ML20247F987
| ML20247F987 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 11/19/1985 |
| From: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | Asselstine, Palladino, Roberts NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20245D175 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-88-198 NUDOCS 8905300245 | |
| Download: ML20247F987 (98) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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,I WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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November 19, 1985 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Palladino Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Commissioner Bernthal Commissioner Zech FROM:
William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION This is in response to your request for available information on EQ tests for Pilgrim.
During a telephone conversation late in the afternoon of November 15, 1985, the Boston Edison Company provided the status of tests for the five remaining items of its Equipment Qualification Program covered by its September 23, 1985 extension request. The five items consisted of Yarway level indicators, Fenewall-temperature switches, control switches (Electroswitch and General Electric (GE)), Type S1 cable and GE SIS cable. Up to the time of the November 15th telephone conversation, the licensee has successfully qualified Fenewall temperature switches and GE SIS cables. The tests for the Yarway switches have also been completed and fot.nd to be successful with the i
exception of some apparent anomaly which is being investigated. The licensee has stated that it expects the anomaly to be successfully resolve. The tests for the control switches have been completed and appear to be successful in i
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the " closed contact" position. The "open contact" testing was incorrectly
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wi.ed by the Wyle Labs and will be retested by November 22, 1985. The testing schedule of November 22, 1985 of S1 cable has not changed.
The licensee in a subsequent letter (enclosed), dated November 15, 1985, requests an extension of the schedule up to February 8,1986 for the purpose of completing the documentation for all the five items. This is based on its estimate that it will require approximately 10 weeks time from November 30, i
1985 to have the complete documentation file in place. The licensee comitted l
to provide the NRC staff with verbal status reports regarding test progress.
It anticipates providing a final written report on testing status prior to November 30, 1985.
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1 RPTS RILEY AMX RILEY C ASSOCIATES, Ltd.
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4 EIF197030 NEARING OM MAXAGEMEXT PROBLEMS 5
REACTOR 5--TRg yILoRIN CASE 6
AT U.S.
7 NEDME5 DAY, JULY 16, 1986 8
Rouse of Representatives Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power 9
Committee on Energy end Commerce 10 11 Washington, D.C.
12 13 14 at 9: 43 a.a The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, 15 the Monorable Rayburn House office Building, 16 Room 2322, 17 Edward J. Markey (chairman 1 presiding.
Sikorski, Moorhead, Representatives Markey, 18 Frasent:
19 Mielson, and Studds.
Sidman, Chief Counsel and Stati Presents Lawrence R.
20 Udall, Professional Staff Mamba Staff Directors Richard A.
2 1 staff Assistants and dessica Laverty, St Linda M. Correia, 13 Minority Counsel.
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MAME :- NIr197030'
-Mr. MARKEY. Good Gerning.
i 24 This is a' hearing of the Subcommittee of Energy 25 Conservation and Power on the Filgrin Muclear Fower Plant 26 the state of Massachusetts.
27 1986, the Subcommittee heard troubling 28 At a May 22, testimony from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regardinl 29 The Nuclear the safety of commercial atomic remotors.
30 Regulatory. commission testified that serious management 31 plant and it deficiencies plague more than one desen U.S.
32 the MRC has virtually no regulations -
33 despite this fact, This testimony followed-copa directly with the problem.
34 hearings in which the Commission 35 earlier Subcommittee rist of a core meltdown in the nex 36 acknowledged that the Plant was between 12 and 45 percent, 37 years at a U.S.
allowing.for significant uncertainties, the t2 38
- although, could be higher.
39 figure Today's hearing is intended to take a closer look 40 MRC's approach to utilities with management weaknesses ~
41 the particular problems af fecting' 30st<
42 as a case study, Edison's F11gria Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth, 43 44 Massachusetts.
My friend and colleague, Congressman Gerry studds, 45 represents the citizens of Flymouth and its surrounding 46 areas, specifically requested the Subconnittee to eva2t 47 This hearing is inter Pilgrim's problems and progress.
48 l
PAGE 3
MAME: MIp197030 to be fully responsivo to his interest ond concern.cnd that.
e 49 of many other-elected representatives from Massachusetts, 50 Governor Michael Dukakis.
51 including I would like to call attention to the f At the outset, 52 that there is some good news that should be taken note of 53 The MRC has successfully focused the attention of 54 today.
its staff, Boston Edison management and the general public 55
.This achievemer on serious management problems at Pilgrim.
56 is particularly important because it has not been forced 57 such as the 191 upon the agency as a result of near misses, 58 failure of the automatic shutdown system at salem, New 59 in 1985 loss of feedwater at Davis-Besse, 60 Jersey, or the 61 Ohio.
it remains to be seen whether MRC h at the same time, 62 done all that it could to enforce its regulatory standards 63 and whether its regulations are sufficient in the first 64 f
65 place.
66 Indeed, despite MRC's strong oversight, it allowed p; i
ite serious management failings. Mindsight 67 to operate desP we must recogn I think that in retrospect, 68 always 20/20.
that Boston Edison, as well as a number of other problem 69 plants discussed in the Conmission's report to the 70 have substandard operations and management 7 1 Subcommittee, extent public hea; that it is unknown whether a..d to what 72 and safety has been jeopardized by thear operation.
73
____m_
i pact 4
XAME 'MIr197030 Congress and tho Acoriccn 700710 nover intended end wi.
e 74 never accept for nuclear reactors to operate with the types 75 My.
of management deficiencies that have been disclosed.
76 views are not all that different from the anonymous nuclear 77 utility executive quoted in a recent edition of the Energy 78 Although the following quotation ysttains to Ranche 79 Daily.
just as easily _have mentioned the Pilgrim 80 seco, it could Both imp 0
Why didn't XRC shut Rancho Seco down.
41 plant.
They must have known what war and MRC let it go on and on.
82 Now 83 there.
How that it's ocHn, they say don't start-up.
that's a-different matter.
84 perhaps the most troubling aspect of the pilgrim saga 85 criticism from MRC and the Institute for f
86 that, despite the IXpo, year in and year out, 87 Muclear Operations, management problems at pilgrim largely went uncorrected.
88 89 According to MRC's Tabruary 18, 1986 SALp report, Boston or'susta Edison has an inability to improve performance, 90 achieved.
91 improved performance once 1986 MRC report told Boston Edison that a 92 An April 2, 93 principal factor inhibiting progress was
a prevailing v; in the organization that the improvements made to date ha-94 corrected the problems and a reluctance by management 95
- IXp0, acknowledge some problems identified by the XRC.
$6 industry's own self-policing organization, issued 97 the 98 reports detailing a myriad of problems, the most importan l
FAGE 5
' MAME8 RIT197030 aspect of which is that anny cro longstanding concerns 99 identified but uncorrected.
100 previously the regulatory history of F11 grim shows that 101 In short,
'significant efforts by MRC and IMPO are no guarantee that 102 In the case of public health and safety will be protected.
103 all of the attention and all of the 104 Boston Edison, constructive criticism barely seems to have mattered.
105 The MRC and Boston Edison would have us 106 Th things will be different now at Pilgrim.
107 all this time, company has made a nushcr of recent changes and should be 108 These changes do not, however, 109 commended for doing so.
linger over t fundamental questions which still 110 answer the why did My questions include the followings til company.
Boston Idison's improvement efforts instituted af ter the 112 113 1982 record NRC fine fas.I' Why did Boston Edison fail te and IMPO about speerd.
head repeated warnings from the MRC 114 And how will Poston Edison P ant?
l 115 problons at the 116 demonstrate to the MRC and the citizens of Massachu that identified problems including overall management 117 weaknesses, have been corrected?
118 What lasting mechanisms will Boston Edison put in p; 119 And what assure that any improvements are sustained?
120 l
measures will be undertaken to evaluate and potentially 12 1 modify Pilgrim's containment building to provide assuran:
122 that this final barrier between the reactor and the pubh
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' M A ME 81* LIT 197 0 30 will not bo broochod in tho ovont of a cojor occidont ct tho 124 i
125 plant?
l I as similarly and apart from these questions, 126 Separate interested in the adequacy of Pilgrim's offsite energency 127 128 Plan.
I fully recognize that these questions are fundamental 129 rainedoubtsasto'whetherFilgrimshouldoperateatallandl 130 if so, whether Boston Edison should be allowed to operata 131 I would expect that Boston Edison 132 it.
At the very least, opportunity of the currant shutdown to make 133 would take the all possible improvements and satisfy all outstanding.XRC 134 Then, and only then, I would like to se 135 and INFO concerns, program approved and closely type of augmented startup 136 some of monitored by the MRC that would include rigorous testing 137 This special operations and management.
138 both hardware, startup progran should be at restricted Power levels and 139 include a reassessment by MRC and Boston Edison of the I
I 140 structure prior to full power operation.
141 entire management I remain open to the ideas of others about what shoul 142 at a minimun, is my strong belief that, 143 done.
However, it Boston Edison must convincingly demonstrate that it is rea 144 and able to operate pilgrim and that doing so will be 145 consistent with public health and safety.
146 The Subconnittee's interest today extends beyond the 147 particular problems at pilgrin and includes not only the l
148
FAGE 7
MAME: MIT197030 other problem plants, but tho odegucoy of MRC ond industry i
149' efforts to cope with what must now be considered an 150 I an impressed by the Commission's 151 epidemic.
acknowledgement in its testimony that despite its 152 achievements, it has not always succeeded in finding the 153 root cause of nuclear utility problems and in heading ther:
154 off before they reach crisis proportions.
155 The Subcommittee's investigation of Davis-Besse, for 156 disclosed that nuclear utility management probler 157
- example, HRC's own internal management 158 are rivaled only by the I am happy that the Commission appears 159 weaknesses.
160 committed to improving its regulatory process.
One area in which I think the Conmission must act is 161 its regulatory authority to include key managan 162 extending plant manager and senior corporate 16'3 positions such as Utility officis official responsible for nuclear energy.
164 in these two positions are more irportant to reactor safe 165 Yet, while there 166 than any single control room operator.
the necessary detailed Tederal regulations stipulating 167 operators, the qualifications and experience for reactot 168 these are no regulations promulgated by the NRC covering 169 170 Rey management posts.
That concludes the opening statement of the Chair.
17 1 Markey followsil IThe prepared statenant of Mr.
172 173
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9-MAME: MIT.197030 I now turn to tho genticcen'from Californis-175' Mr. MARKEY.
the ranking minority member, Carlos Moorhead.
176 177 Mr. MOORHEAD. Thank.you, Mr. Chairman.
I would first like to welcome Admiral Each, for his ne 178 job as Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
179 180 Mr. EECH. Thank you, s ir. -
I am sure I speak for the Subocanittee 6 181 Mr. M00RMEAD.
I say I wish him well and look forward to working together.
182 183 with him in the future.
184 Mr. EECH. Thank you, sir.
The subject of today's hearing is the ss 185 Mr.'MOORHEAD.
plants and how safe nuclear power operstit 186 of nuclear power relates'to management and other people related issues.
187 the Mamany Commissio-After the Three Mile Island accident, 188 189 concluded that utility management must be responsible for more than s.
safety and accountable for its actions. Today, 190 the nuclear utilities have made 191 years after that accident, significant progress along these lines.
192 Among other things, these utilities have established 193 Institute for Muclear Fowaz Operations and the Nuclear 194 These organizatic Utility Management Resources Committaa.
195 are dedicated to improving the safety of nuclear power pie 196 operation and they have achieved some significant 197 improvements in the areas in which they have become 198 such as the development and accreditation of 199
- involved,
-i.-w.--
PAGE to NAME: MIF197030 training.prograns ond tho dovolopcont of fitnoss for duty.
200
,201 programs.
i In fact,'I understand that the MRC has stated that 202 through the. Nuclear Utility Management Resources 203
- industry, has accomplished more than the NRC could have 204
- Group, accomplished through regulation in the same period of time 205 NRC regulation focused on design approva 206 In the past, More recently, it has 207 for plants under construction.
It would be unfortunate i-208 shiftad to operations reactors.
the NRC were to adopt the same kind of proscriptive appros 209 reactors that it has upplied to plant desigr.
210 f r,I operating 211 and equipment issues in the past, people, whether they ar cannot be required to have high 212 nanagers or employees, Such qualities morale or a desire to do things right.
213 214 cannot be evaluated by using a checklist or an audit are the qualities which we must ha' 215 procedure.
Yet, these in all nuclear plant personnel.
216 safety is vital and good management is 217 Huclear plant 218 essential in achieving that safety.
In addition, a as it is likely t 219 proscriptive approach would be avoided, result in compliance with the literal letter of the 220 regulation, in order to avoid adverse enforcement action 221 222 the XRC.
to require that reactor set 223 Tor example, if MRC were pressure would be put on the operators to avo:
224 minimized, i
I
PAGE 11 MAMEi MIT197030 to this prossuro, o seren cight not 60 -
225 scrams.
Due Such a situation, obviously,.
226 initiated when it's needed.
4 227 would not benefit the public.
' In the management area, MRC should provide. encoursgese' 228 What is needed is an approach 229 and-incentives to excel..
ti WNich ancourages nuclear plant personnel to be ever aler
~
230 ways to improve the safe operation of the plants. Utility 221 management must be ableoto take motions more comprehensive 232 than those necessary to meet MRC's regulations, in order'te; 233 achievs. this goal, as neither Congress nor the MAC could l
234 actually achieve good management through requiring'it by-235 236 statute or regulation.
the MRC and industry to work together to devel 237 I urge innovative approaches to achieving good management and to 238 fostering ever higher performance.by nuclear power plant 239 240 personnel.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
241 The gentleman's time has expired.
242 Mr. MARKEY.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman f rom Massachusetts 243 244 Studds.
I want to'begi.
Mr. STUDDs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
245 very personally conveying my thanks to you and the gentle.
246 from California, the gentleman from Minnesota, the seaber; 247 of the Subconnittee first of all for holding the hearing 248 th secondly for your hospitality and KinCness in allowing 249
FAGE 12 MAME: MIT197030 member, who does not sit on this subocomittoo, to 250 251 participate.
I very'auch appreciate that.
252 I made the request, as you know, because my own l
constituents include both the immediate neighbors of the 253 thousands of others whose health would be put at 254 Plant and risk by any accident at the Pilgrim facility.
255 Mr. Chairman, I can tell you that many peoPla who liv.
1 256 For weeks work in the vicinity of F11 grim are frightened.
257 deluged with news reports about the Soviet nucle 258 they were 259 catastrophe at Chernobyl.
On the heels of this tragedy, t that Filgria 1 MRC revealed before this very Subcommittee, 260 very worst managed nuclear reactors in the ent:
261 one of the i
262 country.
leadership of Boston Edison is entirely correct i 263 The 264 it admits that the company has a public relations problem
-265 But it is note than that.
Boston Edison has a credibilit' What ny constituents want to know is why we sho-266 problen.
when it says that problems tha 267 believe Boston Idison now, been fully identified and corrected long ago 268 should have bein in the full glare of the Public spotlight, 269 only now, 270 addressed?
I am Particularly troubled by Mr. Sweeney's assertic 271 today's testimony, that Boston Edison's current managener-272 That are not directly related to safety.
273 deficiencies absurd on :
contention seems to me, with all due respect, 274 I
PAGE 13 L
MAME: MIT197030 Moreover, it is also symptomatic of a sorious 275 face.
management weakness that the MRC itself has said 276 characterizes Boston Edison's attitude namely--and I 277 in the organization, that the 278 guote-
a prevailing view, improvements made to date have corrected the problems.
279 as you very well kne Management problems, Mr. Chairman, 280 l
According to the MRC and other f
281 are safety problems.
experts, for example, management problems are probably the f
282 single greatest contributor to the risk of a core meltdown.
