Text

Intervenor Exhibit I-SC-72,consisting of 851216 Post-Exercise Assessment,850926 Exercise of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans of State of Ny & Monroe & Wayne Counties for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Station
	ML20238A333
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	05/07/1987
From:	Petrone F; Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	;
References
	OL-5-I-SC-072, OL-5-I-SC-72, NUDOCS 8708310030
	Download: ML20238A333 (108)
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FINAL POST EXERCISE ASSESSMENT

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September 26,1985 Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Pr.eparedness Plans of New York State, ,

Wayne County, and Monroe County, for the

ROBERT E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER STATION December 16,1985 Federal Emergency Management Agency Region !!

s Frank P. Petrone , 26 Federal Plaza

, Regional Director New York, N.Y.10278

r s PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONS New York State o Radiological Emergency Preparedness e Department of Labar Group e Department of Education e State Emergency Management Office e Div. of Military and Naval Affairs e Department of Health e Department of Transportation e Division of State Police e Department of State o Department of Agriculture and Markets e Fire Administration e Department of Environmental e Energy Office Conservation e Public Service e Department of Parks & Recreation e Rochester Gas & Electric e Department of Social Services Monroe County e Office of Emergency Preparedness e Town of Webster e Department of Health e City of Rochester e Sheriff's Department e Fire Coordinator e Public Information Office o Regional Transit Authority e County Executive e Lift Line e Department of Transportation e Humane Society e Department of Social Services 'e Rochester Gas & Electric e Webster Central School District e RAC ES c e Greece Central School District e U.S. Department of Agriculture Wayne County I

e Board of Supervisors e Schools Coordinator e Office of Emergency Management e County Extension Association e Sheriff's Department e Office of Aging e Fire Coordinator e Wayne Area Transportation e Highway Department Services e Ambulance Coordinator e Wayne Central School District e Social Services e Palmyra-Macedon Central School e American Red Cross District e Williamson Central School District e Union Hill Fire Department e Ontario Fire Department o East Williamson Fire Department e Walsworth Town Highway Dept.

Nonparticipating Governments and Organizations None

r 0

a y CONTENTS PA RTICIP ATING GOVERNMENTS AND ORG ANIZATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii A D B R E VI AT I O N S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v i

SUMMARY

.................................................................vii 1 I NT R O D U C TI O N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1 Ex e rc is e B a c kgro u n d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.2 Fed e ral O bs e rv e rs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.3 E v alu a t i o n C ri t e ri a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.4 Ex e rc is e O bj e c t iv es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.4.1 New York State. Emergency Operations Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.4.2 New York State Field Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.4.3 Western District Emergency Operations Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 ,

1.4.4 Lake District Emergency Operations Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 l 1.4.5 Emergency Operations Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 i

1. 4. 6 Jo i n t N e w s C e n t e r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 7 l 1.4.7 Wayne County Emergency Operations Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.4.8 Wayne County Field Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 l 1.4.9 Monroe County Emergency Operations Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1.4.10 Monroe County Field Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 .

1.5 Ex e rc is e Sc e nario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1.5.1 Major Sequence of Events on Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1.5.2 Sc e n ario Ov e rv ie w . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 )

1.5.3 Description of State and Local Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 i 1.5.4 Actual and Simulated Of f-Site Even ts Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 l 1.5.5 Ex e rc is e Ti m elin e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2 E X E R C IS E E V A L U ATIO N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 2.1 NewYorkState.....................................................24 2.1.1 State Emergency Operations Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 2.1.2 Western District Emergency Operations Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 2.1.3 Lake District Emergency Operations Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 2.1.4 Emergency Operations Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 2.1.5 Joint Ne w s C e nt e r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 l 2 . 2 W a yn e C o u n t y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 2.2.1 Wayne County Emergency Operations Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 2.2.2 Field Monitoring Tea ms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 2.2.3 Field Implementation of County Actions to Protect the Public . . . . . . . 40 l 2.2.4 Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 2.2.5 P u b lic A w ar e n e ss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 2.3 M o nro e C o un ty Op e ra tio ns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5 2.3.1 Monroe County Emergency Operations Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 2.3.2 Fi eld M o ni t o ri n g Te a m s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4 8 2.3.3 Field Implert.entation of County Actions to Protect the Public . . . . . . . 50 2.3.4 Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 2.3.5 P u blic A w ar e n e ss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 iii

r i CONTENTS (Cont'd) 3 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTING DEFICIENCIES OR AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: SEPTEatBER 26,1985 EX E RCIS E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 4 SUS 13tARY OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION...............................................................73 TABLES 1.5.1 Em ergency Classifica tion Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 1.5.2 Protective Action Decision /Public Notification Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3.1 Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station - Remedial Action Ne w York Sta t e EO C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4 I

3.2 Robert E. G!nna Nuclear Power Station - Remedial Action l W e s t e rn D i s tri c t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6 3.3 Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station - Remedial Action L a k e D i s t r i c t . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7 I

3.4 Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station - Remedial Action i l

Em erge ncy Operations Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8 j 3.5 Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station - Remedial Action JointNewsCenter..................................................59 l

3.6 Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station - Remedial Action WayneCounty......................................................60 3.7 Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station - Remedial Action St o n ro e C o u n t y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8 4.1 Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station - Remedial Action N e w York S ta te EO C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4 i 4.2 Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station - Remedial Action W e s t e rn D is t ri c t E 0 C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8 4.3 Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station - Remedial Action La k e D i s t ri c t E O C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9 4.4 Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station - Remedial Action Em ergency Operations Facility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 8 0 4.5 Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station - Remedial Action Jo i nt N e ws C e n t e r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 IV

I e i TABLES (Cont'd) 4.6 Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station - Remedial Action W a yn e C o u n t y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2 4.7 Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power. Station - Remedial Action M o nr o e C o u n t y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 9 t

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V

5 ABB REVIATIONS ANL -

Argonne National Laboratory BNL -

Brookhaven National Laboratory DOC -

U.S. Department of Commerce DOE -

U.S. Department of Energy DOH -

Department of Health (New York State)

DOT -

U.S. Department of Transportation EBS -

Emergency Broadcast System EOC - emergency operations center EOF -

emergency operations facility EFA -

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency EPZ - emergency planning zone ERPA - emergency response planning area FDA -

U.S. Food and Drug Administration FEMA -

Federal Emergency Management Agency HHS -

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services INEL -

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory

JNC - Joint News Center K! -

potassium lodide LDEOC -

Lake District Emergency Operations Center (Newark)

NRC -

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OEP -

Office of Emergency Preparedness (Monroe County)

PIO -

public information officer RAC -

Regional Assistance Committee R AC ES -

Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service RECS -

Radiological Emergency Communications System REPP -

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan RERP -

Radiological Emergency Response Plan SEOC -

State Emergency Operations Center (Albany)

SEMO -

State Emergency Management Office TLD -

thermoluminescent dosimeter USDA -

U.S. Department of Agriculture VCT - volume control tank WCEMO -

Wayne County Emergency Management Office !

WDEOC - Western District Emergency Operations Center (Batavia) vi

0 i

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SUMMARY

On Thursday, September 26,'1985, a team of twenty-four Federal Observers-

. evaluated an exercise of the radiological emergency response plans and level of preparedness for the G!nna Nuclear Power Station. This was a day exercise, from i approximately 0745 to 1600. Following the exercise, an evaluation was made by the I federal observer team and a preliminary briefing for exercise participants was held at the Sheraton-Newark Inn on September 27,1985 at 1130. A briefing for the general public was held that same evening at 1900 in the Joint News Center at the Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation Hadcuarters in Rochester, New York. Subsequent to those -

- preliminary briefings, detailed evaluations were prepared and are included in this report.

During a full-scale exerelse FEMA requires that most components of the State and local emergency response organizations participate. Federal observers evaluated the following operations:

e State EOC in Albany )

e Off-site Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) l l

e Joint News Center e Western District EOC in Batavia 1

e State Lake District EOC in East Newark

)

e Wayne County EOC

! e Monroe County EOC e Bus evacuation of school children and general population l e Traffic Control Points (TCPs) e Route Alerting e Impediments to evacuation e Radiological monitoring l e Reception and Congregate Care Centers l

l The following is a summary of evaluations made by federal observers during the September 26,1985 exercise.

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State of New York Overall, management of the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Albany was very good. State and voluntary agencies demonstrated the knowledge and capability to respond effectively to scenario events. The Governor's designee utilized State resources and coordinated exercise events with county and utility representatives. Staff l

notification was sufficient; however, there is a need to establish a staff status board to ensure that all agency representatives report as directed.

The EOC space was adequate. Communications support equipment consisted of RECS lines, hotlines, telecopiers, telephones and radios. All equipment worked well.

Accident assessment personnel arrived at the EOC in a timely manner and promptly established contact with their liaison at the EOF. Dose projections were made initially based on plant conditions and later on reported release rates and field monitoring data. At one point the information transmitted over the Radiological Emergency Communications System (RECS) telephone caused confusion concerning the source term.

However, the State Radiological Health personnel confirmed the correct source term via telephone. Protective actions recommendations were made in a timely manner. Field data was tracked, plotted and used to verify projections based on the source term.

The New York State personnel monitoring center (PMC) was activated. The capability to monitor State emergency workers, their vehicles and, if necessary, to decontaminate them and properly handle both solid and liquid contaminated waste, was adequately demonstrated.

Western District EOC The facilities and cesources available at the Western District EOC were sufficient to support an extended emergency response activity. All required displays and maps were posted. Two previously identified deficiencies concerning the displays have been corrected. A map displaying population distribution by Emergency Response Planning Areas (ERPAs) was posted and a status board depicting the emergency classification level was clearly visible and updated in a timely manner throughout the exercise. The entire staff was involved in the decision-making process, assisting the coordinator in timely and accurate decisions. ,

Improvements are still needed in communication equipment used at the Western District EOC. An inadequate number of commercial telephoce' lines and telephone instruments are available in the EOC operations room. Only three (3) telephone lines are available for use by all the responding agencies. The FL OS machile, providing hard copy capability with several locations, also malfunctioned.

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l Lake District EOC

, The Lake District EOC emergency staff response was activated at the Alert Notification (0853) and the facility was fully staffed by 1000. There was adequate space, equipment and supplies to support emergency operations. The designated official was in charge of the operation. Incoming personnel were briefed and periodic staff briefings were held. Messages were promptly logged in and a status board was maintained and

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updated as necessary.

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is located in the basement of an annex )

building to Rochester Gas & Electric's executive offices, sixteen miles from the site of the Ginna reactor. The EOF consists of a large, open central area where information, analysis and decision-making functions take place. There are four adjacent rooms and a second open area. Space is adequate and information is displayed using the status boards.

1 The EOF was fully staffed, functional and activated prior to the declaration of a l Site Area Emergency. The Recovery manager who is in charge of the EOF was supported by senior staff members including the former Ginna Station superintendent. Incoming l Information from the control room for the reactor or the on-site Technical Support Center j (TSC) was promptly relayed to cognizant EOF staff. The Recovery Manager used a l portable loud speaker to brief EOF staff regularly throughout the exercise. l l

Accident assessment and information on Protective Action Recommendations l were based on information regarding the known or probable status of the reactor and containment structure. This approach was the only available one, since according to the scenario, release of radioactive materials into the environment did not begin until early afternoon, several hours after the declaration of a General Emergency. Decisions were made during EOF senior staff conferences and promptly announced, posted and transmitted. The Recovery manager was in command and control at all times.

The EOF staff demonstrated the capability to analyze reactor information,

! forming timely protective action recommendations and communicating them to the state and counties. The New York State staff arrived in a timely manner, received information from all sources and accurately analyzed it.

Joint News Center Overall, the emergency public information function, handled from the Joint News Center, was very good. The Monroe and Wayne County PIO staffs are extremely competent and efficient. The State PIO staff once again did an execilent job.

Coordination between the counties and with the State was very good.

The Joint News Center layout and copying capability is much improved, correcting two deficiencies. The detailed and clear EPZ map in the press briefing room was used to track protective actions and wind speed. A similar map was displayed in the county PiO area and' protective actions were indicated using color overlays.

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EBS message was aired l Wayne County sirens sounded at 0925 and the 'first j beginning at 0927. The Monroe sirens were not sounded until 0929 due to a real incident --

' l a fire.

The EBS messages themselves were clear, well-written and issued within the !

prescribed 15 minutes of decisions made by the County Chief Executive to implement protective actions. Some EBS messages referred listeners to the calendar and others l referred to both the calendar and the telephone book insects. All messages should refer to I both, not only in the interest of consistency, but more importantly because people are more likely to keep their telephone books than the calendar.

At the Joint News Center, the copiers, which are noisy, would be more suitably Rumor control inquiries made by Federal piaced out of the county PiO work area.

observers were handled adequately.

I Wayne County, New York Emergency Operations Center and resources in Wayne County were generally acceptable; however, the Emergency Operation Center (EOC) has inadequate ventilation.

The Radiological Emergency Communications System (RECS) telephone was subject to interference both from within the EOC from another telephone line and from a pitch tone internal to the line. The RECS lines should be inspected to determine the cause of these All maps and displays in the problems which were also identified in the 1983 exercise.

EOC were adequate.

The Chairman of the Board of Supervisors promptly reported to the Wayne County He relied on EOC and assumed control of an overall emergency response organization. >

county resources to assess and implement emergency response functions, and coordinate major decisions and actions with the State and Monroe Initial County.

andCommunications between follow-up eme.gency ,

the Wayne County Warning point and EOC were good. Information concerning the J notifications were received via the RECS telephone.

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' emergency action level, plant conditions and weather data were clear and timely. l information was recorded on RECS message forms for use in dose assessment and copies of the RECS messages were delivered to the County ExecutiveExecutive for coordination of decision-decision-making l

making with Monroe County and New York State authorities. Recommended was coordinated through the. dedicated Executive Hotline telephone. )

Protective Actions such as sheltering and evacuation were well coordinated and decisions l requiring implementation were timely. Continuous communications were maintained throughout the exercise using a dedicated telephone which linked Wayne County PIO personnel at the County EOC and the Joint News Center. All protective action decisions were relayed to the Joint News Center for the coordination of Emergency Broadcast Messages originating at that facility.

The Radiological The Wayne County dose assessment capability was adequate.

Assessment Officer has been trained and he and his staff demonstrated the ability to accurately calculate doses using three different systems (1. hand calculator with The manual calculation, 2. preprogrammed hand held calculator and 3. personal computer).

ability to understand, interpret and use the appropriate Protective Action Guides was x

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r satisfactorily demonstrated. Back up dose assessment support personnel from both l '

Rochester Gas & Electric and Stato liaison officers were available but their assistance was l not required during this exercise.

Evacuation of the segment of the general population that relies on public trans-portation was effectively demonstrated by dispatching two (2) buses. Both bus drivers were well trained and knew all bus pick-up points and had a thorough knowledge of dosimetry. -

FEMA observers introduced impediments to evacuation during this exercise by l simulating two accidents in the field. Response to these impediments were prompt and' '

l effective. Policemen dispatched to traffic control points followed proper procedures by; l closing off roads; setting-up equipment; directing traffic; ability to use dosimeters; and ]'

l knowledge of evacuation plans.

Sirens were sounded at approximately 0925 for approximately 5 minutos. No reports of actual siren failure were received; however, route alerting based on simulated siren failure, introduced by a Federal observer, was conducted effectively as part of the i off-site scenario.

Spot checks of pu'blic awareness regarding emergency measures for the Ginna Nuclear Power Station were conducted in Wayne County and included hotel / motel staff, staff members for schools with tone alert radios and a sample of the general population.

Fifteen of the twenty general population respondents in the 10-mile EPZ said they had l

received the public information on the calendar and maps showing evacuation routes and location of reception centers. There was mixed interest in becoming familiar with emergency measures. However, all respondents were willing to cooperate and would evacuate if instructed to do so.

The Palmyra-Macedon Sr. High School provided a good demonstration of their capabilities to function as a reception and congregate care facility. The facility was fully staffed and a roster was available with additional staff listed to provide 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months staffing capability. The physical facilities were very adequate for both the reception and congregate care functions. Monitoring areas were well established for both vehicle and personnel monitoring. Contamination monitoring procedures were well demonst ated for both vehicle and personnel monitoring. Although all the monitoring instru...ents were operational, no calibration stickers were displayed on any of the survey instruments. The route from the vehic!e decontamination area back to the personnel monitoring area should be revised to assure that all personnel are monitored.

Monroe County, New York The Monroe County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was activated and fully staffed in a timely fashion. The County warning point notified key personnel of the emergency classifications " Unusual Event." Consequently, by 0919 the EOC war fully operational The operations room was welllighted providing close, but reasonable working areas for agency representatives as well as the dose assessment staff who worked in similar quarters. Maps indicating evacuation routes, population by ERPAs, locations of xi

l reception and congregate care centers and stren locations were displayed. Security at the I access point to the EOC was good. All prospective EOC entrants were required to provide l proper identification.

Overa!!, the command and control function at the Monroe County EOC was well organized. Adequate respenses coupled with proper utilization of county resources provided solutions to traffic related problems that were interjected during the exercise.

At all times the County Chief Executive or his alternate were clearly in control.

However, on two occasions the decision-maker did not follow recommendations of this staff. Specifically, the Radiological Officer's initial recommendation to evacuate planning areas M1 and M2 was not implemented. The decision to shelter ERPAs M1, M2 and M3 was not discussed with the Radiological Officer. The decision-maker subsequently followed a later recommendation to evacuate; however, due to the delay in implementing the first recommendation, the last evacuees leaving the effected ERPAs could have been exposed to the airborne plume.

Internal communications were very well organized through the proper use and control of the internal messages forms. Briefings veere held on a regular basis and status boards were updated continually to reflect receipt of current information. Agency logs of all communications were maintained. Public alerting and instructional messages were effectively coordinated and disseminated by the County Executive. Each protective action was well coordinated through the use of a dedicated phone linking Monroe and Wayne counties and the State of New York. Protective action decisions were properly communicated to the Joint News Center.

