ML20247F987
| ML20247F987 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 11/19/1985 |
| From: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | Asselstine, Palladino, Roberts NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20245D175 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-88-198 NUDOCS 8905300245 | |
| Download: ML20247F987 (98) | |
Text
. _ - . __ _ . - _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _
yW
- '..ps tu,o,,
UNITED STATES
<!' , o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
{ .
,I WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 November 19, 1985
'k*..../
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Palladino Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Commissioner Bernthal Commissioner Zech FROM: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION This is in response to your request for available information on EQ tests for Pilgrim.
During a telephone conversation late in the afternoon of November 15, 1985, the Boston Edison Company provided the status of tests for the five remaining items of its Equipment Qualification Program covered by its September 23, 1985 extension request. The five items consisted of Yarway level indicators, '
Fenewall-temperature switches, control switches (Electroswitch and General Electric (GE)), Type S1 cable and GE SIS cable. Up to the time of the November 15th telephone conversation, the licensee has successfully qualified Fenewall temperature switches and GE SIS cables. The tests for the Yarway i
switches have also been completed and fot.nd to be successful with the exception of some apparent anomaly which is being investigated. The licensee has stated that it expects the anomaly to be successfully resolve. The tests for the control switches have been completed and appear to be successful in the " closed contact" position. The "open contact" testing was incorrectly i
(
wi.ed by the Wyle Labs and will be retested by November 22, 1985. The testing
[ schedule of November 22, 1985 of S1 cable has not changed.
The licensee in a subsequent letter (enclosed), dated November 15, 1985, requests an extension of the schedule up to February 8,1986 for the purpose of completing the documentation for all the five items. This is based on its estimate that it will require approximately 10 weeks time from November 30, i
1985 to have the complete documentation file in place. The licensee comitted l
to provide the NRC staff with verbal status reports regarding test progress.
It anticipates providing a final written report on testing status prior to November 30, 1985.
$k"hg5B90523 p. ia Dirc JOHNSONBB-198 PDR xecutive Director .
.Jfor Operations I
(
Enclosure:
As stated [
E -- - a
I Y u ^
FAGE i
7 ,
GAME: NIF197030
) $
1 RPTS RILEY 2 AMX RILEY C ASSOCIATES, Ltd.
3 4 EIF197030 5 NEARING OM MAXAGEMEXT PROBLEMS 6 AT U.S. REACTOR 5--TRg yILoRIN CASE 7 NEDME5 DAY, JULY 16, 1986 8 Rouse of Representatives 9
Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power 10 Committee on Energy end Commerce 11 Washington, D.C.
12 13 14 at 9: 43 a.a 15 The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, the Monorable 16 Room 2322, Rayburn House office Building, 17 Edward J. Markey (chairman 1 presiding.
Sikorski, Moorhead, Frasent: Representatives Markey, 18 19 Mielson, and Studds.
Sidman, Chief Counsel and Stati Presents Lawrence R.
20 Udall, Professional Staff Mamba 21 Staff Directors Richard A.
staff Assistants and dessica Laverty, St Linda M. Correia, 13 Minority Counsel.
N 4/P A.
pagg 3 MAME :- NIr197030' i
24
-Mr. MARKEY. Good Gerning.
25 This is a' hearing of the Subcommittee of Energy 26 Conservation and Power on the Filgrin Muclear Fower Plant l 27 the state of Massachusetts.
28 At a May 22, 1986, the Subcommittee heard troubling 29 testimony from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regardinl The Nuclear 30 the safety of commercial atomic remotors.
31 Regulatory. commission testified that serious management plant and it 32 deficiencies plague more than one desen U.S.
33 despite this fact, the MRC has virtually no regulations -
This testimony followed-34 copa directly with the problem.
hearings in which the Commission 35 earlier Subcommittee 36 acknowledged that the rist of a core meltdown in the nex 37 years at a U.S. Plant was between 12 and 45 percent, although, allowing.for significant uncertainties, the t2 38 39 figure could be higher.
40 Today's hearing is intended to take a closer look 41 MRC's approach to utilities with management weaknesses ~
42 as a case study, the particular problems af fecting' 30st<
43 Edison's F11gria Nuclear Power Station in Plymouth, 44 Massachusetts.
45 My friend and colleague, Congressman Gerry studds,
- 46 represents the citizens of Flymouth and its surrounding 47 areas, specifically requested the Subconnittee to eva2t This hearing is inter 48 Pilgrim's problems and progress.
l
PAGE 3 MAME: MIp197030 e
49 to be fully responsivo to his interest ond concern.cnd that.
50 of many other-elected representatives from Massachusetts, 51 including Governor Michael Dukakis.
52 At the outset, I would like to call attention to the f 53 that there is some good news that should be taken note of today. The MRC has successfully focused the attention of 54 55 its staff, Boston Edison management and the general public
.This achievemer 56 on serious management problems at Pilgrim.
57 is particularly important because it has not been forced such as the 191 58 upon the agency as a result of near misses, 59 failure of the automatic shutdown system at salem, New in Jersey, or the 1985 loss of feedwater at Davis-Besse, 60 61 Ohio.
62 at the same time, it remains to be seen whether MRC h 63 done all that it could to enforce its regulatory standards 64 and whether its regulations are sufficient in the first f 65 place.
i 66 Indeed, despite MRC's strong oversight, it allowed p; to operate desP ite serious management failings. Mindsight 67 we must recogn always 20/20.
I think that in retrospect, 68 69 that Boston Edison, as well as a number of other problem 70 plants discussed in the Conmission's report to the Subcommittee, have substandard operations and management 7 1 extent public hea; 72 that it is unknown whether a..d to what 73 and safety has been jeopardized by thear operation.
____m_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _
i pact 4
,. XAME 'MIr197030 e
74 Congress and tho Acoriccn 700710 nover intended end wi.
75 never accept for nuclear reactors to operate with the types My.
76 of management deficiencies that have been disclosed.
77 views are not all that different from the anonymous nuclear 78 utility executive quoted in a recent edition of the Energy 79 Daily. Although the following quotation ysttains to Ranche 80 seco, it could just as easily _have mentioned the Pilgrim Both imp 0 41 plant. Why didn't XRC shut Rancho Seco down.
They must have known what war 82 and MRC let it go on and on.
Now 83 there.
How that it's ocHn, they say don't start-up.
84 that's a-different matter.
85 perhaps the most troubling aspect of the pilgrim saga f
86 that, despite criticism from MRC and the Institute for the 87 Muclear Operations, IXpo, year in and year out, 88 management problems at pilgrim largely went uncorrected. !
89 According to MRC's Tabruary 18, 1986 SALp report, Boston or'susta 90 Edison has an inability to improve performance, 91 improved performance once achieved. ;
An April 2, 1986 MRC report told Boston Edison that a 92
a prevailing v; 93 principal factor inhibiting progress was 94 in the organization that the improvements made to date ha-95 corrected the problems and a reluctance by management IXp0,
$6 acknowledge some problems identified by the XRC.
97 the industry's own self-policing organization, issued 98 reports detailing a myriad of problems, the most importan l
FAGE 5
' MAME8 RIT197030 99 aspect of which is that anny cro longstanding concerns 100 previously identified but uncorrected.
101 In short, the regulatory history of F11 grim shows that 102 'significant efforts by MRC and IMPO are no guarantee that In the case of 103 public health and safety will be protected.
104 Boston Edison, all of the attention and all of the 105 constructive criticism barely seems to have mattered.
106 The MRC and Boston Edison would have Th us all this time, things will be different now at Pilgrim.
107 108 company has made a nushcr of recent changes and should be These changes do not, however, 109 commended for doing so.
linger over t answer the fundamental questions which still 110 why did til company. My questions include the followings 112 Boston Idison's improvement efforts instituted af ter the Why did Boston Edison fail te 113 1982 record NRC fine fas.I' and IMPO about speerd.
114 head repeated warnings from the MRC 115 problons at the Pl ant? And how will Poston Edison 116 demonstrate to the MRC and the citizens of Massachu 117 that identified problems including overall management 118 weaknesses, have been corrected?
What lasting mechanisms will Boston Edison put in p; 119 And what 120 assure that any improvements are sustained?
l 12 1 measures will be undertaken to evaluate and potentially 122 modify Pilgrim's containment building to provide assuran:
$!3 that this final barrier between the reactor and the pubh l
=. - - - - - - - - _ - _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ -
<s PAGE 6
. ' M A ME 81* LIT 197 0 30 124 will not bo broochod in tho ovont of a cojor occidont ct tho i
125 plant?
l I as similarly Separate and apart from these questions, 126 127 interested in the adequacy of Pilgrim's offsite energency 128 Plan. !
129 I fully recognize that these questions are fundamental 130 rainedoubtsasto'whetherFilgrimshouldoperateatallandl l
131 if so, whether Boston Edison should be allowed to operata At the very least, I would expect that Boston Edison 132 it.
opportunity of the currant shutdown to make 133 would take the 134 all possible improvements and satisfy all outstanding.XRC and INFO concerns, Then, and only then, I would like to se 135 program approved and closely 136 some type of augmented startup of 137 monitored by the MRC that would include rigorous testing This special both hardware, operations and management.
138 139 startup progran should be at restricted Power levels and I
140 include a reassessment by MRC and Boston Edison of the I
entire management structure prior to full power operation.
141 I remain open to the ideas of others about what shoul 142 at a minimun, However, it is my strong belief that, 143 done.
144 Boston Edison must convincingly demonstrate that it is rea 145 and able to operate pilgrim and that doing so will be 146 consistent with public health and safety.
147 The Subconnittee's interest today extends beyond the l
' 148 particular problems at pilgrin and includes not only the
FAGE 7
. MAME: MIT197030 i
149' other problem plants, but tho odegucoy of MRC ond industry 150 efforts to cope with what must now be considered an 151 epidemic. I an impressed by the Commission's 152 acknowledgement in its testimony that despite its 153 achievements, it has not always succeeded in finding the 154 root cause of nuclear utility problems and in heading ther:
155 off before they reach crisis proportions.
156 The Subcommittee's investigation of Davis-Besse, for 157 example, disclosed that nuclear utility management probler are rivaled only by the HRC's own internal management 158 weaknesses.
I am happy that the Commission appears 159 160 committed to improving its regulatory process.
161 One area in which I think the Conmission must act is 162 extending its regulatory authority to include key managan 16'3 positions such as plant manager and senior corporate Utility officis 164 official responsible for nuclear energy.
165 in these two positions are more irportant to reactor safe Yet, while there 166 than any single control room operator.
the necessary 167 detailed Tederal regulations stipulating operators, the 168 qualifications and experience for reactot these 169 are no regulations promulgated by the NRC covering 170 Rey management posts.
17 1 That concludes the opening statement of the Chair.
Markey followsil IThe prepared statenant of Mr.
172 173
-i.
pagg. .g
,; ,J N A'ME 8 NIT 197030 .7
'1784
- INSERT ****DC3383
-l s
?.
I-t e
f l
l
l-p . . . ..
' PAGE. 9-
, MAME: MIT.197030 Mr. MARKEY. I now turn to tho genticcen'from Californis-175' 176 the ranking minority member, Carlos Moorhead.
177 Mr. MOORHEAD. Thank.you, Mr. Chairman.
178 I would first like to welcome Admiral Each, for his ne 179 job as Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
180 Mr. EECH. Thank you, s ir . -
Mr. M00RMEAD.
I am sure I speak for the Subocanittee 6 181 182 I say I wish him well and look forward to working together.
183 with him in the future.
184 Mr. EECH. Thank you, sir.
Mr.'MOORHEAD.
The subject of today's hearing is the ss 185 186 of nuclear power plants and how safe nuclear power operstit 187 relates'to management and other people related issues.
188 After the Three Mile Island accident, the Mamany Commissio-189 concluded that utility management must be responsible for 190 safety and accountable for its actions. Today, more than s.
191 years after that accident, the nuclear utilities have made 192 significant progress along these lines.
193 Among other things, these utilities have established 194 Institute for Muclear Fowaz Operations and the Nuclear These organizatic 195 Utility Management Resources Committaa.
. 196 are dedicated to improving the safety of nuclear power pie 197 operation and they have achieved some significant 198 improvements in the areas in which they have become 199 involved, such as the development and accreditation of
-i.-w.-- - . . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
PAGE to
. NAME: MIF197030 200 training.prograns ond tho dovolopcont of fitnoss for duty.
i
,201 programs.
202 In fact,'I understand that the MRC has stated that 203 industry, through the . Nuclear Utility Management Resources 204 Group, has accomplished more than the NRC could have 205 accomplished through regulation in the same period of time In the past, NRC regulation focused on design approva 206 More recently, it has 207 for plants under construction.
shiftad to operations reactors. It would be unfortunate i-208 209 the NRC were to adopt the same kind of proscriptive appros f r,I operating reactors that it has upplied to plant desigr.
210 211 and equipment issues in the past, people, whether they ar 212 nanagers or employees, cannot be required to have high Such qualities 213 morale or a desire to do things right.
214 cannot be evaluated by using a checklist or an audit Yet, these are the qualities which we must ha' 215 procedure.
216 in all nuclear plant personnel.
Huclear plant safety is vital and good management is 217 In addition, a 218 essential in achieving that safety.
as it is likely t 219 proscriptive approach would be avoided, 220 result in compliance with the literal letter of the 221 regulation, in order to avoid adverse enforcement action 222 the XRC.
223 Tor example, if MRC were to require that reactor set 224 minimized, pressure would be put on the operators to avo:
i I
PAGE 11 MAMEi MIT197030 scrams. Due to this prossuro, o seren cight not 60 -
225 Such a situation, obviously,.
226 initiated when it's needed. '
4 227 would not benefit the public.
228
' In the management area, MRC should provide. encoursgese' What is needed is an approach 229 and-incentives to excel..
ti 230 WNich ancourages nuclear plant personnel to be ever aler
~
221 ways to improve the safe operation of the plants. Utility 232 management must be ableoto take motions more comprehensive 233 than those necessary to meet MRC's regulations, in order'te; 234 achievs. this goal, as neither Congress nor the MAC could l 235 actually achieve good management through requiring'it by-236 statute or regulation.
I urge the MRC and industry to work together to devel 237 238 innovative approaches to achieving good management and to 239 fostering ever higher performance.by nuclear power plant 240 personnel.
241 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MARKEY.
The gentleman's time has expired.
242 243 The Chair recognizes the gentleman f rom Massachusetts 244 Studds.
I want to'begi.
245 Mr. STUDDs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
246 very personally conveying my thanks to you and the gentle.
247 from California, the gentleman from Minnesota, the seaber; 248 of the Subconnittee first of all for holding the hearing th 249 secondly for your hospitality and KinCness in allowing
12 FAGE
, , MAME: MIT197030 member, who does not sit on this subocomittoo, to 250 251 participate. I very'auch appreciate that.
I made the request, as you know, because my own l 252 253 constituents include both the immediate neighbors of the 254 Plant and thousands of others whose health would be put at 255 risk by any accident at the Pilgrim facility.
256 Mr. Chairman, I can tell you that many peoPla who liv. 1 257 work in the vicinity of F11 grim are frightened. For weeks 258 they were deluged with news reports about the Soviet nucle catastrophe at Chernobyl. On the heels of this tragedy, t 259 that Filgria 1 260 MRC revealed before this very Subcommittee, 261 one of the very worst managed nuclear reactors in the ent: ;
i 262 country.
263 The leadership of Boston Edison is entirely correct i 264 it admits that the company has a public relations problem
-265 But it is note than that. Boston Edison has a credibilit' 266 problen. What ny constituents want to know is why we sho-believe Boston Idison now, when it says that problems tha 267 268 should have been fully identified and corrected long ago 269 only now, in the full glare of the Public spotlight, bein 270 addressed?
