ML21113A001

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
CG-2021-02-DRAFT Op Test
ML21113A001
Person / Time
Site: Columbia Energy Northwest icon.png
Issue date: 03/04/2021
From: Greg Werner
Operations Branch IV
To:
Energy Northwest
References
50-397/21-02 50-397/OL-21
Download: ML21113A001 (384)


Text

JPM A-1 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE ILC-24 JPM A-1 TIME CRITICAL Delta T Cavitation Alarm Verification LESSON LENGTH 0.2HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE Rev. No.

EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Jeff Lux DATE 08/20/2020 REVISED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MAJOR REVISION RECORD Major Description Affected Rev of Revision Pages Number MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description of Revision Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Pages By Date Approval Number TASK STANDARD:

Alternate Path Time Critical X TC Time: 10 Minutes Validation Time: 5 Min TASK APPLICABILITY: RO X SRO TASK NUMBER / TITLE(S): RO-1171 Respond to Delta T Cavitation Limit alarm.

K/A IMPORTANCE FACTORS: RO: 3.9 SRO: 4.2 K/A NUMBER: 2.1.25 K/A STATEMENT: Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

GENERIC 1 - Conduct of Operations AREA:

EVALUATION In-Plant Sim Control Room Admin X TYPE: Other - List:

Page 2 of 11

ILC-24 JPM S-4 R0 JPM SETUP Special Setup Instructions:

Have copies of applicable procedure available in the JPM examination room.

JPM Special Instructions:

None.

Tools or Equipment:

Have Calculator, Ruler, Steam tables available for all candidates Safety Items:

N/A PPM

Reference:

4.602.A6 3-7 Location:

Admin - Exam Security Posted room.

Page 3 of 11

ILC-24 JPM A-1 R0 Examiner In JPM Exam Room:

Ensure JPM is placed facedown on the desk for each candidate performing this JPM.

Initial Conditions:

  • CGS is in MODE 1.
  • RRC-P-1A and RRC-P-1B are operating at 60 Hz.
  • The Delta-T indication and counter on the FANUC and ASD Diagnostic display indicate the Delta-T is LT 10.7°F and the counter is counting down.
  • Digital Indications Initiating Cue:

You have been directed to calculate the Delta-T and determine if the alarm is valid per the annunciator response procedure, based on that determination what are action will you recommend to the CRS.

This is a TIME CRITICAL JPM and your time starts now.

Examiner Mark the time start for this JPM.

Page 4 of 11

ILC-24 JPM A-1 R0 START TIME:

STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Examiner Note: All Steps below are directly from 4.602.A6 3-7 exactly as written. Any red markups on the procedure step section indicates expected operator response.

If the candidate has not turned in this JPM by the 10 minute mark, the examiner will collect the JPM regardless of completion status.

Step 1:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Candidate reads and performs proper place keeping. We are not in the initial stages of start up per the initial conditions. This alarm is unexpected.

Step 2:

SAT UNSAT Standard: N/A This information is provided in the initial conditions.

Step 3:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Page 5 of 11

ILC-24 JPM A-1 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT This information is provided in the initial conditions.

Step 4:

RC-TR-650 point 2 = 535F Uses Attachment 1, Pressure Temperature Conversion Table CRITICAL TASK SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Operator calculates the difference. Uses 547°F from attachment 1 based on MS-PI-9 Indicating 1014 psig. Subtracts 535°F (RRC-TR-650 point 2) resulting in 12°F delta-T. Candidate determines that the alarm is NOT valid.

EXAMINER NOTE: In the note above, the operator may use the attachment provided or the steam tables (DEH Display is not an available option for this JPM). If the operator chooses to use the steam tables for this evolution, they must convert 1014 psig to the value of 1029 psia in order to achieve the correct results.

Step 5:

CRITICAL TASK SAT Standard: UNSAT Candidate determines that the delta-T Cavitation Bypass Switch will be placed in bypass at H13-P634. N/A Page 6 of 11

ILC-24 JPM A-1 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 6:

CRITICAL TASK SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Candidate does not perform this step.

EXAMINER NOTE: The CRITICAL TASK for this step is that the candidate does NOT recommend / perform this step.

Step 7:

CRITICAL TASK SAT Standard: UNSAT Candidate does not perform these steps. N/A EXAMINER NOTE: The CRITICAL TASK for this step is that the candidate does NOT recommend / perform this step.

STOP TIME:

Page 7 of 11

ILC-24 JPM A-1 R0 RESULTS OF JPM A-1 Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Examiner (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard: Candidate determines that the Delta-T alarm is NOT valid and indicates the Delta-T Cavitation Bypass switch will be taken to bypass.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Examiner Signature: Date:

Page 8 of 11

ILC-24 JPM A-1 R0 ANSWER KEY FOR JPM A-1 Calculations indicate the low delta-T IS NOT VALID.

Recommended Action(s)

Place the delta-T Cavitation Limit Bypass Switch to BYPASS Calculations indicate the low delta-T IS VALID.

Recommended Action(s) (if remains for GT 3 minutes)

Page 9 of 11

ILC-24 JPM A-1 R0 STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

  • CGS is in MODE 1.
  • RRC-P-1A and RRC-P-1B are operating at 60 Hz.
  • Per the ARP, the Delta-T indication on the counter on the FANUC and ASD Diagnostic display has been displayed. The display indicates the Delta-T is LT 10.7°F and the counter is counting down.
  • Digital Indications (Below)

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initiating Cue:

You have been directed to calculate the Delta-T and determine if the alarm is valid per the annunciator response procedure, based on that determination what are action will you recommend to be taken by the CRS.

Indicate on the answer sheet if the Delta-T is OR is NOT a valid alarm and what action you recommend based on your determination.

Page 10 of 11

ILC-24 JPM A-1 R0 STUDENT JPM ANSWER SHEET (A-1)

THIS IS A TIME CRITICAL JPM Calculations indicate the low delta-T IS NOT VALID.

Recommended Action(s)

Calculations indicate the low delta-T IS VALID.

Recommended Action(s) (if remains for GT 3 minutes):

When completed, hand this sheet to the exam proctor.

Page 11 of 11

JPM A-2 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE ILC-24 JPM A-2 Calculate Power using Bypass Valve Position LESSON LENGTH 0.2HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE Rev. No.

EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Jeff Lux DATE 08/20/2020 REVISED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MAJOR REVISION RECORD Major Description Affected Rev of Revision Pages Number MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description of Revision Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Pages By Date Approval Number TASK STANDARD:

Alternate Path Time Critical TC Time: Validation Time: 5 Min TASK APPLICABILITY: RO X SRO X TASK NUMBER / TITLE(S): RO-0906 Increase reactor power to 24%

K/A IMPORTANCE FACTORS: RO: 4.4 SRO: 4.7 K/A NUMBER: 2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgements based on K/A STATEMENT:

operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

GENERIC 1 - Conduct of Operations AREA:

EVALUATION In-Plant Sim Control Room Admin X TYPE: Other - List:

Page 2 of 10

ILC-24 JPM A-2 R0 JPM SETUP Special Setup Instructions:

Have copies of Attachment 7.1 of PPM 3.1.2 for each candidate. (Page25)

JPM Special Instructions:

None.

Tools or Equipment:

Have Calculator, Ruler, Steam tables available for all candidates Safety Items:

N/A PPM

Reference:

PPM 3.1.2 Attachment 7.1 Location:

Admin - Exam Security Posted room.

Page 3 of 10

ILC-24 JPM A-2 R0 Examiner Notes In JPM Exam Room:

Mark the time that the JPM is given to the candidate.

Initial Conditions:

(Not require to be read to the candidates, given via hand out)

CGS is in the process of starting up with the following parameters indicated:

  • APRM-1 Indicates 12.8% Power
  • APRM-2 Indicates 15.1% Power
  • APRM-3 Indicates 13.9% Power
  • APRM-4 Indicates 14.2% Power
  • Bypass Valve #1 is indicating 44% open.
  • Bypass Valve #2 is indicating 47% open.
  • Bypass Valve #3 is indicating 49% open.
  • Bypass Valve #4 is indicating 45% open.
  • House Loads are equal to 1% Core Thermal Power
  • Reactor Feed Water Inlet Temperature is 165°F Initiating Cue:

(Not require to be read to the candidates, given via hand out)

You have been directed to perform Q38 of PPM 3.1.2. In addition, determine if APRM readings are greater than extrapolated power levels using BPV positions.

START TIME:

Page 4 of 10

ILC-24 JPM A-2 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Examiner Note: PPM 3.1.2 Attachment 7.1 is provided to the candidate.

Examiner Note: Due to the thickness of the line on the graph, the candidate can attempt to extrapolate by using slightly above the 170° line; this will not influence the results of this JPM. However, If the candidate uses the incorrect feed water temperature line (The blue line corresponding to 80°F feed water temperature) the candidates calculated Core Thermal Power will be approximately 14.5%.

Step 1:

Completes Attachment 1 of PPM 3.1.2 Standard: CRITICAL TASK Uses the Red line corresponding to 170°F BPV #1 is at 44% open which correlates to approximately 2.9% of CTP SAT BPV #2 is at 47% open which correlates to approximately 3.2% of CTP UNSAT BPV #3 is at 49% open which correlates to approximately 3.3% of CTP BPV #4 is at 45% open which correlates to approximately 3.0% of CTP N/A House Loads (Given in initial conditions) is approximately 1%

Total Core Thermal Power is calculated at approximately 13.4%

Step 2:

Compares values to actual APRM levels.

Standard:

Compares calculated Total CTP (~13.3%) to the given APRM readings and determines that: CRITICAL TASK

  • APRM-1 Indicates 12.8% Power (Initial Conditions) and is NOT greater than extrapolated BPV position power levels. SAT
  • APRM-2 Indicates 15.1% Power (Initial Conditions) and IS greater than UNSAT extrapolated BPV position power levels.
  • APRM-3 Indicates 13.9% Power (Initial Conditions) and IS greater than N/A extrapolated BPV position power levels.
  • APRM-4 Indicates 14.2% Power (Initial Conditions) and IS greater than extrapolated BPV position power levels.

STOP TIME:

Page 5 of 10

ILC-24 JPM A-2 R0 RESULTS OF JPM A-2 Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Examiner (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard:

Determines that APRM-1 power level is NOT greater than extrapolated BPV position power levels. Determines that APRM-2, APRM-3 and APRM-4 power levels ARE greater than extrapolated BPV position power levels.

Filled out Section of Attachment 7.1. (Tolerances in RED)

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Examiner Signature: Date:

Page 6 of 10

ILC-24 JPM A-2 R0 ANSWER KEY (A-2)

Based on the results of Attachment 7.1 of PPM 3.1.2.

Circle answer choice IS or IS NOT

  • APRM-1 power level IS / IS NOT Greater than extrapolated BPV power levels.
  • APRM-2 power level IS / IS NOT Greater than extrapolated BPV power levels.
  • APRM-3 power level IS / IS NOT Greater than extrapolated BPV power levels.
  • APRM-4 power level IS / IS NOT Greater than extrapolated BPV power levels.

Page 7 of 10

ILC-24 JPM A-2 R0 STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

CGS is in the process of starting up with the following parameters indicated:

  • APRM-1 Indicates 12.8% Power
  • APRM-2 Indicates 15.1% Power
  • APRM-3 Indicates 13.9% Power
  • APRM-4 Indicates 14.2% Power
  • Bypass Valve #1 is indicating 44% open.
  • Bypass Valve #2 is indicating 47% open.
  • Bypass Valve #3 is indicating 49% open.
  • Bypass Valve #4 is indicating 45% open.
  • House Loads are equal to 1% Core Thermal Power
  • Reactor Feedwater Inlet Temperature is 165°F STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initiating Cue:

You have been directed to perform Q38 of PPM 3.1.2. In addition, determine if APRM readings are greater than power level reading extrapolated from BPV positions.

When complete turn in Attachment 7.1 of PPM 3.1.2 and your findings on the answer sheet provided.

Page 8 of 10

ILC-24 JPM A-2 R0 STUDENT JPM ANSWER SHEET (A-2)

Based on the results of Attachment 7.1 of PPM 3.1.2.

Circle answer choice IS or IS NOT

  • APRM-1 power level IS / IS NOT Greater than extrapolated BPV power levels.
  • APRM-2 power level IS / IS NOT Greater than extrapolated BPV power levels.
  • APRM-3 power level IS / IS NOT Greater than extrapolated BPV power levels.
  • APRM-4 power level IS / IS NOT Greater than extrapolated BPV power levels.

When completed, hand this sheet to the exam proctor along with your completed Attachment 7.1 of PPM 3.1.2 Page 9 of 10

ILC-24 JPM A-2 R0 Page 10 of 10

JPM A-3 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE ILC-24 JPM A-3 RO Determine stay time in HRA - can task be completed LESSON LENGTH 0.2HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE Rev. No.

EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Jeff Lux DATE 08/20/2020 REVISED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MAJOR REVISION RECORD Major Description Affected Rev of Revision Pages Number MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description of Revision Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Pages By Date Approval Number TASK STANDARD:

Alternate Path Time Critical TC Time: Validation Time: 7 Min TASK APPLICABILITY: RO X SRO X TASK NUMBER / TITLE(S): RO-0557 Use applicable plant procedures.

K/A IMPORTANCE FACTORS: RO: 3.2 SRO: 3.7 K/A NUMBER: 2.3.4 K/A STATEMENT: Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency l conditions.

GENERIC 3 - Radiation Control AREA:

EVALUATION In-Plant Sim Control Room Admin X TYPE: Other - List:

Page 2 of 8

ILC-24 JPM A-3 R0 JPM SETUP Special Setup Instructions:

Have copies of applicable procedure available in the JPM examination room.

JPM Special Instructions:

None.

Tools or Equipment:

Have Calculator, Ruler, Steam tables available for all candidates Safety Items:

N/A PPM

Reference:

SWP-RPP-01 GEN-RPP-11 Location:

Admin - Exam Security Posted room.

Page 3 of 8

ILC-24 JPM A-3 R0 EXAMINER NOTES In JPM Exam Room:

Mark the time that the JPM is given to the candidate.

Initial Conditions:

  • The job is expected to take 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> and 20 minutes.
  • You have an accumulated (TEDE) dose of 1150 mrem for the calendar year.

Initiating Cue:

Determine your personal maximum stay time for the job that will not exceed the allowable Annual Administrative Dose Hold Point limit. Do NOT apply the HP 200mRem warning margin to the administrative annual admin dose limit. Show each step of your calculation. When complete, return all JPM materials to the Examiner.

Page 4 of 8

ILC-24 JPM A-3 R0 START TIME:

STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Examiner Note: Provide a copy of SWP-RPP-01 (radiation Protection Program) if requested.

Step 1: CRITICAL Determine the Annual Administrative Dose Hold Point value. TASK SAT Standard:

Determined 2 Rem is the Annual Administrative Dose Hold Point limit. UNSAT

[Based on GEN-RPP-11 which is NOT a provided reference]

N/A Step 2:

CRITICAL Determine the minimum High Radiation Area dose rate. TASK SAT Standard:

Determines 100 mrem/hr is the minimum area radiation dose rate which defines a UNSAT High Radiation Area.

[Based on SWP-RPP-01 Definition] N/A Step 3: CRITICAL Determine the job site area dose rate based on the Initial Conditions. TASK SAT Standard:

Determines job site area dose rate as follows: UNSAT 100 mrem/hr x 1.7 = 170 mrem/hr N/A Step 4: CRITICAL Determine dose remaining to reach admin limit of 2 rem (2000 mrem). TASK SAT Standard:

Calculates 850 mrem (2000 - 1150 = 850) remains to reach limit. UNSAT N/A Step 6: CRITICAL TASK Determine maximum stay time.

SAT Standard:

UNSAT Calculates stay time: 850 mrem divided by 170 mrem/hr equals 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

Determines based on this stay time that they can NOT complete this task. N/A Termination Criteria: Examinee returns documented answer to Examiner.

STOP TIME:

Page 5 of 8

ILC-24 JPM A-3 R0 RESULTS OF JPM A-3 Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Examiner (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard:

Candidate determines the following in order to calculate stay time:

  • 2 Rem is the Annual Administrative Dose Hold Point limit.

Calculates remaining dose of 850 mRem, Calculates a stay time of (870 / 170) 5 Hours.

Determines they can NOT complete this job.

Determines a stay time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Examiner Signature: Date:

Page 6 of 8

ILC-24 JPM A-3 R0 STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

  • The job is expected to take 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> and 20 minutes
  • You have an accumulated (TEDE) dose of 1150 mrem for the calendar year.

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initiating Cue:

Determine your personal maximum stay time for the job that will not exceed the allowable Annual Administrative Dose Hold Point limit.

Do NOT apply the HP 200mRem warning margin to the administrative annual admin dose limit.

Show each step of your calculation.

When complete, return all JPM materials to the Examiner.

Page 7 of 8

ILC-24 JPM A-3 R0 STUDENT JPM ANSWER SHEET Can you complete this job? (Yes or No) ____________.

My MAXIMUM stay time for this job is: __________________.

Page 8 of 8

JPM A-4 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE ILC-24 JPM A-4 Tagout RHR-P-3 Using Manual Forms LESSON LENGTH 0.2HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE Rev. No.

EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Jeff Lux DATE REVISED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MAJOR REVISION RECORD Major Description Affected Rev of Revision Pages Number MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description of Revision Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Pages By Date Approval Number TASK STANDARD:

Alternate Path Time Critical TC Time: Validation Time:

9 Min TASK APPLICABILITY: RO X SRO TASK NUMBER / TITLE(S): RO-0695 Conduct a clearance order manually (back up method)

K/A IMPORTANCE FACTORS: RO: 4.1 SRO: 4.3 K/A NUMBER: 2.2.13 K/A STATEMENT: Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures.

GENERIC 2 - Equipment Control AREA:

EVALUATION In-Plant Sim Control Room Admin X TYPE: Other - List:

Page 2 of 11

ILC-24 JPM A-4 R0 JPM SETUP Special Setup Instructions:

Have copies of applicable procedure available in the JPM examination room.

JPM Special Instructions:

None.

Tools or Equipment:

Have Calculator, Ruler, Steam tables available for all candidates Safety Items:

N/A PPM

Reference:

PPM 1.3.64 OI-12 EWD-9E-010 M521-2 M521-3 CR410096 OE Plant Tagging Error (Not Provided)

Location:

Admin - Exam Security Posted room.

Page 3 of 11

ILC-24 JPM A-4 R0 Examiner Notes In JPM Exam Room:

Mark the time that the JPM is given to the candidate.

Initial Conditions:

  • CGS is shut down for a refueling outage.
  • SOMS is out of service and will not be available for the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
  • RHR-P-3 requires to be tagged out for a pump seal replacement. (The system will be breached.)
  • A field operator has drained the system in preparation for the clearance order hang.

Initiating Cue:

Using the Manual Clearance Order Process per OI-12, Determine what components require tags including the tag type and the components tagged position. Annotate your answers on the answer sheet provided.

Page 4 of 11

ILC-24 JPM A-4 R0 START TIME:

STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Examiner Note: Copies of PPM 1.3.64, OI-12, EWD-9E-010, M521-2 and M521-3 are provided to the candidate. Steps provided below for determining the required tags / Isolation points can be performed in any order.

Step 1:

Reviews EWD-9E-010 to determine power supply.

CRITICAL TASK SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Determines RHR-42-8B7A is the RHR-P-3 Power supply and requires a DANGER TAG in the OFF position. Annotates on answer sheet provided.

Step 2:

Reviews EWD-9E-010 to determine the main control room control switch.

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Determines a Equipment control Tag is required for RHR-RMS-P/3 is required in the STOP position. Annotates on answer sheet provided.

Examiner Note: This is not a required element for successful completion of this task. RHR-42-8B7A in the OFF position provides the protection required. The equipment configuration tag is placed for control room configuration control and is not a protection boundary.

Page 5 of 11

ILC-24 JPM A-4 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 3:

Reviews M521-3 for equipment isolation control points.

CRITICAL TASK SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Determines a DANGER tag is required for RHR-V-210 (RHR-P-3 Min Flow) in the CLOSED position.

Determines a DANGER tag is required for RHR-V-82 (RHR-P-3 Suction Isolation) in the CLOSED position.

Determines a DANGER tag is required for RHR-V-85C (RHR-P-3 Discharge Isolation) in the CLOSED position.

Annotates on answer sheet provided.

Page 6 of 11

ILC-24 JPM A-4 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 4:

Reviews M521-2 for equipment isolation control points.

Standard:

Determines a DANGER tag is required for RHR-V-85B (RHR-P-3 Discharge Isolation) in the CLOSED position.

Determines a DANGER tag is required for RHR-V-737(V) (RHR-P-3 Vent) in the CRITICAL OPEN position. TASK Examiner Note: Student Must have a minimum 1 of the following SAT potential Drain points tagged in the Open position. Pressure Test connections can be used as a drain path for an isolated system. A UNSAT Minimum of 1 OF 3 required for credit for this JPM. N/A Determines a DANGER tag is required for RHR-V-738(D) (RHR-P-3 Drain) in the OPEN position.

OR Determines a DANGER tag is required for RHR-V-712 (Pressure Test Connection) in the OPEN position.

OR Determines a DANGER tag is required for RHR-V-713 (Pressure Test Connection) in the OPEN position.

Annotates on answer sheet provided.

Examiner Note: Per the initial conditions the system will be breached, thus the vent and drain valves are DANGER tagged to keep the system depressurized and drained.

(OI-12 Clearance Order Review Checklist # 14)

STOP TIME:

Page 7 of 11

ILC-24 JPM A-4 R0 EXAMINER ANSWER KEY (A-4)

Tag Type Equipment (EPN) & EPN Placement Description Configuration Examiner Note: Student Answer sheets may also include a Equipment Configuration Tag for RHR-RMS-P/3 in the STOP position, This is not a required element for successful completion of this task. RHR-42-8B7A racked out provides the protection required. The equipment configuration tag is placed for control room configuration control and is not a protection boundary.

RHR-42-8B7A DANGER (RHR-P-3 Disconnect) OFF RHR-V-210 DANGER (RHR-P-3 Min Flow) CLOSED RHR-V-82 DANGER (RHR-P-3 Suction Isolation) CLOSED RHR-V-85C DANGER (RHR-P-3 Discharge Isolation) CLOSED RHR-V-85B DANGER (RHR-P-3 Discharge Isolation) CLOSED RHR-V-737(V)

DANGER (RHR-P-3 Vent) OPEN Examiner Note: Student Must have a minimum 1 of the following potential Drain points tagged in the Open position. Pressure Test connections can be used as a drain path for an isolated system. A Minimum of 1 OF 3 required for credit for this JPM.

And a MINIMUM of ONE of the following RHR-V-738(D)

DANGER (RHR-P-3 Drain) OPEN RHR-V-712 DANGER (Pressure Test Connection) OPEN RHR-V-713 DANGER (Pressure Test Connection) OPEN Page 8 of 11

ILC-24 JPM A-4 R0 RESULTS OF JPM A-4 Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Examiner (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard: Indicates the correct breaker and valves for manual tag out of RHR-P-

3. (As indicated on answer sheet provided for examiner.)

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Examiner Signature: Date:

Page 9 of 11

ILC-24 JPM A-4 R0 STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

  • CGS is shut down for a refueling outage.
  • SOMS is out of service and will not be available for the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.
  • RHR-P-3 requires to be tagged out for a pump seal replacement.

(The system will be breached)

  • A field operator has drained the system in preparation for the clearance order hang.

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initiating Cue:

Using the Manual Clearance Order Process per OI-12, Determine what components require tags including the tag type and the components tagged position. Annotate your answers on the answer sheet provided.

Page 10 of 11

ILC-24 JPM A-4 R0 STUDENT JPM ANSWER SHEET (A-4)

Tag Type Equipment (EPN) & EPN Description Placement Configuration When completed, hand this sheet to the exam proctor.

Page 11 of 11

JPM A-5 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE ILC-24 JPM A-5 TIME CRITICAL Delta T Cavitation Alarm Verification LESSON LENGTH 0.2HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE Rev. No.

EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Jeff Lux DATE 08/20/2020 REVISED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MAJOR REVISION RECORD Major Description Affected Rev of Revision Pages Number MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description of Revision Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Pages By Date Approval Number TASK STANDARD:

Alternate Path Time Critical X TC Time: 10 Minutes Validation Time: 7 Min TASK APPLICABILITY: RO SRO X TASK NUMBER / TITLE(S): RO-1171 Respond to Delta T cavitation limit alarm.

K/A IMPORTANCE FACTORS: RO: 3.9 SRO: 4.2 K/A NUMBER: 2.1.25 K/A STATEMENT: Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, l etc.

GENERIC 1 - Conduct of Operations AREA:

EVALUATION In-Plant Sim Control Room Admin X TYPE: Other - List:

Page 2 of 14

ILC-24 JPM A-5 R0 JPM SETUP Special Setup Instructions:

Have copies of applicable procedure available in the JPM examination room.

JPM Special Instructions:

None.

Tools or Equipment:

Have Calculator, Ruler, Steam tables available for all candidates Safety Items:

N/A PPM

Reference:

4.602.A6 3-7 Location:

Admin - Exam Security Posted room.

Page 3 of 14

ILC-24 JPM A-5 R0 STUDENT BRIEF In JPM Exam Room:

Ensure JPM is placed facedown on the desk for each candidate performing this JPM.

Initial Conditions:

  • CGS is in MODE 1.
  • RRC-P-1A and RRC-P-1B are operating at 60 Hz.
  • Per the ARP, the Delta-T indication on the counter on the FANUC and ASD Diagnostic display has been displayed. The display indicates the Delta-T is LT 10.7°F and the counter is counting down.
  • Digital indications Initiating Cue:

The Reactor Operator has determined Delta T per the annunciator response procedure and handed it to you as the CRS. Based on the information provided, determine what actions you will direct.

This is a TIME CRITICAL JPM (10 Minutes) and your time starts now.

Examiner Mark the time start for this JPM.

Page 4 of 14

ILC-24 JPM A-5 R0 START TIME:

STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Examiner Note: All Steps below are directly from 4.602.A6 3-7 exactly as written. Any red markups on the procedure step section indicates expected operator response.

Step 1:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Candidate reads and performs proper place keeping. We are not in the initial stages of start up per the initial conditions. This alarm is unexpected.

Step 2:

SAT UNSAT Standard: N/A Given in the initial conditions.

Step 3:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Given in the initial conditions to be true.

Page 5 of 14

ILC-24 JPM A-5 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 4:

Reviews RO Calculations Uses Attachment 1, Pressure Temperature Conversion Table CRITICAL TASK SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Operator reviews the RO Calculation. RO should not have performed a conversion to get the value from Conversions table. The formula that the RO used is correct but should not have applied it to this situation. Pressure conversions ARE performed if the operator uses the steam tables and not the attachment.

CRS performs the calculation using the Value for 1016# resulting in a value of 549-degree minus the 537-degree indicated on RRC-TR-650 point 2 to get a value of 12 degrees. The alarm is NOT valid.

EXAMINER NOTE: In the note above, the operator may use the attachment provided or the steam tables (DEH Display is not an available option for this JPM). If the operator chooses to use the steam tables for this evolution, they MUST convert 1016 psig to the value of 1030.7 psia and correctly extrapolate the value in the steam tables in order to achieve the correct results.

Page 6 of 14

ILC-24 JPM A-5 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 5: CRITICAL TASK SAT Standard: UNSAT Candidate determines that the delta-T Cavitation Bypass Switch is required to be placed in bypass at H13-P634. N/A Step 6:

CRITICAL TASK SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Candidate does not perform this step.

EXAMINER NOTE: The CRITICAL TASK for this step is that the candidate does NOT perform this step.

Step 7:

CRITICAL TASK SAT UNSAT Standard:

Candidate does not perform these steps. N/A EXAMINER NOTE: The CRITICAL TASK for this step is that the candidate does NOT perform this step.

STOP TIME:

Page 7 of 14

ILC-24 JPM A-5 R0 RESULTS OF JPM A-5 Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Examiner (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard: Candidate determines that the Delta-T alarm is NOT valid and the Delta-T Cavitation Bypass switch will be taken to bypass.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Examiner Signature: Date:

Page 8 of 14

ILC-24 JPM A-5 R0 ANSWER KEY FOR JPM A-5 Action to be taken:

Place the delta-T Cavitation Limit Bypass Switch to BYPASS Page 9 of 14

ILC-24 JPM A-5 R0 STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

  • CGS is in MODE 1.
  • RRC-P-1A and RRC-P-1B are operating at 60 Hz.
  • Per the ARP, the Delta-T indication on the counter on the FANUC and ASD Diagnostic display has been displayed. The display indicates the Delta-T is LT 10.7°F and the counter is counting down.
  • Digital indications STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initiating Cue:

The Reactor Operator has determined Delta T per the annunciator response procedure and handed it to you as the CRS. Based on the information provided, determine what actions you will direct.

Page 10 of 14

ILC-24 JPM A-5 R0 STUDENT JPM ANSWER SHEET (A-5)

THIS IS A TIME CRITICAL JPM Action to be taken:

When completed, hand this sheet to the exam proctor.

Page 11 of 14

ILC-24 JPM A-5 R0 3-7 LOOP B DELTA T CAVITATION LIMIT 3-7 WINDOW SOURCE AUTOMATIC ACTIONS NOTE: This is an expected alarm if reactor is shut down or during early stages of startup, if pump speed is GT 18 Hz.

NOTE: The plant lifetime limit for actual jet pump cavitation is 15 minutes in each RRC loop.

1. DISPLAY the delta-T indication and counter on the FANUC & ASD Diagnostic display (RRC-VD-R673, H13-P602) by pressing CONTROL STATION on the ASD main menu.
2. VERIFY delta-T is LT 10.7°F with the counter counting down.

NOTE: Use Attachment 1, steam tables and/or DEHs Main Display Steam Table Button to determine saturation temperature from steam dome pressure.

NOTE: The low delta-T signal is valid if the loop B calculated delta-T is LT 10.7°F.

10. CALCULATE delta-T by comparing one of the RRC Loop B suction temperatures below with Steam Dome pressure saturation temperature (MS-PI-9) to determine if the low delta-T indication is valid:

546 (PI-9) - 537 = 9 # Alarm is VALID RRC-TR-650 point 2 TDAS X310 TDAS B057 (When Reactor Coolant temperature is GT 420°F)

TDAS B058 (When Reactor Coolant temperature is GT 420°F)

NOTE: The delta-T counter will continue to count down and indicate BYPASSED after the T Cavitation Limit Bypass switch has been taken to BYPASS.

3. IF the delta-T signal is not valid, THEN PLACE the T Cavitation Limit Bypass switch to BYPASS (Key 19) ( H13-P634).

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

Page 12 of 14

ILC-24 JPM A-5 R0 (CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE) 3-7 LOOP B DELTA T CAVITATION LIMIT

4. IF the delta-T signal is valid, THEN PERFORM the following:
a. IF the cause of the low delta-T is a Reactor Feed Pump trip AND resultant RRC pump run back, THEN VERIFY the low delta-T clears in LE 3 minutes.
b. IF a valid low delta-T condition remains for GT 3 minutes, THEN REDUCE power per PPM 3.2.4 until both RRC pumps frequency is 15 Hz.
c. VERIFY the running RRC pumps have run back to 15 Hz after 10 minutes have elapsed.
d. VERIFY the following have transferred to MANUAL:
  • RRC-M/A-676A
  • RRC-M/A-676B
5. IF entry conditions have been met, THEN ENTER ABN-CORE, Unplanned Core Operating Conditions.
6. VERIFY RPV level stabilizes at set point.
7. LOG the duration of low delta-T condition in the Control Room Log.
8. EVALUATE the event per SWP-CAP-01, Attachment 8.2 CR Initiation Guidance.

REFERENCES:

EWD-49E-051 EWD-3E-089 (CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

Page 13 of 14

ILC-24 JPM A-5 R0 1016psia PRESSURE TEMPERATURE CONVERSION TABLE Psig = psia - 15# = 1001#

psig °F psig °F psig °F psig °F 1050 552 700 505 375 442 202 388 1040 551 690 504 370 440 199 387 1030 550 680 502 365 439 196 386 1020 549 670 500 360 438 193 384 1010 547 660 499 355 437 190 383 1001#

1000 546 546 650 497 350 435 187 382 990 545 640 495 345 434 184 381 980 544 630 494 340 432 181 380 970 543 620 492 335 431 178 379 960 541 610 490 330 430 175 377 950 540 600 489 325 429 172 376 940 539 590 487 320 427 169 374 930 538 580 485 315 426 166 373 920 536 570 483 310 424 163 372 910 535 560 481 305 423 160 371 900 534 550 479 300 421 157 369 890 532 540 477 295 420 154 368 880 531 530 476 290 418 151 366 870 530 520 474 285 417 148 365 860 528 510 472 280 415 145 363 850 527 500 470 275 414 142 362 840 526 490 468 270 412 139 360 830 524 480 466 265 411 136 359 820 523 470 463 260 409 133 357 810 522 460 461 255 407 130 356 800 520 450 459 250 406 127 354 790 519 440 457 245 404 124 352 780 517 430 455 240 402 121 350 770 516 420 452 235 400 118 349 760 514 410 450 230 399 115 347 750 513 400 448 225 397 112 345 740 511 395 447 220 395 109 343 730 510 390 445 215 393 106 341 720 508 385 444 210 391 103 340 710 507 380 443 205 389 100 338 NOTE: To determine the saturation temperature, record pressure as read from the instrument and record the temperature from this table, corresponding to the nearest pressure. Use standard rounding techniques. DO NOT INTERPOLATE.

END Page 14 of 14

JPM A-6 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE ILC-24 JPM A-6 SRO Verification of BPV Extrapolated Power LESSON LENGTH 0.2HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE Rev. No.

EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Jeff Lux DATE REVISED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MAJOR REVISION RECORD Major Description Affected Rev of Revision Pages Number MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description of Revision Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Pages By Date Approval Number TASK STANDARD:

Alternate Path Time Critical TC Time: Validation Time: 7 Min TASK APPLICABILITY: RO X SRO X TASK NUMBER / TITLE(S): RO-0906 Raise reactor power to 24%

K/A IMPORTANCE FACTORS: RO: 4.4 SRO: 4.7 K/A NUMBER: 2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgements based on K/A STATEMENT:

operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

GENERIC 1 - Conduct of Operations AREA:

EVALUATION In-Plant Sim Control Room Admin X TYPE: Other - List:

Page 2 of 12

ILC-24 JPM A-6 R0 JPM SETUP Special Setup Instructions:

Have copies of Attachment 7.1 of PPM 3.1.2 for each candidate. (Page25)

JPM Special Instructions:

None.

Tools or Equipment:

Have Calculator, Ruler, Steam tables available for all candidates Safety Items:

N/A PPM

Reference:

PPM 3.1.2 Attachment 7.1 Location:

Admin - Exam Security Posted room.

Page 3 of 12

ILC-24 JPM A-6 R0 EXAMINER In JPM Exam Room:

Mark the time that the JPM is given to the candidate.

