ML17081A534

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9-Columbia-2017-02 Final Operating Test
ML17081A534
Person / Time
Site: Columbia Energy Northwest icon.png
Issue date: 03/09/2017
From: Vincent Gaddy
Operations Branch IV
To:
Energy Northwest
References
Download: ML17081A534 (352)


Text

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline (Rev 2 - 01/23/17) Form ES-301-1 Facility: Columbia Generating Station Date of Examination: 2/27/17 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: 1 Administrative Topic (see Note) Type Describe activity to be performed Code*

PERFORM ALTERNATE POWER CALCULATION WORKSHEET A-1 Conduct of Operations (N)(R)

Description:

Determines that the Core Thermal Power Validation is satisfactory by performing K/A: 2.1.20 (4.6 / 4.6) PPM 9.3.1 Attachment 7.4 (Alternate Power Calculation Worksheet).

MAIN TURBINE CHANGE OF LOAD RATE A-2 DETERMINATION Conduct of Operations (M)(P)(R)

Description:

Determine the Main Turbine Load K/A: 2.1.25 (3.9 / 4.2) Change Recommendation when raising Main Turbine load from 12% to 70%.

A-3 VALIDATE FUSE INSTALLATION PER PPM 1.3.47 (RO)

Equipment Control (N)(R)

K/A: 2.2.41 (3.5 / 3.9)

Description:

For the RO Candidate, given circumstance requiring fuse replacement and OPEX AR 00314141 an electrical print, determine correct replacement fuse and provide justification.

DETERMINE RWP/ALARA TASK TO USE A-4 FOR CLEARANCE TASK Radiation Control (N)(R)

Description:

When hanging a Clearance Order K/A: 2.3.7 (3.5 / 3.6) tag, determination the proper RWP and ALARA Task to sign on to to accomplish the task.

NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).

  • Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs) (0)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1) (4)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected) (1)

Page 1 of 1

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline (Rev 2 - 02/13/17) Form ES-301-1 Facility: Columbia Generating Station Date of Examination: 2/27/17 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: 1 Administrative Topic (see Note) Type Describe activity to be performed Code*

DETERMINE ACTION BASED ON PLANT A-5 CONDITIONS AND PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE Conduct of Operations (D)(R)

Description:

Given equipment status and an K/A: 2.1.7 (4.4 / 4.7) electrical bus lockout, determine required operator action based on existing plant conditions.

DETERMINE THE OPERABILITY OF THE SLC SYSTEM A-6 Conduct of Operations (M)(R)

Description:

Given OSP-INST-H101 (Shift and Daily Instrument Checks for Modes 1, 2 & 3),

K/A: 2.1.25 (3.9 / 4.2) and CSP-SLC-M101 (Chemistry SLC Surveillance), determine the operability status of the Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System.

VALIDATE FUSE INSTALLATION PER PPM A-7 1.3.47 (SRO)

Equipment Control (N)(R)

Description:

For the SRO Candidate, given K/A: 2.2.41 (3.5 / 3.9) circumstance requiring fuse replacement and an electrical print, validate that the correct OPEX AR 00314141 replacement fuse was chosen and provide justification.

ESTIMATE MAIN CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR GROSS GAMMA ACTIVITY RATE A-8 AND DETERMINE ACTIONS Radiation Control (D)(P)(R)

Description:

Estimate Main Condenser air ejector Gross gamma activity rate and K/A: 2.3.11 (3.8 / 4.3) determine that a reactor power reduction is required to maintain Main Condenser Gross activity LT the LCO 3.7.5 limit.

A-9 COMPLETE CLASSIFICATION NOTIFICATION FORM (CNF) FOR SAE Emergency Plan (M)(R)

Description:

Given a dose projection printout, K/A: 2.4.41 (2.9 / 4.6) classify the event and complete Classification Notification Form. (Time Critical)

Page 1 of 2

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline (Rev 2 - 02/13/17) Form ES-301-1 NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).

  • Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 4 for SROs) (2)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1) (3)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected) (1)

Page 2 of 2

JPM A-1 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR INITIAL TRAINING COURSE TITLE ADMIN JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE PERFORM ALTERNATE POWER CALCULATION WORKSHEET (Admin)

LESSON LENGTH .5 HRS MAXIMUM STUDENTS 1 INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED Lesson Plan PQD Code Rev. No.

Simulator Guide PQD Code Rev. No.

JPM PQD Code A-1 Rev. No. 2 Exam PQD Code Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 01/31/17 REVISED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 02/09/17 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY: DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY: DATE APPROVED BY: DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use.

MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Number of Revision Pages By Date Approval JPM SETUP Simulator ICs; Malfunctions; Triggers; Overrides:

N/A Setup Instructions:

Print a copy of Attachment 7.4, Alternate Power Calculation Worksheet, from PPM 9.3.1, Manual Core Heat Balance.

Have a calculator available.

JPM Instructions:

Verify current procedure against JPM. Revise JPM if any steps have changed.

Tools/Equipment: Calculator Safety Items: None Task Number: Validation Time: 15 minutes Alternate Path: No Time Critical: No PPM

Reference:

PPM 9.3.1 Rev 15 Location: Any NUREG 1123 Ref: 2.1.20 4.6 / 4.6 Performance Method: Perform Task Standard:

Determine that the Core Thermal Power Validation is satisfactory by properly calculating CTPTFSP to be between 87.6% and 87.7% ( 87.6% and 87.7%) and determining that CTPCALC - CTPTFSP is 2%.

A-1 Rev. 2 Page 2 of 8

JPM CHECKLIST INITIAL A Manual Core Heat Balance was performed in accordance with PPM 9.3.1, Manual Core Heat Balance.

CONDITIONS:

The following parameters are provided to you from PPM 9.3.1, Attachment 7.1, DATA Collection Form, and PPM 9.3.1, Attachment 7.2, Calculation of Reactor Core Power.

  • CTPCALC = 87.6%
  • MS-PI-20B (Turbine First Stage Pressure)(line 13c of attachment 7.1) = 559.2 psig
  • B041 (Total Steam Flow)(line 14b of attachment 7.1) = 12.9 Mlb/hr INITIATING You have been directed to perform PPM 9.3.1 Attachment 7.4, Alternate Power Calculation Worksheet, in order to validate the CUE: calculation. Select answer below and return sheet to examiner when task is complete.

A-1 Rev. 2 Page 3 of 8

  • Items are Critical Steps JPM Start Time: _____________

Time JPM Task Element Evaluators Cue Performance Standard Results Step Step 1 1 Record the Percent Core Thermal Records CTPCALC (87.6%) S/U Power calculated on Attachment 7.2 line 27.

Step 2 If the calculated percent CTP is GT 96% then plot the calculated percent CTP on the following figure as a Recognizes that CTP is less than 2 function of the Turbine First Stage S/U 96% and N/As the step.

Pressure computer point X365, T017 or panel indication from MS-PI-20B recorded on attachment 7.1 line 13a, 13b or 13c.

Step 3 If the calculated percent CTP is GT Recognizes that CTP is less than 3 96% and is within the acceptable area S/U 96% and N/As the step.

then the CTP validation is satisfactory.

  • Items are Critical Steps A-1 Rev. 2 Page 4 of 8

JPM Time Step Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step 4 Substitutes turbine first stage Accept value within the range of pressure provided in the initial 87.6% to 87.7% for CTPTFSP.

If the calculated CTP is LE 96% then conditions into the formula (MS-PI-complete the following calculation to ( 87.6% and 87.7%)

20B):

calculate the expected percent CTP based on the Turbine First Stage CTPTFSP = 11.7 + (0.1358

  • 559.2)

Pressure computer point X365, T017 4 Determines that: S / U*

or panel indication from MS-PI-20B recorded on attachment 7.1 line 13a, CTPTFSP = 87.64%

13b or 13c. Determines that:

CTPCALC (87.6%) - CTPTFSP (87.64%) = -0.04%.

Step 5 If the calculated percent CTP is GT 20% and LT 30% then verify the difference between the calculated Recognizes that power is higher than 5 percent CTP and the Turbine First S/U 30% and N/As the step.

Stage Pressure percent CTP is LE to 7%. If the difference is within 7%

then the CTP validation is satisfactory.

  • Items are Critical Steps A-1 Rev. 2 Page 5 of 8

JPM Time Step Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step 6 Identifies that the calculated value is within the required band as follows:

If the calculated percent CTP is GE 30% and LE 96% then verify the difference between the calculated CTPCALC (87.6%) - CTPTFSP 6 percent CTP and the Turbine First (87.64%) = -0.04%. S / U*

Stage Pressure percent CTP is LE to 2%. If the difference is within 2% Determines that -0.04% is within the then the CTP validation is required 2% difference.

satisfactory.

Termination Criteria: Student hands completed Student JPM Answer Sheet to the examiner.

JPM Stop Time: _____________

Transfer the following to the Results of JPM page: Any Unsat step - indicate if step was a Critical Step; JPM completion time.

A-1 Rev. 2 Page 6 of 8

RESULTS OF JPM:

Examinee (Please Print): ______________________________________________

Evaluator (Please Print): ______________________________________________

Task Standard:

Determine that the Core Thermal Power Validation is satisfactory by properly calculating CTPTFSP to be between 87.6% and 87.7% ( 87.6% and 87.7%) and determining that CTPCALC - CTPTFSP is 2%.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Evaluator's Signature: Date:

A-1 Rev. 2 Page 7 of 8

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

A Manual Core Heat Balance was performed in accordance with PPM 9.3.1, Manual Core Heat Balance.

The following parameters are provided to you from PPM 9.3.1, Attachment 7.1, DATA Collection Form, and PPM 9.3.1, Attachment 7.2, Calculation of Reactor Core Power.

  • CTPCALC = 87.6%
  • MS-PI-20B (Turbine First Stage Pressure)(line 13c of attachment 7.1) = 559.2 psig
  • B041 (Total Steam Flow)(line 14b of attachment 7.1) = 12.9 Mlb/hr Initiating Cue:

You have been directed to perform PPM 9.3.1 Attachment 7.4, Alternate Power Calculation Worksheet, in order to validate the calculation.

Select answer below and return sheet to examiner when task is complete.

CTP validation was / was not (circle one) satisfactory.

A-1 Rev. 2 Page 8 of 8

Number: 9.3.1 Use Category: CONTINUOUS Major Rev: 015 Minor Rev: N/A

Title:

Manual Core Heat Balance Page: 36 of 42 ALTERNATE POWER CALCULATION WORKSHEET

1. Record the Percent Core Thermal Power calculated on Attachment 7.2 line 27. Initial 87.6%

CTPCALC = Calculated Percent Core Thermal Power = ____________

2. If the calculated percent CTP is GT 96% then plot the calculated percent CTP on the following figure as a function of the Turbine First Stage Pressure computer point X365, T017 or panel indication from MS-PI-20B recorded on attachment 7.1 line 13a, 13b or N/A 13c.

COLUMBIA ALTERNATE CTP EXPECTED 100.5 HEAT BALANCE VALIDATION FAILED 100.0

. 99.5 99.0 P E R C E N T C T P F R O M H E A T B A L A N C E (% )

98.5 H E A T B A L A N C E V A L ID A T IO N F A IL E D 98.0 97.5 ACCEPTABLE 97.0 96.5 96.0 95.5 95.0 94.5 94.0 93.5 93.0 600 605 610 615 620 625 630 635 640 645 650 655 660 665 670 TURBINE FIRST STAGE PRESSURE (PSIG) .

Attachment 7.4, Alternate Power Calculation Worksheet

Number: 9.3.1 Use Category: CONTINUOUS Major Rev: 015 Minor Rev: N/A

Title:

Manual Core Heat Balance Page: 37 of 42

3. If the calculated percent CTP is GT 96% and is within the acceptable area then the CTP N/A validation is satisfactory.
4. If the calculated CTP is LE 96% then complete the following calculation to calculate the expected percent CTP based on the Turbine First Stage Pressure computer point X365, T017 or panel indication from MS-PI-20B recorded on attachment 7.1 line 13a, 13b or Initial 13c.

CTPTFSP = 11.7 + ( 0.1358 * (Turbine First Stage Pressure) ) = % CTP 559.2 psig ) = _________

CTPTFSP = 11.7 + ( 0.1358 * (____________) 87.64 % CTP CTPCALC-TFSP = CTPCALC - CTPTFSP = _____87.6% 87.64%

__ ___ __ = _____-0.04%

5. If the calculated percent CTP is GT 20% and LT 30% then verify the difference between the calculated percent CTP and the Turbine First Stage Pressure percent CTP is LE to N/A 7%. If the difference is within 7% then the CTP validation is satisfactory.
6. If the calculated percent CTP is GE 30% and LE 96% then verify the difference between the calculated percent CTP and the Turbine First Stage Pressure percent CTP is LE to Initial 2%. If the difference is within 2% then the CTP validation is satisfactory.
7. If the CTP validation based on the Turbine First Stage Pressure was satisfactory in the Initial previous steps then the following steps are not required and may be marked N/A.

Candidate does not have to continue 8. If the Steam Flow computer point X132 was recorded on attachment 7.1 line 14a then N/A past step convert the value to MLB/HR with the following equation.

7, but may elect to do so.

Total Steam Flow = X132 / 1x106 = ______________ / 1x106 = _____________ Mlb/hr

9. If the Steam Flow computer point B041 or panel indication from RFW-FR-607 was Initial recorded on attachment 7.1 line 14b or 14c then record the value in MLB/HR below.

Total Steam Flow = B041 or RFW-FR-607 = _____________ 12.9 Mlb/hr

10. If the calculated percent CTP is GT 96% then plot the calculated percent CTP on the following figure as a function of the Total Steam Flow recorded above. N/A Attachment 7.4, Alternate Power Calculation Worksheet

Number: 9.3.1 Use Category: CONTINUOUS Major Rev: 015 Minor Rev: N/A

Title:

Manual Core Heat Balance Page: 38 of 42 COLUMBIA ALTERNATE CTP EXPECTED 100.5 HEAT BALANCE VALIDATION FAILED 100.0

. 99.5 99.0 P E R C E N T C T P F R O M H E A T B A L A N C E (% )

98.5 H E A T B A L A N C E V A L ID A T IO N F A IL E D 98.0 97.5 ACCEPTABLE 97.0 96.5 96.0 95.5 95.0 94.5 94.0 93.5 93.0 13.25 13.50 13.75 14.00 14.25 14.50 14.75 TOTAL STEAM FLOW (MLB/HR) .

11. If the calculated percent CTP is GT 96% and is within the acceptable area then the CTP N/A validation is satisfactory.

Attachment 7.4, Alternate Power Calculation Worksheet

Number: 9.3.1 Use Category: CONTINUOUS Major Rev: 015 Minor Rev: N/A

Title:

Manual Core Heat Balance Page: 39 of 42

12. If the calculated CTP is LE 96% then complete the following calculation to calculate the expected percent CTP based on the Total Steam Flow from lines 2 or 3. Initial CTPws = -4.6 + ( 8.7 * (Total Steam Flow) ) - ( 0.1 * (Total Steam Flow)2 ) = % CTP 12.9 CTPws = -4.6 + ( 8.7 * (__________) 12.9

) - ( 0.1 * (__________) 2 90.99

) = _________  % CTP 87.6%

CTPCALC-WS = CTPCALC - CTPws = __________ 90.99% = __________

- __________ -3.39%

13. If the calculated percent CTP is GT 20% and LT 30% then verify the difference between the calculated percent CTP and the Steam Flow expected percent CTP is LE to 5%. If the N/A difference is within 5% then the CTP validation is satisfactory.
14. If the calculated percent CTP is GE 30% and LE 96% then verify the difference between the calculated percent CTP and the Steam Flow expected percent CTP is LE to 4%. If the Initial difference is within 4% then the CTP validation is satisfactory.

NOTE: The Alternate Power Calculations can both fail due to operation with the Feed Water Temperature reduced below the normal value. This is a normal and expected condition during FFTR operation or with a #5 or #6 Feed Water Heater out of service.

15. If the CTP validation based on the Turbine First Stage Pressure and Total Steam Flow are both NOT satisfactory then the discrepancy should be investigated to determine the cause.
a. Review the calculations on Attachment 7.2 for potential math errors.
b. Review the input data on Attachment 7.1 for potential input data errors.
c. If the feed water temperature is more than 10 °F below the normal Feed Water Temperature displayed on the chart on the following page then no additional action is required. The Alternate Power Calculations are failed due to the Feed Water Temperature.
16. If the CTP validation based on the Turbine First Stage Pressure and Total Steam Flow are both NOT satisfactory and the cause cannot be determined then plant operation should be conservatively restricted until the discrepancies are justified. {P-123752}

Attachment 7.4, Alternate Power Calculation Worksheet

JPM A-2 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE OPERATIONS TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE MAIN TURBINE CHANGE OF LOAD RATE DETERMINATION (Admin)

LESSON LENGTH .5 HRS MAXIMUM STUDENTS 1 INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED Lesson Plan PQD Code Rev. No.

Simulator Guide PQD Code Rev. No.

JPM PQD Code A-2 Rev. No. 4 Exam PQD Code Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Ron Hayden DATE 10/21/14 REVISED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 02/08/17 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE SAT Coordinator APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Number of Revision Pages By Date Approval JPM SETUP Simulator ICs; Malfunctions; Triggers; Overrides:

N/A Special Setup Instructions:

Ensure student has access to a calculator, ruler, and a copy of SOP-MT-START.

JPM Instructions:

Verify current procedure against JPM. Revise JPM if any steps have changed.

Tools/Equipment: Calculator; Clear Ruler Safety Items: None Task Number: RO-0325 Validation Time: 10 Minutes Alternate Path: No Time Critical: No PPM

Reference:

SOP-MT-START Rev. 26 Location: Any NUREG 1123 Ref: 2.1.25 (3.9 / 4.2) Performance Method: Perform Task Standard:

The time needed to change main turbine load has been calculated and written in the space provided on the Student JPM Information Card and is within the range allowed. Specifically, the following must be satisfied:

  • Correlated 12% to a First Stage Steam Temperature of 100°F (accept 95°F to 105°F)
  • Correlated 70% load to a First Stage Steam Temperature of 250°F (accept 245°F to 255°F)
  • Calculated the temperature difference (250°F - 100°F) to be 150°F (accept 140°F to 160°F)
  • Plotted First Stage Steam Temperature Change to Time to Change Load-Hours using the 20,000 cycles curve and determined that the time to change load is 1.1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (accept a range of 1.05 to 1.20 hour2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />s/63 to 72 minutes).

A-2 Rev. 4 Page 2 of 6

JPM CHECKLIST INITIAL CONDITIONS: Columbia is in the process of starting up. The Main Turbine is on the line and is currently 12% loaded.

INITIATING CUE:

You have been directed to determine the time required to change load from 12% to a load of 70%. Assume a fatigue index of 20,000 cycles. Inform the CRS of your determination when complete by writing it in the space provided below and handing this sheet back to the examiner.

  • Items are Critical Steps Time Step Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results JPM Start Time: ______________

1 Refers to Attachment 6.1 of SOP-MT-START.

S/U 2 SOP-MT-START Referred to example at bottom of Attachment 6.1 to determine Attachment 6.1 S/U use of graphs:

  • Percent Rated Load vs. First Stage Temp Change
  • Time to change Load vs. First Stage Temp Change 3 Correlated 12% load to a First Stage Steam Temperature of Accept a range of 95° to S/U*

100°F (accept 95°F to 105°F). 105° 4 Correlated 70% load to a First Stage Steam Temperature of Accept a range of 245° to S/U*

250°F (accept 245°F to 255°F). 255° 5 Calculated the temperature difference (250°F - 100°F) to be Accept a range of 140° to S/U*

150°F (accept 140°F to 160°F). 160° 6 Plotted First Stage Steam Temperature Change to Time to Accept a range of 1.05 S/U*

Change Load-Hours using the 20,000 cycles curve and hours to 1.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> determined that the time to change load is 1.1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. (63 to 72 minutes)

Termination Criteria: Student hands completed JPM Information Card to the examiner.

JPM Stop Time:______________

A-2 Rev. 4 Page 3 of 6

Time Step Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Transfer the following to the Results of JPM page: Any Unsat step - indicate if step was a Critical Step; JPM completion time.

A-2 Rev. 4 Page 4 of 6

RESULTS OF JPM:

Examinee (Please Print): ______________________________________________

Evaluator (Please Print): ______________________________________________

Task Standard:

The time needed to change main turbine load has been calculated and written in the space provided on the Student JPM Information Card and is within the range allowed. Specifically, the following must be satisfied:

  • Correlated 12% to a First Stage Steam Temperature of 100°F (accept 95°F to 105°F)
  • Correlated 70% load to a First Stage Steam Temperature of 250°F (accept 245°F to 255°F)
  • Calculated the temperature difference (250°F - 100°F) to be 150°F (accept 140°F to 160°F)
  • Plotted First Stage Steam Temperature Change to Time to Change Load-Hours using the 20,000 cycles curve and determined that the time to change load is 1.1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (accept a range of 1.05 to 1.20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />).

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Evaluator's Signature: Date:

A-2 Rev. 4 Page 5 of 6

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

Columbia is in the process of starting up. The Main Turbine is on the line and is currently 12% loaded.

Initiating Cue:

You have been directed to determine the time required to change load from 12% to a load of 70%.

Assume a fatigue index of 20,000 cycles.

Inform the CRS of your determination when complete by writing it in the space provided below and handing this sheet back to the examiner.

The time required to change load from 12% to 70% is:

A-2 Rev. 4 Page 6 of 6

Number: SOP-MT-START Use Category: CONTINUOUS Major Rev: 026 Minor Rev: 002

Title:

Main Turbine Start Page: 64 of 73 LOAD CHANGING RECOMMENDATIONS (HPT FIRST STAGE TEMP CHANGE) 250 12 70 150 1.1 CT-23813-A EXAMPLE (Shown on Charts)

Determine the time required and load change rate to raise load from 25% to 100%. Use a 10,000 cycle fatigue index for this example.

PROCEDURE Enter Figure 1 at 25% load and 100% load and determine from curve the first stage temperature change from 0 to 25% load to be 155° F and from 0 to 100% load to be 295° F. By subtracting the 0-25% temperature change from the 0-100% change, the first stage temperature change that occurs in raising load from 25% to 100% is 295° - 155° =140° F.

Enter Figure 2 with the 140° F first stage steam temperature change and project to the selected 10,000 cycle fatigue index curve. It is determined that load should be raised from 25% to 100% load at a uniform rate over 0.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (12 minutes). The load change rate is 75%/12 min.= 6%/min.

END Attachment 6.1, Load Changing Recommendations (HPT First Stage Temp Change)

2017 NRC Exam - JPM A-2 JPM KEY Page 1 of 1

JPM A-3 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE OPERATIONS TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE VALIDATE FUSE INSTALLATION PER PPM 1.3.47 (RO) (Admin)

LENGTH OF LESSON 0.5 Hour INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED Lesson Plan PQD Code Rev. No.

Simulator Guide PQD Code Rev. No.

JPM PQD Code A-3 Rev. No. 2 Exam PQD Code Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Steve Bruce DATE 12/05/16 REVISED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 1/30/17 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE SAT Coordinator APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Number of Revision Pages By Date Approval JPM SETUP Simulator ICs; Malfunctions; Triggers; Overrides:

N/A Special Setup Instructions:

Obtain a cleared fuse (BUSS F10A/250V/1A) and a choice of 3 replacement fuses (BUSS F10A/250V/1A, BUSS F10A/250V/10, and BUSS F10A/250V/20A for the student to select from. Ensure the fuses look similar (same labels).

Provide a copy of EWD-15E-042 and PPM 1.3.47 (Fuse Replacement Control).

It is recommended to provide a magnifying glass to assist in reading the fuse ratings as well as containers marked with Cleared Fuse and Replacement Fuse to help them from getting mixed up for the candidate.

JPM Instructions:

Verify current procedure against JPM. Revise JPM if any steps have changed.

Tools/Equipment: Fuses (as specified above) Safety Items: None Task Number: RO-0570 Validation Time: 10 Minutes Alternate Path: No Time Critical: No PPM

Reference:

PPM 1.3.47 Rev. 11 Location: Any NUREG 1123 Ref: 2.2.41 (3.5 / 3.9) Performance Method: Perform Task Standard: Student determines that the replacement fuse should be a 10A fuse and hands the correct fuse to the CRS (evaluator). The correct fuse is marked with 250V 10A on one end and BUSS F10A on the other end.

A-3 Rev. 2 Page 2 of 7

JPM CHECKLIST SETUP: Provide the student with EWD-15E-042, PPM 1.3.47, the cleared fuse, and three choices of replacement fuses.

INITIAL CRD-LIS-601B, MS-LIS-200B, and MS-LIS-300B have lost power. Plant conditions are now stable.

CONDITIONS:

EFIN troubleshooting has identified that fuse GG-F02 in H13-P611 has cleared.

INITIATING The CRS directs you to determine the correct replacement fuse. All potential replacement fuses have come from the warehouse CUE: and have been validated for use in the plant.

Inform the CRS of your decision by completing the Student JPM Information Card provided with justification of your answer and by handing the CRS (evaluator) the card with the correct replacement fuse.

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step JPM Start Time: ___________

1 Evaluates EWD-15E-042. Determines that the rating for fuse S/U*

GG-F02 is 10A.

2 Evaluates the cleared fuse. Determines that the cleared fuse May not refer to cleared (blown fuse) rating is 1A. in determining the correct fuse.

Candidate must properly read 250V S/U 1A portion of fuse rating and should not read BUSS F10A portion of rating as documented in Attachment 9.1 of PPM 1.3.47.

A-3 Rev. 2 Page 3 of 7

3 Evaluates available replacement fuses Determines that the fuse marked as a May refer to PPM 1.3.47 to help by looking at the rating printed on 10A fuse is the correct fuse. identify correct fuse.

the fuse.

Candidate must properly read 250V S/U*

10A portion of fuse rating and should not read BUSS F10A portion of rating as documented in Attachment 9.1 of PPM 1.3.47.

4 Informs the CRS. Informs the CRS that the Evaluator may need to prompt the replacement for fuse GG-F02 should candidate to provide the correct be a 10A fuse and provides the replacement fuse.

correct replacement fuse to the CRS.

S/U*

Candidate should provide fuse with rating of 250V 10A to the examiner. The BUSS F10A defines the type of fuse, not the rating.

Termination Criteria: The student turns in the completed answer sheet and selected fuse for replacement to the evaluator.

JPM Stop Time: _____________

Transfer the following to the Results of JPM page: Any Unsat step - indicate if step was a Critical Step; JPM completion time.

A-3 Rev. 2 Page 4 of 7

RESULTS OF JPM:

Examinee (Please Print): ______________________________________________

Evaluator (Please Print): ______________________________________________

Task Standard: Student determines that the replacement fuse should be a 10A fuse and hands the correct fuse to the CRS (evaluator). The correct fuse is marked with 250V 10A on one end and BUSS F10A on the other end.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Evaluator's Signature: Date:

A-3 Rev. 2 Page 5 of 7

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

CRD-LIS-601B, MS-LIS-200B, and MS-LIS-300B have lost power. Plant conditions are now stable.

EFIN troubleshooting has identified that fuse GG-F02 in H13-P611 has cleared.

Initiating Cue:

The CRS directs you to determine the correct replacement fuse.

All potential replacement fuses have come from the warehouse and have been validated for use in the plant.

Inform the CRS of your decision by completing the Student JPM Answer Sheet provided with justification of your answer and by handing the CRS (evaluator) the card along with the correct replacement fuse.

A-3 Rev. 2 Page 6 of 7

STUDENT JPM ANSWER SHEET The correct replacement fuse is: ________________

Provide your justification below:

A-3 Rev. 2 Page 7 of 7

Initials Verify Revision Information Prior To Use Date Number: 1.3.47 Use Category: INFORMATION Major Rev: 011 Minor Rev: 001

Title:

Fuse Replacement Control Page: 1 of 17 PCN#:

PLANT PROCEDURES MANUAL N/A Effective Date:

  • 1.3.47*

1.3.47 12/12/14

Number: 1.3.47 Use Category: INFORMATION Major Rev: 011 Minor Rev: 001

Title:

Fuse Replacement Control Page: 2 of 17 DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES Justification (required for major revision)

Page(s) Description (including summary, reason, initiating document, if applicable)

1. Added reference to MI-1.8 Conduct of Maintenance
2. Added reference to PPM 1.3.1 OPERATING POLICIES, PROGRAMS AND PRACTICES
3. Added reference to ARCR 231072, LPCS-FCV-11 lose position indication when opening
4. Changed Plant Technical to Plant Technical Engineering at step 6.1.2.
5. Clarified search requirements in step 6.4.1d
6. Added instruction to retain and forward a blown fuse to the Fuse Program Engineer for evaluation, step 7.1.
7. Deleted step 7.3 For fuses that have labels, install fuses such that the labels are visible. This step has been iincorporated in MI-1.8 Conduct of Maintenance.

Changed reference to PPM 1.6.2 which has been superseded by SWP-DOC-01 and clarified exceptions for the exact fuse replacement, step 7.6 Minor Rev 001 - Added attachment for fuse type identification; minor reformatting.

Number: 1.3.47 Use Category: INFORMATION Major Rev: 011 Minor Rev: 001

Title:

Fuse Replacement Control Page: 3 of 17 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1.0 PURPOSE ................................................................................................................................ 4 2.0 DISCUSSION ........................................................................................................................... 4

3.0 REFERENCES

......................................................................................................................... 4 4.0 DEFINITIONS ........................................................................................................................... 6 4.1 Fuse Control Log Sheet ............................................................................................................ 6 4.2 Fuse Control Station ................................................................................................................. 6 4.3 Fuse Files................................................................................................................................. 6 4.4 Limitations on Use .................................................................................................................... 6 4.5 Replacement ............................................................................................................................ 6 5.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ......................................................................................... 7 6.0 RESPONSIBILITIES ................................................................................................................. 7 6.1 Maintenance Manager .............................................................................................................. 7 6.2 Fuse User/Installer ................................................................................................................... 7 6.3 Fuse Control Station Attendant/Supervisor ............................................................................... 7 6.4 Technical Services/System Engineering (Fuse Program Engineer) ........................................... 8 7.0 PROCEDURE........................................................................................................................... 9 8.0 DOCUMENTATION ................................................................................................................ 11 9.0 ATTACHMENTS..................................................................................................................... 11 9.1 Fuse Type Identification .......................................................................................................... 12 9.2 Fuse Control Log .................................................................................................................... 17

Number: 1.3.47 Use Category: INFORMATION Major Rev: 011 Minor Rev: 001

Title:

Fuse Replacement Control Page: 4 of 17 1.0 PURPOSE This procedure provides instructions and administrative controls necessary to assure control of Plant fuses and establish a record of fuse replacements.

2.0 DISCUSSION 2.1 This procedure governs replacement of all Plant fuses unless specifically exempted by procedure.

2.2 This procedure does not apply to removal and subsequent installation of the same fuse, per PPM 1.3.64.

2.3 Fuse replacement internal to discrete non-safety related end devices, such as CCTV cameras and CRTs, are not required to be entered on the Fuse Control Log Sheet.

2.4 Fuses may be drawn from the warehouse or Fuse Control Station. The Fuse Control Log Sheet, Attachment 9.2, is to be filled out regardless of where replacement fuses are obtained.

{3.3}

2.5 Fuse replacement is allowed "one time only" per event. Subsequent events will be documented via WR, WO or CR.

3.0 REFERENCES

3.1 OER 81007A (SOER 81015) Partial Loss of DC Power {3.1}

3.2 PER 294-0526, Fuse Replacement Results in Potential Damage to Valve and Motor {3.2}

3.3 PER 297-0263, Replacement Fuses Not Documented in Fuse Control Log {3.3}

3.4 PER 297-0934, INPO OE 8637, Bussmann Fuse Failure (Type KT Fuse) {P-145869}

3.5 PER 201-0155, Fuse Replacement Without Updating EW {P-175476}

3.6 RECA AU 297-058-A, Quality Audit Report {P-144582}

3.7 PER 299-0856, Inadequate Corrective Actions - Min 20 and 30 AMP Fuses 3.8 PER 205-0502, Wrong Fuse Installed 3.9 SWP-CAP-01, Corrective Action Program 3.10 SWP-MAI-01, Work Management Process Overview 3.11 MI-1.8 Conduct of Maintenance 3.12 PPM 1.3.1 OPERATING POLICIES, PROGRAMS AND PRACTICES

Number: 1.3.47 Use Category: INFORMATION Major Rev: 011 Minor Rev: 001

Title:

Fuse Replacement Control Page: 5 of 17 3.13 CR 2-05-08774, Improper Records Retention {P-235291}

3.14 PPM 1.3.42, Troubleshooting Plant Systems and Equipment 3.15 PPM 1.3.64, Plant Clearance Orders 3.16 AR-CR 231072 LPCS-FCV-11 lost position indication when opening 3.17 AR-CR 314141 CRD-LIS-601B fuse non-conforming condition

Number: 1.3.47 Use Category: INFORMATION Major Rev: 011 Minor Rev: 001

Title:

Fuse Replacement Control Page: 6 of 17 4.0 DEFINITIONS 4.1 Fuse Control Log Sheet Located at Fuse Control Station and Electric Shop for providing inventory control of installed fuses except as exempted from this procedure. Information on the Fuse Control Log Sheet is completed by the User/Installer of the fuse with review for completeness by the Fuse Control Station Attendant or Supervisor.

4.2 Fuse Control Station A location designated by the Maintenance organization where fuses are stored and issued in a controlled manner. A Fuse Control Log is maintained at the Fuse Control Station and Electric Shop.

4.3 Fuse Files Fuse Files contain the Limitations on Use and the Acceptance Tag for each fuse. The Fuse Files are located in the Fuse Control Station.

4.4 Limitations on Use Information containing special instructions or restrictions associated with use of an item.

4.5 Replacement In the context of this procedure, replacement is defined as removal of an existing fuse and installation of a new fuse.

Number: 1.3.47 Use Category: INFORMATION Major Rev: 011 Minor Rev: 001

Title:

Fuse Replacement Control Page: 7 of 17 5.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 5.1 Coordinate fuse replacement activity with Operations to assure that acceptable Plant status is maintained.

5.2 The steps in this procedure can be performed in any order.

5.3 Take special precautions when replacing a blown fuse. If the fuse cleared due to a fault, replacing the fuse could cause a high fault current.

5.4 Do not replace a fuse in a MOV circuit without first consulting Electrical Maintenance Supervision. {3.2}

5.5 Deenergize power circuits prior to fuse removal or installation with the following exceptions:

  • Fuses may be removed or installed under load for circuits less-than 150 volts and less-than-or-equal-to 15 amps with Shift Manager's permission
  • Fuses may be removed or installed under load if directed by an approved procedure or Work Request 6.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 6.1 Maintenance Manager 6.1.1 Establish the Fuse Control Station and assure completion of Fuse Control Log entries.

6.1.2 Coordinate with Plant Technical Services Engineering to facilitate quarterly technical reviews.

6.2 Fuse User/Installer 6.2.1 Perform fuse replacement under proper Plant procedures.

6.2.2 Document fuse replacement as directed by this procedure. Include information sufficient to identify the specific fuse installed.

6.3 Fuse Control Station Attendant/Supervisor 6.3.1 Review Fuse Control Log Sheets to ensure that all applicable fields are complete and maintain the fuse inventory at the fuse control station.

6.3.2 Fax or email a copy of Fuse Log to Fuse Program Engineer weekly.

6.3.3 Submit completed Fuse Log sheets to Records Control.

6.3.4 Maintain Fuse Files.

Number: 1.3.47 Use Category: INFORMATION Major Rev: 011 Minor Rev: 001

Title:

Fuse Replacement Control Page: 8 of 17 6.4 Technical Services/System Engineering (Fuse Program Engineer) 6.4.1 Retrieve and review the completed Fuse Control Log Sheets weekly to verify that Plant configuration is being maintained as designed. Perform weekly review in the following manner:

a. Collect log sheets from the Fuse Control Station.
b. Enter data from the Fuse Control Log into the master database.
c. For every fuse replacement, verify the proper fuse was installed.
d. Perform an AR search and Ops log search to ensure that there is an entry in the Fuse Log for all reported fuse replacements.
e. Search the master database of the Fuse Log for reoccurring or repeat failures.

6.4.2 Resolve recurring failures of specific fuses or other design discrepancies per applicable Plant procedures.

Number: 1.3.47 Use Category: INFORMATION Major Rev: 011 Minor Rev: 001

Title:

Fuse Replacement Control Page: 9 of 17 7.0 PROCEDURE CAUTION Fuse replacement must be coordinated with Operations to assure that acceptable Plant status is maintained.

CAUTION Do not replace fuses in an MOV circuit without first consulting Electrical Maintenance Supervision. {3.2}

7.1 Replace fuses per applicable procedures. Troubleshoot per PPM 1.3.42. Rework per SWP-MAI-01 and SWP-CAP-01, if appropriate. If conditions warrant, investigate the reason for a blown fuse prior to installing a new fuse. If the reason is known (e.g., overload, short circuit, ground, bad relay coil, etc.), document it in the Additional Information section of the Fuse Control Log. If there is no apparent reason for a blown fuse, note it in the Fuse Control Log and forward the blown fuses to the Fuse Program Engineer for evaluation IAW with MI-1.8 and PPM 1.3.1. The results of the evaluation will be entered into the comments section of the fuse log.

{AR-231072}

7.2 If no PMT is to be performed after fuse replacement, then check fuse continuity. It is preferred to check fuse continuity after installation, if practical. {P-144582}

7.3 If a fuse is found in a spared circuit, notify Maintenance Supervisor. Remove fuse after an engineering review has confirmed it is in a spared circuit.

7.4 Do not mix approved fuse types (for example FRS and TRS) in the same three-phase circuits or DC circuits.

7.5 Use the following to determine which fuses to replace:

  • Three phase power fuses - replace all three fuses
  • DC power fuses - replace both fuses
  • Circuits with secondary fuses (Double Fused) - replace primary and secondary fuses

Number: 1.3.47 Use Category: INFORMATION Major Rev: 011 Minor Rev: 001

Title:

Fuse Replacement Control Page: 10 of 17 7.6 Obtain replacement fuse(s) from the Fuse Control Station, use attachment 9.1 as necessary to verify fuse type and rating. Replace fuse(s) with the exact type and rating as the one being replaced. If required fuse is not available from Fuse Control Station, Warehouse 75, or the main warehouse then contact Maintenance Supervisor or Technical Services/Systems Engineering for direction. Fill out Fuse Control Log Sheet, Attachment 9.2, regardless of where replacement fuse(s) is obtained. {3.1} {3.3}

7.6.1 Two exceptions to the "replace with exact type" requirement are:

a. When an As Found fuse is known to be the wrong type and/or rating, install the correct fuse based on a review of verified design documents by the Maintenance Supervisor or Technical Services/Systems Engineering. Enter drawing reference(s) on the Fuse Control Log Sheet under "Additional Information". {3.1}
b. When an Aas found@ fuse has been shown to be the wrong size based on the results of trouble shooting, operating experience, or review of vendor documents. In this case a fuse can be used that is different than the Aas found@

fuse after obtaining Engineering approval per an approved plant process.

{P-175476}

In either of the above cases, replacement fuses shall be sized based on the fuse sizing criteria in design Engineering procedure EES-5. If the fuse sizing change impacts information on plant drawings the applicable drawings must be redlined in accordance with SWP-DOC-01 and an action request initiated to make the changes to the associated drawings.

{P-175476}, {AR-231072}

7.7 Review and comply with the Limitations on Use for the fuse. The Limitations on Use are located in the Fuse File.

7.8 Fill out Fuse Control Log Sheet, Attachment 9.2. Complete all applicable fields.

  • Fuse Control Log Reviewer or Supervisor Initials
  • Load EPN
  • Fuse Location
  • Fuse Number, Compartment Number or Circuit Number
  • Type and Rating of fuse removed (As Found)
  • Type and Rating of fuse drawn from the Fuse Control Station for installation. If installed fuse was not replaced with the exact type and rated fuse per Section 7.6, record name of person who authorized substitution in Additional Information column.
  • Quantity of fuses drawn for the given EPN
  • WR/WO number, N/A if not applicable

Number: 1.3.47 Use Category: INFORMATION Major Rev: 011 Minor Rev: 001

Title:

Fuse Replacement Control Page: 11 of 17

  • Name and Initials of Installer, Date of installation
  • Additional Information, if applicable 7.9 Return the Fuse Control Log Sheet to the Fuse Control Station Attendant or Supervisor to verify all applicable fields are completed.

8.0 DOCUMENTATION Completed Fuse Control Log Sheets satisfy all documentation requirements. Retain completed sheets in accordance with the Plant Administrative Procedures.

9.0 ATTACHMENTS 9.1 Fuse Type Identification 9.1 Fuse Log

Number: 1.3.47 Use Category: INFORMATION Major Rev: 011 Minor Rev: 001

Title:

Fuse Replacement Control Page: 12 of 17 FUSE TYPE IDENTIFICATION IDENTIFICATION OF FUSES Fuses have identifications printed on them. The printing on the fuse will identify the physical size, the type of fuse, and the fuse ratings.

There are four different systems used to identify fuses. The systems are the old military designation, the new military designation, the old commercial designation, and the new commercial designation. All four systems are presented here, so you will be able to identify a fuse no matter which designation is printed on the fuse.

You may have to replace an open fuse that is identified by one system with a good fuse that is identified by another system. The designation systems are fairly simple to understand and cross-reference once you are familiar with them.

OLD MILITARY DESIGNATION Figure 2-8 shows a fuse with the old military designation. The tables in the lower part of the figure show the voltage and current codes used in this system. The upper portion of the figure is the explanation of the old military designation. The numbers and letters in parentheses are the coding for the fuse shown in figure 2-8.

Attachment 9.1, Fuse Type Identification

Number: 1.3.47 Use Category: INFORMATION Major Rev: 011 Minor Rev: 001

Title:

Fuse Replacement Control Page: 13 of 17 Figure 2-8. - Old type military fuse designation.

The old military designation always starts with "F," which stands for fuse. Next, the set of numbers (02) indicates the style.

Style means the construction and dimensions (size) of the fuse. Following the style is a letter that represents the voltage rating of the fuse (G).

The voltage code table in figure 2-8 shows each voltage rating letter and its meaning in volts. In the example shown, the voltage ratings is G, which means the fuse should be used in a circuit where the voltage is 250 volts or less. After this is a set of three numbers and the letter "R," which represent the current rating of the fuse. The "R" indicates the decimal point. In the example shown, the current rating is 1R00 or 1.00 ampere. Some other examples of the current rating are shown in the current code table of figure 2-8. The final letter in the old military designation (A) indicates the time delay rating of the fuse.

While the old military designation is still found on some fuses, the voltage and current ratings must be "translated," since they use letters to represent numerical values. The military developed the new military designations to make fuse identification easier.

Attachment 9.1, Fuse Type Identification

Number: 1.3.47 Use Category: INFORMATION Major Rev: 011 Minor Rev: 001

Title:

Fuse Replacement Control Page: 14 of 17 NEW MILITARY DESIGNATION Figure 2-9 is an example of a fuse coded in the new military designation. The fuse identified in the example in figure 2-9 is the same type as the fuse used as an example in figure 2-8.

Figure 2-9. - New type military fuse designation.

The new military designation always starts with the letter "F," which stands for fuse. The set of numbers (02) next to this indicates the style. The style numbers are identical to the ones used in the old military designation and indicate the construction and dimensions of the fuse. Following the style designation is a single letter (A) that indicates the time delay rating of the fuse. This is the same time delay rating code as indicated in the old military designation, but the position of this letter in the coding is changed to avoid confusing the "A" for standard time delay with the "A" for ampere. Following the time delay rating is the voltage rating of the fuse (250) V. In the old military designation, a letter was used to indicate the voltage rating. In the new military designation, the voltage is indicated by numbers followed by a "V," which stands for volts or less. After the voltage rating, the current rating is given by numbers followed by the letter "A." The current rating may be a whole number (1A), a fraction (1/500 A), a whole number and a fraction (1 1/2A), a decimal (0.250A), or a whole number and a decimal (1.50A). If the ferrules of the fuse are silver-plated, the current rating will be followed by the letter "S." If any other plating is used, the current rating will be the last part of the fuse identification.

As you can see, the new military designation is much easier to understand than the old military designation.

You may find a fuse coded in one of the commercial designations.

Attachment 9.1, Fuse Type Identification

Number: 1.3.47 Use Category: INFORMATION Major Rev: 011 Minor Rev: 001

Title:

Fuse Replacement Control Page: 15 of 17 The commercial designations are fairly easy to understand and figure 2-10 shows the old and new commercial designations for the same type of fuse that was used in figures 2-8 and 2-9.

Figure 2-10. - Commercial designations for fuses:

OLD COMMERCIAL DESIGNATION Figure 2-10, view A, shows the old commercial designation for a fuse. The first part of the designation is a combination of letters and numbers (three in all) that indicates the style and time delay characteristics. This part of the designation (3AG) is the information contained in the style and time delay rating portions of military designations.

In the example shown, the code 3AG represents the same information as the underlined portions of F02 G 1R00 A from figure 2-8 (Old Military Designation) and F02A 250VIAS from figure 2-9 (New Military Designation). The only way to know the time delay rating of this fuse is to look it up in the manufacturer's catalog or in a cross-reference listing to find the military designation. The catalog will tell you the physical size, the material from which the fuse is constructed, and the time delay rating of the fuse. A 3AG fuse is a glass-bodied fuse, 1/4 inch X 1 1/4 inches (6.35 millimeters X 31.8 millimeters) and has a standard time delay rating.

Attachment 9.1, Fuse Type Identification

Number: 1.3.47 Use Category: INFORMATION Major Rev: 011 Minor Rev: 001

Title:

Fuse Replacement Control Page: 16 of 17 Following the style designation is a number that is the current rating of the fuse (1). This could be a whole number, a fraction, a whole number and a fraction, a decimal, or a whole number and a decimal.

Following the current rating is the voltage rating; which, in turn, is followed by the letter "V," which stands for volts or less (250V).

NEW COMMERCIAL DESIGNATION Figure 2-10, view B, shows the new commercial designation for fuses. It is the same as the old commercial designation except for the style portion of the coding. In the old commercial system, the style was a combination of letters and numbers. In the new commercial system, only letters are used.

In the example shown, 3AG in the old system becomes AGC in the new system. Since "C" is the third letter of the alphabet, it is used instead of the "3" used in the old system. Once again, the only way to find out the time delay rating is to look up this coding in the manufacturer's catalog or to use a cross-reference listing. The remainder of the new commercial designation is exactly the same as the old commercial designation.

END Attachment 9.1, Fuse Type Identification

Number: 1.3.47 Use Category: INFORMATION Major Rev: 011 Minor Rev: 001

Title:

Fuse Replacement Control Page: 17 of 17 Fuse Control Log (3) (2)

Installer Additional Information Fuse No, As Found Replacement New Fuse (e.g., If Fuse Is Not Comp No, or Type/Rating Type/rating WR/WO No. If Conti-nuity Used Then Give the Reviewer Load EPN Fuse Location Ckt No. (e.g., TRS (e.g., TRS (1) Applicable Check Name Reason) or N/A if not Initials (e.g., LPCS-P-2) (e.g., MC-7B) (e.g., TBL-F14) 25) 25) Qty (N/A If Not) () (Print) Init. Date applicable (1) Replace all three fuses for three phase circuits, both for DC power circuits and secondary fuses where used. Do not mix fuse types.

(2) Provide additional information as necessary to enable others to locate the specific fuse replaced and review the installation for conformance to design requirements.

(3) Fuse(s) replaced with exact type and rating as the installed fuse per Section 7.0. If installed fuse was not replaced with exact type and rated fuse, identify in the Additional Information column the name of the person who authorized the substitution per Section 7.6.

END Attachment 9.2, Fuse Control Log

JPM A-4 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR INITIAL TRAINING COURSE TITLE ADMIN JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE DETERMINE RWP/ALARA TASK TO USE FOR CLEARANCE TASK (Admin)

MAXIMUM STUDENTS LESSON LENGTH .5 HRS 1 INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED Lesson Plan PQD Code Rev. No.

Simulator Guide PQD Code Rev. No.

JPM PQD Code A-4 Rev. No. 1 Exam PQD Code Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 01/20/17 REVISED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 02/05/17 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use.

MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Number of Revision Pages By Date Approval JPM SETUP Simulator ICs; Malfunctions; Triggers; Overrides:

N/A Setup Instructions:

Print out copy of ATTACHMENT 1 for student use.

JPM Instructions:

Verify current procedure against JPM. If any steps have changed, the JPM should be revised.

Tools/Equipment: N/A Safety Items: N/A Task Number: Validation Time: 8 minutes Prerequisite Training: N/A Time Critical: No

Reference:

GEN-RPP-01 R8; GEN-RPP-02 R34 Location: Any NUREG 1123 Ref: 2.3.7 (3.5 / 3.6) Performance Method: Perform Task Standard: Candidate fills out the Student JPM Answer Sheet to indicate that the Ops High Rad Area (HRA) RWP 30003963 is required to be signed on to under ALARA Task # 011458161008.

SURVEY MAP REDACTED A-4 Rev. 1 Page 2 of 10

JPM CHECKLIST INITIAL Columbia Generating Station is shutdown for a refueling outage.

CONDITIONS:

INITIATING You have been directed by the Control Room Supervisor to hang Danger tag serial number 41020 as part of tagout D-HPCS-V-CUE: 102R18-001. Health Physics has been contacted. A separate Clearance Tag Hang List was previously used to hang tag serial numbers 41014 through 41019.

Review the task and from the information provided and fill out the Student JPM Answer Sheet to indicate which RWP and ALARA Task is required to be used to hang tag serial number 41020.

Give the Student JPM Answer Sheet to the evaluator when complete.

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step JPM Start Time: _________

Reviews the Recognizes that tag SN 41020 is to be Clearance Tag Hang hung on the HPCS-V-4 handwheel. S/U 1 List to determine component to hang tag on.