271 I am Particularly troubled by Mr. Sweeney's assertic 272 today's testimony, that Boston Edison's current managener-273 deficiencies are not directly related to safety. That absurd on :
274 contention seems to me, with all due respect, I
PAGE 13 L , , . MAME: MIT197030 275 face.
Moreover, it is also symptomatic of a sorious 276 management weakness that the MRC itself has said 277 characterizes Boston Edison's attitude namely--and I 278 guote- a prevailing view, in the organization, that the 279 improvements made to date have corrected the problems.
as you very well kne 280 Management problems, Mr. Chairman, l
are safety problems. According to the MRC and other f 281 experts, for example, management problems are probably the f 282 283 single greatest contributor to the risk of a core meltdown.
284 One example that proves this point has been Boston Edison's This was 285 chronic understaffing of control room operators.
It was directly related te 286 problem that existed for years.
287 safety and it was attributable solely to poor management.
288 The burden of proof, with respect to the Pilgrim power those who would guastion to those 289 plant, has shifted _from this plant. The 290 who would defend the safety of operating by perf ormance not jus 291 burden.is .- on B_osion_ Edison to prove, 292 promise, that it has the ability, the discipline, and the 293 sense of responsibility necessary to operate a nuclear pow 294 plant the way such a plant can and should be run.
And 295 Simply meeting minimum standards is not enough.
296 should never have been considered enough either by plant 297 management or by the MRC.
298 While my remarks in this hearing focus primarily on 1 299 Edison's management problems, there are other safety issus
- 4 PAGr. 14
, - MAMEs 317197030 First, 300 related to pilgrim with which I ma very.concernod.
301 there is the issue to which you referred, Mr. chairman, of ;
the plant's containment structure.
After Chernobyl, the l 302 l 303 nuclearindustryintheUnitedStateswasquicktopointtc{
30'4 containment buildings as an additional layer of protection 305 for those in our country. The fact is that the MRC does nr.
l 306 require containment structures to be able to withstand a 307 core meltdown, and that indeed the Mark I containment 308 building in use at pilgrim is perhaps the most likely of a 1 309 design type in the United States to be breached in an 1
310 accident.
Second, there is a need to have an adequate and appsc 311 312 energency preparedness plan to protect the public in the I as troubled both by the obvious 313 avant of an accident.
314 inadequacies of the interin plan in effect for pilgrin ar.<
315 by the fact that Boston Edison was slow to meet its 316 responsibility to have an operational alert and notificat:
317 systen, and to educate the public about evacuation plans, 318 indeed it can be stated at this time that the public has 319 been inforned at all.
I be
[
320 While I appreciate the efforts made by the XRC, Because
. 32 1 the American public needs and desires more.
322 management can imperil public health and safety, the MRC 32 3 aust do something beyond simply calling attention to Something desperately ,
324 problems once they have occurred.
. 1
, PAGE 15 i
, MAME: MIT197030. l 335 needs to be done to prevent problocs from getting out of 326 hand in the first place.
327 The fact that 16 nuclear reactors suffer from serious i 320 management problems is compelling reason to deaand a much 329 stronger regulatory approach.
9 is with -
330 Mr. Chairman, my primary concern, obviously, 331 safety of the people of Massachusetts. F11 grin must not 332 operate until Boston Edison and the NRC can clearly show 333 that the management and safety problems that Plague the 1 l
l
-334 utility have not only been corrected, but that safeguards that th6y will not occur again~.
335 are in Place to assure 336 Mr. Chairman, once again, I thank you for your courte 337 and your Xindness in holding the hearing.
Mr. MARKEY.
I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts 338 339 I thank his very much for his interest in this issue.
340 We welcome now to the subcowaittee, Chairman Lando Z<
341 Jr., who is appearing before this subcommittee now for ths 342 first time in his capacity as chairman of the Nuclear An 343 Regulatory Connission. We welcome you, Mr. Chairman.
344 we welcome with you Commissioner Roberts, Connissioner 345 Bernthal and Commissioner Ass 61stine.
346 I might, Mr. Chairman, before you begin your testinc1 347 you would consider responding to a request which I am goa '
348 to make of the Connission, either in your opening statene-349 or later in response to specific questions to a request t i l
l I
-4 PAGE 16
, MAME: MIF197030 350 the Concission which I oc going to Doko to initicto 3 l
351 rulemaking and to seek comment from the industry and the 352 general public as to what regulations would be appropriate Jk
/
\
l 353 to achieve better management practices for nuclear 354 licensees.
This advance notice of rulemaking should not be 1 355 limited, in ny mind, to specific requirements for plant 1
356 managers and senior corporate officers responsible for 357 nuclear operations. And I would ask that you please, eith 358 at this point or in response to questions address that f
359 issue.
360 So we welcome you, Commissioner,.and we look forward 361 your opening statenant on this issue. ;
FAGE 17
, MAME: MIT197030 EECM, JR., CMAIRMAN, MUCLEAR 362 STATEMENT OT LAXD0 W.
COMMISSIONER THOMAS 363 REGULATORY COMMISSIDXs ACCOMPANIED BY 364 M. ROBERTS, COMMISSIONER JAMES X. ASSELSTIME, COMMISSIONER 365 TREDERICK M. BERMTNAL, TMOMAS MURLEY, REGION I 366 ADMINISTRATOR; AND MILLIAM PARLER, OTTICE OT GEXERAL 367 COUNSEL.
368 369 370 STATEMEMT OF MR. EECH.
371 l Before I make my !
372 Mr. EECH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
373 opening statement, let me respond very briefly, if I may, 374 some comments that have been made by the statements so far 375 First of all, you stated in your opening statement, P.-
W:
376 Chairman, that NRC had virtually no regulations'to cope what are management deficiency problems. I would like to 377 disagree with that, to the extent that I think we do indes, 378 i
379 have authority to protect the public health and safety, 380 whether that is in the form of rulemaking or regulations c 381 whatever, I can assure you that this chairman and this 382 commission has the authority to protect the public health 383 and safety. There should be no question about that.
I certainly apr 384 You said hindsight is always 20/20.
385 with that; hindsight is 20/20. What we are trying to do 386 been pointed out also, is to be able te look into the fut.
e
^- "'"----$.-_ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
18 l PAGE MAME: nip 197030 o littlo bit.
And thot is very difficult to do, but that is 387
$88 what we intend to do to the best.ci our ability.
389 public health and safety is our primary goal. Safety is our primary concern.
We have a responsible job to the 390 We intend to carry it out. We have a 391 American people.
We operate, as you well 392 professional staff to support us. i 393 know, in the public domain. We offer our views for public scrutiny. We have, indeed, I believe, acted responsibly.
394 think the American people can be assured that the Nuclear 395 396 Regulatory Commission is firmly committed with a group of 397 dedicated Americans to protecting public health and safety.
I think that I would certainly agree with your statene 398 And also with Mr. Studds reques 399 that we must be convinced.
400 that we will be convinced that Boston Edison can demonstr 401 ability to operate the plant safely before NRC is satisfie(
that it can operate again. We fully intend to make sure j 402 403 that we are fully satisfied in that regard.
404 Mr. Moorhead mentioned that in the past we have focus.
that is true.
405 design and licensing matters, and of course, We are recently 406 Mow we have 100 plants in operation.
I think that is appropriate.
407 focusing more on operations.
408 Eis comment about not be prescriptive and not having On the oth 409 checklists is certainly one that is important.
We war.
41 0 hand, we need facts, and we want to watch results.
but througn facts 41 1 to watch performance, not subjectively,
PAGE 19
- MAME: MIT197030 No do not intend to 412 best we can. We intend to do th0t.
We intend to encourage ou.
413 avoid scrans that are necessary.
414 operators to scram the plant whenever there is a doubt in We intend to ancourage safety.
415 their mind at all.
416 So those are things, as we try to look into the future will be very mindful of. We do not intend to have a 417 418 cookie-cutter approach to any of our performance indicator:
that we are working on.
We intend to be very otraful abou-419 420 that.
I agree with Mr.
Moorhead that we should encourage 421 We are doing that and fully 422 exc611ence in management.
We intend to continue the emphasis on 423 intend to do that.
424 safe operations. That is first and foremost.
On 425 We do intend to work together with the industry.
other hand, ue are aindful of our responsibilities to the 426 And whereas we encourage excellence and 427 government.
i 428 cooperation, we also know that we have our responsibility e i 429 and we intend to carry then out.
Mr.
Studds reference to the Boston Edison plant--I k 430 just b will get into more detail here this morning--but I 431 432 to assure him that we fully intend to review the performs 433 carefully. I think the actions that the X1C has taken ir I thinii 434 Pilgrim plant in the past have been responsible. l 435 have been especially mindful of their performance since It 1982.
We recognize that they did make some changes.
436
PAGE 20 HAME: MIT197030 No j 437 appear that they were moving in tho right direction.
438 have been disappointed by the results, and that is why we I 439 are reviewing this situation at pilgrim'very carefully. '
440 Xow, Mr. Studds, I can assure you und the people of i 441 Massachusetts that we intend to carry out our 442 responsibilities and to be completely: satisfied in all 443 respects before we would agree to allow restart of the l 444 Filgrim plant.
Mr. Chairman, if I may give you a brief ormi statemen ;
445 today. First of all, I do welcome this opportunity to 446 447 appear before you as my first appearance in Congress in my I would like to give a brief 448 role as HRC's chairman.
critical importance of 449 description of my views on the 450 excellence in nuclear power management, and on XRC's role 451 addressing management problems.
Chairman, I would like to 452 With your permission, Mr.
453 my prepared remarks for the record and just summarize the 454 briefly.
Your Prepared remarks, without objection 455 Mr. MARKEY.
456 be included in the record in their entirety.
457 Mr. 2ECH. Ihank you, sir.
458 Let me say right now that my primary docus will be <
As there is in any other fors 459 safety first and foremost.
of energy production, a risk is involved in producing 460 nuclear electricity. Although the risk is small in 46 1
FAGE 21
,MAME: NIF197030 462 yroducing nucloor olcotricity, wo Gust onsuro thct this --. ,
remain small, and that it -remains reasonable and acceptable l{
463 l
464 This 1s a very demanding technology. Discipline, w65 technical competence, constant vigilance, management involvement, and competent performance are mandhtory if we 466 467 are to succeed in providing the benefits of nuclear energy 468 to the.American people in a reliable and safe manner.
469 Sound management of nuclear Power cannot be regulated 470 through the publication and enforcement of federal rules-c 471 how to manage: A clear dedication to the safe use of 472 nuclear power must come from within the top officials of licensed to construct .)
473 each of the 55 utilities which are 474 operate these plants. From first-line supervisors to the 475 chief executive officer and board of directors, utility 476 executives nust dedicate themselves to the highest standa 477 of performance and must be held accountable for their 478 octions.
Turther, it is expected that each utility will endor 479 480 support snd participate in those industry programs and 481 initiatives established by industry groups to assist 482 individual utiliifes in achieving excellence in nuclear 483 powar operations.
484 .In my view, our role in the MRC is to monitor close.
485 critically each plant's operational safety performance, 486 encourage and recognize industry initiatives that affect
PAGE 22
." MAME: MIT197030 487 . safety,;and more importantly, to stop in quickly ond 488 decisively on those cases where there are indicators that 489 performance may be degrading.
490 Just as every level of utility management must be 491 personally accountable for safety, I believe every level of 492 MRC' management, including the Commission itself, should'be 493 accountable for the objective monitoring and evaluation of 494 utility performance, and for initiating within the NRC's 495 regulatory framework actions to promptly address and corre 496 adverse trends.
497 Mr. Chairman it is my responsibility to exercise per leadership, to make sure that the staff is provided with t 498 resources and the authorities necessary to do their job 499 500 right, and to ensure that the Commission becomes directly 501 . involved in addressing the most significant operational 502 performance problems. I have a strong desire to serve my 503 country well in this assignment.
504 Huelear power now makes a significant contribution tc 505 economy, to the well-being of our citizens, and to the 506 overall strength of our country. I feel deeply obligated -
507 exercise my responsibilities in a manner which allows the 508 nuclear option the opportunity to continue to serve our 509 nation's needs now and in the future.
Mavertheless, the right of our citizens to live in a 51 0 51 1 environment which does not present an undue risk to their
FAGE 23
.' MAME: MIF197030 512 health and sofoty overtidos tho ictortenso of the nuoloor option, and/or the continued operation of any single nuclee
$13 facility. Management at each licensed utility is 514 My 515 responsible for maintaining safe nuclear operations, 516 fellow commissioners and I are charged with ensuring that 517 this obligation is responsibly discharged.
Mr.
Chairman, with these personal views as background 518 519 let me describe ths Muclear Regulatory Commission programs 520 which are in place to monitor nuclear operations, evaluate 521 management performance, and address potential safety problems. The system involves three key levels of MRC 522 managements the Regional Administrators, the Executive 523 524 Director for Operations (the ID0] and his headquarters and the Commission itself, with 525 senior management team, 526 provisions for escalation of management involvement problem.
527 depending upon the significance of the The five regional administrators are the MRC's most 528 the adequacy of knowledgeable senior managers concerning 529 performance and management at each nuclear station in the.
530 respective regions. Ihrough frequent visits to the 531 facilities, meetings with senior utility plant and corpor 532 533 managener.t, and execution of the agency's enforcement 534 actions, the regional administrators evaluate operating 535 performance and trends, ensure that the XP.C concerns are an:'
l
' 536 promptly and directly conveyed to utility management, L
PAGE 24
,' NAME: NIr197030 takon to rosolvo cny 537 . insist that oppropriato octions cre.
538 problem and preclude its recurrence.
We in. Washington do not' leave'these managers alone in 539 540 field to deal in isolation with matters affecting the publa 541 safety. In order to achieve additional perspective and 542 regional uniformity, the ma$or actions of the regional 543
' administrators are closely monitored with the Executive LIn !
544 Director for Operations and senior headquarters staff.
545 addition, the Commission meets regularly with each of the 546 regional administrators to discuss the performance of !
547 nuclear facilities.
It is important that our senior managers in the field 548 549 headquarters work closely together et monitor each 550 facility's operational performance, especially those 551 indicators which point to a potential problem in managene:
552 Accordingly, the Executive Director for Operations has 553 recently established a formal program to bring headquarta='
554 and regional senior staff together periodically for 555 dedicated, in-depth discussions of significant plant operational safety problems. These discussions focus on-556 557 adequacy of the utilities' top management _ involvement an('
. 558 the perf ormance of operational managers at both plant an(
559 corporate levels.
560 One important result of these discussions has been 4 56 1 determination that, where appropriate, the Executive i
PAGE 25
,' MAMEi MIr197030 l Director for operations will write dirootly to'tho'
~
f 562 1 563 licensee's chief executive officer to' indicate his conce ;
564 for operational and management performance, and to solicit.
)
565 the chief executive officer's personal involvement and l
566 response. As'the chairman, I intend to get personally J 567 involved in this program and at appropriate times to i 568 interface myself with the chief executive officers. k
[
569 At the, regional level, the Systematic Assessment of 570 Licensee Performance, the SALP program, has proven to be a 571 useful mechanism for the periodic, formal evaluation of for openly conveying the results c:
572 av'agement performances and for serving as'a 573 our evaluations to utility management; i 574 basis to structure and implement any needed performance 575 improvements.
576 Although I strongly endorse our current SALP evaluati program, these 12 to 18 month reviews need to be 577 578 supplemented with the development of a set of quantitative andacators which will objectively and reliab1>-
579 performance capture the trends of safety performance on a more frequer 580 The commission is considering development and i 581 basis.
testing of performance indicators as a means of monitorin 582 I regard this regulatory 583 plant safety performance.
