ML20207D814
| ML20207D814 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/11/1988 |
| From: | Baranski J, Czech L, Papile J NEW YORK, STATE OF |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OL-3-A-003, OL-3-A-3, NUDOCS 8808160108 | |
| Download: ML20207D814 (28) | |
Text
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DUCKETED USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
(
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 E 11 P6:01 Before the Atemic Safety and Licensinc Scard v> F :.
CCCr:. g. I rch.
)
In the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
)
(Emergency Planning)
I (Shoreham Nuclear Power
)
Station, Unit 1)
)
)
i AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES D. PAPILE, JAMES C.
BARANSKI AND LAWRENCE B.
CZECH James D. Papile, James C. Baranski and Lawrence B.
- Czech, being duly sworn, depose and say as follows:
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I.
Introduction i
1.
I, James D. Papile, am currently the Director of the State of New York's Radiological Emergency Preparedness Group
("REPG"), a position which I have held for a little over a year.
1 Prior to that and since 1980, I was one of three associate planners for REPG.
In my seven years with REPG I have helped 1
l write and/or review numerous radiological emergeacy response plans.
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I, James C. Baranski, am a nuclear facility specialist with REPG.
I also hold the additional position of Exercise Director for REPG.
I have been a REPG emergency planning nuclear facility specialist since 1981, and I have been the REPG Exercise Director since January 1985.
I have had extensive experience with nuclear power operations, including eight years in the United States Navy Nuclear Power Program and six years as a Senior Reactor Operator at Indian Point Unit 3.
3.
I, Lawrence B. Czech, am currently Chief of Nuclear Protection Planning with REPG.
In that position, I am responsible for the preparation, maintenance, revision, and oversight of the State portion of the New York State Emergency Response Plan.
I am trained in health physics and have worked in t 'l the area of radiological health and radiation protection for
(/
j approximately 25 years.
t i
l 4.
REPG, under the auspices of the State of New York's j
Disaster Preparedness Commission, is responsible for emergency I
l planning and preparedness for radiological emergencies pertaining i
to commercial nuclear power plants.
We have two roles in this planning process.
First, as emergency planners, we provide: (i) technical evaluations to senior State decision makers during
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actual emergencies, drills and FEMA evaluated exercises; (ii) 1 technical support in the preparation of drill scenarios; and (iii) technical training for State commissioners, county execu-tive officers and health officials, county dose assessment staff, public information staff and other REPG staff.
Second, through l
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q' 4
its Exercise Director, REPG has lead responsibility for scenario
(_) writing and off-site exercise planning.
In particular, REPG must drills and exercises maximize training requirements ensure that and meet defined objectives.
In addition, the Exercise Director coordinates development of on-site /off-site scenarios among federal officials, state and county governments, and nuclear utilities.
5.
We are familiar with and have reviewed LILCO's Motion for Summary Disposition of Contentions 7 and 8 (Ingestion Pathway and Recovery and Reentry) ("LILCO Motion"), which discusses the New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan for Commercial Power Plants ("New York State Plan").
We are also generally aware of the fact that LILCO has filed a series of gm motions related to the legal authority issues, asserting
~ generally that in an emergency, State and Suffolk County person-nel would respond according to the LILCO and State Plans and would work cooperatively with LILCO personnel.
LILCO's Motion is based on the premise that "during a Shoreham emergency, the State of New York would implement its ' generic' recovery and reentry and ingestion pathway procedures since they are not site-specific and would use the LILCO Plan as needed to compensate for the fact that no county plan for Shoreham has been appended to the generic section of the State Plan."
LILCO Motion at 2.
LILCO's factual assumptions are wrong.
The New York State Plan is in fact site-specific for recovery and reentry activities and for all activi-1 ties, including ingestion pathway, does not work, and could not work, as LILCO postulates.
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6.
LILCO starts from the assumptions that (i) :he New York O(_)
State Plan contains "detailed procedures about what the State would do during recovery and reentry (sic] ingestion pa:hway phases," and (ii) the counties play "minor roles" in planning for ingestion pathway and recovery and reentry decisions.
LILCO Facts No. 11/ and LILCO Motion at 1.