The County radiological officer and his staff in the Monroe County EOC were mobilized in a timely manner. The functions of this office were fully operational within 30 minutes of the declaration of the alert emergency classification level. Radiological l field monitoring teams were also mobilized in a timely fashion. Dose projection {

calculations were performed by two separate computer systems and, in the event of a failure, could have been completed using a manual method. The dose assessment staff was hampered by the fact that plant data did not arrive in the Monroe EOC in a timely manner, often arriving 30 to 90 minutes late. Communications between the EOC and field monitoring team was excellent. The field monitoring teams need additional training to assure all equipment and supplies are available and in working order prior to' leaving the j assembly point. Also, the teams must follow established procedures for counting the air sample media to ascure valid results. As field monitoring data became available, comparisons were made between measured and projected dose rates.

The operation of the reception and congregate care center established in Olympia High School in Greece was excellent in all respects. Also, bus evacuation routes were run very well; bus drivers were knowledgeable about exposure control and bus pick-up points.

Due to some misunderstanding, the police did not establish the Traffic Control Points (TCPs) in a timely manner. However, once clarification was provided, the TCPs were established promptly. The general public, based on surveys conducted by observers, was cognizant as to what procedures should be followed during a radiological emergency.

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1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND l 'On December 7,1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response.

FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:

e Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans developed by state and local governments, e Determining whether such plans can be implemented on the basis of ,

observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans conducted by state and local governments, and e Coordinating the activities of federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:

U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) '

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)

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U.S. Department of Transportation'n (DOT) l U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) ,

- U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)

U.S. Department of Interior (DOI).

Representatives of these agencies serve as members of the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.

Radiological emergency preparedness plans (REPPs) for the Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station, which is located in Ontario, New York, were formally submitted '

to the RAC by the state and involved local jurisdictions. This submission was followed closely by the critiquing and evaluation of these plans. An exercise was then held on January 21, 1982, and a post exercise assessment was issued by FEMA, Region II on February 12, 1982. A public meeting was held on May 5,1982, to act" taint the public with the plan contents, answer questions, and receive suggestions on the plans.

A second exercise was conducted on June 22, 1983, and the post exercise assessment was issued by FEMA Region II on October 12, 1983. A third exercise was conducted on September 26, 1985 between the hours of 0730 and 1600, to assess the capability of the S, tate and local emergency preparedness organizations to implement

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their radiological emergency response plans and procedures to protect the public in a radiological emergency involving the P.obert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station.

An observer team consisting of personnel from FEMA Region II, the RAC, l FEMA's contractors, and federal and state agencies evaluated the September 26 exercise.

. Twenty-four (24) observers were assigned to evaluate activities of state and local

) jurisdictions. Team leaders coordinated team operations.

Following the exercise, the federal observers met to compile their evaluations.

Observers presented observations specific to their assignments, the teams of observers developed preliminary assessments for each jurisdiction, and team leaders consolidated the evaluations of individual team members. Based on these preliminary assessments, a public critique of the exercise was held for exercise participants and the general public j at 1900 on Friday, September 27, 1985 at the Joint News Center at the Rochester Gas i and Electric Corporation Headquarters in Rochester, New York.

The findings presented in this report are based on evaluations of federal observers, which were reviewed by FEMA Region II. FEMA requests that state and local jurisdictions submit a schedule of remedial actions for correcting the deficiencies j discussed in this report. The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to j the FEMA Associate Director of State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, '

D.C., that all negative findings observed during the exercise have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into state and local plans, as appropriate. l I

1.2 FEDERAL OBSERVERS Twenty-four (24) federal observers evaluated off-site emergency response ;

functions. These individuals, their affiliations, and their exercise assignments are given I below. l Observer Agency Exercise Location / Function (s)

R. Kowieski FEMA Oversight Observation / Region II RAC Chairman G. Connolly FEMA State Emergency Operations Center (EOC)/ Team Leader R. Honkus INEL State EOC/ Accident Assessment W. Gasper ANL Western District EOC/ Team Leader R. Bernacki FDA Lake District EOC; State Personnel Monitoring Center /

Team Leader; Radiological Monitoring C. Amato NRC Ginna Emergency Operations Facility ' EOF)/ Liaison M. Jackson FEMA Joint Medit. Center /Public Information Office P. Weberg FEMA Wayne Co. EOC/ Team Leader -

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Observer Agency Exercise Location / Function (s) l P. Giardina EPA Wayne Co. EOC/ Accident Assessment o

T. Baldwin ANL Wayne Co. EOC/ Communications, Public Information 1 J

l Wayne Co./ Radiological Field Monitoring; l B. Salmonson INEL Reception and Congregate Care Center R. Zantopp BNL' Wayne Co./ Radiological Field Monitoring; Reception and Congregate Care Center -)

B. Houston FEMA Wayne Co./ Evacuation, Access' Control Point and !,

General Population Bus Route; Alert and Notification A. Davis FEMA Wayne Co./ Evacuation, Access Control Point and

' General Population Bus Route; Alert and Notification l

C. Herzenberg ANL . Wayne Co./ Evacuation, School Evacuation Bus Route; )

Stren failure; Alert and Notification ]

l A. Hart USDA Wayne Co./ Evacuation, School Evacuation Bus Route; Impediment to Evacuation; Alert and Notification -1 S. McIntosh FEMA Monroe Co. EOC/ Team Leader i J. Keller INEL Monroe Co. EOC/ Accident Assessment J

. P. Cammarata FEMA Monroe Co. EOC/ Communications; Public Information Officer J. Opelka ANL Monroe Co./ Radiological Field Monitoring; Reception and Congregate Care Center L. Slagel INEL Monroe Co./ Radiological Field Monitoring; Reception and Congregate Care Center J. Smith DOT Monroe Co./ Evacuation, Access Control Point and General Population Bus Route; Alert and Notification -

Y. Klein ANL Montce Co./Evacation, Access Control Point; Alerting, Siren Failure, Alert and Notification T. Buckowski FEMA Monroe Co./ Evacuation, School Evacuation Bus Route, Impediment to Evacuation; Alert and Notification a

u._______________________.______ _______m____ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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1.3 EVALUATION CRITERIA The exercise evaluations presented in Sec. 2 are based on applicable planning standards and evaluation criteriu set forth in NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 (Nov.

1980), Sec. II. For the purpose of exercise assessment, FEMA uses an evaluation method to apply the criteria of NUREG-0654. FEMA classifies exercise inadequacies as deficiencies or areas requiring corrective actions. Deficiencies are demonstrated and observed inadequacies that would cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power facility in the event of radiological emergency. Because of the potential impact of deficiencies on emergency preparedness, they are required to be promptly corrected through appropriate remedial actions including remedial exercises, drills or other actions. Areas requiring corrective sctions are demonstrated and observed l inadequacies of State and local government performance, and although their correction is required during the next scheduled biennial exercise, they are not considered, by j themselves, to adversely impact public health and safety. In addition to these inadequacies, FEMA identifies areas recommended for improvement, which are problem areas observed during an exercise that are not considered to adversely impact public health and safety. While not required, correction of these would enhance an i organizations level of emergency preparedness. l 1.4 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES .

The objectives of state and local jurisdictions in this exercise were to demonstrate the adequacy of radiological emergency response plans, the capability to mobilize needed personnel and equipment, and familiarity with procedures required to cope with an emergency at the Rochester Gas and Electric Company's Robert E. Ginna ;

Nuclear Generating Station. The exercise was to involve activation and participation of staff and response facilities of Ginna as well as emergency organizations and facilities of New York State and the counties of Monroe and Wayne. Federal agencies were to be notified during the exercise according to existing protocols. Federal agencies with radiological emergency preparedness responsibility were not to participate actively I" the play of this exercise. Federal representatives, however, were to act as exercise evaluators. The scope of this exercise, with some exceptions, was to endeavor to demonstrate by actual performance a number of primary emergency preparedness l functions. At no time was the exercise to interfere with the safe operations of the Ginna I plant. The State of New York Radiological Emergency Group developed the following objectives for this exercise.

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1.4.1 New York State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)

1. Demonstrate the ability to receive and verify the initial and followup emergency notifications from the licensee.

2. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate the State j EOC in a timely manner.

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3. Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing in the EOC on a 24-hour b. asis (through rosters).

4. Demonstrate that the State EOC has adequate space, equipment, j

, and supplies to support emergency operations. 1

5. Demonstrate that the State, counties, and licensee can establish appropriate communication links, using both primary and backup systems.

6. Demonstrate that messages are transmitted in an accurate and t!mely manner, that messages are properly logged, that status boards are accurately maintained and updated, that appropriate i briefings are held, and that incoming personnel are briefed. ]

7. Demonstrate that the designated official is in charge and in control of an overall coordinated response.

8. Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.

9. Demonstrate 'he ability to identify the need for and request, Federal assistance, if warranted.

10. Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective action recommendations to the public based on licensee recommenda-tions, independent recommendations from the accident assess-ment group, and off-site factors such as evacuation time ,

estimates and traffic conditions. I i

l 11. Demonstrate that the transmission of the EBS message can be l properly coordinated with the activation of the prompt i notification siren system. -

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12. Demonstrate the ability to project radiation dosage to the public l via plume exposure, based on plant data and field measurements, l and to determine appropriate protective measures br. sed on PAGs.

13. Demonstrate the decision chain that has been established to authorize exposure for emergency workers in excess of the ;

general public PAGs.

14. Demonstrate the ability to authorize, based on predetermined ,

3 criteria, whether to administer KI to emergency workers.

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6 1.4.2 New York State Field Activities (NYS Fleid)

1. Demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontami-nation of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles including adequate provisions for handling contaminated waste.

1.4.3 Western District Emergency Operations Center (WDEOC) .

1. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate the WDEOC in a timely manner.

2. Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing in the WDEOC on a 24-hour basis (through rosters).

3. Demonstrate that the Western District EOC has adequate space,-

equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations.

4. Demonstrate that messages are transmitted in an accurate and timely manner, that messages are properly logged, that status boards are accurately maintained and updated, that appropriate briefings are held, and that incoming personnel are briefed.

5. Demonstrate that the designated official is in charge and in control of an overall coordinated response.

6. Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.

1.4.4 Lake District Emergency Operations Center (LDCOC)

1. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff 'and activate the LDEOC in a timely manner.

2. Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing in the LDEOC on a 24-hour basis (through rosters).

3. Demonstrate that the Lake District EOC has adequate space, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations.

4. Demonstrate that messages are transmitted in an accurately and j j timely manner, that messages are properly logged, that status j boards are accurately maintained and updated, that appropriate briefings are held, and that incoming personnel are briefed.

5. Demonstrate that the designated' official is in charge. and in control,of an overall coordinated response.

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6. Demonstrate ' the ability to . communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.

1.4.5 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) i Demonstrate that messages are transmitted in an accurate and k

1. I timely manner, that messages are properly logged, that status boards are accurately maintained and updated, that appropriate j briefings are held, and that incoming personnel are briefed. {

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2. Demonstrate- the ability to mo'bilize s'taff and activate State functions at the EOF in a timely manner. ..

3. Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing of State functions in J the EOF on a 24-hour basis (through rosters).

4. Demonstrate that the EOF has adequate space, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations.

5. Demonstrate the ability to communicate with a!! appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.

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.1.4.6 Joint News Center

1. Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing of State and County functions '~ the joint news center on a 24-hour basis'(through rosters). ;

2. Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate, '

and timely manner.

3. Demonstrate the ability to prepare and implement EBS to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ in a timely manner (i.e., within 15 minutes after command and control decision for protective -

action recommendations).

( 4. Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control /

media response in a coordinated manner.

5. Demonstrate the ability to share information with o'.her agencies at the JNC prior to its release.

6. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate State and County functions at the joint news center by pre-positioning personnel.

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8 1.4.7 Wayne County Operations Center (WCEOC)

1. Demonstrate the ability to receive initial and followup emergency -

notifications.

2. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate the EOC in a timely manner. ;

3. Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing in the EOC on a 24- !

hour basis (through rosters).

4. Demonstrate that the County EOC has adequate space, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations.

5. Demonstrate that the State a'nd counties ' can establish appropriate communication links using both primary and backup systems. !

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6. Demonstrate that the County EOC has adequate access control and that security can be maintained.

7. Demonstrate that messages are transmitted in ,a accurate and timely manner, messages are properly logged, that status boards are accurately maintained and updated, that appropriate briefings

are held, and that incoming personnel are briefed.

8. Demonstrate that the appropriate official is in charge and .in control of an overall coordinated response.

9. Demonstrate the ability of the designated official to determine the need for and ability to obtain State assistance, if warranted.

10. Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and fleid personnel, including U.S. Coast Guard and Ontario-Midland Railroad.

11. Demonstrate the ability to project radiation dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant data and field measurements, and to determine appropriate protective measures, based on PAGs.

12. Demonstrate the ability to provide advance coordination of public alerting and instructional messages with the State and other counties.

I l 13. Demonstrate the organizational ability to manage an. orderly evacuation of all or part of tne 10-mile EPZ, if warranted.'

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14. : Demonstrate the organizat!onal ability to deal with impediments to evacuation, such as inclement weather or traffic obstructions.

15. Demonstrate the organizational abliity necessary to control access to an evacuated area.

16. -Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to effect an early dismissal of schools within the 10-mile EPZ, if warranted.

! 17. Demonstrate the ability to activate the prompt notification siren j system in coordination with the State and other counties. _

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1.4.8 Wayne County Field Activities (WC Field)

1. Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure including proper use of personnel dosimetry.

2. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize and deploy field monitoring teams in a timely manner.

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3. Demonstrate appropriate _ equipment and procedures for deter-mining ambient radiation levels.

. 4. ' De monst'r ate appropriate equipment and procedures for I

measurement of airborne radiolodine concentrations as low as 0.1 picocurries/cc in the presence of noble gases.

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5. Demonstrate the ability to provide backup public alerting

procedures, if necessary, in the event of partial stren system failure.

6. Demonstrate that the permanent population within the 10-mile EPZ has received information on how they will be notified and

! what their actions should be in the event of a radiological emergency, and that this information is updated on an annual basis.

7. Demonstrate that information on emergency actions has been provided to transient populations within the 10 mile EPZ.

8. Demonstrate that traffic control points can be established in a timely manner.

9. Demonstrate the ability to administer KI, once the decision has i been made to do so.

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(. 10. Demonstrate. a sample of resources necessary to impiement a'n orderly evacuation of all or part of the 10 'co EPZ.

' 11. Demonstrate 'a sample of resources necessary to deal with' t4, irripediments to evacuation, such as inclement wea'ther or traffic 4 obstructions.

1 12. Demonstrate a cample of resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.

i 13. Demonstrate a sample of resources necessary to effect an early dismissal of schools within the 10-m!!e EPZ.

14. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate a t Reception / Congregate Care Center in a timely manner.

15. Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing at the Reception Center by roster and the-Congregate Care Center by roster for 24-hour operation.

16. Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees.

Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities for mass care of

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evacuees.

18. Demonstrate that emergency workers know who can authorize excess exposure.

1.4.9 Monroe County Emergency Operations Center (MCEOC) l

1. Demonstrate the ability to receive initial and followup emergency.

notification.

2. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate the EOC in a timely manner.

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3. Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing in the EOC on a 24-hour basis (through rosters). - l

4. Demonstrate that the County EOC has adequate space, equipment, and supplies to : upport emergency operations.

5. Demonstrate that the State . and counties can estabilsh appropriate communication links using both primary and backup -

systems.

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6. Demonstrate that the County EOC has adequate access control and that security can be maintained. j

7. Demonstrate that messages are transmit'ted in an accurate and I

timely manner, messages are properly logged, that status boards are accurately maintained and updated, that appropriate briefings 1 are held, and that incoming personnel are briefed.

8. Demonstrate that the appropriate official is in charge and in control of an overall coordinated response.

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9. Demonstrate the ability of the designated official to determine d the need for and ability to obtain State assistance, if warranted.

10. ' Demonstrate 'the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel, including U.S. Coast Guard and Ontario-Midland Railroad.

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11. Demonstrate the ab!11ty to project radiation dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant data and field measurements, i and to determine appropriate protective measures, based on PAGs.

12. Demonstrate the ability to provide advance coordination of public l alerting and instructional messages with the State and other '

counties.

13. Demonstrate the organizational ability to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the 10-mile EPZ, if warranted.

14. Demonstrate the organizational ability to deal with impediments to evacuation, such as inclement weather or traffic obstructions.

15. Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to effect an early dismissal of school's within the 10-mile EPZ, if warranted.

16. Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to control

! access to un evacuated area.

17. Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the 10-mile EPZ, if warranted.

18. Demonstrate the ability to activate the prompt notification siren system in coordination with State and other counties.

3 12 1.4.10 Monroe County Field Activities (MC Field)

1. Demonstrate the ability to . continuously monitor anc control emergency worker exposure including proper use of personnel ;

dosimetry.

2. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize and deploy field monitoring teams in a timely manner.

3. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedure for determining ambient radiation levels.

4. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and p>ocedures for measurement of airborne radioiodine concentrations as low as 0.1 picoeurries/cc in the presence of noble gases.

5. Demonstrate the ability to provide backup public alerting procedures, if necessary, in the svent of partial siren system failure.

6. Demonstrate that the permanent population within the 10-mile EPZ has received information on how they will be notified and what their actions should be in the event cf a radiological emergency, and that this information is updated on an annual basis. ,

7. Demonstrate that information on emergency actions has been provided to transient populations within the 10-mile EPZ.

8. Demonstrate that traffic control points can be established in a timely manner.

9. Demonstrate the ability to administer KI, once the decision has been made to do so.

10. Demonstrate a sample of resources necessary to implement an orderly evacut. tion of all or part of the 10-mile EPZ.

11. Demonstrate a sample of resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, such as helement weather or traffic obstructions.

12. Demonstrate a sample of resources necessary to control access to l an evacuated area.

13. Demonstrate a sample of resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the 10-mile EPZ.

[ - -

I 13

14. Demonstrate the ability to mobilize staff and activate a Reception / Congregate Care Center in a timely manner.

15. Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing at the . Reception o Center by roster and the Congregate Care Center by roster for 24-hour operation.

16. Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures 'for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees.

17. Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities for mass care of -

evacuees.

18. Demonstrate that emergency workers know who can authorize excess exposure.

1.5 EXERCISE SCENARIO 1.5.1 Major Sequence of Events on Site Given below is a listing of exercise events, and the approximate. times that they were projected to occur by the scenario.

