendices Volume 3 Revision 2 (ML23201A226) (2024 Draft GEIS) Table E.3-12 Page E-36.
120 Id., Page F-19 (starting at Line 4).
35 obtained by dividing the all-hazards CDF by the internal events CDF. But an examination of the Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) data supplied in Table 4.15-2 (and reproduced here in Table 5) shows that the LERF values for fire are disproportionally larger for fire then for internal events. This can be seen by deriving the Conditional Containment Failure Probability (CCFP). A discussion on CCFP derivation is given below. The CCFP for internal events is about 2E-2 while the value for fire is 8.4E-2 (see Table 5 below for these values). Thus, using an external events multiplier (based on a ratio of all hazards to internal events CDF) underestimates the impact of a significantly larger containment failure probability for fire. This process leads to unrepresentatively low population dose by a factor of four for fire and fire is the largest external event contributor to risk.
3.2.3 Seismic Events In Section F.3.2.2, the Draft SEIS states:
[G]iven the significant margin between the cumulative population dose risk results from the Oconee Station license renewal SAMA Analysis and the cumulative 95th percentile UCB [upper confidence bound] population dose risk results from the 1996 LR GEIS (factor of 266), the Oconee SLR ER [Environmental Report] FCDFs [fire core damage frequencies] do not challenge the 95th percentile estimates used in the 1996 LR GEIS.121 Presumably, this comparison relies upon the same external event multiplier discussed above.
But this same fallacy exists here as with the fire results: the seismic CDF values that the multiplier relies upon depend only on the CDF values and do not take into consideration the difference in the containment failure probabilities. In the seismic case the CCFP is 4.2E-1 or 42%
(see Table 5 below). Thus, it is far from clear that the assumed margin in the population dose exists.122 3.2.4 Underestimating Risk by Failing to Aggregate Changes in Risk The Draft SEIS evaluates changes in impact for various accident/risk scenarios (e.g., changes in fire CDF, changes in seismic CDF) to see how each affects the conclusions of the 1996 GEIS regarding accident risk. The Draft SEIS then compares these changes with the margin between Oconee SAMA and the 1996 LR GEIS. Thus, the Draft SEIS states:
Given the significant margin between the cumulative population dose risk results from the Oconee Station SAMA and the cumulative 95th percentile UCB population dose risk results (factor of 266) 121 Draft SEIS Page F-19, Lines 16 through 18.
122 Draft SEIS Page F-20 at lines 22-23 there is an editorial error when the text states: lie in the range of 10 x 10-4 per year to 10 x 10-4 per year
36 from the 1996 LR GEIS, the reevaluated Oconee Station SCDF does not 95th percentile estimates used in the 1996 LR GEIS.123 Each time that the Draft SEIS does this the NRC concludes that there are large margins between the risk results derived by the 95th-percentile UCB and the scenario being evaluated (see example above). But there is a fundamental problem with this approach, which causes the NRC to seriously underestimate the total risk increase from the aggregate of the scenario. The NRC is evaluating each scenario in isolation, without examining their compounding effects. The NRC thereby seriously underestimates the change in risk.
Instead of looking at each scenario in isolation, Ill aggregate the increased risk posed by the multiple scenarios which the NRC evaluates individually. I accept, only for the purposes of this illustration, the NRC risk impact calculations on each individual scenario.
Table 6 - Aggregation of Changes in Risk Scenario SAMA 1998 (CDF)
Risk Factor Change Comment Fire124 4.5E-6 6.0E-5 13 factor change in CDF Seismic125 3.9E-5 5.7E-5 1.5 factor change in CDF Power Uprate126 1.3 factor change in LERF Higher Burnup Fuel127 1.38 factor change in population dose risk LPSD128 2
factor change in CDF Jocassee Dam Failure129 30 factor change in population dose risk Total Impact 2098 The total impact of this aggregation is a factor of over 2000 risk increase. This total is the simple product of the individual values supplied by the NRC and shown in the risk factor change column of the table. As can be seen from the table the supposed margin between the potential change in seismic risk and the 1996 SAMA is a factor of 266. But the risk aggregation of these 123 2024 Draft SEIS Page F-21 Lines 38 - 41 (emphasis added).
124 2024 Draft SEIS Table F-18 Page F-18.
125 2024 Draft SEIS Table F-8 Page 22.
126 2024 Draft SEIS Page F-24 Lines 41.
127 2024 Draft SEIS Page F-25 Lines 17.
128 2024 Draft SEIS Page F-25 Lines 41 - 42.
129 2024 Draft SEIS Page F-29 Line 46.
37 six issues has a factor of over 2,000. Thus, the risk aggregation swamps the seismic factor of 266.
In providing this estimate, I recognize that the mathematical aggregation of these individual risks in this table is inaccurate because they multiply relate to different elements of a risk analysis that may not be compared directly to achieve an accurate result. For instance, three of the results are changes in core damage frequency, two are in population dose risk and the final is in large early release frequency. However, it is legitimate to aggregate these numbers in order to illustrate the scale on which the NRC is underestimating the effect of individual CDF changes on overall risk. I would note that it is possible to conduct a mathematically correct aggregation, but the available data in the various sources (i.e., 1996 GEIS, 1998 Oconee SEIS, 1998 Oconee ER, 2013 GEIS Rev. 1, 2021 Oconee ER and Draft Oconee SEIS) are simply insufficient to the task. The NRC should provide the necessary data and conduct the analysis in order to provide a reasonable estimate of how changes in CDF estimates for multiple scenarios affect overall risk.
3.2.5 Invalid assumption that studies of BWR and Westinghouse PWR is applicable to Oconee reactors.
In Section F.3.2.2, the Draft SEIS also discusses the State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analysis (SOARCA) work. As stated in the text, the SOARCA work was performed on a BWR and two Westinghouse PWRs.130 But Oconee, as a Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) PWR -- with once through steam generators (SG) in contrast to more common u-tube steam generators -- is significantly different than the SOARCA plants.
In addition to the differences in reactor design, Oconee has other unique features. It is the only plant in the nation without emergency diesel generators (EDG) as the required source of onsite emergency power, relying instead on the Keowee hydro units. SOARCA identified losses of offsite power (LOOP) as the dominant contributor to population dose. With a completely different approach to addressing LOOPs, it is unclear whether the SOARCA insights do or do not apply to Oconee absent the EDGs. Oconee also, does not have main steam isolation valves (MSIV) between the SG and the turbine. MSIV have an impact on population dose. Without additional analysis it is unclear how any useful insights obtained from the SOARCA work is relevant to Oconee.
3.3 Failure to Address Uncertainties In Section F.3.9, the Draft SEIS discusses uncertainty in the 1996 GEIS. It states that the 1996 GEIS uses the very conservative 95th-percentile, UCB estimates for environment impact.131 130 Draft SEIS page F-22.
131 2024 Draft ONS SEIS, Page F-29 Line 1.
38 These estimates are of the total population dose. But using the 95th percentile of the final results does not constitute comprehensive uncertainty analysis.
The NRCs PRA Policy Statement states: The Commission's safety goals for nuclear power plants and subsidiary numerical objectives are to be used with appropriate consideration of uncertainties in making regulatory judgments on the need of proposing and backfitting new generic requirements on nuclear power plant licensees.132 Consideration of uncertainties is an integral component of PRA133 and it is also an NRC-required component.134 The NRCs NUREG-1855 Rev. 1 supplies extensive guidance on how to perform uncertainty analysis and how to use uncertainty analysis in risk-informed decision making.135 This is because the uncertainties show the degree to which the NRC can have confidence in its predictions.136 With respect to PRAs, the NRC expects that appropriate consideration of uncertainties will be given in the analyses used to support the decision and the interpretation of the findings of those analyses.137 Because PRAs are integral to reactor risk analyses in Environmental Impact Statements (EIS),138 the requirement for uncertainty analysis is equally important to an environmental analysis as to a safety analysis.
To illustrate this point: NRC Regulatory Guide 1.174, Rev. 1, An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis, states that if total CDF is considerably greater than 1E-4 per reactor year, the NRCs focus in considering licensing actions should be on finding ways to decrease rather than increase the risk.139 As Dukes own SAMA results indicate (see their results in Table 1) the CDF values at 1.2E-4 for Oconee are above the RG 1.174 thresholds. Likewise, the LERF values of 132 Final Policy Statement, Use of PRA Methods in Nuclear Regulatory Activities, 60 Fed. Reg. 42,622 (Aug. 16, 1995) (emphasis added).
133 American Society of Mechanical Engineers /American Nuclear Society Standard ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications, Addendum A to RA-S-2008, ASME, Feb. 2009.
134 NRC Regulatory Guide 1.200 Rev. 3 Dec. 2020 (ML120238B871). See Table 2 Summary of Technical Characteristics and Attributes of a Level 1, Internal Events PRA for the At-Power Operating Mode Page 17 and Section C.1.2.11 Technical Elements for the Interpretation of Results (Including Uncertainty Analysis) Page 34.
135 NUREG-1855, Rev. 1, Guidance on the Treatment of Uncertainties Associated with PRAs in Risk-Informed Decision Making, March 2017 (ML17062A466).
136 Id. at 1.
137 Id. at iii.
138 See Standard Review Plans for Environmental Reviews for Nuclear Power Plants, Supp. 1, Operating License Renewal at 5-3, 5-5, 5-7 (NUREG-1555, Supp. 1, Draft for Comment, Feb. 2023).
139 2018.01, An Approach for Using PRA In Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis, Revision 3 (ML17317A256) (RG 1.174) Page 28.
39 1.9E-5 (Oconee Units 1 & 2) and 1.7E-5 (for Unit 3) exceed the RG 1.174 thresholds of 1E-5.140 This is precisely the type of situation where uncertainty information should be taken into consideration. Based on my years of experience, it is reasonable to suspect that the 90 percent uncertainty confidence bands around the external hazards of fire, flood and seismic are around two or event three orders of magnitude. These deficiencies deserve serious consideration.
An adequate probabilistic risk analysis would include parametric uncertainty data on all input parameters and calculate the corresponding CDF and LERF with uncertainty bounds (e.g. a CDF or LERF of 1E-5 per year with a 90% confidence band of 1E-6 to 5E-5 per year). The analysis would then propagate those CDF and LERF values with their uncertainty bands through the Level 2 and Level 3 PRA evaluations ending with estimates of both prompt and latent cancer fatalities with uncertainty bands. Finaly, the analysis would compare that calculated values with their corresponding uncertainties against the decision thresholds, i.e., safety goals. But the Draft SEIS deficient and unacceptable as it never calculates probabilistic uncertainties.
