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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,
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ATOKIC ENERGY COMMISSION .T'
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l In the Matter of I
Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Unit 2) Docket No. 50-323 l
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INITIAL DECISION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD i
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James P. Gleason, Chairman
' Thomas H. Pigford, &mber Hugh C. Paxton , Member I
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_ APPEARANCES Philip A. Crane , Jr. , Esq. , and John C. Morrissey, Esq. on behalf of the Applicant.
Troy B. Connor, Jr. , and Martin G.
Malsch on behalf of the Regulatory Staf f, Atomic Energy Commission. ,
1 Scovil F. Hubbard and Robert N. Tait on behalf of Board of Supervisors, San Luis Obispo County, Calif. ,
In te rveno r.
Hal Stroube on behalf of Luigi Marre Land and Cattle Company and San Luis Obispo Bay Properties, Intervenor.
Frederic Eissler on behalf of the Scenic Shoreline Preservation Conference , Inc. ,
In te rvenor.
Ian I. McMillan, San Luis Obispo Co un ty , In te rveno r. j Paul Clif ton on behalf of the Secretary for Resources, State of California, Limited Appearance.
John Whelen, San Luis Obispo County, Limited Appearance.
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STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS l
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- 1. This proceeding involves the application of Pacific Gas and I
l Electric Company (the " Applicant") dated June 28, 1968, as amended by i
' six amendments supplemental thereto (the " application"), for a license under Section 104 b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to construct and operate a second 3250 megawatt (thermal) pressurized water reactor power plant adjacent to Unit 1 at its Diablo Canyon site in San Luis Obispo County, California.
- 2. The application was reviewed by the AEC regulatory staff
(" Staff") which concluded that the Applicant had satisfied all AEC requirements for the issuance of a provisional construction permit.
The application was also reviewed by the Commission's Advisory l
Committee on Reactor Safeguards which concluded that the proposed j l
f acility can be constructed with reasonable assurance and that it i 1
can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the )
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public, l 3. On November 17, 1969, the Atomic Energy Commission (the "Connission") issued a " Notice of Hearing on Application for Provisional Cons truction Permit ," In the Matter of Pacific Gas and Electric Company j (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant , Unit 2) , Docket No. 50-333, which sets out the issues to be considered and initially decided by this Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (" Board"), designated by the Commission to conduct this proceeding, as a basis for determining l
whether a provisional construction permit should be issued to the Applicant. This Notice of Hearing was published in the FEDERAL REGISTER on November 19, 1969 (34 F.R. 18439).
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- 4. Petitiona for Lenvc to intervcoc in t h1 nmt te r wei r filed by the following:
Elston L. Kidwell, Chairman l
l Board of Supervisors San Luis Obispo County San Luis Obispo Bay Properties , Inc.
Luigi Marre Land and Cattle Cempany I an I . McMillan Scenic Shoreline Preservation Conference, Inc.
Frederick Eissler A petition to make an appearance was filed by Mr. Paul Clif ton on l
behalf of the Secretary for Resources, State of California. The I petitions of Messrs. Eissler and Metullan and of the Scenic Shoreline l
Preservation Conference , Inc. ("Confe rence") , we re filed in opposition to the granting of I he provisional cons truction pernit for the proposed 1
facility. The other petitions were filed in favor of granting the proposed provisional construction permit. In an order dated December 31, 1969, the Board granted all the above petitions except that of Mr. Eissler, which was denied. This proceeding is therefore a " contested proceeding" within the meaning of 10 CFR 2.104. During the hearing, the petition of Mr. John Whelan, a resident of San Luis Obispo, to make a limited appearance was approved by the Board.
- 5. Pursuant to the Notice of Hearing and in accordance with the requirements of the Act and the Commission's regulations , a pre-i hearing conference was held by the Board in San Luis Obispo, California, l 1
on December 5,1969.
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- 6. A public hearing was held by the Board January 13, and i 14, 1970, to consider the issues specified for a contested proceeding j l
in the Notice of Hearing. On January 14, 1970, the Board recessed i
the hearing pending receipt of additional information requested by i the Board f rom the parties and to provide the Board with an opportunity, af ter a review of the transcript of the tes timony, to determine whether subsequent tes timony would be required. During the recess, the Board 1
received the additional information requested, reviewed the testimony 1 i
and also received requests from the Conference in February,1970, to I l
1 schedule an additional day of hearing and responses in opposition j l
the re t o from the Applicant and the S taf f on March . and March 4,1970, j l
respectively. The Confe rence requested a third day of hearing to l present tes ticony and to "ask questions on new ge: logical, seismological j l
seismic design information on meteorelegy and air ventilation in the .,
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! design of the plant". No p ro f e r o f new in f o rma t i:- af fecting the .
k plant design was made by the Conference. On Marr 18, 1970, the Board (
issued its Order terminating the recess of the hearing and closed the re co r:! . The Order by the Beard denied the reques: for a third day of hearing and reques ted the subr.ission of proposed findings o f f act and l
conclusions of law f rom the Applicant and other parties.
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- 7. On April 5, 1970, a subsequent petitic was received from l
the Conference, which submitted certain informati:n in support of l
I its request, to open the record of this proceeding for an additional hearing. On April 20, 1970, the Staff replied to :he above petition and advised it was undertaking further investigate:ns of the information l
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submitted by the Conference on the existence of fault zones and the l
impact of earthquake shocks from these zones on the seismic design l
criteria of the proposed plant.
On May 7, 1970, the Staff advised the Board and parties that its investigation revealed no basis for changing its conclusion on the adequacy of the design criteria and in support of its conclusion, submitted )
reports to the Board and the parties , from th* U. S. Geological Survey and the U. S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, on June 11, 1970 and June 15, 1 1970.
- 8. On July 13, 1970, the Conference submitted a petition requesting the Commission to order the Applicant to prepare an l
" environmental statement required by the National Environmental Policy l Act (Section 102(c) ) (NEPA) and by the regulations of the Commission" i and to " delay consideration of Pacific's application for a construction permit for Diablo Unit 2 pending investigation of these environmental j factors". Replies dated July 20, 1970, and July 23, 1970, in opposition )
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to the Conference's report were submitted by the Applicant and the Staff.
- 9. On July 20, 1970, af ter notice to all the parties, the Board issued an Order reopening the hearing, to be held on August 7, 1970, in San Luis Obispo, California, for the purpose of receiving additional I evidence from the Applicant and the parties on the new seismic information referred to in the Conference's petition of April 5,1970, and investigated by the Staf f.