Projected by Scenario Event

, 0730 Oil Storage Room fire is detected. I l

0745 UNUSUAL EVENT declared due to major fire lasting more than ten minutes or fire department called.'

0830 Rod drops into core, turbine runback to 80%, all 8 steam dumps go wide i open, reactor does not trip automatically. Operators trip reactor manually and close main steam isolation valves.

0845 ALERT declared due to failure to bring reactor suberitical after a reactor trip signal has been initiated and reactor trip breakers failed to i open.

0915 Failed fuel monitor alarms, high RCP injection filter D/P alarms.

i 1015 NR*

1030 Site Area Emergency declared due to failed fuel monitor off-scale.

l i

14 Projected by Scenario Event 1115 Low pressurizer pressure, pressurizer level decreasing rapidly, safety injection actuated, containment radiation monitors off-scale high, hig containment sump levels indicated. The "B" emergency diesel and the a high head S.I. pump fail to start.

1130 GENERAL t'MERGENCY declared due LOCA inside containment vessel with failed fuel indicated and/or LOCA identified inside of containment with loss of a safety injection delivery to the RCS. Immediate sheltering recommendation for Wayne ERPA 1.

1230 Core uncovery begins as indicated by in-core thermocouple reading 750*F and increasing.

1315 Hydrogen explosion in containment indicated by pressure spike. Release starts from containment as indicated by pir.at vent sping monitors.

Depressurization valves indicate full open.

1330 1A High head safety injection pump breaker is changed out and pump is started with deliver to core. Core starts regaining level and cooling..

1515 Release from containment is terminated by outside depressurization valve closing.

1 1545 Offsite Dose Assessment and the State and Counties Time Warp ahead 1 two days.

1600 Recovery operations begin. l l

1715 Terminate Exercise. ;

i l

1.5.2 Scenario Overview !

l The exercise scenario commences at 0630 hours0.00729 days 0.175 hours 0.00104 weeks 2.39715e-4 months with the Ginna nuclear unit operating at a stable 100% full power condition. The unit has been operating at this power level for 250 days continuously. Reactor coolant activity is normal (i.e., very low) and the following equipment is out of service for various reasons: ;

- 1 A RCP seal injection filter is out for replacement. I

- Turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump is out for preventative maintenance.

IC S.I. pump is out for thrust bearing cooler replacement.

1

15

- 1A charging pump is out for cracked block replacement.

- 1B charging pump was just taken out for plunger replacement at 0400 hours0.00463 days 0.111 hours 6.613757e-4 weeks 1.522e-4 months .

- 1A steam generator PORV is held and apart for leaking bonnet repair.

The first major event of the scenario is a major fire in the oil storage room at 0730, that lasts more,than ten minutes. This triggers the declaration of an UNUSUAL EVENT (i.e.,

fire lasting more than ten minutes.or fire department called or major fire in plant). The . ,

fire is declared out at 0810.

The next major event occurs at 0830 when a control rod suddenly drops into the core. This dropped rod generates a turbine runback to 80% full power and arms steam dump to condenser. The 8 steam dump valves go wide open due to a failed controller and the reactor reaches an overpower condition of approximately 120% full power. The reactor trip signals are generated from this overpower condition, but the trip breakers do not open because of a common cause failure. The operators trip the reactor manually sad are successful. This event triggers the declaration of an ALERT condition (i.e.,

failure to bring the reactor suberitical after a reactor trip signal has been initiated and reactor trip breakers failed to open). Because of the major cooldown occurring from the open steam dump valves, the operators close the main steam isolation valves to mitigate the cooldown transient. The plant is stabilized at Hot Shutdown conditions by 0900.

Decay heat removal is by the "B" steam generator via atmospheric PORY as the "A" steam generator atmospheric PORV is held for maintenance.

At 0915 the following events happen indicating some fuel was damaged during the overpower condition and possibly some small crud ' bursts happened during the overpower - cooldown transient:

R-9 (Failed Fuel Monitor; alarms and indicate a steady increase.

High RCP sealinjection filter D/P, alarms.

l An auxiliary op9rator is sent to the Aux!!!ary Building to check on seal injection filter j high D/P and reports the following problems:

- Seal injection filter D/P is off scale high and flow to RCP's is = 1 GPM (normal is 8 GPM).

1B SI pump casing is cracked and borated water is leaking on floor.

i l At 1000 hours0.0116 days 0.278 hours 0.00165 weeks 3.805e-4 months the 1A and IB RCP #1 seal hi flow alarms annunciate and are reading off' scale high. The 1A and IB RCP's are shutdown within 30 minutes.

The next major classification event occurs at 1015 hours0.0117 days 0.282 hours 0.00168 weeks 3.862075e-4 months when the failed fuel monitor (R-9) goes off scale high. A SITE EMERGENCY is declared (i.e., failed fuel

16 monitor off scale high). At 1045 hours0.0121 days 0.29 hours 0.00173 weeks 3.976225e-4 months the 18 Steam Generator PORV is found closed off and RCS temperature increasing. All a* tempts to open the PORV fall and steam generator pressures rise until the SG safeties open at 1085 PSIG.

The scenario continues with a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) at 1115 hours0.0129 days 0.31 hours 0.00184 weeks 4.242575e-4 months from the loss of the RCP seals. Approximate leak rate is 600 GPM from the seals. At this time safety injection is actuated with the following equipment failing to operate:

- "B" Emergency diesel generator (trip bar problem).

- "A" S.I. pump. (Breaker problem, approximately 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months to fix).

The other two high head S.I. pumps were held for problems already so this is a LOCA A

without safety injection. RCS pressure hangs up too high for low head injection. ;

General Emergency classification should be made at this time based solely on plant conditions (i.e o LOC A identified inside containment with failed fuel indicated by sampling of RCS or containment atmosphere or LOCA identified inside containment with No loss of all safety injection delivery to RCS or loss of all RHR deliver to core).

release is taking place at this time.

The LOC A without safety injection continues and at 1230 hours0.0142 days 0.342 hours 0.00203 weeks 4.68015e-4 months the control room starts receiving indications that the core has uncovered. At 1315 the control room has indications of a hydrogen explosion in containment and a release starting to atmosphere through the containment depressurization valves. .

At 1330 the 1A hl head safety injection pump breaker is repaired and the 1A Si pump is started. Water injection and core cooling commence and recovery from the accident begins.

The release from the containment continues until 1515 when the plant is allowed to stop the release by the theory that the operator has cycled the valve enough times to l finally make it close.

At 1545 offsite dose assessment and the State and Counties Time Warp ahead l two days to complete their objective in a timely maru er. l l

At approximately 1600 recovery operations were expected to begin.

At approximately 1715 the Exercise should be terminated after all objectives have been met and recovery operations demonstrated. i 1.5.3 Description of State and Local Resources All emergency response agencies were to be responsible for ensuring that their resources were actually deployed in adequate numbers to reasonably test their notification, mobilization, command, coordination, and communications capabilities.

Except as noted below, state and county agencies were to have total authority in determining the degree of mobilization and deployment of their resources in a radio-

17

. logical emergency at the Ginna Nuclear Power Station. Consistent with this intent,' the

, decision to demonstrate or to actually deploy resources was to be made at the time of the exercise.

The following personnel and resources were to be deployed by the state and local governments to demonstrate the capabilities of their emergency resources.

l 1

Public Notification During the exercise an actual test of the sirens and the accompanying Emergency ~

Broadcast System (EBS) announcement were to be demonstrated. Additional exercise EBS messages were to be prepared. Actual transmission of these messages to WHAM /FM, the primary insert station (CPCS-1) and broadcast by the EBS network was to be simulated.

Radiological Field Monitoring Teams in addition to off-site monitoring teams dispatched by Ginna, the following county radiological monitoring field teams were to be demonstrated.-

No.of County Teams Wayne -2 Monroe 2 Each team was to be supplied with a controller. The controllers were to have simulated-field data, which they were to provide to the teams to determine local dose rate readings consistent witn the scenario. Each team was to have the equipment necessary to deter-mine both gamma dose rates and airborne radiolodine concentrations. Emphasis was to l be on the rapid deployment of the teams, rapid gathering of data, communication of data l to the EOC, and prompt sharing of the field data with the state, the EOF, and the o'ther county.

The monitoring teams were not to be suited up in anticontamination clothing.

Radiological Exposure Control All emergency workers in the 10-mile plume exposure EPZ were to have permanent and self-reading dosimeters, access to thyroid blocking agents (Ki), and- !

exposure record cards. They were to be familiar with procedures for exposure control, (e.g., at what exposure levels to contact supervisors, and with procedures for obtaining )

clearance for excess exposures).

e-I l

(

18 Completion of Bus Routes for Evacuees Each of the two plume exposure EPZ counties was to activate e. limited number of evacuee bus routes as follows:

No. of Routes General School County Pooulation Evacuation Wayne 2 2 Monroe 1 1-Resources to complete both the general population and school' evacuation bus routes were to be activated out of sequence based on free-play messages inserted at the County EOCs. Bus routes were not to be preassigned. The federal evaluators.were to indicate which bus routes were to be demonstrated on the exercise day. The federal evaluators, in concert with the assigned state controller and appropriate county staff, were to ensure that the selected bus routes did not affect normal public transportation.

The bus drivers were to assemble at their normel dispatch location and be assigned appropriate routes, briefed, and deployed in accordance with the appropriate procedures. The buses were to complete their assigned routes but they were not to pick up any evacuees. Upon completion of the general population route, the buses were to report to appropelate reception / congregate care centers. The buses and drivers were then to be secured. There were to be no time constraints on running the evacuation bus route.

Traffic Control Points Local agencies supplemented by state resources were to deploy personnel to de monstrate activation of a suitable sample of traffic control points for major evacuation routes in each county:

No.of Traffic Control I County Points Wayne 2 i Monroe 2 Traffic control points were not to be preassigned or repositioned. To provide a greater test of the capability to respond to an actual incident and to allow more free play in the exercise, the federal evaluators were to provide the state controller at their respective county EOCs with information on the locations of traffic control points to be demonstrated during the exercise. The state controller was then to request the county EOC to demonstrate the activation of traffic control points.

19 Once traffic control points had been established and observed by federal-evaluators, local officials were to release personnel to normal duties and to simulate the continuation of coritrol points where required. The relieved personnel were not to be used for any other exercise functions. Rotation of traffic control personnel was :o be simulated from personnel that would have been available from off-duty sections. For training purposes, selected traffic control personnel were to report. to personnel monitoring centers af ter they had been secured from their exercise assignment.

1

)

Impediments to Evacuation l

~

Federal evaluators were to introduce free play events to test procedures for removing impediments from evacuation routes. A problem was to be given to the decision maker in the county EOC stating that there was an impediment at a given location. The demonstration was to include the actual dispatch of a police or other emergency vehicle to the scene, a report from the scene to the County EOC requesting appropriate resources, identification of the availability of the required resources (e.g., a tow truck or public works equipment), evaluation of the problem, and as appropriate, )

I arrangements for an alternate evacuation route or dispatch of the required resources. If an alternate evacuation route was required, the decision maker was to inform the public via an EBS message. If the impediment was to be cleared, the time of arrival at the scene and the time for clearing the impediment were to be estimated.

No.of County impediments l l

Wayne i location f Monroe 1 location l l

l Personnel Monitoring Centers l l

Wayne county was to set up and demonstrate a personnel monitoring center for local emergency workers. During the exercise, the processing of selected emergency workers who had completed their exercise participation was to be demonstrated.

Decontamination actions were to be simulated.

At the personnel monitoring center, anything that could potentially damage property (such as parking vehicles on grass) was to be simulated. All necessary equip-ment was to be assembled at the personnel monitoring center; however, its use could be l

simulated. Detailed simulation actions were to be implemented by the leader of the l

personnel monitoring center. In addition, the state was to demonstrate the activation of I a personnel monitoring center for emergency workers.

Relocation Centers A least one reception / congregate care center was to be opened and staffed in each of the two counties in accordance with their respective local emergency response

?O plans. Supplies required for long-term mass care (e.g., cots, blankets, food) need not have been acquired or brought to the centers. However, the center personnel were to obtain estimates on how many evacuee's would be arriving had the exercise been a real emergency. The center personnel were then to estimate the supplies required for the potential evacuees. Sources of the required supplies were then to be located and the means for transporting the suppiles was to be determined. A few volunteers were to be processed through the registration procedure. Procedures for monitoring and decontaminating evacuees were to be demonstrated at reception centers. Federal evaluators were to introduce free play problems to require the processing of evacuees arriving at a congregate care center without appropriate documents from the referral reception center.

Because of logistics and the need to make prior arrangements for access to relocation centers during an exercise, such centers were selected before the day of the exercise.

No.of County Centers Activated Wayne 1 reception / congregate care center Monroe 1 reception / congregate care center Volunteer Organizations i

Response organizations identified in the plans were to participate in the exercise. Members of volunteer organizations such as volunteer fire departments, ,

ambulance squads, amateur radio clubs, and American Red Cross have other I responsibilities, including earning a livelihood, that take precedence over their participation in an exercise. Therefore, the staffing of these volunteer organizations for exercise purposes was to be on an as-available basis.

Closecut of the Exercise ;

The federal observers were not to release any participants from the exercise play. That was to be a responsibility of the local EOCs. The EOCs were to have been appropriately staffed until such time as the exercise was determined to have been terminated.

21 l

l 1.5.4 Actual and Simulated Off-site Events Matrix l

New York Monroe Wayne State County County i <

e Call up of EOC Personnel ' Actual Actual Actual l e Activate EOC Organization Actual Actual Actual i e Maintain EOC Security Actual Actual Actual l e Response to Plant Fire N/A N/A Simulate i e EPZ Siren Activation ,

N/A Actual Actual 6 EBS Message Actual Actual Actual _

e Dispatch Field Survey Teams N/A Actual-2 Actual-2 )

e Exchange of Field Data N/A Actual Actual )

e Field Team Communication Actual Actual Actual i e Personnel Monitoring Actual State j Actual i e Reception Center Setup N/A Actual Actual e Congregate Care Center N/A Actual Actual l

e School Dismissal Bus Pickup N/A Actual-1 Actual-2 l e General Population Evacuee Bus N/A Actual-1 Actual-2 Pickup l

e Main Traffic Control Point N/A 2 Points 2 Points l

e Road Impediment N/A Actual-1 Actual-1 Simulate-1 Simulate-1

. e Coast Guard Involvement N/A Notify Notify l e Dose Assessment Actual Actual Actual e PAG Recommendation Actual Actual Actual e Operate Joint News Center Actual Actual Actual 1.5.5 Exercise Timeline Tables 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 provide a detailed timeline of events that were observed during the September 26, 1985 exercise. Table 1.5.1 details escalation of the emergency classification levels, notification of emergency response personnel and times that notification of radiological release information as received by various facilities. Table l 1.5.2 details protective action decisions and the time at which these decisions were Issued to the public via the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS).

l l

0

s 5 1 w 0 9 e r 9 0 - -

N e 0 t !

t e sd s d t n e o o e o e n e 6 n r y n p n p n 8 8 i C 4 e o e o 1 3 R R o 7 a o r i r i 0 8 / /

J 0 WM P t t t 1 1 N N t y r l e y a l ot r n C S t

f ud e

n uD - - f o o 6 3 5 5 f 4 0 5 5 MC 4 5 4 1 a 2 ) 2 8 .

7 8 7 9 t 0 ! 3 5 d 0 0 0 0 s 1 ! 1 1 e t

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_ S- C- ap n a uD WC o 6 4

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1 6 5 2 o 5

1 5

2 0

3 0

3 5

1

=

7 8 7 8 N 8 0 8 3 5 R 0 0 0 0( 0 1 1 1 1 /

N

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_ n c b r i 6 2 0 5 3 ? 5 a

_ e tr C 4 5 3 3 2 l 2 R c t 7 8 7 9 0 i 3 / i

_ s s D 0 0 0 0 1 t 1 N l ei p

_ WD p

_ a t

_ t o c n

_ ei 6 3 6 0 2 2 8

_ k r C 4 5 5 0 3 4 2 R =

_ a. ts EO 7 8 8 0 0 8 3 /

_ 8 i

0 0 0 1 8 1 1 N A

_ /

D N

_ e e 6 n

n t C 4 R R R R 0

4 2 6 5 1 o i

a 7 / / / / 1 3 5 i l

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_ S a

- m c i o T

_ l n t

- e n h n t e c

_ i o t a

e s a e

t F cd s t

_ a O e a a u t E D- mW o a c

i f

3 6 8 0 5 6 d

_ i A A R 5 8 2 ) 1 1 e s / / / 9 0 l ! 3 5 v N N N 0 r s 1 i ! 1 1 e

_ l a s b

C y e d o

_ y t r 5 e i a A A 4 A c 4 A A l l /

A r

_ 8 / / / / / e n N

/

0 N N N

. i c N N N w e

e t U D g s t

_ r n

_ e n e v

m o t n n n n e E i n n n n

_ y t e o o o l e o o o t

_ c a v t t t a l t t d t a 1 n c E t t ! t n a yt yt t e t h et a a e a yd o e c a c e a 5

gi r t l

a I c

i c l n c a n I t ei r t r n e A el l

a ei n c ed c s et t a e a c s nI t

s

_ 1 e s m s uf s i t f i of li a ar gf r gf a t i aif e r i t s i i l e r i e r i e r 1 e mi m

_ E a ut e t i r t c c e t e t n e t. a t r

_ E l n o l o n e o a e p i m o ea l

e t o l

e e o t i T

l l

C U N A N I P N F D o S E N C F N R S N R TN

l

- l A

T l

1 23 TABLE 1.5.2 Protective Actiori Decision /Public Notification Timeline l l

'WT s,

Affacted Areas EBS Message E8S + Decision Decision Jurisdiction (s) (ERPAs) Decision Time Issued (Minutes)

Sound sirens and Wayne County All of 10-mile 0917 0927 10 l issue test EBS Monroe County EPZ message f

Close schools and Wayne County All of 10-mile 0938 0953 15 j parks Monroe County EPZ 1

Shelter Mobility- Wayne County W-1 1023 1034 11 l Impaired persons {

Shelter animals Monroe County M-1. M-2 1102 1116 14 and place on stored feed i Evacuation Mcnroe County W-1 Evacuation 1142 1156 14 1

Wayne County M-1 large office complexes only Evacuation Monroe County M-1, 1208 1223 15 M02 and M-3 Evacuation Wayne County W-2 and W-3 1234 1247 13 Shelter Monroe County M-4 M-5. M-6 EBS Messages M-7. M-8 and were combined M-9 into one (1) message Evacuation , Wayne County V-2 and W-4 1240 1247 7 4

. o 24 2 EXERCISE EVALUATION This section provides a narrative overview of the observation evaluations from the September 26, 1985 radiological preparedness exercise for the Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station. These evaluations are keyed to the exercise objectives listed in Section 1.4 of this report. References to those objectives are provided in the narrative which follows.