584 initiative as top priority for the Muclear Regulatory 585 Commission.
586 Together with the initiative taken by the Executive l
PAGE 26
~
. MAMEs HIT 197030 587 Director for Operations in ostob11shing porforncnce review our increased use of objective performance 588 by senior staff, 589 indicators should further improve NRC's effectiveness in 590 providing the American people with relative and safe nucle 591 energy.
592 Mr. Chairman, with'your permission, I will submit for 5931
. record the Commission's responses to questions provided by-594 the subcommittee, as well as descriptions of operational 595 histories, enforcement actions and SALP ratings for those 596 facilities which have been identified for increased As you have 597 regulatory attention by the senior staff.
documents includes an analysis of 598 requested, one of these 599 management performance at Boston Edison's pilgrim facility it is 600 And finally, Mr. Chairman, as a matter of fact, h
601:
intention to carefully review the pilgrim situation at t e 602 Commission level. And if our review at the Commission les to ask the Boston Edison management tc 603 deems it warranted, to appear before the Commission at a public meeting 604 their resolve in this open meeting prior to 605 demonstrate 606 Region I authorizing restart of the pilgrim plant. '
Mr. Chairman, that completes my testimony and we wot-607 608 pleased to answer your guestions.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. All e 609 Mr. MARKEY.
610 information which you mentioned that is in written form 6; t
611 be included in the Subcommittee's record in its entirety.
PAGE 27 3p.. ,
, NAMES ~ 31r197030 Soch, Jr. fellows -
612 (Tho proporce stctocent of Icado W.
' d ,:
'613 614 ********** INSERT **********
11 l
1 PAGE 28 MAME: MIT197030 MI, MARKEY. I would also liko to th0nk you ct this tici 615 for the 1
616 for the detailed report which you did provide It was 617 Subcommittee in anticipation of this hearing.
618 detailed and it was on time.
619 Mr. ZECH. Thank you, sir.
Mr. MARKEY.
That is something that I want to compliner 1 620 621 you for. sometimes it has not been a characterist i 622 Commission.
623 Mr. ZECH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MARKEY.
Any other members of the Commission that 624 625 wishes to make an opening statecant?
Mr. ASSELSTINE. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
626 627 Mr. MARKEY. Commissioner Asselstine.
Mr. ASSELSTINE.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to add a f e28 Commission's prepared statement.
629 comments to the I think it is worth emphasizing that management weakr 630 631 in nuclear power plant operations can and do have a If allowed to 632 significant adverse s af ety consequence .
633 continue for lengthy Periods of time, poor nuclear plant 634 management can result in deterioration of the plant's an '
635 material conditions in degraded equipment reliability; 636 in substandard plant operations and human performance to 637 point where a serious operating event or an accident is 638 likely.
639 Ihe Commission's responses to the Subcommittee's que
FAGE 29
- ' MAMEi MIp197030 640 dotoil instanoos in chich this dotoriarction in plcnt sciet 641 performance due to ineffective management has occurred in the past few years. These cases including the Salen scran 642 643 failure events the Davis-lesse loss of feedwater events ths-644 Rancho Seco over cooling events the Browns-Terry water levi 645 instrumentation problems are all too familiar to the NRc a.
646 to this subcommittee.
647 Once plant conditions degrade to the point where a 648 significant operating event occurs, the licensee inevitabl 649 faces a long and costly plant shutdown to address both its operation:
650 management failures and the resulting hardware, 651 and regulatory problems.
652 These events typically impose a significant strain or 653 utility's personnel and resources. They also impose a re burden on the NRC.
To cite just one example, well over~a 654 655 year after the management failures at TVA resulted in the 656 shutdown of the TVA plants, the MRC is devoting very and addressing tne 657 substantial resources to understanding 658 TVA management problems and their many consequences, and 659 there is still no and in sight.
660 The heavy burden involved in responding to serious .
i
. 661 operating events inevitably limits our ability to pursue 662 more forward looking initiatives aimed at the early 663 identification of operating problems and management 664 ineffectiveness at other plants,
_-.m______.____ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ .- _ __ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _
PAGE 30.
,' MAME: MIT197030 665 Tino11y, Mr. Cheironn, thaso sozious oporcting ovents the MR 666 undermine public confidence in the utility licensee, 667 and the safety of nuclear power in general. These are the p
668 prices of a reactive approach to regulation.
669 Tor all of these reasons, both the MRC and the nuclea:
670 industry should be making every effort to identify nuclear 671 plant annagement weaknesses before they result'in serious I sense a growing 673 operating tvants or accidents.
673 recognition within the MRC of the need for more forward.
i 674 looking initiatives to identify and address nuclear plant 675 management vulnerabilities before they lead to a serious 676 operating event.
677 Tor example, I give the MAC staff credit, as you do, 678 Chairman, in the case of pilgrin, for identifying in its 679 February 18, 1986 SALP evaluation, not only the continuing 680 poor performance in such areas as plant operations, 681 radiological controls and energency preparedness, but mise 682 the management weaknesses that were the root causes of th:
683 poor performance.
.In the several months since the pilgrim's SALP repor-684 i 685 issued, I believe that the MRC staff has done an effectiv ' l 686 $ob in communicating its concerns about the management 687 weaknesses at pilgrim to the Commission, to the licensee' including the CEO and Boa:
688 senior corporation management, of Directors, to state and local government officials and 689
PAGE 31
,' MAME: MIp197030 690' the public.
I also applaud Chairman Zech's efforts to focus greater l
691 692 attention on the performance of the operating plants, with 693 crecial emphasis on the plants with the history of poor-performance.
I support his efforts to develop performance 594 695 indicators which can help identify those plants with These 696 operating problems and safety vulnerabilities.
697 efforts together with the three levels of MRC reviSW 698 described in the Commission's testimony should holy laprove 699 our ability to identify the symptoms or consequences of 700 nuclear plant management problems.
Although these measures should bring about some 701 702 improvement in our ability to detect deteriorating or 703 unacceptable plant performance, I believe there are still 704 gaps in our ability to identify management weaknesses in 705 nuclear plant operations, particularly before those 706 weaknesses manifest themselves in seriously degraded safat 707 performance of the plant.
our ability to assess whether a licensee's managemenf 708 709 improvement program is producing the desired results in 710 terms of upgraded management performance is also limited.
71 1 Our experience with pilgrim highlights these weaknesses 1.
71 2 our current regulatory program.
We im41ed to identify or to act upon the management 71 3 714 problems of this licensee until they resulted in the sard
PAGE 32 XAME: MIp197030 subject of ths 715 safety performance problems which e6ro th3 When those problems 716 Commission's 1982 enforcement action.
7 17 were identified, the XRC took strong enf orcement action an 718 the form of the largest civil penalty imposed up to that 719 time on an MRC licensee coupled with an enforcement order 720 modifying the plant's license. The enforcement action 721 emphasized the breakdown in the licensee's management 722 controls as the root cause of the safety violations.and 723 required that the licensee develop a comprehensive plan te 724 address the causes of the violation.
725 An independent appraisal of the licensee's_ site and 726 corporate management organization and functions was 727 specifically required. The utility submitted a lengthy 728 response to the dotice of violation, which included a 729 management reorganization and new initiatives to improve management oversight and control of nuclear operations.
730 731 periodic neetings were held between the licensee and the 732 staff to monitor the licensee's progress in correcting th 733 problems which led to the enforcement action.
734 Despite these efforts, we were unable to learn unti 1982 violatic 735 four years later that the root cause of the 736 ineffective management of the nuclear program, remained 737 uncorrected.
lesson from this experje 738 Mr. Chairman, I believe the 739 we need some additional tools aimed specifically at the
1 PAGE 33
,' XAME: MIT197030 740 assessment of.tho.11oonaco's ocnopocont.offoetivanoss. I 741 would suggest the development of indicators of management poor 742 performance which can be used both to identify the 743 performers and to measure the effectiveness of management 744 improvement programs.
745 We should also consider what options are available to i 1
746 to bring about effective and lasting improvement in the 747 cases of poor management.
748 Tinally, I believe we should pay particular attention 749 the experience, qualifications and capabilities of key 750 nuclear managers, most notably the nuclear vice president.
and plant manager.
I would support the concept, Mr.
751 752 Chairman, you suggested, of an advanced notice of proposet 753 rulemaking, to identify alternatives for ensuring that the compete:
754 key management positions are filled by qualified, 755 and experienced people.
756 In my view, new initiatives in these areas when coup; 757 with Chairman Zech's proposed technical performance 758 indicators and a grsater XRC emphasis on plant operations 759 would do much to improve the safety and reliability of th 760 plants and public confidence in the MRC and in the indust 761 Thank you.
762 (The prepared statement of Jamer X. Asselswine folio 763 764 **********IMSERI**********
FAGE 34
, MAME: MIT197030 Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Cennissionor. Any other caobers ;
765' I i
766 'the Commission wish to make an opening' statement?
i I
767 [Mo response.)
Mr. MARKEY. Thank you very much. I will now turn to th 768 769 Subcommittee members and guests for guestionslof the panel.
770 Let me begin by re-stating the questions that I raised 771 before when you began your opening statement and ask that 772 you respond specifically to the suggestion which I made, 773 that the Commission initiate an advanced rulemaking to 774 solicit industry and public comment on whether or not 775 additional regulations are nerassary to deal with management 776 problems.
777 One idea that I have is to extend regulatory oversight 778 the position of plant manager and senior vice president for 779 nuclear operations.
780 Could you discuss with me your feelings about the need 781 at least have some form of advanced rulemaking proceedings, !
782 so that we can discuss perhaps whether or not it would be 783 wise for us to expand the scope of the regulatory 784 inquisition into the operation of the nuclear aspects of l
785 these plants?
Mr. EECH. Yes, sir. I would be pleased to discuss th 786 787 with you. Trankly, my answer is I'm not sure that 788 rulemaking is the appropriate course of action to take, 799 because frankly I don't know that we can regulate quality 1 l
O FAGE 35
'XAME: MIT197030 .
790 perforcanco of concgors. No ocn cnocurogo it. We can do a' 791 number of things. I don't know that a cookie. cutter j 792 prescriptive approach, a list of requirements, is 793 appropriate. On the other hand, I think your suggestion deserves very careful consideration. With due respect to 794 795 you, Mr. Chairman, I will certainly give it careful 796 consideration.
797 Mr. MARKEY. The reason I suggested it, Mr. Chairman, 1 .
798 do have an epidemic here. Although we somewhat have reliot-799 upon the good faith of management, not just in this plant 800 but in plants throughout the country over the past 801 generation, it turns out that even MRC evaluations 802 themselves have gaven testimony to the fact that there has 803 been significant failure of that process.
804 I recommend to you that not necessarily that a rule b 805 in place, but at least the public and industry be given a 4 806 forum in which advanced rulemaking proceedings are 807 undertaken towards the goal of decidang whether or not at 808 appropriate to expand the scope of that regulation.
809 Let me turn to another area.
810 Mr. ZECH. Mr. Chairman. I don't agree uith you that t I don't agree with that terminology. I 411 is an epidemic.
certainly agree there are problems. I agree there is zoon 812 for improvenant. I don't think the term epidemic is 813 That is just my opinion. I respect you foz 814 appropriate.
L----________--______ __
7_
a PAGE 36 l MAME:-MIr197030 Thero is not in ny judgcent on opidacio.
815 hoving yours.
There has been some 816 There has been some serious incidents.
817 things that-we have been tracking very closely, given more 818 attention to than others. That is part of our way of'doing 819 business. I think it is appropriate that we attend to the 820 plants that.in our judgment have not been performing as wel That is what we have done. Ne intend to do mo2 L 821 as others.
822 of that in,the future.
823 I think that you should be assured and the public shot i 824 be assured that we recognize there is room for improvement '
825 and where there is room for improvement, wewilldevoteou.f 826 energies in that direction.
827 Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, again, to make a point, whi (
828 think perhaps'we can disagree on what an epidemic is, but 829 when 16 of the plants in this country out of 100 are 830 identified as having problems of this nature, in your mind 831 that might not be an epidemic, but it seems to this Chairs 832 and I thank it would seen so to the public at large, that 833 an unacceptably large percentage of the nuclear power plar 834 in this country that have been identified as having P
835 management problems.
836 Mr. EECE. If I may r.amind you, Mr. Chairman, that is role, to protect the public health and safety. Those f 837 f 838 plants--I think 13 of the 16 are in a shutdown condition.
t 839 That means we are tending to our business of protecting
V i PAGE 37
'MAME: HIr197030 '
840 public health and sofoty. 'We don't liko that cony p10nts 841' having problems either. I would respectfully submit that'e 842 responsible public' servants, that is what we are doing.
I hope that number wi!'
803 Those plants are getting attention.
I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, if 844 decrease in the future.
(
845 it doesn't decrease, we will increase it if we th' ink it is You can call it an epidemic. I won't debate t~I 846 necessary.
847 point further.
848 I $vst wanted to say that in my view, we are indeed 849 exercising our responsibilities to protect the public heel I
850 and safety.
Mr. MARKEY. I under, stand.
All I as suggesting is ths 851 852 existing processes have broken down in terms of their 853 effectiveness and the Proof is the number of plants which What I as recommending to -
854 are shutdown in this country.
with the long term 855 is that perhaPs in teras of dealing problems, that inherent in the nuclear regulatory scheme 856 857 that we have been working under, that we institute new top down, we have t 858 procedures to guarantee that from the 859 kind of accountability and the type of prof astacnalisa tr 860 can perhaps help us to avoid the necessity in the future 86 1 having 15 percent of the nuclear power plants in this 862 country non-operational because of the kind of deficione:'
863 which are identified.
864 I think the types of recommendations that I as maki:
FAGE 38 MAME' MIp197030 865 timed towards achioving that goal. 3 Mr. EECH. Mr. Chairman, I must make this point.
.I ;
866 867 certainly agree that no one wants that number of plants 868 shutdown. Our responsibility is for public health and 869 safety. I assure you, if we have problems with more than 1:
~
I am concerned about that. j 870 plants, we will shut more down.
871 Matura11y, I want the plants to operate, as an American 872 citizen, as I am sure .you do.
873 My primary concern is public health and safety. I can 874 tell you that if we have to shut down five more, we will de 675 it.
876 Mr. MARKEY. Again, our goal is to avoid having any n02, 877 these plants hospitalized. We are trying to keep'then 878 out--all I am trying to recommend to you is there is a i
879 mechanism f or Preventive care here that might help to ensu:
880 that in.the future we don't--
881 Mr. EECH. We want to help the plants keep operating bi 882 don't want to do it at the public peril, Mr. Chairman.
p 883 Mr. MARKEY. Commissioner Berntha17-884 Mr. BERMTHAL. Mr. Chairman, the terminology you are u
Epidemic
885 I agree with the Chairman, Commissioner Each.
486 somehow implies this is a new disease that has appeared. i What I would suggest isi 887 You also referred to a breakdown.
888 there is a cultural change poing on out there. There is an l
889 important transition going on.
l
PAGE 39 XAME 'MIF197030 890 If I ocy point to ths Tennessee Volloy Authority,.I hat 691 characterized their difficulties many times as one of 892 standing in place too long while the rest of'the world was 893 advancing. I think that is exactly what is going on in thi:
894 industry. The management in this industry is being of thorough 895 upgraded. We are approaching a point, I hope, 896 and widespread excellence in the management of the nuclear-I suspect that kind of excellence is not 897 utility industry.
898 something that you would have seen to or 15 years ago.
We are paying more 899 There is a change going on out there.
This is not something new. This is not :-
900 attention to it.
901 disease that has suddenly appeared throughout the industry 902 There is a change going on. We are trying to promote 903 change.
It has not suddenly 904 Mr. MARKEY. I agree with you.