Initial Conditions:

(Not require to be read to the candidates, given via hand out)

CGS is in the process of starting up with the following parameters indicated:

  • APRM-1 Indicates 12.8% Power
  • APRM-2 Indicates 15.1% Power
  • APRM-3 Indicates 13.9% Power
  • APRM-4 Indicates 14.1% Power
  • Bypass Valve #1 is indicating 44% open.
  • Bypass Valve #2 is indicating 47% open.
  • Bypass Valve #3 is indicating 49% open.
  • Bypass Valve #4 is indicating 45% open.
  • House Loads are equal to 1% Core Thermal Power
  • Reactor Feed water Inlet Temperature is 165°F Initiating Cue:

(Not require to be read to the candidates, given via hand out)

The Reactor Operator has performed step Q38 of PPM 3.1.2 and turned in attachment 7.1 Core Thermal Power versus Bypass Valve Position indicating that APRM-1, APRM-3 and APRM-4 require gain adjustments.

As the CRS you are verifying the RO results of step PPM 3.1.2 step Q38 and determining the performance of step Q39 of PPM 3.1.2.

Page 4 of 12

ILC-24 JPM A-6 R0 START TIME:

STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Examiner Note: PPM 3.1.2 Attachment 7.1 is provided to the candidate.

Due to the thickness of the line on the graph, the candidate can attempt to extrapolate by using slightly above the 170° line, this will not impact the results of this JPM.

However, If the candidate uses the incorrect feedwater temperature line (The blue line corresponding to 80°F feedwater temperature) they will result in Core Thermal Power of approximately 14.5%. A correctly filled out Attachment 7.1 (Tolerance acceptable band listed in red) should look like this:

Step 1:

Verifies Attachment 1 of PPM 3.1.2 Standard:

Uses the Red line corresponding to 170°F BPV #1 is at 44% open which correlates to approximately 2.9% of CTP BPV #2 is at 47% open which correlates to approximately 3.2% of CTP BPV #3 is at 49% open which correlates to approximately 3.3% of CTP CRITICAL BPV #4 is at 45% open which correlates to approximately 3.0% of CTP TASK House Loads (Given in initial conditions) is approximately 1%

SAT Values provided by the Reactor Operator: UNSAT N/A Page 5 of 12

ILC-24 JPM A-6 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Compares findings of the Reactor operator to his findings:

Notes that the values provided by the Reactor Operator are INCORRECT (Incorrect Feedwater temperature line was used). The Correct value for Total Core Thermal Power is approximately 13.4% as calculated by the CRS.

Step 2:

Compares values to actual APRM levels and determines the APRMs that require a gain adjustment per step Q39 of PPM 3.1.2.

Standard:

Compares calculated Total CTP (~13.4%) to the given APRM readings and determines that:

CRITICAL

  • APRM-1 Indicates 12.8% Power (Initial Conditions) and is NOT greater TASK than extrapolated BPV position power levels.

SAT

  • APRM-2 Indicates 15.1% Power (Initial Conditions) and IS greater than extrapolated BPV position power levels. UNSAT
  • APRM-3 Indicates 13.9% Power (Initial Conditions) and IS greater than extrapolated BPV position power levels. N/A
  • APRM-4 Indicates 14.1% Power (Initial Conditions) and IS greater than extrapolated BPV position power levels.

Determines that APRM-1 REQUIRES a gain adjustment per step 39 of PPM 3.1.2.

STOP TIME:

Page 6 of 12

ILC-24 JPM A-6 R0 RESULTS OF JPM A-6 Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Examiner (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard:

Determines the RO calculations are NOT correct. APRM-1 power level is NOT greater than extrapolated BPV position power levels. Determines that APRM-2, APRM-3 and APRM-4 power levels ARE greater than extrapolated BPV position power levels.

Determines APRM-1 REQUIRES a gain adjustment per PPM 3.1.2 step Q39.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Examiner Signature: Date:

Page 7 of 12

ILC-24 JPM A-6 R0 ANSWER KEY (A-6)

Based on your assessment:

The calculations performed by the Reactor Operator are Correct / Incorrect. (circle choice)

If Incorrect provide the corrected assessment:

The correct value for calculated reactor power based on BPV position is 13.4%_______________________

OR APRM-1 is NOT GT extrapolated BPV position power levels.

APRM-2, APRM-3 and APRM-4 ARE GT extrapolated BPV position power levels.

Which APRM(s) (If Any) are NOT greater than extrapolated BPV position power levels AND require a gain adjustment per step Q39 of PPM 3.1.2.?

APRM-1 Requires a gain adjustment.

Page 8 of 12

ILC-24 JPM A-6 R0 STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

CGS is in the process of starting up with the following parameters indicated:

  • APRM-1 Indicates 12.8% Power
  • APRM-2 Indicates 15.1% Power
  • APRM-3 Indicates 13.9% Power
  • APRM-4 Indicates 14.1% Power
  • Bypass Valve #1 is indicating 44% open.
  • Bypass Valve #2 is indicating 47% open.
  • Bypass Valve #3 is indicating 49% open.
  • Bypass Valve #4 is indicating 45% open.
  • House Loads are equal to 1% Core Thermal Power
  • Reactor Feedwater Inlet Temperature is 165°F STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initiating Cue:

The Reactor Operator has performed step Q38 of PPM 3.1.2 and turned in attachment 7.1 Core Thermal Power versus Bypass Valve Position indicating that APRM-1, APRM-3 and APRM-4 require gain adjustments.

As the CRS you are verifying the RO results of step PPM 3.1.2 step Q38 and determining the performance of step Q39 of PPM 3.1.2.

TURNED IN COPY OF COMPLETED ATTACHMENT 7.1 of PPM 3.1.2 Page 9 of 12

ILC-24 JPM A-6 R0 Page 10 of 12

ILC-24 JPM A-6 R0 STUDENT JPM ANSWER SHEET (A-2)

Based on your assessment:

The calculations performed by the Reactor Operator are Correct / Incorrect. (circle choice)

If Incorrect provide the correct assessment:

Which APRM(s) (If Any) REQUIRE a gain adjustment per step Q39 of PPM 3.1.2.?

When completed, turn in this JPM to the exam proctor.

Page 11 of 12

ILC-24 JPM A-6 R0 Page 12 of 12

JPM A-7 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE ILC-24 JPM A-7 Verification of CISP move over spent fuel pool.

LESSON LENGTH 0.2HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE Rev. No.

EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Jeff Lux DATE REVISED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

ILC-24 JPM A-7 R0 MAJOR REVISION RECORD Major Description Affected Rev of Revision Pages Number MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description of Revision Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Pages By Date Approval Number TASK STANDARD:

Alternate Path Time Critical TC Time: Validation Time:

7 min TASK APPLICABILITY: RO SRO X SRO-0059 Coordinate maintenance activities; SRO-0096 Determine TASK NUMBER / TITLE(S): applicability of limiting conditions related to: Licensee Controlled Specifications.

K/A IMPORTANCE FACTORS: RO: 2.6 SRO: 3.9 K/A NUMBER: 2.2.18 Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during l shutdown K/A STATEMENT:

operations, such as risk assessments, work prioritization, etc.

GENERIC 2 - Equipment Control AREA:

EVALUATION In-Plant Sim Control Room Admin X TYPE: Other - List:

Page 2 of 10

ILC-24 JPM A-7 R0 JPM SETUP Special Setup Instructions:

Have copies of applicable procedure available in the JPM examination room.

JPM Special Instructions:

None.

Tools or Equipment:

Have Calculator, Ruler, Steam tables available for all candidates Safety Items:

N/A PPM

Reference:

LCS 1.9.2 Crane Travel PPM 1.3.40 Outage Mode Change, Refueling Activity Readiness, and ISFSI Activity Readiness Evaluation.

Location:

Admin - Exam Security Posted room.

Page 3 of 10

ILC-24 JPM A-7 R0 Examiner Notes In JPM Exam Room:

Mark the time that the JPM given to the candidate.

Initial Conditions:

  • CGS is shut down for a refueling outage.
  • The Spent Fuel Pool is previously verified subcritical for GT 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
  • There is equipment staged on the refueling floor to support the refueling outage.

Initiating Cue:

The on-shift Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor has just requested permission to move the Cavity In-Vessel Service Platform (CISP) to perform an in-vessel inspection due to suspected paint chips falling in vessel.

It is required to move the CISP at a height 7 feet off the refueling floor to clear staged equipment.

During the CISP move, it will extend over the spent fool pool a distance of 6 feet.

The CISP will not be loaded for this move.

(CGS OE AR334964 / AR00198338)

Page 4 of 10

ILC-24 JPM A-7 R0 START TIME:

STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Examiner Note: LCS section 1.9.2 and PPM 1.3.40 Pages 1-11 and attachment 7.5 are provided to the candidate.

Examiner Note: All Steps below are directly from PPM 1.3.40 and LCS Section 1.9.2 exactly as written. Any red markups on the procedure step section indicates expected operator response.

Step 1:

Candidate refers to PPM 1.3.40 Attachment 7.5. Performs Analysis of condition 1.

Standard:

SAT UNSAT N/A Step 2:

Candidate refers to PPM 1.3.40 Attachment 7.5. Performs Analysis of condition 2.

CRITICAL TASK SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Page 5 of 10

ILC-24 JPM A-7 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Candidate marks condition 2 NOT MET.

Step 3:

Candidate refers to PPM 1.3.40 Attachment 7.5. Performs Analysis of condition 3.

SAT Standard: UNSAT N/A Page 6 of 10

ILC-24 JPM A-7 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 4:

Reviews if Criteria is met CRITICAL Standard: TASK Candidate determines that the requirement to move the CISP are not met and the SAT CISP move is not permitted.

UNSAT N/A STOP TIME:

Page 7 of 10

ILC-24 JPM A-7 R0 RESULTS OF JPM A-7 Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Examiner (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard: SRO has indicated that the move of the CISP is NOT permitted due to exceeding the requirement of SR 1.9.2.3 (CISP Height is GT 6 feet above the refuel floor).

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Examiner Signature: Date:

Page 8 of 10

ILC-24 JPM A-7 R0 STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

  • CGS is shut down for a refueling outage.
  • The Spent Fuel Pool has been verified subcritical for GT 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
  • There is equipment staged on the refueling floor to support the refueling outage.

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initiating Cue:

The on-shift Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor has just requested permission to move the Cavity In-Vessel Service Platform (CISP) to perform an in-vessel inspection due to suspected paint chips falling in vessel.

It is required to move the CISP at a height 7 feet off the refueling floor to clear staged equipment. During the CISP move, it will extend over the spent fool pool a distance of 6 feet.

The CISP will not be loaded for this move.

On the next page, indicate your intention of allowing the move over the Spent Fuel Pool by initialing where indicated OR indicate your intention of disallowing the move over the Spent Fuel Pool and your associated reason. When done, hand the completed JPM Answer Sheet to the examiner.

Page 9 of 10

ILC-24 JPM A-7 R0 STUDENT JPM ANSWER SHEET (A-7)

(Check Mark appropriate box)

Move of the CISP is allowed.

Move of the CISP is NOT allowed. Provide justification.

Page 10 of 10

JPM A-8 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE ILC-24 JPM A-8 Estimate MC AE Gross Gamma Activity and required actions.

LESSON LENGTH 0.2HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE Rev. No.

EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Jeff Lux DATE 08/30/20 REVISED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MAJOR REVISION RECORD Major Description Affected Rev of Revision Pages Number MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description of Revision Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Pages By Date Approval Number TASK STANDARD:

Alternate Path Time Critical TC Time: Validation Time:

10 Min TASK APPLICABILITY: RO SRO X TASK NUMBER / TITLE(S): SRO-0658 K/A IMPORTANCE FACTORS: RO: 3.4 SRO: 3.8 K/A NUMBER: 2.3.14 Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, K/A STATEMENT:

abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities.

GENERIC 3 - Radiation Control AREA:

EVALUATION In-Plant Sim Control Room Admin X TYPE: Other - List:

Page 2 of 14

ILC-24 JPMA-8 R0 JPM SETUP Special Setup Instructions:

Have copies of applicable procedure available in the JPM examination room.

JPM Special Instructions:

None.

Tools or Equipment:

Have Calculator, Ruler, Steam tables available for all candidates Safety Items:

N/A PPM

Reference:

ABN-OG Location:

Admin - Exam Security Posted room.

Page 3 of 14

ILC-24 JPMA-8 R0 Examiner Notes In JPM Exam Room:

Mark the time that the JPM is given to the candidate.

Initial Conditions:

  • CGS is at 100% power.
  • Various alarms are locked in due to suspected fuel pin damage.
  • Offgas Post Treatment Radiation Monitor, OG-RIS-601A is in alarm.
  • Refer to parameters indicated on attached handout.

Initiating Cue:

Based on the information provided determine what action, if any, should be taken. Fill in the result of your conclusion on the attachment provided.

Page 4 of 14

ILC-24 JPM A-8 R0 START TIME:

STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Examiner Note: The candidate must recognize the entry condition for ABN-OG, provide a copy of ABN-OG after requested by the candidate.

Step 1:

CRITICAL TASK SAT Standard: UNSAT Reviews radiation readings on WEA-RIS-14, RW Building Vent Exhaust Rad Monitor, and TEA-RIS-13, Turbine Building Vent Exhaust Rad Monitor, as N/A indicated on handout.

Determines that radiation readings are normal and entry into section 4.2 of ABN-OG is NOTrequired. Determines that section 4.1 should be used.

Step 2:

SAT UNSAT Standard: N/A Verifies indications provided Step 3:

SAT Standard: UNSAT OG-V-60 is a normally open valve for Mode 1 operations, there is nothing in the N/A initial conditions to suggest that OG-V-60 would be closed.

Page 5 of 14

ILC-24 JPM A-8 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 4:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Based on the indications provided, the turbine building and radwaste building radiation levels are normal.

Step 5:

CRITICAL TASK SAT Standard: UNSAT Determines OG-RR-604 indication on handout reads 7.8E+03 (7800) mr/Hr.

Determines OG-FR-620 indication on handout reads 43.0 SCFM. N/A Multiplies 7800 x 43.0 = 335,400.

Divides 355,400 by 1000 = 335.4 (mCi/sec)

Step 6:

CRITICAL TASK SAT UNSAT Standard: N/A Based on a Main Condenser Gross gamma activity reading of 335.4 mCi/sec, candidate determines that a power reduction per PPM 3.2.4 to maintain Main Condenser Gross gamma activity LT 332 mCi/sec is required.

Page 6 of 14

ILC-24 JPM A-8 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 7:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Annotates on answer sheet the need to direct chemistry to perform these steps.

Step 8:

SAT UNSAT Standard: N/A Annotates on answer sheet the need to evaluate TS.

Step 9:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Annotates requirement for documentation in the MCR log.

Step 10:

SAT UNSAT Standard:

The confirmation of fuel damage is based on the chemistry results which will not N/A be provided for this JPM. Candidate does not perform this step.

Page 7 of 14

ILC-24 JPM A-8 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 11:

SAT Standard:

UNSAT Candidate may directing maximizing flow through RWCU demineralizers.

N/A STOP TIME:

Page 8 of 14

ILC-24 JPM A-8 R0 RESULTS OF JPM A-8 Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Examiner (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard: Main Condenser air ejector gross gamma activity rate has been properly calculated per ABN-OG, step 4.1.4 and used to justify reactor power reduction as directed by ABN-OG, step 4.1.5.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Examiner Signature: Date:

Page 9 of 14

ILC-24 JPM A-8 R0 STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

  • CGS is at 100% power.
  • Various alarms are locked in due to suspected fuel pin damage.
  • Offgas Post Treatment Radiation Monitor, OG-RIS-601A is in alarm.
  • Refer to parameters indicated on attached handout.

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initiating Cue:

Based on the information provided determine what action, if any, should be taken. Fill in the result of your conclusion on the attachment provided.

Page 10 of 14

ILC-24 JPM A-8 R0 STUDENT JPM INFORMATION HAND OUT (page 1 of 3)

Page 11 of 14

ILC-24 JPM A-8 R0 STUDENT JPM INFORMATION HAND OUT (page 2 of 3)

WEA-RIS-14 Page 12 of 14

ILC-24 JPM A-8 R0 STUDENT JPM INFORMATION HAND OUT (page 3 of 3)

TEA-RIS-14 Page 13 of 14

ILC-24 JPM A-8 R0 STUDENT JPM ANSWER SHEET INITIAL HERE IF NO ACTIONS ARE REQUIRED:

REASON NO ACTIONS ARE REQUIRED:

INITIAL HERE IF ACTIONS ARE REQUIRED:

ACTION(S) IF REQUIRED AND REASON FOR ACTION:

Page 14 of 14

JPM A-9 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE ILC-24 JPM A-9 EP - SRO Immediate Operator Actions for a Code Red / Classify the emergency - TIME CRITCAL LESSON LENGTH 0.4 HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE Rev. No.

EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Jeff Lux DATE 12/10/20 REVISED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MAJOR REVISION RECORD Major Description Affected Rev of Revision Pages Number MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description of Revision Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Pages By Date Approval Number TASK STANDARD:

Alternate Path Time Critical TC Time: 15 Validation Time:

X Minutes 10 Min TASK APPLICABILITY: RO SRO X TASK NUMBER / TITLE(S): SRO-0015 Direct Response to bomb threat emergencies K/A IMPORTANCE FACTORS: RO: 4.6 SRO: 4.4 K/A NUMBER: 2.4.49 Ability to perform without reference to procedures those actions that K/A STATEMENT:

require immediate operation of system components and controls.

GENERIC 4 - Emergency Plan AREA:

EVALUATION In-Plant Sim Control Room Admin X TYPE: Other - List:

Page 2 of 9

ILC-24 JPM A-9 R0 JPM SETUP Special Setup Instructions:

Have copies of applicable procedure available in the JPM examination room.

JPM Special Instructions:

None.

Tools or Equipment:

Have Calculator, Ruler, Steam tables available for all candidates Safety Items:

N/A PPM

Reference:

13.1.1 Emergency Classification Chart 13.1.1A Classifying the Emergency - Technical Bases Location:

Admin - Exam Security Posted room.

Page 3 of 9

ILC-24 JPM A-9 R0 Examiner Notes In JPM Exam Room:

Ensure JPM is placed facedown on the desk for each candidate performing this JPM.

Initial Conditions:

  • CGS is at 100% power
  • A hostile action against CGS has resulted in an explosion in Service Water Pump House A and has been reported to the main control room by the security sergeant.
  • Security has announced a CODE RED.

Initiating Cue:

As the CRS; what IMMEDIATE Operator actions that you would direct and/or perform?

Classify this event per PPM 13.1.1.

This is a TIME CRITICAL JPM (15 Minutes) and your time starts now.

Examiner Mark the time start for this JPM.

START TIME:

Page 4 of 9

ILC-24 JPM A-9 R0 START TIME:

STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Examiner Note: Copies of ABN-SECURITY will NOT be provided to the candidate; immediate operator actions are required for this event from memory.

Step 1:

Lists the immediate operator actions on the form provided.

CRITICAL Standard: TASK Lists the immediate operator actions on the form provided.

SAT Required to have:

3.1.1a - Call Security (Confirmation of the Code Red). UNSAT Examiner Note: When security receives the call from the main control room, they will provide confirmation of the code red even if not specifically asked N/A for. Thus, the call to security meets the requirement for this piece of the critical task.

3.1.1b - Scram the Reactor 3.1.1c - Notify SAS officer of the name and description of the Licensed Operator being sent to the Vital Island.

Examiner Note: Performance of 3.1.1C also meets the requirements for 3.1.1E. Notification to the SAS of the description of the operator being sent to the vital island implies the intent to send an operator to the vital island.

3.1.1d - Verify the SAS officer transmits the name and description of the Licensed Operator being sent to the Vital Island over the security radio frequency.

Examiner Note:3.1.1d is not a required element of the Critical Task.

Confirmation of an expected action (not performed by licensed operators) does not meet definition of a critical task element.

Page 5 of 9

ILC-24 JPM A-9 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 2:

Candidate classifies the event using PPM 13.1.1 Standard: CRITICAL Candidate determines a SITE AREA EMERGENCY on HS1.1 TASK SAT UNSAT N/A STOP TIME:

Page 6 of 9

ILC-24 JPM A-9 R0 RESULTS OF JPM A-9 Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Examiner (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard: Candidate has listed the IMMEDIATE operator actions that would be directed per ABN-SECURITY (exact wording is not required but must meet the intent of the step.)

The following is the minimum required to meet the first critical task element:

- Call security (The call to security will result in confirmation of the code red even if not directly specified)

- Scram the reactor

- Notify SAS of operator being sent to the vital island. (SAS would prompt for the name and description of the operator. This also indicates the intent to send an operator to the vital island which is a separate step, but considered met if this step is performed)

And the Operator has classified the event per PPM 13.1.1. as HS1.1 SITE AREA EMERGENCY.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Examiner Signature: Date:

Page 7 of 9

ILC-24 JPM A-9 R0 STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

  • CGS is at 100% power
  • A hostile action against CGS has resulted in an explosion in Service Water Pump House A and has been reported to the main control room by the security sergeant.
  • Security has announced a CODE RED.

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initiating Cue:

As the CRS; what IMMEDIATE Operator actions that you would direct and/or perform?

Classify this event per PPM 13.1.1.

Page 8 of 9

ILC-24 JPM A-9 R0 STUDENT JPM ANSWER SHEET What IMMEDIATE Operator actions that you would direct and/or perform?

What is the event classification per PPM 13.1.1?

Page 9 of 9

JPM S-1 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE ILC-24 JPM S-1 Vent the drywell Per SOP-CN-CONT-VENT (ALT Path)

LESSON LENGTH INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE Rev. No.

EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY DATE REVISED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MAJOR REVISION RECORD Major Description Affected Rev of Revision Pages Number MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description of Revision Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Pages By Date Approval Number TASK STANDARD:

Alternate Path Time Critical TC Time: Validation Time:

X 16 Min TASK APPLICABILITY: RO X SRO X TASK NUMBER / TITLE(S): RO-0287 / Purge and de-inert containment with standby gas treatment.

K/A IMPORTANCE FACTORS: RO: 4.2 SRO: 4.3 K/A NUMBER: 223001 A2.07 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the PRIMARY CONTAINMENT SYSTEM AND AUXILIARIES; and (b) based on those K/A STATEMENT: predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations:

High Drywell Pressure SAFETY 5 - Containment Integrity FUNCTION:

EVALUATION In-Plant Sim X

Control Room Admin TYPE:

Other - List:

Page 2 of 19

ILC-24 JPM S-1 R0 JPM SETUP Special Setup Instructions:

Use barriers to segregate front panel from back panels. Multiple candidates will be performing JPMs simultaneously at front and back panels.

JPM Special Instructions:

See Simulator Operator Instructions Below Tools or Equipment:

Barriers to segregate front panels from back panels.

Safety Items:

No Special safety items are required.

PPM

Reference:

SOP-CN-CONT-VENT R27 m1 Location:

Simulator Reset the Simulator to IC-200 Places the plant at 100% power with a slightly elevated drywell Simulator pressure (Approximately 1 psig).

Operator Turn off all annunciators for panels that will not be monitored by the Instructions candidate(s) during the performance of this JPM set.

Load Schedule File: JPM S-1 S-2 S-3 ILC 2021 Page 3 of 19

ILC-24 JPM S-1 R0 STUDENT BRIEF (Performed by Evaluator)

In Simulator:

I will explain the initial conditions and state the task to be performed. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. When your task is given, you will repeat the task and I will acknowledge "That's Correct (OR "That's Incorrect", if applicable).

For this JPM all actions and monitoring will be performed from Control Room back panels.

Monitoring of any front panel indications is not required.

Initial Conditions:

  • CGS is operating at 100% Power, with NO equipment out of service.
  • Due to changing barometric conditions Drywell pressure is approximately 1.0 psig and up very slow.
  • Wetwell Pressure is less than Drywell Pressure as expected.

Initiating Cue:

The CRS has directed you to vent the Drywell to LT 0.5 psig per COP-CN-CONT-VENT using SGT Train B. (LT 0.5psig as Indicated on P813 CMS-PI-7).

  • Primary Containment Venting, Deinerting, Purging, and Ventilating Valve Lineup, SOP-CN-CONT-VENT-LU, has been completed.
  • Containment atmosphere analysis is available.
  • ALL Containment Radiation Monitoring System Leak and LOCA Monitoring Equipment is available.
  • CMS-RIS-12A Channel 1 and CMS-RIS-12B Channel 1 at PRM-RR-1 and PRM-RR-2 are functional. Activity levels have NOT increased in the last hour and have been LT the alarm setpoint for the last hour.
  • PRM-RE-11 is functional Page 4 of 19

ILC-24 JPM S-1 R0 START TIME:

STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Examiner Note: Give the operator the marked up copy of SOP-CN-CONT-VENT. (Pre-requisites are already initialed / Precautions and limitations are circle - slashed)

Examiner Note: All Steps below are directly from SOP-CN-CONT-VENT exactly as written. Any red markups on the procedure step section indicates expected operator response. ALL manipulations are from H13-P813 for the venting steps and H13-P811 for the start of SGT B Train.

Step 1:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

The vent path is through SGT two-inch bypass line, Per the preceding note Sampling is NOT required. Mark the Step N/A Step 2:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Based on initial conditions the reactor is in Mode 1 with no expected equipment out of service. Deinerting in Not being performed. Performs and initials first bullet and N/As bullets 2 and 3.

Page 5 of 19

ILC-24 JPM S-1 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 3:

SAT UNSAT Standard:

N/A Informs CRS.

Examiner Cue: operator informs the CRS:

An extra RO will make all required documentation on the H101s Step 4:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Per the initial conditions there is no equipment out of service. Marks N/A Step 5:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Per the initial conditions there is no equipment out of service. Marks 5.1.2 N/A Step 6:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Performs this step. Given in the initial conditions.

Page 6 of 19

ILC-24 JPM S-1 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 7: SAT UNSAT Standard:

Verifies Green lamp on and Red lamp off for CEP-V-11 on P813 N/A Examiner Note: In the event the operator chooses to vent through SGT-A (contrary to Initial Conditions) This does not constitute automatic failure. The same fault (Alt Path) has been applied to SGT-A and the same operator response will be required in the event that this occurs.

Step 8:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Marks Steps N/A per the initial conditions, Venting is to be performed through SGT-B.

Page 7 of 19

ILC-24 JPM S-1 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 9:

SAT N/A UNSAT N/A Standard:

Operator Marks N/A. Not venting through SGT-A Step 10:

SAT UNSAT Standard: N/A Operator verifies Red lamp on and Green lamp off for SGT-V-2B Step 11:

CRITICAL STEP SAT Standard:

UNSAT Operator verbalizes expected response of Main Heaters energizing, SGT-V-5B2 automatically opens and SGT-FN-1B2 starts within 10 seconds and places N/A SGT-FN-1B2 Control Switch from auto (counter Clockwise) to PTL system start.

Examiner Note: The following step is Alternate Path. On step 5.1.7c (bullet 2)

SGT-V-5B2 Fails to auto open.

Operator action is required to manually open SGT-V-5B2.

Step 12:

CRITICAL STEP SAT UNSAT Standard:

N/A Operator initials for Main Heaters energizing. Operator notes that SGT-V-5B2 fails to auto open and manually opens SGT-V-5B2 by turning the switch clockwise (spring returns to auto). Operator verifies the auto start of SGT-FN-1B2.

Page 8 of 19

ILC-24 JPM S-1 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 13:

SAT Standard: UNSAT Operator may or may not go to manual based on their indications. There will not be a real need to go to manual but it is not wrong if the operator decides to N/A perform this step based on their perception of indications.

Step 14: CRITICAL STEP SAT Standard:

Places the control switch for SGT-V-1B to Open by taking the switch in the UNSAT clockwise direction (spring return to auto) and verifies Red lamp on and Green lamp off. N/A Step 15:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Operator monitors operation of SGT. Reads the caution associated with the next few steps.

Page 9 of 19

ILC-24 JPM S-1 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 16:

SAT UNSAT Standard:

Per the initial conditions Wetwell venting is not desired and Wetwell pressure is N/A LT Drywell pressure. N/As this entire step.

Step 17:

CRITICAL STEP SAT Standard:

UNSAT Operator takes the control switch for CEP-V-1B (Spring return to normal) clockwise to open and verifies Red lamp on and Green lamp off. N/A Operator takes the control switch for CEP-V-2B (Spring return to normal) clockwise to open and verifies Red lamp on and Green lamp off.

Step 18:

SAT Standard:

UNSAT Informs the CRS to log the vent time in the Control Room Log.

Examiner Cue: When the operator informs the CRS: N/A I Understand, Log the vent start time in the Control Room Log.

Step 19:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Evaluates and marks both steps N/A. Per initial conditions this is NOT performed to support Inerting and it is not following ILRT/BLRT Page 10 of 19

ILC-24 JPM S-1 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 20:

Continues to monitor Drywell Pressure indication in preparation of performing Step 5.1.1f SAT UNSAT Standard: N/A Monitors Drywell pressure at CMS-PI-7.

Operator may attempt to transition to the front panels (H13-P601) for digital indication of drywell pressure. Or the operator may ask for this indication.

Examiner Cue: If the operator attempts to transition to the digital front panel indication for drywell pressure. Provide the candidate with the appropriate cue sheet below based on the indications seen at CMS-PI-7 (Next 6 pages)

Examiner Note: This task does not require the operator to lower drywell pressure all the way to LT 0.5 psig. The examiner may conclude the JPM at any time following the vent lineup is properly established and drywell pressure is lowering.

Examiner Cue:

Inform the candidate that the JPM is Complete STOP TIME:

Page 11 of 19

ILC-24 JPM S-1 R0 EXAMINER CUES FROM FRONT PANEL INDICATIONS (IF REQUESTED)

Page 12 of 19

ILC-24 JPM S-1 R0 Page 13 of 19

ILC-24 JPM S-1 R0 Page 14 of 19

ILC-24 JPM S-1 R0 Page 15 of 19

ILC-24 JPM S-1 R0 Page 16 of 19

ILC-24 JPM S-1 R0 Page 17 of 19

ILC-24 JPM S-1 R0 RESULTS OF JPM S-1 Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Examiner (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard:

Drywell Pressure has been vented to LT 0.5 PSIG as Indicated on CMS-PI-7 pe SOP-CN-CONT-VENT Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Examiner Signature: Date:

Page 18 of 19

ILC-24 JPM S-1 R0 STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD (Given to Candidate)

Initial Conditions:

  • CGS is operating at 100% Power, with NO equipment out of service.
  • Due to changing barometric conditions Drywell pressure is approximately 1.0 psig and up very slow.
  • Wetwell Pressure is less than Drywell Pressure as expected.

Initiating Cue:

The CRS has directed you to vent the Drywell to LT 0.5 psig per SOP-CN-CONT-VENT using SGT Train B. (LT 0.5psig as Indicated on P813 CMS-PI-7).

  • Primary Containment Venting, Deinerting, Purging, and Ventilating Valve Lineup, SOP-CN-CONT-VENT-LU, has been completed.
  • Containment atmosphere analysis is available.
  • ALL Containment Radiation Monitoring System Leak and LOCA Monitoring Equipment is available.
  • CMS-RIS-12A Channel 1 and CMS-RIS-12B Channel 1 at PRM-RR-1 and PRM-RR-2 are functional. Activity levels have NOT increased in the last hour and have been LT the alarm setpoint for the last hour.
  • PRM-RE-11 is functional Page 19 of 19

JPM S-2 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE ILC-24 JPM S-2 Transfer SL-21 to SL-11 from SM-2 (Alt Path)

LESSON LENGTH 0.4HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE Rev. No.

EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY DATE REVISED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MAJOR REVISION RECORD Major Description Affected Rev of Revision Pages Number MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description of Revision Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Pages By Date Approval Number TASK STANDARD:

Alternate Path Time Critical TC Time: Validation Time:

X 6 min TASK APPLICABILITY: RO X SRO X TASK NUMBER / TITLE(S): RO-0390 Transfer 480V Buses from Alternate to Normal.

K/A IMPORTANCE FACTORS: RO: 3.4 SRO: 3.7 K/A NUMBER: 262001 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the K/A STATEMENT: control room: All breakers and disconnects (including available switch yard):

Plant-Specific SAFETY 6 - Electrical FUNCTION:

EVALUATION In-Plant Sim X

Control Room Admin TYPE:

Other - List:

Page 2 of 9

ILC-24 JPM S-2 R0 JPM SETUP Special Setup Instructions:

Use barriers to segregate front panel from back panels. Multiple candidates will be performing JPMs simultaneously at front and back panels.

JPM Special Instructions:

See Simulator Operator Instructions Below Tools or Equipment:

Barriers to segregate front panels from back panels.

Safety Items:

No Special safety items are required.

PPM

Reference:

SOP-ELEC-480V-OPS with P&Ls circle slashed and CRS annotation of administrative procedural change to step 5.2.2, change E-B-21/11 to E-CB-21/11 (Initial and date / annotate on front cover.)

Location:

Simulator Reset the Simulator to IC-200 Places the plant at 100% power with a slightly elevated drywell pressure (Approximately 1 psig).

Turn off all annunciators for panels that will not be monitored by the Simulator candidate(s) during the performance of this JPM set.

Operator Ensure:

Instructions

  • SL-21 is being supplied from SM-2 (Normal Line Up)

Load Schedule File: JPM S-1 S-2 S-3 ILC 2021 Page 3 of 9

ILC-24 JPM S-2 R0 STUDENT BRIEF In Simulator:

I will explain the initial conditions and state the task to be performed. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. When your task is given, you will repeat the task and I will acknowledge "That's Correct (OR "That's Incorrect", if applicable).

For this JPM all actions and monitoring will be performed from Control Room FRONT panels. Monitoring of any back panel indications is not required.

Initial Conditions:

  • CGS is operating at 100% Power, with NO equipment out of service.

Initiating Cue:

The CRS has directed you to Transfer E-SL-21 TO E-SL-11 FROM E-SM-2.

  • All 125V DC Distribution Systems are in service per SOP-ELEC-125V-OPS (Pre-Requisites are complete)
  • The CRS has annotated and approved and administrative procedural revision to step 5.2.2.

It now reads Verify E-CB-21/11(Changed from E-B-21/11)

Page 4 of 9

ILC-24 JPM S-2 R0 START TIME:

STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Examiner Note: Provide the operator with the marked up copy of SOP-ELEC-480V-OPS.

Examiner Note: All Steps below are directly from SOP-ELEC-480V-OPS exactly as written. Any red markups on the procedure step section indicates expected operator response.

Step 1:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Reads the caution and notes and performs proper place keeping.

Step 2:

SAT Standard: UNSAT Reads amps from E-AM-2/21 and E-AM-1/11, Adds them together and verifies that N/A the total is LE 277 amps.

Step 3:

SAT UNSAT Standard:

Verifies Green light and green flag are displayed N/A Step 4:

SAT Standard: UNSAT Takes the permissive selector switch to the TRIP 21/2 Position.

N/A Page 5 of 9

ILC-24 JPM S-2 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 5:

SAT Standard:

Reads note and provides proper place keeping. Closes E-CB-21/11. UNSAT N/A Examiner Note: Operator may at this time note that CB-21/2 Failed to trip and take action to manually trip CB-21/2 based on automatic action that was expected to occur. If performed at this time, the critical task associated with Step 8 (below) is considered met.

Step 6:

SAT UNSAT Standard:

Verifies CB-21/11 Green light extinguished. N/A Step 7:

SAT UNSAT Standard:

Verifies CB-21/11 red light illuminated. N/A Step 8:

Examiner Note: This step is alternate path for automatic action that did not CRITICAL STEP occur. CB-21/2 Fails to auto trip.