2.1 NEW YORK STATE 2.1.1 State EOC Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)

The exercise objective (SEOC 1) to demonstrate the ability to receive and verify the initial and follow-up emergency notifications from the licensee was effectively accomplished by the use of the Radiological Emergency Communications System (RECS) telephone. Because this is a direct communication link from the SEOC to the utility, verification is accomplished by a roll call procedure after the transmittal of each message. The RECS system is staffed on a 24-hour basis at the State Warning Point, the assessment area and the alternate State Warning Point (State Police). There is, in addition to the RECS line, an executive hotline with the capability to receive emergency communications from each of the two counties within the 10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ).

The ability to mobilize staff and activate the SEOC in a timely manner was successfully demonstrated (SEOC 2). The SEOC was promptly activated af ter the Alert notification was received via the RECS line. Most of the state emergency management operations staff.had already reported to work for usual duty, since this notification was received at 0858. The other agency representatives had to be notified and mobilized.

This notification process was accomplished primarily by telephone calls. All personnel were notified within approximately 30 minutes. A total of 26 state agencies were contacted. Additional personal paging devices could shorten the time required to notify individuals. However, since the existing system was demonstrated to work effectively, the need for additional personal pagers is not considered a deficiency. The SEOC was considered operational at approximately 0900 and was fully staffed by approximately 1030. There is a need to establish a system to ensure that State agencies have arrived at the EOC. It is suggested that a status board listing each state agency and time notified be placed at the operations room entrance so that each agency can post the time they arrived.

The SEOC is capable of 24-hour operations based upon roster indicating primary and backup personnel for each function (SEOC 3). In most cases both the primary and backup responders participated in the exercise. The SEOC includes a complete kitchen and dormitory to service 24-hour operations The SEOC ,has adequate space, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations (SEOC 4). The SEOC is a large facility designed to function independently

F 25 under adverse conditions. The layout and workspaces are completely satisfactory.

Agency representatives report to a large operations room which contains designated desks and telephones for each agency. Each agency has its own work area, but al'. reas are in close proximity. Multiple systems are available for communication. Supps are i readily available since the SEOC is contiguous to the State Emergency Management l Office (SEMO) facility. The State has a new computer system purchased to assist in the automation of certain activities (message logs, etc.). This system was not ready for use during the exercise. j l .

1 The state, counties, and utility demonstrated the ability to establish appropriate primary and backup communication links at the SEOC (SEOC 5). The primary communi- ~

cations link from the SEOC to the utility is by dedicated telephone. The backup system consists of radio linkages via the counties. In addition, commercial telephone and Radio l l

Amateur Civil Emergency Service (R ACES) are avsilable. The primary communications !

link from the SEOC to the county EOCs is also by the executive hotline telephone, with a i l

backup radio system. The State communicated to the emergency workers in the field via radio link through the State District offices.

The transmittal and logging of messages, the maintenance of status boards, and j the briefing of personnel were successfully demonstrated at the SEOC (SEOC 6). Most

( messages at the SEOC were received over the RECS telephone. These messages were l promptly recorded, copied, and distributed throughout the SEOC to decision makers, to l accident assessment and operations staffs, and to the 26 agencies represented. Status l boards were maintained in each room within the SEOC and were updated throughout the l exercise. In addition, a rear screen projector was used in the large operations room to provide a detailed summary for the agency representatives. General briefings were conducted by SEMO periodically in the operations area. In two instances, it was observed that inaccurate reports concerning who is responsible for the issuance of evacuation orders was given by State personnel. Credit was given to the state, when it was the' counties' responsibility.

Although the State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Group (REPG) director did not attend staff briefings, he was kept informed on the highlights by SEMO personnel. It is suggested that the REPG Director attend the briefings.

The director of the state Radiological Emergency Preparedness Group under the Disaster Preparedness Commission was effectively in charge and in control of the overall l coordinated response at the SEOC (SEOC 7). The director promptly reported to the l SEOC and assumed control upon his arrival. He directed all state operations throughout the exercise and consulted with the two counties over the executive hotline on a frequent basis. Further, his review of the changing conditions, in coordination with SEMO, assured I that the state was prepared to act if called upon by the counties.

l The SEOC demonstrated the ability to communicate with all appropriate l

locations, organizations, and field personnel (SEOC 8). The existing communications systems available at the SEOC consist of RECS telephone, dedicated telephones, commercial telephones, radio, and telefax.

O

26 Personnel at the SEOC demonstrated the ability to identify the need for, request, and obtain federal assistance (SEOC 9). The FE31A Regional Office was promp:!y contacted by the SEOC after confirmation of the Alert emergency' classification was.

received from the utility. The state clearly was aware of which federal agencies to contact for specific needs and was prepared to contact them, if needed. A review of available assistance from Brookhaven National Laboratory was discussed.

The accident assessment group was able to demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective action recommendations to the public in a timely manner based on licensee recommendations, independent recommendations, and off-site factors (SEOC 10). In addition, plant conditions and status were considered in determining proper recommendations.

Since there was not a state declaration of emergency for this exercise, public alerting and instructional messages were under the control of the individual counties and not the state. Nevertheless, the state did demonstrate its ability to coordinate public alerting and instructional messages with the local jurisdictions (SEOC 11). Each of the EBS messages was discussed over the executive hotline prior to. Its preparation and release. The activation of sirens was coordinated by the counties among themselves as well as with the state.

Personnel at the SEOC satisfactorily demonstrated the ability to project radiation dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant data and field measurements, and to determine appropriate protective measures, based on P ACs (SEOC 12). The dose assessment team at the SEOC performed well during the exercise. Dose projections were used to determine appropriate protective action recommendations.

The state has a procedure and decision chain for authorizing potential-exposure for emergency workers !n excess of the general public PAGs, thereby meeting one of the ]

exercise objectives (S17C 13). Although it was not demonstrated for this exercise, since the governor had not declared a state of emergency, it would be the responsibility of the state health commissioner or his designee to decide whether or not to authorize such excess exposure.

The SEOC emergency response staff demonstrated their ability to authorize, based on predetermined criteria, whether to administer K1 to emergency workers (SEOC 14). Due to the very low lodine releases during the exercise, the use of KI was not recommended for emergency workers. Discussions and assessments were made at the EOC concerning the potential use of Kl.

The objective to demonstrate adequate equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles including adequate provisions for handling contaminated waste was met (NYSFleid 1). The demonstration of decontamination peccedures and the performance of emergency personnel at New York

' State's Personnel Sionitoring Center (PSiC) in Newark, New York was excellent. This facility is set up for the monitoring and decontamination of State emergency workers.

Procedures were demonstrated for determining the need for decontamination of both people and vehicles. Stonitoring and surveying techniques used by P31C personnel to screen incoming emergency workers were good. These procedures were based on New York State Standard Operating Procedures (SOP).

27 Recently calibrated GM survey meters were utilized for monitoring with 0.1 l mR/hr used as the.llmit for requiring decontamination.

The layout of the facility was set up to permit a smooth flow of emergency

, workers through the center. Areas were roped off to distinguish between radioactively

" clean" and " contaminated" zones. The PMC, as staffed during the exercise, can accommodate and process approximately 6 vehicles and 12 people each hour. If i necessary, 3 additional decontamination teams from Oswego County can be called in to Increase the capacity of the Center to 24 vehicles and 48 people / hour. j l j Survey and decontamination teams were properly dressed and equipped to do ~

l l

their jobs. Vehicles can be thoroughly washed down and decontaminated either outdoors l or at an inside facility depending upon the weather. Wash water can be contained and held for proper disposal using the existing sewerage system. Inside shower facilities are available for the decontamination of personnel. Shower water can also be contained and held for disposal. Solid wastes are collected in properly marked drums.

DEFICIENCIES There were no deficiencies observed at the SEOC during this exercise.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE AC 150NF ,

i There were no areas requiring cortNtive actions observed at the SEOC during this exercise.

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT

1.

Description:

Arrival of personnel for the State agencies represented at the SEOC was not inventoried.

Recommendation: A status board listing notification times and I arrival times at the EOC should be installed in the operations room near the entrance, so that each agency's staffing status can be recorded and displayed.

2.

Description:

The State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Group director did not attend staff briefings.

Recommendation: The REPG director should participate in the periodic staff briefings.

4

28

3. Description inaccurate reports concerning responsibility for issuance of the evacuation order was given by State personnel.

Recommendation: Additional training be provided to SEOC staff concerning the decision making process for PAGs.

2.1.2 Western District Emergency Operation.3 Center (WDEOC)

The WDEOC demonstrated the ability to mobilize staff and activate the WDEOC in a timely manner -(WDEOC 1). The WDEOC was activated following the initial notification from the plant at the unusual event classification level. Staff members were alerted using a standard call list which contained current telephone numbers of the emergency staff both at home and at work. The WDECC was fully staffed at 0935.

I Twenty-four hour staffing was demonstrated through the distribution of a second shift duty roster (WDEOC 2). Upon their arrival at the EOC, each agency was requested to provide second shif t information to add to the master duty roster. All agencies represented were able to provide sufficient 24-hour staffing designations.

The facilities, supplies and amenities available at the WDEOC are adequate for support of a sustained emergency response operation (WDEOC 3). The main operations room is equipped with all the required maps and displays. The lack of a map showing population distribution by ERPA's, which was identified during the previous exercise, has l been corrected. New ERPA designations have been approved and are now being used.

Population by sectors are identified on the maps displayed (9 ERPA's now replace the old 5 ERPA system). The WDEOC has bunk space, showers, kitchen, decontamination areas, emergency back up power, health clinic and abundant room to handle the expected emergency staff.

The objective to demonstrate that messages are transmitted in an accurate and i timely manner, that messages are properly logged, that status boards are accurately maintained and updated, that appropriate briefings are held and that incoming personnel are briefed was met at the WDEOC (WDEOC 4).

I Internal communications provided adequate information flow for all agencies represented at the EOC. Messages were logged and disseminated, when appropriate, to the responding representatives. Periodic brief!ngs were conducted by the director and included status reports by each agency present. Interagency discussions and decision-making were good. A status board was maintained with accurate and timely information. An overhead projector was used as a status board, depicting the emergency classification level, a time line of events and other appropriate data. The previous deficiency dealing with display of the emergency classification levels was corrected I

when the emergency level was posted in a highly visible location and changed as required throughout the day. Incoming personnel were briefed on current conditions and activities j

as they reported into the EOC. To improve the timely and accurate flow of information in the EOC an additional person should be used in the RADEF room where the RECS telephone is monitored. The two staff members stationed in that room could be overloaded with their operations and their messages relaying to the operations room.

l -

I 29 4

The objective dealing with direction and control of the EOC by a designated official was met (WDEOC 5). The WDEOC director is the person designated in the plan as the one in charge of the overall emergency operations. During the exerebe he displayed professional and proficient leadership by commanding and controlling the EOC's

- activities through staff briefings, decision-making and other associated duties.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was partially met (WDEOC 6).

Improvements are still needed in the communication equipment at the WDEOC. An inadequate number of commercial telephone lines and instruments are present in the l

EOC operations room. There are only three lines available for use by all the responding agencies represented at the WDEOC. Additional lines and equipment are needed to prevent overloads. In addition, the outdated and unreliable radio system (TMC) used to communicate with the State EOC in Albany is a system prone to failure. Previous problems with this system have caused deficiencies in prior exercises and the communications group and the WDEOC management group are concerned with the systems reliability. The telefacs machine experienced some problems with message transmission and reception from the SEOC in Albany. Periodically, message delays were noted as the machine (apparently in Albany) malfunctioned. The RECS hotline functioned well throughout the exercise, messages were received, recorded, logged and distributed. Other communication systems used during the exercise performed as expected with no additional problems noted.

DEFICIENCIES There were no deficiencies observed at the WDEOC during this exercise.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1.

Description:

The unreliable and outdated radio system, which caused problems during the 1983 exercise, is still a potential source of communication problems (NUREG-0654, !!, F.1).

Recommendation: A new radio system should be purchased and installed at all applicable locations.

2.

Description:

There are an inadequate number of telephone lines and telephone equipment available at the WDEOC (NUREG-0654, II, F.1).

Recommendation: Additional telephone lines and equipment should be secured for the WDEOC.

9

30 AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT

1.

Description:

The telefacs machine malfunctioned causing a breakdown in hard-copy message flow between the WDEOC and the SEOC in Albany.

Recommendattom Determine the cause of the telefacs equipment problem and correct it.

2. Description The two staff members stationed in the RADEF room, where the RECS telephone is monitored, could become-overloaded with their operations, thereby delaying messages to the-operations room.

Recommendat'lom An additional person should be added to:the -

staff in the RADEF room to improve the timely and accurate flow of information in the EOC.

2.1.3 Lake District Emergency Operations Cent,er (LDEOC)'

The exercise objective to mobilize staff and activate the LDEOC in a timely manner was met (LDEOC 1). The emergency staff call-up list, containing both home and work telephone numbers- was used to notify personnel. The Alert notification was received at the LDEOC at 0853 and the EOC was fully staff-ed and operational at 1000.

Representatives from ten state agencies were present and participated in the exercise.

A roster was provided which contained the names and positions of the LDEOC first and second shif t personnel demonstrating the ability to maintain staffing on a 24-hour continuous basis (LDEOC 2).

The LDEOC had adequate space, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations (LDEOC 3). Shower and kitchen areas are available for use during extended EOC operations. All required maps and displays were posted in the EOC operations area.

The Exercise objective (LDEOC 4) concerning the timely transmittal and logging of messages, the maintenance of status boards, and briefing of personnel was met.- All messages were logged on a standard. form with copies given to appropriate officials.

Emergency classification levels were posted throughout the exercise and a status board was maintained with current issues and significant events.

~

The district director held periodic briefings with the staff to keep.them apprised i of'the current situations. All incoming personnel were also briefed.-

The district director was the designated individual in charge and in control of.an overall coordinated response at the LDEOC (LDEOC 5). He demonstrated this coordination and control through the use of staff briefings, direct communications with j the state EOC in Albany and by providing an integrated emergency response with all state agencies. .

. - - . , . . ..> . . . - . .. * .. , , - . , - , ,,,J

i '

! r i *

l l l 31 l l

t j The ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was demonstrated (LDEOC 6). The RECS telephone was operational throughout the exercise and provided the LDEOC the primary means of commun!Tition l with the State EOC, the utility and the counties. In addition to the RECS there a:'e other ,

. systems available including: Police Radio, commercial telephones, TMC radio and l RACES. The communication systems demonstrated during the exercise were adequate to l support the limited operations at the LDEOC. Additional commercial telephone lines l Into the EOC operation area would help to assure that the three lines already available would not become overloaded.

DEFICIENCIES There were no deficiencies observed at the LDEOC during this exercise. >

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1.

Description:

There are an inadequate number of commercial telephone lines at the LDEOC (NUREG-0654, II, F.1).

Recommendation: Additional telephone lines be installed for use

, by the emergency staff.

l l l AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT

^

l There were no areas recommended for improvement observed at the LDEOC l during this exercise. i l i l 2.1.4 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) l l

The ability to mobilize staff and activate the state functions at the EOF in a

1mely manner was demonstrated (EOF 2). The demonstration of the alerting and l mobilization of the staff assigned to the EOF was good. The EOF was fully staffed and i activated at 1030 during the Alert classification. According to exercise participants there is a call-up system in place to alert and mobilize staff members at any time. State participants at the EOF were well trained and knowledgeable in their respective responsibilities and duties.

Staffing to support the State function at the EOF for.a sustained 24-hour per day basis was demonstrated through the presentation of duty rosters (EOF 3). At 1115 the EOF director, or the Recovery Manager, announced that second shif t relief would be needed. Non-essential personnel were dismissed and advised to return home and remain on standby. Through simulation, the relief shif t was fully staffed and briefed on currient conditions prior to their employment at 1235.

I 32 l l

There was sufficient space, equipment and supplies to support emergency l operations at the EOF. (EOF 4). Although the working area within the EOF was adequate i to support the required functions, additional space would be beneficial for the dose assessment staff and the communications team. Also in the communications area, measures to control noise and improve ventilation should be made. At times the staff briefings were inaudible due to the excessive noise levels.

The objective dealing with the transmission of messages in a timely manner, that -

messages are properly logged, that status boards are accurately maintained and updated, i that appropriate briefings are held and that incoming personnel are. briefed was j demonstrated at the EOF (EOF 1). The deficiency ' determined during the previous )

exercise dealing with delays in information flow and consistency in the format of j standardized forms was corrected. The RECS and the telecopier were used to transmit i timely and accurate information. Hard copies of messages were generated by the telecopy machine and were identical to those used by the RECS operator. There were some delays experienced in recording the information received over the RECS onto the standardized forms. These delays were minimal and did not impede the operation at the EOF. The Recovery manager was supported by senior staff members including the former superintendent of the Ginna Station. Incoming information from the control room for the reactor or the on-site Technical Support Center (TSC) was relayed to cognizant -

EOF staff.

Accident assessment and formation of Protective Action Recommendations were based on information as to the known or probable status of the reactor and containment structure. This approach was the only one available since postulated release of radio-active materials into the environment did not begin until early afternoon, several hours after the declaration of a General Emergency. The EOF dose assessment group employed !

a computer system which promptly calculated dose at the required reference points.

- Decisions were made during EOF senior staff conferences and promptly announced, posted and transmitted. Periodic staff belefings were conducted ' by the Recovery Manager using a portable " bullhorn." This system proved to be somewhat ineffective in providing an audible briefing to all participants.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropelate locations, organizations and field personnel was met (EOF' 5). Prirr,2y and secondary communication links were demonstrated to the State and County EOCs. Hard copy capability is available to the media center and was demonstrated to be reliable and reasonably fast in the transmission of messages. Field information and data derived by the County's field monitoring teams was relayed to the EOF from the County EOCs using commercial telephones or hard copy transmission. ,

The EOF staff demonstrated that they could protect the public health and safety by: assimilating, reducing and analyzing reactor information, forming timely protective -

action recommendations, and communicating information to all appropriate locations.