Reviews the Survey Recognizes that HPCS-V-4 is located Map for the Reactor in a High Radiation Area (HRA) and S/U Building 522 areas that a HRA Entry RWP is required.

2 to determine radiological conditions affecting HPCS-V-4.

Refers to available Determines that HRA Entry RWP #

3 choice of RWPs on 30003963 is needed to perform task. S/U*

provided card.

A-4 Rev. 1 Page 3 of 10

Refers to available Determines that ALARA Task #

choice of ALARA 011458161008 is the one to be used. S/U*

4 Tasks under HRA Entry RWP 30003963.

Records RWP and Records RWP # 30003963 and ALARA Task ALARA Task # 011458161008 on S/U*

5 numbers to Student answer sheet.

JPM Answer Sheet Termination Criteria: Student hands completed Student JPM Answer Sheet to the examiner.

JPM Stop Time: _____________

Transfer the following to the Results of JPM page: Any Unsat step - indicate if step was a Critical Step; JPM completion time.

A-4 Rev. 1 Page 4 of 10

RESULTS OF JPM:

Examinee (Please Print): ______________________________________________

Evaluator (Please Print): ______________________________________________

Task Standard: Candidate fills out the Student JPM Answer Sheet to indicate that the Ops High Rad Area (HRA) RWP 30003963 is required to be signed on to under ALARA Task # 011458161008.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Evaluator's Signature: Date:

A-4 Rev. 1 Page 5 of 10

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

Columbia Generating Station is shutdown for a refueling outage.

Cue:

  • You have been directed by the CRS to hang Danger tag serial number 41020 as part of tagout D-HPCS-V-102R18-001.
  • Health Physics has been contacted.
  • A separate Clearance Tag Hang List was previously used to hang tag serial numbers 41014 through 41019.

Review the task and from the information provided, fill out the Student JPM Answer Sheet to indicate which RWP and ALARA Task is required to be used to hang tag serial number 41020. Provide Justification.

Give the Student JPM Answer Sheet to the evaluator when complete.

A-4 Rev. 1 Page 6 of 10

STUDENT JPM ANSWER SHEET RWP # ________________ must be signed onto to perform task.

ALARA Task # ________________ is the one to be used.

Justification:

A-4 Rev. 1 Page 7 of 10

A-4 Rev. 1 Attachment 1 Page 8 of 10

RWP Card (Front and Back)

A-4 Rev. 1 Attachment 1 Page 10 of 10

JPM A-5 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE DETERMINE ACTION BASED ON PLANT CONDITIONS AND LESSON TITLE PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE (SRO)(Admin)

LESSON LENGTH .5 HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE A-5 Rev. No. 4 EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Ron Hayden DATE 02/15/15 REVISED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 02/07/17 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Number of Revision Pages By Date Approval JPM SETUP Simulator ICs; Malfunctions; Triggers; Overrides:

N/A Special Setup Instructions:

Have copies of ABN-CORE and ABN-RRC-LOSS available for student reference.

JPM Instructions:

Verify current procedure against JPM. Revise JPM if any steps have changed.

Tools/Equipment: None Safety Items: None Task Number: SRO-0659 Validation Time: 15 minutes Alternate Path: No Time Critical: No PPM

Reference:

ABN-CORE Rev. 16; Location: Any ABN-RRC-LOSS Rev. 13 NUREG 1123 Ref: 2.1.7 (4.4 / 4.7) Performance Method: Perform Task Standard:

Determine that a reactor SCRAM is required due to operating in Region A of the Power to Flow map with the OPRM inoperable, per ABN-CORE step 3.2.

JPM A-5 Rev. 4 Page 2 of 6

JPM CHECKLIST INITIAL With Columbia operating at full power, a common cause failure of the OPRMs required the CRS to direct placing both OPRM CONDITIONS Manual Enable/Bypass switches in the BYPASS position. Three hours later a lockout on SH-5 occurs.

The following plant conditions are reported by CRO1: Reactor power 50%. Active loop drive flow is 27500 gpm. Rod line is 85%.

INITIATING From the information given, determine the procedural action required. On the Student JPM Answer Sheet provided, indicate what that action is and provide the procedural reference (including step) for that action. When completed hand the Student JPM Answer CUE: Sheet back to the examiner.

  • Items are Critical Steps Time Step Element Standard Evaluators Cue Sat/Unsat JPM Start Time: _____________

1 Plots operating points given. Determines operation is now in Region A of the Single Loop Power to Flow map (using S/U*

Attachment 6.1 of ABN-RRC-LOSS).

2 Determines required procedural Refers to ABN-CORE (Step 3.2) and determines action based on conditions given. that a manual reactor scram is required due to operating in Region A of the Power to Flow map S/U*

with the OPRMs inoperable.

3 Fills out answer sheet. Indicates that a Manual Scram is required per ABN-CORE (Step 3.2). S/U*

4 Fills out answer sheet (reason). Indicates that a scram is required because of operation in Region A of the Power to Flow map S/U*

with the OPRMs inoperable.

Termination Criteria: Student hands completed Student JPM Answer Sheet to the examiner.

JPM Stop Time: _____________

Transfer the following to the Results of JPM page: Any Unsat step(s) and JPM completion time.

JPM A-5 Rev. 4 Page 3 of 6

JPM RESULTS:

Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Evaluator (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard: Determine that a reactor SCRAM is required due to operating in Region A of the Power to Flow map with the OPRM inoperable, per ABN-CORE step 3.2.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Evaluator's Signature: Date:

JPM A-5 Rev. 4 Page 4 of 6

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

With Columbia operating at full power, a common cause failure of the OPRMs required the CRS to direct placing the OPRM Manual Enable/Bypass switches in the BYPASS position.

Three hours later a lockout on SH-5 occurs.

The following plant conditions are reported by CRO1:

  • Reactor power is 50%.
  • Active loop drive flow is 27500 gpm
  • Rod line is 85%

Initiating Cue:

From the information given, determine the procedural action required.

On the Student JPM Answer Sheet provided, indicate what that action is and provide the procedural reference (including step) for that action. Also include the reason for that action.

When completed hand the Student JPM Answer Sheet back to the examiner.

JPM A-5 Rev. 4 Page 5 of 6

STUDENT JPM ANSWER SHEET The action required is:

The reason for the action is:

The action is per procedure/step: _____________/_______

JPM A-5 Rev. 4 Page 6 of 6

Number: ABN-RRC-LOSS Use Category: CONTINUOUS Major Rev: 013 Minor Rev: N/A

Title:

Loss of Reactor Recirculation Flow Page: 30 of 32 SINGLE LOOP POWER/FLOW MAP END Attachment 6.1, Single Loop Power/Flow Map

JPM A-6 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR/STA REQUALIFICATION TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE DETERMINE THE OPERABILITY OF THE SLC SYSTEM (SRO)(Admin)

MAXIMUM STUDENTS LESSON LENGTH .5 HRS 1 INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED Lesson Plan PQD Code Rev. No.

Simulator Guide PQD Code Rev. No.

JPM PQD Code A-6 Rev. No. 3 Exam PQD Code Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 02/03/17 REVISED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use.

MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Number of Revision Pages By Date Approval JPM SETUP Simulator ICs; Malfunctions; Triggers; Overrides:

N/A Special Setup Instructions:

Print out a filled out copy of OSP-INST-H101. The only remaining steps of the procedure should be steps 53, 54, and 55. Print out a fully completed copy of CSP-SLC-M101 that indicates Boron Concentration of 14.3

% weight. Have both available for student reference.

JPM Instructions:

Verify current procedure against JPM. Revise JPM if any steps have changed.

The evaluator and student will use current procedure. The evaluator should mark off steps as they are completed, note comments, and transfer the comments to the Results of JPM page.

Tools/Equipment: N/A Safety Items: N/A Task Number: SRO-0163 Validation Time: 10 Minutes Prerequisite Training: N/A Time Critical: No PPM

Reference:

OSP-INST-H101 Rev. 86 Location: Any CSP-SLC-M101 Rev. 14 NUREG 1123 Ref: 2.1.25 (3.9 / 4.2) Performance Method: Perform Task Standard:

Determine that SLC is NOT operable per step #53 of OSP-INST-H101 by graphing SLC Temperature (64°F) vs. SLC Tank Concentration (14.3 % weight) in the Unacceptable Operation region on Attachment 9.6.

A-6 Rev. 3 Page 2 of 6

JPM CHECKLIST INITIAL The plant is operating at 100% power.

CONDITIONS:

Chemistry added water to the SLC tank 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> ago and have just completed surveillance CSP-SLC-M101, Standby Liquid Control Boron Concentration Test.

SLC-TIC-2 indicates 64°F SLC-LI-601, SLC-LI-1 and TDAS X077 all indicate 4900 gallons.

INITIATING CUE: Determine SLC Operability and provide justification for your answer on this information card.

Return this sheet to evaluator when complete.

  • Items are Critical Steps Time Step Element Standard Sat/Unsat JPM Start Time: _____________

1 Reviews copy of CSP-SLC-M101. Determines from Attachment 9.1 of CSP-SLC-M101, that SLC concentration is 14.3 weight S/U*

% Boron 2 Reviews OSP-INST-H101 step #53. Determines the need to use ATT. 9.6 for comparison. S/U 3 Reviews ATT. 9.6 of OSP-INST-H101 Determines SLC concentration/temperature is outside of the acceptable region. Refers to S/U*

NOTE 4.

4 Reviews OPS-INST-H101 step #55. Determines the need to use Att. 9.7 for S/U comparison.

5 Reviews ATT. 9.7 of OPS-INST-H101. Determines SLC Tank volume is acceptable.

S/U A-6 Rev. 3 Page 3 of 6

  • Items are Critical Steps Time Step Element Standard Sat/Unsat 6 Fills in answer sheet. Fills in answer sheet that SLC is NOT S/U*

operable.

Termination Criteria: Student hands completed Student JPM Answer Sheet to the examiner.

JPM Stop Time: _____________

Transfer the following to the Results of JPM page: Any Unsat step - indicate if step was a Critical Step; JPM completion time.

A-6 Rev. 3 Page 4 of 6

RESULTS OF JPM:

Examinee (Please Print): ______________________________________________

Evaluator (Please Print): ______________________________________________

Task Standard: Determine that SLC is NOT operable per step #53 of OSP-INST-H101 by graphing SLC Temperature (64°F) vs. SLC Tank Concentration (14.3 % weight) in the Unacceptable Operation region on Attachment 9.6.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Evaluator's Signature: Date:

A-6 Rev. 3 Page 5 of 6

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

The plant is operating at 100% power.

Chemistry added water to the SLC tank 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> ago and have just completed surveillance CSP-SLC-M101, Standby Liquid Control Boron Concentration Test.

SLC-TIC-2 indicates 64 °F SLC-LI-601, SLC-LI-1 and TDAS X077 all indicate 4900 gallons.

Cue:

Determine SLC Operability and provide justification for your answer on this information card.

Return this sheet to evaluator when complete.

ANSWER The SLC System is:

OPERABLE NOT OPERABLE Justification for answer:

A-6 Rev. 3 Page 6 of 6

JPM A-7 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE OPERATIONS TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE VALIDATE FUSE INSTALLATION PER PPM 1.3.47 (SRO) (Admin)

LENGTH OF LESSON 0.5 Hour INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED Lesson Plan PQD Code Rev. No.

Simulator Guide PQD Code Rev. No.

JPM PQD Code A-7 Rev. No. 2 Exam PQD Code Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Steve Bruce DATE 12/05/16 REVISED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 1/30/17 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE SAT Coordinator APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Number of Revision Pages By Date Approval JPM SETUP Simulator ICs; Malfunctions; Triggers; Overrides:

N/A Special Setup Instructions:

Obtain a cleared fuse (BUSS F10A/250V/1A) and a choice of 3 replacement fuses (BUSS F10A/250V/1A, BUSS F10A/250V/10, and BUSS F10A/250V/20A for the student to select from. Ensure the fuses look similar (same labels).

Provide a copy of EWD-15E-042 and PPM 1.3.47 (Fuse Replacement Control).

It is recommended to provide a magnifying glass to assist in reading the fuse ratings as well as containers marked with Cleared Fuse and Replacement Fuse to help them from getting mixed up for the candidate.

JPM Instructions:

Verify current procedure against JPM. Revise JPM if any steps have changed.

Tools/Equipment: Fuses (as specified above) Safety Items: None Task Number: SRO-0212 Validation Time: 10 Minutes Alternate Path: No Time Critical: No PPM

Reference:

PPM 1.3.47 Rev. 11 Location: Any NUREG 1123 Ref: 2.2.41 (3.5 / 3.9) Performance Method: Perform Task Standard: Student determines that the replacement fuse should be a 10A fuse and hands the correct fuse to the SM (evaluator). The correct fuse is marked with 250V 10A on one end and BUSS F10A on the other end.

A-7 Rev. 2 Page 2 of 7

JPM CHECKLIST SETUP: Provide the student with EWD-15E-042 (see Attachment 1), PPM 1.3.47, the cleared fuse, and three choices of replacement fuses.

INITIAL CRD-LIS-601B, MS-LIS-200B, and MS-LIS-300B have lost power. Plant conditions are now stable.

CONDITIONS:

EFIN troubleshooting has identified that fuse GG-F02 in H13-P611 has cleared.

INITIATING The SM directs you as the FIN Team SRO to independently validate the correct replacement fuse. All potential replacement fuses CUE: have come from the warehouse and have been validated for use in the plant.

Inform the SM of your decision by completing the JPM Answer Sheet provided with justification of your answer and by handing the SM (evaluator) the correct replacement fuse.

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step Start Time: ____________

1 Evaluates EWD-15E-042 Determines that the rating for fuse S/U*

(Attachment 1). GG-F02 is 10A.

2 Evaluates the cleared fuse. Determines that the cleared fuse May not refer to cleared (blown fuse) rating is 1A. in determining the correct fuse.

Candidate must properly read 250V S/U 1A portion of fuse rating and should not read BUSS F10A portion of rating as documented in Attachment 9.1 of PPM 1.3.47.

A-7 Rev. 2 Page 3 of 7

3 Evaluates available replacement fuses Determines that the fuse marked as a May refer to PPM 1.3.47 to help by looking at the rating printed on 10A fuse is the correct fuse. identify correct fuse.

the fuse.

Candidate must properly read 250V S/U*

10A portion of fuse rating and should not read BUSS F10A portion of rating as documented in Attachment 9.1 of PPM 1.3.47.

4 Informs the SM. Informs the SM that the replacement Evaluator may need to prompt the for fuse GG-F02 should be a 10A candidate to provide the correct fuse and provides the correct replacement fuse.

replacement fuse to the SM.

S/U*

Candidate should provide fuse with rating of 250V 10A to the examiner. The BUSS F10A defines the type of fuse, not the rating.

Termination Criteria: The student turns in the completed answer sheet and selected fuse for replacement.

JPM Stop Time: ____________

Transfer the following to the Results of JPM page: Any Unsat step - indicate if step was a Critical Step; JPM completion time.

A-7 Rev. 2 Page 4 of 7

RESULTS OF JPM:

Examinee (Please Print): ______________________________________________

Evaluator (Please Print): ______________________________________________

Task Standard: Student determines that the replacement fuse should be a 10A fuse and hands the correct fuse to the SM (evaluator). The correct fuse is marked with 250V 10A on one end and BUSS F10A on the other end.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Evaluator's Signature: Date:

A-7 Rev. 2 Page 5 of 7

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

CRD-LIS-601B, MS-LIS-200B, and MS-LIS-300B have lost power.

Plant conditions are now stable.

EFIN troubleshooting has identified that fuse GG-F02 in H13-P611 has cleared.

Initiating Cue:

The SM directs you as the FIN Team SRO to independently validate the correct replacement fuse.

All potential replacement fuses have come from the warehouse and have been validated for use in the plant.

Inform the SM of your decision by completing the Student JPM Answer Sheet provided with justification of your answer and by handing the SM (evaluator) the card along with the correct replacement fuse.

A-7 Rev. 2 Page 6 of 7

STUDENT JPM ANSWER SHEET The correct replacement fuse is: ________________

Provide your justification below:

A-7 Rev. 2 Page 7 of 7

JPM A-8 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET INITIAL LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM TITLE ADMIN JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE COURSE TITLE ESTIMATE MAIN CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR GROSS GAMMA LESSON TITLE ACTIVITY RATE AND DETERMINE ACTIONS (SRO)(Admin)

LESSON LENGTH .5 HRS MAXIMUM STUDENTS 1 INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED Lesson Plan PQD Code Rev. No.

Simulator Guide PQD Code Rev. No.

JPM PQD Code A-8 Rev. No. 8 Exam PQD Code Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Ron Hayden DATE 10/21/06 REVISED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 02/10/17 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use.

A-8 Rev. 8 Page 1 of 8

MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Number of Revision Pages By Date Approval JPM SETUP Simulator ICs; Malfunctions; Triggers; Overrides:

N/A Setup Instructions:

Provide student a calculator and access to ABN-OG.

JPM Instructions:

Verify current procedure against JPM. If any steps have changed, the JPM should be revised.

Tools/Equipment: Calculator Safety Items: N/A Task Number: SRO-0658 Validation Time: 10 minutes Alternate Path: No Time Critical: No PPM

Reference:

ABN-OG Rev. 4 Location: Any NUREG 1123 Ref: 2.3.11 (3.8 / 4.3) Performance Method: Perform Task Standard: Main Condenser air ejector gross gamma activity rate has been properly calculated per ABN-OG, step 4.1.4 and used to justify reactor power reduction as directed by ABN-OG, step 4.1.5.

A-8 Rev. 8 Page 2 of 8

JPM CHECKLIST INITIAL Columbia is operating at full power. Various alarms are locked in due to suspected fuel pin damage.

CONDITIONS:

OFFGAS POST TREATMENT RADIATION MONITOR, OG-RIS-601A, is in alarm.

Refer to the parameters indicated on the attached handout.

INITIATING Based on the above information, determine what action, if any, should be taken. Fill in the result of your conclusion on the CUE: attachment provided.

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step Start Time: ___________

1 Determines procedure. Recognizes entry condition into ABN-OG and refers to procedure. S/U 2 Reviews radiation readings on Determines that radiation readings are normal and WEA-RIS-14, RW Building Vent entry into section 4.2 of ABN-OG is not required.

Exhaust Rad Monitor, and TEA- Determines that section 4.1 should be used.

RIS-13, Turbine Building Vent S/U Exhaust Rad Monitor, as indicated on handout.

A-8 Rev. 8 Page 3 of 8

3 ABN-OG Step 4.1.4 Estimate Main Condenser air Determines OG-RR-604 indication on handout reads ejector gross gamma activity rate 7.8E+03 (7800) mr/Hr.

using the following formula:

[OG Pretreatment (mRem/hr) S/U*

(OG-RR-604)] X [OG System flow (scfm) (OG-FR-620)] divided by 1000 = Main Condenser Gross gamma activity (mCi/sec).

4 ABN-OG Step 4.1.4 Estimate Main Condenser air Determines OG-FR-620 indication on handout reads ejector gross gamma activity rate 43.0 SCFM.

using the following formula:

[OG Pretreatment (mRem/hr) (OG- S/U*

RR-604)] X [OG System flow (scfm) (OG-FR-620)] divided by 1000 = Main Condenser Gross gamma activity (mCi/sec).

5 ABN-OG Step 4.1.4 Estimate Main Condenser air Multiplies 7800 x 43.0 = 335,400.

ejector gross gamma activity rate using the following formula:

[OG Pretreatment (mRem/hr) (OG- S/U*

RR-604)] X [OG System flow (scfm) (OG-FR-620)] divided by 1000 = Main Condenser Gross gamma activity (mCi/sec).

A-8 Rev. 8 Page 4 of 8

6 ABN-OG Step 4.1.4 Estimate Main Condenser air Divides 355,400 by 1000 = 335.4 (mCi/sec) ejector gross gamma activity rate using the following formula:

[OG Pretreatment (mRem/hr) (OG- S/U*

RR-604)] X [OG System flow (scfm) (OG-FR-620)] divided by 1000 = Main Condenser Gross gamma activity (mCi/sec).

7 ABN-OG Step 4.1.5 Based on a Main Condenser Gross gamma activity reading of 335.4 mCi/sec, candidate determines that a Determines required action. power reduction per PPM 3.2.4 to maintain Main S/U*

Condenser Gross gamma activity LT 332 mCi/sec is required.

Termination Criteria: Hands the JPM Answer Sheet to the examiner.

JPM Stop Time:______________

Transfer the following to the Results of JPM page: Any Unsat step - indicate if step was a Critical Step; JPM completion time.

A-8 Rev. 8 Page 5 of 8

RESULTS OF JPM:

Examinee (Please Print): ______________________________________________

Evaluator (Please Print): ______________________________________________

Task Standard: Main Condenser air ejector gross gamma activity rate has been properly calculated per ABN-OG, step 4.1.4 and used to justify reactor power reduction as directed by ABN-OG, step 4.1.5.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Evaluator's Signature: Date:

A-8 Rev. 8 Page 6 of 8

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

Columbia is operating at full power. Various alarms are locked in due to suspected fuel pin damage.

OFFGAS POST TREATMENT RADIATION MONITOR, OG-RIS-601A, is in alarm.

Refer to the parameters indicated on the attached handout.

Cue:

Based on the above, determine what action, if any, should be taken.

Fill in the result of your conclusion on the JPM Answer Sheet. Hand the JPM Answer Sheet to your examiner when complete.

A-8 Rev. 8 Page 7 of 8

JPM ANSWER SHEET INITIAL HERE IF NO ACTIONS ARE REQUIRED:

REASON NO ACTIONS ARE REQUIRED:

INITIAL HERE IF ACTIONS ARE REQUIRED:

ACTION(S) IF REQUIRED AND REASON FOR ACTION:

A-8 Rev. 8 Page 8 of 8

A-8 (rev 8) Attachment 1 Page 1 of 3

WEA-RIS-14 A-8 (rev 8) Attachment 1 Page 2 of 3

TEA-RIS-14 A-8 (rev 8) Attachment 1 Page 3 of 3

JPM A-9 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE COMPLETE CLASSIFICATION NOTIFICATION FORM (SAE) (SRO)(TC)(Admin)

LESSON LENGTH .5 HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE A-9 Rev. No. 9 EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Ron Hayden DATE 05/10/01 REVISED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 2/10/17 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE SAT Coordinator APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use A-9 Rev. 9 Page 1 of 6

MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Number of Revision Pages By Date Approval JPM SETUP Simulator ICs; Malfunctions; Triggers; Overrides:

N/A Special Setup Instructions:

Provide for student a completed URI Dose Assessment (with emergency classification hidden) that supports the administration of this JPM and a blank copy of the paper Classification Notification Form (Form 24075 R24).

JPM Instructions:

Verify Current Procedure against JPM. If any steps have changed, the JPM should be revised.

Tools/Equipment: None Safety Items: None Task Number: SRO- 0315, 0529, 0638 Validation Time: 12 Minutes Alternate Path: No Time Critical: Yes 30 Minutes PPM

Reference:

PPM 13.8.1 Rev. 36 Location: Simulator NUREG 1123 Ref: 2.4.41 (2.9/4.6) Performance Method: Perform Task Standard: Applicant classifies event as a SAE (5.1.S.2) within 15 minutes due to Thyroid CDE dose at 1.2 miles of GT 500 mrem. Applicant correctly completes and submits Classification Notification Form within 15 minutes of classification.

A-9 Rev. 9 Page 2 of 6

JPM CHECKLIST INITIAL The plant has experienced an event that has resulted in the following conditions: The plant scrammed an hour ago. A release has CONDITIONS: been ongoing for 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and 44 minutes. Release rate is stable. A URI Does Assessment has been performed.

INITIATING The Shift Manager has directed you to complete the Classification Notification Form based only upon the results of the completed CUE: Dose Assessment. This is the initial classification of this event. Present the completed CNF to the Shift Manager for signature. This is a Time Critical JPM and your time starts now.

  • Items are Critical Steps Time Step Element Standard Evaluators Cue Sat/Unsat JPM (Classification) Start Time: _______________________

1 Classifies event Classifies event as a SAE within 15 minutes based upon Thyroid CDE S/U*

dose at 1.2 miles of GT 500 mrem.

NOTE: THIS STOPS THE FIRST 15 MINUTE CLOCK AND STARTS THE NEXT 15 MINUTE NOTIFICATION CLOCK Classification Stop Time / Notification Start Time: _______________________

2 Completes Classification Notification Fills in following information on the S/U Form. CNF:

3 Block 1 Checks b. (Drill) S/U 4 Block 2 Enters a 1 S/U*

5 Block 3 Enters a name S/U*

6 Block 4 Checks a. (Initial Classification) and enters a date and time S/U*

7 Block 5 Checks c. (Site Area Emergency)

S/U*

8 Block 6 Determines that this block is N/A due to classification not being a General S/U*

Emergency A-9 Rev. 9 Page 3 of 6

  • Items are Critical Steps Time Step Element Standard Evaluators Cue Sat/Unsat 9 Block 7 Checks No S/U*

10 Block 8 Enters 7 for Wind Speed S/U*

11 Block 8 Enters 300 for degrees S/U*

12 Block 8 Checks No for Precipitation S/U*

13 Block 8 Enters A as Stability Classification S/U*

14 Block 9 Checks Release S/U*

15 Block 10 Checks Airborne S/U*

16 Block 11 Enters a date and time for Estimated Start of Release (3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 44 minutes S/U*

ago) 17 Block 12 Checks Yes.

Checks 250mr/hr Thyroid -OR-S/U*

Checks Unfiltered or Unmonitored Release 18 Block 13 Enters 5.1.S.2 for EAL#

S/U*

19 Block 14 Checks b.

S/U JPM (Notification) Stop Time:____________________

Termination Criteria: Student hands the examiner the completed CNF.

Transfer the following to the Results of JPM page: Any Unsat step - indicate if step was a Critical Step; JPM completion time.

A-9 Rev. 9 Page 4 of 6

RESULTS OF JPM Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Evaluator (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard: Applicant classifies event as a SAE (5.1.S.2) within 15 minutes due to Thyroid CDE dose at 1.2 miles of GT 500 mrem. Applicant correctly completes and submits Classification Notification Form within 15 minutes of classification.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Evaluator's Signature: Date:

A-9 Rev. 9 Page 5 of 6

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

The plant has experienced an event that has resulted in the following conditions:

  • The plant scrammed an hour ago
  • A release has been ongoing for 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and 44 minutes
  • Release rate is stable.

A URI Dose Assessment has been performed.

Initiating Cue:

The Shift Manager has directed you to complete a Classification Notification Form based only on the results of the completed Dose Assessment.

This is the initial classification of this event.

Present the completed CNF to the Shift Manager for signature.

THIS IS A TIME CRITICAL JPM and your time starts now A-9 Rev. 9 Page 6 of 6

From: Gaddy, Vincent To: Farina, Thomas

Subject:

RE: CGS Request for Modification of JPM A-9 Critical Step Date: Monday, March 13, 2017 9:01:33 AM TJ, I agree with your assessment and recommendation.

Vince From: Farina, Thomas Sent: Wednesday, March 08, 2017 11:00 AM To: Gaddy, Vincent <Vincent.Gaddy@nrc.gov>

Subject:

CGS Request for Modification of JPM A-9 Critical Step

Vince, Following administration of JPM A-9 onsite last week, CGS requested a change to one of the approved critical steps. Specifically, JPM stem 17 is a critical step which requires that an applicant identify that requirements for distribution of KI tablets are met, and check off the reason that the requirements are met on the offsite notification form. KI requirements are met for 2 separate reasons: 1) estimated dose rate to thyroid exceeds 250 mr/hr at site boundary, and 2) unfiltered or unmonitored release in progress. The approved JPM step requires that the applicant check both reasons in order to pass the step and JPM. The licensee requests that this step be modified to an or statement, meaning that if the applicant checks either reason, the JPM step is satisfied. Ive attached their request, the proposed modification to the JPM, and the JPM key.

I support this request from the licensee. Whether an applicant identifies only one reason or both, the same PAR recommendation is submitted to offsite authorities. Ill use your response to this email as justification to modify the JPM step or leave as-is.

Thanks, Please call me if you have questions, TJ

TIMES RECORDED ON FORM ARE BASED ON START TIME OF JPM.

1 Type of Event: 2 COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION

a. Emergency 1
b. X Drill CLASSIFICATION NOTIFICATION FORM (CNF) No:

3 4 Classification/Status Time: Date:

Notification Provided By: Phone:

(Emergency Director) a. X Initial Classification Time Date Name (Print): (509) b. Reclassification Print Name c. Termination

d. PAR Changes/Additions
e. Information Section Map 5 a. UNUSUAL EVENT No Offsite Protective Actions Recommended
b. ALERT No Offsite Protective Actions Recommended
c. X SITE AREA EMERGENCY Automatic Protective Action Recommendation EVACUATE:

Columbia River Ringold Fishing Area Wahluke Hunting Area Schools in EPZ Horn Rapids Recreation Area/ORV Park

d. GENERAL EMERGENCY Automatic Protective Action Recommendation EVACUATE:

Columbia River Ringold Fishing Area Wahluke Hunting Area Schools in EPZ Horn Rapids Recreation Area/ORV Park 8 Meteorological Data: 6 PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS Wind Speed: 7 mph from 300 degrees IF a General Emergency is declared, Precipitation: Yes X No THEN Refer to PPM 13.2.2 Determining PARs.

Stability Classification A IF A GE is NOT declared, This section is Not Applicable 9 No Release(Block 10,11&12 are N/A) X Release Basis for PARs: X Not Applicable Radiological Plant Type of release: 11 Estimated Start of Release: 0-2 miles 2-10 miles 10 N/A N/A Start Time - 3 hr 44min All Sections Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 X Airborne Time/Date: Time/Date Monitor & Monitor & Monitor & Monitor &

Prepare Prepare Prepare Prepare Water Release Terminated: Shelter In Shelter In Shelter In Shelter In Shelter In Time/Date: Place Place Place Place Place Evacuate Evacuate Evacuate Evacuate Evacuate 12 State Criteria met for administering KI(Information only) 7 Security Event: Yes X No N/A Responding personnel are to report to:

No On-Site Facilities X Yes X 250 mrem/hr thyroid Alternate Facilities, Energy Northwest Office Complex, 1.4 x 10-7 ci/cc I-131 3000 George Washington Way X Unfiltered or unmonitored release 13 EAL# Description; Offsite Release 5.1.S.2 Additional Information; 14 Prognosis of Situation: a. Unknown b. X Stable c. Escalating d. Improving 15 Emergency Director Approval Signature:

24075 R24

Completion of Classification Notification Form (CNF)

Completing the form Block 1. Type of event: For actual emergencies, the block Emergency should be checked.

For drills or exercises, the block Drill should be checked.

Block 2. Classification Form Number: This is a sequential number indicating the order of offsite notifications.

The first CNF is #1 followed by #2, etc.

Block 3. Notification provided by. This is the name of the Emergency Director providing the information for the Crash call. Phone number is the number at which the notifier can be contacted.

Block 4. Classification/Statues: a-e.

Item a or b: The time listed is the time at which the ED declares the emergency classification or upgrade.

This time starts the 15-minute notification requirement.

Item c.: Termination, no Classification Level should exist or be marked.

A CNF and Crash must be initiated at the termination of a drill or actual event.

Item d.: If additional PARs are required after the CNF for the GE has been transmitted, complete this block.

The need for additional PARs requires notifications be completed within 15 minutes of the time in the block.

Item e.: Periodic information updates such as release information, KI, prognosis, and changes in Met conditions should be provided at least once an hour.

Block 5. Check block for appropriate emergency classification.

(UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY, GENERAL EMERGENCY)

Block 6. When a General Emergency is declared, Refer to PPM 13.2.2 Determining Protective Action Recommendations, Check applicable sections/actions and communicated during the Crash call for the GE.

If a GE is NOT declared, this section is N/A and does NOT need to be filled in.

Block 7. Identify whether the event is security based (Auto Dialer Scenario 191) and reporting location for Offsite Response Organization (ie. County and State Personnel) responding to CGS.

Block 8. Enter Meteorological data. Following a release, if meteorological data changes ensure additional PARs are considered and provide offsite notification. To convert Delta T to stability class, refer to PPM 13.8.1.

Block 9. If there is a No RELEASE, then blocks 10, 11 & 12 are N/A.

If there is a RELEASE then enter information in blocks 10, 11 & 12.

If RELEASE starts after CNF and CRASH notification has been completed, then provide new CNF and Crash notifications to offsite agencies as soon as RELEASE Criteria has been met.

Block 10. If there is a RELEASE, mark it as airborne or water.

Block 11. If there is a RELEASE, enter the start time. Enter stop time following release termination.

Block 12. The block with information on the States criteria for KI is an information notification not a PAR.

Block 13. Enter the EAL number. Provide a short description of the event. Do not use jargon and avoid acronyms.

Block 14. Enter Prognosis of Situation. This is a judgment call primarily relating to the condition of the reactor.

Block 15. Ensure the Emergency Director has signed the form prior to transmittal to the offsite agencies.

Additional information to consider when completing the CNF CNF must be filled out in entirely prior to transmittal to offsite agencies. Transmittal of the CNF should occur prior to initiation of each Crash Call. The requirement to complete 15-minute notifications to the offsite agencies should not be delayed if the time needed to complete the form would impact the notification requirement. In cases where the Crash Call is initiated prior to transmittal, the form should be filled out and transmitted as soon as possible.

When the Control Room is providing emergency classifications, they will ensure the SCC has received the CNF at which time the SCC will follow up with the offsite agencies to ensure they have received the information. If the SCC is not available, the Control Room Notifier must provide the information block by block to the offsite agencies.

If the CNF information is being communicated from the EOF or TSC, all information on the form must be verbally communicated. When communicating the CNF information, it must be communicated block by block for each of the blocks.

If an error on the CNF is recognized during the Crash Call, the correction should be noted on the CNF, initialed, and communicated during the Crash Call.

If an error is recognized in block 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 or 13 after the Crash Call has concluded, a new corrected CNF with the next sequential number should be completed, transmitted, and followed up with a Crash Call.

24075 R24

1 Type of Event: 2 COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION

a. Emergency
b. Drill CLASSIFICATION NOTIFICATION FORM (CNF) No:

3 4 Classification/Status Time: Date:

Notification Provided By: Phone:

(Emergency Director) a. Initial Classification Name (Print): (509) b. Reclassification

c. Termination
d. PAR Changes/Additions
e. Information Section Map 5 a. UNUSUAL EVENT No Offsite Protective Actions Recommended
b. ALERT No Offsite Protective Actions Recommended
c. SITE AREA EMERGENCY Automatic Protective Action Recommendation EVACUATE:
  • Columbia River
  • Ringold Fishing Area
  • Wahluke Hunting Area
  • Horn Rapids Recreation Area/ORV Park
d. GENERAL EMERGENCY Automatic Protective Action Recommendation EVACUATE:
  • Columbia River
  • Ringold Fishing Area
  • Wahluke Hunting Area
  • Horn Rapids Recreation Area/ORV Park 8 Meteorological Data: 6 PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS Wind Speed: mph from degrees IF a General Emergency is declared, Precipitation: Yes No THEN Refer to PPM 13.2.2 Determining PARs.

Stability Classification IF A GE is NOT declared, This section is Not Applicable 9 No Release(Block 10,11&12 are N/A) Release Basis for PARs: Not Applicable Radiological Plant Type of release: 11 Estimated Start of Release: 0-2 miles 2-10 miles 10 N/A N/A All Sections Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Airborne Time/Date: Monitor & Monitor & Monitor & Monitor &

Prepare Prepare Prepare Prepare Water Release Terminated: Shelter In Shelter In Shelter In Shelter In Shelter In Time/Date: Place Place Place Place Place Evacuate Evacuate Evacuate Evacuate Evacuate 12 State Criteria met for administering KI(Information only) 7 Security Event: Yes No N/A Responding personnel are to report to:

No On-Site Facilities Yes 250 mrem/hr thyroid Alternate Facilities, Energy Northwest Office Complex, 1.4 x 10 µci/cc I-131

-7 3000 George Washington Way Unfiltered or unmonitored release 13 EAL# Description; Additional Information; 14 Prognosis of Situation: a. Unknown b. Stable c. Escalating d. Improving 15 Emergency Director Approval Signature:

24075 R24

Completion of Classification Notification Form (CNF)

Completing the form Block 1. Type of event: For actual emergencies, the block Emergency should be checked.

For drills or exercises, the block Drill should be checked.

Block 2. Classification Form Number: This is a sequential number indicating the order of offsite notifications.

The first CNF is #1 followed by #2, etc.

Block 3. Notification provided by. This is the name of the Emergency Director providing the information for the Crash call. Phone number is the number at which the notifier can be contacted.

Block 4. Classification/Statues: a-e.

Item a or b: The time listed is the time at which the ED declares the emergency classification or upgrade.

This time starts the 15-minute notification requirement.

Item c.: Termination, no Classification Level should exist or be marked.

A CNF and Crash must be initiated at the termination of a drill or actual event.

Item d.: If additional PARs are required after the CNF for the GE has been transmitted, complete this block.

The need for additional PARs requires notifications be completed within 15 minutes of the time in the block.

Item e.: Periodic information updates such as release information, KI, prognosis, and changes in Met conditions should be provided at least once an hour.

Block 5. Check block for appropriate emergency classification.

(UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY, GENERAL EMERGENCY)

Block 6. When a General Emergency is declared, Refer to PPM 13.2.2 Determining Protective Action Recommendations, Check applicable sections/actions and communicated during the Crash call for the GE.

If a GE is NOT declared, this section is N/A and does NOT need to be filled in.

Block 7. Identify whether the event is security based (Auto Dialer Scenario 191) and reporting location for Offsite Response Organization (ie. County and State Personnel) responding to CGS.

Block 8. Enter Meteorological data. Following a release, if meteorological data changes ensure additional PARs are considered and provide offsite notification. To convert Delta T to stability class, refer to PPM 13.8.1.

Block 9. If there is a No RELEASE, then blocks 10, 11 & 12 are N/A.

If there is a RELEASE then enter information in blocks 10, 11 & 12.

If RELEASE starts after CNF and CRASH notification has been completed, then provide new CNF and Crash notifications to offsite agencies as soon as RELEASE Criteria has been met.

Block 10. If there is a RELEASE, mark it as airborne or water.

Block 11. If there is a RELEASE, enter the start time. Enter stop time following release termination.

Block 12. The block with information on the States criteria for KI is an information notification not a PAR.

Block 13. Enter the EAL number. Provide a short description of the event. Do not use jargon and avoid acronyms.

Block 14. Enter Prognosis of Situation. This is a judgment call primarily relating to the condition of the reactor.

Block 15. Ensure the Emergency Director has signed the form prior to transmittal to the offsite agencies.

Additional information to consider when completing the CNF

  • CNF must be filled out in entirely prior to transmittal to offsite agencies. Transmittal of the CNF should occur prior to initiation of each Crash Call. The requirement to complete 15-minute notifications to the offsite agencies should not be delayed if the time needed to complete the form would impact the notification requirement. In cases where the Crash Call is initiated prior to transmittal, the form should be filled out and transmitted as soon as possible.
  • When the Control Room is providing emergency classifications, they will ensure the SCC has received the CNF at which time the SCC will follow up with the offsite agencies to ensure they have received the information. If the SCC is not available, the Control Room Notifier must provide the information block by block to the offsite agencies.
  • If the CNF information is being communicated from the EOF or TSC, all information on the form must be verbally communicated. When communicating the CNF information, it must be communicated block by block for each of the blocks.
  • If an error on the CNF is recognized during the Crash Call, the correction should be noted on the CNF, initialed, and communicated during the Crash Call.
  • If an error is recognized in block 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 or 13 after the Crash Call has concluded, a new corrected CNF with the next sequential number should be completed, transmitted, and followed up with a Crash Call.

24075 R24

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline (Rev 3 - 02/13/17) Form ES-301-2 Facility: Columbia Generating Station Date of Examination: 2/27/17 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: 1 Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function S-1: TRANSFER BUS SM-3 FROM TR-S TO TR-N & TRANSFER SM-8 FROM TR-B TO SM-3

Description:

Transfer 4160 VAC Bus SM-3 from the Startup Transformer to (A)(M)(S) 6 the Normal Transformer and then transfer 4160 VAC Bus SM-8 from the Backup Transformer to SM-3 K/A: 262001.A4.04 (3.6 / 3.7)

S-2: RESPOND TO LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING

Description:

Restore Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Loop B shutdown (D)(L)(S) 4 cooling per SOP-RHR-SDC (RHR Loop B Shutdown Cooling Quick Restart).

K/A: 205000.A2.06 (3.4 / 3.5)

S-3: HPCS SYSTEM INITIATION

Description:

Initiate High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system per SOP-HPCS-INJECTION and restore RPV level back to directed band. Following (A)(N)(EN) start of the HPCS pump its minimum flow valve will fail to automatically close 2 (L)(S) once RPV injection has occurred (resulting in a lower injection rate into the RPV). Valve must be manually closed to maximize injection.

K/A: 209002.A4.04 (3.1 / 3.1)

S-4: INITIATE CR HVAC IN MANUAL PRESSURIZATION MODE

Description:

Place both trains of Control Room Ventilation in the Manual Pressurization Mode of operation per SOP-HVAC/CR-OPS (inlet damper for (A)(M)(EN) 9 one of the Control Room Emergency Filter Units fail to auto open and must be (S) opened manually).

K/A: 290003.A4.03 (2.8 / 2.8)

S-5: RE-ESTABLISH SECONDARY CONTAINMENT/START RB HVAC

Description:

Restart Reactor Building (RB) HVAC using RB Outside Air Fan 1A and RB Exhaust Air Fan 1A per SOP-HVAC RB-RESTART-QC to re- (D)(P)(S) 5 establish Secondary Containment integrity.

K/A: 290001.A4.01 (3.3 / 3.4)

S-6: LOWER RPV PRESSURE USING DEH

Description:

Recognize that auto control of bypass valves to lower RPV pressure to a target of 550 psig does not work and that the manual lowering of (A)(D)(L)(P) 3 RPV pressure at a rate LE 50 psig per minute through manual control of (S)

Bypass Valves would be required.

K/A: 241000.A4.02 (4.1 / 4.1)

S-7: (RPS) RESTORE RPS A FROM ALTERNATE POWER SOURCE

Description:

Transfer RPS A to its Alternate power supply by performing (D)(P)(S) 7 subsequent steps in ABN-RPS.

K/A: 212000.A2.01 (3.7 / 3.9)

Page 1 of 2

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline (Rev 3 - 02/13/17) Form ES-301-2 S-8: Swap RCC Heat Exchangers

Description:

Direction is provided to swap RCC Heat Exchangers from RCC- (N)(S) 8 HX-1C in service to RCC-HX-1A in service.

K/A: 400000.A4.01 (3.1 / 3.0)

In-Plant Systems (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

P-1: RESTART RPS-MG-1 AND REPOWER RPS BUS

Description:

Direction is provided to restart the RPS Motor Generator (RPS-MG-1) which supplies power to RPS Bus A using SOP-RPS-START. During the start the expected voltage indication is not present requiring manual reset (A)(D)(R) 6 of the MG overvoltage trip. The Underfrequency indicator remains lit and must manually be reset.

K/A: 212000.A2.01 (3.7 / 3.9)

P-2: INSERT CONTROL RODS BY VENTING SCRAM AIR HEADER

Description:

Based on initial conditions provided, recognize that manually venting the scram air header is the next action to take in an attempt to insert (D)(E)(R) 1 control rods.

K/A: 295037.EA1.05 (3.9 / 4.0)

P-3: REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL ACTIVATION DURING A CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION (Time Critical)**

Description:

Based on a Main Control Room evacuation due to fire, and from (D)(E)(R) 7 a designated starting point, transit to the Remote Shutdown Panel and activate panel within required time using ABN-CR-EVAC Attachment 7.2.

K/A: 295016 AA1.07 (4.2 / 4.3) ** Ref: OI-69, TCOA-3/TCOA-4

  • All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
  • Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 (5)

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9 (7)

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1 (2)

(EN)gineered safety feature 1 (2) (control room system)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1 (3)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2 (4)

(P)revious 2 exams 3 (3) (randomly selected)

(R)CA 1 (3)

(S)imulator Page 2 of 2

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline (Rev 3 - 02/13/17) Form ES-301-2 Facility: Columbia Generating Station Date of Examination: 2/27/17 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: 1 Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function S-1: TRANSFER BUS SM-3 FROM TR-S TO TR-N & TRANSFER SM-8 FROM TR-B TO SM-3

Description:

Transfer 4160 VAC Bus SM-3 from the Startup Transformer to (A)(M)(S) 6 the Normal Transformer and then transfer 4160 VAC Bus SM-8 from the Backup Transformer to SM-3 K/A: 262001.A4.04 (3.6 / 3.7)

S-2: RESPOND TO LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING

Description:

Restore Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Loop B shutdown (D)(L)(S) 4 cooling per SOP-RHR-SDC (RHR Loop B Shutdown Cooling Quick Restart).

K/A: 205000.A2.06 (3.4 / 3.5)

S-3: HPCS SYSTEM INITIATION

Description:

Initiate High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system per SOP-HPCS-INJECTION and restore RPV level back to directed band. Following (A)(N)(EN) start of the HPCS pump its minimum flow valve will fail to automatically close 2 (L)(S) once RPV injection has occurred (resulting in a lower injection rate into the RPV). Valve must be manually closed to maximize injection.

K/A: 209002.A4.04 (3.1 / 3.1)

S-4: INITIATE CR HVAC IN MANUAL PRESSURIZATION MODE

Description:

Place both trains of Control Room Ventilation in the Manual Pressurization Mode of operation per SOP-HVAC/CR-OPS (inlet damper for (A)(M)(EN) 9 one of the Control Room Emergency Filter Units fail to auto open and must be (S) opened manually).

K/A: 290003.A4.03 (2.8 / 2.8)

S-5: RE-ESTABLISH SECONDARY CONTAINMENT/START RB HVAC

Description:

Restart Reactor Building (RB) HVAC using RB Outside Air Fan 1A and RB Exhaust Air Fan 1A per SOP-HVAC RB-RESTART-QC to re- (D)(P)(S) 5 establish Secondary Containment integrity.

K/A: 290001.A4.01 (3.3 / 3.4)

S-6: LOWER RPV PRESSURE USING DEH

Description:

Recognize that auto control of bypass valves to lower RPV pressure to a target of 550 psig does not work and that the manual lowering of (A)(D)(L)(P) 3 RPV pressure at a rate LE 50 psig per minute through manual control of (S)

Bypass Valves would be required.

K/A: 241000.A4.02 (4.1 / 4.1)

S-8: Swap RCC Heat Exchangers

Description:

Direction is provided to swap RCC Heat Exchangers from RCC- (N)(S) 8 HX-1C in service to RCC-HX-1A in service.

K/A: 400000.A4.01 (3.1 / 3.0)

Page 1 of 2

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline (Rev 3 - 02/13/17) Form ES-301-2 In-Plant Systems (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

P-1: RESTART RPS-MG-1 AND REPOWER RPS BUS

Description:

Direction is provided to restart the RPS Motor Generator (RPS-MG-1) which supplies power to RPS Bus A using SOP-RPS-START. During the start the expected voltage indication is not present requiring manual reset (A)(D)(R) 6 of the MG overvoltage trip. The Underfrequency indicator remains lit and must manually be reset.

K/A: 212000.A2.01 (3.7 / 3.9)

P-2: INSERT CONTROL RODS BY VENTING SCRAM AIR HEADER

Description:

Based on initial conditions provided, recognize that manually venting the scram air header is the next action to take in an attempt to insert (D)(E)(R) 1 control rods.

K/A: 295037.EA1.05 (3.9 / 4.0)

P-3: REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL ACTIVATION DURING A CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION (Time Critical)**

Description:

Based on a Main Control Room evacuation due to fire, and from (D)(E)(R) 7 a designated starting point, transit to the Remote Shutdown Panel and activate panel within required time using ABN-CR-EVAC Attachment 7.2.

K/A: 295016 AA1.07 (4.2 / 4.3) ** Ref: OI-69, TCOA-3/TCOA-4

  • All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
  • Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 (5)

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 8 (6)

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1 (2)

(EN)gineered safety feature 1 (2) (control room system)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1 (3)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2 (4)

(P)revious 2 exams 3 (2) (randomly selected)

(R)CA 1 (3)

(S)imulator Page 2 of 2

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline (Rev 4 - 02/28/17) Form ES-301-2 Facility: Columbia Generating Station Date of Examination: 2/27/17 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: 1 Control Room Systems: 8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function S-5: RE-ESTABLISH SECONDARY CONTAINMENT/START RB HVAC

Description:

Restart Reactor Building (RB) HVAC using RB Outside Air Fan 1A and RB Exhaust Air Fan 1A per SOP-HVAC RB-RESTART-QC to re- (D)(P)(S) 5 establish Secondary Containment integrity.

K/A: 290001.A4.01 (3.3 / 3.4)

S-2: RESPOND TO LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING

Description:

Restore Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Loop B shutdown (D)(L)(S) 4 cooling per SOP-RHR-SDC (RHR Loop B Shutdown Cooling Quick Restart).

K/A: 205000.A2.06 (3.4 / 3.5)

S-3: HPCS SYSTEM INITIATION

Description:

Initiate High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system per SOP-HPCS-INJECTION and restore RPV level back to directed band. Following (A)(N)(EN) start of the HPCS pump its minimum flow valve will fail to automatically close 2 (L)(S) once RPV injection has occurred (resulting in a lower injection rate into the RPV). Valve must be manually closed to maximize injection.

K/A: 209002.A4.04 (3.1 / 3.1)

In-Plant Systems (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

P-1: RESTART RPS-MG-1 AND REPOWER RPS BUS

Description:

Direction is provided to restart the RPS Motor Generator (RPS-MG-1) which supplies power to RPS Bus A using SOP-RPS-START. During the start the expected voltage indication is not present requiring manual reset (A)(D)(R) 6 of the MG overvoltage trip. The Underfrequency indicator remains lit and must manually be reset.