SAT UNSAT Standard:

N/A Operator notes that CB-21/2 failed to auto trip and takes action to manually trip CB Step 9:

CRITICAL STEP SAT Standard:

UNSAT N/A Page 6 of 9

ILC-24 JPM S-2 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 11:

SAT UNSAT Standard:

Verifies green light illuminated and green flag displayed. N/A Step 12:

SAT UNSAT Standard:

Places Trip Permissive selector switch to off. N/A Step 13:

SAT UNSAT Standard:

Verifies E-AM-1/11 is LE 277 amps. N/A Examiner Cue: Inform the candidate that the JPM is Complete STOP TIME:

Page 7 of 9

ILC-24 JPM S-2 R0 RESULTS OF JPM S-2 Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Examiner (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard:

SL-21 is transferred to SL-11 from SM-2 Per SOP-ELEC-480V-OPS Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Examiner Signature: Date:

Page 8 of 9

ILC-24 JPM S-2 R0 STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

  • CGS is operating at 100% Power, with NO equipment out of service.

Initiating Cue:

The CRS has directed you to Transfer E-SL-21 TO E-SL-11 FROM E-SM-2.

  • All 125V DC Distribution Systems are in service per SOP-ELEC-125V-OPS (Pre-Requisites are complete)
  • The CRS has annotated and approved and administrative procedural revision to step 5.2.2. It now reads Verify E-CB-21/11 (Changed from E-B-21/11)

Page 9 of 9

JPM S-3 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE ILC-24 JPM S-3 Lower Reactor Pressure to 1015# per SOP-DEH-OPS LESSON LENGTH 0.4HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE Rev. No.

EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY DATE REVISED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MAJOR REVISION RECORD Major Description Affected Rev of Revision Pages Number MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description of Revision Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Pages By Date Approval Number TASK STANDARD:

Alternate Path Time Critical TC Time: Validation Time:

X 6 Minutes TASK APPLICABILITY: RO X SRO X TASK NUMBER / TITLE(S): RO-0348 Operate DEH In Auto K/A IMPORTANCE FACTORS: RO: 4.1 SRO: 4.1 K/A NUMBER: 241000 A4.02 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the K/A STATEMENT:

control room: Reactor pressure SAFETY 3 - Reactor Pressure Control FUNCTION:

EVALUATION In-Plant Sim X

Control Room Admin TYPE:

Other - List:

Page 2 of 10

ILC-24 JPM S-3 R0 JPM SETUP Special Setup Instructions:

Use barriers to segregate front panel from back panels. Multiple candidates will be performing JPMs simultaneously at front and back panels.

JPM Special Instructions:

See Simulator Operator Instructions Below Tools or Equipment:

Barriers to segregate front panels from back panels.

Safety Items:

No Special safety items are required.

PPM

Reference:

SOP-DEH-OPS SOP-DEH-QC Location:

Simulator Reset the Simulator to IC-200 Places the plant at 100% power with a slightly elevated Reactor Pressure.

Simulator Turn off all annunciators for panels that will not be monitored by the Operator candidate(s) during the performance of this JPM set.

Instructions Load Schedule File: JPM S-1 S-2 S-3 ILC 2021 Page 3 of 10

ILC-24 JPM S-3 R0 STUDENT BRIEF In Simulator:

I will explain the initial conditions and state the task to be performed. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. When your task is given, you will repeat the task and I will acknowledge "That's Correct (OR "That's Incorrect", if applicable).

For this JPM all actions and monitoring will be performed from Control Room FRONT panels. Monitoring of any back-panel indications is not required.

Initial Conditions:

  • CGS is operating at 100% Power, with NO equipment out of service.

Initiating Cue:

  • The CRS has directed you to lower Reactor Pressure to 1015 psig (MS-PI-9) at 50 psig per minute per SOP-DEH-OPS using DEH in automatic.
  • CRS recommends a pressure target of 953 psi which corresponds to approximately 1015 psig reactor pressure.

Page 4 of 10

ILC-24 JPM S-3 R0 START TIME:

STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Examiner Note: Provide the candidate with a copy of SOP-DEH-OPS section 5.4. The operator may also use SOP-DEH-QC following the fault.

Examiner Note: All Steps below are directly from SOP-DEH-OPS exactly as written. Any red markups on the procedure step section indicates expected operator response.

Step 1:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Reads notes and documents proper place keeping.

Examiner Note: Operator may reference ABN-PRESSURE and attachment 7.1 graph prior to commencing the reactor pressure change.

Step 2:

SAT UNSAT Standard: N/A Verifies AUTO is illuminated.

Step 3:

CRITICAL STEP SAT UNSAT Standard:

N/A Selects Pressure Target and enters 953. Selects OK.

Page 5 of 10

ILC-24 JPM S-3 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 4:

SAT UNSAT Standard:

N/A Verifies 953 is displayed in the target window and verifies that hold is illuminated.

Step 5:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Selects pressure rate and ensures that pressure rate is set to 50. Selects OK.

Step 6:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Verifies the correct pressure rate in the PRESSURE RATE window, Selects GO, Selects YES and verifies that GO is illuminated.

Step 7:

Examiner Note: This step begins the Alternate Path. Pressure response will continue to lower after hitting the target value.

CRITICAL STEP SAT Standard:

Operator Verifies that pressure response continues to lower beyond target value. UNSAT Operator notes that Governor valves are opening.

N/A Operator acknowledges 4.8220.B1 2-4 DEH WARNING and 4.603.A8 RPV LEVL HIGH/LOW ALERT. Due to the unexpected pressure response (failing transmitters and resultant effect of RPV level.

Page 6 of 10

ILC-24 JPM S-3 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 8:

If the operator informs the CRS of the fault.

Examiner Cue: Take actions to restore RPV pressure to 1016 psig.

Examiner Note: PPM 1.3.1 Allows the operator to take manual control when control in automatic is no longer desired. Operator may take Throttle Pressure Control to Manual without the use of the SOP-DEH-OPS-QC (Critical Step 9 below). All of the remaining steps listed are directly from SOP-DEH-OPS-QC.

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Reads note and performs proper place keeping.

Examiner Note: A manual demand signal of 101% results in reactor pressure approximately 1018 psig and manual demand signal of 102% results in reactor pressure approximately 1010 psig.

Step 9:

CRITICAL STEP Standard: SAT Selects TP Auto/Manual, Selects TP Manual and selects yes. Operator then UNSAT verifies that the plant is stable and going to TP Manual has stopped the pressure drop. N/A Examiner Note: The Critical task is considered met if the operator stops the pressure reduction prior to the automatic scram signal of 831 psig with the mode switch in run.

Step 10:

CRITICAL STEP SAT Standard: UNSAT The operator selects DEMAND LOWER to raise pressure. The operator may press the jog button. The operator slowly raises pressure in manual to 1015 psig. N/A Page 7 of 10

ILC-24 JPM S-3 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Examiner Note: As long as the operator demonstrates the ability to raise reactor pressure in Manual Control, the critical task is considered met. It is NOT required to restore pressure all the way back to 1016 psig.

The Examiner can consider this JPM complete at any time after they have determined the operators ability to raise pressure using throttle pressure manual. If further evaluation is required, the examiner may allow the candidate to restore pressure all the way back to 1016 psig.

Examiner Cue: Inform the candidate that the JPM is Complete STOP TIME:

Page 8 of 10

ILC-24 JPM S-3 R0 RESULTS OF JPM S-3 Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Examiner (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard:

Operator has halted the lowering Reactor Pressure by taking DEH to Throttle Pressure Manual prior to reaching the scram set point of 831psig and has COMMENCED restoring pressure to 1016psig. (Restoration all the way back to 1016 psig is not required).

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Examiner Signature: Date:

Page 9 of 10

ILC-24 JPM S-3 R0 STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

  • CGS is operating at 100% Power, with NO equipment out of service.

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initiating Cue:

  • The CRS has directed you to lower Reactor Pressure to 1015 psig (MS-PI-9) at 50psig per minute per SOP-DEH-OPS using DEH in automatic.
  • CRS recommends a pressure target of 953 psi which corresponds to approximately 1015 psig reactor pressure.

Page 10 of 10

JPM S-4 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE ILC-24 JPM S-4 Swap RB HVAC Fans per SOP-HVAC/RB-OPS LESSON LENGTH 0.4HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE Rev. No.

EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Jeff Lux DATE 12/10/20 REVISED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MAJOR REVISION RECORD Major Description Affected Rev of Revision Pages Number MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description of Revision Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Pages By Date Approval Number TASK STANDARD:

Alternate Path Time Critical TC Time: Validation Time:

X 14 Minutes TASK APPLICABILITY: RO X SRO X RO-0497 Startup Reactor Building HVAC (REA/ROA, RB Sump TASK NUMBER / TITLE(S):

Exhaust and Steam tunnel Fans)

K/A IMPORTANCE FACTORS: RO: 3.1 SRO: 2.9 K/A NUMBER: 288000 A4.01 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the K/A STATEMENT:

control room: Start and stop fans SAFETY 9 - Radioactivity Release FUNCTION:

EVALUATION In-Plant Sim X

Control Room Admin TYPE:

Other - List:

Page 2 of 11

ILC-24 JPM S-4 R0 JPM SETUP Special Setup Instructions:

Use barriers to segregate front panel from back panels. Multiple candidates will be performing JPMs simultaneously at front and back panels.

JPM Special Instructions:

See Simulator Operator Instructions Below Tools or Equipment:

Barriers to segregate front panels from back panels.

Ensure Flags are brought to back panels for the candidate Safety Items:

No Special safety items are required.

PPM

Reference:

SOP-HVAC/RB-OPS with Prerequisites signed off and P&Ls circle slashed.

Location:

Simulator Reset the Simulator to IC-101 Simulator Places the plant at 100% power. Load schedule file JPM S-4 S-5 ILC 2021 Operator Instructions Ensure all annunciators are acknowledged. Turn off annunciators for panels that will not be monitored by the candidate(s) for this JPM set.

Schedule File Page 3 of 11

ILC-24 JPM S-4 R0 STUDENT BRIEF In Simulator:

I will explain the initial conditions and state the task to be performed. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. When your task is given, you will repeat the task and I will acknowledge "That's Correct (OR "That's Incorrect", if applicable).

For this JPM all actions and monitoring will be performed from Control Room BACK panels.

Monitoring of any front panel indications is not required.

Initial Conditions:

  • CGS is at 100% power and preparing for shut down for a maintenance outage window.

Initiating Cue:

The CRS has directed you to swap RB HVAC fans to ROA-FN-1A and REA-FN-1A Running and ROA-FN-1B and REA-FN-1B Secured for upcoming maintenance outage.

  • SOP-HVAC/RB-START is completed.
  • All FAZ signals are cleared and reset.

Page 4 of 11

ILC-24 JPM S-4 R0 START TIME:

STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Examiner Note: Provide the candidate with a copy of SOP-HVAC/RB-OPS section 5.1 Examiner Note: All Steps below are directly from SOP-HVAC/RB-OPS exactly as written. Any red markups on the procedure step section indicates expected operator response.

NOTE: The operator MAY N/A non applicable steps of this procedure in advance of performance.

Step 1:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Marks prerequisites complete based on initial conditions provided.

Step 2:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Reads notes and provides proper place keeping.

Page 5 of 11

ILC-24 JPM S-4 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 3:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Places REA-DPIC-1A in manual.

Marks N/A for REA-DPIC-1B.

Step 4:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Adjusts REA-DPIC-1A to 60% output.

Marks N/A for REA-DPIC-1B.

Step 5:

CRITICAL TASK SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Secures ROA-FN-1B and REA-FN-1B SIMULTANEOUSLY.

Marks N/A for ROA-FN-1A and REA-FN-1A.

Page 6 of 11

ILC-24 JPM S-4 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 6:

SAT UNSAT Standard: N/A Verifies REA-AD-1B Closed.

Marks N/A for REA-AD-1A.

Step 7:

CRITICAL TASK SAT UNSAT Standard: N/A Starts REA-FN-1A AND as soon as the breaker is closed as observed by the red lamp, immediately proceeds to step 7 and starts ROA-FN-1A.

Marks N/A for REA-FN-1B.

Step 8:

CRITICAL TASK SAT UNSAT Standard: N/A Starts ROA-FN-1A immediately after start is observed for REA-FN-1A Marks N/A for ROA-FN-1B.

Page 7 of 11

ILC-24 JPM S-4 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 9:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Verifies REA-AD-1A is open.

Marks N/A for REA-AD-1B.

Step 10:

CRITICAL TASK SAT UNSAT Standard:

N/A Adjusts REA-DPIC-1A as needed to achieve APPROXIMATELY -0.8 WC Marks N/A for REA-DPIC-1B.

Step 11:

SAT UNSAT N/A Page 8 of 11

ILC-24 JPM S-4 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Standard:

After the controller is stable at -0.8 WC, transfers REA-DPIC-1A to auto. The operator may null the controller by matching the auto signal dial wheel to the manual signal indication (which was taken to 60% in previous step), place the controller in auto, and slowly adjust the controller in auto (the wheel) until it reaches -0.8 WC.

Marks 5.1.9b N/A.

Step 12:

CRITICAL TASK SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Places REA-FN-1B and ROA-FN-1B to normal after stop.

The critical task of this step is to Mark N/A for REA-FN-1A and ROA-FN-1A.

Improper performance of this step could result in all fans secured.

Examiner Cue: Inform the candidate that the JPM is Complete STOP TIME:

Page 9 of 11

ILC-24 JPM S-4 R0 RESULTS OF JPM S-4 Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Examiner (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard: ROA-FN-1A and REA-FN-1A are running with ROA-FN-1B and REA-FN-1B Secured.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Examiner Signature: Date:

Page 10 of 11

ILC-24 JPM S-4 R0 STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

  • CGS is at 100% power and preparing for shut down for a maintenance outage window.

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initiating Cue:

The CRS has directed you to swap RB HVAC fans to ROA-FN-1A and REA-FN-1A Running and ROA-FN-1B and REA-FN-1B Secured for upcoming maintenance outage.

  • SOP-HVAC/RB-START is completed.
  • All FAZ signals are cleared and reset.

Page 11 of 11

JPM S-5 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE ILC-24 JPM S-5 RPS-MG-1 OC Trip - ABN-RPS Response (Alt Path)

LESSON LENGTH 0.4HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE Rev. No.

EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Jeff Lux DATE 12/10/20 REVISED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MAJOR REVISION RECORD Major Description Affected Rev of Revision Pages Number MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description of Revision Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Pages By Date Approval Number TASK STANDARD:

Alternate Path Time Critical TC Time: Validation Time:

X 9 Minutes TASK APPLICABILITY: RO X SRO X TASK NUMBER / TITLE(S): RO-0104 Respond to a loss of reactor protection.

K/A IMPORTANCE FACTORS: RO: 3.7 SRO: 3.9 K/A NUMBER: 212000 A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to K/A STATEMENT:

correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: RPS motor-generator set failure SAFETY 7 - Instrumentation FUNCTION:

EVALUATION In-Plant Sim X

Control Room Admin TYPE:

Other - List:

Page 2 of 9

ILC-24 JPM S-5 R0 JPM SETUP Special Setup Instructions:

Use barriers to segregate front panel from back panels. Multiple candidates will be performing JPMs simultaneously at front and back panels.

JPM Special Instructions:

See Simulator Operator Instructions Below Tools or Equipment:

Barriers to segregate front panels from back panels.

Safety Items:

No Special safety items are required.

PPM

Reference:

ABN-RPS Location:

Simulator Reset the Simulator to IC-101 Places the plant at 100% power. Load schedule file JPM S-4 S-5 ILC 2021.

Insert trigger 1 (causes the overcurrent trip of RPS-MG-A). Allow 1 minute Simulator for plant to stabilize, acknowledge all annunciators and turn off the Operator annunciators for panel that will not be monitored by the candidate(s) for this Instructions JPM set.

Load Schedule File: JPM Set 2 ILC 2021 Schedule File Page 3 of 9

ILC-24 JPM S-5 R0 STUDENT BRIEF In Simulator:

I will explain the initial conditions and state the task to be performed. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. When your task is given, you will repeat the task and I will acknowledge "That's Correct (OR "That's Incorrect", if applicable).

For this JPM all actions and monitoring will be performed from Control Room FRONT panels. Monitoring of any back panel indications is not required.

Initial Conditions:

  • CGS is at 100% power and preparing for shutdown for a maintenance outage window.
  • RPS-MG-1 has experienced an overcurrent trip. RPS-MG-1 is not available for restart.

Initiating Cue:

The CRS has directed you to take actions per ABN-RPS up to and including step 4.4. A different operator has been assigned to verify annunciators (attachment 7.1) per step 2.2.8 Page 4 of 9

ILC-24 JPM S-5 R0 START TIME:

STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Examiner Note: Provide the operator with a copy of ABN-RPS.

Examiner Note: All Steps below are directly from ABN-RPS exactly as written. Any red markups on the procedure step section indicates expected operator response.

Step 1: This step is ALTERANTE Path. EDR-V-20 Failed to automatically isolate, requiring manual operator action.

Standard:

Checks that all automatic actions (Below) have occurred. Finds EDR-V-20 did not automatically close, manually closes EDR-V-20. Hold the switch in the closed position and observes the red lamp is extinguished and the green lamp is on.

CRITICAL TASK SAT UNSAT N/A Page 5 of 9

ILC-24 JPM S-5 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 2:

SAT Standard: UNSAT Makes plant announcement to stop all maintenance and surveillance testing.

N/A Step 3:

CRITICAL TASK SAT Standard: UNSAT Throttles open RWCU-V-104. Observes both the red lamp and green lamp on for RWCU-V-104. N/A Step 4:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Reads notes and provides the proper place keeping.

Step 5:

CRITICAL TASK SAT UNSAT N/A Page 6 of 9

ILC-24 JPM S-5 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Standard:

Reads note and provides proper place keeping.

Verifies power is available by observing the Alternate feed white light is illuminated. Places the RPS power selector switch to the ALT A position.

Marks 4.4.1a.2) N/A - NOT repowering RPS-B. Performance of this step will result in a full reactor scram.

Step 6:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Marks this entire step as N/A. Per the initial conditions RPS-MG-1 is not available for restart.

Informs the CRS that EDR-V-20 was Manually closed and RPS A has been re-powered from the alternate power supply.

Examiner Cue: Inform the candidate that the JPM is Complete STOP TIME:

Page 7 of 9

ILC-24 JPM S-5 R0 RESULTS OF JPM S-5 Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Examiner (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard: EDR-V-20 has been manually closed and RPS A has been re-energized from the alternate power supply.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Examiner Signature: Date:

Page 8 of 9

ILC-24 JPM S-5 R0 STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

  • CGS is at 100% power and preparing for shut down for a maintenance outage window.
  • RPS-MG-1 has experienced an overcurrent trip. RPS-MG-1 is not available for restart.

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initiating Cue:

The CRS has directed you to perform the subsequent operator actions of ABN-RPS, Steps 4.1 through step 4.4. Inform the CRS when RPS A has been re-energized.

Page 9 of 9

JPM S-6 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE ILC-24 JPM S-6 Initiate RCIC per SOP-RCIC-INJECTION-QC LESSON LENGTH 0.4HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE Rev. No.

EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Jeff Lux DATE 12/10/20 REVISED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MAJOR REVISION RECORD Major Description Affected Rev of Revision Pages Number MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description of Revision Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Pages By Date Approval Number TASK STANDARD:

Alternate Path Time Critical TC Time: Validation Time:

X 4 Minutes TASK APPLICABILITY: RO X SRO X RO-0268 Manually initiate Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)

TASK NUMBER / TITLE(S):

system for RPV Injection (Using Arm and Depress)

K/A IMPORTANCE FACTORS: RO: 3.8 SRO: 3.7 K/A NUMBER: 217000 A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM (RCIC) ; and (b) based on those predictions, K/A STATEMENT:

use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: System initiation signal SAFETY 4 - Heat Removal from the core.

FUNCTION:

EVALUATION In-Plant Sim X

Control Room Admin TYPE:

Other - List:

Page 2 of 8

ILC-24 JPM S-6 R0 JPM SETUP Special Setup Instructions:

Use barriers to segregate front panel from back panels if multiple candidates will be performing JPMs simultaneously at front and back panels.

JPM Special Instructions:

See Simulator Operator Instructions Below Tools or Equipment:

Barriers to segregate front panels from back panels if required.

Safety Items:

No Special safety items are required.

PPM

Reference:

ABN-RPS (CGS OE CR359064 RCIC-V-46 Failed to operate in automatic)

Location:

Simulator Reset the Simulator to IC-201 Places the plant in a post scram condition with RFW pumps tripped. Reactor Simulator pressure does not allow for Condensate booster pump injection. Reactor water Operator level is outside the +13 to 54 band.

Instructions Load Schedule File: JPM S-6 S-7 ILC 2021 Schedule File Page 3 of 8

ILC-24 JPM S-6 R0 STUDENT BRIEF In Simulator:

I will explain the initial conditions and state the task to be performed. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. When your task is given, you will repeat the task and I will acknowledge "That's Correct (OR "That's Incorrect", if applicable).

For this JPM all actions and monitoring will be performed from Control Room FRONT panels. Monitoring of any back panel indications is not required.

Initial Conditions:

  • CGS is scrammed due to a reactor feedwater level control event that resulted in the trip of both Reactor Feedwater pumps. Reactor pressure does not allow for Condensate Booster pump injection.

Initiating Cue:

The CRS has directed manually initiate RCIC for level control +13 to +54. Inform the CRS when level when RCIC is in service.

Page 4 of 8

ILC-24 JPM S-6 R0 START TIME:

STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Examiner Note: Provide the candidate with a copy of a copy of SOP-RCIC-INJECTION-QC.

Examiner Note: All Steps below are directly from SOP-RCIC-INJECTION-QC exactly as written.

Any red markups on the procedure step section indicates expected operator response.

Step 1:

CRITICAL TASK SAT UNSAT Standard:

N/A Rotates the RCIC MANUAL INITIATION collar clockwise.

Operator acknowledges 4.601.A4 1-8 RCIC MAN INITIATION SWITCH ARMED Step 2:

CRITICAL TASK SAT Standard:

Operator depresses and hold the RCIC MANUAL INITIATION pushbutton while UNSAT monitoring for proper start of RCIC as indicated by increasing RPM and flow.

Operator monitors for proper valve response as indicated in step 3. N/A Step 3:

SAT UNSAT Standard:

N/A Operator may note that RCIC-V-46 Failed to automatically open. See step 4 for standard.

Step 4:

Operator verifies that all actuation have occurred as expected.

CRITICAL TASK SAT UNSAT N/A Page 5 of 8

ILC-24 JPM S-6 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Standard:

Operator verifies all actuations listed in the NOTE (above). Operator notes that RCIC-V-46 Failed to automatically open and manually open RCIC-V-46.

Acknowledges expected alarms for RCIC start 4.601.A4 3-7 RCIC PUMP DISCH FLOW LOW and 4.601.A4 1-7 RCIC LUBE OIL CLR WATER PRESS HIGH/LOW (CGS OE CR359064 RCIC-V-46 Failed to operate in automatic)

Step 5:

Level Control Standard:

Operator controls RCIC in automatic, level is trending to the +13 to +54 Band.

Operator may rotate RCIC-FIC-600 Thumbwheel to increase RCIC to 700gpm in SAT automatic. This is not a critical task as the initiation of RCIC with no leak in progress will provide for heat removal from the core and RPV level. UNSAT N/A Examiner Note: With RCIC Running with the current plant conditions, reactor water level will be trending up at approx. 3 per minute. The critical task is considered met once RCIC is operating correctly with RCIC-V-46 open and level trending towards the +13 to 54 band. It is NOT required for the operator to restore level to

+13.

Examiner Cue: Inform the candidate that the JPM is Complete STOP TIME:

Page 6 of 8

ILC-24 JPM S-6 R0 RESULTS OF JPM S-6 Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Examiner (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard: RCIC has been manually initiated for level control and RCIC-V-46 has been manually opened. Reactor Water level is trending towards the +13 to 54 band.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Examiner Signature: Date:

Page 7 of 8

ILC-24 JPM S-6 R0 STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

  • CGS is scrammed due to a reactor feedwater level control event that resulted in the trip of both Reactor Feedwater pumps. Reactor pressure does not allow for Condensate Booster pump injection.

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initiating Cue:

The CRS has directed you restore RPV level +13 to +54 using RCIC.

Inform the CRS when level has been restored and in band.

Page 8 of 8

JPM S-7 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE ILC-24 JPM S-7 Reactor Feed pump A Quick Restart LESSON LENGTH 0.4HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE Rev. No.

EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Jeff Lux DATE 12/10/20 REVISED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MAJOR REVISION RECORD Major Description Affected Rev of Revision Pages Number MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description of Revision Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Pages By Date Approval Number TASK STANDARD:

Alternate Path Time Critical TC Time: Validation Time:

X 8 Minutes TASK APPLICABILITY: RO X SRO X TASK NUMBER / TITLE(S): RO-0371 Start a Reactor Feedwater Pump.

K/A IMPORTANCE FACTORS: RO: 3.9 SRO: 3.7 K/A NUMBER: 259001 A4.02 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Manually K/A STATEMENT:

start/control an RFP/TDRFP SAFETY 2 - Reactor Water Inventory Control FUNCTION:

EVALUATION In-Plant Sim X

Control Room Admin TYPE:

Other - List:

Page 2 of 9

ILC-24 JPM S-7 R0 JPM SETUP Special Setup Instructions:

Use barriers to segregate front panel from back panels. Multiple candidates will be performing JPMs simultaneously at front and back panels.

JPM Special Instructions:

See Simulator Operator Instructions Below Tools or Equipment:

Barriers to segregate front panels from back panels.

Safety Items:

No Special safety items are required.

PPM

Reference:

SOP-RFT-RESTART-QC Location:

Simulator Reset the Simulator to IC-201.

Places the plant in a post scram condition with RFW pumps tripped. Reactor pressure does not allow for Condensate booster pump injection. Reactor water level is outside the +13 to 54 band.

Simulator Operator Acknowledge all annunciators on front panels. Turn off all annunciators for Instructions panels that will not be monitored by the candidate(s) during the performance of this JPM set.

Load Schedule File: JPM S-6 S-7 ILC 2021 Schedule File Page 3 of 9

ILC-24 JPM S-7 R0 STUDENT BRIEF In Simulator:

I will explain the initial conditions and state the task to be performed. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. When your task is given, you will repeat the task and I will acknowledge "That's Correct (OR "That's Incorrect", if applicable).

For this JPM all actions and monitoring will be performed from Control Room FRONT panels. Monitoring of any back panel indications is not required.

Initial Conditions:

  • CGS is scrammed due to a reactor feedwater level control event that resulted in the trip of both Reactor Feedwater pumps.
  • The Cause of the Reactor Feedwater Pump trips has been found and corrected.

Initiating Cue:

The CRS has directed you to perform a quick restart of RFW-P-1A (Reactor Feedwater Pump 1A) using SOP-RFT-RESTART-QC.

Another Operator will transfer RPV Control per SOP-RFW-FCV-QC after you have completed restart of the RFW pump.

Inform the CRS when RFW-P-1A pump speed is GT 800 RPM and has been transferred to MDEM.

Page 4 of 9

ILC-24 JPM S-7 R0 START TIME:

STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Examiner Note: Provide the Operator with a copy of SOP-RFT-RESTART-QC.

Examiner Note: All Steps below are directly from SOP-RFT-RESTART-QC exactly as written.

Any red markups on the procedure step section indicates expected operator response.

Step 1:

Standard:

Observes Green light is OFF and Red light is ON for the following valves on H13-P601:

SAT

  • MS-V-22A
  • MS-V-22B UNSAT
  • MS-V-22C N/A
  • MS-V-22D
  • MS-V-28A
  • MS-V-28B
  • MS-V-28C
  • MS-V-28D Step 2:

SAT Standard:

Verifies lights are extinguished on H13-P603 Apron for Reactor Vessel High Level UNSAT Seal Ins.

N/A Step 3:

SAT Standard:

UNSAT Observes MDVP already selected (yellow button) on RFT-COMP-1 or RFT-COMP-2 on H13-P840. N/A Observes RFW-P-1A Output as zero percent (0%) on RFT-COMP-1 or RFT-COMP-2 on H13-P840.

Page 5 of 9

ILC-24 JPM S-7 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Examiner Note: ANNUNCIATORS P840.A1 1-1 (TURBINE A TRIP) & 3-1 (TURBINE A TEST HEADER PRESSURE LOW) CLEAR WHEN RFW TURBINE A IS RESET.

Reset results in the high pressure and low pressure stop valves opening. The low CRITICAL pressure stop valve will momentarily have both the red lamp and green lamp TASK extinguished until it is fully open.

Step 4: SAT UNSAT Standard: N/A Turns RFW-DT-1A Emerg Trip/Reset switch CW from NORM to RESET (clicks into position).

Step 5:

SAT Standard:

UNSAT Observes High Pressure stop valve (MS-V-172A) Red light ON and Green light OFF. N/A Observes Low Pressure stop valve (BS-V-60A) Red light ON and Green light OFF

(~30 seconds later).

Step 6:

SAT UNSAT Standard:

Turns RFW-DT-1A Emerg Trip/Reset switch CCW from RESET to NORM (clicks N/A into position).

Step 7: CRITICAL TASK Standard: SAT Momentarily turns switch for RFW-V-112A CCW from NORM to CLOSE. UNSAT Momentarily turns switch for RFW-V-112B CCW from NORM to CLOSE.

[Observes Green light ON and Red light OFF for RFW-V-112A & B.] N/A Step 8:

CRITICAL TASK SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Page 6 of 9

ILC-24 JPM S-7 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Periodically depresses the UP ARROW () button on RFT-COMP-1 or RFT-COMP-2 [may use with FAST] to raise speed to GT 800 RPM.

[Observes % Output rising.] [Observes Speed Setpoint and Actual Speed (RPM) rising.]

Step 9:

CRITICAL TASK Standard:

[Observes RFW-P-1A speed GT 800 RPM.] SAT Depresses the MDEM button on RFT-COMP-1 or RFT-COMP-2 UNSAT Depresses the Yes pushbutton.

N/A Informs the CRS that RFW-P-1A speed is GT 800 RPM and is placed in MDEM Examiner Cue: Inform the candidate that the JPM is Complete STOP TIME:

Page 7 of 9

ILC-24 JPM S-7 R0 RESULTS OF JPM S-7 Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Examiner (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard: RFW-P-1A is reset with speed GT 800 RPM and operating in MDEM Mode. RFW-V-112A and RFW-V-112B are closed.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Examiner Signature: Date:

Page 8 of 9

ILC-24 JPM S-7 R0 STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

  • CGS is scrammed due to a reactor feedwater level control event that resulted in the trip of both Reactor Feedwater pumps.
  • The Cause of the Reactor Feedwater Pump trips has been found and corrected.

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initiating Cue:

The CRS has directed you to perform a quick restart of RFW-P-1A (Reactor Feedwater Pump 1A) using SOP-RFT-RESTART-QC.

Another Operator will transfer RPV Control per SOP-RFW-FCV-QC after you have completed restart of the RFW pump.

Inform the CRS when RFW-P-1A pump speed is GT 800RPM and has been transferred to MDEM.

Page 9 of 9

JPM S-8 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE ILC-24 JPM S-8 Swap CRD pumps per SOP-CRD-PUMPS LESSON LENGTH 0.4HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE Rev. No.

EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Jeff Lux DATE 12/10/20 REVISED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MAJOR REVISION RECORD Major Description Affected Rev of Revision Pages Number MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description of Revision Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Pages By Date Approval Number TASK STANDARD:

Alternate Path Time Critical TC Time: Validation Time:

X 9 Minutes TASK APPLICABILITY: RO X SRO X TASK NUMBER / TITLE(S): RO-0659 Shift CRD Pumps.

K/A IMPORTANCE FACTORS: RO: 3.1 SRO: 3.1 K/A NUMBER: 201001 A4.01 K/A STATEMENT: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: CRD Pumps SAFETY 1 - Reactivity Control FUNCTION:

EVALUATION In-Plant Sim X

Control Room Admin TYPE:

Other - List:

Page 2 of 9

ILC-24 JPM S-8 R0 JPM SETUP Special Setup Instructions:

Use barriers to segregate front panel from back panels if multiple candidates will be performing JPMs simultaneously at front and back panels.

JPM Special Instructions:

See Simulator Operator Instructions Below Tools or Equipment:

Barriers to segregate front panels from back panels if required.

Safety Items:

No Special safety items are required.

PPM

Reference:

SOP-CRD-PUMPS with Pre-requisites signed off and P&Ls circle slashed.

Location:

Simulator Reset the Simulator to IC-101 Simulator Places the plant at 100% power. No equipment out of service.

Operator Instructions Load Schedule File: None Required Schedule File Page 3 of 9

ILC-24 JPM S-8 R0 STUDENT BRIEF In Simulator:

I will explain the initial conditions and state the task to be performed. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. When your task is given, you will repeat the task and I will acknowledge "That's Correct (OR "That's Incorrect", if applicable).

Initial Conditions:

  • CGS is at 100% power.

Initiating Cue:

  • The CRS has directed you to swap CRD pumps to CRD-P-1B running and CRD-P-1A secured per SOP-CRD-PUMPS. Precautions and limitations have been reviewed.

An equipment operator in the field has verified:

  • CRD-P-1B Oil bottle is full.
  • CRD-P1B gear unit bullseye is full.
  • RCC Is lined up to supply CRD pumps per SOP-RCC-START
  • All personnel are clear of CRD pump area.

Page 4 of 9

ILC-24 JPM S-8 R0 START TIME:

STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Examiner Note: Provide the operator with SOP-CRD-PUMPS section 5.1 with pre-requisites signed off and P&Ls circle slashed.

Examiner Note: All Steps below are directly from SOP-CRD-PUMPS exactly as written. Any red markups on the procedure step section indicates expected operator response. All manipulations will be performed at H13-P603 Step 1:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Reads the notes and provides proper place keeping.

Step 2:

SAT UNSAT Standard:

Per the initial conditions the equipment operator has already performed this step. N/A Step 3:

SAT UNSAT Standard:

Per the initial conditions the equipment operator has already performed this step. N/A Step 4: CRITICAL TASK Standard: SAT Places CRD-FC-600 in manual by moving the CRD-FC-600 auto/manual switch to UNSAT the left.

N/A Page 5 of 9

ILC-24 JPM S-8 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 6:

SAT UNSAT Standard:

Reads the notes and provides proper place keeping. Flags the expected N/A annunciators and makes an announcement for the start of CRD-P-1B to the effect of Starting CRD-P-1B, All personnel stand clear CRD pump area and 487 Vital island SM-8 Switchgear Step 9:

CRITICAL TASK Standard: SAT Starts CRD-P-1B by taking the control switch clockwise start (Spring return to UNSAT auto). Operator verifies proper running amps for CRD-P-1B (Approx. 30amps).

Verifies Red running lamp is illuminated and green lamp is extinguished. N/A Step 10: CRITICAL TASK Standard: SAT Stop CRD-P-1A by taking the control switch to stop (spring return to auto). Verifies UNSAT red running lamp extinguished and green lamp is illuminated.