Therefore, it does not have a basis for confidence in its risk estimates for purposes of assessing environmental risk or compliance with safety goals.
3.4 Inadequate Discussion Effects of Climate Change on Accident Risk All of the above discussion on risk, including flooding risks, are based on past assumptions regarding external hazards. The authors of those previous analysis (e.g., 1983 FERC, NSAC-60, IPE/IPEEE studies) were unaware of the significant changes in the likelihood and severity of extreme weather events that are occurring today and will inevitably increase as a result of Climate Change. Consistent with GDC 2, the discussion of risk in these documents are based on natural phenomena which are historically reported for sites and their surrounding areas.
While GDC 2 required the consideration of sufficient margin, there was never any consideration that future hazards could be worse than anticipated from the past ones.
However, the NRC knows that Climate Change is inevitable and that it will substantially impact both the frequency and severity of weather-related hazards including Local intense precipitation (LIP), probably maximum precipitation (PMP) and other severe weather effects.
In describing the local environment, the Draft SEIS states that nuclear power plant structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety are designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena, such as flooding, without loss of capability to perform safety functions.
And the Draft SEIS states that if new information about changing environmental conditions becomes available, the NRC will evaluate the new information to determine if any safety-related changes are needed.141 However, the Draft SEIS does not address the fact that the Oconee reactors were not designed to withstand a flood caused by failure of the Jocassee Dam, 140 RG 1.174 Page 28.
141 Draft SEIS Pages 3 3-36.
40 and it does not discuss the environmental risks caused by inevitable increases in the frequency and severity of severe storms as a result of Climate Change.
Instead, the NRC has arbitrarily decided:
The impacts of natural phenomena, including seismic hazards, on nuclear power plant systems, structures, and components are outside the scope of the NRCs license renewal environmental review.142 In making this statement, the NRC has ignored guidance from the Council on Environmental Quality which states:
[A]gencies should consider increased risks associated with development in floodplains, avoiding such development wherever there is a practicable alternative, as required by Executive Orders 11988 and 13690. Agencies also should consider the likelihood of increased temperatures and more frequent or severe storm events over the lifetime of the proposed action... For example, an agency considering a proposed development of transportation infrastructure on a coastal barrier island should consider Climate Change effects on the environment and, as applicable, consequences of rebuilding where sea level rise and more intense storms will shorten the projected life of the project and change its effects on the environment.143 Focusing on the NRC, a recent report by the Government Accountability Office states:
Nuclear power plants can be affected by natural hazardsincluding heat, drought, wildfires, flooding, hurricanes, sea level rise, and extreme cold weather eventssome of which are expected to be exacerbated by climate change144 However, the GAO concludes that:
NRCs actions to address risks to nuclear power plants from natural hazards in its licensing, license renewal, and inspection processes do not fully consider the potential increased risks from natural hazards that may be exacerbated by Climate Change.145 142 Draft SEIS Page 3-30, Lines 12 - 14.
143 2023.01.09, Federal Register Notice, National Environmental Policy Act Guidance on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Climate Change, Page 1207 Section V (footnote omitted).
144 GAO-24-106326, Page 1.
145 2024.04, Government Accountability Office, NRC Should Take Actions to Fully Consider the Potential Effects of Climate Change, GAO-24-106326 (GAO-24-106326), Page 34.
41 In fact, this report goes on to briefly address license renewals. It also states:
Without incorporating the best available information into its licensing and oversight processes, it is unclear whether the safety margins for nuclear power plants established during the licensing periodin most cases over 40 years agoare adequate to address the risks that Climate Change poses to plants.146 I agree with the GAO that Climate Change will inevitably affect the safety of nuclear reactors, including Oconee -- and therefore should be considered by the NRC in the SEIS. If anything, the GAO Report is not strong enough because it missed the hazards associated with high winds and tornadoes and the impact of Climate Change on them. These hazards are incorporated into most if not all nuclear power plants PRAs including Oconees. At Oconee the calculated CDF from high winds is 1.6E-5 per year (see Table 1 above). This CDF is more than 50% of the CDF from all internal events. Climate Change will increase the frequency and severity of these events too. In any case, Im going to focus on Climate Changes impact on flooding.
I agree with the GAO report when it observes that climate change has driven increases in the frequency and severity of some extreme weather events.147 The NRC has focused on two types of flooding events at Oconee. The first is Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP) falling on the watershed both upstream and adjacent to the plant. Filling the watershed beyond its capacity can cause flooding the plant and causing core damage and containment failure. The second is Local Intense Precipitation (LIP). LIP is essentially a PMP event immediately on top of the plant. The concern with LIP events is that they drop large quantities of rain directly on the plant proper without filling the watershed. If the plant is not designed to handle this event (i.e., sufficient site drainage capability), there is the potential again for water to enter the plant cause damage including core damage and containment failure. Keep in mind that Oconee was designed and built as a dry site, it was never intended and cannot deal with large quantities of water on site.
Dukes Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report address both of these hazards. Table 13 of this document identifies the flood heights associated with both. It should be noted that the flood height associated with dam failures is redacted in this version.148 The associated NTTF evaluations look at these flood hazards but none addressed Climate Change.
This omission constitutes a significant deficiency in the Draft SEIS because Climate Change demonstrably affects the frequency and intensity of some external events and therefore has the potential to significantly increase accident risks. Moreover, the frequency and intensity of 146 GAO-24-106326, Page 39.
147 GAO-24-106326, Page 13, Footnote 21.
148 FHRR Rev. 1 at Table 13 on Page 58.
42 Climate Change effects are increasing over time. Given that the NRC is proposing to rely on the Draft SEIS for decisions that could affect reactor safety decades from now, the Draft SEIS must address these changing effects over the entire licensed lifetime of reactors, which may end 4 decades from now.
Climate change has already started to increase the frequency and intensity of these events.149 As discussed above in, the Draft SEIS is already inadequate as a general matter for making broad generalizations about external event CDF based on extrapolations from internal event CDF values and limited actual plant-specific values for external event impact on population dose.
The NRC is well-aware of the issues of Climate Change and its impact on nuclear plant safety.
After the Fukushima meltdowns, the NRC Office of Research initiated a research program to develop tools to assist in probabilistic and deterministic assessments of external hazards including seismic, high winds and flooding with a consideration of Climate Change.150 In addition, Climate Change has been a topic of discussion at the NRCs Regulatory Information Conference (RIC) in recent years.151 The effects of Climate Change on accident risk are and will continue to be site-specific and not subject to generalization. For example, the three reactors at the Oconee plant -- for which the NRC is now considering an application for subsequent license renewal -- lie downstream of two large dams. The design of the dams includes consideration of the maximum probable flood induced by the maximum probable precipitation (i.e., storm). The assumption in all past FERC and NRC required studies, assumes that neither the Jocassee or Keowee Dams will be overtopped by a PMP event on their respective watershed. Climate change has the potential to significantly increase the amount of precipitation falling on watersheds above the dams. But 149 See, for example, Effects of climate change on probable maximum precipitation: A sensitivity study over the Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa River Basin, April 13, 2017, Journal of Geophysical Research:
Atmospheres, https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/2016JD026001 (Effects of Climate Change on PMP); Climate change is probably increasing the intensity of tropical cyclones, March 31, 2021 NOAA, https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-probably-increasing-intensity-tropical-cyclones; Climate Change Indicators: Weather and Climate, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/weather-climate; Global Warming and Hurricanes, NOAA Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, April 11, 2023, https://www.gfdl.noaa.gov/global-warming-and-hurricanes/.
150 See NRC Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment Research Program Overview, February 22 - 25, 2021 (ML21064A418) and Potential Impacts of Accelerated Climate Change, PNNL-24868, May 2016 (ML16208A282)).
151 See Climate Change Impact on the Safety of Nuclear Installations, March 8-10, 2022 (ML22140A312)) & Observations on Extreme Weather and Impacts on Nuclear Power Plants, EPRI ML22140A320, 2022).
43 with Climate Change will the respective reservoirs have sufficient capacity to handle a Climate Change exacerbate PMP? The NRC seems uninterested.
Climate change affects risk in two ways. First, it increases the likelihood or initiating event frequency of events. For example, increased storm frequency can lead to higher initiating event frequency for losses of offsite power (LOOPs). Second, Climate Change can increase the probability of failure of design features or mitigation equipment. A 2020 severe windstorm at the Duane Arnold plant (ML21139A091) illustrates this phenomenon. While the storm may or may not be directly attributable to Climate Change, it is a reasonable example of the type of severe weather effects that Climate Change can cause today and will cause in the future. In that case, a severe windstorm caused a loss of offsite power (LOOP). As a result of the LOOP, debris accumulated at the suction of the service water systems, which are necessary to cool the emergency diesel generators (EDGs) and the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) heat exchangers. The NRCs risk analysis of the event showed an increase in the failure probabilities of the service water system, the EDGs and the ECCS due to this climate-related external event.
Consideration of these risks in an EIS would provide important information regarding climate-related accident risk as well as identification of mitigation measures to address those risks.
A third way that Climate Change affects risk analysis, which is unique to flooding risk, is the cliff edge effect. With most hazards if the severity is increased slightly, the stress on the system is increased somewhat proportionately. However, with many flood-related issues, a small increase in the hazard can cause a dramatic and often overwhelming impact on a structure. For example, a small increase in wave height could raise the flood height sufficiently to overtop a floodwall inundating the equipment the floodwall is designed to protect. Risk analyses for climate change-related flooding must look carefully at this cliff-edge phenomenon.
PMP is a significant input into the design of critical infrastructure such as dam and reactor safety analysis directly and indirectly through its impact on probable maximum flood (PMF).
The National Academies under sponsorship of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has started a project to modernize the probable maximum precipitation (PMP) methodology.152 The NRC is well aware of this effort as they have already participated in at least one of the initial project workshops. PMP and PMF also impact reactor safety directly via their impact on local intense precipitation (LIP). This project will consider approaches for estimating PMP in a changing climate, with the goal of recommending an updated approach, appropriate for decision-maker needs. This project is clear evidence that the Federal Government and the NRC understands the significance and severity of Climate Change on critical infrastructure. Waiting for the project completion is unnecessary and inappropriate.