- 10. On July 26, 1970, the Conference in a letter to the Chairman of the Board objected to the short notice of the hearing and requested an adequate notice period. The Applicant and the Staf f, by communient im -
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~5-dated July 29, 1970, and August 5,1970, respectively, responded in opposition to the Conference's objection and request.
- 11. On August 7,1970, the public hearing was reopened in San Luis Obispo , California. During the proceeding, the Conference ,
I indicated it was participating in the hearing under protest, renewed its objections to the short period of notice for the hearing, its j reque s t for additional time to prepare for the proceedings, its ;
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objections to the limited scope of the hearing and other matters it 1 had raised in prior communications to the Board. Evidence was received f rom the Applicant , the Staff and the Conference on seismic matters. l At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board denied the request fo r a continuance of the hearing and the request submitted by the Conference on J uly 13, 1970, to delay consideration of the Applicants' application
! pending resolution of environmental requirements.
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- 12. The Board requested the Applicant and parties to submit supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law.
- 13. Subsequent to the close of the record, the Board received proposed findings and conclusions from the Applicant, the Staff and l the Con ference. In addition, it received various statements and replies to statements from all the parties and an additional request )
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from the Conference to reopen the hearing, and objections thereto by the Applicant and the Staff.
1 FINDINGS OF FACT
- 14. The Applicant is a large operating public utility engaged 1
) principally in the business of supplying electric and natural gas i
l service throughout most of northern and central California. The I
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e D Applicant is soundly financed, has adequate resources at its command, and plans to finance the cost of the proposed f acility, which it estimates will be approximately $230.2 million, as a part of its continuing construction program.
- 15. The Applicant has had extensive experience in the design, constr'cetion and operation of electric generating plants. Its personnel have been involved with nuclear power generation for a number of years, and its Humboldt Bay reactor has been in operatien since 1963. The Applicant was granted a provisional construction permit for Unit I at its Diablo Canyon site in April 1968. The nuclear steam supply system supplier, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, has designed and constructed a number of pressurized water reactors which have been licensed by the Commission for construction or operation.
- 16. The site for the proposed unit cons;sts of approximately 750 acres near the mouth of Diablo Canyon Creek adjacent to the Pacific
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Ocean in San Luis Obispo County, California. The 585-acre portion south of the creek is 1 cased to the Applicant fc r 99 years wita an option to renew for an additional 99 years. The Applicant owns in fee the l
portion of the site lying north of Diablo Creek and the land for the l
l proposed switchyard. The exclusion area distance from the reactor to the nearest site boundary on land is one-half ad;e. The radius of the low population zone is six miles and the population center distance is
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ten udles, which is the distance from the site te the nearest boundary I l
of the City of San Luis Obispo.
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- 17. The regional climatology was considered in the Applicant's studies of the site, and its evaluation takes into account extreme as well as normal conditions. . The meteorological program under way at .
the site is intended to provide a basis for the deve?.opment of a specific gaseous radioactive release limit at the operating license stage of the unit. The studies to date indicate that the diffusion parameters assumed in the analysis of potential accidental releases are conservative and -
that conditions more severe than those are seldom experienced. - It is estimated that exposures to the environs at the site boundary from routine gaseous releases with both units operating will be about 1/400 ]
of 10 CFR 20 limits on an annual basis. l
- 18. The proposed facility will be founded on bedrock capable of carrying the intended loads. The rock upen which the structures are i to be based is euch that undermining of the plant structures by wave y action is not a problem. The geologic study of the site for Unit 1 t )
included excavation of about 2,400 feet of trenches that were extended through the terrace material a minimum of three feet into bedrock.
For l the area underlying Unit 2 additional trenches with an aggregate length i
of nearly one-half mile were excavated and examined in detail by geologists. Several old, small faults can be identified in the bedrock, but no 1ndication of major faulting was found. The evidence indicates !
there has been no movement in the small bedrock faults at the site for l over 100,000 years.
- 19. The facility is being designed to withstand the largest earthquakes to be expected in the general area. Possible offshore faults were considered in the study upon which the design is based. Of e
the possible earthquakes studies, the Applicant determined that a magnitude 7-1/4 (Richter) earthquake along the Nacimiento Fault, which is 20 miles from the site, and an aftershock with a magnitude of 6-3/4 at the site resulting f rom a magnitude 8-1/2 earthquake along the San Andreas Fault, which is 48 miles from the site, would produce the maximum ground accelerations at the site. These were calculated to be 0.12 g (adjusted to 0.15 g for design purposes) and 0.20 g, respectively.
When the response spectra of the two earthquakes were considered it was found that the hypothetical earthquake along the Nacimiento Fault produced higher accelerations in structures having longer natural periods than the other earthqueke.
- 20. The hydrology of the site has been evaluated. There is no hazard to the site from flooding because the Diablo Canyon Creek and watershed are not large enough to cause a flood which would endanger the unit. The culvert under the switchyard has been designed based upon a conservative evaluation of 100-year floods which considered maximum rainfall intensities and not merely average rainf all. A fic od by-pass around the switchyard is to be provided for the unlikely event the culvert should get pl gged or otherwise be inadequate to carry off s torm water.
- 21. Structures and components important to nuclear safety, failure of which might cause, or increase the severity of, and accident, including structures and components vital to safe shutdown and isolation i of the reactor, are classified as Class I. Structures and components important to reactor operation but not easential to safe shutdown and isolation of the reactor are considered as Class II. Structures and components not related to reactor operation or containment are considered as Class III. Class I structures are. designed to withstand horizontal
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seismically induced loads obtained by using response spectra of either of the two design earthquakes, whichever controls. Vertical accelerations equal to two-thirds of the maximum horizontal ground acceleration are applied to structures, and the resulting stresses caused by horizontal and vertical accelerations are considered to act simultaneously and are added directly. Conservative values of structural damping are l used. After completion of the design a review will be made for the pur-l pose of confirming no loss of function for components necessary for a safe shutdown using a combined response spectrum with acceleration values twice those used in the design. Class I structures are designed to withstand the design-basis earthquake. The ground acceleration of the 1
design-basis earthquake is 0.40 g, with an accompanying response spectrum identified in the application. Class Il structures are designed to withstand the operational-basis earthquake , which results in 0.15 g on site ground acceleration for a pos tulated San Andreas earthquake j 4
(48 miles away, magnitude 8-1/2), and 0.20 g ground acceleration for a Nacimiento earthquake (20 miles away, magnitude 7-1/4), with appropriate l response spectra. As a minimum, Cl ass III s trutures and _ rpa nt.s are designed according to the ear. y _ re g1a ic- m t: _r ;il n n t I
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- 22. The Applic W. h ira : .a : c a pre-: c rniencl, radiological I surs. of the site abe . ts e ,ent be forc Una r : n plreca 1' eper.tien.