N/A Step 11:

SAT Standard: UNSAT Nulls the controller by using the CRD-FC-600 thumbwheel to match the automatic signal to the manual signal. N/A Step 12: CRITICAL TASK Standard: SAT Takes the controller to automatic by moving the CRD-FC-600 auto/manual switch UNSAT to the right.

N/A Page 6 of 9

ILC-24 JPM S-8 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 13: CRITICAL TASK SAT Standard: UNSAT Slowly open CRD-V-3 in increments to establish 255-265 psid as indicated on CRD-PI-602. N/A Examiner Cue: Inform the candidate that the JPM is Complete STOP TIME:

Page 7 of 9

ILC-24 JPM S-8 R0 RESULTS OF JPM S-8 Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Examiner (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard: CRD-P-1B is running with CRD-P-1A secured. Drive water pressure has been adjusted to 255 - 265 psid on CRD-DPI-602.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Examiner Signature: Date:

Page 8 of 9

ILC-24 JPM S-8 R0 STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

  • CGS is at 100% power.

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initiating Cue:

The CRS has directed you to swap CRD pumps to CRD-P-1B running and CRD-P-1A secured per SOP-CRD-PUMPS. Precautions and limitations have been reviewed.

An equipment operator in the field has verified:

  • CRD-P-1B Oil bottle is full.
  • CRD-P1B gear unit bullseye is full.
  • RCC Is lined up to supply CRD pumps per SOP-RCC-START
  • All personnel are clear of CRD pump area.

Page 9 of 9

JPM P-1 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE ILC-24 JPM P-1 A SW Pump Start from ARSD Panel LESSON LENGTH 0.4HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE Rev. No.

EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Jeff Lux DATE REVISED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MAJOR REVISION RECORD Major Description Affected Rev of Revision Pages Number MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description of Revision Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Pages By Date Approval Number TASK STANDARD:

Alternate Path Time Critical TC Time: Validation Time:

8 Minutes TASK APPLICABILITY: RO X SRO X TASK NUMBER / TITLE(S): RO-1057 Perform all actions for a control room evacuation.

K/A IMPORTANCE FACTORS: RO: 4.2 SRO: 4.3 K/A NUMBER: 295016 A1.07 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to CONTROL K/A STATEMENT:

ROOM ABANDONMENT: Control room / LOCA control transfer mechanisms.

SAFETY 4 - Heat removal from the core.

FUNCTION:

EVALUATION In-Plant X Sim Control Room Admin TYPE: Other - List:

Page 2 of 11

ILC-24 JPM P-1 R0 JPM SETUP Special Setup Instructions:

Bring proper PPE for plant entry.

JPM Special Instructions:

None.

Tools or Equipment:

None.

Safety Items:

PPE For normal plant entry.

PPM

Reference:

ABN-CR-EVAC Location:

In Plant Page 3 of 11

ILC-24 JPM P-1 R0 STUDENT BRIEF In Plant:

I will explain the initial conditions and state the task to be performed. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. When your task is given, you will repeat the task and I will acknowledge "That's Correct (OR "That's Incorrect", if applicable).

For this JPM all actions will be SIMULATED.

Initial Conditions:

  • An evacuation of the Main Control Room has been entered due to a fire.
  • SW-P-1A must be started from the Alternate Remote Shutdown Panel to supply cooling water necessary for shutdown and heat removal from the plant.
  • RHR-P-2As discharge pressure is GT 75 psig
  • It has been verified that SW-P-1A is NOT operating at this time.
  • ABN-CR-EVAC Attachments 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, 7.6, 7.7, 7.8, 7.9, 7.10 and 7.20 have ALREADY been completed.

Initiating Cue:

The CRS has directed you to start SW-P-1A from the Alternate Remote Shutdown Panel using ABN-CR-EVAC Attachment 7.13. Control manipulations will NOT be performed. All actions and steps will be SIMULATED.

Page 4 of 11

ILC-24 JPM P-1 R0 START TIME:

STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Examiner Note: Provide the candidate with a copy of ABN-CR-EVAC Attachment 7.13 Examiner Note: All Steps below are directly from ABN-CR-EVAC exactly as written. Any red markups on the procedure step section indicates expected operator response.

Step 1:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Reads the caution and note, provides proper place keeping.

Step 2:

SAT Standard: UNSAT Verifies discharge pressure on SW-PI-32AR.

N/A Examiner Cue: When the operator locates and checks SW-PI-32AR.

Pressure is as indicated Step 3:

SAT Standard: UNSAT Per the initial conditions and with discharge pressure indicating downscale, N/A operator determines SW-P-1A is not already running and marks this step N/A.

Page 5 of 11

ILC-24 JPM P-1 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 4:

CRITICAL TASK SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Locates switches 46,56,57 and 58 and simulates turning the switches clockwise to the EMERG position.

Step 5:

SAT UNSAT Standard:

Examiner Cue: When the operator locates the indications for SW-V-2A. N/A Green lamp is ON; Red lamp is OFF for SW-V-2A Based on those indications the operator determines SW-V-2A is closed. Marks this step N/A.

Step 6:

CRITICAL TASK Standard:

Simulates taking the control switch for SW-P-1A to start. SAT Examiner Note: The pump does not start until SW-V-12A indicates intermediate. UNSAT Examiner Cue: After the control switch is taken to start N/A Green lamp is ON; Red lamp is OFF for SW-P-1A Page 6 of 11

ILC-24 JPM P-1 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 7:

CRITICAL TASK Standard: SAT Operator simulates taking the control switch for SW-V-12A. Verbalizes expected response of SW-P-1A starts after SW-V-12A indicates intermediate. UNSAT N/A Examiner Cue: 10 seconds after the operator simulates opening SW-V-12A.

The red lamp and green lamp are both ON for SW-V-12A Step 8:

SAT When the Operator Verifies the indications for SW-P-1A Examiner Cue: Green lamp is OFF; Red lamp is ON for SW-P-1A UNSAT Standard:

N/A Operator verifies the indicating lights for SW-P-1A. Based on the indications provided SW-P-1A is running.

Step 9:

CRITICAL TASK Standard: SAT Operator simulates placing the control switch for SW-V-2A to the OPEN position.

UNSAT Examiner Cue: If the operator requests the status of the indicating lights or SW-V-2A N/A The red lamp and green lamp are both ON for SW-V-2A Step 10:

Standard: SAT Examiner Note: The normal stroke time for SW-V-2A is approximately 2 minutes total. The valve opens for 14 seconds, holds for 48 seconds and then fully opens. UNSAT The examiner may use simulated time compression for this step.

Examiner Cue: The red lamp is ON and green lamp is OFF for SW-V-2A N/A Based on the provided indications, the operator verifies that SW-V-2A is fully open.

Page 7 of 11

ILC-24 JPM P-1 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 11:

Standard: SAT Operator simulates verification of adequate pressure. After the operator locates the correct indication (SW-PI-32AR). Then: UNSAT Examiner Note: If the examiner desires to explore the depths of the operators knowledge, they may ask What would you expect pressure to be? N/A OR Examiner Cue: SW-PI-32AR Indicates 220 psig Examiner Cue: Inform the candidate that the JPM is Complete STOP TIME:

Page 8 of 11

ILC-24 JPM P-1 R0 RESULTS OF JPM P-1 Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Examiner (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard: The start of SW-P-1A from the Alternate Remote Shutdown panel has been completed (simulated).

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Examiner Signature: Date:

Page 9 of 11

ILC-24 JPM P-1 R0 STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

  • An evacuation of the Main Control Room has been entered due to a fire.
  • SW-P-1A must be started from the Alternate Remote Shutdown Panel to supply cooling water necessary for shutdown and heat removal from the plant.
  • RHR-P-2As discharge pressure is GT 75 psig
  • It has been verified that SW-P-1A is NOT operating at this time.
  • ABN-CR-EVAC Attachments 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, 7.6, 7.7, 7.8, 7.9, 7.10 and 7.20 have ALREADY been completed.

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initiating Cue:

The CRS has directed you to start SW-P-1A from the Alternate Remote Shutdown Panel using ABN-CR-EVAC Attachment 7.13. Control manipulations will NOT be performed. All actions and steps will be SIMULATED.

Page 10 of 11

ILC-24 JPM P-1 R0 Page 11 of 11

JPM P-2 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE ILC-24 JPM P-2 Shift CRD Flow Control Valves LESSON LENGTH 0.4HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE Rev. No.

EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Jeff Lux DATE REVISED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MAJOR REVISION RECORD Major Description Affected Rev of Revision Pages Number MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description of Revision Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Pages By Date Approval Number TASK STANDARD:

Alternate Path Time Critical TC Time: Validation Time:

10 Minutes TASK APPLICABILITY: RO X SRO X TASK NUMBER / TITLE(S): EO-2120 Shift CRD flow control valves.

K/A IMPORTANCE FACTORS: RO: 2.9 SRO: 2.8 K/A NUMBER: 201001 A4.03 Ability to operate and/or monitor in the control room: CRD System Flow control K/A STATEMENT:

Valve.

SAFETY 1 - Reactivity Control FUNCTION:

EVALUATION In-Plant X Sim Control Room Admin TYPE: Other - List:

Page 2 of 12

ILC-24 JPM P-2 R0 JPM SETUP Special Setup Instructions:

Bring proper PPE for plant entry.

JPM Special Instructions:

None.

Tools or Equipment:

None.

Safety Items:

PPE For normal plant entry.

PPM

Reference:

SOP-CRD-VALVES Location:

In Plant Page 3 of 12

ILC-24 JPM P-2 R0 STUDENT BRIEF In Plant:

I will explain the initial conditions and state the task to be performed. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. When your task is given, you will repeat the task and I will acknowledge "That's Correct (OR "That's Incorrect", if applicable).

For this JPM all actions will be SIMULATED.

Initial Conditions:

  • While performing PPM 5.5.11, it was determined that CRD-FCV-2B was inoperable. CRD Flow Control Valves have to be swapped to CRD-FCV-2A being in-service to continue in PPM 5.5.11.
  • Control Rod Drive System is in operation per SOP-CRD-START Initiating Cue:

The CRS has directed you to shift the in-service CRD flow control valve to CRD-FCV-2A per SOP-CRD-VALVES Section 5.4. Inform the CRS when CRD-FCV-2A is in automatic operation and CRD-FCV-2B has been removed from service. The performance of this JPM will be simulated.

Control manipulations will not be performed.

Page 4 of 12

ILC-24 JPM P-2 R0 START TIME:

STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Examiner Note: Provide the candidate with a copy of SOP-CRD-VALVES section 5.4 Examiner Note: All Steps below are directly from SOP-CRD-VALVES exactly as written. Any red markups on the procedure step section indicates expected operator response.

Step 1:

SAT UNSAT Standard:

N/A Indicates that a radio or local phone would be used to establish communication with the main control room.

Step 2:

SAT UNSAT Standard:

Simulates turning CRD-V-46A in the closed direction to verify position. N/A Step 3:

SAT Standard: UNSAT Observes CRD-M/A-9A in Manual.

N/A Examiner Cue: After the candidate verifies the correct position CRD-M/A-9A is in manual Step 4:

SAT Standard: UNSAT Simulates turning CRD-M/A-9A Variable Control Knob in the full counter-clockwise direction. N/A Examiner If candidate is simulating turning control knob in correct direction Examiner Cue: CRD-M/A-9A output is 0%

Page 5 of 12

ILC-24 JPM P-2 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 5:

CRITICAL TASK Standard:

While in communication with the control room, simulates slowly rotating CRD-M/A- SAT 9A variable control knob until CRD-FCV-2A (Flow Control) open light on H13-P603 is illuminated. UNSAT Acknowledges the note.

N/A Examiner: If candidate is simulating turning control knob in correct direction Examiner Cue: CRD-FCV-2A open light is illuminated on H13-P603 Step 6:

CRITICAL TASK Standard:

SAT Simulates slowly rotating CRD-M/A-9A variable control knob to 15% open.

UNSAT Examiner: If candidate is simulating turning control knob in correct direction, N/A Examiner Cue: CRD-M/A-9A indicates 15%

Step 7:

SAT Standard: UNSAT Asks the control room if the open light for CRD-FCV-2A is still illuminated.

N/A Examiner Cue: CRD-FCV-2A is still illuminated Step 8:

SAT UNSAT Standard:

Per the previous verification with the main control room. N/A Page 6 of 12

ILC-24 JPM P-2 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 9:

CRITICAL TASK Standard:

Simulates turning handwheel for CRD-V-46A in the open direction. SAT Examiner: If candidate is simulating turning valve in the counter clockwise UNSAT direction, then:

N/A Examiner Cue: The Stem is fully risen Step 10:

CRITICAL TASK Standard:

SAT Simulates turning handwheel for CRD-V-47A in the open direction.

Acknowledges and place keeps the caution for making adjustments in small UNSAT increments N/A Examiner: If candidate is simulating turning valve in the counter clockwise direction, then:

Examiner Cue: The Stem is fully risen Step 11:

SAT Standard:

Verbalizes intent to monitor CRD system flow on CRD-FI-19. UNSAT N/A Examiner: When candidate indicates that they are monitoring CRD-FI-19 Examiner Cue: CRD system flow is as indicated.

Page 7 of 12

ILC-24 JPM P-2 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 12:

CRITICAL TASK Standard:

Simulates slowly rotating CRD-M/A-9A Variable control know to match the output SAT signal with the automatic signal.

UNSAT Examiner: If candidate is simulating turning control knob in correct direction, N/A Examiner Cue: CRD-M/A-9A signal are matched Step 13:

CRITICAL TASK Standard:

Simulates moving selector to AUTO SAT Examiner: If candidate is simulating swapping the controller in the correct UNSAT direction:

N/A Examiner Cue: As Indicated Step 14:

SAT Standard:

UNSAT Examiner: When the candidate checks the controller for matched output signals N/A Examiner Cue: CRD-M/A-9B signal are matched Step 15:

CRITICAL Standard: TASK Simulates moving selector to for CRD-M/A-9B to the man position SAT Examiner: If candidate is simulating swapping the controller in the correct UNSAT direction:

N/A Examiner Cue: As Indicated Page 8 of 12

ILC-24 JPM P-2 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 16:

SAT UNSAT Standard:

Candidate verbalizes that system flow would be monitored N/A Step 17:

CRITICAL Standard: TASK Simulates slowly rotating CRD-M/A-9B variable control knob full counter-clockwise SAT Examiner: If candidate is simulating turning the control nob in the correct UNSAT direction:

Examiner Cue: CRD-M/A-9B output is as indicated, CRD-FCV-2A is N/A maintaining flow.

Step 18:

CRITICAL Standard: TASK Simulates turning the handwheel for CRD-V-47B in the closed direction SAT Examiner: If candidate is simulating turning the handwheel in the clockwise UNSAT direction N/A Examiner Cue: CRD-V-47B is as indicated Step 19:

CRITICAL TASK Standard:

Simulates turning the handwheel for CRD-V-46B in the closed direction SAT Examiner: If candidate is simulating turning the handwheel in the clockwise UNSAT direction N/A Examiner Cue: CRD-V-4B is as indicated Page 9 of 12

ILC-24 JPM P-2 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 20:

SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Verbalizes the control room would perform the next step or contacts the main control room.

Examiner Cue: Inform the candidate that the JPM is Complete STOP TIME:

Page 10 of 12

ILC-24 JPM P-2 R0 RESULTS OF JPM P-2 Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Examiner (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard: CRD-FCV-2A is operating in automatic (simulated) and CRD-FCV-2B has been removed from service (simulated) per SOP-CRD-VALVES.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Examiner Signature: Date:

Page 11 of 12

ILC-24 JPM P-2 R0 STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

  • While performing PPM 5.5.11, it was determined that CRD-FCV-2B was inoperable. CRD Flow Control Valves have to be swapped to CRD-FCV-2A being in-service to continue in PPM 5.5.11.
  • Control Rod Drive System is in operation per SOP-CRD-START STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initiating Cue:

The CRS has directed you to shift the in-service CRD flow control valve to CRD-FCV-2A per SOP-CRD-VALVES Section 5.4. Inform the CRS when CRD-FCV-2A is in automatic operation and CRD-FCV-2B has been removed from service. The performance of this JPM will be simulated. Control manipulations will not be performed.

Page 12 of 12

JPM P-3 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE ILC-24 JPM P-3 Trip DG-1 Using the Mechanical Overspeed LESSON LENGTH 0.4HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE Rev. No.

EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Jeff Lux DATE REVISED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MAJOR REVISION RECORD Major Description Affected Rev of Revision Pages Number MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description of Revision Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Pages By Date Approval Number TASK STANDARD:

Alternate Path Time Critical TC Time: Validation Time:

X 10 Minutes TASK APPLICABILITY: RO X SRO X TASK NUMBER / TITLE(S): EEO-2091 Trip DG-1 or DG-2 using the mechanical overspeed trip.

K/A IMPORTANCE FACTORS: RO: 3.7 SRO: 3.7 K/A NUMBER: 264000 A4.04 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Manual start, K/A STATEMENT:

loading and stopping of emergency diesel generator.

SAFETY 6 - Electrical FUNCTION:

EVALUATION In-Plant Sim X

Control Room Admin TYPE:

Other - List:

Page 2 of 12

ILC-24 JPM P-3 R0 JPM SETUP Special Setup Instructions:

Bring proper PPE for plant entry.

JPM Special Instructions:

None.

Tools or Equipment:

None.

Safety Items:

PPE For normal plant entry.

PPM

Reference:

ABN-CR-EVAC Location:

In Plant Page 3 of 12

ILC-24 JPM P-3 R0 STUDENT BRIEF In Plant:

I will explain the initial conditions and state the task to be performed. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this job performance measure will be satisfied. When your task is given, you will repeat the task and I will acknowledge "That's Correct (OR "That's Incorrect", if applicable).

For this JPM all actions will be SIMULATED.

Initial Conditions:

You have just completed a surveillance on Diesel Generator #1. While shutting down the Diesel Generator, it would not trip. The control room has been notified and the engineer is on the way to the #1 Diesel Generator Room.

Initiating Cue:

The CRS has directed you to trip Diesel Engine #1 using the Mechanical Overspeed Trip. Inform the CRS when DG #1 has been tripped.

The performance of this JPM is simulated.

Control manipulations will not be performed.

Page 4 of 12

ILC-24 JPM P-3 R0 START TIME:

STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Examiner Note: Provide the candidate with a copy of SOP-DG1-SHUTDOWN section 5.3.

Examiner Note: All Steps below are directly from SOP-DG1-SHUTDOWN exactly as written. Any red markups on the procedure step section indicates expected operator response.

Step 1:

CRITICAL TASK SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Acknowledges notes and provides proper place keeping.

Locates the mechanical overspeed trip mechanism on engine 1A2.

Step 2:

SAT UNSAT Standard:

Simulates pushing down on the overspeed trip limit switch and continues to hold it N/A in this position.

Page 5 of 12

ILC-24 JPM P-3 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 3:

Standard: SAT Simulates pushing/rotating the trip lever away from the solenoid trip mechanism in a clockwise rotation. UNSAT Examiner Cue: The Trip lever is NOT rotating away from the solenoid trip N/A mechanism.

Following the Examiner Cue the candidate may choose to not perform Steps 4-6 and continue with step 7 of this JPM based on the understanding that at this point it is clear that the over speed trip mechanism for Engine 1A2 will not work.

Page 6 of 12

ILC-24 JPM P-3 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 4:

SAT Standard:

Simulates releasing the reset lever, and ensures it rotates to the TRIPPED UNSAT position.

Examiner Cue: The Reset lever remains in the latched position. N/A Step 5:

SAT Standard:

UNSAT Verifies both engines have tripped.

N/A Examiner Cue: You can hear that both engines are running.

Page 7 of 12

ILC-24 JPM P-3 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 6: Candidate recognizes failure of engine 1A2 Trip mechanism. Candidate proceeds to engine 1A1 to trip the diesel using the alternate engine mechanical overspeed.

SAT Standard:

UNSAT Candidate goes back to step 5.3.1 for the alternate trip mechanism.

IF the candidate contacts the CRS for direction. ONLY repeat the initiating cue. N/A Examiner Cue: Trip Diesel Engine #1 using the Mechanical Overspeed Trip Step 7:

CRITICAL TASK SAT UNSAT N/A Standard:

Acknowledges notes and provides proper place keeping.

Locates the mechanical overspeed trip mechanism on engine 1A1.

Step 8:

CRITICAL TASK SAT Standard: UNSAT Simulates pushing down on the overspeed trip limit switch and continues to hold it in this position. N/A Page 8 of 12

ILC-24 JPM P-3 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 9:

CRITICAL TASK SAT Standard:

Simulates pushing/rotating the trip lever away from the solenoid trip mechanism in UNSAT a clockwise rotation.

N/A Examiner Cue: The Trip lever rotates clockwise away from the solenoid.

Step 10:

SAT Standard:

UNSAT Simulates releasing the reset lever, and ensures it rotates to the TRIPPED position. N/A Examiner Cue: The Reset lever rotates clockwise to the tripped position Page 9 of 12

ILC-24 JPM P-3 R0 STEP / STANDARD SAT /

UNSAT Step 11:

CRITICAL TASK Standard: SAT Verifies both engines have tripped.

UNSAT Examiner Cue: You can hear that both engines are coasting down.

N/A Step 12:

SAT UNSAT Standard: N/A Verifies both engines coast down and eventually stops rotating.

Examiner Cue: Both Engines have stopped rotating.

Examiner Cue: Inform the candidate that the JPM is Complete STOP TIME:

Page 10 of 12

ILC-24 JPM P-3 R0 RESULTS OF JPM P-3 Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Examiner (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard: DG-1 has been mechanically tripped per SOP-DGD1-SHUTDOWN.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Examiner Signature: Date:

Page 11 of 12

ILC-24 JPM P-3 R0 STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

You have just completed a surveillance on Diesel Generator #1. While shutting down the Diesel Generator, it would not trip. The control room has been notified and the engineer is on the way to the #1 Diesel Generator Room.

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initiating Cue:

The CRS has directed you to trip Diesel Engine #1 using the Mechanical Overspeed Trip. Inform the CRS when DG #1 has been tripped.

The performance of this JPM is simulated.

Control manipulations will not be performed.

Page 12 of 12

INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET SC-1 PROGRAM TITLE OPERATIONS TRAINING COURSE TITLE COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION SIMULATOR EXAMINATION Scenario begins with the crew lowering power to 90% for economic dispatch. Following the reactivity manipulation, the crew will experience a drifting rod. Crew will take actions of ABN-ROD LESSON TITLE and the SRO will evaluate TS. MS-LIS-200A will spuriously trip, SRO will evaluate TS. The plant will then experience a OBE earthquake resulting in loss of RPV instrumentation and a rupture in the RFW pump A oil system. Crew will manually trip RFP A. After the plant is stabilized an aftershock earthquake results in further loss of instrumentation and Core oscillations that should have caused an automatic scram (electric ATWS) Actions to initiate ARI will be successful.

Following the scram failure of RFW-V-118 will complicate level control, CB-S3 will fail to auto close and SW-V-2B will fail to automatically close on SW start. Final event is a OBE earthquake that causes a loss of all RPV level instrumentation which results in the crew performing core flood up to ensure adequate core cooling.

LENGTH OF LESSON 1.5 Hours Lesson Plan PQD Code Rev. No.

Simulator Guide PQD Code SC-1 Rev. No.

JPM PQD Code Rev. No.

Exam PQD Code Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Jeff Lux DATE 06/02/20 REVISED BY DATE VALIDATED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW DATE APPROVED DATE CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 1 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station Facility: Columbia Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: 1 Generating Station Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: Columbia is operating at 100% power.

Lower reactor power to 90% using Reactor Recirculation flow per PPM 3.2.6 (Power Maneuvering) after assuming the shift based on BPA Load Following request. Steps 5.1.1 thru 5.1.6 of PPM 3.2.6 Turnover:

are complete. Proper margin to Pre-Conditioned Status (PCS) exists per PPM 9.3.18. The Reactivity brief has been performed.

Critical Tasks:

A reactor scram should have occurred due to core oscillations. Crew takes actions to manually scram CT-1 the reactor per ABN-CORE With a loss of all Reactor Water Level Indication, Open 7 SRVs per PPM 5.1.4 to commence RPV CT-2 flooding within 25 Minutes of a loss of all RPV Level instrumentation (ABN-INSTRUMENTATION attachment 7.1 determination) with a minimum of one injection source lined up to inject to the RPV.

NOTE: An unintentional or unnecessary RPS or ESF actuation may result in the creation of a post-scenario Critical Task, if that actuation results in a significant plant degradation or significantly alters a mitigation strategy.

Event Trigger Event Type* Event Description No.

CRO1 lowers reactor power (for load following) using Reactor Recirculation (RRC)

R (SRO/ATC) flow to 90% per PPM 3.2.6 (Power Maneuvering). The BOP operator takes the 1 -

N (BOP) Main Turbine out of Governor Valve Optimization mode per SOP-MT-GV/OPTIMIZATION (Section 5.2) prior to the RRC flow reduction.

The crew receives a Rod Drift Alarm, ATC responds and takes immediate actions to continuous insert Rod 22-31. When the operator initially releases the continuous C (ATC) insert pushbutton the rod will start to drift back out of the core. After the rod is 2 2 TS (SRO) hydraulically isolated in the field it will remain full in. The SRO will evaluate TS and declare the rod inoperable.

LCO 3.1.3 C.1 and C.2 MS-LIS-200A will spurious trip bringing in alarms (no actual trip) for MSIV half trip and NS4 group 1 isolation on low reactor level. Crew will determine that that it is 3 3 TS (SRO) not valid based on plant indications, SRO evaluate TS for the failed instrument.

LCO 3.3.6.1 A1 - Place the channel in trip in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Operating Basis Earthquake causes instrument line failures, Crew enters ABN-4 4 EARTHQUAKE and ABN-INSTRUMENTATION and takes actions.

C (SRO / ATC) The previous OBE causes a leak in the RFP A turbine oil system. Crew enters 11 R (SRO / ATC) ABN-OIL for a large oil leak, and takes manual actions to trip of RFW-P-1A.

An aftershock earthquake results in further loss of RPV level instrumentation. The plant will experience core oscillations and should have automatically scrammed 5 5 M (ALL) but did not. (Electric ATWS). The crew takes actions to manually scram the reactor. CT-1. Initiation of ARI is successful to place the rods in the core. Crew Enters PPM 5.1.1 RPV Control.

6 - C (SRO/ATC) During the course of lining up on the startup flow control valves, RFW-V-118 will not open. This complicates RPV level control for ATC. RFW-V-109 can be CGS 2019 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 2 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station manually throttled to control level while controlling RFP speed in MDEM. ATC Can also use HPCS and RCIC as an alternative.

Following the scram, BOP will find that CB-S3 Failed to auto close. BOP takes 7 - C (BOP) manual actions to close CB-S3 and repower SL-31.

SW-P-1B Fails to auto start due to Failure of SW-V-2B to auto open. DG-3 Will be 8 - C (BOP) running with no service water. Manual opening of SW-V-2B will result in proper operation of SW-P-1B.

OBE Earthquake causes a complete loss of RPV Level instrumentation. Crew will 9 9 M (ALL) enter PPM 5.1.4 to open 7 SRVs and flood the core to the elevation of the main steam lines. CT-2

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications Target Quantitative Attributes Actual Description Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 3 RFW-V-118 Failure / CB-S3 FAC / SW-V-2B FAO ABN-ROD / ABN-EARTHQUAKE and ABN-Abnormal events (2-4) 3 INSTRUMENTATION / ABN-OIL Major transients (1-2) 2 Scram (Electric ATWS) / PPM 5.1.4 Core flood up EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 5.1.1 RPV Control Entry into a contingency EOP with substantive 1 5.1.4 RPV Floodind actions ( 1 per scenario set)

Pre-identified Critical tasks ( 2) 2 SEE CTs below CGS 2019 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 3 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station SCENARIO 1

SUMMARY

Event 1 The Scenario starts from 100% power. Once the crew has the shift, CRO1 lowers reactor power (for load following) using Reactor Recirculation (RRC) flow to 90% per PPM 3.2.6 (Power Maneuvering). The BOP operator takes the Main Turbine out of Governor Valve Optimization mode per SOP-MT-GV/OPTIMIZATION (Section 5.2) prior to the RRC flow reduction.

Normal Evolution, no triggers required.

Event 2 The crew receives a Rod Drift Alarm, ATC responds and takes immediate actions to continuous insert Rod 22-31. When the operator initially releases the continuous insert pushbutton the rod will start to drift back out of the core. After the rod is hydraulically isolated in the field it will remain full in. The SRO will evaluate TS and declare the rod inoperable.

LCO 3.1.3 C.1 and C.2 Insert the control rod within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and disarm the control rod within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

Trigger 2 Inserts MAL-RMC004-2231 (Rod 22-31 Drifts Out). Trigger 12 removes the malfunction allowing the Rod to remain in its current position.

Event 3 MS-LIS-200A will spurious trip bringing in alarms (no actual trip) for MSIV half trip and NS4 group 1 isolation on low reactor level. Crew will determine that that it is not valid based on plant indications, SRO evaluates TS for the failed instrument.

LCO 3.3.6.1 A1 - Place the channel in trip in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Trigger 3 Inserts BST-RRS124F to spurious trip for MS-LS-200A Event 4 The crew will experience a OBE earthquake which causes the failure of several instrument lines from the RPV. Crew will take actions of ABN-EARTHQUAKE. Through the performance of panel walkdowns and ABN-INSTRUMENTATION the crew will find that EFC-106 and EFC-109 Have closed resulting in a partial loss of main control room RPV level instrumentation Trigger 4 Inserts MAL-RRS007F, Instrument line break downstream of EFC-X109 and MAL-RRS007H, instrument line breaks downstream of EFC-X106. It also starts the oil leak on RFP-A via MAL-FPT003A that is described under event.

The previous OBE resulted is a weld failure on RFW-P-1A turbine oil reservoir. (Event is initiated on trigger 4). The crew will enter ABN-OIL, due to the size of the leak the crew will manually trip RFW-P-1A prior to reservoir level dropping below 6. Tripping the fed pump results in entry into the OPRM enabled region and entry into ABN-CORE, the SRO will also enter ABN-POWER for the unplanned power reduction. After evaluation of the 2-loop power to flow map, the crew will reduce rod line to below 100% to exit the area of increased awareness.

Trigger 11 MAL-FPT003A 25gpm oil leak on RFW-P-1A oil system.

CGS 2019 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 4 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station Event 5 Aftershock earthquake causes a further failure in instrument lines and loss of RPV level indication. The plant will experience core oscillations and should have automatically scrammed but failed to as a result of failed scram relays. The crew takes the mode switch to shut down and takes immediate actions per PPM 3.3.1 QC (Electric ATWS). (CT-1) Manual Initiation of ARI will be successful in inserting all control rods. SRO will further evaluate ABN-INSTRUMENTATION to track the availability of RPV level and pressure indications.

Trigger 5 Inserts MAL-SEIS004 OBE Earthquake and MAL-RRS005E Instrument Line break downstream of EFC-X107. Inserts 30% Core Oscillations.

Event 6 Following the scram report and immediate actions, the ATC operator will line up feedwater on the startup flow control valves. During the performance of SOP-RFW-FCV-QC RFW-V-118 will not open. This will complicate level control forcing the operator to use RFW-V-109 while adjusting RFW pump speed to control level or use RCIC and HPCS for level control.

Pre-Inserted Malfunction Inserts MOV-CFW048F for RFW-V-118 Fail as is and OVR-CFW022F to override RFW-V-118 to the closed position Event 7 Following the scram CB-S3 fails to automatically close. The BOP operator will take actions to manually re-power SM-3 and SL-31. SRO will evaluate ABN-ELEC-SM3/SM8. BOP will restart drywell cooling fans and direct the field operator to re-energize MC-8C and MC-8E.

Pre-Inserted Malfunction Inserts BKR-EPS051 CB-S3 Fails to auto close Event 8 Per ABN-ELEC-SM3/SM8 the BOP operator will verify the start of SW-P-1B (DG2 will be running). SW-P-1B will be running with low amps and low flow due to SW-V-2B failing to open. The operator will take manual actions and successfully open SW-V-2B to restore SW to the running diesel generator. (NOTE: This is not a critical task due to the diesel generator not being required to restore power to the bus for essential operation of low pressure ECCS umps.)

Pre-Inserted Malfunction Inserts MOV-SSW011F, SW-V-2B Fails to auto open.

Event 9 After the plant is stable following the scram, the crew will experience and after shock earthquake resulting in further failure of instrument lines from containment. The SRO will evaluate ABN-INSTRUMENTATION for the additional closure of excess flow check valves. Due to a complete loss of RPV level indications in the main control room, the SRO will enter PPM 5.1.4 RPV Flooding. (CT-2) The crew will open seven SRVs and flood the RPV to the elevation of the main steam lines to ensure adequate core cooling.

Trigger 9 Inserts MAL-SEIS001 Earthquake and also inserts MAL-RRS007G, MAL-RRS005F and MAL-RRS007E Instrument line breaks downstream of EFC-X112, EFC-X110 and EFC-X114.

TERMINATION CRITERIA:

The scenario will be terminated the crew has opened 7 SRVs with a minimum of one injection source lined up and injecting to the RPV as indicated by the flowrate of the selected pump.

CGS 2019 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 5 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station CT-1 Critical Task Statement:

With a reactor scram should have automatically occurred on core oscillations, take actions to manually scram the reactor per ABN-CORE.

Safety Significance:

If reactor power is elevated (above the APRM downscale trip setpoint) or cannot be determined, the core may be susceptible to large, irregular neutron flux oscillations.

Analyses of neutronic / thermal-hydraulic instabilities during failure-to-scram conditions have been performed. Instabilities are manifested by oscillations in reactor power which, if the reactor cannot be shutdown, may increase in magnitude. If the oscillations remain small or moderately sized, they tend to repeat on approximately a two second period. Under certain circumstances, however, the oscillations may continue to grow and become sufficiently large and irregular to cause localized fuel damage. The initiation and growth of these oscillations is principally dependent upon the subcooling at the core inlet: the greater the subcooling, the more likely oscillations will commence and increase in magnitude Initiating Cue:

Reactor scram should have occurred as indicated by both divisions NEUTRON MONITOR TRIP alarms in at P.603. And the presence of core oscillations as indicated by fluctuation on the period meters and the APRMs.

Measurable Performance Standard:

Manual actions taken inset control rods per ABN-CORE prior to the complete loss of instrumentation (inserted 23 minutes following the trigger that caused global core oscillations)

Justification: The critical task is bounded to the complete loss of instrumentation for the following reasons. From the time of initiation of the oscillations it takes about 3 minutes for both NEUTRON MONITORING TRIP alarms to come in, if the crew has not taken action with 20 minutes of these alarms, the core will have been allowed to oscillate for 20 minutes with the likely result of fuel damage (see safety significance above)

Performance Feedback:

Mode switch has been taken to shut down and ARI has been initiated resulting in all rods in the core prior to the complete loss of instrumentation.

CGS 2019 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 6 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station CT-2 Critical Task Statement:

With a loss of all Reactor Water Level Indication, Open 7 SRVs per PPM 5.1.4 to commence RPV flooding within 25 Minutes of a loss of all RPV Level instrumentation (ABN-INSTRUMENTATION attachment 7.1 determination)

Safety Significance:

Heat removal from the reactor must be sufficient to prevent rupturing the fuel clad. Four viable mechanisms of adequate core cooling exist. In order of preference they are:

  • Core Submergence (-161 in.)
  • Steam cooling with injection of makeup water to the RPV (-186 in.)
  • Steam cooling without injection of makeup water to the RPV (-198 in.)
  • Spray cooling with HPCS or LPCS injecting at equal to or greater than 6000gpm with RPV water level at or above 2/3 core height (-210 in.)

