ML20238A372

Intervenor Exhibit I-SC-78,consisting of 850219 Post-Exercise Assessment,841023 Exercise of Radiological Emergency Response Plans of State of Nj,Salem County & Six Localities & Cumberland County...For Salem Nuclear..

ML20238A372
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	05/07/1987
From:	Petrone F Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:
References
OL-5-I-SC-078, OL-5-I-SC-78, NUDOCS 8708310047
Download: ML20238A372 (145)

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, ASSESSMENT , . , -l 1

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a October 23,1984,

/ Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Response Plans of I, the State of.New Jersey, Salem County, and Six Localities and Cumberland County and Two Localities for Public Service Electric and Gas Company's Salem Nuclear Generating Station

Hancocks Bridge, Salem County, i New Jersey

. b February 19,1985 k Federal Emergency Management Agency I

I Region II .

i Frsak P. Petrone 26 Federal Plaza Regional Director New York, N.Y.10278

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1 Participating Governments The State of New Jersey Salem County Elainboro Lower Alloways Creek Mannington Pennsville Quinton -

. Salem City Cumberl'and County

. Greenwich Stow Creek l

Nonparticipating Governments The State of Delaware

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.- l CONTENTS l LIST O F AB B REVIATIO NS AND AC RO NY MS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vil

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SUMMARY

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l 1 I NT R O D U C T I O N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I 1.1 Ex e rcise Bac k gro u nd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.2 Fe d e ral O bs e rv e rs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

1. 3 E v al ua t i o n C ri t e ri a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4 1.4 Ex e rc ise O bj ec tiv es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

. 1.5 Ex e rc is o Sc e n ario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1.5.1 Major Sequence of Events on Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1.5.2 Sc e n ario S u m m ary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

/ 1.5.3 Description of State and County Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4

2 EXE R CISE EVA L U ATIO N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.1 Ne w Jersey State Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.1.1 StateEOC................................................... 18 2.1.2 Bureau of Radiation Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2.1.3 G eneral Population Bus Evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . . .,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 2.2 Emergency Operations Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 2.2.1 S tat e o f Ne w Jers e y. B R P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 2.2.2 Ne w Jersey State Police FC P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 2.3 Joint News Media Center and Public Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

2. 4 Sale m C o unty Ope ra tio ns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 2.4.1 Sale m C o un ty E O C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 2.4.2 Sale m County Municipal EOCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 2.4.3 Field Implementation of Acticns to Protect the Public . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 2.5 Cu mberland County Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 2.5.1 C u m ue rland C o unty E O C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 2.5.2 Cumberland County Municipal EOCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

\ 2.5.3 Fleid Implementation of Actions to Protect the Public . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 2.6 County Radiological Field Monitoring Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 3 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTING DEFICIENCIES: OCTOBER 23,1984, EXERCISE..............'............................................... 63 4 SU M M A R Y O F D DEFICIENCIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6 .

TABLES .

3.1 Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Remedial Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 4.1 Summary of Recommendations to Remedy Deficiencies in Off-Site Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness at Exercises for the Sale = Nuclu.: Generating Station on October 23, 1984; October 26, 1983; Ootober 13, 1982; and April 8,1981................................ 107 V

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ANL Argonne National Laborstory ARC American Ked Cross BRP New Jersey Bureau of Radiation Protection CCEOC Cumberland County Emergency Operations Center DEP New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection DF, Decontamination Factor i DOC U.S. Department of Commerce DOE U.S. Department of Energy

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DOT U.S. Department of Transportation EAL Emergency Action Level EBS Emergency Broadcast System

. EMC Emergency Management Coordinator '

EMRAD Emergency Mandgement Radio - A New Jersey State Pollee emergency radio system EMS Emergency Medical Services EOC Emtegency Operations Center

. EOF Licensee Near-Site Emergency Operations Facility

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EPA Emergency Planning Areas EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ER Emergency Room FAA Federal Aviation Administration FCP Forward Command Post ,

FDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services INEL Idaho National Engineering Labocatory m

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. ,a p KI Potassium Iodide LOCA ,

Loss of Coolant -

Accident ,

NGS Nuclear Generating Station '

NJDOH New Jersey Department of Health NJSP New Jersey State Police NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commisslon

, NU REG-0654 Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, I Rev.1)

OEM Office of Emergency Management, NJSP OPSECURE Operations Secure Radio . .. ,

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PAG Protective Action Guides .

. PAR Protective Action Recommendation P!O Public Information Officer

• PSE&G , Public Service El'actric and Gas Company l RAC Regional Assistance Committee RACES Rtdio Amateur Civil Emergency Service RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan SCEOC Salem County Emergency Operations Center l -

SEOC State (New Jersey) Emerg?ncy Operations Center SNGS Salem Nuclear Generating Station l SOP ' Standard Operating Procedure SRAO State Radiological Assessment Officer TCP Traffle Control Point l TLD Thermoluminescent Desimeter l

TSC Technical Support Center, SNGS 4 l

USCG U.S. Coast Guard l USDA U.S. Department of Agrictdture l USEPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

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SUMMARY

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An exercise of plans and preparedness for off-site radiological emergency I response was conducted for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey, on October 23, 1984. Following the exercise, a preliminary evaluation was made by a 27-member federal observation team. The Chairman of the Regional Assistance Committee held a briefing for exercise participants and the general public was held on '

l October 25, 1984, at the Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G) Salem Training Center in Salem, New Jersey. The evaluation, deficiencies, and recommendations related to this exercise are included in this report.

Section 1 of. this report presents background information on the 1984 exercise, -

describes the evaluation criteria and exercise objectives, and presents a description of the exercise scenario.

fs Each exercise deficiency and the corresponding recomrnendation is described by i

. l jurisdiction in Section 2 of 'this report. Section 3 provides a form for developing a  ;

schedule for correcting deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding and other

, deficiencies based on the October 23, 1984, exercise. Section 4 tabulates the status of deficiencies observed at all the radiological emergency preparedness exercises held in  ;

conjunction with the Salem Nuclear Generating Station. ,

1 The State of New Jersey Due to a malfunction of the primary dedicated telephone line with the utility, the. New Jersey State Police Headquarters in West Trenton was notifled of an Alert at che Salem Nuclear Generating Station via backup commercial telephone at approximately 8:38 a.m. This backup means of notification was timely and worked very effectively.

The initial malfunction of the direct telephone ilne to the plant was quickly repaired. All subsequent notifications of change in the emergency classification were received via the

( dedicated telephone line and were verified by call-back trom the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC).

l As in the past, the facilities, work areas, and communications equipment at the State EOC were excellent. Since last year, the Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) dose assessment functions have been transferred from .the SEOC to the Emergency l Operations Facility (EOF). Communications between the BRP liaison office in the SEOC l and the command-and-control center in the SEOC should be strengthened to facilitate and expedite protective-action decision making at the SEOC.

Some of the messages generated by the State EOC, including the governor's State of Emergency Declaration and some dose information, were not received by Cumberland County. The statt. and county should determine the source of the communication problem and take appropriate action to remedy the problem.

Status boards,;c-i::di:: briefings, and communications flow within the SEOC were goodi Throughout the exercise, the appropriate emergency classification leitel was 1

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4 posted in the command center, tnra operations room, the rumor control room, and the agency briefing area. It is suggested that maps in the EOC be equipped with overlays that indicate ' sectors, where protective actions have .been implemented. Emergency .

management personnel were very well' trained. All of the defic'lencies observed at the.

State EOC during last years' exercise relating to alert and notification, arrangements for transportation resources, and the use of radioprotective drugs by emergency workers :

have been corrected. A previous deficiency regarding the designation of areas to be evacuated was also corrected in this year's exercise. The New Jersey Office of Emergency Management used compass sectors to define the areas to be evacuated and these sectors were effectively converted to narrative descriptions of the affected areas for use in EBS messages.

Public information was handled in an effective and timely. manner. There was very good coordination and communication between the public information officer at the State EOC and the Joint Media Center. There was a minor problem with coordination with the primary Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) station WDEL in Delaware. The

• State EOC requested that the Emergency Broadcast message be broadcast at 11:25 a.m.,

but WDEL broadcast it at 11:20 a.m. prior to the sounding of the strens. HoTvever ' the message was rebroadcast after the strens sounded. An EBS message should have accompanied the order to evacuate the schools. .There was also a minor problem at the.

Joint Media Center, where no media kits with background information were available for t,he press. i>ress briefings were handled professionally, and . there was effective coordination between the state, the utility, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

. The overall responsk of. the New Jersey State Police at the Forward Command Post (FCP) irt Salem City was very good. Activation and staffing were timely, and this facility was managed in an excellent manner. A problem developed when New Jersey State Po!!ce were activated to relieve the access control personnel provided by the ,

Lower Alloways Creek Police Department. ' The New Jersey. State Police personnel 'j

rr. ported to a different location for one of the control points. The reason for this 'l inconsistency should be resolved so that personnel from both pollee departments report to the same access, control points. The management personnel and communications specialists at the State Police FCP were well trained and demonstrated an excellent knowledge of their responsibilities.

The State demonstrated the evacuation of the general public by dispatching two New Jersey Transit Authority buses from their garage at Camden. Both of these buses arrived at the mustering point in a timely manner. New Jersey State Police met the New Jersey Transit Authority buses at the mustering point and provided escort and radio communications during the simulated evacuation of the public along two bus routes..The

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j bus drivers had been trained in the use of dosimeters and potassium lodide (KD. I However, additional training should be given to the New Jersey Transit Authority bus .

drivers regarding the use of self-reading dosimeters and the procedures for communicat- 1 ing exposures to their supervisors. In ~ addition, it should be noted that the permanent-record devices had no visible identification numbers and could not be ' assigned by number to an Individual. All permanent-record dosimeters must be traceable to the individual i who used that device. Consideration should also be rivan M i m. p '85 the msps and descriptions of the bus routes in the mass-transit route packages. These improvements x- 1 I

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would greatly improve the ability of a bus driver who may be unfamiliar with the area to negotiate the evacuation route in a timely fashion.

New Jersey' Bureau of Radiation Protection representatives were present at the Emergency Operations Facility tn perform independent dose assessment and make protective action recommendations to the New Jersey Office of Emergency Management after appropriate discussion with utility and Nuclear Regulatory Commission representatives. This transfer of the dose assessment function from the State EOC to the EOF was experimental and is not in accord with the current New Jersey Radiological Emergency Response Plan. In our view, the potential exists for improvements over the J current plan. If this transfer is to be permanent, the following procedural modifications and plan changes must be considered:

I l e The BRP should negotiate with the utility for rearrangement and {

reallocation of space throughout the EOF to allow grouping of dose 1

<' assessment personnel and key Bureau of Radiation Protection /

k Office of Emergency Management representatives. ,, l i

e The BRP should redefine the functional roles of BRP representa- )

tives in the EOF with respect to other BRP responsibilities. For j example, once the BRP representatives in the EOF have reached a j decision in consultation with utility and NRC persornel, this

• decision should be reported directly to the Office of Emergency Management personnel in the SEOC without the need for consultation with Bureau of Radiation Protection representatives 1 outside the EOF. l The New Jersey Bureau of Radiation Protection activated the Forward Command Post (FCP) and field monitoring teams in a timely fashion. County personnel secompanied the state field teams for training. The field teams performed their assigned functions well. Problems identifled last year with maintaining radio contact g with the field teams occurred again. The flow of information from the Forward Command Post to the field teams also remains a problem. In addition, the Forward Command Post received limited dose projection information and no information on public protective action recommendations from the Bureau of Radiation Protection / Emergency Operations Facility. Due to this lack of information flow, the field teams were not ,

directed to define the plume center line in the most efficient manner.

! Salem County l

Operations and management at the~ newly located Salem County Emergency Operations Center (SCEOC) demonstrated some improvement over previous exercises.

The expanded space provides a facility that will support emergency response operations.

Alerting and notification of all appropriate emergency personnel occurred promptly.

Security was well managed. Access was limited to essential personnel, thereby avoiding confusion and overcrowding. With the exception of the mince problem dascrihed in the state summary section, the activation of sirens was timely and coordinated with the EBS message. The flow of information to staff agencies was effective.

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However, several problems continue to hamper the capability of Salem County to respond effectively to a radiological emergency. The county delayed relaying some

, official state decisions to implement protective actions to the municipalities.' Other

• such decisions were not relayed at all. For examples e Messages with the decision to distribute and administer potassium iodide (KI) for emergency workers were delayed up to it hours, e Messages with the decision to. shelter certain sectors were delayed to some municipalities and were not receivet.1 at all by at least one municipality (Salem City), and e Messages with the decision to evacuate certain sectors were delayed to some municipalities up to it hours.

s Further, it was noted that an incorrect location for the congregate care center was transmitted by the Emergency Operations Center to the bus driver conducting the school evacuation. Some of these problems were caused by an. Insufficient number of trained staff. Improved EOC management and better communications procedures resulting in a smoother flow of Information from Salem County to the municipalities are required to solve these problems. This improvement would assure an integrated response to any radiological emergency. -

The Red Cross provided timely staffing and sufficient supplies at the Woodstown Congregate Care Cente'. r The posting of Information' regarding exercise status was demonstrated and represented an improvement over previous exercises. However, there were no police offleers or other personnel available to provide traffic control or security at the congregate care center. .

Finally, there were no personnel or Instruments available to monitor and decontaminate evacuees and vehicles at the congregate care center in Woodstown. Also, the Quinton Fire House Decontamination Center for emergency workers is inadequately equipped with monitoring equipment, showers, and permanent record dosimetry. In addition, workers responsible for decontamination were not aware of decontamination action levels. This deficiency was also identified during the 1982 and 1983 exercises at a different location.

P Cumberland County The Cumberland Country EOC was activated on a normal workday schedule with permanent staff reporting between 0800 and 0830. Upon confirmation of the Alert emergency ' classification leve!, the county coordinator, deputy coordinator, and dispatcher initiated and completed' county personnel notification within 15 minutes.

Although notification was completed in a timely manner, full staffing of the EOC was not completed until 1115. Capability for continuous 24-hour staffing was demonstrated by roster.

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.The emergency management coordinator was in full command at all times and showed excellent knowledge of the plan and procedures.' His permanent staff also I demonstrated adequate knowledge of emergency planning and response, although some i agency personnel seemed to need additional training. Briefings of emergency staff were  ;

conducted frequently and wereL adequate, an improvement over the previous exercises. 1 The facility was well equipped to communicate-with all responding agencies and. teams except fleid monitoring teams.

The county field monitoring team consisted of five members, which is larger than necessary and should probably be divided into two teams, one for initial mobilization and one for a second shift. The field team's radio was inadequate for contacting.their EOC or the Forward Command Post from the field locations visited.

The EOC was very crowded during the exercise and the county should consider adding additional space. Other problems noted at the CCEOC included the following:

I' e The notification of the Alert emergency classification level from ,

Salem Nuclear Power Generating Station at 0835 was erroneously distributed internally as having been transmitted by Salem County.

This led to a period of confusion concerning the reasons for this -

notification being initiated by Salem County, which is contrary to the normal flow of information from the state to Cumberland County, as required by the plan and procedures.

b The message forms were not always complete. In particular the -

time of reception and the time to implement recommended actions were sometimes omitted. This made the tracking of messages, including protective action recommendations, difficult.

( e Health Department representatives and other staff members need more training in the use and distribution of potassium iodide for emergency workers.

Munleipalities l Each of the eight municipalities demonstrated its ability to carry out effectively l

an emergency response operation. The municipal participants in the exercise clearly i

showed that they were familiar with the existing radiological emergency plan and procedures. In addition, most of the deficiencies identified in the 1983 exercise were corrected. These corrections consisted of i e Improved message handling procedures, j e Use of displays, and j

e Appropriate dosimetry.

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However, previous deficiencies concerning working space in the Pennsville EOC are still unresolved. The installation of a backup power generator in the Greenwich EOC has not

- , been complete <;i. .. .- .

Field activities including access control, route alerting, and removal of impediments to evacuation were effectively handled by local resources. Emergency operations were well organized but not fully tested due to delayed information flow from Salem County and the state. Certain protective action recommendations were substantially delayed or not communicated at all, by the County to municipalities.

Public Awarenesa Prior to the exercise, the utility had distributed a public information brochure l concerning emergency planning and a map to residents and businesses within the 10-mile ,.

emergency planning zone. The state is proceeding with a survey for the area to '

determine the extent of public awareness. Six of the federal observers interviewed approximately 40 residents during the exercise in order to assess public knowledge of emergency actions during of a radiological emergency.

Public awareness varied widely ir. this limited sample. Most persons were not aware that the sirens were a signal to tune to the EBS station. In addition, they were not aware of predesignated evacuation routes. Only a limited number of stores had on cis-play a small poster which was distributed in order to advise the public to listen to one of several EBS radio stations after, hearing the strens. .

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, I 1 INTRODUCTION l l

1.1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND  ;

I On December 7, 1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response.

FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning. for fixed nuclear l facilities include the following:

e Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the , review and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans developed by state and local governments.

e Determining whether such plans can be implemented, on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans conducted by state and local governments.

I e Coordinating the activities of federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process: ,

- U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) '

- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) l

- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) l

- U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) l

- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)

- U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)

- U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)  !

- U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) -

k-- Representatives of these agencies serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.

Formal submission ,of the radiological emergency response plans for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station (SNGS) to the RAC by the states and involved local jurisdictions was followed by a critique and an ongoing evaluation of these plans. A l public meeting was held to acquaint the public with the plans' contents, answer questions, and receive suggestions for changes in these plans.

A first joint radiological emergency preparedness exercise was conducted for SNGS on April 8, 1981, and post-exercise assessments for that exercise were l subsequently ssued. A second joint exercise on October 13,1982, was also followed with post-exercise assessments issued by FEMA Regions II and III. A third joint exercise, I

conducted on October 26, 1983, was also followed with a post-exercise assessment. A fourth joint exercise was conducted on October 23, 1984, to assess the capability of state, county, and municipal eme:gency preparedness organizations to (1) implement their radiological emergency preparedness plans and procedures, and (2) to protect the

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l public during a radiological emergency at Public Service Electric and Gas Company's (PSE&G's) SNGS. A medical drill at the Salem County Memorial Hospital' was also

.. conducted on September 27, 1984, in order to evaluate .the. adequacy of . hospital and ambulance facilities and procedures for handling injured and contaminated individuals.

This drill was evaluated by a federal observer.

An observer team consisting of persont.el from FEMA, - the R AC, ' FEMA's contractors, and federal and state agencies evaluated the October 23, 1984, exercise.

FEMA, Region II assigned 27 federal observers to evaluate the activities in the state of New Jersey and affected jurisdictions. Team leaders coordlaated team operations.

Following the exercise, these federal observeru met to compile their evalua-tions. Team leaders consolidated the evaluations of individual team members and furnished them to the RAC chairman. A pub!!c critique of the exarcise for exercise participants and the general public was held by the RAC chairman at 1000 on Thursday, ,,

October 25,1984, at the P$E&G Salem Training Center in Salem, N.J.

The findi' p presented in'this post-exercise assessment *are based on evaluations of federal observers, which have been reviewed by FEMA Region IL The state of l Delaware participated on a limited basis in the exercise of October 23,1984 for the l purpose of training to maintain emergency preparedness capabilities. FEMA requests that state and local jurisdictions submit.a schedule of remedial actions for correcting the i deficiencies discussed in this report. The regional director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA associate director of state and local programs and support.

Washington, D.C., that all deficiencies observed during the exercise have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into state and local plans, as appropriate.

1.2 FEDERAL OBSERVERS Twenty-seven federal observers evaluated off-site emergency response functions. These individuals, their affiliations, and their exercise assignments are given -

below. Acronyms for the agencies may be found in the list of abbreviations.

Observer Agency Location (s) Exercise Function R. Kowieski FEMA Various Region II RAC Chairman j Overview observation  !

P. McIntire FEMA ' State Emergency Operations Overview observation Center (SEOC) l R. Acerno FEMA SEOC Team leader I

T. Baldwin ANL SEOC Communications i H. Fortin FEMA SEOC Public information 4

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3  !

. l Obse'rver A_gency Location (s) Exercise Function N. Kelly . FEMA SEOC and Joint Media -

Public information -

l Center J. Moon EPA State Bureau of Radiation ~ Accident assessment Protection - Forward j Command Post l

1 C. Gordon NRC PSE&G Off-site Emergency Utility response j Operations Facility (EOF)

J. KellAr INEL' EOF Accident assessment '*

R. Rospenda ' ANL New Jersey State Pollee - Communleations; traffle '

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[ Forward Command Post control points; bus evac- l

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untion escorts I I

N. Chipman INEL Salem County Bus evacuation; congre- )

gate care center R. Honkus INEL Cumberland County and Bus evacuation; congre-

. Salam County gate care center; alert and notification '

1 L Slagle INEL Salem County Radiological monitoring ,

teams l

B. Salmonson INEL 'Cumberland County Radiological monitoring l

- teams ,

j k R. Garelik' FEMA ' Salem County EOC Team leader l

l H. Fish DOE Salem County EOC Communications J. Opelka ANL Salem County and Decontamination center;

. Cumberland County evacuation of mobility-Impaired persons; public awarenest; Stow Creek munleipal EOC i J. O'Sullivan FEMA Salem County School bus evacuation; 1 Impediments to evacua-tion; public awareness M. Dabney FEMA Cumberland County EOC , Team leader R. Brandenburg ANL Cumberland County EOC Communications

._- - - _ _ - . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - . _ _ _ _ - _ _ . _ - - - _ __ J

,9-1 4

4 Observer Agency Location (s) - Eureise Function i

_ C. Malina , USDA Salem County Salem City municipal:

EOC; public awareness J. Smith USCG Salem County Pennsville municipal EOC; 1 i public awareness

- j W. Knoerzer ANL Salem County and Traffic control points; '

Cumberland County alert and notificaf.fon l l

S. Curtis ANL Salem County and Greenwich and Quinton. I Cumberland County municipal EOCs; traffic control points; public awareness T H. Bushby ANL - Salem County ,

Mannington municipai EOCs route alerting; im- l pediments to evacuation l i

3 1

R. Reynolds FEMA Lower Allcways Creek Team leader Salerr , l

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County municipal EOCs ]

R. Bernacki FDA Salem County and Salem Elsinboro municipal EOC:_ ,

j County Memorial Hospital

• medical drill

• 1.3 EVALUATION CRITERIA 4

l The exercise evaluations presented in Sec. 2 are based on applicable planning l standards and evaluation criteria set forth'in Section II of NUREG-0654-FEMA-1, Rev.1 l (Nov. 1980). Folicwing the' overview narrative for each jurisdiction ~ or activity, deft- , I ciencies and accompanying recommendations are presented. Deficiencies are presented in two categories. .The first category includes those defleiencies that would lead to a <

negative finding, that is, a fhding that off-site emergency preparedness was, not ade-quate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of thejublic living near the site-in the event of a radiological l emergency. A negative finding would be based on at least one deficiency oQ this type.1 The second categor; includes r!1 other defible:ncies where, Alt $ough dimon-strated (and daserved) performance during the exercise'was substandard and corrective

/ actions are nicessary, otNpe.'actoes gsve FEMA reasonable assurance that, in a real ,

e, radiological eiriergency, the health and safety of the public could be protected. These other defieleieles also includefall' other problem arec.s where performance was '

considered addquate but wher,e a correctable weakness was ceserved. Ccerection of Ue 7 ,

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• Medical drill was held on September 27,1954, prior to the October 23,1984, exercise. '

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~ . 5 weakness would enhance the ability of the organization to respond to radiological

- emergencies.

, 1.4 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES 1 The licensee (Public Service Electric and Gas Company), FEMA, NRC, the state of New Jersey, and a municipal representative planned a coordinated exercise of their respective' emergency plans for both the on-site and off-site support agencies. The exercise involved activation and participation of the staff 'and response facilities of SNGS as well as emerg:ncy organizations and emergency facilities of the State of New Jersey, Salem County, Cumberland County, and the eight municipalities.

I The exercise was intended to ' demonstrate many, but not necessarily all, of the .

( SNGS capabilities to respond to a wide range of emergency conditions. This scenario was designed to activate the radiological emergency response plans (RERPs) for SNGS and PSE&G's corporate radiological amargency response plan through their various levels. '

. Although the scenario accurately simulates operating events, it was not intended to assess all of the operator's diagnostic capabilities, but rather to provide sequences that ultimately demonstrated the operator's ability to respond to events and that resulted in l I

l exercising both on-site and off-site emergency procedures. The exercise demonstrated a number of primary emergency preparedness functions. At no, time was the exercise permitted to interfere with the safe operations of SNGS, and the plant management at its discretion could have suspended the exercise for any period of time necessary to ensure this goal. Free play was encouraged and the referees interfered only if operator

, or player action would have prematurely terminated the exercise or deviated excessively from the drill schedule. j Federal agencies were notified during. the exercise according to existing i emergency response procedures. Federal agencies with radiological emergency  ;

preparedness responsibility did not actively participate in the play of this exercise.

( Federal representatives, however, did act as exercise evaluators. -

To provide a conservative exercise in terms of off-site doses and areas affected, exercise meteo'rology was used. Actual meteorotegy might have led to projected radio-logical doses below established protective action guides (PAGs) within the areas of interest.