283 One example that proves this point has been Boston Edison's 284 This was chronic understaffing of control room operators.
285 It was directly related te 286 problem that existed for years.
it was attributable solely to poor management.
287 safety and The burden of proof, with respect to the Pilgrim power 288 those who would guastion to those 289 plant, has shifted _from this plant. The who would defend the safety of operating 290 by perf ormance not jus burden.is on B_osion_ Edison to prove, 291 292 promise, that it has the ability, the discipline, and the of responsibility necessary to operate a nuclear pow 293 sense plant the way such a plant can and should be run.
294 And Simply meeting minimum standards is not enough.
295 should never have been considered enough either by plant 296 297 management or by the MRC.
While my remarks in this hearing focus primarily on 1 298 Edison's management problems, there are other safety issus 299
- 4 PAGr.
14
- MAMEs 317197030
- First, related to pilgrim with which I ma very.concernod.
300 issue to which you referred, Mr. chairman, of 301 there is the After Chernobyl, the l
the plant's containment structure.
l 302 nuclearindustryintheUnitedStateswasquicktopointtc{
303 containment buildings as an additional layer of protection 30'4 The fact is that the MRC does nr.
305 for those in our country.
l require containment structures to be able to withstand a 306 core meltdown, and that indeed the Mark I containment 307 building in use at pilgrim is perhaps the most likely of a 1
308 in the United States to be breached in an 309 design type 1
310 accident.
a need to have an adequate and appsc 311 Second, there is energency preparedness plan to protect the public in the 312 I as troubled both by the obvious 313 avant of an accident.
inadequacies of the interin plan in effect for pilgrin ar.<
314 fact that Boston Edison was slow to meet its 315 by the responsibility to have an operational alert and notificat:
316 public about evacuation plans, 317 systen, and to educate the indeed it can be stated at this time that the public has 318 319 been inforned at all.
I be
[
While I appreciate the efforts made by the XRC, 320 Because the American public needs and desires more.
32 1 management can imperil public health and safety, the MRC 322 aust do something beyond simply calling attention to 32 3 Something desperately problems once they have occurred.
324
1 PAGE 15 i
MAME: MIT197030.
l done to prevent problocs from getting out of 335 needs to be 326 hand in the first place.
16 nuclear reactors suffer from serious i 327 The fact that management problems is compelling reason to deaand a much 320 329 stronger regulatory approach.
9 is with -
Chairman, my primary concern, obviously, 330 Mr.
F11 grin must not safety of the people of Massachusetts.
331 operate until Boston Edison and the NRC can clearly show 332 that the management and safety problems that Plague the l
333 1
l utility have not only been corrected, but that safeguards
-334 that th6y will not occur again~.
335 are in Place to assure 336 Mr. Chairman, once again, I thank you for your courte 337 and your Xindness in holding the hearing.
I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts 338 Mr. MARKEY.
I thank his very much for his interest in this issue.
339 We welcome now to the subcowaittee, Chairman Lando Z<
340 before this subcommittee now for ths 341 Jr., who is appearing 342 first time in his capacity as chairman of the Nuclear An We welcome you, Mr. Chairman.
343 Regulatory Connission.
we welcome with you Commissioner Roberts, Connissioner 344 Bernthal and Commissioner Ass 61stine.
345 I might, Mr. Chairman, before you begin your testinc1 346 you would consider responding to a request which I am goa '
347 to make of the Connission, either in your opening statene-348 or later in response to specific questions to a request t i 349 l
l I
-4 PAGE 16 MAME: MIF197030 the Concission which I oc going to Doko to initicto 3
l 350 rulemaking and to seek comment from the industry and the 351 352 general public as to what regulations would be appropriate Jk
/
to achieve better management practices for nuclear
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l 353 This advance notice of rulemaking should not be 354 licensees.
1 355 limited, in ny mind, to specific requirements for plant managers and senior corporate officers responsible for 1
356 And I would ask that you please, eith 357 nuclear operations.
at this point or in response to questions address that 358 f
359 issue.
So we welcome you, Commissioner,.and we look forward 360 361 your opening statenant on this issue.
FAGE 17 MAME: MIT197030 362 STATEMENT OT LAXD0 W.
- EECM, JR., CMAIRMAN, MUCLEAR 363 REGULATORY COMMISSIDXs ACCOMPANIED BY COMMISSIONER THOMAS 364 M.
ROBERTS, COMMISSIONER JAMES X. ASSELSTIME, COMMISSIONER 365 TREDERICK M.
BERMTNAL, TMOMAS MURLEY, REGION I 366 ADMINISTRATOR; AND MILLIAM PARLER, OTTICE OT GEXERAL 367 COUNSEL.
368 369 370 STATEMEMT OF MR. EECH.
371 l
372 Mr. EECH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Before I make my !
373 opening statement, let me respond very briefly, if I may, some comments that have been made by the statements so far 374 First of all, you stated in your opening statement, P.-
375 that NRC had virtually no regulations'to cope W:
376
- Chairman, I would like to what are management deficiency problems.
377 to the extent that I think we do indes, 378 disagree with that, i
379 have authority to protect the public health and safety, whether that is in the form of rulemaking or regulations c 380 whatever, I can assure you that this chairman and this 381 commission has the authority to protect the public health 382 There should be no question about that.
383 and safety.
I certainly apr You said hindsight is always 20/20.
384 385 with that; hindsight is 20/20.
What we are trying to do 386 been pointed out also, is to be able te look into the fut.
e
^-
l PAGE 18 MAME: nip 197030 And thot is very difficult to do, but that is 387 o littlo bit.
what we intend to do to the best.ci our ability.
$88 public health and safety is our primary goal. Safety is 389 We have a responsible job to the 390 our primary concern.
We intend to carry it out.
We have a 391 American people.
We operate, as you well i
392 professional staff to support us.
We offer our views for public 393 know, in the public domain.
We have, indeed, I believe, acted responsibly.
394 scrutiny.
American people can be assured that the Nuclear 395 think the Regulatory Commission is firmly committed with a group of 396 Americans to protecting public health and safety.
397 dedicated I would certainly agree with your statene 398 I think that 399 that we must be convinced.
And also with Mr. Studds reques that we will be convinced that Boston Edison can demonstr 400 the plant safely before NRC is satisfie(
401 ability to operate 402 that it can operate again.
We fully intend to make sure j
that we are fully satisfied in that regard.
403 Moorhead mentioned that in the past we have focus.
404 Mr.
that is true.
405 design and licensing matters, and of course, We are recently 406 Mow we have 100 plants in operation.
I think that is appropriate.
focusing more on operations.
407 Eis comment about not be prescriptive and not having 408 On the oth checklists is certainly one that is important.
409 We war.
we need facts, and we want to watch results.
41 0
- hand, but througn facts to watch performance, not subjectively, 41 1
PAGE 19 MAME: MIT197030 We intend to do th0t.
No do not intend to 412 best we can.
We intend to encourage ou.
avoid scrans that are necessary.
413 operators to scram the plant whenever there is a doubt in 414 We intend to ancourage safety.
415 their mind at all.
So those are things, as we try to look into the future 416 417 will be very mindful of.
We do not intend to have a cookie-cutter approach to any of our performance indicator:
418 We intend to be very otraful abou-419 that we are working on.
420 that.
Moorhead that we should encourage I agree with Mr.
421 We are doing that and fully exc611ence in management.
422 intend to continue the emphasis on 423 intend to do that.
We That is first and foremost.
424 safe operations.
On We do intend to work together with the industry.
425 are aindful of our responsibilities to the 426 other hand, ue And whereas we encourage excellence and 427 government.
i cooperation, we also know that we have our responsibility e i 428 429 and we intend to carry then out.
Studds reference to the Boston Edison plant--I k 430 Mr.
just b into more detail here this morning--but I 431 will get to assure him that we fully intend to review the performs 432 I think the actions that the X1C has taken ir 433 carefully.
I thinii Pilgrim plant in the past have been responsible.
l 434 have been especially mindful of their performance since 435 It We recognize that they did make some changes.
436 1982.
PAGE 20 HAME: MIT197030 No j
appear that they were moving in tho right direction.
437 have been disappointed by the results, and that is why we I
438 are reviewing this situation at pilgrim'very carefully.
439 Xow, Mr. Studds, I can assure you und the people of i
440 Massachusetts that we intend to carry out our 441 responsibilities and to be completely: satisfied in all 442 respects before we would agree to allow restart of the l
443 444 Filgrim plant.
if I may give you a brief ormi statemen ;
445 Mr. Chairman, I do welcome this opportunity to 446 today.
First of all, appear before you as my first appearance in Congress in my 447 a brief I would like to give 448 role as HRC's chairman.
critical importance of description of my views on the 449 excellence in nuclear power management, and on XRC's role 450 addressing management problems.
451 Chairman, I would like to With your permission, Mr.
452 my prepared remarks for the record and just summarize the 453 454 briefly.
Your Prepared remarks, without objection 455 Mr. MARKEY.
be included in the record in their entirety.
456 457 Mr. 2ECH. Ihank you, sir.
Let me say right now that my primary docus will be <
458 As there is in any other fors safety first and foremost.
459 a risk is involved in producing 460 of energy production, Although the risk is small in 46 1 nuclear electricity.
FAGE 21
,MAME: NIF197030 wo Gust onsuro thct this 462 yroducing nucloor olcotricity, and that it -remains reasonable and acceptable l{
463 remain small, l
This 1s a very demanding technology.
Discipline, 464 constant vigilance, management w65 technical competence, and competent performance are mandhtory if we 466 involvement, are to succeed in providing the benefits of nuclear energy 467 to the.American people in a reliable and safe manner.
468 Sound management of nuclear Power cannot be regulated 469 publication and enforcement of federal rules-c 470 through the A clear dedication to the safe use of 471 how to manage:
nuclear power must come from within the top officials of 472 licensed to construct.)
473 each of the 55 utilities which are From first-line supervisors to the 474 operate these plants.
chief executive officer and board of directors, utility 475 executives nust dedicate themselves to the highest standa 476 and must be held accountable for their 477 of performance 478 octions.
is expected that each utility will endor 479 Turther, it support snd participate in those industry programs and 480 initiatives established by industry groups to assist 481 individual utiliifes in achieving excellence in nuclear 482 483 powar operations.
our role in the MRC is to monitor close.
484
.In my view, critically each plant's operational safety performance, 485 encourage and recognize industry initiatives that affect 486
PAGE 22
." MAME: MIT197030 487. safety,;and more importantly, to stop in quickly ond decisively on those cases where there are indicators that 488 489 performance may be degrading.
Just as every level of utility management must be 490 491 personally accountable for safety, I believe every level of including the Commission itself, should'be 492 MRC' management, accountable for the objective monitoring and evaluation of 493 utility performance, and for initiating within the NRC's 494 regulatory framework actions to promptly address and corre 495 496 adverse trends.
it is my responsibility to exercise per 497 Mr. Chairman that the staff is provided with t 498 leadership, to make sure authorities necessary to do their job 499 resources and the and to ensure that the Commission becomes directly 500
- right,
. involved in addressing the most significant operational 501 I have a strong desire to serve my 502 performance problems.
country well in this assignment.
503 power now makes a significant contribution tc 504 Huelear 505 economy, to the well-being of our citizens, and to the I feel deeply obligated -
506 overall strength of our country.
exercise my responsibilities in a manner which allows the 507 nuclear option the opportunity to continue to serve our 508 nation's needs now and in the future.
509 the right of our citizens to live in a 51 0 Mavertheless, environment which does not present an undue risk to their 51 1
FAGE 23
.' MAME: MIF197030 health and sofoty overtidos tho ictortenso of the nuoloor 512 and/or the continued operation of any single nuclee
$13
- option, Management at each licensed utility is 514 facility.
My responsible for maintaining safe nuclear operations, 515 fellow commissioners and I are charged with ensuring that 516 this obligation is responsibly discharged.
517 Chairman, with these personal views as background 518 Mr.
let me describe ths Muclear Regulatory Commission programs 519 which are in place to monitor nuclear operations, evaluate 520 management performance, and address potential safety 521 The system involves three key levels of MRC 522 problems.
the Executive 523 managements the Regional Administrators, 524 Director for Operations (the ID0] and his headquarters and the Commission itself, with 525 senior management team, provisions for escalation of management involvement 526 problem.
depending upon the significance of the 527 The five regional administrators are the MRC's most 528 the adequacy of senior managers concerning 529 knowledgeable and management at each nuclear station in the.
530 performance Ihrough frequent visits to the 531 respective regions.
meetings with senior utility plant and corpor 532 facilities, and execution of the agency's enforcement 533 managener.t, actions, the regional administrators evaluate operating 534 performance and trends, ensure that the XP.C concerns are 535 an:'
promptly and directly conveyed to utility management, l
536 L
PAGE 24
,' NAME: NIr197030 takon to rosolvo cny 537. insist that oppropriato octions cre.
538 problem and preclude its recurrence.
We in. Washington do not' leave'these managers alone in 539 field to deal in isolation with matters affecting the publa 540 In order to achieve additional perspective and 541 safety.
the ma$or actions of the regional 542 regional uniformity,
' administrators are closely monitored with the Executive 543 LIn !
Director for Operations and senior headquarters staff.
544 the Commission meets regularly with each of the 545
- addition, regional administrators to discuss the performance of 546 547 nuclear facilities.
is important that our senior managers in the field 548 It headquarters work closely together et monitor each 549 facility's operational performance, especially those 550 indicators which point to a potential problem in managene:
551 the Executive Director for Operations has 552 Accordingly, recently established a formal program to bring headquarta='
553 and regional senior staff together periodically for 554 in-depth discussions of significant plant 555 dedicated, These discussions focus on-556 operational safety problems.
top management _ involvement an('
adequacy of the utilities' 557 the perf ormance of operational managers at both plant an(
558 559 corporate levels.
One important result of these discussions has been 4 560 where appropriate, the Executive 56 1 determination that, i
PAGE 25
,' MAMEi MIr197030 l
Director for operations will write dirootly to'tho' f
~
562 1
licensee's chief executive officer to' indicate his conce 563 for operational and management performance, and to solicit.
564
)
the chief executive officer's personal involvement and l
565 As'the chairman, I intend to get personally J
566 response.
involved in this program and at appropriate times to i
567 interface myself with the chief executive officers.
k 568 At the, regional level, the Systematic Assessment of
[
569 Licensee Performance, the SALP program, has proven to be a 570 formal evaluation of useful mechanism for the periodic, 571 for openly conveying the results c:
572 av'agement performances and for serving as'a our evaluations to utility management; i
573 basis to structure and implement any needed performance 574 575 improvements.
our current SALP evaluati Although I strongly endorse 576 18 month reviews need to be these 12 to 577
- program, supplemented with the development of a set of quantitativ 578 andacators which will objectively and reliab1>-
579 performance trends of safety performance on a more frequer 580 capture the The commission is considering development and i
581 basis.
of performance indicators as a means of monitorin 582 testing I regard this regulatory 583 plant safety performance.
initiative as top priority for the Muclear Regulatory 584 585 Commission.
Together with the initiative taken by the Executive 586 l
PAGE 26 MAMEs HIT 197030
~
Director for Operations in ostob11shing porforncnce review 587 our increased use of objective performance 588 by senior staff, indicators should further improve NRC's effectiveness in 589 providing the American people with relative and safe nucle 590 591 energy.
Mr. Chairman, with'your permission, I will submit for 592
. record the Commission's responses to questions provided by-5931 the subcommittee, as well as descriptions of operational 594 histories, enforcement actions and SALP ratings for those 595 facilities which have been identified for increased 596 As you have regulatory attention by the senior staff.