Per 5.0.10: If RPV water level cannot be determined, the actions specified in the subsequent steps (of PPM 5.1.1) cannot be performed since RPV level and level trend information is required for determining which actions to take. The transition to PPM 5.1.4, RPV Flooding, is necessary to assure continued adequate core cooling under conditions where RPV water level cannot be determined.

Uncovery to 1/3 core height can be sustained for 25 - 30 minutes without significant core damage. Uncovery below 1/3 core height for 10 to 20 minutes can foster clad temperatures around 2200 °F. Total uncover for about 4 minutes (immediately after shutdown) can probably be experienced without significant core damage.

Initiating Cue:

Loss of all Control room RPV Level Indication per ABN-INSTRUMENTATION attachment 1.

Measurable Performance Standard:

7 Safety Relief Valves (ADS preferred) manually opened with a minimum of one injection source lined up per PPM 5.1.4 RPV Flooding to commence core flood up within 25 minutes of the loss of all RPV level indication.

Performance Feedback:

7 Safety Relief valves are open with a minimum of one injection source lined up and injecting (As indicated by the flow meter associated with the injection source used) to the RPV per PPM 5.1.4 CGS 2019 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 7 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station EVENT No. 1:

AS BRIEFED OR WHEN DIRECTED (Following the crew taking the shift, starting at PPM 3.2.6 step 5.1.5)

==

Description:==

Lower reactor power with Reactor Recirculation (RRC) flow to 90% for load following per PPM 3.2.6 (which includes placing Main Turbine into Governor Valve Sequential Valve Mode).

Event is initiated by the turnover and starts with PPM 3.2.6 step 5.1.7.

Time Pos. Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: Power reduction may be considered complete following an observable reduction in reactor power.

The following steps are from PPM 3.2.6 (Power Maneuvering) which was previously completed (marked up) through step 5.1.5.

Per PPM 3.2.6 SRO Directs BOP Enter Sequential Valve operation per SOP-MT-GV/OPTIMIZATION SRO Performs SOP-MT-GV/OPTIMIZATION section 5.2 BOP CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 8 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station BOP Informs SRO DEH is in Sequential Valve Mode.

Continues with power reduction per PPM 3.2.6 SRO SRO May Direct BOP to monitor for feedwater heater alarms during transient Step 5.1.4 Directs to slowly reduce power to approximately 1000MWe, Per the crew turnover and the procedure notes above concerning target power level and rate, Directs ATC to lower power with flow to achieve 90% reactor power at a rate not to exceed 1% per minute per SOP-RRC-FLOW-QC Examiner Note: The BOP is expected to act as peer checker for this evolution.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 9 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Performs power reduction as directed using SOP-RRC-FLOW-QC ATC Gives a P/P/L Report CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 10 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station EVENT No. 2:

AS BRIEFED OR WHEN DIRECTED (Following reactor power change to 90%)

BOOTH OPERATOR - Activate TRIGGER 2

==

Description:==

Drifting Rod (22-31) - Rod will drift back out of the core when continuous insert button is initially released.

Time Pos. Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: For ease of use, this Simulator Guide only contains the applicable steps of the governing procedures which the crew is expected to perform within the time constraints of the scenario.

4.603.A7 5-7 ROD DRIFT Identifies the Control Rod that is drifting using PPC and/or RWM (ROD 22-31)

Takes immediate actions per ABN-ROD ATC ATC CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 11 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Directs Field Operator to Hydraulically Isolate Control Rod 22-31 per ABN-ROD BOP When contacted as OPS 2 to Hydraulically Isolate rod 22-31, Wait 90 seconds and:

BOOTH OPERATOR - Activate TRIGGER 12 (removes the Rod Drift Out malfunction, No other booth operator actions are required as the individual HCU valves are not modelled in the simulator)

BOOTH ROLEPLAY: Control Rod 22-31 is Hydraulically Isolated Per ABN-ROD ATC Upon Release, Monitors Rod 22-31 and Informs the SRO that the it remains fully inserted.

Examiner Note: Management expectation is to declare the control rod INOP (even though it is not considered INOP per Technical Specifications).

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 12 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Evaluates TS Technical Specification Action Statement:

LCO 3.1.3 C.1 - Insert control rod 22-31 within 3hours LCO 3.1.3 C.2 - Disarm control rod 22-31 HCU within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> SRO SRO Calls Production SRO and/or SNE for support.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 13 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station EVENT No. 3:

AS BRIEFED OR WHEN DIRECTED (Following the Actions of ABN-ROD and the SRO TS Call)

BOOTH OPERATOR - Activate TRIGGER 3

==

Description:==

Spurious Trip pf MS-LS-200A (SRO TS Call)

Time Pos. Applicants Actions or Behavior Acknowledges and evaluates annunciators 4.601.A12 2-4 NS4 GROUP 1 ISOLATION RPV LEVEL LOW -129 4.601.A12 2-1 MSIV HALF TRIP SYSTEM A BOP CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 14 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Informs SRO of RPS-RLY-K38A (MS-LIS-200A) Failure May refer to ABN-INSTRUMENTATION BOP May direct field operator to investigate MS-LT-61A located on P004, RB 522 NW If contacted as OPS 2 to Investigate MS-LT-61:

Wait 2 minutes and BOOTH ROLEPLAY: There is no obvious damage to MS-LT-61A Evaluates TS 3.3.6.1 Technical Specification Action Statement:

Enters LCO 3.3.6.1 A1 for Function 1A - Place the channel in trip in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

SRO Call Production SRO / WW Manager / Maintenance for support CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 15 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station EVENT No. 4 (Part 1):

AS BRIEFED OR WHEN DIRECTED (Following the SRO TS Call for MS-LIS-200A)

BOOTH OPERATOR - Activate TRIGGER 4

==

Description:==

OBE Earthquake and partial loss of main control room RPV level instrumentation.

Actions for ABN-EARTHQUAKE - Start this page Actions for ABN-INSTRUMENTATION - Start Page 18 Time Pos. Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: This section covers the associated actions of ABN-EARTHQUAKE which is performed Simultaneous with actions associated with ABN-INSTRUMENTATION (Located in the next section)

Responds to the OBE Earthquake felt in the main control room, acknowledges BOP 4.851.S1 2-5 MINIMUM SEISMIC EARTHQUAKE EXCEEDED and 4.851.S1 5-1 OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE EXCEEDED.

Enters ABN-EARTHQUAKE (Entry and action for ABN-INSTRUMENTATION are SRO covered in the next section)

Directs BOP to perform subsequent actions of ABN-EARTHQUAKE SRO Directs ATC and BOP to perform a panel walkdown Performs subsequent actions of ABN-EARTHQUAKE BOP CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 16 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station BOP When contacted as SAS, immediately:

BOOTH ROLEPLAY: The announcement for ABN-EARTHQUAKE will be repeated on the security channel.

Directs ATC and BOP to perform Panel walk downs per ABN-EARTHQUAKE May set key parameters for Drywell parameters below.

SRO Perform Panel Walkdowns. May report loss of Instrumentation due to the closure of ATC EFC-106 and 109.

BOP May set key parameters for Drywell as directed by SRO.

Continues with subsequent actions of ABN-EARTHQUAKE BOP Directs Field operators to inspect the fuel pool for damage (Step 4.11), Perform watch station plant walkdowns (Step 4.15), and Inspect the 115Kv and 230Kv lines from the plant to Ashe and Benton substations (Step 4.17.)

When contacted as Field Operator to inspect the fuel pool for damage, Wait 2 minutes and:

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 17 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station BOOTH ROLEPLAY: The Spent Fuel Pool has no apparent damage When contacted as Field Operator to Inspect the 115Kv and 230Kv lines from the plant to Ashe and Benton substations for damage, Wait 5 minutes and:

BOOTH ROLEPLAY: The 115Kv and 230Kv lines from the plant to Ashe and Benton substations have no apparent damage Examiner Note: This section covers the associated actions of ABN-INSTRUMENTATION which is performed Simultaneous with actions associated with ABN-EARTHQUAKE (Located in the previous section)

Enters ABN-INSTRUMENTATION SRO BOP 4.601.A2 4-4 RHR B/C INJECTION VLV OPEN PERMISSIVE 4.601.A3 3-3 LPCS INJECTION VLV OPEN PERMISSIVE 4.601.A4 4-3 RHR A INJECTION VLV OPEN PERMISSIVE May reference ABN-INSTRUMENTATION and report to SRO that alarms are symptoms of the closure of EFC-106 and EFC-109.

4.603.A8 1-7 RFW CONTROL SYSTEM TROUBLE ATC 4.603.A8 4-7 RFW/TURBINE RPC LEVEL HIGH TRIP CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 18 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Reports to CRS RFW-LI-606B is upscale and reactor Vessel High Level B Seal In SRO Refers to ABN-INSTRUMENTATION Attachment 7.1 (Below with annotation)

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 19 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station SRO Directs BOP/ATC to Flag all affected RPV level and pressure instruments.

Provides pier check of SRO performance of Attachment 7.1 (Above) Flags the ATC affected RPV Level and Pressure indications.

SRO Calls (any combination) for support: Production SRO / WW Manager / Maintenance Examiner Note: Due to the VAST amount of instruments affected by the closure of EFC-106 and EFC-109 and the time frame required to analyze this many tech spec entries (as seen below), it is not reasonably expected for the SRO to make the TS call in the time frame allotted in this sequence of events.

ONLY if it is desired by the lead evaluator to further evaluate the SRO on TS calls (2 TS call already made previously this scenario), this can be used as a SRO follow up TS question.

Technical Specification Actions:

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 20 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 21 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 22 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station EVENT No. 4 (Part 2):

AS BRIEFED OR WHEN DIRECTED (NOTE: It takes about 5 minutes to receive the first alarm after activating this trigger)

BOOTH OPERATOR activate Trigger 11.

==

Description:==

Oil leak on RFW-P-1A Turbine oil system. Requires manual operator action to trip RFW-P-1A per ABN-OIL.

Time Pos. Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR : 4 Minutes AFTER the activation of Trigger 4 4.840.A1 7-3 TURB A RESVR OIL LEVEL LOW ATC SRO Enters ABN-OIL, Sets a key parameter for TURB A Reservoir level If directed as Field Operator to Measure TO-TK-3A, Wait 3 Minutes and :

Report level after 3 minutes based on level indication on TO-LT-14A Located on the FPT03 Screen. (Right side of homepage under BOP system tabs.

Call X2171 As OPS 3 and BOOTH ROLEPLAY: RFP oil Reservoir Level is XXX inches The is a large amount of oil on the floor in the Reactor Feedwater Pump Room A. I have caution taped the area and placed oil absorbent pads to contain the oil within RFW Pump Room A CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 23 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Based on the Rate of oil loss, ATC May recommend to the SRO to Trip RFW-P-1A ATC at this time.

Sets a key parameter for RFW-P-1A Oil Reservoir level with action to manually trip SRO RFW-P-1A.

Enters ABN-OIL If directed as Field Operator to add oil (Via steps 5 and 6 above):

BOOTH ROLEPLAY: I Understand -Give verbatim repeat back of directions given-Examiner Note: Due to the rate of the leak, there is no possibility of the field operator taking actions with enough rigor to prevent the requirement to manually trip RFW-P-1A.

Per ABN-OIL SRO If directed as RWCR to take affected sump pumps to PLT (Via step 4.2 above): Wait 1 minute and:

BOOTH ROLEPLAY: The Affected sump pumps are in pull to lock NOTE: No trigger required for this action.

SRO Per ABN-OIL CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 24 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ATC When directed by SRO, Verifies proper operation of RFW-P-1B Continues with ABN-OIL SRO Manually trips RFW-P-1A Verifies proper runback of RRC pumps to 30Hz ATC Informs CRS of Entry into the OPRM trip Enabled Region (4.603.A7 3-7)

Evaluates 2 loop power to flow map. Gives evaluation to SRO (Hands over the quick card).

Enters ABN-POWER and ABN-CORE SRO Directs ATC to Monitor for Core Oscillations.

Per ABN-POWER step 4.1.8 SRO Per CRC Direction, Inserts Rods per the fast shutdown sequence to reduce rod line ATC less than 100%

Informs SRO when Rod Line is Below 100%

Examiner Note: Lead examiner can proceed to Trigger 5 at their digression. Steps below are included if it is desired by the lead examiner to see the performance of the remaining steps of ABN-OIL. This will not occur until the crew has stabilized the plant following the transient.

SRO Directs remaining steps of ABN-OIL CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 25 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Verifies MS-V-172A is Closed / Verifies BS-V-60A is Closed WHEN turbine 1st stage pressure is LT 10 psig, VERIFYs BS-V-44A; BS-V-45A ATC and MS-V-142A are open.

Verifies RFW-FCV-2A is closed ATC Directs filed operators per ABN-OIL BOP If directed as Field Operator to:

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 26 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station (If given all 3 directions at once, just wait 3 minutes and report all 3)

Verify the leak has stopped, Wait 3 Minutes and:

BOOTH ROLEPLAY: Report as OPS 3 It appears the leak has stopped, I cannot see further accumulation of oil on the floor If directed as Field Operator to: Secure RFW-P-breakers per attachment 7.1 or Verify RFW-P-1A is shutdown per SOP-RFT-SHUTDOWN.

BOOTH ROLEPLAY: I Understand -Give verbatim repeat back of directions given-Examiner Note: Steps 4.5.5 and 4.5.6 Above are not short evolutions, by the time this is reported as being completed the scenario should be completed.

Updates the crew, performs a brief.

SRO Calls (any combination) for support: Production SRO / WW Manager / Maintenance CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 27 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station EVENT No. 5:

AS BRIEFED OR WHEN DIRECTED (Plant is stable following manual trip pf RFW-P-1A)

BOOTH OPERATOR - Activate TRIGGER 5

==

Description:==

OBE Aftershock causes further loss of RPL Instrumentation. Automatic Scram does not work requiring the operator to manually scram the reactor (Electric ATWS) and take immediate actions per PPM 3.3.1. (ARI Works to insert all rods)

Time Pos. Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: CRITICAL TASK 1 Time Start: ____________ = Scram is required on core oscillations per ABN-CORE. (Automatic scram should have already occurred on both divisions neutron monitoring trip)

Time Stop: ____________= Manual scram initiated by the crew.

The critical task is considered met if the crew inserts a manual reactor scram prior to complete loss of instrumentation (trigger 10)

Examiner Note: Following the insertion of control rods using ARI, the plant will experience a level 8 trip. This is due the nature of the scenario and is no reflection of the crews ability to respond.

Acknowledges 4.603.A8 1-1 OPRM ALARM and 4.603.A7 OPRM TRIP (If the crew waits to scram the reactor per ABN-CORE, they will also receive 4.603.A7 and A8 ATC 3-3 NEUTRON MONITOR TRIP Recognizes that core oscillations exist (per ABN-CORE) and the scram should have automatically scrammed. Informs SRO Directs Manual scram of the reactor per ABN-CORE or based on an automatic scram should have already occurred.

SRO ATC Manually scrams the reactor.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 28 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Reports EOP entrys on Failure to Scram.

Continues with immediate actions.

ATC Reports to SRO that ARI was successful and all rods are in.

Enter PPM 5.1.1 RPV Control Simultaneously works through Level / Pressure / Power legs of PPM 5.1.1 RPV Control.

Directs BOP to verify +13 Actuations (L-1)

Verifies overrides in section L-2 of PPM 5.1.1 RPV Control SRO Directs ATC to Using HPCS and RCIC (MSIVs closed on level 8 trip and Condensate Booster pumps can not inject at the current pressure)

Directs BOP to control pressure (Per P-3) 800 psig to 1050 psig with SRVs May later elect to lower pressure band to 500-600# using SRVs to control level using Condensate Booster Pumps.

Directs ATC to perform PPM 3.3.1 Reactor Scram ATC Performs subsequent actions of PPM 3.3.1-QC CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 29 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Starts to transfer RPV Level control to RFW-FCV-10A/B (Full steps Listed below, ATC does not need to wait for SRO direction to begin this lineup.)

Sets a key parameter placard for level control Performs subsequent actions of PPM 3.3.1-QC BOP Verifies +13 Actuations Sets a key parameter placard for pressure control and controls pressure as directed. (Step 3.2.2 of PPM 3.3.1-QC)

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 30 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station EVENT No. 6:

PRE-INSERTED MALFUNCTION

Description:

RFW-V-118 Will not open.

This complicates RPV level control for ATC. RFW-V-109 can be manually throttled to control level while controlling RFP speed in MDEM. ATC will also use HPCS and RCIC for RPV level control.

Sets a key parameter placard for level control Performs SOP-RFW-FCV-QC to transfer RPV level control to RFW-FCV-10A/B ATC CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 31 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ATC uses RCIC to suppliment level control strategy per SOP-RCIC-INJECTION-QC ATC May use HPCS to suppliment level control strategy per SOP-HPCS-INJECTION-ATC QC CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 32 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Re-Performs board walkdowns (Due to OBE Earthquake Prior to Scram), Monitors containment parameters for change.

Recognizes closure of an additional excess flow check valve instrument line (EFC-107) and reports it to SRO.

BOP Re-Evaluates ABN-INSTRUMENTATION based on additional EFC-107 Closure SRO Directs ATC to Flag RFW-LI-606A Examiner Note: following the scram:

BOP response to electric plant (CB-S3 Malfunction) and ABN-ELEC-SM3/SM8 is covered under EVENT 8.

BOP response to SW-V-2B failure to auto open under EVENT 9 CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 33 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station EVENT No. 7:

BOOTH OPERATOR - Pre-Inserted malfunction

==

Description:==

CB-S3 Fails to automatically close; SM-8 is powered from TR-B and SL-31 is de-energized.

Time Pos. Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: Only the pertinent steps of ABN-ELEC-SM3/SM8 are listed below Responds to electric plant for annunciators not consistent with a normal reactor scram.

4.800.C5 2-3 BUS 8 LOSS OF VOLTAGE 4.800.C5 1-2 DG 2 AUTOSTART 4.800.C5 1-7 BKR 8-3 TRIP BOP 4.800.C3 2-4 BKR 3/31 TRIP Automatic Action that should have occurred - Manually Selects CB-S3 Sync Selector Switch to MAN. Takes CB-S3 breaker control switch to CLOSE. Verifies SM-3 is normal Voltage.

Reports to SRO: Manually closed CB-S3, SM-8 is being powered from TR-B Enters ABN-ELEC-SM3/SM8 Directs BOP to restore power to SL-31 per ABN-ELEC-SM3/SM8 SRO Re-Powers SL-31 from SM-3 (Dead Bus) per SOP-ELEC-480V-OPS-QC BOP CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 34 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS: May elect to re-energize SL-31 from SL-21 per SOP-ELEC-480V-OPS-QC BOP BOP Informs SRO SL-31 is re-energized.

Directs further actions of ABN-ELEC-SM3/SM8 SRO NOTE: This can also be directed from ABN-ELEC-SM3/SM8 Step 4.2.1 Directs Field Operator to close E-CB-81/8C and E-CB-83/8E BOP If directed as Field Operator to close E-CB-81/8C and E-CB-83/8E:

Wait 3 Minutes and:

BOOTH OPERATOR: INSERT TRIGGER 13 and Call MCR X2171 BOOTH ROLEPLAY: Report as OPS 2 E-CB-81/8C and E-CB-83/8E are closed Directs BOP to perform subsequent actions of ABN-ELEC-SM3/SM8 SRO BOP Re-Starts drywell cooling fans per SRO direction.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 35 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Per ABN-ELEC-SM3/SM8 SRO BOP SEE EVENT 8 (NEXT EVENT)

BOP EVENT No. 8:

BOOTH OPERATOR - Pre-Inserted Malfunction CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 36 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station

==

Description:==

SW-V-2B Fails to auto open Time Pos. Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: Event 9 can be performed by the crew at anytime following the scram and transfer of the electric plant to the startup transformer.

Per ABN-ELEC-SM3/SM8 BOP NOTE: BOP may have recognized this failure and attemped the following steps at anytime following the scram and electric plant response based on the auto start of DG2 and does not require direction from the SRO to do so.

Verifies Indications for SW-P-1B.

SW-P-1B Red Lamp illuminated.

SW-V-12B Indicated fully open.

SW-V-2B Indicated fully closed.

BOP SW-FI-9B Loop B Flow Indicator and SW-P-1B Motor Current both indicate low.

SW-PI-32B is downscale.

Recognizes SW-V-2B failed to open and Manually open SW-V-2B.

Reports to SRO that SW-V-2B opened manually.

SRO Annotates the failure of SW-V-2B to automatically open with the time of failure.

EVENT No. 9:

PRE-INSERTED- Trigger 9 Activates automatically 23 minutes after the initiation of trigger 5.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 37 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station

==

Description:==

Aftershock earthquake results in complete loss of Main Control Room level instrumentation (Per Attachment 1 of ABN-INSTRUMENTATION) Requiring the crew to perform PPM 5.1.4 RPV Flooding.

Examiner Note: Activation of TRIGGER 9 commences the start time for CRITICAL TASK 2 Time Pos. Applicants Actions or Behavior Acknowledges aftershock earthquake. 4.851.S1 2-5 MINIMUM SEISMIC EARTHQUAKE EXCEEDED.

Reports to SRO Closure of additional EFC Valves.

BOP Evaluates ABN-INSTRUMENTATION Attachment 1 for further loss of RPV Level indications.

SRO CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 38 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station SRO SRO Directs BOP / ATC To verify complete loss of RPV Level and Pressure Indications.

Perform Panel Walkdowns to Confirm ABN-INSTRUMENTATION Attachment 1 for ATC complete loss of Main Control Room level and pressure instrumentation.

BOP Informs SRO of confirmed loss of instrumentation SRO Updates the crew, provides a brief Evaluates Override of PPM 5.1.1 RPV Control located at both L-2 and P-1 SRO Enters PPM 5.1.4 RPV Flooding Evaluates overrides of PPM 5.1.4 SRO CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 39 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Directs BOP to mark WW Level in Feet (PPM 5.1.4)

SRO BOP Marks WW Level in feet Examiner Note: CRITICAL TASK 2 Time Start: ____________ = Loss of all RPV Level Instrumentation (Activation of Trigger 10)

Time Stop: ____________= 7 Safety Relief Valves open per PPM 5.1.4 RPV Flooding The critical task is considered met if any 7 safety relief valves are opened within 25 minutes of a loss of all RPV level instrumentation with one injection source lined up for injection (or Injecting)

SRO Directs BOP to open 7 SRVs BOP Opens 7 SRVs Directs ATC to Flood the RPV to the elevation of the main steam lines.

SRO Floods the RPV using table 11 systems.

ATC NOTE: HPCS; Condensate and RCIC are all available. Low pressure ECCS systems are not be required to flood to the elevation of the main steam lines.

SRO Continues evaluation of PPM 5.1.4 CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 40 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Continues down 2 or More Leg of the flow chart.

SRO Directs BOP to close MSIVs / MSL Drains and RCIC Isolation Valves, With HPCS and Condensate available RCIC is not required for injection.

NOTE: Due to having high pressure sources available, the SRO does NOT have to wait until flooded to the main steam lines to close the MSIVs Close MSIVs / MSL Drains and aquires keys from SM cabinet and closes RCIC BOP Isolation Valves Directs BOP to evaluate flooded to the main steam lines per table 12.

SRO TERMINATION CRITERIA: The scenario will be terminated the crew has opened 7 SRVs and lines up at least one injection source to the RPV OR as directed by the Examination Team.

Examiner Note: The steps below are provided if the lead examiner requires further evaluation of the crew. It can take up to 25 minutes for indications of flooding to the main steam lines to be verified based on the number of injection sources used for RPV flood up.

Evaluate flooded to main steam lines per table 12.

BOP Monitor Indications (Below)

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 41 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station When Indications above are seen, Informs the SRO that RPV is flooded to the level BOP of the Main Steam Lines.

SRO If not previously closed, Directs Closure of MSIVs, MSL Drains and RCIC Isolation SRO Valves.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 42 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Directs ATC to control injection into the RPV to maintain steam lines flooded with injection as low as practicable.

ATC Controls Injection Rate to the RPV as directed.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 43 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station SIMULATOR SETUP Unload simulator (between each scenario)

Verify in ILC load Load correct S/D Sequence (if necessary)

Reload simulator Reset to ILC Exam IC 127 (reset, go to Run, reset again)

Test EQ machine at correct volume for OBE event Load Schedule file SC-1 ILC 2021R1 Validate that there are no unexpected annunciators or parameters out of band Verify pump running magnets Verify normally removed keys REMOVED except for: NONE Flag the following: NONE Place clearance tag on: NONE Protect the following: NONE Have copy of PPM 3.2.6 with Steps 5.1.1 thru 5.1.5 initialed as completed.

CREW TURNOVER CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 44 of 45

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-1 (Rev 1 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Initial Conditions:

  • Columbia is operating at 100% power Shift Turnover:
  • Following shift turnover, lower power to 90% using Reactor Recirculation flow per PPM 3.2.6 (Power Maneuvering) based on BPA Load Following request
  • Steps 5.1.1 thru 5.1.6 of PPM 3.2.6 are complete
  • Proper margin to Pre-Conditioned Status (PCS) exists per PPM 9.3.18
  • The Reactivity brief has been performed CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Page 45 of 45

INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET SC-2 PROGRAM TITLE OPERATIONS TRAINING COURSE TITLE COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION SIMULATOR EXAMINATION Scenario begins with a swap of DEH pumps (Not Faulted). LPCS Ch A High Drywell pressure relay will fail causing a half trip of the logic. ABN-Instrumentation will be entered and the SRO will LESSON TITLE evaluate TS. MS-RV-1A will spurious open requiring the crew to down power to 90% per ABN-SRV. SRO will evaluate TS. Relief valve will close when fuses are removed. APRM-4 fails upscale, crew will diagnose and bypass APRM-4. No tech spec action is required. Crew will get reports from the field and annunciators for a fire in TR-B, Crew will take actions of ABN-FIRE and ABN-ELEC-GRID. Next event, DEH-P-1A will experience a winding overcurrent trip. DEH-P-1B Will not auto start and will not manually start. The SRO will enter ABN-DEH-LEAK and direct a manual scram of the reactor. The plant will experience a Hydraulic ATWS and fail to scram. SLC-P-1A will trip and SLC-P-1B will experience reduced flow. The crew will control reactor water level per PPM 5.1.2 and insert control rods per PPM 5.5.11.

LENGTH OF LESSON 1.5 Hours Lesson Plan PQD Code Rev. No.

Simulator Guide PQD Code SC-2 Rev. No.

JPM PQD Code Rev. No.

Exam PQD Code Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Jeff Lux DATE 06/29/20 REVISED BY DATE VALIDATED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW DATE APPROVED DATE CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 1 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station Facility: Columbia Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: 1 Generating Station Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: The reactor is at 100% Power.

The reactor is at 100% Power. Following turnover the crew is to shift DEH pumps per SOP-DEH-Turnover:

OPS.

Critical Tasks:

During ATWS with power > 5%, terminate and prevent injection with exception of SLC, RCIC, and CRD, into the RPV until RPV level is -65 inches to establish a Lowered Level (LL).

CT-1 -AND-Maintain RPV level above -186 inches. Short excursions below -186 inches does not constitute failure of CT provided level restored and maintained above -186 inches within 10 minutes of going below -186 inches.

With reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, commence inserting control rods per PPM 5.5.11 CT-2 Attachment 6.1 Tab B prior to transitioning to Tab E.

NOTE: An unintentional or unnecessary RPS or ESF actuation may result in the creation of a post-scenario Critical Task, if that actuation results in a significant plant degradation or significantly alters a mitigation strategy.

Event Trigger Event Type* Event Description No.

1 - N (BOP) BOP swaps DEH Pumps per SOP-DEH-OPS. DEH-P-1A is placed in service and DEH-P-1B is secured. This is a normal evolution and is not faulted.

I (BOP / SRO) LPCS relay K4 will trip and cause a 1/2 initiation of LPCS / RHR A initiation logic.

2 TRG-2 BOP refers the ARP and determines that the K4 relay has tripped. SRO evaluates TS (SRO) technical specifications.

C (ALL) MS-RV-1A Spurious Opening. SRO will take actions per ABN-SRV. ATC will lower power to LE 90%. When the control switch for MS-RV-1A is taken to off the SRV 3 TRG-3 R (SRO / ATC) will remain open. The SRO will direct BOP to remove the control power fused for TS (SRO) MS-RV-1A which will result in the closure of MS-RV-1A.

APRM-4 Fails upscale. ATC Verifies APRM-4 is faulted using the trip status 4 TRG-4 I (ATC / SRO) display on P603. BOP verifies the diagnosis on APRM chassis (Back Panels).

SRO Directs ATC to bypass APRM-4 and evaluates technical specifications.

C (BOP / SRO) Fire in TR-B / TR-B Lockout. Crew will take actions of ABN-FIRE and ABN-ELEC-5 TRG-5 TS (SRO) GRID. SRO Evaluates Tech Specs for the loss of TR-B DEH-P-1A will experience a winding overcurrent trip. DEH-P-1B Will not auto start and will not manually start. DEH Hydraulic pressure will degrade. The SRO will 6 TRG-6 M (ALL) enter ABN-DEH-LEAK and direct a manual scram of the reactor. The plant will experience a Hydraulic ATWS and fail to scram.

On scram the crew will experience a Hydraulic ATWS. SRO will enter PPM 5.1.2 RPV Control ATWS. ATC will take immediate actions for reactor power GT 5%,

SLC-P-1A will trip and SLC-P-1B will experience reduced flow. BOP will take manual control of HPCS and inhibit ADS. SRO will direct stop and prevent with 7 - M (ALL) exception of SLC, RCIC and CRD and intentionally lower level to below -65.

(Critical Task #1). ATC will control RPV level GT -186 using condensate and feed. Crew will perform PPM 5.5.11 to insert control rods. Control rod insertion will be successful by manually driving control rods. (Scram-Reset-Scram will not work)

(Critical Task #2)

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 2 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications Target Quantitative Attributes Actual Description Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 1 Hydraulic ATWS with Degraded SLC ABN-INSTRUMENTATION, ABN-SRV, ABN-FIRE / ABN-Abnormal events (2-4) 4 ELEC-GRID, ABN-DEH-LEAK Major transients (1-2) 2 Loss of DEH Scram, Hydraulic ATWS EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 PPM 5.1.2 RPC Control ATWS Entry into a contingency EOP with substantive Scenarios 1 and 3 Contain EOP contingencies for this 0

actions ( 1 per scenario set) scenario set Pre-identified Critical tasks ( 2) 2 See Critical Task Sheets.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 3 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station SCENARIO

SUMMARY

Event 1 BOP swaps DEH Pumps per SOP-DEH-OPS. DEH-P-1A is placed in service and DEH-P-1B is secured.

This is a normal evolution and is not faulted.

(NO TRIGGER REQUIRED)

Event 2 LPCS High Drywell Pressure CH A relay K4 trips. The Crew responds to LPCS / RHR A DRYWELL PRESS HIGH and references the ARP. The BOP investigates and finds LPCS-RLY-K2 relay on H13-P629 panel tripped. T SRO Evaluates Tech Specs for the tripped relay LCO 3.3.5.1 Condition A.1 - Enter Condition B immediately.

LCO 3.3.5.1 B.3 - Place channel in trip within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

LCS 1.3.5.3 Condition A.1 - Place channel in trip within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

(TRIGGER-2) Activates malfunction RLY-CSS03 to trip relay LPCS-RLY-K4.

Event 3 The crew will respond to MS-RV-1A Spurious opening, this results in the SRV open and Relief Valve Tailpipe Temp High annunciators. SRO will take actions per ABN-SRV. BOP will take the control switch to open and ATC will lower power to LE 90%. BOP will act as a pier checker for the reactivity manipulation.

When the control switch for MS-RV-1A is taken to off the SRV will remain open. The SRO will direct BOP to remove the control power fused for MS-RV-1A which will result in the closure of MS-RV-1A.

SRO Evaluates Tech Specs for the SRV; Wetwell Level and placing RHR in SPC.

LCO 3.6.2.2 Condition A.1 - Restore Suppression Pool level in 2 Hours LCO 3.5.1 Condition A.1 and LCO 3.6.1.5 Condition A.1 to restore RHR and RHR Drywell sprays in 7 days.

No LCO Entry is required for the failure of MS-RV-1A (TRIGGER-3) Activates OVR-RRS012D Causing MS-RV-1A to inadvertent open.

Event 4 APRM-4 Fails upscale. The crew responds to annunciators for Rod Out Block and APRM UPCS or INOP trip. ATC Verifies APRM-4 is faulted using the trip status display on P603. BOP verifies the diagnosis on APRM chassis (Back Panels). SRO Directs ATC to bypass APRM-4 and evaluates technical specifications. No LCO entry is required, only 3 APRM Channels are required operable.

(TRIGGER-4) Activates MAL-NIS006D - APRM-4 Fails High Event 5 The crew will receive a call from the field reporting dark black smoke from the transformer yard. Seconds later the crew will receive alarms for Fire and deluge activation on the Back Up Transformer. BOP will take immediate actions of ABN-FIRE. SRO Will enter and perform actions of ABN-FIRE and ABN-ELEC-GRID.

SRO Evaluates Tech Specs for the loss of TR-B LCO 3.8.1 Condition A.1 and A.3 for AC Sources Operating - Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for operable offsite circuit in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter and restore the off-site circuit to operable status in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 4 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station (TRIGGER-5) Activates ANN-FCP2E02B, ANN-FCP-2E02A, ANN-FCP2E02C, ANN-FCP3H05 and MAL-OED003 to simulate a fire in the oil circuit breaker of TR-B resulting in activation of the deluge system and lock out of TR-B.

Event 6 The previously started DEH-P-1A will experience a winding overcurrent trip. DEH-P-1B Will not auto start and will not manually start. DEH Hydraulic pressure will degrade. The SRO will enter ABN-DEH-LEAK and direct a manual scram of the reactor. The plant will experience a Hydraulic ATWS and fail to scram.

(TRIGGER-6) Activates MAL-DEH003G for overcurrent trip of DEH-P-1A, MAL-DEH015B for DEH-P-1B failure to auto start and OVR-DEH008D overriding DEH-P-1B to stop to ensure it can not be manually started. MAL-DEH002 is inserted to simulate check valve leak by causing DEH pressure to degrade with no pumps running.

Event 7 On manual scram the crew will experience a Hydraulic ATWS. SRO will enter PPM 5.1.1 RPC Control and transition to 5.1.2 RPV Control ATWS. ATC will take immediate actions for reactor power GT 5%,

SLC-P-1A will trip and SLC-P-1B will experience reduced flow. BOP will take manual control of HPCS and inhibit ADS. SRO will direct stop and prevent with exception of SLC, RCIC and CRD and intentionally lower level to below -65. (Critical Task #1). ATC will control RPV level GT -186 using condensate and feed (Critical Task #1). Crew will perform PPM 5.5.11 to insert control rods. A seconds CRD pump will be started and RPS trip signals will be overridden. Control rod insertion will be successful by manually driving control rods. (Scram-Reset-Scram will not work)

(PRE-INSERTED MALFUNCTIONS) MAL-CRD007B, MAL-CRD007A and LOA-CRD955to simulate SDV Blockage resulting in a hydraulic ATWS. MOV-RCI005F to fail the RCIC injection valve as is.