The following objectives were developed for this exercise and have been referenced in the narrative of the exercise evaluation section (Sectio'n 2) of this report:  ;

!. State of New Jer*ey

1. Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff

a. Demonstrate the ability to receive and verify the initial and follow-up emergency notifications from the utility.

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b. Denfonstrate the s ollity to mobilize staff and activate the state '

EOC in a timely canner. ,

c.

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Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate state functions at the EOF in a timely manner.

d. ' Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate state functions at the Joint Media Center in a timely manner.

e. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate the BRP and NJSP Forward Command Post in a timely manner.

f. Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing in the state EOC on l a 24-hour basis (roster only).

g. Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing of state funct!ons in the Joint Media Center on a 24-hour basis (roster only).

h. Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing of state functions in the EOF on a 24-hour basis (roster only). .

I. Demonstrate the ability of the BRP to maintain staffing for accident assessment and at the Forward Command Post on a 24-hour basis, including staffing of the field monitoring teams.

2. Emergency Operations Faellities and Resources

a. Demonstrate that the emergency response facilities have adequate space, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operat:ons.

b. Demonstrate that the state, countles, and municipalities can -

establish adequate communications links using either the primary or backup systems.

c. Demonstrate that the emergency _ response facilities have .

adequate access control and that security can be maintained.

3. Einergency Operations Management

a. Demonstrate that messages are transmitted in an accurate and timely manner, that messages are properly logged, that status boards are accurately maintained and updated, that appropriate briefings are heid, and that incoming personnel are briefed.

b. Demonstrate that the designated official is in charge and in .

cor. trol of an overall coordinated response.

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c. Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.

d. Demonstrate the ability to identify the need for, to request, and

. to obtain federal assistance (dependent upon the demands of the exercise scenario). The operations officer and lead SRAO in the state EOC will be questioned with regard to these capabilities.

e. Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective action recommendations to -the public based on utility recommendations, independent recommendations ; from the accident assessment . group, and ' off-site . factors such as evacuation time estimates and traffic conditions.

f. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate public alerting and -

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instructional messages'with the counties and municip'alities prior to broadcast over the EBS network. .

4. Public Alerting and Notification

' ^

a. Demonstrate the ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ, excluding the water part of the EPZ, and disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes of the governor's or his designee's decision to initiate a protective action. Alert and notification of the wet lands and river areas was to be

- i accomplished by simulation only and was to be accomplished within 45 minutes.

b. Demonstrate the ability to formulate and distribute appropriate ,

instructions to the pubtle in a timely manner.

l .

k c. Demonstrate that the transmission of the EBS . message is properly timed to begin within 1 minute of the end of the siren sounding.

d. Demonstrate the public notification system by activation of the '

siren system and activation of the EBS to transmit an exercise test message.

5. Pubile and Media Relations ,

I

a. Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate, I and timely manner.

D. Demonstrate the ability to provide advance coordination of information released. I l

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c. Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated manner.

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6. Accident Assessment

a. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize and deploy field monitoring teams in a timely manner.

b. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for deter-mining ambient radiation levels.

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c. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for measurement of airborne radiolodine concentrations as low as 0.1 picoeuries/cm3in the presence of noble gases.

l

d. Demonstrate the ability to project radiation dosage to the public i l

, via plume expo.ure base.d on plant data and field measurements, .

and to determine appropriate protective measures based on PAGs.

7. Action to Protect the Public

a. Demonstrate that the state can establish access control points in a timely manner. This was to be accomplished by relieving municipal personnel in Lower Alloways Creek Township.

8. Health, Medical, and Exposure Control l

l a. Demonstrate the ability to routinely monitor and control emergency worker exposures including proper use of personnel dosimetry.

b. Demonstrate that emergency workers understand who can 1 authorize excess exposure under the Protective Action i Guidelines. l

c. Demonstrate that emergency workers understand who can authorize them to use potassium iodide.

d. Demonstrate the ability to supply potassium iodide and administer it, if warranted, once the decision has been made to do so.

e. Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles including adequate provisions for handling contaminated waste.

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9. Recovery and Reentry

, Not to be demonstrated at this ereccise. . .

!!. Local Jurisdictions - Counties and Municipalities

1. Alerting and Mobilization of Officials and Staff

a. Demonstrate the ability to receive initial and follow-up emergency notifications,

b. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate the county EOCs in a timely manner.

c. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate the municipal EOCs within the county in a timely manner.

. d. Demonstrate the ability to maintairi staffing in the county EOC on a 24-hour basis (roster only).

e. Demonst' rate the ability to maintain staffing in 'the municipal EOCs within the county on a 24-hour basis (roster only).

f. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate the Congregate Care Shelter / Decontamination Center in a timely manner.

g. Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing at the Congregate Care Shelter / Decontamination Center on a 24-hour basis (roster only).

2. Emergency Operation Facilities and Resources

a. Demonstrate that the emergency response facilities have adequate space, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations.

b. Demonstrate that the state, counties, and municipalities can i establish adequate communication links, using either the primary or backup system.

c. Demonstrate that the emergency response facilities have adequate access control and that security can be maintained.

3. Emergency Operations Management

a. Demonstrate th'at messages are transmitted in an accurate and timely manner, that messages are properly logged, that status

10 boards are accurately maintained and updated, that appropriate briefings are held, and that incoming personnel are briefed. ,

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b. " Demonstrate that t!ie appropriate official is in charge and Iri control of an overall coordinated response.

c. Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.

d. Demonstrate the ability of the designated official to determine the need for State- assistance and his ability to obtain State assistance.

4. Public Alerting and Notification

a. Demonstrate the ability to provide backup public alerting procedures, if necessary,, in the event of.a partial siren system failure. .

b. Demonstrate the ability to activate the prompt notification siren system in coordination with state instructions (Salem County only). .

5. Public and Media Relations

a. Demonstrate that the permanent population has received information on how they are to be notified and what their actions should be in the event of a radiological emergency. This was to be accomplished by providing to FEMA, prior to this exercise, the results of a public information survey conducted in i the Salem EPZ area and a spot check, during the exercise, on-  !

public awareness as to whether the public knew how to respond  ;

to a radiological emergency. l

b. Demonstrate that information on emergency actions has been provided to transient populations.

c. Demonstrate the ability to provide advance coordination of information released.

6. Actions to Protect the Public

a. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary ,

to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the 10-mile  ;

EPZ.

b. Demonstrate the organizational ability knd resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuations, such as inclement weather or traffle obstructions.

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c. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of the mobility-impaired I Individuals within the 10-mile EPZ. -

d. De$tonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the 10-mile j EPZ.

e. Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees.

f. Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities for mass care of evacuees. ,

g. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate an orderly evacuation of - J

( onelte personnel with licensee (Salem County only).

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h. Demonstrate that acces's control points can be established in a )

timely manner. )

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7. Health, Medical, and Exposure' Control j 1

1

a. Demonstrate the ability to routinely monitor and control '

emergency worker exposure including proper use of personnel desimetry.

b. Demonstrate the ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision has been made to do so.

c. De me.,nstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles

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including adequate provisions for handling contaminated waste.

d. Demonstrate adequacy of ~ ambulance facilities and procedures for handling injured and contaminated individuals.

e. Demonstrate adequacy of hospital facilities and procedures for handling injured and contaminated individuals (prior to or during exercise).

8. Recovery and Reentry

! Not to be demonstrated during this exercise.

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12 1.5 EXERCISE SCENARIO 1.5.1 Major Sequence of Events on Site Given below is a listing of exercise events, the approximate times that they were projected to occur by the scenario, and the actual times of occurrence.

Approximate Time Projected A'etual . Event

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805 805 Notification of Unusual Event - helicopter crashes on site.

. 815 835 Declaration of Alert classification due to helicopter crash.

930 938 Escalation to STte Area Erherrency based or} fire n vital i switchgear room. .

1 1045 1103 Escalation to General Emergency based on loss-of-coolant-accident. ,

1600 End of exercise.

1.5.2 Scenario Summary 1

At approximately 0805 a PSE&G helicopter crashes on site. .The crash landing is controlled and no explosion occurs. The Security;and Fire Biigade reports to the scene and an Alert should be declared. At about 0900 a smoke alarm is received from the 64 ft -

elevation of the vital switchgear room and the Fire Brigade is dispatched to investigate. q The fire is extinguished and no power loss is experienced at this time. After the initial I damage assessment, it is reported at 0930 that the."C" vital. bus has significant fire damage. This should trigger the declaration of a Site Area Emergency and the associated notifications.

4 A maintenance team working outside of the containment boundary drops a heavy - .!

piece of equipment, resulting in a pipe break in the safety injection system. At 1028 a .

severe steam leak is reported to the control room by the maintenance crew. Members of the crew were scared and slightly contaminated in their haste to evacuate.

q A reactor trip and Si actuation occurs as a result of the LOCA. An electrical fault (result of the fire) develops on "C" vital bus which de-energizes the bus and will not allow diesel to close in on the faulted bus. This results in no SI pumps being available and only one charging pump available (#21 charging pump). A LOCA is now in progress with _ I limited means of RCS inventory makeup available. At this stage there is a low-level

) radioactive release in progress (no failed fuel at this time). ' However, . the potential l exists for a serious release. m l G &

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1 A complete loss of off-site power occurs due to an explosion at the New Freedom Substation. At this time "B" diesel fails to start, "A" diesel starts but output breaker will not.close due to a fault signal on "A" vital bus (resulting from a voltage spike at New Freedom). "C" vital bus is still deenergized from the fault ca' ed by the fire. This '!

- power outage results in a complete loss of feedwater and a complete loss of RCS makeup -

capability. This will lead to a loss of natural circulation and the formation of volds and localized boiling in the core. The above events should have triggered the declaration of a J

. General Emergency and the associated notifications at about 1045. -

With no heat removal via the secondary and no injection into the RCS, a steam bubble expands in the reactor head area. RCS inventory continues to be lost via the i LOCA at about 230 gal / min. Localized boiling and void formation at the top of the core results in cladding damage and a high-level noble gas release begins.

At about 1130, diesel generator "B" is started and energizes "B" vital bus. Major j

' loads are started which restore one centrifugal charging pump and one AFW pump to service. Operatiens will establish core cooling and inventory control and commence a

• controlled cooldown to RHR cut-in cond,itions.

Peak dose rate projected at LPZ (5 miles, >250 mRIhr, unknown release duration) should result in an Evacuation Protective Action recommendation.

At about 1215 a Fire Alarm is received from Auxillary Building Charcoal Filter Bank (heat detector >250*F). Deluge is activated, destroying the effectiveness of the filters. This results in a high-level lodine release start!ng at this time (this fire alarm repeats several times during the remainder of the exercise).

At about 1445, ths fault on "A" vital bus is corrected anri"A" diesel picks up "A" bus. Operations now has another AFW pump and other vital pumps to continue with cooldown to RHR.

At approximately 1545, the release rate starts to drop rapidly as the ventilation system begins to clear auxillary building.

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Containment entry may be made at this point to manually close the 21-24SJ16 valves, stopping the LOCA. At this point the release is mainly from activity in the water already in'the auxiliary building and thus no major changes in the source term occur l (release is already tailing off).

I 1.5.3 Description of State and County Resources l Concept of Operations and Control of the Exercise ~

All emergency response agencies were responsible for ensuring that their resources were actually deployed in numbers adequate to provide a reasonable test of .

their notification, mobilization, command, coordination, and communications capabilities. Except as note:! below, state, county, and municipal agencies had total 6 aus M

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l 14 authority in determining the degree of mobilization and deployment of their resources, '

consistent with this intent. Since the intent of the exercise was to demonstrate cctual abilities as closely as possible, the participants were to act as they would during a real -

l emergency. All~ actions were to be taken where possible. . Actions were to be simulated- j only when they could not feasibly be performed. ,

. The exercise initiating events were controlled by the lead referee at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station (SNGS). Hypothesized initiating events consisted of four .

types of information (1) information and data provided to control room personnel by the I lead referee or his designee, (2) Information provided to SNGS personnel concerning environmental and plant systems, radioactivity, (3) on-site and off-site dose rate data (simulated gamma and lodine dose-rate measurements) provided to the site and State  ;

monitoring teams by referees, and (4) referee / observer supplied " problems". for off-site participants (such as a disabled vehicle or a farmer who must return to his farm after an evacuation).

As the initiating events were provided- to the station staff, they were to determine the nature of the einergency and implemented th'e appropriate station emergency plan procedures. After the emergency classification had been. determined, l

the appropriate federal, state, county, and municipal authorities were to be notified in accordance with station emergency plan procedures.

Upon notification of the hypothesized emergency at SNGS,'the state of New Jersey and the New Jersey counties and municipalities were to complete their initial l notifications and activation of emergency facilities in accordance with their emergency plans and procedures. The state of Delaware participated on a limited basis in the 1984 l

SNGS exercise for the purpose of training to ' maintain emergency preparedness capabilities.

The hyr

• sized Energency was to continue to develop based on data and information prended to the control room personnel by the lead referee. As the situation developed, follow-up Informatfor was to be forwarded to the New Jersey and Delaware strte EOCs. The New Jersey Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) was to analyze the j

information and recommend protective actions as- they would in a real emergency.

However, for purposes of this exercise, the BRP was to assume a detector efficiency of.

1.50% as opposed to the 1.77% efficiency to which their instruments were actually set.

Information was to be exchanged betwee'r. the states and the licensee lat

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appropriate times. Where information would normally be confirmed via an independent

'~ source (such as National Weather Service for weather data) the confirmation data was to be obtained. If the confirmation data conflicted with the hypothesized data provided by -

the site, the hypothesized data was to be utilized for accident assessment purposes. If -

any inconsistencies were noted in the initiating events, they were to be questioned by the state accident assessment team as they would be in a real emergency.

Certain loconsistencies (such 'as plume width, release duration, technical reason for the simulated release, etc.) may have Deen intentionally included and were required ts provide an exerclae basis which tested the capabilities of the licensee, state, counties, and municipalities to the maximum extent feasible in a limited time frame. If an

15 Incons..tency was known or determined to be intentional, then the accider.t assessment group was to note.the inconsistency and !gnore it. The lead referee was to have the authority to resolve or explain any inconsistencies or poblems that may have occurred -

during the exercise. .

With the exception of the aforementioned cited and potentialinconsistencies and

, the closecut of the emergency, the internal operations of the licensee, state, county, and

, municipal command centers were to be identical with their intended operation in a real' emergency.

The exercise was to be terminated should a situation develop at the station whlch could adversely affect the licensee's ability to protect public health and safety.

If a locs] emergency were to occur during the exercise, requiring a local agency to terminate its participation in the exercise, the agency was_ te notify the state and county Emergency Operations Centers of the situation and terminate its participation.

{y The State was to then inform all other agencies involved in _ the exercise of the situation. All messages about real events were to be clearly identifled as such. I The following provide the minimum response capabilities which were to be demonstrated by the State and local governments during the 1984 emergency. exercise. , )

Initial Notifleation/ Communications

' Initial notificat!on and communications were to be performed in accordance with 1 the procedures in New Jersey Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP).

Emeriency Facilities Activation / Command and Control Activation and operation of emergency facilities were to be in accordance with

-( the New Jersey RERP.

Accident Assessment l Dose projections and protective action recommendations were to be performed in i accordance with procedures in New Jersey RERP. Exercise-initiating events were to be controlled by the state controller from the state EOC in West Trenton, N.J. SNGS site i

personnel were to determine the nature of the emergency and provide information to the j state Bureau of Radiation Protection.  !

Field Monitoring and Sampling Teams' New Jersey state observers were to provide simulated field data to the four radiological monitoring teams of the state and counties.

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Prompt Notification System .

, All EBS m4ssages during the exercise were to be prepared and forwarded to the ,

Em'e rgency Broadcast System gate *:ay station (WDEL) in accordanceE with RERP procedures. Only one exercise message was to_ be broadcast in consonance with the actual siren activation.

Publie Information Press releases were to be prepared during .the exercise in accordance with' procedures in the state RERP. The joint emergency news center in the PSE&G Training Center on Chestnut Street, Salem, N.J. was to be activated.' Rumor control was to be demonstrated at the state EOC, West Trenton.

Route Alerting (Sleen Failure) .

The following municipalities were to be prepared to demonstrate their back."p-notification capability by dispatching route alerting teams: Elsinboro, Mannington, and

- Pent.sville. The observed demonstration was to be identified by FEMA during .the exercise. ,

Access Control Lower Alloways Creek Township was to Initially man two of the five-mile radius access control points to be designated by FEMA during the exercise. Township personnel were to subsequently be relieved by New Jersey State Police enlisted personnel.

Impediments to Evacuation FEMA was to identify two Incidents, one in Salem and one in Elsinboro, which would require municipal and/or county respon.se for coordination, traffic routing and controls, and road clearing operations. i General Populaticu Bus Evacuation FEMA was to identify one bus route in each county to be demonstrated. The FEMA observers were to coordinate their observation through the state EOC and were to -

meet the New Jersey Transit buses either at the Maple Snade garage or the Salem Vo-Tech Schoolin Mannington.

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{ 17 School Bus Evacustica FEMA was to identify one school evacuation route for demonstration. This was to be coordiriated and' initiated from the Salem County' EOC in conjb6ction with the exercise ' time line. The response, however, was to be delayed if regular school bus operations would be disrupted by the demonstration.

Decontamination Center The Quinton Fire Station was to be set up and staffed for emergency workers and vehicle decontamination operations as it would be during an actual incident.

Emergency Medical Services and Hospital Response All aspects of this demonstration were to be accomplished during the September 27, 1984, medical drill. This was to be initiated on site at 0900 and continue through' Initial treatment, monitoring, transport, hospital response, and decontantination. In addition to the on-site victim, at least four additional contaminated victims were to be treated at Sclem County Memorial Hospital.

1 Mobility Impaired Evacuation Demonstration 1

FEMA was to designate four locations to be visited by the county evacuation .

vehicle with subsequent travel to a Congregate Care Shelter. - No individuals were to ]

l actually be transported. The federal observer was :o initiate this demonstration from j the county EOC.  !

I Congregate Care Shelters Shelter facilities were to be demonstrated at Vineland H!gh School in Cumberland County and Woodstown High School.In Salem County. . Approximately 25 people were to be processed at each facility. American Red Cross operations were to be supplemented by county monitoring and, decontamination personnel at both locations.

Federal observation was to occur during the initial coordination activities at the county EOCs and to continue at the Congregate Care Shelters. j Close-Out of the Exercise Close-out of the exercise was to occur after the lead referee had provided the initiating event to terminate the exercise.

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. i 18 -

2 EXERCISE EVALUATION '

This section provides a narrative o'verview of the observation' evaluations 'of the October 23, 1984 radiological emergency preparedness exercise for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station. These evaluations have been keyed to the exercise objectives listed in Sec.1.4 of- this report. References to these objectives are provided in the narrative I which follows. l 1

2.1 NEW JERSEY STATE OPERATIONS .

2.1.1 State EOC Overview '

The New Jersey State Police Headquarters in West Trenton was notifled of an alert at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station (SNGS) via commercial telephone at approximately ' 0838. This backup means of notification was timely and worked effectively. An initial malfunction of the dedicated telephone,line (primary means of notification) was quickly repaired and all subsequent notifications of change in the.

emergency classiffeation were received via this primary means of notification and were

. verified by call-back to the plant from the state EOC. This effectively demonstrated the exercise objective (State 1.a) regarding emergency notifications.

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Notification of the SEOC staff and State agencies was completed from the State Police Headquarters by approximately 0920 and the SEOC was fully. staffed by 'l approximately 0940. All state response agencies participating in the exercise were represented at the SEOC throughout the exercise. In a number of cases, agencies were double-staffed, which provided beneficial training for backup ' personriel, and demonstrated the capability for 24-hour staffing which was one of the exercise objectives (State 1.f). The organizations represented at the SEOC consisted' of the follov.!ngs e New Jersey State Police -

l e State Office of Emergency Management (OEM) -

e State Department of Law and Public Safety e Department of Corrections - Office of Institutional Services e Department of Health e New Jersey Transit e

19 ,

e Department of Agriculture

.- e Departrnent of Defense . . . . .

e Department of ' Environmental Protection e Department of Energy e Department of Education ,

e New Jersey Marine Police ,

e U.S. Coast Guard e American Red Cross ,

e Salvation Army The staff present displayed adequate training and knowledge of their responsibilities. The exercise objective (State 1.b) to activate and staff the SEOC was adequately. demonstrated.

The deputy direetce, New Jersey OEM effectively managed operations at the SEOC throughout the exercise, satisfying an exercise objective (State 3.b). Status boards, briefings, and communications flow within the SEOC were generally good. The appropriate emergency classification level was posted throughout the exercise in the ecmmand center, operations room, and agency briefing area. Maps were prominently displayed, and emergency classification levels and status boards were. updated on a timely basis by appropriate staff. Periodic briefings and good communications flow kept key staff apprised of the existing emergency situation. The preceding items satisfied one of the exercise objectives (State 3.a). Emergency management personnel were very well s trained. All of the deficiencies observed at the state EOC during last year's exercise relating to alert and notification, arrangements for transportation resources, and the use of radioprotective drugs by emergency workers have been corrected.

A previous deficiency regarding the designation of areas to be evacuated has been corrected operationally. New Jersey- OEM used c'ompass sectors rather than I emergency planning areas to define the areas to be evacuated. These sectors were effectively converted to narrative descriptions of the affected areas and included in the EBS evacuation advisory message. However, in order to complete correction of this previous def!clency, the plan should be revised and the emergency planning area concept should be removed. Also, in order to provide a cornplete picture of the current status, maps in the SEOC should be equipped with overlays to indicate sectors where protective actions have been implemented.

As in the'past, the facilities at the SEOC were excellent this year, satisfying one of the exercise objectives (State 2.a). Background noise was minimal, and furniture, space, lignting, communications, and other physical requirements were adequate. An

20 .

on-site generator available as a source of backup electrical power was observed but not demonstrated. The faellity contained cots and a complete kitchen and could support

. i extended operations.. Access to the SEOC was controded, thereby satisfying one of the exercise objectives (State 2.c).

Since last year, the BRP dose assessment functions have been transferred from the SEOC to the near-site EOF in Salem City on an experimental basis. Communleations I between dose assessment peesonnel and the SEOC were handled through a BRP liaison

! officer and his staff who were located on another floor in the SEOC. There was,

! however, a considerable delay between consideration of the protective action recommen-dation for sheltering, which was discussed in the BRP liaison office, and presentation of this recommendation to the state OEM. Therefore, it is recommended that internal com-munications between the BRP and the command and control center should be strength-ened to expedite protective-action decision making at the' SEOC. -~ Stationing the BRP liaison officer on the same floor near the command and control center would help to achieve this goal." Also, the role of the BRP liaison office should be defined as one of relaying and interpreting, as necessary - technical information communicated to the SEOC by BRP dose assessment personnel at the EOF (see Summary and Sec. 3.2.1).

Communications facilities at the SEOC were excellent as in the past. Dedicated

telephone lines link the SEOC with the plant,. the EOF, the Salem and Cumberland a County EOCs, and the Media Center. Backup communications,to these facilities are provided via commercial telephone lines and EMRAD radio. _ Except for the initial malfunction of the dedicated line to the plant which was quickly repaired, all of these primary systems functioned well, thus satisfying two of the exercise objectives (State 2.b and State 3.c). Com'munications ' with Salem 'and Cumberland counties could be established via backup commercial telephone and this was demonstrated at least once.

EMRAD radio was functional for this exercise as a redundant backup system for communicating with the counties or for communications directly with the municipal EOCs, although demonstration of this capability was not an objective of the exercise.

The primary means of communication with local EOCs is4ndirect, with the appropriate county relaying the message. The transmittal of information from the SEOC to the county EOCs was effective. However, based on observations at the state and two county EOCs, it was evident that some communications to the county EOCs, especially Salem County, were difficult to complete. The reason for this difficulty should be identified and resolved by the appropriate jurisdiction.

Public information was handled in an effective and timely. manner at the SEOC.

~

There was excellent coordination and communication between the public information officer (PIO) at the SEOC 'and the Joint Media Center in Salem City. This included advance coordination of information released thus satisfying one of the exercise objectives (Stata 5.b). The ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instructions to the public in a timely manner was adequately demonstrated, satisfying an exercise objective (State 4.b). Eva'cuation instructions to the public, in general, were clearly stated, with the exception that there were no instructions given for the evacuation of school children in EBS messages. Communications between the SEOC and the Joint Med!a Center was by dedicated phone line. Equipment for transmitting hard cep!:: Of messages, including EBS messages, was available' at both locations. The ability to t

, . ,. . . _ _ . _ _ . . .. _ _ _ - .a.

21 i .

establish and operate ' a rumor control system in a coordinated manner, one o.f the exercise objectives (State 5.c), was adequately demonstrated. Rumor control was

~

. handled out of the SEOC where five phone lines (toll-free 800 numbers) were available for rumor control purposes. This system was observed to be operational during the -

exercise.