Climate change is here, the NRC and the licensee know it, steps should be taken now to protect the plant and the public from its effects.
44 As an example of what Climate Change has the potential to do let me use the example of Duane Arnold. The Duane Arnold plant in Iowa was prematurely and permanently shuttered after being hit with a Derecho with wind speeds exceeding 100mph. Climate change has been implicated in the severity of this extreme weather event (Hints of a derecho-climate change link, ten years after 2012 storm, Washington Post, June 29, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2022/06/29/derecho-climate-change-severe-storm/)
So how could a Climate Change exacerbated flood impact Oconee? If water levels rise above grade, systems need to protect the plant during transients and accident will begin to fail. The first cliff edge, when water rises essentially above grade it will flow unimpeded into the turbine building and its below grade levels. These levels contain safety related and other risk significant equipment including high pressure service water, low pressure service water and emergency feedwater. The loss of these systems will impact other emergency equipment dependent on them. If water level reaches approximately not already impacted by the loss of cooling water. Finaly (the third cliff edge), if water level overtops the wall protecting the SSF it too will fail. The SSF is the last line of permanently installed equipment potentially capable of dealing with the flood. If the SSF fails all that remains is the untried FLEX equipment.
The Jocassee Dam has about of freeboard during a PMP according to the currently evaluations. See Figure 11, Jocassee PMP hydrographs in FHRR Rev.1.153 This hydrograph shows a maximum flood elevation behind Jocassee Dam of
. MSL and the top of the dam is at MSL, leaving freeboard of approximately
. The PMP event causes the lakes elevation to rise from a level of in less than 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> (the hydrograph indicates rising water level starting at 2000 minutes into the analysis and hitting its maximum at about 2400 minutes. Overtopping in the current analysis of record is prevented by only significant pre-flood events (lowering the water level based on warning starting at time 0 in the hydrograph by utilizing grid dependent hydro-generators) and during the event by utilizing the tainter gates and the hydro-generators. Each additional foot of elevation behind the Jocassee Dam contains about 1% extra capacity. Thus, the extra of freeboard is about 3% extra capacity. Will a Climate Change exacerbated PMP consume that 3% of freeboard? The previously reference paper on the Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa River Basin (slightly to west of the Jocassee and Keowee basin) finds that:
Our results showed that PMP driven by projected future climate forcings is higher than 1981-2010 baseline values by around 20% in the 2021-2050 near-future and 44% in the 2071-2100 far-future periods (emphasis added).154 153 FHRR Rev. 1 Figure 11, Page 31.
154 Effects of Climate Change on PMP, see Abstract on Page 4808 (emphasis added).
45 Maybe, the NRC should look into it.
As discussed above Climate Change will make this type of event more likely, increasing the associated CDF, LERF and population dose values. Climate Change will also increase the intensity of storms increasing the likelihood (and speed of such events) that if the event occurs plant equipment will be impacted.
In summary, in my professional opinion, the Draft SEIS does not reflect a complete or adequately rigorous evaluation of all external hazards, does not consider uncertainties and does not address the reasonably foreseeable effects of Climate Change on the risks of accidents at Oconee. It simply does not perform the NEPA required hard look at environmental impacts.
The GAO certainly agrees that the NRC has not looked hard enough at Climate Change. Given these serious deficiencies, the NRC cannot claim to have a reasonable basis for concluding that the environmental impacts of accidents during a license renewal term are SMALL.
- 4. CONCLUSION The history of the NRCs regulation of the Oconee reactors presents grave concerns in several significant respects.
First and foremost, from a regulatory perspective, it is unacceptable that the NRC has allowed Duke to operate for the past ten years without completing flood protection measures that NRC required ten years ago in 2011 to protect the public from the undue risk of a core melt accident caused by failure of the Jocassee Dam.
Second, the NRCs silence on this matter for the past ten years is inexcusable. The NRC should stand by its judgment, which it has never repudiated or withdrawn, that protection of public health and safety requires installation of substantial additional flood protection measures.
Third, the NRCs risk analysis in the Draft SEIS is seriously deficient in other respects, including incomplete and misleading evaluations of CDF and lack of uncertainty analysis.
Fourth, the Draft SEIS fails to consider the real threat of climate change on reactor safety and environmental risks. These impacts are inevitable and significant.
Finally, Duke has consistently downplayed the severity of the risk posed by the Jocassee Dam, to the point that it now seeks approval of a second license term for its three Oconee reactors, based on flood risk estimates that are demonstrably incorrect, incomplete, and poorly conducted. Duke has ignored data in its own possession showing that the risk of a core melt accident with subsequent containment failure caused by Jocassee Dam failure is significantly higher than Duke asserts. Duke has also ignored significant additional contributors to core damage frequency, including seismically induced dam failure, overtopping, and outages. Of course, Climate Change will only make the flood results and effects worse.
46 SLR Proceeding: a moment of crisis and opportunity: The NRCs SLR proceeding provides the agency with an opportunity to restore public confidence in its commitment to ensure public health and safety, by ending its silence regarding the crucially important 2011 Safety Evaluation, and by requiring Duke to complete the flood protection measures required ten years ago. The NRC should prepare a new environmental risk analysis that uses correct, complete, and up-to-date methods and data. Finally, Duke should account for its failure to implement measures required by the NRC ten years ago for adequate protection, and now ignored in Dukes SLR application.
Non-Public Attachment D November 21, 2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
) Docket Nos. 50-269/270/287 SLR-2 Oconee Nuclear Station,
) June 7, 2024 Units 1, 2 & 3
)
REPLY BY BEYOND NUCLEAR AND THE SIERRA CLUB TO OPPOSITIONS TO THEIR HEARING REQUEST AND PETITION TO INTERVENE I.
INTRODUCTION Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(i)(2), the March 28, 2024 Order of the Secretary of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission), the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards (ASLBs) Memorandum and Order (Initial Prehearing Order) (May 8, 2024), and the ASLBs Memorandum and Order (Request to Address Impacts of Final Rule Applying Generic Environmental Impact Statement to Subsequent License Renewal Period)
(May 21, 2024), Petitioners Beyond Nuclear, Inc. (Beyond Nuclear) and the Sierra Club, Inc.
(Sierra Club) hereby reply to oppositions by Duke Energy Corp. (Duke) and the NRC Staff to Petitioners Hearing Request and Petition to Intervene (April 29, 2024, corrected May 1, 2024) (Hearing Request).1 With support by the expert declaration and technical report of nuclear engineer and risk analyst Jeffrey Mitman2, Petitioners contentions charge that the Draft 1 Applicants Answer to the Hearing Request and Petition to Intervene and Motion for Leave to Amend Contention 3 Filed by Beyond Nuclear and Sierra Club (May 6, 2024) (Duke Answer);
NRC Staff Answer in Opposition to Petition for Leave to Intervene Filed by Beyond Nuclear Inc.
and Sierra Club Inc. (NRC Staff Answer).
2 See Declaration of Jeffrey T. Mitman in Support of Beyond Nuclears and Sierra Clubs Hearing Request (April 29, 2024) (Mitman Declaration) (Attachment 1 to Petitioners Hearing Request); and Mr. Mitmans Expert Report, NRC Relicensing Crisis at Oconee Nuclear Station: Stop Duke From Sending Safety Over the Jocassee Dam: Updated Analysis of Neglected Safety, Environmental and Climate Change Risks (April 2024) (Mitman Report or Expert
2 Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (Draft SEIS)3 for the NRCs proposed decision to extend the operating licenses for Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3 (Oconee) for a twenty-year subsequent license renewal (SLR) term is inadequate because it provides erroneous, incomplete and misleading information regarding whether Duke has provided the Oconee reactors with adequate protection from failure of the upstream Jocassee Dam; because it contains accident risk estimates that fail to meet NEPA requirements for rigor, accuracy, completeness and consideration of uncertainties; and because it fails to address the effects of climate change on accident risk. Each of these categories of deficiencies is significant in its own right. Taken together, they show a level of inadequacy that is grossly unacceptable.
Neither Duke nor the Staff opposes Petitioners standing to participate in this proceeding.
But both parties oppose the admissibility of Petitioners contentions regarding omissions and inadequacies in the Draft SEIS. As discussed below in Section II, however, Dukes and the NRC Staffs arguments against admission of Petitioners contentions are without merit. The contentions should be admitted.
Report) (Exhibit 1 to Mitman Declaration). Mr. Mitmans expert report updates an expert he filed on behalf of Petitioners in the first SLR proceeding for the Oconee reactors in 2021.
3 The Draft Oconee EIS is entitled: Draft Site-Specific Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, Supplement 2, Second Renewal Regarding Subsequent License Renewal for Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2 and 3 (Feb. 2024).
In their Hearing Request, Petitioners referred to the document as the Draft SEIS because of its designation as Supplement 2. As the NRC Staff Answer recognizes, however, the EIS is not actually a supplement. Therefore, henceforth, Petitioners will use the abbreviation Draft EIS.
3 II.
RESPONSE TO ASLB QUESTIONS IN MAY 21, 2024 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Petitioners hereby respond to the questions posed by the ASLB in its May 21, 2024 Memorandum and Order, except for questions posed to the NRC Staff.
- 1. What is the applicability of the 2024 License Renewal Rule to this proceeding?
Because Duke elected to have the NRC prepare a site-specific EIS for its SLR application for the Oconee reactors, the 2024 License Renewal Rule does not apply to this proceeding.4 It would be unfair and prejudicial to Petitioners to apply the 2024 Rule to their contentions at any time in this proceeding, because they invested significant time and resources into this promised adjudicatory proceeding rather than in commenting on the Draft License Renewal GEIS.5
- 2. [omitted]
- 3. What is the relevance of the 2024 Rules Compliance Provision to this Proceeding?
It has no relevance because the Rule does not apply.
- 4. What is the status of the NRC Staffs Compliance with the 2024 Rule in This Proceeding?
The Staffs status of compliance is irrelevant because the 2024 Rule does not apply to this proceeding.
4 Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-22-03, 95 N.R.C. 40 (2022). See also Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Units 3 and 4), CLI-22-02, 95 N.R.C. 26 (2022); Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Units 3 and 4), LBP-24-03, __ N.R.C. __ (March 7, 2024).