The survey will be continued following commencement of opera:icn of Units 1 and 2 to aid in ascertaining the effecti ceness of was te discharge controls and procedures . Various s tate and federal agencies will evaluate this program or conduct s tudies of their own. As a part of the Applicant's
program consideration has been given to the possibility of concentra-tion of radioactive elements in abalone which could result in exposures to man through the food chain.
The Applicant and the Staff conclude that concentration by abalone of radioactivity from the discharge water during simultaneous operation of both units will not result in significant exposure 'to man.
It was established that normal practice is to set radioactivity
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limits in reactor discharge water in terms of a gross beta limit of 10 l miciocuries/ml. On the basis of a revised table subattted in the Summary of the Application (dated 11/1969), the Applicent calculates that abalone continuously exposed to water at this gross beta limit, and taking no credi t for dilution af ter discharge into the ocean, would l
reach a grows beta activity of 200 x 10 7 microceries/grcm in the abalone meat. The applicant estimates that the maximum dietary intake of abalone meat is 1/10 of the intake of water. Therefore, on the basis of gross beta limit in the discharge water lower than the 10-7 microcuries/ml normally applied to reactor coolant discharges. However, when individual radionuclides are censidered, the Applicant's revised calculations Icad to the conclusion that the estimatel maximum dietary consumption of abalonc, exposed to water at the gross beta maximum permissible concentration (MPC) will not res ult in an annual dose exceeding that from the assumed continuous intake of water at the gross beta MPC. Therefore, since the Applicant plans to apply the gross beta MPC as an operating limit for the discharge water, it is important that the environmental monitoring program include measurement of the concentration of individual radionuclides in representative samples l of abalone. The Applicant plans to include such measurements in the
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environmental monitoring program, and there are plans for further study of the concentration factors for abalone exposed to particular radioactive species in the discharge water.
The Applicant has described equipment and :echniques for con-trolling the radioactivity in the liquid discharges and expects that the actual yearly averaged discharge concentration will be a factor of 45.8 below the gross beta limit assumed in the calculation of the l
l abalone food chain.
- 23. The f acility will be designed to- avoid damage from either distantly or locally generated seismic sea waves. The site is not particularly sensitive to seismic sea wave run-up r draw-down. Studies l by the Applicant 's consultant, Marine Advisers, In:. , indicate that the maximum run-up and draw-down to be expected at the site would be plus 18 j
! feet mean lower low water (MLLW) and minus 9 feet MLLW, respectively. '
Most of the plant will be located at or above elevation 85 feet above sea level. Cooling water for the plant will be tsien from the Pacific Ocean. Class I equipment located at the intake vill be .
I protected in a water-tight compartment below the t:p deck of the intake j j
structure to accommodate a wave run-up to elevatie: plus 30 feet MLLW. 1 The intake structure is designed to supply water t: the auxiliary -
salt water cooling system in the event of a downsurge to minimum 17.4 feet }1LW.
- 24. The proposed reactor is designed to eperate a- 50 MWt I with an expected ultimate. capability of 3568 MWt. The majot .aponen ts of the nuclear steam supply system, including containment and engineered safety features, have been designed for a power level of 3580 MWt and this power level has been used in analyzing postulated accidents in
i conformance with the guidelines of 10 CFE Part 100. Core thermal and hydraulic analyses are for a reactor outp:: of 3250 MWt. Before operation at any power level above 3250 M7: is authorized, the l
Commission must examine the safety of operation at the higher power 4 level.
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The nuclear steam supply system, as designed by Westinghouse, ic similar to that of other pressurized water reactor systems that have been granted construction permits and opera:ing licenses by the AEC.
There have been evolutionary changes in the design of Unit 2 since I 1
l issuance of the construction permit fer Un.: 1, and these changes will be made in the design of Unit 1.
The mcs; important of these changes involves the emergency core cooling syster. In addition, the control rod absorber material has been changed. A number of technical programs under way at the time of the Unit 1 cons tr.: tion permit hearings have been completed with satisfactory results.
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pressurized' water reactor which transfers reactor heat to four steam generators.
Steam generated in the secondtre side of the steam generators passes to the turbine.
The fuel for the reactor will be slightly enriched UO 2 pellets enclosed withu sealed Zircaloy tubes.
Reactivity control will be accomplished by 3 3 full-length control rod essemblies and eight part-length centre'. rod assemblies. The sbsorber sections of the control rods are te be fabricated of boron carbide sealed in stainless steel tubes. In addition, a soluble neutron absorber in the form of boric acid in the reactor coolant will be employed for long-term reactivity control, for cold shutdown, and for shutdown during refueling.
During the first fuel cycle fixed burnable poison rods are to be provided. The reactor coolant system will t
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l circulate water at the required flow rate and temperature to meet the !
I heat removal requirements of the reactor core. ;
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- 27. The reactor protection system wi31 monitor signals from nuclear and process instrumentation which are indicative of reactor j plant conditions . Independent, redundant channels are to be provided in the protection system so that a failure in any given instrument channel ]
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\ This redundance also would not prevent a safe shutdown of the reactor.
will permit channel testing and calibration during power operation. A single control room will contain the controls and instrumentation necessary for operation of the reactor and turbine generater for each unit. The control panels for Unit 2 are to be physically separated from those of Unit 1.
- 28. The reactor containment structure is to be a reinforced concrete vessel with a steel liner which encloses the reactor and the reactor cool system. The containment structure is designed for an in te rnal p ' are of 47 psig and a maximum leakage rate of 1/10th of one percent of the containment volume per day at the design pressure. l Pipelines which penetrate the containment structure have provision for isolation.