905 appeared. It has been there for years and it is dust bain I think the purpose of-906 identified in terms of .its scope.
that ws mig?'
907 this hearing is to begin to identify remedies 908 apply to make sure that we begin to reduce the likelihood 909 it occurring again.
910 Commissioner Asselstine, do you have any comments?
911 Mr. A55EL5 TIME. Mr. Chairman, just a brief comment.
One is when you look at a:
913 think there are two questions.
individua's case, is the Commission taking effective actie:
91 3 '
91 4
^o ensure that the public is protected. That is one set i
, 4
FAGE 40
' ~ KAMES.MIT197030 issues.
We hevo oxocinod a number of thoso. plants over the.
915 916 past couple of years to see how ef fectively we have done
.917 that part of ouz job.
918 But the other part is, 1s the regulatory program 919 functioning the way we ward it to, and if the consequence 1 92 M '
vaiting to find out about these. problems when'something var V
921 serious happens, when the condition of the plant has
]
- t 922 deteriorated to.the point where a serious operating event
[
923 occurs or is very likely to occur in 'she immediate future, then it seems to me the regulatory process har not 924 925 functioned.the way we want it to. What we need are the 926 early warning signs and thr,' ability to find these problems 927 early on and to deal with them.
928 I think management is the root cause of many of these problems, and I also think that there is a group of plants 929 930 the plants that us.have identified, that have had for sons just ncj 931 I time now a level of management performance that is l
932 acceptable for the long term.
933 I am not sure I would agree with Commissioner Bernth:
The implication, I thirk, was that.
934 assessment of TVA.
935 well, they were operating at an acceptable level for a wh 936 and then everybody else just passed them by and they have I think the TVA problems are muc 937 Rept up with standards.
938 worse than that.
939 But in any event, I think the key is to have a systs l
l
1 PAGE 41 X AM,E 8' nip 197030 940 ~ place, a regulctory systom, cnd o syston within the industr 941 that iden'tifies these' problems and fixes them early before i
942 we saa the serious deterioration of plant performance. It
{
943 in no one's interest to have plants shut down for lengthy 944 periods of time simply because things are so bad that 1 945 neither we nor the industry nor the Public have any 946 assurance that the plants ca.- Se run safely. And that's t 4 947 situation ,that we f aced at a nuahar of plants last year.
948 Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, in my opening statement I m-q 949 it clear that I expect that Boston Edison will not simply I real 950 start up pilgrim as if this were a regular outage.
+}
951 feel that what is needed is a rigorous start-up program 952 tests the company prior to full power operation.
953 Does the Commission agree, and will it agree to closs 954 monitor such a program?
Mr. ZECH. Mr. Chairman, certainly we intend to close '
955 956 monitor any kind of a Procedure that the Pilgrim plant wi 957 have.
I do not want at this time to commit to you how na 958 people, length of time, any kind of a prescriptive formul 959 that we are going to use for Pilgrim.
960 I can assure you, Mr. Chairarn, we are going to be We will monitor it, we n 96 1 watching the Pilgrim situation.
think is appropriate. If we feel that it 962 do whatever we 963 appropriate at the time to have a formal, slow, delibera4 964 start-up, we will de so. I am not Prepared at this time l
l l
~ - - - - - - - - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
PAGE 42 MAME: MIpzi97030 ellowed 965 say that we are ready, excopt to toll you that wo will do
~
966 what we think is right to make sure that that plant is process 1 967 operated safely.
968 Mr. MARKEY. Do you have any ideas right now, Mr. Chairmar .ic aha
- is safe 969 as to what kinds of processes should be undertaken to ensure r name is 970 that Edison is in a position to properly operate the plant Region '
971 before its start-up?
want ther.
972 Mr. EECE. We want to watch the recent management changes clude ser' 973 they have taken at pilgrim, which frankly seem to be absolutely in the right dizaction to me. But they are so 974 during t 975 early and the plant has had such serious problems over the again :
976 years that I don't think we should jump to any conclusions.
be a We want to watch this management, we want to develop a 977 978 feeling of confidence that some of the new management team
- hat I ha 979 is getting their ideas in place.
980 I think this is going to take a close observation on our able to you are 981 part. We will have our regicnal administrator, Dr. Tom as far 982 Murley, who is here today and can tell you anything I can assure you we are e time it 943 as any details he may have in mind.
u expect-984 going to havs a very close supervision of oparation of that ant?
985 plant. We will be completely confident before we allow it
.he plant 986 to restart.
987 Mr. MARKEY. Let me interrupt you right there, then, Mr. Would 988 Chairman, and ask Mr. Murley, the regional administrator in I the 989 charge of this plant, what specific plans you might have to / August,
1 PAGE 44
," MAME: MIT197030 so that wo een go, 1015 several waaks before the planned restart, J 1016 our inspection plan staffed out.
1017 Mr. MARXIY. And is it your intention to add additions:
Now many 1018 personnel for the monitoring of this plant? j 1019 additional people are you requesting?
1020 Mr. MURLEY. Yes, we have over the last several years 1021 alreadyhadmoreinspectioncoveragethantheeverage.attj 1022 plants in Region I. Nonetheless, even today, I have three 1023 resident inspectors there. I would expect to keep that 1024 complement for some time into the future of three resident 1025 inspectors, and during the start-up phase, which might be' 1026 natter of a few weeks, I would have around-the-clock 1027 coverage, which may entail up to six inspectors, 1028 Mr. MARKEY. Commissioner Asselstine?
Mr. ASSELSTIME.
Mr. Chairman, it seems to me there a:
1029 issues h~re.
e One is what.do we need to do before any 1030 1031 decision is made to start up the plant to assuxe ourselve:
1032 that this time things are different, a question that 1033 Congressman Studds raised in his opening statement.
1034 Then the second is, what do we need to do to monitor performance, assuming that we are satisfied enough to all 1035 1036 the plant to resume operation?
1037 I have been doing some thinking about this the past 1038 so, particularly since we received the show-cause petitic 1039 which lays out, I think, the full range of these sets of
7-___-__
PAGE 45 MAME: MIp197030 1040 issues.
1041 I personally would like to see several things done be Clearly one of 1042 the agency makes a decision on start-up..
1043 those that I would endorse is the Chairman's proposal that 1044 the Commission have a meeting to thoroughly review the 1045 situation on pilgrim, not only with the NRC staff, but wii 1046 the company and its senior management.
1047 But a few other things omaa to my mind that might be 1048 useful.
pirst, a mid-tern SALP review. It has now been nine 1049 1050 months since the close of the last SALP period, it's been Licensee received the SALP report i 1051 five nonths since the identified the series of management concerns and breakdos 1052 1053 that we saw at the plant. I think it is perhaps time to 1054 take a look and see where they stand, and how much reall)
I personally belis 1055 has been accomplished in those areas.
that we ought to take a look at where they stand on thess.
1056 1057 SALP items before the agency allows the plant to restart 1058 I was somewhat troubled that the Chairman's response 1059 Mr.
Studds indicated that that wasn't to be part of a start-up review.
One thing that I would look at in 1060 196 1 particular there is this guestion of shortage of 11oonse , 1 1062 reactor operators at the plant. The utility, based upon a
1063 what I heard a couple of days ago, has put into place t
1064 longer term prograa to get the licensed operators that
, 'pAGE 46 l NAME: MIr197030, 1065 nood, but for tho noxt 'oight conths or so thoy f oco tho sant i 1066 kind'of shortage that was of concern to us last yea . -
1067 There are;some ways around that to deal,with it, notab:
1068 using licensed. senior reactor operators, but I would like te, 1069 see a specific plan on how they are going to avoid the kind 1070 of overtime problems that they had last year with this 1071 chronic shortage of reactor-operators.
1072 Second, it seems to me it would be useful to have a What 1073 special evaluation of the new management performance.
1074 I would like to ces is a team of inspectors, including 1075 senior NRC ar.nagement people, to go in and look at how well 1076 these new managers are pe: forming. Do they understand the Do they know their jobs? Now do they deal with the 1077 plant?
Are they changing 1078 plant staff? Are they having an effect?
1079 the attitudes of the placa? Are they getting their message 1080 across? Are they setting goals, and are they requiring 1081 people to meet those goals?
1082 Third, I think we need a review by the NRC Staff and 1083 TEMA of the energency planning problems and issues that ha-1084 been raised. I would like to see that.
1085 Tourth, we need an MRC Staff evaluation of the issues 1986 . led to the shutdown of the plant back in April. There As a The utility has made its submitta; 1087 set of hardware issues.
1088 and we need a review of those.
1089 Tifth, we need a Staff review of the new issues that
J
- FAGE 47
, , MAME8 NIF197030 arisen since the-plant was shut down. Iho questions obout 1090 1091 the utility's performance of leak rate tests and the 1092 match-up between their technical specifications, their 1093 surveillance procedures, and our own regulations, and how 1094 they are doing on fire protection, and then finally I thin:
1095 we need a Commission meeting where the Commission hears th.
1096 results of all of those kinds of efforts. So that would b 1097 my suggestion of the kinds of things that ought to occur 1098 before a decision is made to start up the plant. I 1099 Afterwards, I certainly agree with the kind of intensive M 1100 involvement and oversight that you have suggested and that 1101 Mr. Murley has indicated he had in mind.
1102 Mr. MARKEY. Well, I clearly agree with you, Commissic 1103 as to the extent to which the Commission should go in 1104 ensuring that all of these tests are given to ensure the 1105 plant is safe. The question is, do the other four 1106 Commissioners agree with us, and I think that that is ver: j 1107 auch of an open question.
1108 I would like at this time, if I may, Commissioner, we 1109 have a slight logistical problem right now. There is a r 1!10 call on thc Floor right now that only has seven minutes 1111 left. We will take a brief break right now for about to 1112 minutes. We will come back, we will recognise you, 1113 Commissioner / 3ernthal, and you, Mr. Chairman, if you wish 1114 and than we will move on to other members for questioning
'e
1 FAGE 48 l MAME: MIT197030 111Si the panel. We will take a brief rocess.
I 1116' [ Recess.]
1117 Mr. MARKEY. If we can reconvene the hearing, I will a l l
1118' people to take their seats. j 1119 At the point at which we recessed, Commissioner Assel f 1120 had just finished his comment, and Commissioner Bernthal 6
- 1121 seeking recognition.
1122 Mr. Bernthal, any comments you wish to make.-
1123 Mr. BERMTHAL. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to not leas 1124 impression that seems to have been left, that anybody at 1125 this table--and I hope and think I can speak for other 1126 members here--6ir, agrees.with the idea that this long list 1127 management assessaknts and matters that need to be carefu.'
1128 looked at before restart will be looked at and should be 1129 looked at.
1130 I suspect that 95 percent of that list are matters t 1131 routinely get looked at before this Commission permits 1132 restart of any plant that has had serious difficulties.
I 1133 Dr. Murley, in my judgment, is one of our most capak 1134 regional administrators, and I am confident that he is ge 1135 to look very carefully at those things. The Commission s In fact, I wa '
1136 going to look very carefully at that list.
1137 almost moved to ask whether there was anything there that 1138 would not be done, and I spoke with Mr. Murley in the !
f 1139 interin and he suggested that the mid-tern SALP may not l'
PAGE 49
,' XAME: MIF197030 1140 done. But I con cssuro you, 00 cro ocutoly ownto of the 1141 categories in that SALP rating system, and those are the 1142 primary categories that will receive attention before that 1143 plant will be permitted to restart.
1144 So I just wanted to make clear that there is no questi-1145 about the resolve, in my judgment, of this commission to se 1146 to it those matters receive very careful attention.
1147 Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.
1148 Mr. Chairman?
Mr. ZECH. Yes, sir. I would just like to say that 1149 1150 certainly we will take a good hard look at the suggestions They seem reasonab.
1151 that commissioner Asselstine has made.
1152 to me right offhand.
as Commissioner Bernthal has indicated, the 1153 I think, 1154 is one--rather than a full-blown SALF, which is a rather 1155 lengthy process, I think we should do a rather focused one 1156 tailored specifically for this plant. But I think it woul accomplish even more, and I think we should definitely mak 1157 1158 some kind of assessment like that.
1159 As far as the emergency plan is concerned, I would D The 1160 like to point out that one is scheduled for October.
1161 full-blown drill which MAC will participate'in. And so I 1162 think what has been suggested is certainly reasonable.
l We might 1163 Again I would have to take another look at it.
1164 want to add some other things to it.
' FAGE 50.
MAME: MIT197030 l
1165 Mr. MARKEY. That concludes my time for the first round, 1166 questions. I expect to ask others, but I would like to sus .
1167 note parenthetically that this subcommittee does intend to 1168 very closely monitor the procedures which are implemented 1169 the Commission to ensure that in f act the public health an-1170 safety has been guaranteed as a precondition to a restart, 1171 and the time table that has been mentioned by Mr. Murley 1172 seems somewhat ambitious, and because of that this 1173 subcommittee, I can assure you, is going to look at all of 1174 these recommendations and see the extent to which they has 1175 been implemented before the restart.
That concludes my opening round. The Chair now reco!
1176 1177 the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Studds.
1178 Mr. STUDDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
1179 Gentleman, as you know, I don't serve on this commit 1180 and I certainly don't have a background of personal Perhaps that i 1181 expertise in the field of nuclear energy.
both a good thing and a bad thing in addressing a subject 1182 1183 like this.
I have at my disposal the extraordinary detad 1184 information and guestions prepared by the very competent 1185 staff of this committee and by some of my own staff.
, 1186 The more I read the detailed guestions, the more I a 1187 beginning to think that the real guastions that need to 1 1188 asked, at least certainly from this lay legislator's perspective, are broad and general Policy questions, r a t:-
1189
PAGE 51 Mang MIT197030 1190 than the detoils of a particular sofoty deficiency or 1191 whatever.
1192 It seems to me that some things really stand out here.
1193 I say, approaching it, as I do, as a layman. I note that i 1194 Mr. Asselstine's remarks, his written testimony, he 1195 encapsulates, really, the situation which we face and I 1196 think that most citizens would' view as the situation befor.
1197 them, and I quote briefly from him, if I may. He is setti:
1198 the stage for what he believes is a description of an 1199 analysis of weaknesses in our current regulatory program, 1200 and he says:
1201 We failed to identify or to act upon the management 1202 problems of this Licensee--that is to say, pilgrim- un 1203 they resulted in serious safety performance problems which 1204 were the subject of the Commission's 1982 enf orcement -
1205 action. When those problems were identified, the MRC too}
1206 strong enforcement action in the form of the largest civil 1207 penalty imposed up to that time on an MRC Licensee, couple 1208 with an enforcement order modifying the plant's license.
1209 That is four and a half years ago.
1210 I continue from Mr. Asselstine's testimony.
1211 The enforcement action amphasised a breakdown in tl 1212 Licensee's management controls as the root cause of the 1213 safety violations, and required that the Licensee develop 1214 comprehensive Plan to address the causes of the violation
A-FAGE 52 M AME s ' 'XIT 197 0 30 1215 But despite'theso offerts, we woro unablo to loctn Entil 1216 some four years later that the root cause.of the 1982 1217 violation, ineffective management of the nuclear progrea, 1218 remained uncorrecte'd.
What's going on ha 1219 How to me, the quest 19n is obvious.
1220 Given the Commission's concerns, given, as you yourselves 1221 have testi'fied, the extraordinary amount of above-average 1222 attention and inspections and manpower devoted to trying.to 1223 focus on pilgrim, given the extraordinary action taken by the Commission four and one-half years ago, what are we 1224 1225 doing here today?
1226 How is it possible that four and a half years later, as I.
1227 understand it, to a inzgo extent the root cause of the 1228 problems identified and responded to so severely by the 1229 Commission four and a half years ago remains essentially.