These assumptions are incorrect.
As a general matter, it is true that a "generic" State Plan exists, but detailed county plans for each plant located in New York State except Shoreham are an integral part of that State plan.
These county plans provide many of the details, procedures, and specific data and information necessary to permit the State to respond as required to the needs of a particular site, within both the 10-mile and 50-mile planning zones.
In addition, however, there are also many additional routines devel-oped at the State and county level via close interaction of personnel which are not reflected in the generic State Plan or the county addenda.
LILCO ignores the existence and importance of these additional routines.
These county plans and other procedures describe important roles for Counties to play in recovery and reentry activities and the Counties play significant support roles for ingestion pathway.
It is therefore a serious misconception to suggest that Counties play "minor roles" in said activities.
As a result, the State could not adequately respond to a Shoreham emergency witnout a detailed Shoreham-specific off-site plan appended to the State generic plan, without the i
training of State and local personnel concerning those specifics, 1/
LILCO Statement of the Material Facts as to Which There is No Genuine Issue to be Heard on Contention 7 (Ingestion Patnway) and 8 (Recovery and Reentry) ("LILCO Facts").
s 4
1 i
.7 without the development of internal agency procedures, and with-rm ls-)
the evaluation of State and local personnel during exercises out and drills.
7.
Based on its incorrect assumption that the counties play a "minor role," LILCO then argues that "the State can apply its recovery and reentry and ingestion pathway procedures in the
' generic plan' section of the State Plan to a Shoreham emer-gen:y."
LILCO Motion at 2.
This statement ignores the structure of the New York State Plan, the nature of planning for the recovery and reentry response, and the support role of the counties in the ingestion pathway phase.
In fact, LILCO makes several general assumptions about the New York State Plan and
~
emergency planning which are unwarranted.
O 8.
It is implicit in LILCO's Motion -
primarily via LILCO's silence -- that LILCO assumes effective ingestion pathway and/or recovery and reentry activities could be implemented by State or local government personnel despite the fact that those personnel have not participated in Shoreham-specific drills and exercises.
From experience at other sites in New York State, we have learned that the only way that State and local government personnel have been able to develop adequate site-specific response capabi.'. ties is through detailed planning, interfacing with personnel, drilling, and exercising.
Through detailed State and local government drills and exercises, government personnel have learned to work together and to prepare for unexpected O
5-
1 events.
Absent such site-specific training, the likelihood of an
(_-
effective response is low.
9.
At numerous points in its Motion, LILCO refers to plans for other counties in New York State.
LILCO Motion at 3-4 and LILCO Attachments 2-4 and 9-12.
The apparent point that LILCO attempts to make by these references is that what is done at these other plants is somehow indicative of what Suffolk County would or could do on ingestion and/or recovery and reentry activ-ities for Shoreham.
We disagree.
Based upon our experience, we know that despite whatever surface similarity might exist among county plans for various sites, the actual fact is that the various counties respond very differently to ingestion pathway and recovery and reentry matters.
The differences result from a
(i variety of factors, including:
the perceived strengths and V
weaknesses of various departments of government at the local level; the degree of advance interaction which occurs between State, local government, and utility personnel; and the amount and quality of drills and other training which actually occurs.
1 1
j We stress that what is set forth in the generic State Plan and the County plan addenda do n21 exclusively represent what actually is done (or planned to be done) in an emergency situa-tion.
Rather, there are detailed, albeit somewhat informal procedures and techniques which are worked out between State, 1
local government, and utility personnel in the planning and I
training process which actually enhance the real framework for an lntegrated response.
Thus, LILCO's Facts Nos.
8-9, 17-18 are not relevant in this proceeding.
At any rate, we dispute the d
6-l 4
apparent inference LILCO draws from those facts, luga, that wna I
i
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is set forth in the general plans for other Counties is a) all that is actually done by or for those counties, or b) is completely u.dicative of what ought to be done for a Shoreham emergency.
10.
There is no State preparedness related to the ingestion pathway or recovery and reentry portions of LILCO's Plan.
The State has no sufficient resources to respond to a Shoreham emer-gency.