- 29. In addition to the containment system, other engineered safety features are designed to limit the amount of fission products released to the containment in case of an accident, and to reduce the consequent pressure within the containment. These include the emergency core cooling system, the containment ventilation system, containment spray equipment, and the containment isolation system. On-site diesel emergency power will be provided for the engineered safety feature lot in the event of failure of normal station auxiliary power.
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- 30. The waste disposal system is to collect, monitor, and )
process for safe disposal all liquid, solid, and gaseous wastes. The system is designed to process fluid wastes for discharge to the environ-ment under controlled conditions in accordance with 10 CFR Part 20.
Suit-able facilities are planned for handling and on-site storage of solid wastes prior to disposal. The activity concentration of liquid and gaseous wastes will be determined prior to discharge to guide compliance !
I with 10 CFR Part 20. The Applicant expects that discharges of liquid radioactive wastes will be only a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 20 limits. The Applicant estimates that exposures to the environs at the site boundary from routine gaseous releases with both units operating
, vill be about 1/400 of 10 CFR Part 20 limits on an annual basis.
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- 31. A safety evaluation of the reactor has been prepared for a variety of postulated abnormal operating conditions and equipment I
failures. The Board spent considerable time on the guidelines and criteria of 10 CFR Part 100 in its review of this application. The Board indicates that the Commission expects conforcance with the condi-tions set forth therein and the adequacy of those guidelines is not questioned. Accordingly, the Board finds that the doses calculated by the Applicant are below the guidelines established by 10 CFR 100.
However, the Board notes the following:
1 (1) Rapid removal of inorganic iodine within the )
l containment building by the sodium-hydroxide sprays is one of the l l
engineered safety features which results in the acceptable values of j these predicted doses. In this application the Staff predicts a l spray removal rate constant of 3.8 hr-1, as contrasted with a removal l
a I rate cons t ant of 4. , hr-1 predicted by the Staff for Indian Point 3, which is closely similar to Diablo 2 with regard to reactor design and spray renoval system.
The Staff explains the difference on the basis of different spray flow rates in the two facilities. Westinghouse has designed the spray-removal systens for both facilities, and one of its representatives s tates that the two spray-recoval systems are identical so that there is no difference in flow rates. Application here of the l
1 higher value predicted by the Staff for Indian Point 3 would indeed result in an even lower predicted dose for Diablo 2. However, the existence of such differences in estimates for what is apparently the same system inevitably raises some question as to the validity of both numbers.
It is reasonable that independent calculations should be part of a thorough evaluation by the Staff. However, the Board believes that in these instances, the >Staf f is thus responsible for adequately describing and justifying the validity of its own estimates.
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A witness for the Applicant tes tified that Westinghouse believes a higher spray removal efficiency can be reliably expected .
However, t he Applicant has not yet proposed or justified a design margin to be included with his theoretical esticate of his higher spray removal efficiency.
The re fore , the Board has no alternative than to rely upon the more conservative estimate predic:ed by the Staff.
(3) During the hearing it was made clear that both Applicant and Staff have calculated the design-basis accident dose on the assumption that an individual located at any point on the site !
boundary and an individual located at any point on the outer boundary i of the low population zone are identified as adults. The doses to auch 4
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individuals from breathing the cloud containing radioactive iodine f rom the postulated accident are then calculated by Applicant and Staff on-the basis of the properties of a " standard man". There was testimony in the record that a child immersed in the same radioactive cloud for the same period would receive a dose-which is approximately three times larger than that calculated for the " standard man". Evidently this is due to the. higher ratio of breathing rate to thyroid mass for the child, as compared to that of an adult. The Board is uncertain as to whether consideration of individuals at these locations is' limited to adults.
Although a witness for the Applicant stated that 10 CFR Part 100 applies specifically to adults, the Board does not find this interpretation in 10 CFR Part 100. The Board believes that the reputed low probability of the occurrence of the design-basis accident is no justification for an arbitrary interpretation of 10 CFR Part 100 as it applies to individuals.
(4) If the dose were recalculated for a child, using.the I
f actor of three suggested by a Staf f witness, the esticated dose would remain less than 300 rem at the low-population boundary on the basis of the parameters used by the Staff. On this same basis, the 2-hr. dose at the site boundary would significantly exceed the 300 rem guideline.
However, this is not the case when the Applicant's para:eters for 1
dose calculations are used. The identification of a consistent and ;
reasonable method of calculating the accident dose to an off-site
" individual" also affects satisfactory resolution of the proposed redesign of the fuel-handling facility. In this regard the Staff has concluded that the postulated fuel handling accident will result in off-site doses exceeding the 10 dFR Part 100 guidelines and that redesign l
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i j The Board believes that there are technical alternatives
! i l available which could and should be pursued if doses to children are j I l l contemplated within the meaning of 10'CFR 100. As an example, the l l Applicant may be able to propose and justify a margin of safety for spray removal efficiency which is sufficient to meet the dose require-ments for all individuals. The Board believes that in view of the Commission's review procedures and other proceedings in the Commission's regulatory process, this issue can and will be resolved. ;
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- 32. A quality assurance program for the design and construction of Unit 2 is intended to be responsive to the recently published AEC proposed quality ast arance criteria. Within the Applicant's engineering department a new group has been established separate from the design group with responsibility for a continuing review of the quality assurance program and for reporting .'n its adequacy to the applicant's management.
This new group is headed by the Director, Quality Engineering.
- 33. The technical information generated from the research and !
development to be done in connection with the facility will be used to demonstrate the safety of the design, to obtain more sharply defined j 1
margins of conservatism, or to lead to design improvements. The research and development areas are common to all Westinghouse pressurized water reactors, and the results of these efforts as they are performed for preceding pressurized water reactors will be applicable to this facility.
Two specific areas in which additional information is being developed l
and which will contribute to facility operation are the power distri-bution control program and the fuel rod burst program. Eleven other areas of research and development are being conducted. )
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- 34. The report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards has identified certain areas requiring further review by the staff as the facility design details are developed or as the additional These items will be reviewed with the j information becomes available. !
staff and by the Advisory Committee prior to issuance of any operating license, j I
- 35. As indicated above, the interveners 5cenic Shoreline l l
Preservation Conference, Inc. , and Idn McMillan, apposed the granting l 1
of the provisional construction permit to the App'_icant . The Conference's petition to intervene, and certain supplemental material furnished to the Board by the Conference prior te :he granting of the petition, indicated that the Conference is a conservation organization concerned with the proper protection and utilization of the coastlines and associated ecological resources so as to pro:ent the health, safety and welf are of citizens. Among the members o f the Conference are 26 residents of San Luis Obispo County. The princip al contentions of these interveners, relevant to the issues of this proceeding, were that the inventory and normal release of radioactive fission prcducts in the proposed Diablo 2 f acility would create real and potential hazards to the people over a wide area. The interveners ind:cated their intention to raise questions on the subject of geology , me:earological conditions ,
permissible standards of waste discharges, evacus: ion plan, and storage, disposal, and transportation of radioac:ive was tes.