1230 unaddressed? What should the Commission have done that it 1231 did not do in these preceding.four and one-half years?
1232 Why are we still here today addressing the same root 1233 cause?
1234 hr. ZECH. Well, Mr. Studds, if I may respond briefly, 1235 first of all, in 1982 I'believe the Commission did take 1286 aggressive an3 significant action resulting in the largest 1
1837 eivil penalty assessed at that time. I thank it was a 1238 responsible action. I think that my review of the situatic 1239 was that the Commission at that time and the Staff at that l
g .
PAGE $3 MAMEs NIr19703C They woro 1240 time felt that that was sufficient oction.
1241 confident that improvements-would be made.
1242 My review'also indicates that most of the focus by the 1243 pilgrim people at that time was on hardware items and on There wa 1244 Physical hardware-type plant design deficiencies.
1245 apparently not enough focus on management responsibilities 1246 at that time.
1247 They did upgrade various plant control systems-and did But I see it, although the 1248 take a number of actions.
efforts were there, they were focusing more on hardware thr' 1249 on management. I think in retrospect we have an 1250 appreciation of the fact that the pilgrim management was q
1251 1252 focusing on those hardware issues, as was XRC.
1253 I think now it is a fact that I think we know more th 1254 did ther.. I think that Boston Edison has learned a hard j
1255 lesson, and although we are not as all confident at this 3
1256 stage that those management problems have been resolved.
1257 think that the root causes that you referred to are well and we will 1258 recognized now by Boston Edison and by MRC, 1259 indeed focus on those.
1260 Essentially, I'think we didn't 30 far enough in revi the performance, and I think that ta retrospect we were 1261 1262 expecting that that large fine and the actions that were 1263 taken regarding hardware would indeed result in better !
Over time, it showed that it was not enough l 1264 performance.
1 N_---____-_____ _
G4, FAGE 54
., MAME: MIr197020 n I would liko~to 1265' and that's tho truo story, Mr. Studds.
1266 paint-it a-little bit rosier, but those are the facts,:and 1267 think I can only be honest-with you and say that we wish n 1268 that we'd done a better job.
1269 We do think, though--at least, my persons 1 feeling is-Ihe plan 1270 the public health and safety was not endangered.
1273 simply didn't improve as much as it should have. I can
,1272 assure you that we intend to do all we.can to correct thos 1273 matters and to devote considerable attention and effort 1274 towards ensuring ourselves that the Boston Edison 1275 organization management-wise has been impressed and that o 1276 NRC Staff is also focusing on those management issues.
1277 So all I can say is, we're going to do the very best 1278 can to make sure that we've 1 earned those lessons and app 1279 them so that the people of your area will be confident 1280 that--not only has Boston Edison looked at the situation, 1281 the MRC has, and we will not allow restart until we're 1282 ^ confident that the plant can be operated safely.
1283 nr. STUDDS. Well, I appreciate your candor, sir, and 1284 sure some of it is not particularly pleasant for you.
1285 I know Commissioner Asselstine wants to say somethi:
1886 let me $ust say to you that I omn't avoid the haunting 1287 feeling that auch of what you just said would have been :-
1288 had there been a similar hearing here in 1982. Perhaps t.
1289 was, but I can just hear the Commission saying in 1982, i
l
[ PAGE '55
. .,' XAME: MIT197030 1290 having just imposed cn unproccdontod- fino upon the utility, ,
1291 that, quote, Boston Edison has learned a hard lesson,
1292 unquote.
1293 Mr. EECM. We hope, I'm sure--
1294 Mr. STUDD5. your and a half years later, they've learn' 1295 it again according to you.
1296 Mr. EECH. I'm sure--I can't argue that point, Mr. Stud 1297 and I'm sure that the Commission in '42 did indeed think 1298 that they had done sufficient. All I can say is, those are 1299 the facts, and we hope that we will have learned from the 1300 lesson of the past few years.
in 1301 Mr. STUDDS. Following up on what you just said, 1302 hindsight now, with the opportunity of hindsight, in retrospect, what do you think you might have done or shoul:
1300 1304 have done or do you wish you had done that you did not do 1305 that period?
The only thing I can say, Mr. Studds, is th 1306 Mr. EECH.
1307 think that the Commission in those days and prior to that !
1308 had been focusing their primary attention on licensing 1309 activities, regulatory activities, and hardware issues, j And it was very L
1310 plant-specific issues, design issues.
1811 appropriate over the years.
1312 Mow that we have 100 plants oporating, our focus is !
changing. With the number of licansing matters decreasing 1313 1314 we recognize fully that we must indeed focus on plant f
- 'FAGE 56
, XAME: MIT197030 1315 operations and safety of oporctions, rathor thon liconsing 1316 matters, and I think that just recognizes our .
1317 acknowledgement of the fact that our responsibilities for 1318 public hemith and safety are shifting somewhat.
1319 So I think, looking back, it would have been good in 1 1320 perhaps, if the focus would have been more on operational 1321 and management activities, rather than hardware issues, but 1322 that is th,e way it was, and I hope we've learned those 1323 lessons.
1324 Mr. STUDDS. Thank you.
1325 Mr. MARKEY. May I beg the indulgence of the gentleman 1326 Massachusetts?
1327 The ranking minority member from California has to les If it would be acceptable '
1328 in the next five minutes or so.
1329 to the gentleman from Massachusetts to suspend his questio 1330 at this tine, 1331 Mr. STUDDS. I would be delighted to yield to Mr. Moor.
Mr. MARKEY. And I will reccgnize the gentleman from 1332 1333 California and then immediately recognite--
1334 Mr. STUDDS. I'll be happy to do that, Mr. Chairman, s for 1 1335 let me again thank the ranking member, Mr. Moorhead, 1836 ocurtesy as well, and I'm delighted to yield.
Mr. MARKEY. The gentleman's time has expired for this 1337 period of time.
The chair recognizes the gentleman fron 1338 1339 California, Mr. Moorhead, on his own time.
PAGE 57
MAME: NIT 197030 MOORHEAD, Thank you, Mr. Choircen.
1340 .Mr. i 1341 ~How many years has MRC been conducting systematic 1342 assessment'of licensee performance' inspections?
1343 Mr. EECH. Oh, I would have to ask my staff to perforr 1
1344 would guess it's six or seven, but--I'm informed it's six '
1345 years ago, sir. l 1346 Mr. MOORHEAD. Can you make a general observation abo effects of these inspections? Eas licensee performance 1847 1348 generally been improving or declining?
1349 Mr EECH. Mr. Moorhead, I could give you a general 1350 comment. My view is that it has had a significant effect' 1351 addres.3ing these matters to the licensee, bringing then 1352 personally to their attention, but with your permission, 1353 would lil::
to ask Mr. Taylor to give a very brief--a ver)!
1854 brief answer to your guestion to supplement mine. ]
1355 Mr. Taylor is the head of our' Inspection and Enforce 1356 program at Headquarters in Washington.
Mr. TAYLOR. I am James Taylor. I would say yes, Mr 1357 f' 1358 Moorhead, that the SALP process-has focused, helped to f<
1359 both licensee and MRC attention across the broad spectru 1360 operations, and I think performance has improved general 1861 if you look across the plants.
1362 Mr. MOORHEAD. Commissioner Asselstinet 1363 Mr. ASSELSTIME. Mr. Moorhead, I agree with that. I ,
and the SALP proce 1364 in general, performance has improved, 1:
1
V PAGE 58.
XAME: nip 197030 1365 is a useful tool in helping to bring chout improved 1366 performance, although I would have to say that in some 1367 specific cases, I think that we've fallen into a trap with 1368 the SALP process, and that.in those cases, the SALP process L
1369 became more an annual validation that things were still bad or that the same problams were still existing. It didn't 1370 1871 become a vehicle for bringing about change and improvement.
1372 I think there is more attention to that and more 1373 recognition of it, but at least in some cases--and I think 1374 Davis-Besse is a good exkaple--year after year, we saw the 1375 same problems, and we weren't doing as much about it as we 1376 should have been.
1377 Mr. MOORMEAD. Well, with regard to the poor performer:
137A have these inspections left that performance unchanged?
1379 Mr. ASSELSTIME. I think in some instances they did.
1380 think in some instances the SALP process did not serve as 1381 effective vehicle for bringing about raa' and lasting 1382 improvement in performance.
1383 Mr. M00RHIAD. Well, are these poor performers, while 1384 achieving the desired levels of XRC's desire, still or are the 1885 performing better than they did five years ago, 1886 doing worse?
1887 Mr. ASSELSTIME. I suspect that, in general, plants at 1388 doing better, but I'd also have to say that in the case of.
1389 some of the plants that had serious operating events last l
i
4 PAGE- 59 MAME ' rip 197030 ,
1390 year, I'm not sure they ware doing ouch bottor thon they 1391 were five years.ago.
1592 Browns perry, Davis-Basse, Rancho seco, performance ws 1393 pretty bad last year for those plants, and the SALP process 1394 had identified those' kinds of poor performance problems ani 1395 .a history of poor performance at those plants.
1896 Mr. M00RMEAD. Commissioner Secht Mr. EECN. Yes. I think the SALP process 73s generall.
1397 It. helped the good 1398 helped across the board, Mr. Moorhead.
1899 pwrformers.
1400 And let me just make a point very briefly here. We're 1401 focusing today on the poor performers, which is approprint 1402 Mr. Chairman, because that's what you asked us to do, but 1403 -there's an awful lot of good performers out there, too.
1404 Ihere's an awful lot of very responsible management people dedicated Americans that are'really doing an outstanding :
1405 1406 with a deep-seated ec=mitment to safety,.and I don't~ thin}!
1407 we should overlook that this morning.
1408 We're talking about a small percentage, and most of -
1409 management people , I- think, are outstanding.
Moorhe 1410 I think the SALP process has been useful, Mr.
l 1411 would agree--and part of my initiative for performance 141 2 indicators is to suppletant the SALP process, give it nor 141 3 teeth, give it more facts, and so whereas I do think the 1414 SALP process has been useful across the board for both ot L
- ~ PAGE 60 g -. ,
M&ME: MIT197030.
1415 finost perforcors and our below-cvorogo performors, I do l 1416 believe that it can.be enhanced by the performance 1417 indicators program, which I mentioned earlier, but I think' 1418 the SALP should be recognised as's contributionLto safety 1419 across the board.
1420 Mr. M00RMLAD. Sometimes it appears that the licensee-1421 performance declines when.aven more greater' attention is 1422 given by MRC to their performance. Can you explain this i423 phenomenon?
I'll try.
1424 Mr. EECH. Not vary well,' frankly.
1425 Mo, I think that's probably true. Sometimes when--I 1426 it's the fact that when we identify a performer that does 1427 give us concern and we start looking deeper and deeper in 1428 the problem, we do indeed find that there are more proble 1429 I suppose it's like any kind of inspection. Once.you st 1430 looking for things real hard, you usually find some thing 1431 that can be improved.
1432 So I think more than anything, it's our inspection 1433 process. We have indeed developed, I think,-over the yes 1434 a tougher way to inspect, and when we send a team out the 1435 they usually come back with things that they've seen tha need correction.
I think At's more or less, frankly, th, 1436 1437 tougher inspection technitues than anything else, but I 1438 think that it is true that once we look at a utility rea-1439 hard, that we do find that occasionally there is more th
g-
- PAGE 61-MAME: MIT197030 1440 we expected to find. I think that's oil part of ths 1441 straightforward, candid process we have, and I think it's 1442 probably appropriate. Sometimes we'll find mores sometimes-1443 we'll find less.
Mr. M00RMLAD.
Well, that brings up another question, 1444 1445 though. I understand very few MRC employees have actual )
1446 ! experience in civilian--operating civilian power reactors c 1447 in corporate annagement experience.
1448 What kind of training do your inspectors get to comper 1449 for this lack of experience? 1 1450 Mr. EECH. We do have training for.them. We 'use contr:
f 1451 people when we need additional experience with actuEl i 1452 operations, as well as our own people. We would like to
)
1453 have--I think it would be very healthy is we did have more 1454 actual utility operational people in our organization. I 1455 thinkit'ssomethingthatweshouldgivedevotedattentier.]
1456 to. I can assure you that I think, frankly, my background 1457 in the Navy as an operator in the Navy, qualified many yes 1458 ago certainly, but it has given me a considerable confider 1459 that I can look at a plant and perhaps make a contzdbutio:
1460 whereas others who haven't had that kind of backgrounC ca:
1461 aske the same contribution with the same confidanoa.
1462 So it's important that the XRC continue our efforts i 1463 nore operational people, and I would--I would submit that 1464 that's something that we should continue our efforts in t,
PAGE 62 PAGE 63.
F197030
.ol .
irootion.
could just make a Mr. MOORMEAD. Do you think that SALP ratings are, l and if not, do you ibly does not entirely ndorstood by the public and the media, I, as the Chairman invo any plans to better communicate the signifiennee of
- are meant to be A, I sour regulatory action to the public and to the media?
it, the way A, B, anc Mr. EECH. I'm not sure they're as well as understood as sanly but by and larg-Frankly, the categories ara a tool 43'd like them to be.
bla .
for us to use. Cat sry I means.that the utility is a spirit in which our sporating at a 1s.el that we're very satisfied with, and we That is aver we do and howeve son probably decrease our attention to a degree.
ope that we at the M7 reserved for those very outstanding organizations.
y, that,1f all the Mumber II means we continue the normal inspection prog rage--should that da) and the Category III, of course, means that we increase the inspection.
That doesn't mean that they're not safe at all; .ings would recognize it ceans they are safe essentially. But it means that we
,e tends to assume th.
should increase our inspection, and that's what we do.
e in this gane of rat.
And then the plant, of course, has the same their efforts in >dy wants to be on th responsibilities in that area to increase is rating and ranking enything that receives a Category III.
I'm no so sure tha try to use an absolu But those are useful tools for us. ademic analogy is it's as well understood as it might be, but I can assure yo that it is a useful tool, and I think that we should balance of my time, definitely continue the SALP program'and perhaps try to an and appreciate, of oxylain it a little bit better, so that it ',an be letter in the subcommittee I understood.
' PAGE 64
. .M&ME8 RIF197030 1515 hearing process.
1516 The Chair once again recognizes the gentleman from 1517 Massachusetts.
1518 Mr. STUDD5. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
1519 I know that Commissioner Asselstine wanted to respond.
er.
1520 I ask you to do that, sir, let me just ask you to comment one other thing in the process.
In the testimony to be 1521 1522 offered by Mr. Sweeney on behalf of Boston Edison .in a few 1523 moments, he says It should be noted that the concerns we 1524 are addressing today are different from those for which we were fined in 1982. The issues then were safety related an l
1525 1526 failure to comply with regulations. Today the issues are 1527 not directly related either to compliance or to safety.
1528 I want to know, as you respond to the earlier colloguy were having, whether or ..ot you agree with that statement.
1529 1530 And if not, if you could provide us with some examples 1531 precisely of what you mean.
I do not 1532 Mr. ASSELsTIME. Let me start with that one.
1533 agres with that statement. I think that the problems are 1534 basically the same problans. The root cause problem was I 1535 ineffective management back then in 1982 and I think that 1536 that is the problem that we face today. I also do not buy i i l
1537 this notion that these are a set of management issues that i
1538 they have to deal with, but that they are unrelated to 1539 safety.
e
65 XAME: nip 197030 PAGE 1540 In my own estination, porticulorly 1 coking at the poor.
1541 Performers and the serious operating events over the past 1542 year, 'if you have a weak and ineffective management 1543 structure, it is slaply a matter of time until that reflect-itself in Poor performance and deteriorated condition in t1 l
1544 1545 plant itself. In fact, I think that is exactly what-we sat
- k; 1546 in 1982.