MOT-SLC001G and PMP-SLC002F which results in SLC A trip and reduced flow on SLC-P-1B. SLC is degraded to about 20gpm total.

TERMINATION CRITERIA:

The scenario will be terminated when Level has been restored and is being controlled in band -

140 to -80 and Control rods are being inserted manually per PPM 5.5.11.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 5 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station CT-1 Critical Task Statement:

During ATWS with power > 5%, terminate and prevent injection with exception of SLC, RCIC, and CRD, into the RPV until RPV level is -65 inches to establish a Lowered Level (LL).

-AND-Maintain RPV level above -186 inches. Short excursions below -186 inches does not constitute failure of CT provided level restored and maintained above -186 inches within 10 minutes of going below -186 inches Safety Significance:

This is a procedural requirement of PPM 5.1.2 (RPV Control - ATWS). Allowing SLC, RCIC and CRD injection avoids conflicts with other instructions in the EOPs such as injecting SLC and inserting control rods. Stopping other injection sources prevents potential fuel damage due to cold water injection.

(Ref: PPM 5.0.10 Rev 21, section 8.3.4.)

-AND-Prevent unnecessary significant challenge to containment or the RPV.

Initiating Cue:

Procedural direction by PPM 5.1.2 Step L-6 directs lowering RPV level to < -65 inches by stopping and preventing all injection into RPV except from boron injections systems, RCIC and CRD, defeating interlocks if necessary.

-AND-Procedural direction by PPM 5.1.2 Step L-12 directs maintaining RPV level from -140 inches to -80 inches (best practice band) with outside shroud injection systems (Table 5). OI-15 (EOP and EAL Clarifications), Section 4.3.2.a.)

Measurable Performance Standard:

The critical task is considered met if the crew stops and prevents injection with the exception of SLC, RCIC, and CRD PRIOR to any direction given or actions taken that results in the injection of a high pressure water source (Reactor Feed Water) into the reactor.

-AND-Crew uses Reactor Feedwater system to maintain RPV level above -186 inches.

(ED required if level cannot be restored and maintained above -186 inches)

Performance Feedback:

RPV level and reactor power start lowering with no injection with the exception of SLC, RCIC, and CRD.

-AND-RPV level indication. Short excursions below -186 inches does not constitute failure of CT provided level restored and maintained above -186 inches within 10 minutes of going below

-186 inches.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 6 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station CT-2 Critical Task Statement:

With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, commence inserting control rods per PPM 5.5.11 Tab B prior to transitioning to Tab E Safety Significance:

If reactor power is elevated (above the APRM downscale trip setpoint) or cannot be determined, the core may be susceptible to large, irregular neutron flux oscillations.

110°F is the highest Wetwell temperature at which initiation of boron injection will permit injection of the Hot Shutdown Boron Weight of boron before Wetwell temperature exceeds the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit (HCTL).

Reactor shutdown on control rod insertion alone is preferable to injecting boron for the following reasons:

  • Boron contaminates the primary system requiring extensive cleanup.
  • If a leak occurs below the elevation of the RPV water level being maintained, boron injection may never shut down the reactor.
  • A reactor shut down on boron is not necessarily a stable condition. The reactor could return to criticality if boron is subsequently diluted or displaced by a leak.

Initiating Cue:

Reactor scram required and reactor not shutdown as indicated by APRM Downscale Lights not lit and Reactor Power indicating >5% on APRMs.

Measurable Performance Standard:

Control rods insertion is successful per PPM 5.5.11 TAB B (Manually Driving Control Rods) prior to transitioning to Tab E Performance Feedback:

Reactor Power is decreasing and Control Rod Full-In Lights illuminated as control rods are fully inserted.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 7 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Examiner Note: For ease of use, this Simulator Guide only contains the applicable steps of the governing procedures which the crew is expected to perform within the time constraints of the scenario.

EVENT No. 1:

AS BRIEFED OR WHEN DIRECTED (Following the crew taking the shift)

==

Description:==

Shift DEH Pumps per SOP-DEH-OPS Section 5.6. Field Operator is on station following shit turnover.

Time Pos. Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Directs BOP to shift DEH Pumps (Per Shift Turnover)

Per SOP-DEH-OPS Section 5.6.2 May contact the operator in advance to ensure good start of DEH-P-1A.

BOP Contacts Field operator for DEH-PI-43 When contacted as field operator for good start of DEH-P-1A, Immediately respond BOOTH OPERATOR Role Play Good Start of DEH-P-1A When contacted as field operator for DEH-PI-43, Immediately respond BOOTH OPERATOR Role Play DEH-PI-43 is approximately 2000 psig BOP Informs SRO that the DEH pump swap is complete and DEH Pressure on DEH-PI-21 is normal and stable.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 8 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station EVENT No. 2:

AS BRIEFED OR WHEN DIRECTED (Following The DEH pump Swap)

BOOTH OPERATOR - ACTIVATE TRIGGER 2

==

Description:==

LPCS Relay K4 trip Time Pos. Applicants Actions or Behavior Responds to annunciators.

4.601.A3 5-2 LPCS / RHR A DRYWELL PRESS HIGH Enters ABN-INSTRUMENTATION BOP Determines Relay LPCS-RLY-K4 tripped Informs CRS of Tech Spec 3.3.5.1 and LCS 1.3.5.3 references May direct a Field Operator to investigate MS-PS-48A (P026 RB 522 NE)

When contacted as field operator to investigate MS-PS-48A BOOTH OPERATOR Role Play There is no apparent visible damage to MS-PS-48A Enters ABN-INSTRUMENTATION SRO Evaluates TS and LCS for the tripped relay.

Technical Specification and LCS Action Statements:

Summary of all listed Below LCO 3.3.5.1 Condition A.1 - Enter Condition B immediately.

LCO 3.3.5.1 B.3 - Place channel in trip within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

LCS 1.3.5.3 Condition A.1 - Place channel in trip within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.5.1 The ECCS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.5.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.5.1-

1. ACTIONS CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 9 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station NOTE Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 10 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 11 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station EVENT No. 3:

AS BRIEFED OR WHEN DIRECTED (Following the crew taking the shift)

BOOTH OPERATOR - ACTIVATE TRIGGER 3

==

Description:==

MS-RV-1A Spurious opening. (Pulling Fuses will result in closure of the SRV)

Time Pos. Applicants Actions or Behavior Responds to annunciators.

4.601.A2 5-8 SRV OPEN 4.601.A2 6-7 RELIEF VALVE TAILPIPE TEMP HIGH BOP Observes red open lamp on 4.601 Apron for MS-RV-1A Reports stuck open SRV to SRO (BOP DOES NOT ATTEMPT to close the SRV from P601)

Enters ABN-SRV SRO Directs BOP to perform step 4.2 of ABN-SRV BOP Reports to SRO, MS-RV-1A confirmed as open.

SRO Directs BOP to Place the control switch for MS-RV-1A to OPEN Directs ATC to Lower power with flow to 90% per SOP-RRC-FLOW-QC Places the control switch for MS-RV-1A to OPEN BOP Informs SRO That MS-RV-1A Control switch is in the open position.

Lowers power to 90% using SOP-RRC-FLOW-QC ATC NOTE: BOP will Act as the pier checker for this evolution CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 12 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ATC Continues with ABN-SRV SRO Places the control switch for MS-RV-1A to OFF, notes that SRV still indicates open.

BOP Reports to SRO that MS-RV-1A Remains OPEN.

Continues with ABN-SRV SRO BOP Refers to Attachment 7.1 of ABN-SRV CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 13 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station BOP Takes proper electrical precautions and removes fuses BB-F35 and BBF36 Checks 4.601 Indications for MS-RV-1A, Notes Green Lamp on and red lamp off.

Indicates Closed.

Verifies temperatures on MS-TR-614 for RV-1A are lowering.

Reports to SRO that MS-RV-1A is closed.

Informs SRO of EOP Entry for Wetwell level (Occurred during the performance of ABN-SRV) (4.601.A12 2-3 and 4.601.A11 2-3 SUPP POOL LEVEL HIGH annunciators)

Continues with ABN-SRV SRO Directs BOP to place B RHR in SPC per SOP-RHR-SPC Enters PPM 5.2.1 Primary Containment Control on Wetwell level above +2 BOP Examiner Note: BOP May start SW-P-1B per SOP-SW-START OR Allow SW to auto start per the note in SOP-RHR-SPC CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 14 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station BOP IF BOP Elects to start SW-P-1B per SOP-SW-START (In Place of allowing auto start of SW-P-1B)

BOP BOP BOP Continues with SOP-RHR-SPC CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 15 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station BOP CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 16 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station When contacted as HP for radiological conditions:

BOOTH OPERATOR Role Play as Health Physics I Understand radiological conditions may have changed due to starting RHR-P-2B BOP Informs SRO that B RHR is in suppression pool cooling.

Evaluates TS for the Stuck open SRV per ABN-SRV / B RHR in SPC and Suppression pool level.

Technical Specification Action Statement:

Summary of all listed Below LCO 3.6.2.2 A.1 For Suppression pool level - Restore in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> LCO 3.5.1 A.1 and 3.6.1.5 A.1 For RHR and RHR Drywell Spray - Restore in 7 days.

LCO 3.6.2.3 A.1 for RHR Suppression Pool Cooling - Restore in 7 Days SRO And Declares RHR B Inoperable but available per LCO 3.5.1 A.1 for ECCS Operating and LCO 3.6.1.5 A.1 For RHR Drywell Spray CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 17 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Continues with PPM 5.2.1 Primary Containment Control SRO Directs lowing WW Level per SOP-RHR-SPC.

Examiner Note: The actual lowering of WW level is not a required element of this scenario.

Upon completion of placing RHR B in SPC and SRO Technical specification evaluation, the scenario can move on the next element by activation of TRIGGER 3.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 18 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station EVENT No. 4:

AS BRIEFED OR WHEN DIRECTED (Following BOP Completion of placing RHR in SPC)

BOOTH OPERATOR - ACTIVATE TRIGGER 4

==

Description:==

APRM-4 Fails Upscale Time Pos. Applicants Actions or Behavior Responds to 4.603.A7 2-7 ROD OUT BLOCK, 4.603.A8 1-6 APRM UPSC or INOP ATC TRIP and 4.603.A8 2-6 APRM UPSCALE Informs the SRO Takes actions of 4.603.A8 1-6 APRM UPSC or INOP TRIP ATC CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 19 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ATC Checks Back Panel Indications as directed BOP BOP BOP Confirms APRM-4 is the fault. Reports SRO Directs ATC to Bypass APRM-4 per 4.603.A8 1-6 ARP Bypasses APRM-4 By taking the APRM BYPASS joystick on p.603 to the APRM-4 ATC Position (Left)

Informs SRO That APRM-4 Is bypassed CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 20 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Evaluates LCO 3.3.1.1, LCS 1.3.3.1, LCS 1.3.2.1 Technical Specification Action Statement:

No TS Actions are required, 3 of the 4 APRMs channels are required to be operable.

With only APRM-4 inoperable meet this requirement.

SRO Contacts Production SRO / Work Control for assistance.

SRO Performs a crew brief.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 21 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station EVENT No. 5:

AS BRIEFED OR WHEN DIRECTED (Following APRM-4 Taken to bypass)

Dial 2222 and Role Play BOOTH OPERATOR - There is dark black smoke coming from the transformer yard Wait 20 Seconds and:

BOOTH OPERATOR - ACTIVATE TRIGGER 5

==

Description:==

Fire in TR-B Oil Circuit Breaker resulting in Trip of TR-B Time Pos. Applicants Actions or Behavior Informs SRO of X2222 Emergency Call Acknowledges alarms on FCP FCP-2 6-1 SYS 60 DELUGE BACKUP XFMR TR-B TROUBLE and FIRE FCP-3 10-2 FP-P-2A PUMP RUNNING Takes Immediate Actions per ABN-FIRE BOP ENTERS ABN-FIRE May enter ABN-TRANSFORMER SRO Examiner Note: Actions provided in ABN-TRANSFORMER do not mitigate this event, most actions do not apply.

Responds to annunciators on the electric plant.

4.600.C4 1-5 XFMR TR-B LOCKOUT TRIP 4.600.C4 2-5 XFMR TR-B TROUBLE BOP 4.600.C4 4-5 XFMR TR-B UNDERVOLTAGE 4.600.C4 6-5 115KV OIL CKT BRK OPEN 4.600.C4 4-3 OSCILLOGRAPH START CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 22 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Diagnoses indications and informs SRO of TR-B Lockout Trip.

Enters ABN-ELEC-GRID for unanticipated loss of E-TR-B SRO Directs BOP to continue with subsequent actions of ABN-FIRE Continues with subsequent actions of ABN-FIRE BOP When dispatched as Fire Brigade leader to investigate transformer yard Wait 2 Minutes and Call back on the radio and Role Play BOOTH OPERATOR as Fire Brigade Leader It appears there was an oil fire in the TR-B Oil Circuit Breaker, Deluge has activated and the fire is OUT Examiner Note: Lead Evaluator can choose to move on with the scenario at any point following initial response with immediate actions completed. The remaining actions are included if desired by lead evaluator.

The Tech Spec evaluation for loss of TR-B (included at the end of the write up for this event) and can be done as a follow up question for the candidate when the scenario is completed if desired by lead evaluator to continue scenario progression.

SRO Continues with actions of ABN-FIRE CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 23 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Or BOP Per subsequent actions of ABN-FIRE BOP If Contacted as SCC BOOTH OPERATOR: as SCC, give verbatim repeat back of direction given.

Evaluates TS for the loss of TR-B Technical Specification Action Statement:

LCO 3.8.1 A1 and A3 for AC Sources Operating SRO CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 24 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Provides crew brief SRO Contacts production SRO / Work Control for assistance.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 25 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station EVENT No. 6:

AS BRIEFED OR WHEN DIRECTED (SRO TS Call for Loss of TR-B)

BOOTH OPERATOR ACTIVATE TRIGGER 6

==

Description:==

Overcurrent Trip of DEH-P-1A, DEH-P-1B Will not start.

Examiner Note: It takes about 1.5 Minutes for DEH pressure to decay and cause 4.820.B1 2-4 DEH WARNING and 4.820.B1 6-5 DEH PMP DISCH PRESS LOW annunciators.

Time Pos. Applicants Actions or Behavior Responds to 4.820.B1 2-4 DEH WARNING and 4.820.B1 6-5 DEH PMP DISCH PRESS LOW. Checks DEH-PI-21 Hydraulic Oil Header Pressure, Notes approx.

1900# and down slow. Notes DEH-P-1A and DEH-P-1B are not running (DEH-P-1A BOP was the in-service pump from previous evolution)

Informs SRO of DEH Pressure with trend and that no DEH- pumps are currently running.

SRO Enters ABN-DEH-LEAK on low DEH Discharge Pressure.

Continues with ARP for 4.820.B1 6-5 DEH PMP DISCH PRESS LOW BOP May contact field operator to monitor DEH reservoir level and investigate for a DEH BOP leak.

If contacted as Field Operator to investigate DEH. Wait 2 minutes and:

BOOTH OPERATOR Role Play: I have no indications of a DEH Leak, DEH Reservoir level is 23 and stable.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 26 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Continues with ABN-DEH-LEAK May set a key parameter for DEH Pressure and provide the crew with an update of actions if the key parameter is met.

SRO Directs ATC to Scram the reactor.

Scrams the reactor per PPM 3.3.1-QC Also reports EOP entries on Failure to Scram ATC Informs SRO SLC-P-1A did not start and SLC-P-1B Reduced flow.

Informs SRO that it is a Hydraulic ATWS.

Monitors for proper operation of the bypass valves. (At this point there is still BOP enough hydraulic oil pressure to expect a response from the bypass valves)

Directs Field Operator to investigate SLC CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 27 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station If contacted as Field Operator to investigate SLC. Wait 3 minutes and:

BOOTH OPERATOR Role Play: SLC pump A is not running, SLC Pump B appears to be running normally Continues with subsequent action of PPM 3.3.1-QC ATC Enters PPM 5.1.1 RPV Control and transitions to PPM5.1.2 RPV Control ATWS.

SRO CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 28 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station EVENT No. 7:

Pre-Inserted malfunction for Hydraulic ATWS PRE-INSERTED MALFUNCTION

==

Description:==

Hydraulic ATWS with degraded SLC Flow (SLC-P-1A Overcurrent Trip and SLC-P-1B degraded flow)

Time Pos. Applicants Actions or Behavior Directs actions of PPM 5.1.2 RPV Control ATWS SRO Inhibits ADS by taking ADS DIV 2 INHIBIT (MS-RMS-ADS-12B) and ADS DIV 1 INHIBIT (MS-RMS-ADS-12A) to the inhibit position.

BOP Takes Manual Control of HPCS, Preferred method: Takes HPCS MANUAL INITIATION Collar to Armed and simultaneously depresses the initiation push button while holding the HPCS-P-1 Control Switch in the STOP Position. Manually closes HPCS-V-4.

SRO BOP Verifies +13 Actuations. (RHR-V-40 and RHR-V-49 are closed)

SRO Checks Overrides in L-2, P-1 and Q-1. None of the overrides currently apply.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 29 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station May Direct performance of PPM 5.5.1 concurrent with PPM 5.5.6. (They can also SRO direct these individually)

Performs PPM 5.5.1 (Overriding ECCS Valve Logic to Allow Throttling RPV Injection)

OVERRIDE HPCS-V-4 (HPCS RPV Injection Valve) automatic logic by placing HPCS-RMS-S25 in the OVERRIDE position (H13-P625)

OVERRIDE LPCS-V-5 (LPCS RPV Injection Valve) automatic logic by placing LPCS-RMS-S21 in the OVERRIDE position (H13-P629)

BOP OVERRIDE RHR-V-42A (RHR RPV Injection Valve) automatic logic by placing RHR-RMS-S105 in the OVERRIDE position (H13-P629)

OVERRIDE RHR-V-42B (RHR RPV Injection Valve) automatic logic by placing RHR-RMS-S106 in the OVERRIDE position (H13-P618)

OVERRIDE RHR-V-42C (RHR RPV Injection Valve) automatic logic by placing RHR-RMS-S107 in the OVERRIDE position (H13-P618)

BOP Performs PPM 5.5.6 CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 30 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station SRO Updates the Crew (Per OI-15): We will be intentionally lower RPV level to below minus 65 inches ATC Closes RCIC-V-1 Examiner Note: CRITICAL TASK 1 (Part 1 of 2)

Time: ____________ Injection prevented with exception of SLC, RCIC, and CRD During ATWS with power > 5%, terminate and prevent injection with exception of SLC, RCIC, and CRD, into the RPV until RPV level is -65 inches to establish a Lowered Level (LL).

SRO (Per OI-15) Directs ATC Stop and Prevent with Condensate and Feed Lines up on S/U Flow Control Valves per SOP-RFW-FCV-QC ATC CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 31 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station When RFW-V-112A and B are shut, reports to SRO Condensate and Feed have been stopped and prevented SRO Informs ATC Caution - rapid injection may cause fuel damage (OI-15)

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 32 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Directs ATC Go to and maintain RPV level -140 to -80 with condensate and feed. Begin injection at -65.

Examiner Note: CRITICAL TASK 1 (Part 2 of 2)

Time Start: ____________ If Level excursion results in level dropping below -186 Inches Time Stop: _____________Level has been restored to Greater than -186 inches.

Maintain RPV level above -186 inches. Short excursions below -186 inches does not constitute failure of CT provided level restored and maintained above -186 inches within 10 minutes of going below -

186 inches.

Controls level as directed, start injection LE -65 and reports when in band and controlling.

ATC May recognize RCIC-V-13 Failure to open and report to CRS and have BOP call field operator.

If contacted as Field Operator to investigate RCIC-V-13. Wait 2 minutes and:

BOOTH OPERATOR Role Play: RCIC-V-13 will NOT open.

SRO Directs a pressure band of 800 - 1050 psig while maintaining bypass valves fully open.

Directs BOP to verify -50 Actuations.

Controls pressure using SRVs Maintaining BPVs full open as directed.

BOP Verifies -50 Actuations.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 33 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station NOTE: DEH Hydraulic Pressure will decay such that bypass valves will not be able to be maintained fully open. After Bypass valves are no longer available BOP will control pressure using SRVs as directed by the SRO.

Continues with Power leg of PPM 5.1.2 RPV Control ATWS SRO Performs PPM 5.5.11 for a Hydraulic ATWS BOP CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 34 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ATC Directs Field Operator to place CRD Filters in service per ABN-CRD-MAXFLOW If contacted as Field Operator to Place CRD Filters in service:

BOOTH OPERATOR: Click CRD Filters on Thunderview Home Screen Wait 3 minutes and Role Play:

BOOTH OPERATOR: CRD Filters are in service per ABN-CRD-MAXFLOW Starts a second CRD Pump per ABN_CRD-MAXFLOW ATC Continues with PPM 5.5.11 BOP RPS-B Was never Lost.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 35 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Performs Attachment 6.1 to OVERRIDE RPS trip signals.

BOP Scram is reset at P603 EXAMINER NOTE: ATC will work with BOP to Scram / Reset / Scram and drive rods manually.

These actions will be performed simultaneously and the following could be performed by BOP or ATC depending on SRO Direction and availability Continues with PPM 5.5.11 ATC Or BOP CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 36 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Examiner Note: CRITICAL TASK 2 Time: ____________ Control Rod Insertion successful as indicated by Reactor Power decreasing and Control Rod Full-In Lights illuminated as control rods are fully inserted. This task must be completed prior to transitioning to Tab E of PPM 5.5.11.

The critical task is considered met when a minimum of 1 Rod is in the FULL IN position as indicated by the full core display.

ATC Or BOP ATC Reports to SRO that manually driving rods is successful.

Per PPM 5.5.11 Tab B ATC Or BOR CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 37 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ATC Reports to SRO that scram / reset / scram is not successful.

TERMINATION CRITERIA:

The scenario will be terminated when Level has been restored and is being controlled in band -140 to -80 and Control rods are being inserted manually per PPM 5.5.11.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 38 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station SIMULATOR SETUP Unload simulator (between each scenario)

Verify in ILC load Load correct S/D Sequence (if necessary)

Reload simulator Reset to IC-127 (reset, go to Run, reset again)

Test EQ machine at correct volume for OBE event Load Scenario 2 Schedule file (SC-2 ILC 2021)

Validate that there are no unexpected annunciators or parameters out of band Clear all Alarms for digital displays (RFW / DEH / RRC and APRM ODAs on front AND back panels.

Verify pump running magnets Verify normally removed keys REMOVED except for: NONE Flag the following: NONE Place clearance tag on: NONE Protect the following: NONE Have copy of: SOP-DEH-OPS section 5.6.2 CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 39 of 40

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-2(Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station CREW TURNOVER Initial Conditions:

  • The Plant is at 100% power.

Shift Turnover:

  • Following turnover, the crew is scheduled to swap DEH pumps to place DEH-P-1A in service and place DEH-P-1B in standby per SOP-DEH-OPS. A Field Operator is standing by at the DEH Pump skid.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Page 40 of 40

INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET SC-3 PROGRAM TITLE OPERATIONS TRAINING COURSE TITLE COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION SIMULATOR EXAMINATION The scenario begins with a swap of the WMA fans and a blown control power fuse on WMA-AD51A. (SRO TS Call). Second event is RWCU-TK-2 overflow, results in a loss of SL-63 with a LESSON TITLE failure of RRC-P-1A to runback. The second ASD channel for RRC-P-1A will trip resulting in single loop operations. When the plant is stabilized SM-7 will experience a lock out combined with a fault on the standby CRD pump will result in a manual reactor scram due to a complete loss of CRD. A main steam line break in the drywell and a broken drywell floor results in rising containment parameters. RHR-V-16B is failed, the crew will ED prior on unable to restore and maintain below PSP.

LENGTH OF LESSON 1.5 Hours Lesson Plan PQD Code Rev. No.

Simulator Guide PQD Code SC-3 Rev. No.

JPM PQD Code Rev. No.

Exam PQD Code Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Jeff Lux DATE 08/25/20 REVISED BY DATE VALIDATED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW DATE APPROVED DATE CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 1 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Facility: Columbia Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: 1 Generating Station Examiners: Operators:

Reactor Power is 100%. After the crew takes the shift, they will swap operation of WMA fans. (Per the turnover sheet).

Initial Conditions:

RWCU-DM-1B is removed from service for planned backwash/precoat After taking the shift, the crew is too swap WMA fans to WMA-FN-51A running and WMA-FN-51B secured for run time equalization. Pre-requisites 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 of SOP-HVAC/CR-OPS have been previously completed by the off-going crew.

Turnover: Backwash / Precoat of RWCU-DM-1B is scheduled for the shift. Section 5.1 of SOP-RWCU-DEMIN was completed the previous shift (Removing Filter Demineralizers from Service and Placing in Hold.). Backwash and precoat of RWCU-DM-1B will commence after the crew takes the shift.

No other equipment is out of service or protected.

Critical Tasks:

With no CRD pumps running and two or more control rod accumulator trouble alarms are in, initiate a manual CT-1 scram within 20 minutes. (ABN-CRD / TS 3.1.5)

Initiate Emergency Depressurization (ED) by opening the first of seven (7) Safety Relief Valves (ADS preferred) when Wetwell pressure cannot be restored and maintained below the Pressure Suppression Pressure (PSP). CT CT-2 is considered met if any combination of 7 Safety Relief Valves are opened within 15 minutes of reaching PSP.

(PPM 5.2.1, PPM 5.1.3)

NOTE: An unintentional or unnecessary RPS or ESF actuation may result in the creation of a post-scenario Critical Task, if that actuation results in a significant plant degradation or significantly alters a mitigation strategy.

Event Trigger Event Type* Event Description No.

C (SRO / BOP) BOP Swap WMA fans to WMA-FN-51A running and WMA-FN-51B Secured.

1 - During the swap, WMA-AD-51A1 will experiences blown control power fuse TS (SRO) rendering WMA-FN-51A inoperable. SRO will evaluate TS.

RWCU-TK-2 Overflows during the performance of a backwash and precoat.

Results in required entry into ABN-FLOODING and ABN-RAD-SPILL. Additionally, TRG-2 C (SRO) the flooding causes a ground on MC-6B and overcurrent trip of SL-63.

2 (CGS OE -RWCU-TK-2 Overflow CR390321 02/25/19)

C (ATC) Following the trip of SL-63, RRC-P-1A fails to automatically run back to 51hz. ATC will manually lower speed of RRC-P-1A to 51hz.

RRC ASD CH 1A1 Overcurrent trip. Crew Enters ABN-RRC-LOSS and evaluates R (SRO / ATC) the single loop power to flow map, the crew reduces rod line per the fast shutdown 3 TRG-3 TS (SRO) sequence for single loop operations. SRO Evaluates and enters LCO 3.4.1 (CGS OE - CR404225 02/14/20)

On this event the crew will experience a lock out on SM-7. Crew will enter ABN-C (BOP) ELEC-SM1/SM7. BOP will take immediate actions for the loss of SM-7 and ABN-RPS. Due to the loss of SM-7 CRD-P-1A will trip, The ATC operator will attempt to restore CRD, however CRD-P-1B ill not start.

4 TRG-4 M (ALL) The crew will enter ABN-CRD and Scram the reactor with reactor pressure GE 900 psig and 2 or more scram accumulators are inoperable with charging header pressure LT 940 psig. CT-1 CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 2 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station A Main steam line break aft of the flow restrictor (LOCA) results in rising DW 5 - C (SRO / BOP) pressure. Crew will enter PPM 5.2.1 Containment control. SRO will direct Wetwell sprays at 2#. (Due to the lockout on SM-7 RHR-A is unavailable for WW Sprays)

Upon verification of 1.68# Actuations, BOP will find that FDR-V-4 did not close.

6 - I (BOP)

Manual operator action will result in closure of FDR-V-4.

During the CREW performance of PPM 5.2.1 Containment Control The crew will attempt to spray the drywell AT 12# and recognize RHR-V-16B will not open. With 7 - M (ALL) drywell sprays un-available, DW pressure will continue to rise. The crew will be required to emergency depressurize when Drywell pressure cannot be restored and maintained below PSP. CT-2

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications Target Quantitative Attributes Actual Description LOCA with drywell floor failure / Failure of RHR-V-16B Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 3 (Results in loss of drywell spray function / FDR-V-4 Failure to auto close WMA-AD-51A1 Failure / RWCU Tank overflow causes OC Abnormal events (2-4) 4 trip of SL-63 / ASD-CH-1A1 Trip / Lockout of SM-7 Reactor scram due to loss of CRD / Emergency Major transients (1-2) 2 Depressurization on WW pressure PPM 5.1.1 (RPV Control); PPM 5.2.1 (Primary Containment EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 2 Control)

Entry into a contingency EOP with substantive 1 PPM 5.1.3 (Emergency RPV Depressurization) actions ( 1 per scenario set)

Pre-identified Critical tasks ( 2) 2 See Critical Task Sheets.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 3 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station SCENARIO

SUMMARY

Event 1 BOP swaps WMA fans to WMA-FN-51A running and WMA-FN-51B secured for run time equalization.

Pre-requisites 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 of SOP-HVAC/CR-OPS have been previously completed by the off-going crew. During the performance of this evolution WMA-AD-51A1 control power fuse blows charring the fuse block resulting in inability to swap the fans.

SRO Evaluates Tech Specs TS 3.7.3 Condition A - Restore CREF subsystem to operable status in 7 days.

TS 3.7.4 Condition A - Restore control room AC subsystem to operable status in 30 days.

(Pre-Inserted Malfunction and Event - NO TRIGGER REQUIRED) Pre-Inserted OVR-RWB024C WMA-AD-51A1 Closed / On start of WMA-FN-51A it creates event 15 and inserts malfunction 15 (MOV-RWB001F Fail Control Power)

Event 2 Crew receives a call from the Radwaste tool crib attendant who reports a large puddle of water in the service air compressor area. The Crew will enter ABN-FLOODING. The flooding causes a ground in MC-6B resulting in an overcurrent trip of SL-63. After the bus loss RRC-P-1A fails to automatically run back to 51HZ. The RWCR operator reports that during the performance of RWCU backwash and precoat, RWCU-TK-2 overflowed and the flooding has been stopped. The crew will enter ABN-RAD-SPILL. The Crew will also enter ABN-POWER for the RRC runback.

Crew will evaluate annunciator response 4.602.A6 6-2 RECIRC A OR B HIGH FLOW DELTA, ABN-POWER and TS for RRC flow mismatch. ATC will manually reduce RRC-P-1A to 51hz.

(CGS OE - RWCU tank overflow - CR390321 02/25/19)

SRO Evaluates Tech Specs TS 3.4.1 Condition A - Not required to enter this TS after RRC-P-1A is reduced to 51hz and flows are matched.

(TRIGGER-2) Activates the overcurrent ground on SL-63 (MAL-EPS002H). Preinserted malfunction RRC Pump A - all runbacks failed (MAL-RFC017A).

No additional triggers / malfunctions required for RWCU tank overflow; all indications are outside the main control room.

Event 3 Load overcurrent fault on RRC ASD CH1A1 results in RRC-P-1A trip. Crew enters ABN-CORE and ABN-RRC-LOSS. After evaluation of the power to flow map for single loop operations, the crew will reduce rod line to LT 80% per ABN-RRC-LOSS.

(TRIGGER-3) Activates MAL-RFC005F ASD CH A1 load overcurrent fault - RRC-P-1A Trips (CGS OE - Both ASD Channels failed on RRC-P-1A Resulting in single loop operations -

CR404225 02/14/20)

Event 4 The next event, SM-7 Locks out resulting in a loss of RPS-A and a loss of CRD-P-1A (which was the running CRD pump). The crew will take its immediate action of ABN-RPS (stop all maintenance and surveillance testing) and ABN-ELEC-SM1/SM7 (Place RCC-P-1A in PTL and verify RCC-P-1C started)

The Crew will also emergency stop DG-1 due to running with no service water available.

During the attempt to restore an operating CRD pump, CRD-P-1B will not start. The crew will enter ABN-CRD and take actions to scram the reactor per ABN-CRD. (Critical Task #1). The SRO will enter PPM 5.1.1 RPV Control and take actions to stabilize the plant (Via PPM 5.1.1 level leg and pressure leg.)

(TRIGGER-4) Activates MAL-EPS001G Overcurrent / ground on SM-7. Pre-Inserted malfunctions OVR-CRD007C and BKR-CRD002 prevent CRD-P-1B from being manually started by the operator.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 4 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Event 5 Following the plant scram, a leak will develop on the MS line, aft of the flow restrictor. Due to the sudden pressure transient the Drywell Floor will break. Containment pressure will rise and the crew will enter PPM 5.2.1 Primary Containment Control and Re-Enter PPM 5.1.1 RPV Control. On re-entry into PPM 5.1.1, the SRO will re-evaluate the overrides of L-2 and direct the ATC operator to secure the RRC pumps. Entry and evaluation of 5.2.1, the SRO will set a key parameter of 285 degrees in the Drywell and 2 psig in the Wetwell (Due to the broken Drywell floor, pressure will reach 2# in the Wetwell very quickly).

The crew will monitor containment parameters and when WW pressure reaches 2 psig, the crew will spray the WW with RHR-B (RHR-A is not available due to previous lock out on SM-7). The crew will evaluate that the containment pressure response and also report a broken drywell floor.

(CONDITIONAL TRIGGER 17) Activates MAL-RRS009B, Main steam line B break before the flow restrictor and MAL-PCN006 Drywell Floor Failure Event 6 During 1.68# verifications, BOP will find that FDR-V-4 Drywell Drain Outboard Isolation failed to close.

BOP Manual operator action will result in the closure of FDR-V-4 (PRE-INSERTED MALFUNCTION) AOV-SCN013F FDR-V-4 Fail to Auto Close.

Event 7 The crew continues to monitor containment parameters as a result of the leak in containment and Drywell floor failure. Following the completion of Wetwell sprays the SRO will set a new key parameter of 12 psig in the Wetwell per P-7 of PPM 5.2.1 Primary Containment Control. At 12# in the WW the crew will attempt to spray the drywell using RHR-B, but RHR-V-16B will not open. Crew will contact the field operator to manually open RHR-V-16B and the field operator will report that it is mechanically bound. With no method left available to spray the Drywell, pressures will continue to rise and the crew will emergency depressurize per step P-12 (When Wetwell pressure cannot be restored and maintained below PSP).

Crew will enter PPM 5.1.3 Emergency RPV Depressurization and open 7 SRVs. (Critical Task #2).

(PRE-INSERTED MALFUNCTION) MOV-RHR009F RHR-V-16B Fails as Is.

TERMINATION CRITERIA:

The scenario will be terminated when an Emergency Depressurization has been performed, and RPV level is being controlled above TAF (- 161 inches) OR as directed by the Examination Team.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 5 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station CT-1 Critical Task Statement:

With no CRD pumps running and two or more control rod accumulator trouble alarms are in, initiate a manual scram within 20 minutes. (ABN-CRD / TS 3.1.5)

Safety Significances:

This step reflects the requirements of Technical Specification 3.1.5. With inadequate charging water pressure, all of the accumulators could become inoperable, resulting in a potentially severe degradation of the scram performance. Therefore, within 20 minutes from discovery of charging water header pressure < 940 psig concurrent with two or more control rod scram accumulators inoperable, adequate charging water header pressure must be restored.