K/A: 212000.A2.01 (3.7 / 3.9)

P-3: REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL ACTIVATION DURING A CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION (Time Critical)**

Description:

Based on a Main Control Room evacuation due to fire, and from (D)(E)(R) 7 a designated starting point, transit to the Remote Shutdown Panel and activate panel within required time using ABN-CR-EVAC Attachment 7.2.

K/A: 295016 AA1.07 (4.2 / 4.3) ** Ref: OI-69, TCOA-3/TCOA-4

  • All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

Page 1 of 2

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline (Rev 3 - 02/13/17) Form ES-301-2 Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 2-3 (2)

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 4 (4)

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1 (1)

(EN)gineered safety feature 1 (1) (control room system)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1 (2)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 1 (1)

(P)revious 2 exams 2 (1)

(R)CA 1 (2)

(S)imulator Page 2 of 2

JPM P-1 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE RESTART OF RPS-MG-1 AND REPOWER RPS BUS (Plant) (Alt Path)

LESSON LENGTH .5 HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE P-1 Rev. No. 6 EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Ron Hayden DATE 6/10/08 REVISED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 02/10/17 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE SAT Coordinator APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Number of Revision Pages By Date Approval JPM SETUP Simulator ICs; Malfunctions; Triggers; Overrides:

None Special Setup Instructions:

None JPM Instructions:

Verify Current Procedure against JPM. If any steps have changed, the JPM should be revised.

The student is given SOP-RPS-START Sections 5.1 and 5.3.

Tools/Equipment: None Safety Items: None Task Number: RO-0248 Validation Time: 12 Minutes Alternate Path: Yes Time Critical: No PPM

Reference:

SOP-RPS-START Section 5.1 and 5.3 Rev. 5 Location: Plant NUREG 1123 Ref: 212000A2.01 (3.7 / 3.9) Performance Method: Simulate Task Standard: RPS-MG-1 is running with RPS-CB-MG1 (generator output breaker) closed, and RPS-EPA-3A and RPS-EPA-3C (EPA breakers) reset and closed.

P-1 Rev. 6 Page 2 of 10

JPM CHECKLIST INITIAL RPS Division A has been de-energized due to a fault. The fault has been identified and CONDITIONS: corrected.

INITIATING The CRS directs you to restart RPS-MG-1 and repower the Division A RPS bus in CUE: accordance with SOP-RPS-START section 5.1 and 5.3. Precautions and Limitations have been reviewed and are satisfied. Inform the CRS when the RPS EPA breakers have been closed. The performance of this JPM is simulated. Control manipulations will not be performed.

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step JPM Start Time: _______________

1 Step 5.1.1 Observes RPS-DISC- The handle is pointing 7A1Bs handle. to On. S/U Verify RPS-DISC-7A1B is Closed (RPS Bus Mtr Gen MG-1 Supply Breaker) (E-MC-7A).

2 Step 5.1.2 Performs this step.

S/U Perform the following at E-CP-C72/S001A (RPS-MG-1 Control Panel):

3 Step 5.1.2a Observes the Green Motor The Green light is on.

Off indicating light is on. S/U Verify Motor Off indicating light illuminated (Green).

4 Step 5.1.2b Observes RPS-CB-MG1 is Indicate that the lever open with lever in Off is pointed downward S/U Verify RPS-CB-MG1 Open position. (towards off).

(Generator Output Breaker).

5 Step 5.1.2c Simulates depressing and The start pushbutton holding is depressed. S/U*

Depress and Hold RPS-RMS-MG1/START, RPS-RMS-MG1/ START, Red light On, Green MOTOR ON pushbutton pushbutton (Motor On). light Off depressed.

The motor starts to make noise and starts to spin.

P-1 Rev. 6 Page 3 of 10

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step 6 Step 5.1.2d Observes the Green Motor The Green light is off Off indicating light off and and the Red light is S/U Verify the following:

the Red Motor On on.

  • Motor Off indicating light indicating light is on.

extinguished (Green)

  • Motor On light illuminates (Red) 7 Step 5.1.2e Simulates releasing the The MG motor is MOTOR ON pushbutton spinning at a constant S/U*

When RPS-MG-1 has come (when cue is read). speed and noise.

up to speed, then release RPS-RMS- MG1/START pushbutton.

NOTE: Motor On pushbutton doubles as an Over Voltage Trip Reset pushbutton.

Alt 8 Step 5.1.2f Verbalizes that voltage Indicate zero volts on Path indication would be RPS-VM-MG1A. S/U*

If voltage is not indicated at expected on RPS-VM-rated speed, then When the pushbutton MG1A.

momentarily depress has been depressed RPS-RMS-MG1/ START, Simulates momentarily and released then:

Motor On pushbutton to depressing the Indicate 120 volts on reset the overvoltage trip. RPS-RMS-MG1/START, RPS-VM-MG1A.

Motor On pushbutton.

9 Step 5.1.2g Observes voltage on Continue to indicate RPS-VM-MG1A. 120 volts on RPS- S/U Verify RPS-VM-MG1A VM-MG1A.

voltage stabilizes at about 120 VAC.

10 5.1.2h Simulates closing Indicate that the lever RPS-CB-MG1 by pushing is pointed up S/U*

Close RPS-CB-MG1.

up on lever to On. (towards On).

11 Step 5.1.3 Performs section 5.3 as follows: S/U Proceed to Section 5.3.

12 Step 5.3.1 Recognizes Section 5.1 was just completed. S/U Verify Section 5.1 completed.

P-1 Rev. 6 Page 4 of 10

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step 13 Step 5.3.2 Verbalizes where the EPA The student does not breaker keys # 166 & 168 have to go to the S/U*

Obtain required EPA breaker are located (Control Room control room to keys from the Control Room in key locker outside Shift obtain keys - an key locker: Managers office). explanation on where the keys are is

  • Key 166 (RPS sufficient.

C72-S003-A Div A Test)

(RPS-EPA-3A)

  • Key 168, (RPS You have obtained the C72-S003-B Div A Test) keys.

(RPS-EPA-3B) 14 Step 5.3.3 Performs this step.

S/U Close RPS-EPA-3A as follows (EPA Breaker)

(RPS-MG2 Room):

15 Step 5.3.3a Observes S-1 is in Normal The keylock switch is S/U position. pointed to Normal.

Verify breaker keylock switch S-1 in Normal.

16 Step 5.3.3b Observes S-2 is in OPER The keylock switch is S/U position. pointed to OPER.

Verify breaker keylock switch S-2 in OPER.

17 Step 5.3 3c Observes Power In The Red, RPS-MG-1 S/U Indicator is on. Power In light is on.

Verify the Power In indicator illuminated.

18 Step 5.3.3d Observes the following All indicator lights are S/U indicators: off.

If any of the following indicators are illuminated,

  • Overvoltage then rotate keylock switch
  • Undervoltage S-2 to RESET, and return to
  • Underfrequency OPER
  • Power Out
  • Overvoltage
  • Undervoltage
  • Underfrequency
  • Power Out P-1 Rev. 6 Page 5 of 10
  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step 19 Step 5.3.3e Verifies the following All indicator lights are S/U indicators are off.

Verify the following indicators extinguished: extinguished:

  • Overvoltage
  • Overvoltage
  • Undervoltage
  • Undervoltage
  • Underfrequency
  • Underfrequency
  • Power Out
  • Power Out 20 Step 5.3.3f Simulates opening EPA Indicate that the S/U*

breaker RPS-EPA-3A by breakers lever is in the Open RPS-EPA-3A to reset pushing down on lever lowered position it. towards OFF position. (towards Off).

21 Step 5.3.3g Simulates closing EPA Indicate that the S/U*

breaker RPS-EPA-3B by breakers lever is in the Close RPS-EPA-3A. pushing up on lever raised position towards ON position. (towards On).

22 Step 5.3.3h Observes the Power Out The Red RPS-EPA-S/U indicator is on. 3C Power Out light is Verify the Power Out on.

indicator illuminated.

NOTE: EPA breakers are designed such that the undervoltage lights for RPS-EPA breakers may illuminate indicating an undervoltage condition without activating the undervoltage trip circuit.

23 Step 5.3.4 Verifies under voltage light The under voltage S/U is not on with breaker light is off.

If the under voltage light is closed.

illuminated and the breaker is closed, then initiate a work request.

24 Step 5.3.5 Performs this step. S/U Close RPS-EPA-3C as follows (EPA Breaker)

(RPS-MG2 Room).

25 Step 5.3.5a Observes S-1 is in Normal The keylock switch is S/U position. pointed to Normal.

Verify breaker keylock switch S-1 in the NORMAL.

26 Step 5.3.5b Observes S-2 is in OPER The keylock switch is S/U position. pointed to OPER.

Verify breaker keylock switch S-2 in the OPER.

P-1 Rev. 6 Page 6 of 10

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step 27 Step 5.3.5c Observes Power In The Power In light is S/U Indicator is on. lit.

Verify the Power In indicator illuminated.

Alt 28 Step 5.3.5d Observes the following All indicators are off Path S/U*

indicators: except the white If any of the following under frequency light indicators are not

  • Overvoltage is on.

extinguished, then rotate

  • Undervoltage keylock switch S-2 to the
  • Underfrequency RESET position, and return
  • Power Out to OPER
  • Overvoltage
  • Undervoltage
  • Underfrequency
  • Power Out Simulates rotating The switch has been Recognizes need to reset Keylock switch S-2 to turned to RESET and RESET and back to back to OPER.

OPER.

29 Step 5.3.5e Verifies the following All indicator lights are S/U indicators are off.

Verify the following extinguished:

indicators extinguished:

  • Overvoltage
  • Overvoltage
  • Undervoltage
  • Undervoltage
  • Underfrequency
  • Underfrequency
  • Power Out
  • Power Out 30 Step 5.3.5f Simulates opening EPA Indicate that the S/U*

breaker RPS-EPA-3C by breakers lever is in the Open RPS-EPA-3C to reset pushing down on lever lowered position it. towards OFF position. (towards Off).

P-1 Rev. 6 Page 7 of 10

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step 31 Step 5.3.5g Simulates closing EPA Indicate that the S/U*

breaker RPS-EPA-3C by breakers lever is in the Close RPS-EPA-3C. pushing up on lever raised position towards ON position. (towards On).

32 Step 5.3.5h Observes the Power Out The Power Out light S/U indicator is on. is on.

Verify the Power Out indicator illuminated.

NOTE: EPA breakers are designed such that the undervoltage lights for RPS-EPA breakers may illuminate indicating an undervoltage condition without activating the undervoltage trip circuit.

33 Step 5.3.5i Verifies under voltage light The under voltage S/U is off with the breaker light is off.

If the under voltage light is closed.

illuminated and the breaker is closed, then initiate a work request.

Termination Criteria: Student informs the CRS that RPS-EPA-3A and RPS-EPA-3C breakers are closed.

JPM Stop Time: _______________

Transfer the following to the Results of JPM page: Any Unsat step - indicate if step was a Critical Step; JPM completion time.

P-1 Rev. 6 Page 8 of 10

RESULTS OF JPM Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Evaluator (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard: RPS-MG-1 is running with RPS-CB-MG1 (generator output breaker) closed, and RPS-EPA-3A and RPS-EPA-3C (EPA breakers) reset and closed.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Evaluator's Signature: Date:

P-1 Rev. 6 Page 9 of 10

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

RPS Division A has been de-energized due to a fault The fault has been identified and corrected Initiating Cue:

  • The CRS directs you to restart RPS-MG-1 and repower the Division A RPS bus in accordance with SOP-RPS-START section 5.1 and 5.3.
  • Precautions and Limitations have been reviewed and are satisfied.
  • Inform the CRS when the RPS EPA breakers have been closed.

THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS JPM IS SIMULATED.

CONTROL MANIPULATIONS WILL NOT BE PERFORMED.

P-1 Rev. 6 Page 10 of 10

JPM P-2 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE INSERT CONTROL RODS BY VENTING SCRAM AIR HEADER (Plant)

LESSON LENGTH .5 HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE P-2 Rev. No. 3 EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Ron Hayden DATE 05/11/06 REVISED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 02/10/17 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Number of Revision Pages By Date Approval JPM SETUP Simulator ICs; Malfunctions; Triggers; Overrides:

N/A Special Setup Instructions:

None JPM Instructions:

The student is handed the Student Information JPM Card and PPM 5.5.11 Tab D.

Tools/Equipment: Pre staged EOP Tools Safety Items: Hard Hat; Safety Glasses; Gloves Task Number: RO-0680 Validation Time: 9 Minutes Alternate Path: No Time Critical: No PPM

Reference:

PPM 5.5.11 Rev. 8 Location: Plant NUREG 1123 Ref: 295037 EA1.05 (3.9 / 4.0) Performance Method: Simulate Task Standard: The SCRAM air header has been vented and components restored to initial configuration upon completion of PPM 5.5.11 Tab D.

P-2 Rev. 3 Page 2 of 7

JPM CHECKLIST INITIAL A scram has been initiated and the blue scram lights are extinguished at H13-P603. Reactor CONDITIONS: pressure is stable at 930 psig and Reactor Power is 38%.

INITIATING The CRS has directed you to insert control rods by venting the Scram Air Header per PPM CUE: 5.5.11 Tab D. Inform the CRS when Tab D has been completed. The performance of this JPM will be simulated. Control manipulations will not be performed.

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step JPM Start Time:_______________

1 Close CRD-V-95, Scram Simulates turning the Handwheel rotates in the S/U*

Air Header Isolation handwheel for CRD-V-95 clockwise direction until it clockwise to close valve stops moving.

If observed, VPI points to shut.

2 Close CRD-V-729, CRD- Simulates turning the Handwheel rotates in the S/U*

PI-13 Isolation handwheel for CRD-V-729 clockwise direction until it clockwise to close valve stops moving.

If observed, VPI points to shut.

Note/Caution: Pressurized air will be released when drain plug is removed from CRD-PI-13 which could cause personnel injury 3 Remove instrument drain Retrieve wrench from EOP Drain plug removed and in S/U*

plug for CRD-PI-13 Toolbox, simulates hand rotating the instrument drain plug counterclockwise on CRD-PI-13 until drain plug is removed 4 Open CRD-V-729, CRD- Simulates turning the Air can be heard/felt S/U*

PI-13 isolation handwheel for CRD-V-729 coming from drain line counter-clockwise to open the valve Handwheel rotates in the counter-clockwise direction until it stops moving.

If observed, VPI points to open.

P-2 Rev. 3 Page 3 of 7

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step 5 When scram air header is Verifies CRD-PI-13 Air can no longer be S/U fully depressurized and no indicates the air header is heard/felt coming from further rod motion depressurized drain line observed Indicate 0 psig on the gauge face Contacts the Control Room to verify the status Inform the candidate that of rod motion. no further rod motion is observed 6 Restore system alignment as follows:

7 Close CRD-V-729 Simulates turning the Handwheel rotates in the S/U*

handwheel for CRD-V-729 clockwise direction until it clockwise until valve is stops moving.

closed If observed, VPI points to shut.

8 Install instrument drain Simulates inserting the Plug is connected to the S/U*

plug for CRD-PI-13 drain plug back into the pipe and has stopped pipe and simulates turning turning the drain plug for CRD-PI-13 clockwise to reinstall it 9 Open CRD-V-729 Simulates turning the Handwheel rotates in the S/U*

handwheel CRD-V-729 counter-clockwise counter-clockwise until direction until it stops valve is opened moving.

If observed, VPI points to open.

10 Open CRD-V-95 Simulates turning the Handwheel rotates in the S/U*

handwheel for CRD-V-95 counter-clockwise counter-clockwise until direction until it stops valve is opened moving.

If observed, VPI points to open.

Termination Criteria: Student informs the CRS that actions to vent Scram Air Header have been completed.

JPM Stop Time:_______________

P-2 Rev. 3 Page 4 of 7

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step Transfer the following to the Results of JPM page: Any Unsat step - indicate if step was a Critical Step; JPM completion time.

P-2 Rev. 3 Page 5 of 7

RESULTS OF JPM INSERT CONTROL ROD BY VENTING SCRAM AIR HEADER Examinee (Print): __________________________________________________________________

Evaluator (Print): __________________________________________________________________

Task Standard: The SCRAM air header has been vented and components restored to initial configuration upon completion of PPM 5.5.11 Tab D.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Evaluator's Signature: Date:

P-2 Rev. 3 Page 6 of 7

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

A scram has been initiated and the blue scram lights are extinguished at H13-P603.

Reactor pressure is stable at 930 psig and Reactor Power is 38%.

Initiating Cue:

  • Inform the CRS when actions for Tab D have been completed THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS JPM IS SIMULATED CONTROL MANIPULATIONS WILL NOT BE PERFORMED P-2 Rev. 3 Page 7 of 7

CGS 2017 NRC JPM P-2 Number: 5.5.11 Use Category: CONTINUOUS Major Rev: 008 Minor Rev: 001

Title:

Alternate Control Rod Insertions Page: 8 of 13 VENT SCRAM AIR HEADER (CRD-IR-3, RB 522' SE corner)

D CLOSE CRD-V-95, Scram Air Header Isolation CLOSE CRD-V-729, CRD-PI-13 Isolation Pressurized air will be released when drain plug is removed from CRD-PI-13 which could cause personnel injury.

REMOVE instrument drain plug for CRD-PI-13 OPEN CRD-V-729, CRD-PI-13 Isolation WHEN scram air header is fully depressurized AND no further rod motion observed RESTORE system alignment as follows:

1. CLOSE CRD-V-729
2. INSTALL insrument drain plug for CRD-PI-13
3. OPEN CRD-V-729
4. OPEN CRD-V-95 INFORM CRS Attachment 1 Page 1 of 1

JPM P-3 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL ACTIVATION DURING A CONTROL LESSON TITLE ROOM EVACUATION (Plant) (Time Critical)

LESSON LENGTH .5 HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE P-3 Rev. No. 6 EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Ron Hayden DATE 08/24/06 REVISED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 02/10/17 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE SAT Coordinator APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Number of Revision Pages By Date Approval JPM SETUP Simulator ICs; Malfunctions; Triggers; Overrides:

N/A Special Setup Instructions:

This JPM should be started from the outside of the exit door from the Control Room. The student should be handed the JPM Information Card and the examiner will read the initial conditions and cue to the student.

It expected that the student will go to the Remote Shutdown Room to get a copy of ABN-CR-EVAC. When the procedure is identified in the RSD Room, then hand the student a copy of Attachment 7.2.

JPM Instructions:

Verify Current Procedure against JPM. If any steps have changed, the JPM should be revised.

Tools/Equipment: None Safety Items: Hard Hat, Safety Glasses Task Number: RO-1057, SRO-0251 Validation Time: 9 Minutes Alternate Path: No Time Critical: YES - 10 Minutes PPM

Reference:

ABN-CR-EVAC Rev. 35 Location: Plant NUREG 1123 Ref: 295016 AA1.07 (4.2 /4.3) Performance Method: Simulate Task Standard: Remote Shutdown Panel Activation has been accomplished within 10 minutes from the Shift Manager directing a reactor scram.

P-3 Rev. 6 Page 2 of 7

JPM CHECKLIST EVALUATORS NOTE: Start this JPM outside the Control Room Exit door.

Per the initiating cue, your time starts now will be considered Time 0.

INITIAL The SM has just directed a reactor scram due to a control room fire. Operators are CONDITIONS: completing the immediate actions of ABN-CR-EVAC.

INITIATING Starting from just outside of the exit door from the Control Room, the CRS has directed you CUE: to perform Attachment 7.2 to activate the Remote Shutdown Panel. The performance of this JPM will be simulated. No control manipulations will be performed. This is a time critical JPM and your time starts now.

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step JPM Start Time:_______________

WHEN THE STUDENT HAS ENTERED THE RSD ROOM AND HAS A COPY OF ABN-CR-EVAC IN HAND, GIVE THE STUDENT HIS COPY OF ATTACHMENT 7.2.

Note: The RSD panel must be activated within 10 minutes from the time the Shift Manager (or designee) orders a reactor scram due to a design basis fire.

CAUTION: Failure to transfer RCIC flow control to EMERG may cause RCIC to trip when DP-S1-1A feeder is tripped in the subsequent step.

1 Step 7.2.1 Simulates placing RCIC- The switches arrow is RMS-RSTS7 (transfer pointing to EMERG S/U*

Place RCIC-RMS-RSTS7 switch 1) in the EMERG in EMERG (RCIC FLOW position CONTROL RCIC-FIC-1R POWER TRANSFER)

(C61-P001, RSD).

Note: De-energizing DP-S1-1A will defeat the automatic ADS function from Division 1.

P-3 Rev. 6 Page 3 of 7

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step 2 Step 7.2.2 Simulates opening breakers Each breaker is found in on DP-S1/1: the ON position. S/U*

Verify open the following breakers on DP-S1/1

  • IN-3A feeder (Cubicle As each breaker is opened:

within 15 minutes (Battery 2B - simulates turning The handle is pointing to Charger Room 1): handle CW to OFF the OFF position

  • E-DISC-DPS11/2B position)

(IN-3A feeder)

  • DP-S1-1A feeder
  • E-DISC-DPS11/2C (Cubicle 2C - simulates (DP-S1-1A feeder) turning handle CCW to
  • E-DISC-DPS11/2D OFF position)

(IN-3B feeder)

  • IN-3B feeder (Cubicle 2D - simulates turning handle CW to OFF position) 3 Step 7.2.3 In ARSD Room, simulates Each switch is found with placing the following the arrow pointing to S/U*

Place the following four power transfer switches to NORMAL (4) power transfer the EMERG position: As each switch is turned:

switches to EMERG (E-CP-ARS, ARSD):

  • 41 The switches arrow is
  • 47 pointing to EMERG
  • 41
  • 48
  • 47
  • 59
  • 48
  • 59 4 Step 7.2.4 In RSD Room, simulates Each switch is found with placing the following the arrow pointing to S/U*

Place all five (5) FRTS power transfer switches to power transfer switches to NORMAL EMERG (E-CP-FRTP, EMERG: As each switch is turned:

RSD):

  • 31 The switches arrow is
  • 31
  • 32 pointing to EMERG
  • 32
  • 33
  • 33
  • 34
  • 34
  • 35
  • 35 P-3 Rev. 6 Page 4 of 7
  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step 5 Step 7.2.5 Simulates placing the Each switch is found with following power transfer the arrow pointing to S/U*

Place the following twelve switches to EMERG: NORMAL (12) power transfer switches to EMERG

  • 2 and 5 As each switch is turned:

(EC61-P001, RSD):

  • 6 and 7 The switches arrow is
  • 2 and 5
  • 8 and 11 pointing to EMERG
  • 6 and 7
  • 12 and 13
  • 8 and 11
  • 15 and 16
  • 12 and 13
  • 17 and 18
  • 15 and 16
  • 17 and 18 6 Step 7.2.6 Simulates placing the Each switch is found with following power transfer the arrow pointing to S/U*

Place the following four switches to EMERG: NORMAL (4) power transfer switches to EMERG

  • 21 As each switch is turned:

(H22-P100, RSD):

  • 22 The switches arrow is
  • 21
  • 23 pointing to EMERG
  • 22
  • 24
  • 23
  • 24 7 Notify the CRS that Notifies CRS that Inform the student that the S /U Attachment 7.2 is attachment 7.2 is complete. JPM is complete.

complete.

Termination Criteria: Student informs CRS that Attachment 7.2 is complete.

JPM Stop Time:_______________

Transfer the following to the Results of JPM page: Any Unsat step - indicate if step was a Critical Step; JPM completion time.

P-3 Rev. 6 Page 5 of 7

RESULTS OF JPM REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL ACTIVATION DURING A CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Evaluator (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard: Remote Shutdown Panel Activation has been accomplished within 10 minutes from the Shift Manager directing a reactor scram.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Evaluator's Signature: Date:

P-3 Rev. 6 Page 6 of 7

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

  • The SM has just directed a reactor scram due to a control room fire.
  • Operators are completing the immediate actions of ABN-CR-EVAC.

Initiating Cue:

  • Starting from just outside of the exit door from the Control Room, the CRS has directed you to perform Attachment 7.2 to activate the Remote Shutdown Panel.
  • The performance of this JPM will be simulated.
  • No control manipulations will be performed.
  • This is a time critical JPM and your time starts now.

P-3 Rev. 6 Page 7 of 7

CGS 2017 NRC JPM P-3 Number: ABN-CR-EVAC Use Category: CONTINUOUS Major Rev: 034 Minor Rev: 001

Title:

Control Room Evacuation and Remote Cooldown Page: 22 of 63 7.2 Remote Shutdown Panel Activation and DP-S1/1A Deenergization (CRO1)

NOTE: The RSD panel must be activated within 10 minutes from the time the Shift Manager (or designee) orders a reactor scram due to a design basis fire.

CAUTION Failure to transfer RCIC flow control to EMERG may cause RCIC to trip when DP-S1-1A feeder is tripped in the subsequent step.

7.2.1 PLACE RCIC-RMS-RSTS7 in EMERG (RCIC FLOW CONTROL RCIC-FIC-1R POWER TRANSFER)

(C61-P001, RSD). $1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 NOTE: De-energizing DP-S1-1A will defeat the automatic ADS function from Division 1.

7.2.2 VERIFY OPEN the following breakers on DP-S1/1 within 15 minutes (Battery Charger Room 1):

  • E-DISC-DPS11/2B (IN-3A feeder)
  • E-DISC-DPS11/2C (DP-S1-1A feeder)
  • E-DISC-DPS11/2D (IN-3B feeder) 7.2.3 PLACE the following four (4) power transfer switches to EMERG (E-CP-ARS, ARSD): {C-9091}

$ 41

$ 47 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 $ 48 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 $ 59 Attachment 7.2, Remote Shutdown Panel Activation (CRO1)

Attachment 1 Page 1 of 2

CGS 2017 NRC JPM P-3 Number: ABN-CR-EVAC Use Category: CONTINUOUS Major Rev: 034 Minor Rev: 001

Title:

Control Room Evacuation and Remote Cooldown Page: 23 of 63 7.2.4 PLACE all five (5) FRTS power transfer switches to EMERG (E-CP-FRTP, RSD). {C-9083}

$ 31 31 32

$ 32

$ 33 33 34 $ 34 35

$ 35 7.2.5 PLACE the following twelve (12) power transfer switches to EMERG (C61-P001, RSD):

$2

$5 1 2 $6

$7 3 4 5 6 7 8 $8

$ 11 9 10 11 12 13 $ 12

$ 13 14 15 16 17 18 $ 15

$ 16

$ 17

$ 18 7.2.6 PLACE the following four (4) power transfer switches to EMERG (H22-P100, RSD):

$ 21 21 22

$ 22

$ 23 23 24 $ 24 7.2.7 NOTIFY the CRS that Attachment 7.2 is complete.

END Attachment 7.2, Remote Shutdown Panel Activation (CRO1)

Attachment 1 Page 2 of 2

JPM S-1 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE TRANSFER SM-3 FROM TR-S TO TR-N & TRANSFER SM-8 FROM TR-B TO SM-3 (Sim)(Alt Path)

LESSON LENGTH .5 HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE S-1 Rev. No. 2 EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 01/20/17 REVISED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 02/05/17 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Number of Revision Pages By Date Approval JPM SETUP Simulator ICs; Malfunctions; Triggers; Overrides:

Any IC where SM-3 is being powered from TR-N and SM-8 is being powered by TR-B. A startup IC is preferred to add operational validity.

Insert malfunction BKR-EPS051 to FA_AUT_TRIP Special Setup Instructions:

None JPM Instructions:

Verify current procedure against JPM. Revise JPM if any steps have changed.

Tools/Equipment: None Safety Items: None Task Number: RO-0611 Validation Time: 15 minutes Alternate Path: Yes Time Critical: No PPM

Reference:

SOP-ELEC-4160V-OPS Section 5.3 and Location: Simulator Section 5.10 Rev. 12 NUREG 1123 Ref: 262001A4.04 (3.6 / 3.7) Performance Method: Perform Task Standard: SM-3 has been transferred from the Startup Transformer to the Normal Transformer per SOP-ELEC-4160V-OPS. SM-8 has been transferred from the Backup Transformer to SM-3 in accordance with SOP-ELEC-4160V-OPS.

S-1 Rev. 2 Page 2 of 10

JPM CHECKLIST INITIAL Plant startup is in progress. All busses have been transferred from TR-S to TR-N other than SM-3. SM-8 is aligned to TR-B due to CONDITIONS: maintenance being conducted on breaker E-CB-8/3. Maintenance has just been completed on breaker E-CB-8/3 and it is ready for post maintenance testing.

INITIATING The CRS has directed you to transfer SM-3 from TR-S to TR-N in accordance with SOP-ELEC-4160V-OPS. The CRS has also CUE: directed you to transfer SM-8 from TR-B to SM-3 to support post maintenance testing in accordance with SOP-ELEC-4160V-OPS.

All Prerequisites / Precautions and Limitations have been addressed. CRS has addressed Tech Specs.

  • Items are Critical Steps Time Step Element Standard Cue Sat/Unsat JPM Start Time: ______________

NOTE: The control and indications necessary to perform this section are located at H13-P800 (Bd C).

1 Step 5.3.1 Observes CB-N1/3 white Lockout Circuit Avail light is illuminated VERIFY E-CB-N1/3 white S/U LOCKOUT CIRCUIT AVAIL light illuminated.

2 Step 5.3.2 Observes CB-N1/3 green light illuminated and green flag displayed VERIFY E-CB-N1/3 green light S/U illuminated and green flag displayed.

3 Step 5.3.3 Observes CB-S3 white Lockout Circuit Avail light illuminated VERIFY E-CB-S3 white S/U LOCKOUT CIRCUIT AVAIL light illuminated.

S-1 Rev. 2 Page 3 of 10

  • Items are Critical Steps Time Step Element Standard Cue Sat/Unsat 4 Step 5.3.4 Observes CB-S3 red light illuminated VERIFY E-CB-S3 red light S/U illuminated.

5 Step 5.3.5 Places CB-N1/3 Sync Selector switch to the MAN position PLACE E-CB-N1/3 Sync Selector S/U*

switch in MAN.

6 Step 5.3.6 Observes voltages present on both incoming and running buses VERIFY voltage present on both S/U incoming and running buses.

NOTE: The blue Sync Permit light for E-CB-N1/3 is illuminated from initiation of breaker closure until closure actually occurs.

NOTE: E-CB-S3 should automatically trip when E-CB-N1/3 closes.

NOTE: H13-800.C3.3-3, BKR S3 TRIP will alarm when the following step is performed.

7 Step 5.3.7 Places CB-N1/3 control switch to S/U*

close by turning to the right CLOSE E-CB-N1/3.

S-1 Rev. 2 Page 4 of 10

  • Items are Critical Steps Time Step Element Standard Cue Sat/Unsat Alt Path 8 Step 5.3.8 Observes CB-S3 red light illuminated S/U*

and green light out and then manually VERIFY E-CB-S3 auto trips. trips E-CB-S3.

Reports to CRS that E-CB-S3 failed to automatically trip (communications not considered a critical step).

9 Step 5.3.9 Recognizes that E-CB-S3 is already S/U in trip from previous step and takes PLACE E-CB-S3 control switch in no action.

TRIP.

10 Step 5.3.10 Observes S3 green light illuminated S/U and green flag displayed VERIFY E-CB-S3 green light illuminated and green flag displayed.

11 Step 5.3.11 Places CB-N1/3 Sync Selector switch S/U to the OFF position PLACE E-CB-N1/3 Sync Selector switch in OFF.

S-1 Rev. 2 Page 5 of 10

NOTE: The controls and indications necessary to perform this section are located at H13-P800 (Bd C).

12 Step 5.10.1 Candidate identifies that E-CB-3/8 is already closed. Marks first part of PERFORM the following prior to step N/A.

transferring SM-8 to SM-3:

Candidate recognizes that SM-3 is If E-CB-3/8 is open, THEN CLOSE being powered by TR-N. Marks S/U E-CB-3/8 as follows: second part of step N/A.

If TR-S is supplying SM-3, THEN VERIFY SM-3 has sufficient capacity to carry SM-8.

13 Step 5.10.2 Candidate verifies that E-CB-8/3 white LOCKOUT CIRCUIT AVAIL VERIFY E-CB-8/3 white light is illuminated. S/U LOCKOUT CIRCUIT AVAIL light illuminated.

14 Step 5.10.3 Candidate verifies that E-CB-8/3 green light illuminated and green flag VERIFY E-CB-8/3 green light displayed. S/U illuminated and green flag displayed.

15 Step 5.10.4 Candidate verifies that E-CB-B8 white LOCKOUT CIRCUIT AVAIL VERIFY E-CB-B8 white light illuminated. S/U LOCKOUT CIRCUIT AVAIL light illuminated.

16 Step 5.10.5 Candidate verifies that E-CB-B8 red light illuminated.

VERIFY E-CB-B8 red light S/U illuminated.

S-1 Rev. 2 Page 6 of 10

17 Step 5.10.6 Candidate places E-CB-8/3 Sync Selector switch in MANUAL.

PLACE E-CB-8/3 Sync Selector S/U*

switch in MANUAL.

18 Step 5.10.7 Candidate verifies that voltage is present on both incoming and VERIFY voltage present on both running buses. S/U incoming and running buses.

NOTE: The blue Sync Permit light for E-CB-8/3 is illuminated from initiation of breaker closure until closure actually occurs.

NOTE: E-CB-B8 should automatically trip when E-CB-8/3 closes.

NOTE: H13-800.C.5.5-3 BACKUP XFMR BKR B8 TRIP will alarm when the following step is performed.

NOTE: H13-800.C4.3-5 TR-B REV PWR RELAY may alarm when the following step is performed.

NOTE: Closing E-CB-8/3 causes E-CB-B8 to trip open. This renders E-CB-B8 automatic closure inoperable until E-CB-B8 control switch is placed in TRIP. Although E-TR-B become inoperable instantaneously E-TR-S becomes operable when E-CB-8/1 is closed, therefore only one offsite supply is inoperable at a time.

19 Step 5.10.8 Candidate asks for CRS direction As CRS directs that TR-B remain (optional). available.

IF required to maintain TR-B As equipment operator, state that you S/U available, THEN STATION a Candidate directs an Equipment are stationed at E-CB-B8 dedicated operator at E-CB-B8. Operator to be stationed at E-CB-B8.

S-1 Rev. 2 Page 7 of 10

20 Step 5.10.9 Candidate asks for CRS direction. As CRS, state that log entries will be made.

IF TR-B is required to be operable, THEN ENTER E-TR-B as S/U inoperable in the Plant Logging System. Refer to LCO 3.8.1 and 3.8.2.

21 Step 5.10.10 Candidate closes E-CB-8/3.

S/U*

CLOSE E-CB-8/3.

Termination Criteria: Student completes assigned tasks through procedure step 5.10.10 (JPM Step 21).

JPM Stop Time: ______________

Transfer the following to the Results of JPM page: Any Unsat step - indicate if step was a Critical Step; JPM completion time.

S-1 Rev. 2 Page 8 of 10

RESULTS OF JPM Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Evaluator (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard: SM-3 has been transferred from the Startup Transformer to the Normal Transformer per SOP-ELEC-4160V-OPS. SM-8 has been transferred from the Backup Transformer to SM-3 in accordance with SOP-ELEC-4160V-OPS.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Evaluator's Signature: Date:

S-1 Rev. 2 Page 9 of 10

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

Plant startup is in progress. All busses have been transferred from TR-S to TR-N other than SM-3. SM-8 is aligned to TR-B due to maintenance being conducted on breaker E-CB-8/3.

Maintenance has just been completed on breaker E-CB-8/3 and it is ready for post maintenance testing.

Initiating Cue:

The CRS has directed you to transfer SM-3 from TR-S to TR-N in accordance with SOP-ELEC-4160V-OPS.

The CRS has also directed you to transfer SM-8 from TR-B to SM-3 to support post maintenance testing in accordance with SOP-ELEC-4160V-OPS.

  • All Prerequisites / Precautions and Limitations have been addressed.
  • CRS has addressed Tech Specs.

S-1 Rev. 2 Page 10 of 10

JPM S-2 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE RESPOND TO A LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING (Sim)

LESSON LENGTH .5 HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE S-2 Rev. No. 2 EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 12/29/16 REVISED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 02/07/17 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use S-2 Rev. 2 Page 1 of 12

MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description Affected Entered Effective Manager By Date Rev Number of Revision Pages Approval JPM SETUP Simulator ICs; Malfunctions; Triggers; Overrides:

Manually place simulator in MODE 4 with RHR-P-2B lined-up for SDC with SW-P-1B operating. Insert inadvertent closure of RHR-V-8 and RHR-V-9. Perform steps to secure RHR Loop B Shutdown Cooling Lineup using SOP-RHR-SDC (Section 5.5).

Special Setup Instructions:

Place Danger Tag on RHR-V-64B (RHR B Min Flow valve control switch)

Have copy of SOP-RHR-SDC, section 5.7, available for student (ensure all of section 3 and 4 initialed (or N/Ad and initialed), as appropriate for plant conditions and steps 5.7.1 & 5.7.2 initialed with step 5.7.3 marked N/A and initialed.)

Clear BISIs on H13-P601 after simulator placed in RUN JPM Instructions:

Verify current procedure against JPM. Revise JPM if any steps have changed.

Consider allowing student to review initial conditions and que prior to entering simulator (time saver).

Tools/Equipment: None Safety Items: None Task Number: RO-1300 Validation Time: 15 Alternate Path: Yes Time Critical: No PPM

Reference:

SOP-RHR-SDC rev 25 Location: Simulator NUREG 1123 Ref: 205000.A2.06 (3.4 / 3.5) Performance Method: Perform Task Standard: RHR pump B started and shutdown cooling flow re-established between 5400 gpm and 8000 gpm in accordance with SOP-RHR-SDC steps 5.7.4 through 5.7.23.

S-2 Rev. 2 Page 2 of 12

JPM CHECKLIST INITIAL Given the following:

CONDITIONS:

  • The reactor is in Mode 4.
  • RHR Loop B was in Shutdown Cooling when RHR-V-8 and RHR-V-9 inadvertently closed, tripping RHR-P-2B.
  • No activities have occurred that could cause the formation of voids in RHR-B.
  • SW-P-1B is operating per SOP-SW-START.

INITIATING The CRS directs you to restore RHR Loop B shutdown cooling per SOP-RHR-SDC, section 5.7, RHR Loop B Shutdown Cooling CUE: Quick Restart. All Precautions and Limitations have been reviewed. Steps 5.7.1 - 5.7.3 are complete. Begin at step 5.7.4.

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step JPM Start Time: ______________

CAUTION: To prevent failure of the RHR pumps due to excessive radiation exposure, alternate shutdown cooling, by Suppression Pool Cooling, is the only allowable mode for shutdown cooling once a degraded core condition has been identified.

CAUTION: Two Loop RHR Shutdown Cooling operations may cause actuation of Excess Flow Trip Isolation if ICP-RHR-Q901, RHR SDC Mode High Flow Isolation - CFT/CC, has not been completed within its required surveillance interval.

CAUTION: Failure to warm the RHR pump suction line may cause excessive thermal stress on the RHR injection line/Recirculation piping tee.

NOTE: This section is used if the Delta-T between RHR B Heat Exchanger Outlet and RRC-P-1A Suction (RRC-TR-650, pt. 1, or TDAS pt. X292) is LT 80 degrees F.

NOTE: If normal Shutdown Cooling cannot be used, then refer to ABN-RHR-SDC-ALT.

S-2 Rev. 2 Page 3 of 12

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step NOTE: Technical Specifications require Reactor Vessel and head flange temperatures be maintained GT 80 degrees F when the Vessel head bolting studs are being tensioned. (SR 3.4.11.7)

NOTE: If core decay heat is present, or if system metal temperature is high, a recirculation pump of RHR pump (do not use a recirculation pump if an RHR pump is available) along with a means of determining Reactor water temperature should be kept in service.

Examiner Note: Candidate may bring up Shutdown Cooling screen on PDIS computer to validate system parameters.

1 Step 5.7.4

  • Observed RHR-V-8 CLOSED.

VERIFY RHR-V-8 OPEN (RHR

Isolation) (H13-P601). S/U*

  • Observed that RHR-V-8 Red Light is ON and Green Light is OFF.

2 Step 5.7.5

  • Observed RHR-V-9 CLOSED.

VERIFY RHR-V-9 OPEN (RHR Shutdown Cooling Suction Inboard

  • Repositioned RHR-V-9 Switch to Isol) (H13-P601). open.

S/U*

  • Observed that RHR-V-9 Red Light is ON and Green Light is OFF.

3 Step 5.7.6 Observed RHR-V-4B Red Light is VERIFY RHR-V-4B CLOSED OFF and Green Light is ON.

S/U (Pump Suction from Supp Pool)

(H13-P601).

S-2 Rev. 2 Page 4 of 12

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step 4 Step 5.7.7 Observed RHR-V-6B Red Light is ON and Green Light is OFF.

VERIFY RHR-V-6B OPEN S/U (Shutdown Cooling Suction) (H13-P601).

5 Step 5.7.8 N/A per initial cue.

IF RHR-V-6B, RHR-V-8, or RHR-V-9 were closed, AND any activity occurred that could cause the S/U formation of voids while they were closed, THEN FILL and VENT RHR-P-2B suction piping as follows:

6 Step 5.7.9 Observed RRC-P-1B Red RUN Light is OFF and Green STOP Light S/U VERIFY RRC-P-1B OFF per SOP-is ON.

RRC-SHUTDOWN.

NOTE: IF CRD Recirculation Pump seal purge is in operation, do not close both RRC-V-67B and RRC-V-23B.

7 Step 5.7.10 Verified RRC-V-67B Red Light is OFF and Green Light is ON VERIFY one of the following CLOSED. N/A the other.

  • RRC-V-67B (preferred) S/U (Recirc Pump B Discharge)

(H13-P602)

  • RRC-V-23B (Recirc Pump B Suction) (H13-P602)

S-2 Rev. 2 Page 5 of 12

8 Step 5.7.11 N/A (RRC-V-67B already closed)

IF unable to close either RRC-V-23B S/U or RRC-V-67B, THEN REFER to ABN-RHR-SDC-ALT.

NOTE: IF the RRC pump is not in service, than an alternate RRC temperature as determined by the CRS/Shift Manager should be used.

9 Step 5.7.12 N/A per initial cue.

IF RHR-SDC-B has been off GT two hours, THEN VERIFY the T between RHR B Heat Exchanger Outlet (RHR-TRS-601 or TDAS pt.

X059) and RRC-P-1A Suction (RRC-TR-650, pt. 1, or TDAS pt.

X292) is LT 80° F.

S/U

  • RRC pump suction temperature. ______F
  • RHR B Heat Exchanger (HX)

Outlet temperature. ______F

  • T between suction and HX Outlet temperatures. ______F 10 Step 5.7.13 Verified RHR-V-3B Red Light is OFF and Green Light is ON.

VERIFY RHR-V-3B is CLOSED S/U (RHR-HX-1B Isolation) (H13-P601).

S-2 Rev. 2 Page 6 of 12

11 Step 5.7.14 Verified RHR-V-48B Red Light is OFF and Green Light is ON.

CLOSE or VERIFY CLOSED S/U RHR-V-48B (RHR-HX-1B Shell (valve already closed)

Side Bypass) (H13-P601).

NOTE: The following steps are designed to minimize the potential of a water hammer when RHR-P-2B is started.

Examiner Note: Power is available to RHR-V-53B.

12 Step 5.7.15

  • Verified either RHR-V-53B Red or IF power is available to RHR-V-53B, Green Light is ON.

THEN THROTTLE OPEN RHR-

  • Repositioned and held RHR-V-V-48B approximately 8 seconds. 48B to open for approximately 8 S/U*

seconds and released.

  • Verified both RHR-V-48B Red and Green Lights are ON.

13 Step 5.7.16 Informs CRS about OSP-RCS-C102 Acknowledge report and state that surveillance requirement. another operator will be assigned to IF required, the surveillance. S/U THEN LOG RPV cooldown rate per OSP-RCS-C102.

14 Step 5.7.17 N/A (not refueling)

IF starting the RHR pump during refuel activities, THEN NOTIFY the S/U Refuel Supervisor RPV water clarity may be reduced.

S-2 Rev. 2 Page 7 of 12

15 Step 5.7.18

  • Verified SW-P-1B Red Light is VERIFY SW-P-1B operating per ON and Green Light is OFF S/U SOP-SW-START.
  • Observed flow was indicating in normal band.

CAUTION: Exceeding a flow of 8000 gpm or failure to maintain 800 gpm may cause RHR pump damage/failure.

NOTE: Attachment 6.1 shows RHR recommended operating conditions.

NOTE: With RHR B PUMP DISCH PRESS HIGH/LOW in alarm, RHR-P-2B may be started for EOP related activities.

Examiner Note: Two-handed operation is allowed.

Examiner Note: Only first bullet (pump start) required to satisfy Critical Step.

16 Step 5.7.19

  • Rotated RHR-P-2B control-switch START RHR-P-2B. to start.
  • Verified Red Light is ON and S/U*

Green Light is OFF

  • Observed discharge pressure increased.

S-2 Rev. 2 Page 8 of 12

Examiner Note: Power is available to RHR-V-53B. Two-handed operation is allowed.

Examiner Note: Only second bullet (open RHR-V-53B) required to satisfy Critical Step.

17 Step 5.7.20

  • Verified either RHR-V-53B Red or IF power is available to RHR-V-53B, Green Light is ON.

THEN IMMEDIATELY OPEN

Return) (H13-P601).

  • Verified RHR-V-53B Red Light is ON and Green Light is OFF.

18 Step 5.7.21 N/A (power available)

IF power is not available to RHR-V-53B, AND RHR-V-53B has been left S/U OPEN, THEN IMMEDIATELY THROTTLE OPEN RHR-V-48B approximately 8 seconds:

19 Step 5.7.22 Verified flow LT 3000 gpm then rotated and held RHR-V-48B IF flow is not GE 3000 gpm, control-switch in Open until THEN THROTTLE RHR-V-48B to approximately 3000 gpm flow was S/U establish approximately 3000 gpm. established.

S-2 Rev. 2 Page 9 of 12

Examiner Note: Critical Step met if flow within range of 5400 gpm to 8000 gpm.

20 Step 5.7.23 Rotated and held RHR-V-48B control-switch in Open until GT 5400 After 30 seconds, THROTTLE gpm but LT 8000 gpm was RHR-V-48B to establish GT 5400 established (preferably GT 7000 S/U*

gpm but LT 8000 gpm (preferably gpm).

GT 7000 gpm).

Termination Criteria: Steps 5.7.4 through 5.7.23 complete.

JPM Stop Time: ______________

Transfer the following to the Results of JPM page: Any Unsat step - indicate if step was a Critical Step; JPM completion time.

S-2 Rev. 2 Page 10 of 12

RESULTS OF JPM Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Evaluator (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard: RHR pump B started and shutdown cooling flow re-established between 5400 gpm and 8000 gpm in accordance with SOP-RHR-SDC steps 5.7.4 through 5.7.23.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Evaluator's Signature: Date:

S-2 Rev. 2 Page 11 of 12

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

Given the following:

  • The reactor is in Mode 4.
  • RHR Loop B was in Shutdown Cooling when RHR-V-8 and RHR-V-9 inadvertently closed, tripping RHR-P-2B.
  • No activities have occurred that could cause the formation of voids in RHR-B.
  • SW-P-1B is operating per SOP-SW-START.

Initiating Cue:

The CRS directs you to restore RHR Loop B shutdown cooling per SOP-RHR-SDC, section 5.7, RHR Loop B Shutdown Cooling Quick Restart.

All Precautions and Limitations have been reviewed.

Steps 5.7.1 - 5.7.3 are complete (begin at step 5.7.4)

S-2 Rev. 2 Page 12 of 12

JPM S-3 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE HPCS SYSTEM INITIATION (Sim)(Alt Path)

LESSON LENGTH .5 HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE S-3 Rev. No. 4 EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 12/29/16 REVISED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 02/10/17 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE SAT Coordinator APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Number of Revision Pages By Date Approval JPM SETUP Simulator ICs; Malfunctions; Triggers; Overrides:

Initialize to IC-212 Execute associated Schedule/Event files Special Setup Instructions:

Insert a manual scram and allow RPV/L to recover to about 0 then trip both RFPs. Reduce RPV inventory to -40 inches Insert malfunction MOV-CSS004F to FAIL_AUTO_CLOSE JPM Instructions:

Verify current procedure against JPM. Revise JPM if any steps have changed.

Tools/Equipment: None Safety Items: None Task Number: RO-0235 Validation Time: 10 minutes Alternate Path: Yes Time Critical: No PPM

Reference:

SOP-HPCS-INJECTION-QC Rev. 4 Location: Simulator NUREG 1123 Ref: 209002 A4.04 (3.1 / 3.1) Performance Method: Perform Task Standard: HPCS-P-1 is running. HPCS Min Flow valve (HPCS-V-12) has been manually closed.

RPV level is in the band of +13 to +54 with HPCS-V-4 closed without causing a Level 8 trip.

S-3 Rev. 4 Page 2 of 6

JPM CHECKLIST INITIAL A failure of the master controller caused RPV level to drop. The Control Room Supervisor directed a manual scram. Both Reactor CONDITIONS: Feed Pumps tripped as RPV level approached 0. PPM 5.1.1, RPV Control, has been entered. RCIC system in not available.

INITIATING The CRS has directed you to initiate the HPCS system, verify proper system operation, and restore RPV level back to a band of CUE: +13 to +54. Inform the CRS when system operation has been verified; RPV level is in the band of +13 to +54, and HPCS-V-4 has been closed.

  • Items are Critical Steps Time Step Element Standard Cue Sat/Unsat JPM Start Time: ______________

1 Step 2.1 Observes Level 8 amber seal-in light S/U Verify Reactor Level 8 Seal-in is not lit (HPCS-RMS-E22A/S6) is reset 2 Step 2.2 Rotates the collar in the clockwise If not already running, then ARM and direction and depresses the S/U*

DEPRESS the HPCS MANUAL pushbutton to initiate HPCS INITIATION pushbutton 3 Step 2.3 Observes HPCS-P-1 Red light on and Green light off. May also verify S/U Verify HPCS-P-1 running discharge pressure and amps 4 Step 2.4 Observes HPCS-V-4 Red light on S/U Verify HPCS-V-4 open (RPV and Green light off Injection)

S-3 Rev. 4 Page 3 of 6

Evaluator note: Min Flow valve (HPCS-V-12) should automatically close when HPCS injection rate exceeds ~1300 gpm. Student should recognize that HPCS-V-12 is full open when it should have closed.