- 36. At ;he hearing a witness for Mr. McMillan presented testimony indicating the occurrence of a recent earthquake, of magnitude 4, within 11 mi]es of tLe site, as reported in Septe:ber,1969 by the
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Ll . S. Coast and Geode tic Survey. The testiw ny t>> the tit a r t and Applicant was that the nearest seismically signif1 cant fault is about ,
18-20 miles to the northeast. The witness also introduced evidence that recent seismic activity might better be attributed to a fault which is only nine miles away from biablo 2, and the witness states that this nearer fault has an extension to within four miles of ;
Diablo. The witness for the intervenor also stated that those portions
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of the seismic design criteria for Diablo 2 which are based upon a postulated San Andreas shock of magnitude 8.5 and an af tershock at j l
Diablo of magnitude should be modified to an af tershock magnitude ]
of 7.3 to 7.5.
Allegations of new seismic information which were raised by i
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the Conference in its petition of April 5 and subse:uent investigation 1
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! by the staff led to the third day of hearing. These areas related to the significance cf the Edna Fault (passing within four and one-half to five miles of the site), and of an apparent no rt heas t to southwest 4 l alignment o f of fsho re epicenters.
In its petition of April 5, the Conference alleged the existence i of a recently active of fshore fault pointing towarc the vicinity of Diablo Canyon and based their testic.cny upon a map;ing of epicenters l
! , of off-shore earthquakes reported by the U.S. Coas; and Geodetic Survey.
These epicenters varied in magnitude f rom 3.7 to 7.. and were at i
distances f rom the Diablo site varying f rom 15 to 120 miles. The I
i Conference pointed out that these epicenters, when :aken as a group, fell l generally along a straight line which, when projected in the northeast-
! vouthwest direction, intersected the California coastline in the vicinit y l o f the Diablo site. The Conference concluded that :his orientation of
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l "pleenters suggested the existence of an of f shuro tault. The Lonterence further observed that the southwesterly projection of this line of l epicenters intersected a well-known tectonic structure, the Murray Fracture Zone, which is predominantly an east-west feature that extends to and possibly beneath the California continental shelf.
i If there were indeed a northeast-southwest fault along the line l
suggested by the epicenters, and if the f ult intersected the coastline l at or near the plant site, the predicted earthquake from the depicted length of this inferred fault would likely exceed in magnitude the on-site shaking from the design-basis earthquake described in the PSAR.
Data presented to the Board during the August hearing indicate that l this would be true whether or not this postulated fault was further connected to the Murray Fracture Zone. The Board thus concludes that l
a fault zone trending as suggested by the Conference would be significant to the Diablo seismic consideration. If it were concluded that this f aul t e xi s t s , further consideration of the possible connection to Murray would be required to establish the new design-basis-earthquake.
If it is concluded that the probability of exis tence of this f ault is too low to warrant f urther consideration, then its possible connection to Murray is of no importance.
I.
The Applicant and Staf f concluded that the apparent northeast- I southwest alignment of the epicenters is fortuitous on the grounds that spark testing by the Coast and Geodetic Survey has ider.tified northwest-southeast structural features in the ocean floor in this area, and that ]
the earthquakes plotted are probably clusters associated with the dominant i northwest t rending st ructures. An Applicant's witness testified that i
. , . . .)
421-apparent alignment of epicenters of magnitude less' than 5 does not i
necessarily indicate a structural trend; i.e. , a fault. The Conference i-witness agreed that the significance of such correlation is uncertain for small earthquakes, but he concludes that the apparent lineation, including the larger magnitude epiceEters, is still sufficient to warrant further studies of offshore seismicity before reaching a decision on the plant site.
Testimony by the Conference stated that the Edna Fault Zone which passes within 5 miles of the Diablo site, had not been properly considered by the Applicant. Conference testimony indicated recent seismic activity in the Edna Fault area. A Conference witness tenta-tively identified a new fault called the Los Osos Fault,. north of the Edna Fault Zone. He stated that the Edna Fault, the West Huasna Fault, the so-called Los Osos Fault, and possibly an extension beneath the 1
oceaa or up the coast might combine to constitute a single fault of seismic significance. The Staff concluded that Edna is a branch of the West Huasna Fault but that the predominant sense of displacement along West Huasna may differ f rom that along Edna. Applicant concludes that the sinuous shape of Edna and the reportedly different senses of the fault zones indicate that these faults are not structurally contiguous.
Applicant and Staff stated that recent small shocks and evidence concerning the Los Osos Fault did not affect earlier conclusions I about the adequacy of the seismic design. The Conference contended that the opinions of the witnesses for Applicant and Staff should be supported by more detailed geological mapping.
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The Staff states that the Diablo. design basis earthquake is i
i represented by an on-site acceleration of 0.4 g and an appropriate response spectrum. This is considerably greater than the on-site
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l shaking that would result from the significant Nacimiento and San Andreas earthquakes described by the Applicant, which result in on-site acceleration of 0.20 g and 0.15 g, respectively. The conserva-tism indicated by the difference between these latter accelerations and the design basis acceleration appears to be sufficient to acconodate i
the possible uncertainties associated with these geologic and seismic i questions and considerations raised by Conference. Consequently, the Board concludes that the seismic design is adequate.
, 37. A Conference witness pointed out tha: the AEC Director '
l l of Regulation had, in connection with this applica: ion, requested certain details of the Site Emergency Plan for Diablo, and that information appearing in this application is only in part responsive to the request from the Director of Regulation. Ee contended'that the answers should be available and on record to enab;i the public to make some judgment as to the magnitude of the safety pr:blems involved with the proposed Diable 2 facility. The Board agrees that the requested information should ultimately be supplied by the A;plicant and that, when so supplied, it should be of public record. However, the Board unde rst ands that it is the practice o f the Comdsnan to require such details at the time an operating license is applied for. The regulation 10 CFR 50.34 specifically requires an emergency plan in conjunction with an operating license application, but no such requirement appears for a construction permit application. The Board believes that there is
sufficient'information elsewhere in this ' application to provide for an adequate evaluation of the magnitude of the potential safety problems in connection with Diablo 2.
