DCL-95-206, Comment Supporting Petition for Rulemaking PRM-50-61 Re Improving Fire Protection Regulations

Comment Supporting Petition for Rulemaking PRM-50-61 Re Improving Fire Protection Regulations

ML20093E941
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	10/06/1995
From:	Rueger G PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Hoyle J NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
References
FRN-60FR29784, RULE-PRM-50-61 60FR29784-00016, 60FR29784-16, DCL-95-206, OL-DPR-80, OL-DPR-82, NUDOCS 9510170172
Download: ML20093E941 (20)

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L Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street Room 1451 GregoryM Rueger t

l* PO Box 770000 Senior Vice PresideOOCKL TED l SanFrancim CA94177 General Manager Ugggg l 415/973-4684 Nuclear Power Generation Fax 415/973-2313

% OC716 A 9 :49 October 6,1995 ,

Of'f ICE Of iEGETMY f PG&E Letter DCL-95-206 00CHEI W d "Erweg ,

BRun v Mr. John C. Hoyle, Secretary

~p ll U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,. ~ , ,, 2 3 Washington, D.C. 20555

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Attent. ion: Docket.mg and Services Branch (4cre.9A1%

Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80 Docket No. 50-323, OL-DPR-82 Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 Comments on the Nuclear Energy Institute Petition for Rulemaking Gentlem- " .

On June 6,1995, the NRC published in the Federal Lgister (60 FR 29784) a notice of receipt of a Petition for Rulemaking filed by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) regarding fire protection at nuclear power plants. The petition (assigned Docket No. PRM-50-61) proposed an amendment to 10 CFR 50.48," Fire Protection," to add a new Appendix S to 10 CFR 50 that provides an alternative to the current Appendix R regulations governing fire protection at nuclear facilities. The notice stated that the NRC is seeking public comments on the petition and specific input on 13 questions regarding the nature and scope of the petition. Although comments on the petition were requested by ,

September 29, PG&E is forwarding comments that may be of benefit to the Commission during the review period.

PG&E's comments on the petition are enclosed. PG&E is generally supportive of the direction of the proposed rule to improve fire protection regulations. However, PG&E believes that until approved methods of performing fire hazards analysis using vire modeling techniques and fire related probabilistic risk analysis are provided, the proposed rulemaking would not prevent licensees from continuing to seek NRC acceptance of a plant-specific condition. Generic Letter (GL) 86-10 allowed licensees the ability to evaluate a condition's impact on the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

Consistent with the direction of the proposed rule, GL 86-10 gave licensees the option to change their license condition, to incorporate the approved Fire Protection Program into the Final Safety Analysis Report, and to evaluate any changes to the approved program using the 10 CFR 50.59 process. Although the current regulations are prescriptive such that NRC approval would be required for minor deviations from the requirements, acceptable alternatives to comply with specific sections of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, have been provided in existing guidance documents.

PG&E -- NRS, A10A 9510170172 951006 333 MARKET /A1073 50 61 PDR F C CA 94177 pgD J

. Mr. John C. Hayle -

October 6,1995 Page 2 PG&E recommends that, in lieu of a new rule, a guidance document be gen: rated to contain acceptable alternatives to satisfying the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. These alternatives should be based on previously accepted features, and therefore, would not be

- considered a deviation from the mle.

PG&E appreciates the opportunity to comment on this important aspect of nuclear plant safety.

We encourage the NRC to continue the gradual shift toward performance-oriented approaches to establish regulatory safety objectives and acceptance criteria, thereby reducing compliance cost :

for licensees.

Sincerely,

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Aa8 r a

Gregory M. Rueger cc: L. J. Callan Kenneth E. Perkins James C. Stone

. Thomas E. Tipton, NEI Michael D. Tschiltz NRC Document Control Desk )

Diablo Distribution Enclosure 6934S/ FAD /l167 1

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4 i ENCLOSURE Comments on Petition for Rulemakine (10 CFR 50.48 and Annendix S) 1 i .

j Summarv of the Petition for Rulemaking a i Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is the organization responsible for establishing unified nuclear industry policy on matters affecting the nuclear energy industry. On June 6,1995, the Nuclear j Regulatory Commission (NRC) published in the Federal Register (60 FR 29784), a notice of j receipt of a Petition for Rulemaking filed by NEI regarding fire protection at nuclear power l plants. The current NRC requirements for fire protection are stipulated in General Design 4

Criterion (GDC) 3 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A,10 CFR 50.48, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.

