ND-22-0051, (Taac Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC 2.6.09.13a Index Number 652)

(Taac Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC 2.6.09.13a Index Number 652)

ML22047A313
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	02/16/2022
From:	Yox M Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
ND-22-0051
Download: ML22047A313 (7)

Text

Cani Michael J. Vox 7825 River Road Regulatory Affairs Director Waynesboro, GA 30830 Southern Nuclear Vogtle3&4 706-848-6459 tel ND-22-0051 10CFR 52.99(c)(1)

FEB 1 6 2022 Docket No.:

52-025 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 3 ITAAC Closure Notification on Completion of ITAAC 2.6.09.13a findex Number 6521 Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(1), the purpose of this letter is to notify the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of the completion of Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) Item 2.6.09.13a [Index Number 652]. This ITAAC confirms that the central and secondary alarm stations have conventional (landline) telephone sen/ice with the main control room and local law enforcement authorities. This ITAAC also confirms that the central and secondary alarm stations are capable of continuous communication with security personnel. The closure process for this ITAAC is based on the guidance described in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 08-01, "Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process Under 10 CFR Part 52," which was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.215.

^

This letter contains no new NRC regulatory commitments. Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) requests NRC staff confirmation of this determination and publication of the required notice in the Federal Register per 10 CFR 52.99.

If there are any questions, please contact Kelli Roberts at 706-848-6991.

Respectfully submitted.

Michael J. Yo>

Regulatory Affairs D/rector Vogtle 3 & 4

Enclosure:

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 Completion of ITAAC 2.6.09.13a [Index Number 652]

MJY/RLB/sfr

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-22-0051 Page 2 of 3 To:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company/ Georgia Power Companv Mr. Peter P. Sena III Mr. D. L. McKlnney Mr. H. Nieh Mr. G. Chick Mr. S. Stimac Mr. P. Martino Mr. J. B. Williams Mr. M. J. Yox Mr. A. S. Parton Ms. K. A. Roberts Ms. J.M. Coleman Mr. C. T. Defnall Mr. C. E. Morrow Mr. K. J. Drudy Mr. J. M. Fisher Mr. R. L. Beiike Mr. S. Leighty Ms. A. C. Chamberlain Mr. J. C. Haswell Document Services RTYPE: VND.LI.L06 File AR.01.02.06 cc:

Nuclear Reaulatorv Commission Ms. M. Bailey Mr. M. King Mr. G. Bowman Ms. A. Veil Mr. C. P. Patel Mr. G. J. Khouri Mr. C. J. Even Mr. B. J. Kemker Ms. N. C. Coovert Mr. C. Welch Mr. J. Gaslevic Mr. O. Lopez-Santiago Mr. G. Armstrong Mr. M. Webb Mr. T. Fredette Mr. C. Santos Mr. B. Davis Mr. J. Vasquez Mr. J. Eargle Mr. T. Fanelli Ms. K. McCurry Mr. J. Parent Mr. B. Griman Mr. V. Hall

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-22-0051 Page 3 of 3 Oqlethorpe Power Corporation Mr. R. B. Brinkman Mr. E. Rasmussen Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia Mr. J. E. Fuller Mr. 8. M. Jackson Daiton Utilities Mr. T. Bundros Westinqhouse Electric Company. LLC Dr. L. Oriani Mr. D. 0. Durham Mr. M. M. CorlettI Mr. Z. 8. Harper Mr. J. L. Coward Other Mr. 8. W. Kline, Bechtel Power Corporation Ms. L. Matis, Tetra Tech NUS, Inc.

Dr. W. R. Jacobs, Jr., Ph.D., CDS Associates, Inc.

Mr. 8. Roetger, Georgia Public Service Commission Mr. R. L. Trokey, Georgia Public Service Commission Mr. K. C. Greene, Troutman Sanders Mr. 8. Blanton, Balch Bingham

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-22-0051 Enclosure Page 1 of 4 Southern Nuclear Operating Company ND-22-0051 Enclosure Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 Completion of ITAAC 2.6.09.13a [Index Number 652]

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-22-0051 Enclosure Page 2 of 4 ITAAC Statement Desion Commitment 13.a) The central and secondary alarm stations have conventional (landline) telephone service with the main control room and local law enforcement authorities.

13.b) The central and secondary alarm stations are capable of continuous communication with security personnel.

Inspections/Tests/Analvses Tests, inspections, or a combination of tests and inspections of the central and secondary alarm stations' conventional telephone services will be performed.

Tests, inspections, or a combination of tests and inspections of the central and secondary alarm stations' continuous communication capabilities will be performed.

Acceptance Criteria The central and secondary alarm stations are equipped with conventional (landline) telephone service with the main control room and local law enforcement authorities.

The central and secondary alarm stations are equipped with the capability to continuously communicate with security officers, watchmen, armed response individuals, or any security personnel that have responsibilities during a contingency event.

ITAAC Determination Basis Tests, inspections, or a combination of tests and inspections of the central and secondary alarm stations' conventional telephone services and continuous communication capabilities were performed to verify the central and secondary alarm stations are equipped with conventional (landline) telephone service with the main control room and local law enforcement authorities and to verify the central and secondary alarm stations are capable of continuous communication with security personnel. The Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 Plant Security System ITAACs only cover the Unit 3 plant security system design commitment scope.