Management of coordinated siren activation and EBS broadcast, which was one of the exercise objectives (State 4.c), was effectively demonstrated. The EBS message was initially broadcast at '1120, prior to siren activation. This was immediately recognized and corrected at the SEOC by having the EBS message aired at 1125 (State 4.d). The New Jersey OEM demonstrated exceptional capability to evaluate and correct this initial mistiming as it. happened. The previous deficiency regarding the timing of the siren activation and the EBS message has been corrected. The exercise objective (State.4.a) to disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes of the Governor's decision was accomplished. In addition, the EBS message was effectively received and monitored at the SEOC, correcting another previous deficiency.

Protec"tive ' action recommendations were posted' on htatus boards in the .BRP liaison office on the second floor of the SEOC, thus correcting a previous deficiency.

The scenario, in general, provided enough activity to demonstrate the emergency preparedness of the staff at the SEOC and to test areas of earner deficiencies.

l j Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding 1

No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the SEOC during this exercise.

i Other Deficiencies

(- 1. Deficiency: The previous deficiency regarding the designation of areas to be evacuated has been operationally addressed. The use of emergency planning areas has been replaced at the SEOC by the i use of compass sectors, which are then converted to narrative descriptions of the affected areas for EBS messages. Although this system works well, the use of emergency planning areas is still i referenced in the New Jersey Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP). Practice is not consistent with the plan. (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.a.) .

Recommendation: The New Jersey RERP should be revised to j remove the emergency planning area concept and replace it with the procedure presently in use based on compass sectors.

2. Defielency: Maps in the SEOC did not indicate the sectors in which protective actions had been implemented. (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.a.)

]

I

22 Recommendation: Maps In the SEOC should be equipped with overlays that indicate sectors where protective actions have been

. ., implemented. . .. .

3. Deficiency: 'The Bureau of . Radiation Protection (BRP) liaison

-officer and his staff ar; located on the second floor of the SEOC, ,

hampering communicat'.ans and protective action decision making with the command anc' control center, which is located on the first floor of the SEOC. (! UREG-0654, II, A.1.b.)

Recommendation: Communications between the Bureau of Radiation Protection office and the command and control center

. should be strengthened to facilitate and expedite protective action .

decision making at the SEOC. Consideration should be given to moving the BRP liaison, office to the first floor of the EOC and - ,

defining the role of this liaison office as one of relaying and

. Interpreting,.as necessary, technical information from the EOF.

4. Deficiency: Although evacuation procedur~es were generally clearly stated in the EBS messages, there were no instructions given for the evacuation of schoolchildren. (NUREG-0654 II, -

J.10.g.) .

Recommendation: The EBS evacuation messages should make it clear whether schoolchildren are to be evacuated or not.

l i

2.1.2 Bureau of Radiation Protection (BRP) 2.1.2.1 BRP Headquarters Overview The Bureau of Radiation Protection dose assessment functions have been transferred from the SEOC to the~ EOF in Salem City. The transfer of these functions was done on an experimental basis for this year's exercise.

1 j Protective action recommendations were observed to be posted on the status boards deficiency in "?om the BRP IIalson the 1983 office on the second floor of the SEOC. This corrects a exercise.

' An evaluation of the BRP dose assessment functions, which were transferred -

from the SEOC to the EOF in Salem City, is presented in Section 2.2 of this report.

4 .

23 Deflelencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding

~

There were no deficiencies.that would lead to a negative find!'ng observed.at the BRP headquarters during this exercise.

Other Deficiencies There were no other deficiencies observed at the BRP headquarters during this exercise.

2.1.2.2 BRP Forward Command Post I

• Overview

. Activation' and staffing of the Bureau of Radiation Protection Forward Command Post (BRP-FCP) at the Shiloh Fire Station was accomplished in a timely manner, meeting I one of the exercise objectives (State 1.e). The FCP was operational with partial staffing- l at 1000, and was fully. staffed _ at 1117. A helicopter was used to transport the commander and some members of the response team to the FCP. Prior to this arrival, the second in command was clearly fn charge. In addition to the BRP, other organizations represented at the FCP included the NJDEP and the NJSP. A shift change at the FCP was not demonstrated (State 1.1), but a call list was provided to demonstrate 24-hour staffing capability.

Access control and security at the FCP were implemented by a NJSP trooper assigned to the facility, thus meeting one of the exercise objectives (State 2.c).

The FCP has adequate facilities, including ample space, lighting, furniture, j f- ventilation, backup power, status boards, and maps. This satisfied one of the exercise l

I

( objectives (State 2.a). The status boards were posted and were clearly visible. They were kept up-to-date on most significant' events when the information was received.

l Timeliness of the postings was hindered however, since some of the significant events (protective actio.s) were not relayed to the FCP from the EOF.

Message handling at the FCP was very efficient. Messages received from the I

field monitoring teams were recorded, posted on a status board, plotted on the map, and then transmitted to the EOF. This satisfied an exercise objective (State 3.a).

l The FCP commancer demonstrated his capability to take command of the FCP and to coordinate the overall response (State 3.b).

Radiological exposure control was adequately demonsti'ated at the FCP (State 8.a). A radio message was sent to the field teams every half hour telling them to read and record their personnel dosimeters. When field team members returned to the FCP,

they were carefully monitored and their names, social security numbers, and dates of l birth were recorded. There was a separate status board posted in the FCP displaying _s dosimeter readings for each team to ensure that no worker received excessive exposure.

k n

g. . .

24 A mobile laboratory at !he FCP appears to be sufficiently equipped to analyze field samples properly. The laboratory staff were well trained and were familiar with proper procedures and equipment . operations required for sample analysis. If, for some reason, the equipment'at the mobile lab at the FCP was not suffielent, the BRP had the capability to fly the samples to the laboratory in Trenton.

The timely flow of information between the various BRP locations (FCP, field teams, EOF, and SEOC), which has been a problem in previous exercises, was again a problem (State 3.c). (Also see report sections 2.1.1, 2.1.2.1, 2.1.2.3, and 2.2.1.) Since BRP did not have de. tailed procedures available, due to the experimental change in operational concept for this year's exercise, it is difficult to define the source of the problem. For example, information on the accident emergency classification level was not always transmitted to the FCP in a timely manner. This type of information would originate in the EOF. Information on public protective action recommendations was also not transmitted to the FCP, and this information would originate in the SEOC. Limited dose projection information was transmitted from the EOF to the FCP; however, the

, basic met, horological data (wind speed and direction) was made available to the FCP.

The field teams were not used effielently to define the plume (State 6.d). The location of the projected plume centerline appeared to differ between the FCP and the EO F. This disagreement caused the inefficient use of the f! eld teams and was not identified in a timely manner due to the lack of information flow. The most significant emergency worker protective action - '

directive for emergency workers to administer KI -- was handled in a timely and enicient manner.

Radio communications with the field monitoring teams continues to be hampered by equipment problems, as it has in the past (State 2.b). Although a radio transmission tower is to be installed at the FCP in the future to improve the situation, the tower was not yet in place at the time of the exercise. The problem with communications with the field monitoring teams was noted as a deficiency in the past and remains to be corrected. With the exception of this problem, the radio operator at the FCP handled radio communications efficiently and identified transmissions as being related to a drill.

This corrects an earlier deficiency.

At one point during the exercise there was difficulty in contacting the EOF by telephone. The radio was then used as a backup method. Thls attempt to contact tne EOF was not successful because the EOF staff did not have their radio turned on. When communications were reestablished, using the telephone, the EOF staff was advised to turn on its radio (see Sec. 2.2.1).

Although the scenario was uncomplicated, with no wind shifts, it provided sufficient activity to adequately assess the capabilities of the BRP-FCP.

Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the BRP-FCP.

a*

..= . . . . . - . . . . . . -

25 Other Deficiencies

> . 1. Deficiency: The individual in c,harge at the BRP-FCP did not - -

obtain maximum use of the field monitoring teams due to ineff!cient positioning of the teams. (NUREG-0654, II, F.1.d.)

Recommendation: The BRP-FCP should improve its coordination l with the EOF with regard to the projected location of the plume and the need for data at specific locations.

2. Deficiency: Some problems with determining where to locate field monitoring teams were caused by the lack of sufficient referees.

There were 4 teams and only 3 referees. (NUREG-0654, II, F.1.d.)

Recommendation: The state BRP should ensure that a sufficient

( number of trained referees are provided for exercises.

~

3. Deficiency: Radio communications between the field monitoring teams and the FCP continues to be a problem. Radio contact was intermittently lost throughout the exercise by both field teams

_ observed. (NUREG-0654, II, F.1.d.)

Recommendation: The adequacy of the existing communications system utilised between the FCP and the field monitoring tear..s ,

should be reviewed and improvements Implemented in order to assure the capability for uninterrupted communications between the FCP and the field teams. Installation of the radio tower planned for the FCP can improve the communications.

4. Deficiency: Notifications regarding the status of emergency or protective actions in effect were not relayed to the field

\ monitoring teams with the exceptien of the recommendation to take KI. (NUREG-0654, II, F.1.d. O.4.J.)

Recommendation: The FCP should keep field teams better informed with respect to the status of emargency or protective action recommendations.

2.1.2.3 Radiological Field Monitoring Teams Overview The New Jersey BRP activated and deployed the radiological field-monitoring teams in a timely manner, thereby satisfying an exercise objective (State 6.a). The state field teams performed their assigned functions well. In addition to the state BRP personnel, members of the Salem and Cumberland county radiological field-monitoring teams accompanied the state field teams for training purposes.

26 ,

l i The state deployed four field-monitoring teams, Reuter Stokes monitoring teams, l . health physics teams, and an environmental sample transportation team. Of these teams, l

two field-monitoring teams, Vanguard A and Vanguard C, were evaluated during the

• I exercise. The state monitoring teams are to be mobilized as follows:

a) The utility notifies the New Jersey State Police at Trenton of a possible radioactive release situation.

b) The State Police Headquarters notifies the BRP.

c) The BRP tlien notifies the officialin charge of the state radiation-monitoring teams.

1 d) The official then notifies each individual team member.

The Vanguard A team is transported by helicopter to' the FCP. The other three state teams come in state vehicles which are equipped for fleid monitoring. . . ,

The initial mobilization and call-up of the state' field teams was not observed.

However, upon arrival at the Shiloh Forward Command Post, the team members went

. through a very complete equipment check prior to deployment to the field. Team

_ members were assigned specific responsibilities and team leaders were briefed on plant status and meteorological conditions.

Although conducting an actual shift change was an exercise objective (State 1.1) -

l to demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing on a 24-hour basis, this shift change was not performed by the BRP field monitoring teams. An actual shift change should be demonstrated by the radiological field monitoring teams during a future exercise.

.I Equipment for both teams was generally veiy good. ' The vehicles used were large  !

enough to accommodate the team members and equipment and were suitable for expected weather conditions.

The teams were equipped with low range (0-50 mR/hr) CDV-700 survey meters and high range (0-500 R/hr) CDV-715 Model la lon chambers. Either Ludlum Model 2218 dual analyzers or Eberline SAM II analyzers were used for counting particulate air filtets ,

or radiolodine cartridges in the field. The field-monitoring kits contained adequate I equipment and supplies for collecting environmental samples such as soll, vegetation,  ;

water, or milk, and backup equipment was available at the FCP. Current . calibration  ;

documentation was missing from all but one of the radiation detection instruments. This i should be corrected before the next exercise.

The field team members were very knowledgeable about monitoring locations and monitoring procedures. Thay demonstrated appropriate set-up of equipment ~ and appropriate air sampling methods for detecting radiolodine at a concentration of 7 uCl/cm3 (State 6.c), as well as procedures for determining ambient radiation levels (State S.b).

~

One team, : Vanguard A, experienced the failure of an air sampler and power converter. Although the team demonstrated their knowledge of correctly, using the equipment, it is recommended that backup equipment be requested from the TCP if equipment failure occurs during future exercises.

+

._.__._.__..__-mm..__--

. 27 Radiological exposure control equipment and procedures used by both teams were

. observed to be good (State 8.a). Both teams had all the necessary protective equipment. Potassium lodide (K!) was carried in the team's, kit and the team members-know the procedures for the use of KI (State 8.c and 8.d). They were directed to simulate its ingestion by the FCP at 1317 hours0.0152 days <br />0.366 hours <br />0.00218 weeks <br />5.011185e-4 months <br />. Team members all had low- and mid-range pocket dosimeter charger, record-keeping cards, and TLD dosimeters. Team members know how often to read their dosimeters (every 30 minutes) and read them 1 more frequently in areas of high radiation fields. However, they were unsure what the I maximum authorized dose was, but said that they would request instructions from the FCP (State 8.b) if their dosimeters exceeded 250 mR. All team members were aware of procedures for decontamination and went through the Decontamination Hot Line set up at the FCP. This satisfied an exercise objective (State 8.e).  ;

1 l

Communications between the field monitoring teams and the FCP were again a problem in this year's exercise (State 3.c), and remedial actions to correct this deficiency j remain in' complete. Radio contact with the FCP was intermittently lost throughout the C- . exercise by both field teams observed. Many areas were noted in which contact with the FCP was either interrupted or not possible on a reliable, continuous basis. No backup radio system was available. These intermittent radio failures appeared to create some  !

confusion with the direction (placement and movement) of the field teams by the FCP.

Also, the teams were not kept informed of the plume boundaries and conditions within

~

the EPZ, or of protective actions in effect. The FCP did not aid field teams in moving  ;

, from assignment to assignment to minimize exposure to the contaminated area or l cloud. This was a deficiency in last year's exercise and remains uncorrected.

The scenario for this exercise was not complex in that there were no changes in wind direction or speed. However, it was useful in checking the knowledge and capabilities of the field monitoring teams.

Deficiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding ,

4

( No defielencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed for either l the Vanguard A or C radiological field-monitoring teams.

l l .

l Other Deficiencies

1. Deficiency: The air sampler of the Vanguard A team malfunctioned and would not operate at a constant sampling rate of 3 f t 3/ min. Their power converter also fa!!ed. (NUREG-0654. II, H.10, I.8.)

l Recommendation: The causes of failure of the Vanguard A team air sampler and power converter should be determined and corrected.

1 1

0 ,

' '

• l' 28 ,

2.- Deficiency: Both teams did not have documentation of the last calibration for all of the radiation detection instruments.

, ,. Individual instruments either did_not have calibration labels or the .

-labels indicated dates that were over one year old. (NUREC-0654, -

II, H.10.)

Recommendation: Instrument calibration documentation proce-dures should be strengthened to ensure that calibrations are performed according to plan and that evidence of the calibrations la present.

2.1.3 General Population Bus Evacuation I

Overview The s' tate' participated in the evacuation of the general public by dispatching two New Jersey Transit Authority buses from their garage in Camden at about'10.20. Both buses arrived at the mustering point at the Mannington Voc-Tech Career Center in a

.. timely manner at approximately 1111. These buses were used to simulate evacuation of the transit-dependent general population along two routes, one in Salem County and one in Cumberland County.

Two New Jersey State Police units arrived at thel mustering point at the Mannington Voc-Tech Career Center at approximately 1052, met the New Jersey Transit Authority buses, and provided escort and radio communications for the buses during the simulated evacuation. This demonstration corrected three previously identified deficiencies. ,

At approximately 1322 the message to run both evacuation routes was received via polica radio, and at approximately 1325 and -1326 the buses departed from- the -

mustering . point. After proceeding to the evacuation route starting points and completing the appropriate routes, both buses arrived at the Congregate Care. Center in a timely manner.

Maps of the routes were provided for use by tht bus drivers and state police escorts. However, because of the nature of the maps, the lack of road signs along the -

routes, and since the bus drivers and the state police escorts were not familiar.with the area, some problems were observed in comp'eting the bus routes. For example, several turns were missed and a segment of one route was run backwards. The maps had been prepared in small segments to provide a convenient size for the drivers' use while :

driving. However, this segmentation made it difficult for drivers to determine their exact location while on the route. This difficulty could be remedied simply by marking on each map where the previous map ends and the next map begins.- A large map of the entire route on one page should also be included for reference. However, even with these difficulties, the routes were run in a tin.ely manner.

a---- ---- - - - .

j . . ...

. _: ~

. 29 Both the bus driver and state police escort for one route had received training and were knowledgeable about exposure control procedures, allowable dose limits, and the use of KI. They were provided with adequate dosimeters (0-20 R and 0-200 R), which were read and recorded at 15-30 minute intervals. TLDs were also provided. KI placebos had been provided and the use of KI was simulated by one bus driver. However, the bus driver on the second route did not know exposure limits, procedures for being authorized to receive additional exposure (State 8.b), and the frequency for reading the self-reading dosimeters. Thus, the related exercise objective (State 8.a) was only partially met'and additional training should be provided. The driver on the second bus knew the procedure for authorizing the use of KI (i.e., who would authorize usage). The exercise objective (State 8.c) for demonstrating knowledge of the procedure for authorizing K! usage was satisfied and the corresponding defleiency corrected. However, the message to simulate ~

the use of KI was not received by the other driver, thereby only partially meeting one of the exercise objectives (State 8.d).

The permanent recoid devices were not identified by any visible Identification number or code. Such . identification is necessary to establish the exposure received by the individual using the device issued to him/her.

The scenario for this exercise provided sufficient activity to demonstrate, on a limited scale, the ability to provide for bus evacuation of the general public.

I Defleiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding  ;

No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed during this exercise for the general population bus evacuation.

! Other Deficiencies l

( 1. Deficiency: Some problems were observed in following the proper evacuation routes. This was because the bus drivers and state police escorts were unfamiliar with the area, roadways were poorly marked, and because the route maps were segmented. (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.a O.1, J.10.g.).

, Recommendation: Consideration should be given to installing l additional road name signs and/or route number ' markers, and

! providing better maps e.nd written descriptions of the routes.

l Existing small maps could be improved by placing an "x" or a match line at the point where the previous map ends. A larger j map showing the entire evacuation route should also be included for reference in each bus driver's packet of maps.

Deficiency: The bus drivers' knowledge of radiation protection and 2.

I dosimetry varied greatly between the two drivers. (NUREG-0654, II, 0.1, K.3.a.)

I .

--_ ._. =_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _

i 30 ,

Recommendation: Additional training should be provided to ensure that all bus drivers are knowledgeable thout appropriate radiation

- protection, including the.use of dosimetn a d'owable dose limits, and procedures for being authorized to ree ue additional expo-sure. The training schedule should be submitted to FEMA.

3. Deficiency: The message 'to simulate the use of KI was not received by one of the bus drivers. (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.e, J.10.f.)

Recommendation: Communications should be improved to ensure thu messages concerning radiation exposure protective measures are received by all bus drivers.

4. Deficiency: The permanent record dosimeters utilized by the bus drivers were not identified by a visible ! certification number or code. (NUREG-0654, !!, K.3.a. K.3.b.)

Recom mendation: All permanent record dosimeters must have a specific identification number so as to be traceable to the

. individual who used the device; 2.2 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY 2.2.1 State of New Jersey BRP

. The EOF was activated at the Site Area Emergency. On an experimental basis,.

the BRP dose assessment function was carried out this year at the EOF rather than at the SEOC. If it is decided to permanently transfer the dose assessment functions of BRP to the EOF, the necessary procedures to implement the new arrangement should be prepared and the current RERP should be revised to reflect these changes. The necessary staff were activated from their normal work locations and arrived at the EOF in a timely manner, meeting one of the exercise objectives (State 1.c). Three BRP representatives arrived within one hour (1039) of their initial notification in accordance with mobilization procedures. The initial staff consisted of an engineer, a health physicist, and a communicator. Two management representatives arrived approximately one hour later (1155) and were promptly briefed prior to assuming control, satisfying part of one of the exercise objectives (State 3.a). BRP staff at the EOF performed the following functions:

e Communications with BRP personnel in the SEOC, e Evaluation of plant parameters and radiation effluents, o Analysis and verification of environmental data provided by field teams,

7 i

!=# . ..i; . ._. _ _ . . _ , . . , ._ ..

3 ,

l

. 31 e Dose assessment, l

. e Development and transmit,tal of protective action recommendations to OEM, and i e Interface' with the utility and NRC representatives for decision making.  ;

. < y One BRP member was identified as reporting directly to the Technical Support Center (TSC) but this function was not observed. A shift change was demonstrated by presentation of a roster (State 1.h) which described the full complement of BRP staff, a first shift for initial response, and a second shift to provide 24-hour coverage. This only partly satisfied tliegthift-change exercise objective (State 1.1), since BRP staffing for accident assessment 'was to have been demonstrated by an actual shift change. With respect to the initial personnel responding, it was clear that the individual in charge did

(- -

not have tlie authority to make decisions without concurrence from BRP SEOC personnel. A decialor that was reached at the EOF regarding protective measures was, l

i delayed after the BR? SEOC representatives requested additional information. The  !

command and control exercise objective (State 3.b) was therefore only partly met.  !

With the dose assessment functions 'of the BRP transferred to the EOF on an  ;

experimental basis, the allocated space in tb EOF was insufficient for the additional staff and equipment. Postings of plant parameters, status board information, and displays of area maps for radiological field team tracking were adequate. The location ~ i of the State's work area within the EOF decreases the efficiency of information flow between the utility and BRP. Therefore, BRP technical staff were required to move to different locations ~throughout the EOF in order to obtain . appropriate utility information. The exercise objective (State 2.a) concerning adequacy of faci!! ties was therefore only partly met. Guards were posted at entrances and exits of the EOF and log-in sheets were maintained, thereby meeting an exercise objective (State 2.c).

One dedicated telephone IWa' was available for communleation with 'BRP representatives in the SEOC and twofeommercial lines were used for communications with the BRP representative in the TSC and for discussion with the field team commander at the FCP directing off-site monitoring teams. The ability to communicate with these parties satisfled an exercise objective (State 2.b). Messages transmitted to the SEOC described current plant conditions and any protective actions which were warranted. Also related wera a brief event description, the emergency classification Ic. vel, plume direction, potentiallygffected population areas, meteorological data, and the locations of offsite monitoring teams. The adequacy of message handling satisfied part of 'the one of the exercise objectives (State 3.a). Additional communications capabilities, such as radios and hard copy printers, were also available at the EOF but were not dedicated solely to BRP use. At one point during the exere!se the BRP-FCP had difficulty in contacting the EOF by telephone. The radio was then used as the backup method. This was unsuccessful because the EOF staff did not have the radio turned on. When communications weth rWstabilshed using the telephone, the. EOF Staff were advised to turn on their radio.' in addition, the Rapidcom hard-copy device, which s

had been installed in response to an earlier defleiency, did not operate properly and therefore the deficiency has not yet bean torrected._

l 4

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. , , s The RRP ' don escument siaff :n the EOF made dose projections ,by computer '-

based inintdy on default vrnes and later on source terms when this inform.1t!on became '

<-' . available. The methodology wa1 reasonable. and results of the BRP. ca'uulations were e . ' g' correlated with those of ':he utility and occasionally viith those of the NRC, which also #

participated in this exercise. Protective Actior: Reecmmendations (PAhlrWere driven j ,

al nost exclusively by print stat'us. BRP nucleo engide'ers independently evaluated plant

' , status information which was available from the utility and arrived at PARS which

sgreed with the utility. The (nitial PAR Sheltering) was discussed with Delaware and the "

NRC prior to being sent to BRP personnel in the SEOC. There was a delap,in the w implementation of this PAR, weh was : precautionary, t,y OEM becausefof delaytcaused

" 7 J.

by BRP personnel in the SEOC (see Sec.11.1). s -

a When available information indicated Niat Wgnificant quantities of nyolod!]e were being released to the environment,LEIRP requested permission from th6'New Jers'ey Department of Health for emergtney field workers to ,ute EI. e 91s request was '

precautionary, since the data nectryry to yJantify projected potendil doses ivould not

, hhv4 been available for an extendes periori,.since the plume was not ove? tecessiblef !s,nd l areas. p This. decision

, strict Jacorr'4nce with the was R2RP.technicanf The pdblic found, given the alder PAR (evacuation)1W circumstance!$,'f defaped (l soTgt:' hat by the BRP personnel at f.pS 3EOC, but to a lesser degree ther,the fi$st PAR.

Af ter deld data became available (after the PAR recommendations), th'a BRP made doae projectfys to confirm that the PARS already taken were sufficient,' based on the EPA i >

protectivi. action guidelines. The: exercise objective (State 6.d) regarding ability to make g dose projections and determine protective actions was met. However, the BRP FCP wai .

hampered by a lac'x of ermmunications from the EOF regarding emergency a'etion levels,  !

dose projection datt, and protective action measures. Action shoi 'i be taken#to improve I

f coorc'Inattua tmd ensurp a tirrely flow of information from the EOF to the FCP. '!

,Due to the low wind speeds tutd inaccessibility of sampimplocations close to the plant, actual field measureme.its were just beginning to be meet as the exercise terminated. in fact, BRP ejetinded to participate in the exercise for one hour after the rest of % participants hed term!nated the erett:Ise, '3 v ,

l / l ,

The scenario tyr.s adequate for the BRP at the EOF to c's.:moretrate all anticipated objectives and provided a good means to test the taining att kn)wledge of

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BRP players. >

Deficierules'that Would Lesd to e Negative Finding I There were no deficiencies oturved at t.w State of New Jersey PRP at the EOF that would lead to a rg.tive finding.