- 38. The Conference challenged the radiological safety of the Diablo site and the proposed Diable 2 facility on the gounds of vulnerability to acts of war and sabotage. The rules of. the Commission .
preclude consideration of so-called acts of war in licensing proceedings. -
- 39. The Conference and Mr. McMillan, also presented some -
general testimony on radiation ef fects. They state d that there were current uncertainties in the magnitude of the risk from low levels of ionizing radiation and requested that the Board take these uncertainties into account in making an evaluation of risk versus benefit for the l
proposed evaluating public safety for the proposed Diablo 2 facility.
l However, no specific evidence was introduced. In reaching its conclusions i
set forth below, the Board has relied upon the existing regulations. '
- 40. A witness for Mr. McFE11an questions the adequacy of present knowledge en the transport and possible concentration of radioactive compounds in the food chains, either in the sea or on the land. However, the only specific question relating to the radioactive
'l food chain, as identified in this proceeding, is that connected with abalone. The Board's conclusions concerning abalone are found in ,
paragraph 22.
- 41. A witness for the Conference challenged the adequacy of the meteorological information on which the conclusions of satis--
factory analysis of radioactive concentrations fro possible releases at the Diablo site are based. He argued that the existing meteorological data have emphasized the air-mixing characteristics in the site locality but do not sufficiently describe the effects of local terrain upon
_ _ . _ _ , .____mm______ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _m----
th=ee characteristics, at greater distinaces from the site. The planned or normal atmospheric releases of radioactivity must meet the 10 CFR 20 maximum permissible conc'entrations at and beyond the site boundary, and compliance with this requirement is to be verified I i
by environmental monitoring instrumentation. The Applicant expects k
that his releases will be controlled so that the actual concentration the site boundary is a factor of 400 below the maximum permissible f at )
j concentration. The Board understands that the highest off-site 1 l
concentration of radioactivity will occur at some point on the site boundary for Diablo 2. As long as the regulations on allowable I
concentrations of radioactivity are complied with St the site boundary, l
l the Board can identify no mechanism which could result in higher concen-trations at greater distances from the site. Therefore, for the purpose of assessing safety associated with normal releases, the present ;
meteorological data seem to be sufficient in scope. The Board notes that more extensive data of this type will be available for a more detailed and precise determination of an allowable release limit at the . operating license state. The above observations are also applicable to the assessment of the possible 2-hour dose at the site boundary resulting f rom the postulated design-basis accident. The Board accepts the Staff assessment that, for the purpose of estimating the possible 30-day dose at the low-population zone in the event of a design-basis accident, the Applicant's use of meteorological dispersion parameters which are generally accepted to be very conservative and which are correlated with the site date is sufficient for the present estimate of these doses from a postulated accident. Therefore, the Board concludes that the existing meteorological data provide sufficient basis for determination, at the construction permit stage, of reasonable
assurance of safety.
- 42. The Board herein takes -cognizance of the contention of the Conference that the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) applies to proceedings on applications for construction permits before. !
the Commission. However, the Board believes tha: no' justifiable: reason has been submitted to delay this application pursuant to the Conference's request of July 13, 1970. This conclusion rests 2n. the laws and regulations of the Commission which recognize the necessity for additional time for complete compliance in the case of pending applications and the opportunity for meeting any additional environmen al requirements prior to the issuance of an operating license.
- 43. The Applicant is a California corporation. The activities j to be conducted under the provisional constructic: permit will be 1
l within the jurisdiction of the United States, and all of the directors and principal of ficers of the Applicant are United States citizens.- The Applicant is not owned, controlled or dominated by an alien, or a foreign government . The activities to be conducted do not ' involve any restricted data, but the Applicant has agreed' to' safeguard'any such data which might become involved in accordan:e with the Commission's regulations. Special nuclear material for' use as fuel in the proposed .
facility will be subject to Commission regulations and will be obtained from sources of supply so that there will be no diversion of such material from military purposes.
- 44. The Board has reviewed Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law presented by the Applicant, Staf f and Conference, as well as the comments in the proposals received frcs all the_ parties.
It serves no purpose herein to enumerate its specific acceptance or
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rejection of such proposals except as they are incorporated in the decision herein. The Board also believes that the Ccnference had adequate opportunity to prepare its case for the hearing conducted on August 7,1970 and this conclusion is substantiated by the evidence it submitted during the hearing.
CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER Upon consideration of the entire record in this proceeding, and in light of the foregoing findings and discussions, this Atomic Safety and Licensing Board makes af firmative findings on items numbered 1-3 and a negative finding on item 'e specified in the Notice of Hearing in this proceeding., published in the FEDERAL REGISTER on November 19, 1969.
In accordance with the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
- 1. The Director of Regulation is authorized to issue a construction permit pursuant to Section 104 b. of the Act substa :ially in the form of Appendix A to the " Notice of Hearing on Application for Pro-visional Construction Permit" in the captioned matter within ten (10) days f rom the date of the issuance of this decision; and
- 2. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.764, good cause not having been shown to the contrary, this initial decision shall be immediately ef fective; and, in the absence of any further order f rom the Commission, shall constitute the final decision of the Commission for:y-five (45) days afger the issuance, subject to the review thereof a-d further decision to by .the Commission upon exceptions filed by any party pursuant 10 CFR 2.762 or upon its own motion.
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- 3. It is further ordered that the Conference's request to reopen i the hearing is hereby denied, l
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Dated at: Washing ton, D.C.
This oth day of recember , 1970 , i l
1 ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
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H lw,2 f]m ..