DEFICIENCIES There were no deficiencies observed at the EOF during this exercise.

. o (

33 AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

~

There were no Areas Requiring Corrective Actions observed at the EOF during this exercise.

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT

1.

Description:

The working space provided for the dose assessment staff and the communication group was somewhat limited at the EOF. ,

Recommendation: Increase . the space available for dose assessment activities.

l

2.

Description:

Excessive noise levels became a problem during staff i briefings at the EOF.

Recommendation: Control the noise levels in the EOF operations l l

area and install a PA system to augment the " bull horn" now in use during staff briefings.

3.

Description:

There was inadequate ventilation in the communication and dose assessment areas at the EOF, ,

Recommendation improve the ventilation ~ system to those areas effected. .

. 4.

Description:

Some minor delays were observed at the EOF in the recording of information received over the RECS onto the standardized form.

Recommendation: Determine the cause of these delays and provide proper remedial actions.

! 5.

Description:

The use of a portable " bullhorn" by the Recovery Manager in conducting periodic staff briefings was somewhat ineffective in providing an audible briefing to all participants.

Recommendation: An alternative public address. system should be used during briefings to improve the effectiveness of internal communications. l 2.1.5 Joint News Center (JNC)-

The ability to maintain staffing on a 24-hour basis at the joint news center by State and County personnel was demonstrated through the presentation of second shif t k

d 34 duty rosters (JNC 1). The roster provided names of individuals to back-up all functions at the JNC along with their office and home phone numbers.

The JNC layout and copying capability is much improved over the previous setup, correcting two prior deficiencies identified during the 1983 exercise. A detailed and clear EPZ map in the press briefing room was used to track protective action recom-mendations and wind speed information for easy viewing by press representatives.

Numerous media briefings were conducted at the JNC during the exercise, including briefirgs following the issuance of each of the 10 EBS messages. The briefings were accurate and complete with hard copy transcripts of EBS messages msde available promptly. Public information offic6rs (PIO) from New York State, Wayne County, Monroe County and utility spokesmen parti cipated in the news briefings. The objective to demonstrate the ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner was satisfactorily met (JNC 2).

The objective to demonstrate the ability to prepare and implement EBS to alert the pubile within the 10-mile EPZ in a timely manner was partially met (JNC 3). All EBS messages generated at the JNC were prepared and read (simulated) to the primary EBS station within 15 minutes of each decision. In general the EBS messages were clear and accurate in context and description. The initial EBS message was not well coordinated with the sounding of the strens. In Wayne County the strens were activated at 0925 and sounded for 3 minutes. The EBS message was transmitted and broadcasted at 0927 which was during the sounding of the siren and therefore premature. Monroe County was involved in a real event. A fire was reported which required the use of the sirens at the same time they were needed for the notification of exercise activities. The. county used ;

the siren for the fire and then re-activated them for the exercise at 0929. l In general, the EBS messages were well-written and complete. Some messages neglected to mention both the calendar and the telephone book as reference documents for emergency procedures to be followed by the populace. These messages listed the calendar only. All messages should refer to both, not only in the interest of consistency, but more importantly because people are more likely to keep their telephone books than the calendar. >

EBS message #3 specified a telephone number to be used by mobility-impaired l persons, in Wayne County, requiring assistance in evacuation. This telephone number was tested for validity, but the person answering the telephone was not aware of the system or procedures.

The objective to demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control / l media response in a coordinated manner was met (JNC 4). Numerous test calls were placed to the rumor control telephone number. In all instances the queries were adequately answered by the rumor control operator.

Interagency transfer and sharing of information at the JNC prior to its release was sufficiently demonstrated (JNC 5). The state and county PIOS communicated well among themselves and with the utility personnel at the JNC.

I

. o 35 l

L DEFICIENCIES l

There were no deficiencies observed at the JNC during this exercise.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION ,

1.

Description:

Some EBS messages did not contain complete l Instructional information (NUREG-0654, II, E.5).

Recommendation: EBS messages should specify both the telephone book and calendars are sources of information for emergency procedures. ]

I I

2.

Description:

The phone number given for use by mobility-impaired persons in need of assistance for evacuation was not staffed by trained personnel (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.d, E.7).

Recommendation: Training should be provided for operators of the mobility-impaired phone numbers.

'I AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT l

There were no areas recommended for improvement observed at the JNC during this exercise. .

(

l l 2.2 WAYNE COUNTY l

l 2.2.1 Wayne County Emergency Operations Center i

The Wayne. County Sheriff's Communications Center serves as the County Warning Point. The initial ne tification of the unusual event was received over the Radiological Emergency Communications Systems (RECS). Subsequent notification messages were received simultaneously on the RECS line at the warning point and EOC which activated following the Unusual Event. However, as in previous exercises, the RECS telephone in the County EOC was subject to interference. Probleins resulted from another telephone within the EOC and from a pitch tone internal to the line'. Problems with the communication line continues a deficiency from an earlier exercise (12). All notification messages were recorded on the designated state form and contained information about the emergency classification level, plant status and meteorological data. At both the county warning r * ' and EOC, there was an adequate demonstration of the ability to receive initial and > w-up emergency notifications (WCEOC 1).

The activation and staf' ; of the Wayne County EOC was timely and efficient.

Mobilization of emergency personnel began at approximately 0755 and activation was cornpleted at 0815. The EOC was fully staffed. All appropriate agencies responded I

1 36 1

within 30 minutes of the initial notification, which was performed using a call down list. l This demonstration satisfied an exercise objective (WCEOC 2).

The ability to maintain 24-hour staffing was demonstrated by the presentation of a roster (WCEOC 3). l Wayne County partially demonstrated the ability to support an emergency I operations facility (WCEOC 4). While all maps, displays and equipment were adequate, the EOC operations area had a limited working space and poor ventilation. Prolonged use of this facility would reduce the efficiency of emergency response personnel. j J

The Radiological Emergency Communications System (RECS) is the primary link between the EOC and utility. The Executive Hotline links Wayne County, Monroe County j and the State EOCs. A dedicated telephone was available for direct and continuous j communications between the county PIO at the EOC and the Joint News Center. A two- l meter radio was used to commun!cate with two field monitoring teams tnat had been dispatched from County Fire stations. All of the equipment and personnel necessary to operate these communication syste ms were in place. There was an adequate demonstration of the appropriate communication links, both primary and secondary {

(WCEOC 5). 1 l

Wayne County Sheriff's officers maintained access control to the county EOC.

Assigned officers were well trained and efficient. They promptly logged all appropriate personnel and maintained security. Their excellent performance satisfied an exercise objective (WCEOC 6).

l Another objective (WCEOC 7) was met by the acceptable demonstration of the message distribution procedures. This corrects a deficiency from an earlier exercise (13). All messages were received in a timely manner, messages were properly logged on the appropriate forms, and accurate information was promptly posted on the available status board. Furthermore, briefings were regularly held to update the EOC staff on the emergency situation. Intra-agency briefings also took place and they were both adequate and timely. The staff included representatives from 14 different organizations. All staff displayed acceptable levels of training and knowledge in carrying out their assignments.

The EOC was effectively managed by the Chairman of the Board of Supervisors who coordinated the overall emergency response (WCEOC 8). This individual promptly reported to the EOC and assumed control upon his arrival. He utilized county resources to assess and implement emergency response functions. Moreover, there was good coordination with the state and Monroe County officials within the 10-mile EPZ. The Chairman of the Board of Supervisors demonstrated familiarity with procedures for requesting State assistance. He determined that, under the conditions of this exercise, l State assistance was not warranted (WCEOC 9).

Communications with all locations and field personnel . were adequately demonstrated at the Wayne County EOC, thereby meeting an objective of the exercise (WC EOC 10). The U.S. Coast Guard, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and Ontario-Midland Railroad were notified at the Unusual Event from the County Warning Point at the Sheriff's Communication Center. All county and state agencies were

. c i

l 37 l

l notified by telephone from the warning point. After the EOC was activated, at l

approximately 0815, communication responsibilities were shifted from the Warning Point l

' to the EOC. Except for the problem with the RECS line noted above, all telephe e and I

radio communication systems within the EOC were functional and operated satisfactorily l' during the exercise. The two-meter radio system used to communicate with the field l <

monitoring team was functional and according to the radio operator at the EOC, no l i

communication problems were encountered. Communications with other county and State field personnel were carried out using the appropriate communication system. f; The radiological assessment officer demonstrated his capability to project radiation dosage using a hand calculator. The assessment staff successfully utilized an -

f IBM-PC-XT with a software program designed to accept Ginna data. In addition, an HP-l 11C pre-programmed calculator was successfully used for dose calculations. The l knowledge and training displayed by the assessment staff corrects a deficiency from a previous ekereise (#16) and meets an exercise objective (WCEOC 11). However, the effectiveness of the dose assessment activities could be improved by increasing the I number of available, trained staff. f Public alerting activities were carried out by the Wayne County EOC.

Coordination between the participating counties and the State ensured that sirens were j sounded before the EBS broadcast was transmitted. Sirens and tone alert radios were sounded at 0925 followed by the EBS message at 0927. Preparation of the EBS message was coordinate ( by the Wayne County PIO at the EOC with a representative at the Joint News Center. The tran:, mission of all EBS information was timely and the Wayne County PLO verified thr.t all messages were broadcast within 15 minutes of the decisions made by the County Executives. The ability to coordinate public alerting and. instructional messages met an exercise objective (WCEOC 12).

l

. The evacuation of Wayne County Emergency Planning Areas (ERP As) W-1, W-2 and W-4 was well managed (WCEOC 13). Traffic Control points were simulated at all l

locations neSessary to evacuate ERPA W-1 which was designated under the first evacuation recommendation. The second evacuation recommendation included ERPAs W-2 and W-4 and involved simulated establishment of additional traffic control points and relocation of the traffic control points used in the evacuation of ERPA W-1.

i Evacuation activities also included a demonstration of buses for relocation of the general population. Staging of the buses was simulated; however, two bus routes were actually run during the exercise. Two vehicles were dispatched from the Wayne County Highway garage under instructions from the transportation coordinator at the County EOC. The notice to the Highway garage to deploy these buses was based on a free-play message that was introduced at the county EOC.

I Two impediments to evacuations were introduced as free-play messages at the EOC. Response to one impediment was demonstrated while the second response was simulated. State police were dispatched to traffic control points #11 and #12. They followed proper procedures by closing off roads, setting up equipment, directing traffic and using personal dosimetry. Within the EOC there was a discussion of how traffic would be rerouted and the kinds of special equipment that would be utilized for the conditions of the simulated free-play problem. Plans were also made for the simulated l

]

' 38 use of a helicopter to monitor traffic flow at the sites of the two impediments. The fle!d 3,

and simulated activities demonstrated EOC staff can adequately manage the emergency

, resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation (WCEOC 14).

i L

> The ebjective to demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to control

!/ aedess to the evacuated area was met (WCEOC 15). A total of 36 traffic control points werq designated to direct traffic out of the evacuated areas and to control access. The g

State Police were requested by the County Sheriff to provide additional units. When the evacuJtion was complete, Saffic control point units were relocated on the perimeter of the evacuated area to comrol access. Two of the traffic control points were actually

\

p staffed by personnel dispatched by the County Sheriff. - All other locati6as were y simulated during the exercise.

The decision to simulate the closing of all Wayne County Schools in the evacu-ated areas was made at approximately 0938. A number of actions were taken in response

' to this decision including: (1) notification of school dismissal, (2) opening of reception

'M center and estimating of student ' arrival time, (3) preparation of an EBS message, (4)

!' verification of school dismissal and arrival at the designated reception center. These actions demonstrated that personnel at the Vlayne Coup.y EOC are adequately prepared '

i to effect an early dismissal of schools within the 10 misc'EPZ (WCEOC 16).

s ,

Public alerting activities wcce coordinated between the Wayne and Monroe County executives and the state. These actions were promptly carried out demonstrating Wayne County's ability to ectivate. the alert and notlOcation system and meet an exer-1 cise objective (WCEOC 17).

I J

DEFICIENCIES There were no deficiencies observed at the Wayne County EOCs during the

' l exe~cise.

l ARYAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 8-

. 1.

Description:

The RECS line at the Wayne County EOC Em subject l to interference from another telephone within'the EOC and from a L pitch-tone internal to the line (NUREG-0654, II, F.1.b, F.1.d).

I ,

, Recommendation: The RECS line at the Wsyne County EOC should agairi be re-inspected to eliminate.this equinment croblem.

2. lYescription: The EOC operations area continues to hr"e a l!mited working space and poor ventilathh. Prolonged use r ~ als facility '

would reduce the efficier cy (f emergency resp' es ersonnel

~

(NUREG-0654, it, H.3). . ?

1

, Recommendation: The Wrjne County EOC facility should be

< ' relocated to a new facility or the ' existing ideility should be sub stantSily upgraded.

I# .

i J

39 AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT l Description Dose assessment activities could be improved by

! increasing the number of available, trained staff.

j

^

Recommendattom Additional dose assessment staff should be trained I and made available to the Wayne County emergency planning staff.

l l 2.2.2 Field Monitoring Teams j

- J Two teams were dispatched for field monitoring. Team One was deployed from the East Williamson Fire Station while Team Two was deployed from the Union Hill Fire Station. Team One demonstrated that they had the equipment and training to monitor and control emergency worker exposure. This team read and recorded dosimetry

[

readings according to acceptable procedures and transmitted appropriate information to l EOC staff (WCField 1). However, a member of Team Two carried a defective dosimeter ,

f that drifted off scale by the end of the exercise. This loss of capability was not reported l to supervisory staff. Moreover, the team member believed that a replacement dosimeter l was not available. I

! l Members of both teams provided an excellent demonstration of mobilization and deployment capabilities (WCFleid 2). Team One satisfactorily utilized appropriate

- equipment in the field for determining ambient radiation levels. This team's demonstration partially met an exercise objective (WCFleid 3). Team Two experienced three separate problems associcted with this same objective. l I

One, ambient radle.lon ' levels were not monitored during transit to the first location and between the subsequent locations. Two, one team member experienced difficulty in determining the appropriate scale multiplier on the CDV-715 for measuring a level of 400 mR/hr. Three, after completing air sampling in the 400 mR/hr ambient I level, the team member did not respond appropriately and seek procedures for quickly leaving the area.

Team one adequately demonstrated the ability to measure airborne radiciodine in the presence of noble gases. Their performance met part of an exercise objective (WCField 4). Technical ir. consistencies were observed in the measuring procedures used by Team 2. Difficulties were reported in maintaining a constant distance between the sample and detector which could introduce inaccuracies in the measured count rate.

Moreover, the leader of Team Two stated that there was no back up equipment r.t the Union Hill Fire House. If this is the case, a deficiency is continued from a previous t exercise (#15).

DEFICIENCIES There were no deficiencies observed in the activities of the Wayne County radiological field monitoring teams durirg the exercise.

l

. - _ _ . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ ~

l 40 AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION

1.

Description:

Loss of dosimetry capability was experienced by one radiological fleid team member and was not reported to super-visory staff -(NUREG-0654, !!, K.3.a).

Recommendation Field monitoring personnel should be trained to report any loss of dosimetry capability to supervisory staff.

2.

Description:

Radiological monitoring Team 2 did not carry out monitoring during transit between sampling locations, did not determine the appropriate scale multiplier for the CDV-175 and did not respond promptly to changing field conditions (NUREG-06 54, II,1.8).

Recommendation: Radiological monitoring staff should receive more training to increase their ability to use appropriate equipment and procedures.

3.

Description:

The leader of the radiological monitoring team stated that there was no back up equipment at the Union Hill Fire House to measure radiciodine in the plume. Also, backup field monitoring equipment did not appear to be available at the East Williamson Fire Station (NUREG-0654, !!,1.8).

i Recommendation: Additional equipment should be made available to field monitoring teams in case of equipment fa!1ure. ,

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT

1.

Description:

There is an observed technical difficulty in l

maintaining a constant distance between the sample and radio-l logical detector. This factor could introduSe inaccuracies in the measured count rate.

Recommendation A one piece holder for both the sample and detector would maintain a constant distance and axial alignment.

This improvement would provide reproducible results.

2.2.3 Field Implementation of County Actions to Protect the Public Wayne County demonstrated a number of activities in the field. Following a sim,ulated siren failure, the Ontario Fire Department performed route alerting. Their performance was good, even though the terrain was difficult, particularly near to the lake shore. This demonstration met an exercise objective (WCField 5). However, oute !

alerting procedures could be improved with more vehicles, up-dated maps and considera-tion.of notification to the hearing impaired and non-English speaking residents.

i l l

41 During the exercise, state policemen were dispatched to traffic control points

11 and #12 in Wayne County. They followed proper procedures by closing off roads, setting-up equipment and directing traffic. These officers demonstrated a thorough knowledge of evacuation procedures and the prompt establishment of traffic control points (WCFleid 8).

A sample of resources necessary to implement the evacuation of part of the 10 mile EPZ was adequately demonstrated in two locations (WCField 10). These demonstrations involved school evacuations. During this demonstration of county evacuation capabilities, two impediments to evacuations were introduced into the scenario. The nature of the scenario accidents were promptly considered and special equipment was ordered. Emergency traffic was rerouted and the assistance of -

appropriate State and local agencies requested. A sample of resources necessary to deal with impediments to evactiation was successfully demonstrated (WCFleid 11). Access was controlled to the evacuated areas. Access control points were promptly established and all roads were blocked by barriers (WCField 12).

Observers reported that procedures were in place for evact!ation of f!ve Wayne County schools and the Williamson Central School, thereby meeting an exercise objective (WCField 13). l

)'

The Palmyra-Macedon Sr. High School Reception / Congregate Care Center provided a good demonstration of their capabilities to function as a reception and

! congregate care facility. The facility was promptly activated and fully staffed (WCFleid l 14). A roster was available with additional staff listed to demonstrate 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months staffing j capabilities (WCField 15).