While we have reviewed portions of LILCO's Plan, that has been only in the context of providing support to the State in the Shoreham licensing proceeding.
There has been no attempt to "learn" the LILCO Plan, to consider how to implement it, how it might interface with the generic State plan, to develop internal (G
agency procedures essential to an ingestion or recovery / reentry i
response at Shoreham, or to undertake the myriad of other actions which would be required prior to any drills or exercises of these "plans" for Shoreham, much less a response to a real Shoreham emergency.
II. Incestien Pathway 11.
Turning first to ingestion pathway planning, under the New York State Plan, the State Commissioner of Health has numer-l ous ingestion pathway procedure response options.
Egg New York l
State Plan III.35-38.
The options range from simply increasing l
1 environmental surveillance to the removal of surface soil and I
isolating and prohibiting land use.
The range of decisions whicn (s
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must be made is illustrated by tne options availaole for agricul-
\\,_J tural land, which include:
alter use of land, to allow radioactive decay of short-lived radionuclides; remove contami-nated surface crops and decay, for grasses, cutting and rolling sod - raking and removing mulch; remove of surface soil, allow natural surface erosion, or irrigate and leach; add excess lime to decrease nuclide solubility; and isolate and prohibit land use.
New York State Plan III. 38.
To make the decision as to the proper protective response option in just this one area, substan-tial information is needed on soil conditions, crop rotations, water flow patterns, and the resources and time required to perform each option.
This information will have to be collated with information concerning the amount of radiological contamin-(^3 ation.
To the extent County personnel are needed to provide U
these data, there must be interaction with County officials to pre plan who will perform particular tasks.
Then the appropriate county personnel must be trained and that training must be evalu-ated in exercises and drills.
Obviously, proper training of government officials requires time and resources.
Similarly, drills and exercises require time and resources.
At Shoreham, j
there has been no such training, drills or exercises for govern-l l
ment officials.
The existence of a New York State Plan and a LILCO Plan which, to our knowledge, no State or County officials know about or have reviewed and exercised, would not increase che I
likelihood that effective protective action could be taken.
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12.
Just as much information must be analyzed before the m.
State Commissioner of Health makes decisiens concerning agricultural land.
Adequate-ingestion pathway planning also requires similar information ano analysis as to consumable frui:s and vegetables, meat and meat products, grains, and animal feeds.
New York State Plan III. 38.
Although the State Plan broadly divides the responsibility fe" obtaining this information among various State departments and local agencies, the New York State Plan does not have the detailed site-specific procedures required to collect and analyze these data.
The New York State Plan specifically reserves to the State agencies the task of working out how information will be collected and analyzed and how personnel will be trained.
No New York State agency has worked out procedures, dedicated resources or trained personnel for
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ingestion pathway data collection and analysis at the Shoreham L/
site.
LILCO claims to have information available to make the needed ingestion pathway decisions.
To our knowledge the LILCO Plan has no provisions for obtaining information to make decisions on agricultural land, and has inadequate procedures to obtain information on other areas.
At any rate, even if the LILCO Plan had such procedures, they would not be implementable absent detailed training, drills, and exercises and extensive i
study and interfacing among response officials.
None of this has occurred or can be predicted to occur for Shoreham.
l l
13.
The level of training required for a proper ingestion pathway response is illustrated by our preparation for the Ginna exercise of ingestion pathway planning, conducted in October
(
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-9_
1987.
REPG participated in preparation for this exercise, and
(~)J that preparation involved close to nine months of meetings to 8.-
coordinate efforts among the State, the counties and the utili-ties.
In addition to coordination, our preparation involved training and drills for the State and county officials
- Indeed, two of the important lessons learned as a result of the Ginna exercise were:
(i) the planning effort could span a significant amount of time, perhaps up to one year; and (ii) it is important to consult with local cooperative extension agents who are familiar with land use and the particular crops that might be ready for harvesting at that particular time.
14.
LILCO fails to understand the nature of the New York State Plan, and therefore makes misleading statements such as O) County appendices.""the New York State Plan is composed
(-
This ignores the reality that the State Plan depends on the development of detailed procedures -
going beyond the generic Plan and county-specific addenda -- which implement the tasks identified in the Plan.