These rules include key elements of the " defense-in-depth" approach to fire protection, including l

j fire suppression, detection, fire barriers, and safe shutdown. The proposed rulemaking would i

! amend 10 CFR 50.48 and add a new Appendix S to 10 CFR 50.

The proposed amendment to 10 CFR 50.48 would continue to state that plants licensed before January 1,1979, would satisfy the requirements of GDC 3 by meeting all of the requirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR .'?, or only Sections III.G, lil.J, and 111.0 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, I

provided the guidelines of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position (BTP) Auxiliary Power and Conversion Systems Branch (APCSB) 9.5-1 have been previously approved by the NRC.

1 - Furthermore, plants licensed afler January 1,1979, would meet all of Appendix R by providing a fire protection program in accordance with their operating license. The proposed rule also revises l

i 10 CFR 50.48 to give all licensees, regardless of when the operating license was issued, the l

option to comply with Appendix R or, as an alternative, Appendix S in whole or in part. In i

addition, all exemptions to Appendix R previously granted to licensees would apply in full under the terms of Appendix S.

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' The proposed rule is intended to benefit plants that were licensed to operate prior to January 1, 1979 or required by their operating license to meet Appendix R requirements, in part [i.e.,

Sections III.G, III.3, and III.O] provided the NRC has accepted their program to satisfy Appendix l i A to BTP (APCSB) 9.5-1]. For other plants, their fire protection program would meet GDC 3 j provided their fire protection program met the condition of their license. That is, the guidance of j Appendix A to BTP (CMEB) 9.5-1 (NUREG 0800) would satisfy GDC 3. This version of BTP 9.5-1 incorporates the requirements of the Appendix R rule.

Licensing Basis for Diablo Canyon Power Plant The proposed revision to 10 CFR 50.48 and addition of Appendix S would provide minimal benefit to PG&E because the flexibility in changing the approved program is currrently provided

in existing NRC regulatory documents. Consistent with the approach proposed by NEI, PG&E is able to make changes to the approved fire protection program that do not affect the ability to safely shut down the plant. This approach was allowed by following existing NRC documents.

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PG&E's current license conditions for Diabio Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Units I and 2, reflect the standard delineated in Generic Letter (GL) 86-10. That is, "PG&E may make changcs to the 3-'

approved fire protection program without pricr approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire." The approved fire protection program satisfies GDC 3 by maintaining commitments to 3"

' satisfy Appendix A to BTP (APCSB) 9.5-1 and Sections III.G, III.J, III.L, and III.O of 10 CFR- ,

50, Appendix R, including approved deviations.

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Summary of PG&E Comments "

PG&E endorses the objective of the proposed rulemaking to reduce regulatory burden for both j the NRC and licensees. However, the regulatory burden imposed on PG&E would not be i- significantly reduced as described in the proposed rulemaking until clear guidance documents are provided to identify the acceptance criteria for fire modeling techniques and fire risk objectives for plant-specific conditions that would provide less than the protection required by 10 CFR 50,

. Appendix R. ,

PG&E believes that the direction of the proposed rulemaking already exi.cp in current regulations.

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/As allowed by PG&E's operating license, changes can be made to the apprned fire protection l i i program provided that, in the event of a fire, the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is j not affected. This ability is typically demonstrated by performing a fire hazards analysis. If the ,

1 l analysis determines that the plant-specific condition provides a level of fire protection less than 4

that required by the Appendix R rule, then NRC review and acceptance of the condition would be i required. The proposed miemaking attempts to alleviate the need for NRC review of these types

! of plant-specific conditions. However, without a criteria to follow, the basis for acceptability of these types of conditions could not clearly be determined and would be subjective to different f resewers.

To achieve the objective of reducing regulatory burden, PG&E recommends that, in lieu of a new rule, a fire protection guidance document be issued to provide NRC-accepted alternatives to the i: those features required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. This fire protection guidance document j should encompass all previous NRC positions and should supersede past NRC fire protection

documents to ensure up-to-date NRC positions are reflected. This guidance document would only be applicable to future changes of the approved fire protection program. Issuance of this l type of guidance document would be similar to the alternative methods of compliance provided in GL 81-12, " Fire Protection Rule," and its associated clarification letter. The alternative methods

provided in GL 81-12 involved accepted design features or controls to comply with Section III.G.2 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, requirements for associated circuits of concern (e.g., operator actions, interrupting device, isolation devices, etc.). This would alleviate the need to request NRC acceptance for a condition that deviates from the literal requirements, because the l

alternatives'would have been previously determined by the NRC to provide an equivalent level of

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e i Specific Areas for Public Comment l

In addition to comments on the petition for rulemaking, the NRC is soliciting specific comments '

l on 13 issues to assist in developing regulatory positions and approaches for a performance-oriented, risk-based fire protection miemaking.