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dihgh C. Paxtorf i /
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I g sqm '\j Wii ry t, ve.--
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/ James P. Gleason, Chairman I
4 Additional concurring opinion by Dr. T:omas F. Pigford is attached.
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- i T h o cy; !! . Pigford, Concurring
- 1. Assuming that the decisional' record is complete, thero in l l l sufficient evidence in the decisional record to reach the j i
affirmative findings on issues 1-3 and the negative finding on j i
issue 4 as specified to the Board, and I do concur with the Board findings on these issues. I do concur with the fore-going decision but with certain exceptions and reservations )
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as noted herein. )
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- 2. For reasons stated herein I believe that certain procedural 4
l actions in this proceeding may have made it unduly difficult l l for the interveners to present their case. I infer or imply no I conclusion here as to the meri ts , validity, or importance of I
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the additional information which the Conference intended to pre-
. sent or of the additional information which might have resulted .
from their intended questioning of other witnesses. Whether or not these reservations on procedural questions have any bearing upon the completeness of the decisional record and upon the proposed order is beyond my technical qualifications as a member of this Board. If, in its review of this decision, the Commission decides that these procedural reservations have i no such bearing, I will strongly support the order to issue a construction permit. .
- 3. It is my understanding that each member of a Board bears to some extent the shared responsibility of seeing that the proceeding is carried out with due regard to the rights of all parties. There is no attempt here to relate these reservations to any procedural rules or to any rules of law.
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- I That is for lawyers to do. All procedural reservations 1
noted herein were made known to the' other Board members at the time of the procedural action, or very shortly thereafter. )
In most instances they were documented by intra-Board )
l correspondence. The fact that these reservations did not )
i appear explicitly in the record of the proceeding at the time of the procedural action referred to is due to my lack of understanding that not only does a dissenting menter have the obligation to inform the Board chairman of his concern, which I did, but apparently the dissenting member must himself enter the dissent in the procedural record.
l 4. In cross examination the Conference asked an Applicant 1
witness if he had reviewed certain testimony before a Cong ressional Committee on the subject of radiation standards. '
l The Board Chairman ruled that this question could not be '
l asked on the grounds that it was not relevant to any portion '
of the Applicant's testimony. I disagreed with this ruling because a very important portion of the Applicant's evidence, already in the record at that time, dealt with conformity to radiation standards and is relevant thereto.
Intervenor McMillan, in making an opening statement, referred to the above-mentioned testimony before a Congressional Committee. The Board Chairman ruled against such reference on the grounds of " hearsay", with the explanation that McMillan was reading from what others have said and the.t their testimony was not subject to cross examination. I disagreed, because (a) the intervenor was
i here making an openi ng s t.alement of ' what evidence he proponed to deve. lop, and (b) because much of the technien1 inf ormat. inn submitted in evidence by the Applicant and Staff is in the form of technical reports by authors not then present to 'j l
defend or be cross examined, and much is frequently in the form of quotes of what has appeared in some report or textbook.
The Intervenor should have the same opportunity as the other parties.
i The Conference asked its expert witness in biology to '
give the salient points from this Congressional Committee testimony. The Staf f objected on the ground that this would
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be interpretation of hearsay and of reports written by
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witnesses not present. The Chairman ruled that the witness
. could not quote from the report. I disagreed with the ruling for reason (b) cited in the previous paragraph. If such interpretation as that in the Staff objection means l that all parties must bring in the authors of the technical reports and technical quotes involved in the development of their evidence, then a hearing on such cenplex technical issues as nuclear reactor safety would become unwieldy, impossible, and completely outside the scope of proceeding with reasonable dispatch. Surely there must be some way to introduce technical information in a reasonable manner for normal technical review, and surely it is possible to identify key, crucial, and relevant evidence from such information and subject it then to proper cross examination with defense by the originating authors. Again, the
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Int <n venor should be given the same opportunity as the other parties.
- 5. There is some question as to whether er not the Conference .
had suf ficient opportunity for cross examination and for sub:aitting rebuttal evidence in connection with the January i
hearing. This hearing was held on January 13 and 14. The hearing agenda is attached. The January 14 session was I devoted mainly to questioning of the parties by Board members, i 1
1 and most of this time cons.tsted of presentation of answers I to questions posed b; Doard ncmbers in the Deconber, 1969, Prehearing Conference. Near the end of this session it had become apparent that certain technical areas under question f required presentation of additional information. With the consent of the Board the Applicant elected (Jan. TR 410) to ~
present this information in written form af ter the January 14 session.
Prior to the completion of the January 14 afternoon session the Board Chairman gave the parties present the opportunity to cross examine witnesses who had given oral testimony in answer to the Board's questions. He then offered the parties present opportunity to offer rebuttal evidence, the last item on the agenda. Intervenor ficMillan asked a few questions. ~
Mr. Eissler, the Conference representative, was not t present during the January 14 session, and there was no message f rom him concerning possible intentions to of fer rebuttal evidence or to cross examine. ;
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At the end of the January 14 nossjon t- hea ring wm.
reconned for three weeks, and duri.ng the recess the Appli-cant's additional material was supplied in writing.
On February 3, during the recess, the Ecard roccived a petition from the Conference requesting a reconvening of the hearing. The reasons stated in the request were brief and !
vaguely worded. Af ter reviewing this petition, I requested the Board to seek clarification from the Ccnference concerning its petition. My reasons for this request were as follows:
(a) It appeared that the Conference might be a
requesting opportunity to crcss examine on the technical information sub .itted by the Applicant during the recess.
(b) It appeared that there might he some substan-tative basis to those portions of the Conference petition asking for reopening to present new information, such as in the area of geology and seismology.
it appears to me that the Conference certainly must have had the procedural rights under (a ) above.
- The Conference's Prior to the end of the January 14 recess the AEC Staf f counsel admonished the Board that the proposed procedure of allowing the Applicant to furnish technical information in writing during the recess period might well require further hearing if any of the parties wanted to cross examine on this information.
_e_ i February 3 petition i ndica ted t hat they we re defini t ely l
concerned about many i m;uen , arni i t. wm, so irely po: :ibl:
that they mi ght have some reason ior their concerns. I thi not understand how their rights to crose co: amine could have been waived by silence or lack of clear articulation in !
l their request. It appeared to me that the Board, with full i l
I knowledge that the conference might be reg.:esting opportunity i 1
to cross examine, was obligated to seek clarification from the Conference and to determine if the Conference was actually willing to Ict the case rest without f urther cross examination. )
l It has also seemed to me that not only should the Conference i
be allowed to cross examine on the information submitted during recess, but they might also have ' the right to present rebuttal eviden ce . Perhaps their rights on this were waived b, absence from the January 14 session. However, the '. earing reached the .
agenda item of rebuttal evidence near the end of the January 14 session.