Alt Path 5 Recognize HPCS-V-12 failed to close Manually closes HPCS-V-12 when S/U*

with RPV injection flow above 1300 RPV injection flow rate exceeds gpm. ~1300 gpm but before HPCS-V-4 is closed following level restoration.

6 Step 2.5

  • Observes RPV level and when S/U*

level is approaching +13 and Operate HPCS-V-4 as necessary to prior to RPV level reaching +54 maintain the desired RPV level takes the control switch for HPCS-V-4 to closed and observes Green light on and Red light off.

  • Level is in band immediately following HPCS-V-4 closure.

7 Verifies proper HPCS System Observes indications that HPCS DG S/U operation (given in Initiating Cue to is running perform)

Observes that HPCS-P-2 Green light S/U is off and Red light is on Termination Criteria: Student reports RPV level restored to specified band using HPCS. HPCS-V-4 is closed.

JPM Stop Time: ______________

Transfer the following to the Results of JPM page: Any Unsat step - indicate if step was a Critical Step; JPM completion time.

S-3 Rev. 4 Page 4 of 6

RESULTS OF JPM Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Evaluator (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard: HPCS-P-1 is running. HPCS Min Flow valve (HPCS-V-12) has been manually closed. RPV level is in the band of +13 to +54 with HPCS-V-4 closed without causing a Level 8 trip.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Evaluator's Signature: Date:

S-3 Rev. 4 Page 5 of 6

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

  • A failure of the master controller caused RPV level to drop.
  • The Control Room Supervisor directed a manual scram.
  • Both Reactor Feed Pumps tripped as RPV level approached 0.
  • PPM 5.1.1, RPV Control, has been entered.
  • RCIC system in not available.

Initiating Cue:

The CRS has directed you to initiate the HPCS system, verify proper system operation, and restore RPV level back to a band of +13 to +54.

Inform the CRS when system operation has been verified; RPV level is in the band of +13 to +54, and HPCS-V-4 has been closed.

S-3 Rev. 4 Page 6 of 6

CGS 2017 NRC JPM S-3 Number: SOP-HPCS-INJECTION-QC Use Category: CONTINUOUS Major Rev: 004 Minor Rev: 003

Title:

HPCS RPV Injection - Quick Card Page: 4 of 6 2.0 PROCEDURE 2.1 VERIFY Reactor Level 8 Seal-in (HPCS-RMS-E22A/S6) is RESET.

2.2 IF not already running, THEN ARM and DEPRESS the HPCS MANUAL INITIATION pushbutton.

2.3 VERIFY HPCS-P-1 running.

2.4 VERIFY HPCS-V-4 OPEN (RPV Injection).

2.5 OPERATE HPCS-V-4, as necessary, to maintain the desired RPV level.

Attachment 1 Page 1 of 1

JPM S-4 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE INITIATE CR HVAC IN MANUAL PRESSURIZATION MODE (Sim)(Alt Path)

LESSON LENGTH .5 HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE S-4 Rev. No. 2 EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Steve Bruce DATE 11/16/16 REVISED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 02/05/17 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Number of Revision Pages By Date Approval JPM SETUP Simulator ICs; Malfunctions; Triggers; Overrides:

INITIALIZE to IC-210 or any MODE with CR HVAC in normal line-up.

AND perform ONE the following:

  • Enter following into a newly created Schedule file and Event file:

Schedule file:

  • Insert malfunction MOV-RWB005F to FAIL_AUTO_OPEN
  • Insert override OVR-RWB023D to ON
  • Insert malfunction MOV-RWB002F to CLOSE on event 1
  • Insert override OVR-RWB027A to OFF on event 1
  • Insert override OVR-RWB027B to OFF on event 1
  • Insert override STL-CRHVAC221 to ON on event 1
  • Insert STL-CRHVAC221 to ON on event 1
  • Insert override OVR-RWB023D to OFF on event 2 Event file:
  • XWNI096C == 1 (Auto inserts Trigger 1)
  • km05sp(5) == 1 (Auto inserts Trigger 2)

Special Setup Instructions:

Note: TRIGGER 1 - Removal of Fuse 3 in HVAC Panel COHV-2 on RW 525 can be accomplished by turning switch for TMU-V-18A (on H13-P824) to CLOSE (performed by evaluator) or via the Booth.

Provide copy of SOP-HVAC/CR-OPS with steps 5.12.1 & 5.12.2 initialed as complete.

JPM Instructions:

Verify current procedure against JPM. Revise JPM if any steps have changed.

Tools/Equipment: None Safety Items: None Task Number: RO-0502 Validation Time: 7 Minutes Alternate Path: Yes Time Critical: No PPM

Reference:

SOP-HVAC/CR-OPS Rev. 24 Location: Simulator NUREG 1123 Ref: 290003 A4.03 (2.8 / 2.8) Performance Method: Perform Task Standard: Control Room Ventilation Train B has been placed in Control Room Pressurization Mode per SOP-HVAC/CR-OPS, section 5.12.

S-4 Rev. 2 Page 2 of 9

JPM CHECKLIST INITIAL Control Room HVAC is normal operation with WMA-FN-51B running.

CONDITIONS:

INITIATING CRS has directed Control Room Ventilation Train B be placed in Pressurization Mode per SOP-HVAC/CR-OPS section 5.12. All CUE: Precautions and Limitations have been reviewed. Steps 5.12.1 and 5.12.2 are complete. Inform CRS when task is complete.

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step JPM Start Time: _____________

Note: Unless otherwise noted, all control switches and annunciators are located on H13-P826.

Examiner Note: Start at step 5.12.4 for CR HVAC Train B.

1 Step 5.12.3 is N/A N/A because direction is to lineup CR S/U HVAC Train B 2 Step 5.12.4.a. Verified WMA-FN-51B Red light S/U ON and the Green light OFF VERIFY WMA-FN-51B running (Recirc Fan).

S-4 Rev. 2 Page 3 of 9

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step 3 Step 5.12.4.b. Verified (4) valves open by observing If asked, valves in this step are S/U Red Light ON and Green Light OFF verified locked open as annotated in VERIFY the following intake on H13-P826. the Lock Valve Checklist PPM pathways locked open: (H13-P826) 1.3.29, page 38.

Verified LOCKED OPEN by Lock Remote Intake Number 1 (NW) Valve Checklist or Field Operator. If asked to verify as a field operator, Isol): report the valves in this step are verified locked open.

WOA-V-51A (Remote Air Intake No. 1 LOCKED OPEN WOA-V-52A (Remote Air Intake No. 1 LOCKED OPEN Remote Intake Number 2 (SE) Isol):

WOA-V-51B (Remote Air Intake No. 2 LOCKED OPEN WOA-V-52B (Remote Air Intake No. 2 LOCKED OPEN 4 Step 5.12.4.c. Rotated WOA-V-51C control-switch S/U*

to close and verified Red Light OFF CLOSE the following: and Green Light ON. Rotated WOA-V-52C control-switch to close and WOA-V-51C (Outside Air Intake) verified Red Light OFF and Green Light ON.

WOA-V-52C (Outside Air Intake)

Examiner Note: ROLEPLAY: Grant permission as CRS/Shift Manager to install temporary modification.

S-4 Rev. 2 Page 4 of 9

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step 5 Step 5.12.4.d. Formally requested permission from ROLEPLAY: Grant permission as S/U CRS/Shift Manager to install CRS/Shift Manager to install REQUEST PERMISSION from temporary Modification per SOP- temporary modification.

CRS/Shift Manager to install HVAC/CR-OPS.

temporary modification to disable (fail closed) WMA-AD-51B1 (Fresh Air Inlet).

Simulator Operator: When directed, insert Trigger 1 6 Step 5.12.4.e. Directs field operator to remove fuse After Trigger 1 is inserted: S/U*

3 in HVAC Panel COHV-2 and waits REMOVE Fuse 3 in HVAC Panel for report from field that fuse ROLEPLAY: Report as field COHV-2. (Ref. EWD-84E-002) removal is complete. operator and simultaneous verifier that Fuse 3 in HVAC Panel COHV-2 on RW 525 has been removed.

7 Step 5.12.4.f. Rotated WMA-FN-54B control- S/U*

switch to ON, observed Red Light START WMA-FN-54B by placing ON and Green Light OFF.

control switch in ON (Emergency Filter Unit Fan).

Step 5.12.4.g.1. WMA-FN-54B Red Light ON and S/U 8

Green Light OFF.

VERIFY the following occurs:

1) WMA-FN-54B starts.

Examiner Note: The next 2 steps constitute the Alternate Path portion of the JPM.

S-4 Rev. 2 Page 5 of 9

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step Alt Path 9 Step 5.12.4.g.2. WMA-AD-54B1 Red Light OFF and S/U*

Green Light ON.

VERIFY the following occurs:

Examinee recognizes WMA-AD-54B1

2) WMA-AD-54B1 OPEN (WMA-FU- failed to OPEN and turns control-switch 54B Inlet). to open and verifies Red Light ON and Green Light Off.

Alt Path 10 Step 5.12.4.g.3. WEA-FN-51 Red Light ON and Green S/U*

Light OFF VERIFY the following occurs:

Examinee recognizes WEA-FN-51

3) WEA-FN-51 stops (Toilet/Kitchen failed to turn off and turns control-switch Exhaust Fan). to OFF and verifies Red Light OFF and Green Light ON.

11 Step 5.12.4.g.4. WEA-AD-51 Red Light OFF and Green S/U Light ON.

VERIFY the following occurs:

4) WEA-AD-51 CLOSED (Outlet Damper).

12 Step 5.12.4.g.5. Verified the following: S/U VERIFY the following occurs: WMA-AD-54B2 Red Light OFF and Green Light ON.

5) WMA-AD-54B2) CLOSED (WMA-FU-54B Inlet Bypass)

JPM Stop Time: _____________

Termination Criteria: Control Room HVAC Train B has been placed in Control Room Pressurization Mode.

S-4 Rev. 2 Page 6 of 9

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step Terminating Cue: Student reports Control Room HVAC Train B has been placed in Control Room Pressurization Mode.

Transfer the following to the Results of JPM page: Any Unsat step - indicate if step was a Critical Step; JPM completion time.

S-4 Rev. 2 Page 7 of 9

RESULTS OF JPM Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Evaluator (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard:

Control Room Ventilation Train B has been placed in Control Room Pressurization Mode per SOP-HVAC/CR-OPS, section 5.12.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Evaluator's Signature: Date:

S-4 Rev. 2 Page 8 of 9

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

Control Room HVAC is in normal operation with WMA-FN-51B running.

Initiating Cue:

CRS has directed Control Room Ventilation Train B be placed in Pressurization Mode per SOP-HVAC/CR-OPS section 5.12.

All Precautions and Limitations have been reviewed.

Steps 5.12.1 and 5.12.2 are complete.

Inform CRS when task is complete.

S-4 Rev. 2 Page 9 of 9

JPM S-5 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE RE-ESTABLISH SECONDARY CONTAINMENT/START RB HVAC (Sim)

LESSON LENGTH .5 HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE S-5 Rev. No. 3 EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Ron Hayden DATE 06/03/08 REVISED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 02/06/17 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Number of Revision Pages By Date Approval JPM SETUP Simulator ICs; Malfunctions; Triggers; Overrides:

None Special Setup Instructions:

Reset to any IC. Turn off both ROA and REA fans. Allow secondary D/P to decay such that all expected annunciators are received. Acknowledge all associated annunciators.

JPM Instructions:

Verify current procedure against JPM. Revise JPM if any steps have changed.

Tools/Equipment: None Safety Items: None Task Number: RO-0497 Validation Time: 8 Minutes Alternate Path: No Time Critical: No PPM

Reference:

SOP-HVAC/ RB-RESTART-QC Rev. 1 Location: Simulator NUREG 1123 Ref: 290001 A4.01 (3.3 / 3.4) Performance Method: Perform Task Standard: ROA-FN-1A and REA-FN-1A are running with REA-DPIC-1A in Auto and adjusted to achieve approximately -0.8 W.G.

S-5 Rev. 3 Page 2 of 7

JPM CHECKLIST INITIAL A series of events occurred that resulted in no running Reactor Building Supply or Exhaust fan. PPM 5.3.1, Secondary Containment CONDITIONS: Control, was entered due to high Reactor Building differential pressure. Prior to starting Standby Gas Treatment, the Control Room received information that Reactor Building HVAC could be restarted.

INITIATING The CRS directs you to restart RB HVAC by starting ROA-FN-1A and REA-FN-1A per SOP-HVAC RB-RESTART-QC. Inform CUE: the CRS when Secondary Containment may be declared operable. Simulate all plant announcements.

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Results Step Cue JPM Start Time: _____________

Student uses the quick card to perform this JPM.

1 Step 2.1 Places toggle for REA-DPIC-1A to the Manual position.

Place REA-DPIC-1A(1B) (P Control RX S/U*

Bldg/Outside) in manual.

2 Step 2.2 Depresses the open and/or closed pushbutton for S/U*

REA-DPIC-1A to have red indicator at Set REA-DPIC-1A(1B) output signal at approximately 60% of scale.

approximately 60% of scale 3 Step 2.3 Place the control switch for the following fans in Turns the handles counter-clockwise and pulls out to PULL-TO-LOCK: engage the Pull-To-Lock position for:

  • ROA-FN-1A (Reactor Bldg Supply Fan)
  • ROA-FN-1A (Reactor Bldg Supply Fan) S/U*
  • ROA-FN-1B (Reactor Bldg Supply Fan)
  • ROA-FN-1B (Reactor Bldg Supply Fan)
  • REA-FN-1A (Reactor Building Exhaust Fan)
  • REA-FN-1A (Reactor Building Exhaust Fan)
  • REA-FN-1B (Reactor Building Exhaust Fan)
  • REA-FN-1B (Reactor Building Exhaust Fan)

S-5 Rev. 3 Page 3 of 7

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Results Step Cue 4 Step 2.4 Verify the following valves are open: Observes the Red light on and Green light off for:

S/U

  • ROA-V-1 (RB Supply Outboard Isolation)
  • ROA-V-1
  • ROA-V-2 (RB Supply Inboard Iso)
  • ROA-V-2
  • REA-V-1 (RB Exhaust Inboard Iso)
  • REA-V-1
  • REA-V-2 (RB Exhaust Outboard Isol)
  • REA-V-2 If student attempts 5 Step 2.5 (2H) Depresses the control switch handle for REA-FN-1A to make a plant to the neutral position. Turns the same handle announcement S/U*

Place REA-RMS-FN1A(B) in Start (Reactor Bldg STOP THEM.

clockwise to the Start position and then releases it.

Exhaust Fan Control Switch). Inform them to make a simulated announcement.

6 Step 2.6 Observes the red light for REA-FN-1A comes on.

S/U*

When REA-FN-1A(1B) breaker closure is observed Depresses the control switch handle for ROA-FN-1A (red light), then immediately place ROA-RMS- to the neutral position. Turns the same handle to the FN1A(B) in Start (Reactor Bldg Supply Fan Start position and releases it.

Control Switch).

7 Step 2.7 S/U*

Manually adjust REA-DPIC-1A(1B) controller Adjusts REA-DPIC-1A to achieve approximately -

output until Reactor Building pressure on 0.8 W.G.. on REA-DPR-1A.

REA-DPR-1A(1B) is approximately -0.8O W.G.

8 Step 2.8 Turns thumbwheel until REA-DPIC-1A is nulled or waits until red arrow lines up with green band and S/U*

Null REA-DPIC-1A (1B), and place then moves lever to AUTO position.

REA-DPIC-1A (1B) in AUTO.

S-5 Rev. 3 Page 4 of 7

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Results Step Cue 9 Step 2.9 Depresses the control switch handles for ROA-FN-1B and REA-FN-1B from PTL and allows switches Place the control switch for the following non- S/U to go to the neutral position.

running fans in the NORMAL-after-STOP position.

  • ROA-FN-1B(1A) Observes the green flag is visible on each switch.

Termination Criteria: Student informs CRS that Secondary Containment may be declared operable.

JPM Stop Time: _____________

Transfer the following to the Results of JPM page: Any Unsat step - indicate if step was a Critical Step; JPM completion time.

S-5 Rev. 3 Page 5 of 7

RESULTS OF JPM Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Evaluator (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard: ROA-FN-1A and REA-FN-1A are running with REA-DPIC-1A in Auto and adjusted to achieve approximately -0.8 W.G.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Evaluator's Signature: Date:

S-5 Rev. 3 Page 6 of 7

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

A series of events occurred that resulted in no running Reactor Building Supply or Exhaust fan.

PPM 5.3.1, Secondary Containment Control, was entered due to high Reactor Building differential pressure.

Prior to starting Standby Gas Treatment, the Control Room received information that Reactor Building HVAC could be restarted.

Initiating Cue:

The CRS directs you to restart RB HVAC by starting ROA-FN-1A and REA-FN-1A per SOP-HVAC RB-RESTART-QC.

Inform the CRS when Secondary Containment may be declared operable.

Simulate all plant announcements.

S-5 Rev. 3 Page 7 of 7

CGS 2017 NRC JPM S-5 Number: SOP-HVAC/RB-RESTART-QC Use Category: CONTINUOUS Major Rev: 001 Minor Rev: 001

Title:

Reactor Building HVAC Restart - Quick Card Page: 4 of 4 2.0 PROCEDURE NOTE: This procedure may be used if reactor building ventilation has been lost and the cause has been corrected.

2.1 PLACE REA-DPIC-1A(1B) (P Control RX Bldg/Outside) in MANUAL.

2.2 SET REA-DPIC-1A(1B) output signal at approximately 60% of scale.

2.3 PLACE the control switch for the following fans in PULL-TO-LOCK:

ROA-FN-1A (Reactor Bldg Supply Fan)

ROA-FN-1B (Reactor Bldg Supply Fan)

REA-FN-1A (Reactor Building Exhaust Fan)

REA-FN-1B (Reactor Building Exhaust Fan) 2.4 VERIFY the following valves are OPEN:

ROA-V-1 (Reactor Bldg Supply Outboard Isolation)

ROA-V-2 (Reactor Bldg Supply Inboard Isolation)

REA-V-1 (Reactor Bldg Exhaust Inboard Isolation)

REA-V-2 (Reactor Bldg Exhaust Outboard Isolation) 2H 2.5 PLACE REA-RMS-FN1A(B) in START (Reactor Bldg Exhaust Fan).

2.6 WHEN REA-FN-1A(1B) breaker closure is observed (red light),

THEN IMMEDIATELY PLACE ROA-RMS-FN1A(B) in START (Reactor Bldg Supply Fan).

2.7 MANUALLY ADJUST REA-DPIC-1A(1B) controller output until Reactor Building pressure on REA-DPR-1A(1B) is approximately -0.8" WC 2.8 NULL REA-DPIC-1A(1B),

AND PLACE REA-DPIC-1A(B) in AUTO.

2.9 PLACE the control switch for the following non-running fans in the NORMAL-after-STOP position.

ROA-FN-1B(1A)

REA-FN-1B(1A) 2.10 NOTIFY the CRS that Secondary Containment may be declared operable.

2.11 NOTIFY Chemistry that RB HVAC has been restarted.

Attachment 1 Page 1 of 1

JPM S-6 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE LOWER RPV PRESSURE USING DEH (Sim) (Alt Path)

LESSON LENGTH .5 HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE S-6 Rev. No. 3 EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Ron Hayden DATE 10/21/14 REVISED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 02/10/17 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Number of Revision Pages By Date Approval JPM SETUP Simulator ICs; Malfunctions; Triggers; Overrides:

Reset to IC with reactor shutdown and pressure being controlled by bypass valves.

Special Setup Instructions:

Reduce RPV pressure to 605 psig using DEH in AUTO.

Insert MAL-DEH017.

Set Pressure Rate to any value other than 50 psig.

JPM Instructions:

Verify Current Procedure against JPM. If any steps have changed, the JPM should be revised.

Tools/Equipment: None Safety Items: None Task Number: RO-0348 Validation Time: 7 Minutes Alternate Path: Yes Time Critical: No PPM

Reference:

SOP-DEH-QC Rev. 5 Location: Simulator NUREG 1123 Ref: 241000 A4.02 (4.1 / 4.1) Performance Method: Perform Task Standard: RPV pressure lowered at a rate of LE 50 psig per minute to LE 550 psig using BPV MANUAL mode.

S-6 Rev. 3 Page 2 of 9

JPM CHECKLIST INITIAL Columbia was operating at full power when a scram was required. Pressure has been lowered to 605 psig to facilitate feeding the CONDITIONS: RPV with the Condensate Booster Pumps per SOP-DEH-QC.

INITIATING The CRS directs you to lower RPV pressure to 550 psig at the rate of 50 psig per minute per SOP-DEH-QC. Inform the CRS when CUE: RPV pressure is 550 psig.

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step JPM Start Time:_______________

NOTE: If the plant is operating in Mode 1 and is GT 25% power, then the DEH set point should be 960 psi. If a reactor pressure change is desired refer to ABN-PRESSURE.

1 Step 2.1.1 Selects Turbine Start Up, Reactor S/U Startup Display, or Main Display.

Initiate Pressure setpoint change as follows (Turbine Start Up; Reactor Startup Display) or (Main Display):

2 a. Select Pressure Target. Selects Pressure Target. S/U 3 b. Enter desired pressure. Enters 5,5,0 psig. S/U 4 c. Select OK. Selects OK. S/U 5 d. If a change in pressure rate is Observes Pressure Rate is not 50 psig S/U desired, then perform the and performs step.

following:

6 1) Select Pressure Rate. Selects Pressure Rate. S/U 7 2) Enter desired Pressure rate. Enters 5,0. S/U 8 3) Select OK. Selects OK. S/U 9 e. Select GO. Selects GO. S/U S-6 Rev. 3 Page 3 of 9

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step 10 f. Select YES. Selects YES. S/U Alt Path 11 g. Verify Press Demand and Throttle Observes no change in Pressure What available action do you S/U Press change at the Pressure Rate. Demand or Bypass Valve position. recommend to lower RPV pressure?

Observes green Hold light is still illuminated.

Informs the CRS.

EVALUATOR: If SOP-DEH-OPS is referenced, when section for manual bypass valve operation is found, cue to use the DEH Quick Card.

12 SOP-DEH-QC Step 2.2 Performs this section.

S/U Manual Bypass Valve Operation.

NOTE: In Manual, raising BPV demand will open the BPVs and cause Reactor pressure to lower. The BPVs will not respond to pressure changes in Manual.

13 Step 2.2.1 Performs this step.

S/U*

Operate the Bypass Valves Manually as follows (Turbine Start-up, Reactor Start screen):

NOTE: In manual, raising BPV demand will open the BPVs and cause Reactor pressure to lower. The BPVs will not respond to pressure changes in Manual.

14 a. Select BPV MANUAL. Selects BPV Manual. S/U*

15 b. Select YES. Selects Yes. S/U*

16 c. If rapid Bypass Valve movement is Verbalizes step (it is anticipated that desired, then select FAST ACTION. S/U this step will not be performed due to initial pressure (605psig) being in close proximity to target pressure (550psig)

S-6 Rev. 3 Page 4 of 9

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step 17 d. If opening Bypass Valves, then Selects BPV Raise.

S/U*

select BPV Raise.

18 e. If closing Bypass Valves, then Does not perform this step.

S/U select BPV Lower.

S-6 Rev. 3 Page 5 of 9

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step NOTE: The JOG button illuminates green when the command is accepted, and extinguishes when the command is complete.

EVALUATOR: Either step f or steps g, h, and i are performed to lower RPV pressure. Whichever is performed makes the other steps not critical steps. It is anticipated that step f will be used to reduce RPV pressure.

19 f. If incremental Bypass Valve Depresses the JOG button to achieve movement is desired, then depress JOG S/U*

a pressure reduction that does not button once for each 1% of valve exceed 50 psig per minute.

demand change desired.

If JPM step 19 was performed, skip JPM steps 20, 21, and 22 (which are now NOT critical step).

20 g. Select GO for full range motion to Selects Go.

S/U*

100% demand or 0% demand.

21 h. Select YES. Selects Yes and observes bypass S/U*

valves starting to open.

22 i. If desired to stop BPV motion, then Selects Hold to stop bypass valve depress hold. S/U*

motion.

23 When RPV pressure Selects BPV Lower. S/U*

approaches/reaches 550 psig, closes Bypass Valves.

EVALUATOR: Student may perform JPM step 24 or steps 25, 26, and 27 to close the Bypass Valves. Whichever is performed makes the other NOT critical.

24 Selects the JOG button until the S/U*

BPVs are closed.

25 Selects Fast Action. S/U 26 Selects Go. S/U*

27 Selects Yes. S/U*

Termination Criteria: When the BPVs are closed, inform the Student that the termination point of the JPM has been reached.

JPM Stop Time:_______________

S-6 Rev. 3 Page 6 of 9

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step Transfer the following to the Results of JPM page: Any Unsat step - indicate if step was a Critical Step; JPM completion time.

S-6 Rev. 3 Page 7 of 9

RESULTS OF JPM LOWER RPV PRESSURE USING BPVs IN MANUAL Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Evaluator (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard: RPV pressure lowered at a rate of LE 50 psig per minute to LE 550 psig using BPV MANUAL mode.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Evaluator's Signature: Date:

S-6 Rev. 3 Page 8 of 9

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

Columbia was operating at full power when a scram was required. Pressure has been lowered to 605 psig to facilitate feeding the RPV with the Condensate Booster Pumps per SOP-DEH-QC.

Initiating Cue:

The CRS directs you to lower RPV pressure to 550 psig at the rate of 50 psig per minute per SOP-DEH-QC.

Inform the CRS when RPV pressure is 550 psig.

S-6 Rev. 3 Page 9 of 9

Initials Verify Revision Information Prior To Use Date Number: SOP-DEH-QC Use Category: CONTINUOUS Major Rev: 005 Minor Rev: N/A

Title:

Main Turbine DEH Operations Quick Card Page: 1 of 6 PCN#:

PLANT PROCEDURES MANUAL N/A Effective Date:

  • SOP-DEH-QC*

SOP-DEH-QC 06/11/13

Number: SOP-DEH-QC Use Category: CONTINUOUS Major Rev: 005 Minor Rev: N/A

Title:

Main Turbine DEH Operations Quick Card Page: 4 of 6 2.0 PROCEDURE 2.1 Initiating Pressure Change in Auto Pressure Control NOTE: If the plant is operating in Mode 1 and is GT 25% power, then the DEH set point should be 960 psi. If a reactor pressure change is desired refer to ABN-PRESSURE.

2.1.1 Initiate Pressure setpoint change as follows (Turbine Start-Up, Reactor Start Display) or (Main Display):

a. SELECT PRESSURE TARGET.
b. ENTER desired pressure.
c. SELECT OK.
d. IF a change in pressure rate is desired, THEN PERFORM the following:
1) SELECT PRESSURE RATE.
2) ENTER desired PRESSURE RATE.
3) SELECT OK.
e. SELECT GO.
f. SELECT YES.
g. VERIFY PRESS DEMAND and THROTTLE PRESS change at the PRESSURE RATE.

Number: SOP-DEH-QC Use Category: CONTINUOUS Major Rev: 005 Minor Rev: N/A

Title:

Main Turbine DEH Operations Quick Card Page: 5 of 6 2.2 Manual Bypass Valve Operation 2.2.1 OPERATE the Bypass Valves Manually as follows (Turbine Start-Up, Reactor Start screen):

NOTE: In manual, raising BPV demand will open the BPVs and cause Reactor pressure to lower. The BPVs will not respond to pressure changes in Manual.

a. SELECT BPV MANUAL.
b. SELECT YES.
c. IF Rapid Bypass Valve movement is desired, THEN SELECT FAST ACTION.
d. IF opening Bypass Valves, THEN SELECT BPV RAISE.
e. IF closing Bypass Valves, THEN SELECT BPV LOWER.

NOTE: The JOG button illuminates green when the command is accepted, and extinguishes when the command is complete.

f. IF incremental Bypass Valve movement is desired, THEN DEPRESS JOG button once for each 1% of valve demand change desired.
g. SELECT GO for full range motion to 100% demand or 0% demand.
h. SELECT YES.
i. IF desired to stop BPV motion, THEN DEPRESS HOLD.
j. ESTABLISH desuperheat spray at approximately 150 psig (COND-PI-40),

by one or more of the following methods. N/A method(s) not used.

  • PLACE COND-PCV-40 to OPEN (Desuper Spray Press Control)
  • PLACE COND-V-178 to OPEN (Desuper Spray Bypass)
  • PLACE COND-PIC-40 in MANUAL (TB 441, IR-9) to establish desuperheat spray at ~100 psig.

Number: SOP-DEH-QC Use Category: CONTINUOUS Major Rev: 005 Minor Rev: N/A

Title:

Main Turbine DEH Operations Quick Card Page: 6 of 6 2.3 Manual Throttle Pressure Control 2.3.1 OPERATE Throttle Pressure Control in Manual as follows:

(Turbine Start-Up, Rx Start panel)

NOTE: Throttle pressure control in manual directly controls Governor Valve and/or Bypass Valve demand signal. Raising the demand signal causes the valve(s) to open and lowering the demand signal causes the valve(s) to close. There is no feedback in this mode. This mode is very difficult to control pressure in and would generally not be used.

a. SELECT TP AUTO/MANUAL.
b. SELECT TP MANUAL.
c. SELECT YES.
d. To lower pressure SELECT DEMAND RAISE.
e. To raise pressure SELECT DEMAND LOWER.
f. IF Rapid Valve movement is desired, THEN SELECT FAST ACTION and verify it illuminates.

NOTE: The JOG button illuminates green when the command is accepted, and extinguishes when the command is complete.

g. IF incremental valve movement is desired, THEN DEPRESS JOG button once for each 1% of valve demand change desired.
h. SELECT GO for full range motion to 100% demand or 0% demand.
i. MONITOR valve position and RPV pressure during valve motion.
j. IF it is desired to stop BPV motion, THEN DEPRESS HOLD.
k. ESTABLISH desuperheat spray at approximately 150 psig (COND-PI-40),

by one or more of the following methods. N/A method(s) not used.

  • PLACE COND-PCV-40 to OPEN (Desuper Spray Press Control)
  • PLACE COND-V-178 to OPEN (Desuper Spray Bypass)
  • PLACE COND-PIC-40 in MANUAL (TB 441, IR-9) to establish desuperheat spray at ~100 psig.

JPM S-7 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE INITIAL LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE RESTORE RPS A FROM ALTERNATE POWER SOURCE (Sim)

LESSON LENGTH .5 HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE S-7 Rev. No. 2 EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Ron Hayden DATE 9/02/06 REVISED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 02/08/17 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY APPROVED BY Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

RESTORE RPS A FROM ALTERNATE POWER SOURCE MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Number of Revision Pages By Date Approval JPM SETUP Simulator ICs; Malfunctions; Triggers; Overrides:

Initialize to IC-214 or any IC with a normal electrical lineup with all load centers energized.

Ensure AR-EX-1B is in service.

Special Setup Instructions:

Insert malfunction MOT-EPS-0001G at 100%.

Acknowledge all annunciators, and allow plant to stabilize.

JPM Instructions:

Verify the current procedure against the JPM. If the procedure is a different revision than listed in the JPM, ensure the critical steps still match. If the critical steps have changed, the JPM should be revised.

The evaluator and student shall use current procedure. The evaluator should mark off steps as they are completed, note comments, and transfer the comments to the Results of JPM page.

Tools/Equipment: None Safety Items: None Task Number: RO-0248 Validation Time: 15 minutes Alternate Path: No Time Critical: No PPM

Reference:

ABN-RPS Rev. 11 NUREG Location: Simulator 1123 Ref: 212000 A2.01 (3.7 / 3.9) Performance Method: Perform Task Standard: RPS-A shifted to the Alternate Power Supply without causing a Reactor SCRAM. RPS half scram reset. RPS restoration completed per steps 4.6 through 4.8.

S-7 Rev. 2 Page 2 of 9

JPM CHECKLIST INITIAL A loss of RPS A occurred 20 minutes ago. All maintenance and surveillance testing has been stopped. Investigation revealed a CONDITIONS: failure of the A RPS MG set motor. ABN-RPS has been completed through step 4.5.

INITIATING The CRS has directed you to transfer RPS A to its Alternate power supply by performing steps 4.6 through 4.8 of ABN-RPS.

CUE: Inform the CRS when the subsequent actions for ABN-RPS have been completed and RPS A has been restored.

  • Items are Critical Steps Time Step Element Standard Cue Sat/Unsat TIME START:_______________

Examiner Note: The candidate is given ABN-RPS Note: Due to loss of RPS A power to APRM Voter 1 and 3, the APRM Chassis 1 and 3 will default to the RUN setpoint. Due to loss of RPS B power to APRM Voter 2 and 4, the APRM Chassis 2 and 4 will default to the RUN setpoint.

1 Step 4.6 Proceeds to 4.6.1.

PERFORM the following to reenergize RPS:

2 Step 4.6.1 N/A S/U IF the condition of the RPS MG set The status of the A RPS MG set is is known to be operable, NOT known to be operable. The initiating cue directs the candidate to AND the RPS bus is known to be operable, restore power from the Alternate Source.

THEN RESTART the RPS MG set, AND REPOWER the bus per SOP-RPS-START and SOP-RPS-OPS.

S-7 Rev. 2 Page 3 of 9

  • Items are Critical Steps Time Step Element Standard Cue Sat/Unsat 3 Step 4.6.2. Proceeds to 4.6.2.a S/U IF the condition of the RPS MG set is uncertain, THEN REPOWER RPS A or B from H13-P610 as follows:

4 Step 4.6.2.a. Check power available from the RPS Alternate Power Supply, MC-6B, by VERIFY power available from the observing the Alternate Feed white Reactor Protection System Alternate light illuminated.

Power Supply, MC-6B, by observing S/U the Alternate Feed white light illuminated.

CAUTION: The MG Set Transfer switch is break before make and positioning it to the wrong supply will result in a full REACTOR SCRAM.

5 Step 4.6.2.b. Place the RPS power source selector S/U*

IF repowering RPS A, switch in the position (ALT A) to be powered from the Alternate Supply THEN PLACE RPS Power Source Select switch in ALT A position.

6 Step 4.6.2.c. N/A S/U IF repowering RPS B, RPS B was not de-energized.

THEN PLACE RPS Power Source Select switch in ALT B position.

S-7 Rev. 2 Page 4 of 9

  • Items are Critical Steps Time Step Element Standard Cue Sat/Unsat 7 Step 4.7.1 If restoring RPS A then perform the following:

When RPS power has been restored stabilized, then perform the following:

8 Step 4.7.1.a. Reset the Half Scram at H13-P603 S/U*

RESET the Half SCRAM at H13-P603.

9 Step 4.7.1.b. Reset Main Steam Line Rad Monitor S/U*

alarms at H13-P606.

RESET Main Steam Line Rad Monitor alarms at H13-P606:

  • MS-RIS-610A
  • MS-RIS-610C 10 Step 4.7.1.c. Depresses the Isolation logic A & S/U*

DEPRESS the following B and Isolation logic C & D reset pushbuttons at H13-P601: pushbuttons at H13-P601.

  • Isolation logic A&B reset pushbutton
  • Isolation logic C&D reset pushbutton 11 Step 4.7.1.d. N/A Inform the candidate that another RETURN RWCU to service per Read the candidate the cue for this operator is placing RWCU into S/U SOP-RWCU-START. step. service and to continue with ABN-RPS.

S-7 Rev. 2 Page 5 of 9

  • Items are Critical Steps Time Step Element Standard Cue Sat/Unsat 12 Step 4.7.1.e Resets RC-1 by depressing WMA- S/U*

RMS-FAZ/3AXY pushbutton.

RESET RC-1 by depressing WMA-RMS-FAZ/3AXY pushbutton.

13 Step 4.7.1.f. Resets RC-2 by depressing WMA- S/U*

RMS-FAZ/3BXY pushbutton.

RESET RC-2 by depressing WMA-RMS-FAZ/3BXY pushbutton.

14 Step 4.7.1.g. N/A S/U RHR SDC was in service, SDC was not in service.

THEN REFER to ABN-RHR-SDC-LOSS.

15 Step 4.7.1.h. Opens RRC-V-20 S/U*

OPEN RRC-V-20.

16 Step 4.7.1.i. Opens EDR-V-20 S/U*

OPEN EDR-V-20.

17 Step 4.7.2 N/A IF restoring RPS B, RPS B remains energized. S/U THEN PERFORM the following.

18 Step 4.8.

OPEN the following: (H13-P601) Verifies FDR-V-3 Open

  • FDR-V-3 Opens FDR-V-4 S/U*
  • FDR-V-4 Termination Criteria: Candidate completes steps 4.6 through 4.8 of ABN-RPS.

S-7 Rev. 2 Page 6 of 9

  • Items are Critical Steps Time Step Element Standard Cue Sat/Unsat TIME STOP:_______________

Transfer the following to the Results of JPM page: Any Unsat step - indicate if step was a Critical Step; JPM completion time.

S-7 Rev. 2 Page 7 of 9

RESTORE RPS A FROM ALTERNATE POWER SOURCE RESULTS OF JPM RESTORE RPS A FROM ALTERNATE POWER SOURCE Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Evaluator (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard: RPS-A shifted to the Alternate Power Supply without causing a Reactor SCRAM. RPS half scram reset. RPS restoration completed per steps 4.6 through 4.8.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Evaluator's Signature: Date:

S-7 Rev. 2 Page 8 of 9

RESTORE RPS A FROM ALTERNATE POWER SOURCE STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

  • A loss of RPS A occurred 20 minutes ago.
  • All maintenance and surveillance testing has been stopped.
  • Investigation revealed a failure of the A RPS MG set motor.
  • ABN-RPS has been completed through step 4.5.

Initiating Cue:

The CRS has directed you to transfer RPS A to its Alternate power supply by performing steps 4.6 through 4.8 of ABN-RPS.

Inform the CRS when the subsequent actions for ABN-RPS have been completed and RPS A has been restored.

S-7 Rev. 2 Page 9 of 9

JPM S-8 INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET PROGRAM TITLE LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING COURSE TITLE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE LESSON TITLE Swap RCC Heat Exchangers LESSON LENGTH .5 HRS INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS INCLUDED LESSON PLAN PQD CODE Rev. No.

SIMULATOR GUIDE PQD CODE Rev. No.

JPM PQD CODE S-8 Rev. No. 3 EXAM PQD CODE Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Dave Crawford DATE 1/20/17 REVISED BY Dave Crawford DATE 02/10/17 TECHNICAL REVIEW BY DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BY DATE APPROVED BY DATE Operations Training Manager Verify materials current IAW SWP-TQS-01 prior to use

MINOR REVISION RECORD Minor Description Affected Entered Effective Manager Rev Number of Revision Pages By Date Approval JPM SETUP Simulator ICs; Malfunctions; Triggers; Overrides:

This JPM is designed to have the candidate place RCC-HX-1A in service and remove RCC-HX-1C from service per SOP-RCC-OPS. To setup the simulator, select an IC where RCC is in the normal lineup and supports this heat exchanger swap. Normally, IC 15 is already in the proper configuration for this JPM.

INITIALIZE to IC-15 or any IC that supports shifting from RCC-HX-1C to RCC-HX-1A.

Special Setup Instructions:

This JPM requires the candidate to use the plant computer to display a system flow. ENSURE that the plant computer screen is cleared PRIOR to the start of the JPM so each candidate has to display the point themselves.

JPM Instructions:

Verify Current Procedure against JPM. If any steps have changed, the JPM should be revised.

Tools/Equipment: None Safety Items: None Task Number: Validation Time: 10 Minutes Alternate Path: No Time Critical: No PPM

Reference:

SOP-RCC-OPS rev 4 Location: Simulator NUREG 1123 Ref: 400000 A4.01 (3.1 / 3.0) Performance Method: Perform Task Standard: RCC-HX-1A is placed in service and RCC-HX-1C is removed from service per SOP-RCC-OPS section 5.2.

S-8 Rev. 3 Page 2 of 7

JPM CHECKLIST INITIAL The CRS has directed you to place RCC-HX-1A in service and remove RCC-HX-1C from service per SOP-RCC-OPS section 5.2.

CONDITIONS: Equipment Operators have verified that RCC-V-3A is OPEN. TSW-V-63A and TSW-V-267A have also been verified to be OPEN.

RCC-HX-1A does NOT need to be vented. SOP-RCC-OPS Prerequisites, Precautions, and Limitations have been reviewed.

INITIATING The CRS has directed you perform section 5.2 of SOP-RCC-OPS to place RCC-HX-1A in service and remove RCC-HX-1C from CUE: service.

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step EVALUATOR NOTE: Ensure that plant computer screens are cleared from the previous JPM before starting.

JPM Start Time:_______________

1 Step 5.2.1 Candidate identifies that RCC-V-3A S/U VERIFY Heat Exchanger Inlet valve is already open per the initiating cue, is open for the idle heat exchanger. marks RCC-V-3A as open and N/A the valves not affected. completes the step.

  • RCC-V-3A 2 Step 5.2.2 Candidate identifies that TSW-V- S/U 63A and TSW-V-267A are already VERIFY the following valves are open per the initiating cue, marks open for the idle heat exchanger: N/A these valves as open then completes the valves not affected. the step.
  • TSW-V-63A
  • TSW-V-267A 3 Step 5.2.3 Candidate identifies in the initiating S/U cue that heat exchangers DO NOT IF the heat exchanger has been fully need to be vented. The step is isolated, THEN VENT the isolated marked N/A heat exchanger as follows:

S-8 Rev. 3 Page 3 of 7

  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step 4 Step 5.2.4 Candidate fully opens throttle valve S / U*

TSW-V-64A by holding the control OPEN the TSW outlet valve. N/A switch to OPEN.

the valves not affected.

  • TSW-V-64A 5 Step 5.2.5 Candidate fully opens throttle valve S/U*

RCC-V-4A holding the control switch OPEN the RCC outlet valve. N/A in OPEN.

the valves not affected. (The third heat exchanger should now be in service). N/A the valves not affected.

  • RCC-V-4A 6 Step 5.2.6 Candidate closes throttle valve TSW- S/U*

V-64C by holding the control switch IF a heat exchanger is to be removed in the CLOSE position. Candidate from service, THEN REMOVE the closes throttle valve RCC-V-4C by selected heat exchanger from service holding the control switch in the by closing the outlet valves: N/A the CLOSE position.

valves not affected.

  • TSW-V-64C
  • RCC-V-4C S-8 Rev. 3 Page 4 of 7
  • Items are Critical Steps Time JPM Task Element Performance Standard Evaluators Cue Results Step 7 Step 5.2.7 Candidate uses plant computer to S/U*

display point F124 for RCC-HX-1C.

THROTTLE OPEN There are multiple ways to do this the off-line heat exchanger outlet any of which are appropriate valve to allow approximately 200 provided the value is displayed in real 400gpm flow, as indicated on PDIS time.

Signal Tag F124, to maintain proper water chemistry in the off-line heat exchanger. N/A the valves not Candidate throttles TSW-V-64C to affected. establish 200-400GPM flow.

  • TSW-V-64C Terminating Criteria: RCC-HX-1A is in service and RCC-HX-1C is removed from service.

JPM Stop Time:_______________

Transfer the following to the Results of JPM page: Any Unsat step - indicate if the step was a Critical Step; JPM completion time.

S-8 Rev. 3 Page 5 of 7

RESULTS OF JPM RESPOND TO INDICATIONS OF A FIRE Examinee (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Evaluator (Print): _________________________________________________________________

Task Standard: RCC-HX-1A is placed in service and RCC-HX-1C is removed from service per SOP-RCC-OPS section 5.2.

Overall Evaluation JPM Completion Time SAT / UNSAT (Circle One) Minutes COMMENTS:

Evaluator's Signature: Date:

S-8 Rev. 3 Page 6 of 7

STUDENT JPM INFORMATION CARD Initial Conditions:

  • The CRS has directed you to place RCC-HX-1A in service and remove RCC-HX-1C from service per SOP-RCC-OPS section 5.2.
  • Equipment Operators have verified that RCC-V-3A is OPEN. TSW-V-63A and TSW-V-267A have also been verified to be OPEN.
  • RCC-HX-1A does NOT need to be vented.
  • SOP-RCC-OPS Prerequisites, Precautions, and Limitations have been reviewed.

Initiating Cue:

The CRS has directed you perform section 5.2 of SOP-RCC-OPS to place RCC-HX-1A in service and remove RCC-HX-1C from service.

S-8 Rev. 3 Page 7 of 7

INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET SC-1 PROGRAM TITLE OPERATIONS TRAINING COURSE TITLE COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION SIMULATOR EXAMINATION RWCU NRHX fouling causes high temperature isolation on RWCU-V-4; CRD-P-1A trips requiring CRD-P-1B to be started; HPCS-P-1 control power failure (Tech Spec); RRC-FT-LESSON TITLE 14A fails low causing APRM-CHS-1 to trip; SRV MS-RV-2B inadvertently opens (will close upon fuse removal); LOCA from RRC-P-1B suction line requiring manual scram; Spray Wetwell and Drywell; RFW-FIC-620 controller failure with RFW-V-109 failing to open and RFW-V-112A & B failing to open once closed; RCIC-FIC-600 fails low on startup requiring manual trip of RCIC turbine; Initiate Emergency Depressurization (ED) on low RPV level and restore RPV level to above TAF LENGTH OF LESSON 1.5 Hours Lesson Plan PQD Code Rev. No.

Simulator Guide PQD Code SC-1 Rev. No. 1 JPM PQD Code Rev. No.

Exam PQD Code Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 12/22/16 REVISED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 02/09/17 VALIDATED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW DATE APPROVED DATE NRC Scenario 1 Page 1 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Facility: Columbia Generating Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: 1 Station Examiners: Operators:

The reactor is in Mode 1 at 100% power. RCIC Operability Test surveillance was just completed to satisfy Post Maintenance Testing (PMT) requirements and has been returned to a Standby status and declared operable. RHR-SYS-B was placed in Suppression Pool Cooling three (3) hours ago to Initial Conditions:

restore Suppression Pool temperature following the testing and to satisfy RHR-P-2B PMT requirements. LCO 3.5.1 A.1, LCO 3.6.1.5 A.1, LCO 3.6.2.3 A.1, and RFO 1.6.1.5 A.1 have been entered for RHR-SYS-B being inoperable.

Maintain RHR-P-2B in operation for the next three (3) hours to satisfy pump PMT requirements for Turnover:

operability.

Critical Tasks:

Initiate Drywell sprays when Wetwell pressure exceeds 12 psig but prior to exceeding PSP, after verifying CT-1 Drywell parameters are within DSIL and RHR is NOT required for adequate core cooling.

Initiate Emergency Depressurization (ED) by opening seven (7) Safety Relief Valves (ADS preferred) after CT-2 RPV water level reaches TAF (-161 inches) and within 10 minutes of level dropping below TAF. CT considered met if any combination of 7 Safety Relief Valves are opened.

CT-3 After ED, and within 10 minutes of RPV pressure lowering to 200 psig, restore and maintain RPV water level above TAF (-161 inches) using Low Pressure ECCS systems.

NOTE: An unintentional or unnecessary RPS or ESF actuation may result in the creation of a post-scenario Critical Task, if that actuation results in a significant plant degradation or significantly alters a mitigation strategy.

Event Malf Event Type* Event Description No. No.

C (BOP,SRO) RWCU NRHX fouling causes high temperature isolation signal to RWCU 1 TRG-2 system. RWCU-V-4 will not close requiring manual closure of RWCU-V-1 TS (SRO)

(Tech Spec) 2 TRG-3 C (ATC,SRO) CRD-P-1A trips requiring CRD-P-1B to be started 3 TRG-4 TS (SRO) HPCS-P-1 control power failure (Tech Spec) 4 TRG-5 I (ATC,SRO) RRC-FT-14A fails low causing APRM-CHS-1 to trip C (BOP,SRO) 5 TRG-6 SRV MS-RV-2B inadvertently opens (will close upon fuse removal)

R (ATC,SRO)

LOCA from RRC-P-1B suction line requiring manual scram 6 TRG-7 M (ALL)

Spray Wetwell and Drywell (CT #1)

RFW-FIC-620 controller failure with RFW-V-109 failing to open and RFW-7 N/A C (ATC,SRO)

V-112A & B failing to open once closed 8 N/A C (BOP) RCIC-FIC-600 fails low on startup requiring manual trip of RCIC turbine Initiate Emergency Depressurization (ED) on low RPV level and restore 9 N/A ---

RPV level to above TAF (CT #2) (CT #3)

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications NRC Scenario 1 Page 2 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Target Quantitative Attributes Actual Description Inability to inject with feedwater; RCIC-FIC-600 output fails Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2 low RWCU NRHX fouling; RWCU-V-4 will not close; CRD-P-1A Abnormal events (2-4) 5 trip; HPCS control power failure; SRV MS-RV-2B opens Major transients (1-2) 1 LOCA from RRC-P-1B suction line PPM 5.1.1 (RPV Control); PPM 5.2.1 (Primary Containment EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 2 Control)

EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions 1 PPM 5.1.3 (Emergency RPV Depressurization)

(0-2)

Critical tasks (2-3) 3 See Critical Task Determination table Trigger Evaluator How Purpose Malfunction Numbers (TRG-x) Directed Triggered TRG-2 YES Manually Event Initiator HTX-RCC010F TRG-3 YES Manually Event Initiator BKR-CRD001 TRG-4 YES Manually Event Initiator BKR-CSS001 TRG-5 YES Manually Event Initiator XMT-RRS036A TRG-6 YES Manually Event Initiator OVR-RRS022D TRG-7 YES Manually Event Initiator MAL-RRS004B TRG-8 Automatically Malf Trigger MAL-RRS004D TRG-9 Automatically Malf Trigger MOV-CFW044F TRG-10 Automatically Malf Trigger MOV-CFW045F (2)

TRG-11 YES Manually Malf Trigger BKR-CFW004; BKR-CFW005; BKR-CFW006 Initial Condition MAL-FWC011 Initial Condition MOV-RWC010F Initial Condition MOV-CFW043F Initial Condition CNH-RCI002B (2)

Contingency action (see Event 7 description).