The allowed Completion Time of 20 minutes is reasonable, to place a CRD pump into service to restore the charging header pressure, if required. This Completion Time is based on the ability of the reactor pressure alone to fully insert all control rods (GE 900 psig).

The ANALYSES Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analyses assume that all of the control rods scram at a specified insertion rate. The scram function of the CRD System, and, therefore, the OPERABILITY of the accumulators, protects the MCPR Safety Limit which ensure that no fuel damage will occur if these limits are not exceeded Ref: NUREG 1021 Rev 11. Appendix D. Critical Task Mythology 1.a

  • take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. (pg. D-14)

Initiating Cues:

No CRD pumps running, Charging Header Pressure is less than 940 psig, as read on CRD-PIS-600, and two or more Control Rod Accumulator Trouble, Amber, lights are in on the Full Core Display.

Measurable Performance Standard:

Reactor Mode Switch placed in Shutdown.

Performance Feedback:

Reactor Power as indicated on the APRMs / IRMs / SRM is decreasing as control rods are being inserted.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 6 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station CT-2 Critical Task Statement:

When Wetwell pressure cannot be restored and maintained below the Pressure Suppression Pressure (PSP), initiate an Emergency RPV Depressurization.

Safety Significance:

If Wetwell or drywell sprays could not be started or if their operation was not effective in reducing primary containment pressure, the RPV is depressurized to minimize further release of energy from the RPV to the primary containment when Wetwell pressure cannot be restored and maintained below the Pressure Suppression Pressure (PSP) limit. This action serves to terminate or reduce as much as possible any continued primary containment pressure increases.

The Pressure Suppression Pressure (PSP) is the lesser of either:

  • The highest Wetwell pressure which can be maintained without steam in the Wetwell airspace, or
  • The highest Wetwell pressure which can be maintained without exceeding the suppression pool boundary design load if SRVs are opened.

The PSP is a function of suppression pool water level. It is used in the EOPs to ensure that pressure suppression capability sufficient to accommodate emergency RPV depressurization is maintained while the RPV is at pressure.

Ref: NUREG 1021 Rev 11. Appendix D. Critical Task Mythology Events requiring emergency depressurization per EOP flow charts are used as examples throughout Appendix D. (1c bullet 1 pg. D-15)

And 1a. Essential safety action for which correct performance prevents degradation of any fission product barrier and take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.

Initiating Cue:

Containment pressure is approaching or has reached the PSP limit with no ability to spray to restore below PSP. (P-12 of PPM 5.2.1 Primary Containment Control)

Measurable Performance Standard:

7 Safety Relief Valves (ADS preferred) manually opened within 15 minutes of reaching PSP.

15 minutes of allotted time allows for operator response into a locked high radiation area for determination of RHR B not available for containment sprays and the diagnosis time required to determine that pressure cannot be restored and maintained below PSP based on current plant conditions.

Performance Feedback:

Reactor pressure is lowering as indicated on MS-LR/PR-623A, MS-LR/PR-623B, or MS-PI-9.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 7 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Examiner Note: For ease of use, this Simulator Guide only contains the applicable steps of the governing procedures which the crew is expected to perform within the time constraints of the scenario.

EVENT No. 1:

AS BRIEFED OR WHEN DIRECTED (Following the crew taking the shift)

Pre-Inserted Malfunction

==

Description:==

Failure of WMA-AD-51A1 During performance of SOP-HVAC/CR-OPS section 5.1.

Time Pos. Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: Following steps are from SOP-HVAC/CR-OPS Section 5.1 Previews SOP-HVAC/CR-OPS. Marks section 5.1.2 N/A (Not performing this step)

Performs Step 5.1.1 BOP Performs Step 5.1.3 RO recognizes failure of WMA-AD-51A1 Indicating lights.

Acknowledges 4.826.P1 10-2 CR HVAC DIV 1 OUT OF SERVICE.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 8 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station And corresponding BISI BOP DOES NOT continue performance of swapping fans and may secure WMA-FN-51A to place the system in a safe configuration.

Examiner Note: Following steps are from ARP 4.826.P1 10-2 Per 4.826.P1 10-2 CR HVAC DIV 1 OUT OF SERVICE BOP Directs OPS2 to check E-DISC-PP-7AE/12 and TB-F03 Reports Failure to SRO, BOP Does not continue with securing WMA-FN-51B. May secure WMA-FN-51A to place the system in a safe configuration prior to reporting to the SRO or secure WMA-FN-51A by direction of the SRO.

BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If asked to check E-DISC-PP-7AE/12 and TB-F03, wait 4 Minutes and report as OPS2: E-DISC-PP-7AE/12 is closed, TB-F03 fuse block appears to be charred Directs BOP to secure WMA-FN-51A (If not already secured)

Call Work Control / Production SRO for support.

Evaluates Technical Specifications Technical Specification Action Statement:

3.7.3 Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) System SRO Condition A: One CREF subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Condition B, Restore CREF subsystem to OPERABLE status in 7 days 3.7.4 Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System Condition A: One control room AC subsystem inoperable, Restore control room AC subsystem to OPERABLE status in 30 days.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 9 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Provides a crew brief.

EVENT No. 2:

==

Description:==

RWCU-TK-2 Overflow / Overcurrent trip of SL-63 / RRC-P-1A fails to runback (CGS OE - RWCU tank overflow - CR390321 02/25/19)

Time Pos. Applicants Actions or Behavior AS BRIEFED OR WHEN DIRECTED (Following SRO TS Call)

BOOTH ROLEPLAY - Call the main control room X2171 as the tool crib attendant and report There is a lot of water on the floor in the Service Air Compressor area, Water appears to be coming from the back area by the electrical panels and stairwell Wait FOUR minutes after completion of phone call and activate TRIGGER 2 Trigger 2 (MAL-EPS002H) Overcurrent trip of SL-63 with pre-inserted malfunction RRC-P-1A Automatic runback failure (MAL-RFC017A)

BOP Informs SRO of flooding in the vicinity of the Service Air Compressors.

Examiner Note: The actions for ABN-FLOODING and the loss of SL-63 will be performed SIMULTANEOUSLY. The actions listed in this scenario guide have been grouped for ease of use.

Examiner Note: The following actions are for ABN-FLOODING Enters ABN-FLOODING SRO Directs BOP to perform actions of ABN-FLOODING.

Performs and directs equipment operators for actions of ABN-FLOODING BOP CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 10 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Contacts RWCR to investigate the flooding.

When contacted as RWCR, respond immediately:

BOOTH ROLEPLAY: During the performance of the backwash and precoat of RWCU-DM-1B, RWCU-TK-2 over flowed. I have secured RWCU-P-4 and the flooding has stopped, there is about 1 of water covering the floor in the area of the tank CGS OE 390321 02/25/2019 Informs the SRO RWCU-TK-2 was the source of the flooding and the flooding has BOP been stopped.

Enters ABN-RAD-SPILL (source of water is potentially RWCU)

SRO Directs BOP to perform actions of ABN-RAD-SPILL Examiner Note: The following actions are for ABN-RAD-SPILL Performs and directs actions of ABN-RAD-SPILL BOP When contacted as Health Physics:

BOOTH ROLEPLAY: This is health Physics wait for the control room operator to inform you of plant conditions followed by a verbatim repeat back of communication given.

Continues performance of ABN-RAD-SPILL BOP Marks section 4.2 and 4.3 N/A CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 11 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Marks Step 4.4 complete per the communication with the RWCR, The pump has been stopped.

Affected area SHOULD have already been evacuted per ABN-FLOODING, if not then step 4.5 of ABN-RAD-SPILL is performed.

BOP Contacts RWCR operator to ensure proper operation of sump pumps.

When contacted as RWCR:

BOOTH ROLEPLAY: The W-4 sump pumps are operating as expected Examiner Note: The following actions taken are for the loss of SL-63 and failure of RRC-P-1A to runback the actions of BOP and ATC are simultaneous. This occurs 5 minutes after the report of flooding.

Responds to the loss of SL-63, Monitors RFW pump response to RRC-P-1B Runback. Monitors RPV power / pressure and level.

Acknowledges annunciators due to the loss of SL-63.

4.602.A6 5-1 LOOP A ASD CHANNEL FAILURE LIMIT 4.602.A6 5-5 LOOP B ASD CHANNEL FAILURE LIMIT ATC 4.602.A13 4-3 ASD 1A2 ALARM 4.602.A13 5-3 ASD 1A2 FAULT 4.602.A13 4-4 ASD 1A2 ALARM 4.602.A13 5-4 ASD 1A2 FAULT CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 12 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Responds to the electric plant annunciators.

4.800.C2 7-6 BUS 63 GROUND 4.800.C2 8-5 BKR 6/63 TRIP BOP 4.800.C2 8-6 BUS 63 MCC OL TRIP 4.800.C5 5-7 125 VDC CHARGER C1-7 TROUBLE Reports to the SRO overcurrent trip or loss of SL-63 Per Annunciator Response Procedure 4.800.C2 7-6 BUS 63 GROUND And Per 4.800.C2 8-6 BUS 63 MCC OL TRIP BOP Directs the field operator to reset the ground on SL-63.

When contacted as Field Operator (OPS 3): Wait 3 minutes and BOOTH OPERATOR - Activate TRIGGER 10 BOOTH ROLEPLAY: SL-63 Trip was due to an overload trip of MC-6B, the ground had been reset Performs actions of annunciator response 4.800.C5 5-7 125 VDC CHARGER C1-BOP 7 TROUBLE.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 13 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Reports to the CRS that Bus S1-7 in on the battery and Amps / Voltage are normal. Refers the CRS to ABN-ELEC-125VDC When contacted as Field Operator (OPS 3): Wait 3 minutes If asked about AC ON indicating lamp BOOTH ROLEPLAY: E-C1-7 red AC ON Indicating lamp is extinguished And If asked about CB-2 BOOTH ROLEPLAY: CB-2 is closed SRO Enters ABN-ELEC-125VDC Evaluates step 4.1.1 of ABN-ELEC-125VDC SRO Sets a key parameter for S1-7 bus voltage. (Loss of E-DP-S1/7 is NOT imminent at this time)

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 14 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Monitors RRC pumps for proper runback.

ATC Recognizes RRC-P-1A did not runback. (RRC-M/A-676A Individual Loop A Control Actual HZ indicates approx. 56hz and receipt of Annunciator 4.602.A6 6-2 RECIRC A OR B HIGH FLOW DELTA Examiner Note: ATC Operator does not have to wait for SRO direction to lower RRC-P-1A to 51hz (OI-9 for Transient Actions) but should inform the SRO off his intended actions.

Recognizes automatic action that should have occurred and reduces RRC-P-1A to 51hz Per SOP-RRC-FLOW-QC section 2.2.

ATC Informs SRO of RRC-P-1A Failure to runback and Manual action to reduce RRC-P-1A to 51hz.

Gives P/P/L report.

OR (In Place of previous step) Reduces flow per 4.602.A6 6-2 RECIRC A OR B HIGH FLOW DELTA (Uses quick card, listed in previous step above)

ATC Enters ABN-POWER for unexpected reactor power change due to Core flow change Per ABN-POWER performs the following:

SRO Directs ATC to lower RRC-P-1A to 51hz (May have been completed on previous step by ATC)

Examiner Note: The actions to reduce RRC flow in loop A can be performed as an automatic action that should have occurred per OI-9 section 16.3.1 or from ABN-POWER / Annunciator response procedure 4.602.A6 6-2. Either results in the operators taking the correct actions for this situation CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 15 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Refers to TS 3.4.1 Two recirculation loops with matched flows shall be in operation.

Technical Specification Action Statement:

3.4.1 Condition A: Recirculation loop flow mismatch not within limits, Declare the SRO recirculation loop with lower flow to be "not in operation." Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

SRO does not enter this TS action statement; flows have been matched via operator actions and entry into this action statement is no longer required Examiner Note: Other actions listed in ABN-POWER are not applicable to the situation given and should not be performed.

Continues to evaluate ABN-POWER SRO Call Work Control / Production SRO for support.

Provides a crew brief IF called as Work Control / Production SRO: Wait 3 minutes (Following the crew brief and plant stabilization)

BOOTH ROLEPLAY Electricians have looked at MC-6B, there is no apparent damage and we expect restoration MC-6B to be available in about 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. I have no further information on RRC-P-1A failure to runback at this time CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 16 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station EVENT No. 3:

==

Description:==

RRC-ASD-1A1 Fault - ABN-RRC-SINGLE LOOP (CGS OE - Both ASD Channels failed on RRC-P-1A Resulting in single loop operations - CR404225 02/14/20)

AS BRIEFED OR WHEN DIRECTED (Plant is stable and RRC-P-1A has been reduced to 51hz)

BOOTH OPERATOR - Activate TRIGGER 3 ASD CH 1A1 Load overcurrent fault. Results in trip pf RRC-P-1A and Single Loop Operations.

CGS OE CR404225 (02/14/20) Trip of both RRC-P-1A ASD channels results in single loop operations Time Pos. Applicants Actions or Behavior Responds to 4.602.A13 1-3 ASD 1A/1 ALARM 4.602.A13 2-3 ASD 1A/1 FAULT 4.603.A8 3-7 RPV LEVEL HIGH / LOW ALERT ATC 4.603.A7 3-7 OPRM TRIP ENABLED Verifies RFW Pumps speed lowers as expected to maintain RPL level in automatic.

Reports to SRO RRC-P-1A trip and entry into the OPRM Enabled region of the power to flow map.

Declares Entry into ABN-CORE and ABN-RRC-LOSS (May Re-Enter ABN-SRO POWER) for entry into the OPRM enabled region and the loss of RRC-P-1A Acknowledges variuos Feedwater Heater Alarms (Expected) due to the rapid power BOP transient.

Verifies position on power to flow map and reports to SRO.

ATC Gives P/P/L Report SRO Second Checks Position on power to flow map Examiner Note: Diagram of SINGLE LOOP POWER / FLOW (ABN-RRC-LOSS Attachment 6.1) provided for reference. Rod line will be approx. 104% to 105% following this transient which places the operators in REGION A.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 17 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Examiner Note: ABN-CORE does not contain applicable actions other than reference to using ABN-RRC-LOSS. Applicable actions of ABN-RRC-LOSS are referenced below.

Enters and Evaluates ABN-CORE.

In several locations ABN-CORE directs the SRO to ABN-RRC-LOSS of actions.

Section 4.1 RRC Pump Abnormal Opration SRO And Section 4.2 for Entry into Region A or the AIA CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 18 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station SRO Refers to ABN-POWER and ABN-RRC-LOSS Section 4.2, Loss of RRC-P-1A Performs the following associated actions of ABN-RRC-LOSS section 4.2 Loss of RRC-P-1A.

SRO Marks Step 4.2.4 as N/A (RRC Loop B is NOT GT 41,725gpm)

Marks Step 4.2.5 s N/A (RRC Loop flow is NOT between 4173gpm and 33,000gpm.

Direct ATC to perform step 4.2.6 of ABN-RRC-LOSS SRO CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 19 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Lowers Rodline to LT 80% Using the Fast Shutdown Sequence, AIA Section.

ATC Upon completion of reactivity manipulation, Informs the SRO and gives the SRO a P/P/L report SRO Continues with ABN-RRC-LOSS and directs ATC to perform steps 4.2.7 and 4.2.8 Per ABN-RRC-LOSS Makes adjustment using SOP-RRC-FLOW-QC ATC CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 20 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station EXAMINER NOTE: Lead examiner does not have to wait for the entire rod line reduction to be completed. After the operator has commenced inserting rods per the fast shutdown sequence, the lead examiner can direct continuing on to event 4 at their disgresion.

SRO Directs BOP to perform step 4.2.8 of ABN-RRC-LOSS Performs Step 4.2.7 of ABN-RRC-LOSS as directed by the SRO BOP SRO Call Work Control / Production SRO for support.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 21 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Provides a crew brief.

Evaluates Technical Specification Technical Specification Action Statement:

SRO Declares RRC Loop A inoperable -OR- Applies the single loop operation limits specified /

resets APRM STP high for single loop operation within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 22 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station EVENT No. 4:

==

Description:==

Lock out of SM-7 / CRD-P-1B will NOT start AS BRIEFED OR WHEN DIRECTED (Plant is stable and ATC has at minimum commenced rod insertion)

BOOTH OPERATOR - Activate TRIGGER 4 Lock out of SM-7 (Loss of CRD-P-1A) and CRD-P-1B has a broken shaft.

Examiner Note: The Actions for the loss of SM-7 / RPS-A and the loss of CRD charging header pressure occur simultaneously.

Time Pos. Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: The following actions are for the loss of RPS A and the loss of SM-7.

Continuously monitors P/P/L.

Recognizes loss of RPS-A due to combination of annunciators 4.603.A7 3-4 1/2 SCRAM SYSTEM A ATC 4.603.A7 1-3 / 1-4 / 2-1 / 2-2 / 2-3 / 3-2 / 3-3 / 4-4

- Indicative of a loss of RPS A, all RPS trips are in due to loss of power to RPS-A Reports to SRO loss of RPS-A Makes plant announcement per immediate actions of ABN-RPS step 3.1 Takes immediate operator actions of ABN-ELEC-SM1/SM7 BOP Informs SRO that immediate actions are complete.

Responds to the electric plant, Notes that there are many alarms in at 4.800.C1 and C3. After evaluation of key annunciators of note (4.800.C1 2-7 BKR 7/1 OC BOP LOCKOUT and 4.800.C1 2-3 BUS 7 LOSS OF VOLTAGE) and the electric panel indications (LOCKOUT CIRCUIT AVAIL lamp is extinguished as depicted below)

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 23 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Recognizes DG-1 is running with no service water available.

Reports to SRO Lockout on SM-7 and DG-1 Running with no service water.

Enters ABN-RPS, ABN-ELEC-SM1/SM7.

SRO Directs BOP to secure DG-1 per the annunciator response OR Directs securing DG-1 per ABN-ELEC-SM1/SM7 OR MAY Enter ABN-SW and directs actions (Any of these actions is correct for this situaton to secure DG-1)

Secures DG-1 per 4.800.C1 3-2 DG 1 ENGINE CLR SW FLOW LOW after obtaining SRO concurrence OR per ABN-SW by direction of the SRO BOP OR per ABN-ELEC-SM1/SM7 step 4.2.2 Secures DG 1 by depressing the emergency stop pushbutton located at P800 apron.

May direct field operator to investigate the loss of SM-7 If directed as field operator to investigate the loss of SM-7, wait 3 minutes and BOOTH ROLEPLAY SM-7 is locked out Examiner Note: The following actions are for the loss of both CRD pumps.

Recognizes CRP-P-1A is no longer in service, 4.603.A7 4-6 CRD PUMPS ABNORMAL OPERATION 4.603.C7 3-8 CRD CHARGE WATER PRESS LOW.

ATC Attempts to start CRD-P-1B per 4.603.A7 3-8 CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 24 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Notes Charging water header pressure.

ATC Checks Pump amps / pressure.

Informs SRO that CRD-P-1B has indication of a broken shaft.

BOP Directs OPS 2 to investigate CRD-P-1B and/or CRD-P-1B breaker When directed to investigate CRD-P-1B, Wait 3 minutes and BOOTH ROLEPLAY: CRD-P-1B has a broken shaft coupling Examiner Note: CRITICAL TASK 1 Time Start: ____________ = No CRD pumps running, Charging Header Pressure is less than 940 psig and GE 2 accumulator trouble alarms are in. (Reactor pressure is GT 900#)

Time Stop: ____________= Manual Reactor Scram initiated within 20 minutes Enters ABN-CRD on a complete loss of CRD drive flow.

SRO Sets a key parameter for charging water header pressure (already met) and 2 control rod accumulator alarms (Inoperable).

Monitors accumulator trouble alarms and charging water header pressure at P603.

4.603.A7 6-7 ROD ACCUMULATOR TROUBLE ATC Reports 2 or more rod accumulator trouble alarms to the SRO CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 25 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Updates the crew. Provides short transient brief.

SRO Directs ATC to scram the reactor per PPM 3.3.1 Scrams the reactor per immediate actions of 3.3.1-QC Reports EOP Entry on RPV Water Level Performs subsequent actions of PPM 3.3.1-QC ATC Starts to transfer RPV Level control to RFW-FCV-10A/B (Full steps Listed below, ATC does not need to wait for SRO direction to begin this lineup.)

SRO Enter PPM 5.1.1 RPV Control BOP Performs subsequent actions of PPM 3.3.1-QC CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 26 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station BOP Simultaneously works through Level / Pressure / Power legs of PPM 5.1.1 RPV Control.

Directs BOP to verify +13 Actuations (L-1)

Verifies overrides in section L-2 of PPM 5.1.1 RPV Control SRO Directs ATC to Using Feed and Condensate Directs BOP to control pressure (Per P-3) 800 psig to 1050 psig with DEH in automatic Directs ATC to perform PPM 3.3.1 Reactor Scram Verifies +13 Actuations BOP Sets a key parameter placard for pressure control and controls pressure as directed.

Sets a key parameter placard for level control Performs SOP-RFW-FCV-QC to transfer RPV level control to RFW-FCV-10A/B ATC CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 27 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ATC ATC Completes up to step 2.2.11. Evaluates steps 2.1.12 and 2.1.13 are not needed at this time.

Gives frequent level reports Informs the SRO that feedwater level control is in automatic on the start up flow control valves.

Examiner Note: ATC may supplement level control strategy with RCIC or HPCS at any time for the remainder of this scenario.

ATC May use RCIC to suppliment level control strategy per SOP-RCIC-INJECTION-QC CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 28 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ATC May use HPCS to suppliment level control strategy per SOP-HPCS-INJECTION-QC ATC Acknowledges 4.602.A5 2-8 SEC PRESS DP HIGH BOP Informs SRO of EOP entry on Reactor Building Differential Pressure Examiner Note: Supplemental Steps of ABN-ELEC-SM1/SM7 are provided below. The LOCA (trigger 5) is on a time delay based on taking the mode switch to shut down. Some of these actions may not be completed (and are not a required element) prior to the next Major Transient. Based on the crew response the lead evaluator can direct the reduction in the time delay for inserting trigger 17 at their discretion.

Gives a transient brief. Continues with ABN-ELEC-SM1/SM7 section 4.2.2 for SRO momentary or complete loss of SM-7.

Enters PPM 5.3.1 on Reactor Building Differential Pressure CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 29 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Directs BOP to perform subsequent actions of ABN-ELEC-SM1/SM7 BOP BOP CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 30 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Informs SRO that SGT is in operation and verifies 4.602.A5 2-8 SEC PRESS DP HIGH Clears Continues with ABN-ELEC-SM1/SM7 BOP CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 31 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station EVENT No. 5:

==

Description:==

Main Steam Line break aft of the flow restrictor / Broken Drywell Floor CONDITIONAL TRIGGER 17 - Trigger 17 is activated on Mode switch taken to Shutdown /

LOCA and drywell floor failure inserted on a 15-minute time delay.

LOCA - Main Steam Line Break aft of the flow restrictor. Leak size increases over a 20-minute Ramp. The rapid initial pressure transient on containment results in Drywell Floor Failure.

Examiner Note: Due to the size and type of leak with the drywell floor broken, Wetwell pressure will reach 2# rapidly so it is likely that the SRO will not have set a key parameter before this happens.

Time Pos. Applicants Actions or Behavior Monitors a rise in containment pressures.

Verifies DSIL trend and shape to determine that there is a leak in the drywell.

BOP Informs the SRO that there is a leak in the drywell.

Informs SRO when drywell pressure reaches 1.68#

Enters PPM 5.2.1 Primary Containment control and re-enters PPM 5.1.1 RPV Control.

Directs BOP to verify 1.68# actuations (L-1 of PPM 5.1.1)

On Re-entry into PPM 5.1.1 evaluates over-rides in L-2 (below)

SRO Directs ATC to secure RRC Pumps.

Begins to work through flow chart for PPM 5.2.1 Primary Containment Control - all legs.

Sets a key parameter of 285° in the drywell (Step DT-3 of PPM 5.2.1) and 2# in the Wetwell (Step P-5 of PPM 5.2.1).

(As noted, Wetwell likely already achieved 2#, in which case key parameter of 2# is not required).

Recognizes HPCS is not required for level control at this time. Closes HPCS-V-4 after 1.68# in the drywell to stop injection.

ATC Presses the stop pushbutton to secure RRC-P-1B per CRS direction. (RRC-P-1A is already tripped from previous faults).

Sets a key parameter placard as directed by CRS for Drywell temperature (285°)

and WW pressure (2#).

BOP Reports to SRO key parameter met, Wetwell pressure is 2# and up slow.

(Due to wetwell pressure reaching 2# quickly, BOP will be forced to perform 1.68#

verifications following initiation of WW sprays).

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 32 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station SRO Directs BOP to mark wetwell level in feet. (PPM 5.2.1)

BOP Provides the CRS with WW Level in feet Directs BOP to spray the wetwell with RHR-B.

SRO (PPM 5.2.1)

Sets a key parameter of 1.68# wetwell pressure to secure wetwell sprays.

Sprays the wetwell per SOP-RHR-SPRAY-WW-QC.

BOP Performs steps up to 2.1.4. Informs SRO that RHR-B is in Wetwell sprays.

Sets a key parameter placard of 1.68# in wetwell to secure WW sprays (step 2.1.4) as directed by SRO.

Continuous - Provides SRO with level reports. Continues with level control and ATC pressure control.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 33 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Examiner Note: Conditional Trigger Fails Bypass Valves Closed when reactor pressure is below 830#. The Crew can still low the pressure band using SRVs, however this will preclude the ability to anticipate Emergency Depressurization on Wetwell pressure.

Gives a crew brief May elect to reduce RPV pressure to reduce RCS leak rate and alow CBP injection per OI-15 Att. 5.1 SRO Directs BOP to control pressure at 550# at 50# per minutes using DEH in automatic per SOP-DEH-QC Attemps to change pressure per SOP-DEH-QC BOP Informs the SRO that Bypass Valves did not open. May attempt to manually open BOP BPV using SOP-DEH-QC Examiner Note: If this step is not performed at this time, it may be performed when the SRO Anticipates ED on Wetwell Pressure Per SOP-DEH-QC BOP CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 34 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station BOP Recognizes that Bypass valves failed to open, informs the SRO.

May direct pressure reduction using SRVs per OI-15 (500# - 600# Using SRVs)

NOTE: SRO May Direct ATC or BOP to perform this action based on availability SRO BOP Sets a new pressure band key parameter placard as directed by SRO. Lowers RPV or pressure using SRVs.

ATC SRO Directs a key Parameter of 12# in the wetwell BOP Sets a key Parameter of 12# in the wetwell CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 35 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station EVENT No. 6:

==

Description:==

FDR-V-4 Fails to Automatically close PRE-INSERTED MALFUNCTION FDR-V-4 Fails to automatically close. (Valve can be manually closed)

Perfroms 1.68# Verifications per ABN-FAZ-QC BOP Reports to SRO, Manually closed FDR-V-4 / May report other components listed above in red due to current plant conditions (but it is expected based on the previous events)

SRO Annotates failure of FDR-V-4 to automatically close.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 36 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station EVENT No. 7:

==

Description:==

Containment pressure continue to rise, at 12# Wetwell pressure attempts to spray the drywell are unsuccessful resulting in emergency depressurization required prior to reaching PSP.

PRE-INSERTED MALFUNCTION RHR-V-16B Fails as is (It will not open) - Prevents crew from performing Drywell Sprays at 12#,

Containment pressure continues to increase requiring emergency depressurization prior to PSP.

Examiner Note: This is the continuation of event 5.

ATC will continue to control RPV level (and pressure if turned over from BOP)

BOP will continue to monitor containment parameters, key parameter of 12# in the Wetwell previously set in event 5.

Continues to monitor containment parameters.

BOP Informs the SRO when the key parameter of 12# in the Wetwell is met.

Directs BOP to verify drywell temp is below DSIL.

SRO BOP Verifies drywell temp is below DSIL and reports to SRO.

SRO Directs BOP to mark Wetwell level in feet.

BOP Provides SRO with a WW Level report.

SRO Directs BOP to STOP RRC Pumps and Drywell Cooling Fans. (May recognize that RRC pums are already secured)

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 37 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station SRO Directs BOP to spray the Drywell with RHR-B Lines up to spray the Drywell using SOP-RHR-SPRAY-DW-QC BOP Reports RHR-V-16B Failure to SRO Directs equipment operator to manually open RHR-V-16B When directed to manually open RHR-V-16B, Wait 8 minutes and BOOTH ROLEPLAY: RHR-V-16B is mechanically bound and will not open May Anticipate ED (IF MANUAL BYPASS VALVE OPERATION WAS NOT ATTEMPTED EARLIER) per PPM 5.1.1 RPV Control override P-1 prior to receiving a response from the field operator.

Updates the crew, perfroms a brief.

SRO Directs BOP to fully open BPVs disregard cooldown rate.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 38 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Manually opens BPVs per SOP-DEH-QC BOP Recognizes failure of Bypass valves to open and informs the SRO.

Updates the crew, Emergency depressurization is required on Wetwell Pressure.

SRO CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 39 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Exits the pressure leg of PPM 5.1.1 RPV Control and enters PPM 5.1.3 Emergency RPV Depressurization per the override in PPM 5.1.1 P-1 Examiner Note: Drywell pressure may reach PSP prior to receiving notification back from the equipment operator. This is not a timed operator response, annotation of time blocks provided for post analysis of this scenario.

CRITICAL TASK 2 Time Start: ____________ = Crew verifies inability to restore and maintain WW Pressure below PSP.

(Crew has attempted to manually open RHR-V-16B and/or Equipment operator reports to control room that RHR-V-16B will not open.)

Time Stop: ____________= the 1st of 7 Safety Relief Valves (ADS preferred) are manually opened.

The critical task is considered met if any combination of 7 safety relief valves are opened within 15 minutes of reaching PSP.

Checks overrides in P-1 of PPM 5.1.3 Emergency RPV Depressurization.

Notes none of the override are applicable at this time.

SRO Performs analysis of Steps P-2 and P-3 of PPM 5.1.3 Emergency RPV Depressurization.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 40 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Directs BOP to prevent injection from RHR-B and RHR-C as pressure drops below 470#.

Examiner Note: The permissive for the automatic opening of RHR-V-42B and RHR-V-42C occurs when RPV pressure drops below 470#. At which time manually overriding the valves closed will prevent them from automatic injecting to the RPV.

Directs BOP to mark WW level in Feet. Per step P-4 of PPM 5.1.3 Emergency RPV Depressurization.

SRO BOP Provides SRO with a WW Level report.

Directs BOP to open 7 SRVs ADS preferred SRO CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 41 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station BOP Reports to SRO when 7 Safety Relief Valves are open.

Continues to control RPV water level above TAF during the pressure ATC transient.

TERMINATION CRITERIA: The scenario will be terminated when an Emergency Depressurization has been performed as indicated by 7 SRVs opened.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 42 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station SIMULATOR SETUP Unload simulator (between each scenario)

Verify in ILC load Load correct S/D Sequence (if necessary)

Reload simulator Reset to ILC Exam IC (reset, go to Run, reset again)

Test EQ machine at correct volume for OBE event Load SC-3 ILC 2021 Schedule file Validate that there are no unexpected annunciators or parameters out of band Verify pump running magnets Verify normally removed keys REMOVED except for: NONE Flag the following: NONE Place clearance tag on: NONE Protect the following: NONE Ensure that WMA-FN-51B is the running fan and WMA-FN-51A is the stand by fan.

Have copy of: SOP-HVAC/CR-OPS available for crew. (Pre-requisites initialed from previous crew)

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 43 of 44

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-3 (Rev 0 - 12/3/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station CREW TURNOVER Initial Conditions:

  • Reactor Power is 100%.
  • RWCU-DM-1B is out of service for scheduled backwash / precoat Shift Turnover:
  • Perform SOP-HVAC/CR-OPS to shift WMA Fans section 5.1 to place WMA-FN-51A in service and secure WMA-FN-51B.
  • Pre-requisites 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 have been previously completed by the off-going crew. (As listed below)
  • Radwaste Chilled Water System IS available and aligned to supply the cooling coils for the Control, Cable, and Critical Switchgear Room Air Handling Units, as required.
  • Standby Service Water System IS available and aligned, as required.
  • Control and Service Air System IS available to supply the air-operated control valves for the chilled water supply to the Cable Room Air Handling Unit
  • Plant Potable Water System IS available to supply makeup water to the Air Handling Unit Loop Seals and Emergency Chillers.
  • Fire Protection System IS available for the Control Room Emergency Filters.
  • Backwash / Precoat of RWCU-DM-1B is scheduled for the shift. Section 5.1 of SOP-RWCU-DEMIN was completed the previous shift (Removing Filter Demineralizers from Service and Placing in Hold.) RWCR Operator will commence backwash and precoat of RWCU-DM-1B following crew turnover.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Page 44 of 44

INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET SC-4 PROGRAM TITLE OPERATIONS TRAINING COURSE TITLE COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION SIMULATOR EXAMINATION The crew will continue power ascension using rods. Rod 26-51 is a stuck rod requiring the crew to take actions of ABN-ROD and SRO TS Call. There will be an overcurrent trip of SL-81, BOP will LESSON TITLE take immediate actions to ensure RCC cooling to the drywell, SRO will direct actions of ABN-ELEC-SM3/SM8. CAS-C-1B Will experience a sheared shaft, Operator actions will result in restoration of CAS pressure. An un-isolable steam leak develops in the RCIC Steam line requiring a manual reactor scram. Following the scram RCC-P-1A trips resulting in a complete loss of RCC, actions taken per ABN-RCC. A steam leak occurs the Main Steam tunnel. Inboard MSIVs fail to automatically close, The Crew must manually close Inboard MSIVs prior to max safe temperatures in 2 areas.

LENGTH OF LESSON 1.5 Hours Lesson Plan PQD Code Rev. No.

Simulator Guide PQD Code SC-4 Rev. No.

JPM PQD Code Rev. No.

Exam PQD Code Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Jeff Lux DATE 12/12/20 REVISED BY DATE VALIDATED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW DATE APPROVED DATE CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 1 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Facility: Columbia Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: 1 Generating Station Examiners: Operators:

Reactor startup is in progress with power at 11%. Plant recently entered Mode 1. RPV pressure is

~950 psig with DEH in Auto with Turbine Bypass Valves controlling pressure. TDRFP 'A' is in MDEM Initial Conditions:

on the Start Up Level Controller (In Automatic). TSW-P-1B is out of service for the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to allow work on discharge check valve TSW-V-52B After turnover, withdraw control rods as required to raise reactor power to ~15%. Next in-sequence Turnover: rod move is per RWM Page 24, Step 8 (Rod 34-51). Continuous rod withdrawal is permitted.

Reactivity Brief has been conducted. All Precautions and Limitations have been addressed.

Critical Tasks:

When a primary system is discharging into the secondary containment, manually scram the reactor before any CT-1 area exceeds its Maximum Safe Operating Temperature (MSOT).

When a primary system is discharging into the secondary containment, isolate the discharge before area CT-2 temperatures exceed Maximum Safe Operating Temperature (MSOT) in more than one area.