597 documents includes an analysis of 598 requested, one of these management performance at Boston Edison's pilgrim facility 599 it is And finally, Mr. Chairman, as a matter of fact, 600 h
intention to carefully review the pilgrim situation at t e 601:
And if our review at the Commission les 602 Commission level.
to ask the Boston Edison management tc 603 deems it warranted, to the Commission at a public meeting 604 appear before their resolve in this open meeting prior to 605 demonstrate Region I authorizing restart of the pilgrim plant.
606 Mr. Chairman, that completes my testimony and we wot-607 pleased to answer your guestions.
608 Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. All e Mr. MARKEY.
609 information which you mentioned that is in written form 6; 610 be included in the Subcommittee's record in its entirety.
t 611
PAGE 27 NAMES ~ 31r197030 3p..
(Tho proporce stctocent of Icado W.
Soch, Jr. fellows -
612
' d,:
'613
- INSERT **********
614 11 l
1 PAGE 28 MAME: MIT197030 I would also liko to th0nk you ct this tici 615 MI, MARKEY.
for the for the detailed report which you did provide 1
616 It was Subcommittee in anticipation of this hearing.
617 detailed and it was on time.
618 619 Mr. ZECH. Thank you, sir.
That is something that I want to compliner 1
620 Mr. MARKEY.
sometimes it has not been a characteristi 621 you for.
622 Commission.
623 Mr. ZECH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Any other members of the Commission that 624 Mr. MARKEY.
wishes to make an opening statecant?
625 626 Mr. ASSELSTINE. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
627 Mr. MARKEY. Commissioner Asselstine.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to add a f e28 Mr. ASSELSTINE.
Commission's prepared statement.
629 comments to the is worth emphasizing that management weakr 630 I think it in nuclear power plant operations can and do have a 631 If allowed to 632 significant adverse s af ety consequence.
poor nuclear plant continue for lengthy Periods of time, 633 management can result in deterioration of the plant's 634 material conditions in degraded equipment reliability; an '
635 in substandard plant operations and human performance to 636 point where a serious operating event or an accident is 637 638 likely.
Ihe Commission's responses to the Subcommittee's que 639
FAGE 29
- ' MAMEi MIp197030 dotoil instanoos in chich this dotoriarction in plcnt sciet 640 performance due to ineffective management has occurred in 641 These cases including the Salen scran 642 the past few years.
the Davis-lesse loss of feedwater events ths-643 failure events Rancho Seco over cooling events the Browns-Terry water levi 644 instrumentation problems are all too familiar to the NRc a.
645 646 to this subcommittee.
Once plant conditions degrade to the point where a 647 the licensee inevitabl 648 significant operating event occurs, faces a long and costly plant shutdown to address both its 649 operation:
management failures and the resulting hardware, 650 651 and regulatory problems.
These events typically impose a significant strain or 652 They also impose a re 653 utility's personnel and resources.
654 burden on the NRC.
To cite just one example, well over~a resulted in the after the management failures at TVA 655 year shutdown of the TVA plants, the MRC is devoting very 656 and addressing tne substantial resources to understanding 657 TVA management problems and their many consequences, and 658 there is still no and in sight.
659 The heavy burden involved in responding to serious.
660 operating events inevitably limits our ability to pursue i
661 more forward looking initiatives aimed at the early 662 identification of operating problems and management 663 ineffectiveness at other plants, 664
_-.m______.____
PAGE 30.
,' MAME: MIT197030 Mr. Cheironn, thaso sozious oporcting ovents 665
- Tino11y, the MR 666 undermine public confidence in the utility licensee, These are the and the safety of nuclear power in general.
667 p
prices of a reactive approach to regulation.
668 Tor all of these reasons, both the MRC and the nuclea:
669 industry should be making every effort to identify nuclear 670 plant annagement weaknesses before they result'in serious 671 I sense a growing 673 operating tvants or accidents.
recognition within the MRC of the need for more forward.
673 looking initiatives to identify and address nuclear plant i
674 management vulnerabilities before they lead to a serious 675 676 operating event.
677 Tor example, I give the MAC staff credit, as you do, in the case of pilgrin, for identifying in its 678
- Chairman, 679 February 18, 1986 SALP evaluation, not only the continuing in such areas as plant operations, 680 poor performance radiological controls and energency preparedness, but mise 681 682 the management weaknesses that were the root causes of th:
683 poor performance.
several months since the pilgrim's SALP repor-684
.In the I believe that the MRC staff has done an effectiv '
i l
685
- issued,
$ob in communicating its concerns about the management 686 pilgrim to the Commission, to the licensee' 687 weaknesses at including the CEO and Boa:
senior corporation management, 688 to state and local government officials and 689 of Directors,
PAGE 31
,' MAME: MIp197030 690' the public.
I also applaud Chairman Zech's efforts to focus greater l
691 attention on the performance of the operating plants, with 692 crecial emphasis on the plants with the history of poor-693 I support his efforts to develop performance 594 performance.
indicators which can help identify those plants with 695 These operating problems and safety vulnerabilities.
696 efforts together with the three levels of MRC reviSW 697 described in the Commission's testimony should holy laprove 698 our ability to identify the symptoms or consequences of 699 nuclear plant management problems.
700 Although these measures should bring about some 701 improvement in our ability to detect deteriorating or 702 unacceptable plant performance, I believe there are still 703 gaps in our ability to identify management weaknesses in 704 particularly before those 705 nuclear plant operations, weaknesses manifest themselves in seriously degraded safat 706 of the plant.
707 performance our ability to assess whether a licensee's managemenf 708 improvement program is producing the desired results in 709 terms of upgraded management performance is also limited.
710 Our experience with pilgrim highlights these weaknesses 1.
71 1 our current regulatory program.
71 2 We im41ed to identify or to act upon the management 71 3 problems of this licensee until they resulted in the sard 714
PAGE 32 XAME: MIp197030 subject of ths safety performance problems which e6ro th3 715 When those problems Commission's 1982 enforcement action.
716 were identified, the XRC took strong enf orcement action an 7 17 the form of the largest civil penalty imposed up to that 718 time on an MRC licensee coupled with an enforcement order 719 The enforcement action 720 modifying the plant's license.
emphasized the breakdown in the licensee's management 721 controls as the root cause of the safety violations.and 722 required that the licensee develop a comprehensive plan te 723 address the causes of the violation.
724 An independent appraisal of the licensee's_ site and 725 corporate management organization and functions was 726 The utility submitted a lengthy 727 specifically required.
response to the dotice of violation, which included a 728 management reorganization and new initiatives to improve 729 and control of nuclear operations.
730 management oversight periodic neetings were held between the licensee and the 731 staff to monitor the licensee's progress in correcting th 732 problems which led to the enforcement action.
733 Despite these efforts, we were unable to learn unti 734 1982 violatic four years later that the root cause of the 735 ineffective management of the nuclear program, remained 736 737 uncorrected.
lesson from this experje Mr. Chairman, I believe the 738 we need some additional tools aimed specifically at the 739
1 PAGE 33
,' XAME: MIT197030 assessment of.tho.11oonaco's ocnopocont.offoetivanoss. I 740 the development of indicators of management 741 would suggest performance which can be used both to identify the poor 742 performers and to measure the effectiveness of management 743 744 improvement programs.
We should also consider what options are available to i
745 1
to bring about effective and lasting improvement in the 746 747 cases of poor management.
I believe we should pay particular attention 748
- Tinally, qualifications and capabilities of key 749 the experience, nuclear managers, most notably the nuclear vice president.
750 I would support the concept, Mr.
751 and plant manager.
of an advanced notice of proposet 752 Chairman, you suggested, to identify alternatives for ensuring that the 753 rulemaking, compete:
754 key management positions are filled by qualified, 755 and experienced people.
In my view, new initiatives in these areas when coup; 756 757 with Chairman Zech's proposed technical performance indicators and a grsater XRC emphasis on plant operations 758 would do much to improve the safety and reliability of th 759 plants and public confidence in the MRC and in the indust 760 761 Thank you.
Asselswine folio (The prepared statement of Jamer X.
762 763
- IMSERI**********
764
FAGE 34 MAME: MIT197030 765' Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Cennissionor.
Any other caobers ;
I i
'the Commission wish to make an opening' statement?
i 766 I
767
[Mo response.)
768 Mr. MARKEY. Thank you very much.
I will now turn to th Subcommittee members and guests for guestionslof the panel.
769 Let me begin by re-stating the questions that I raised 770 before when you began your opening statement and ask that 771 you respond specifically to the suggestion which I made, 772 that the Commission initiate an advanced rulemaking to 773 solicit industry and public comment on whether or not 774 additional regulations are nerassary to deal with management 775 776 problems.
idea that I have is to extend regulatory oversight 777 One the position of plant manager and senior vice president for 778 779 nuclear operations.
you discuss with me your feelings about the need 780 Could at least have some form of advanced rulemaking proceedings, 781 can discuss perhaps whether or not it would be 782 so that we for us to expand the scope of the regulatory 783 wise inquisition into the operation of the nuclear aspects of 784 l
785 these plants?
786 Mr. EECH. Yes, sir.
I would be pleased to discuss th Trankly, my answer is I'm not sure that 787 with you.
788 rulemaking is the appropriate course of action to take, because frankly I don't know that we can regulate quality 1
799
O
'XAME: MIT197030 FAGE 35 790 perforcanco of concgors.
No ocn cnocurogo it.
We can do a' 791 number of things.
I don't know that a cookie. cutter j
792 prescriptive approach, a list of requirements, is 793 appropriate.
On the other hand, I think your suggestion 794 deserves very careful consideration.
With due respect to 795 you, Mr. Chairman, I will certainly give it careful 796 consideration.
797 Mr. MARKEY. The reason I suggested it, Mr. Chairman, 1 798 do have an epidemic here.
Although we somewhat have reliot-799 upon the good faith of management, not just in this plant 800 but in plants throughout the country over the past 801 generation, it turns out that even MRC evaluations themselves have gaven testimony to the fact that there has 802 803 been significant failure of that process.
I recommend to you that not necessarily that a rule b 804 805 in place, but at least the public and industry be given a 4
806 forum in which advanced rulemaking proceedings are 807 undertaken towards the goal of decidang whether or not at 808 appropriate to expand the scope of that regulation.
809 Let me turn to another area.
810 Mr. ZECH. Mr. Chairman. I don't agree uith you that t 411 is an epidemic.
I don't agree with that terminology.
I 812 certainly agree there are problems.
I agree there is zoon 813 for improvenant.
I don't think the term epidemic is 814 appropriate.
That is just my opinion.
I respect you foz L----________--______
7_
a PAGE 36 MAME:-MIr197030 Thero is not in ny judgcent on opidacio.
815 hoving yours.
There has been some There has been some serious incidents.
816 things that-we have been tracking very closely, given more 817 That is part of our way of'doing 818 attention to than others.
I think it is appropriate that we attend to the 819 business.
plants that.in our judgment have not been performing as wel 820 821 as others.
That is what we have done.
Ne intend to do mo2 L
822 of that in,the future.
I think that you should be assured and the public shot i
823 assured that we recognize there is room for improvement '
824 be wewilldevoteou.f and where there is room for improvement, 825 826 energies in that direction.
827 Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, again, to make a point, whi (
think perhaps'we can disagree on what an epidemic is, but 828 100 are 829 when 16 of the plants in this country out of 830 identified as having problems of this nature, in your mind but it seems to this Chairs 831 that might not be an epidemic, 832 and I thank it would seen so to the public at large, that an unacceptably large percentage of the nuclear power plar 833 in this country that have been identified as having 834 P
835 management problems.
If I may r.amind you, Mr. Chairman, that is 836 Mr. EECE.
f Those role, to protect the public health and safety.
f 837 838 plants--I think 13 of the 16 are in a shutdown condition.
t That means we are tending to our business of protecting 839
V i
PAGE 37
'MAME: HIr197030 public health and sofoty. 'We don't liko that cony p10nts 840 I would respectfully submit that'e 841' having problems either.
responsible public' servants, that is what we are doing.
842 I hope that number wi!'
Those plants are getting attention.
803 I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, if 844 decrease in the future.
(
it doesn't decrease, we will increase it if we th' ink it is 845 I won't debate t~I You can call it an epidemic.
846 necessary.
847 point further.
I $vst wanted to say that in my view, we are indeed 848 exercising our responsibilities to protect the public heel 849 I
850 and safety.
All I as suggesting is ths 851 Mr. MARKEY. I under, stand.
existing processes have broken down in terms of their 852 effectiveness and the Proof is the number of plants which 853 What I as recommending to -
shutdown in this country.
854 are with the long term is that perhaPs in teras of dealing 855 that inherent in the nuclear regulatory scheme 856
- problems, 857 that we have been working under, that we institute new top down, we have t procedures to guarantee that from the 858 kind of accountability and the type of prof astacnalisa tr 859 can perhaps help us to avoid the necessity in the future 860 15 percent of the nuclear power plants in this 86 1 having country non-operational because of the kind of deficione:'
862 863 which are identified.
that I as maki:
I think the types of recommendations 864
FAGE 38 MAME' MIp197030 3
865 timed towards achioving that goal.
Mr. Chairman, I must make this point.
.I 866 Mr. EECH.
certainly agree that no one wants that number of plants 867 Our responsibility is for public health and 868 shutdown.
I assure you, if we have problems with more than 1:
869 safety.
I am concerned about that. j
~
870 plants, we will shut more down.
I want the plants to operate, as an American 871 Matura11y, 872 citizen, as I am sure.you do.
My primary concern is public health and safety.
I can 873 tell you that if we have to shut down five more, we will de 874 675 it.
876 Mr. MARKEY. Again, our goal is to avoid having any n02, 877 these plants hospitalized.
We are trying to keep'then out--all I am trying to recommend to you is there is a 878 mechanism f or Preventive care here that might help to ensu:
i 879 880 that in.the future we don't--
We want to help the plants keep operating bi 881 Mr. EECH.
882 don't want to do it at the public peril, Mr. Chairman.
p 883 Mr. MARKEY. Commissioner Berntha17-884 Mr. BERMTHAL. Mr. Chairman, the terminology you are u
Epidemic
I agree with the Chairman, Commissioner Each.
885 somehow implies this is a new disease that has appeared.
486 i
What I would suggest isi 887 You also referred to a breakdown.
There is an there is a cultural change poing on out there.
888 889 important transition going on.
l l
PAGE 39 XAME 'MIF197030 If I ocy point to ths Tennessee Volloy Authority,.I hat 890 characterized their difficulties many times as one of 691 standing in place too long while the rest of'the world was 892 I think that is exactly what is going on in thi:
893 advancing.
The management in this industry is being 894 industry.
of thorough upgraded. We are approaching a point, I hope, 895 and widespread excellence in the management of the nuclear-896 I suspect that kind of excellence is not 897 utility industry.
something that you would have seen to or 15 years ago.
898 We are paying more There is a change going on out there.
899 This is not :-
900 attention to it.
This is not something new.
has suddenly appeared throughout the industry 901 disease that We are trying to promote 902 There is a change going on.
903 change.
904 Mr. MARKEY. I agree with you.
It has not suddenly dust bain It has been there for years and it is 905 appeared.
I think the purpose of-906 identified in terms of.its scope.
that ws mig?'
is to begin to identify remedies 907 this hearing 908 apply to make sure that we begin to reduce the likelihood 909 it occurring again.
Commissioner Asselstine, do you have any comments?