NRC Scenario 1 Page 3 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 SCENARIO 1

SUMMARY

Event 1 (TRG-2) Reactor Water Cleanup Non-Regenerative Heat Exchanger (RWCU-HX-2A/2B NRHX) fouling causes a rising temperature at the outlet of the NRHX leading to the RWCU filter demineralizers. The crew takes actions per ARP 4.602.A5 6-8 (CLEANUP FLTR INLET TEMP HI) to include monitoring temperature, verifying system lineup, and ensuring proper Reactor Closed Cooling (RCC) flow to the RWCU NRHX exist. When the crew recognizes that the RWCU NRHX outlet temperature is approaching 140°F, and isolation appears imminent, CRO-2 will stop the running RWCU pump (RWCU-P-1A) and attempt to close the RWCU Suction Outboard Isolation Motor-Operated Valve (MOV) (RWCU-V-4), which will not close. The crew will close the Inboard Isolation MOV (RWCU-V-1) to isolate RWCU.

The CRS refers to Technical Specifications and determines the following actions apply:

  • LCO 3.6.1.3 A.1 - Isolate the affected penetration flow path (within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />) by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange or check valve with flow through the valve secured.

Event 2 (TRG-3) Control Rod Drive Pump 1A (CRD-P-1A) inadvertently trips requiring the ATC operator to start CRD-P-1B per ARP H13-P603 A-7 3-8 (CRD CHARGE WATER PRESS LOW). Actions include placing the CRD Flow Controller in Manual, zeroing the output and then starting CRD-P-1B. The controller is then nulled and placed back in Auto and CRD system parameters restored.

Event 3 (TRG-4) High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS-P-1) control power fails (fuses blow) due to electrical fault.

The BOP operator refers to ARP 601.A1 6-8 (HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE). If directed to investigate, the HPCS pump control power fuses are reported as blown. Any attempt to replace fuses will result in fuses again blowing.

With both RHR-SYS-B and HPCS inoperable, the CRS refers to Technical Specifications and determines the following additional actions apply:

  • LCO 3.5.1 C.1 - Restore RHR-SYS-B or HPCS system to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Event 4 (TRG-5) A downscale failure of Reactor Recirculation Flow Transmitter 14A (RRC-FT-14A) occurs causing Channel 1 of the Average Power Range Monitor (APRM-CHS-1) to trip. With only one (1) vote sent to the 2-out-of-4 voter logic no half-scram or reactor trip signals are generated. The crew takes actions per annunciator 603.A8 3-6 (FLOW REFERENCE OFF NORMAL). The CRS directs the ATC operator to bypass APRM-CHS-1.

With APRM-CHS-1 inoperable (and bypassed), the CRS refers to Technical Specifications and determines that only three (3) APRM channels are required to be operable and that no Technical Specification actions are required.

NRC Scenario 1 Page 4 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Event 5 (TRG-6) Non-ADS Safety Relief Valve (SRV) MS-RV-2B inadvertently opens. The crew confirms this by observing at least one of the following: 1) Rise on MS-RV-2B tailpipe temperature on MS-TR-614; 2)

Rising Suppression Pool temperature or level; or 3) Reduction in Main Generator output of ~70 MWe.

The CRS enters ABN-SRV and directs the ATC operator to reduce reactor power to < 90% using Reactor Recirculation (RRC) flow. The BOP attempts to close the SRV using the control switch. The valve will not close requiring the BOP to remove solenoid fuses per Attachment 7.1. Once fuses are removed the SRV closes. Entry into PPM 5.2.1 (Primary Containment Control) will be required if Suppression Pool level exceeds +2 inches or wetwell temperature exceeds 90°F.

Event 6 (TRG-7) A primary leak from the RRC-P-1B suction line occurs. The crew takes actions to identify and isolate the leak per ABN-LEAK which will not be successful. The leak continues to increase until degrading plant parameters require a manual reactor scram. The crew takes actions per PPM 3.3.1 (Reactor Scram), PPM 5.1.1 (RPV Control), and PPM 5.2.1 (Primary Containment Control). The crew initiates Wetwell sprays when Wetwell pressure reaches 2 psig and initiates Drywell sprays when Wetwell pressure exceeds 12 psig but prior to exceeding the Pressure Suppression Pressure (PSP) limit (PPM 5.2.1 Figure F) and after verifying Drywell parameters are within the Drywell Spray Initiation Limit (DSIL)

(PPM 5.2.1 Figure E) and RHR is NOT required for adequate core cooling (CT #1). RHR will be re-aligned from Drywell spray to LPCI injection after emergency depressurization is initiated. Due to a loss of sufficient RPV injection, RPV level continues to lower requiring the crew to emergency depressurize the RPV because sufficient high pressure injections system are not available.

Event 7 Total loss of feedwater injection occurs: Reactor Feedwater Flow Indicating Controller (RFW-FIC-620) output fails low and FWH 6A/6B Bypass Valve (RFW-V-109) fails to open preventing RFW injection into the RPV. RFW-HX-6A & B Discharge to Rx Discharge MOVs (RFW-V-112A & B) fail to open (if attempted) after being initially closed to support feeding with the RFW Flow Control Valves (RFW-FCV-10A/B).

Examiner Note: If the ATC operator fails to close either RFW-V-112A or RFW-V-112B then with specific Examiner direction, Trigger 11 will be entered to cause a trip of all running Condensate Booster pumps to ensure a total loss of feedwater injection occurs which is needed to support Critical Tasks.

Event 8 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Flow Indicating Controller (RCIC-FIC-600) fails low on RCIC system startup requiring a manual trip of the RCIC turbine.

Event 9 With insufficient high pressure injection sources available, and with RPV level continuing to lower, the CRS enters PPM 5.1.3 (Emergency RPV Depressurization) and initiates emergency depressurization by opening seven (7) Safety Relief Valves (ADS preferred) after RPV water level reaches TAF (-161 inches) and within 10 minutes of level dropping below TAF. (CT #2) After ED, and within 10 minutes of RPV pressure lowering to 200 psig, the crew will restore and maintain RPV water level above TAF (-161 inches) using Low Pressure ECCS systems. (CT #3) Wetwell and Drywell sprays can be reinitiated per PPM 5.2.1 when not needed for adequate core cooling.

TERMINATION CRITERIA: The scenario will be terminated when Emergency Depressurization has been performed and RPV level is being controlled in the prescribed band OR as directed by the Examination Team.

NRC Scenario 1 Page 5 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Critical Task Determination Measurable Performance Critical Task Safety Significance Cueing Performance Feedback Indicators CT #1 - Initiate Drywell Primary containment Procedural direction The operator Valve position will sprays when Wetwell pressures at or above in PPM 5.2.1 (Primary will manually change and Drywell pressure exceeds 12 specified limits pose a Containment Control - open Drywell spray flow will psig but prior to direct threat to primary step P-7) when spray isolation increase.

exceeding PSP, after containment integrity Wetwell pressure valves.

verifying Drywell and the pressure exceeds 12 psig.

parameters are within suppression function.

DSIL and RHR is NOT required for adequate (Ref: PPM 13.1.1A core cooling. (Classifying the Emergency - Technical Bases) Attachment 4.1 section 3)

CT #2 - Initiate Preclude core damage Procedural direction The operator The valve light Emergency by establishing in PPM 5.1.1 (RPV will manually indications for each Depressurization (ED) conditions that allow Control - step L-15) open 7 Safety of the 7 Safety by opening seven (7) low pressure ECCS when RPV Level Relief Valves Relief Valves will Safety Relief Valves systems to restore cannot be restored (ADS preferred) change from Green (ADS preferred) after water level above TAF and maintained above to emergency lit to Red lit when RPV water level (Safety Limit) -186 inches. depressurize control switch is reaches TAF (-161 the RPV. taken to Open.

inches) and within 10 (Ref: CGS Technical minutes of level Specifications - 2.1.1.3) Reactor pressure dropping below TAF. will lower in response.

CT #3 - After ED, and Preclude core damage Procedural direction All available low Indication of within 10 minutes of by establishing in PPM 5.1.1 (RPV pressure ECCS applicable ECCS RPV pressure lowering conditions that allow Control - step L-16) systems are system flow.

to 200 psig, restore low pressure ECCS which directs aligned to and maintain RPV systems to restore restoring and restore RPV RPV level rises to water level above TAF water level above TAF maintaining RPV level level. greater than TAF.

(-161 inches) using (Safety Limit) above -186 inches Low Pressure ECCS and ultimately above systems. (Ref: CGS Technical TAF.

Specifications - 2.1.1.3)

NRC Scenario 1 Page 6 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 1

==

Description:==

RWCU NRHX fouling causes high temperature isolation signal to RWCU system.

RWCU-V-4 (Suction Outboard Isolation MOV), will not close requiring manual closure of RWCU-V-1 Suction Inboard Isolation MOV).

Event is activated using TRIGGER 2.

BOOTH OPERATOR - As briefed or when directed activate TRIGGER 2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP/ATC Acknowledges annunciator 602.A5 6-8 (CLEANUP FLTR INLET TEMP HIGH) and informs CRS Examiner Note: Following steps are from ARP 4.602.A5 6-8 (CLEANUP FLTR INLET TEMP HIGH)

Examiner Note:

BOP 1: Checks (and continues to monitor) RWCU NRHX Outlet temperature on RWCU-TI-607 (may be done prior to pulling ARP) 3: Refers to SOP-RCC-OPS and verifies proper RCC flow to NRHX (requires field support)

BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If sent to verify proper RCC flow to NRHX, report RCC flow to NRHX is normal and has not changed during the shift. RCC-V-8 is in the proper throttled position.

BOP 4: Monitors RCC HX Outlet temperature BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If sent to verify proper RCC HX outlet temperature, report RCC HX outlet temperature is normal.

BOP 6: Verifies RWCU flow is normal 7: Dispatches field operators to perform walk-downs and to verify proper RCC and RWCU system alignment BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If sent to check for any RCC leakage, report No signs of RCC leakage found.

BOP 8: If temp approaches 140°F and isolation appears imminent (it will be):

  • Stops RWCU-P-1A
  • Attempts to close RWCU-V-4 (fails to close)
  • Closes RWCU-V-1
  • Verifies closed RWCU-V-44 NRC Scenario 1 Page 7 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 1 (CONTINUED)

If RWCU automatically generates isolation signal (if crew does not respond in time):

  • Reports RWCU-V-4 failed to close automatically and could not be closed manually
  • Closes RWCU-V-1
  • Verifies trip of RWCU-P-1A CRS Will establish a Key Plant Parameter to isolate RWCU prior to exceeding 140°F on the NRHX outlet Directs isolating RWCU per the ARP prior to exceeding 140°F on the NRHX outlet Evaluates Technical Specifications and determines the following actions apply:

LCO 3.6.1.3 A.1 - Isolate the affected penetration flow path (within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />) by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange or check valve with flow through the valve secured.

LCO 3.6.1.3 A.2 - Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated once per 31 days for isolation devices outside primary containment.

Event Comments:

Event No. 2 may be initiated after RWCU-V-1 has been closed and Tech Specs evaluated (or as directed by the Exam team) and is activated using TRIGGER 3.

NRC Scenario 1 Page 8 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 2

==

Description:==

CRD-P-1A trips requiring CRD-P-1B to be started Event is activated using TRIGGER 3.

BOOTH OPERATOR - As briefed or when directed activate TRIGGER 3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Acknowledges annunciator 603.A7 3-8 (CRD CHARGE WATER PRESS LOW ) and recognizes that the running CRD pump tripped and informs CRS Examiner Note: CRS will mark time to track potential entry into LCO 3.1.5 (Control Rod Scram Accumulators) - No Tech Spec call expected to be made based on little time required to start CRD pump.

CRS Notes time 2nd rod accumulator alarm comes in without CRD pump running Examiner Note: Following steps are from ARP 4.603.A7 3-8 (CRD CHARGE WATER PRESS LOW ) (May also use ABN-CRD) which are used to start CRD-P-1B.

BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If sent to investigate CRD-P-1A breaker at SM-7, wait 1 minute then report CRD-P-1A breaker is tripped with flags dropped on instantaneous overcurrent for phases A and C.

1: Checks CRD-PIS-600 (Charging Water Header Pressure at H13-P603) -

will be LT 1300 psig 2: Determines if either CRD pump is running (neither pump will be running) 3a: Places CRD-FC-600 in manual 3b: Reduces CRD-FC-600 output to zero ATC 3c: Starts CRD pump 1B 3d: Nulls CRD-FC-600 3e: Transfers CRD-FC-600 to Auto 3f: IF necessary, then adjust CRD-V-3 (Drive/Cooling Water Pressure Control) to 255-265 psid on CRD-DPI-602 (Drive HDR/RX P)

CRS Evaluates Technical Specification 3.1.5 (no entry Condition exists)

Directs CRD-P-1B to be Protected per PPM 1.3.83 (Protected Equipment Program) Attachment 7.1 (based on CRD-P-1A unavailability)

Event Comments:

EVENT No. 3 may be initiated after CRD-P-1B started and CRD parameters restored (or as directed by the Exam team) and is activated using TRIGGER 4.

NRC Scenario 1 Page 9 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 3

==

Description:==

HPCS-P-1 control power failure (Tech Spec)

Event is activated using TRIGGER 4.

BOOTH OPERATOR - As briefed or when directed activate TRIGGER 4 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Acknowledges annunciator 601.A1 6-8 (HPCS OUT OF SERVICE) and recognizes a loss of HPCS pump breaker position indication and informs CRS Notes that BISI for CB HPCS OUT OF SERV is lit ATC Continues to monitor reactor power, pressure and level Examiner Note: Following step is from ARP 4.601.A1 6-8 (HPCS OUT OF SERVICE)

BOP 1: Refers to BISI (CB HPCS OUT OF SERV) (ARP Attachment 1 - Page 4) to determine actions required (see below)

Examiner Note: Following steps are from ARP 4.601.A1 6-8 (Attachment 1 - Page 4)

BOP 1: Directs field operator to check status of HPCS Pump breaker (HPCS-CB-P1) and associated breaker control power fuses BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If sent to check status of the HPCS Pump breaker, wait 1 minute then report HPCS Pump breaker is racked in with breaker open. Have loss of local breaker indication.

BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If sent to check status of the HPCS Pump breaker control power fuses, wait 1 minute then report Both the HPCS breaker close and trip fuses appear blown.

BOP 2: Refers CRS to Technical Specification 3.5.1 Examiner Note: Following steps are from ARP 4.601.A1 6-8 (HPCS OUT OF SERVICE)

CRS 3: Refers to PPM 1.10.1 (Notifications and Reportable Events) to determine reportability requirements:

  • 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> reportable to NRC based on Prevention of a Safety Function per 10 CFR 52.72(b)(3)(v)(D)

Evaluates Technical Specifications and determines the following actions apply:

LCO 3.5.1 B.1 - Immediately verify by administrative means that RCIC is operable LCO 3.5.1 B.2 - Restore HPCS system to operable status within 14 days LCO 3.5.1 C.1 - Restore RHR-SYS-B or HPCS system to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> NRC Scenario 1 Page 10 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 3 (CONTINUED)

Examiner Note: If HPCS pump control power fuses are replaced they will blow again.

CRS May direct HPCS control power fuses be replaced or removed or request troubleshooting assistance before doing so.

BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If directed to replace the HPCS Pump control power fuses, wait 1 minute then report Replaced the trip and close control power fuses for the HPCS Pump. Appears the fuses may have blown again.

BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If directed to remove the HPCS Pump control power fuses, wait 1 minute then report Control power fuses for the HPCS Pump have been removed.

CRS Directs the following systems to be Protected per PPM 1.3.83 (Protected Equipment Program) Attachment 7.1 (based on HPCS unavailability)

  • RCIC-P-1
  • LPCS-P-1
  • DG-SYS-A
  • DG-SYS-B
  • ADS-SYS-A
  • ADS-SYS-B
  • SW-SYS-A
  • SW-SYS-B Event Comments:

EVENT No. 4 may be initiated after CRS evaluates Tech Specs (or as directed by the Exam team) and is activated using TRIGGER 5.

NRC Scenario 1 Page 11 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 4

==

Description:==

RRC-FT-14A fails low causing APRM-CHS-1 to trip Event is activated using TRIGGER 5.

BOOTH OPERATOR - As briefed or when directed activate TRIGGER 5 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Acknowledges annunciator 603.A8 3-6 (FLOW REFERENCE OFF NORMAL) and informs CRS Examiner Note: Following steps are from ARP 4.603.A8 3-6 (FLOW REFERENCE OFF NORMAL)

ATC 1: Determine which channel is causing the alarm by checking RBM ODA (H13-P603) or RBM chassis (H13-P608) (BOP will have to check P608)

BOP May investigates RBM chassis at H13-P608 (as a backup to H13-P603 indications)

ATC 2: If CRS directs, bypasses failed channel (APRM A) at H13-P603 -

Annunciator clears 3: Refers CRS to Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 and LCS 1.3.2.1 CRS Directs bypassing APRM A Evaluates Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 and LCS 1.3.2.1 and determines the minimum number of required APRMs remain operable and that no Technical Specification or LCS actions apply.

Event Comments:

EVENT No. 5 may be initiated after APRM A is bypassed (or as directed by the Exam team) and is activated using TRIGGER 6.

NRC Scenario 1 Page 12 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 5

==

Description:==

SRV MS-RV-2B inadvertently opens (will close upon fuse removal)

Event is activated using TRIGGER 6.

BOOTH OPERATOR - As briefed or when directed activate TRIGGER 6 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Acknowledges annunciator 601.A2 5-8 (SRV OPEN) and informs CRS Examiner Note: Following step is from ARP 4.601.A2 5-8 (SRV OPEN)

BOP 1: Refers CRS to ABN-SRV CRS Enters ABN-SRV and directs subsequent actions Examiner Note: Following steps are from ABN-SRV CRS 4.1: May establish a Key Plant Parameter of Suppression Pool temperature of less than 110°F (not expected to reach)

BOP 4.2: Verifies SRV MS-RV-2B is open by one or more of the following:

  • Rising tailpipe temperature (H13-P614)
  • Rising Suppression Pool temperature or level
  • Reduction in Main Generator output (approx. 70 MWe)

Examiner Note: Following three steps are required since reactor power is > 90 percent. (May get High Level Alarm, 4.603.A8 1-7)

BOP 4.4.1: Places control switch for SRV MS-RV-2B to Open ATC 4.4.2: Reduces reactor power to < 90% using RRC flow BOP 4.4.3: Places control switch for SRV MS-RV-2B to Off NRC Scenario 1 Page 13 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 5 (CONTINUED)

Examiner Note: SRV remains open requiring removal of fuses.

CRS 4.6: Directs removal of SRV fuses for SRV MS-RV-2B per Attachment 7.1 Examiner Note: BOP should remove badge, rings, and conductive materials and don protective eye-wear (ISPM-20 or ISPM-7 for electrical safety).

Examiner Note: Refer to Simulator Guide (page 31) in reference to ABN-SRV Attachment 7.1.

ATC Monitors for a change in SRV position status while fuses are pulled Examiner Note: Applicants are trained to leave fuses on floor just outside the cabinet.

BOP 4.6: Removes fuses (using fusepullers) listed on ABN-SRV (Attachment 7.1) (Fuses BB-F29 and BB-F30 will be removed from Panel H13-P628)

CRS Enters PPM 5.2.1 (Primary Containment Control) if wetwell level exceeds +2 inches (which corresponds to Tech Spec limit of 31 ft 1.75 inches)

Examiner Note: Already in Suppression Pool cooling.

CRS Enters (or re-enters) PPM 5.2.1 (Primary Containment Control) if wetwell temperature exceeds 90°F Examiner Note: High wetwell level will likely occur requiring entry into LCO 3.6.2.2. High wetwell temperature requiring EOP entry should not occur. There are no applicable TS actions associated with the faulty non-ADS SRV (tracking only).

CRS 4.9: Evaluates Technical Specifications and determines the following actions apply:

SRV MS-RV-2B: NONE High wetwell level > 31 feet 1.75 inches: LCO 3.6.2.2 A.1 - Restore Suppression Pool water level to within limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> High wetwell temperature > 90°F: LCO 3.6.2.1 A.1 - Verify Suppression Pool average temperature is 110°F once per hour AND Restore Suppression Pool average temperature to 90°F within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 4.10: May discuss need to perform OSP-CVB/IST-M701 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of SRV opening 4.11: May discuss need to initiate Condition Report to evaluate reactivity event per PPM 1.3.79 Event Comments:

NRC Scenario 1 Page 14 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 6 may be initiated after fuses have been removed for SRV MS-RV-2B and associated Tech Specs evaluated (or as directed by the Exam team) and is activated using TRIGGER 7.

NRC Scenario 1 Page 15 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 6

==

Description:==

LOCA from RRC-P-1B suction line requiring manual scram Event is activated using TRIGGER 7.

BOOTH OPERATOR - As briefed or when directed activate TRIGGER 7 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Acknowledges annunciator 601.A3 6-5 (LEAK DETECTION DRYWELL FLOOR DRAIN FLOW HIGH) and observes rising Drywell pressure Reports indications of primary leak to CRS Pulls up DSIL curve on GDS to check for excessive Drywell pressure for given Drywell temperature (curve slopes to the right)

Examiner Note: Following steps are from ARP 4.601.A3 6-5 (LEAK DETECTION DRYWELL FLOOR DRAIN FLOW HIGH)

BOP 1: May check Drywell Floor Drain flow GE 5 GPM as read on EDR-FRS-623 (already have evidence of significant leak) 3: Refers CRS to ABN-LEAKAGE 4: Continues to monitor containment parameters due to RCS leakage 5: May refer CRS to Technical Specification 3.4.5 CRS Enters ABN-LEAKAGE Examiner Note: Following steps are from ABN-LEAKAGE Examiner Note: ABN assumes a smaller initial leak rate which can be diagnosed over time.

Only relevant actions will be performed.

BOP 4.1.3: Monitors Containment radiation monitors at RAD Board 22 and 23 (may not get to this) 4.1.4: Monitors Drywell temperature and pressure (in progress)

CRS 4.1.9: Directs ROs to investigate source of leak and isolate if possible (unisolable)

Examiner Note: CRS will direct manual scram before automatic high Drywell pressure scram occurs. If time permits RRC flow may be reduced to 74Mlbm/hr before scram inserted.

CRS Updates crew and directs ATC to scram the reactor Examiner Note: Following steps are Immediate Actions from PPM 3.3.1 (Reactor Scram)

NRC Scenario 1 Page 16 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 6 (CONTINUED)

ATC 6.1.1: Places Reactor Mode Switch to Shutdown 6.1.2: Monitors reactor power, pressure and level 6.1.5: Inserts SRM and IRM monitors (detectors)

After above three steps ATC makes scram report to CRS:

  • Mode switch is in Shutdown
  • RPV pressure is (value and trend)
  • RPV level is (value and trend)
  • EOP entry on low RPV level (and possibly high Drywell pressure) 6.1.6: After CRS repeat back, reports all control rods are IN CRS Enters PPM 5.1.1 (RPV Control) on low RPV level (+13 inches)

Enters PPM 5.2.1 (Primary Containment Control) and re-enters PPM 5.1.1 on high Drywell pressure (1.68 psig)

Examiner Note: Following steps are Subsequent Actions from PPM 3.3.1 (Reactor Scram)

ATC 6.2.5.a: Verify Recirc pumps have run back to 15 Hz 6.2.6: Range down on IRMs, as necessary, to follow power decrease BOP 6.2.7: Make PA announcement for reactor scram Examiner Note: See Event 8 for feedwater actions per SOP-RFW-FCV-QC quick card. Should a Level 8 occur (+54.5 inches), there will be no impact on the remainder of the scenario due to a loss of reactor feedwater.

ATC 6.2.8: Transfers level control to RFW-FCV-10A/B per SOP-RFW-FCV-QC BOP 6.2.9: If necessary (with Main Generator load < 50 MWe):

  • If Main Turbine did not trip - simultaneously depress both Emerg Trip pushbuttons (H13-P820)
  • If Main Generator did not trip -depress either Unit Emergency Tip pushbutton or Unit Overall Trip pushbutton (H13-P800)
  • Verify power transfer to Startup Transformer (TR-S)

CRS Directs 1.68 psig and +13 inch actuations be verified (EOP 5.1.1 L-1)

NRC Scenario 1 Page 17 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 6 (CONTINUED)

BOP Verifies 1.68 psig actuations - Observes:

  • All ECCS pumps started (except for HPCS) and min flow valves opened
  • EDG-1 & EDG-2 running
  • GDS status for containment isolation valve closure (no yellowed border NSSSS groups indicated)

Verifies +13 inch actuations - Observes:

  • GDS status for containment isolation valve closure (no yellowed border NSSSS groups indicated)

Reports actuations verified to CRS CRS Works down the Primary Containment Pressure leg of PPM 5.2.1 (RPV Containment Control) and sets a Key Plant Parameter of 2 psig Wetwell pressure (EOP 5.2.1 P-5)

BOP Reports when Wetwell pressure reaches 2 psig CRS Directs Wetwell Spray using RHR B or A spray loops (EOP 5.2.1 P-6)

BOP Refers to SOP-RHR-SPRAY-WW-QC quick card to initiate Wetwell Sprays:

  • 2.1.1: Verify RHR-P-2A(B) running
  • 2.1.2: Verify RHR-V-42A(B) closed (LPCI injection valve)
  • 2.1.3: Open RHR-V-27A(B) (Suppression Pool Spray valve)
  • 2.1.4: Before Wetwell Spray drops below 0.0 psig, or when directed by the CRS, then close RHR-V-27A(B)

CRS Directs Wetwell Sprays be secured prior to Wetwell pressure reaching 0.0 psig (EOP 5.2.1 P-4)

Works down the Primary Containment Pressure leg of PPM 5.2.1 (RPV Containment Control) and sets Key Plant Parameter of 12 psig in the Wetwell (EOP 5.2.1 P-7)

Works down the Drywell Temperature leg of PPM 5.2.1 (RPV Containment Control) and sets Key Plant Parameter of 285 °F in the Drywell (not expected to be reached during scenario) (EOP 5.2.1 DT-3)

BOP Reports Wetwell pressure at 12 psig NRC Scenario 1 Page 18 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 6 (CONTINUED)

CT #1 - Initiate Drywell sprays when Wetwell pressure exceeds 12 psig but prior to exceeding PSP, after verifying Drywell parameters are within DSIL and RHR is NOT required for adequate core cooling.

Examiner Note: Although it is expected that CRO2 will verify within DSIL, CT # 1 is considered met even if DSIL not verified provided sprays initiated when within DSIL.

CRS Directs CRO2 to verify within DSIL (Drywell Spray Initiation Limit - Fig. E on PPM 5.2.1 (Primary Containment Control)) (EOP 5.2.1 P-8)

BOP Reports Drywell parameters within DSIL CRS Verifies RHR-P-2A not currently needed to ensure Adequate Core Cooling Directs RRC pumps be verified off and Drywell Cooling fans be secured (EOP 5.2.1 P-11.1)

BOP Verifies RRC pumps off and secures the Drywell Cooling fans on back panel (bottom row of containment fans with switches that are not in the brown area on the panel)

Reports completion to CRS CRS Directs Drywell Sprays (should be initiated on opposite loop that Wetwell Sprays are on (EOP 5.2.1 P-11.2)

BOP Refers to SOP-RHR-SPRAY-DW-QC quick card:

  • 2.1.1: Verify RHR-P-2A(B) is running
  • 2.1.2: Verify RHR-V-42A(B) closed (LPCI injection valve)
  • 2.1.3: Open the following to spray the Drywell:

RHR-V-17A(B) (Drywell Spray Inboard Isolation)

RHR-V-16A(B) (Drywell Spray Outboard Isolation)

  • 2.1.4: Before Drywell pressure drops below 0.0 psig, or when directed by the CRS, then close the following:

RHR-V-16A(B)

RHR-V-17A(B)

NRC Scenario 1 Page 19 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 6 (CONTINUED)

CRS Directs Drywell Sprays be secured before Drywell pressure drops to zero (EOP 5.2.1 P-10)

BOP/ATC Reports Main Steam Tunnel temperature alarms When MSIVs close: Updates crew that MSIVs are closed and pressure control is with SRVs at 800 to 1050 psig (or current pressure band)

CRS May direct RPV pressure reduction to a band of 500 to 600 psig (but not expected in order to conserve inventory)

BOP Lowers RPV pressure if directed using SOP-DEH-QC (Main Turbine DEH Operations Quick Card):

  • 2.1.1a: Selects PRESSURE TARGET
  • 2.1.1b: Enters desired pressure
  • 2.1.1c: Selects OK
  • 2.1.1.d: If change in pressure rate is desired:

1: Selects PRESSURE RATE 2: Enters desired PRESSURE RATE 3: Selects OK

  • 2.1.1.e: Selects GO
  • 2.1.1.f: Selects YES
  • 2.1.1.g: Verifies pressure demand and throttle pressure change at the pressure rate.

Event Comments:

EVENT No. 7 is activated at the beginning of the scenario and is realized when ability to feed reactor with feedwater system has been lost.

NRC Scenario 1 Page 20 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 7

==

Description:==

RFW-FIC-620 controller failure with RFW-V-109 failing to open and RFW-V-112A & B failing to open once closed Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: Following steps are from SOP-RFW-FCV-QC (Transfer RPV Level Control to RFW-FCV-10A/10B - Quick Card).

Examiner Note: If the ATC operator fails to close either RFW-V-112A or RFW-V-112B below (i.e.

one or both valves remain open) then direct insertion of Trigger 11 to cause a trip of all running Condensate Booster pumps to ensure a total loss of feedwater injection occurs which is needed to support Critical Tasks.

ATC 2.1.1: (2-handed operation) Starts closing RFW-V-112A and RFW-V-112B 2.1.2: Starts opening RFW-V-118 2.1.3: Verifies RFW-V-109 is closed 2.1.4: (2-handed operation) Verifies RFW-V-117A and RFW-V-117B open 2.1.5: Verifies RFW-LIC-620 is in Manual (V selected for Valve position demand with 0 output) 2.1.6: IF Reactor Feed Pump(s) (RFP) are operating, then performs the following:

  • 2.1.6.a: Verifies RFPs have ramped down in speed
  • 2.1.6.b: Places RFW-P-1B in MDEM mode
  • 2.1.6.c: Places RFW-P-1B in MDEM mode
  • 2.1.6.d: Controls turbine speed as required
  • 2.1.6.e: If desired, then places RFW-FCV-2A(B) in Manual and slowly open to approximately 80%

NRC Scenario 1 Page 21 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 7 (CONTINUED)

Examiner Note: RFW-HX-6A & B Discharge to Rx Discharge MOVs (RFW-V-112A & B) will fail to open (if attempted) after being closed below.

ATC 2.1.7: Verifies RFW-V-112A and RFW-V-112B are fully closed 2.1.8: Verifies RFW-V-118 is fully open 2.1.9: IF Reactor Feed Pump(s) (RFP) are operating, then adjusts the running RFP speed to establish ~ 200 psid across RFW-FCV-10A & 10B using either Feedwater touch screen (H13-P840)

Examiner Note: Controller failure will not allow step 2.1.10 below to be performed.

ATC 2.1.10: Adjusts RFW-LIC-620 manual output to control RPV level - Will be unsuccessful Examiner Note: For step below RFW-V-109 fails to open and RFW-V-118 is already fully open.

ATC 2.1.12: If unable to control RPV level with RFW-FCV-10A/B, then considers throttling RFW-V-109 or RFW-V-118 to control RPV level Reports to CRS existing faults with feedwater and the inability to feed Event Comments:

EVENT No. 8 is activated at the beginning of the scenario and is realized when RCIC system is started manually or automatically starts on low RPV level (-50 inches).

NRC Scenario 1 Page 22 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 8

==

Description:==

RCIC-FIC-600 fails low on startup requiring manual trip of RCIC turbine Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: Indications of RCIC controller failure will be the same whether RCIC is started manually below or RCIC started automatically on low RPV level (- 50 inches)

CRS (If not already running) Directs manual start of RCIC for RPV level control BOP Refers to SOP-RCIC-INJECTION-QC quick card:

  • 2.1.1.a: Verifies the RCIC Manual Initiation Pushbutton in Armed
  • 2.1.1.b: Depresses and hold the RCIC Manual Initiation pushbutton
  • 2.1.1.c: When all applicable RCIC valves have repositioned, then releases the RCIC Manual Initiation pushbutton Recognizes RCIC turbine speed oscillating below minimum requirement of 2100 RPM (with no RPV injection flow) and that the RCIC controller (RCIC-FIC-600) output is zero Shifts RCIC controller (RCIC-FIC-600) to Manual and presses the right OPEN pushbutton in an attempt to raise controller output (RCIC Turbine speed) - Will be unsuccessful Reports RCIC controller problem (and inability to inject with RCIC) to CRS NRC Scenario 1 Page 23 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 8 (CONTINUED)

CRS May direct trip of RCIC turbine based on above report Examiner Note: ATC may trip RCIC turbine based on direction from CRS or after recommending to CRS in which case RCIC ARPs may not be immediately addressed. RCIC may auto trip on high backpressure.

ATC Acknowledges annunciator 603.A4 1-4 (RCIC TURBINE BEARING OIL PRESSURE LOW) and informs CRS Examiner Note: Following steps are from ARP 4.603.A4 1-4 (RCIC TURBINE BEARING OIL PRESSURE LOW )

BOP 1: If not required for inventory control, then trip RCIC-DT-1 manually (RCIC Turbine) 2: Verify RCIC-V-46 is closed CRS May inform Security of the unavailability of RCIC system BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If sent to investigate status of RCIC system locally, wait until RCIC has been tripped, then report RCIC is not running and nothing abnormal was found.

Event Comments:

EVENT No. 9 is to Initiate Emergency Depressurization (ED) on low RPV level and restore RPV level to above TAF NRC Scenario 1 Page 24 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 9

==

Description:==

Initiate Emergency Depressurization (ED) on low RPV level and restore RPV level to above TAF Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Works down the level leg of PPM 5.1.1 (RPV Control) and recognizes that CRD and SLC are the only high pressure injection sources available (EOP 5.1.1 L-3 (Table 1))

ATC Direct field operator perform ABN-CRD-MAXFLOW to facilitate starting a second CRD pump BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If sent to perform field actions for ABN-CRD-MAXFLOW, insert Trigger 26 and wait 1 minute, then report Field actions for ABN-CRD-MAXFLOW are complete.

ATC Completes MCR actions per ABN-CRD-MAXFLOW:

  • 4.8.1: Place CRD-FC-600 in Manual
  • 4.8.2: Start the second CRD pump to have both pumps in service
  • 4.8.3: Adjust CRD-FC-600 to throttle open CRD-FCV-2A(2B)
  • 4.8.4: Throttle opens CRD-V-3 to maximize flow to the RPV Gives RPV level reports as level continues to lower CRS Directs SLC initiation (EOP 5.1.1 L-12 (Table 3))

Directs ADS be inhibited when ADS Timers initiate (EOP 5.1.1 L-5)

Expands level band as RPV level drops (EOP 5.1.1 L-6)

Directs BOP to verify containment isolations as RPV level lowers to -50 inches and again at -129 inches (EOP 5.1.1 L-1)

NRC Scenario 1 Page 25 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 9 (Continued)

BOP Verifies the following containment isolation valves closed at -50 inches (as seen at the Isolation Control System panel or on GDS):

  • EDR-V-19 / EDR-V-20
  • FDR-V-3 / FDR-V-4
  • RHR-V-49 / RHR-V-40
  • RHR-V-9 / RHR-V-8
  • RWCU-V-1 / RWCU-V-4
  • RRC-V-19 / RRC-V-20
  • RHR-V-60A / RHR-V-75A
  • RHR-V-60B / RHR-V-75B
  • TIP isolation valves BOP Verifies the following ADDITIONAL containment isolation valves closed at

-129 inches (as seen at the Isolation Control System panel or on GDS):

  • MS-V-22A / MS-V-28A
  • MS-V-22B / MS-V-28B
  • MS-V-22C / MS-V-28C
  • MS-V-22D / MS-V-28D
  • MS-V-67A
  • MS-V-67B
  • MS-V-67C
  • MS-V-67D
  • MS-V-16
  • MS-V-19 NRC Scenario 1 Page 26 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 9 (CONTINUED)

ATC Initiates SLC as directed - Refers to SOP-SLC-INJECTION-QC quick card:

  • 2.1: Removes the SLC keylock switch blanks and inserts both keys into the SLC system control switches
  • 2.2: Initiates SLC injection by performing the following (H13-P603):

Places SLC System A control switch to the OPER position Places SLC System B control switch to the OPER position

  • 2.3: Records the following:

SLC flowrate (~43 gpm for one pump or ~86 gpm for both)

Initial tank level Circles RWCU-V-4 status (should be closed)

  • 2.4: Reports one of the following, or similar words, to the CRS as they hand the CRS the procedure:

SLC is injecting normally SLC is partially injecting SLC failed to inject Reports initial tank level of 4800 gallons and that SLC flowrate is 86 gpm BOP/ATC When RPV level drops to -129 inches and the ADS Timers initiate, inhibits ADS Reports ADS inhibited to CRS Reports RPV level as it transitions from Wide Range to Fuel Zone Reports RPV level at TAF and trending down CRS Determines that Emergency Depressurization (ED) is required when RPV level cannot be maintained > -161 inches (EOP 5.1.1 L6)

NRC Scenario 1 Page 27 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 9 (CONTINUED)

TIME RPV LEVEL AT TAF _______________

CT #2 - Initiate Emergency Depressurization (ED) by opening seven (7) Safety Relief Valves (ADS preferred) after RPV water level reaches TAF (-161 inches) and within 10 minutes of level dropping below TAF.

CRS Updates crew and exits the pressure leg of PPM 5.1.1 (RPV Control) via override and enters PPM 5.1.3 (Emergency RPV Depressurization)

Determines that with high Drywell pressure signal sealed in, low pressure ECCS systems will be required to maintain Adequate Core Cooling (and therefore will not be stopped and prevented) (EOP 5.1.3 P-3)

Determines Wetwell level is above 17 feet (EOP 5.1.3 P-4)

Directs 7 SRVs be opened (ADS preferred) (ADS SRVs are those with the red stripe on left side of their nameplate) (EOP 5.1.3 P-5)

BOP Opens 7 SRVs (ADS preferred) as directed while verifying proper containment response as each is opened and reports completion to CRS CRS Directs Wetwell and Drywell sprays and Suppression Pool Cooling be secured to maximize RPV injection (EOP 5.1.1 L-16)

BOP When directed, refers to SOP-RHR-SPRAY-WW-QC quick card to secure Wetwell Sprays:

  • 2.1.4: Closes RHR-V-27A(B)

When directed, refers to SOP-RHR-SPRAY-DW-QC quick card to secure Drywell Sprays:

  • 2.1.4:

Closes RHR-V-16A(B)

Closes RHR-V-17A(B)

NRC Scenario 1 Page 28 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 9 (CONTINUED)

BOP When directed secures Suppression Pool Cooling (on RHR B loop) by closing RHR-V-24B. (If manually overridden open)

CT #3 - After ED, and within 10 minutes of RPV pressure lowering to 200 psig, restore and maintain RPV water level above TAF (-161 inches) using Low Pressure ECCS systems.

BOP Allows ECCS injection valves to automatically open at 470 psig Reports RPV injection as it occurs, when level is rising, and again when level is restored above TAF (-161 inches)

CRS When below TAF, maximizes RPV injection with all available systems (requiring securing of all Sprays and Suppression Pool Cooling) (EOP 5.1.1 L-16)

When above TAF, provided enough injection available, directs re-initiation of Wetwell and Drywell sprays and Suppression Pool Cooling with RHR as appropriate (Wetwell Spray initiation if Wetwell pressure reaches 2 psig and Drywell Spray initiation if Wetwell pressure exceeds 12 psig)

BOP/ATC Secures injection systems as directed to return RPV level to -50 inches to

+54 inches band BOP Reinitiates Wetwell and Drywell Sprays as appropriate using quick cards Refers to SOP-RHR-SPRAY-WW-QC quick card to initiate Wetwell Sprays:

  • 2.1.1: Verify RHR-P-2A(B) running
  • 2.1.2: Verify RHR-V-42A(B) closed (LPCI injection valve)
  • 2.1.3: Open RHR-V-27A(B) (Suppression Pool Spray valve)
  • 2.1.4: Before Wetwell Spray drops below 0.0 psig, or when directed by the CRS, then closes RHR-V-27A(B)

NRC Scenario 1 Page 29 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 9 (CONTINUED)

CRS Verifies Drywell parameters within DSIL (EOP 5.2.1 P-8)

Verifies RHR-P-2A(B) not currently needed to ensure Adequate Core Cooling Directs Drywell Sprays (should be initiated on opposite loop that Wetwell Sprays are on (EOP 5.2.1 P-11.2)

BOP Refers to SOP-RHR-SPRAY-DW-QC quick card:

  • 2.1.1: Verify RHR-P-2A(B) is running
  • 2.1.2: Verify RHR-V-42A(B) closed (LPCI injection valve)
  • 2.1.3: Open the following to spray the Drywell:

RHR-V-17A(B) (Drywell Spray Inboard Isolation)

RHR-V-16A(B) (Drywell Spray Outboard Isolation)

  • 2.1.4: Before Drywell pressure drops below 0.0 psig, or when directed by the CRS, then close the following:

RHR-V-16A(B)

RHR-V-17A(B)

CRS Directs Drywell Sprays be secured before Drywell pressure drops to zero psig (EOP 5.2.1 P-10)

Event Comments:

TERMINATION CRITERIA: The scenario will be terminated when Emergency Depressurization has been performed and RPV level is being controlled in the prescribed band OR as directed by the Examination Team.

NRC Scenario 1 Page 30 of 32

ABN-SRV (ATTACHMENT 7.1 - Page 9)

SRV FUSE LIST SRV SOLENOID FUSE PANEL BB-F35 MS-RV-1A C BB-F36 H13-P628 BB-F27 MS-RV-1B C BB-F28 H13-P628 BB-F17 MS-RV-1C C BB-F18 H13-P628 BB-F37 MS-RV-1D C BB-F38 H13-P628 BB-F19 MS-RV-2A C BB-F20 H13-P628 BB-F29 MS-RV-2B C BB-F30 H13-P628 BB-F25 MS-RV-2C C BB-F26 H13-P628 BB-F23 MS-RV-2D C BB-F24 H13-P628 BB-F21 MS-RV-3A C BB-F22 H13-P628 BB-F33 MS-RV-3B C BB-F34 H13-P628 BB-F31 MS-RV-3C C BB-F32 H13-P628 BB-F15 A BB-F16 H13-P628 BB-F53 C BB-F54 H13-P628 MS-RV-3D AA-F15 B AA-F16 H13-P631 EE-F01 A EE-F02 E-CP-ARS*

BB-F11 A BB-F12 H13-P628 AA-F11 B AA-F12 H13-P631 MS-RV-4A BB-F49 C BB-F50 H13-P628 CC-F29 B CC-F30 C61-P001 NRC Scenario 1 Page 31 of 32

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 1 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 TURNOVER Initial Conditions:

  • Columbia is operating at 100% power
  • RCIC Operability Test surveillance was just completed to satisfy Post Maintenance Testing (PMT) requirements and has been returned to a Standby status and declared operable
  • RHR-SYS-B was placed in Suppression Pool Cooling three (3) hours ago to restore Suppression Pool temperature following the testing and to satisfy RHR-P-2B PMT requirements (see marked up procedure)
  • Maintain RHR-P-2B in operation for the next three (3) hours to satisfy pump PMT requirements for operability.

NRC Scenario 1 Page 32 of 32

INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET SC-2 PROGRAM TITLE OPERATIONS TRAINING COURSE TITLE COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION SIMULATOR EXAMINATION Lower RRC Flow to 90% using Flow (enter GV Sequential Mode); CRD-LESSON TITLE FC-600 Fails High; LPCS-P-2 Trips (TS); MS-PS-23D Fails causing Half Scram (2 Rods Scram but 1 does not Fully Insert - Can Manually Insert)(TS); FPC-P-1B Trip (FPC-P-1A Fails to Auto Start); Trip of E-CB-1/7 with Scram (ATWS) occurring on Auto-Shift to TR-B; Hydraulic ATWS (Lower Level to -140 to -80); Reduced SLC Injection Flow; RWCU-V-4 Fails to Auto Close; Scram-Reset-Scram not Effective in Inserting Rods (Manual Insertion Permitted)

LENGTH OF LESSON 1.5 Hours Lesson Plan PQD Code Rev. No.

Simulator Guide PQD Code SC-2 Rev. No. 1 JPM PQD Code Rev. No.

Exam PQD Code Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 12/22/16 REVISED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 02/08/17 VALIDATED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW DATE APPROVED DATE Operations Training Manager NRC Scenario 2 Page 1 of 33

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 2 FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Facility: Columbia Generating Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: 1 Station Examiners: Operators:

Columbia is operating at 100% power. Control Rod Drive (CRD) Pump 1B (CRD-P-1B) is out of Initial Conditions:

service for extended Maintenance. CRD-P-1A is Protected.

Lower reactor power to 90% using Reactor Recirculation flow per PPM 3.2.6 (Power Maneuvering) after assuming the shift based on BPA Load Following request. Steps 5.1.1 thru 5.1.6 of PPM 3.2.6 Turnover:

are complete. Proper margin to Pre-Conditioned Status (PCS) exists per PPM 9.3.18. The Reactivity brief has been performed.

Critical Tasks:

During ATWS with power > 5%, terminate and prevent injection with exception of SLC, RCIC, and CRD, into the RPV until RPV level is -65 inches to establish a Lowered Level (LL).

CT-1 -AND-Maintain RPV level above -186 inches. Short excursions below -186 inches does not constitute failure of CT provided level restored and maintained above -186 inches within 10 minutes of going below -186 inches.

With reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, commence inserting control rods per PPM 5.5.11 CT-2 Attachment 6.1 Tab B prior to transitioning to Tab E.

NOTE: An unintentional or unnecessary RPS or ESF actuation may result in the creation of a post-scenario Critical Task, if that actuation results in a significant plant degradation or significantly alters a mitigation strategy.

Event Malf. Event Type* Event Description No.

Lower reactor power with Reactor Recirculation (RRC) flow to 90% for R (ATC) 1 N/A load following per PPM 3.2.6 (which includes placing Main Turbine into N (BOP)

Governor Valve Sequential Valve Mode)

CRD Drive Header Flow Control Valve controller (CRD-FC-600) output 2 TRG-2 I (ATC) fails high while in automatic C (BOP,SRO) 3 TRG-3 RHR-SYS-A/LPCS Keep Fill Pump (LPCS-P-2) trips (Tech Spec)

TS (SRO)

Failure of MS-PS-23D which causes a half scram on RPS B side. Two C (ATC,SRO) 4 TRG-4 control rods scram but one does not go full in (must be manually inserted)

TS (SRO)

(Tech Spec) 5 TRG-5 C (BOP) Ground causes FPC-P-1B to spuriously trip (FPC-P-1A fails to auto start)

Trip of E-CB-1/7 with transfer of SM-7 to Backup Transformer resulting in reactor trip signal 6 TRG-6 M (ALL)**

Hydraulic ATWS - Lower RPV Level -80 inches to -140 inches (CT #1)

(CT #2)

SLC-P-1A shaft shears when pump starts and SLC-P-1B develops a 7 N/A N/A discharge flow blockage which limits SLC injection flow.

RWCU-V-4 does not auto close on SLC initiation but can be closed 8 N/A C (ATC) manually.

Scram/Reset/Scram not effective in inserting control rods - Control rods 9 N/A C (BOP) can be manually driven in NRC Scenario 2 Page 2 of 33

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 2 FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specifications
    • Event forms a portion of significant CGS PSA Accident Sequence (TTC044) (Ref: PSA-1-SM-0001 (Rev 7))

Target Quantitative Attributes Actual Description Reduced SLC injection capability; RWCU-V-4 fails to Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 3 auto close; Scram-reset-scram ineffective CRD-FC-600 failure; LPCS-P-2 shaft seizure; RPS B Abnormal events (2-4) 4 half scram (2 control rods inadvertently scram); FPC-P-1B trip Major transients (1-2) 1 E-CB-1/7 breaker trip leading to hydraulic ATWS EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 PPM 5.1.1 (RPV Control)

EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 1 PPM 5.1.2 (RPV Control - ATWS)

EOP based Critical tasks (2-3) 2 See Critical Task Determination table Trigger Evaluator How Purpose Malfunction Numbers (TRG-x) Directed Triggered TRG-2 YES Manually Event Initiator CNH-CRD001E; BST-CRD001F TRG-3 YES Manually Event Initiator PMP-CSS004S BST-RRS067F; MAL-RMC007-3835; MAL-RMC007-1815; TRG-4 YES Manually Event Initiator MAL-RMC005-1815 TRG-5 YES Manually Event Initiator MOT-FPC002G BKR-EPS003; MAL-CRD007A1; MAL-CRD007A2; MAL-CRD007B1; TRG-6 YES Manually Event Initiator MAL-CRD007B2 TRG-7 Manually Field Action BKR-RHR001 TRG-8 Manually Field Action BKR-CSS002 TRG-9 Automatically Malf Trigger BST-CRD001F TRG-10 Automatically Malf Trigger MAL-RMC007-1815; MAL-RMC005-1815 Initial Condition BST-FPC020F Initial Condition PMP-SLC001B Initial Condition BKR-CRD002 Initial Condition PMP-SLC002F Initial Condition MOV-RWU010F NRC Scenario 2 Page 3 of 33

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 2 FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Event 1 The Scenario starts from 100% power with Control Rod Drive (CRD) Pump 1B (CRD-P-1B) out of service for extended maintenance. Once the crew has the shift, the ATC operator lowers reactor power (for load following) using Reactor Recirculation (RRC) flow to 90% per PPM 3.2.6 (Power Maneuvering). The BOP operator takes the Main Turbine out of Governor Valve Optimization mode per SOP-MT-GV/OPTIMIZATION (Section 5.2) prior to the RRC flow reduction.