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Other Deficiencies

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1. Deficienev: The designat4d BRP official' at thi EOF was not uneydvocally injontrol and his authority for det.Jion ma#tywas not clear. Recommendations for protective actions had to receive

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'33 support from the BRP staff at the SEOC prior to being sent to

. OEM. (NUREG-OS54, II, A.1.d.)

Recommendation: If it is decided to transfer dose assessment functions of the BRP to the EOF permanently, the functional roles' i of the BRP representatives ^ in the EOF versus those in the SEOC ]

should be redefined. This is needed in order to clearly identify one '

individual to unequivocally carry out BRP responsibilities.

2. Defielency: With the dose assessment ' functions of - the BRP transferred to the EOF, the allocated space in the EOF was insufficient for the additional staff and equipment, and the arrangement of allocated space hindered interaction between dose assessment and management personnel for the BRP and those of the utility. (NUREG-0654, II, H.2, A.I.b.)

Recommendation: If it is deelded to transfer the dose assessment. * *

. functions of the. BRP to the EOF permanently, the BRP should negottete with the utility and obtain additional space as well as .

rearrangement of space throughout the. EOF to allcw grouping of dose assessment personnel in one area ard key utility and BRP/OEM management representatives in ancther. '

i

3. Deficiency: The transfer of the BitP dose assessment function from the SEOC to the EOF was experimental and is not in accord with the current New Jersey RERP. (NUREG-0654, II, P.3, P.4, P.5.)

l Recommendation: If it is decided to permanently transfer the dose assessment functions of the BRP to the EOF, the necessary procedures to implement the new arrangement should be prepared

( and the current RERP revised to reflect the changes.

4. .Defielency: The' BRP-FCP was hampered .by a lack of communications from the EOF regarding emergency action levels,'

dose projection data, and protective action measures. (NUREG-06 54, II,1.11, F.1.d.)

i Recommendations. Action should be taken to improve coordlaation and ensure a timely flow of information from 'the EOF to the 1 FCP. Future training should stress the importance of an ~open  ;

exchange of information from the EOF regarding protective action  ;

measures and dose projection data. '

1

5. Deficiency: An attempt by the BRP-FCP to contact the EOF using the backup re.dio ' method was unsuccessful during the exercise because the EOF staff did not have adequate training in the  !

l operation of the equipment. (NUREG-0654, II, F.1.d.)

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Recommendation Future training should stress the need to have the backup radio operational during an emergency response in case i problems develop with use of the primary system. The use of the backup radio system should be demonstrated in a future exercise.

l 2.2.2 New Jersey State Police FCP The New Jersey State Police Forward Command Post (NJSP-FCP) was located in a separate room at the EOF to provide noise control during radio communications.

Activation and staffing of the NJSP-FCP were performed in an orderly and timely manner, satisfying an exercise objective (State 1.e). At 0846 the NJSP Division headquarters notifled the troop level officer in charge to activate the FCP. He then l notified the appropriate on-duty staff to mobilize to the FCP with appropriate equipment and materials. The staff arrived at the facility and the FCP was declared operational at  ;

0945. Procedures are in place to mobilize staff and activate the FC? at any hour of the day.- ,

The staff at the FCP displayed good knowledge of their duties and were well-l trained. A system for 24-hour staffing was demonstrated. The officer in charge at the l FCP totaled up the number of staff who would be needed for potentiaj field assignments l and assignment to the FCP for the next shift. He then telephon'ed this requirement to l

the NJSP Woodstown station. Personnel to relieve the initial shilt would be contacted and mobilized fro ^m the Woodstown station.

Management of the NJEP-FCP was excellent. This satisfied one of the exercise objectives (State 3.b). A state police lieutenant was effectively in charge and controlled l the operations at all times. He executed his duties in a knowledgeable and confident  !

manner. Although formal briefings were not required due to the small size of the facility l l and the constant interaction between the Lieutenant and his staff, all personnel were made aware of the status of activities on an informal basis.

A copy of the plan and other reference materials were on hand and were referred to when necessary. Message logs were strictly maintained both for radio and for phone communications, thereby satisfying part of one of the exercise objectives (State 3.a).

The FCP was notified cf the plant status changes in a timely manner by the NJSP

' division headquarters.

The facilities at the NJSP-FCP were generally good and partlany satisfied an exercise objective (State 2.a). The only deficiencies, as described below, were the lack of a status board end the lack of shielding similar to the nearby ECF room. There was adequate furniture, space and lighting. The FCP was located in a sepe. rate room at the utility's Nuclear Training Facility in Salem. This facility can adequately support extended operations. Backup power was available but not demonstrated. Security and access control were good, meeting an exercise objective.(State 2.c). Security personnel were posted at entrances to the PSE&G Nuclear Training Facility.

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35 . .

I A master map was posted which showed the locations of evacuation zones with

. populations, evacuation routes, traffic control points, access control points, decontamination centers, Congre, gate Care / Relocation Centers, EPZ schools, direction of traffic flow along evacuation routes, and EPZ zones. However, there was no status board for posting the emergency classification level. .

The NJSP-FCP rcem was not shleided like the nearby EOF room in the same building. When FCP personnel were advised to move to the sealed EOF room for protection at 1550 they could not do so, since there were no hookups available for their communications equipment. A relocation to the NJSP Woodstown station would have been required, if the exercise had continued. However, at 1600 the NJSP-FCP was -

advised that the exercise had been terminated.

Communications equipment and procedures at the.NJSP-FCP were very good.

No problems were encountered in communicating with any of the appropriate organiza-tions, locations, or field personnel. This satisfied two of the exercise o'ojectives (Stato

(..- 2.b and 3.c). Communications equipment consisted of five dedicated. telephone lines, a commercial telephone line, and radio equipment. The five dedicated lines are to the SEOC, the NJSP Woodstown station, the NJSP Public Information Officer, and two lines to the NJSP division headquarters. All.11nes operated properly. The radio equipment consisted of a state police radio, which was used for contact with state police units in the fleid, and an EMRAD radio which could be used for communications to and from i county and municipal EOCs, the state of Delaware, municipal police stations, and the Salem nuclear generating station.

The only role played by the NJSP-FCP in protective actions was the coordination i of staffing for the traffic control / access control points (State 7.a), and providing escorts for buses on evacuation routes. At 1114 the FCP was advised by division headquarters that a General Emergency would be declared at 1120 and was requested to provide state police units to relieve Lower Alloways Creek police units at two control points.

However, the NJSP reported to a different location for one of the control points. The reason for .this inconsistency should be resolved so that personnel from both police

(- departments report to the same control points.

Since the NJSP-FCP was located within the PSE&G Nuclear Training Center in Salem, provisions of dosimetry were handle.1 by PSE&G staff. TLD's were distributed to FCP staff at 1410. Although no specific instructions were issued to the FCP staff at the -

time the TLDs were handed out, the FCP staff were aware of the procedures for use of the TLDs (State 8.a). NJSP field personnel from the FCP had been issued dosimetry at their base, the Woodstown NJSP station.

Defleiencies that Would Lead to a Negative Finding There were no deficiencies observed at the NJSP-FCP at the EOF that would lead to a negative finding.

, g 36 Other Deficiencies

1. . Deficiency: . A status board .was not present. in .the NJSP-FCP an'd there was no posting of the emergency classification level.

(NUREG-0654, II, D.3.)

Recommendation: A status board displaying the emergency claalfication level should be displayed and maintained in the NJSP-FC P.

. 2. Deficiency: The NJSP-FCP room was not shielded like the nearby EOF room in the same building. When the FCP personnel were advised to move to the sealed EOF room for radiation exposure protection they could not do so, since there were no communications hookups available in the EOF room. (NUREG- T 0654, II, J.9, J.10.m.) )

Recommendation: It is recommended that the FCP room in the Nuclear Training Facility building be protecte'd similar to that in the EOF room, or that the FCP be relocated to the NJSP

'- Woodstown station.

3. Defielency: The NJSP reported to a slightly different location for

- one of the two access control points demonstrated during the exercise. This became apparent when the NJSP attempted to relieve the Lower Alloways Creek police at the indicated post.

(NUREG-0654, II, J.10.], J.10.a.)

Recommendation: It is recommended that coordination between the NJSP and local police be implemented in order to obtain agreement on the precise location of the traffic control / access control points. In particular, the exact location of post #6A needs to be confirmed.

2.3 JOINT NEWS MEDIA CENTER AND PUBLIC EDUCATION The Joint ' News Media Center was established in Salem County at PSE&G's Nuclear " raining Center. The mobilization of. staff was timely, meeting one of the exercise objectives (State 1.d). A full staff was present during the exercise. Public Information Officers (PIOS) from the following organizations were present:

e Governor's office  !

e State Emergency Management l e Salem County e Cumberland County

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e Nuclear Regulatory Commission e Public Service Electric & Gas Co. ~

Clerical help was also present at the media center to support the PIOS. The clerical staff was excellent. All press releases : vere typed, copied, and distributed in a timely manner. The ability to maintain staffing of state functions at the Media Center on a 24-hour basis was demonstrated by the presentation of a roster listing trained personnel for all functions. This satisfied an exercise objective (State 1.g). The presence of security guards at entrances to the facility ensured access control and security, thereby satisfying 1

another of the exercise objectives.

The facilities at the Media Center were excellent. thus satisfying an exercise objective (State 2.a). Provisions were made for each individual reporSr to have his/her own telephone and typewriter. The P!Os had their own room adjacent to the briefing

(.. room for conferring prior to talking to press representatives. This conference room was effectively utilized, resulting in good advance coordination of information released. This satisfied an exercise objective (State 5.b). In addition, the SEOC 'was consulted prior to the release of information to the press. Press briefings were conducted in a professional manner whenever there was significant information to be given, thus meeting one of tne exercise objectives (State 5.a). Separate b'riefings were held with all P!Os before er.ch presentation to the press. Media kits containing background. Information were not available at the Media Center. However, background information was provided verbally. Press releases were laid out in sequence for the press representatives to pick up at any time.

• Communications systems at the Media Center were good and the ability to communicate with appropriate locations and organizations was demonstrated, thereby satisfying an axercise objective (State 3.c). Communications with the SEOC were by dedicated telephone and hard-copy device. Communications with the local EOCs were by means of commercial telephone.

Exercise objectives (State 3.e, 3.f and 4.b) requiring demonstration of the ability to formulate instructions to the public, to coordinate with appropriate organizations prior to distribution, and to distribute the instructions were only partly met. Emergency public instructions were formulated at the Media Center. The EBS message concerning evacuation was written in a clear and concise manner, easily understandable by the pubile. Hard-copy EBS messages were available at both the Media Center and the SEOC.

Rumor control was implemented by frequent press briefings at the Media Center and by the establishment of a tell-free 800 telephone number which members of the public could call. This satisfieo one of the exercise objectives (State 5.c). Rumor control calls were handled at the SEOC where five dedicated telephone lines were available for this purpose. The rumor control lines were observed to be operating anit functional during the exercise.

The scenario was generally adequate to test the emergency preparedness of the Medla Center staff and facilities. However, there was a lack of activity in the afternoon. m

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, 38 PSE&G had distributed a public information brochure and' ma'p concerning emergency planning to residents and businesses within the 10-mile Emergency Planning .

. Zone (EPZ), partly correcting a previous deficiency. ,

In order to assess the level of public awareness, the state and utility 'are j conducting a survey of EPZ residents. Prior to the issuance of the results of this formal survey, a limited spot check of residents within the 10-mile EPZ was conducted on the ,

day of the exercise (Local. 5.a). Six federal observers interviewed a total. of. "

l approximately 40 residents in several of the municipalities within the EPZ in order to assess pubtle knowledge of emergency planning activities to be performed in case of a j radiological emergsney. It was found that putille awareness varied widely in this limited spot check. Most persons interviewed were not familiar with the relationship between .

the sirens and the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS). In addition, they were not aware of predesignated evacuation routes. It was' observed that a limited number of stores had  !

on display a small poster which had been distributed in order to advise the public to listen ..

to one of several radio stations after hearing the sirens (Local 5.b). )

Defleieneles That Would Lead to a Negative Finding '

.. No deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding were observed at the Joint I Mews Media Center. ,

Other Deficiencies

1. Defleiency: Media kits 'containing background information were not available at the Media Center. (NUREG-0654, II, G.5.)

Recommendation: Media kits should be prepared 'and be made available to the press at h Media Center. - '

\

1 2.- Defielenen Although the results of the formal survey conducted by the state and utility regarding public awareness are not yet '

available at this time, a spot-check of EPZ residents during the exercise indicated that, even though PSE&G has malled informa--

tion concerning emergency planning to EPZ residents, public awareness of protective actions was somewhat weak. This is a continuing deficiency that was observed at previous' exercises. i

, (NUREG-0654, II, G.1, G.2.)

Recommendation: The public education program must be intensified so the residents of Salem and Cumberland counties are more aware of protective actions to be taken during a radiologbal emergency.

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_7_.-

39 2.4 SALEM COUNTY OPERATIONS

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2.4.1 Salein County EOC <

Overview j Activation and staffing of the Salem County EOC (SCEOC) were generally performed in a timely and efficient manner after receipt of the initial notification call-from the SEOC at 0855. The ability to receive the initial notification satisfied an exercise objective -(Local 1.a). However, the radiological officer and the' Red Cross representative were late in arriving at the SCEOC. Therefore, the exercise objective (I,ocal 1.b) concerning staff mobilization was only partly met. Most agency desks were occupied shortly after the notification of a Site Area Emergency. However, additional-communication personnel would have been helpful in the first two hours .as only one

(' telephone communleator was present. At approximately 1200 additional personnel were . I available. Additional staff to monitor thq ' direct ' telephone !!ne to the SEOC would I permit faster response to critical communications.

]

Staffing at the SCEOC consisted of representatives from the following organiza-tions: fire, public works, American Red Cross, schools, health, State Department of Health, radiological, industrial, sheriff, agriculture, Salvation Army, and the NJSP. The staff present generally displayed adequate training and knowledge. Internal briefing and use of the pub!!c address system at the SCEOC were demonstrated during the exercise, thus correcting a previous defielency. The ability to maintain staffing on a 24-hour basis was demonstrated by roster presentation, satisfying an exercise objective (Local 1.d).  !

However, the SCEOC staff indleated that supplemental personnel from' the state OEM or other countlea might be required for prolonged operations.

The SCEOC was located in a new facility this year, which represents'an improve-ment over past exercises due to its expanded space. When fully com'pleted, this new

( facility will meet response needs. However, at this time it is noted that the communications room is too small and the noise level was high, making it difficult to use the telephones. The relocation of communications equipment to a larger room would be advantageous. The exercise objective (Local 2.a) concerning the adequacy of facilities is, therefore, partly met at this time. .With the preceding exception, the facilities as a whole were adequate. Status boards were displayed,. emergency classification levels were posted, message logs were maintained, and the appropriate maps were displayed. A previous deficiency regarding the adequacy of message logs and status postings has been-corrected. The SCEOC had excellent security and access control, thereby satisfying an I l- exercise objective (Local 2.c).

Although the emergency management director was . involved in ~ the exercise activities (Local 3.b), there were several problems related to the management of critical data that hampered the county capability to effectively respond to a radiological emergency. -This raises serious concern about the overall capability and effectiveness of the SCEOC. The dissemination of information to municipalities in Salem County was not timely and has the poten11 to adversely affect the health and safety of the public and L.-_.__ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _

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40 emergency workers. Some official state decisions to implement protective actions were substantially delayed in being received by the municipalities from the SCEOC. In one case (5alem City) a protective ac. tion message was not received from the county. For exampis: .

o Sheltering. At approximately 1155 Salem County received the sheltaring recommendation. Although Lower Alloways Creek and Elsinboro received the sheltering recommendation message from SCEOC at about 1219 and 1223 respectively, Salem City never received the message.

e Evacuation. At approximately 1335 Salem County received the evacuation recommendation messa;e for ce'rtain sectors. This

, evacuation message was not received at the Salem City, Elsinboro, i and Lower Alloways Creek EOCs until about 1450,1454, and 1459, respectively. /

~

e Administration of KL At approximately'1340 Salem County was -

, notified to administer KI to emergency workers. This notification was not received until about 1501 and 1515 at Pennsville and Elsinboro.

o School Evacuation. An incorrect location of the Congregate Care Center was transmitted by the SCEOC to the bus driver conducting the school evacuation.

The above problems require better overall management and coordination of information at the SCEOC as well as an improved flow of information from Salem County to the municipalities. This improvement is needed in order to assure an integrated response in the event of a radiological emergency at SNGS.

' The exercise objectives concerning the administration of KI (Local 7.b) and the ,

ability to manage an orderly evacuation (Local 6.a) are not considered to have been met in this exercise. A previous deficiency regarding Salem County's response to requests for assistance from the municipalities could not be evaluated since no such requests from the municipalities were observed during this year's exercise.

Communications equipment at the SCEOC is adequate to establish communica-tions links with other response organizations, thereby satisfying two exercise objectives (Local 2.b and 3.c). However, as noted above, the use of the communications equipment to provide timely information flow from the SCEOC to the municipalities was not adequate. Both primary and backup communications systems were demonstrated during the exercisc. Although the communications equipment is adequate, relocation within the EOC would reileve some of the congestion and noise observed in the current location.

Since it is anticipated that this equipment will be moved as the center is organized, future reviews will determine the effectiveness of its relocation.

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Hard-copy communication , equipment should be in place in the SCEOC and should be utilized. It is recognized that this equipment is available in the building but it was not 1 moved to the basement EOC. Greater. reliance on such, equipment would expedite key *

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message flow. -

Message logs were . maintained, copies of messages were distributed as needed,:

and status boards were maintained, but message flow was not timely.' Therefore, this exercise objective (Local 3.a) is only partly met, and a previous defielency regarding the implementation of a'more-effective message control system is considered inaomplete.

As described earlier, 'the timeliness of aessage _ transmissions . could be improved by adding additional communications personnel to the SCEOC staff. Message runners available in. previous exercises could also be used on a regular basis to speed the' flow of; information. .

)

,' l The public alerting function was performed in 'a satisfactory manner by Salem County officials using'the siren system that is in place. This sat!sfied an exercise objective (Local 4.b). Salem County was advised at 1110 of the st te decision to sound the sirens, and at 1120 the sirens were activated. The ability to coordin' ate an orderly "

evacuation of on-site individuals was adequately demonstrat'ed, thereby , meeting an exercise objective (Local 6.g).

]

Radiological exposure control was appropriately managed and demonstrated at the SCEOC, satisfying an exercise objective (Local 7.a). Adequate supplies of dosimetry-equipment and KI were on hand, and the staff were trained in their proper use. 1 It is noted that in a response to a previous 'defielency, it was indicated that the state will revise the Salens County Plan to indicate that the county sheriff does not have an active role in access control. The state and Salem County have not yet completed the revisions to the RERP and this item remains incomplete until the revisions have been submitted to FEMA.

• The exercise scenario was adequata and provided sufficient activity to test the capabilities of the SCEOC.

(

Deficiencies T1 at Luld Lead to a. Negative Finding

1. Defielency: Information dissemination at the Salem County EOC -

and.the transmission of timely protective action messages to all the municipalities within Salem County continues to be a problem. This was also identified in previous exercises. So me -

official state decisions to implement protective actions were substantially delayed in being transmitted to the municipalities -

from the SCEOC. In one case a protective action message was not

, received from the county. These communications problems appear l , to be the result of lack of adequate management and a lack of an adequata number of trained personnel in the SCEOC. .(NUREG-0654, II, A.1.d., A.2.a.)

_ .. t 42 ,

Recommendations Better overall management'and coordination of ' , .

Information, as well as improved flow of information from Salem

, . County ,te t)le municipalities .are required. Staffing, procedures,.

and training at the SCEOC should be reviewed to determine how improvements can be implemented.

2. Defielency: There were significant delays at the Salem County i EOC in notifying some of the municipalities of the evacuation message. Salem County's ability to manage an orderly evacuation was therefore not demonstrated. (NUREG-0654,11, J.9, J.10.g )

Recommendation: Better overall management and more timely information flow from . Salem . County to the municipalities are required.

3. Deficiency: There were significant delays at the Salem County EOC in notifying some of the municipalities of the message to adminis+er KI to emergency workers. Salem County's capability related to the administration of KI was therefore not demon-l strated. (NUREG-0654, II, J.10,e.)

Recommendation: Better overall management and more timely information flow from Salem County to the municipalities are required. Staffing, procedures, and training at the SCEOC should be reviewed to determine how improvements can be implemented.

Other Deficiencies

4. Deficiency: The radiological officer and the Red Cross represen-tative were late in reporting to the SCEOC. (NUREG-0654, !!,

E.2.) ,

Recommendation: Mobilization procedures should be reviewed to ensure that all personnel can be notified and mobilized to the SCEOC in a timely manner in the event of an actual radiologic.al emergency.

_5. Defleiency: The communications room at the new Salem County EOC is small and thc noise level was high, making it diffleult to use the telephones. (NUREG-0654, II, H.2.)

Recommendation: Consideration should be given to relocating the communications equipment to a larger room at the SCTOC.

6. Deficienev: Although 24-hour staffing capability 'of the SCEOC was demonstrated by presentation of a roster, the SCEOC staff m indicated that supplemental personnel from the state OEM or from

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other counties might be required for prolonged operations.

. (NUREG-0654, II, A.4, A.3.)

Recommendation: The potential need for supplemental resources -

)

from other counties and/or the Stkte should be identified in the I plan, and written agreements reached with these other jurisdic- )

tions for .providing thest resources. Appropriate training should l also be p:ovided.

7. Defielency: The hard-copy communication devlee was not moved to the new SCEOC and was not utilized during the exercise.

(NUREG-0654, II, H.3, F.1.b.)

Recomrnendation: It is suggested that the hard copy device be moved to the new EOC and that it be used during future exercises  !

to expedite the flow of key messages. )

2.4.2 Salem County Munfelpal EOCs

• Federal observers evaluated activities at the following municipal EOCs in Salem County during the exercise: . l e Salem City e Mannington e Pennsville o Quinton

. e Elsinboro e Lower Alloways Creek Overview In general, activation of the municipal EOCs was prompt and notification was e

carried out using a combination of call lists, pagers, and automatic dialing systems.

k However, at Salem City there was over a one hour delay in the EOC dispatcher notifying the EMC of the Alert declaration. Alerting procedures at Salem City should be improved {

to ensure that the EMC is notifled in a more timely manner. The mobilization and activation objective (Local 1.c) was met as well as the objective (Local 1.e) l demonstrating 24-hour staffing espabilities by presentation of a roster. Presentation of a 24-hour roster corrected a previous deficiency at the Mannington EOC. However, all ,

of the Mannington calllist telephone numbers were not updated. The telephone numbers j on this call list should be periodically reviewed and updated as needed. _ Participation -l levels at most of the EOCs was good. The Elsinboro EOC had low staffing levels because ,

the current work schedules of the volunteer staff prevented participation In the i exercise. This continues a previous deficiency. Staffir.g levels at Mannington were also low for the same reason.

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Emergency operatiens within the EOCs were well organized and efficiently ,

l -executed. In all cases. the individual EMC was the appropriate official specified in the plan to be in charge of local emergency response, which satisfled an exercise objective I

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1 (Local 3.b). The EMCs organized their staffs, briefed them en the emergency situation, And involved them in the decision-making process.' The various EOC staffs demonstrated

. adequate knowledge of thele responsibilities and effectively l carried out. their .

assignments. Staff briefings occurred at the municipal EOCs, fulfilling part of another objective (Local 3.a). .

The objective (Local 2.a) to ' demonstrate' the adeqaacy. of the municipal-emergency facilities in Salem County was met. to various . degrees. ' The Quinton and '

Mannington - EOCs are being moved to new improved facilities. Operations at the Pennsville EOC are confined by the small physical size of this facility.L This contin'ues a deficiency that was reported at Pennsville during a previous exercise. The space at the Elsinboro .EOC was adequate for the staff - members present during . the' exercise.

However, if full staffing occurred at Elsinboro, r this . facility may not be . adequate.

Extended-use facilities were available at the Quinton EOC, and Lower Alloways Creek EOC where there is a use agreement with the firehouse next door. : Some of the EOCs had backup power immediately available but Elsinboro and Salem City did not. The objective (Local 2.c) for demonstrating access control 'and maintaining. security was achieved by all the EOCs.- This corrected a previous' deficiency reported at the Elsinboro EOC. Within the EOCs the required status boards, maps, procedural checklists and message logs mee available and effectively used to meet part of a more comprehensive

. exercise objective (Local 3.a). The previously reported deficiencies concerning the use of checklists, and appropriate posters were. corrected at the Elsinboro EOC.

The communleations equipment in the Salem County municipal EOCs was good.

The primary system was either the EMRAD rsdio or a dedicated telephone line which linked the local EOCs with the county EOC. Various backup communications systems were available, including EMRAD, RACES, dedicated lines to the County- EOC, CB radios, and fire radios.

The dedicated telephone line linking the Lower Alloways Creek EOC and the utility was operational, correcting a previous exercise defleiency. The. objectives for demonstrating the adequacy of the primary .and secondary com.munications links with appropriate locations and field personnel were met (Local 2.b and 3.c). All communica-tions daff at the municipal EOCs performed well and reflected adequate training. This corrected a previously reported deficiency at Elsimoro.