910 Mr. A55EL5 TIME. Mr. Chairman, just a brief comment.
911 One is when you look at a:
913 think there are two questions.
is the Commission taking effective actie:
91 3 individua's case, That is one set
^o ensure that the public is protected.
91 4 i
4
FAGE 40
' ~ KAMES.MIT197030 We hevo oxocinod a number of thoso. plants over the.
915 issues.
past couple of years to see how ef fectively we have done 916
.917 that part of ouz job.
But the other part is, 1s the regulatory program 918 the way we ward it to, and if the consequence 1 919 functioning M vaiting to find out about these. problems when'something var 92 serious happens, when the condition of the plant has V
]
921 deteriorated to.the point where a serious operating event
- t 922
[
occurs or is very likely to occur in 'she immediate future, 923 the regulatory process har not 924 then it seems to me What we need are the functioned.the way we want it to.
925 early warning signs and thr,' ability to find these problems 926 early on and to deal with them.
927 I think management is the root cause of many of these 928 and I also think that there is a group of plants 929
- problems, that us.have identified, that have had for sons 930 the plants just ncj time now a level of management performance that is I
931 l
932 acceptable for the long term.
I am not sure I would agree with Commissioner Bernth:
933 934 assessment of TVA.
The implication, I thirk, was that.
well, they were operating at an acceptable level for a wh 935 and then everybody else just passed them by and they have 936 I think the TVA problems are muc 937 Rept up with standards.
938 worse than that.
I think the key is to have a systs But in any event, 939 l
l
1 PAGE 41 X AM,E 8' nip 197030 a regulctory systom, cnd o syston within the industr 940 ~ place, that iden'tifies these' problems and fixes them early before 941 i
we saa the serious deterioration of plant performance. It 942
{
in no one's interest to have plants shut down for lengthy 943 periods of time simply because things are so bad that 1
944 neither we nor the industry nor the Public have any 945 Se run safely.
And that's t 4 946 assurance that the plants ca.-
situation,that we f aced at a nuahar of plants last year.
947 in my opening statement I m-948 Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, it clear that I expect that Boston Edison will not simply q
949 I real pilgrim as if this were a regular outage.
950 start up feel that what is needed is a rigorous start-up program
+}
951 prior to full power operation.
952 tests the company Does the Commission agree, and will it agree to closs 953 monitor such a program?
954 certainly we intend to close '
955 Mr. ZECH. Mr. Chairman, monitor any kind of a Procedure that the Pilgrim plant wi 956 957 have.
I do not want at this time to commit to you how na any kind of a prescriptive formul 958 people, length of time, 959 that we are going to use for Pilgrim.
I can assure you, Mr. Chairarn, we are going to be 960 We will monitor it, we n watching the Pilgrim situation.
96 1 think is appropriate.
If we feel that it 962 do whatever we 963 appropriate at the time to have a formal, slow, delibera4 I am not Prepared at this time 964 start-up, we will de so.
l l
l
~
PAGE 42 MAME: MIpzi97030 965 say that we are ready, excopt to toll you that wo will do ellowed
~
what we think is right to make sure that that plant is 966 process 967 operated safely.
1 968 Mr. MARKEY. Do you have any ideas right now, Mr. Chairmar.ic aha
- is safe as to what kinds of processes should be undertaken to ensure 969 r name is that Edison is in a position to properly operate the plant 970 Region 971 before its start-up?
want ther.
We want to watch the recent management changes 972 Mr. EECE.
clude ser' 973 they have taken at pilgrim, which frankly seem to be 974 absolutely in the right dizaction to me.
But they are so during t early and the plant has had such serious problems over the 975 976 years that I don't think we should jump to any conclusions.
again :
be a 977 We want to watch this management, we want to develop a feeling of confidence that some of the new management team 978
- hat I ha 979 is getting their ideas in place.
to take a close observation on our able to 980 I think this is going 981 part.
We will have our regicnal administrator, Dr. Tom you are as far 982 Murley, who is here today and can tell you anything e time it I can assure you we are as any details he may have in mind.
943 u expect-a very close supervision of oparation of that 984 going to havs ant?
We will be completely confident before we allow it 985 plant.
.he plant 986 to restart.
987 Mr. MARKEY. Let me interrupt you right there, then, Mr. Would 988 Chairman, and ask Mr. Murley, the regional administrator in I the 989 charge of this plant, what specific plans you might have to / August,
1 PAGE 44
," MAME: MIT197030 so that wo een go, several waaks before the planned restart, J
1015 1016 our inspection plan staffed out.
And is it your intention to add additions:
1017 Mr. MARXIY.
Now many j
personnel for the monitoring of this plant?
1018 additional people are you requesting?
1019 we have over the last several years 1020 Mr. MURLEY. Yes, alreadyhadmoreinspectioncoveragethantheeverage.attj 1021 Nonetheless, even today, I have three 1022 plants in Region I.
I would expect to keep that 1023 resident inspectors there.
complement for some time into the future of three resident 1024 and during the start-up phase, which might be' 1025 inspectors, I would have around-the-clock 1026 natter of a few weeks, which may entail up to six inspectors, 1027
- coverage, 1028 Mr. MARKEY. Commissioner Asselstine?
Mr. Chairman, it seems to me there a:
1029 Mr. ASSELSTIME.
is what.do we need to do before any 1030 issues h~re.
One e
the plant to assuxe ourselve:
1031 decision is made to start up 1032 that this time things are different, a question that Congressman Studds raised in his opening statement.
1033 Then the second is, what do we need to do to monitor 1034 assuming that we are satisfied enough to all 1035 performance, 1036 the plant to resume operation?
I have been doing some thinking about this the past 1037 particularly since we received the show-cause petitic 1038 so, the full range of these sets of 1039 which lays out, I think,
7-___-__
PAGE 45 MAME: MIp197030 1040 issues.
I personally would like to see several things done be 1041 1042 the agency makes a decision on start-up..
Clearly one of those that I would endorse is the Chairman's proposal that 1043 the Commission have a meeting to thoroughly review the 1044 situation on pilgrim, not only with the NRC staff, but wii 1045 the company and its senior management.
1046 But a few other things omaa to my mind that might be 1047 1048 useful.
1049 pirst, a mid-tern SALP review.
It has now been nine it's been months since the close of the last SALP period, 1050 Licensee received the SALP report i 1051 five nonths since the the series of management concerns and breakdos 1052 identified 1053 that we saw at the plant.
I think it is perhaps time to and how much reall) take a look and see where they stand, 1054 1055 has been accomplished in those areas.
I personally belis a look at where they stand on thess.
1056 that we ought to take 1057 SALP items before the agency allows the plant to restart I was somewhat troubled that the Chairman's response 1058 Studds indicated that that wasn't to be part of a 1059 Mr.
1060 start-up review.
One thing that I would look at in particular there is this guestion of shortage of 11oonse,1 196 1 The utility, based upon reactor operators at the plant.
1062 a couple of days ago, has put into place a
1063 what I heard t
longer term prograa to get the licensed operators that 1064
'pAGE 46 l
NAME: MIr197030, but for tho noxt 'oight conths or so thoy f oco tho sant i 1065
- nood, kind'of shortage that was of concern to us last yea.
1066 ways around that to deal,with it, notab:
1067 There are;some using licensed. senior reactor operators, but I would like te, 1068 see a specific plan on how they are going to avoid the kind 1069 of overtime problems that they had last year with this 1070 1071 chronic shortage of reactor-operators.
1072 Second, it seems to me it would be useful to have a What special evaluation of the new management performance.
1073 I would like to ces is a team of inspectors, including 1074 1075 senior NRC ar.nagement people, to go in and look at how well 1076 these new managers are pe: forming.
Do they understand the 1077 plant?
Do they know their jobs?
Now do they deal with the Are they changing 1078 plant staff? Are they having an effect?
1079 the attitudes of the placa?
Are they getting their message 1080 across?
Are they setting goals, and are they requiring 1081 people to meet those goals?
think we need a review by the NRC Staff and 1082 Third, I TEMA of the energency planning problems and issues that ha-1083 1084 been raised.
I would like to see that.
we need an MRC Staff evaluation of the issues 1085
- Tourth,
. led to the shutdown of the plant back in April. There As a 1986 The utility has made its submitta; 1087 set of hardware issues.
1088 and we need a review of those.
we need a Staff review of the new issues that 1089
- Tifth,
J FAGE 47 MAME8 NIF197030 1090 arisen since the-plant was shut down.
Iho questions obout 1091 the utility's performance of leak rate tests and the 1092 match-up between their technical specifications, their surveillance procedures, and our own regulations, and how 1093 they are doing on fire protection, and then finally I thin:
1094 we need a Commission meeting where the Commission hears th.
1095 1096 results of all of those kinds of efforts.
So that would b 1097 my suggestion of the kinds of things that ought to occur before a decision is made to start up the plant.
1098 I
I certainly agree with the kind of intensive M 1099 Afterwards, involvement and oversight that you have suggested and that 1100 1101 Mr. Murley has indicated he had in mind.
1102 Mr. MARKEY. Well, I clearly agree with you, Commissic as to the extent to which the Commission should go in 1103 ensuring that all of these tests are given to ensure the 1104 1105 plant is safe.
The question is, do the other four Commissioners agree with us, and I think that that is ver: j 1106 1107 auch of an open question.
1108 I would like at this time, if I may, Commissioner, we There is a r 1109 have a slight logistical problem right now.
call on thc Floor right now that only has seven minutes 1!10 We will take a brief break right now for about to 1111 left.
We will come back, we will recognise you, 1112 minutes.
1113 Commissioner / 3ernthal, and you, Mr. Chairman, if you wish and than we will move on to other members for questioning 1114
'e
1 FAGE 48 MAME: MIT197030 111Si the panel.
We will take a brief rocess.
I 1116'
[ Recess.]
1117 Mr. MARKEY. If we can reconvene the hearing, I will a l 1118' people to take their seats.
j At the point at which we recessed, Commissioner Assel f 1119 1120 had just finished his comment, and Commissioner Bernthal 6 1121 seeking recognition.
Mr. Bernthal, any comments you wish to make.-
1122 1123 Mr. BERMTHAL. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to not leas 1124 impression that seems to have been left, that anybody at this table--and I hope and think I can speak for other 1125 members here--6ir, agrees.with the idea that this long list 1126 assessaknts and matters that need to be carefu.'
1127 management looked at before restart will be looked at and should be 1128 1129 looked at.
1130 I suspect that 95 percent of that list are matters t routinely get looked at before this Commission permits 1131 1132 restart of any plant that has had serious difficulties.
1133 Dr. Murley, in my judgment, is one of our most capak I
regional administrators, and I am confident that he is ge 1134 The Commission s 1135 to look very carefully at those things.
In fact, I wa '
1136 going to look very carefully at that list.
almost moved to ask whether there was anything there that 1137 1138 would not be done, and I spoke with Mr. Murley in the f
interin and he suggested that the mid-tern SALP may not l' 1139
PAGE 49
,' XAME: MIF197030 00 cro ocutoly ownto of the 1140 done.
But I con cssuro you, and those are the 1141 categories in that SALP rating system, primary categories that will receive attention before that 1142 1143 plant will be permitted to restart.
So I just wanted to make clear that there is no questi-1144 1145 about the resolve, in my judgment, of this commission to se to it those matters receive very careful attention.
1146 1147 Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.
1148 Mr. Chairman?
1149 Mr. ZECH. Yes, sir.
I would just like to say that certainly we will take a good hard look at the suggestions 1150 They seem reasonab.
that commissioner Asselstine has made.
1151 1152 to me right offhand.
the as Commissioner Bernthal has indicated, 1153 I think, which is a rather is one--rather than a full-blown SALF, 1154 I think we should do a rather focused one 1155 lengthy process, But I think it woul tailored specifically for this plant.
1156 and I think we should definitely mak 1157 accomplish even more, 1158 some kind of assessment like that.
the emergency plan is concerned, I would D 1159 As far as The like to point out that one is scheduled for October.
1160 And so I full-blown drill which MAC will participate'in.
1161 think what has been suggested is certainly reasonable.
l 1162 We might Again I would have to take another look at it.
1163 want to add some other things to it.
1164
FAGE 50.
MAME: MIT197030 1165 Mr. MARKEY. That concludes my time for the first round, l
I expect to ask others, but I would like to sus 1166 questions.
does intend to note parenthetically that this subcommittee 1167 very closely monitor the procedures which are implemented 1168 the Commission to ensure that in f act the public health an-1169 been guaranteed as a precondition to a restart, 1170 safety has and the time table that has been mentioned by Mr. Murley 1171 seems somewhat ambitious, and because of that this 1172 1173 subcommittee, I can assure you, is going to look at all of these recommendations and see the extent to which they has 1174 1175 been implemented before the restart.
1176 That concludes my opening round.
The Chair now reco!
gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Studds.
1177 the 1178 Mr. STUDDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
as you know, I don't serve on this commit 1179 Gentleman, and I certainly don't have a background of personal 1180 1181 expertise in the field of nuclear energy.
Perhaps that i and a bad thing in addressing a subject 1182 both a good thing I have at my disposal the extraordinary detad 1183 like this.
information and guestions prepared by the very competent 1184 staff of this committee and by some of my own staff.
1185 The more I read the detailed guestions, the more I a 1186 beginning to think that the real guastions that need to 1 1187 at least certainly from this lay legislator's 1188
- asked, are broad and general Policy questions, r a t:-
1189 perspective,
PAGE 51 Mang MIT197030 1190 than the detoils of a particular sofoty deficiency or 1191 whatever.
1192 It seems to me that some things really stand out here.
1193 I say, approaching it, as I do, as a layman.
I note that i Asselstine's remarks, his written testimony, he 1194 Mr.
1195 encapsulates, really, the situation which we face and I think that most citizens would' view as the situation befor.
1196 1197 them, and I quote briefly from him, if I may.
He is setti:
the stage for what he believes is a description of an 1198 1199 analysis of weaknesses in our current regulatory program, 1200 and he says:
1201
We failed to identify or to act upon the management 1202 problems of this Licensee--that is to say, pilgrim- un they resulted in serious safety performance problems which 1203 1204 were the subject of the Commission's 1982 enf orcement -
1205 action.
When those problems were identified, the MRC too}
1206 strong enforcement action in the form of the largest civil 1207 penalty imposed up to that time on an MRC Licensee, couple 1208 with an enforcement order modifying the plant's license.
1209 That is four and a half years ago.
1210 I continue from Mr. Asselstine's testimony.
The enforcement action amphasised a breakdown in tl 1211 Licensee's management controls as the root cause of the 1212 1213 safety violations, and required that the Licensee develop 1214 comprehensive Plan to address the causes of the violation
A-FAGE 52 M AME s ' 'XIT 197 0 30 1215 But despite'theso offerts, we woro unablo to loctn Entil 1216 some four years later that the root cause.of the 1982 1217 violation, ineffective management of the nuclear progrea, 1218 remained uncorrecte'd.
1219 How to me, the quest 19n is obvious.
What's going on ha 1220 Given the Commission's concerns, given, as you yourselves 1221 have testi'fied, the extraordinary amount of above-average attention and inspections and manpower devoted to trying.to 1222 1223 focus on pilgrim, given the extraordinary action taken by what are we 1224 the Commission four and one-half years ago, 1225 doing here today?
How is it possible that four and a half years later, as 1226 I.
to a inzgo extent the root cause of the 1227 understand it, problems identified and responded to so severely by the 1228 Commission four and a half years ago remains essentially.
1229 1230 unaddressed?
What should the Commission have done that it did not do in these preceding.four and one-half years?
1231 still here today addressing the same root 1232 Why are we 1233 cause?