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1. Scope 1

(a) Theproposed rule onlyfocuses on the overallsafety objectives to safely shut down the l plantin the event ofajire. l Current NRCfire protection regulations emphasi:e the defense-inapth philosophyforfire l protection. Thisphilosophy applies to structures, systems, and components that are required l for safe shutdown and those that are important to safety. The defense-in-depth objectives are:

(1) topreventfiresfrom starting; j (2) to detect rapidly, control, and extinguish prompdy thosefires that do occur; and l (3) toprovide protectionfor structures, systems, and components important to safety so that l afire that is not promptly extinguished byfire suppression activities wHl not prevent safe shutdown of the plant. l l

The proposed nde limits this defense-in-depth philosophy to only those plant areas needed to shut down the reactorfromfadlpower operation. In addition, the use ofprobabilistic risk assessments (FRA)for eachfire area wiH determine the level offire protection required as \

opposed toprotection of areas without consideration ofrisk sigmficance. The NRC is l solicitingpublic comments on whether the proposed limitations of the defense-in-depth phuosophy arejustified or should the regsdation apply to allplant areas that are important to safety. The NRC is also soliciting comments on the extent ofelimination or relaration of the margin ofsafety in afire area, and if use ofa PRA wiH residt in betterfocus and coherence in the NRC's regadations.  ;

l PG&E Response PG&E believes that an effective fire protection program should consider equipment important-to-safety, which, by definition in BTP 9.5-1, is equipment required for safe shutdown and those required to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. In addition, PG&E believes the use of PRA may assist in determining the level of fire protection in an area. However, in addition i to PRA, the risks involved with preventing the ability to safely shut down should also be a factor ll in determining the level of fire protection in an area. Relaxation of the margin of safety may potentially result in relaxation of fire protection features installed to provide a defense-in-depth approach to fire protection.  ;

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4 The overall requirement for fire protection stems from GDC 3 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A. GDC 3 states:

" Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed and located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions. Noncombustible and heat resistant materials shall be used wherever practical throughout the unit, particularly in locations such as the containment and control room. Fire detection and fighting systems of appropriate capacity and capability shall be provided and designed to minimize the adverse effects of fires on structures, systems, and components important to sa#ety. Fire fighting systems shall be designed to assure that their rupture or inadvertent operation does not significantly impair the safety capability of these structures, systems, and components."

The intent of a fire protection program, as described in Section 9.5.1 of the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-75, Rey,1, dated May 1,1976), is to provide assurance, through a defense-in-depth design, that a fire will not prevent the performance of necessary safe plant shutdown functions and

-'will not significantly increase the risk of radioactive releases to the environment. Thus, a fire i protection program er. compasses the components, procedures and personnel utilized in carrying out all activities of fire protection and includes such things as fire prevention, detection, annunciation, control, : confinement, suppression, extinguishment, administrative procedures, fire brigade organization, inspection and maintenance, training, quality assurance, and testing. ]

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Safety-related systems and components are defined in the BTP 9.5-1 as " systems and components l l required to shut down the reactor and mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents and i maintain it in a safe shutdown condition." The BTP provides guidance acceptable to meet

. .GDC 3 and addresses fire protection for safety-related systems and equipment in nuclear power ,

plants. Economic property loss considerations probably dictate additional fire protection program

- - requirements. Because the fire protection program encompasses many areas, the guidance provided in BTP 9.5-1 is not limited to safe shutdown. Chariging the proposed wording to address only safe shutdown areas does not relieve the licensee of the defense-in-depth philosophy l' for fire protection in other fire areas identified in the BTP (e.g., lube oil storage rooms, battery rooms, etc.).  !

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$ It is not clear from the proposed regulation how fire protection in these non-safe shutdown areas

, will be maintained. PG&E is required by its operating licenses to maintain commitments made to

satisfy Appendix A to BTP (APCSB) 9.5-1. The proposed wording of the rule to address only safe shutdown areas does not relieve PG&E from satisfying Appendix A to BTP (APCSB) 9.5-1.