Although the communications equipment functioned well, there were significant delays in the municipal 'EOCs receiving protective action recommendations from .the SC20C. This deficiency is discussed in Section 2.4.1 of this report. . At Elsicboro, there was a significant time lag for notification of state decisions regarding evacuation and the .

distribution of KI. Proper procedures for message writing, logging, and distribution were followed at Salem City. However, this EOC also experienced . difficulty in receiving protective action messages from the SCEOC. A sheltering order and notification of local school evacuation were not received. The slow and incomplete notifications from ~ the I ,

SCEOC to the Salem City nd Elsinboro EOCs interfered with the efficient operations of communications at the local level. However, the cause of these problems and the

~

resulting deficiency are attributed to problems observed at the SCEOC. -

e .

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l Demonstration of public alerting by the various municipal EOCs was limited.  ;

Following notification and activation of the sirens and EBS, route alerting was initiated i from Salem City, Elsinboroi and Lower Allowers Creek. Route alerting was not observed at Quinton and Mannington, but all of the EOCs had procedures in place to manage an

)'

evacuation of the local area, wh'.ch met an exercise objective (Local 4.a). The mar.agement of protective actions associated with an evacuation were carried out by Salem City, Pennsville, Lower Alloways Creek EOCs and simulated at the Elsinboro EOC. These actions consisted of coordinating the establishment of access and traffic control points (Local 6.h) and managing the clearing of impediments to evacuation routes (Local 6.b).

All of the EOCs had Iow-range dosimeters, chargers, permanent record dosimeters and record-keeping cards. All EOCs but Elsinboro had intermediate-range I dosimeters and this continues a previously reported defielency. High-range dosimeters )

were available at some FOCs in varying numbers. Inventories of exposure control equip- j ment were rufficient at all EOCs except at Elsinboro, where only two sets of low- and high-range dosimeters were available during the observer's evaluation period. According t.o the Elsinboro EMC,40 sets of dosimeters had recently been received but could not be located during this exercise. A corrective action at the Pennsville EOC involving the j supply of <fosimeters had been completed. Observers reported that all of the EOCs have  !

a designated staff member assigned to manage exposure control, including the- I distribution of KI' implementation of decer.tamination procedures, and the use of I personal dosimetry. However, the radiological afficer at Lowee Alloways Creek was not '

aware of the exposure threshold for recalling field staff. At this facility, there was an excellent demonstration of monitoring by the radiological team before personnel were allowed access to the EOC. The objective (Local 7.a) for demonstrating emergency worker exposure control was achieved at all EOCs except for Elsinboro. The objective (Local 7.b) concerning the supply and administration of KI was effectively demonstrated at all of the municipal EOCs in Salem County.

1 The municipal EOCs in Salem County demonstrated their ability to respond to an e

emergency situation. The scenario was adequate to test their emergency preparedness

\. capabilities, although there were some long periods of inactivity. .

Defleiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding There were no deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding observed at the Salem County municipal EOCs during this exercise.

Other Deficiencies

1. Defielenev: At Salem City there was over a one-hour delay in the EOC dispatcher notifying the EMC of the Alert declaration.

(NUREG-0654. II, E.2.)

i e

46 .i Recom mendation: Alerting procedures at Salem City should be improved to ensure that the EMC is notified of the Alert.

declaration la a more timaly manner. .

2. Defielency: Not all of the telephone numbers on the Mannington call list used for alerting emergency staff had been updated.

(NUREG-0654 II, E.2.)

' Recommendation: Telephone . numbers listed on the Mannington staffing call list should be perlo'dically reviewed and updated as needed. .

. 3. Deficie.vy: The Elsinboro and Mannington EOCs need to improve their participation levels. The interaction and coordination of.

their staffs could not be fully evaluated. (NUREG-0654, II, A.2.a.)

P.ecom mendation: A system should be implemented to increase the participation levels of volunteer staff at the Elsinboro and Mannington EOCs. The timing of the exercise should be given greater consideration in development of the scenario.

4. Deficiency: The Pennsvillo EOC is too small for effective operation. (NUREG-0654, II, H.3.) '

Recomniendation: Consideration should be given to relocating the Pennsville EOC to a larger facility. j

5. Defielency: Emergency backup power was not available and functioning at the Elsinboro and Salem City EOCs. (NUREG-0654, II, H.3.)

Recommendation: Emergency generators should be [nade available and maintained at the Salem City and Elsinboro EOCs to assure uninterrupted operation of these local EOCs. 1

6. Def!clency: The Elsinboro EOC has no intermediate-range (0-5 R or 0-20 R) dosimeters. This' repeats a previous defielency.

(NUREG-0654, II, K.3.a,b.)

Recommendation: An adequate supply of Intermediate-range (0-5 R or 0-20 R) dosimeters should be provided for the Elsinboro EOC..

7. Defielency: The Elsinboro EOC had an insufficient number (only 2) of dosimeter sets available during the exercise period. (NUREG-0654, II, K.3.a,b.)

Recommendation: An adequate supply of dosimeters should ce available at the Elsinboro EOC.

r- - - - -- -- - - -- -- - - -

47

8. Defieleneyt The radiological officer at the Lower Alloways Creek

. EOC was not aware of the exposure threshold for recalling field staff. (NUREG-0654, !!, K.4.)- - -

Recommendation: Emergency staff should be trained to be knowledgeable in the maximum allowable dose for field staff.

2.4.3 Field Implementation of Actions to Protect the Public Four of the eix Salem County municipalities (Elsinboro, Lower Alloways Creek, Salem City, and Pennsville) participated in observed field actions to protect the public.

Demonstrations of field activities varied amor.g the municipalities but included the following areas: congregate care, decontamination, route alerting, access control, and evacuation. ,

The Salem County Congregate Care Shelter was.promptly activated and staffed a't the Woodstown High School, Woodstown, New Jersey, which demonstrated an exercise objective (Local 1.f). The shelter was staffed by professionals and volunteers from the l American Red Cross (ARC). The shelter staff was notified by telephone and arrived '!

within 30 minutes. Staff present included three shelter managers, a registered nurse, and six other personnel responsible for registration, food service, and communications. The presence of three shelter managers demonstrated the abillty to provide management capability over a prolonged period of time, correcting a previous deficiency. Additional personnel are available from other Amerlean Red Cross chapters to maintain 24-hour staffing, which demonstrated an exercise objective (Local 1.g).

As part of the simulated evacuation, buses arrived at the shelter. No passengers were carried on the buses; however, 24 high school students were brought into the center to simulate the arrival of evacuees. The exercise' objective (Local 6.e) of demonstrating adequate procedures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees was only

.. ' partly mat. Registration procedures were adequate, but radiological monitoring was not demonstrated. Each person was registered using a standard ARC registration card, and a nurse evaluated individuals for possible medical complications.

There were no radiological monitoring personnel or equipment for monitoring of evacuees at this Congregate Care Shelter. This deficiency has the potential to adversely affect the health and safety of the public. Because of the absence of monitoring equipment, corrective actions on a previous' defielency regarding ' calibration of equipment could not be verified. Likewise, another earlier deficiency on knowledge of contamination levels requiring decontamination could not be checxed and remains incomplete. The shelter does have the space for monitoring vehicles and Individuals; shower facilities are available.

The exercise objective (Local 6.f) to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities for

, mass care of evacutes was met. The Congregate Care Shelter has room for an estimated 600 evacuees. Eleven other shelters are available to the ARC, if additional capacity is needed Kitchen facilities and a food supply were available at the shelter. Additional food supplies are available from local grocery stores and from the National ARC. The

e 48 center is equipped to accommodate handicapped evacuees. The facility had a nursing station established and there was quick access to hospital care, if needed.

t ,

Com'munfeations by telephone and two-way radio were available and worked well, which satisfied an exercise objective (Local 2.b). The radio equipment was in the ARC vehicle and served as the primary communications link. However, messages transmitted to the shelter were not adequate. The shelter manager was not apprised of the number of evacuees which could come to the shelter or given any information as to nuclear plant status or other exercise events. This did not meet an exercise objective (Local 3.a) and repeats a previous defielency. In addition. there were no' police o' fficers er other personnel available to provide traffic control or security at the Congregate Care Center, and this exercise objective (Local 2.c) was not met.

The* Salem County Decontamination Center for emergency workers was located at the Quinton Fire Station in Quinton, New Jersey, which is inside the plume exposure EPZ about seven miles from the plant. The Decontamination Center was activated and 5 staffed by three officials from the county health department and five members of the-lo'eal fire department, which satisfied an exercise objective (Local 1.f). . Monitoring of  ;

personnel and vehicles and decontamination of vehicles was demonstrated, meeting an l exercise objective (Local' 7.c). The equipment used included low-range beta / gamma

~

detectors. The detectors were available for monitoring vehicles, correcting a previous defielency. However, due to the limited number of. low-range radiation detectors, which

, were observed at the Decontamination Center during the exercise, only about fifteen people per hour can be . monitored. Although the . type of equipment was correct, the observed supply was inadequate; therefore, the exercise objective (Local 2.a) was only partially met. During shift changes there could be lines of potentially. conta:ninated workers waiting to be monitored. The use of anticontamination ' clothing 'was  !

demonstrated. Fifty-gallon drums were available for contaminated clothing ar.d other

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articles. Water from t!'e showers drain directly to the sanitary sewer and water from vehicle decontamination drains to the storm sewer. 3 Center ell des gne The enter o o shower, w ch co dI t he processing of people. Also, separate showers were not available for men and women, although the locatfor. of a future women's shower was included in the overall plan of the  ;

facility. '

? )

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The staff working at the -Decontamination Center wore self-reading pocket dosimeters, correcting a previous deficiency, but permanent-record dosimeters were not available. Workers were aware of procedures for dosimeter reading and record keeping, and exposure record forms were available, which demonstrates an ' exercise objective (Local 7.a). However, no forms were available to indicate the body location of )

contamination for monitored individuals. Staff did not know the contamination levels for determining the need for decontamination, which repeats a previous deficiency. They j said they would . decontaminate anyone showing readings above background. This .i approach will' protect emergency workers from contamination but it could lead to '

excessive lines at the shower and monitoring station.

s e

_ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . - - - . _ _ . _ _ _ - - - _ - - - J

7 .,

7 . -. . _. . ___ ...

. 49 A free-play message was inserted to' activate route alerting in Pennsville. A fire

.. department ambulance with sirens and loudspeakers was deployed for this purpose. - All fire department persannel had dosimeters, which corrects a previous deficiency. The firemen knew the' route and the message to be transmitted over the public address system. No maps or written messages were used nor were they needed for this team.

However, maps and written messages should be available for less well trained firemen.

Route alerting was completed promptly and efficiently, successfully demonstrating an ]

exercise objective (Local 4.a).

Two access control points, 6A and 8A, were promptly activated it. Salem County,

. which demonstrates part of an exercise objective (Local' 6.h). An officer and squad car from Lower 'Alloways Creek police department were present at both locations by 1030 l and were recalled to headquarters at approximately 1135. According to the exercise objective, the state police were to relieve municipal police at the access control points.

Location 8A was re-staffed by a state police officer by 1200. However, a state police officer was not observed at the 6A location (intersection of Salem New Bridge Canton

.Rd. and Maskells Mill Rd.). Apparently, this state police officer arrived at a different nearby loca' tion (Intersection of Maskells Mill Rd. and Harmersvills Picks Corner Cohansey Rd.) at approximately 1200. The' exercise objective (Local 6.h) was only partially met due to the mix-up concerning the location of access control point 6A. All officers were knowledgeable about locations of evacuation routes as well as established.

procedures for traffic control. All officers had dosimeters and TLDs, which

,. demonstrated an exercise objective. .The state police officer had simulated KI. Both officers at point 8A were aware of exposure control, KI, and decontamination procedures. The Lower'Alloways Creek police officer at point tiA was not familiar with the use. of dosimeters or the use of K! but indicated he would request Instructions from j headquarters. Consequently, the exercise objectives for demonstrating proper use of ]

dosimetry end K1 were only partially met (Local 7.a). Corrective actions on a previous i deficiency regarding the use of doelmeters and training in their use by police officers at traffic control points are considered incomplete.

(' Salem City and Elsinboro EOCs responded to deal with impediments to evacuation, successfully demonstrating an execuise objective (Local 6.b). Salem City l responded promptly and efficiently to an accident by sending two police cars, a fire l truck, and ambulance to the scene. The police units demonstrated traffic control, which corrects a previous defielency. All rescue squad personnel had dosimeters, which corrects a previous defielency. Personnel were knowledgeable about procedures for reading dosimeters. However, most did not carry their own dosimeters but left them in their vehicles, which only partially m'ests the objective for demonstrating proper use of personal dosimetry (Local 7.a). Not all personnel responding to .the Impediment to evacuation problem were aware of procedures for use and authorization of KI, which does not meet an exercise objective (Local 7.b). The Elsinboro EOC simulated essponse to an j accident because the free play message was received late in the exercise and personnel '

were not available to respond.

The exercise objective (Local 6.c) for demonstrating the capability to evacuate mobility-impaired individuals was not met because at the time that free-play message was introduced, the bus driver was not available. -

(

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50 The exercise objective (Local 6.d) to demonstrate the ability-and resources to i effect an orderly evacuation of schools was only partially met. The bus driver was I notified from the SCEOC and instructed to proceed,to the Quinton. School., The driver . i was unsure of the destination and contacted the SCEOC via the two-way radio to confirm 1 the location. The bus left Quinton School and the driver was instructed to proceed to the

'Mannington, Technical School on Route 45. - However, according to the plan, evacuees l from the Quinton School are supposed to.be taken to the Arthur Shalick High School in i Centerdon. The bus driver for school evacuation did not know which reception center  !

school evacuees were to be taken to. All bus drivers for school evacuation should be .I trained to know the reception cer.ter(s) to which school evacuees should be.taken. The bus driver did not have a dosimeter and was not trained in the u::e of dosimetry, exposure ,

control procedures, or the use of KI, which repeats previous deficiencies and does not meet exercise objectives (Local.7.a and 7.b).

A separate medical drill was conducted on September 27, 1984, at the Salem -

County Memorial Hospital. During this drill the objectives df -demonstrating the adequacy of ambulance and hospital facilities and procedures for handling injured'and ,

I conta'minated individuals were met (Local 7.d and 7.e). In addition, all previous deficiencies were corrected. These deficiencies were related to the adequacy of radiological monitoring instruments, familiarity with standard operating. procedures,-

monitoring and decontamination of the ambulance and.its crew, and the presence of health physics personnel for consultation. ,

A communication link between Salam County Memorial Hospital and the ambulances is provided by EMS radio. During the drill, the ambulances called in to the l hospital to state that an accident involving a car and a truck carrying radioactive '

materials had occurred. Four people were injured (injuries were described) and contaminated (beta-gamma emitters). The ambulance crews also advised the hospital of their estimated arrival time at the hospital. Overall, the communications were good;  ;

however, the ambulance crew member who called in over the radio neglected to say "This '

is a drill." This could have caused confusion if the message had been picked up by other radio operators. ,

Overall, the performance of Salem County Memorial Hospital was excellent.

During the drill, the hospital had a person trained in the use of monitoring equipment available to monitor incoming patients. Two health physicists from PSE&G also arrived within 30 minutes of being called. PSE&G had supplied the hospital with two Ebertirle E-140v survey meters and one Eberline RO-2 Ion Chamber (recently calibrated).

When the four ambulances participating in the drill arrived, the hospital Emergency Room (ER) staff performed a triage so that the most severely injured persons would be treated first. Medical needs took precedent. All four patients had a small beta -

source hidden on them and hospital personnel were able to detect three of them. The fourth one probably was not detected because it was covered by a thick bandage which most likely attenuated the beta rad!ation. All four patients were treated and decontaminated efficiently in a !!ttle over an hour. Plant Health physicists were used to monitor patients leaving the ER after treatment and to monitor ambulances and their crews. They also monitored hospital staff leaving the ER. Sound procedures were feb .wed throughout the drill so that possible contamination would not spread. One of 4

(

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. . . , ; . ,, ...._._.._.__.a . . . - _ _ . . ... ..

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l_ the ambulance gurneys had a source 'hldden on it' which' was detected by hospital l ,

personnel.

t . . . . . . .. . . .

Three persons from Radiation Management Corp. in Philadelphia, arrived riear the conclusf.c:t of the drill. They were called to assist in dose assessment, long-term :

treatment, and possible cleanup. -

l During the drill, hospital security was excellent. Ambulances were directed properly and then roped off and the ER was secured.

The scenario for the medical drill provided sufficient activ'ity for the hospital staff. It was realistic and allowed.the hospital to clearly demonstrate that they had '

corrected areas of earlier deficiency, and had met the exercise objectives.

1 I Deficiencies That Would Lead to a N'egative Finding

\,

• 1. Deficiency: There were no radiological monitoring personnel or equipment at the Congregate Care Shelter to monitor evacuees

. for radiological contamination. (NUREG-0654, II, J.12.)

Recommendation: l The Congregate Care Shelter should l

demonstrate the ability to monitor evacuees and vehicles in future exercises.

Other Defielencies l

2. Defielency: The Salem County Congregate Care Shelter was not-well informed about the progress of the exercise, nor apprised of when and how many evacu.ees, to expect. (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.h.)

\  ;

.I Recommendation: The ARC representative at the SCEOC should keep the Congregate Care Shelters up-to-date on exercise events and provide them with information on the expected number and arrival time of evacuees. *

3. Defielency: There were no police officers or other personnel l available to provide traffic control or security at the Congregate Care Shelter. (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.h.)

, Recommendation: Police officers or other uniformed personnel -

should be assigned to the Congregate Care - Shelter to provide traffic control and security.

4. Deficiency: At the Salem County emergency worker Decon-tamination Center, only about fifteen people per hour could be l N

i

)

52 monitored due to the limited number of low-range radiation detectors observed during the exercise. During shift changes there could be lines of potentially contaminated workers waiting

• to be monitored. (NUREG-0654, II. H.7.)

Recommendation: Additional low-range radiation detectors

' should be available at the emergency worker Decontamination Center. '

5. Deficiency: At the Decontamination Center only one shower stall was available for decontamination, which would bo insufficient during emergency worker shift changes or peak processing of people at the center. (NUREG-0654, II, K.5.b.)

Recommendation: Additional shower facilities should be ,

available at the Decontamination Center. Separate showers should be available for men and women. -

6. Defielency: The personnel at the Decontamination Center did not have permanent-record dosimetry. (NUREG-0654, II. K.3.a.)

Recommendation: The personnel at the decontamination center should have permanent-record dosimetry.

7. Deficiency: The forms available for recording emergency worker exposures do not include a place for recording the location of body contamination for monitored workers. (NUREG-0654 II, J.12.)

Recommendation: Emergency worker exposure record forms should be revised to include a place for recording the location of body contamination.

8. Deficiency: Personnel at the Salem County emergency worker Decontamination Center were not aware of the radiation levels above which decontamination should be performed. (NUREG-0654, II. K.S.a.)

Recommendation: Additional training should be provided for Decontamination Center personnel who are responsible for determining whether emergency workers need to be decontaminated.

9. Deficiency: The route alerting teams in Pennsville are not supplied with maps or written messages. (NUREG-0654. II, E.6.)

Recommendation: The route alerting teams should be supplied with maps and written messages to assura the effective route alerting, if needed.

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. . . 53

10. Deficiency: The Lower Alloways Creek police officer at one access control point was not completely familiar with the use of dosimeters and KI., (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.e, K.3.b.)

Recommendation: Police should receive KI and additional training on the use of dosimeters and KI.

11. Defielency: Most' emergency workers responding to an impedi-ment to evacuation left their dosimeters in their vehicles.

(NUREG-0654, II, K.3.a,b.)

Recommendation: All emergency workers should be Instructed to carry dosimeters with them at all times in the field.

12. Deficiency: Not all emergency workers responding to the

(- impediment to evacuation were aware of procedures for use and authorization of KI. (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.e.)' -

Recommendation: All emergency workers should be fully trained in the use of KI. ,

13. Defleiency: The ability to evacuate mobility-impaired individuals was not demonstrated. (NUREG-0654, II. J.10.d.)

Recommendation: The ability to evacuate mobility impaired indi-viduals should be tested in a future exercise.

14. Deficiency: The Salem County EOC instructed the school bus driver to take evacuees to a location not designated in the plan for that specific school. (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.a.)

( Recommendation: The Salem County EOC should give instruc-tions consistent with their plan.

15. Defielency: The bus driver for school evacuation did not know which reception center school evacuees were to be t'a ken to.

(NUREG-0654, II, J.10.a.)

Recommendation: All bus drivers for school evacuation should be {

trained to know the reception center (s) to which school evacuees should be taken. ]

16. Defleiency: The bus driver for the school evacuation did not have a dosimeter. (NUREG-0654, II. K.3.a.)

Recommendation: Dosimeters should. be provided to all drivers involved in evacuation buaing. The listing on distribution of dosimetry should be provided to FEMA.

_ . - . -- -- *' ._L' 54

17. Defielency: The bus. driver for the school evacuation was not trained in the use of dosimeters or KI. (NUREG-0654, !!. K.3.a.) l

~

Recommendation: All emergency w'orkers should be fully tral'ned in radiological exposure control including the use of dosimeters I and KI. The training schedule for all emergency workers should be furnished to FEMA. ,

18. Defielency: During the September 27, 1984, medical drill, the ambulance crew member who called in to Salem County Memorial Hospital over the radio neglected to say "This is a drill."

(NU REG-0654, II, F.2, N.2.c.)

l R_ recommendation: All radio transmissions made as part of future i medical drills should be clearly identifled as such.

]

1 1

2.5 CUMBERLAND COUNTY OPERATIONS )

J I

2.5.1 Cumberland County EOC '

I Overview ,

, f The ability to mobilize staff and activate the Cumberland County EOC (CCEOC) was fully demonstrated, satisfying an exercise objective (Local 1.b). j i

The emergency management staff, consisting of the director, his deputy, and one l seerttary, reported to the EOC as on a normal work day between 0800 and 0830 hours0.00961 days <br />0.231 hours <br />0.00137 weeks <br />3.15815e-4 months <br />.

Since the fire / rescue communication staff operates on a 24-hour / day basis, the midnight-to-0800 shift was available and remained activated for training after being replaced by the 0800-to-1600 shift. #

Upon confirmation of the alert status at 0859, the county coordinator, deputy j coordinator, and dispatcher initiated personnel notification at 0900 using a telephone list. The ability to receive this initial notification, as well as subsequent notifications, satisfied an exercise objective (Local 1.a). The notification process was completed within 15 minutes. Additional staff were contacted after the Site Area Emergency had been declared at 1003 and full staffing was completed by 1115. The RACES operator was not available to participate in the drill. The 24-hour / day staffing capabilities were demonstrated by shift change and presentation of a coster, satisfying an exercise objective (Local 1.d).

The county emergency management coordinator (EMC) was in full command at all times and showed an excellent knowledge of' the plan and procedures. This satisfied an exercise objective (Local 3.b). Briefings of emergency staff were conducted frequently' and reflected an improvement over the previous exercises satisfying part of one of the exercise objectives (Local 3.a) and correcting an earlier deficiency. Due to l

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-55 . 1 i

the lack of exere!Je activity involving Cumberland County, briefings were heid ' ,

infrequently during the af ternoon.

i . 4 The emergency management coordinator's decision to simulate evacuation of three elementary schools within the plume exposua EPZ and transportation of the students to the Reception / Care Center located at the Cumberland Regional High School at 1125 was an exceptional management decision. This decision was arrived at prior to the state's recommendation of similar. action.

Although state assistance was not required by Cumberland County during the exercise, the EMC was capable of determining whether state aid was required _thereby meeting an exercise objective (Local 3.d).

Access control and security at the EOC were provided by the fire police. )

Although these functions were adequately demonstrated, the facility was occasionally .I overcrowded and noisy, due to the presence of nonessential personnel who were not - i Identified in the county's RERP staffing list. A means should be developed to limit the number of personnel in the CCEOC. The exercise objectiv' '(Local 2.c) concerning access control and security was, therefore, only partly met. ,

The facilities at the CCEOC were marginal. Space and furniture were limited.-

Cumberland County should investigate the possibility of providing additional space and -

facilities for the CCEOC. The status board, maps and displays at the CCEOC were adequate. The exercise objective (Local 2.a) concerning the adequacy of emergency response facilities is considered only partly met.

The communications equipment and its use by communications personnel at the CCEOC are adequate. The exercise objective (Local 2.b) regarding the ability to establish adequate communications links with other organizations was effectively demonstrated. The communications staff were dispatchers who normally handle the county fire and rescue communications. The available communications equipment consisted of dedicated telephone lines to the utility, SEOC, municipal EOCs, and local fire and rescue facilities. Commercial telephones served as a backup system to reach all of these faellities as well as other places such as the Media Center, local schools, etc.

EMRAD radio p~rovided an additional backup communications system to' many of the locations mentioned above. Amateur radio equipment was also available, but no operator was present during this exercise. A hard-copy device was also used to communicate with

• the SEOC.