If the Conference had been present at that instance, l there would have been little opportunity that day to present l much in this area and a continuation to a later day would have been necessary. The schedule of other commitments by certain Board members required that the January 14 session end at, or very near, the time that recess occurred and would have pre-c) uded a continuation of the hearing on January 15. Therefore, -
it appears that the Conference may still have had some rights to cross examination on Board questions answered on January 14 and some rights to present rebuttal evidence.
Because of considerations (a ) and (b) above, I disagreed with the Board decision not to seek clarification from the Conference.
On March 18 the Board majority issued an order which
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l denied the Conference's February 3 petition on the grounds i that granting the request for reopening would be destructive to an orderly procedure. I dinsented from that order because l
the Board had not sought or obtained the clarification j i
neccesary before reasonable judgment could be made on the Conference petition.
These are strictly procedural reservations, and they imply here no judgment on the merits of additional evidence that the Conference might have developed if further clarifi-cation had shown that the petition should be granted. It i is noted here that a subsequent petition (April 5) by the ;
Conference was later granted (July 20) on the geological and 1 seismological issues and led to the August 7 hearing. l
- 6. I do not agree with that portion of paragraph 44 of the ~
Decision which states the Conference had ample opportunity to prepare its case for the reopened August 7 hearing. It is my !
understanding that hearings are supposed to be scheduled at the reasonable convenience of the parties cencerned. The record shows (Aug. TR 14, 15, 200) that after the Board had decided to reopen, a member of the AEC Licensing Board Panel ,
staff (not the Board Chairman) telephoned Mr. Eissler, president of .the Conference, to attempt to find the mcst '
s q suitable date at the earliest possible time. The message that the hearing was schedulep for August 7 was lef t with Mr. Eissler's wife. On July 26, Mr. Eissler responded and.
requested an extension because more. time was needed to review
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tho ;tafI r olu n1 on !
.e i nini c f ai t i a i and I o .' centtil e hi: inen 4
memnary witnesses and obtain a legal counpl. Accordin.; .
to fir.
Eissler's testimony, he was then informed by the Board Chairman that the hearing could not be reset I was .
not consulted when the Board decided to deny the Conference request to postpone. ,
It has been argued that the Conference had sufficient time to review the supplemental geologic report and the supplemental seismic report which had been distributed to the parties by the AEC Staff on June 15,and this argument
- seems to reflect the stated attitude (Aug. TR 7, 201) that the sole purpose of the reopened proceeding was to incorporate these reports by the AEC Staff into the record and to permit cross examination on these reports. .
The existence of certain new information concerning geology and seismology was first identified by the Conference .
The material outlined and briefly summarized in the conference 's April 5 petition indicated that there was I suf ficient chance that sufficient substantive new inform might exist to merit a reopening for the Conference to present its case on this issue.
The AEC Staff evidently I decided upon review of the Conference's April 5 petition at th the new information which the Conference proposed topresent _
was sufficiently substantive to warrant their own investi i
gation. of the information given in the petition itself * .
See page ~9-for this footnote.
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, ment ioned above. The Conference has str.ted that it needed time to seek a lawyer and schedule its expert witnesses. It is unreasonable to expect any party with limited funds to have a lawyer and expert witnesses standing by for the indefinite periods between request and answer that had been established by the pattern of actions of this Board. The very long periods taken by the Board in responding on March 18 to the Conference petition of February 3, and in responding on July 20 to the Conference petition of April 5, indicate such a slow and uncertain tempo of Board action that the Conference could not be reasonably expec;od to maintain a readily available hearing staff during ?.e interim period.
The Board majority states that the evidence submitted by 1
the Conference during the reopened hearing substantiates their I conclusion that the Conference had suffi:ient notice. I agree with the Board that important new considerations of geology and seismicity were presented, but I cannot agree that this indicates that the Conference, if given the requested extension, could not have more adequately presented its case.
In fact, much of the testimony by witnesses for the Conference, the Applicant, and the Staff, in relation to some of the important facets of the Edna fault issue, was based upon observations and recollections of what had been said or written by a UCLA professor, who wac not a witness in this ,
proceeding, and upon conflicting observations of what they saw on several different geologic maps attributed to that professor but which are not here in evidence. The hearing -
record indicates that all of the parties, and the decisional i
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I procer.c it.ne]f, would have 1;enefited from moi. mlerfuate preparation.
My exception here does not mean that there is insuf ficient evidence in this record to support the remaining conclusions of fact stated in the foregoing decision.
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- 7. There is another area of Board action which I believe has had serious and adverse effect upon the rights of all l partiec to this proceeding, and that is the lack of l reasonably prompt action by this Board in attending to its duties. The details and schedules of Board meetings, or lack thereof, to deal with this proceeding are not matters of public record. I conclude, however, that the Board has proceeded with anything but reasonable dispatch when it l cannot respond to the Conference's February 3 petition until March 18 and to the Conference's April 5 petition j until July 20, and when it takes four months to issue a decision after the August 7 hearing. It might appear that )
the remarkably s1c . schedule of performance by this Board reflects long and serious consideration by the Board in deliberating unusually difficult and complicated issues.
That is simply not the case. I have strongly dissented in several instances when the Board has decided not to act, when it has postponed reviewing the evidentiary record, and when it has refrained even from scheduling future dates to meet and do its job. It will be tempting to blame the
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- prn t r ic t - l o n < i f. h o f t h i t.
Di oc<" ili ivi--over thirteen mon t h-
,iio- I h- i t ;ue of tlo- notice vil Ihe he.itisni- oinin of hi i sou r O_: . This case is not. that complicated. The over.ill
.i delay can be attributed largely to the Board itself.
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- 8. The foregoing necessarily loads to some reservation with regard to Paragraph 44 of the Decision, which deals with pro-posed findings. I can, however, concur with the remainder of 4 the Decisien, except as noted herein.
- 9. The s,tacifics and detail are written here with full recogniticr of the Commission's admonition that Boards should present c:ncise and short decisions. Also, it is with great reluctance that I express these reservations, because pro-
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ccdural mtters are outside the area of my professional com- ,
petence 2.nd because these reservations divulge some division among a Ecard of qualified individuals. However, this ,
I addendum is compelled by my concern that remaining silent i l
i may result in further unfairness to the parties. As a matter l
of care and conscience, I cannot join the foregoing decision l l
without having expressed these reservations sufficiently and l explicit 1; so that they will not be misunderstood and distorted by generalization, with possible harm to the parties. .
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Thomas H. Pigford2 December 8, 1970 ,
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