5 See Statement of Policy on Conduct of Adjudications, CLI-98-12, 48 N.R.C. 18 (1998)
(Adjudication Policy Statement).
4
- 5. What impact does the 2024 Rule have on this proceeding relative to Petitioners contentions?
As discussed above, Petitioners do not believe the 2024 Rule should have any effect on Petitioners contentions in this proceeding.
III. PETITIONERS CONTENTIONS MEET NRC ADMISSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS.
A. Contention 1 is Admissible.
Contention 1 (Erroneous, Incomplete and Misleading Information Regarding Whether Duke Has Provided the Oconee Reactors with Adequate Protection From Failure of the Upstream Jocassee Dam) states:
The NRC Staffs conclusion that accident impacts of continuing to operate the Oconee reactors are insignificant, i.e., SMALL (Draft SEIS at F-5), is based on the assertion that Duke has provided the Oconee reactors with adequate protection from accident risks caused by external events, such as failure of the upstream Jocassee Dam. In support of this assertion, the Draft SEIS relies heavily on a description of the scope, nature and outcome of the NRC Staffs review of seismic and flooding risks (i.e., external hazards) to Oconee, conducted between 2012 and 2020 in response to the catastrophic 2011 Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident in Japan. As stated in the Draft SEIS:
In Section 4.15.1.2.1, Design-Basis Accidents, of its ER, Duke Energy summarized the site-specific requirements needed to operate a nuclear power facility, such as the Oconee Station safety analysis report (Duke Energy 2020-TN9001). The Oconee Station safety analysis report presents the design criteria and design information for Oconee Station.
The Oconee Station safety analysis report also discusses various hypothetical DBAs and the safety features designed to prevent and mitigate accidents. A number of the postulated accidents are not expected to occur during the life of the plant but are evaluated to establish the design basis for the preventive and mitigative safety systems of the facility.
The acceptance criteria for DBAs are described in 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 100.
The NRC has reviewed Oconees design basis on several occasions following the issuance of the initial operating licenses.
[An] example of NRCs review of Oconee Station design-basis is its review of external hazards information for all operating power reactors, including Oconee, as ordered by the Commission following the Fukushima accident. On November 17, 2020, the NRC staff completed its review for Oconee Station and concluded that no further regulatory action (sic) were needed to ensure adequate protection or compliance with regulatory
5 requirements, including site-specific external hazards information, re-confirming the acceptability of Oconee Stations design basis (NRC 2020-TN8995). [citing Draft SEIS at F F-4 (citing letter from R.J. Bernardo, NRC to J.E. Burchfield, Jr., Duke re:
Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 - Documentation of the Completion of Required Actions Taken in Response to the Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident (Nov. 17, 2020) (ML20304A369) (NRC 2020-TN8995) (NRC 11/17/20 Letter))].
- 1. Reliance on erroneous, incomplete and misleading information The Draft SEIS assertion is based on erroneous, incomplete and misleading information.
Therefore, because the Draft SEIS bases its conclusion of insignificant environmental impacts on an unsupported claim that the reactors are adequately protected against flooding risks caused by failure of the Jocassee Dam, the Draft SEIS is inadequate to satisfy NEPAs requirement for a hard look at the environmental impacts of the proposed second license renewal decisions. [citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989); National Audubon Society v. Dept of Navy, 422 F.3d 174, 185 (4th Cir. 2005); State of New York v. NRC, 681 F.3d 471, 479, 482 (D.C. Cir.
2012); Limerick Ecology Action, 869 F.2d 719, 730 (3d Cir. 1989)].
In addition, the Draft SEIS fails to satisfy NEPA because it omits any discussion of the environmental significance of an outstanding 2011 Safety Evaluation establishing a minimum flood height that safety equipment must be protected against and also prescribed measures for providing adequate protection against a flood caused by failure of the Jocassee Dam. [citing Mitman Report, § 2.6.4 (quoting Letter from Eric J. Leeds, NRC, to Preston Gillespie, Duke, re: Staff Assessment of Dukes Response to Confirmatory Action Letter Regarding Dukes Commitments to Address External Flooding Concerns at the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 (ONS) (TAC Nos.
ME3065, ME3066, and ME3067) and Enclosed Safety Evaluation (Jan. 28, 2011)
(ML103490330) (2011 Safety Evaluation).] The 2011 Safety Evaluation remains effective because the NRC has not repudiated the safety findings or requirements in the Safety Evaluation based on an evaluation of whether adequate protection of public health and safety can be provided without those safety findings or measures. While the NRC Staff claims to have closed the issues raised by the 2011 Safety Evaluation, the document relied on by the Staff for this purported closure does not use adequate protection language and therefore does not demonstrate that the NRC believes public health and safety is adequately protected in the absence of the requirements of the 2011 Safety Evaluation. [citing Letter from Catherine Haney, NRC to Scott Batson, Duke re:
Oconee Nuclear Station - Confirmatory Action Letter Followup Inspection Report 050000269/2016009, 050000270/2016009, 05000287/2016009 (June 16, 2016)
(ADAMS Accession No. ML16168Al76) (Haney Letter).] Because the Draft SEIS bases its conclusion of insignificant environmental impacts on an unsupported claim regarding adequate protection from flooding risks caused by failure of the Jocassee Dam, the Draft SEIS is inadequate to satisfy NEPA.
6 The Draft SEIS assertion that adequate protection of the Oconee reactors from external hazards is ensure[d] invokes Section 182(a) of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a), requiring the [NRC] to ensure that the utilization or production of special nuclear material will... provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public. [citing Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 824 F.2d 108, 109 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a))]. Adequate protection is the primary statutory standard relating to the [NRCs] mandate to ensure the safe operation of nuclear power plants. [citing Union of Concerned Scientists, 824 F.2d at 109.] Thus, use of that phrase conveys a clear message that accident risks have been reduced to a level that is both acceptable under the Atomic Energy Act and insignificant or SMALL under NEPA.
[citing Limerick Ecology Action v. NRC, 869 F.2d at 730; Citizens for Safe Power v.
NRC, 524 F.2d 1291, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Final Rule, Revisions to Environmental Review for Renewal of Nuclear Power Plant Operating Licenses, 78 Fed. Reg. 37,282, 37,289 (June 20, 2013).] Under the Atomic Energy Act, no further action to reduce that acceptable level of risk is required; and under NEPA, the only required additional actions are disclosure of the impacts and consideration of alternatives to manage or avoid the residual risks of these unlikely accidents. [citing 78 Fed. Reg. at 37,289.]
Here, the Draft SEIS claim that the adequate protection standard has been satisfied with respect to flooding protection from external events such as Jocassee Dam failure is erroneous because it is not supported by any safety analysis of whether that statutory standard has been satisfied. Further, the Draft SEIS ignores the Staffs own documents that have concluded that failure of the Jocassee Dam is a credible accident that must be addressed by safety measures in order to provide adequate protection to public health and safety. Finally, by claiming that continued operation of the Oconee reactors satisfies the adequate protection standard, without acknowledging that the multiple documents it relies on provide no such conclusion, the NRC misleads other agencies, state and local governments, and the general public, lulling them into a false sense of security.
- a. Incorrect claims with respect to design-basis review, legal effect of the 50.54(f) letter, and adequate protection findings Design-basis review. In the Draft SEIS, the NRC Staff cites the NRC 11/17/20 Letter for the proposition that the Staff reviewed the Oconee Station design-basis. [citing Draft EIS at F-4]. But the NRC 11/17/20 Letter itself does not discuss or even refer to a design-basis review with respect to external flooding events at Oconee. And there is no evidence in the record of the NRCs post-Fukushima actions that such a review was done.
Submittal of external hazards information purportedly ordered by the Commission. The 50.54(f) letters cited in the Draft SEIS did not order the submittal of external hazards information. The information was request[ed] and therefore submittal was discretionary. [citing Letter from NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees and Construction Permit Holders re: Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1.2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident (March 12, 2012) (ML12053A340) (50.54(f) Letter].
7 Adequate Protection. The Draft SEIS also states that in the NRC 11/17/20 Letter, the NRC concluded that no further regulatory action (sic) were needed to ensure adequate protection or compliance with regulatory requirements. [citing 50.54(f) Letter]. But the words adequate protection do not appear anywhere in the NRC 11/17/20 Letter, nor does the Letter address the question of whether the Oconee reactors comply with regulatory requirements for provision of adequate protection from flooding risks posed by failure of the Jocassee Dam. Nor do the references cited by the NRC 11/17/20 Letter contain any findings regarding adequate protection or compliance with regulations required for adequate protection. For instance:
At pages 8-10, the NRC 11/17/20 Letter contains a discussion of Dukes reevaluation of the flooding hazard to the Oconee reactors, which was requested by a 50.54(f) letter sent to all licensees on March 12, 2012. [citing NRC 11/17/20 Letter at 1]. In this discussion, the NRC states that the local intense precipitation, rivers and streams, and dam failure flood-causing mechanisms were not bounded by the CDB
[current design basis]. Therefore, additional assessments of these flood-causing mechanisms were required. [citing NRC 11/17/20 Letter at 9]. According to the Letter:
The NRC staff used a graded approach to determine if this site would need to perform an IA [flooding integrated assessment] for the reevaluated flooding hazard, or if an FE [focused evaluation] would suffice. Based on the graded approach, Oconee completed an FE (Reference 6.20) to ensure appropriate actions were identified and taken to protect the plant from the reevaluated flood hazard. The NRC staff conducted a regulatory audit (Reference 6.22),
completed its review of the FE, and concluded in the staff assessment (Reference 6.21) that the licensee provided sufficient information in response to the 50.54(f) letter. Audit results were summarized in the staff assessment.
[citing NRC 11/17/20 Letter at 9].
Based on this information, the NRC concluded that: [n]o further regulatory actions are required related to the flood hazard reevaluations. [citing NRC 11/17/20 Letter at 9]. This portion of the NRC 11/17/20 Letter does not support the Draft SEIS, because the words adequate protection appear nowhere in the discussion of the flooding reevaluation. Instead, the NRC simply stated that Duke had provided sufficient information in response to the 50.54(f) letter. [citing NRC 11/17/20 Letter at 9].