Mescage recording and logging was done on prepared forms. Each dispatcher maintained an action log of all messages'and each official message was logged as it went

~

to or came from the EOC staff. Although message handling ~ was generally adequate, a few minor problems were observed and the exercise objective (Local 3.a) was only partly met, continuing a previous deficiency. For example, the in!tial message of Alert status from the Salem Generating Station was incorrectly recorded as coming from Salem County. Also, some messages did not have the time indicated on the forms, making tracking information, including protective action recommendations, difficult. There was also some uncertainty as to how messages to the state were to be identified as exercise messages. This latter problem was resolved with the SEOC after several hours.

q

^

l 56 l However, additional training of communications' personnel should be conducted to ensure accurate documentat!on of messages.

The ability to comrnunicate with all appropriate' locations, organizations, and field teams was adequately demonstrated with the exception of the Cumberland County

- radiological field-monitoring team. As described in Section 2.8, the field team's radio was not adequate for contacting the CCEOC and the FCP from all field monitoring locations. Although it was not an objective of the exercise to demonstrate the radiological field-monitoring capabilities of the county field teams, the objective (Local 1 3.c) to demonstrate communications with all appropriate organizations, which would include field monit'oring teams, was only_ partly met. However, during this exercise the municipal EOCs at Stow Creek and Greenwich were kept informed of important exercise 1 developments. This constitutes an improvement over the 1983 exercise and corrects an earlier deficiency.

Route alerting was not an exercise objective in Cumber' land County. . Neverthe-less, the county and its local municipalities decided to' initiate their own free play by, ,

transmitting messages of' nonworking sirens In Greenwich Township to trigger" route i alerting by the sheriff's department. Vehicles were dispatched at 1125 and alerting was {

completed at 1242.

Although the permanent emergency management staff ~ displayed adequate knowledge of radiological exposure control procedures, the health departme'nt I representative and some volunteer staff members seemed to have only a limited  !

knowledge of the use and distrib.ution of K! tablets. Additional training should be ,

implemented to familiarize selected staff members with the use of KI.

The ability to use personal dosimetry was adequately demonstrated at the CCEOC and this ' exercise objective (Local 7.a) was met. All equipment was calibrated and distributed to the staff by the radiological officer at the appropriate time during the exercise. The distribution of KI to radiological field-monitoring teams was performed adequately according to plan and this exercise objective (Local 7.b) was also met.

j During the exercise, the Cumberland County EMC confirmed allinformation and held discussions with appropriate staff members, thereby meeting an exercise objective (Local 5.c) by providing advance coordination of information released. The EMC also verbally verifled the availability of resources to manege in orderly evacuation of EPZ areas, if it'should become necessary. This satisfied en nercise objective (Local 8.a).

The scenario, although very realistic in scope, d(d not provide enough activity to justify the staffing levels present during the afternoom - This lack of activity prompted the county coordinator to develop and send free play messages arbitrarily to generate action for his personnel. The scenario generally providMd sufficient activity to observe and test areas of earlier deficiency.

Defleiencies That Would Lead to a Negative Finding i

No deficiencies were observed at the CCEOC that would lead to a negative -

finding. ,

i

• . . ..,g , ; . .. -.

l 57 Other Deficiencies

1. Deficiency: The Cumberland County EOC occasionally became overcrowded and ncisy due to the . presence of nonessential personnel who were not identified in the county's RERP staffing list. (NUREG-0654, II, H.3, A.2.a.) }

Recommendation: A means should be developed to limit the number of personnel in- the CCEOC. For example, only those individuals with a preestablished EOC or field assignment should be allowed access into the EOC with specific permission of the EMC.

2. Deficiency: The facilities at the Cumberland County EOC were marginal. Space and furniture were limited. .( NUREG-0654, !!,

e ,

H.3, A.4.)

Recommendation: Cumberland County should Investigate the .

possibility of providing additional space and facilities for the EOC.

3. Defielency: Some minor problems with ' message handling and documentation were observed at the CCEOC, including incorrectly identifying the source of a message, not noting the times that-

, some of the messages were received, and not knowing with certainty how to identify messages to the state as exercise messages. (NUREG-0654, II, A.2.a.)

Recommendation: Additional training of communications personnel should be conducted to ensure accurate documentation of metrages.

( 4. Defielency: The Cumberland County radiological field-monitoring l team's radio was not adequate for contacting the CCEOC and the FCP from all field monitoring locations. (NUREG-0654, II, F.1.d.) -

Recommendation: Cumberland County should investigate the need for a moi *e powerful radio system for use by their radiological field teams for communications with the EOC and FCP.

5. Deficiency: Some of the volunteer staff at the Cumberland County EOC as well as the health department representative seemed to have only a limited knowledge of the distribution and use of E!. (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.e, 0.1.)

Recommendation: Additional training should be implemented to familiarize selected staff members with the use of KI.

7 58 ,

2.5.2 Cumberland County Municipal EOCs i

\

Omview '

)

1 Municipal EOCs were activated at Stow Creek (Hopewell) and Greenwich Township (Greenwich) in Cumberland County, New Jersey. Procedures for activation of the Stow Creek EOC wefe observed althcugh the staff was repositioned. Procedures for activation of the Greenwich EOC were not directly observed, but according to the log -

sheets, activation was prompt and efficient (Local 1.c). _

Both municipal EOCs demonstrated their ability to receive initial emergency notification thereby meeting an exercise objective (Local 1.a). Written procedures for activation of both EOCs were complete and included a list of names and current telephone numbers of the ' staff. The ability to main? tin continuous 24-hour operations was demonstrated through double staffins and by presentation of a roster. The objectives involving reaff mobilization and -

24-hour staffing were achieved (Local 1.c and 1.e). It is important to note that both municipal, EOCs .were staffed by volunteers. Each staff demonstrated. knowledge of procedures and capabilities for decision making. . 1 EOC management was effective and well organiseil. Exercise objectives (Local 3.a and 2.c) were demonstrated when a plan and written checklist were referenced, message logs were maintained, and access was effectively controlled. In addition, the EMCs who were designated in the plans (Local 3.b) periodically' briefed their staff and Integrated staff input into the decision-makir ar process. A procedure for acquiring supplemental EOC staff was implemented at the Greenwich EOC when the demands of the scenario began to stress the available staff'.

The EOC facilities were adequate in. terms of furniture, space, lighting, telephones, and noise control. Although the Greenwich EOC was physically very small, this faellity, as well as the Stow Creek EOC, was able to accommodate the operational' needs of the staff, thus meeting an exercise objective (Local 2.a). . Extended operations could be supported. A generator was still lacking, although one has been ordered for the Greenivich EOC, continuing a previously reported deficiency. The required boards and maps were posted in visiole locations at both centers and the status boards were updated on a regular basis. The use of the status board at Stow Creek' corrected a previous defielency. Overall, both the Greenwich and' Stow. Creek EOCs were adequate for the level of response activity. The emergency workers demonstrated an excellent ability to use their respective centers effectively.

The primary and secondary communication systems were adequate at' each EOC. Commercial and dedic'ated telephones were available to link the municipal and county EOCs and there was a backup system available through the EMRAD radio. Fire -

band radios were also available. All . of these systems functioned well . during the~  ;

exercise, demonstrating the exercise objectives (Local 2.b.and 3.c). : The personnel:at each center demonstrated their expertise In the operation . of their respective communication centers. The "NJSP EOC Message Form" was used effectively at both locations. '

1 a

.2 a .. ' .L l- <

i

-- . 59 Each EOC had the necessary dosimetry equipment, and personnel were adequately trained in .the proper use of this equipment. Potassium lodide (KI) was available for all emergency workers- and was administered (simulated) when recommended by.the state. Training and knowledge of procedures for the administration of KI were adequate. These activities met two exercise objectives (Local 7.a and 7 b).

, However, the interval between the receipt of the order to dispense and the time to administer KI to Greenwich emergency workers in the field was very short (approximately five minutes). Had the EMC not made an earlier decision to send KI with his field staff, administration of KI would not have been timely.

The emergency werkers at the local EOCs demonstrated excellent response capabilities to the simulated radiological emergency. Procedures were available at both locations to manage an orderly evacuation, meeting a specified exercise objective (Local 6,.a). Levels of participation were high and the knowledge and training of the staffs were exce3ent.

Deficlex.cles That Would Lead to a Negative Finding i There were no deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding at either the l _

Greenwich or Stow Creek muni ! pal EOCs.

t l

0:her Deficiency

1. Deficiency: Emergency backup power was lacking at ' the Greenwich municipal EOC (NUREG-0654, II, H.3.)

Recommendation: An emergency generator of appropriate

~

capacity should be procured to assure uninterrupted operation at the Greenwich EOC. j i

k' 2.5.3 Field Implementation of Actions to Protect the Public i

Overview l

l Route alerting (Local 4.a) was coordinated by personnel at the Cumberland -

County municipal EOCs. However, these route alerting activities were not directly observed in theV!41d. In the Greenwich EOC there was a simulated electrical failure which precluded the sounding of sirens. Exercise scenario demands at both EOCs reqcired the request .of supplementary county personnel to perform route alerting.

Traffic and access control points (Local 6.h) were staffed by County personnel. Route alerting in both municipalities was accomplished by driving prescribed routes using mobile units nyuipped with public address systems.

Firefighters from both EOCs were assigned to fight. s simulated fire and they demonstrated the use of pecper radiological exposure control procedures (Local 7.a).

l f  !

L l

t

'I

' - _ - . .__-__2____-

60

• i

' They also had an' adequate supply of K! (Local 7.b). At Stow Creek, this demonstration corrected a previously reportecidefielency.

l The objectise (Local 1.f) for activation and staffing of the Cumberland County Congregate Care Center (CCCCC) was demonstrated but not directly observed because of obser ter's schedule. Based on the registration log, staffing proceeded promptly and included personnel from five different agencies. Procedures were available for the registration and monitoring of evacuees, thereby meeting an exercise objective (Local 6.e). However, only three individuals were available for radiological monitoring. A larger staff may be necessary in an actual emergency situation. This demonstration took place at a community college, although one or all of six local schools would be activated in an actual emergency.' Each of these schools cculd shelter approximately 200

, individuals. Parking, sanitary facilities, and showers were available at each facility, and I sleeping accommodations and food supplies would be available within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The available facilities observed were adequate for mass care, were accessible to the handicapped, and meet an exercise objective (Local 6.f).  ;

l Commercial telephone, police radio, and amateur radio commuitications were

• available to link the CCCCC to the local EOC and emergency medical facilities (Local 2.b and 3.c). A nursing station was established and there was access to three hospitals which are within 10 miles of the care center.

Deficiencies That Would Lesd to a Negative Finding There were no deficiencies that would lead to a negative finding observed during the field Implementation of actions to protect the public by Cumberland County and Cumberland County municipalities during the exarcise. 1 l

l Other Deficiencies No other deficiencies were observed. /

2.6 COUNTY RADIOLOGICAL FF" D MONITORING TEAMS Overview j i

Members of the Salem and Cumberland county radiological field monitoring .

teams accompanied the state field teams for training p".: poses. Since demonstration of I the emergency response capabilities of the county monitoring teams was not a formal objective for this year's exercise, the descriptions and evaluations presented in this section are for information only and no defielencies are listed.

The county field monitoring teams were to mobilize at their respective county EOCs, and then proceed to the BRP-FCP at Shiloh to meet with the state monitoring )

teams. Mobilization of the Salem County monitoring team was not observed. All team l e

. 61 members were already at work at the Salem County Health Department when the call requesting their activation was received at 0030. Salem County's rnethod of team

. ' mobilization appears. to be quite satisfactory.. The Salem County EOC is only.about 1/4 .

mile from the working location of the team members. No briefing of the team before deployment was observed. The team required 26 minute .o travel from the EOC to the BRP-FCP, arriving there at 1040. This travel time could be shortened by more direct routing.

The Salem County monitoring team followed the state Vanguard A team in a separate vehicle, but could not communicate with the state team by radio. The county j team reported its monitoring results to the SCEOC. l Mobilization of the Cumberland County monitoring team was performed in an i organized end timely manner. The field team members, who were County Health I Department representatives, were contacted at work and arrived promptly (0949) at the CCEOC. They had been placed on standby at the alert stage. The team members had

heir monitoring equipment with them when they, arrived at the EOC. Personal dosimetry and records were obtained at the EOC. The team departed the CCEOC at 1000 and arrived at the BRP-FCP in Shiloh at 1021. Befora deployment, the Cumberland fleid monitoring team was thoroughly briefed.

The Cumberland County team had access to very good monitoring equipment. l One notable shortage, however, was the lack of an AC converter for field operation of the air sampling pump. The county team had to borrow the state team's AC converter in order to take air samples. Also, the team members could use more training in diagnosing and trouble-shooting equipment problems, e.g., power supply connections.

The Cumberland County team had five members. This is larger than necessr..f and crowds the vehicle. Perhaps the members could be divided into two teams - one mobilized and one backup. )

The technical operations of the Cumbeu -d County monitoring team were

(

adequate. Written procedures were used *or set-up and operation of monitoring equipment, and the instruments were cperated correctly. Appropriate samples were taken and the procedure for sampling radioactivity levels in the air was adequate to detect concentrations as low as 104 aCl/cm3 .

Radio communications were observed to be a problem. The Cumberland County field team radio was inadequste tot contacting their EOC or the FCP from field monitoring locations. j Only one s'et of direct-reading dosimeters was issued to the Cumberland County team. The county radiological health officer had a policy of one set of direct reading dosimeters per vehicle, regardless of how many individuals were in the vehicle. In this l case, two vehicles were used but one was without the benefit of direct reading l l dosimeters. This procedure is suitable if the tsam members are always together in the i field and there is no chance for them to become separated. Each individual did have a )

i permanent record TLD.

5- -

. =

62 The follosring suggestions for improvement apply to the Cumbor* land County radiological field monitoring team an,d are based on observations made during the t

. . training exerciser, ,

e Hands-on training in instrument use and trouble shooting would benefit the team.

e An AC converter or an AC generator for the air sampling equipment is needed.

e Consideration could be given to forming two teams from the existing team members. This would provide a backup team in the event a shift change is required.

e in future exercises, cons!deration should be given to having the ,

team members play actively in the exercise rather than following and observing the state team. This would provide better exercise training and experience. One approach could be to have one experienced state team member and a referee accompany the county team, which could then participate independently in the exercise.

As noted previously, the activities of the county field-monitoring teams were not formally evaluated, since their activities were not exercise objectives. The above observations and suggestions for improvement are, therefore, provided for information and training purposes oruy. The suggestions are not considered deficiencies for this-exercise.

b 1

(

l'. , , .

i i

. 63 ,

3 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECT!NG DEFICIENCIES: OCTOBER 23,1984, EXERCISE Section 2 of this report lists deficiencies tiased on -the findings and recommendations of federal observers at . the radiological emergency preparedness exercise for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station held on October 23, 1984. These evaluations are based on the applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in NUREG-0654-FEMA-1, Rev.1 (Nov.1980), and objectives for the exercise agreed upon by the state, FEMA, and the RAC.

The Regional Director. of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA- l Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that any deficiencies that require . corrective ' actions have " been ~ corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into the plans as appropriate. -

FEMA requests that both the str.te and local jurisdictions submit a schedule of C' actions they have taken or intend to take to correct these deficiencies. FEMA

' recommends that a detailed plan, including dates of completion for scheduling and Implementing recommendations, be provided if _ corrective. actions cannot be instituted immediately. FEMA further recommends that an additional effort be made by alllevels of government to improve intergovernmental coordination . in all aspects of the emergency planning process. A meeting between state, countyi local, and ' FEMA officials is advisable.

No defielencies were observed at the state level that would cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that-appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the site in the event of a radiological emergency. However, four such deficiencies were observed at the county level (Salem County).

These and other deficiencies observed at the October 23, 1984, exercise for the SNGS, as well as outstanding deficiencies from prev!ous exercises, require that a schedule of corrective actions be developed. These deficiencies are summarized in the following Table 3.1. Cross-referencing is provided in Table 3.1 to the corresponding deficiency and corrective action'in Table 4.1. The cross-referencing appears at the end of the borrective action description on Table 3.1 and indicates t!'e number of the item as j it appears in Table 4.1. j f I

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106 J .. ,

4

SUMMARY

OF DE!*ICIENCIES l Section 3 of this report provides a schedule for the correction of deficiencies noted during the Oc.tober 23,1984 exercise.

Table 4.1 summarizes recommendations to correct those deficiencies. For j purposes of verification, the table compares these recommendations with the recommendations based upon the previous exercises. ' The current : status of all recommendations is indicated.

Cross-referencing is provided for the 1984 exercise deficiency recommendations appearing in Table 4.1. The cross-referencing appears at the end of the corrective action description and consists of the section number of this report in whigh the deficiency is .

described, and the number of the deficiency as listed in the section.

3i G

9 .

J 4

f

?

1

_.x..x_

[ . e 1

.. ~. -.--. __ ,

i 107 Table 4.8 teceanendettene to tenedy Deficiencies Le of f-Site Radielegical toergency  ;

' . Reapease Preparedness at tuercises for the .Salse Nuclear Gene a sting Station es j October *13. 1964 October 16, 1963 Octobe r 13,*1942, sad April 8. 1991 l Deficioney l f

! NUREG-0454 tdentified l FEh4-t!P-L Preetous tuerstee taercise Presang Rev.1. e Referesise g,,,gg,,,b 10/14/83 10/13/64 Jurisdictlen" Status lee. Reseemended Corrective Action 1 The Burseu et Radiattee Protecties A.let a .at e 1 (N)

(887) 11aises officer med his staff I

are located on the seteed fleer of the j . State toc. heapertag esammasiest tees i

and protective acties decisies emains with the Commed and C. rel cantar which ta located en the first fleer of the 20C. Caesuaisettees between the nurses of Radiaties Protesttee Of fice i and the Caussad and Centrol Center should be stressthened to f acilitate I and espedite protective aattee .

deciatea eshing at the State 20C. '

Ceesideratten* should be gives to .

enving the 8SP listsee office to the y first fleer of the 50C and defletag the role of this 1141ase of fice as one

• of relaytag and laterpreting. ae secessary. technical taformattee fr +

the 80F (Secties 2.1.13 3). l 1 Frecedures for commseisattee with A.3 s . State G l

federal agencies eheutd be legiroved.

l The state precedures should be

( endified coecerates calle to

' ' grasahaves Messenal Laboratory for federal assistance.

. 3 There to e need for precedures for A.3 s State C requeettag emettettag aseistance and caertisattag such assistance with the State.

4 Based se the prevteus enettise there A.3 s State C was a generet agreement that federst agencies should be tavelved to eser-41ses. Eevever. FEMA was the eely federal agency leve&ved to this

. eseretee.

$ Checklists, which were to be developed 0.4  : $ tate C se a result of the 1981 esercise, were act steerved.

t 0 I

i.

108 Table 4.1 (Cent'd) ,

Dettaisesy NUREC-06SA identified

• FiM4-REF-!

Sev. 1, 8 Frev .es Emerstee laatties Preseng i ieferesee Iserstees t 10/16/43 10/23/84 Jurisdicties* States no. tesseemedad Cetteetive Acties E.1 s State C 6 to roeposee to e critietse rerstdief Selee C estificettee procedurre et t'.e M8 F! s a Cumeeriaed C enartise. e selfied *Iaitial Catact s 81stebete C.

Nessage Fore

• has been developed. fte Leuer A11sweye C Seen s see. homever. was eseredic. a Meaniestos C aseisipelittee have mec yet received posesville C a

the forms. Faecedureg for their use s Quinten C ehem14 be developed. These forme Sales City C eheeld be utilised by all levele of a Creeswich . C s

l goveresset. Stew Creek C s

l

• E.2 s State 7 All agencias should toepoed promptly to estiftsattee se required by the

- a ples. , ,

8.5 s -

state C 8 Care eheute to takes to have the estes semed betere the Its is estivated. A

• prese M al cheese requittas that.

prior to ESS estivation. the seusty eastgency assageness seerdiester ,

settfy the state that the strees had seueded would ensure the timely

. eequenstag el alerting med .

satifiesties.

9 The SAF FCF ehem14 improve its to- F s State C tornel ceammetaatione. especially its enesege heard.

F.1 s state C 10 The redie teimattatione Liek between the FCf and the toc should be estateleed throughout the assident.

11 The tedirtdual to charge et the SEF" F.1.d a State 1 (N)

FCf did set ottain masimme use of the fiete monitoring taase due to inefficient posittening of tho teams. The 847-FCF should taprove its testdination with the EOF with regard to the projected 18cettee of the Skues and the need for date et specifie toestione (Secties 2.1.2.2 1).

12 Seen prettees with deteruimtes ehete F.1.4 s state  ! (N)

, te locate field seesteries tease vote sensed by the leek of sufficient

, refersee. There were feet tease and only three referees. The State StF oheuld tesure that, e sufficient number of treteed referees are provided for emettises (Seattee 2.1.2.23 2).

l l

c' 8 -

r r . .c - _ . . -

' 6 ,

1 109 Tabis 4.1 (Cont'd)

Deficiency NU310-0454 tdentitled FEMA *AEP-1 .,

Previous tzercise Ese rctae Presang I

No. teseemended Carrective Actise Rev. 1. a Reference g,,,,g,,,b n0/26/83 10/23/84 Jurisdiction" Status 13 Radio com unicatises between the FCF P.1.4 a a State 1 and all of the field moniserias taaes should be escured. Radio equipenet i should be evaleated and Leproved to I etteinsta difficulties in saintasains contact with the field teses. Radio ceammenacetions between the field ape 1=

tertag teses and the FCF continued to be e prettee dettag the 1984 esercise.

Radie contact wee Latermittently test throughout the esertise by both field

. teams steerved. The adequacy of the esisting comnanicatises syss ee -

(, utL11aed between the PCF and the field monitoring teses should be reviewed n and improvements implemented La otter . .

to assure the espettlity for uninter-

]

rupted commanitations between the FCF l

end the field teams. testa 11attee of *

! the radio tower plaened for the PCP ces improve the commanisettoes (Sectice 2.1.2.24 3).

14 Notifications regarding the statue of P.1.4 a a State T eastbency or protective actione la 0.4.) '

effect were not relayed to e,he field esattering teams with the enception of the recomasudation to take El during the 198a ene'cise.

r The FCF should keep field teses better taferend with respect to the statue of emergency or protective action recommendations (section 2.1.1.14 4 ).

15 The receiver in the state EOC 4.4.a a s State C l apparently wee not senettive enough to a =

State-JMC C pick up the first its test,seeaage.

At the Media Center there are new radies La the state F10 wort area.

16 The att sampler of the fanguard 4 tese E.10  : State 1 (N) malfunctioned and weeld eet operate at 1.4 s.coastaat sampling rate of 3 afe.

- (- Their power converter aise failed.

The causes of f ailure of the fastaard l A toes air sempler and power converter should be determined and corrected (Section 2.1.2.33 1).

( 17 Seth teses did set have docuenstaties 3.10 a' State 1 (N) of the laat calibrettee for all et the radiation detection teatruesats.

l !adividual instrummsts either did met I have calibrettom Labela er the labela indicated dates that vers ever one year eld. teatrv ent calibration

• documentactee procedures ebeuld be i

atteagthemed to ensure that talibre*

l tiene are perforers uc=* ding to plait j and that evidence of the calibrettmas is present (Sertton 2.1.2.34 2).

I

. s .

~'

110 Table 4.1 (Cent'd) .

+ .

Deficiency NUREC=O434 Identif1ed TEMA=9E9=1 See. 1 Previeue Ezercise Exercise No. Reseaseeded Carrective Aesten Reference

• Esertisee' Preseng 10/26/83 10/23/8A Juttadicties' status 18 The field esatteries equiposes le kept 1.s a State C to the sa? FCF. rather than with field sette. The equipment used for thte lates eserstse Le the very ease agesp=

east that was used at Oyster Creas.

Distributing the equipanes escording to whe a the nest esercise will be leaves ese of the two New Jersey estee without equipeast. This defittesey should be corrested by providtag each alte with Lte own field meettering agetposet. . the equipases would to evalistle for use by neckup perseasel ]

eves if the eseitettag teses were delayed by usespected probleen such as

• s bed weather. If the equipeset were ,

stored with the field taaes. seamp .

and calibrattee could be performed during trasett.

19 Ceemuettatises between the Stf FCP and 1.8 s State C esattertog tease should be teproved by estag a standardized format for trase=

eittal of the data. .

20 n yroid deae data should always be 1.9 s State C takes and transmitted.

21 The thyre &d dose rate moeitering 1.9 m State C equipeast ($as II) steeld use silver seettte eartridges and should be oper=

aged at the proper air flew rate. The stiver seelite eartridges were avst1=

ables cherceal cartridges were used due to oest of stiver seelite.

g 22 New Jersey uses esepeas sectore to J.10.s s define preteettee actise areas, where=

a State I as P$t&G designates RFAa- State and ettlity representatives should agree te a etsgle method for areas weare preteetive actises esy be implemented. j This deftsiesey regardtag the desig= /

sattee of areas to be esseusted has been operattenally addressed duties the 1964 esarelse. The use of toer=

gency planetag Areas hoe been replaced at the State 20C by the use of compass sectors which are . then coeverted to marrative descripetene of the affected e~ na for 138 eneaages. Althoush this sysses verts well, the use of teer=

seery Planetag Areas Lo' still tefer-eased Le the New Jersey Radselegical tearsseey taspeese Plan (1117).