Event 2 (TRG-2) CRD Drive Header Flow Control Valve controller (CRD-FC-600) output fails high while in automatic which causes 603.A7 5-8 (CRD PUMP SUCTION FLTR D HIGH) annunciator to come in caused by abnormally high system flow. Upon finding the CRD-FC-600 controller output failed high, the ATC operator informs the CRS and shifts the controller to manual and restores CRD system parameters to normal. Annunciator will clear once system parameters restored to normal.

Event 3 (TRG-3) The shaft on RHR-SYS-A/LPCS Keep Fill Pump (LPCS-P-2) seizes causing a trip of the pump. The RHR A PUMP DISCH PRESS HIGH/LOW annunciator alarms shortly after LPCS-P-2 trips. The LPCS PUMP DISCH PRESS HIGH/LOW annunciator will alarm ~13 minutes after LPCS-P-2 trips (unless LPCS pump started before then). Based on system status and ARP direction, the CRS will direct the BOP operator to start the Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) Pump (and place into Suppression Pool Mixing per SOP-LPCS-SP) to maintain system availability provided the LPCS PUMP DISCH PRESS HIGH/LOW annunciator is not in alarm. To prevent an inadvertent start of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump 2A (RHR-P-2A) and therefore a potential for water hammer, the CRS will direct control power fuses removed (TRG-7) from the RHR-P-2A starting circuit. If LPCS pump is not started and the LPCS PUMP DISCH PRESS HIGH/LOW annunciator is received, LPCS Pump control power fuses will also be removed (TRG-8). The CRS will refer to ABN-RHR-DEPRESS as time permits to determine system recovery actions.

With RHR-P-2A and LPCS inoperable, the CRS refers to Technical Specifications and Licensee Controlled Specifications and determines the following actions are applicable:

  • LCO 3.5.1 C.1 - Restore either RHR-SYS-A or LPCS subsystem to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />
  • LCO 3.6.2.3 A.1 - Restore RHR-SYS-A Suppression Pool Cooling subsystem to operable status within 7 days
  • RFO 1.6.1.5 A.1 - Restore RHR-SYS-A Suppression Pool Spray subsystem to operable status within 7 days Note that LCOs 3.4.6, 3.4.9, and 3.6.1.3 are considered but not applicable with the plant in Mode 1.

Event 4 (TRG-4) Main Steam pressure switch 23D (MS-PS-23D) fails high causing Reactor Protection System (RPS) relay K5D (RPS-RLY-K5D) to actuate a RPV Pressure High Trip Scram relay (as evidenced by annunciator 603.A8 2-2 (RPV PRESS HIGH TRIP)). This actuation causes a half scram on the RPS B side with all RPS B white RPS scram lights de-energized. The ATC operator will determine that two control rods (38-35 and 18-15) inadvertently scrammed during the half scram and that control rod 18-15 only partially inserted. The CRS enters ABN-ROD, section 4.2, for inadvertently scrammed rods. The ATC operator reduces RRC flow to 74 Mlbm/hr at 5% per minute. Following flow reduction, an attempt is made to fully insert control rod 18-15 using the CONTINUOUS INSERT pushbutton (which will be successful). The crew diagnoses the instrument failure and determines the half scram cannot be reset.

The CRS refers to Technical Specifications and determines that TS 3.3.1.1 (RPS Instrumentation) Action A.1 or A.2 requires affected channel or affected trip system, respectively, to be placed in TRIP within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. In addition, control rod 18-15 is considered inoperable for not fully inserting when inadvertently scrammed. LCO 3.1.3 (Control Rod Operability) Action C.1 requires rod 18-15 to be fully inserted within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and its associated CRD (HCU) disarmed within four hours.

NRC Scenario 2 Page 4 of 33

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 2 FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Event 5 (TRG-5) Bus 81 ground as sensed on MC-8BB which powers Fuel Pool Cooling Pump 1B (FPC-P-1B) causes FPC-P-1B to trip when power fuses blow. With this power loss, the standby Fuel Pooling Cooling pump (FPC-P-1A) will not auto start. ARP 4.627.FPC2.3-1 (CIRCULATION PUMP B DISCHARGE PRESSURE LOW) directs entry into ABN-FPC-LOSS. The BOP operator will manually start FPC-P-1A to re-establish fuel pool cooling.

Resetting the Bus 81 ground annunciator (TRG-1) will be successful, if attempted, since ground cleared upon the FPC-P-1B power fuses blowing. Since the status of the FPC-P-1B thermal overloads are unknown at this point the BOP operator may place the FPC-P-1B control switch in the IR-69 position to allow reset of associated overloads.

Event 6 (TRG-6) Trip of CB-1/7 (4160V feed from SM-1 to SM-7) results in an automatic transfer of Division 1 AC safety bus (SM-7) to the Backup Transformer (TR-B). The transient results in a trip of the LPCS Pump (previously started) and a loss of RPS Motor Generator A power to RPS A. With a RPS B half scram signal already present, a full scram signal now exists. The ATC operator recognizes a scram should have occurred and that an ATWS condition exists. The ATC operator takes scram actions including pressing all Manual scram pushbuttons and initiating ARI logic. Both trains of SLC are started due to reactor power being > 5%.

The CRS enters PPM 5.1.1 (RPV Control) and transitions into PPM 5.1.2 (RPV Control - ATWS) and directs the BOP operator to inhibit ADS and to take manual control of HPCS. The CRS addresses the level leg first and directs the BOP operator to perform PPM 5.5.6 (Bypassing MSIV Low RPV Level and High Steam Tunnel Temperature interlocks) to allow MSIVs to stay open on subsequent RPV level reduction. PPM 5.5.1 (Overriding ECCS Valve Logic To Allow Throttling ECCS Injection) is also performed. The CRS then directs stopping and preventing all injection into the RPV except for SLC, CRD and RCIC. When level reaches -65 inches, the ATC operator will restart injection into the RPV through the RFW Startup flow control valve to maintain a RPV Level band of -80 to -140 inches. (CT #1) The CRS directs an RPV pressure band of 800 to 1050 psig with the Digital Electro-Hydraulic (DEH) system in automatic. If reactor power is above 25%, the capacity of the RFW Start-up flow line will be exceeded and the ATC operator will have to augment flow by opening RFW-V-109 (Bypass valve for Feedwater Heaters 6A and 6B). The BOP operator performs PPM 5.5.11 (Alternate Control Rod Insertions) in an attempt to insert control rods.

This event forms a portion of significant CGS PSA Accident Sequence (TTC044) (Ref: PSA-1-SM-0001 (Rev 7))

Event 7 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) Pump 1A fails due to a sheared shaft and SLC Pump 1B discharge is partially blocked resulting in a reduced SLC injection flow in the RPV at approximately 18 gpm. This injection rate will cause reactor power to drop slowly but not prior to the crew lowering RPV level to -80 to -140 inches. Reactor Water Cleanup Valve 4 (RWCU-V-4) does not auto close on the SLC initiation but will be closed manually.

Event 8 Reactor Water Cleanup Valve 4 (RWCU-V-4) does not auto close on the SLC initiation but will be closed manually.

Event 9 Control rods insertion will be attempted per PPM 5.5.11 (Alternate Control Rod Insertions). (CT #2) Since hydraulic ATWS occurred (no white RPS scram lights lit), the BOP operator will remove two (2) ARI fuses and bypass (via switch) the Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) High Level trip. CRD-P-1A will be found tripped and will have to be restarted before a re-scram is attempted. The Scram - Reset - Scram method of control rod insertion is not effective requiring the BOP operator to bypass the Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) and manually insert control rods individually using CRD drive pressure.

TERMINATION CRITERIA: The scenario will be terminated when RPV level is being maintained between -

80 inches to -140 inches, one attempt at scram-reset-scram has been completed, and manual insertion of control rods has commenced OR as directed by the Examination Team.

NRC Scenario 2 Page 5 of 33

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 2 FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Critical Task Determination Table Measurable Performance Critical Task Safety Significance Cueing Performance Feedback Indicators CT #1 - During This is a procedural Procedural direction Crew stops and RPV level and ATWS with power requirement of PPM by PPM 5.1.2 Step L- prevents injection reactor power start

> 5%, terminate and 5.1.2 (RPV Control - 6 directs lowering with the exception lowering.

prevent injection with ATWS). Allowing RPV level to < -65 of SLC, RCIC, and exception of SLC, SLC, RCIC and CRD inches by stopping CRD. -AND-RCIC, and CRD, into injection avoids and preventing all the RPV until RPV conflicts with other injection into RPV -AND- RPV level level is -65 inches to instructions in the except from boron indication.

establish a Lowered EOPs such as injections systems, Crew uses Reactor Level (LL). injecting SLC and RCIC and CRD, Feedwater system inserting control rods. defeating interlocks if to maintain RPV

-AND- Stopping other necessary. level above -186 injection sources inches.

Maintain RPV level prevents potential fuel -AND-above -186 inches. damage due to cold (ED required if Short excursions water injection. Procedural direction level cannot be below -186 inches by PPM 5.1.2 Step L- restored and does not constitute (Ref: PPM 5.0.10 Rev 12 directs maintained above failure of CT 21, section 8.3.4.) maintaining RPV -186 inches) provided level level from -140 restored and -AND- inches to -80 inches maintained above - (best practice band) 186 inches within 10 Prevent unnecessary with outside shroud minutes of going significant challenge to injection systems below -186 inches containment or the (Table 5).

RPV.

OI-15 (EOP and EAL Clarifications),

Section 4.3.2.b.)

CT #2 - With reactor This is a procedural Reactor scram Crew uses Reactor power is scram required and requirement of PPM required and reactor alternate methods decreasing.

the reactor not 5.1.2 (RPV Control - not shutdown. to insert control shutdown, ATWS). Provides a rods per PPM Control rod Full-In commence inserting method to shutdown 5.5.11 Attachment lights as rods are control rods per PPM the reactor when 6.1 Tab B fully inserted.

5.5.11 Attachment required, lowering the 6.1 Tab B prior to reactors energy state, transitioning to Tab to prevent exceeding E. primary containment design limits and minimize the potential consequences of power oscillations.

(Ref: PPM 5.0.10 Rev 21, section 8.3.6.)

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Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 2 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 1

==

Description:==

Lower reactor power with Reactor Recirculation (RRC) flow to 90% for load following per PPM 3.2.6 (which includes placing Main Turbine into Governor Valve Sequential Valve Mode).

Event is initiated by the turnover and starts with PPM 3.2.6 step 5.1.7.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: Power reduction may be considered complete following an observable reduction in reactor power.

Examiner Note: Following steps are from PPM 3.2.6 (Power Maneuvering) which was previously completed (marked up) through step 5.1.6.

CRS 5.1.7 Records date and time downpower initiated.

5.1.8 Directs BOP to enter Sequential Valve Operation per SOP-MT-GV/OPTIMIZATION (Section 5.2).

Examiner Note: Following steps are from SOP-MT-GV/OPTIMIZATION (Section 5.2)

BOP Performs the following to enter Sequential Valve Operation:

5.2.1 If VPL DEMAND is not at 100%, then set VPL DEMAND to 100% as follows (Menu, Main Display):

SELECT VPL TARGET.

ENTER 100%.

SELECT OK.

SELECT GO.

SELECT YES.

VERIFY GO illuminated.

VERIFY VPL DEMAND ramps to VPL TARGET value.

NRC Scenario 2 Page 7 of 33

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 2 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 1 (CONTINUED)

BOP 5.2.2 Completes entry into Sequential Valve Mode as follows:

SELECT SEQUENTIAL VALVE MODE.

SELECT YES.

VERIFY GV-1 and GV-4 move to their pre-optimization positions (approximately equal).

VERIFY SEQUENTIAL VALVE MODE is illuminated.

Examiner Note: Following steps are a continuation of PPM 3.2.6 (Power Maneuvering).

CRS 5.1.10 Assigns an individual to track thermal power changes.

Examiner Note: Crew will track change in power as scenario progresses.

CRS 5.1.11 & 5.1.12 If thermal power changes GT 15% in one hour, then notify Chemistry to evaluate the Offgas release rate.

Examiner Note: Main Generator output will not be reduced to 1000 MWe as specified in step 5.1.15 since reactor power reduction is only to 90%.

CRS 5.1.15 Directs ATC to lower power with flow to achieve 90% reactor power at a rate not to exceed 1% per minute.

Examiner Note: Following steps are from Quick Card SOP-RRC-FLOW-QC.

Examiner Note: The BOP is expected to act as peer checker for this evolution.

ATC Lowers reactor power using RRC Flow per SOP-RRC-FLOW-QC (Section 2.1):

Examiner Note: Sufficient margin to fuel-preconditioning limits exist as specified in turnover.

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Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 2 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 1 (CONTINUED)

ATC 2.1.1 Informs CRS to monitor fuel-preconditioning limits (per 9.3.18) while changing reactor power.

2.1.2 Verifies both RRC individual flow controllers are in Auto and then lowers RRC flow using RRC-M/A-R675 (Master Control) Lower pushbutton, as necessary, to achieve a 1% per minute power change until 90% power is achieved.

2.1.3 Verifies total core flow is LT 105%.

2.1.4 Verifies RRC loop A and B is LT 57.5 Mlb/hr.

2.1.5 Notifies the CRS when the change in Reactor power is complete.

Comments:

Event No. 2 is initiated after CRS gets the report that the power reduction is complete (or as directed by the Exam team) and is activated using TRIGGER 2.

NRC Scenario 2 Page 9 of 33

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 2 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Event No. 2

==

Description:==

CRD Drive Header Valve controller (CRD-FC-600) output fails high while in automatic.

Event is activated using TRIGGER 2.

BOOTH OPERATOR - As briefed or when directed activate TRIGGER 2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Responds to CRD PUMP SUCTION FLTR P HIGH alarm (P603.A7 5-8).

Observes CRD Cooling Header flow at ~70 gpm and Drive Header/Reactor D/P at ~350 psid and informs the CRS before referring to ARP.

Examiner Note: Steps below to take manual control are authorized per PPM 1.3.1 (Operating Policies, Programs and Practices) step 4.6.4.

Examiner Note: Steps below may be performed without a procedure as permitted by OI-9 (Operations Standards and Expectations) section 16.3.1.

ATC Observes Flow Control Valve (CRD-V-2B) full open.

Observes CRD Flow Controller (CRD-FC-600) red arrow upscale and the signal is near 100% and informs the CRS.

Places CRD-FC-600 controller in manual.

Depresses the close pushbutton to restore CRD Cooling Header flow to

~62 GPM and Drive Header D/P to ~265 psid.

Observes CRD-V-2B dual indication and the red arrow on CRD-FC-600 returning to the green band.

Examiner Note: Following step is from ARP P603.A7 5-8 (CRD Pump Suction Filter D/P HIGH).

Only step 1 applies since controller failure is causing the alarm due to excessive flow.

Examiner Note: BOP may perform below step while ATC performs manipulations.

BOP 1: Checks CRD-dPIS-15 (CRD Pump Suction Filter Differential Pressure)

(CRD-IR-1A).

BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If sent to check suction filter D/P, wait 1 minute then report D/P at 9 psid (if suction filter annunciator locked in) or 5 psid (if suction filter annunciator cleared).

BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If sent to investigate, wait 1 minute then report Nothing abnormal found with CRD system.

CRS Contacts Work Control for assistance in troubleshooting controller failure.

Comments:

Event No. 3 is initiated after CRS gets the report that CRD parameters have been returned to normal (or as directed by the Exam team) and is activated using TRIGGER 3.

NRC Scenario 2 Page 10 of 33

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 2 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Event No. 3

==

Description:==

RHR-SYS-A/LPCS Keep Fill Pump (LPCS-P-2) trip (Tech Spec)

Event is activated using TRIGGER 3.

BOOTH OPERATOR - As briefed or when directed activate TRIGGER 3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: RHR A discharge low pressure alarm comes in shortly after LPCS-P-2 (Keep Fill) pump shaft seizes. Pump continues to run for several seconds before tripping on over current.

BOP Responds to RHR A PUMP DISCH PRESS HIGH/LOW alarm (P601.A4 3-1).

Observes RHR Loop A discharge pressure at ~20 psig (Low) and informs the CRS before referring to ARP.

Examiner Note: Below alarms/indications come in when the keep fill pump breaker trips open.

Examiner Note: Below Out Of Service alarms along with the illuminated BYPASS AND INOPERABLE STATUS PANEL (BISI) for LPCS-P-2 Power Loss/OL is used to determine the required ARP actions. RHR A and LPCS BISIs both light (and require the same ARP actions) since they have the Keep Fill pump in common. Either ARP may be used.

BOP Several seconds later responds to the RHR A OUT OF SERVICE and LPCS OUT OF SERVICE alarms (P601.A4 6-1 & P601.A3 6-3, respectively) and associated BISIs caused by LPCS-P-2 (keep fill pump) power loss/overload.

Observes panel indication lost for LPCS-P-2 (power loss due to breaker trip) and informs CRS before referring to ARP.

Examiner Note: CRS may give priority to starting LPCS pump to maintain its availability before other ARP actions are performed. RHR A pump should not be started.

Examiner Note: LPCS low pressure alarm comes in ~13 min after keep fill pump shaft seizes.

CRS has sufficient time to direct LPCS pump started before LPCS discharge low pressure alarm is received. If crew does not start the LPCS Pump then its control power fuses should be removed following receipt of the LPCS discharge low pressure alarm (P601.A3 5-3).

BOOTH OPERATOR - If directed to remove control power fuses for LPCS Pump, wait 1 minute then ACTIVATE TRIGGER 8. Report LPCS Pump control power fuses have been removed.

BOOTH OPERATOR - If asked, pre-start checks for LPCS and RHR Pump A are complete.

Examiner Note: Following step is from ARP 4.601.A4 6-1 for RHR A Out of Service (or ARP 4.601.A3 6-3 for LPCS Out of Service). Either will direct actions for LPCS-P-2 PWR LOSS/OL.

BOP 1. Requests permission from CRS to start LPCS-P-1 per SOP-LPCS-SP (LPCS Suppression Pool Mixing) to maintain operability.

Examiner Note: Following steps (to start LPCS-P-1) are from SOP-LPCS-SP (LPCS Suppression Pool Mixing) section 5.1.

Examiner Note: It is expected the CRS will allow an auto start of Service Water Pump A.

NRC Scenario 2 Page 11 of 33

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 2 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Event No. 3 (CONTINUED)

BOP 5.1.2 Informs CRS to ENTER LPCS-SYS-1 as inoperable, but available, in the Plant Logging System.

5.1.3 Starts LPCS-P-1 (should make plant announcement before starting).

5.1.4 Verifies LPCS-FCV-11 opens during low flow conditions (approximately 800 gpm) (Minimum Flow Bypass).

5.1.5 Throttles open LPCS-V-12 for approximately 6400 gpm (Test Bypass to Suppression Pool).

BOP 5.1.6 Verifies LPCS-FCV-11 closes (approximately 800 gpm).

5.1.7 Verifies SW-P-1A running.

5.1.8 Notifies HP that radiological conditions may have changed.

5.1.9 Monitors Suppression Pool temperatures.

Examiner Note: Following step is a continuation of ARP for RHR A (or LPCS) Out of Service (loss of Keep Fill pump)

BOP 2. Refers to ARP 4.601.A4 3-1 (RHR A PUMP DISCH PRESS HIGH/LOW).

Examiner Note: Following steps are from ARP 4.601.A4 3-1 (RHR A PUMP DISCH PRESS HIGH/LOW.

BOP 1. Checks RHR Loop A pressure at the following:

  • RHR-PI-612A (H13-P601)
  • RHR-PIS-22A (H22-P018, RB 501)
  • TDAS pt. X155 4.a IF not operating RHR per the EOPs, then inhibits RHR-P-2A start by pulling its control power fuses.

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Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 2 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Event No. 3 (CONTINUED)

BOOTH OPERATOR - If directed to report RHR Loop A discharge pressure on instrument rack H22-P018 in RB 501, wait 1 minute then report Instrument rack H22-P018 pressure indicates ________ psig (refer to soft panel and report to nearest 5 psig increment).

BOOTH OPERATOR - If directed to remove control power fuses for RHR Pump A, wait 1 minute then ACTIVATE TRIGGER 7. Report RHR Pump 2A control power fuses have been removed.

BOP 4.b Checks operation of LPCS-P-2 (Water Leg Pump).

BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If sent to investigate status of LPCS-P-2 locally at the pump, wait 1 minute then report LPCS-P-2 is warm to the touch and not running.

4.c Verifies the following valves are closed:

  • RHR-V-16A (Upper Drywell Spray)
  • RHR-V-17A (Upper Drywell Spray)
  • RHR-V-24A (Test Line Isolation)
  • RHR-V-27A (Suppression Pool Spray)
  • RHR-V-42A (LPCI Isolation)

Examiner Note: CRS may refer to below procedure but no verifiable actions will be performed.

CRS 4.d Refers to ABN-RHR-DEPRESS (Starting RHR Loop A Following Depressurization) due to loss of the Keep Fill system.

Examiner Note: Of the Technical Specification referenced below in the ARP, only LCO 3.5.1, 3.6.1.5 and 3.6.2.3 apply. Other LCOs apply which are not listed in the ARP. See end of this event for all applicable CRS Technical Specification actions.

CRS 5. Refers CRS to Technical Specifications 3.4.6, 3.4.9, 3.5.1, 3.6.1.5, 3.6.2.3, and 3.6.1.3 and Licensee Controlled Specifications 1.3.4.6.

Examiner Note: Following step is a continuation of ARP for RHR A (or LPCS) Out of Service (loss of Keep Fill pump)

BOP 3. Checks the status of the breaker, control power fuses, or thermal overloads for LPCS-P-2 at LPCS-42-7B6B.

BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If sent to investigate status of LPCS-P-2 at the breaker, wait 1 minute then report The breaker at LPCS-42-7B6B was found tripped. There is a mild acrid odor near the breaker. (NO FIRE)

BOP 4. Refers CRS to Technical Specifications 3.5.1, 3.4.9, 3.6.1.5 and 3.6.2.3.

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Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 2 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Event No. 3 (CONTINUED)

CRS Evaluates Technical Specifications and determines the following Required Actions apply:

LCO 3.5.1 A.1 (RHR-SYS-A & LPCS are both tracked as inoperable) -

Restore respective subsystem to operable status within 7 days LCO 3.5.1 C.1 - Restore either RHR-SYS-A or LPCS subsystem to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO 3.6.1.5 A.1 - Restore RHR-SYS-A Drywell Spray subsystem to operable status within 7 days LCO 3.6.2.3 A.1 - Restore RHR-SYS-A Suppression Pool Cooling subsystem to operable status within 7 days Evaluates Licensee Controlled Specifications (LCS) and determines the following Required Action applies:

RFO 1.6.1.5 A.1 - Restore RHR-SYS-A Suppression Pool Spray subsystem to operable status within 7 days Examiner Note: LCOs 3.4.6, 3.4.9, and 3.6.1.3 are considered but not applicable.

CRS Direct postings for Protected Equipment to include RHR B, RHR C, HPCS, HPCS SW, DG2, DG3, and SW-B Comments:

Event No. 4 is initiated after LPCS has been placed into Suppression Pool Mixing and the required Tech Spec Actions entered (or as directed by the Exam team) and is activated using TRIGGER 4.

NRC Scenario 2 Page 14 of 33

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 2 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Event No. 4

==

Description:==

Failure of MS-PS-23D which causes a half scram on RPS B side. Two control rods scram but one does not go full in (must be manually inserted) (Tech Spec)

Event is activated using TRIGGER 4.

BOOTH OPERATOR - As briefed or when directed activate TRIGGER 4 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: The PRV High Pressure Trip causes the half scram on RPS B.

ATC Responds to RPV PRESS HIGH TRIP (P603.A8 2-2) and 2 SCRAM SYSTEM B (P603.A8 3-4) alarms and informs CRS.

Validates that a half scram occurred on RPS B (all white RPS B scram lights de-energized) and informs the CRS.

Examiner Note: The Rod Accumulator Trouble results from the two rods which scrammed on the half scram.

ATC Responds to ROD ACCUMULATOR TROUBLE (P603.A7 6-7) alarm.

Scans the full core display (or observes RWM screen) for drifting and/or scrammed control rods.

Recognizes two control rods have blue SCRAM lights lit and flashing ACCUM lights and informs the CRS.

Selects control rod 38-35 and observes it full in.

Selects control rod 18-15 and observes it partially inserted.

Acknowledges Rod Accumulator Trouble alarm from P603 to allow any subsequent Rod Accumulator Trouble inputs to activate alarm.

CRS Refers to Technical Specification 3.1.5 in response to rod 18-15 which failed to fully insert on scram.

Examiner Note: Following steps are from ARP 4.603.A8 3-4 (2 SCRAM SYSTEM B).

ATC 2.a. Checks the Full Core Display for individual control rods that may have scrammed (may have been previously performed).

CRS 2.b. Enters ABN-ROD (Control Rod Faults).

2.c. Stops all maintenance or surveillance testing that has the potential for generating a trip on the unaffected RPS channel (A).

Examiner Note: Failed pressure switch (MS-PS-23D) which failed in the TRIP condition caused the half scram which cannot be bypassed (without maintenance support). The half scram cannot be immediately reset.

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Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 2 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Event No. 4 (CONTINUED)

CRS 4. Refers to Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 for failed RPS instrument.

Examiner Note: Following steps are from ABN-ROD (Control Rod Faults) section 4.2 (note that there are no Immediate Actions that are currently applicable per section 3.2).

ATC 4.2.1 Reduce core flow to 74 Mlbm/hr at 5% per minute (core flow is

> 80 Mlbm/hr (on MS-FR-613 at H13-P603)).

CRS 4.2.2 If thermal power changes GT 15% in one hour, then notify Chemistry to evaluate the Offgas release rate.

ATC 4.2.4.a. Selects the affected control rod(s) and verifies position (may have been previously performed).

Examiner Note: Control rod 18-15 is the partially inserted rod.

ATC 4.2.4.b.1) Selects control rod 18-15 and depresses the CONTINUOUS INSERT Pushbutton at H13-P603.

4.2.4.b.2) Drives control rod 18-15 to its FULL IN position.

4.2.4.b.3) Releases the CONTINUOUS INSERT Pushbutton.

4.2.4.b.4) Verifies control rod 18-15 remains in the FULL IN position.

4.2.4.c. If necessary, reset the rod accumulator trouble annunciator using the accumulator trouble acknowledge pushbutton (H13-P603).

4.2.4.d. If necessary, reset the control rod drift annunciator using the rod drift reset pushbutton (H13-P603).

CRS 4.2.4.e. Refers to Technical Specifications (Reactivity).

4.2.4.f. Initiates (or directs) a MON run to verify acceptable thermal limits and preconditioning.

Examiner Note: Following steps are from ARP 4.603.A8 2-2 (RPV PRESS HIGH TRIP). Step 2.c.

cannot be performed (RPS B will not reset).

BOP 2.a. Determines cause for half scram by investigating backpanel area and observing that RPS relay (RPS-RLY-K5D) has dropped out.

BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If sent to investigate MS-PS-23D and/or B, wait 1 minute then report Nothing appears abnormal with MS-PS-23D(B).

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Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 2 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Event No. 4 (CONTINUED)

Examiner Note: CRS may also declare rod Control rod 38-35 inoperable based on not knowing reason for rod scram.

CRS Evaluates Technical Specifications and determines the following Required Actions apply:

LCO 3.1.3 C.1 - Fully insert control rod 18-15 within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.

LCO 3.1.3 C.2 - Disarm CRD for control rod 18-15 within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

LCO 3.3.1.1 A.1 - Place High Pressure trip channel in TRIP -OR-LCO 3.3.1.1 A.2 - Place RPS B trip system in TRIP Comments:

Event No. 5 is initiated after control rod 18-15 is fully inserted and required Tech Spec Actions entered (or as directed by the Exam team) and is activated using TRIGGER 5.

NRC Scenario 2 Page 17 of 33

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 2 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Event No. 5

==

Description:==

Ground causes FPC-P-1B to spuriously trip (FPC-P-1A fails to auto start).

Event is activated using TRIGGER 5.

BOOTH OPERATOR - As briefed or when directed activate TRIGGER 5 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: FPC BOARD FPC-2 TROUBLE is an alarm informing the BOP that there is an alarm on backpanel H13-P627 (Fuel Pool Cooling Div 2 panel).

BOP Responds to BUS 81 GROUND (P800.C5 3-5) and FPC BOARD FPC-2 TROUBLE (P851-S2) alarms and informs CRS.

Examiner Note: Below Out Of Service alarm along with the illuminated BYPASS AND INOPERABLE STATUS PANEL (BISI) for Fuel Pool Cooling Pump 1B Loss is used to determine the required ARP actions.

BOP Responds to FPC DIV 2 OUT OF SERVICE (P627.FPC2 4-1) alarm and identifies BISI (FPC-P-1B PWR LOSS) as cause. Informs CRS.

Examiner Note: Following steps are from ARP 4.627.FPC2 4-1 (FPC DIV 2 OUT OF SERVICE).

Examiner Note: FPC-P-1B power fuses blew which requires a manual start of FPC-P-1A.

BOP Manually starts FPC-P-1A and inform CRS.

CRS Enters ABN-FPC-LOSS on entry condition (unplanned loss of FPC).

Examiner Note: Following steps are from ABN-FPC-LOSS section 4.1. CRS may only direct steps 4.1.1 and 4.1.2.a be performed based on ground fault on FPC-P-1B.

Step 4.1.2.a is not required to be completed prior to moving to the next event.

BOP 4.1.1 Monitor Spent Fuel Pool level and temperature as directed.

4.1.2.a. Place FPC-P-1B control switch in the IR-71(69) position.

Examiner Note: Following steps are from ARP 4.800.C5 3-5 (BUS 81 GROUND).

Examiner Note: Ground will be reported to be on Bus E-MC-8BB.

BOP 1. Directs area operator to investigate ground location on the SL-81 Ground Fault Indication Panel.

Examiner Note: Alarm in MCR will clear (once locally reset) since power fuses (upon blowing) removed the ground for FPC-P-1B which is powered from E-MC-8BB.

Examiner Note: Although step 3 below directs exit of ARP, CRS may still perform steps 7. & 8.

NRC Scenario 2 Page 18 of 33

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 2 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Event No. 5 (CONTINUED)

BOP 2. & 3. Directs area operator to attempt to reset ground alarm locally (ground alarm relay resets).

CRS 7. Maintains grounded circuit de-energized by not replacing fuses for FPC-P-1B until troubleshooting plan developed.

8. Directs Work Request be generated for repair of grounded circuit.

BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If sent to investigate ground location, wait 1 minute then report SL-81 ground appears to be on MC-8BB.

BOOTH OPERATOR - If directed to attempt to reset ground alarm locally, wait 1 minute then ACTIVATE TRIGGER 1. Report ground indication on MC-8BB is cleared.

Comments:

Event No. 6 is initiated when crew actions for loss of Fuel Pool cooling are complete (or as directed by the Exam team) and is activated using TRIGGER 6.

NRC Scenario 2 Page 19 of 33

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 2 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Event No. 6

==

Description:==

Trip of E-CB-1/7 with transfer of SM-7 to Backup Transformer results in reactor trip signal.

Event is activated using TRIGGER 6.

BOOTH OPERATOR - As briefed or when directed activate TRIGGER 6 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Acknowledges annunciator 800.C3 6-1 (BKR 1/7 TRIP) and informs CRS Reports that Bus SM-7 momentarily lost power and automatically transferred to the Backup Transformer ATC Reports half scram on RPS A with failure to scram (half scram on RPS B already exists)

Examiner Note: Following steps are Immediate Actions from PPM 3.3.1 (Reactor Scram)

ATC 6.1.1: Places Reactor Mode Switch to Shutdown 6.1.2: Monitors reactor power, pressure and level 6.1.3: (2 handed operation) Since APRMs are not downscale the following is performed:

  • 6.1.3.b: Initiates ARI 6.1.4: Recognizes that reactor power is > 5% and informs the CRS (See Event 7 for SLC actions)

CRS Updates crew on EOP entry into PPM 5.1.1, RPV Control, and directs/verifies that the Mode Switch has been placed in SHUTDOWN CRS Updates crew and exits PPM 5.1.1 (RPV Control) and transitions to PPM 5.1.2 (RPV Control - ATWS)

Directs BOP to:

  • Inhibit ADS and take manual control of HPCS
  • Verify actuations for +13 and -50 as they occur
  • Directs pressure control with bypass valves in Auto BOP Takes both ADS control switches to the INHIBIT position and acknowledges associated alarms (P601.A3 6-1 ADS DIV 1 OUT OF SERVICE and P601.A2 6-8 ADS DIV 2 OUT OF SERVICE)

NRC Scenario 2 Page 20 of 33

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 2 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Event No. 6 (CONTINUED)

Arms and Depresses the HPCS system initiation pushbutton while holding the control switch for HPCS-P-1 to STOP Takes the control switch for HPCS-V-4 to close when it gets fully opened Reports to CRS that ADS is inhibited and manual control of HPCS has been established CRS Directs PPM 5.5.6 be performed (Bypassing the MSIV Isolation Interlocks on High Tunnel Temperature and low RPV level)

BOP Goes to EOP drawer and gets PPM 5.5.6 procedure and equipment bag containing two keys Performs PPM 5.5.6:

  • At H13-P609 places MS-RMS-S84 to BYPASS
  • At H13-P611 places MS-RMS-S85 to BYPASS Updates crew upon completion BOP Recognizes and reports EOP entry conditions due to Drywell pressure, Drywell temperature and Wetwell level (as they occur)

CRS Updates crew and enters PPM 5.2.1 (Secondary Containment Control)

Establishes a key parameter: Wetwell pressure of 2 psig May establish a key parameter of Drywell temperature at 285°F BOP Reports when Wetwell pressure reaches 2 psig CRS Directs RCIC-V-1 closed (if Main Turbine online)

BOP If directed, closes RCIC-V-1 CRS Directs performance of PPM 5.5.1 (Overriding ECCS Valve Logic to Allow Throttling RPV Injection)

NRC Scenario 2 Page 21 of 33

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 2 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Event No. 6 (CONTINUED)

BOP Goes to EOP drawer and pulls PPM 5.5.1 procedure and equipment bag containing 5 keys and performs PPM 5.5.1:

  • HPCS - Override HPCS-V-4 (HPCS RPV injection valve) automatic logic by placing HPCS-RMS-S25 in the OVERRIDE position (H13-P625)
  • LPCS - Override LPCS-V-5 (LPCS RPV injection valve) automatic logic by placing LPCS-RMS-S21 in the OVERRIDE position (H13-P629)
  • RHR Loop A - Override RHR-V-42A (RHR RPV injection valve) automatic logic by placing RHR-RMS-S105 in the OVERRIDE position (H13-P629)
  • RHR Loop B - Override RHR-V-42B (RHR RPV injection valve) automatic logic by placing RHR-RMS-S106 in the OVERRIDE position (H13-P618)
  • RHR Loop C - Override RHR-V-42C (RHR RPV injection valve) automatic logic by placing RHR-RMS-S107 in the OVERRIDE position (H13-P618)

Updates crew to completion of PPM 5.5.1, and that the ECCS injection valves are closed and throttleable CT #1 - During ATWS with power > 5%, terminate and prevent injection with exception of SLC, RCIC, and CRD, into the RPV until RPV level is -65 inches to establish a Lowered Level (LL).

-AND-Maintain RPV level above -186 inches. Short excursions below -186 inches does not constitute failure of CT provided level restored and maintained above -186 inches within 10 minutes of going below -186 inches.

Examiner Note: Refer to Simulator Guide (page 32) for RPV Level Range information.

CRS Directs the ATC to:

  • Lower level to a band less than -65 inches but greater than -186 inches (preferred band is -80 inches to -140 inches)
  • Commence RPV injection at -65 inches ATC Aligns the Feed and Condensate system per SOP-RFW-FCV-QC quick card as follows:
  • 2.1.1: Starts closing RFW-V-112A and RFW-V-112B
  • 2.1.2: Starts opening RFW-V-118
  • 2.1.3: Verifies RFW-V-109 is closed
  • 2.1.4: Verifies RFW-V-117A and RFW-V-117B open
  • 2.1.5: Verifies RFW-LIC-620 is in manual (V selected for Valve position demand) with 0 output NRC Scenario 2 Page 22 of 33

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 2 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Event No. 6 (CONTINUED) 2.1.6: If Reactor Feed Pumps are operating then perform the following:

  • b. Places RFW-P-1B in MDEM mode
  • c. Places RFW-P-1A in MDEM mode
  • d. Controls Turbine speed as required
  • e. If desired, then places RFW-FCV-2A (B) in manual and slowly open to approximately 80%

2.1.7: Verifies RFW-V-112A and RFW-V-112B are fully closed 2.1.8: Verifies RFW-V-118 is fully open 2.1.9: If Reactor Feed Pumps are operating, then adjusts the running RFP speed to establish ~ 200 psid across RFW-FCV-10A & 10B using either Feedwater touch screen (H13-P840) 2.1.10: Adjusts RFW-LIC-620 manual output to control RPV level Examiner Note: CRO1 will be monitoring the wide range level instruments to maintain RPV level between -80 inches and -140 inches. One or more of the following will be used:

  • Wide Range Rx Level, MS-LI-604, on panel H13-P603
  • Reactor Press/Wide Range LVL, MS-LR/PR-623A or B, on panel H13-P601
  • GDS display on H13-P602 If level lowers to below -147 inches on the wide range instruments, Reactor Fuel Zone Comp, MS-LR-615, on panel H13-P601 will be used.

NRC Scenario 2 Page 23 of 33

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 2 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Event No. 6 (CONTINUED)

ATC Reports EOP entry on low RPV water level at +13 Reports Reactor Power as it drops due to lowering level Maintains RPV level between -65 inches and -186 inches as directed

(-80 inches to -140 inches is the preferred band)

Does not commence feeding until RPV level drops below -65 inches CRS Directs PPM 5.5.11, ALTERNATE Control Rod Insertions, be performed to insert control rods (see Event 9)

BOP Reports trip of LPCS pump (started during Event 3)

Comments:

Event No. 7 is activated at the beginning of the scenario and is realized when SLC system is started.

NRC Scenario 2 Page 24 of 33

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 2 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Event No. 7

==

Description:==

SLC-P-1A shaft shears when pump starts and SLC-P-1B develops a discharge flow blockage which limits SLC injection flow Event is activated at the beginning of the scenario and is realized when SLC system is started.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC When it is recognized that depressing the manual scram pushbuttons and initiating ARI has not inserted the control rods, refers to SOP-SLC-INJECTION-QC quick card and performs the following:

2.1: Removes the SLC keylock switch blanks and insert both keys into the SLC System control switches 2.2: Initiates SLC injection by performing the following (H13-P603):

  • Places SLC System A control switch to the OPER position
  • Places SLC System B control switch to the OPER position 2.3: Records the following:
  • SLC Flow rate (~43 gpm for one pump, or 86 gpm for both pumps)

Will record reduced flowrate of ~24 gpm

  • Initial SLC tank level
  • Circle RWCU-V-4 status (should be closed but is open)

Reports to CRS that SLC is injecting at a reduced flowrate Directs field operator to investigate problems with SLC BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If directed to investigate SLC, wait 1 minute and report It appears that SLC Pump A has a broken shaft and that there is a flow restriction with SLC train B.

Comments:

Event No. 8 is activated at the beginning of the scenario and is realized when SLC system is started and RWCU-V-4 does not automatically close.

NRC Scenario 2 Page 25 of 33

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 2 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Event No. 8

==

Description:==

RWCU-V-4 does not auto close on SLC initiation but can be closed manually Event is activated at the beginning of the scenario and is realized when SLC system is started and RWCU-V-4 does not automatically close.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC After starting both SLC pumps, recognizes that RWCU-V-4 did not automatically close Takes manual action to close RWCU-V-4 (Successful)

Reports issue with RWCU-V-4 to CRS with action taken Comments:

Event No. 9 is activated at the beginning of the scenario and is realized when Scram/Reset/Scram proves ineffective.

NRC Scenario 2 Page 26 of 33

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 2 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Event No. 9

==

Description:==

Scram/Reset/Scram not effective in inserting control rods - Control rods can be manually driven in Event is activated at the beginning of the scenario and is realized when Scram/Reset/Scram proves ineffective.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: Refer to Simulator Guide (pages 29 through 31) in reference to PPM 5.5.11.

BOP Goes to EOP drawer and pulls procedure for PPM 5.5.11 and equipment bag to perform PPM 5.5.11:

Performs PPM 5.5.11:

  • Determines that no RPS scram lights are lit and:

Removes one TB1 ARI fuse (P650 F01, F02, F03 or F04)

Removes one TB2 ARI fuse (P650 F01, F02, F03 or F04)

Observes that some or all blue scram valve lights are lit and determines Tab B should be performed:

  • Places the SDV HIGH LEVEL TRIP control switch to BYPASS
  • Ensures both CRD pumps are running - may direct ABN-CRD MAXFLOW be performed
  • Determines the scram cannot be reset
  • Overrides RPS trip signals per Attachment 6.1:

At H13-P611 - Installs a jumper between RPS-RLY-K9B terminal stud 2 and RPS-RLY-K12F terminal stud 4 At H13-P611 - Installs a jumper between RPS-RLY-K9D terminal stud 2 and RPS-RLY-K12H terminal stud 4 At H13-P609 - Installs a jumper between RPS-RLY-K9A terminal stud 2 and RPS-RLY-K12E terminal stud 4 At H13-P609 - Installs a jumper between RPS-RLY-K9C terminal stud 2 and RPS-RLY-K12G terminal stud 4 BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If directed to perform ABN-CRD-MAXFLOW, wait 1 minute and activate Trigger 26. Report completion when valves are fully opened.

NRC Scenario 2 Page 27 of 33

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 2 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Event No. 9 (CONTINUED)

CT #2 - With reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, commence inserting control rods per PPM 5.5.11 Attachment 6.1 Tab B prior to transitioning to Tab E.

BOP Continues with Tab B operator actions:

  • Resets the scram by depressing reset pushbuttons
  • Determines that CRD drive header pressure can be established
  • Places the RWM bypass switch to bypass on H13-P603
  • Manually starts to drive control rods by starting at 10-43 and inserting every other rod in every other row

If all rods did not insert, continues scram/reset/scram per Tab B and raises SDV drain time by 2 minutes

  • Determines no control rod motion do to Scram/Reset/Scram and requests drain time extension Comments:

TERMINATION CRITERIA: The scenario will be terminated when RPV level is being maintained between -80 inches to -140 inches, one attempt at scram-reset-scram has been completed, and manual insertion of control rods has commenced OR as directed by the Examination Team.

NRC Scenario 2 Page 28 of 33

PPM 5.5.11 ALTERNATE ROD INSERTION (Attachment 6.1)

Any control rod not fully inserted The following may be entered at any time based on fault, with CRS permission, C - Scram Individual Control Rods D - Vent Scram Air Header E - Vent CR Over Piston Volumes Any white NO RPS SCRAM light lit YES REMOVE one TB1 ARI fuse:

REMOVE applicable divisional RPS fuses, based on lit white RPS scram lights, as necessary to insert a full scram.: PANEL FUSE EPN Trip System/ P650 F01 PANEL FUSE (contractor) Group P650 F02 P650 F03 P609 LL-F13 C72A-F18A A1 P650 F04 P609 LL-F14 C72A-F18E A2 P609 BB-F12 C72A-F18C A3 P609 BB-F13 C72A-F18G A4 P611 LL-F13 C72A-F18B B1 P611 MM-F21 C72A-F18F B2 REMOVE one TB2 ARI fuse:

P611 BB-F12 C72A-F18D B3 P611 AA-F20 C72A-F18H B4 PANEL FUSE P650 F01 P650 F02 P650 F03 IF SDV Vent and Drain Valves dont close, P650 F04 THEN REMOVE SDV VENT AND DRAIN VALVE fuses, if required:

EPN SDV PILOT PANEL FUSE (contractor) SOLENOIDS P609 MM-F20 C72A-F17A CRD-SPV-9A/182A Some or All Blue NO P611 MM-F20 C72A-F17B CRD-SPV-9B/182B SCRAM valve lights D

lit YES YES All Rods IN INFORM CRS B

NO INSTALL the following fuses removed Perform concurrently above:

  • SDV VENT AND DRAIN VALVE fuses B C E NRC Scenario 2 Page 29 of 33

PPM 5.5.11 ALTERNATE ROD INSERTION (Attachment 6.1)

RESET / SCRAM B

RESTORE RPS B per ABN-RPS, if unable continue with driving rods PLACE SDV HIGH LEVEL TRIP control switch to BYPASS ENSURE both CRD pumps are operating Can NO scram be reset OVERRIDE RPS trip signals, YES Attachment 6.1 RESET SCRAM If unable to reset scram, then MANUALLY DRIVE rods.

ADJUST CRD-FC-600 and CRD-V-3 as necessary to establish CRD drive header pressure.

WHEN Can CRD drive SDV drained header NO more than 2 pressure be minutes established CLOSE CRD-V-34 YES INITIATE manual scram PLACE RWM bypass switch to bypass INFORM MANUALLY DRIVE rods as follows:

YES CRS (NOTE: CRS may direct inserting clustered All Rods IN rods (2 or more adjacent rods) first.

1) Starting with 10-43, insert every other rod in every other row, disregard edge rods.

INSTALL the following 2) Starting with 14-47, insert every other rod in NO fuses removed in TAB A: every other row, disregard edge rods.

3) Starting in row 43, insert the remaining rods
  • TB1 ARI fuses in every row, disregarding edge rods.
  • TB2 ARI fuses 4) Insert edge rods Further NO attempts desired YES YES All Rods IN RAISE SDV drain time by 2 minutes NO B E NRC Scenario 2 Page 30 of 33

PPM 5.5.11 ALTERNATE ROD INSERTION (Attachment 6.1)

Overriding RPS Trips

  • At H13-P611:
  • INSTALL a jumper between RPS-RLY-K9B, terminal stud 2, and RPS-RLY-K12F, terminal stud 4.
  • INSTALL a jumper between RPS-RLY-K9D, terminal stud 2, and RPS-RLY-K12H, terminal stud 4.
  • At H13-P609:
  • INSTALL a jumper between RPS-RLY-K9A, terminal stud 2, and RPS-RLY-K12E, terminal stud 4.
  • INSTALL a jumper between RPS-RLY-K9C, terminal stud 2, and RPS-RLY-K12G, terminal stud 4.

RPS - RLY - K9A (B, C, D) 1 5 7 11 HFA Relay (rear view) 3 9 13 RLY - K9 14 4 10 2 6 8 12 RPS - RLY - K12E(F,G,H) 1 5 7 11 3 9 "Jumper" 13 RLY - K12 14 4 10 2 6 8 12 NRC Scenario 2 Page 31 of 33

REACTOR WATER LEVEL INSTRUMENT RANGES NRC Scenario 2 Page 32 of 33

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 2 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Initial Conditions:

  • Columbia is operating at 100% power
  • CRD-P-1B is out of service for extended Maintenance
  • CRD-P-1A is Protected Shift Turnover:
  • Lower power to 90% using Reactor Recirculation flow per PPM 3.2.6 (Power Maneuvering) after assuming the shift based on BPA Load Following request
  • Steps 5.1.1 thru 5.1.6 of PPM 3.2.6 are complete
  • Proper margin to Pre-Conditioned Status (PCS) exists per PPM 9.3.18
  • The Reactivity brief has been performed NRC Scenario 2 Page 33 of 33

INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET SC-3 PROGRAM TITLE OPERATIONS TRAINING COURSE TITLE COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION SIMULATOR EXAMINATION Place RHR-SYS-A in SP Cooling (LPCS/RHR A ADS Permissive fails to annunciate)

(Tech Spec); Rod (26-19) drifts out. Once inserted, control rod to drift out again (Tech LESSON TITLE Spec); SW-P-1A trips which requires RHR-P-2A to be secured; RFP B vibrations rise requiring RRC Flow reduction and manual trip of RFP B; OBE causes steam leak in RCIC Pump Room with Failure of RCIC-V-8 and RCIC-V-63 to fully close; Manual scram inserted; Steam leak develops in the Main Steam Tunnel; MS-V-22A and MS-V-28A through D fail to automatically close (MS-V-28A through D can be closed manually but does not isolate leak); Emergency Depressurization required on two Max Safes LENGTH OF LESSON 1.5 Hours Lesson Plan PQD Code Rev. No.

Simulator Guide PQD Code SC-3 Rev. No. 1 JPM PQD Code Rev. No.

Exam PQD Code Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 12/22/16 REVISED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 02/08/17 VALIDATED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW DATE APPROVED DATE NRC Scenario 3 Page 1 of 30

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 3 FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Facility: Columbia Generating Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: 1 Station Examiners: Operators:

Columbia is operating at 85% power due to economic dispatch. Safety Relief Valve 2C (MS-RV-2C) is known to be leaking. Suppression Pool high temperature alarms (601.A11.1-3 and 601.A12.1-3)

Initial Conditions:

have just annunciated. Reactor Closed Cooling (RCC) Pump 1B is tagged out for planned maintenance. RCC-P-1A and RCC-P-1C are protected.

After shift turnover place RHR-P-2A in Suppression Pool Cooling (using maximum cooling) and allow SW-P-1A to auto start per SOP-RHR-SPC (section 5.1) - Steps 5.1.1 through 5.1.4 are complete.

Associate Tech Specs and LCS action statements have been entered for RHR-SYS-A being inoperable but available.