Nor do the words adequate protection appear in the Staff reference documents cited by the NRC 11/17/20 Letter in support of its conclusion that no further regulatory actions are required for Oconee. [citing NRC 11/17/20 Letter at 9 (citing Refs. 6.21 and 6.25)].
8 For instance, Ref. 2.61, a Staff Assessment... Related to the Focused Evaluation for Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 as a Result of the Reevaluated Flooding Hazard Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 contains the following
Conclusion:
The NRC staff has concluded that the licensee performed the Oconee FE in accordance with the guidance described in NEI 16-05, Revision 1, as endorsed by JLD-ISG-2016-01, and that the licensee has demonstrated that effective flood protection exists from the reevaluated flood hazards.
[quoting Letter from Juan F. Uribe, NRC to Ed. Burchfield, Jr., Duke, re:
Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 - Staff Assessment of Flooding Focused Evaluation (CAC Nos. MG0265, MG0266, MG0267, and EPID L-2017-JLD-0029), Enclosed Staff Assessment at 10 (June 18, 2018)
(ML1814A755)].
This conclusion does not state that flood protection is adequate to protect health and safety as the term is used in the Atomic Energy Act and the Draft SEIS -- only that it is effective. And the term effective is undefined.
Similarly, Ref. 2.65, an NRC letter reporting on the NRC Staffs treatment of reevaluated flood hazard information, states that Oconee is included in Category 1, which:
Corresponds to sites where no additional regulatory action is warranted.
This category includes sites that have all the flood hazard mechanisms bounded by the current design basis, or sites where the licensee has demonstrated that effective or feasible flood protection will address the unbounded reevaluated hazards. This means that both licensees and staff are finished with the 50.54(f) letter flooding reevaluation assessments and backfit decisions for these sites. [citing Letter from Mary Jane Ross-Lee, NRC to The Licensees of Operating Power Reactors re: Treatment of Reevaluated Flood Hazard Information Provided Under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident, Encl. 1 at 4 (Aug. 20, 2019) (ML19067A247)].
Ref. 2.65 contains no representations regarding adequate protection of public health and safety from flooding hazards posed by failure of the Jocassee Dam.
Again, the terms effective and feasible are undefined.
In fact, in the entire post-Fukushima review record for Oconee, no NRC document can be found that makes adequate protection findings with respect to the risk of flooding from failure of the Jocassee Dam or measures necessary to provide adequate protection from those risks. The only adequate protection findings relate to the adequacy of mitigation measures. [citing NRC 11/17/20 Letter; Letter from Tony
9 Brown, NRC, to Thomas D. Ray, Duke, re: Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3
-- Safety Evaluation Regarding Implementation of Mitigating Strategies and Reliable spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Related to Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051 (CAC Nos. MF0782, MF0783, MF0784, MF0785, MF0786, and MF0787) (Aug. 30, 2017) and enclosed Safety Evaluation (August 30, 2017) (M17202U791)].
- b. Disregard of the Staffs own documents that have concluded that failure of the Jocassee Dam is a credible accident that must be addressed by safety measures in order to provide adequate protection to public health and safety.
The Draft SEIS also disregards a number of important facts and legal determinations that bear on the environmental impacts of re-licensing the Oconee reactors, including:
The fact that when the Oconee reactors were initially licensed by the NRC, neither Duke nor the NRC considered that failure of the Jocassee Dam was credible; and therefore, the NRC did not require Duke to protect the reactors safety equipment against a flood caused by dam failure. [citing Mitman Report § 2.3.2].
The fact that in 2008, even before the Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident, the Staff had already issued a Section 50.54(f) letter to Duke, stating that while Duke was relying on walls constructed around the two ground-level entrances to the SSF [Standby Shutdown Facility] to provide sufficient protection against floods, an Inundation Study prepared by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) had predicted that a failure of the Jocassee Dam could result in a flood height of above grade.
[citing Letter from Joseph G. Giitter, NRC to Dave Baxter, Duke, re:
Information Request Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Related to External Flooding, Including Failure of the Jocassee Dam at Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 (TAC Nos. MD8224, MD8225, and MD8226) (Aug. 15, 2008) (ML081640244) (NRC 08/15/08 Letter); Mitman Report, § 2.6.2].
The fact that in 2009, the NRC remain[ed] concerned that Duke had not demonstrated that the Oconee units will be adequately protected in the event of a Jocassee Dam failure. [citing NRC 08/15/08 Letter; Mitman Report, § 2.6.2]. The Staff also stated that Jocassee Dam failure is a credible event and needs to be addressed deterministically. [citing Letter from Joseph G. Giitter, NRC to Dave Baxter, Duke, re: Evaluation of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke) September 26, 2008, Response to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Letter Dated August 15, 2008, Related to External Flooding at Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 (Oconee) (TAC Nos. MD8224, MD8225, and MD8226) at 2 (April 30, 2009) (ML09057077); Mitman Report, § 2.6.2].
The fact that in 2011, the Staff issued a Safety Evaluation concluding that the flood depth at the Oconee reactors needed to be raised to in order to
10 ensure adequate protection. [citing Mitman Report, § 2.6.4 (quoting 2011 Safety Evaluation)].
The fact that as a result of the post-Fukushima review, the NRC has now approved lowering the flood depth to
, i.e., reducing the flood depth against which the SSF must be protected by
- and that the NRC has made no finding that this new flood depth (i.e.,
) will provide adequate protection to public health and safety. [citing Letter from Scott L. Batson, Duke to NRC re: Supplemental Information Regarding NRC 2008 and 2012 Requests for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Pertaining to External Flooding at Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS), Enclosure, Table D at 7 (March 6, 2015)]. Yet, the Draft SEIS asserts that adequate protection of public health and safety from external hazards will be ensured during the proposed continued operation of the Oconee reactors. [citing Draft EIS at F-5].
By relying on purported adequate protection findings to assert that the environmental impacts of continued operation of the Oconee reactors are SMALL, without actually demonstrating that any such findings were made, the NRC violates the cardinal rule that a NEPA analysis must show consideration of all relevant environmental concerns. State of New York, 681 F.3d at 476. Nothing in the record provided by the NRC here is relevant to the assertions of adequate protection that are made in support of the proposed finding that the environmental impacts of reactor accidents are SMALL. As discussed in the attached Mitman Declaration, these errors, omissions, and misleading statements have enormous safety and environmental significance because they obscure the fact that the NRC has failed to provide the basic level of protection to the Oconee reactors that is required by the Atomic Energy Act. [citing the introduction to Mr. Mitmans report and in Sections 2, 3.1 and 4].
- 2. Omission of discussion of relevant factor affecting outcome of environmental analysis: abandonment of 2011 Safety Evaluation without making new adequate protection findings In addition, the Draft SEIS fails to satisfy NEPA because it omits any discussion of the environmental significance of the outstanding 2011 Safety Evaluation establishing a minimum flood height that safety equipment must be protected against and also prescribed measures for providing adequate protection against a flood caused by failure of the Jocassee Dam. [citing Mitman Report, § 2.6.4 (quoting 2011 Safety Evaluation)]. This is a relevant environmental concern, State of New York, 681 F.3d at 476, because the NRC relies on its safety reviews for nuclear reactor licensing decisions as the basis for its environmental findings. See discussion above in Subsection 1.
The 2011 Safety Evaluation remains effective because the NRC has not repudiated the safety findings or requirements in the Safety Evaluation based on an evaluation of whether adequate protection of public health and safety can be provided without those safety findings or measures. [citing 2011 Safety Evaluation and Haney Letter].
11 Because the NRC has not repudiated the 2011 Safety Evaluation or made new adequate protection findings for the reduced flood height and altered measures for responding to that flood height, the 2011 Safety Evaluation remains an open and unresolved safety issue for which the NRC is unable to vouch for the adequate protection of the Oconee reactors from accident risks. The effect of that significant gap or deficit in the NRCs safety-based regulatory program on the NRCs ability to make a finding that the environmental impacts of accidents are insignificant or SMALL must be addressed in the Draft SEIS.
- 1. Dukes and the Staffs objections to the admissibility of Contention 1 have no merit.
Contention 1 asserts the following overarching legal and factual dispute with the Draft EIS:
The NRC Staffs conclusion that accident impacts of continuing to operate the Oconee reactors are insignificant, i.e., SMALL (Draft SEIS at F-5), is based on the assertion that Duke has provided the Oconee reactors with adequate protection from accident risks caused by external events, such as failure of the upstream Jocassee Dam. In support of this assertion, the Draft SEIS relies heavily on a description of the scope, nature and outcome of the NRC Staffs review of seismic and flooding risks (i.e., external hazards) to Oconee, conducted between 2012 and 2020 in response to the catastrophic 2011 Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident in Japan.
Petitioners contend that the Draft EIS fails to satisfy NEPA because it:
omits any discussion of the environmental significance of the outstanding 2011 Safety Evaluation establishing a minimum flood height that safety equipment must be protected against and also prescribed measures for providing adequate protection against a flood caused by failure of the Jocassee Dam.... This is a relevant environmental concern, State of New York, 681 F.3d at 476, because the NRC relies on its safety reviews for nuclear reactor licensing decisions as the basis for its environmental findings.
While Duke and the Staff argue that Petitioners claims are baseless, they have failed to show that any of the following key facts relied on by Petitioners are incorrect:
First, Contention 1 demonstrates that the Draft EIS claim that the adequate protection standard has been satisfied with respect to flooding protection from external events such as Jocassee Dam failure is not supported by any safety analysis of whether that statutory standard has been satisfied. In page after page of their responses to Contention 1, neither Duke nor the
12 Staff cites any adequate protection finding with respect to whether the Oconee reactors are adequately protected from flooding risk.
Second, Contention 1 demonstrates that the only document to invoke the adequate protection standard is the 2011 Safety Evaluation, which required Duke to raise the flood protection level for the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) to in order to provide adequate protection from flooding. While Duke attempts to disparage the significance of the Safety Evaluation, it remains the only document to address the statutory standard of adequate protection or to articulate what is needed to provide it. All other review documents after 2011 use undefined terms as a substitute for adequate protection, such as effective and feasible.