Returning to the example of ingestion pathway implementation, the New York State Plan leaves to various State agencies the responsibility of developing implementation procedures.
i Two major examples of a site-specific implementation procedures are (1) development of an adequate local communication network for use by the ingestion sampling teams, and (2) the establishment of an adequate opera-tions base for the ingestion sampling teams.
1 O
10 -
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15.
LILCO wrongly asserts that the State Plan has "clearly
(/
defined responsibilities" for counties such as Suffolk County.
LILCO Motion at 2.
In fact, the New York State Plan does not define responsibilities, since the precise details of how the County can respond are only worked out in discussions when trying to determine what kind of assistance to the Stcte the counties can provide.
For example, in preparing for the Ginna exercise, despite the existence of a generic State Plan and county-specific addenda, there still needed to be discussions to delineate State and county responsibilities.
These had to occur at the pre-planning stage, and then needed to be implemented and refined during drills, table-top exercises, and similar training sessions which emphasized the interfacing of personnel from the State, County, and utility.
Obviously, for Shoreham, this has not been
[}doneforStateandcountyofficials.
16.
The LILCO Motion unintentionally reflects the compli-cated nature of the ingestion pathway procedures, for it states chat the "Departments of Health, Agriculture and Markets, Environmental Conservation, State Police, and Transportation, the State Emergency Management Office (SEMO), and the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Group (REPG) will participate in assessing the impact of the radiological emergency on the ingestion pathway and will work with local governments in their response."
Motion at 20-21.
This shows the types of information which must be gathered and the interagency coordination wnich must occur to make ingestion pathway recommendations.
This coordination involves interaction with the numerous officials and has never.
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been practiced with respect to Shoreham.
Training and drills n
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that are Shoreham-specific would be essential.
17.
LILCO attempts to evade the need for a Shoreham site specific ingestion pathway plan by arguing that Suffolk County and Nassau County are already part of ingestion pathway plans for other sites.
LILCO Motion at 18 n.12 and 19.
It is a fundamental premise of radiological emergency planning that such planning be site-specific to a certain plant, for only then can one plan to coordinate State, County and utility activities.
Moreover, one dedicates resources and trains personnel to react to an emergency at or emanating from a specific site.
Thus, the fact that Suffolk and Nassau Counties are part of other plants' ingestion pathways does not provide the basis for any meaningful
('}
ingestion pathway planning, capabilities, or preparedness v
concerning a Shoreham accident.
1 i
18.
Thus, LILCO statements such as "there can be no question that the State's response to an ingestion pathway inci-dent would be adequate" (LILCO Motion at 26) are simply asser-tions without any support in fact.
The d.ecisions to be made in ingestion pathway analyses are numerous, complex, and require a vast amount of data.
To our knowledge, the counties near Shoreham have not dedicated the resources or trained the person-nel to support a state ingestion pathway response.
Under these circumstances, it would be unlikely that such resources could be provided on an ad has basis, i
O 12 -
III.
Redevery and Reentry r"(
19.
Turning next to recovery and reentry operations, LILCO-states that the New York State Plan "details what it will do during the recovery and reentry and ingestion pathway response phases of a radiological emergency and who on the State and local government level will be responsible for carrying out those functions Motion at 1 and LILCO's Facts 1 and 2.
This is not true.
The New York State Plan simply sets forth a general overview of what will go on during recovery and reentry and ingestion pathway phases.
The actual details of what goes on are not in the State Plan.
20.
In fact, recovery and reentry operations are extremely
(~h complicated and require detailed advance planning and drills as
%J to who is doing what and how.
For example, the entire process of recovery operations can begin only when there is a "determination of the recovery actions to be taken."
New York State Plan. IV.2.
To make this determination, the following kinds of activities are considered:
a.
Sampling and monitoring of radiation and evalua-tion of data by the Department of Health.
b.
Decontamination activities, including waste disposal, under the' direction of the Department of Health, undertaken by the appropriate local agency j
depending on the method utilized.
I c.
Security, including police and fire protection for i
affected areas -- will be provided by State and local police, and local fire agencies.
d.