Well, Mr. Studds, if I may respond briefly, 1234 hr. ZECH.
first of all, in 1982 I'believe the Commission did take 1235 aggressive an3 significant action resulting in the largest 1286 I thank it was a 1837 eivil penalty assessed at that time.
1 I think that my review of the situatic 1238 responsible action.
was that the Commission at that time and the Staff at that 1239 l
g PAGE
$3 MAMEs NIr19703C They woro time felt that that was sufficient oction.
1240 confident that improvements-would be made.
1241 My review'also indicates that most of the focus by the 1242 pilgrim people at that time was on hardware items and on 1243 There wa Physical hardware-type plant design deficiencies.
1244 apparently not enough focus on management responsibilities 1245 1246 at that time.
They did upgrade various plant control systems-and did 1247 1248 take a number of actions.
But I see it, although the they were focusing more on hardware thr' 1249 efforts were there, I think in retrospect we have an 1250 on management.
the fact that the pilgrim management was q
1251 appreciation of focusing on those hardware issues, as was XRC.
1252 I think now it is a fact that I think we know more th 1253 I think that Boston Edison has learned a hard 1254 did ther..
j although we are not as all confident at this 1255 lesson, and 3
stage that those management problems have been resolved.
1256 root causes that you referred to are well 1257 think that the and we will recognized now by Boston Edison and by MRC, 1258 1259 indeed focus on those.
1260 Essentially, I'think we didn't 30 far enough in revi and I think that ta retrospect we were 1261 the performance, that that large fine and the actions that were 1262 expecting taken regarding hardware would indeed result in better 1263 it showed that it was not enough l Over time, 1264 performance.
1 N_---____-_____
G4, FAGE 54 MAME: MIr197020 Studds.
I would liko~to n
1265' and that's tho truo story, Mr.
paint-it a-little bit rosier, but those are the facts,:and 1266 think I can only be honest-with you and say that we wish n 1267 1268 that we'd done a better job.
though--at least, my persons 1 feeling is-1269 We do think, Ihe plan the public health and safety was not endangered.
1270 I can simply didn't improve as much as it should have.
1273 assure you that we intend to do all we.can to correct thos
,1272 matters and to devote considerable attention and effort 1273 towards ensuring ourselves that the Boston Edison 1274 organization management-wise has been impressed and that o 1275 1276 NRC Staff is also focusing on those management issues.
1277 So all I can say is, we're going to do the very best can to make sure that we've 1 earned those lessons and app 1278 them so that the people of your area will be confident 1279 only has Boston Edison looked at the situation, 1280 that--not and we will not allow restart until we're 1281 the MRC has, 1282 ^ confident that the plant can be operated safely.
1283 nr. STUDDS. Well, I appreciate your candor, sir, and sure some of it is not particularly pleasant for you.
1284 I know Commissioner Asselstine wants to say somethi:
1285 let me $ust say to you that I omn't avoid the haunting 1886 that auch of what you just said would have been :-
1287 feeling had there been a similar hearing here in 1982. Perhaps t.
1288 was, but I can just hear the Commission saying in 1982, 1289 i
l
[
PAGE
'55
.,' XAME: MIT197030 just imposed cn unproccdontod-fino upon the utility, 1290 having
Boston Edison has learned a hard lesson,
1291 that, quote, 1292 unquote.
1293 Mr. EECM. We hope, I'm sure--
your and a half years later, they've learn' 1294 Mr. STUDD5.
1295 it again according to you.
I'm sure--I can't argue that point, Mr. Stud 1296 Mr. EECH.
and I'm sure that the Commission in '42 did indeed think 1297 1298 that they had done sufficient.
All I can say is, those are and we hope that we will have learned from the 1299 the facts, 1300 lesson of the past few years.
in Following up on what you just said, 1301 Mr. STUDDS.
in with the opportunity of hindsight, 1302 hindsight now, what do you think you might have done or shoul:
1300 retrospect, have done or do you wish you had done that you did not do 1304 1305 that period?
is th The only thing I can say, Mr. Studds, 1306 Mr. EECH.
1307 think that the Commission in those days and prior to that their primary attention on licensing 1308 had been focusing regulatory activities, and hardware issues, 1309 activities, j
And it was very L
1310 plant-specific issues, design issues.
1811 appropriate over the years.
our focus is Mow that we have 100 plants oporating, 1312 With the number of licansing matters decreasing 1313 changing.
we recognize fully that we must indeed focus on plant 1314 f
'FAGE 56 XAME: MIT197030 operations and safety of oporctions, rathor thon liconsing 1315 matters, and I think that just recognizes our 1316 acknowledgement of the fact that our responsibilities for 1317 public hemith and safety are shifting somewhat.
1318 1319 So I think, looking back, it would have been good in 1 perhaps, if the focus would have been more on operational 1320 and management activities, rather than hardware issues, but 1321 1322 that is th,e way it was, and I hope we've learned those 1323 lessons.
1324 Mr. STUDDS. Thank you.
1325 Mr. MARKEY. May I beg the indulgence of the gentleman 1326 Massachusetts?
ranking minority member from California has to les 1327 The If it would be acceptable '
1328 in the next five minutes or so.
to the gentleman from Massachusetts to suspend his questio 1329 1330 at this tine, I would be delighted to yield to Mr. Moor.
1331 Mr. STUDDS.
And I will reccgnize the gentleman from 1332 Mr. MARKEY.
California and then immediately recognite--
1333 1334 Mr. STUDDS. I'll be happy to do that, Mr. Chairman, s for 1 let me again thank the ranking member, Mr. Moorhead, 1335 1836 ocurtesy as well, and I'm delighted to yield.
The gentleman's time has expired for this 1337 Mr. MARKEY.
1338 period of time.
The chair recognizes the gentleman fron 1339 California, Mr. Moorhead, on his own time.
PAGE 57
MAME: NIT 197030 1340
.Mr. MOORHEAD, Thank you, Mr. Choircen.
i
~How many years has MRC been conducting systematic 1341 assessment'of licensee performance' inspections?
1342 1343 Mr. EECH. Oh, I would have to ask my staff to perforr 1
but--I'm informed it's six '
1344 would guess it's six or seven, 1345 years ago, sir.
l Mr. MOORHEAD. Can you make a general observation abo 1346 1847 effects of these inspections?
Eas licensee performance 1348 generally been improving or declining?
1349 Mr EECH. Mr. Moorhead, I could give you a general My view is that it has had a significant effect' 1350 comment.
1351 addres.3ing these matters to the licensee, bringing then personally to their attention, but with your permission, 1352 to ask Mr. Taylor to give a very brief--a ver)!
1353 would lil::
brief answer to your guestion to supplement mine.
]
1854 Taylor is the head of our' Inspection and Enforce 1355 Mr.
1356 program at Headquarters in Washington.
1357 Mr. TAYLOR. I am James Taylor.
I would say yes, Mr f'
that the SALP process-has focused, helped to f<
1358
- Moorhead, both licensee and MRC attention across the broad spectru 1359 operations, and I think performance has improved general 1360 1861 if you look across the plants.
1362 Mr. MOORHEAD. Commissioner Asselstinet 1363 Mr. ASSELSTIME. Mr. Moorhead, I agree with that. I and the SALP proce 1364 in general, performance has improved, 1:
1
V PAGE 58.
XAME: nip 197030 is a useful tool in helping to bring chout improved 1365 although I would have to say that in some 1366 performance, I think that we've fallen into a trap with 1367 specific cases, the SALP process, and that.in those cases, the SALP process L
1368 became more an annual validation that things were still bad 1369 It didn't or that the same problams were still existing.
1370 a vehicle for bringing about change and improvement.
1871 become I think there is more attention to that and more 1372 1373 recognition of it, but at least in some cases--and I think we saw the 1374 Davis-Besse is a good exkaple--year after year, and we weren't doing as much about it as we 1375 same problems, 1376 should have been.
1377 Mr. MOORMEAD. Well, with regard to the poor performer:
have these inspections left that performance unchanged?
137A 1379 Mr. ASSELSTIME. I think in some instances they did.
instances the SALP process did not serve as 1380 think in some effective vehicle for bringing about raa' and lasting 1381 1382 improvement in performance.
1383 Mr. M00RHIAD. Well, are these poor performers, while 1384 achieving the desired levels of XRC's desire, still or are the 1885 performing better than they did five years ago, 1886 doing worse?
1887 Mr. ASSELSTIME. I suspect that, in general, plants at but I'd also have to say that in the case of.
1388 doing better, some of the plants that had serious operating events last 1389 l
i
4 PAGE-59 MAME ' rip 197030 year, I'm not sure they ware doing ouch bottor thon they 1390 1391 were five years.ago.
1592 Browns perry, Davis-Basse, Rancho seco, performance ws pretty bad last year for those plants, and the SALP process 1393 had identified those' kinds of poor performance problems ani 1394
.a history of poor performance at those plants.
1395 1896 Mr. M00RMEAD. Commissioner Secht I think the SALP process 73s generall.
1397 Mr. EECN. Yes.
1398 helped across the board, Mr. Moorhead.
It. helped the good 1899 pwrformers.
just make a point very briefly here. We're 1400 And let me 1401 focusing today on the poor performers, which is approprint because that's what you asked us to do, but 1402 Mr. Chairman,
-there's an awful lot of good performers out there, too.
1403 Ihere's an awful lot of very responsible management people 1404 1405 dedicated Americans that are'really doing an outstanding :
with a deep-seated ec=mitment to safety,.and I don't~ thin}!
1406 should overlook that this morning.
1407 we 1408 We're talking about a small percentage, and most of -
1409 management people, I-think, are outstanding.
Moorhe I think the SALP process has been useful, Mr.
1410 l
would agree--and part of my initiative for performance 1411 indicators is to suppletant the SALP process, give it nor 141 2 give it more facts, and so whereas I do think the 141 3
- teeth, SALP process has been useful across the board for both ot 1414 L
PAGE 60 M&ME: MIT197030.
- ~
g finost perforcors and our below-cvorogo performors, I do l
1415 believe that it can.be enhanced by the performance 1416 indicators program, which I mentioned earlier, but I think' 1417 the SALP should be recognised as's contributionLto safety 1418 1419 across the board.
Mr. M00RMLAD. Sometimes it appears that the licensee-1420 performance declines when.aven more greater' attention is 1421 Can you explain this 1422 given by MRC to their performance.
i423 phenomenon?
1424 Mr. EECH. Not vary well,' frankly.
I'll try.
Sometimes when--I 1425 Mo, I think that's probably true.
fact that when we identify a performer that does 1426 it's the give us concern and we start looking deeper and deeper in 1427 do indeed find that there are more proble 1428 the problem, we Once.you st I suppose it's like any kind of inspection.
1429 looking for things real hard, you usually find some thing 1430 1431 that can be improved.
1432 So I think more than anything, it's our inspection We have indeed developed, I think,-over the yes 1433 process.
1434 a tougher way to inspect, and when we send a team out the they usually come back with things that they've seen tha 1435 I think At's more or less, frankly, th, 1436 need correction.
tougher inspection technitues than anything else, but I 1437 think that it is true that once we look at a utility rea-1438 that we do find that occasionally there is more th 1439
- hard,
g-PAGE 61-MAME: MIT197030 1440 we expected to find.
I think that's oil part of ths straightforward, candid process we have, and I think it's 1441 1442 probably appropriate. Sometimes we'll find mores sometimes-1443 we'll find less.
Well, that brings up another question, 1444 Mr. M00RMLAD.
I understand very few MRC employees have actual
)
1445 though.
! experience in civilian--operating civilian power reactors c 1446 1447 in corporate annagement experience.
What kind of training do your inspectors get to comper 1448 1449 for this lack of experience?
1 We 'use contr:
1450 Mr. EECH. We do have training for.them.
need additional experience with actuEl f
i 1451 people when we 1452 operations, as well as our own people.
We would like to have--I think it would be very healthy is we did have more
)
1453 I
actual utility operational people in our organization.
1454 thinkit'ssomethingthatweshouldgivedevotedattentier.]
1455 I can assure you that I think, frankly, my background 1456 to.
as an operator in the Navy, qualified many yes 1457 in the Navy but it has given me a considerable confider 1458 ago certainly, that I can look at a plant and perhaps make a contzdbutio:
1459 whereas others who haven't had that kind of backgrounC ca:
1460 aske the same contribution with the same confidanoa.
1461 So it's important that the XRC continue our efforts i 1462 1463 nore operational people, and I would--I would submit that that's something that we should continue our efforts in t, 1464
PAGE 63.
PAGE 62 F197030
.ol.
irootion.
could just make a Mr. MOORMEAD. Do you think that SALP ratings are, l
and if not, do you ibly does not entirely ndorstood by the public and the media, I, as the Chairman invo any plans to better communicate the signifiennee of
- are meant to be A, I
sour regulatory action to the public and to the media?
it, the way A, B, anc I'm not sure they're as well as understood as Mr. EECH.
the categories ara a tool sanly but by and larg-43'd like them to be.
- Frankly, bla.
for us to use.
Cat sry I means.that the utility is a spirit in which our at a 1s.el that we're very satisfied with, and we sporating That is aver we do and howeve son probably decrease our attention to a degree.
ope that we at the M7 reserved for those very outstanding organizations.
that,1f all the y,
Mumber II means we continue the normal inspection prog rage--should that da) of course, means that we increase the and the Category III, That doesn't mean that they're not safe at all;.ings would recognize inspection.
But it means that we it ceans they are safe essentially.
,e tends to assume th.
and that's what we do.
should increase our inspection, e in this gane of rat.
And then the plant, of course, has the same their efforts in
>dy wants to be on th responsibilities in that area to increase is rating and ranking that receives a Category III.
enything I'm no so sure tha try to use an absolu But those are useful tools for us.
ademic analogy is it's as well understood as it might be, but I can assure yo that it is a useful tool, and I think that we should balance of my time, definitely continue the SALP program'and perhaps try to an and appreciate, of bit better, so that it ',an be letter oxylain it a little in the subcommittee I
understood.
PAGE 64
.M&ME8 RIF197030 1515 hearing process.
1516 The Chair once again recognizes the gentleman from 1517 Massachusetts.
1518 Mr. STUDD5. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I know that Commissioner Asselstine wanted to respond.
1519 I ask you to do that, sir, let me just ask you to comment er.
1520 In the testimony to be 1521 one other thing in the process.
offered by Mr. Sweeney on behalf of Boston Edison.in a few 1522
It should be noted that the concerns we 1523 moments, he says today are different from those for which we 1524 are addressing The issues then were safety related an l
1525 were fined in 1982.
1526 failure to comply with regulations.
Today the issues are not directly related either to compliance or to safety.
1527 I want to know, as you respond to the earlier colloguy 1528 whether or..ot you agree with that statement.
1529 were having, if you could provide us with some examples 1530 And if not, 1531 precisely of what you mean.
1532 Mr. ASSELsTIME. Let me start with that one.
I do not 1533 agres with that statement.
I think that the problems are 1534 basically the same problans.
The root cause problem was ineffective management back then in 1982 and I think that I
1535 I also do not buy i that is the problem that we face today.
i 1536 l
this notion that these are a set of management issues that 1537 i
they have to deal with, but that they are unrelated to 1538 1539 safety.
e
PAGE 65 XAME: nip 197030 1540 In my own estination, porticulorly 1 coking at the poor.
1541 Performers and the serious operating events over the past
'if you have a weak and ineffective management 1542
- year, 1543 structure, it is slaply a matter of time until that reflect-itself in Poor performance and deteriorated condition in t1 l
1544 1545 plant itself.
In fact, I think that is exactly what-we sat
- k; 1546 in 1982.