. Monitoring hot lines were established and contamination monitoring procedures were well demonstrated for both vehicle monitoring and personnel monitoring (WCField i 16). The following weaknessas were noted:

1. Personnel contamination surveys were done with the plastic protector caps in place on the pancake detectors - this reduces the detector sensitivity. ;

2. There were no calibration stickers on any of the survey instruments used for personnel monitoring.

3. The route from the vehicle decontamination area back to the {

personnel monitoring area allowed for potentially contaminated personnel to leave the area without going through the personnel monitoring area. Better access control is needed between the vehicle decontamination and personnel monitoring operations. j l l The available facilities were adequate for providing mass care to evacuees. They were sufficient for both reception and congregate care functions (WCFleid 17). ,

i

42 DEFICIENCIES There were no deficiencies observed in Wayne County's fieli! implementation of actions to protect the public during the exercise.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION

1.

Description:

Staff at the personnel monitoring center need additional training. Survey instruments were used with protective caps that reduce sensitivity and the instruments lacked cailbration tags or stickers. In addition, a better traffic flow pattern needs to be developed for returning potentially contaminated individuals to the personnel monitoring areas (NUREG-0654, !!, J.12). .

Recommendation: Staff at the personnel monitoring center needs additional training. An improved traffic flow pattern needs to be established for movement of potentially contaminated individuals from the vehicle contamination area to the personnel monitoring area.

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT

1.

Description:

Supplemental route alerting by the Ontario Fire Department could be improved with more vehicles, up-dated route alerting maps and by notification procedures for the hearing impaired and non-English speaking residents.

Recommendation: Prepare updated reute alerting maps and I develop supplemental procedures for notification of the hearing impaired and non-English speaking residents. Additional vehicles would reduce route timt ,.

2.2.4 Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control The school evacuation demonstration by the Williamson Central School and Wayne Central School Bus included a good performance of monitoring and control of emergency worker exposure (WCField 1). These demonstrations partially correct deficiencies from a previous exercise (#18). The Ontario fire department was responsible for route alerting activities. However, the dosimeters and survey meters stored at the fire department were not taken into the field. This continues part of a deficiency from a previous exercise as well as the problems observed at the personnel monitoring center.

These problems are discussed under Sect!on 2.2.3 and involve training issues as well as a need to improve traffic flow for potentially contaminated individuals.

Most personnel involved in the field activities were able to provide KI to their i participating staff. This partially satisfied an exercise objective (WCField 9). The l l

s

I l*

43 L .

Ontario Fire Department personnel that performed route alerting did not have K!

, available. Their staff were sent into the field without KI which could not have been promptly administered once the decision had been made to do so.

Some staff from the various field assignments were aware of the individual who could authorize excess exposure. This partially meets a designated exercise objective (WCFleid 18). This includes traffic control points and bus drivers for evacuation routes in Wayne County and Williamson schools. However, bus drivers with the Williamson Central School & ave buses that did not have 2-way radios. Any communications with supervisory staff regarding their excess dose would be made after arrival at the reception center. The Ontario Fire Department staff that participated in route alerting activities did not know correct exposure limits for call-in nor did they appear to know who could authorize excess exposure.

DEFICIENCIES There were no deficiencies observed in the demonstration of Wayne County emergency worker radiological exposure control during the exercise.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION i

1. Description The On:ario Fire Department did not have K!

available for their field personnel assigned to route alerting. l Individuals were sent into the field without K! which could not j

. have been administered promptly, once the decision had been made to do so (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.e).

Recommendation KI should be made available to the Ontario Fire Department for all staff involved in field activities. Procedures should be in place for the prompt administration of KI should the ,

need arise.

2.

Description:

The Ontario Fire Department Staff that participated in route alerting activities did not know correct exposure limits.

Moreover, personnel did not know the individual who could ,

authorize excess exposure (NUREG-0654,11, K.4).

Recommendation: The Ontario Fire Department staff who are involved in route alerting should receive additional training in procedures for managing worker exposure control. They should be aware of dose limitations and who can authorize excess exposure.

3.

Description:

The Ontario Fire Department staff responsible for ;

route alerting did not take dosimetry into the field (NUREG-0654, II, K.3.a).

44 . .

Recommendattom The Ontario Fire Department personnel that perform route alerting'should be. given additional training in emergency worker radiological exposure control.

4.

Description:

Bus drivers from the Williamson Center School drove buses that were not equipped with 2-way radios. Desimetry readings and requests for emergency information could not be promptly related to emergency managers (NUREG-0654, II, K.3.b, K.4).

Recommendation Buses to be used for evacuations should be equipped with 2-way radios.

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT There were no areas recommended for improvement observed in Wayne County's Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control.

2.2.5 Public Awareness Sirens were sounded at approximately 0925 and the duration was approximately 3 minutes. Sirens were heard by federal observers at 4 locations in the County and reports of siren soundings at other locations were received from numerous individuals who were interviewed. No reports of actual siren failure were received; however, route alerting based on simulated stren failure was conducted effectively as part of the scenario. EBS ,

messages were heard on WHAM-AM at 0940; subsequent EBS messages were heard at 1008 and later on the same station.

- Spot checks of public awareness regarding emergency measures for the Ginna Nuclear Power Station were conducted in Wayne County and included hotel / motel staff, schools with tone alert radios, and the general population. Fifteen of the twenty respondents in the 10-mile EPZ said they had received the public information on the calendar and maps of evacuation routes and location of reception centers. There was mixed interest in becoming familiar with emergency measures. However, all respondents were willing to cooperate and would evacuate if instructed to do so. All but five.

respondents heard the sirens sound. Five of the twenty respondents knew the delli was'in progress.

Based on limited interviews of local residents, some individuals had not received public information and they were not certain of emergency measures. This exercise objective was partially met (WCField 6) and a deficiency from a previous exercise is partially continued. Similar observations were also reported for the transient population, particularly migrant workers who may include non-English speaking individuals. While some respondees were aware of emergency preparedness procedures, other. were not.

The exercise objective involving transients was partially met (WCField 7). ,

4 9

_ - - - _ _ - - _- - . _ - _ - . _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . - . . - _ _ - - _ . - - - - - . _ _ _ _ . - - - - _ - - - - _ . _ - . _ . . - - - - _ _ - J

. . 45 l

DEFICIENCIES There were no de91enci'es observe (! in Wayne County's Public Awareness during the exercise.

~

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION t

1.

Description:

Some transient residents interviewed were not adequately aware of what actions were to be taken in a radiological emergency (NU".rG-0654, II, G.2). .

Recommendation: Pudic education efforts should be continued and transient populations such as migratory workers should be included in 'he awareness programs.

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT

1. Description Based on limited interviews, some individual residents had not received public information and were not certain of emergency measures.

Similarly, some transients were not aware of emergency preparedness.

Recommendation: The dissemination of public information should be improved to increase the awareness of eniergency preparedness by residents and transients.

2.3 MONROE COUNTY OPERATIONS 2.3.1 Monroe County Emergency Operations Center The Monroe County Warning Point received the notification of an unusual event at 0745. Using a fully computerized notification system, the warning point simultaneously alerted key county officials. At the Monroe County EOC, RECS messages from the utility were confirmed promptly. Thus, this objective was met (MCEOC 1).

Following the alerting of county personnel at the Notification of Unusual Event classification, the Monroe County EOC was activated in a timely manner. The EOC was fully staffed by 0915 (MCEOC 2).

The ability of Monroe County to maintain staffing in the EOC on a 24-hour ba. sis was demonstrated by a charge in personnel participating in the emergency response team. All department (agency) directors were relieved by second shif t staffing (MCEOC J).

The EOC facilities are well-lighted and provide limited but adequate space for agency representatives. The telefax machine linking the EOC with the JNC was operational during most of the day. This corrects a previously identified deficiency.

9

46 . .

Communications equipment in the dose assessment area (telephones, the RECS line, and RACES) at times cau,se excessive noise levels (MCEOC 4).

Primary and backup communication links with other emergency operations facilities were effectively implemented. The telephone line used to transrdt telefax messages between the EOC and the JNC was inoperable for a brief period. The EOC staff restored this link within a. short period, and effective communications were maintained throughout the remainder of the exercise (MCEOC 5).

Adequate security was established at the EOC. Individuals entering the EOC were required to present identification and log in on the sign-in sheet provided (MCEOC 6).

Internal communications were well organized and effective. Messages were logged, and the status board in each of the rooms was updated regularly. Briefings were j f

held whenever new information became available (MCEOC 7).

Overall, the command and control function at the Monroe County EOC was well organized. Adequate responses coupled with proper utilization of county resources provided solutions to traffic related problems that were interjected during the exercise.

At all times the County Chief Executive or his alternate were clearly in control.

However, the decision-maker did not necessarily follow recommendations of his staff to '

evacuate planning areas M1 and M2. The decision-maker subsequently followed a later recommendation to evacuate; howevet, due to the delay in implementing the first recommendation, the last evacuees leaving the effected ERPAs could have been exposed to the airborne plume. Thus, this objective (MCEOC 8) has been only partly met.

Since evacuation time estimates included in the plan are for the entire 10-mile EPZ, determination of the time required to evacuate the portion of the EPZ cannot be made. Because of this factor, we were not able to determine whether anyone would have been exposed to the airborne plume as a result of the delay in implementation of the evacuation recommendation.

State aid was not requested at this exercise. Thus no opportunity was presented to demonstrate objective MCEOC 9.

The County EOC communicated effectively with all emergency response f' locations and organizations, including field personnel. The U.S. Coast Guard and the Ontario-Midland Railroad were contacted during the Site Area Emergency, and were placed in standby status (MCEOC 10). <

\

Radiation dosage to the public was projected using two computer systems and backup manual calculations. When field monitoring data became available, the dose assessment staff compared projected and measured dose rates. The number of comparisons was limited by the lack of positive field monitoring data. Potential consequences of exposure to the public were determined from plant conditions, and were used to make protective action recommendations. However, this process was impeded by delays in the transmission of plant data from the EOF to the county EOC. Efforts by the Monroe County liaison officer at the EOF to expedite the flow of plant data were largely l

unsuccessful. The Radiological Officer was able to obtain more timely updates on the l

1 i

47 i

plant status after the EOF was activated. The county radiological officer managed

. adequately dose assessment activities. However, he could have deployed county field I monitoring teams more effectively, in order to better _ define the plume boundries.

Further, he could have been more forceful in presenting PAG recommendations to

- decisionmakers. This objective has only been partly met (MCEOC 11). .

The County Executive coordinated public alerting and instructional messages with his counterparts at the State and Wayne County EOCs, using a dedicated telephone line. When the state and county officials in charge agreed on protective actions., the County Executive immediately notified the Monroe County PIO at the Joint News Center. The PIO included the information received from the EOC in EBS messages. Ten' EBS messages were prepared, and their broadcast was simulated, within 15 minutes.

Each EBS message contained accurate information, including detailed description of the boundaries of the affected ERPA's (MCEOC 12). j The Monroe County officials in charge determined the actions necessary to evacuate the affected ERPA's. County resources were deployed to assure the smooth j flow of evacuation traffic (MCEOC 13). The EOC director quickly identified the resources necessary to remove obstructions along evacuation routes and with the support of agency staff, mobilized needed equipment ' including ambulances and helicopters, to remove obstructions to evacuation (MCEOC 14).

The organizational ability to effect an early dismissal of schools within the 10-mile EPZ was demonstrated (MCEOC 15 and 17). The organizational ability needed to control access to the evacuated area was adequate (MCEOC 16).

The County Executive and his alternate, using the executive hot line, coordinated the activation of the prompt notification siren system with their counterparts at the State and Wayne County EOCs. The siren activation was coordinated with the EBS message (MCEOC 18).

DEFICIENCIES There were no deficiencies observed at the Monroe County EOC during the exercise.

l AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTION ACTION l

1.

Description:

The initial recommendation of the radiological officer to evacuate ERPA's M1 and M2 was not implemented by the official in charge. A subsequent recommendation to evacuate was implemented. The delay in implementing an evacuation order could have led to unnecessary exposure of evacuees to the airborne i plume (NU REG-0654,11, J.9).

Recommendation: The official in charge should be frequently briefed on the findings and recommendations of the radiological officer.

i 48

2.

Description:

Efforts by the Monroe County liaison officer at the EOF to expedite the flow of plant data were largely unsuccessful (NUREG-0654, II, F.1.d).

Recommendation: The Monroe County radiological officer should identify the cause of the delay in the transfer of plant data, and should develop procedures to assure that this information . is promptly received.

'3.

Description:

The dose assessment staff compared projected and measured dose rates. The number of comparisons was limited by l 4

the lack of positive field monitoring data (NUREG-0654, II, I.8).

Recommendation: The county radiological officer should deploy field monitoring teams to obtain a more complete definition of the plume, so that an adequate number of comparisons between pro- g jected and measured dose rates can be made.. These comparisons are needed in order to verify protective action recommendations.

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT There were no areas re' commended for improvement observed at the Monroe County EOC during the exercise.

2.3.2 Field Monitoring Teams Field monitoring team members were called according to prescribed notification

~

procedures. The deployment area was activated by 1010, and two field teams were deployed into the field by 1043. - Team B was at its first position before the General l Emergency was declared. Field monitoring teams were properly briefed on plant and '

meteorological conditions before deployment but they did not check their equipment adequately before going into the field. The following equipment-related problems arose during field-monitoring activities: (1) The battery was not connected on the CDV-715 instrument; (2) No plastic bag was available to be placed over the HP-210 pancake probe; and (3) One of the anti-contamination suits did not have the required rubber gloves. This objective has only been partly met (MCFleld 2).

The field monitoring teams were well-equipped to measure ambient radiatian I

levels. Correct procedures were followed; measurements were taken at chest level 14nd at ground level at each location. The low-range CDV-700 was used because radiation fields were not high enough to justify the use of the high-range CDV-715. ' The teams occasionally turned off the CDV-700 while in transit between monitoring locations, to minimize battery drain. In an actual event, field monitoring teams would' leave the detector on, in order to detect possible radiation fields between monitoring locations (MCField 3).

49 To measure airborne radiolodine concentrations, air was drawn through a filter cartridge and paper filter at the rate of 0.8 cfm for 10 minutes.' An HP 210 pancake probe and an Eberline 140N rate meter were used to measure the activity of the radioiodine particles deposited in the filter cartridge and filter. The procedures used to measure radiciodine contamination deposited in the filter media were not consistent or Neither team had holders for the filter media, as specified in their reproducible. ,

procedures, nor were they familiar with the term. This objective has only been partly met (MCFleid 4).

DEFICIENCIES There'were no deficiencies observed in the activities of the Monroe County Field Monitoring Teams.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION

1.

Description:

The field monitoring teams did not check their equipment adequately before going into the field (NUREG-0654, !!,

I.8).

Recommendation: Field monitoring teams should thoroughly check l'

their equipment against the list in the plan before leaving their deployment area.

2.

Description:

The procedures used to measure radiolodine concentration deposited in the filter media were not consistent or reproducible (NUREG-0654, II, I.9).

f Recommendation: Appropriate equipment and procedures should l be provided to assure controlled and reproducible measurement of l airborne radiciodine concentrations. Field monitoring teams j should be trained on an ongoing basis in the measurement of radiciodine samples.

I AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT l

l There were no Areas Recommended for Improvement observed in the activities of the Monroe County Field Monitoring Teams.

l

! 2.3.3 Field Implementation of County Actions to Protect the Public The County EOC called a local police department Ic provide public route L alerting, as a backup to a simulated siren failure. A police officer was promptly dispatched to the vicinity of the failed siren. The officer covered the area at an ,

h*

l

50 '

i appropriate speed. He modified the designated route in order to cover areas of seasonal cottages and new construction that were not on the assigned route, although within the ,

perimeter of the failed siren (MCField 5). I The Webster Police Department promptly established traffic control point #4.

Two squad cars were dispatched to the location, arriving within four minutes of the )

initial notification to the Webster Police Department dispatcher. Both officers were familiar with procedures for access control and the desired direction of traffic flow.

Traffic control point #1 was established only after a lengthy delay, which resuited from significant confusion regarding its location. Once the officer arrived there, control was adequately established. However, due to the delay, the objective can be considered only ,

partly met. 'This is a partial demonstration of remedial actions recommended at the last j exercise (MCField 8). !

' l Monroe County satisfactorily demonstrated a sample of resources required to implement an orderly evacuation of the 10-mile EPZ. Resources mobilized included: (1) traffic control; (2) bus evacuation of the general population: and (3) radiological monitoring, reception and congregate care of evacuees. This corrects a previously identified deficiency (MCField 10).

Police officers reported that major evacuation routes are generally kept clear of snow, ice and debris. State and town highway crews can be requested through the police dispatcher to remove impediments to evacuation (MCFleid 11)- .

Police officers at traffic control points #4 and #1 were fa[nillar with procedures for access control. The availability of adequate resources required for access control was demonstrated (MCField 12).

The Webster Bus Garage identified the buses, drivers and mechanics it has available, both directly and under contract with another bus line, for evacuation of schools within the 10-mile EPZ. This objective (MCFleld 13) was met.

The reception / congregate care center was activated out of sequence. The center manager mobilized county public health, Red Cross, and county social services workers in a timely fashion. The center was fully activated by 1500 (MCFleid 14). Second-shift operations of the center was demonstrated by presentation of a roster (MCField 15).

Procedures to register and monitor evacuees were handled satisfactorily (MCField 16).

The adequacy of facilities for mass care of evacuees was excellent (MCField 17).

DEFICIENCIES There were no deficiencies observed in Monroe County's Field Implementation of County Actions to Protect the Public during the exercise.

AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION

Description:

Traffic control point #1 was established only af ter a significant delay, which resulted from significant confusion regarding its location (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.j).

. . 51 Recommendation: Police officers should be briefed on TCP location when being dispatched.

. AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT

Description:

The police officer modified the designated (public alerting) route in order to cover areas of seasonal cottages and new construction that were not on the assigned route.

Recommendation: The plan sh'ould be updated to reflect areas of seasonal residences and new construction. 1 1

I 2.3.4 Emergency Worker Erposure Control Exposure control a:tivities were observed for field monitoring teams, County public health workers assigned to monitoring and decontamination activities at reception and congregate care centers, local police assigned to traffic control and route alerting I duties, and evacuation bus drivers. In general, emergency workers were equipped with i high-range (0-200 R) and low-range (0-5 R) pencil dosimeters, TLD's, and dose record ;

l cards. Local police assigned to traffic control ari.d route alerting were equipped with high-range dosimeters o'aly. , Most field emergency workers were familiar with j procedure t for periodic recording of accumulated exposures, and knew the dose limits at l which they were to notify their dispatcher. In several Instances, emergency workers ]

were not aware of the dose at which they should call in, or were not familiar with the I frequency at which readings were to be taken. This objective has been only partly met. ,

The remedial actions recommended at the last exercise have not yet been completed (MCFleid 1).