Availability of medical service -- will be ascer-
/ ')
tained by State and local health officials..
7 Availability of electric power and telepnene e.
r, ccmmunications -- will be ascertained by Puolic
\\_;
Service Commission.
f.
Adequacy of food and water supply -- will be determined by Department of Agriculture and Markets and Department of Health.
g.
Operability of sanitary systems -- will be deter-mined by Department of Environmental Conservation.
h.
Availability of transportation -- will be deter-mined by local officials.
i.
Availability of sources of heat -- will be ascer-tained by State Energy Office.
j.
Condition and needs of the affec*ed population --
will,be surveyed and determined by Department of Social Services with assistance from the American National Red Cross.
New York State Plan IV 2-3.
Each one of these determinations requires extensive fact gathering and analysis.
kji 21.
LILCO asserts that the State "directs all recovery and reentry activities for radiological emergencies for all nuclear power plants in New York State other than Shoreham Motion at 3 and LILCO Facts No.
4.
This is not true.
Much of the direction comes from local personnel, because the New York i
State Plan specifically provides that "Local Chief Executives assess the needs of their affected areas in connection with the State Energy Management Office.
They direct recovery operations in their jurisdictions."
New York State Plan IV.l.
To respond adequately to a radiological emergency, the local officials must be trained and have the necessary resources.
To our knowledge, no such training and dedication of resources has been done for a radiological emergency at Shoreham.
%J,
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q 22.
LILCO also asserts that the emergency plans for kl counties in New York State normally defer to the State Plan for instructions on recovery activities.
First, this is irrelevant, because planning must Joe site-specific.
Second, this is only a half truth.
The counties must take direct action and have the lead with regard to gathering data and directing people not to reenter contaminated zones.
23.
LILCO attempts to limit the Suffolk County recovery and reentry functions as follows:
Consequently, the only functions that a county performs independently of the State are (1) providing security and fire protection, (2) determining the availability of transportation, and (3) gathering data and submitting them for federal aid.
None of these functions require special radiological expertise.
()
Rather, they are the types of activities that counties
\\_/
normally perform during any emergency.
The only function that may require special assistance during a Shoreham emergency would be assessing the transporta-tion needs of the public.
LILCO Motion at 14 (footnote omitted).
This is not true.
Counties must, under the New York State Plan, supply data such as the availability of medical services, and more significantly, "must direct the recovery operations in their jurisdiction."
New York State Plan IV.l.
This is a responsibility which requires planning, training and resources.
It is not likely that this could be done on an ad h22 basis in a timely and ef fective manner.
24.
Moreover, even if we were to assume tnat other county
()planswererelevant, LI*CO ignores the substantial responsibil-15 -
1 ities identified in the county plans, and thereby understates
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the role of the counties in implementing recovery and reentry operations.
For example, the Monroe County Plan specifies that the New York State Plan provides only "guidelines" for recovery and reentry operations.
Egg Monroe County Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan at I-0-2 (May, 1987) (hereafter "Monroe County Plan").
The County's responsibilities include:
Completion of radiation surveys by the County a.
Department of Health (CDOH) and the New York State Department of Health (NYSDOE) which indicate that contamination levels in an evacuated area are at least below the contamination action guides in Table D-1.
In areas which have been contaminated (sic], the CDOH and the NYSDOH may direct that reentry be allowed to all but specifically cordoned-off subareas.
b.
Determination that a threat to public health, as a
,_3 consequence of a release of radiation,
.o longer l
eX1sts.
c.
Completion of the CDOH and NYSDOH directed decon-tamination activities, including waste disposal, undertaken by County Fire Departments.
Assistance and guidance in this area will be obtained from the U.S.
Department of Energy.
d.
Notification to incoming traffic control check points of the areas for which reentry is authorized and the realignment of the traffic control perimeter.
e.
In conjunction with the State of New York, the Federal government, and the Nuclear Facility Operator, the preparation and issuance of announce-ments to the com.aunications media (e.g., news-papers, and radio and television stations) and Reception / Congregate Care Centers specifying the areas which may be reentered.
f.