1547 so'I guess I would disagree with the company's statens 1548 on both counts.
1549 Back to your earlier question, why did the company's
'1550 improvement efforts after 1982 fail and why did we get 1551 fooled'in the process. I agree with much of what Chairman 1552 zech said. I think the company took too narrow of a focus back in 1982. we emphasized the management problem as the 1553 1554 underlying root cause, but I think the focus tended'to be i 1555 hardware issues and on the symptoms, rather than the root 1556 cause of the problem.
1557 Since many of the instances, at that time, focused or 1558 making modifications to the plant, controlling hardware ar 1559 modifications changes, I think that is where the company 1 auch of their effort. Even though they did a management 1560 1561 review, in nindsight it mov appears to me that they'did ac 1562 deal with the people problem, they dealt with the questior 1563 of modifications and hardware.
1564 I do not think that they changed the attitude probler i
l
+
'pAGE $6 MAME8 .NIr197030
'1565 ithey had, tho attitudo of tronting.this nuolocr plant euch pc 1566 - as they did a fossil plant. It'is not clear to me that the
)
1567 senior corporate management was committed to change or'was ll And they did 1568 heavily involved in the process back in.'82.
1569 not put in place an attitude of critical self-assessment. l 1570 think that.was. missing.
1571 Now why did we get fooled? I think we tended to foct 1572 those thing as well. The plant went into a long outage tc replace its piping.
And the company did a pretty good-sol 1513 1574 in managing the work. Again, that is modifications to the That is whe; 1575 plant, making hardware changes to the plant.
1576 they seemed to .have learned the lessons f airly well and I 1577 think we were generally satisfied with that performance.
'8-1578 Ihat is why you saw the 5Al? ratings go up in 1984 and 1579 In hindsight, it seems to me that we did not (ocus iz which'is tt 1580 much--nor did the company--on the root cause, We did r.
1581 management structure and the management system.
1582 did deep enough to make sure that the management attituds 1583 really had changed,'that they had in place an affective 1584 management team that was telling the people at the plant 1585 expected of them, that was setting realistic and aggress.
1586 goals for dealing with the many problems that they had a-1587 the plant, and was holding people accountable for meetin!
1588 those goals.
1589 And I think that there are two examples that you ca I
1.' ' FAGE 67
. x&NEs NIF197030 15'90 to, the number of liconsod reactor oporators, and t'no radiological control situation at the Plant. Those Problem.
1591 v.
In fact, the IMpo 1592 were net surprises to the company.
1593 reviews in tha 1981-82 time frame pointed those out as 1594 weaknesses. I do:not think the company put in flace a management system and.a set of management' controls to deal t
1595 And as a result, those-
'1596 effectively with those problems.
1597 were two of the significant atens that we criticised the 1598 company again, earlier this year, for in the latest 5 ALP 1599 report.
1600 so I think the answer is we did not focus on the root That is what we have to do now. We have to 1601 cause enough.
team really is 1602 ensure.ourselves that this new management 1603 functioning effectively. I do think we have the attention-Ther 1604 of the company and the company's board of directors, ,
'1605 Lis now question in my mind that the senior management of ..
.1606 this company now is devoting a great deal of time-and enerl 1607 and attention to this plant.
1608 What we need to make sure of now is that the changes 1609 really are meaningful.and that they are having positive 1610 effects.
1611 Mr. STUDDs. At the risk of becoming too specific aga:
1612 laymen, is there anything mysterious about the number of 1613 licensed operators required to manage a Plant of this size 1614 Is that subject to debate or is that fairly much a subjec-
- _.__.________._____.___________--m.______m_.m. - . - . . _ _ . _ . _ . . . . _ _.
=
.)
PAGE 68 .)
k .,
,' MAMEt XIp197030-1615 of consensus? .i
'1616 Mr. A55EL5 TIME. I think it ~ is a ~ subject of consensus ~.
, . 1 is well established what they need to have..There have beet 1617 1618 some increases in the numbers. of operators that have been 1619 needed since the Three Mile' Island accident.
1620 The difficulty is in planning far enough ahead to maF 1621 sure that you always have people in the training pipeline, 1622 so that you will always have enough operators that you do-not'get into a shortage situation. My experience is that 1623 1624 the.well-managed plants around the country focus in on jurl 1625 that kind of a problem and they say what do we need and le 1626 us make sure we have the resources and the people-to'do t;'
1627 job.
In. fact, the wel!
1628 And they are always well equipped.
country have 1629 managed and well operated plants around the And they have th 1630 more licensed operators than they need.
1631 licensed operators throughout their organization, where t 1632 can take advantage of that experience and knowledge.
f 1633 Mr. STUDDS. Well, have the shortage of licensed oper has that been episc 1634 which you have identified at pilgrim, 1635 and occasional or has that been chronic?
1686 Mr. ASSELSTIME. I thint. it has been chronio, althous 1637 regional people could address that better.
althot.
1638 Mr. MAP, KEY. The.gentlensn's time has expired, 1639 Asselstine you do have the right to respond to the quest:.
1 l
l l !
u__-___--_-__ _ >
FAGE 69 MAME: MIF197030 1640 or any otheir combors of the Concissien beforo th3 genticOor 1641 from Massachusetts' time has expired.
1642 Mr. ASSELSTIME. My own impression is that it has been 1643 chronic problem--at least in the osse of reactor operators.
1644 but I think our regional people could provide some Certainly, it has been a 1645 additional information on it.
1646 problem in '82 and '85.
1647 Mr. EECH. Dr. Murley, could you give us a very brief i
\
1648 response please?
Mr. MURLEY. Yes, Congressman, it has been a chronic 1649 1650 problen in recent years. It is another manifesta [1on of th' 1651 nanagement failure to plan ahead and tc have enough 1652 operators in the trainin9 pipeline, as Commissioner 1653 Asselstine said.
1654 Mr. MARKEY. Iho gentlanan's time has expired f,or this 1655 round. The Chair now recognizes the gentlanan from Utah, l 1656 monbar of the Subcommittee Mr. Mielson.
1657 Mr. MIELSON. Thank you. Admiral Esch, it is nice to you as Chairaan. I appreciate your coming and I apprecia-1658 1659 the Chairnan holding these hearings.
1660 Is MRC satisfied with the SALP process in general?
1661 Mr. EECE. With the SALP process?
1662 Mr. MIEL50H. Yes.
1663 Mr. ZECH. I think the SALP process, yes, I an satisi 1664 with it. On the other hand, I do think--as I have indica
- FAGE 70
, .MAME: IIF197030 aarlier--thot it should bo onhcncod. And that is'ona roosor 1665 1666 I--
1667 Mr. MIEL50M. Now would you' improve it?
1668 Mr. EECM. I would improve'it by establishing what I to:
I might say the industry 1669 performance indicator program.
1670 already has this program in effect. The imp 0 organization 1671 has a performance indicator program going so what I as 1672 suggesting is not so new, but it is something we do not hav.
1673 at MRC, and I think we should have. Performance indicators ,
1674 would be a collection of a number of actual items, such as 1675 rad waste at-the plant, the exposure of workers, the number 1676 of scrams, the number of outstanding modifications, the 1677 responsiveness of management to key MRC directions and 1678 maintenance items, and a number of things like that.
1679 But those very specific facts, trended over a, period <
1680 time, would be in my judgment a significant enhancement.to- j 1681 the SALP process.
1682 Mr. HIELSOM. Do you believe construction and l-1683 implementation of standardized designs would improve 1684 management competency?
Mr. EECH. Absolutely. It would improve it significan' 1685 1686 Mr. Mielson, and I think--
1687 Mr. MIEL50M. Do you think it would' simplify the 1688 operations?
Mr. ZECH. Absolutely. Simplify it and make it safer 4 1689
v .
,; .PAGE 71 MAMEs IIF197030 l
1690 thoro's no question but that is the way to go, Mr. MIEL50X. However, do you think s' law calling.for 5 e '
1691
-1692 managers will automatically solve the problem?
1693 ~ Mr. EECH. Mot necessarily.
1694 Mr. MIEL50M. You cannot, by a stroke of the pan--
1695 Mr. EECH. No, I do not think so. -You cannot.really 1696 legislate or regulate quality, a.s we know, I do not think ..
1697 But on the other hand, I think a recognition of the 1698 imPortance of management involvement is certainly somethin 1699 important. I have noticed, on my visits to plants, as MI, 1700 Studds was talking about earlier, and Chairman Markey, the 1701- is no question but management involvement is the key to 1702 safety. So I think we have to recognize that.
1703 I am not so sure you can regulate that, but you must 1704 . recognize it.
Mr. XIELSOM. Are there certain non-regulatory aspect:
1705 1706 will improve management that you could recommend?
1707 Mr. ZECH. I think so. Most of them are in the area 1708 someway or another to encourage excellence of performance 1709 to encourage a real recognition that this is a demanding 1710 technology. It is not just another way to make steam. I 1711 does require an awful lot more disolpline and attention.t 1712 detail.
1713 Those are the kind of things that simply are attitud 1714 perhaps and I do not think you can legislate them but I
PAGE 73 MAME: MIT197030 c.
1715 think you should rocognizo that they should bo impressed 1716 upon nuclear managenent personnel.
1717 Mr. MIEL50M. M r '. Bernthal.
Hr. BERMINAL.
Mr. Mielson, I wanted to make a comment.
1718 1719 earlier because Mr. Studds, I think, had raised a similar-1720 noint. And that is how difficult I think the Commission hr Our 1721 foend this .nar.kgement issue to be, quite frankly.
-1722 predictive powers, like everyone's I guess, are not very as they say.
1723 good, especially when the future is involved, 1724 And if.you go back a little bit and look at a couple have. We at 1725 recent examples, you see the problems that att In the 1726 not very good at assessing each management issues.
1727 case of Termi, for example, a plant that has had 1728 difficulties uith management and startup.
Mr. MIELSOM.
I 'only have about one more minute,'let r-1729 1730 ask--do I have one minute.
1731 Mr. BERMINAL. I am sorry.
Mr. MIELSOM. Chairman Markey asked for a list of the 1732 Mave you revise 1733 performers in May, the last time we met.
1734 that since you gave the off the cuff names last timer?
1735 Mr. EECH. I think we have, Mr. Mielson, slightly.
1736 Mr. MIEL50M. Would you provide that for the Committs Mr. EECH.
I think we have provided it to the Committ 1737 1738 Mr. MIELSON. One last, in view of the U.S. Mavy's 1:
1739 success in getting performance indicators and your desir<
. _-_._____________._--__.-.___.m -
PAGE 73
. , - NAME: MIT197030 1740' do that, would you also--for the cosaittaa--discuss how, in 4
1741 view of the Navy's failure, you could do it in the.MRC?
1742 Mr. EECH. I do not know'about the Navy's failure.;I dc
.1743 understand. The Navy has not faf. led in that regard, as far 1744 as I know.
1745 Mr. MIEL50X. Wall.-I guess it is a matter of grades,.JH 1746 C, or whatever you are talking about.
1747 I thank the Chairman. I realise we 40 have to go for 1748 vote, and I thank the Commissioners for coming.
1749 Mr. MARKEY. We will take a brief recess for about ten And then we 1750 minutes. There is a roll call on the floor.
1751 will reassemble.
1752 (Recess,1 Mr. MARKEY. Mr.
Chairman, according to your testimony-1753 1754 MRC held management meetings with Boston Edison Company-1984 to' 1755 aPProximately every six weeks until September of 1756 monitor Progress of the 1982-ordered management in 1757 improvement Program. Why did these meetings stop 1758 september of 1984, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. EECH. I would like to call on Dr. Murley, Please 1759 1760 respond to that, Mr. Chairman.
1761 Mr. MARKEY. Dr. Murley, could you once again some 40 1 l
1762 to the table?
Mr. MURLEY. Yes, Mr. Chairman. As one of the action 1763 1764 we required in 1982, it was for the utility to Put in Pla
PAGE 74 I ,
.' MAME: MIp197030 They-did that. It was o 1765 a performance improvement plan.
,1766 comprehensive plan that again focused on the problems that 1767 we saw in 1982, and part of that plan was to have management We!
1768 meetings between the MRC and Boston Edison periodically.
1769 did that. >
The plan wct completed in late 1984. I saw no need f e-1770 1771 meetings on that plan. Suite frankly, I saw that the
- 1772 problems were deeper than just were being addressed by the so.that is why we. stopped.
1773 performance improvement. plan, q At the time, ther.
1774 Mr. MARKEY. So just let me clarify.
1775 were you satisfied as to the adequacy and sufficiency of th 1776 management changes which had been made at Boston Edison?
Mr..MURLEY. No, sir. As I said, the meetings.that we 1777 1778 having were focused on this performance improvement plan 1779 that, it was becoming clear to me late last f all, were . not At abot 1780 really getting to the root causes of the problem.
1781 the same time--
By last fall, do you mean 196 1782 Mr. MARKEY. Excuse me.
1783 1985? i I'm sorry.'
Mr. MURLEY. Excuse me. The fall of 1984.
1784 1785 that as the plan was finished, we stopped having those I should say that we continue to has 1786 particular meetings. I 1787 periodic meetings with the company on specific management 1788 issues as they come up, and we continued those.
1789 Mr. MARKEY. So at that point, then, in September of
'pAGE 75 MAME: IIT197030 1790 you oscolated rathor then relaxed the acount of conitoring {
1791 that you were conducting?
s 1792 Mr. MURLEY. No, we changed the focus, I think would b 1793 way to say it. I stopped the periodic meetings on the We changed, 1794 performance plan because it was completed.
i 1795 then, to look at the enforcement problems we were having 1796 radiological controls and other areas.
1797 Mr. MARKEY. But even with your change of focus, then, 1798 program that you were conducting did not work in terms of 1799 the final result, which is this hearing?
Mr. MURLEY. Yes. Keep in mind that our focus was ki:
1800 1801 changed by the fact that all through 1984 they had an 1802 outage, a very long cutage to replace the cracked piping.
1803 As a result of that, we had an intense inspection program 1804 and I followed that pretty closely myself, but they did a!
1805 good job on that.
1806 But with regard to the . underlying management probles 1807 we see today, they really only came into focus to me in 1808 January of this year when we completed our SALP evaluatic 1809 that covered the 1985 period.
1810 Mr. MARKEY. So then the process which was in place 1 1811 fully capable of identifying this underlying management 1812 problem--
1813 Mr. MURLEY. I think that is fair.
of the op 1814 Mr. MARKEY.--of all of these years, then,
_ __.m___.__.m.___.__ - _ _ _ _- _ . _ . - _ _ _ _ . - _ . . .
FAGE 76 MAME: MIT197030 1815 of the plant.
Mr. MURLEY.
As I said, we only do a SALP once a-year, a:!
1816 1817 that is when everything gets pulled together, and at least 1818 for me it came into focus in January of this year._ We did 1819 not have indicators that showed trends during the year, and 1820 as I said, the outage in 1984 kind of distorted the trend 1821 because they did that t' sty well.
Mr. MARKEY. Lat me asX you, then, Dr. Murley, how woule 1822 1823 you characterize the assurances that were given to you by 1824 Boston Edison back in 1982 as to their commitment to 1825 rectifying Problems at the plant?
Mr. MURLEY. I was not in this job in 1982.
I didn't t 1826 1827 the job until 1983, But I did review the changes ths.t they 1828 made, and they were guite comprehensive. They brought in a the 1829 senior vice president from another yart of the company, 1830 hired an outside vice President for nuclear operations fror.
another company, and they changed plant managers.