Emergency wor <ers in the field were equipped with KI. When questioned, each worker knew that K! was to be used when the decision to do so was given by the l emergency worker's dispatcher (MCFleid 9).

i Emergency field workers were aware that authorization' for excess exposure would be given through their respective dispatchers (MCField 18).

DEFICIENCIES There were no Deficiencies observed in Monroe County's Emergency Worker Exposure Control during the exercise.

l AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION

1.

Description:

Local police assigned to traffic control and route alerting were equipped with high-range dosimeters only (NUREG-l 06 54, II, K.3.a).

52 . .

J Recommendation: 0-5 R dosimeters should be issued to all emergency workers, as specified in the plan.

2.

Description:

In several instances, emergency workers were not aware of the dose at which they should callin, or were not familiar with the frequency at which readings were to be taken (NUREG- ,

06 54, II, K.3.b, K.4).

1 Recommendation Training of emergency workers in exposure l control procedures should be conducted on an ongoing basis.

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT l

There were no Areas Recommended for Improvement observed in Monroe j County's Emergency Worker Exposure Control during the exercise.

l l 2.3.5 Public Awareness

]

A spot check of the population within the 10-mile EPZ indicated that most 1 residents had received calendars, brochures, and telephone book inserts with information

]

on procedures for notification of a radiological emergency at Ginna. This corrects a

. )

deficiency observed at earlier exercises (MCField 6). !

)

Since there are no hotels in Monroe County within the 10-mile EPZ, the provision j of information on emergency actions to transient populations within the 10-mile EPZ was l not observed (MCField 7). j l

1 DEFICIENCIES There were no deficiencies observed in Monroe County's Public Awareness during the exercise )

AREAS REQ'UIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION There were no areas requiring corrective action observed in Monroe County's Public Awareness during the exercise.

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT There were no areas recommended for improvement observed in Mource County's Public Awareness during the exercise.

- . 53 3 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTING OR AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: SEPTEMBFR 26,1985 EXERCISE Section 2 of this report lists deficiencies or areas requiring corrective action based on the findings and recommendations of federal observers at the radiological emergency preparedness exercise for the Ginna Nuclear Power Station held on September 26, 1985. These evaluations are based on the applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in NUREG-0654-FEMA-1, Rev.1 (Nov.1980), and objectives for the exercise agreed upon by the state, FEMA, and the RAC.

The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that any deficiencies or areas requiring corrective actions have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into the plans as appropriate.

FEMA requests that both the state and local jurisdictions submit a schedule of i actions they have taken or intend to take to correct these inadequacies. FEMA recommends that a detailed plan, including dates of completion for scheduling and j implementing recommendations, be provided if corrective actions cannot be instituted j immediately. FEMA further recommends that an additional effort be made by alllevels l of government to improve intergovernmental coordination in all aspects of the emergency planning process. A meeting between state, county, local, and FEMA officials is advisable, l No deficiencies were observed at the state or county level that would cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the site in the event of a radiological emergency. I Areas requiring corrective action which were observed at the September 26, 1985 exercise for the Ginna Nuclear Power Station, as well as outstanding deficiencies or areas requiring corrective action from previous exercises, require that a schedule of corrective actions be developed. These deficiencies or areas requiring corrective action are summarized in the following Tables 3.1 through 3.7.