But these words do not convey any message that the NRC has applied the statutory standard for providing a minimally safe level of protection as required by the adequate protection standard in the Atomic Energy Act.6 Duke and the Staff attempt to discount and disparage the legal and factual significance of the 2011 Safety Evaluation, stating that it does not impose any actual requirements and that it was superseded. But the 2011 Safety Evaluation is significant for the establishment of what the NRC views as necessary for adequate protection of Oconee from external flooding. Rather than demonstrating grounds for rejection of Contention 1, Dukes and the Staffs arguments demonstrate that the parties have a genuine and material legal and factual dispute.
Third, Contention 1 demonstrates that as a result of the post-Fukushima review, the NRC has now approved lowering the flood depth to
, i.e., reducing the flood depth against which the SSF must be protected by Despite this reversal of the adequate protection 6 See Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 824 F.2d 108, 109 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a)) (cited in Hearing Request at 10).
13 finding in the 2011 Safety Evaluation, the NRC has made no subsequent finding that the 2011 Safety Evaluation was wrong or that this new flood depth of will provide adequate protection to public health and safety. Duke and the Staff are unable to controvert this legally significant fact.
Duke accuses Petitioners of failing to engage with the full post-Fukushima regulatory history for Oconee and cherry-picking the record.7 To the contrary, Petitioners have combed every document seeking some indication that the NRC applied the adequate protection standard when it lowered the flood height for Oconee from
. No such finding can be found. Thus, Duke is left to argue that adequate protection findings can be inferred from other phrases used in NRC Staff reviews, or from the fact that the 50.54(f) letter sent to licensees invoked the concept of adequate protection.8 Duke also attempts to discount the 2011 Safety Evaluation on the ground that it presented a highly conservative and bounding analysis of a hypothetical failure of the Jocassee Dam.9 In making this argument, Duke highlights Petitioners point: if the NRC Staff later found that an adequate protection finding could be made without such a highly conservative and bounding analysis, it could have said so in a follow-up safety evaluation. But it did not.
Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that measures the Draft EIS is passing off as ensuring adequate protection and thereby also ensuring impacts that are SMALL do not actually meet the adequate protection standard.
7 Duke Answer at 27-28.
8 See, e.g., Duke Answer at 19 (asserting that a statement by the NRC Staff that [n]o further regulatory actions are required is an [i]mplicit finding of adequate protection). This is a slim reed on which to base the reduction of a flood wall height by fourteen feet.
9 Duke Answer at 27.
14 Accordingly, Petitioners reasonably assert, in their admissible contention, that where a safety evaluation has identified flood protection measures needed for adequate protection of public health and safety, revocation or abandonment or those measures would require a follow-up safety evaluation and findings that public health and safety continues to be protected.
Otherwise, the Draft EIS has no grounds to assert that the environmental impacts of operating Oconee in a second license renewal term are SMALL because Duke has provided the Oconee reactors with adequate protection from external flooding.
- 2. The issues raised by Contention 1 are within the scope of this NEPA proceeding.
Both Duke and the NRC Staff argue that Contention 1 is inadmissible because it raises safety issues that are outside the scope of this NEPA proceeding.10 This argument is entirely without merit, because the Draft EIS itself cites the NRCs purported adequate protection findings as a key basis for its finding that the environmental impacts of external flooding at Oconee are SMALL.11 The NRC cant have it both ways, by relying explicitly on demonstrably incorrect safety assurances under the Atomic Energy Act for its NEPA findings, at the same time that it declares such assurances to be beyond the scope of issues that can be raised in challenging those findings. As long as the Draft EIS relies on an adequate protection finding for its finding of no significant impact, Petitioners are entitled to question whether such an adequate protection finding actually exists.
B. Contention 2 is Admissible.
Contention 2 (Draft EIS Risk Estimates Fail to Meet NEPA Requirements for Rigor, Accuracy, Completeness, and Consideration of Uncertainties) states:
10 Duke Answer at 26, 30-31, NRC Staff Answer at 18-24.
11 See Draft EIS at F-5.
15 In addition to the deficiencies described above in Contention 1, the Draft SEIS is deficient in other significant respects, which result in the significant understatement of accident risk.
These deficiencies, as set forth in Section 3.2 of Mr. Mitmans expert report, include an inaccurate all hazards core damage frequency (CDF) estimate (Section 3.2.1), significantly underestimating the probability of a large containment failure from fire (Section 3.2.2),
making an unsupported assumption regarding the margin for population dose due to seismic events (Section 3.2.3), underestimating risk by failing to aggregate changes in risk (Section 3.2.4), and relying on an invalid assumption that studies of boiling water reactors and Westinghouse pressurize water reactors are applicable to the Oconee reactors (Section 3.2.5).
In addition, the Draft SEIS fails to address uncertainties, in violation of NEPA and NRC guidance for probabilistic risk assessments. See Limerick Ecology Action, 869 F.2d at 744 and NRC guidance cited in Mitman Report, Section 3.3.12
- 1. Dukes objections to Petitioners manner of pleading Contention 2 have no merit.
Duke argues that Contention 2 is inadmissible because it fails to meet multiple pleading requirements. First, Duke argues that Contention 2s reliance on Mr. Mitmans technical report is inconsistent with Commission precedent prohibiting wholesale incorporation of more detailed analyses as alleged support for contention admissibility.13 But the cases cited by Duke do not support its argument. In Summer (CLI-10-01), the Commission observed that the petitioner had relied on an expert declaration, but did not fault the petitioner for that reliance per se. Instead, as quoted by Duke, the Commission held that the Licensing Board did not err in excluding portion of [a] contention where [the] expert report did not specifically challenge or expressly challenge the text of the relevant analysis.14 But Duke does not argue that Mr. Mitmans criticism of the Draft EIS lack specificity with respect to the Draft EIS, nor would such a charge 12 Hearing Request at 16-17.
13 Duke Answer at 32 (quoting S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. (Virgil Summer Nuclear Station, Units 2 &
3), CLI-10-01, 71 N.R.C. 1, 21-22 (2010) and citing Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Palisades Nuclear Plant and Big Rock Point Site), CLI-22-08, 96 N.R.C. 1, 100 (2022) (citing Public Service Co. of N.H. (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-89-03, 29 N.R.C. 234, 240-41 (1989)).
14 Duke Answer at 32 (quoting Summer (CLI-10-01), 71 N.R.C. at 21-22) (emphasis added by Petitioners).
16 be supportable. Each of Mr. Mitmans criticisms of the Draft EIS is explicitly directed at a specific portion of the Draft EIS.
Nor do the other cases cited by Duke support its position. In Palisades (CLI-22-08), the Commission refused to allow wholesale incorporation by reference of large documents as the basis for a contention.15 Mr. Mitmans Report is not large, and the contention specifically refers to specific portions of the Report. In Seabrook (CLI-89-03), the Intervenors submitted a late-filed contention that disputed decommissioning funding estimates without identifying evidence on which they rely in either the contention or the supporting expert declaration.16 Instead, the Intervenors referred to a petition under 10 C.F.R. § 2.758, asserting that [a]ll of the facts and assertions contained in [that] petition are incorporated by reference.17 These references were sizable and massive according to the Commission.18 Here, in contrast, Contention 2 explicitly incorporates clearly identified pages of Mr. Mitmans expert report.19 Duke is also incorrect in arguing that Contention 2 itself fails to explain the significance of Mr. Mitmans assertions, thereby rendering it inadmissible.20 Contrary to Dukes assertion, Contention 2 explicitly asserts that the Draft EIS contains multiple deficiencies that result in the 15 Palisades (CLI-22-08), 96 N.R.C. at 100 (emphasis added).
16 29 N.R.C. at 240.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Dukes suggestion that it was necessary to scour affidavits or other attachments to identify potential threshold admissibility arguments is absurd. See Duke Answer at 35. Contention 2 leads the reader directly to the discrete relevant sections of Mr. Mitmans expert report. Each of these sections provides a detailed explanation of how the Draft EIS underestimated accident risk, made erroneous assumptions, or failed to follow required protocols for risk assessments such as uncertainty analysis, thereby resulting in an underestimate of accident risk.
20 Duke Answer at 32 (citing S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. (Virgil Summer Nuclear Station, Units 2 &
3), LBP-10-06, 71 N.R.C. 350, 361 (2010).
17 significant understatement of accident risk.21 The title of the contention statement also asserts that the Draft EIS Risk Estimates Fail to Meet NEPA Requirements for Rigor, Accuracy, Completeness, and Consideration of Uncertainties.22 And Petitioners cite legal requirements for a hard look at environmental impacts.23 Petitioners thereby gave Duke adequate notice of their legal and factual claims.
Contrary to well-established Commission policy, Duke would turn the NRCs threshold admissibility requirements into a fortress to deny intervention.24 As the Commission has held, contentions will be ruled inadmissible only if they consist of bare assertions and speculations with no tangible information, no experts, no substantive affidavits.25 By furnishing... the reasoned opinion of a qualified expert regarding these technical inadequacies in the Draft EIS environmental analyses, Petitioners have satisfied the NRCs criteria for admission of Contention 2.26 21 Hearing Request at 16.
22 Id.
23 Hearing Request at 16-17 (citing Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349; and Limerick Ecology Action v.
NRC, 869 F.2d 719, 730 (3rd Cir. 1989)).
24 GPU Nuclear, Inc., Jersey Central Power & Light Co. and Amergen Energy Co., LLC (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-06, 51 N.R.C. 193, 202 (2000) (quoting Duke Energy Corp. (Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-99-11, 49 N.R.C. 328, 335 (1999) (quoting Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3),
ALAB-216, 8 A.E.C. 13, 20-21 (1974). See also Fansteel, Inc. (Muskogee, Oklahoma Site),
CLI-03-13, 58 N.R.C. 195, 203 (2003) (the requirement for specificity and factual support is not intended to prevent intervention when material and concrete issues exist.).
25 Fansteel (CLI-03-13), 58 N.R.C. at 203.
26 U.S. Dept. of Energy (High-Level Waste Repository), LBP-09-06, 69 N.R.C. 367, 409 (2006)
(LBP-09-06).
18
- 2. Dukes and the Staffs objections to specific portions of the Mitman Report have no merit.