1831 Mr. MARKEY. But they did not correct the root problem.
1832 l
! 1833 Mr. MURLEY. It turned out that that was--
1834 Mr. MARKEY. They moved the chairs around a little bit 1835 ultimately they never got to the core problem.
1836 Mr. MUELEY. As it turns out, that is correct, l Okay. Let me move on te 1837 Mr. MARKEY. That is correct.
1838 next question.
j As you know, a number of Massachusetts politicians an 1839 1
f e --__- ___-_- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
PAGE 77
,' MAME: 217197030 1840 organizations hevo submittod a show ocuso potition under tho
-1841 regulations at 10 CPR 2.206 requesting that MAC suspend pilgrim's operating license. The first question is what 1842 1843 standard must be met by petitioners-who are requesting a 1844 hearing, Mr. Chairman?
1845 Mr. EECH. Can I ask my Office of. General Counsel, Mr.
1846 parler, to respond to that questionf.
1847 Mr. MARKEY.
If the gentleman would identify himself it 1848 the record.
I as the gene:
1849 Mr. PARLER. My name is Willias parler.
1850 counsel of the agency.
Mr. MARKEY. Excuse me. You don't know what that stan 1851 1852 is, Mr. Chairman?
1853 Mr. ZECH. I know there is a standard, but I think it 1854 be appropriate to give you specifics, Mr. Chairman, and I ,
1855 would auch prefer.to have the office of General Counsel gi-1856 you those specifics, with your permission.
Mr. MARKEY.
I recognize the counsel for that purpose.
1857 Mr. PARLER.
The general standard for hearings is in 1858 Any person who 1859 Section 189 of the Atomic Energy Act.
1860 demonstrates that the person's interest may be affected b' 1861 proceeding or by a situation, that is the touchstone for.
1862 hearings.
Mr. MARKEY.
Now, do you believe that the standard yo-1863 1864 just enunciated is being met in this particular case?
yagg 7g-
+ . ., MAME NIF197030 1865' Mr. PARLER. In what contoxt, sir?
1866 Mr. MARKEY. The show cause petition.
.1867 Mr. PARLER. I only heard about the show cause petitior 1868 this morning. It is my impression that it was just 1869 received.
1870 Mr. EECH. If I any interrupt, Mr. Chairman, I just ses last night myself. I don't think general counsel has had 1871 1872 chance to review it. I have only seen it briefly. I can 1873 assure you, though, that we are going to look at all the 1874 items presented to us very carefully, and the staff has $u 1875 received the report probably this morning. We will review 1876 those items carefully, and certainly any of those that hev 1877 safety implications, we will review with the greatest of 1878 care and don't intend to start up the plant until at least 1879 those safety items that we determine are resolved.,
1880 Mr MARKEY. It seems to me that in this particular ca the petitioners are quoting from NRC-generated documents, 1881 1882 and that on that basis alone, they seem to have some 1883 material relevance to the question.
1884 Mr. ZECH. I an sure the do, Mr. Chairman. All I car.
We 1885 1s that we staply need time to review then carefully.
1886 intend to do that.
Mr. MARKEY. Can I ask historically how many show cau:
1887 in foot, been recognized t 1888 petitions over the years have, 1889 the Commission?
PAGE 79 NAME: MIT197030 1890 Mr. EECH. Mr . Forlo'r , con you rosPend to that, plooso ?
There have been 1891 Mr. FARLER. I don't have the numbers.
1892 quite a few Section 2.206 petitions that have been filed.
1893 out of the number that have been filed, I think'that 1894 relatively few have resulted in hearings.
1895 Mr. MARKEY. What I am saying is out of hundreds that at
- 1896 have been filed over the history of the Commission, are we 1897 talking about one hearing that might have been granted, or-1898 five, or fifty? What is the range we are talking about?
Mr. PARLER. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I woul 1899 1900 like to get that information and supply it for the record.
1901 I just don't have it in my head.
1902 Mr. MARKEY. Commissioner Asselstine, do you have any i
1903 information?
1904 Mr. A55EL5 TIME. Mr. Chairman, I think it is a v,ery sai 1905 number. The one that I can remember is the Indian Point 1906 special Proceeding. I think that proceeding was begun as 1 1907 result of petitions filed with the Commission. A second c:
1908 that is somewhat analogous, at least, I think, is the
- 1. That was a special 1909 question of restart of TMI Unit 1910 proceeding that the Commission on its own initiative began 1911 Those are the two that I can think of, At least Indian 1912 Foint is the only one I can recall that resulted from 1913 yetitions being filed with the Commission, 1914 Mr. MARKEY. So it's a handful, at best.
-y FAGE. 80
,' xnMEs. NIT 197030 1 1915 Mr. 155ELSTIME. That'sright,boccusointhasocases1l
. i 1916 a matter of discretion on the part of.the Commission whethel 1917 it chooses to grant a hearing, as opposed to licensing 1918 cases, in which as long as individuals can establish that 1919 they.have an interest and at least one valid issue, they as, 1920 entitled to a hearing as a matter of right.
1921 Mr. EECH..But I would like to Point out, Mr. Chairman.
1922 just to make sure the record is correct, that we review al.
1923 those allegations with great care and respect and make wha 1924 I believe is a very competent judgment.
Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairatn. Let me move on.
1925 1926 If a utility today, Mr. Chairman, were to approach it 1927 and to ask for a license'to construct and operate and 1928 General Electric boiling water reactor with a Mark I desis 1929 could and would the XRC license it? ,
1930 Mr. EECH. We would review their request, like we wou:
1931 request, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MARKEY. Could it meet current regulatory standar$
1932 1933 Mr. ZECH. We would have to subject it to the standar.
1934 We would have to subject it to the modifications we have 1935 ande recently, the severe accident policy and other thing I
1936 I think there would ha changes that we would require.
1937 would say right off-hand that there would be some 1938 modifications that would be required to that particular 1939 design in 1986.
9 .
i PAGE S1
'MAME: NIF197030 1940 Mr. MARKEY. Substantial changes? ;
i 1941 hr. EECH. I think that I would prefer to say there wouJ 1942 be changes, but I think you could tern them substantial, I 1943 suppoca. I would have to--
j 1944 Mr. map. KEY. Now would you ters them? i
{
1945 Mr. EECH. I would say that they would be changes that 1 I
1946 would upgrade the ; plant in accordance with-- !
i 1947 Mr. MARKEY. Minor changest s.
Mr. EECH. Changes, Mr. Chairman.
Not minor, and perhs' 1948
's
1949 not really substantial, but more on the substantial side
> 1950 than on the minor side.
s 1951 (Laughter.)
Mr. Asselstine, we are having great diset 1952 Mr. MARKEY.
1953 in this subcommittee and in Congress in general as to the 1954 need to go towards standardized nuclear plant design. Wou:
that we 1955 you reconnend shat this plant design be the one 1956 select to build to or 30 nuclear power plants?
1957 Mr. ASSELSIINE. I guess I wouldn't, Mr. Chairman. We We have the Hope Creek poi:
1958 one more of these to license.
the Commission before too long. I 1959 probably coming before i 1960 think that is the last Mark I, the last of that generatic 1961 For myself, I would say for any futura plant, not $v 1962 G.E. Mark I design, but for any futura plant it does seen 1963 ne that we need to take a hard look at contsinnent performance, and we ought to insist upon some substantia 1964 l
PAGE 82
~'
. ,' MAME: MIT19703C improvements in sofoty, both in the cocidont provention sid.
1965 But 1966 of the house and in the containment performance side.
1967 doubt you would ever see another application for a Mark I containment in this country.
Utilities simply wouldn't 1968 1969 choose one. But that doesn't mean we don't need to deal 19T0, with the problem for the existing plants.
Mr. MARKEY. I have to interrupt again. There is anot) 1971 1972 roll call on the Floor. There as orly five minutes left it 1973 go. No will take another ten-minute recess and then 1974 reconvene at that point. I apologize to one and all.
1975 [ Recess . ]
1976 Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, you ha it completed any stat 4 1977 which you wish to make?
1978 Mr. ASSELSTIME. Mr. Chairman?
1979 Mr. MARKEY. Commissioner Asselstina?
Mr. ASSELSTINE.
I wanted to add one additional point, 1980 1981 could, on the question of when would the commission grant hearing in the case of a show cause petition. And I thin) 1982 '
the answer, based on previous Commission decisions--notab.
1983 1984 in the Indian point case--is if the Commission determined I
1985 the basis of the review of the petition, that the petitio 1986 raised a substantial safety question, then the Commission 1987 would grant a hearing.
occurred very zarely in the past. The Indi 1988 Ihat hrs l
1989 point case is the only case in which the Commission has l
o l 1 l
L l
e, PAGE $3 c ., NAME: MIF197030 And 1990 granted a hearing that I hevo been oblo to identify.
l 1991 aven that.one was.done,.I think in large measure, as a 1992 discretionary matter.
1993 Mr. MARKEY. Commissioner Bernthal. i Mr. BERXTHAL.
I wanted to add a short comment, gettinf l 1994 !
I think /
1995 back to Mark I containment issue, Mr. Chairman.
1996 there is one illuminating possible answar to that and that 1997 is that there is a Mark II and a Mark III containment toda 1998 And therefore, it seems unlikely that the Commission wouli Insten 1999 approve something to build a plant that was Mark I.
they would ask them why have you not come in with a Mark f 2000 2001 III, probably.
Mr. Chairman,-and 2002 Mr. MARKEY. Let me move on then.
2003 perhaps Dr. Murley, I would like to ask you about your 2004 . reaction to the results of a survey conducted by Boston earceived problems, 2005 Edison of some of its employees abot.*
Ihe survey, conducted late last year obtained the followi:
2006
T 2007 comments from the Boston Edison staff about the MRC '
2008 regulatory climate is seen as oppressive and stressful.
2009 current regulatory climate creates a halter skelter 2010 environment that results in coniksed, multi-focused work 201 1 behavior. The regulator is seen as too attentive to 2012 inconsequential detail and he is perceived as an antagoni 201 3 even to those who are highly dedicated to quality 2014 performance.
PAGE S4
,, , NAME: MIT197030 !
I 2015 Mr. EECH. May I rospond brioily?
2016 Mr. MARKEY._Could you comment on that? l Mr. EECH. Yes. I would like to, and then I will ask D.
2017 2018 Murley to elaborate briefly. {
All I can say, Mr. Chairman, is this. We hear commenti 2019 2020 like that from time to time, sometimes we are told that ou 2021 regulatory people are much'too conscientious.and they are Other times we hear just the 2022 much too involved in details.
2023 opposite, that they perhaps should be involved more.
but it doe 2024 Frankly, we are trying to strike a balance, 2025 not bother me too much when I hear comments that our 2026 regulatory people are conscientious or even overly 2027 conscientious. I would prefer to heer those comments than 2028 others. But I would like to ask Dr. Murley to address you:
2029 specific question.
2030 Mr. MARKEY. Dr. Murley, let me interject this before 2031 respond. And that is that it is heartening to know that 2032 Boston Edison conducts these kinds of-surveys in order to, But at the 2033 in fact, obtain worker problem identification.
2034 same time, what I hear is that this reveals an attitude tt 2035 causes probicas in terms of a solid working relationship j 2036 Letween the utility and the regulatory that would, in fact 2037 guarantee that we do have properly implemented safety 2038 procedures st the plant. Would you agree with that? .
Mr. MURLEY. Yes.
As Chairman Each said, we hear com 2039 G-_ _
FAGE SS
. MAMEi NIF197030' I instruct cy staff that wo 2040 like that from'tico.to't100.
2041 are public servants and our goal is to_ protect the public At the same time, we have to act 2042 ~ health and safety.
2043 ? professionally with the licensee. I think we are doint 2044 that.
There are some people in the plants and to some extent' 2045 That is, if the '
2046 stems from the attituda of the management.
2047 weloose MRC's involvement and if they realise that we have role to perform, then that attitude gets pushed out in to 2048 2049 the plant, tas we do not see that, sometimes, in some of 2050 the best run plants in the region.
2051 But I think there was an attitude, guite frankly, of 2052 defensiveness on the Part of the management at Boston 2053 Edison. And this was reflected down at the. lower levels,-2 2054 an afraid.
Mr. MARKEY. Again, Dr. Murley, I am not commenting up 2055 I think that you are heading 2056 the work that you have done.
And my point, I guess, is that 14 2057 in the right direction. f just has not gone far enough yet, in order to ensure that-l 2058 2059 there is the Proper relationship that is structured betwe<<!
2060 you and the reguinted utility.
206 1 Mr. MUELEY. I agree.
Mr. MARKEY. That concludes this round of questioning l 2062 ;
206 3 Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts.
I apologize te Mr. STUDDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
2064
PAGE 46- -
NAME: MIp197030 of you whose sto cchs any'bo rumbling. No ens ever said oui 2065 2066 procedures here were particularly rational.
2067 I would like to ask a question, if I say, on the subia of emergency planning. And it may be that.Dr. Murley may b 2068 the most appropria+e person to respond. I leave that to 2069 l
2070 you.
Th9 MRC regulations. require that the Commission make :
2071 i
2C72 finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate 2073 protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a 2074 radiological emergency.
2075 Do you--maybe this is really, I guess, to Dr. Murley, 2076 the closest on-scene. Do you personally have confidence including 2077 that both onsite and offsite emergency plans, 2078 evacuation plans, for pilgrim are adeguate and workab2e?
Mr. MURLEY. Yes, I do. There has been an emergency 2079 at least, 2080 exercise every year for the last several years, 2081 the pilgrim site and in the ten mile emergency planning zone. I have observed those exercises myself.
2082 2083 And TEMA has given us e--in some cases, I should say, Ihose have bc 2084 have been deficiencies that PEMA has found.
But on 2085 corrected in subsequent emergency exercisas.
2086 balance, I am satisfied that the plans are adeguate and a-2087 workable. '
2088 Mr. STUDDS. Just for the record, can you--or someone 2089 here--clarify for us the legal responsibility for the
PAGE- 87
.. MAME: MIT197020 1090 development cnd th3 10picsontation of ocergency ovoountion 2091 plans? Now does that responsibility spread between TEMA, 2092 between the NRC, between the state government and between An 2092 local governments? And is there someone else involved?
2094 who is responsible for what?
2095 Mr. EECH. I would like to ask Mr. Parler to respond te 2096 that, Mr. Studds, our Office of General Counsel.
2097 Mr. PARLER. For the.onsite emergency plan, that is the 2098 licensee's responsibility. To the extent that the ensite that is' 2099 planning might interface with the offsite planning, !
kind of like a combination of TEMA and.MRC's responsibility l 2100 2101 Tor the offsite planning and the review of the adequacy o 2102 the state and local plans, that is TEMA's responsibility.
2103 TEMA has its regulations in 44 CTR part 250, to handl 2104 requests by state for the review of a state and local government offsite plans. In the absence of such a reques 2105 2106 to TEMA, under part 250, the NRC and TEMA have memoranda c 2107 understanding under which the TEMA examines the offsite 2108 planning and provides information and reports to the NRC.
assurance finding that 2109 The NRC makes the final reasonable 2110 you zaferred to earlier, in some of your remarks.
3111 Nr. STUDB5. I think I understand that.
211 2 Who is responsible for developing the plan that tellt :
l' 211 3 citizens in and arour.d the utility, for a radius of ten l 2114 miles in some circumstances I gather--and perhaps up to 5 l
FAGE SS l
. . MAME: MIT197030 L.
miles, what they cro to do? Whose sospensibility is it"to 2115 2116 develop that Plan?
Mr. PARLER. The offsite plan is the responsibility of 2117 2118 state and looni governments.
2119 Mr. STUDDS. The state and local governments?
L l Mr. FARLEp.. Yes. If the state and local government-2120 2121 refuses to do so, there is a provision that the utility itself may develop an offsite plan. FEMA reviews the 2122 2123 offsite plan.