NOTE: An unintentional or unnecessary RPS or ESF actuation may result in the creation of a post-scenario Critical Task, if that actuation results in a significant plant degradation or significantly alters a mitigation strategy.

Event Trigger Event Type* Event Description No.

N (ATC / SRO) Withdraw control rods as required to raise reactor power to ~15%.

1 -

R (ATC / SRO)

C (ATC / SRO) Control Rod 26-51 is stuck. Crew enters ABN-ROD for control rod immovable under 2 - normal drive pressure. Crew attempts to increase drive water pressure to move the TS (SRO) rod and are unsuccessful. SRO Evaluates TS (LCO 3.1.3 A.1, A.2, A.4)

Overcurrent trip pf SL-81. BOP will take immediate actions of ABN-ELEC-SM3/SM8 3 TRG-3 C (BOP / SRO) to ensure RCC flow to the drywell. SRO will enter and direct actions of ABN-ELEC-SM3/SM8. BOP will ensure that two Main Steam tunnel fans are in operation.

CAS-C-1B will experience a shaft break, CAS-C-1A and CAS-C-1C will fail to auto 4 TRG-4 C (BOP) start. BOP will take manual actions to start CAS-C-1A and CAS-C-1C. SRO will enter ABN-CAS and set a key parameter for CAS pressure.

Steam leak develops upstream of RCIC-V-8 (RCIC Turbine Steam Isolation) in TIP Mezzanine area in the Reactor Building. RCIC-V-63 (RCIC Steam Supply Inboard 5 TRG-5 M (ALL)

Isolation) fails to completely close requiring manual scram before TIP Mezzanine area exceeds its Maximum Safe Operating Temperature (MSOT). (CT-1)

Following the scram, RCC-P-1A overcurrent trips. This requires entry into ABN-6 TRG-6 C (SRO/BOP) RCC. Due to RCC-P-1B and RCC-P-1C previously lost due to the trip pf Sl-81, this results in a complete loss of RCC flow.

OBE (Earthquake) results in piping rupture in Main Steam Tunnel. All inboard 7 TRG-7 M (ALL) MSIVs fail to automatically close on high tunnel temperature. Manual closure required to isolate the rupture before exceeding 2nd MSOT. (CT-2)

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 2 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Target Quantitative Attributes Actual Description OBE Earthquake with rupture in the Main Steam Tunnel.

Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2 Trip of RCC-P-1A (complete loss of RCC)

ABN-ELEC-SM3/SM8 loss of SL-81 / ABN-EARTHQUAKE Abnormal events (2-4) 4 on OBE / ABN-HELB for RCIC Steam leak / ABN-RCC RCIC Steam leak PPM 5.5.1 Scram required / OBE Major transients (1-2) 2 Earthquake with rupture in the Main Steam Tunnel PPM 5.1.1 (RPV Control); PPM 5.3.1 (Secondary EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 2 Containment Control)

Entry into a contingency EOP with substantive [NONE] (SC-1 and SC-3 contain EOP Contingency actions 0

actions ( 1 per scenario set) for this scenario set.)

Pre-identified Critical tasks ( 2) 2 See Critical Task Sheets.

SCENARIO 1

SUMMARY

Event 1 The scenario begins with the crew continuing to raise power to 15% with Control Rods. The next Rod in sequence is control rod 34-51 currently at position 12. ATC and BOP will monitor for proper neutron response (include LPRMs, APRMs, Bypass Valve position, etc. as specified in SOP-CR-MOVEMENT Normal Evolution, no triggers required.

Event 2 The crew will continue with the power ascension using control rods, Rod 26-51 is the next rod in sequence. When ATC attempts to withdraw Control Rod 26-51 it will not move (stuck rod). The crew will enter ABN-ROD section 4.3 and attempt to increase drive pressure in increments to withdraw the rod. These attempts will be unsuccessful. SRO will evaluate technical specifications.

LCO 3.1.3 Control Rod Operability: A.1 Verify stuck Rod Separation Criteria - Immediately AND A.2 Disarm the associated control rod drive - 2 Hours AND A.4 Perform SR 3.1.1.1 - 72 Hours NOTE: A.3 Is NOT applicable due to thermal power NOT greater than LPSP of the RWM.

Pre-Inserted Malfunction. MAL-RMC005-2651 for Rod 26-51 Stuck Event 3 The scenario continues with an overcurrent trip of SL-81. The BOP operator will take immediate actions per ABN-ELEC-SM3/SM8 to restore RCC flow to drywell loads. SRO will direct actions of ABN-ELEC-SM3/SM8. BOP will place Hotwell Level control on LIC-1 in automatic and ensure 2 Main Steam tunnel fans are operating.

TRIGGER-3 MAL-EPS002K, Overcurrent ground on SL-81.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 3 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Event 4 Following the loss of SL-81, CAS-C-1B will experience a shaft shear. CAS pressure will slowly lower as indicated on CAS-PI-1. CAS-C-1A and CAS-C-1C will fail to auto start. Th BOP operator will manually start CAS compressors per annunciator response procedure 4.840.A5.

Operator actions will be successful and CAS pressure will b restored to the normal operating value.

TRIGGER-4 PMP-CAS002B, Shaft break on CAS-C-1B and MAL-CAS005A / MAL-CAS005C for CAS-C-1A and C failure to auto start.

Event 5 A steam leak develops upstream of RCIC-V-8 (RCIC Turbine Steam Isolation) in TIP Mezzanine area in the Reactor Building. Annunciators P601.A2 2-2 (LEAK DET RWCU ROOMS TEMP HI-HI), P601.A3 2-5 (LEAK DET RWCU ROOMS TEMP HI-HI), P601.A2 1-1 (LEAK DET RCIC PIPE ROUTING AREA TEMP HI-HI), and P601.A3 1-8 (LEAK DET RCIC PIPE ROUTING AREA TEMP HI-HI) come in when the TIP Mezzanine area temperature reaches 160°F.

The annunciators are accompanied by generated isolation signals which cause the RWCU (Reactor Water Cleanup) system to isolate by closing pump suctions (RWCU-V-1 and RWCU-V-4) and then tripping the RWCU pumps.

The same generated isolation signals attempt to isolate the RCIC (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling) system by closing RCIC-V-8 (RCIC Turbine Steam Supply Isolation) which does close and RCIC-V-63 (RCIC Steam Supply Line Inboard Isolation Valve) which does not close (valve goes intermediate and stops). Any manual attempt to close RCIC-V-63 is unsuccessful.

CRS enters ABN-HELB (High Energy Line Break) and PPM 5.3.1 (Secondary Containment Control).

Manual scram is required before the TIP Mezzanine area temperature reaches the Maximum Safe Operating Temperature (MSOT) of 212°F. (CT-1)

TRIGGER-5 MAL-RCI006 to 100,000 ramped over 20 minutes, RCIC Steam Line Break.

MOV-RCI012F for RCIC-V-63 Fails as is (Open)

Event 6 Following the scram, RCC-P-1A overcurrent trips resulting in multiple cooling water low flow alarms or the Reactor Recirculation Pumps. Due to the previous loss of SL-81 this results in a complete loss of RCC. The crew will take actions of ABN-RCC to trip both Reactor Recirculation Pumps. The crew will then enter ABN-RRC-LOSS and take further actions to prevent thermal stratification by closing CRD-V-34.

TRIGGER-6 MOT-RCC001G to 100. Overcurrent trip of RCC-P-1A Event 7 Annunciators P851.S1 5-1 (OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE) followed by P601.A2 3-1 (LEAK DET MSL TUNNEL TEMP HI-HI) and P601.A3 1-7 (LEAK DET MSL TUNNEL TEMP HI-HI) occur as a result of an earthquake causing a steam leak in the Main Steam Tunnel.

The annunciators are accompanied by generated isolation signals which attempt to isolate the Main Steam system by closing all four (4) Inboard MSIVs (MS-V-22A through D) and all four (4)

Outboard MSIVs (MS-V-28A through D). All of the Outboard MSIVs automatically close but none of the Inboard MSIVs automatically close.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 4 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station As a minimum, MS-V-22D has to be manually closed to isolate the leak. Once isolated, Main Steam Tunnel temperatures start trending down thereby preventing a second Maximum Safe Operating Temperature (MSOT). (CT-2)

TRIGGER-7 MAL-SEIS004, OBE Earthquake. AOV-RRS003F(4F,5F,6F), Inboard MSIVs fail as is (Open). Event Creation Files used to remove AOV malfunctions when the operator manually attempts to close the inboard MSIVs.

TERMINATION CRITERIA: The scenario will be terminated when a manual scram has been inserted and the main steam leak in the Main Steam Tunnel has been isolated OR as directed by the Lead Examiner.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 5 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station CT-1 Critical Task Statement:

When a primary system is discharging into the secondary containment, manually scram the reactor before any area exceeds its Maximum Safe Operating Temperature (MSOT).

Safety Significance:

If a primary system is discharging into the secondary containment, one of three conditions must exist:

  • A primary system break cannot be isolated because the system is required for damage control or must be operated in PPM 5.1.1 through PPM 5.2.1.
  • No isolation valves exist upstream of a primary system break, or if isolation valves do exist, they cannot be closed because of some mechanical / electrical /

pneumatic failure.

  • The source of the discharge cannot be determined.

If any temperature in any one of the areas listed in Table 23 approaches its MSOT, adequate core cooling, containment integrity, safety of personnel, or continued operability of equipment required to perform EOP flowchart actions can no longer be assured. PPM 5.1.1, RPV Control, must be entered to make certain the reactor is scrammed. Scramming the reactor reduces decay heat levels and the energy that the RPV may be discharging to the secondary containment.

Initiating Cue:

Primary system is discharging into the secondary containment and any area is approaching its MSOT as indicated on P632 LD-MON-1A or 2A (as applicable) and P642 LD-MON-1B or 2B (as applicable).

Measurable Performance Standard:

Manual reactor scram initiated by placing the mode switch to Shut down or by pressing the Manual Scram pushbuttons.

Performance Feedback:

Reactor shutdown as indicated by APRMs downscale.

CT-2 CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 6 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Critical Task Statement:

When a primary system is discharging into the secondary containment, isolate the discharge before area temperatures exceed Maximum Safe Operating Temperature (MSOT) in more than one area.

Safety Significance:

Should secondary containment temperature continue to increase and exceed its MSOT in more than one area, the RPV must be Emergency Depressurized. To prevent an unwanted Emergency RPV depressurization, any discharge from the primary containment to secondary containment must be isolated before exceeding a second MSOT. Isolating the high energy system mitigates a direct and immediate threat to secondary containment integrity, protects equipment located in secondary containment, and protects personnel on and off the site.

Initiating Cue:

Primary system is discharging into the secondary containment and a second area is approaching its MSOT as indicated on P632 LD-MON-1A or 2A (as applicable) and P642 LD-MON-1B or 2B (as applicable).

Measurable Performance Standard:

Leak from primary to secondary containment is isolated through operator action.

Performance Feedback:

Primary system stops discharging into secondary containment and associated secondary containment temperatures start to lower.

EVENT No. 1:

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 7 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Examiner Note: For ease of use, this Simulator Guide only contains the applicable steps of the governing procedures which the crew is expected to perform within the time constraints of the scenario.

AS BRIEFED OR WHEN DIRECTED (Following Crew Turnover)

==

Description:==

Withdraw control rods as required to raise reactor power to ~15%.

Time Pos. Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: Following steps are from SOP-CR-MOVEMENT (Control Rod Movement). The crew may go through a dry run on communications expected per SOP-CR-MOVEMENT.

Examiner Note: The next 2 rods to withdraw in the startup sequence are as follows (each will be moved from position 12 to 48): 34-51 & 26-51. The 2nd rod withdrawn (26-51) is stuck.

Directs CRO1 to withdraw control rods as required to raise reactor power to CRS approximately 15%.

(5.1.1) References the Startup Rod Withdrawal sequence (Pull) sheets to identify next rod to withdrawal (control rod 34-51).

(5.1.2) Selects control rod to be moved (currently at position 12).

ATC CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 8 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ATC BOP Peer checks CRO1 during rod manipulations.

ATC / Monitors instruments during rod moves to include LPRMs, APRMs, Bypass Valve BOP position, etc. as specified in SOP-CR-MOVEMENT (Attachment 6.2).

EVENT No. 2:

==

Description:==

Pre-Inserted Malfunction 26-51 Stuck Rod MAL-RMC005-2651 Time Pos. Applicants Actions or Behavior (5.1.1) References the Startup Rod Withdrawal sequence (Pull) sheets to identify ATC next rod to withdrawal (control rod 26-51).

(5.1.2) Selects control rod to be moved (currently at position 12).

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 9 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ATC ATC Recognizes Rod 26-51 in not moving. Informs SRO Enters ABN-ROD SRO CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 10 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station SRO Refers to sections 4.4 - 4.8 of ABN-ROD. Proceeds to section 4.7 Immovable SRO Control Rod at Any Position (High Drive Water Pressure Method). Sections 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 do not apply because these methods are used for a rod that is full in.

SRO Directs ATC to perform section 4.7 of ABN-ROD for rod 26-51 ATC ATC CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 11 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ATC ATC ATC Informs SRO that the Rod did not Move, Proceeds with ABN-ROD If Directed to Coordinate with the control room to establish 395-405 psid CRD Differential Pressure.

BOOTH OPERATOR: Role Play I am already in that area and can coordinate when you are ready.

After the operator makes an adjustment to CRD-V-3. Report:

BOOTH OPERATOR: Role Play Based on IR-2 drive header pressure and cooling header pressure; Drive header/reactor differential pressure is 400psid.

NOTE: No trigger is required ATC ATC Informs SRO that the Rod did not Move, Proceeds with ABN-ROD CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 12 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ATC ATC ATC Informs the CRS to document the control rod 26-51 on attachment 7.1 Documents Control Rod 26-51 on Attachment 7.1. proceeds with Section 4.13 of ABN-ROD SRO Directs BOP to contact a filed operator to disarm the affected control rod drive.

Directs field operator to disarm the control rod drive for control rod xx-xx per SOP-BOP CRD-HCU section 5.6.

If Directed to Hydraulically Isolate the control rod drive for rod xx-xx, Wait 5 minutes and BOOTH OPERATOR: Role Play Rod 26-51 HCU has been isolated NOTE: No trigger is required; individual HCU Isolation valves are not modelled.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 13 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Evaluates TS Technical Specification Action Statement:

LCO 3.1.3: A.1 Verify stuck Rod Separation Criteria - Immediately SRO AND A.2 Disarm the associated control rod drive - 2 Hours AND A.4 Perform SR 3.1.1.1 - 72 Hours NOTE: A.3 Is NOT applicable due to thermal power NOT greater than LPSP of the RWM.

NOTE: Per TS Bases The separation criteria are not met if: a) the stuck control rod occupies a location adjacent to two "slow" control rods, b) the stuck control rod occupies a location adjacent to one "slow" control rod, and the one "slow" control rod is also adjacent to another "slow" control rod, or c) if the stuck control rod occupies a SRO location adjacent to one "slow" control rod when there is another pair of "slow" control rods adjacent to one another.

With no rods previously identified or annotated as slow, the SRO may declare separation criteria met.

SRO Calls SNE, Performs a crew brief.

EVENT No. 3:

AS BRIEFED OR WHEN DIRECTED (Following SRO TS Call for Stuck Rod)

BOOTH OPERATOR: Activate Trigger 3

==

Description:==

Overcurrent trip of SL-81 Time Pos. Applicants Actions or Behavior Responds to Annunciators 4.800.C5 1-5 BKR 8/81 TRIP 4.800.C5 2-5 BKR 8/81 GROUND BOP 4.602.A6 2-1 RECIRC A PUMP SEAL COOLING WTR FLOW LOW 4.602.A6 3-2 RECIRC A MOTOR WINDING COOLANT FLOW LOW 4.602.A6 1-5 RECIRC B PUMP SEAL COOLING WTR FLOW LOW CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 14 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station 4.602.A6 3-6 RECIRC B MOTOR WINDING COOLANT FLOW LOW Takes immediate actions Per ABN-ELEC-SM3/SM8 Informs SRO of SL-81 Overcurrent Trip.

Enters ABN-ELEC-SM3/SM8 Section 4.5 SRO Enters ABN-RCC Directs BOP to ensure Hotwell Level controller is controlling in AUTO per ABN-SRO ELEC-SM3/SM8 Directs BOP to verify 2 Steam tunnel fans are operating.

Verifies HWLC per ABN-ELEC-SM3/SM8 as directed.

BOP If Contacted to investigate the loss of SL-81, Wait 2 minutes and report BOOTH OPERATOR: Role Play SL-81 indicates an overcurrent lockout, No other indications are abnormal.

BOP Verifies Steam tunnel fans per ABN-ELEC-SM3/SM8 as directed.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 15 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station May Contact field operator to determine is 2 steam tunnel fans are running.

Examiner Note: RRA-FN-8 and RRA-FN-9 are started remotely by field operators, RRA-FN-21 Controls are at 4.812 and is started by BOP.

If Directed to verify 2 steam tunnel fans operating, wait 3 minutes and BOOTH OPERATOR: Role Play RRA-FN-8 in running, RRA-FN-9 Does not have power at the breaker and RRA-FN-21 is NOT currently running.

If Directed to start RRA-FN-21, Immediately respond BOOTH OPERATOR: Role Play I do not have controls for RRA-FN-21 in the field.

BOP Starts RRA-FN-21 Refers to ABN-RCC Section 4.2.

SRO Notes Step 4.2.3 (Stop RWCU) Can not be performed due to loss of power to SRO associated RWCU Valves.

Directs BOP / ATC to monitor RRC-P-1A(B) bearing, winding and seal temps.

SRO Evaluates Tech Specs / Performs crew brief.

May direct for the removal of Control Power fuses for RHR-P-2C (No Flowpath due to the loss of SL-81)

SRO May direct for the removal of Control Power fuses for RHR-P-2B (Lost Spray functions, but still has min flow and injection flow paths.)

If Directed to remove the control power fuses for RHR-P-2C, Wait 3 Minutes and INSERT TRIGGER 9 BOOTH OPERATOR: Role Play Control Power Fuses for RHR-P-2C have been removed.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 16 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station If Directed to remove the control power fuses for RHR-P-2B, Wait 3 Minutes and INSERT TRIGGER 10 BOOTH OPERATOR: Role Play Control Power Fuses for RHR-P-2B have been removed.

Examiner Note: Due to the timing and flow of this scenario, an SRO TS call is not expected for this event and is only required is determined by the lead evaluator. (Can also be used as a follow up question is desired)

Contacts production and work week manager for assistance.

Evaluates TS for the loss of SL-81 Technical Specification Action Statement:

LCO 3.8.7 A.1: Restore SL-81 in 8 Hours Per the table in the bases for 3.8.7-1 SRO CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 17 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station IF Control Power Fuses were removed for RHR-P-2C Then must also enter:

IF Control Power Fuses were removed for RHR-P-2C AND RHR-P-2B Then must also enter:

3.5.1C CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 18 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 19 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station EVENT No. 4:

AS BRIEFED OR WHEN DIRECTED (Following Completion of Actions for ABN-ELEC-SM3/SM8)

BOOTH OPERATOR: Activate Trigger 4

==

Description:==

CAS-C-1B Shaft break, CAS-C-1A and CAS-C-1C Fail to Auto start PMP-CAS001B / MAL-CAS005B / MALCAS005C Examiner Note: From time of trigger activation it takes about 2 minutes and 20 seconds before the first alarm (4.840.A5 8-6 STANDBY AIR COMP ON) is reached. It takes about 3 minutes and 30 seconds to reach the second alarm (4.840.A5 7-4 CONTROL AIR HDR PRESS LOW)

Time Pos. Applicants Actions or Behavior Responds to 4.840.A5 8-6 STANDBY AIR COMP ON.

BOP Manually starts CAS-C-1A by taking the control switch on P.840 to RUN Manually starts CAS-C-1C by taking the control switch on P.840 to RUN Informs SRO Manually started CAS-C-1A and 1C, Reports CAS pressure and trend.

SRO Refers to ABN-CAS BOP If Directed to verify the status of the Service Air Compressor, wait 2 minutes and BOOTH OPERATOR: Role Play The Service Air Compressor is running with all indications as expected.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 20 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station May Set a key parameter of 75# per ABN-CAS SRO Reports to SRO that CAS pressure is up slow and being restored by the standby BOP CAS compressors.

SRO Provides crew brief.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 21 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station EVENT No. 5:

AS BRIEFED OR WHEN DIRECTED (Following the start of stand by CAS compressors)

BOOTH OPERATOR: Activate Trigger 5

==

Description:==

Description:

Steam leak develops upstream of RCIC-V-8 (RCIC Turbine Steam Isolation) in TIP Mezzanine area in the Reactor Building. RCIC-V-63 (RCIC Steam Supply Inboard Isolation) fails to completely close requiring manual scram before TIP Mezzanine area exceeds its Maximum Safe Operating Temperature (MSOT). (CT-1)

Time Pos. Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: First annunciators P602-A5 2-8 (SEC PRESS P HIGH) and P601-A12 6-2 (LD RWCU / RCIC PIPE AREA TEMP HIGH) comes in ~4 minutes after event is triggered.

Annunciator P602-A5 2-8 (SEC PRESS P HIGH) comes in first followed by P601-A12 6-2 (LD RWCU / RCIC PIPE AREA TEMP HIGH) about a minute later.

Acknowledges annunciators 4.602-A5 2-8 (SEC PRESS P HIGH) and P601-A12 6-2 (LD RWCU / RCIC PIPE AREA TEMP HIGH) informs the SRO.

Continues with ARP for 4.602-A5 2-8 BOP Enters PPM 5.3.1 (Secondary Containment Control) on high Secondary containment pressure above 0.0 in. WC.

SRO CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 22 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Evaluates overrides in SC-1 of PPM 5.3.1, Currently none are applicable.

SRO Refers to Tech Spec 3.6.4.1.

Examiner Note: The CRS will begin to evaluate Tech Specs but then change priorities when RCIC high temperature alarm is received. Tech Spec evaluation not credited for scenario.

Acknowledges annunciator P601-A12 6-2 (LD RWCU / RCIC PIPE AREA TEMP HIGH). Takes actions of 4.601.A12 6-2 BOP If directed to investigate for a possible steam leak, Wait 1 minute and report BOOTH OPERATOR Role Play The Rx Bldg. 501 TIP Mezzanine area is very warm and humid. I feel its unsafe to investigate further. Im leaving the area.

Enters ABN-HELB, Performs applicable actions SRO Direct BOP to Evacutate all non essentialpersonnel.

(4.2.1) Evacuates all non-emergency personnel from the affected building per PPM BOP 13.5.1. Refer to form 26048 for evacuation (Public Address Emergency Message Format - Localized Evacuation).

BOP Continues to monitor temperatures on LD-MON CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 23 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station (1 & 2) Observes rising temperature on LD-MON-1A (Drop A1-5) on H13-P632 and on LD-MON-1B (Drop A1-5) on H13-P642. Both represent the TIP Mezzanine area in RB 501 where steam leak resides.

Plots temperature trends on RB Area Temps (paper) log and updates CRS on temperature trends.

Examiner Note: The steam leak upstream of RCIC-V-8 (RCIC Turbine Steam Isolation) causes a high temperature in the TIP Mezzanine area in Rx Bldg. 501. (see below)

As TIP Mezzanine temperature rises, the following annunciators will come in resulting in RCIC and RWCU isolation signals when temperature reaches 160°F (alarm set point):

  • P601-A2 1-1 & P601-A3 1-8 (LD RCIC PIPE ROUTING AREA TEMP HI-HI)
  • P601-A2 2-2 & P601-A3 2-5 (LD-RWCU ROOMS TEMP HI-HI) (duplicate actions)

(5) Enters PPM 5.3.1 (Secondary Containment Control) on Secondary Containment SRO high temperature of 160°F (alarm level) when it occurs (see EOP Table 23 above).

(EOP Steps SC-2 & SC-4)

Acknowledges annunciators for Area temp HI-HI.

4.601.A2 1-1 LEAK DET RCIC PIPE ROUTING AREA TEMP HI-HI 4.601.A3 1-8 LEAK DET RCIC PIPE ROUTING AREA TEMP HI-HI 4.601.A2 2-2 LEAK DET RWCU ROOMS TEMP HI-HI BOP 4.601.A3 2-5 LEAK DET RWCU ROOMS TEMP HI-HI 4.601.A11 6-1 RCIC DIV 2 OUT OF SERVICE 4.601.A4 1-5 RCIC TURBINE TRIP 4.601.A4 6-8 RCIC DIV 1 OUT OF SERVICE CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 24 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Performs Actions Per 4.601.A2 1-1 or 4.601.A3 1-8 (Duplicate Responses)

NOTES RCIC-V-63, 76 Do not have power and did not close.

BOP Reports to SRO that RCIC steam supply could not be isolated. (EOP Step SC-9)

May Direst Field Operator to manually close RCIC-V-63 If directed to manually close RCIC-V-63, Wait 3 minutes and report BOOTH OPERATOR Role Play RCIC-V-63 is mechanically bound and will not close BOP Evaluates PPM 5.3.1 RCIC Can not be Isolated and is discharging into SC SRO CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 25 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station SRO Establishes a Key Parameter for TIP Mezzanine area temperature below the Max Safe value of 212°F (EOP Steps SC-13 & SC-14)

Trends TIP Mezzanine temperature as Key Parameter and notifies CRS when BOP value is reached.

When notified Key Plant Parameter has been reached, updates the crew on plant SRO conditions then enters PPM 5.1.1 (RPV Control).

Examiner Note: CRITICAL TASK 1 When a primary system is discharging into the secondary containment, manually scram the reactor before any area exceeds its Maximum Safe Operating Temperature (MSOT).

Time Start: ____________ = SRO Directs manual reactor scram Time Stop: ____________= MSOT is exceeded in 1st area.

SRO Directs CRO1 to scram the reactor.

ATC Performs subsequent actions of PPM 3.3.1-QC CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 26 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Notes level control is already on RFW-FCV-10A/B. Only performs steps of SOP-RFW-FCV-QC necessary to control RPV Level.

ATC 2.1.6 d. Control Turbine speed as required. May place RFW-LIC-620 to control level in manual.

Sets a key parameter placard for level control Simultaneously works through Level / Pressure / Power legs of PPM 5.1.1 RPV Control.

Directs BOP to verify +13 Actuations (L-1)

NOTE: Due to low power levels +13 my or may not be reached based on initial SRO ATC response Verifies overrides in section L-2 of PPM 5.1.1 RPV Control Directs ATC to Using Feed and Condensate.

SRO Directs BOP to control pressure (Per P-3) 800 psig to 1050 psig with DEH in automatic. (May direct CRO-2 to establish a new pressure band of 550# psig with DEH in automatic to reduce the driving head of the leak into Secondary Containment).

Directs ATC to perform PPM 3.3.1 Reactor Scram Verifies +13 Actuations (If Directed)

Sets a key parameter placard for pressure control and controls pressure as BOP directed. (Step 3.2.2 of PPM 3.3.1-QC)

If Directed to lower the pressure band per SOP-DEH-QC CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 27 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station SRO Calls Production / WW manager for assistance and conducts crew brief.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 28 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station EVENT No. 6:

AS BRIEFED OR WHEN DIRECTED (Following the scram after the plant has been stabilized)

BOOTH OPERATOR: Activate Trigger 6

==

Description:==

Overcurrent Trip of RCC-P-1A MOT-RCC001G Examiner Note: Continuous monitoring: This event compounds the previous loss of SL-81.

RCC-P-1A trip results in a complete loss of RCC flow.

Time Pos. Applicants Actions or Behavior 4.820.B1 7-1 RCC PUMP AMOTOR OL TRIP 4.602.A6 2-1 RECIRC A PUMP SEAL COOLING WTR FLOW LOW 4.602.A6 3-2 RECIRC A MOTOR WINDING COOLANT FLOW LOW BOP 4.602.A6 1-5 RECIRC B PUMP SEAL COOLING WTR FLOW LOW 4.602.A6 3-6 RECIRC B MOTOR WINDING COOLANT FLOW LOW Recognizes complete loss of RCC flow. Reports to SRO Enters ABN-RCC-LOSS SRO Reads the note and procedds to sesction 4.1 of ABN-RCC-LOSS.

Recgnizes plant was previously scrammed and marks that step completed, Directs ATC to stop both RRC pumps.

STOPs RRC-P-1A and RCC-P-1B using the stop pushbuttons on 4.602 Apron.

ATC Reports to SRO that both RRC pumps are secured.

SRO Per ABN-RCC-LOSS CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 29 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Marks step complete, RWCU was previously lost due to the trip of SL-81 SRO Directs BOP to take all 3 RCC pumps to Pull to Lock Places RCC-P-1A, RCC-P-1B and RCC-P-1C in the PTL position from 4.820 BOP apron section as directed.

Per ABN-RCC-LOSS SRO Enters ABN-RRC-LOSS and directs BOP to monitor Drywell pressure. (May set a key parameter. But this is not required as the plant is already scrammed)

BOP Monitors Drywell pressure as directed.

Per ABN-RRC-LOSS (directed from ABN-RCC-LOSS)

SRO Enters ABN-CORE Examiner Note: Actions of ABN-CORE are not included in this write up. There are no substantial actions of ABN-CORE to mitigate this event.

SRO Per ABN-RRC-LOSS CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 30 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station SRO Recognizes scram can not be reset at this time, Directs BOP to Close CRD-V-34.

Directs BOP to control reactor pressure in batches per ABN-RRC-LOSS Contacts field operator to close CRD-V-34 BOP Controls reactor pressure as directed.

If directed to manually close CRD-V-34, Wait 3 minutes and ACTIVATE TRIGGER 8 and BOOTH OPERATOR Role Play CRD-V-34 is closed CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 31 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station EVENT No. 7:

AS BRIEFED OR WHEN DIRECTED (After plant is stabilized and actions of ABN-RCC-LOSS and ABN-RRC-LOSS have been directed and taken)

BOOTH OPERATOR: Activate Trigger 6

==

Description:==

OBE (Earthquake) results in piping rupture in Main Steam Tunnel. All inboard MSIVs fail to automatically close on high tunnel temperature. Manual closure required to isolate the rupture before exceeding 2nd MSOT. (CT-2)

Time Pos. Applicants Actions or Behavior Responds to the OBE Earthquake felt in the main control room, acknowledges 4.851.S1 2-5 MINIMUM SEISMIC EARTHQUAKE EXCEEDED and 4.851.S1 5-1 BOP OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE EXCEEDED.

Refers CRS to ABN-EARTHQUAKE.

Enters ABN-EARTHQUAKE.

(4.2) Verify adequate systems are available for safe shutdown and cooldown of SRO reactor.

Dircts BOP to make announcement and perform subsequent actions per ABN-EARTHQUAKE.

Performs actions of ABN-EARTHQUAKE as directed by SRO.

BOP CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 32 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station BOP When contacted as SAS, immediately:

BOOTH ROLEPLAY: The announcement for ABN-EARTHQUAKE will be repeated on the security channel.

Directs ATC and BOP to perform Panel walkdowns per ABN-EARTHQUAKE SRO ATC Perform Panel Walkdowns as directed BOP Continues with subsequent actions of ABN-EARTHQUAKE BOP Directs Field operators to inspect the fuel pool for damage (Step 4.11), Perform watch station plant walkdowns (Step 4.15), and Inspect the 115Kv and 230Kv lines from the plant to Ashe and Benton substations (Step 4.17.)

When contacted as Field Operator to inspect the fuel pool for damage, Wait 2 minutes and:

BOOTH ROLEPLAY: The Spent Fuel Pool has no apparent damage CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 33 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station When contacted as Field Operator to Inspect the 115Kv and 230Kv lines from the plant to Ashe and Benton substations for damage, Wait 5 minutes and:

BOOTH ROLEPLAY: The 115Kv and 230Kv lines from the plant to Ashe and Benton substations have no apparent damage Examiner Note: Annunciator 601.A3 3-8 (LEAK DET MSL TUNNEL DT HIGH) comes in first quickly followed by annunciators 601.A3 1-7 & 601.A2 3-1 (LEAK DET MSL TUNNEL TEMP HIGH). CRO-2 should address the higher priority alarms.

Acknowledges annunciators 4.601.A3 1-7 / 601.A2 3-1 (LEAK DET MSL TUNNEL TEMP HIGH) and informs CRS.

BOP Informs CRS of alarming points and trend on MSL D (MSL Tunnel GT 80°F)

(which is a PPM 5.3.1 (Secondary Containment Control) entry condition)

Re-enters PPM 5.3.1 (Secondary Containment Control) on MSL Tunnel DT GT 80°F (Table 22)

SRO Establishes a Key Parameter for Main Steam Tunnel Max Safe temperature of 320°F Examiner Note: CRITICAL TASK 2 When a primary system is discharging into the secondary containment, isolate the discharge before area temperatures exceed Maximum Safe Operating Temperature (MSOT) in more than one area.

Time: ____________ = MSIVs are manually closed.

Time Stop: ____________= Second MSOT is reached.

Note: This is not a timed task; the critical task is considered met if all MSIVs are manually closed prior to reaching the second MSOT.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 34 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station Determines the status of the NSSSS Group 1 isolation which should have occurred:

  • Recognizes that MS-V-22A through D failed to automatically close based on Group 1 isolation signal.

Attempts to close MS-V-22A through D and notes that all valves closed.

BOP Informs the CRS that MS-V-22A through D did not automatically close but were able to be closed manually.

Takes MSIV switches for those MSIVs that automatically shut to the Closed position Reports that Main Steam Tunnel temperature has turned and is starting to lower and that the leak appears to be isolated.

TERMINATION CRITERIA: The scenario will be terminated when a manual scram has been inserted and the main steam leak in the Main Steam Tunnel has been isolated OR as directed by the Lead Examiner.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 35 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station SIMULATOR SETUP Unload simulator (between each scenario)

Verify in ILC load Load correct S/D Sequence (Executive / Site Specific /

RWM Seq / Click on A2C25SIM)

Reload simulator Reset to IC-130 (reset, go to Run, reset again)

Test EQ machine at correct volume for OBE event Load Scenario 4 Schedule file Load Scenario 4 Event file (if not loaded automatically)

Validate that there are no unexpected annunciators or parameters out of band Verify pump running magnets Verify normally removed keys REMOVED except for: NONE Flag the following: NONE Place clearance tag on: TSW-P-1B Protect the following: TSW-P-1A Provide the marked up copy of the SC-4 Start Up Pull sheets AA2C25SIM Stopwatch for crew use during surveillance.

Provide a marked of copy of Startup Flow chart R88 P1-pdf CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 36 of 37

Appendix D NRC SCENARIO SC-4 (Rev 0 - 06/16/2020) FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station CREW TURNOVER Initial Conditions:

  • Reactor Power is ~10%
  • TDRFP A is in MDEM on the Start Up Level Control Valves (In Automatic) controlling reactor water level.
  • TSW-P-1B is out of service for the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to allow work on discharge check valve TSW-V-52B.

Shift Turnover:

  • After turnover, withdraw control rods as required to raise reactor power to ~15%. Next in-sequence rod move is per RWM Page 24, Step 24-8 (Rod 34-51). Continuous rod withdrawal is permitted. (Rod Sequence sheets already verified correct by SM / SNE)
  • Reactivity Brief has been conducted.
  • All Precautions and Limitations have been addressed.

CGS 2021 NRC Exam Scenario 4 Page 37 of 37