  • LCO 3.5.1 Action A.1 which requires restoring RHR-SYS-A to operable status within 7 days Turnover:
  • LCO 3.6.1.5 Action A.1 which requires restoring RHR-SYS-A drywell spray subsystem to operable status within 7 days
  • LCO 3.6.2.3 Action A.1 which requires restoring RHR-SYS-A suppression pool cooling subsystem to operable status within 7 days
  • RFO 1.6.1.5 Action A.1 which requires restoring RHR-SYS-A suppression pool spray subsystem to operable status within 7 days The pre-evolution brief has been completed and operators are stationed near both pumps.

Critical Tasks:

With reactor at power and with primary system discharging into secondary containment, manually scram CT-1 reactor before any area exceeds its maximum safe operating temperature.

With a primary system discharging into secondary containment and area temperature exceeding maximum safe operating level in more than one area, initiate Emergency Depressurization (ED) by opening seven (7)

Safety Relief Valves (ADS preferred) within 10 minutes of second MSOT being exceeded. CT considered met if any combination of 7 Safety Relief Valves are opened.

CT-2 Note: If the crew properly elects to invoke the EMERG DEPRESS is anticipated override in ppm 5.1.1 (RPV Control) and in doing so, the second maximum safe operating level is not exceeded, this Critical Task is considered to be met.

NOTE: An unintentional or unnecessary RPS or ESF actuation may result in the creation of a post-scenario Critical Task, if that actuation results in a significant plant degradation or significantly alters a mitigation strategy.

Event Malf. Event Type* Event Description No.

N (BOP) Place RHR-SYS-A in Suppression Pool Cooling (LPCS/RHR A ADS 1 N/A TS (SRO) Permissive fails to annunciate during pump start) (Tech Spec) **

C (ATC,SRO) Control rod (26-19) drifts out. Once inserted, releasing the continuous 2 TRG-2 insert pushbutton allows the control rod to drift out again, requiring the TS (SRO) control rod to be isolated (Tech Spec)

C (BOP,SRO) Standby Service Water Pump 1A (SW-P-1A) trips which requires 3 TRG-3 Residual Heat Removal Pump 2A (RHR-P-2A) (currently in Suppression TS (SRO) Pool Cooling) to be manually secured (Tech Spec)

NRC Scenario 3 Page 2 of 30

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 3 FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Reactor Feed Pump (RFP) B vibrations rise requiring RRC Flow 4 TRG-4 C (ATC,BOP,SRO) reduction and manual trip of the B RFP Operating Bases Earthquake causes a steam leak in the RCIC Pump Room with Failure of RCIC-V-8 and RCIC-V-63 to fully close (preventing 5 TRG-5 M (ALL)

RCIC leak isolation). Manual scram inserted before first secondary containment max safe operating temperature is reached (CT #1) 6 N/A M (ALL) Steam leak develops in the Main Steam Tunnel MS-V-22A and MS-V-28A through D fail to automatically close (MS-V-7 N/A C (BOP) 28A through D can be closed manually but does not isolate leak)

Emergency Depressurization (PPM 5.1.3) is performed when two areas 8 N/A ---

exceed their max safe operating temperature (CT #2)

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS) Technical Specifications
    • Ref: Columbia OE (AR-00049685 - Root Cause Analysis of RHR-PS-19A Isolation Mispositioning Event)

Target Quantitative Attributes Actual Description Several MSIVs fail to automatically close and one Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 1 cannot be closed ADS Permissive fails on RHR pump A start; Rod 26-Abnormal events (2-4) 3 19 drifts out; RFB B high vibrations RCIC steam leak requiring scram; Main steam line Major transients (1-2) 2 break PPM 5.1.1 (RPV Control); PPM 5.3.1 (Secondary EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 2 Containment Control)

EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 1 PPM 5.1.3 (Emergency RPV Depressurization)

EOP based Critical tasks (2-3) 2 See Critical Task Determination table Trigger Evaluator How Purpose Malfunction Numbers (TRG-x) Directed Triggered TRG-2 YES Manually Event Initiator MAL-RMC004-2619 TRG-3 YES Manually Event Initiator BKR-SSW001 TRG-4 YES Manually Event Initiator ANN-840A1G05; MAL-FPT005B TRG-5 YES Manually Event Initiator MAL-RWB001; MAL-RCI004 TRG-6 Manually Event Initiator MAL-RMC004-2619 TRG-7 Manually Field Action ANN-840A1G05 TRG-8 Automatically Malf Trigger MAL-RRS006A; MAL-RCI004 TRG-9 Automatically Malf Trigger MAL-RRS006A Initial Condition BST-RHR014F Initial Condition AOV-RRS003F Initial Condition MOV-RCI012F Initial Condition MOV-RCI016F Initial Condition RLY-NSF097F Initial Condition BKR-RCC002 NRC Scenario 3 Page 3 of 30

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 3 FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 SCENARIO 3

SUMMARY

Event 1 As part of the turnover, and with annunciators for Suppression Pool high temperature in alarm (601.A11 1-3 and 601.A12 1-3), CRO-2 will place Residual Heat Removal Loop A (RHR-SYS-A) into Suppression Pool Cooling mode per SOP-RHR-SPC (Suppression Pool Cooling/Spray/Discharge /Mixing). Standby Service Water Pump (SW-P-1A) will be allowed to auto start as permitted by procedure.

During RHR-P-2A pump start for entering Suppression Pool cooling mode, an isolated pressure switch (RHR-PS-19A) prevents the LPCS/RHR A ADS Permissive alarm from annunciating on P601. The CRS refers to Technical Specifications and determines that LCO 3.3.5.1 (Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation) Action A.1 applies which directs entry into the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.1-1 for the channel (Function 4.e) immediately (Condition G). ACTION G.2 directs restoring channel to operable status within 8 days.

Previous Columbia OE (Ref: AR-00049685 - Root Cause Analysis of RHR-PS-19A Isolation Mispositioning Event dated 4/1/2007) involved isolation of same pressure switch which was not discovered until RHR-P-2A was started and the ADS Permissive annunciator did not come in as expected.

Event 2 (TRG-2) Control rod 26-19 drifts out of the core. CRO-1 recognizes the rod drift and takes Immediate Actions to fully insert the control rod using the Continuous Insert pushbutton. The CRS enters ABN-ROD.

When the Insert pushbutton is released, the control rod begins again to drift out of the core. CRO-1 re-inserts the control rod full-in (and keeps the Continuous Inset pushbutton pressed) while the crew takes action to isolate the HCU for control rod 26-19 (TRG-6). The CRS declares control rod 26-19 inoperable.

The CRS refers to Technical Specifications and determines that LCO 3.1.3 (Control Rod Operability)

Action C.1 applies which requires rod 26-19 to be fully inserted within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and Action C.2 which requires associated CRD (HCU) disarmed within four hours.

Event 3 (TRG-3) Standby Service Water Pump 1A (SW-P-1A) trips on motor winding overcurrent which requires Residual Heat Removal Pump 2A (RHR-P-2A) (currently in Suppression Pool Cooling) to be manually secured per ABN-SW. Standby Service Water System A (SW-SYS-A) not being available requires that the DG1 Diesel Engine Mode Selector be placed MAINT (Maintenance) effectively making DG1 inoperable.

The CRS declares SW-SYS-A and DG1 inoperable and refers to Technical Specifications and determines that the following applies:

  • LCO 3.7.1 Action B.1 which requires restoring SW-SYS-A to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />
  • LCO 3.8.1 Action B.1 which requires performing SR 3.8.1.1 for operable offsite circuits (OSP-ELEC-W101 (Offsite Station Power Alignment Check )) within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter
  • LCO 3.8.1 Action B.2 which requires declaring required feature(s) supported by DG 1, inoperable when the redundant required feature(s) are inoperable within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of DG1 going inoperable concurrent with the inoperability of the redundant required feature(s)
  • LCO 3.8.1 Action B.3.1 which requires determining operable DGs are not inoperable due to common cause failure within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> - OR - LCO 3.8.1 Action B.3.2 which requires performance of SR 3.8.1.2 for operable DGs within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (if not performed in the past 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />)
  • LCO 3.8.1 Action B.4.1 which requires restoring DG1 to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of DG1 becoming inoperable AND within 6 days of failure to meet LCO (the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is more restrictive in this case) - OR -

LCO 3.8.1 Action B.4.2.1 which requires establishing risk management actions for the alternate AC sources within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> AND LCO 3.8.1 Action B.4.2.2 which requires DG1 to be restored to operable status within 14 days after being declared inoperable but in no case longer than 17 days from failure to meet LCO NRC Scenario 3 Page 4 of 30

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 3 FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Evaluator note: Although several Technical Specification actions are involved, the CRS will only have to refer to LCO 3.7.1 Condition B and LCO 3.8.1 Condition B to find them.

Event 4 (TRG-4) Vibrations start to rise above the ALERT setpoint on Reactor Feed Pump (RFP) B as indicated by annunciator P840.A1.7-5 (Turbine B Vibration Trouble) and validated on (local) vibration instrument RFW-VBI-1B/XS/T1BXY (Turbine Radial Inboard Bearing Vibration). Feed pump bias is adjusted to minimize load on RFP B in an attempt to reduce vibration (which is unsuccessful). Vibration level will exceed the DANGER setpoint requiring Reactor Recirculation flow to be incrementally reduced in 1% to 5% step changes while monitoring vibration level. Vibration level remains above the DANGER setpoint even after Reactor Recirculation (RRC) flow has been reduced to 74 Mlbm/hr. RFP B is manually tripped per ARP direction. The CRS may direct tripping of RFP B before the flow reduction is complete if equipment damage is a concern. Following the trip, the high vibration annunciator will clear if crew attempts a local reset (TRG-7). As RPV level lowers due to the feed pump trip, both Reactor Recirculation (RRC) Pumps will runback to 30 Hz causing reactor power to stabilize at a lower level of

~68% power.

Event 5 (TRG-5) An earthquake (OBE) causes annunciator 851.S-1 5-1 (Operating Basis Earthquake Exceeded) to alarm. ABN-EARTHQUAKE is entered. Concurrently, a steam leak in the RCIC Pump Room develops resulting in RCIC Equipment Area high temperature alarms. PPM 5.3.1 (Secondary Containment Control) and ABN-HELB (Line Break) are entered on Reactor Building (RB) area high temperature. Crew attempts to isolate steam leak as directed by PPM 5.3.1 (Secondary Containment Control). Control Room notifies plant personnel of safety hazard and directs evacuation of affected areas. Neither RCIC-V-63 (RCIC Steam Supply Inboard Isolation) nor RCIC-V-8 (RCIC Turbine Steam Supply Isolation) will automatically close. Manual attempts to shut RCIC-V-63 and RCIC-V-8 are unsuccessful.

CRS enters PPM 5.1.1 (RPV Control) and directs a manual reactor scram before reaching the max safe operating temperature for the RCIC Pump room (CT #1). All control rods fully insert. The CRS WILL direct a reactor pressure reduction to 500 to 600 psig to reduce leak rate.

Event 6 Three (3) minutes after the scram, Main Steam Line A piping ruptures causing an unisolable steam leak.

The CRS re-enters PPM 5.3.1 (Secondary Containment Control) based on a second unisolable steam leak in Secondary Containment resulting in high Main Steam Tunnel temperature.

Event 7 Following the Main Steam Line A rupture, the outboard MSIVs fail to AUTO close due to failure of a logic relay but can be manually closed. MSIV 22A (MS-V-22A) fails to AUTO close due to mechanical failure. Inability to manually close MS-V-22A results in an unisolable leak into secondary containment.

Event 8 The CRS directs entry into PPM 5.1.3 (Emergency RPV Depressurization) once Main Steam Tunnel Temperature exceeds its max safe operating value of 330°F based on two secondary containment areas greater than max safe operating value. With a primary system discharging into secondary containment and area temperature exceeding maximum safe operating level in more than one area, Emergency Depressurization (ED) is initiated by opening seven (7) Safety Relief Valves (ADS preferred) within 10 minutes of second MSOT being exceeded. (CT #2) RPV level will be restored using Condensate Booster Pumps following Emergency Depressurization.

TERMINATION CRITERIA: The scenario will be terminated when an Emergency Depressurization has been performed and RPV level is being controlled in the prescribed band OR as directed by the Examination Team.

NRC Scenario 3 Page 5 of 30

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 3 FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Critical Task Determination Measurable Performance Critical Task Safety Significance Cueing Performance Feedback Indicators CT #1 - With reactor If secondary Procedural direction The operator will All control rods will at power and with containment by PPM 5.3.1 (EOP manually scram fully insert.

primary system temperature exceeds for Secondary reactor by placing discharging into its maximum safe Containment Reactor Mode secondary operating value, Control) Step SC-14 Switch in containment, adequate core directs entering Shutdown.

manually scram cooling, containment PPM 5.1.1 (which reactor before any integrity, safety of requires placing area exceeds its personnel, or Reactor Mode maximum safe continued operability Switch in Shutdown) operating of equipment required before any area temperature. to perform EOP exceeds its flowchart actions can maximum safe no longer be assured. operating temperature.

(Ref: PPM 5.0.10 Rev 21, section 8.9.3 k.1))

CT #2 - With a The criteria of "2 or Procedural direction The operator will The valve light primary system more areas" identifies by PPM 5.3.1 (EOP manually open 7 indications for each discharging into the increase in for Secondary Safety Relief of the 7 Safety secondary parameter trend Containment Valves (ADS Relief Valves will containment and area as a wide spread Control) Step SC-15 preferred) to change from Green temperature problem which may directs Emergency emergency lit to Red lit when exceeding maximum pose a direct and Depressurizing depressurize the control switch is safe operating level in immediate threat to reactor when a RPV. taken to Open.

more than one area, secondary primary system initiate Emergency containment integrity, (RCIC) is Reactor pressure Depressurization (ED) equipment located in discharging into will lower in by opening seven (7) the secondary secondary response.

Safety Relief Valves containment, containment and (ADS preferred) within continued safe two or more area 10 minutes of second operation of the plant, temperatures are MSOT being and personnel both on exceeding their exceeded. and off site. maximum safe operating level.

Note: If the crew (Ref: PPM 5.0.10 Rev properly elects to 21, section 8.9.3 k.3))

invoke the EMERG DEPRESS is anticipated override in ppm 5.1.1 (RPV Control) and in doing so, the second maximum safe operating level is not exceeded, this Critical Task is considered to be met.

NRC Scenario 3 Page 6 of 30

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 3 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 1

==

Description:==

Place RHR-SYS-A in Suppression Pool Cooling (LPCS/RHR A ADS Permissive fails to annunciate during pump start) (Tech Spec)

Event is initiated by the CRS as part of the shift turnover.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Examiner Note: Below evolution was pre-briefed by the crew before entering the simulator.

Steps 5.1.1 through 5.1.4 were previously completed.

CRS Directs CRO-2 to place RHR-SYS-A into Suppression Pool Cooling mode using SOP-RHR-SPC (section 5.1 starting with step 5.1.5)

Examiner Note: Following steps are from SOP-RHR-SPC (starting with step 5.1.5)

Examiner Note: Annunciator 601.A3 5-1 (ADS LPCS/RHR A Pump Permissive) will fail to alarm when RHR-P-2A started. May take crew a minute or so to validate proper pump starting response.

BOP 5.1.5: Starts RHR-P-2A (and verifies proper pump starting indications)

  • Breaker closed red indication above pump control switch
  • Pump current spikes then returns to normal
  • Verifies annunciator 601.A3 5-1 (ADS LPCS/RHR A Pump Permissive) alarms Notes alarm does not come in and informs the CRS Examiner Note: With RHR pump running on min flow, it is expected the CRS will direct BOP to continue evolution while referring to Technical Specifications.

CRS Acknowledges report and directs CRO-2 to continue evolution BOP 5.1.6: Verifies RHR-FCV-64A opens during low flow conditions (approximately 800 gpm) (Minimum Flow Bypass) (H13-P601)

NRC Scenario 3 Page 7 of 30

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 3 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 1 (CONTINUED)

BOP 5.1.7: (2-handed operation) Throttles open RHR-V-24A to between 2500 and 7000 gpm, as determined by the CRS (Suppression Pool Cooling/Test Return) (H13-P601) 5.1.8: Verifies RHR-FCV-64A closes (approximately 800 gpm) 5.1.9: Verifies SW-P-1A running 5.1.10: If maximum cooling is desired, then closes RHR-V-48A (RHR-HX-1A Shell Side Bypass) (H13-P601) 5.1.11: If minimum cooling is desired, then performs the following:

  • 5.1.11.a: Throttles open RHR-V-48A (RHR-HX-1A Shell Side Bypass) (H13-P601)
  • 5.1.11.b: Throttles closed RHR-V-3A (RHR-HX-1A Outlet)

(H13-P601) 5.1.12: Maintains Suppression Pool temperature between 55°F and 90°F 5.1.13: Notifies HP that radiological conditions may have changed NRC Scenario 3 Page 8 of 30

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 3 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 1 (CONTINUED)

BOP Refers to ARP 601.A3 5-1 (ADS LPCS/RHR A Pump Permissive)

Examiner Note: Following step is from ARP 4.601.A3 5-1 (ADS LPCS/RHR A Pump Permissive)

Examiner Note: Refer to the following:

The SOURCE (as shown) on the ARP page insinuates that RHR-PS-19A OR RHR-PS-16A is needed to the cause the alarm while in actuality, both are needed to cause the alarm. In this case, RHR-PS-19A will be found to be isolated (prior CGS OE) thereby preventing the alarm.

In any case, the CRS should refer to the applicable Technical Specification.

BOP 1. CRO-2 refers CRS to Technical Specification 3.3.5.1 CRS/BOP Dispatches operator or calls Work Week Manager to investigate the status of RHR pressure switches (RHR-PS-16A and 19A)

BOOTH NOTE: If directed to investigate both pressure switches at once then, wait 1 minute and make both reports at once.

BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If directed to investigate anything abnormal with RHR-PS-16A, wait 1 minute then report Nothing abnormal found with RHR-PS-16A.

BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If directed to investigate anything abnormal with RHR-PS-19A, wait 1 minute then report RHR-PS-19A was found isolated.

CRS Evaluates Technical Specification 3.3.5.1 and determines the following action applies:

LCO 3.3.5.1 Action G.2 - Restore channel (RHR-PS-19A) to operable status within 8 days Comments:

EVENT No. 2 may be initiated once RHR A is in Suppression Pool Cooling and ADS Function Tech Spec has been addressed (or as directed by the Exam team) and is activated using TRIGGER 2.

NRC Scenario 3 Page 9 of 30

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 3 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 2

==

Description:==

Control rod (26-19) drifts out. Once inserted, releasing the continuous insert pushbutton allows the control rod to drift out again, requiring the control rod to be isolated (Tech Spec)

Event is activated using TRIGGER 2.

BOOTH OPERATOR - As briefed or when directed activate TRIGGER 2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Responds to H13-P603, peer checks what rod is drifting, and acknowledges and resets the ROD DRIFT alarm (603.A7 5-7)

Examiner Note: Following Immediate Action steps are from ABN-ROD (section 3.1)

ATC 3.1.2: Selects the drifting control rod (26-19) 3.1.3: Performs the following:

  • 3.1.3.a: Depresses the Continuous Insert pushbutton
  • 3.1.3.b: Drives the control rod to its FULL IN position
  • 3.1.3.c: Releases the Continuous Insert pushbutton
  • 3.1.3.d: If the control starts to drift back out, then performs the following:

3.1.3.d.1): Depresses and Holds the Continuous Insert pushbutton 3.1.3.d.2): Informs CRS that control rod 26-19 needs to be isolated at its HCU CRS Enters ABN-ROD BOP Directs field operator to hydraulically isolate control rod 26-19 per ABN-ROD step 4.1.2.a BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If directed to hydraulically isolate control rod 26-19, wait 1 minute then insert Trigger 6, report Control rod 26-19 hydraulically isolated per ABN-ROD, step 4.1.2.a.

NRC Scenario 3 Page 10 of 30

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 3 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 2 (CONTINUED)

Examiner Note: Following Subsequent Action steps are from ABN-ROD (section 4.1)

ATC 4.1.2.b: Once report received control rod 26-19 hydraulically isolated, releases the Continuous Insert pushbutton 4.1.3: Resets the Control Rod Drift annunciator using ROD DRIFT RESET pushbutton on H13-P603 (may be already reset by CRO-2)

CRS 4.1.5: Notifies the SNE 4.1.6: Initiates (or direcs) a MON Run to verify acceptible thermal limits and preconditioning 4.1.7: Determines if the problem is generic in nature (CRS will call SNEs and station management to make this determination) 4.1.8: Refers to Technical Specification 3.1.3 (see next page) 4.1.9 & 4.1.10: Performed by calling for help external to the Main Control Room (Event 3 may occur prior to the CRS making these notifications).

Examiner Note: Management expectation is to declare the control rod INOP (even though it is not considered INOP per Technical Specifications).

CRS Evaluates Technical Specifications and determines the following actions apply:

LCO 3.1.3 C.1 - Insert control rod 26-19 within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> LCO 3.1.3 C.2 - Disarm control rod 26-19 HCU within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Comments:

EVENT No. 3 is initiated after control rod 26-19 HCU has been isolated and associated Tech Spec addressed (or as directed by the Exam team) and is activated using TRIGGER 3.

NRC Scenario 3 Page 11 of 30

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 3 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 3

==

Description:==

Standby Service Water Pump 1A (SW-P-1A) trips which requires RHR Pump 2A (RHR-P-2A) (currently in Suppression Pool Cooling) to be manually secured (Tech Spec)

Event is activated using TRIGGER 3.

BOOTH OPERATOR - As briefed or when directed activate TRIGGER 3 Examiner Note: This event starts with several BISIs (Bypass and Inoperable Status Indicators) common with SW-P-1A to illuminate which causes several annunciators to alarm. The main annunciator the CRO-2 should pursue is at H13-P840 (840.A5 2-2 (SW Pump A Motor OL/ Gnd))

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Amongst all annunciators in alarm, recognizes that a trip of Service Water Pump 1A has occurred Silences lower priority annunciators and refers to ARP 840.A5 2-2 (SW Pump A Motor OL/ Gnd)

Examiner Note: Following steps are from ARP 840.A5 2-2 (SW Pump A Motor OL/ Gnd)

BOP 1: If SW-P-1A tripped then perform the following:

  • 1.d: Refers CRS to ABN-SW
  • 1.e: Informs CRS the DG1 Diesel Engine Mode Selector needs to be placed in MAINT (effectively make DG inoperable)
  • 1.f: Informs CRS to complete OSP-ELEC-W101 within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 4: Refers CRS to Technical Specification 3.7.1 CRS Enters ABN-SW BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If directed to place DG 1 Diesel Engine Mode Selector in MAINT, wait 1 minute then insert Trigger 10, report DG 1 Diesel Engine Mode Selector is in MAINT.

BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If directed to investigate why SW-P-1A tripped, report SW-P-1A motor is very hot to the touch. Its breaker was found tripped. Overcurrent relay flags are dropped out.

Examiner Note: Following steps are from ABN-SW (section 4.2)

CRS 4.2.1: Places DG1 in MAINT (may have been previously performed)

Examiner Note: When CRS discusses need to complete OSP-ELEC-W101 (Offsite Station Power Alignment Check ) inform them that it will be performed by another RO.

CRS 4.2.3: Directs OSP-ELEC-W101 completed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of DG1 being declared inoperable NRC Scenario 3 Page 12 of 30

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 3 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 3 (CONTINUED)

BOP 4.2.5: IF SW A flow is lost (non LOCA), and Adequate Core Cooling and Containment Integrity is assured, then secures the following operating pump:

  • RHR-P-2A Examiner Note: CRS may direct CRO-2 to exit the Suppression Pool Cooling lineup on RHR Loop A.

Examiner Note: Following steps are from SOP-RHR-SPC (section 5.2)

BOP 5.2.1: Notifies HP that the actions to stop Suppression Pool Cooling may potentially change radiological conditions.

5.2.2: Verifies RHR-V-3A open (Two handed operation) 5.2.3: Verifies RHR-V-48A open (Two handed operation) 5.2.4: Closes RHR-V-24A 5.2.5: Stops RHR-P-2A (may already be stopped) 5.2.6: Verifies RHR-V-64A closed Examiner Note: Crew will not have time to complete step below.

BOP 5.2.7: Verifies RHR Loop A is in Standby Status per SOP-RHR-STBY Examiner Note: Continuing steps from ABN-SW (section 4.2)

CRS 4.2.12: Enters SW-SYS-A and DG-SYS-A as inoperable in the Plant Logging System (see below)

Evaluates Technical Specifications and the LCS and determines the following actions apply:

LCO 3.7.1 Action B.1 which requires restoring SW-SYS-A to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO 3.8.1 Action B.1 which requires performing SR 3.8.1.1 for operable offsite circuits (OSP-ELEC-W101 (Offsite Station Power Alignment Check ))

within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter (discussed earlier)

NRC Scenario 3 Page 13 of 30

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 3 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 3 (CONTINUED)

LCO 3.8.1 Action B.2 which requires declaring required feature(s) supported by DG 1, inoperable when the redundant required feature(s) are inoperable within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of DG1 going inoperable concurrent with the inoperability of the redundant required feature(s)

LCO 3.8.1 Action B.3.1 which requires determining operable DGs are not inoperable due to common cause failure within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> - OR -

LCO 3.8.1 Action B.3.2 which requires performance of SR 3.8.1.2 for operable DGs within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (if not performed in the past 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />)

LCO 3.8.1 Action B.4.1 which requires restoring DG1 to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of DG1 becoming inoperable AND within 6 days of failure to meet LCO (the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is more restrictive in this case) - OR -

LCO 3.8.1 Action B.4.2.1 which requires establishing risk management actions for the alternate AC sources within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> AND LCO 3.8.1 Action B.4.2.2 which requires DG1 to be restored to operable status within 14 days after being declared inoperable but in no case longer than 17 days from failure to meet LCO Directs the following systems to be Protected per PPM 1.3.83 (Protected Equipment Program) Attachment 7.1 (based on SW Pump A and DG1 unavailability)

  • DG-SYS-B
  • SW-SYS-B
  • RHR-SYS-B
  • RHR-SYS-C
  • E-TR-S
  • E-TR-B
  • ADS-SYS-B
  • H13-P800 Bd. C Control and Indication areas Comments:

EVENT No. 4 is initiated after RHR Pump A is secured and associated Tech Specs addressed (or as directed by the Exam team) and is activated using TRIGGER 4.

NRC Scenario 3 Page 14 of 30

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 3 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 4

==

Description:==

Reactor Feed Pump (RFP) B vibrations rise requiring RRC Flow reduction and manual trip of the B RFP Event is activated using TRIGGER 4.

BOOTH OPERATOR - As briefed or when directed activate TRIGGER 4 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Acknowledges annunciator 804.A1 7-5 (TURB B VIB TROUBLE) and informs CRS Examiner Note: Vibration levels for RFP B Turbine Radial Inboard Bearing (see ARP page below) are considered at the ALERT setpoint when it reaches 3 mls and at the DANGER setpoint when it reaches 4.5 mls.

Examiner Note: Following steps are from ARP 804.A1 7-5 (TURB B VIB TROUBLE)

BOP 1: Directs field operator to investigate source of the vibration using RFW-VMP-1 on TB 441 Elev BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If sent to investigate high vibrations on vibration panel, wait 1 minute then report RFP B Turbine Radial Inboard Bearing, EPN RFW-VBI-1B/XS/T1BXY, reads 3.1 mls up slow. All other bearing vibration levels are normal.

BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If sent to investigate high vibrations locally at turbine, wait 1 minute then report RFP B Turbine sounds slightly different than what Im used to hearing.

BOP 2: Verifies reported vibration is above is above the applicable alarm setpoint (3 mls)

NRC Scenario 3 Page 15 of 30

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 3 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 4 (CONTINUED)

Examiner Note: Bearing vibration will continue to rise above the DANGER level (4.5 mls) even after ARP step 4 is completed below.

BOP 4: If any value is above the ALERT setpoint, but below the DANGER setpoint, then adjust the lead Feed Pump bias to minimize load on the affected Reactor Feedwater Pump/Turbine (B) as follows:

  • Raise RFW-P-1A Speed using RFT-COMP-1or RFT-COMP-2 (Pump Control Screen)
  • Lower RFW-P-1B Speed using RFT-COMP-1or RFT-COMP-2 (Pump Control Screen)
  • Verify feed pump speed controllers are stable and not hunting Directs field operator to report current vibrations on the RFP B Turbine Radial Inboard Bearing BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If directed to report current vibrations on vibration panel BEFORE BIAS ADJUSTMENT MADE, then report RFP B Turbine Radial Inboard Bearing reads 3.6 mls up slow.

BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If directed to report current vibrations on vibration panel AFTER BIAS ADJUSTMENT MADE (50 RPM Bias Change), then report RFP B Turbine Radial Inboard Bearing reads 4.7 mls up slow.

BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If directed to report current vibrations on any other bearing report All other bearing vibration levels are normal.

BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If directed to report when bearing vibration level reaches the DANGER setpoint of 4.5 mls then only report AFTER BIAS ADJUSTMENT MADE, that the RFP B Turbine Radial Inboard Bearing reads 4.5 mls up slow.

ATC 5: If any indicated value is sustained at or above the DANGER setpoint following feed pump load reduction via bias adjustment, then reduce Reactor Power with Reactor Recirculation flow incrementally, within the capacity of one Reactor Feed Pump, to reduce vibrations (Consider 1-5%

step changes in Reactor Power while monitoring vibrations)

SRO Directs CRO-1 to reduce reactor power with RRC flow using (1-5%) step changes while monitoring bearing vibrations Examiner Note: Intent is to report bearing vibration level above the DANGER (4.5 mls) setpoint throughout the flow reduction. Vibration level will continue to trend up slowly but once power has been reduced approximately 5%, a call will come in from the field that the B RFP is vibrating excessively and the operator is leaving the area due to safety concerns.

NRC Scenario 3 Page 16 of 30

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 3 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 4 (CONTINUED)

CRS 6: If any indicated value is sustained at or above the DANGER setpoint following feed pump load reduction via bias adjustment, then reduce Reactor Power with Reactor Recirculation flow incrementally, within the capacity of one Reactor Feed Pump, to reduce vibrations (Consider 1-5%

step changes in Reactor Power while monitoring vibrations)

CRS directs power reduction ATC Reduces reactor power with RRC flow as follows:

Notes reactor power and/or Main Generator output (MWe)

Refers to SOP-RRC-FLOW-QC quick card and performs the following per section 2.1 (Reactor Power change with RRC Flow controllers in Auto):

  • 2.1.1: Monitors fuel pre-conditioning limits (per PPM 9.3.18) while changing reactor power
  • 2.1.2: Lowers RRC flow using RTC-M/A-R675 (Master controller) as necessary (below sub-steps are good practice steps)

Observes lowering frequency on both RRC pumps Verifies reactor power lowers and RFPs respond to maintain RPV level

  • 2.1.3: Verifies total core flow is less than 105%
  • 2.1.4: Verifies RRC Loop A and B is less than 57.5 Mlbm/hr
  • 2.1.5: Notifies CRS when change in power is complete BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If directed to report current vibrations during power reduction, then report RFP B Turbine Radial Inboard Bearing reads 5.2 mls up slow.

BOOTH ROLEPLAY - Once reactor power has been lowered approximately 5%, make the following report (make it sound urgent): The B RFP is vibrating excessively and I am leaving the area due to safety concerns.

Examiner Note: If the same operator adjusted RFP bias and performed the downpower, cue the CRS after he directs tripping RFW-P-1B that the SM desires the [other operator: CRO1 or CRO2] to trip the pump.

CRS Directs tripping RFW-P-1B per step 6 of ARP (840.A1 7-5) or out of concerns for equipment safety ATC Trips the B Feed Turbine Monitors for RRC Runback to 30Hz (both pumps)

Verifies RFP A responds properly to transient in controlling RPV level When plant stabilizes, provides reactor power, pressure and level to CRS NRC Scenario 3 Page 17 of 30

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 3 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 4 (CONTINUED)

BOP Make plant announcement concerning reactor power and RFP status Follows up with ARP 840.A1 1-5 (TURB B TRIP) (as time permits)

  • 1: Verifies proper RRC Runback occurred
  • 2: Verifies MS-V-172B closed (RFW-P-1B High Press Stop Valve)
  • 3: Verifies BS-V-60B closed (RFW-P-1B Low Press Stop Supply)
  • 4: Verifies the following open:

BS-V-44B (BS-V-60B Body Drain)

BS-V-45B (RFW-DT-1B Stage Drain)

MS-V-142B (RFW-P-1B HP Stop Above Seat Drain)

  • 5: Verifies RFW-FCV-2B is closed (Pump Minimum Flow)
  • 6: When RFW-DT-1B slows to less than 1 rpm, and lube oil is available, then place RFW-DT-1B Turning Gear Control to Auto Engage May direct field operator to reset vibration panel alarms (to clear MCR annunciator)

BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If directed to reset local vibration panel alarm, then activate TRG-7 (MCR annunciator will clear)

Comments:

EVENT No. 5 is initiated after the B RFP has been tripped and the plant is stabilized (or as directed by the Exam team) and is activated using TRIGGER 5 NRC Scenario 3 Page 18 of 30

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 3 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 5

==

Description:==

Operating Bases Earthquake causes a steam leak in the RCIC Pump Room with Failure of RCIC-V-8 and RCIC-V-63 to fully close (preventing RCIC leak isolation). Manual scram inserted before first secondary containment max safe operating temperature is reached.

Event is activated using TRIGGER 5.

BOOTH OPERATOR - As briefed or when directed activate TRIGGER 5 Examiner Note: First annunciator (601.A3 5-7 (LEAK DET RCIC EQUIP AREA DT HIGH))

indicative of RCIC steam leak does occur not until about 3 minutes after the OBE.

Examiner Note: RCIC maximum safe operating temperature (1st Max Safe) will not be reached for at least the next 15 minutes.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Acknowledges annunciator 851.S1 5-1 (OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE EXCEEDED) and informs CRS Examiner Note: Following steps are from ARP 4.851.S1 5-1 (OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE EXCEEDED)

BOP 1: Identifies alarm on H13-P823 (Board L) (CRO-2 goes to the back to check Board L indications) - Reports all red and all amber shock lights illuminated (indication of seismic strength) 2: Refers CRS to ABN-EARTHQUAKE CRS Enters ABN-EARTHQUAKE Examiner Note: Following steps are from ABN-EARTHQUAKE (due to higher plant priorities only certain actions will be listed here - Crew may not get to all of them)

CRS 4.2: Verify adequate systems are available for safe shutdown and cooldown of reactor (will verify equipment operability against turnover sheet) 4.4: Discusses need to initiate controlled reactor shutdown per PPM 3.2.1 BOP 4.7: Makes announcement per ABN-EARTHQUAKE step 4.7 4.8: Directs SAS (Secondary Alarm Station) to repeat above announcement on the Alternate Security/ Area Wide and Security radio channels BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If directed to repeat announcement as SAS, then repeat back direction (CRO-2 does this by talking over the chain to the Booth Operator or calling the Booth)

CRS 4.10: Directs crew to check for any indications of RCS leakage or any other equipment issues BOP 4.11: Directs field operator to check the Spent Fuel Pool for damage BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If directed to check Spent Fuel Pool for damage, wait 1 minute then report There are no signs of damage to the Spend Fuel Pool.

NRC Scenario 3 Page 19 of 30

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 3 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 5 (CONTINUED)

ATC Actively monitors reactor power, pressure and level for abnormalities 4.1.14 Checks neutron monitoring system for proper operation and changes CRS 4.1.15: Directs initial plant inspection Examiner Note: RCIC steam leak starts. Annunciator 601.A3 5-7 (LEAK DET RCIC EQUIP AREA DT HIGH) comes in first quickly followed by annunciators 601.A3 1-4 & 601.A2 1-2 (LEAK DET RCIC EQUIP AREA TEMP HI-HI). CRO-2 should address the higher priority alarms.

BOP Acknowledges annunciators 601.A3 1-4 / 601.A-2 1-2 (Leak Detection RCIC Equip Area Hi-Hi) and informs CRS Examiner Note: Following steps from ARPs 601.A3 1-4 / 601.A2 1-2 (Leak Detection RCIC Equip Area Hi-Hi)

BOP 1: Identifies alarming point(s) on LD-MON-1A on H13-P632 2: Compares alarming point(s) on LD-MON-1B on H13-P642 3: Informs CRS of alarming points and trend (RCIC Pump Room DT >

50°F) (which is a PPM 5.3.1 (Secondary Containment Control) entry condition)

CRS Enters PPM 5.3.1 (Secondary Containment Control) on RCIC Pump Room DT > 50°F (Table 22)

BOP 4 & 5: Determines the status of the following RCIC components:

  • RCIC-V-63 (should be closed but remains intermediate)
  • RCIC-V-76 closed (already closed)
  • RCIC-V-8 (should be closed but remains intermediate)
  • RCIC Turbine (should be tripped and is tripped)

Reports to CRS that RCIC-V-63 and RC-V-8 did not fully close (indicate intermediate) and that RCIC did not isolate 6: May direct field operator to SAFELY investigate possible steam leak in the RCIC Pump Room (before becoming too large)

BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If directed to investigate RCIC Pump Room leak, wait 1 minute then report The RCIC Pump Room appears unsafe to enter based on high temperature and humidity.

BOP 8 & 10: Refers CRS to ABN-HELB and to Technical Specification 3.3.6.1 NRC Scenario 3 Page 20 of 30

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 3 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 5 (CONTINUED)

Examiner Note: Following steps are from ABN-HELB (Line Break) (section 4.2)

BOP Makes evacuation announcement as directed CRS Directs CRO-2 to obtain the keys for RCIC-V-8 and RC-V-63 and attempt to manually shut them (May also be directed from 5.3.1, SC-9, below)

BOP With keys in hand, inserts one key into keylock switch for RCIC-V-63 and takes it to close Inserts second key into keylock switch for RCIC-V-8 and takes it to close Reports to CRS that RCIC could not be manually isolated (RCIC-V-63 and RCIC-V-8 did not close)

CRS Requests assistance in getting RCIC-V-8 closed (more accessible than RCIC-V-63) although any attempt will be unsuccessful BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If directed to close RCIC-V-8 locally, wait 5 minutes then report Im here with maintenance. We could not close RCIC-V-8. It appears mechanically bound.

Examiner Note: Refer to Simulator Guide (page 29) for full page MSOT values.

CRS Establishes a Key Plant Parameter for RCIC Pump Room temperature below the Max Safe value of 200°F (see below)

BOP Trends RCIC Pump Room temperature as Key Plant Parameter and notifies CRS when value reached NRC Scenario 3 Page 21 of 30

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 3 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 5 (CONTINUED)

CT #1 - With reactor at power and with primary system discharging into secondary containment, manually scram reactor before any area exceeds its maximum safe operating temperature.

CRS When notified Key Plant Parameter has been reaced, updates the crew on plant conditions then enters PPM 5.1.1 (RPV Control)

Directs CRO1 to scram the reactor Examiner Note: Following steps are Immediate Actions from PPM 3.3.1 (Reactor Scram)

ATC 6.1.1: Places Reactor Mode Switch to Shutdown 6.1.2: Monitors reactor power, pressure and level 6.1.5: Inserts SRM and IRM monitors (detectors)

After above three steps CRO1 makes scram report to CRS:

  • Mode switch is in Shutdown
  • RPV pressure is (value and trend)
  • RPV level is (value and trend)
  • EOP entry on low RPV level (and possibly high Drywell pressure) 6.1.6: After CRS repeat back, reports all control rods are IN CRS Enters PPM 5.1.1 (RPV Control) on low RPV level (+13 inches)

Directs CRO2 to verify containment isolations occurred at +13 inches BOP Verifies +13 inch containment isolation valves closed on the Isolation Control panel:

  • RHR-V-8, RHR-V-9
  • RHR-V-40, RHR-V-49
  • RHR-V-60A, RHR-V-60B
  • RHR-V-75A, RHR-V-75B EVENT No. 5 (CONTINUED)

NRC Scenario 3 Page 22 of 30

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 3 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Examiner Note: Following steps are Subsequent Actions from PPM 3.3.1 (Reactor Scram)

ATC 6.2.5.a: Verify Recirc pumps have run back to 15 Hz 6.2.6: Range down on IRMs, as necessary, to follow power decrease BOP 6.2.7: Make PA announcement for reactor scram ATC 6.2.8: Transfers level control to RFW-FCV-10A/B per SOP-RFW-FCV-QC quick card BOP 6.2.9: If necessary (with Main Generator load < 50 MWe):

  • If Main Turbine did not trip - simultaneously depress both Emerg Trip pushbuttons (H13-P820)
  • If Main Generator did not trip -depress either Unit Emergency Tip pushbutton or Unit Overall Trip pushbutton (H13-P800)
  • Verify power transfer to Startup Transformer (TR-S)

Examiner Note: Following steps are from SOP-RFW-FCV-QC (Transfer RPV Level Control to RFW-FCV-10A/10B - Quick Card).

ATC 2.1.1: (2-handed operation) Starts closing RFW-V-112A and RFW-V-112B 2.1.2: Starts opening RFW-V-118 2.1.3: Verifies RFW-V-109 is closed 2.1.4: (2-handed operation) Verifies RFW-V-117A and RFW-V-117B open 2.1.5: Verifies RFW-LIC-620 is in Manual (V selected for Valve position demand with 0 output) 2.1.6: IF Reactor Feed Pump(s) (RFP) are operating, then performs the following:

  • 2.1.6.a: Verifies RFPs have ramped down in speed
  • 2.1.6.b: Places RFW-P-1B in MDEM mode
  • 2.1.6.c: Places RFW-P-1B in MDEM mode
  • 2.1.6.d: Controls turbine speed as required
  • 2.1.6.e: If desired, then places RFW-FCV-2A(B) in Manual and slowly open to approximately 80%

EVENT No. 5 (CONTINUED)

NRC Scenario 3 Page 23 of 30

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 3 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 ATC 2.1.7: Verifies RFW-V-112A and RFW-V-112B are fully closed 2.1.8: Verifies RFW-V-118 is fully open 2.1.9: IF Reactor Feed Pump(s) (RFP) are operating, then adjusts the running RFP speed to establish ~ 200 psid across RFW-FCV-10A & 10B using either Feedwater touch screen (H13-P840) 2.1.10: Adjusts RFW-LIC-620 manual output to control RPV level 2.1.12: If unable to control RPV level with RFW-FCV-10A/B, then considers throttling RFW-V-109 or RFW-V-118 to control RPV level CRS Directs CRO-2 to maintain RPV pressure band from 800 to 1050 psig using DEH in automatic (WILL direct CRO-2 to establish a new pressure band of 500-600 psig with DEH in automatic to reduce the driving head of the leak into secondary containment)

BOP Lowers RPV pressure if directed using SOP-DEH-QC (Main Turbine DEH Operations Quick Card):

  • 2.1.1a: Selects PRESSURE TARGET
  • 2.1.1b: Enters desired pressure
  • 2.1.1c: Selects OK
  • 2.1.1.d: If change in pressure rate is desired:

1: Selects PRESSURE RATE 2: Enters desired PRESSURE RATE 3: Selects OK

  • 2.1.1.e: Selects GO
  • 2.1.1.f: Selects YES
  • 2.1.1.g: Verifies pressure demand and throttle pressure change at the pressure rate.

Comments:

EVENT No. 6 is activated at the beginning of the scenario and is realized 3 minutes after the Reactor Mode Switch is taken to Shutdown.

EVENT No. 6 NRC Scenario 3 Page 24 of 30

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 3 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017

==

Description:==

Steam leak develops in the Main Steam Tunnel Event is activated at the beginning of the scenario and is realized 3 minutes after the Reactor Mode Switch is taken to Shutdown.

BOOTH OPERATOR: TRG-9 will automatically insert to worsen the MST steam leak once RPV pressure lowers to 750 psig. BE READY to manually insert Trigger 9 (if necessary) to ensure Main Steam Tunnel Temperature DOES NOT trend back down. This will require close coordination with the Scenario Coordinator.

Examiner Note: First annunciator (601.A3 3-8 (LEAK DET MSL TUNNEL DT HIGH)) indicative of a Main Steam Line break does not occur until about 6 minutes after the scram.

Examiner Note: Annunciator 601.A3 3-8 (LEAK DET MSL TUNNEL DT HIGH) comes in first quickly followed by annunciators 601.A3 1-7 & 601.A2 3-1 (LEAK DET MSL TUNNEL TEMP HIGH). CRO-2 should address the higher priority alarms.

BOP Acknowledges annunciators 601.A3 1-7 / 601.A2 3-1 (LEAK DET MSL TUNNEL TEMP HIGH) and informs CRS Examiner Note: Following steps from ARPs 601.A3 1-7 / 601.A2 3-1 (LEAK DET MSL TUNNEL TEMP HIGH)

BOP 1: Identifies alarming point(s) on LD-MON-2A on H13-P632 2: Compares alarming point(s) to temperatures on LD-MON-2B on H13-P642 and recognizes steam leak appears to be on MSL A 3: Informs CRS of alarming points and trend on MSL A (MSL Tunnel >

80°F) (which is a PPM 5.3.1 (Secondary Containment Control) entry condition)

CRS Re-enters PPM 5.3.1 (Secondary Containment Control) on MSL Tunnel DT

> 80°F (Table 22)

BOP 4 & 5: Determines the status of the NSSSS Group 1 isolation which should have occurred - See Event 7 (next page)

Comments:

EVENT No. 7 is activated at the beginning of the scenario and is realized when the MSIVs do not close as expected.

NRC Scenario 3 Page 25 of 30

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 3 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 7

==

Description:==

MS-V-22A and MS-V-28A through D fail to automatically close (MS-V-28A through D can be closed manually but does not isolate leak)

Event is activated at the beginning of the scenario and is realized when the MSIVs do not close as expected.

BOP Recognizes that MS-V-22A and MS-V-28A through D failed to automatically close based on Group 1 isolation signal Attempts to close MS-V-22A and MS-V-28A through D and notes that all valves closed except for MS-V-22A Informs CRS of the failure of MS-V-22A and MS-V-28A through D to auto close and that after manual close attempt all valves closed with exception of MS-V-22A Takes MSIV switches for those MSIVs that automatically shut to the Closed position Informs crew that pressure control is with SRVs (using previously provided band)

Reports that Main Steam Tunnel temperature continues to rise Comments:

EVENT No. 8 is an Emergency Depressurization (PPM 5.1.3) when two areas exceed their max safe operating temperature NRC Scenario 3 Page 26 of 30

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 3 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 8

==

Description:==

Emergency Depressurization (PPM 5.1.3) is performed when two areas exceed their max safe operating temperature SECOND MAX SAFE EXCEEDED: _______________

Examiner Note: Refer to Simulator Guide (page 29) for full page MSOT values.

CRS Establishes a Key Plant Parameter for Main Steam Tunnel temperature of 320°F (Max Safe value) (see below)

BOP Trends MSL Tunnel temperature as Key Plant Parameter and notifies CRS when value reached CRS Directs second operator verify max safe temperature in two areas has been exceeded ATC Verifies max safe temperature in two areas has been exceeded NRC Scenario 3 Page 27 of 30

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 3 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 8 (CONTINUED)

CT #2 - With a primary system discharging into secondary containment and area temperature exceeding maximum safe operating level in more than one area, initiate Emergency Depressurization (ED) by opening seven (7) Safety Relief Valves (ADS preferred) within 10 minutes of second MSOT being exceeded.

Note: If the crew properly elects to invoke the EMERG DEPRESS is anticipated override in ppm 5.1.1 (RPV Control) and in doing so, the second maximum safe operating level is not exceeded, this Critical Task is considered to be met.

CRS When verified Key Plant Parameter has been reached, updates the crew on plant conditions, exits the pressure leg of PPM 5.1.1 (RPV Control) via override then enters PPM 5.3.1 (Emergency RPV Depressurization)

Determines a high Drywell pressure signal is not sealed in Determines Wetwell level is > 17 feet Directs 7 SRVs be opened (ADS preferred) (ADS SRVs are those with the red stripe on left side of their nameplate)

BOP Opens 7 SRVs (ADS preferred) as directed while verifying proper containment response as each is opened and reports completion to CRS CRS Directs pumps not required for Adequate Core Cooling be stopped from injecting Directs RPV level band of -50 to +54 inches ATC Maintains RPV level as required to maintain RPV level band Comments:

TERMINATION CRITERIA: The scenario will be terminated when an Emergency Depressurization has been performed and RPV level is being controlled in the prescribed band OR as directed by the Examination Team.