- With respect to maintenance of areas required to meet safe shutdown (Section III.G of 10 CFR

50, Appendix R), the current regulations and PG&E's license conditions already allow the flexibility proposed by this revised rule.

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1. (b). Exclusion ofnew requirements beyond the scope ofthe current regulations.

The proposed rule does not take into consideration other requirements affectingfire safety beyond Appendix R regulations. Eramples ofnew requirements include: (1) lessons learned from the results ofindividualplant examination of external events (IPEEE) and research, (2) concerns with personnel hfe safety, (3) resolution ofgeneric safety issues related tofire protection (e.g., earthquake inducedfires), (4) operating experiences, (5) performance criteriafor compensatory measures, (6) quality assurance, and (7) consideration offire-related risks during shutdown conditions andplant decommissioning.

The NRC approved a new policyfor separating regadatory actionsfor new safety issuesfrom thosefor improving regadatory efpciency (SECY-94-090). Specifically, with respect topre protection rulemaking, any nerv safety issues that resultedfrom implementation of the Fire Protection Task Action Pfar, would be evaluated, and backfit requirements developed, separate and independentfrom efforts to improve regulatory efficiency in thefire protection area. The NRC is soliciting comments on whether the SECY.94-090 policy should be maintained or if the staffshould seek commission approval to deviatefrom the established policy and simultaneouslypromulgate modifications to improve the efficiency of the regidation and new requirements in the same rtdemaking.

PG&E Resps_n_s PG&E believes the new policy of separating regulatory actions for new safety issues from those for improving regulatory efficiency (SECY-94-09)is prudent. PG&E does not consider the direction being taken by the proposed rule to be a new safety issue, and should not be a backfit requirement. The direction of this proposed rule should be applied to future changes made to the approved fire protection program. The fire safety issues that result from other NRC requirements should already be considered in the overall fire protection program.

For example, the risks due to fire evaluated in the IPEEE and during low-power and shutdown conditions take into consideration combustible loading, available fire protection features, and equipment necessary to safely shut down the plant. The proposed rulemaking should not affect these fire safety issues which should already be considered in the overall effectiveness of the fire protection program.

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2. Safety-Neutral: Demonstration that theproposalis " safety-neutral" Theproposed rule is intended to reduce the regidatory burden on licensees without reducing the protection provided to the health andsafety of the public. Because guidance documents are notyet available, it is not clear how the proposed ride would impact risk. The petition does not include a demonstration of how the proposed rule achieves an equivalent level of fire safety to that currently established byplants having a NRC-approvedfire protection program that meets the current regidations.

The NRC is seeking comments on details ofimplementation of the proposed rule ami the mechanismfor licensees to demonstrate that alternativefire protection approaches allowed by the proposed rule, while reducing burden, will have no sigmficant adverse effect on plant risk compared to that achieved by current NRCfire protection regsdations. Specifically, the NRC is soliciting supporting technical demonstration, including risk-based analysis, that justifies exclusions or relaxation in itsfire protection requirements.

PG&E Response In accordance w'. '. De standard license condition prc vided in GL 86-10, licensees currently have )

the capability to make a change to their approved Fire Protection Program provided the ability to safely shut down the plant is not affected. This can be determined by completion of a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation and performance of a fire hazards analysis. The risks due to fires .

are identified as part of the IPEEE in the fire PRA. Therefore, the impact to fire risk would be l determined in the safety evaluation. l Page 6 of 18

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3.1mplementation Guidance: Extent thatjudgment can be made on petition given the l j absence of an industry guideline, and the demonstration of application of advanced '

methods infire sciences and PRA.'

The proposed rule allows the use offire modeling and risk assessment techniques, but does 3' not include regadatory requirements or a guidance document that wouldspecify methods and criteriafo,~ verifying and validating these methods. In addition, a verification and ,

' validation or approvalprocessfor thesefire models has not been proposed.

1 The NRC is seeking information on details arut specific examples of these advances infire sciences arulPRAs, and how these could be utili: edin the US nuclearpower industry. Also, to what extent shouldprior review arut approval of these techniques by the NRC staff be required before application by a licensee and, to ensure consistent application, should a L licensee 's compliance with these alternatives be reviewed arut approved by the NRC before implementation.

PG&E Response i

Fire-modeling techniques performed by a nationally recognized fire protection organization, such as NFPA or SFPS, should be reliable techniques and would wt need NRC approval , -ior to use.