13.a) The central and secondarv alarm stations are equipped with conventional (landline) telephone service with the main control room and local law enforcement authorities.

Testing was performed per ITAAC Technical Report SV3-SES-ITR-800652 (Reference 1) to verify that the central alarm station (CAS) and the secondary alarm station (SAS) are equipped with conventional (landline) telephone sen/ice with the Unit 3 main control room and local law enforcement authorities and satisfy the applicable conventional (landline) communications requirements of the VEGP Unit 3 and Unit 4 Physical Security Plan associated with 10 CFR 73.55G)(4).

The communications test between the CAS/SAS and the Unit 3 main control room was conducted by making a phone call using a conventional (landline) telephone from the CAS/SAS to the Unit 3 main control room and confirming verification of voice transmission and reception between the CAS/SAS and the Unit 3 main control room.

The communications test between the CAS/SAS and the local law enforcement authorities was

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-22-0051 Enclosure Page 3 of 4 conducted by making a phone call using a conventional (landllne) telephone from the CAS/SAS to the local law enforcement authorities listed In VEGP Procedure 90017-C (Reference 2) and confirming verification of voice transmission and reception between the CAS/SAS and the local law enforcement authorities.

The results of the above testing are documented In Reference 1 and verify the central and secondary alarm stations are equipped with conventional (landllne) telephone service with the main control room and local law enforcement authorities.

13.b) The central and secondarv alarm stations are eaulDoed with the caoabllltv to contlnuouslv communicate with securltv officers, watchmen, armed resoonse Individuals, or anv securltv personnel that have resoonslbllltles durlno a contlnoencv event.

Testing was performed per ITAAC Technical Report SV3-SES-ITR-800652 (Reference 1) to verify that the CAS and SAS are equipped with the capability to continuously communicate with security personnel (security officers, watchmen, armed response Individuals, or any security personnel that have responsibilities during a contingency event) and satisfy the applicable continuous communications requirements of the VEGP Unit 3 and Unit 4 Physical Security Plan associated with 10 CFR 73.55(j)(3).

The continuous communications test between the CAS/SAS and security officers, watchmen, armed response Individuals, or security personnel that have responsibilities during a contingency event was conducted using continuous communications testing methods similar to those Identified In Reference 2. The continuous communications methods used at VEGP Unit 3 Include portable Ultrahigh Frequency (UHF) primary security radios, portable Very High Frequency (VHF) radios, and security Intercom communication stations.

Portable UHF security radio testing was conducted between the CAS/SAS and security officers at locations similar to those that would be accessed by security officers and watchmen performing duties required by the VEGP Unit 3 and Unit 4 Physical Security Plan. Portable VHF radio testing was also conducted between the CAS/SAS and security officers. Intercom communication station testing was conducted between CAS/SAS and security officers at the local Intercom communication stations located In VEGP Unit 3. The testing contacts and confirms voice transmission and reception between the CAS/SAS and a security officer assigned a portable UHF security radio, a security officer assigned a VHF radio, and each Intercom system station located In VEGP Unit 3. Armed response Individuals and security personnel that would have responsibilities during a contingency event utilize the applicable portable UHF security radios, VHF radios, and Intercom communication stations tested above.

The results of the above testing are documented In Reference 1 and verify the central and secondary alarm stations are equipped with the capability to continuously communicate with security officers, watchmen, armed response Individuals, or any security personnel that have responsibilities during a contingency event.

The test results contained In Reference 1 provide evidence that the IT/\\AC Acceptance Criteria requirements are met:

The central and secondary alarm stations are equipped with conventional (landllne) telephone service with the main control room and local law enforcement authorities; and

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ND-22-0051 Enclosure Page 4 of 4 The central and secondary alarm stations are equipped with the capability to continuously communicate with security officers, watchmen, armed response individuals, or any security personnel that have responsibilities during a contingency event Reference 1 is available for NRG inspection as part of the Unit 3 ITAAC 2.6.09.13a Completion Package (Reference 3).

ITAAC Finding Review In accordance with plant procedures for ITAAC completion. Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) performed a review of all findings pertaining to the subject ITAAC and associated corrective actions. This review found there were no relevant ITAAC findings associated with this ITAAC. The ITAAC completion review is documented in the ITAAC Completion Package for ITAAC 2.6.09.13a (Reference 3) and is available for NRC review.

ITAAC Completion Statement Based on the above information, SNC hereby notifies the NRC that ITAAC 2.6.09.13a was performed for VEGP Unit 3 and that the prescribed acceptance criteria was met.

Systems, structures, and components verified as part of this ITAAC are being maintained in their as-designed, ITAAC compliant condition in accordance with approved plant programs and procedures.

References favailable for NRC inspection)

1. SV3-SES-ITR-800652, SES Communications: ITAAC 2.6.09.13a, Rev 0 (SRI)

2. Procedure 90017-C, Security Radio and Communications System, Version 34.0

3. 2.6.09.13a-U3-CP-RevO, ITAAC Completion Package