Practise is set comeistaat with the plan. The Kew Jersey RESP should be revised to reeeve the teergency Planning kue concept, and replace it with the procedure presently to use based as compaae sectore (Sectten 2.1.14 1).

6 8 e n

• 111 4

. Table 6.1 (Cent'd)

L Defittency NURIC-0634 tdenttfted FEMA-117-1 tev. 1 previous Esercise tseretse Preseng No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference

• suertises t 10/26/53 10/13/84 Juttedietton" 7tatus 23 Mape is the State goc did not Ladicata J.10.4 s State 1 the oesters La which protective settens had been taptemented. Naps to the state toc should be equipped with everlays that tadicate sectors where protective actises have been taple=

eented (section 1.1.1 2 ).

26 seen proeless were observed to feliev- J.10.a s 8tste . 1 (s) ing the prope r evacuation routes. J.10.g This was tecause the bua drivers and 08 state polica escorts were unfamiliar with the ares, roadways were poorly, marked. and because the route espe were seguented. Cassideracios eheutd be gives to installing additieaal road name signe sad /ar route num6er earners, and providing better esos and erittee desertptione of tha routes.

Esistteg small espo neute be leeroved by placing se "s* er e estch Line as '

the peint where t'as praetous esp ande.

A targer ese showing the entire evacu=

atten route should slae be taciudad for referseas in each bus driver's ,

packet of espe (Section 2.1.33 1).

23 The protettive hits for the field ese- J.10.e a State C ttering teses should contain KI. as called for in the pies. KZ was avail-ante at the SEP FCP and would have been distributed is a real energeosy.

26 The sesease to stan14:e the use of El J.10.e s State  ! (N) was est received by one of the bus J.10.f

• drivers tavelves La the general populatten baa evacuatten. Communica-tiene should be leproved to ensure that messages conee rstag radiatten espesure protective seasures are tessived by all bue drivers (Seettee '

2.t.3; 3 ).

(

27 Assurance should be given that basee J.10.g a a State 1 are avatlable for evacuaties the put- A.3 Lis in a timely fashlee. (NJOEM and U Traasts should floatise as MOU.)

28 Althmagh evacuatteg precedures worn J.10 3 State generally clearly stated La the ISS

1 (3) sessages. t here were ne lastructione givea for the evacuatien of scheel childres. ESS evacuation messages enould ease it clear waether scheel entidten are to be eventated er est (Section 2.1.1; a). .

i 0 e e, e

i 112 I

i I

Table 4.1 (Cont'd)

Dettelesey

' NUREC-06S4 Tdentified FEMA-REP *1 tav. 1 Previeue Exercise Esercise j Preseng No. Recommended Carrective Action Reference

• tuercises'. 10/26/83 10/23/84 Jurisetttion' Status I

29 fe ry little doce projecties. plant 1.4 s State I r

ce stes, of precoctive acties

, 1efoseattee see transettted back to a

the SEP-fCF free 317 headquarters.

More opee eschenge of data and inforeettee should be esinteised between 817 headquarters and the 817-FCP.

30 C41eulation of evaulative population 1.14 s State N/Obs(83) dose should be performed periodically. 5/0bj(84) 31 317 should better coordinate the re- J.11 s State N/0 N

, seessible ageestes la ingeotten path- N/t *

way saupting and seasurensets.

I . ,

32 F. ape er displays identifytag dairy J.11 s State C farne or food presseeing plaats were not pested er eve 11able. Maps or displays tedicating key land-use data (e.g.. f arming). daaries f ood process-Les plaats. water supply, 1 stakes, veter treatment plante. and reservette ehem14 he developed.

23 The bus drivers' knowledge of radia- E.3.a a State t tien protection sad desteatry varied 0.1 l

great 1r between the two drivere

, tavelved La the general populattee bus evacuation. Additional trateing should be provided to ensure that all i bue drivere are keewiadgeable about appropriate radiattee protection sneluding the use of deeinstere.

allevable dose 11eles. and precedures for being sethorised to receive additional esposure. The training schedule should be outaitted to FEM (Section 2.1.31 2).

34 The permanent record des t reece 1.3.a u *

$ttte us11tsed by the bus desvers tevel?ed 1.3.b to the generst populattom bus evoca '

uattee woes set idestified by e vietble Identification mueber -of code. All paraanent record desteetere east have a spectfic identificattee number se se to be traceable to the individust who used the device (Seetten 2.1.38 4).

33 Staulated release of radiattee should P.9 s State be large enough to allow for signif- C tcant activity in the area of field eenitoringa and dose easessment caps-6111ty.

m_______

r . e'

• 1 l

113  !

t Thble 4.1 (Cess'd) f4ficiency NutzG-0654 tdeattfted _

71MA-117-8 Rev. 1, Previeves Exe rcise Eseretse Preseng No. Recoassaded Corrective Aattom Reference" taarsises t LO/26/83 LO/23/84 Jurisd1ction' Statue l

34 These is a need for improved coordie- J.10.g a State C l atton between the USP and C Tranatt during enarciese in esecuting evocaa- l tion of the general public. Proca- I dures need to be clarifted bec,ve se sJSP and M Tranett meetgesting lead and dispatah respoestb1Lities ,f or eveeustion buses.

37 The sat wee not nettfied of the F.1.e a State I avtalatten of the plant eastgency action level (CAL) free usueuel event to alert. The BLP was unaware of the l C, change until it contacted the et11Lty approsimetely 30 minuses after the change. .The plan provisions for noti-I i

]

fytag each respeese organtassion of I the plant IC:. maat be followed. ]

l 34 Ouplicate esplanettone of plant F.1.4 . s State 1 events, eurrest esteerology. and dose projectica checks to SAP were delayed. Precedures for the prompt receipt of such data by BEF headquarters should be taproved.

• 39 !aproper inst mati.e and traintag J.10.e. State c have been gives regarding the author- K. 3. b isattoe and adetaistration of El to energesey bus drivers have been ande. ,

leproved pesetstona sad training era i required for the use of radLopro-testive drugs by emergency worksrs.

40 4e essesses vers posted in the eas1* J.11 s State 1 dont assessment area of the 310C re- i garding protective actions taptemented  !

for the ingestion pathway. Protective actions testemented should be clearly posted on the statua boards and asps.

[ 41 The FCP radle operator did nas always 2.1  ; State C

( Ladicate that the tressaissions were part of the anarcise. The PC7 redte operator should always latlude "this Ls a detti...* in the transaiastens.

Perhaps tutber stamping the, informatten on the message form vt11 enhance the transmission of thie loformetten.

al Cominanisatdne capettlity between the F.1.s a State  :

C tranatt dispatcher and evacuattoa tuses is lacking. O treastt buses showLd be equipped with radies. The interia use of state police escort vehittee thould continas until the radies are installed.

T b

E B 1

...e--- .m. ._

I- -

114 Taste 4.4 (Cont'd)

Dettetency NuttG.4654 1deetified FEMaattF-1 Rev. 1 Previeve Eseestes tuercise Preseng t 44. Recommended Corrective Action Reference

• taereisee# 10/26/43 10/23/84 Juttadictien* Status i

43 The tus drivere had ne tratatag to 8.10 "J State I radiatten record keeping er keswiedge 0.4 of espesure concret procedures. No destanter chargers were availaba et the asetertog point. The tue drivers should retenve further training to ,

radielegtsal arposure costrol.

44 With the dose assessment functf ees of A.l.h a State-t0F 1 (M) the BLP trama retted to the 20F, the E.2 .

altecated space in the EOF was insufftstent for the additional staf f and equipeset, and the arrangement of ] I alleseted space hindered intersetten between dose assessment and esmagement pereseret for the SEP and these of the yttlity. If it to decided to tressler the dose assessenet functione of the i Sif to the 80F perennently, the 917 >

should eegettete with the utiltty and j ettate addittenal space ,as well se ,

rearrangensat of space throvshout the EOF to allow grouping of does essese-

• ment pereennel in one area and key utility and SEP/CDt eenagement, representatives is esother (Sectica 2.2.11 2). i I

l 4S The deesgnatet 3RF official at the EOF A.I.d a S t at e-f.07 1 (N) i

, was not unequivocally in contrei and

%1e authority for decistem-seming was

', not staar. Receemandattens f or pre-  !

tactive acttene had to receive support l from the 41F staf f at the State ROC prior to being eens to OEM.  !! it is decided to trameter dose assessaant functione of the SLF to the 20F per unently, the functional reteo of the SLF representatives in the tof versus these in the State EOC should be redefined. This to needed to order to staarly identify see individaal to unequivocally astry out SEP reopenet-nt11ttee ($esties 2.2.13 1).

44 Setore the CCF opees, the utility 9.4 s State-t0F C teeneical support center should have the serrest telephone numbero se make contact with appropriate state repre-eentatives.

41 4 statua neerd wee set present in the 9.3 s State-10F I (M)

U5F-FCF med there was no posting of the emergenef elavettteetten. level. A stesse heard displaying the emmegency claastfiestien level should be displaced and estatained in the MSP=

• FCF (sectten 2.2.2s !).

l

f s .o - .% - . . . .

115 Table 4.1 (Cent'd)

Deficiency NUtgG-0434

~

Ydeatifted .

l FEMA-REF-1 tev. 1 Previeue t

taercise tuerstee Freseng No. Reseammeded Correttive Aesten Reference

• Emeralsee 10/26/g3 10/23/84 Jurisdiction' Status i

l 64 The 1942 Feet tuercise Assessment F.I.h a State-tor C stat:dt stece the phone to Lower l Alloways Creek at the F0F is not to be eenverted to stato use. ether unasures should be takee se that there are eere ,

telephones for state agancies at the 507.

At the 1983 eneecise. te wee ebeerved that the phone to tower A11eware Creek had been disconnected. Dedicated sad seenercial phone liaee had been

['" added. There are new suf ficient tele-phones for state agencies at the 10F.

. 69 The StF-FCF was hampered by a lack of F.A.d a State-tor 1 seemunitattene f ree the 10F regarding 1.11 eastgensf action levels, dose projoesten data, and protective action measures. Action should be taken to improve coordinetten and ensure a tiesty flow of Reformation free the j EOF to the FCP. Future training I should strose the importanas of an e spea eschenge of soformation . f ree the

, 20F refteding protective action enesures and dose projectica date (Section 2.2.14 4).

50 As attempt by the StF-FCF to contact F.I.d a State-ROF  ! (N) the 10F using the becaup radle method was unsuccessful during the esercise because the EOF etsif did not have adequate training La the operation of the equipeset. Future training should stress the need to have the backup radle operational during an eastgency reopense in case probleen develop with use of the primary syntes. The use of the backup radio systen should be desenstrated in a futura emerstae (Sectise 2.2.13 $1.

51 The M sF-F;F rees was not shielded J.9 s State *t0F 1 (N) like the nearbf EOF toes La the seen J .10. e butiding. When the FCF perseenal were advised to esse to the sealed tot roes for restation espesure protection they '

could not de se elece there were ne seemunicattene hoekups avaL1able in the 20F rees. It ta receanended that tne PCP roes te the nuclest training Fullity batiding be protected sistlar to that te the EOF race. er that the FCF be relocated to the MSP Weedeteve stattee (Section 2.2.2s 2).

l 1 .,

l 1

1 l

l

i 0

. o .

• 1 .

116 Table 4.1 (Cent'd) .

Deficiency wensc-0454 Identified FEMA +A&P-1 Rev. 4 Prevleue tsartise Eseretse Presen Re fe rence* Iseretees' 10/28/83 10/23/84 Juttadiettoe s g g,,,, g No. Reeseemoeded Corrective Actime 12 the RJSP reported to e slightly J.10.e a state-t0F 1 (m) different toesttee for see of the rue J.10.]

eesses control potete dessestrated durteg the emettise. Thle besses apparent when the KJ87 attempted to retteve see 1. eve r Alloways Creek pelige at the tedicated poet. It te recesssaded that seerdteatten between the RJSP and local police be taptemented to arder to obtate agree- .

eens se the preslee lesattee of the traff te sentrol/essees costrel potete.

In particulgt. the seest locatise of poet #64 seeds to be coeftreed (Secties 2.2.34 3). .

, $3 The trasofer of the SEP dose assese- F.3 e -State-t0F 1 (N) ,

ment feesties free the Sta(e 10C to P.4 the EOF was esperisestal and La est te F.S

• accord with the currest New Jersey RERF. If it it decided to pereenestly

• treaefer the deae assessment fonctiees of the SEP to the EOF, the nessessry precederse to tapleases the new arrangesses should be prepared see the eurrest RESF tevised to reflect the thenges (Seatten 2.2.13 3). 1 54 Satellite EBS statione should be E.S s State =JHC ".

better briefed to proper procedures concerntag transetttal of Lefermetten f ree the state regardLag radielegical energeactee.

55 Rard septes of the ESS esseegee should E.S - a State-JMC C ]

be eve &lable for the state Floo. j l

Se Additteest treteing of the rueer G.4.s s State =JMC C sentret staff is necessary if they are to esevey reformation properly ressedin.g en enfolding emergency. ,

57 It one not sheerved whether the 4.4.b a State-JHC .

-sthead . sed b, the e.dt. .seter clo had the telephone esseer of the state P10 in t% goverser's of fice.

38 Medte tite sentalains backgreved C.5 s State-JMC 1 (N)

, informattee were set eve 11able at the media center. Media kita should be l prepared and be ende stallable to the press at the media center (Seattee 2.3s 1).

a a f ]

i

. . - . . . ~,

117

. Table 4.1 (Cont'd)

Defittency WURSC-04$4 Tdentitled FEMA-017-1 Prerteus tseretee tsaretas preseng go. Rev. L. a Reference g,,,,g,,,b 10/26/33 10/23/64 Jurtsdictten* status Reeeessended Corrective Actise 39 pubita inf oression esterials have been G.I. s a a State-Jfac 1 developed in4Lessing evacuatten routes G.2 (1981) sad the locattee of eengregate care centers. These asserials have set been dist ributed by PSt&G due te prietta4 problene. Distributee of .

j puelle 1eforeettee tafereleg reetdesta of protestive aattene ensuid be continued. Ze addittee, taformation ,

l I should be dieseniaated to these 3 loestions where traastanta night tes

e.g., Sales Gelf and Country Clus, and the Sales Meter t. edge.

. Althaugh the resulte of the forest '

• survey tenducted by the State and utt11tr regarding pubits awarenees are i

set yet available, a opet cheth of 173

reeldoets durtag the 1944 esercise J

' tadicated that, aves though P$ tad hae

. estled inforestion concerning eser-

' gency plaantag to EPS residente, i public awarenese of procrettve settone ese sener?at weak. This La a cos- ,

1 tinuing defittency that sea observed J et previous esercises. The pubits I educatten prograa mast be intenstf ted j es the teetdents of Sales and Cueberland covettee be more evere of .

protective actions to be taken during j a rad &ologissi energency (Seatten 2.34 1 21.

60 Caunty should to subsegweet osarctose. I A.1.s a 54 Lee C desenstrate a capattitty la fire and rescue. transportation and public tafessatten.

el The SCEOC emergency act ivities were A.L.d s a s Salet I not always well tetograted and the ap- A.2.a propriate organisattese were est ase-

[ sistently tavelved to dartston-makieg. ,

' %, A more effeettre ameagement systee including better teformattee diesent-nation seens the staf f and better use et staff ressurses should be provided.

leformatten itseensaaties at the Sales Nadical drill em 9/27/84 adeguately dessestrated that as Lejered, costaatseted persen seuld be handled sed treated.

4

• o

. -.m _.

.A.

?

'l .

118 Tot te, 4.1 (Cent'd) .

1 ,

Defittency NORAG-04$4 tdantiffed ftMA-eEP-1 Prestees tearstee Emerstse Preseng Rosemenaded Certeett e Accles Rev. l. e Referense g,,,,g,. t 10/26/83 10/23/84 Jettedittian* Status

, me.

County EOC and the trenesteelee of I tiesty pesteetive estion esseages to l I ell the moittpelities withis Sales I Cemety seesseued to be a prehlee j dettog the 1934 esorties.

This see aise identified te provteue esertises. I Sees efflatel State destelses to ]

1eptement protective aatsene were j outstantially delayed is beleg retelved by tse asettipelittee free the $(IOC. Te one case a protective settee sessage wee not resolved free the teusty. These seemsnicettees .\'

problems appear to be the result of Lash of adequate eneageuses and a leek ,

of en adequate number of trained per-eeneel to the SCROC. Setter evere11 .

_a eed coordinettee of infer =

estion. es seit es leproved flew of tafermettee f ree 541ee Cemety to the aselcipe11 ties are required. Staff tag.

• procedures, sed training et the SBOC shestd be resteund tt determine how taprovensate ese he taptemented .

(seetten 2.4.ls 4).

62 Tae 1942 rest tearstee 4eeeeeemet J.10.j e e e Selee  !

stated

• Sales County east dessestrate the espettlity to taptement protettive esseures. The tesety should decena ettete its sepability to participate to relocate the populase. eveemste reeldente from the EP3 and toetret estees.*

At the 1983 seerstee, the seuety demonstrated the obtlity to eveemete reeldeste free the EP3. Assess aestrel see not se objective for the eevnty for thle emersloe and should to deusestrated to e future esertise.

63 There were eigetfitant delays to the J.9 3 Salee  !

Sales County toc nettfytes.eees of the J.10.g ,

annisspe11stes of the esecusttee ensease. Sales Cemety's ability to ennage se orde'rly eveemattee woe, therefers, est desanotteted. Better everall inonagement and eere tienly Lefereotion flee frees Sales Canety to the moete19411ttee are regelred.

Staffing. prosedures and tralalog et the SCEOC enemid he rettemed to deter-eined new terrevement ces te (sple-eented (sectise 1.4 1s 2).

i

..D '

e a

. 119 l

Totle 4.1 (Cont'd)

. Deficiency i

NUREC-06$4 tdentified l l FEMA-REP-1 Rev l. Frevieve taercise tuercise ~ Preseng No. Recousseded Carrective Acties Referanse* Esercises' 10/16/83 10/13/84 Juttadiction' Statue ,

l 64 There were significant delays in the J.10.e s Sales 1 Sales County toc netsfring sees of the knicipalltsee of the message to ade& sister El to emergency workers.

Sales Cauety's teestilitt reteted to the administrettee of El s'ee . there" fore. set deessetrated. Setter evers11 emesseemet and eere timely teforsetten flow free Selee Ceuety to the maicipeittles are retstrod.

Steffing, procederne. and traialog at l ~

the 330C should be reviewed to l / dete rmine how taprovemente tes be taptemented (Section 2.e.13 3). *

( *

. 65 tves though there wee esseptette soor- 4.2.s *a a Selee - 1 dinettee of protective er parallet a a a Centerland 1 settees free the state perspective. s . Reemington C direettvee were est ef fectively ested s is Sales City C upes et the esuety sad leesi level. s a a Eloistere 1 leformatten esseSement vos week and a Lower Allowere Creek C coordination of protective actione a Penneville C taaffitteet. s Quietee C a a e Greeswich C a a Stow Creek C 66 Although 24-hour stafflud cepentlity A.3 a $s188 I (M) of tha SCEOC wee dessestrated by A.e presentottee of a teeter. the $30C staff ledicated that suppleasetet

. personnet free the State OEM or free other teuettes eight be required for prolonged operettoes. The poteettet need for supplemented resources free other sousties and/or the State should j be identified la the Flem, sad writtee '

agreeenste reached with these other jettedictions for providing these I resources. Appropriate treistog I should elee he provided (Sectise

/ 3.4.18 6).

\t 67 41theogh a letter was sent to all A.4 s Sales C Meyere and 8eerde of Chosee Freehold- a Cemberland C are as a result of the 1981 esertise, a Lower Allowere C the level of particitettee of emer= s s Meanington 1 deecy pereennel is the eseraise see a Selee C1ty a O dieeppeteting. Every effort steeld to. s a a tietsbere 1 ande by the Meyere and leerd of Free- a Poseeville C j helders to educate their emergency a Quantos C i perseene t of the tapertence of the Creeswich C l esortise esperience. Stow Crash C I

j l

i i

d a

l

a- a ]

- az

. ~ . , - . , , , _ , , , _

e e.

.j 120 Table 4.1 (Cent'd)

Deficiency NUSEG-0454 Ydentified FEMA-atp*1 Rev. 1 Prevleue taercise- Emerstee preseng',

me. Recommended Corrective Actise Re fe rence* toerstees' 10/16/83 10/23/84 Jertedittton" status

. De the beste of the 1984 esersise.

! this reemine laceeplete for th=

tistabete and Massingtse 80Co. The listabore and Manningtse toCe esed to leerove their participating levels.

The Lateractise and soordiesttee of their staff coeld ses be folly evaluated. A systee chev14 he tuple-

. eented to tecrease the participetten levele of volunteer staff at the j Elstebete and Meenginates 50Ca. The tiete6 of the esercise should be stree 3 i greater eenetderettee to the scenarte 6 developensa (seetten 2.4.21 31.

64 The chethlist of actione to be takee 0.4 a* Sales C et differest emergency clasetticaties 1evele costaleed ta ' the state plan i sheeld be used.

69 The seesty sheeld tavestigste se la= t.2 s Seles C l preveneet to ' the alerttag eyesee for a Cumberland C' j

= emergoesy coopeese staf f te order to l reduce roepeees time.

70 The radielegical of ficer and the Red 8.2 e sense 1 (M ) ,

Crees representative were late to reperting to the $ctoC. Mob (11 settee precede'ed should be reviewed to ensure that all pereeeee t can be settfled and mobilised to the SCEOC to a timely asener to the eveet of an actual radiolesteet emergency (Seattee 2.a.11 a ).

71 Com unicastese between sangregate care F.1 s Sales C sed desentestaatten aestere eneuld be taproved. i 72 nere than one perses should be used to 7.1.e s selee j

, handle 20C redte traffis. j j 73 A het 11ee systee should be testalled f.1.h a Sales C te Sales Cemety. to allow stealtanoeue calle to all lessi governments.

76 Ceemnteettees withis the SCt0C were F .'t . b s  : Selen 1 limited er.d telephoed traff14 did est fles emnethly. Sales Ceesty sheeld comef dar more space to ocessedate se efftetest plassumes of telephemes to the SCROC. The coasty should aise esealder Septeasettag e aere effective telepheme onesage seetrol eyetee to facilitate the flow and see of emergoesy infereottoa.

F a a l

I 121 * '

i l

1 . Table 4.1 (Cast'd)

Deficiency

, sungCH) ele ideattfied FanA-REP-!

ta v. 1 Previous Emercise Emereise No. Recoeuraded Corrective Astlee Refere*ce* Esercises' 10/16/83 10/13/84 Preseng Jurisdiction

• Status l

75 The hard-esty comesnicattee defies wee F.1.h a Sales 1 (M) j met moved to the new SC10C and wee not E.3 ,

ettlised dering the esercise. It is suggested that the hard copy devise be moved to the new toc and that it be used dettas future saartises to sapedits the flow of key massages (Sectten 2.4.11 7).

74 11stabore. Manningtee, and Quintes F.1.4 x a Sales reported that requeste for reformation N/Obs (la and other assistance free the SCEOC I did est etways receive a proept  !

respeces. Implement a precediere for I more efficient reopenase by the SCEOC 1 to requeste for infernsttee and .

assistance to local EDCs. -

77 All covettee and manicipalistas should F.3 s tales C participate to consonnication tratains a a Cumberisad N/Obs. (1 sad drills. s a Elstabore N/Obs. ($

s inwer Alloways C a Manningtes W/Obs.(03 s Poseertile C a Quinton C a Sales City N/Obs.(83 s Creenwich N/0be.(83 a, Stow Crees C 78 triefisg precedures at the SC10C vers R.3 a a net sufficient er timely and the Sales C

. public addrese syntes vee see cos-sistently used to settfy staf f of the energency situation. Salee County should review internal comnications j with the intent of tepreetag briefing i

l procedures and consistant use of the public address system to estify the staff of changes la the amoreaney classification level.

79 The Sales ECC was atended to the day E.3  : Salee C of the eseretse. Consideratten should be gives to relocattee of the ROC to e j larger facility.

l 80 The county ECC should have en eser- E.)  : a

• tales i

gency leg, and the accident claset-l ficettee sad t'ne protective sattee to

• l effect should be listed en the ROC j statue board. All eessages should be j

,eeted. ,a,e .h-u he ed to ,tet 1aformaties. {

4 I

j 1

e

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4 i

I

s ,

~ ~" ,

s i

i 122 Tatte 4.1 (Cent'd) s .

Defittency NUREG-0654 tdantified rtMA-tztal Previeue taettise Esertise Preseng ne. teseemended Corrective Asstee Rev. 18 Referesse Eseresses' 10/26/83 10/13/84 Juttadietten* Statue 1

41 ledges should be Leeued to 50C etaff E.3 s sales C sad visitete. Greater cara should be takes te determine whether Ladividasta '

should be adattted to the 20C.