Continuation of security for evacuated areas, including those for which reentry has been approved, to prevent unauthorized entry and vandalism.
g.
Provisicn of transportation for those individuals g-)x who were assisted during the evacuation.
( 5
h.
Distribution of drinking water and foodstuffs, if
{3 necessary, for the isolation of ingestion pathways s_)
and sources (see Part I, Section C.8.).
i.
Establishment of a long-term radiation monitoring program for any contaminated county areas.
Monroe County Plan at I-D-2.
IV.
M23t of LILCO's Facts Are Inccmolete, Immaterial, or Irrelevant 25.
On the basis of the foregoing, as well as our overall experience in ingestion pathway and recovery and reentry matters, we disagree in whole or in part with many of LILCO's 55 "Facts" as to which LILCO alleges there is no genuine dispute.
We summarize below our views.
Fact 1.
Denied.
The New York State Plan contains some detailed procedures.
However, many procedures are developed through interfacing of State, local, and utility personnel and site-specific development and are actually created only through extensive training, drills, and exercises.
Face 2.
Denied.
In actual practice, the State and local government personnel who will be responsible for carrying out particular recovery and reentry and ingestion pathway functions i
are not primarily identified in the Plan.
The government person-I nel are identified as a result of conducting thin training, drills, and exercises described in response to Fact 1.
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7 Fact 3.
Agreed.
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Fact 4.
Denied.
Much of the direction of recovery and reentry activities for radiological emergencies is conducted by local government officials.
Local government officials support the State in ingestion pathway activities.
In addition, the State has not developed procedures that are applied generically to other plants.
Rather, all procedures of the State are tailored to site-specific situations such as via detailed inter-facing, training, drills, and eve cises involving State, local, and utility personnel.
Fact 5.
Denied.
County personnel make their own decisions on recovary and reentry.
AV Pact 6.
We do not dispute that the LILCO Plan states what LILCO says that it states.
We do dispute certain of the implica-tions of what LILCO has asserted.
It is implied that there are a finite number of actions which might be chosen which are "consistent with their legal authorities to protect tne health and safety of the public.
Ingestion pathway and recovery and reentry activities are ccmplex.
Accordingly, there is considerable leeway for State and local governments to decide what actions are appropriate.
Given this leeway, it is essential that in advance of an accident if there is to be an effective response, there mast ce detailed interfacing and practice l
sessions to (nsure that there is agreement among all participsnts regarding what actions m'.the be appropriate.
Absent such
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. I w
l detailed pre planning, it is likely that a response would be
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ad h2g, ineffective, and inadequate.
Fact 7 We do not dispute that the Indian Point and Nine Mile Point plans state what they state.
For reasons already stated, we disagree that those statements are relevant to Shoreham.
Further, it must be pointed out that regardless of what is stated in those plans, there are underlying procedures which have been developed for all plants on a site-specific basis.
Accordingly, recovery and reentry operations are more complex and tailored to site-specific contexts than is implied by LILCO's statement.
Fact 8.
We do not deny that this is a quote from the
(')
Monroe County Plan.
However, the quoted statement is taken out
's_J of context.
The New York State Plan does not contain complete 4
instructions on recovery.
Fact 9.
We do not deny that this is a quote from the Monroe County Plan.
We do dispute, however, the implication that this necessarily is the only way a response proceeds.
Rather, as described previously, notwithstanding the general provisions of a plan, implementing techniques and actions are developed through site-specific interfacing taki.ng place during training sessions, drills, and exercises.
Fact 10.
Denied.
W? do not dispute what the State Plan states.
We do dispute, however, that that is a complete state -
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ment of what in fact occurs.
The local chief executives receive
(_/
information and recommendations fece staff members on wnat actions are to be taken.
Given that fact, it is necessary that there be advance planning and training to accomplish those func-tions.
This would be difficult to do on an ad agg basis.
Fact 11.
The State Plan statement is accurate, but it appears on IV-2, not IV-1.
However, in actual fact, recovery operations commence as early as possible in emergencies, not just when a situation "ts stabilized."
Fact 12.
The quotation from the State Plan is accurate.
However, any recovery committee which may be appointed is tailored to the specific site and to the specific details of the
(^3 emergency.