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73 4
~~SUMMARY~~
OF AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Section 3 of this report provides a schedule for the correction of deficier.cies or areas seguiring corrective action noted during the September 26,1985 exercise.
T. ables 4.1 through 4.7 summarize recommendations to correct those deficiencies or areas requiring corrective action. For purposes of verification, the table compares these recommendations with the recommendations based upon the previous exercises.
The current status of all recommendations is indicated.
O l
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74 TABLE 4.1 ROBERT E. CINNA NUCLEAR POWER STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION September 26, 1985 and Previous Exercises New York State EOC Tinal - 12/16/85 Page 1 of 4 NUREC-0654 Reco' wended Corrective Action FEMA-REF-l Rev. 1 Exercise Exercise Exercise Present No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference 1/21/82 6/22/83 9/26/85 Status 1 The message / status board was not updated in NR X C the accident assessment- room at the SEOC after 12:50 p.m. This board shmid be up-dated throughout the exercise.
2 Delays were observed in obtaining information F.1.d X C and receiving answers to questions from the
, state and utility over the RECS line, which was located in the dose assessment room at the Monroe County EOC. Some utility field-menitoring data transmitted via the RECS line were in error and data concerning ground deposition and- iodine release information were not received in a timely manner. The cause for these problems should be reviewed by the state and counties and the appropriate training of staff should be accomplished to improve the accuracy and timeliness of infor-mation transmitted to the counties via the RECS line.
3 Dif ficulty was observed in maintaining rapid F.1.d X C communication between internal groups, especially in the Albany EOC between the radiological intelligence room and "the operations staff. The use of liaison officers could epeed the flow of information between these groups. For instance. the operations ataff could be asatsted by a liaison person assigned to monicer inf orma-tion coming into the radiological intelli-
. gence toon.
6 ' Improvement in internal connunications should F.1.d X C be possible based on the results of the exercise; for example, rapid communication between the radiological intelligence room and the operations staff should be ensured.
5 Security measures should ensure that the NR X C covements of media representatives can be monitored. .
6 The scenario used could not demonstrate the A.4 x c de ci sion-1taking capabilities of the backup team that would provide 24-hour support.
Future exercises could be designed to demonstrate the transfer of responsibilities more effectively. This could be built into the exercise by simulating the passage of time between events.
e e 73 TABi,E 4.1 (Cont'd)
Final - 12/16/85 Page 2 of a NUREC-0654 Recommended Corrective Action FEMA-REP-L Rev. 1, Exercise Exercise Exercise Present No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference 1/21/82 6/22/83 9/26/85 enas 7 The state's decision to evacuate ERPAs W i .* I.10, X C V4 was reached without fully integrating tne J.9 input fro's radiological intelligence into.the decision. In, Honroe County, decision makars appeared to rely less heavily on the county's own dose assessment capabilities, which were outstanding, than on state and Wayne County data. Coordination between command and accident / dose assessment should be improved by more fully integrating the input of the -
accident /doJe assessment staff into protec-
~~tive action decisions.~~
8 Some EBS messages referred to telephone books ~ E.7, X- I for additional .information. Complete infor- J.10.c mation was not available in the latest Rochester telephone book and vsa very dif f t-cult to find in the 1983-84 telephone book for Wayne County. References to telephone books and public information brochures in EBS messages should be reviewed. The EBS messages should describe the location of the information in the telephone book well enough that it can be found quickly.
9 The statement, "This is not a test " in EBS E.7, X 1 messages numbered 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 J.10.c conflicts with the statement. "This is a test," in messages numbered 2 and 3. The l
messages should be revieved and a single statement consistant with the requiremet.t of the state RE?P should be chosen for all messages. .
10 State and counties should ensure that, after E.5 X C a state of emergency is declared, the affected public is provided with timely and complete inf o r ta tion about actions being carried out by both state and county responders.
Il Future exercises should demonstrate means for C.4.c X C rumor control. Rumor control officials thould have the capability to conitor local television and neve broadcasts to determine whether messages and assessments are being perceived ccrrectly.
l
76 TABLE 4.1 (Cont'd) .
Final - 12/16/85 Page 3 of 4 NUREC-0654 Reconeended Corrective Action F EMA-REP-1 I' gey, g, Exe rcise Exercise Exercise Present No. Recom:nended Corrective Action Reference 1/21/82 6/22/83 9/26/85 Status 12 All radiological data should be displayed by H.12 X C i
uniforin locational designations at the SE0C
( regardless of the county of origin. Data should also be listed chronologically with l
distance from the plume centerline indicated.
Data should be labeled consistently with proper radiological units and parameters.
13 The state accident assessment team should H.12, X X C coordinate better with county field teams so J.10.s, that all county data are used by the state in 7, 10 its assessment activities. Additional training in making timely use _ of all field data is recommended. The role of each entity (utility, county, state, and federal) in providing monitoring data should be more clearly defined. and procedures for obtaining and using the data should be fully imple-mented.
14 Programmable calculators with printing I.10, X C capabilities would facilitate prompt M.4 estioation of population dose rates and all other dose calculations. Such calculators would also improve the traceability and 4 reproducibility of results.
15 Carry-through of FEMA contact with other F.1.c X C federal support agencies should be more ef fectively demonstrated in future exercises.
16 The state should improve its means of access H.12 X K C to data collected by the county and utilize the county data more fully in reaching pro-tective action decisions.
l 17 Maps of crop distribution should be available J.11 X I at the SEOC.
18 The decision to include or exclude captive J.10.e K 1 populations under the state's K1 policy should be cade.
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77 TABLE 4.1 (Cont'd)
Final - 12/le 65 Page 4 of 4 NUREG-0654 Recommended Corrective Action ~ ~ ~
FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1, Exe rcise F.xercise Exercise Present No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference 1/21/82 6/22/83 9/26/85 Status 19 Wayne County followed procedures to request' J.10.e. X 1 authorization f rom D011 for exposures to emer- K.4 gency workers in excess of EPA protective action guides. Based on data available to the state at that time, the authorization was dentod. Upon receipt of the original request for authorization to exceed protective action ]
i guides, the state should have contacted Wayne '
County for the information and data needed to support a recommendation for authorizing the excies doses, and it should have moved more I quickly to authorize the precautionary us6 of K1 for the one Wayne County field monitoring team that received a 5 Ree whole body dose, j' The state should fully utilize the county field ronitoring data and coordinate more closely with the counties in deciding whether to authorize the use of KI and worker exposures in excess of protective action guides.
20 Additional training and proceduras for the K.3.b X C use of dosimeters is recommended.
21 Me.mbe rs of the ingestion pathway sampling K.5.b X 1 l team shouli have protective cluthing, I particularly hand and foot coveringr. '
avails.ble.
22 Futura exercisss should allow additional time N.1 X C to demonstrate rather than simulate key re -
l entry acd recovery procedures. ]
t !
23 Consideration should be given to having the M.1 X C exercise simulate a longer time span to increase involvement of backup staff and to !
atlew demonstration of procedures that would be used during the post-accident period to protect the public.
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78 TABLE 4.2 R08ERT E. CINNA NUCIEAR POWER STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION September 26, 1985 and Previous Exercises Western District EOC .
Final - 12/16/35 Page 1 of 1 NUREC-0654 Recommended Corrective Action FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1, Exercise 'F.xercise En reise Present No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference 1/21/82 6/22/83 9/26/85 Status 1 Security measures should ensure that the NR X C.
movements' of media representatives can be monitored.
2 The display of the emergency classification D.3 X C level at the WDEOC was difficult for some emergency workers to read and was not shown continuously throughout the exercise. Con-sideration should be given to improving the visibility of the display. At a minimum the emergency classification level must be dis-played at all times.
1 Maps of population by ERPA should be avail- J.10.b X C able for VDEOC workers.
4 There less interference between the local F.1.d X I government tadio and RECS dedi,:ated land line at the 1.DEOC. The snurce of interference needs to be located and eliminated.
5 The telef ax machine at the WDEOC ran up to 1- - F.1.d X C L/2 tours late. An additional machine to provide for timely telefax messages is desir-able. Also, the WDF.0C teletah is not com-patible with the state accident assessment telefax; copies of plume isopleths could not be received. If possible, the WCECC should ,
be provided with compatible equipment. .
6 The t.cenario used could not demonstrate the A.4 K C decis tin-saking capabilities of the backup team that would provide 24-hour support.
Future exercises could be designed to demonstrate the transfee of responsibili:tes more effectively. This could be built into the exercise by simulating the passage of time between events.
7 The unreliable and ontdated radio system. F.1 X 1 which caused problems during the 1993 exercise, is still a potential source of communication problems. A new radio system should be purchased and installed at all applicable locations.
8 There are an inadequate number of telephone F.1 x 1 Lines and telephone equipment available at the WE EOC. Additional telephuna lines and equipment should be secured for the WDEOC.
l
79 TABLE 4.3 ROBERT E. CINNA NUCLf.AR POWER STATION - REMEDI AL ACTION September 26, 1985 and Previous Exercises j Lake District EOC i Final - 12';+ d5 l
Page , of 1 i
NUREC-06 54 Recommended Corrective Action FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1, Exercire Exercise Exercise Present l No. Reco m ided Corrective Action Reference 1/21/82 6/22/83 9/26/85 Status 1 Security measures should ensure that the VR X C .
movements of media representatives can be I monitored. '
l 2 When many simultaneous coussunications were F.1.d X C being handled at the LDEOC, noise levels were high. This problem should be studied and noise control measures instituted if l feasible.
\
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! 3 The scenario used could not demonstrate the A.4 X C de cis ion-making capabilities of the backup l team that would provide 24-hour support.
! Future exercises could ba (lesigned to !
I demonstrate the transfer of responsibilities {
[ more effectively. This could be built into j l the exercise by simulating the passage of l time between events.
4 There are an inadequate number of commercial F.1 X I telephone lines at the LDEOC. Additional telephone lines should te installed for use by the emergency ets f f.
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80 TAB 1.E 4.4 It0BERT E. CINNA NUCLEAR POWER STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION September 26, 1985 and Previous Exercises Emergency Operations Facility Final - 12/16/55 Page 1 of 1 NUREC-0654 Reco mended Corrective Action FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1, Exercise Exercise Exercise Present No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference 1/21/82 6/22/83 9/26/85 Status 1 Delays were observed in obtaining information F.1.d X -
I and receiving answers to questions from the state and utility over the RECS line, which was located in the dose assessment room at the Monroe County EOC. Some utility field-monitoring data transmitted via the RECS line were in error and data concerning ground deposition and iodine release information were not received in a timely raanne r. The cause for these probless should be reviewed by the state and counties and the appropriate training of staf f should be accomplished to improve the accuracy and timeliness of infor-mation transmitted to the counties via the RELS line.
2 Displays of important site data should be J.10.a. X C available,in the EOF. b, c 3 The format for transmitting radiological F.1.d X C information from the nuclear facility ,
cperator to other jurisdictions should agree with the format of the standard state forms.
Some confusion resulted at the SE0C and the UDEOC when data bel:lg tranmitted over the RECS line from the nuclear facility operator did not conform to the standard format.
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. _ _ _ _ _ _ ____._____m_ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . . _ _ _ ____.___m_ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _
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I si i TABLE 4.5 ROBERT E. CINNA NUCLEAR POWER STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION ,
September 26, 1985 and Previous Exercises l Joint News Center I
final - 12/ P !5 Page i j NUREC-0654 Recommended Corrective Action l FEMA-REP-1 ;
Rev. 1 Exa rcise Exercise Exercise Present i No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference 1/21/82 6/22/83 9/26/85 Status l l
l 1 PIO work space in the JiNC was too small. C.3.a X C 5 leading to overcrowding. and there were insufficient desks and chairs for PIO personnel. These conditions impeded the
! timely preparation of press releases.
i Reorganization and reallocation of space should be considered to alleviate l.
overcrowding.
2 Televisions and radios should be provided to E.5, X C l enable Pios to monitor EBS broadcasts and E.6 I general press coverage.
1 3 The copying machine at the JEhc was too slow C.3.a X C '
to keep up with the workload. A second or a faster machine should be considered.
4 Some EBS messages did not contain complete E.5 X 1 l instructional information. ESS messages shosid specify both the telephone book and calendars are sources of information for emergency procedures.
5 The celephone number given for use by E.7 x I j mo bili t y-im p ai re d persons in need of J.10.d -
assistance for evacuation was not staffed by trained personnel. Training should be provided for operators of the mo bili t y-impaired telephone numbers.
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TABLE 4.6 ROBERT E. CINNA NUCLEAR POWER STATION - REMEDIAL ACTION September 26, 1985 and Previous Exercises .
Wayne County Final - 12/16/S5 Page 1 of 7 htREC-0654 Recommended Correettve Action TEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1 Exercise Exercise fea rcise Present No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference 1/21/82 6/22/83 9/26/85 Status 1 Some of the effects on operations produced by H.3 X C the very limited floor space in the ECC may be mitigated by assigning someone the respon-sibility for preventing persons (visitors, observers, workers) free standing or sitting se that they interfere of hinder operations and by declaring certain active areas in EOC off-limits to nonessential personnel.
2 The operations and dose assessment rooms of H.3 X I the Wayne County EOC were crowded and ventilation was poor. Ventilation in the existing factitty should be improved.
3 A small public-address system within the ECC H X C would facilitate briefings.
4 Although the Wayne County EOC proved adequate H.3 X C during the exercise, a better floJr plan is needed that will permit side-by-side displays of evacuation routes, sampling points, relo- ,
cation centers and shelters, population dis-tribution by evacuation area, and current status. ,
5 Designations for sampling points ou maps in J.10.a X C the dose assessment room followed the system indicated in NTREC-0654; the new county plan f ollows an alternate scheme. The plan should be revised to conform to the system for designating sampling points actually in use.
6 The RECS speaker disruoted coersunications on F.1.d X I the RECS line. Interf erence on the RECS line also occurred when anotner telephone in the dose assessment room was used during RICS transmissions. RECS should be reviewed to identify and eliminate sources of in t e r-ference.
7 Additional telephones should be provided in r X C the EOC for each agency of group official.
8 Additional operators for the connunications H X C equipment should be trained to provide additional backup.
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I 83 TABLE 4.6 (Cont'd) _ ~
rinal - 12/16/85
( Page 2 of 7 l NU KEG-0654 Recommended Corrective Aert's
, F EMA-REP-1 l Rev. 1 Exercise Exercise Exercise Present No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference 1/21/82 6/22/83 9/26/85 Status 9 Although dose assessment staff communicating F.1.d X C.
with the county liaison of ficer at the EOF by commercial telephone copied message content correctly, the time and source of messdges were frequently omitted. Staff should receive additional training in message handling procedures.
10 A dedicated (hot line) telephone between the F.1.b X C Wayne County EOC and the Monroe County EOC is recommended.
11 Tests of the completed stren system should J.10.c X N/Obj (S3) include sound level sessurements made throughout the EPZ co establish the adequacy of the warning.
12 Prepared sample messages should be dis- E.5 X C tributed to the ESS along with instructions on information to be supplied at the time of the emergency.
13 A more secure code for activacitig the ESS E.5, X C s.hould be employed. E.6 14 The length of time needed to 41 ort the ISS to E.5 X C standby and to activate the E8S shouid be shortened to detl with a f ast-coving sequence of events.
~~15 Nesseges shoald be prepared for use eith the E.6 K C l mobile publ.c-address units in the event that this backup is needed.~~
16 televisions and radios should be provided to E.5 X C enable Plos to monitor E85 broadcasts and E.6 general press coverage.
17 Additional education of the public is needed C . l' , X X' X 1 l concerning notification methods and responses C.2 l such as turning on the radio and/or tele-I vision to get the ESS sessages when the l strens are sounded. Based on spot checks of the general population, sost people who were interviewed on the day of the exercise.
eL*,ber did not reoesber receiving a public inf o rmation brochure or believed that the strens were a signal to evacuate the EPZ rather than a signal to tune to the local E85 station. Based on these field observations, continuing public education efforts are recommended.
84 TABt.E 4.6 (Cont'd)
Final - 12/16/95 Page 3 of 7 htRIC-0654 Recommended correettve Aetton FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1 Exercise Exercise Exercise Present No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference 1/21/82 6/22/83 9/26/85 Status 18 The county press releases should supplement C.4.a X C the state releases during the period of time that a state of emergency exists. The county PIO should continue to talesse appropriate information on county functions until the emergency is over and recovery and reentry have been completed.
19 Coordination and information exchange among C.4.b X C the P10s at the county E3C. the Plos at the a
JENC, and the Plos at the state should be strengthened.
20 The Wayne County radiological assessment A. f. X X C capability should be improved by additional training and by providing additional personnel so that a 24-hour capability is achieved. (See item VI.8 for 6/22/83 j re coime nda t ion on dose assessment capability.)
21 One.of the field monitoring teams was unable H.7 X X la to ceasure radiotodine in the plume due to an equipment failure. Wayne County should identif y sources of backup radiological moni-
~~toring equipment.~~
22 Procedures should be modified so that initial . F.1.d X C tsadings of contamination levels are trans-mitted to the EOC soon after the tean makes measurements at a new location.
23 The newly appointed Vryne County radiological 1.8 X C of ficer needs additional training to assure a dosa assessment capability in Wayne County in the initial hours of a radiological accident while backup personnel f rors outside Wayne County are in transit. Wayne County should j also consider expandirs its own dose assess- j ment staff, thereby reducing their reliance I on outside assistance.
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TABLE 4.6 (Cont'd)
Final - 12/16/85 F.ne is of 7 i
NUREG-0654 Recommended ('orrective Ace t :-
FEM-REP-1
. .Rev. 1 Exe rcise Exercise Exercise Present No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference 1/21/82 6/22/83 9/26/85 Status 24 Evacuation routes should be designed to J.10.g X X C 1 minimize exposure of the evacuees. The evacuation baa assigned to route W2 passed through the plume on its way to the first pickup point. Standard operating procedures should be reviewed and modified if possible to insure that buses do not pass through the -
plume unnecessarily. Alternative routes may be necessary based on the direction of travel ,
of the plume. l l
25 Methods for disposal of the contaminated J.9 1 N/Obj (83) wastes collected at the decontamination N/Obj (85) centers need to be provided.
26 Additional staff and radiological survey NR K C equipment should be considered for handling the number of evacuees expected at the relocation centers in a real emergency. .
27 Additional training and procedures for the K.3.b X C l use of dostmeters is recommended.
l 28 It is recommended that a permanent record K.3.a K C type of dostmeter and a sensitive range, direct-reading dosimeter be supplied to emergency workers in addition to the 0-200 R high-range instruments. .
29 Not all bus drivers and police of ficers were K.4 x 1 i certain of the esposure limita specified in I the plan or witn procedures for requesting
( authorization to receive excess exposure. l Training of emergency workers should empha- J size radiation exposure liraitst a card should be inserted in the exposure control kit as a
! reminder.
l 30 staff at the personnel monitoring center were K.S.a. x x 1 unf ao111ar with criteria for decontamination K.5.b of personnel, equipment and vehicles, pro-cedures to be followed if contamination could )
not be reduced below 0.1 mAes/hr. or proce-dures for handling an injured. contaminated patient. Additi;nal training in decontasi-nation procedures is recommended.
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1 TABLE 4.6 (Cont'd) !
Final - 12/16/85 Page 5 of 7 NUREC-0654 Recoceended Corrective Action F DtA-REP-1 Rev. 1, Exercise Exercise Exercise Present No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference 1/21/82 6/22/83 9/:6/85 Status 31 Flow of information back to field workers F.1.d K C will be necessary to involve them effectively in the exercise.
32 consideration should be given to having the H.1 1 C exercise simulate a longer time span to increase involvement of backup staff and to allow demonstration of procedures that would be used during the post-accident period to l protect the public. )
1 33 The RECS line at the Wayne County EOC was F.1.b. K 1 I subject to inter'trence from another tele- F.1.d phone within the E0C a td from a pitch-tone ,
internal to the lice. The RECS line at the Wayne County EOC should again be re-inspected to eliminate this equipment problea.
l 34 The EOC operations area continues to have a H.3 X 1 1 limited working space and poor ventilation.
Prolonged use of this facility would reduce l
the efficiency of emergency response pe r-l s ont.e 1. The Wayne County EOC facility should ]'
be relocated to a new facility or the existing facility should be substantially upgradsd. ,
35 1.oss of dosimetry capability was experienced K.3.a X 1 by one radiological field team nembn and was j not reported to supervisory staff. Field l monitoring personni should be trained to I report any loss of dosimetry capability to supervisory staf f.
36 Radiological monitoring Team 2 did not carry I.8 x I <
out monitoring during transit between f sampling locations, did not deternine the appropriate scale multiplier f or the CDv-175 i and did not respond promptly to changing field cenditions. Radiological monitoring staff should receive more training to increase their ability to use appropriate 1 equipment and procedures.
i 37 The leader of the radiological mocitoring I.8 K I i i team stated that there was no back up j equipment at the Union Hill Fire House to measure radiotodine in the plume. Also, backup field monitoring equipment did not appear to be available at ene East '41111amson Fire Station. Additional eautpment should be made available to field monitoring teams in case of equipment failure.
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1 L_________-__-_ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ . - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
87 TABt.E 4.6 (Cont'd)
Final - 12/16/95 Page 6 of 7 NUREd-0654 Recommended Corrective Action FEMA-REP-1 -
Rev. 1, Exercise Exe rcise Exer ; se Present No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference 1/21/82 6/22/83 9/;. s) Status 38 Staff at the personnel monitoring center need J.12 X I additional training. Survey instruments were used with protective caps that reduce sensi-tivity and the instruments lacked calibration tags or stickers. In addition, a better traffic flow paLtern needs to be developed for returning potentially contaminated indi-viduals to the personnel monitoring areas.
Staff at the personnel monitocing center needs additional training. An improved traffic flow pattern needs to be established for movement of potentially contaminated indi"iduals from the vehicle contamination area to the personnel monitoring area.
39 The Ontario Fire Department did not have KI J.10.e X I available for their field personnel assigned to route alerting. Individuals were sent into the field without KI which could not have been administered promptly, once the decision had been made to do so. KI should be made available to the Ontario Fire Department for 3 all staff involved in field activities.
j Procedures should be in place for the prompt administration of KI should the need arise.
40 The Ontario Fire Department Staff that par- K.4 X I ticipated in route alerting activities did not know correct exposure limits. Moreover, personnel did not know the individual who could authorize excess exposure. The Ontario Fire Department staff who are involved in route alerting should receive additional training in procedures for managing worker exposure control. They should be aware of dose listrations and who can authorize excess exposure.
41 The Ontario Tire Department staff responsible K.3.4 X 1 for route alerting did not take dostmetry into the field. The Jntario Tira Departeent personnel that perfora route alerting should be given additional training in emergency worker radiological exposure control.
42 Bus drivers from the Williamson Center School K.3.b, X I drove buses that were not equipped with 2-way K.4 radios. Do sime t ry readings and requests for energency inf o ru t ion could not be promptly related to energency managers. Buses to be used for evacuations should be equipped with 2-way radios.
88
. TABLE 4.6 (Cant'd)
Final - 12/16/S$
Page 7 of 7 l
l NUP.EG-0654 Recommended Corrective Action FDIA-REP-1 Rev. 1, Exercise Exercise Exercise Present No. Recommended Corrective Action- ' Reference - 1/21/82- 6/22/83 9/:6/85 Status
!' 43 Some transient residents interviewed were not C.2 K I adequately aw are of what actions were to be taken in a radiological energency. Public education efforts should be continued and transient populations such, as .sigratory workers should be included in the awareness -
programs.
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T- e, 5 89 TABLE 4.7
' ROBERT E. CINNA NUCLEAR PCVER STATION - REMEDIAI, ACTION September 26, 1985 and Previous Exercises .
Monroe County ,
Final - 12/16/85 Page'1 of.5 NURIC-0654 Recommended Corrective Ae!' 3 FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1, Exercise Exercise Exercise Present No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference 1/21/82 6/22/83 9/26/85 Status 1 A dedicated (hot line) telephone between the F.1.b X C Wayne County EOC and the Monroe County EOC is recommended.
2 The dose assessment room at the Monroe County H.3 .X C EOC had limited working space and it was difficult to accommodate the staff required to carry out this function. County emergency preparedness officials should be encouraged to implement one of the space improvement alternatives which they have .already con-sidered.
3 Displays of population density and evacuation J.9, 10 X -C routes should be provided near the ' display of plume location so that comparisons and decisions needed for emergency responses may be made easily.
I 4 The display space should be modified so that J.9. 10 X C l plume radiation contours can be overlaid on
~~one of the weil displays making the plume I location readily apparent. This should be~~
! . updated as needed.
5 Additional personnel should be trained to A.4 X C provide 24-hour espability for the decon-tamination center and for field sampling.
o 6 The state's decision to evacu.te ERPAs W3 and 1.10, X C j
We was reached withnut fuity integrating the J.9 input from radiological intelligence into the decision. In Monroe Ccety, decision makats
,4 appeared tn rely less heavily on the county's I own dose assessment capabilities. which were outstanding, than on state and Wayne County date. Coordination between coasmand ar.d accident /duse assessoent should be ioproved by more fully integrating the input of the ,
accident / dose assessment staff into protec-tive action decisions.
I 7 Drills are recommended to give the County v.3 K .C Commissioner and the Daputy Director experi-ence in sanaging the EOC operations so that in-depth sanagement experience is developed.
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TABL E ' 4.7 (Cent'd)
Final - 12/11/35 Page 2 of 5 NUREC-0654 Recommended Corrective Action FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1 Exercise Exercise Exercise Present No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference 1/21/82 6/22/83 9/26/85 Status 8 Tests of the completed stren systes should J.10.c X N/Obj (63) include sound level measurements made throughout the EPZ to establish the adequacy of the warning.
9 Prepared sample messages should be die- E.5 X C tributed to the ESS along with instructions on information to be supplied at the time of the emergency.
10 A more secure code for activating the EBS E.5, I' C should be employed. E.6 11 The length of time needed to alert the EBS to E.5 X C
~~standby and to activate the EE- should be ,~~
~~shortened to deal with a fast moving sequence~~
~~of events.~~
1 12 Messages should be prepared for use with the E.6 K N/Obj (33) mobile public-address units in the event that N/Obj (SS) this backup is needed.
13 Coordinated procedures for rumor control c.4.e X C should be developed jointly by the utility, state, and county P10s. .
14 Additional education of the public is needed C.1, 1 % ! 'I concerning notification methods and responses G.2 such as turning on the radio and/or tele- j i
l vision to get the EBS messages when the sirens are sounded. Based on spot checks of 6 f
the general population. most people who were interviewed on the day of the exercise.
i either did not remember receiving a public l
l information brochure or believed that the strens were a signal to evacuate the EPZ rather than a signal to tune to the local ESS station. Based on these field observations, continuing public education offorts are recommended.
l 15 Dissemination of educational material to the G.1 X C I public should be completed promptly.
j
[6 Hotel and motel operators should periodically G.2 X C receive. or have available, instruction material for alerting transients.
17 Press releases must be coordinated between C.4.a. K C utility. state, and county Plos so that C.4.b release, by each cover all activities and do not coe lict.
4
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. . 91 !
TABLE 4.7 (Cont'd) ]
Final - 12/16/55 Page 3 of 5 I
NUREG-0654 Recommended Corrective Acttan J FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1 Exercise Exercise Exercise- Present No. Recomrsended Corrective Action Reference 1/21/82 6/22/83 9/26/85 Status 18 The telecopier that would be used to transmit C.4.b X .C backup hard copies of EBS messages and news ;
releases was not operating properly on the day of the exercies. This telecopier should be repaired.
19 Procedures should be modified so that initial F.1.d X C readings of contamination levels are trans- '
mitted to the EOC soon after the team makes measurements et a new location.
20 The Honroe County radiological assessment A.4 X C should be improved by additional training and l by providing aodigional personnel so that a
! 24-hour capability is achieved.
I 21 The written directions covering the route J.10.g X X C from the last pick-up point to the reception / ,
congregate care center for the Monroe County I bus evacuation route were dif ficult for the bus driver to f ollow. These written direc-tio^s should be reviewed and revised if necessary. and they should be augmented with I maps of the primary and alternate routes that .I should be taken. Bus drivers should also be , j trained regarding the primary and alternate toutes to the reception / congregate care
, centers.
22 The police officer attending one of the J.10.j X C Monroe County traffic control points did not know where he was to be positioned or how access was to be controlled. The sheriff's office was unable to provide clarification when the field officer radioed in for information. The descriptions of traffic control points that are contained in the Monroe County law enforcement and traffic control procedures should also be reviewed and verified to insure that various offices of the law enforcement agencies with these responsibilities have copies of the pro-cedures readily available for reference.
23 Procedures for the disposal of contaminated J.9 X N/Obj(33) wastes (e.g.. clothing) collected into N/Obj ( 513 )
plastic bags at the decontamination centers should be developed.
24 Additional etaining and procedures for the K.3.b X C use of dostseters te reco sended.
U 93 * .. .
TABLE 4.7 (Cont'd)
Final - 12/16/85 Page 4 of 5 WREC-0654 Recommended correettve Aceton F EMA-REP-1 Rev. 1, Exe rcise Exercise Exercise Present No. Recomriended Corrective Action Reference 1/21/82 6/22/83 9/26/85 Status 25 It is recommended that a permanent record K.3.a X C type of dosimeter and a sensitive range, direct-reading dosimeter be supplied to emergency workers in addition to the 0-200 R high-range instruments.
26 The low-range dosimeters (0-5 R) used during K.5.a X 1 the exercise were not sensitive enough to detect the low levels of exposure , which, ,
according to procedures in the Honroe County plan, require emergency workers to contact their supervisor when they have received an exposure of 100 mR. Consideration should be given to raising the minimum reporting level -
to at least 500 mR, which can be more easily read on the existing low-range dosimeters.
27 Flow of inf o rma tion back to field workers F.1.d X C will be necessary to involve them effectively in the exercise.
28 C, consideration should be given to having the H.1- 1 C exercise simulate a longer time span to increase involvement of backup staff and to allow demonstration of procedures that would
~~be used during the post-accident period to protect the public.~~
29 The initial recommendation of the radio- J.9 X I t logical officer to evacuate ERPA's M1 and M2 was not ir.pleme n t ed by the official in charge. A subsequent recommendation to evacuate was implemented. The delay in implementing an evacuation order could have led to unnecessary exposure of evacuees to the airborne plume. The official in charge should be frequently briefed on the findings and recommendation of the radiological officer.
30 Efforts by the Monroe County liaison of ficer F.I.d X I at the EOF to expedite the flow of plant data were largely unsuccessful. The Monroe County radiological officer should identify the cause of the delay in the transfer of plant data, and should develop procedures to assure that this information is prooptly received.
, .,1 t 93
,: .s 1.
TABI.E 4.7 (Cont'd)
Final'- 12/16/95
.___ ' age 5 of 5
\
. NUREC-0654 Recommended Corrective Action FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1, Exercise Exe rcise Exercise Present No. Recommended Corrective Action Reference .1/21/82 6/22/83 9/76/85 Status i 31' The dose assessment staff compared projected I.8 X I and measured dose rates. The number of com-parisons was limited by the lack of positive field monitoring data. The county radio-logical o*ficer should deploy field monitor-trg tJams to obtain a more complete definia tion of tk $1ume, so that an adequate number of comparisons between projected and measured dose rates can be made. These comparisons are needed in order to verify protective action recommendations.
32 The field monitoring teams did not check I.8 X I their equipment adequately before going into the field. Field monitoring teams should thoroughly check their equipment against the list in the plan before leaving their deployment area.
33 The procedures used to measure radiotodine I.9 X 1 concentration deposited in the filter media were not consistent or reproducible. Appro-priate equipment and procedures should be provided 'to assure controlled and reproduc-ible measurement of airborne radiotodine concentrations. Field muitoring teams should be trained on an ongoing basis in the
~~measurement of radiolodine samples.~~
34 Traffic control point #1 was established only J.10.j X I after a significant delay, which resulted from significant confusion regarding its location. Police officers should be briefed on TCP locations when being dispatched.
35 Local police assigned to traffic control and K.3.a X I route alerting were equipped with high-range dosimeters only. 0-5 R dosimeters should be issued to all emergency workers, as specified in the plan.
36 In 'veral instances, emergency Jorkers were X.3.b X I not aware of the dose at which they should K.4 call in, or were not familiar with the fre-quency et which readings were to be taken.
Training of eoergency workers in exposure control procedures should be conducted on an ongoing basis.
NR No NUREC-0654 Reference C Remedial Action Complete l 13 Remedial Action Incomplete N/0 'lo t Observed N/Obj Not an Object've 1821 Equipment complete for field tesast backup sources have not been idertified.
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ML20238A333

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