E.3 3 Sales 1 (N) 82 he seanneitsstees rese et the are Salee Cemety EOC ta small and the netse level was high. esking it difftenit to hear wten using the te lephone. Constderettee should be givvo to ratsasting the eeamunicatione equipment to a larger reos at the SCE0C ($estLen 2.4.13 3).

43 There are no espe indicating the a a Salee Leasttee of eahesta *aed institustens. J.10 . .

• This detail should be included, either ,

en en everlay to be used with eniettag eester espe. er se a separata esp.

I 44 The bee driver for seheel eveaustion J.10.a a Sales 1 (M) in tales County did not know waish

!, ' reception saatar saheel eveeuses wet.

to be tekee to. All bus drivers for ,

scheel eveevatten eheuld be troised to know the reception caeter(s) to which enheel evacuese should be taken.

(Seesteo 2.6.3: 15).

45 The lates County E06 Lastracted the J.10.a a Sales 1 (M) scheel tus driver to take evacuees to a letseles set designated La the plas .

for that sportf te schist. The Sales County EOC should give instruction eenatstent with their plan (Section I 2.. 3 le ).

64 The at t11t'y to evacuate settlity J.10.4 s Sales 1 teostred individuals in 541ae Ceuety was est de mons t rat ed. The attlity to evacuate settlity impaired Ladtviduals j eheutd be tested in future esercise (Section 2.6.33 13).

87 The tue driver for the scheel evas se- J.1J.e - s' sales I tien in Salem County wee not trained E.3.6 La the use of destanters or K1. All emergency workers ehem14 he felly a

trained in radiotesteal erposure sentrol Laciudtag the use of doet-esters and E1. The training schedule for all emergemey verkare should be

. furnished to FEMA (Sectise 2.4.35 17).

l

• l l

l l

7_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _

l'.

L-l l

[

R

(

123 1

i Table 4.1 (Cent'd)

Defittency

. NuagC-0454 tdanettled yEMA-REF-8 Rev. 1 Prevleue Eseretse Esertise Preseng Me. Recousanded Correettve Aeties Reference" Esercioee b 10/26/g3 10/23/84 Juttadietten* Status Sg There were ne petice effisere er other J.10.h *' Sales . 1 (N) personnet available to provida traffic centret er security at the Sales Covaty sengregate care obelter.

Police offisere et other uniformed .

personnel should be assigned to the a:engregate tare shelter to provide traff as centsel and security (section

1. 4. 3 s 3 ).

49 teargeney achteles eheeld be leseted J.10.h a Sales C et the esegregate care center.

Security should be estat11ehed at the facility. It shev14 be staffed with

(. -

redlelegical asaltering and decentas-Laation pereeneek who are profittent in their sesignmente.

90 The Sales County congregate safe ehet- y.t.e a s Salee 1 ter vee not well-tef ormed of the prog-rees of the esercise. er appetsee of .I' when and how eney evacuees to espect.

The AAC representative at the SCROC should keep the esegregate sage shet*

tore ep-to-date en esereise eveets and provide thee with intercession en the a espected stambe r and arrivel ties of evacuees (sectten 2.4 33 1). .

91 As congregate sate contere, separate J.12 s Seles C l reens for Ladividuals with special I neede should be provided.

92 The caestility of Sales Ceuety to J.12  : Sales C provide ceagregate sete sentere vae j not tested.

93 45 the Sales County esegregate sete J.12 a Selon 1 (N) tenter. there were se radiological monitoring personeet er equipeant to .

eentter evacuees for redielegical  !

sentaataation. The toegregate ca.re

( center should deepestrate the ability to esatter evacuees med eehicles La future emerstees (Sectise 2.6.38 I).

94 At the Sales County emergency werker J.12  : Sales t (U -

decontaetaattee uncer, saly steus 15 people per hour could be monitored due

• to the limited naeter of low-range radiation detectore steerved dettag the emettise. Durtag shift changee share could be linee of potentially conteelneted wetaere waiting to be menttered. Addittomal le m sage radiattee detectore eheutd be availatte at the decentesination center (section 2.4.3: 6).

o e

e

a O l, s . . 6 *.

' ., l.

i.

124

, Table 4.1 *(Cent'd)

Defisteesy l uu3804634 Identified i FEMA-tEp=1 1 see. 1, previous Esercise tsarcise Preseng No. Reesesseded Certsettve Aatten taference" Seereises' 10/26f83 10/23/84 Jettadistiee* Status 1

' 95 At the Sales Cauety decentestaation J.12 s Selee  !.(N) eenter, the forms available for recording emergency verter's espeeeres de not teslede a place for recording the locattee of body contanteation for esattered workare. teergemey mother especore record forse should be revised to include a place for recordtag the locettee of body contenteettee (Section 2.4.3s 7).

96 The bee driver for the otheel evasse- E.3.s a

• Sales t ties la Sales Cauety did set have e \

d.e t-t .r. one s-t.re .hould b.  ;

provided to all drivers levolved to evacuati.se busing. The 11stieg on dittribstion et desteatry soeuld be'

. Providad to FEMA (Section 1.4.3: 16).

97 The preeudores for tettial eeressing E.3.s a Sales C of potencia117 eestantaeted pereces eere set perfereed rapidly eseech. .

98 Ferseasel at the Sales Cenery E.3.a s a ,

a Salee 1 energemey worker dessesseinattea

,conter were not euere of the tedtasien levels above which decentaminatten sheeld be performed. Addittemel tratalog should be provided for dessataminattee center percessel she are roepensible for determining onether emergency wortere need to be desentaminated (Seettee 2.4.33 4).

99 The layset of the decenteelmation E.S.b  : '3 ales C center should be theaged to order to e11ateate the peestbility of. sentan=

leattee of cisen sess. N ro should be more than one shower. easegh to

, allow for the esticipated suster of evacuees. Nro should be more coe=

asettatione between somety and state l

persennel. Monstettag testattisse /

need more traintag.

i 1U0 4t the Sales Cement decontamisettee E.S.h a Sales 1 00 center only one shower etall see .

ses11atte for deceitanteatise, which would be Lesefficient dertog emergency .

emeter shtts thanges et peak procesa eleg of people as the seater. Add 1=

ttoeal shower fealtittee should be eve 11able et the decenteelnatten i easter. Separate showere seculd be l

sve11able for are eed venne (Secties 1.e.33 3).

,,,- y _ . _ , , ,

. ~ . --- ' -

. 6 125 i

1 Table 4.1 (Cont'd)

Deficiency

' NITISGH)434 tdantified ,

j FEMA-88 pal Rev. 1 Prevleus taercise - tserstse Ne, tegeemanded Cettectire Attice Reference" Emeretsee' 10/26/03 10/23/84 Jurisdiction" Preseng i Status .j 1

tot le 1982, it one est observed whether L.1 a a Islee ' C f the staff of the $41ee County Eeepital i had boon trained in radialetical setters as had been resemanded af ter the 1981 eastelse.

101 De cemety should demonettete reentry Pt s Sales capability. N/Ob3(43.5 s Cumberland N/0bj(83,3 103 An lacreased level of participatise by N.I.D s Sales C respeese egencies in future emettises a CeJherland C is retutted. Esercise objectives should be esecuted.to the greeteet degree practicable.

104 Radielegical espesure senteel desta, t.3.a a etee 1 estate were set issued by the Cauety for the bse drivet 1 evolved La the evesmattee of traestees depenleat individuets. Moreover the d river appested to have had as training in the use of . destanters. Radielegical esseeste centret destanters and traina ing in their use is required fat per=

senset involved La evesustian busing. *

' 10S Activattee of the 48 tref fle costrel 8.2 s Sales C point wee neither siestated - not demonstrated. The ability to activate ,

traff1s centret points should be tested in fututs esercises.

106 At the SA traffte sentrol point, 1.3.s Sales desteetty agetpoent vee not ebeerved. &

Petice officers assigned to treffte sentret potats should be equipped with j' personal doelenters and should be trained in their use.

107 Rescue squad personnel need addittenal E.3.e a self teading destanters. As adeguate Salee C supply of self reading deelanters te required for the rescue ecuad.

108 A health physicles wee tot available L.1 to heepital staff during the esertise Sales C for seneuttattee. Because this wee an of f-site sesident, se health physicist would have to be actutred free Philadelphia, apprestestely 30 minutes ever. Sales County should tortow the avellability of heenth phystes esper=

tise let medical support and considet ^

the use of utility assistance with eff-site accideets. I

+

e

'e

'4 .

126 -

Table 4.1 (Cont'd)

Defittency NURECM)d54 tdenettted FEMA-AgPat Rev. 1 Provisue tuerstae Eserstee Preseng No. Resnessended Corrective Action taference* tastaisee b 10/26/83 10/23/84 Jettsdtstion' status 109 The heepttal had one taetroment avai1= 1.3.s s Sales C able for radielegical esettertog and L.1 the avs11able staff did not demon =

strate adegeste knowledge of sentamin-attes levels. Available writtee pre =

sederes sete est referenced. Respttal staff membero regetre additieaal radiotegical asetteries equipesas.

Further. the staf f requires addittenal training for deteretning the need for decentasiasties.

110 The heepital staff did not deseestrate K.S.a a Sales .e maattertog and deceassetaation of the L.1 ambulease sad ice staff. The seat- '

toring and decentaminattee of the, ,

embulance and crew should be desse=

strated La a future emergency drill.

til Dettag the September 27. Itse medical F.2 s Setee 1 (N) detti, the ambulasco crew emeter wee 2.2.s catted La to Sales County Menottal Respital over the radte anglected to say "This te e d:111.* A11 radio teseenisetene made se part of future .

andteal drilla should be clearly 1dentified as eush (Sectfee 2.4.31 18).

112 The sales County sangregate care 4.4 . s Sales C shelter shoute be able to dessestrate annagement tapentlity over a prolonged '

period. As assistant er standby shelter annager steu14 be destgaated ,

and trained. 4 113 The radiological monitoring equipuent R.10 s Sales I at the Sales County corsgregate care shelter had not been calibrated althan the past year. 14uipeset sheeld be talibrated et the stem intervele receanended by the supp11er.

11h teargency werkere et the Sales Cousty 1.3.a a Sales 4 sangregate sete eheitst did est know the contamination level' f or detereta*

tag the esed for decentansaattee.

Emergency werke re shoeld geestve additieaal treteing en contamination level for detereistag the seed for desostestaatisa.

l I

I Q

l

_m..

e - . O.

c

. l l

127 J

s Table 4.1 (Cent'd) -

t

. = * .,

Deficiency i

scagC-0434 tdantified FtflA-Stp-l j dev. 1 Prevleue Esercise Isersite Preseng No. Reccesseded Corrective Aatten Reference

• tsersises* 10/26/83 10/23/84 Jurisdiction

• Status

]

f 113 Personnel at the Sales CoundF deces- E.3.e a a Sales '1 i tseisation seater were ses provided I with persesal destancers Wetters at I the dessatastaation center shruld be I supplied with perseas; desteaters. In the 1984 eserties the verkers had pocket desteaters but ne perassent record destosters (Section 2.4.3s 6).

116 The appropriate equipessa for E.7 s Sales C eenitoring vehicles wee est available at the decentastaation center. The decentaelnatten center should be equipped with all assessary radio-4' togical senttering devices to I effectively perfere their functies. g L17 Cueberland Coenty meet demonstress the A.I.e a Custerland C 1 establishment of specifit organiae- ,

tises as part of the overe11 eastgency j

, respeese. All erganisattene Listed in the plan should participate La the eseretee. The detereinatten of whether ergestassional functione sad reopenettitittee have been ' properly

• assigned can sely be done with greater

- participetten .a radiological emer=

gency preparedness esercisee.

(18 There should be more than one person A.I.h a Cumberland C assisting the county emergency esaage-sent coordinator.

119 The Custerland County toc ocessionally A.1.s a Cumberland i Uf) becess avertrended and setsy because 1t. 3 of the presence et see-essential perseenet who were not ident.Lfied La the taunty's itRP staffing list. A seans should be developed to 11sst t>e nusher of personnel in the CCEOC. For esamsta, sely these individuals with a pre estabilahed ROC er field seeige*

sent should be allowed access Late the ROC withest specif ts paraissise of the te (sou ten 2.3.i o.

t .

I 4

.~,. -" L e .d ., .-

k 21 128

-4 Table 4.1 (Cent'd) .

Deficiency Nutsc-0654 tdaatified FEMA-REP-L Previous Esersiae taeraise Preseng Rev. 1. e g,,,gg,,,b 10/24/g3 10/23/64 Juris41stiee 8 Status Referesse me. tessammeded Corrective Aattee a Cumberland 1 (O 120 Sees steer problees with message 1.2.s head 11ag and desseestation were steerved at the CCtoc ineindtag is-correctly identifying the. searce of a

• eseesse, met incloding the tiene that sees of the aseseges were received, and not knowing with eartainty how to identify messages to the stase as essreise esseeges. Additteedl tratatas of seamaiestiees pereewest abould be coeducted to esaure escurate documentattom of essenges (Section .

2.3.18 3).

s Camberland A.4 121 The facilities et the h '-eland 3.J Cesaty 50C were eerstasi. Space end fureiture were lletted. Lamberland

• Geesty steeld investigate the .

Poseintlity of providing additieset epese and facilities for estended operatioes et the 80C (Secties 2 51 2).

s' Camperland 1 (M) 122 The Centerised Ceumsy redtelegical F.1 4 .,

field teen's radio was set adequate for centeattag' the CCIOC and the FCP f r se all field emetteries lasettene.

Osebeeland Cemety steeld tasostigste

• the need for a sete powerful redte systee for use by their redietegical field tesen for seemseicatises with the toc sad FCF (Secties 2.5.13 6).

Cumberland 1 C.1 a s a 123 teetdeate of Casterland and Sales C.2 a s Sales 1 Countlee east he ende euere of protective actions to be takee duttag

• a radielegical emergeoey.

Cueberland C g.3 126 The county EOC required more spese.

fee 61617. en additiemet trailer semid be need.

Cumberkand 12.3 Mape eeuld te larger and show greater J.10. t s detail.

.s Cumberland 1 (o 126 Some of tius volunt eer staff et the J.10.e Ceeberland Ceusty EOC as well 64 the 0.1 health departeenst representestive seeemd to have a 11mited heestadge of the distributee and use of 11.

Additteesi traisieg steeld be tuoteamsted to f amiliarise selreted staff esehere with the ese of E1 (Section 2.5.14 5).

l i

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f I $

l', ,

i 129 i

t i

j ,

Table 4.1 (Cont'd)

Deficioney

• NUuto-C654 tientified FEMA-REP-1 Rav. 1 Presteus tsarcise taercise Preseng No. Reacesseded Carrettive Attlee E4ference* Isertises h

10/26/83 '60/23/84 Jurisdiction' Status 127 De use of destanters need6 taprove- 1.3.s a Cumberland C

, sent. teergency workers within E.3.b

, Cumberland comery require aere tratatng. Setailed planatng and training of ladividuela La the area of radielegical health ,needs to be taproved. Peresneet radiological record devises eheu ld be made available.

' 158 Changes in pleet status and other F.I.b s Cumberland t important enereise developments were

, met proeptly relayed by the CCE0C to the Greenutch and stow Creek 10Cs.

Commenitatisee precedures with local

^

E0Ca cheuld be starified, and cousini- .

eattene personnel trained. The CCE0C should restew sta plan to assure that i appropriate sessages are transmitted  !

to the local E0Ca, and participate 14 comeniniset tene training drilla with the'1ecal 10Ca.

129 De DC held brieflogo of the staff A.1.b 3 Cumberland C only Lef requens tr. De toc staff A.2.a

• would benefit free periodic betettags

, and status updates.

• t 130 Stow Creek firefighters were set E.3.b s Stow Creek C adequately trained to radtelegical espesure sentret precedures, including the use of personal destaaters and doce record keeptag. Alas, they did not have E1. Fireftsnters should resetve pertedic training in radie*

logical owpegure concret precedures.

, D er should alae have K1.

131 A statue board ladicating the 9.3 s s Stow Creek C seersency 41.se s titeation level and

, leportant essaages should be stilised i

, at Stew Creet. De status board tadia casteg the energency claaetfication

Y level sad tapertant sessages should be used at the Stow Creen EOC.

l I

l I

a- a W 9 g.

4 130

. Tante 4.1 (Cent'd)

Deficieecy WUnas 4434 __ identifted FEMA-ttPat prevleue Exercise Emerstee me. Reesseended Carrective Actise tee. 1. s taference g,,,,3,,,b 10/26/83 10/23/84 Jetsadietten' Preseng status 132 As a result of the 1981 eserttee. D.3 m a tietahere C poetere displaytag the surreat emergener slase were preetaaetly displayed te meet 20Cs. The 81einbere toc did not display er ese the re-guired emergoesy properedeces posters.

This toc should poet and use the regelred pestere lastuding eresse boerde, the pleen EP2, pepelatise distribution. eessustise restee, assess centret petote and reisesties sentare. -

133 At sales City there see ever a ese 2.2 s Sales City  ;

hour delay la the 30C dispetther ,

estifytag the' EMC of the alert .

declarattee. Alert tag precedures at .

Sales City shestd be improved to essere that the RMC La estifled of the alara declarettee la a more timely enseer (secties 2 4.24 t).

134 set all of the telepheme ammhere es 3.2 m nonetastee 1 (N) the Messingtse call 11s4 used for .

starting emergency staff. had he,ee k

, updated. Telephone enehere listed se +

l the Masetssten staffing eall 11st should be persedicalir rettewed and updated as needed (Sestice 2.4.24 2).

13$ As in the preetees year. in genersa . A.4 s Maseington C there ves little participation in the a Pensavt11e C esercise by elected and appelated a Creenwith C afficiale. Stem Creek C 136 Meet emergency workere roepeedlag to E.3.s ,a Sales CLtv 1 as impediaset to evacuattee lef t their E.3.t a Elstaboro 1 destantere la their vehis14e. All emerseecy workere should he tastructed

, to carry destasters with thee et all stees la the field (Sectise 2.4.31 ,

11). '

137 The redistagical officer et the 14wer t.4 Lower Allowere 1 (N)

Allowere Creek EOC wee not aware of the espeaure threshold for recalling (tald etsif. Gustgemey staff steeld be trained to be koestedgeable ta the easimme allevable deee for fleid staff ,

(Setties 2.4.23 e).

133 Perseasel of the Leuer Alloweye Creet t.3.a a bewer Allowaye I f eeeue agend had me doetmeters.

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( q 4 1 g-d O. ,

131 Table 4.1 (Cont'd)

Deficisesy umtsc-c454 tdenttried FEMA-REP-l Rev. 1 Previeue Exercise Esertise Preseng No. Receamended Corressive Aattee Reference

• tuercises' 10/26/43 10/13/84 Jertsdiction' status 139 toCs ehemld cheek for seerdtaattee of F.1.b u tietabove C sitene and 188 and settfy the county a lower A11eways C Lf there is a problee with either a Kanntesten g/0bj(33,84 stresa er CBS. s Poseset11e C s Quintee C a Sales City C s . Greenwich C a Stem Creek C 140 Seeurity wee tafernal .et the local s.3 Mannington C 10C. Security steeld be provided. s Quintee C s Creeswich .C-Stem Creek C

, 141 4 soeurity progree see set is place as n.3 s a tietsbere C cthe 11statore ROC. A security erstes should be developed et the tisiebere 80C.

142 teargency backup power wee tea avail- s.3 m tietaboro 1 (N) able and functioning at the Cotabere a Sales City 1 (N) and Selee City 20Cs. teorgency generatore should te ande eve 11able and estatained et the Salem City and Elstaboro IOCs to escure meinterrupted '

operettee of these local toca (Seatten

• 2.4.2s 3).

143 Not eli sistabete and Sales City ,f.10.e  : Elstaboro 1 i emergency workers reopending to the Sales City I tecedimente to evacuatten were swore ef procedures for use and authertse-tien of RI. All emerguecy workers j thould be fully tratned La the ese of '

11 (Section 2.4.3 12).

144 Pepstation distributee aspe are J.10.h a u . Elstatore C aseded f or Quinton, Stew Creet, and a Quinton C Elstaboro. s Stew Creek C 145 toestry precedures by meistpel 20Cs J.12 tietabore N/Obj(83,86

/ auas be performed to st>s essent a tever Allowere N/Obj(03.S.

I possible in the time freen of the a Menelagten N/Obj(83,0

\ '

enereise. m Pensortile N/Ob)(83,54 a Quinton N/0bj(83.84 s Sales City - N/0bj(83,8

. s Creenwich N/0b)(83 B' a . Stem Creet N/0bj(83.8 O

48

1 0 g

9 f

3 132

, Table 4 1 (Cent'd) t

.n- =

I l

Deftalency WJttC-0454 tooneified FEMA-REP-1 tee. 1 Previous tsort tae Czereise No. Reseasseded Corrective Actles Reference" Esarsisee b Preseng 10/26/83 !Q/13/M Jurisdiesten* Statua 14e Utth the encepsten of Sales City, t.3.e a a a 81stabere t destanters were not geserally die- E.3.b s Lower A11 ewers tributed (1981 and 1982). Inadequate C

' s Massingtee supplies of dectesters were observed N Obs e C

at tietsbere end Peneettile (1983). Peenettile C e Quintee Self-reading destantere of both Lew= C N Obe Greeswich range (0-100 ed) sad toterendiate* C a Stee Creek reage (either 0-5 t er 0-20 t) C eenattartty and a permaneet record device should be provided to all energency workers. The 21stebere ROC had se Lasof f taiset neeber (eely 2) of destentar sete available dufteg the 1984 esercise. Thte defislancy wee 3 serrected at Passert11e (Secties 2.4.23.6.7). ,

147 teergener beak up power supplica were 2.3 s a e6ther landequate or lacklog at the Greeevich 't I .s a Stow Creek Creeevich and Stew Creek suaisipal 1 t0Ca. teergency generaters of appre-priate aapacity should be procured te assure uninterrupted operattee of these local ECCa (section 2.3 23 1).

144 the laver Alloways Creen pe11ee J.10.e a L.over Alloways Creek afficer at one accese <4ent rol point E.3.b I was aet esopletely f amiliar with, the use of destastere and 114 Police should recette EI and addittomat training on the use of desteaters and

11. El should be distributed as appropriate (Section 2.4.33 10).

1*9 The 21stabere ROC staf f lacked seem of P.3 s the necessary traintag to perfora all Els tabere C et the co rrest seassanicati see pre.

eederee. 51stabere ROC etsif usebers .

who are reopenettle for testementing the required esamuntestion procedures should ettend tratning seestees.

150 Precedural checklists were est used at D.4 a the 11ainbere IOC. Procedural cheek =

tisintere Liste eheuld be d.ettned and need.

154 & 24-hour call 11st for 20C stafflag A.1.e a a Maestegten was toc. notAave 11able in the naastesten A.4 C prepared and 24-hour call list should be used. Suff1steet energency reopense peresonel should be recruited sad ersined to provide 24=

hour aestinueue emergency respeese operattene.

C

)- *M -...,.. _ . - - __ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ " - " " - ' ' __ _ _.-- - -

]

. 133 Table 4.1 (Cees'd)

NUSEG-0454 Deficiency _

ue, FDia-LEP-1 Ydenettted tessamended Cetreettre Aceton Rev. 1 Previeve Referenc e ' tuoreises

• teerties tastetse 152 . . _ - 10/26/43 LQ/13/84 The route alerting teses to Peenettile Juttadtetten* Preseng Status are est t.6 aseseges. sappited with este er writtee The route alerting tease s ._

• should be suppited with espo and Penaewt11e written , o,ceaegos 1 (N) to effeestre route assure the

($esttee 2.4.h 9).alerties. If seeded L53 The Penneville toc te see see11 for affective operettee. 3.3 a should be Ceesideretten a a Penaeville 50C stventetoereleesttee of the a Peeneettle

/ (Sectise 2.4 24 4). larger fas!!1ty Quinten 1 C

\ 134 Tsslains to emergency resposee g prAedures and 0.1.b use of emergency s equipses te ne'cessary for Masalagtse. itannington C

'N/t .

Se NU12G-0434 reference.

hrevleus azersteee were13.held

' States se Acateber 1941 eed P etl 8, 1948.

State-ROPPrimarily er wholly related to easte er SECC

, State @tC2 Salesa Primerily or wholly relatedperetiene to Jotat Pitaartly er wholly related to $staa Co a Center functione.

MediFrieartly Patility faectione'. er wholly releced to toergenc Cuebertsedt 11stebere Cresortch Primarily or wholly related tounty functione.

Cunherla n dC euety functions.

' Lower A11ewspo Creek Quinten Primarily or vbollr reisted to the resp Sales City Stew Creet ective manicipeitty's functise d

Ct 1: Correstive acttee coepiste M/0bs(83):Carrective estion insemplete

, It/Obj(43 h Not observed dartog the 1963 eser t M/0bs(84): s ee g 8/0tj(84 h Met eteerved during 1984 emeratseNet se objective of the till eueresse (N):

New definleney eteerved rstee ate the 1984 ese1st se objective of the 1984 esercis

-_.