Accordingly, any implication that the specifics of a
\\,_)
recovery committee for a specific site are set by this State Plan l
provision is not accurate.
Fact 13.
Agree.
l l
Fact 14.
The statement regarding the State Plan is accur-l ate.
However, in actual planning for recovery operations, a 1
variety of other persons may have primary responsibility for the i
j referenced actions, depending upon the site-specific implementing l
details that nave been worked out during the interfacing and l
i preparations related to the particular site.
1 1
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Fact 15.
Denied.
The statement
(~b attempts to paraphrase what
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the State Plan says.
In reality, however, the coordination of State assistance may be exercised by many otner persons as well, including representatives of local jurisdictions.
This all depends upon the nature of the actual emergency and the site-specific pre planning, training, and drills which have addressed these matters.
Accordingly, a generalization such as set forth in Fact 15 is not accurate.
Fact 16.
Denied.
This fact is vague in its reference to "local committees for recovery operations."
Accordingly, it is denied.
We also do not believe that the planning for other plants is relevant since the planning must be site-specific.
(T Eact 17.
What occurs in Monroe County is irrelevant to the
\\,i Shoreham proceeding.
Further, based on our experience, it is car understanding that what actually would occur in Monroe County with respect to the County Executive is more ccmplex.
It would depend upon the detailed preparations and planning, plus the availability and knowledge of particular individuals at the time of the accident.
d Part 18.
Not relevant.
The same kind of caveats as with respect to Fact 17 are applicable to Fact 18 Fact 19.
Denied.
Recovery cperations actually involve l
l more considerations than the four major ones that are set forth l
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V 1 I
there.
Ot..er considerations include all of those set forth on
()
pages IV-2 through IV-5 cf the New York C* ate Plan.
Fact 20.
Denied.
While the State Plan provides as quoted, the actual standard which may be used will be decided upon in close consultation with local officials and given the nature and circumstances of the accident.
Detailed pre-planning is necessary to provide flexibility 'n view of the State Plan provisions.
Eact 21.
Denied.
The statement is an inaccurate paraphrase of page IV-2 of the State Plan.
The State Department of Health is nat the only agency that has responsibility for analyzing all of the exposure pathways set forth in LILCO's statement.
In actual practice, local officials, utility personnel, and others may also be involved.
l l
Eact 22.
Denied.
The State Plan. ioes not specify who uses the evaluation of these exposure pathways te determine the projected dose commitments.
In any event, other data may also be i
utilized.
i'act 23.
Denied.
The actual responsibilities overlap i
greatly and the LILCO attempt in Table 1 to create rigid areas of responsibility between State and County officials is not an accurate portrayal of the way emergency response works.
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Fact 24.
L:LCO accurately quotes the State Plan.
The (m
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public information officer ("PIO") has detailed site-specific training to perform these functions.
Absent site-specific training, these functions would be difficult to perform.
Accordingly, we disagree with Fact 24 to the extent it implies that a State-level PIO could be appointed for Shoreham and perform such functions absent the kinds of detailed training which must be provided.
Eact 25.
LILCO accurately states what is in the State Plan.
Ecwever, the statement does not describe the fact that the state PIO is the point of contact, ind the guidance is provided to the PIO by higher authority.
This coordination requires detailed pre-planning.
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Fact 26.
Denied to the extent that there is the implication that these are the only factors that are considered before any information about recovery actions is disseminated to the public.
Denied also to the extent it implies that each such factor must be considered.
The actual response to an emergency situation is less rigid..Such flexibility places a premium on extensive prior planning and training.
Fact 27.
Denied to the extent that it is implied that the actual release of information by the State PIO will be done only with the approval of the State Disaster Preparedness Commission Chairman and the State Health Commissioner.
In reality, the detailed site-specific procedures for how such information will (v"T 23 -
i
be released are worked out and are quite flexible depending upon s_)
the nature of the emergency, and other factors.
Again, a premium is placed on advance training, without which effective response is not possible.
Fact 28.
The quotation of the State Plan is accurate.
No such assistance could be provided in the short term absent detailed pre-planning such as is done for other sites.