NRC Scenario 3 Page 28 of 30

REACTOR BUILDING TEMPERATURE LIMITS (INCLUDING MSOT LIMITS) 23 RB Area Temps LD-TE-# Area Description Max Safe Time_________

Alarm Operating LD-MON-1A(B) setpoint (°F) Value (°F)

A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 1

RWCU-P-1A Rm RWCU-P-1B Rm 3A(B) 3C(D) 2 160 320 160 320 RWCU Pipe Area 4A(B) RCIC Pump Rm 24A(B) RB 548 N (R509) 3 160 200 160 165 24C(D) RWCU Pipe Area RB 548 S (R511) 24E(F) RWCU Pipe Area RB 522 N (R408) 24G(H) Above RWCU Pump Rooms RB 522 (R409) 4 160 180 160 340 160 320 TIP Mezzanine 24J(K) RB 501 NE (R313) 5 160 212 6

LD-MON-2A(B)

A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 Main Steam RHR-P-2B Rm 31A(C) Tunnel 31B(D) Main Steam Tunnel 18A(B) 1 164 320 164 320 140 212 RHR A HX Rm 18C(D) RHR-P-2A Rm 18E(F) 18G(H) RHR A HX Rm 2

140 210 130 212 150 212 RHR B HX Rm RHR B HX Rm 18J(K) 18L(M) 3 140 212 130 210 4

5 6

NRC Scenario 3 Page 29 of 30

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 3 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 TURNOVER Initial Conditions:

  • Columbia is operating at 85% power due to economic dispatch
  • Suppression Pool high temperature alarms (601.A11.1-3 and 601.A12.1-
3) have just annunciated
  • Reactor Closed Cooling (RCC) Pump 1B is tagged out for planned maintenance
  • RCC-P-1A and RCC-P-1C are protected Shift Turnover:
  • After shift turnover place RHR-P-2A in Suppression Pool Cooling (using maximum cooling) and allow SW-P-1A to auto start per SOP-RHR-SPC (section 5.1) - Steps 5.1.1 through 5.1.4 are complete.
  • Associate Tech Specs and LCS action statements have been entered for RHR-SYS-A being inoperable but available o LCO 3.5.1 Action A.1 which requires restoring RHR-SYS-A to operable status within 7 days o LCO 3.6.1.5 Action A.1 which requires restoring RHR-SYS-A drywell spray subsystem to operable status within 7 days o LCO 3.6.2.3 Action A.1 which requires restoring RHR-SYS-A suppression pool cooling subsystem to operable status within 7 days o RFO 1.6.1.5 Action A.1 which requires restoring RHR-SYS-A suppression pool spray subsystem to operable status within 7 days
  • The pre-evolution brief has been completed and operators are stationed near both pumps NRC Scenario 3 Page 30 of 30

INSTRUCTIONAL COVER SHEET SC-4 PROGRAM TITLE OPERATIONS TRAINING COURSE TITLE COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION SIMULATOR EXAMINATION Withdraw Control Rods during Startup; REA-FN-1B Trip requiring PPM LESSON TITLE 5.3.1 Entry and SGTS Start (TS); IRM A Upscale Failure with Half Scram; Loss of SL-11 (Re-energized from Alternate Source); RCIC-P-1 Coupling Found Broken; RHR-P-2B Suction Rupture (Lowering WW Level); SW-V-29 Fails to Auto Open; FDR-V-607 Fails to Close; Manual Scram on Low WW Level (Mode Switch Failure - Scram Pushbuttons Successful); ED performed on Low WW Level (One ADS Valve Fails to Open)

LENGTH OF LESSON 1 Hour Lesson Plan PQD Code Rev. No.

Simulator Guide PQD Code SC-4 Rev. No. 1 JPM PQD Code Rev. No.

Exam PQD Code Rev. No.

DIVISION TITLE Nuclear Training DEPARTMENT Operations Training PREPARED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 01/20/17 REVISED BY Dave E. Crawford DATE 02/08/17 VALIDATED BY DATE TECHNICAL REVIEW DATE INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW DATE APPROVED DATE Operations Training Manager NRC Scenario 4 (Spare)

Page 1 of 23

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 4 FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Facility: Columbia Generating Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: 1 Station Examiners: Operators:

The reactor is in Mode 2 (Reactor startup). Reactor is critical at 5% power with RPV pressure at 500 psig. DEH is in Auto with Bypass Valves at 19.5% open. DEH pressure setpoint is 600 psig with pressurization rate set to 6 psig/minute but will remain in Hold until rods are withdrawn to establish Initial Conditions:

Bypass Valves approximately 30% open.

Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 1A (REA-FN-1A) is out of service for extended maintenance.

Withdraw control rods as required to establish and maintain Bypass Valves approximately 30% open in preparation for the SJAE second stage steam supply shift per ppm 3.1.2 step Q34.

Turnover: Next in-sequence rod is from Group 35, Step 08 (rod 06-39).

Continue RPV pressure rise to 600 psig at 6 psig/minute when Bypass Valves are approximately 30% open.

Critical Tasks:

Manually scram the reactor before wetwell level drops below 19 feet 2 inches (as read on CMS-LR-3 or 4 on CT-1 H13-P601).

When wetwell level cannot be maintained above 19 feet 2 inches (as read on CMS-LR-3 or 4 on H13-P601),

initiate emergency depressurization by opening seven (7) Safety Relief Valves (ADS preferred) within 10 CT-2 minutes of wetwell level lowering to 19 feet 2 inches. CT considered met if any combination of 7 Safety Relief Valves are opened.

NOTE: An unintentional or unnecessary RPS or ESF actuation may result in the creation of a post-scenario Critical Task, if that actuation results in a significant plant degradation or significantly alters a mitigation strategy.

Malf.

Event No. Event Type* Event Description No.

Withdraw control rods as required to establish and maintain the bypass 1 N/A R (ATC) valves approximately 30% open C (BOP,SRO) Trip of REA-FN-1B results in a high reactor building pressure and entry 2 TRG-2 TS (SRO) into PPM 5.3.1 (EOP - Secondary Containment Control) (Tech Spec) 3 TRG-3 I (ATC,SRO) IRM A fails upscale resulting in a half scram Differential current lockout of transformer (TR-1/11) results in a loss of 4 TRG-4 C (BOP,SRO) SL-11 (due to the failure to automatically transfer to SL-21) which requires bus to be manually transferred to SL-21 C (ATC**,SRO) 5 N/A RCIC-P-1 coupling discovered broken (Tech Spec)

TS (SRO)

Failure of the RHR-P-2A suction line results in lowering wetwell level M (ALL)

(RHR-V-4A fails to close preventing isolation of leak) 6 TRG-6 FDR-V-607 fails to auto close due to a failed level switch (which allows flooding to continue into RCIC Pump Room). Cannot be closed manually SW-V-29 fails to auto open when HPCS-P-2 is started for wetwell 7 N/A C (BOP) makeup NRC Scenario 4 (Spare)

Page 2 of 23

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 4 FORM ES-D-1 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Reactor mode switch fails to scram reactor, requiring use of manual 8 N/A C (ATC) scram pushbuttons to scram reactor prior to wetwell level lowering to 19 feet 2 inches (CT #1)

Prior to wetwell level going below 19 feet 2 inches, the crew determines

--- that wetwell level cannot be maintained 19 feet 2 inches and initiates 9 N/A RPV Emergency Depressurization (ED) with 7 SRVs opened (CT #2)

One ADS SRV (MS-RV-4D) fails to open requiring manually opening one C (BOP) non-ADS SRV (CT #2)

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications
    • Normally assigned to BOP. NRC Evaluator will have to direct CRS to use ATC.

Target Quantitative Attributes Actual Description SW-V-29 fails to auto open; Mode switch failure; ADS Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 3 SRV fails to open Fan REA-FN-1B trip; IRM A trip with half scram; Loss Abnormal events (2-4) 3 of SL-11 Major transients (1-2) 2 Primary containment failure; Manual scram PPM 5.1.1 (RPV Control); PPM 5.2.1 (Primary EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 3 Containment Control); PPM 5.3.1 (Secondary Containment Control);

EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 1 PPM 5.1.3 (Emergency RPV Depressurization)

EOP-based Critical Tasks (2-3) 2 See Critical Task Determination table Trigger Evaluator How Purpose Malfunction Numbers (TRG-x) Directed Triggered TRG-2 YES Manually Event Initiator PMP-SCN010S TRG-3 YES Manually Event Initiator MAL-NIS002A TRG-4 YES Manually Event Initiator ANN-800C3A02; BKR-EPS001; BKR-EPS004 MAL-RHR001; XMT-PCN006A; XMT-PCN007A; XMT-TRG-6 YES Manually Event Initiator PCN003A; XMT-PCN004A TRG-7 Manually Event Initiator BKR-RHR001 Initial Condition BKR-SCN001 Initial Condition MOV-SSW009F Initial Condition MOV-RHR029F Initial Condition SRV-RRS016C Initial Condition AOV-SCN014F Initial Condition OVR-RPS001A NRC Scenario 4 (Spare)

Page 3 of 23

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 4 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 SCENARIO 4

SUMMARY

Event 1 With reactor power at ~5% and reactor pressure at ~500 psig during reactor startup, RO1 withdraws control rods per SOP-CR-MOVEMENT (Control Rod Movement) to establish and maintain Main Turbine Bypass Valves (BPVs) approximately 30% open as directed by PPM 3.1.2 (Startup Flowchart), Attachment 7.3, step Q34.

Event 2 (TRG-2) Trip of Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 1B (REA-FN-1B) results in a high Reactor Building pressure and entry into PPM 5.3.1 (EOP - Secondary Containment Control). Secondary containment becomes inoperable.

ARP 4.812.R2 9-1 (REACTOR BUILDING EXHAUST FAN B TRIP) directs starting REA-FN-1A which cannot be started (out-of-service). Subsequent ARP direction requires CRO2 to isolate Reactor Building HVAC and starting the Standby Gas Treatment system to return Reactor Building pressure to within the TS limit ( 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge). The CRS refers to Technical Specifications and determines that TS 3.6.4.1 (Secondary Containment), Action A.1 applies which requires restoring secondary containment to operable status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

Event 3 (TRG-3) IRM A fails upscale resulting in an IRM upscale trip and Neutron Monitor System trip annunciators and a half scram. Per the ARP and when directed by the CRS, CRO1 bypasses IRM A and resets the half-scram.

The CRS refers to Technical Specifications 3.3.1.1 (RPS Instrumentation) and determines that the minimum number of IRM instruments required remains operable and that no TS actions are required.

Event 4 (TRG-4) Differential current lockout of transformer (TR-1/11) supplying 480V Bus SL-11 occurs which de-energizes the bus due to CB-21/11 failing to auto close. After accessing what caused the lockout, and when directed, CRO2 repowers SL-11 from SL-21 using the Quick Card (SOP-ELEC-480V-OPS-QC).

Event 5 Call comes into the Control Room reporting RCIC turbine coupling to the RCIC pump was found broken. CRS will direct the RCIC turbine to be tripped. The CRS refers to Technical Specifications and determines that TS 3.5.3 (RCIC System), Action A.1 applies which immediately requires verifying that HPCS is operable by administrative means AND Action A.2 which requires restoring RCIC system to operable status within 14 days.

Event 6 (TRG-6) A break on the Residual Heat Removal Pump 2A (RHR-P-2A) suction line causes wetwell level to lower.

ABN-FLOODING is entered. When attempting to close the RHR-P-2A Motor-Operated suction valve (RHR-V-4A), the valve fails open. The CRS enters PPM 5.2.1 (EOP - Primary Containment Control) on Suppression Pool low level. Crew should direct removal of control power fuses (TRG-7) for RHR-P-2A as time permits.

FDR-V-607, the cross-connect valve between the RHR-SYS-A and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) rooms fails to auto close due to a failed level switch (which allows flooding to continue into RCIC Pump Room). The valve cannot be manually closed. The CRS re-enters PPM 5.3.1 (EOP - Secondary Containment Control) due high RHR-SYS-A and RCIC room levels. The leak from the Suppression Pool is not considered a Primary System discharging into Secondary Containment and therefore a controlled reactor shutdown is required for high RCIC room water level (6 inches above floor).

NRC Scenario 4 (Spare)

Page 4 of 23

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 4 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Event 7 The crew takes actions to restore wetwell level using the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) pump (HPCS-P-1) per PPM 5.5.23 (Emergency Suppression Pool Makeup). During this lineup, the HPCS Standby Service Water Pump (HPCS-P-2) discharge valve (SW-V-29) fails to auto open when HPCS-P-2 is started, requiring CRO2 to manually open the valve. HPCS is ineffective is restoring Suppression Pool level.

Event 8 The CRS enters PPM 5.1.1 (EOP - RPV Control) and directs manually scramming the reactor prior to wetwell level reaching 19 feet 2 inches. (CT #1) The reactor will not scram when the mode switch is taken to SHUTDOWN. CRO1 identifies the failure to scram and takes actions per PPM 3.3.1 (Reactor Scram) to scram the reactor. The Manual Scram Pushbuttons are effective in inserting all control rods.

Event 9 Prior to wetwell level going below 19 feet 2 inches, the CRS determines that wetwell level cannot be maintained 19 feet 2 inches and directs Emergency Depressurization (ED) per PPM 5.1.3 by opening seven (7) Safety Relief Valves (ADS preferred) within 10 minutes of wetwell level lowering to 19 feet 2 inches. (CT #2)

One Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Safety Relief Valve (MS-RV-4D) fails to open during the ED requiring CRO2 to manually open a non-ADS SRV. (CT #2)

TERMINATION CRITERIA: The scenario will be terminated when emergency depressurization has commenced (7 SRVs open) and RPV level is being controlled in the prescribed band OR as directed by the Examination Team.

NRC Scenario 4 (Spare)

Page 5 of 23

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 4 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 Measurable Safety Performance Critical Task Cueing Performance Significance Feedback Indicators CT #1 - Manually Ensures reactor is Procedural direction by The operator will All control rods fully scram the reactor scrammed and PPM 5.2.1 (EOP for manually scram insert.

before wetwell level shutdown before Primary Containment reactor by placing drops below 19 feet requirement to Control) Step L-5 Reactor Mode 2 inches (as read Emergency directs entering PPM Switch in on CMS-LR-3 or 4 Depressurize (ED) is 5.1.1 (which requires Shutdown (and on H13-P601). reached. placing Reactor Mode follow up with all Switch in Shutdown) Manual Scram If ED is anticipated once it is determined pushbuttons when (see PPM 5.1.1 P-1 that wetwell level RMS fails to scram override), dumping cannot be maintained the reactor).

steam to main above 19 feet 2 inches.

condenser via Main Turbine bypass valves may be used to reduce reactor pressure before the requirement to ED occurs. ED would still be performed if required by EOPs.

(Ref: PPM 5.0.10 Rev 21, 8.8.2 f))

CT #2 - When Suppression of Procedural direction by The operator will The valve light wetwell level cannot pressure from PPM 5.2.1 (EOP for manually open 7 indications for each be maintained blowdown Primary Containment Safety Relief of the 7 Safety above 19 feet 2 (Emergency Control) Step L-6 Valves (ADS Relief Valves will inches (as read on Depressurization) directs Emergency preferred) to change from Green CMS-LR-3 or 4 on through the Depressurizing reactor emergency lit to Red lit when H13-P601), initiate downcomers when Wetwell water depressurize the control switch is emergency cannot be assured for level cannot be RPV. taken to Open.

depressurization by water levels below 19 maintained above 19 opening seven (7) feet 2 inches. feet 2 inches. Reactor pressure Safety Relief Valves will lower in (ADS preferred) (Ref: PPM 5.0.10 response.

within 10 minutes of Rev 21, 7.12.3) wetwell level lowering to 19 feet 2 inches.

NRC Scenario 4 (Spare)

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Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 4 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 1

==

Description:==

Withdraw control rods as required to establish and maintain the bypass valves approximately 30% open.

Event is initiated by Turnover.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Directs RO1 to withdraw control rods to establish and maintain the BPVs approximately 30% open (per startup flowchart step Q34)

Examiner Note: Following steps are from SOP-CR-MOVEMENT (Control Rod Movement)

Examiner Note: The next 5 rods to withdraw in the startup sequence are as follows (each will be moved from position 8 to 12): 06-39, 30-47, 46-31, 30-15, 14-31 ATC 5.1.1 References the Startup Rod Withdrawal sequence (Pull) sheets to identify next rod to withdrawal (control rod 06-39) 5.1.2 Selects control rod to be moved (currently at position 08) 5.1.4:

  • Presses and releases the Withdrawal button
  • Verifies rod is moving in the expected direction (out) and settles at position 10
  • Repeats above two bulleted steps to move same rod from 10 to 12 5.1.6 Verifies control rod 06-39 has settled at position 12 5.1.7 Annotates completed move on the pull sheet Continues rod withdrawal with next rod in sequence (control rod 30-47) by repeating above steps BOP Peer checks RO1 during rod manipulations Periodically reports Bypass Valve position to CRO1 ATC Reports to CRS when Bypass Valves are approximately 30% open Comments:

EVENT No. 2 may be initiated after first rod (06-39) is withdrawn to position 12 (or as directed by the Exam team) and is activated using TRIGGER 2.

NRC Scenario 4 (Spare)

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Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 4 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 2

==

Description:==

Trip of REA-FN-1B results in a high reactor building pressure and entry into PPM 5.3.1 (EOP - Secondary Containment Control) (Tech Spec)

Event is activated using TRIGGER 2.

BOOTH OPERATOR - As briefed or when directed activate TRIGGER 2 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Acknowledges annunciator 812.R2 9-1 (RX BLDG EXH FAN B TRIP)

Determines that fan REA-FN-1B has tripped Reports annunciator and status of fan REA-FN-1B to the CRS Examiner Note: Following steps are from ARP 812.R2 9-1 (RX BLDG EXH FAN B TRIP)

BOP 1: Verifies REA-FN-1B tripped (may have been previously completed) 2: Notes that REA-FN-1A cannot be started (undergoing maintenance) and informs CRS that a Standby Gas Treatment train will have to be started CRS 3.a: Directs CRO2 to start either Standby Gas Treatment train 1A or 1B per the SOP-SGT-START-DIV1(2)-QC (Standby Gas Treatment Start - Quick Card)

Calls for assistance in getting REA-FN-1A or REA-FN-1B back BOP/ATC Acknowledges annunciator 602.A5 2-8 (SEC PRESS DP HIGH) when it comes in and informs CRS Examiner Note: Following steps are from ARP 602.A5 2-8 (SEC PRESS DP HIGH)

BOP/ATC 1 & 2: Checks REA-DPR-1A(B) for RB Pressure (already known to be near zero) and refer to CRS to ppm 3.8.1 (Secondary Containment Control) 3: Refers CRS to Technical Specification 6.3.4.1 Refers to annunciator 812.R1 7-3 (SEC PRESS CONTR A P HIGH/LOW) and 812.R2 7-1 (SEC PRESS CONTR B P HIGH/LOW) and notes they are expected for the plant condition (no RB HVAC)

CRS Enters PPM 5.3.1 (Secondary Containment Control) on low RB differential pressure Evaluates Technical Specifications and determines the following action applies:

LCO 6.3.4.1 A.1 - Restore secondary containment to operable status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> NRC Scenario 4 (Spare)

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Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 4 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 2 (CONTINUED)

Examiner Note: Following steps are from SOP-SGT-START-DIV1-QC (Standby Gas Treatment Start - Quick Card) assuming Div 1 is started (Div 2 components are in parentheses)

Examiner Note: All bullets in steps 3.1.1 & 3.1.2 below are performed regardless of which Standby Gas Treatment train is started.

BOP 3.1.1: (2 handed operation) Places the following fans to Pull to Lock

  • ROA-FN-1A
  • ROA-FN-1B
  • REA-FN-1A
  • REA-FN-1B 3.1.2: Closes the following valves:
  • ROA-V-1
  • ROA-V-2
  • REA-V-1
  • REA-V-2 3.1.3: Momentarily turns SGT-FN-1A1 (SGT-FN-1B2) fan control switch from Auto to PTL SYS.START 3.1.4: Verifies the following items:
  • Main Heaters energize as indicated by the Main Heater ON light and A1 (B2) amp meters
  • SGT-V-5A1 (SGT-V-5B2) opens (Exhaust to Stack)
  • SGT-FN-1A1 (SGT-FN-1B2) starts (within 10 seconds)

Examiner Note: Following are steps from ARP 812.R2 9-1 (RX BLDG EXH FAN B TRIP)

BOP 3.b: Notifies Chemistry to monitor Reactor Building ventilation per ODCM 6.1.2.1 and LCS 1.3.3.1 3.c: Refers CRS to ODCM 6.1.2.1 and LCS 1.3.3.1 4: Refers CRS to ABN-HVAC (no actionable items)

Monitors secondary containment D/P with a Standby Gas Treatment train running and informs CRS when secondary containment D/P has been restored NRC Scenario 4 (Spare)

Page 9 of 23

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 4 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 2 (CONTINUED)

CRS Validates restoration of secondary containment integrity - exits LCO 3.6.4.1 Evaluates exiting of PPM 5.3.1 (Secondary Containment Control)

Comments:

EVENT No. 3 may be initiated after Secondary Containment integrity has been restored and Tech Specs addressed (or as directed by the Exam team) and is activated using TRIGGER 3.

NRC Scenario 4 (Spare)

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Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 4 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 3

==

Description:==

IRM A fails upscale resulting in a half scram Event is activated using TRIGGER 3.

BOOTH OPERATOR - As briefed or when directed activate TRIGGER 3 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ATC Acknowledges annunciators 603.A7 1-5 (IRM ACEG UPSCL TRIP OR INOP) and 603.A7 3-4 (1/2 SCRAM SYSTEM A)

Checks for control rod motion Reports to CRS that a half scram occurred (RPS A white RPS scram lights de-energized) due to IRM upscale and that no rod motion has occurred BOP Makes PA announcement Half Scram system A. Stop all maintenance and surveillance testing on RPS system B.

CRS Calls Work Week Manager or Operations Management for assistance Examiner Note: Following are steps from ARP 603.A7 3-4 (1/2 SCRAM SYSTEM A)

ATC 2.a: Checks for scrammed rods (may have already been performed)

BOP 2.c: Make announcement to stop work (may have already been made)

ATC Positions IRM Bypass Switch to bypass IRM A 3: Resets half scram by doing the following:

  • 3.a: Depresses RPS-RMS-S5A (RPS Logic A1/B1 Reset pushbutton ) (H13-P603).
  • 3.b: Depresses RPS-RMS-S5B (RPS Logic A2/B2 Reset Pushbutton) (H13-P603)
  • 3.c: Verifies the Scram group solenoid lights for Groups 1, 2, 3 and 4 are illuminated (H13-P609 & H13-P603)

Page 11 of 23

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 4 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 3 (CONTINUED)

Comments:

EVENT No. 4 may be initiated after 1/2 scram has been reset and Tech Specs addressed (or as directed by the Exam team) and is activated using TRIGGER 4.

NRC Scenario 4 (Spare)

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Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 4 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 4

==

Description:==

Differential current lockout of transformer (TR-1/11) results in a loss of SL-11 (due to the failure to automatically transfer to SL-21) which requires bus to be manually transferred to SL-21 Event is activated using TRIGGER 4.

BOOTH OPERATOR - As briefed or when directed activate TRIGGER 4 BOP Acknowledges annunciator 800.C3 1-2 (XFMR TR-1/11 DIFF LOCKOUT) and notes 480 VAC Bus SL-11 has de-energized - Reports annunciator and bus status to CRS CRS Enters ABN-ELEC-SM1/SM7 Examiner Note: Following are steps from ARP 800.C3 1-2 (XFMR TR-1/11 DIFF LOCKOUT)

Examiner Note: CB 21/11 would normally automatically close to immediately re-energize bus SL-11. In this case CB 21/11 failed to auto close causing a loss of bus SL-11. SOP-ELEC-480V-OPS-QC quick card will be used or guidance in PPM 1.3.1 to manually close CB 21/11.

BOP 1: Verifies that both CB-1/11 & CB 11/1 feeder breakers tripped open (as expected based on alarm) but that CB 21/11 did not close CRS 3: Requests plant assistance for cause of transformer lockout Examiner Note: Following are steps from ABN-ELEC-SM1/SM7 (section 4.7)

BOP 4.7.1: Verifies DEH-P-1B is running 4.7.3: Verifies SL-11 lockout is reset CRS 4.7.4: When the E-SL-11 problems have been corrected, then restore SL-11 to service per SOP-ELEC-480V-OPS-QC (there are not issues with SL-11 itself) 4.7.5: When SL-11 is returned to service then restore SL-11 loads to service per SOP-ELEC-SM1-MAINT (the CRS will make note of this)

BOP 4: Determines that normal source to Bus SL-11 unavailable but energizes SL-11 using SOP-ELEC-480V-OPS-QC quick card NRC Scenario 4 (Spare)

Page 13 of 23

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 4 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 4 (CONTINUED)

Examiner Note: Following are steps from SOP-ELEC-480V-OPS-QC quick card (section 2.4)

BOP 2.4.1: Verifies CB-21/2 closed 2.4.2: Verifies CB-11/1 green light illuminated and green flag displayed 2.4.3: Verifies CB-21/11 green light illuminated and green flag displayed 2.4.4: Closes CB-21/11 2.4.5: Verifies SL-11 voltage is approximately 480 (432-528) volts 2.4.6: Verifies (and maintains) E-TR-1/11 load 277 amps Comments:

EVENT No. 5 may be initiated after Bus SL-11 has been re-energized (or as directed by the Exam team) and is initiated with a call to the Main Control Room.

NRC Scenario 4 (Spare)

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Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 4 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 5

==

Description:==

RCIC-P-1 coupling discovered broken (Tech Spec)

Event is initiated after Bus SL-11 has been restored (or as directed by the Exam team) and commences with a call to the Main Control Room.

BOOTH OPERATOR - Call the Main Control Room and report the following as OPS-2:

I discovered several pieces of RCIC pump coupling on the floor in the RCIC Pump room. The pump looks detached from the turbine. I am exiting the area since RCIC looks unsafe if there is an auto start.

CRS Directs CRO1 to trip RCIC turbine Examiner Note: For CRO1 credit the CRS will have to be directed to ensure CRO1 gets assigned task while CRO2 monitors reactor parameters.

ATC Trips RCIC turbine as directed by pressing RCIC Manual trip pushbutton or by closing RCIC-V-1 Refers to ARP 601.A4 1-5 (RCIC TURBINE TRIP) for follow up actions Examiner Note: Following are steps from ARP 601.A4 1-5 (RCIC TURBINE TRIP)

ATC 1: Verifies RCIC-V-1 is closed (RCIC Turbine Trip and Throttle Valve)

(H13-P601) 2: Verifies RCIC-V-46 is closed 5: Refers CRS to Technical Specification 3.5.3 CRS 6: Informs Security to take compensatory actions for RCIC out of service Enters RCIC as inoperable in the Plant Logging system - Evaluates Technical Specifications and determines the following actions apply:

LCO 3.5.3 Action A.1 applies which immediately requires verifying that HPCS is operable by administrative means (it is)

LCO 3.5.3 Action A.2 which requires restoring RCIC system to operable status within 14 days Request assistance on RCIC investigation and unplanned unavailability Protects HPCS-P-1, HPCS DG and HPCS Service Water systems Comments:

EVENT No. 6 may be initiated after RCIC has been tripped and Tech Specs addressed (or as directed by the Exam team) and is activated using TRIGGER 6.

NRC Scenario 4 (Spare)

Page 15 of 23

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 4 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 6

==

Description:==

Failure of the RHR-P-2A suction line results in lowering wetwell level (RHR-V-4A fails to close preventing isolation of leak)

Event is activated using TRIGGER 6.

BOOTH OPERATOR - As briefed or when directed activate TRIGGER 6 Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP Acknowledges annunciator 602.A13 2-1 (REACTOR BLDG FLOOR SUMP R1 LEVEL HI-HI) and informs CRS Examiner Note: Following are steps from ARP 602.A13 2-1 (REACTOR BLDG FLOOR SUMP R1 LEVEL HI-HI)

BOP 1: Determines Sump Pump status by calling Radwaste Control Room to ensure that either FDR-P-1A or 1B is running BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If directed to report status of FDR-P-1A and 1B sump pumps, report both floor drain sump pumps are running.

BOP 2: Sends field operator to investigate RI Sump level (and possible flooding) in RHR A pump room Ensures they understand that this is a potentially hazardous situation and that they need to take the appropriate precaution NOTE: This step is also directed from ABN-FLOODING step 4.1.1 BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If directed to investigate possible flooding in RHR A pump room, wait 1 minute and:

If alarm 601.A4 5-3 has not come in report I hear a big inrush of water in the RHR A pump room. The Sump is overflowing with several inches of water on the floor.

If alarm 601.A4 5-3 has already come in report I hear a big inrush of water in the RHR A pump room with about a foot of water of water on the floor and rising. Im leaving due to safety concerns.

NRC Scenario 4 (Spare)

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Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 4 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 6 (CONTINUED)

BOP 3: Notes that FDR-V-607 (RCIC Floor Drain Sump FDR Sump R1 Inlet) did not automatically close and attempts to manually close it on H13-P632 Reports to CRS that FDR-V607 did not auto close and could not be closed manually Acknowledges annunciator 601.A4 5-3 (RHR A PUMP ROOM WATER LEVEL HIGH) and informs CRS Refers CRS to ppm 5.3.1 (Secondary Containment Control) (per ARP)

Examiner Note: Primary indications used for Suppression Pool (Wetwell) water level during this event are CMS-LR-3 or 4, on H13-P601.

BOP Acknowledges annunciator 601.A12 2-3 or 601.A11 2-3 (SUPP POOL LEVEL HIGH/LOW)

Observes lowering level in the Suppression Pool (Wetwell) and provides crew update Examiner Note: Due to timing of actions, steps performed for ABN-FLOODING are not listed here but instead are referenced as actions occur. See note for last BOP action on page 16, 4th CRS action below, CRS action at bottom of page, and last ATC action on page 18 for ABN-FLOODING actions.

CRS Enters ABN-FLOODING Enters 5.3.1 (Secondary Containment Control) on RB water level above alarm setpoint of 6 inches (RHR Pump Room A)

Enters ppm 5.2.1 (Primary Containment Control) based on low suppression level (-2 inches)

Directs CRO2 to verify RHR-P-2A secured and then to shut RHR-V-4A (Pump Suction from Supp Pool) in an attempt to isolate the leak (as directed by ppm 5.3.1 (Secondary Containment Control) step SC-9) or ABN-FLOODING Examiner Note: RHR-V-4A will lose indication (both green and red lights off) when attempt is made to close the valve due to an open control circuit.

BOP Reports after isolation attempt that RHR-V-4A did not close and that Suppression Pool level continues to lower CRS Directs CRO2 to make announcement per ABN-FLOODING step 4.2 NRC Scenario 4 (Spare)

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Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 4 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 6 (CONTINUED)

BOP Since flooding was confirmed by report/plant indications:

  • 4.2.1: Sounds Alert Tone for 5 to 10 seconds
  • 4.2.2: Alert station personnel to flooding in the affected room(s)
  • 4.2.3: Evacuate all unnecessary personnel (may already be done)
  • 4.2.4: Refer to PPM 13.5.1 for localized evacuation CRS Sets a Key Plant Parameter for Suppression Pool (Wetwell) level sufficiently above 19 feet 2 inches (to allow margin for actions needed to ED later on before reaching 19 feet 2 inches)

ATC/BOP 4.1.2: Trends Key Plant Parameter for Suppression Pool (Wetwell) level ATC Directs field operator to remove trip and close (control power) fuses for RHR-P-2A (per ABN-Flooding Attachment 7.1 (section 7.1.1)

BOOTH ROLEPLAY - If directed to pull the control power fuses for RHR-P-2A, wait 1 minute then activate TRIGGER 7 then report The trip and close fuses have been removed for RHR-P-2A.

Comments:

EVENT No. 7 is activated at the beginning of the scenario and is realized when SW-V-29 fails to auto open.

NRC Scenario 4 (Spare)

Page 18 of 23

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 4 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 7

==

Description:==

SW-V-29 fails to auto open when HPCS-P-2 is started.

Event is activated at the beginning of the scenario and is realized when SW-V-29 fails to auto open.

Examiner Note: Crew may not pursue option to raise Wetwell level depending on rate of Wetwell level decrease.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOP When directed to perform ppm 5.5.23 (Emergency Suppression Pool Makeup) the following actions are taken (per section 4)

  • 4.1: Verifies HPCS-V-1 is open (Pump Suction from CST)
  • 4.2: Starts HPCS-P-1
  • 4.3: Verifies HPCS-V-12 opens (HPCS-P-1 Minimum Flow Bypass)

Observes that SW-V-29 did NOT automatically open and therefore attempts to open it manually Reports to the CRS that SW-V-29 did not automatically open but was able to be opened manually

  • 4.6 is N/A (no HPCS auto initiation signal present)
  • 4.7: Throttles open HPCS-V-23 (Test Bypass To Suppression Pool)
  • 4.8: Adjusts flow as necessary to a maximum of 7175 GPM to fill the Suppression Pool
  • 4.9: Verifies HPCS-V-12 closes
  • 4.10: Monitors Suppression Pool level Reports to CRS that HPCS is making up to Suppression Pool but Suppression Pool level continues to lower EVENT No. 8 is activated at the beginning of the scenario and is realized when the Mode Switch is positioned to Shutdown and no scram occurs.

NRC Scenario 4 (Spare)

Page 19 of 23

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 4 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 8

==

Description:==

Reactor mode switch fails to scram reactor, requiring use of manual scram pushbuttons to scram reactor prior to wetwell level lowering to 19 feet 2 inches.

Event is activated at the beginning of the scenario and is realized when the Mode Switch is positioned to Shutdown and no scram occurs.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CT #1 - Manually scram the reactor before wetwell level drops below 19 feet 2 inches (as read on CMS-LR-3 or 4 on H13-P601).

ATC/BOP Reports when Key Plant Parameter met for Suppression Pool (Wetwell) low level CRS When notified Key Plant Parameter has been reached for Wetwell level, updates the crew on plant conditions then enters PPM 5.1.1 (RPV Control)

Directs CRO1 to scram the reactor Examiner Note: Following steps are Immediate Actions from PPM 3.3.1 (Reactor Scram)

ATC 6.1.1: Places Reactor Mode Switch to Shutdown

  • Observes that APRMs do not indicate downscale (all 4 APRM downscale status lights on H13-P603 are not lit) 6.1.2: Monitors reactor power, pressure and level (no change) 6.1.3: IF APRM's are not downscale, THEN PERFORM the following:
  • 6.1.3.b: INITIATE ARI 6.1.5: Inserts SRM and IRM monitors (detectors) (some are not fully inserted during this point in the startup)

NRC Scenario 4 (Spare)

Page 20 of 23

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 4 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 8 (CONTINUED)

ATC After above steps CRO1 makes scram report to CRS:

  • Mode switch is in Shutdown
  • RPV pressure is (value and trend)
  • RPV level is (value and trend)
  • No EOP entry (reactor power is < 5%)

6.1.6: Reports all control rods are IN Examiner Note: Following steps are Subsequent Actions from PPM 3.3.1 (Reactor Scram)

ATC 6.2.6: Range down on IRMs, as necessary, to follow power decrease BOP 6.2.7: Make PA announcement for reactor scram ATC 6.2.8: Transfers level control to RFW-FCV-10A/B per SOP-RFW-FCV-QC quick card (No action - already on startup level controller in Auto)

CRS Sets a Key Plant Parameter for Suppression Pool (Wetwell) level sufficiently above 19 feet 2 inches to allow a controlled Emergency Depressurization NRC Scenario 4 (Spare)

Page 21 of 23

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 4 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 EVENT No. 9

==

Description:==

Prior to wetwell level going below 19 feet 2 inches, the crew determines that wetwell level cannot be maintained 19 feet 2 inches and initiates RPV Emergency Depressurization (ED) with 7 SRVs opened (SRV MS-RV-4D) fails to open requiring manually opening one non-ADS SRV)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Time Wetwell Level < 19.2 Feet _______________ (Suppression Pool WR LVL (CMS-LR-3 or 4, on H13-P601))

CT #2 - When wetwell level cannot be maintained above 19 feet 2 inches (as read on CMS-LR-3 or 4 on H13-P601), initiate emergency depressurization by opening seven (7) Safety Relief Valves (ADS preferred) within 10 minutes of wetwell level lowering to 19 feet 2 inches.

CRS When notified Key Plant Parameter has been reached for Wetwell level, updates the crew on plant conditions, exits the pressure leg of PPM 5.1.1 (RPV Control) via override P-1 (1st) then enters PPM 5.3.1 (Emerg Depressurization)

Determines a high Drywell pressure signal is not sealed in Determines Wetwell level is > 17 feet Directs 7 SRVs be opened (ADS preferred) (ADS SRVs are those with the red stripe on left side of their nameplate)

Examiner Note: Proper containment response (comparing Wetwell and Drywell pressures as each SRV is opened to detect tailpipe failure) will be difficult at an already low RPV pressure.

BOP Opens 7 SRVs (ADS preferred) as directed while verifying proper containment response as each is opened and reports completion to CRS

  • Observes that SRV (MS-RV-4D) did not open
  • Opens one other non-ADS SRV Reports 7 SRV opened and that SRV 4D failed to open requiring the opening of another SRV CRS Directs RPV level band of +13 to +54 inches ATC Maintains RPV level as required to maintain RPV level band TERMINATION CRITERIA: The scenario will be terminated when emergency depressurization has commenced (7 SRVs open) and RPV level is being controlled in the prescribed band OR as directed by the Examination Team.

NRC Scenario 4 (Spare)

Page 22 of 23

Appendix D NRC Scenario No. 4 FORM ES-D-2 Columbia Generating Station ILC NRC Exam - February, 2017 TURNOVER Initial Conditions:

  • The reactor is in Mode 2 (Reactor startup).
  • Reactor is critical at 5% power with RPV pressure at 500 psig.
  • DEH is in Auto with Bypass Valves at 19.5% open.
  • DEH pressure setpoint is 600 psig with pressurization rate set to 6 psig/minute but will remain in Hold until rods are withdrawn to establish Bypass Valves approximately 30% open.
  • Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 1A (REA-FN-1A) is out of service for extended maintenance.

Shift Turnover:

  • Withdraw control rods as required to establish and maintain Bypass Valves approximately 30% open in preparation for the SJAE second stage steam supply shift per ppm 3.1.2 (Startup Flowchart) step Q34.
  • Next in-sequence rod is from Group 35, Step 08 (rod 06-39).
  • Continue RPV pressure rise to 600 psig at 6 psig/minute when Bypass Valves are approximately 30% open.

NRC Scenario 4 (Spare)

Page 23 of 23

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist (Rev 2 - 02/13/17) Form ES-301-5 Facility: Columbia Generating Station Date of Exam: 2/27/2017 Operating Test No.: 1 A E Scenarios P V P E 1 2 3 4 T M L N O I CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION N I T T C S A B S A B S A B S A B I A

A T R T O R T O R T O R T O M L U N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P T P M(*)

E R I U RO RX 5 1 1 1 0 SRO-I NOR 0 1 1 1 U1 I/C 1,2,4, 2,3,4 8 4 4 2 SRO-U 5,7 MAJ 6 5,6 3 2 2 1 TS 1,3 1,2,3 5 0 2 2 RO RX NOR SRO-I I/C SRO-U MAJ TS RO RX NOR SRO-I I/C SRO-U MAJ TS Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

Page 1 of 10

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist (Rev 2 - 02/13/17) Form ES-301-5 Facility: Columbia Generating Station Date of Exam: 2/27/2017 Operating Test No.: 1 A E Scenarios P V P E 1 2 3 4 T M L N O I CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION N I T T C S A B S A B S A B S A B I A

A T R T O R T O R T O R T O M L U N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P T P M(*)

E R I U RO RX 5 1 2 1 1 0 SRO-I NOR 0 1 1 1 I/C 1,2,4, I1 4 4 2 2,4,8 2,3,4 11 SRO-U 5,7 MAJ 6 6 5,6 4 2 2 1 TS 1,3 1,2,3 5 0 2 2 RO RX NOR SRO-I I/C SRO-U MAJ TS RO RX NOR SRO-I I/C SRO-U MAJ TS Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

Page 2 of 10

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist (Rev 2 - 02/13/17) Form ES-301-5 Facility: Columbia Generating Station Date of Exam: 2/27/2017 Operating Test No.: 1 A E Scenarios P V P E 1 2 3 4 T M L N O I CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION N I T T C S A B S A B S A B S A B I A

A T R T O R T O R T O R T O M L U N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P T P M(*)

E R I U RO RX 0 1 1 0 SRO-I NOR 0 1 1 1 I2 I/C 1,5,8 3,4 2,4 7 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 6 6 5,6 4 2 2 1 TS 3,4 2 0 2 2 RO RX NOR SRO-I I/C SRO-U MAJ TS RO RX NOR SRO-I I/C SRO-U MAJ TS Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

Page 3 of 10

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist (Rev 2 - 02/13/17) Form ES-301-5 Facility: Columbia Generating Station Date of Exam: 2/27/2017 Operating Test No.: 1 A E Scenarios P V P E 1 2 3 4 T M L N O I CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION N I T T C S A B S A B S A B S A B I A

A T R T O R T O R T O R T O M L U N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P T P M(*)

E R I U RO RX 5 1 2 1 1 0 SRO-I NOR 0 1 1 1 I3 I/C 1,2,4, 2,4,8 2,3,4 11 4 4 2 SRO-U 5,7 MAJ 6 6 5,6 4 2 2 1 TS 1,3 1,2,3 5 0 2 2 RO RX NOR SRO-I I/C SRO-U MAJ TS RO RX NOR SRO-I I/C SRO-U MAJ TS Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

Page 4 of 10

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist (Rev 2 - 02/13/17) Form ES-301-5 Facility: Columbia Generating Station Date of Exam: 2/27/2017 Operating Test No.: 1 A E Scenarios P V P E 1 2 3 4 T M L N O I CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION N I T T C S A B S A B S A B S A B I A

A T R T O R T O R T O R T O M L U N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P T P M(*)

E R I U RO RX 0 1 1 0 SRO-I NOR 0 1 1 1 I4 I/C 1,5,8 3,4 2,4 7 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 6 6 5,6 4 2 2 1 TS 3,4 2 0 2 2 RO RX NOR SRO-I I/C SRO-U MAJ TS RO RX NOR SRO-I I/C SRO-U MAJ TS Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

Page 5 of 10

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist (Rev 2 - 02/13/17) Form ES-301-5 Facility: Columbia Generating Station Date of Exam: 2/27/2017 Operating Test No.: 1 A E Scenarios P V P E 1 2 3 4 T M L N O I CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION N I T T C S A B S A B S A B S A B I A

A T R T O R T O R T O R T O M L U N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P T P M(*)

E R I U RO RX 5 1 1 1 0 SRO-I NOR 0 1 1 1 I5 I/C 2,4,7 3,4 5 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 6 6 2 2 2 1 TS 3,4 2 0 2 2 RO RX NOR SRO-I I/C SRO-U MAJ TS RO RX NOR SRO-I I/C SRO-U MAJ TS Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

Page 6 of 10

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist (Rev 2 - 02/13/17) Form ES-301-5 Facility: Columbia Generating Station Date of Exam: 2/27/2017 Operating Test No.: 1 A E Scenarios P V P E 1 2 3 4 T M L N O I CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION N I T T C S A B S A B S A B S A B I A

A T R T O R T O R T O R T O M L U N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P T P M(*)

E R I U RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RX 5 1 1 1 0 RO R1 SRO-I NOR 1 1 2 1 1 1 I/C 2,4,7 3,5,9 3,7 8 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 6 6 5,6 4 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

Page 7 of 10

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist (Rev 2 - 02/13/17) Form ES-301-5 Facility: Columbia Generating Station Date of Exam: 2/27/2017 Operating Test No.: 1 A E Scenarios P V P E 1 2 3 4 T M L N O I CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION N I T T C S A B S A B S A B S A B I A

A T R T O R T O R T O R T O M L U N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P T P M(*)

E R I U RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RX 5 1 1 1 0 RO R2 SRO-I NOR 1 1 2 1 1 1 I/C 2,4,7 3,5,9 3,7 8 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 6 6 5,6 4 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

Page 8 of 10

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist (Rev 2 - 02/13/17) Form ES-301-5 Facility: Columbia Generating Station Date of Exam: 2/27/2017 Operating Test No.: 1 A E Scenarios P V P E 1 2 3 4 T M L N O I CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION N I T T C S A B S A B S A B S A B I A

A T R T O R T O R T O R T O M L U N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P T P M(*)

E R I U RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RX 1 1 1 1 0 RO R3 SRO-I NOR 1 1 1 1 1 I/C 1,5,8 2,4,8 3,7 8 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 6 6 5,6 4 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

Page 9 of 10

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist (Rev 2 - 02/13/17) Form ES-301-5 Facility: Columbia Generating Station Date of Exam: 2/27/2017 Operating Test No.: 1 A E Scenarios P V P E 1 2 3 4 T M L N O I CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION N I T T C S A B S A B S A B S A B I A

A T R T O R T O R T O R T O M L U N Y O C P O C P O C P O C P T P M(*)

E R I U RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RX 0 1 1 0 RO R4 SRO-I NOR 1 1 1 1 1 I/C 3,5,9 2,4 5 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 6 5,6 3 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.
3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.
4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

Page 10 of 10

ES-301 U1 - Competencies Checklist (Rev 1 - 02/13/17) Form ES-301-6 Facility: Columbia Gen. Sta. Date of Examination: 2/27/2017 Operating Test No.: 1 RO RO RO RO U-1 SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Interpret/Diagnose 5,6, 6,9 Events and Conditions 8 Comply With and 5, 4,8 Use Procedures (1) 6,9 Operate Control Boards (2)

Communicate 5,6, 6,8 and Interact 9 Demonstrate 4,5, 6,9 Supervisory Ability (3) 8 Comply With and 1,2, Use Tech. Specs. (3) 1,3 3

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

Page 1 of 10

ES-301 I1 - Competencies Checklist (Rev 1 - 02/13/17) Form ES-301-6 Facility: Columbia Gen. Sta. Date of Examination: 2/27/2017 Operating Test No.: 1 RO RO RO I1 SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U RO SRO-I SRO-U Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Interpret/Diagnose 5,6, 6,9 2,4 Events and Conditions 8 Comply With and 5, 4,6 4,8 Use Procedures (1) 6,9 Operate Control 2,6, Boards (2) 8 Communicate 5,6, 4,6 6,8 and Interact 9 Demonstrate 4,5, 6,9 Supervisory Ability (3) 8 Comply With and 1,2, Use Tech. Specs. (3) 1,3 3

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

Page 2 of 10

ES-301 I2 - Competencies Checklist (Rev 1 - 02/13/17) Form ES-301-6 Facility: Columbia Gen. Sta. Date of Examination: 2/27/2017 Operating Test No.: 1 RO RO RO RO I2 SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Interpret/Diagnose 1,5, 3,4 2,4 Events and Conditions 8 Comply With and 5,6 4,6 2,5 Use Procedures (1)

Operate Control 1,5 2,4, Boards (2) 8 5 Communicate 1,5, 3,4, 2,4, and Interact 6 6 5 Demonstrate 3,4, Supervisory Ability (3) 6 Comply With and Use Tech. Specs. (3) 3,4 Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

Page 3 of 10

ES-301 I3 - Competencies Checklist (Rev 1 - 02/13/17) Form ES-301-6 Facility: Columbia Gen. Sta. Date of Examination: 2/27/2017 Operating Test No.: 1 RO RO RO RO I3 SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Interpret/Diagnose 5,6, 6,9 2,4 Events and Conditions 8 Comply With and 5, 4,6 4,8 Use Procedures (1) 6,9 Operate Control 2,6, Boards (2) 8 Communicate 5,6, 4,6 6,8 and Interact 9 Demonstrate 4,5, 6,9 Supervisory Ability (3) 8 Comply With and 1,2, Use Tech. Specs. (3) 1,3 3

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

Page 4 of 10

ES-301 I4 - Competencies Checklist (Rev 1 - 02/13/17) Form ES-301-6 Facility: Columbia Gen. Sta. Date of Examination: 2/27/2017 Operating Test No.: 1 RO RO RO RO I4 SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Interpret/Diagnose 1,5, 3,4 2,4 Events and Conditions 8 Comply With and 5,6 4,6 2,5 Use Procedures (1)

Operate Control 1,5 2,4, Boards (2) 8 5 Communicate 1,5, 3,4, 2,4, and Interact 6 6 5 Demonstrate 3,4, Supervisory Ability (3) 6 Comply With and Use Tech. Specs. (3) 3,4 Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

Page 5 of 10

ES-301 I5 - Competencies Checklist (Rev 1 - 02/13/17) Form ES-301-6 Facility: Columbia Gen. Sta. Date of Examination: 2/27/2017 Operating Test No.: 1 RO RO RO RO I5 SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Interpret/Diagnose 4,7 3,4 Events and Conditions Comply With and 2,6 4,6 Use Procedures (1)

Operate Control 2,4, Boards (2) 6 Communicate 2,6, 3,4, and Interact 7 6 Demonstrate 3,4, Supervisory Ability (3) 6 Comply With and Use Tech. Specs. (3) 3,4 Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

Page 6 of 10

ES-301 R1 - Competencies Checklist (Rev 1 - 02/13/17) Form ES-301-6 Facility: Columbia Gen. Sta. Date of Examination: 2/27/2017 Operating Test No.: 1 RO RO RO RO R1 SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Interpret/Diagnose 1,3, 4,7 3,5 Events and Conditions 4 Comply With and 1,3, 1,3, 5,6 Use Procedures (1) 9 4 Operate Control 2,4, 1,3, 1,3, Boards (2) 6 5,9 7,8 Communicate 2,6, 3,4, 3,5 and Interact 7 8 Demonstrate Supervisory Ability (3)

Comply With and Use Tech. Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

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ES-301 R2 - Competencies Checklist (Rev 1 - 02/13/17) Form ES-301-6 Facility: Columbia Gen. Sta. Date of Examination: 2/27/2017 Operating Test No.: 1 RO RO RO RO R2 SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Interpret/Diagnose 1,3, 4,7 3,5 Events and Conditions 4 Comply With and 1,3, 1,3, 5,6 Use Procedures (1) 9 4 Operate Control 2,4, 1,3, 1,3, Boards (2) 6 5,9 7,8 Communicate 2,6, 3,4, 3,5 and Interact 7 8 Demonstrate Supervisory Ability (3)

Comply With and Use Tech. Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

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ES-301 R3 - Competencies Checklist (Rev 1 - 02/13/17) Form ES-301-6 Facility: Columbia Gen. Sta. Date of Examination: 2/27/2017 Operating Test No.: 1 RO RO RO RO R3 SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Interpret/Diagnose 1,5, 1,3, 2,4 Events and Conditions 8 4 Comply With and 1,3, 5,6 4,6 Use Procedures (1) 4 Operate Control 1,5 2,6, 1,3, Boards (2) 8 8 7,8 Communicate 1,5, 3,4, 4,6 and Interact 6 8 Demonstrate Supervisory Ability (3)

Comply With and Use Tech. Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

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ES-301 R4 - Competencies Checklist (Rev 1 - 02/13/17) Form ES-301-6 Facility: Columbia Gen. Sta. Date of Examination: 2/27/2017 Operating Test No.: 1 RO RO RO RO R4 SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U SRO-I SRO-U Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Interpret/Diagnose 3,5 2,4 Events and Conditions Comply With and 1,3, 2,5 Use Procedures (1) 9 Operate Control 1,3, 2,4,5 Boards (2) 5,9 Communicate 3,5 2,4,5 and Interact Demonstrate Supervisory Ability (3)

Comply With and Use Tech. Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

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