- a. Inaccurate all hazards core damage frequency (CDF) estimate (Mitman Report § 3.2.1)
In Contention 2, Petitioners cite Section 3.2.1 of Mr. Mitmans Report for the proposition that the Draft EIS contains an inaccurate all hazards core damage frequency estimate.27 Duke argues that the Mitman Report does not support the contention because it does not dispute the accuracy of the Draft EIS values for all hazards CDF.28 But Mr. Mitman does indeed dispute the accuracy of the values presented by the Draft EIS. Dukes Answer only serves to confirm that the Draft EIS presents an outdated and inaccurately low value for all hazards CDF as if it is the current value. As Mr. Mitman points out, Table F-4 presents a value of 8.90E-5 as the SAMA All Hazards CDF. While footnote (b) to Table F-4 states vaguely that Data were obtained from the applicable plant-specific supplement to NUREG-1437 (without identifying which supplement or which revision of NUREG-1437 was relied on), the text directly below Table F-4 presents this value as the current value: As provided in Table F-4, the Oconee Station All Hazards CDF is less than the highest estimated Internal Events CDF from the 1996 LR GEIS (Indian Point 2).29 The Draft EIS then uses that outdated information to provide the assurance that the likelihood of an accident that leads to core damage, including accounting for the contribution from external events, is less for Oconee Station than the highest estimated Internal Events CDF used as the basis for the 1996 LR GEIS.30 27 Hearing Request at 16.
28 Duke Answer at 33.
29 Id. (lines 6-7).
30 Id. (lines 7-10).
19 In the next paragraph, the Draft EIS states that the Combined CDF (All Hazards) increased to 1.26E-4 per reactor-year.31 The reader is left to wonder how a value that is 8.90E-5 could have increased to 1.26E-4. The text of the Draft EIS does not explain that Table F-4 is outdated, and indeed relies on it as providing current and up-to-date information for the purpose of assuring the public that all hazards CDF for Oconee is low in proportion to internal hazards.
Mr. Mitman also points out the fallacy of comparing the updated all hazards CDF value of 1.24E-4 to the outdated internal CDF value of 3.5E-4 for Indian Point in Table F-4.32 As he notes, the NRC now has all hazards values of 6.1E-5 (mean) and 6.6E-5 (median), as reported in the Draft License Renewal GEIS of February 2023.33 Because the updated all hazards CDF for Oconee of 1.24E-4 is about twice as high as these values, the Draft EIS significantly understates accident risk. Thus, contrary to the Draft EIS, it does not represent the most up-to-date understanding of plant risk at the time the Draft EIS was prepared.34 Accordingly, Contention 2, with the support of Mr. Mitmans report, raises a genuine and material dispute regarding the accuracy of all hazards CDF values presented in the Draft EIS.
31 Id. (line 11).
32 Draft EIS at F-15 (lines 11-12).
33 Mitman Report at 34 (citing Draft Generic EIS for License Renewal, Rev. 2, Vol. 3 (Feb.
2024)). Contrary to the Staffs assertion at page 31, the Draft EIS failure to consider this data in the Draft License Renewal GEIS is a deficiency because the Draft EIS must - and indeed claims to -- consider the best available information. Thus, consideration of up-to-date data is not just a possible alternative approach but a requirement.
34 Draft EIS at F-15 (line 21).
20
- b. Significant underestimate of probability of a large containment failure from fire (Mitman Report § 3.2.2) and unsupported assumption regarding the margin for population dose due to seismic events significant underestimate of probability of a large containment failure from fire (Mitman Report § 3.2.3)
In Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, Mr. Mitman criticizes the Draft EIS use of an external event multiplier to calculate estimated population dose from fire and seismic events. As he points out, the use of a multiplier obscures and reduces the significantly greater contribution of fire to large early release frequency (LERF) values and the significantly greater contribution of containment failure probabilities to conditional containment failure probability (CCFP).35 Thus, contrary to the Staffs argument, Mr. Mitman raises a deficiency in the Draft EIS and not just a suggestion of other ways the analysis could have been done.36 Mr. Mitman has pointed to a deficiency in the Draft EIS and therefore the contention is admissible.37 Further, contrary to Dukes assertion at page 37, Mr. Mitman does not seek the use of a larger multiplier. What he seeks is to point out the lack of an adequate basis for the assumed margin in the population dose estimates.38 35 Mitman Report at 34-35.
36 NRC Staff Answer at 32-33 (citing Public Service Co. of N.H. (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-12-05, 75 N.R.C. 301, 323 (2012).
37 Seabrook (CLI-12-05), 75 N.R.C. at 323.
38 Mitman Report at 35. Duke correctly notes that a quotation on page 35 of Mr. Mitmans Report is mistakenly attributed to the Draft EIS discussion of seismic events (Section 3.2.2) when in fact it appears in the discussion of fire events (Section 3.2.1). This typographical error is insignificant, because the language quoted by Mr. Mitman is exactly the same in both sections of the Draft EIS. Compare Draft EIS at F-19 (lines 16-19) with Draft EIS at F-21 (lines 38-41).
Essentially the same language is also found in Draft EIS at F-19 (lines 42-45).
21
- c. Underestimating risk by failing to aggregate changes in risk (Mitman Report § 3.2.4)
In Section 3.2.4 of Mr. Mitmans report, he criticizes the Draft SEIS for evaluating accident scenarios in isolation rather than evaluating their compounding effects.39 To illustrate this under-estimate, he multiplies the risk factors that have changed between the 1996 License Renewal GEIS and the 1998 SAMA analysis. While Duke criticizes this method, Mr. Mitman makes it clear that the purpose is not to advocate the use of multiplication but to illustrate how seriously the NRC underestimates the compounding effects of accident risk by simply adding up the probabilities. This aspect of the contention thereby raises an admissible dispute with the Draft EIS.40
- d. Relying on an invalid assumption that studies of boiling water reactor and Westinghouse pressurized water reactors are applicable to Oconee reactors (Mitman Report § 3.2.5)
In Section 3.2.5 of his report, Mr. Mitman criticizes the Draft EIS reliance on the State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analysis (SOARCA) work, based on significant differences between the design of the Oconee reactors and the reactors studied by SOARCA.41 He asserts that given these differences, [w]ithout additional analysis it is unclear how any useful insights obtained from the SOARCA work is relevant to Oconee.42 Duke does not dispute the design differences identified by Mr. Mitman, but instead argues that he has failed to specifically identify the SOARCA insights he disputes or explain 39 Mitman Report at 36.
40 For this reason, the Staff is incorrect in arguing that Mr. Mitman is merely advocating an alternative analytical approach rather than identifying a deficiency in the Draft EIS. NRC Staff Answer at 32-34 (citing Seabrook (CLI-12-05), 75 N.R.C. at 323).
41 Mitman Report at 37.
42 Id.
22 why he disputes them.43 But Mr. Mitman explicitly cites page F-22 of the Draft EIS, which is studded with insights, including:
The SOARCA reports present results of an earthquake and station blackout in terms of individual latent cancer fatality risk and early (or prompt fatality risk. In summary, the mitigated scenarios show essentially zero risk of early fatalities from radiation exposure and result in very small risk of a long-term cancer fatality (NRC 2012-TN3092).
The unmitigated scenarios from SOARCA result in essentially zero risk (1E-14) of early fatality for an individual. Although these unmitigated scenarios result in core damage and release of radioactive material to the environment, the release is often delayed, which allows the population to take protective actions (including evacuation and sheltering).
Therefore, the public would not be exposed to concentrations of radioactive material in excess of NRC regulatory limits.
This result holds even when uncertainties are considered - all three uncertainty analyses continued to show extremely low risk of early fatalities.
For the unmitigated scenarios, the individual risk of a long-term cancer fatality is calculated to be very small, regardless of which distance interval (e.g., 0-10 mi, 0-20 mi, 0-50 mi) is considered. The result holds even when uncertainties are considered (NRC 2022-TN922).
Contrary to Dukes assertion, the Draft EIS contains no disclaimer whatsoever of the applicability of these insights to the Oconee reactors.44 Clearly, the Draft EIS relies on insights from the SOARCA studies to provide blanket assurances to the public that the risks of continuing to operate the Oconee reactors are very low, without acknowledging significant differences between the designs studied by SOARCA and the Oconee reactors that may affect those assurances. Petitioners do not need to prove their case, but to raise a genuine and material dispute, which they have done. This aspect of the contention is admissible.
43 Duke Answer at 42-43. The Staff makes a similar argument at 34-35.
44 See Duke Answer at 43 (citing Draft EIS at F-17).
23
- e. Failure to address uncertainties (Mitman Report § 3.3)
In Section 3.3 of his report, Mr. Mitman asserts the Draft EIS is inadequate because it does not contain an uncertainty analysis that follows NRC guidance for evaluating uncertainties in probabilistic risk analysis (PRA).45 He explains why the uncertainty confidence bands used by the Draft EIS are inadequate to provide a reasonable estimate of uncertainties:
NRC Regulatory Guide 1.174, Rev. 1, An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis, states that if total CDF is considerably greater than 1E-4 per reactor year, the NRCs focus in considering licensing actions should be on finding ways to decrease rather than increase the risk. [citing 2018.01, An Approach for Using PRA In Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis, Revision 3 (ML17317A256) (RG 1.174) Page 28]. As Dukes own SAMA results indicate (see their results in Table 1) the CDF values at 1.2E-4 for Oconee are above the RG 1.174 thresholds. Likewise, the LERF values of 1.9E-5 (Oconee Units 1 & 2) and 1.7E-5 (for Unit 3) exceed the RG 1.174 thresholds of 1E-5. [citing Reg. Guide 1.174 Page 28]. This is precisely the type of situation where uncertainty information should be taken into consideration. Based on my years of experience, it is reasonable to suspect that the 90 percent uncertainty confidence bands around the external hazards of fire, flood and seismic are around two or event three orders of magnitude. These deficiencies deserve serious consideration.46 And he also explains what would be needed for an adequate uncertainty analysis:
An adequate probabilistic risk analysis would include parametric uncertainty data on all input parameters and calculate the corresponding CDF and LERF with uncertainty bounds (e.g. a CDF or LERF of 1E-5 per year with a 90% confidence band of 1E-6 to 5E-5 per year). The analysis would then propagate those CDF and LERF values with their uncertainty bands through the Level 2 and Level 3 PRA evaluations ending with estimates of both prompt and latent cancer fatalities with uncertainty bands. Finaly, the analysis would compare that calculated values with their corresponding uncertainties against the decision thresholds, i.e., safety goals. But the Draft SEIS deficient and unacceptable as it never calculates probabilistic uncertainties. Therefore, it does not have a basis for confidence in its risk estimates for purposes of assessing environmental risk or compliance with safety goals.47 45 Mitman Report at 38-39.