State policy precludes that for Shoreham.
Fac6 29.
Agreed.
East 30.
The description of the State Plan statement is accurate.
Fact 31.
Agreed.
Fact 32.
Denied.
It is denied that providing police security and fire protection during an emergency is a "normal" county function.
The details of who provides particular security and fire protection will vary from site to site, depending upon the infrastructure of the local government and the availability of resources.
Fact 33.
Denied.
The fact is vague.
What counties do in an emergency varies greatly depending upon the site-specific characteristics of the topography and geography, the capabilities of the county, the availability of State resources, and other O
factors.
Absent a listing of the factors which are assumed, this g(-)
fact cannot be idmitted or denied.
Easa 34.
We do not dispute that the LILCO OPIP provides as noted.
We have no confidence, however, that the LERO perconnel necessarily have the capabilities and training to conduct these activities.
Fact 35.
We do not dispute that the LILCO OPIP provides as noted.
Ne have no confidence, however, that the LERO personnel necessarily have the capabilities and training to conduct these activities.
Fact 36 Agreed.
/mb Fact 37.
Agreed, but we disagree as described previously with the implication that it is relevant that parts of Nassau County and Suffolk County are in the ingestion pathway zones for 3
other plants or would assist in providing an adequate response to a Shoreham accident.
u Pact 38.
Agreed, but we disagree as described previously with the implication that the fact that parts of Nassau and Suffolk County are in the ingestion pathway zones for other plants is material or relevant or would assist in providing an adequate response to a Shoreham accident.
O 25 -
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Fact 39.
Denied.
State agencies rely on other internal
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is procedures.
Fact 40.
We do not dispute that LILCO quotes the State Plan correctly.
We disagree with any suggestion, however, that with-out detailed Shoreham-specific advance planning between the State and Federal government, that any effective ingestion pathway response could be effected for a Shoreham emergency.
Fact 41.
Denied to the extent that it is implied that the counties provide only the support noted by LILCO.
In fact, particular counties provide more or less support, depending on such factors as their capabilities, their planning, their training, and the nature of their governmental infrastructure,
(~3 and other factors.
V Ep c t 42.
Agreed.
Fact 43.
Irrelevant.
Egg also responses to Facts 37 and 38.
y Fact 44.
We agree, but emphasize that the State's colo may vary and include more or less responsibility depending upon the site-specific planning which is carried out.
Fact 45.
Agreed.
However, the actual actions of the Disaster Preparedness Commission on ingestion pathway response may be more or less or different from those provided in Fact 45, O
LJ.
i depending on the nature of the accident, the nature of the pre-2
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planning and prepartdness, and the natura of the capabilities of the local governmental officials.
Fact 46.
Agreed.
Fact 42 We do not dispute the accuracy of the quotation from the State Plan.
In fact, however, the actual exercise of command and control will vary from county to county and accident to accident.
Again, the detailed pre-planning and interfacing will explain who exercises command and control in what particular situation.
Generalizations are not possible.
Fact 48.
We do not dispute that the quotation is accurate.
We-disagree with the LILCO statement that this procedure requires that the State establish "an extensive public alert notification system."
The decision whether to establish such a system for Shoreha.% is up to the State and local governments.
Fact 49.
Disagree.
The actual location and components of the joint news center vary from site to site.
l Fact 51 Irrelevant.
Fact 52 We do not disagree that the LILCO Plan J.tates as l
l alleged by LILCO.
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P.2 Paet B2 Danied.
There are times when different persons may in fact be in charge of collecting various samples, raet 53.
Deniad.
We cannot determine what the LILCO P1an
' contemplates."
Fact 54 Denied.
The Ginna exercise included a test of the State ingestion pathway procedure for local governments in the vicinity of Cinna only.
Fact 55 Agreed.
However, we disagree with the imp 11 cation l
l that a State response elsewhere would necessarily be as adequata l
as the State response to Ginna.
The adequacy of the state response at Ginna depended upon time consuming pre-planning and O
,re,aration..
ibsent a simita, xind of offore, it i. not 11xe1, l
that a State response to a Shoreham emergency would be adequate.
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