1547 so'I guess I would disagree with the company's statens 1548 on both counts.
Back to your earlier question, why did the company's 1549
'1550 improvement efforts after 1982 fail and why did we get 1551 fooled'in the process.
I agree with much of what Chairman 1552 zech said.
I think the company took too narrow of a focus e emphasized the management problem as the 1553 back in 1982.
w 1554 underlying root cause, but I think the focus tended'to be i
1555 hardware issues and on the symptoms, rather than the root 1556 cause of the problem.
1557 Since many of the instances, at that time, focused or 1558 making modifications to the plant, controlling hardware ar 1559 modifications changes, I think that is where the company 1 1560 auch of their effort.
Even though they did a management review, in nindsight it mov appears to me that they'did ac 1561 1562 deal with the people problem, they dealt with the questior 1563 of modifications and hardware.
I do not think that they changed the attitude probler 1564 i
l
+
'pAGE
$6 MAME8.NIr197030 tho attitudo of tronting.this nuolocr plant euch
'1565 ithey had, pc 1566 - as they did a fossil plant.
It'is not clear to me that the
)
senior corporate management was committed to change or'was l 1567 And they did heavily involved in the process back in.'82.
1568 not put in place an attitude of critical self-assessment.
1569 1570 think that.was. missing.
1571 Now why did we get fooled?
I think we tended to foct 1572 those thing as well.
The plant went into a long outage tc And the company did a pretty good-sol 1513 replace its piping.
1574 in managing the work. Again, that is modifications to the That is whe; making hardware changes to the plant.
1575
- plant, they seemed to.have learned the lessons f airly well and I 1576 generally satisfied with that performance.
1577 think we were
'8-Ihat is why you saw the 5Al? ratings go up in 1984 and 1578 it seems to me that we did not (ocus iz 1579 In hindsight, which'is tt 1580 much--nor did the company--on the root cause, We did r.
management structure and the management system.
1581 sure that the management attituds 1582 did deep enough to make really had changed,'that they had in place an affective 1583 management team that was telling the people at the plant 1584 that was setting realistic and aggress.
1585 expected of them, goals for dealing with the many problems that they had a-1586 and was holding people accountable for meetin!
1587 the plant, 1588 those goals.
And I think that there are two examples that you ca 1589 I
FAGE 67 1.'
. x&NEs NIF197030 the number of liconsod reactor oporators, and t'no 15'90 to, radiological control situation at the Plant.
Those Problem.
1591 v.
In fact, the IMpo 1592 were net surprises to the company.
1593 reviews in tha 1981-82 time frame pointed those out as I do:not think the company put in flace a 1594 weaknesses.
management system and.a set of management' controls to deal t
1595
'1596 effectively with those problems.
And as a result, those-were two of the significant atens that we criticised the 1597 earlier this year, for in the latest 5 ALP 1598 company again, 1599 report.
so I think the answer is we did not focus on the root 1600 1601 cause enough.
That is what we have to do now.
We have to team really is ensure.ourselves that this new management 1602 1603 functioning effectively.
I do think we have the attention-Ther of the company and the company's board of directors, 1604 senior management of Lis now question in my mind that the
'1605 this company now is devoting a great deal of time-and enerl
.1606 1607 and attention to this plant.
1608 What we need to make sure of now is that the changes really are meaningful.and that they are having positive 1609 1610 effects.
Mr. STUDDs. At the risk of becoming too specific aga:
1611 is there anything mysterious about the number of 1612
- laymen, operators required to manage a Plant of this size 1613 licensed Is that subject to debate or is that fairly much a subjec-1614
_.__.________._____.___________--m.______m_.m.
.)
=
.)
PAGE 68 k
,' MAMEt XIp197030-1615 of consensus?
.i
'1616 Mr. A55EL5 TIME. I think it ~ is a ~ subject of consensus ~.
1 is well established what they need to have..There have beet 1617 some increases in the numbers. of operators that have been 1618 needed since the Three Mile' Island accident.
1619 The difficulty is in planning far enough ahead to maF 1620 sure that you always have people in the training pipeline, 1621 so that you will always have enough operators that you do-1622 1623 not'get into a shortage situation.
My experience is that the.well-managed plants around the country focus in on jurl 1624 that kind of a problem and they say what do we need and le 1625 the resources and the people-to'do t;'
1626 us make sure we have 1627 job.
And they are always well equipped.
In. fact, the wel!
1628 country have 1629 managed and well operated plants around the licensed operators than they need.
And they have th 1630 more licensed operators throughout their organization, where t 1631 1632 can take advantage of that experience and knowledge.
f 1633 Mr. STUDDS. Well, have the shortage of licensed oper has that been episc 1634 which you have identified at pilgrim, and occasional or has that been chronic?
1635 1686 Mr. ASSELSTIME. I thint. it has been chronio, althous 1637 regional people could address that better.
althot.
1638 Mr. MAP, KEY. The.gentlensn's time has expired, Asselstine you do have the right to respond to the quest:.
1639 1
l l
l u__-___--_-__
FAGE 69 MAME: MIF197030 or any otheir combors of the Concissien beforo th3 genticOor 1640 from Massachusetts' time has expired.
1641 ASSELSTIME. My own impression is that it has been 1642 Mr.
chronic problem--at least in the osse of reactor operators.
1643 but I think our regional people could provide some 1644 1645 additional information on it.
Certainly, it has been a 1646 problem in '82 and '85.
Mr. EECH. Dr. Murley, could you give us a very brief 1647 i
\\
1648 response please?
Yes, Congressman, it has been a chronic 1649 Mr. MURLEY.
problen in recent years. It is another manifesta [1on of th' 1650 1651 nanagement failure to plan ahead and tc have enough 1652 operators in the trainin9 pipeline, as Commissioner 1653 Asselstine said.
Iho gentlanan's time has expired f,or this 1654 Mr. MARKEY.
1655 round.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlanan from Utah, l monbar of the Subcommittee Mr. Mielson.
1656 1657 Mr. MIELSON. Thank you.
Admiral Esch, it is nice to I appreciate your coming and I apprecia-1658 you as Chairaan.
1659 the Chairnan holding these hearings.
Is MRC satisfied with the SALP process in general?
1660 1661 Mr. EECE. With the SALP process?
1662 Mr. MIEL50H. Yes.
I think the SALP process, yes, I an satisi 1663 Mr. ZECH.
1664 with it.
On the other hand, I do think--as I have indica
FAGE 70
.MAME: IIF197030 1665 aarlier--thot it should bo onhcncod.
And that is'ona roosor 1666 I--
1667 Mr. MIEL50M. Now would you' improve it?
I would improve'it by establishing what I to:
1668 Mr. EECM.
1669 performance indicator program.
I might say the industry 1670 already has this program in effect.
The imp 0 organization has a performance indicator program going so what I as 1671 suggesting is not so new, but it is something we do not hav.
1672 1673 at MRC, and I think we should have.
Performance indicators would be a collection of a number of actual items, such as 1674 1675 rad waste at-the plant, the exposure of workers, the number the number of outstanding modifications, the 1676 of scrams, responsiveness of management to key MRC directions and 1677 maintenance items, and a number of things like that.
1678 1679 But those very specific facts, trended over a, period <
in my judgment a significant enhancement.to-j 1680 time, would be 1681 the SALP process.
1682 Mr. HIELSOM. Do you believe construction and l-implementation of standardized designs would improve 1683 1684 management competency?
1685 Mr. EECH. Absolutely.
It would improve it significan' 1686 Mr. Mielson, and I think--
1687 Mr. MIEL50M. Do you think it would' simplify the 1688 operations?
1689 Mr. ZECH. Absolutely.
Simplify it and make it safer 4
v
.PAGE 71 l
MAMEs IIF197030 thoro's no question but that is the way to go, 1690 However, do you think s' law calling.for 5 e
1691 Mr. MIEL50X.
managers will automatically solve the problem?
-1692 1693
~ Mr. EECH. Mot necessarily.
1694 Mr. MIEL50M. You cannot, by a stroke of the pan--
1695 Mr. EECH. No, I do not think so. -You cannot.really 1696 legislate or regulate quality, a.s we know, I do not think..
But on the other hand, I think a recognition of the 1697 imPortance of management involvement is certainly somethin 1698 I have noticed, on my visits to plants, as MI, 1699 important.
Studds was talking about earlier, and Chairman Markey, the 1700 is no question but management involvement is the key to 1701-So I think we have to recognize that.
1702 safety.
I am not so sure you can regulate that, but you must 1703 1704
. recognize it.
there certain non-regulatory aspect:
1705 Mr. XIELSOM. Are will improve management that you could recommend?
1706 1707 Mr. ZECH. I think so.
Most of them are in the area someway or another to encourage excellence of performance 1708 a real recognition that this is a demanding 1709 to encourage I
1710 technology.
It is not just another way to make steam.
does require an awful lot more disolpline and attention.t 1711 1712 detail.
Those are the kind of things that simply are attitud 1713 perhaps and I do not think you can legislate them but I 1714
PAGE 73 MAME: MIT197030 think you should rocognizo that they should bo impressed c.
1715 1716 upon nuclear managenent personnel.
1717 Mr. MIEL50M. M r '. Bernthal.
Mr. Mielson, I wanted to make a comment.
1718 Hr. BERMINAL.
earlier because Mr. Studds, I think, had raised a similar-1719 And that is how difficult I think the Commission hr 1720 noint.
Our foend this.nar.kgement issue to be, quite frankly.
1721 predictive powers, like everyone's I guess, are not very
-1722 as they say.
especially when the future is involved, 1723
- good, And if.you go back a little bit and look at a couple 1724 have.
We at recent examples, you see the problems that att 1725 In the 1726 not very good at assessing each management issues.
1727 case of Termi, for example, a plant that has had difficulties uith management and startup.
1728 I 'only have about one more minute,'let r-1729 Mr. MIELSOM.
ask--do I have one minute.
1730 1731 Mr. BERMINAL. I am sorry.
MIELSOM. Chairman Markey asked for a list of the 1732 Mr.
the last time we met.
Mave you revise 1733 performers in May, since you gave the off the cuff names last timer?
1734 that I think we have, Mr. Mielson, slightly.
1735 Mr. EECH.
Mr. MIEL50M. Would you provide that for the Committs 1736 I think we have provided it to the Committ 1737 Mr. EECH.
1738 Mr. MIELSON. One last, in view of the U.S. Mavy's 1:
success in getting performance indicators and your desir<
1739
_-_._____________._--__.-.___.m
PAGE 73
- NAME: MIT197030 do that, would you also--for the cosaittaa--discuss how, in 1740' view of the Navy's failure, you could do it in the.MRC?
4 1741 I do not know'about the Navy's failure.;I dc 1742 Mr. EECH.
The Navy has not faf. led in that regard, as far
.1743 understand.
1744 as I know.
Wall.-I guess it is a matter of grades,.JH 1745 Mr. MIEL50X.
1746 C, or whatever you are talking about.
1747 I thank the Chairman.
I realise we 40 have to go for and I thank the Commissioners for coming.
1748
- vote, Mr. MARKEY. We will take a brief recess for about ten 1749 And then we There is a roll call on the floor.
1750 minutes.
1751 will reassemble.
1752 (Recess,1 Chairman, according to your testimony-1753 Mr. MARKEY. Mr.
held management meetings with Boston Edison Company-1754 MRC 1984 to' aPProximately every six weeks until September of 1755 1756 monitor Progress of the 1982-ordered management in Why did these meetings stop 1757 improvement Program.
1758 september of 1984, Mr. Chairman?
I would like to call on Dr. Murley, Please 1759 Mr. EECH.
1760 respond to that, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MARKEY. Dr. Murley, could you once again some 40 1 1761 l
1762 to the table?
1763 Mr. MURLEY. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
As one of the action it was for the utility to Put in Pla 1764 we required in 1982,
PAGE 74
.' MAME: MIp197030 I
They-did that. It was o 1765 a performance improvement plan.
comprehensive plan that again focused on the problems that
,1766 and part of that plan was to have management 1767 we saw in 1982, We!
meetings between the MRC and Boston Edison periodically.
1768 1769 did that.
1770 The plan wct completed in late 1984.
I saw no need f e-1771 meetings on that plan.
Suite frankly, I saw that the problems were deeper than just were being addressed by the 1772 so.that is why we. stopped.
1773 performance improvement. plan, q
At the time, ther.
MARKEY. So just let me clarify.
1774 Mr.
were you satisfied as to the adequacy and sufficiency of th 1775 management changes which had been made at Boston Edison?
1776 1777 Mr..MURLEY. No, sir.
As I said, the meetings.that we having were focused on this performance improvement plan 1778 1779 that, it was becoming clear to me late last f all, were. not At abot 1780 really getting to the root causes of the problem.
1781 the same time--
1782 Mr. MARKEY. Excuse me.
By last fall, do you mean 196 1783 1985?
i The fall of 1984.
I'm sorry.'
1784 Mr. MURLEY. Excuse me.
that as the plan was finished, we stopped having those 1785 I should say that we continue to has 1786 particular meetings.
I periodic meetings with the company on specific management 1787 and we continued those.
1788 issues as they come up, 1789 Mr. MARKEY. So at that point, then, in September of
'pAGE 75 MAME: IIT197030 you oscolated rathor then relaxed the acount of conitoring {
1790 1791 that you were conducting?
1792 Mr. MURLEY. No, we changed the focus, I think would b s
I stopped the periodic meetings on the 1793 way to say it.
We changed, performance plan because it was completed.
1794 i
to look at the enforcement problems we were having 1795
- then, 1796 radiological controls and other areas.
But even with your change of focus, then, 1797 Mr. MARKEY.
program that you were conducting did not work in terms of 1798 1799 the final result, which is this hearing?
Keep in mind that our focus was ki:
1800 Mr. MURLEY. Yes.
1801 changed by the fact that all through 1984 they had an a very long cutage to replace the cracked piping.
1802
- outage, 1803 As a result of that, we had an intense inspection program and I followed that pretty closely myself, but they did a!
1804 1805 good job on that.
But with regard to the. underlying management probles 1806 they really only came into focus to me in 1807 we see today, January of this year when we completed our SALP evaluatic 1808 1809 that covered the 1985 period.
So then the process which was in place 1 1810 Mr. MARKEY.
fully capable of identifying this underlying management 1811 1812 problem--
1813 Mr. MURLEY. I think that is fair.
of the op Mr. MARKEY.--of all of these years, then, 1814
__.m___.__.m.___.__
FAGE 76 MAME: MIT197030 1815 of the plant.
As I said, we only do a SALP once a-year, a:!
1816 Mr. MURLEY.
that is when everything gets pulled together, and at least 1817 We did for me it came into focus in January of this year._
1818 not have indicators that showed trends during the year, and 1819 the outage in 1984 kind of distorted the trend 1820 as I said, 1821 because they did that t' sty well.
Lat me asX you, then, Dr. Murley, how woule 1822 Mr. MARKEY.
you characterize the assurances that were given to you by 1823 Boston Edison back in 1982 as to their commitment to 1824 rectifying Problems at the plant?
1825 I didn't t I was not in this job in 1982.
1826 Mr. MURLEY.
But I did review the changes ths.t they 1827 the job until 1983, and they were guite comprehensive. They brought in a 1828
- made, the senior vice president from another yart of the company, 1829 vice President for nuclear operations fror.
1830 hired an outside and they changed plant managers.
1831 another company, But they did not correct the root problem.
1832 Mr. MARKEY.
1833 Mr. MURLEY. It turned out that that was--
l They moved the chairs around a little bit 1834 Mr. MARKEY.
ultimately they never got to the core problem.