46 Mitman Report at 39 (emphasis added).
47 Mitman Report at 38-39.
24 Duke argues that the NRCs regulatory guidance is non-mandatory.48 But it is well-established that they provide the agencys best technical guidance.49 Conformance with regulatory guides is likely to result in compliance with specific regulatory requirements, though nonconformance with such guides does not mean noncompliance with the regulations.50 While Duke and the Staff contend that the use of uncertainty bands is sufficient,51 Mr. Mitman has demonstrated that they are inadequate to satisfy NEPAs hard look standard.52 Therefore, Petitioners have presented an admissible contention.
C. Contention 3 is Admissible.
Contention 3 (Draft EIS fails to address the effects of climate change on accident risk) states:
The Draft SEIS fails to satisfy NEPA or NRC implementing regulation 10 C.F.R. § 51.71 because it does not address the effects of climate change on accident risk. As set forth in Section 3.4 of Mr. Mitmans expert report, increased frequency and severity of extreme weather events is inevitable, as agreed by multiple federal agencies. And therefore, climate change will inevitably affect the likelihood and severity of reactor accidents.
Consideration of climate change effects is particularly important for Oconee, which was never designed to withstand a significant flood from failure or overtopping of the Jocassee Dam. Because climate change effects are reasonably foreseeable and potentially significant, 48 Duke Answer at 44, NRC Answer at 36-37. Dukes additional argument that regulatory guidance for uncertainty analysis in PRAs relating to safety is not applicable to environmental analysis Duke Answer at 43) is absurd, given Dukes own reliance for its environmental report on a PRA performed for safety purposes.
49 Curators of University of Missouri, CLI-95-08, 41 N.R.C. 386, 397 (1995). See also Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-444, 6 N.R.C. 760 (1977); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-788, 20 N.R.C. 1102, 1161, 1169 (1984); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-39, 34 N.R.C. 273, 280-81 (1991).
50 Petition for Emergency & Remedial Action, CLI-78-6, 7 NRC 400, 406-07 (1978). See also Wrangler Laboratories et al., LBP-89-39, 30 N.R.C. 746, 756-57, 759 (1989), revd and remanded on other grounds, ALAB-951, 33 NRC 505 (1991).
51 Duke Answer at 44.
52 Hearing Request at 17 and 6 n. 7 (citing Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349)
25 they must be considered. State of New York, State of New York, 681 F.3d at 476. While the NRC asserts that it plans to address climate change risks in the future (Draft SEIS at 3 3-36), this does not excuse the agency from addressing the risks of climate change in this licensing decision as they are understood at this time. Only if the NRC can say that the effects of climate change are so small as to be remote and speculative can it avoid addressing those effects in its environmental review. [citing New York, 681 F.3d at 478].
- 1. Contention 3 is within the scope of this NEPA proceeding.
Duke and the NRC Staff argue that Contention 3 is not within the scope of this proceeding because the Commission has determined that the effects of climate change on a nuclear power plant are ongoing safety issues related to the current licensing basis (CLB) that are not within the scope of license renewal.53 But this argument fails in three key respects.
First, Dukes and the Staffs attempted distinction between issues covered by the Atomic Energy Act and issues covered by NEPA has no basis in fact or law. NEPAs concern for the quality of the human environment encompasses the public health and safety concerns of the Atomic Energy Act.54 And NEPA contains no exception for the Atomic Energy Act.55 Second, neither Duke nor the NRC Staff argues that climate change will have no reasonably foreseeable significant effect on the safety and environmental impacts of Oconees operation during a subsequent license renewal term. Indeed, given the widely held understanding that climate change will increase the frequency and severity of weather events on U.S.
53 Duke Answer at 50-52 (citing NRC Staff Answer at 39-40 (citing Pacific Gas and Elec. Co.
(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-15-21, 82 N.R.C. 295, 304-05 (2015) and Draft EIS at 3-206).
54 For instance, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) establishes the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surrounding. See also Citizens for Safe Power v. NRC, 524 F.2d 1291, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Limerick Ecology Action, 869 F.2d at 729-31, for the proposition that the concerns of NEPA and the Atomic Energy Act overlap and yet impose independent procedural obligations).
55 Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (agencies must comply with NEPA unless their obligations are mutually exclusive).
26 infrastructure (including nuclear plants) in coming years, it would be unreasonable to make such an argument.56 Therefore, given the relevance of climate change to the safety and environmental impacts of prospective operation of Oconee during the SLR term, NEPA requires the NRC to take the effects of climate change on accident risk into account in the decision-making process for Oconee license renewal. The NRC may not shunt those considerations off into a different proceeding.57
- 2. Dukes and the Staffs other objections to Contention 3 have no merit.
Duke and the Staff argue that Contention 3 is inadmissible on a number of other grounds, none of which has merit.
First, Duke and the Staff argue that Petitioners do not identify the specific portion of the Draft EIS that is inadequate for failure to consider climate change impacts.58 But Petitioners cannot be required to criticize an analysis that does not exist. As the Commission has recognized, however, if a petitioner believes that a license application fails to contain information on a relevant matter as required by law, it is sufficient to identify each failure and the supporting reasons for the petitioners belief.59 In any event, Mr. Mitman explicitly addresses how 56 See Mitman Report at 40-41.
57 State of New York, 681 F.3d at 476 (holding that environmental effects that are reasonably foreseeable and potentially significant must be considered). See also Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., 449 F.2d at 1117-18 (ruling that the NRC may not exclude relevant environmental considerations from the hearing process).
58 Duke Answer at 45-46, NRC Staff Answer at 43.
59 Duke Answer at 45. Duke asserts that Petitioners fail to identify the portion of NEPA or 10 C.F.R. § 51.71 that the Draft EIS does not comply with. Id. This argument is frivolous.
Contention 3 explicitly states that The Draft SEIS fails to satisfy NEPA or NRC implementing regulation 10 C.F.R. § 51.71 because it does not address the effects of climate change on accident risk. The language of the contention clearly invokes NEPAs requirement to consider the environmental effects of proposed federal actions and Section 51.71(d)s requirement that a draft EIS must contain a preliminary analysis which considers and balances the environmental and other effects of the proposed action.
27 consideration of climate change effects could have led to a finding of significantly increased accident risk at Oconee.60 Second, Duke argues that the Draft EIS does consider climate change, counting 104 times the phrase appears in the Draft EIS. Duke Answer at 47. But Duke does not point to any discussion of the effects of climate change on accident risk, which is the subject of Contention 3.
In fact, as noted by Mr. Mitman, the Draft EIS explicitly states that it will not address that issue.61 Finally, the Staff argues that the Report GAO-24-106326 by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), does not support Contention 3 in a variety of respects, including the fact that the GAO Report makes no explicit recommendation to consider climate changes effects on safety equipment in NEPA reviews, and that it does not make any recommendations with respect to Oconee.62 But the Staff overlooks the crucial findings of the GAO Report that:
a) Effects of natural hazards on nuclear plants are expected to be exacerbated by climate change; b) NRCs actions to protect nuclear plants from natural hazards in licensing and license renewal proceedings do not fully consider the potential increased risks from natural hazards that may be exacerbated by Climate Change; and c) without incorporating the best available information about climate change into licensing decisions, it is unclear whether the safety margins for nuclear plants 60 Mitman Report at 44-45.
61 Mitman Report at 40 (citing Draft EIS at 3-30 (lines 12-14).
62 NRC Staff Answer at 43-44. Notably, Duke does not address the relevance of GAO 106326.
28 established during the licensing period - in most cases over 40 years ago - are adequate to address the risks posed by climate change to nuclear plants.63 These statements by the GAO establish that climate change effects on Oconee safety equipment and accident risk are reasonably foreseeable and potentially significant. Therefore, Petitioners have presented an admissible contention.
IV.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Dukes and the NRC Staffs objections to the admissibility of Petitioners contentions lack merit. Therefore, Petitioners Hearing Request and Petition to Intervene should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
/signed electronically by/
Diane Curran Harmon, Curran, Spielberg, & Eisenberg, L.L.P.
1725 DeSales Street N.W., Suite 500 Washington, D.C. 20036 240-393-9285 dcurran@harmoncurran.com June 7, 2024 63 Mitman Report at 40-41 (quoting GAO-24-106326 at 1, 34, and 39, respectively).
29 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
) Docket Nos. 50-269/270/287 SLR-2 Oconee Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1, 2 & 3
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on Jun3 7, 2024, I posted on the NRCs Electronic Information Exchange HEARING REQUEST AND PETITION TO INTERVENE BY BEYOND NUCLEAR AND SIERRA CLUB, including:
Attachment 1 (Declaration of Jeffrey T. Mitman) o Exhibit 1 to Mr. Mitmans Declaration (his Expert Report, NRC Relicensing Crisis at Oconee Nuclear Station: Stop Duke From Sending Safety Over the Jocassee Dam (April 2024))
o Exhibit 2 to Mr. Mitmans Declaration (curriculum vitae)
Attachments 2A through 2H (standing declarations).
___/signed electronically by/__
Diane Curran
30 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
) Docket Nos. 50-269/270/287 SLR-2 Oconee Nuclear Station,
)
Units 1, 2 & 3
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that on June 7, 2024, I posted on the NRCs Electronic Information Exchange REPLY BY BEYOND NUCLEAR AND THE SIERRA CLUB TO OPPOSITIONS TO THEIR HEARING REQUEST AND PETITION TO INTERVENE.
___/signed electronically by/__
Diane Curran
November 21, 2024 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC (Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3)
Docket Nos. 50-269-SLR-2, 50-270-SLR-2, 50-287-SLR-2 Certificate of Service Pursuant to 10 C.F.R §2.305, I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing NON-PUBLIC ATTACHMENTS A-D, dated November 21, 2024, have been served upon the Licensing Board judges and Counsels for the Applicant through the Electronic Information Exchange (the NRCs E-Filing System), as a nonpublic filing in the captioned proceeding, this 21st day of November 2024.
/Signed (electronically) by/
Mary Frances Woods Counsel for NRC Staff Mail Stop: O-14-A44 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Telephone: (301) 287-3514 E-mail: Mary.Woods@nrc.gov Dated in North Bethesda, MD this 21st day of November 2024