2124 Mr. STUDDS. Now many concurrences or approvals in tha 2125 Plan are necessary in order for the utility to operate? De 2126 the governor hava to approve the plan?
2127 Mr. PARLER. I am not familiar with the details on-th:
2128 Mr. STUDDS. He does nott Mr. PARLER. I do not know.
2129 2130 Mr. STUDDS. Oh, you do not know.
2131 Mr. FARLER. The governor could well--depending upon -
2132 preferences of the governor, delega* e authority to a stat 2133 official.
2134 Mr. STUDDS. Oh, of course. I did not mean the gover' personally. I mean, does the state government have to 2135
. 2136 approve the plan?
Mr. PARLER.
The state has to approve the state plan, 2137 In the absence of the approv 2138 Mr. STUDDS. All right.
2139 could the utility operate, if the state were to disappros
. FAGE 89
,, .' XAME: NIF1'97030 2140 .the plan er to withhold its opprovn17 Mr. PARLER.
If the utility has an offsite plan of Ats e 2141 2142 and if, under the circumstances, the Nuclear Regulatory
= 2143 Commission is able to make the reasonable' assurance finding; 2144 then if all other things were satisfactory, the utility 2145 could operate.
Mr. STUDDS.
Even in the presence of a disagrescent by 4 2145 2147 state,.with,the plant Mr. FARLER.
Ne are getting close now to live issues thi 2148 2149' are outstanding.
I am pleased, I Mr. STUDDS.
I am glad to hear that.
2150 2151 think.
Mr. PARLER.
In a proceeding which is--you know, under 2152 2153 adjudication before the Commission, another proceeding.
I am not asking--I beg your pardon. Staff 2154 Mr. STUDD5.
2155 me your reference is to another case with which you are My questions 2156 dealing. I am not trying to do that at all.
2157 are generic and general.
I an interested in knowing whether if the governor of 2158 2159 state, or the state government through whatever mechanisa acts, disapproves or f ails to approve a plan or positive 11-2160 a
$161 disapproves a plan, can the utility operate nonetheless, 2162 given MRC approval of the plan?
There is a provision which says that unds 2163 Mr. PARLER.
2164 such circumstances there can be a utility offsite plan. I:
- __ : _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ . _ _ - _ _ _ 1
- fo PAGE
,[ M&ME: MIp197020 2165
.that plcn is othorviso satisfactory, from the MRC s standpoint, and Mr.C makes the reasonable assurance finding, 2166 2167 as far as the administrative decision is concerned the plar 2168 could operate.
2169 Mr. STUDD5. Well, who would implement it in that case, 2170 not the state and local governments?
2171 Mr. PARLER. The utility.
2172 Mr.-STUDta. The evacuation plan?
l 2172 Mr. PARLTR. That is the theory, yes.
Mr. STUDDS.
Por hundreds of thousands of people?
2174 Mr. PARLER.
I am telling you what.my understanding of 2175 situation.is.
If you have a state whic. does not approve 2176 2177
'the plan and does not have a plan, there is a provision 2178 which contemplates--at least in theory--that there could )
2179 utility offsite plan.
Mr. . STUDDS.
I want to auke sure I understand you. An 2180 belabor this point and I assume you have not-2181 not wa'a tr in the country. Br 2182 encountered such a situation to date, 2183 you are suggesting the possibility of assigning generic in terms of 2184 public police powers to a private utility, of approval by 2185 ordering public evacuation in the absence 2186 state or loomi government, if I underste34 you correctly Mr. PARLER. We are talking about a different plenti 2187 2188 different case.
Mr. STUDDS.
I am not talking about any particular c-2iS9
a FAGE 91
, , MAME. MIT197030 2190' as talking generally about uhet the regulatory and statutoryi!
l 2191 situation is, with which we all deal here.
to the best of my 2192 Mr. PARLER. I have described to you, 2193 ab Alty, what the statutory or the legal innescape,is. What 2194 you are asking me, at leart as I understand it, is how 2195 specific matters would be resolved in a specific case and I cannot get into that at this point? f 2196 Mr. STUDDS.
Believe me, I am not trying to be specific 2197 2198 here. Is the approval of the MRC itself necessary for an 2199 evaluation Plan, for the utility to operate?
2200 Mr. PARLER. Iha XRC has to make th a reasonable assurar
(
2201 finding.
2202 Mr. STUDDS. It does?
2203 Mr. PARLER. Yes, sir.
Mr. STUDDS.
Is the approval of FEMA also necessary?
2204 Mr. PARLER.
It all depends on what the situation is.
2205 2206 the NRC gets the best input that it can from TEMA and it i 2207 not my Present view in all cases that the approval of TEMA 2208 would be absolutely necessary.
Mr. SIUDDS.
But the final authority rects with the X7 2209 2210 Mr. FARLER. Yes, sir.
Mr. STUDDS.
Okay, I have two gentismen here who wish 2211 2212 respond. Go right ahead.
Studds , I just want to make the cor.
2213 Mr. BERXTHAL. Mr.
2214 that there should be no question that the final authority
)
--_.1
e FAGE 92
. , NAMES EIT197030
.2215 rests with the NRC. It would be o groot surpriso, I think 2216 to any of us here if the XRC woule approve a plan that TEM.
2217 had not approved.
2218 With respeed to the other issue that Mr. Parler is 2219 understandably ' .ving some difficulty with. It does touch 2220 very cle,.ar vn a current matter befc;e the Commission.
2221 Mr. STUDDS. I assure you that was not my intention.
But the point i 2222 Mr. BERXTMAL. No, I understand that.
2223 that strictly, my understanding of the law as it reads is 2224 principle--in fact, the law was designed that way. I thir 2225 in principle the Commission could approve i utility plan.
2226 think how that all shakes out, as a legal matter, is a ro:
2227 we have not traveled down yet and we may be traveling dow:
2228 sometime in the future here.
2229 Mr. 2ECH. It should be pointed out, Mr. Chairman, as 2230 well know, that we have not exercised this option in the 2231 past. It is nearby now that we night be involved in such l
2232 option, but you should now and it should be very clear th 2233 this has not.come up in the past. It would be precedent 2234 setting if we did it in the future.
I 2235 Mr. STUDDS. Commissioner Asselstine?
3236 Mr. ASSELSTIME. kr. Studds, I was going to make man) the points that Commissioner Bernthal did. Just one fins 2237 2238 point.
2239 I think the ultimate decision that the Commission hs I
FAGE 93
, , MAME: RIF197030 2240 make.,given the advice that wo hovo reco1vod from the 2241 Tederal Emergency Management Agency, as well as participant 4 2242 in individual cases is first, is the plan adequate? And L
2243 second, if it is called upon to work, will it work?
2244 And that second issue, in particular, involves precise 2245 the kinds of questions that you raised-and that the-in tt 2246 Commission will have to be addressing fairly.guickly, 2247 context--
2248 Mr. DTUDDS. That is precisely--again, speaking genera 2 2249 as trying to get'at. Presumably, the only people 2250 realistically who could implement such a plan, in the event of an energency, would be the state and local police forces 2251 2252 Mr. ASSELSTIME. That is right.
2253 Mr. STUDDS. If you do not have their approval or cooperation, there will be no evacuation. Not even,a pray, 2254 There may or may not be anyway. But there certain' 2255 of it.
So that was my 2256 would not be in the absence of that.
7.257 concern.
2258 one more thing on this, if I may--not that there--I t' frankly.
2259 have raised more questions than we have answered, 2160 According to the 1986 5 ALP--am I getting good at acronyms l
I ,
2261 this field, Mr. Chairman--Boston Idison has failad to amil ;
2262 informational brochures to the general public, educating 2263 those who live near pilgrim about what to do in an 2264 emergency. And the operation of the plant's alert systen,
e PAGE 94
. NAME: NIF197020 2265 to notify resident.s of en onergoney, 'hos siollarly boon s
$266 delayea. Ihose two emergency planning activities, as I' 2267, understand it,i are the responsibility.of the. utility..
2268 If I am correct, when should each iten have been s
And what is th, 2269 completed? When was it or when will it be?
2270 MRC doing about it?
2271 Mr. EECH.'Dr. Murley, would you respond please?
2272 Ex. MU,RLEY. I na sorry, I 40 mot have current today 2272 information. I understand that the company As going over 2274 their mailing list now and checking to find out just exact 2 t
2275 who is in the energency planning zone. But I will have to 2276 Provide that information later.
'2277 Mr. STUDDS. You mean street lists or lists of officia;1 Mr. MURLEY. I do not know how they are going'about ths 2278
Mr. STUDD5. Well, we certainf;' are not ready for an 2279 Does anyone 2280 emergency now. That would seem to be clear.
I realise the plant .
2281 argue with that general observation?
2282 not operating, but the plant has been operating for some No 2282 time and clearly-we ate not' prepared for an energency.
2284 have not got our mailing lists in order.
2285 I hora we are not going to resort to sail in the even 1886 an emergency.
. 2287 (Laughter.)
We do not rely o 2288 Mr. MURLEY. That is just the point.
2289 mailing list. The mailing lists are to provide informatic
o PAGE 95
, I: MAMEs.EIF197030
~
2290 of a genercl bockysound meturo for 700710 on how they shou; 2291 respond when they hear-sirens and that sort of-thing.
Mr. ASSEL5 TIME.
Mr. Studds,-if I could addian additioJ-2292 2293 comment. I appreciate Mr. Murley's comments earlier about but it doe' 2294 his view of the adequacy of emergency planning, 2295 seem to me that there are enough guestions here that this 2296 really deserves a fresh look.
1 2297 I had the impression, quite frankly, during'ay visit 2298 Monday that all of the participants in this process may ne l
2299 .have been working.together quite as well or as c lose y as-
'h ' . 2300 all would have liked. Not just the MRC but also the licensee, the state and local governments and FEMA as wel) 2301 2302 And I think it really needs a fresh look.
2303 Mr. STUDD5. I appreciate that.
2304 Let me say that I thank the chairman for forbearance t
2305 know time has more than expired.
2306 I. understand from staff that the alert system was to I can assure 2307 been in pince by 1981 or '82 at the latest.
2308 you, Dr. Murley, as you must know given the time you span. l 2309 there, that among those:who are unaware of what they are 2310 supposed to do in the event of an emergency are virtually 1811 all of the people who would be affected by that amargency 2312 they do not have a clue of what they are supposed to do.
2313 Which says to me that someone has not done something l
2314 ought to have been done, by way of informing the public.
4 e
'\'.
er
' ~
PAGE 96 .,'
e , , MAME8 .NIF197030 2315 Ihat, of courso, skips tho tool fundccontol question, which 2316 is even if there was a plan and if everyone had.been 2317 ~ informed.about it, is it'within the realm of reality.to 2318 'eMpect that in a genuine emergency, with public panic 2319 -prevailing, that it could be carried out.
2320 Let me say, Mr. Chairman, that the question'that comes sy mind--and I apologize for the time--is how long do we-->
2321 2322 the. Commission, we the Congress, we the. country--how pation 2323 are we to be in a situation where fundamental errors have 2324 been committed and repeated and repeated again?
2325 It reminds ne a bit of the cid saying that if a man ic And if he fools you twice, shame c 2326 _you once, shame on him.
I grasp for an analogy. I do not know what it is, bt' 2327 you.
232M I cannot imagine that we would permit--you were a Navy man.
2329 understand sir? .
2330 Mr. ZECH. Yes, sir.
2331 Mr. STUDDs. Some officers in charge of nuclear weapons 2332 many opportunities to make fundamental mistakes before t h e '.
were replaced. I do not think that is the precise analogy 2333
'2334 I suppose those in charge of the space shuttle would not b 2335 given too many opportunities to make maior mistakes before
$336 it was decided that somebody else probably ought to handle-2337 that.
2338 I do not know what the proper analogy is and I honest:
2339 not know, if I were in your shoes, what precisely to do ani-1
FAGE 97.
.. , XAMEs MIF197030) 2340 when. But I think, os Cocaissionst Assolstino hos just 2341 said, that one thing that everybody ought to.be able to
?
2342 ' agree e,n is that we certairsly have before usJanough' 2343 troubling, substantial, substantive, unanswered guestions t 2344 raise the yellow flag of caution and to proceed very, very
-Thank you, Mr 2345 slowly until those quastions are answered.
2346 Chairman.
2347 Mr. EECN. We intend to proceed with caution, with aLva; 2348 deliberate and thoughtful approach to all the problems of i
)
2349 pilgrim, Mr. Studds. I can assure you that we do feel 2350 responsible for our activities and we feel' accountable for 2351 them, and we intend to carry them out in any areas, 2352 emergency planning or other areas. If we feel that action l 2353 should be taken, everything within our area of 2354 responsibility will be taken. We take t ;r res,ponsibilitie 2)SS for thu public health and safety very seriously. I can j 2356 assure you we are scang to act with responsibility in this-2357 area.
2358 Mr. STUDDS. Thank you.
2359 Mr. MARKEY. The gentleman's time has eMpired.
1 2360 To the gentleman from Massachusetts I would like to sl 2361 him assurances that this subcommittee has been given one c 2362 the largest subcommittee staffs in Congress because of the 2363 nature of the duriadiction that we have and the great 2364 consequences for the public health and safety if mistakes l
o l r
~-
e :
ca
- I PAGE. 98
[ .. . .MAME '%Ii197030 2365 are made, and I givo hic ny ossurcnco that thoro'will be f
2366 continued extensive probing of the MRC actions in responsa 2367 to this hearing and questions raised in the state of I 2358 Massachusetts as to the operation of this plant.
2369, Again, you have touched on in the courJe of your questa ,
I L
2370 a number of very broad public policy tuostions as well that "
2371 have served as continuing themes in oversight responsibility) 1 2372 of this subcommittee in tho'past several years. Many of 2373 them continue to go unresolved and without any final 2374 definition as yet arrived at by the MRC in terms of'what 2375 their policies will be. .
do I give assurances to the gentleman from Massachuset-2376 ,
2377 that we will continue to submit questions to the NRC, in 2378 written form if not a reconvening of the subcommittee to 2379 ensure that a11' issues are raised and answered.
2380 Today's subcommittee hearing reminds me about the old !
2381 news / bad news jokes. The good news is that the MRC is doin a good job of inspecting plants and finding problems. The 2382 2383 bad news is that the NRC is finding out about them.after th 2384 plants have reached crisis situations.
2385 For pilgrim, the good news is that the plant is now s)
The had news, 2386 down and management changes are being made. ,
2387 however, is that this is the same situation we were facing four years ago. There is good news in that both MRC and 2388 2389 IMPO found major problems and brought them to Boston l
- - _ - _ _ _ _____ _ _ ' ~
.1
,e. ~
FAGE 99
'* t ,
MkhEs"NIF197030.
2390 Edison's atto acn,, but tho truly bad crews is that .it i appears tha, despite all of this criticism, that Boston f 2391 i
2392 Edison has failed to implement timely and effective ..
l 2393 corrective action.
i 2394 We thank this yanel for its testimony, 'andwithourthj 2395 we will now dismiss you to lunch and will request the secon j 2396 Panel, consistin9 of executives from the Boston Edison 2397 Company, to come forward to begin presentation of their 2398 testimony.
~
2399 Our next panel is Stepher. Sweeney, President of the Sc 2400 Edison Company. We would request, Mr. Sweeney, that you 2401 identify any of those who may accompany you or assist you :
2402 your testimony today for the record, and that you limit yet 2403 opening statement to five minutes, with the assurances tha' 2404 you will be given every opportunity in the process of the 2405 question and answer period to get in the points that you 2406 wish.
2407 So welcone, and please proceed.
L .. - '__.- L - __- _ ._ _- - - -- -..-..