1835 1836 Mr. MUELEY. As it turns out, that is correct, 1837 Mr. MARKEY. That is correct.
Okay.
Let me move on te l
1838 next question.
j a number of Massachusetts politicians an 1839 As you know, 1
fe --__-
PAGE 77
,' MAME: 217197030 organizations hevo submittod a show ocuso potition under tho 1840 regulations at 10 CPR 2.206 requesting that MAC suspend
-1841 1842 pilgrim's operating license.
The first question is what standard must be met by petitioners-who are requesting a 1843 1844 hearing, Mr. Chairman?
Can I ask my Office of. General Counsel, Mr.
1845 Mr. EECH.
1846 parler, to respond to that questionf.
If the gentleman would identify himself it 1847 Mr. MARKEY.
1848 the record.
I as the gene:
1849 Mr. PARLER. My name is Willias parler.
1850 counsel of the agency.
You don't know what that stan 1851 Mr. MARKEY. Excuse me.
1852 is, Mr. Chairman?
1853 Mr. ZECH. I know there is a standard, but I think it be appropriate to give you specifics, Mr. Chairman, and I 1854 the office of General Counsel gi-1855 would auch prefer.to have you those specifics, with your permission.
1856 I recognize the counsel for that purpose.
1857 Mr. MARKEY.
The general standard for hearings is in 1858 Mr. PARLER.
1859 Section 189 of the Atomic Energy Act.
Any person who demonstrates that the person's interest may be affected b' 1860 proceeding or by a situation, that is the touchstone for.
1861 1862 hearings.
Now, do you believe that the standard yo-1863 Mr. MARKEY.
just enunciated is being met in this particular case?
1864
yagg 7g-MAME NIF197030
+
1865' Mr. PARLER. In what contoxt, sir?
1866 Mr. MARKEY. The show cause petition.
I only heard about the show cause petitior
.1867 Mr. PARLER.
It is my impression that it was just 1868 this morning.
1869 received.
If I any interrupt, Mr. Chairman, I just ses 1870 Mr. EECH.
I don't think general counsel has had 1871 last night myself.
chance to review it. I have only seen it briefly. I can 1872 that we are going to look at all the 1873 assure you, though, items presented to us very carefully, and the staff has $u 1874 We will review received the report probably this morning.
1875 and certainly any of those that hev 1876 those items carefully, safety implications, we will review with the greatest of 1877 care and don't intend to start up the plant until at least 1878 those safety items that we determine are resolved.,
1879 It seems to me that in this particular ca 1880 Mr MARKEY.
quoting from NRC-generated documents, 1881 the petitioners are 1882 and that on that basis alone, they seem to have some 1883 material relevance to the question.
1884 Mr. ZECH. I an sure the do, Mr. Chairman.
All I car.
We staply need time to review then carefully.
1885 1s that we 1886 intend to do that.
Can I ask historically how many show cau:
1887 Mr. MARKEY.
in foot, been recognized t 1888 petitions over the years have, 1889 the Commission?
PAGE 79 NAME: MIT197030 Mr. Forlo'r, con you rosPend to that, plooso ?
1890 Mr. EECH.
1891 Mr. FARLER. I don't have the numbers.
There have been quite a few Section 2.206 petitions that have been filed.
1892 out of the number that have been filed, I think'that 1893 relatively few have resulted in hearings.
1894 What I am saying is out of hundreds that at 1895 Mr. MARKEY.
have been filed over the history of the Commission, are we 1896 talking about one hearing that might have been granted, or-1897 What is the range we are talking about?
1898 five, or fifty?
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I woul 1899 Mr. PARLER.
like to get that information and supply it for the record.
1900 1901 I just don't have it in my head.
1902 Mr. MARKEY. Commissioner Asselstine, do you have any i
1903 information?
1904 Mr. A55EL5 TIME. Mr. Chairman, I think it is a,ery sai v
that I can remember is the Indian Point 1905 number.
The one I think that proceeding was begun as 1 1906 special Proceeding.
A second c:
result of petitions filed with the Commission.
1907 1908 that is somewhat analogous, at least, I think, is the 1.
That was a special 1909 question of restart of TMI Unit proceeding that the Commission on its own initiative began 1910 At least Indian Those are the two that I can think of, 1911 Foint is the only one I can recall that resulted from 1912 yetitions being filed with the Commission, 1913 1914 Mr. MARKEY. So it's a handful, at best.
-y FAGE.
80
,' xnMEs. NIT 197030 1
1915 Mr. 155ELSTIME. That'sright,boccusointhasocases1l
. i a matter of discretion on the part of.the Commission whethel 1916 1917 it chooses to grant a hearing, as opposed to licensing in which as long as individuals can establish that 1918
- cases, they.have an interest and at least one valid issue, they as, 1919 entitled to a hearing as a matter of right.
1920 EECH..But I would like to Point out, Mr. Chairman.
1921 Mr.
just to make sure the record is correct, that we review al.
1922 those allegations with great care and respect and make wha 1923 I believe is a very competent judgment.
1924 1925 Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairatn.
Let me move on.
1926 If a utility today, Mr. Chairman, were to approach it and to ask for a license'to construct and operate and 1927 General Electric boiling water reactor with a Mark I desis 1928 could and would the XRC license it?
1929 1930 Mr. EECH. We would review their request, like we wou:
1931 request, Mr. Chairman.
Could it meet current regulatory standar$
1932 Mr. MARKEY.
We would have to subject it to the standar.
1933 Mr. ZECH.
We would have to subject it to the modifications we have 1934 the severe accident policy and other thing 1935 ande recently, I
I think there would ha changes that we would require.
1936 would say right off-hand that there would be some 1937 modifications that would be required to that particular 1938 1939 design in 1986.
9
i PAGE S1
'MAME: NIF197030 1940 Mr. MARKEY. Substantial changes?
i I think that I would prefer to say there wouJ 1941 hr. EECH.
be changes, but I think you could tern them substantial, I 1942 I would have to--
1943 suppoca.
Mr. map. KEY. Now would you ters them?
j i
1944
{
I would say that they would be changes that 1
1945 Mr. EECH.
I would upgrade the ; plant in accordance with--
1946 i
1947 Mr. MARKEY. Minor changest 1948 Mr. EECH. Changes, Mr. Chairman.
Not minor, and perhs' s.
's not really substantial, but more on the substantial side 1949 1950 than on the minor side.
1951 (Laughter.)
s Mr. Asselstine, we are having great diset 1952 Mr. MARKEY.
in this subcommittee and in Congress in general as to the 1953 need to go towards standardized nuclear plant design. Wou:
1954 that we you reconnend shat this plant design be the one 1955 select to build to or 30 nuclear power plants?
1956 1957 Mr. ASSELSIINE. I guess I wouldn't, Mr. Chairman. We 1958 one more of these to license.
We have the Hope Creek poi:
I the Commission before too long.
1959 probably coming before the last of that generatic think that is the last Mark I, i
1960 For myself, I would say for any futura plant, not $v 1961 G.E. Mark I design, but for any futura plant it does seen 1962 ne that we need to take a hard look at contsinnent 1963 and we ought to insist upon some substantia 1964 performance, l
PAGE 82
,' MAME: MIT19703C
~'
both in the cocidont provention sid.
1965 improvements in sofoty, But and in the containment performance side.
1966 of the house doubt you would ever see another application for a Mark I 1967 Utilities simply wouldn't 1968 containment in this country.
But that doesn't mean we don't need to deal 1969 choose one.
with the problem for the existing plants.
- 19T0, 1971 Mr. MARKEY. I have to interrupt again.
There is anot)
There as orly five minutes left it 1972 roll call on the Floor.
No will take another ten-minute recess and then 1973 go.
1974 reconvene at that point.
I apologize to one and all.
1975
[ Recess. ]
1976 Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, you ha it completed any stat 4
1977 which you wish to make?
1978 Mr. ASSELSTIME. Mr. Chairman?
1979 Mr. MARKEY. Commissioner Asselstina?
I wanted to add one additional point, 1980 Mr. ASSELSTINE.
on the question of when would the commission grant 1981
- could, 1982 hearing in the case of a show cause petition.
And I thin) based on previous Commission decisions--notab.
1983 the answer, in the Indian point case--is if the Commission determined 1984 the basis of the review of the petition, that the petitio 1985 I
raised a substantial safety question, then the Commission 1986 1987 would grant a hearing.
The Indi occurred very zarely in the past.
1988 Ihat hrs l
point case is the only case in which the Commission has l
1989 o
l 1
l L
l
e, PAGE
$3 NAME: MIF197030 c
And granted a hearing that I hevo been oblo to identify.
1990 l
aven that.one was.done,.I think in large measure, as a 1991 1992 discretionary matter.
Mr. MARKEY. Commissioner Bernthal.
1993 i
I wanted to add a short comment, gettinf l 1994 Mr. BERXTHAL.
I think
/
back to Mark I containment issue, Mr. Chairman.
1995 there is one illuminating possible answar to that and that 1996 is that there is a Mark II and a Mark III containment toda 1997 And therefore, it seems unlikely that the Commission wouli 1998 Insten approve something to build a plant that was Mark I.
1999 they would ask them why have you not come in with a Mark f
2000 2001 III, probably.
2002 Mr. MARKEY. Let me move on then.
Mr. Chairman,-and I would like to ask you about your 2003 perhaps Dr. Murley, the results of a survey conducted by Boston 2004. reaction to earceived problems, Edison of some of its employees abot.*
2005 conducted late last year obtained the followi:
2006 Ihe survey,
T Boston Edison staff about the MRC 2007 comments from the regulatory climate is seen as oppressive and stressful.
2008 current regulatory climate creates a halter skelter 2009 environment that results in coniksed, multi-focused work 2010 The regulator is seen as too attentive to 201 1 behavior.
inconsequential detail and he is perceived as an antagoni 2012 who are highly dedicated to quality 201 3 even to those 2014 performance.
PAGE S4 NAME: MIT197030 I
2015 Mr. EECH. May I rospond brioily?
l Mr. MARKEY._Could you comment on that?
2016 2017 Mr. EECH. Yes.
I would like to, and then I will ask D.
2018 Murley to elaborate briefly.
{
We hear commenti All I can say, Mr. Chairman, is this.
2019 2020 like that from time to time, sometimes we are told that ou regulatory people are much'too conscientious.and they are 2021 2022 much too involved in details.
Other times we hear just the that they perhaps should be involved more.
2023
- opposite, but it doe 2024 Frankly, we are trying to strike a balance, too much when I hear comments that our 2025 not bother me regulatory people are conscientious or even overly 2026 I would prefer to heer those comments than 2027 conscientious.
But I would like to ask Dr. Murley to address you:
2028 others.
2029 specific question.
2030 Mr. MARKEY. Dr. Murley, let me interject this before And that is that it is heartening to know that 2031 respond.
Boston Edison conducts these kinds of-surveys in order to, 2032 But at the obtain worker problem identification.
2033 in fact, what I hear is that this reveals an attitude tt 2034 same time, causes probicas in terms of a solid working relationship j
2035 Letween the utility and the regulatory that would, in fact 2036 guarantee that we do have properly implemented safety 2037 2038 procedures st the plant.
Would you agree with that?
As Chairman Each said, we hear com 2039 Mr. MURLEY. Yes.
G-_
FAGE SS MAMEi NIF197030' I instruct cy staff that wo like that from'tico.to't100.
2040 are public servants and our goal is to_ protect the public 2041 2042 ~ health and safety.
At the same time, we have to act I think we are doint
? professionally with the licensee.
2043 2044 that.
There are some people in the plants and to some extent' 2045 That is, if the '
stems from the attituda of the management.
2046 weloose MRC's involvement and if they realise that we have 2047 then that attitude gets pushed out in to 2048 role to perform, sometimes, in some of 2049 the plant, tas we do not see that, the best run plants in the region.
2050 guite frankly, of But I think there was an attitude, 2051 defensiveness on the Part of the management at Boston 2052 Edison. And this was reflected down at the. lower levels,-2 2053 2054 an afraid.
2055 Mr. MARKEY. Again, Dr. Murley, I am not commenting up I think that you are heading the work that you have done.
2056 2057 in the right direction.
And my point, I guess, is that 14 f
in order to ensure that-l just has not gone far enough yet, 2058 there is the Proper relationship that is structured betwe<<!
2059 you and the reguinted utility.
2060 206 1 Mr. MUELEY. I agree.
Mr. MARKEY. That concludes this round of questioning l 2062 Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts.
206 3 Mr. STUDDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I apologize te 2064
PAGE 46-NAME: MIp197030 No ens ever said oui of you whose sto cchs any'bo rumbling.
2065 procedures here were particularly rational.
2066 I would like to ask a question, if I say, on the subia 2067 And it may be that.Dr. Murley may b 2068 of emergency planning.
I leave that to the most appropria+e person to respond.
2069 2070 you.
MRC regulations. require that the Commission make :
2071 Th9 finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate i
2C72 protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a 2073 2074 radiological emergency.
Do you--maybe this is really, I guess, to Dr. Murley, 2075 Do you personally have confidence 2076 the closest on-scene.
including that both onsite and offsite emergency plans, 2077 evacuation plans, for pilgrim are adeguate and workab2e?
2078 2079 Mr. MURLEY. Yes, I do.
There has been an emergency at least, exercise every year for the last several years, 2080 the pilgrim site and in the ten mile emergency planning 2081 observed those exercises myself.
2082 zone.
I have And TEMA has given us e--in some cases, I should say, 2083 Ihose have bc have been deficiencies that PEMA has found.
2084 But on corrected in subsequent emergency exercisas.
2085 balance, I am satisfied that the plans are adeguate and a-2086 2087 workable.
2088 Mr. STUDDS. Just for the record, can you--or someone here--clarify for us the legal responsibility for the 2089
PAGE-87 MAME: MIT197020 development cnd th3 10picsontation of ocergency ovoountion 1090 Now does that responsibility spread between TEMA, 2091 plans?
2092 between the NRC, between the state government and between 2092 local governments?
And is there someone else involved?
An 2094 who is responsible for what?
I would like to ask Mr. Parler to respond te 2095 Mr. EECH.
Mr. Studds, our Office of General Counsel.
2096
- that, For the.onsite emergency plan, that is the 2097 Mr. PARLER.
2098 licensee's responsibility.
To the extent that the ensite that is' planning might interface with the offsite planning, 2099 a combination of TEMA and.MRC's responsibility l 2100 kind of like offsite planning and the review of the adequacy o 2101 Tor the and local plans, that is TEMA's responsibility.
2102 the state to handl TEMA has its regulations in 44 CTR part 250, 2103 for the review of a state and local 2104 requests by state 2105 government offsite plans.
In the absence of such a reques 2106 to TEMA, under part 250, the NRC and TEMA have memoranda c understanding under which the TEMA examines the offsite 2107 and provides information and reports to the NRC.
2108 planning assurance finding that The NRC makes the final reasonable 2109 you zaferred to earlier, in some of your remarks.
2110 3111 Nr. STUDB5. I think I understand that.
Who is responsible for developing the plan that tellt :
211 2 for a radius of ten citizens in and arour.d the utility, 211 3 l'
miles in some circumstances I gather--and perhaps up to 5 l l
2114
FAGE SS MAME: MIT197030 l
2115 miles, what they cro to do?
Whose sospensibility is it"to L.
2116 develop that Plan?
offsite plan is the responsibility of 2117 Mr. PARLER. The 2118 state and looni governments.
The state and local governments?
2119 Mr. STUDDS.
L If the state and local government-l 2120 Mr. FARLEp.. Yes.
there is a provision that the utility 2121 refuses to do so, 2122 itself may develop an offsite plan.
FEMA reviews the 2123 offsite plan.
Now many concurrences or approvals in tha 2124 Mr. STUDDS.
Plan are necessary in order for the utility to operate? De 2125 2126 the governor hava to approve the plan?
I am not familiar with the details on-th:
2127 Mr. PARLER.
2128 Mr. STUDDS. He does nott 2129 Mr. PARLER. I do not know.
2130 Mr. STUDDS. Oh, you do not know.
2131 Mr. FARLER. The governor could well--depending upon -
governor, delega* e authority to a stat 2132 preferences of the 2133 official.
I did not mean the gover' 2134 Mr. STUDDS. Oh, of course.
to does the state government have 2135 personally.
I mean, 2136 approve the plan?
The state has to approve the state plan, 2137 Mr. PARLER.
2138 Mr. STUDDS. All right.
In the absence of the approv could the utility operate, if the state were to disappros 2139
FAGE 89
.' XAME: NIF1'97030
.the plan er to withhold its opprovn17 2140 If the utility has an offsite plan of Ats e 2141 Mr. PARLER.
and if, under the circumstances, the Nuclear Regulatory 2142 Commission is able to make the reasonable' assurance finding;
= 2143 then if all other things were satisfactory, the utility 2144 2145 could operate.
Even in the presence of a disagrescent by 4 2145 Mr. STUDDS.
2147 state,.with,the plant Ne are getting close now to live issues thi 2148 Mr. FARLER.
2149' are outstanding.
I am glad to hear that.
I am pleased, I 2150 Mr. STUDDS.
2151 think.
In a proceeding which is--you know, under 2152 Mr. PARLER.
adjudication before the Commission, another proceeding.
2153 I am not asking--I beg your pardon. Staff 2154 Mr. STUDD5.
me your reference is to another case with which you are 2155 My questions I am not trying to do that at all.
2156 dealing.
are generic and general.
2157 I an interested in knowing whether if the governor of 2158 or the state government through whatever mechanisa 2159
- state, disapproves or f ails to approve a plan or positive 11-2160
- acts, disapproves a plan, can the utility operate nonetheless, a
$161 given MRC approval of the plan?
2162 There is a provision which says that unds 2163 Mr. PARLER.
such circumstances there can be a utility offsite plan. I:
2164 1
PAGE fo
,[
M&ME: MIp197020
.that plcn is othorviso satisfactory, from the MRC s 2165 and Mr.C makes the reasonable assurance finding, 2166 standpoint, as far as the administrative decision is concerned the plar 2167 2168 could operate.
Mr. STUDD5. Well, who would implement it in that case, 2169 not the state and local governments?
2170 Mr. PARLER. The utility.
2171 Mr.-STUDta. The evacuation plan?
2172 l
Mr. PARLTR. That is the theory, yes.
2172 Por hundreds of thousands of people?
2174 Mr. STUDDS.
I am telling you what.my understanding of 2175 Mr. PARLER.
If you have a state whic. does not approve 2176 situation.is.
'the plan and does not have a plan, there is a provision 2177 which contemplates--at least in theory--that there could )
2178 2179 utility offsite plan.
I want to auke sure I understand you. An 2180 Mr.. STUDDS.
belabor this point and I assume you have not-2181 not wa'a tr in the country.
Br encountered such a situation to date, 2182 you are suggesting the possibility of assigning generic 2183 in terms of public police powers to a private utility, 2184 of approval by ordering public evacuation in the absence 2185 state or loomi government, if I underste34 you correctly 2186 Mr. PARLER. We are talking about a different plenti 2187 2188 different case.
I am not talking about any particular c-2iS9 Mr. STUDDS.
a FAGE 91 MAME. MIT197030 as talking generally about uhet the regulatory and statutoryi!
2190' l
situation is, with which we all deal here.
2191 to the best of my 2192 Mr. PARLER. I have described to you, ab Alty, what the statutory or the legal innescape,is. What 2193 at leart as I understand it, is how 2194 you are asking me, specific matters would be resolved in a specific case and I 2195 f
cannot get into that at this point?
2196 Believe me, I am not trying to be specific 2197 Mr. STUDDS.
Is the approval of the MRC itself necessary for an 2198 here.
evaluation Plan, for the utility to operate?
2199 Iha XRC has to make th a reasonable assurar 2200 Mr. PARLER.
(
2201 finding.
2202 Mr. STUDDS. It does?
2203 Mr. PARLER. Yes, sir.
Is the approval of FEMA also necessary?
2204 Mr. STUDDS.
It all depends on what the situation is.
2205 Mr. PARLER.
the NRC gets the best input that it can from TEMA and it i 2206 not my Present view in all cases that the approval of TEMA 2207 2208 would be absolutely necessary.
But the final authority rects with the X7 2209 Mr. SIUDDS.
2210 Mr. FARLER. Yes, sir.
Okay, I have two gentismen here who wish 2211 Mr. STUDDS.
2212 respond.
Go right ahead.
Studds, I just want to make the cor.
2213 Mr. BERXTHAL. Mr.
that there should be no question that the final authority 2214
)
--_.1
e FAGE 92 NAMES EIT197030
.2215 rests with the NRC.
It would be o groot surpriso, I think to any of us here if the XRC woule approve a plan that TEM.
2216 2217 had not approved.
2218 With respeed to the other issue that Mr. Parler is understandably '.ving some difficulty with.
It does touch 2219 vn a current matter befc;e the Commission.
2220 very cle,.ar I assure you that was not my intention.
2221 Mr. STUDDS.
2222 Mr. BERXTMAL. No, I understand that.
But the point i 2223 that strictly, my understanding of the law as it reads is 2224 principle--in fact, the law was designed that way.
I thir 2225 in principle the Commission could approve i utility plan.
2226 think how that all shakes out, as a legal matter, is a ro:
traveled down yet and we may be traveling dow:
2227 we have not 2228 sometime in the future here.
2229 Mr. 2ECH. It should be pointed out, Mr. Chairman, as that we have not exercised this option in the 2230 well know, It is nearby now that we night be involved in such 2231 past.
l 2232 option, but you should now and it should be very clear th It would be precedent 2233 this has not.come up in the past.
2234 setting if we did it in the future.
I 2235 Mr. STUDDS. Commissioner Asselstine?
Mr. ASSELSTIME. kr. Studds, I was going to make man) 3236 Just one fins 2237 the points that Commissioner Bernthal did.
2238 point.
I think the ultimate decision that the Commission hs 2239 I
FAGE 93 MAME: RIF197030 make.,given the advice that wo hovo reco1vod from the 2240 2241 Tederal Emergency Management Agency, as well as participant 4 2242 in individual cases is first, is the plan adequate?
And 2243 second, if it is called upon to work, will it work?
L And that second issue, in particular, involves precise 2244 the kinds of questions that you raised-and that the-2245 in tt Commission will have to be addressing fairly.guickly, 2246 2247 context--
2248 Mr. DTUDDS. That is precisely--again, speaking genera 2 2249 as trying to get'at.
Presumably, the only people realistically who could implement such a plan, in the event 2250 would be the state and local police forces 2251 of an energency, 2252 Mr. ASSELSTIME. That is right.
2253 Mr. STUDDS. If you do not have their approval or 2254 cooperation, there will be no evacuation.
Not even,a pray, But there certain' 2255 of it.
There may or may not be anyway.
2256 would not be in the absence of that.
So that was my 7.257 concern.
2258 one more thing on this, if I may--not that there--I t' frankly.
have raised more questions than we have answered, 2259 2160 According to the 1986 5 ALP--am I getting good at acronyms this field, Mr. Chairman--Boston Idison has failad to amil ;
l I
2261 informational brochures to the general public, educating 2262 those who live near pilgrim about what to do in an 2263 And the operation of the plant's alert systen, 2264 emergency.
e PAGE 94 NAME: NIF197020
'hos siollarly boon 2265 to notify resident.s of en onergoney, s
Ihose two emergency planning activities, as I'
$266 delayea.
understand it,i are the responsibility.of the. utility..
- 2267, If I am correct, when should each iten have been 2268 s
2269 completed?
When was it or when will it be?
And what is th, 2270 MRC doing about it?
Mr. EECH.'Dr. Murley, would you respond please?
2271 I na sorry, I 40 mot have current today 2272 Ex. MU,RLEY.
I understand that the company As going over 2272 information.
their mailing list now and checking to find out just exact 2 2274 But I will have to t
2275 who is in the energency planning zone.
2276 Provide that information later.
You mean street lists or lists of officia;1
'2277 Mr. STUDDS.
I do not know how they are going'about ths 2278 Mr. MURLEY.
Well, we certainf;' are not ready for an 2279 Mr. STUDD5.
That would seem to be clear.
Does anyone 2280 emergency now.
I realise the plant.
2281 argue with that general observation?
but the plant has been operating for some 2282 not operating, No time and clearly-we ate not' prepared for an energency.
2282 have not got our mailing lists in order.
2284 I hora we are not going to resort to sail in the even 2285 1886 an emergency.
2287 (Laughter.)
2288 Mr. MURLEY. That is just the point.
We do not rely o The mailing lists are to provide informatic 2289 mailing list.
PAGE 95 o
I: MAMEs.EIF197030
~
2290 of a genercl bockysound meturo for 700710 on how they shou; respond when they hear-sirens and that sort of-thing.
2291 Mr. Studds,-if I could addian additioJ-2292 Mr. ASSEL5 TIME.
I appreciate Mr. Murley's comments earlier about 2293 comment.
but it doe' his view of the adequacy of emergency planning, 2294 seem to me that there are enough guestions here that this 2295 2296 really deserves a fresh look.
1 I had the impression, quite frankly, during'ay visit 2297 Monday that all of the participants in this process may ne 2298 l
l
.have been working.together quite as well or as c ose y as-2299
'h
. 2300 all would have liked.
Not just the MRC but also the and local governments and FEMA as wel) 2301 licensee, the state And I think it really needs a fresh look.
2302 2303 Mr. STUDD5. I appreciate that.
Let me say that I thank the chairman for forbearance 2304 2305 know time has more than expired.
t I. understand from staff that the alert system was to 2306 2307 been in pince by 1981 or '82 at the latest.
I can assure you, Dr. Murley, as you must know given the time you span.
l 2308 that among those:who are unaware of what they are 2309
- there, supposed to do in the event of an emergency are virtually 2310 all of the people who would be affected by that amargency 1811 they do not have a clue of what they are supposed to do.
2312 Which says to me that someone has not done something 2313 l
ought to have been done, by way of informing the public.
2314 4
'\\'.
e er
~
PAGE 96 e
MAME8.NIF197030 2315 Ihat, of courso, skips tho tool fundccontol question, which 2316 is even if there was a plan and if everyone had.been 2317 ~ informed.about it, is it'within the realm of reality.to 2318
'eMpect that in a genuine emergency, with public panic 2319
-prevailing, that it could be carried out.
Let me say, Mr. Chairman, that the question'that comes 2320 2321 sy mind--and I apologize for the time--is how long do we-->
2322 the. Commission, we the Congress, we the. country--how pation 2323 are we to be in a situation where fundamental errors have 2324 been committed and repeated and repeated again?
It reminds ne a bit of the cid saying that if a man ic 2325 2326 _you once, shame on him.
And if he fools you twice, shame c 2327 you.
I grasp for an analogy.
I do not know what it is, bt' 232M I cannot imagine that we would permit--you were a Navy man.
2329 understand sir?
2330 Mr. ZECH. Yes, sir.
2331 Mr. STUDDs. Some officers in charge of nuclear weapons opportunities to make fundamental mistakes before t h e '.
2332 many 2333 were replaced.
I do not think that is the precise analogy
'2334 I suppose those in charge of the space shuttle would not b 2335 given too many opportunities to make maior mistakes before
$336 it was decided that somebody else probably ought to handle-2337 that.
I do not know what the proper analogy is and I honest:
2338 2339 not know, if I were in your shoes, what precisely to do ani-1
XAMEs MIF197030)
FAGE 97.
2340 when.
But I think, os Cocaissionst Assolstino hos just said, that one thing that everybody ought to.be able to 2341
?
2342 ' agree e,n is that we certairsly have before usJanough' substantial, substantive, unanswered guestions t 2343 troubling, raise the yellow flag of caution and to proceed very, very 2344 2345 slowly until those quastions are answered.
-Thank you, Mr 2346 Chairman.
We intend to proceed with caution, with aLva; 2347 Mr. EECN.
deliberate and thoughtful approach to all the problems of i
2348
)
2349 pilgrim, Mr. Studds.
I can assure you that we do feel 2350 responsible for our activities and we feel' accountable for 2351 them, and we intend to carry them out in any areas, 2352 emergency planning or other areas.
If we feel that action l should be taken, everything within our area of 2353 2354 responsibility will be taken.
We take t ;r res,ponsibilitie 2)SS for thu public health and safety very seriously. I can j
2356 assure you we are scang to act with responsibility in this-2357 area.
2358 Mr. STUDDS. Thank you.
2359 Mr. MARKEY. The gentleman's time has eMpired.
1 To the gentleman from Massachusetts I would like to sl 2360 him assurances that this subcommittee has been given one c 2361 the largest subcommittee staffs in Congress because of the 2362 2363 nature of the duriadiction that we have and the great consequences for the public health and safety if mistakes 2364 l
l o
r
~-
e ca
- PAGE.
98 I
.MAME '%Ii197030
[
and I givo hic ny ossurcnco that thoro'will be f
2365 are made, continued extensive probing of the MRC actions in responsa 2366 2367 to this hearing and questions raised in the state of I
Massachusetts as to the operation of this plant.
2358 Again, you have touched on in the courJe of your questa,
I
- 2369, a number of very broad public policy tuostions as well that "
L 2370 have served as continuing themes in oversight responsibility) 2371 1
2372 of this subcommittee in tho'past several years.
Many of them continue to go unresolved and without any final 2373 definition as yet arrived at by the MRC in terms of'what 2374 2375 their policies will be.
assurances to the gentleman from Massachuset-2376 do I give in that we will continue to submit questions to the NRC, 2377 written form if not a reconvening of the subcommittee to 2378 ensure that a11' issues are raised and answered.
2379 Today's subcommittee hearing reminds me about the old 2380 2381 news / bad news jokes.
The good news is that the MRC is doin 2382 a good job of inspecting plants and finding problems.
The bad news is that the NRC is finding out about them.after th 2383 2384 plants have reached crisis situations.
For pilgrim, the good news is that the plant is now s) 2385 The had news, down and management changes are being made.
2386 however, is that this is the same situation we were facing 2387 There is good news in that both MRC and 2388 four years ago.
IMPO found major problems and brought them to Boston 2389 l
~
.1
,e.
~
MkhEs"NIF197030.
FAGE 99 t
2390 Edison's atto acn,, but tho truly bad crews is that.it i
2391 appears tha, despite all of this criticism, that Boston f
2392 Edison has failed to implement timely and effective 2393 corrective action.
i 2394 We thank this yanel for its testimony, 'andwithourthj 2395 we will now dismiss you to lunch and will request the secon j
2396 Panel, consistin9 of executives from the Boston Edison 2397 Company, to come forward to begin presentation of their 2398 testimony.
2399 Our next panel is Stepher. Sweeney, President of the Sc
~
2400 Edison Company.
We would request, Mr. Sweeney, that you 2401 identify any of those who may accompany you or assist you :
2402 your testimony today for the record, and that you limit yet 2403 opening statement to five minutes, with the assurances tha' you will be given every opportunity in the process of the 2404 2405 question and answer period to get in the points that you 2406 wish.
2407 So welcone, and please proceed.
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