However, it would be prudent to obtain NRC approval of techniques performed by licensees that are plant-specific. Techniques acceptable to the NRC could be provided in a new guidance document. - A new rule would not be required to allow licensees to utilize these techniques, since l i

i the current regulations allow licensees to assess the impact future changes have on the ability to

- safely shut down the plant in the event of a fire.

As part of the IPEEE program, the fire PRA takes into consideration the overall plant risks due to l j

fires. Methods used by licensees for fire modeling and risk assessment techniques are included in the submittals for the IPEEE program, and many of these plant-specific techniques are currently 5 under review by the NRC. As stated before, current regulatory documents allow licensees to make a change to their approved program via the 10 CFR 50.59 process provided the ability to safely shut down the plant is not affected. This determination is based on the fire hazards analysis which will determine the consequences of the design basis fire on the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. The fire hazards analysis should be allowed to credit fire modeling i techniques and results of the fire PRA. However, these techniques and the fire PRA should not be the sole basis for the conclusions of the analysis.

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4. Processfor Burden Relief: Extent to which the rule revision is thepreferred mechanism

. forproviding the burden reliefsought by thepetitioner compared to moving thefire protection program to a Safety Analysis Report.

Currently, by implementation of the starulard license comfition providedin GL 86-10,

" Implementation ofFire Protection Requirements, " arulincorporation of thefire protection program into the Safety Analysis Report, licensees can make a change to theirprogram uruler the 10 CFR 50.59 process. This method ofchanging the program accomplishes most ofwhat the proposed rule allows. That is, licensees can make a change to the approvedfire protection program provided the ability to safely shut down the plant is not affected ami the change does not have an adverse impact on safety.

The NRC is seeking benefits amiadvantages ofa revised regulationforproviding the regulatory reliefsought by the petitioner when compared to current mechanisms. The NRC is also seeking ir! formation regarding how theproposedrule will reduce the regulatory resources needed to evaluate an alternative approach 's safety equivalency amiensure its

. proper implementation.

PG&E Response Regulatory reliefis provided by allowing licensees to assess changes to the fire protection program via the 10 CFR 50.59 process. This. process is consistent with evaluation of changes to the facility, tests performed, and procedures as described in the FS AR. The fire protection program should not be an exception. The proposed rule does not provide additional relief to licensees with respect to evaluating the impact on the ability to safely shut down.

As allowed by GL 86-10, licensees have the option of revising their license condition to allow changes to the approved fire protection program to be evaluated using the 10 CFR 50.59 process .

i to determine if the ability to safely shut down is adversely affected. In assessing the consequences of the design basis accident (a fire), a fire pratection engineer will evaluate acceptability of the

!- change based on a fire hazards analysis. The fire hazards analysis will take into consideration the i hazards in the area, configuration of combustibles, available fire protection features, and the i

ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

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' Regulatory burden could be reduced when determining the consequences of the design basis fire.

By using the guidance provided in GL 86-10 and the prescriptive requirements provided in the '

!- current Appendix R rule, determination of the consequences of a design basis fire would be based on the limited criteria. Regulatory burden would be reduced if the ability to safely shutdown can be demonstrated using methods other than those described in GL 86-10 without the need to obtain NRC review and approval. The proposed rule does not provide any more guidance than is '

already provided. A criteria is needed for determining acceptable technical alternatives to ensure the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. In lieu of a new rule, this criteria could be provided in a guidance document, and would be the basis for determining if NRC review and L approval would be required.'

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. 5. ContentofPerformance-OrientedRisk-BasedRegulation: Levelofdetailandthe inclusion ofrisk-based safety objectives in a revised regulation.

Theproposed rule replaces the prescriptive requirements ofAppendix R withfunctional safety objectives and acceptance criteria in each area ofAppendix R which would be accompanied with guidance documents. Could the same intent be gained by modifying 10 CFR 50.48, and thereby eliminating the needfor Appendix R and Appendix S?

The proposed rule is performance based in that thefunctionality ofsafe shutdown equipment is the ultimate goal. Although the proposed rule allows the use ofPRAfor determining acceptability offire protectionfeatures, it does not contain risk-based objectives that are related to safety goals. The NRC is seeking comments on the ne, d to establish risk-based safety objectives. The NRC is also seeking information to be uss i by licensees on the .

measurable processes or parameters to ensure that the adequacy dplantfire protection features in protecting the safe shutdown capability based on the plant-specificfire risk. In addition, the NRC is seeking information on how previously granted exemptions / deviations should be exemptedfrom the scope of a performance-based regudation.

PG&E ResponJg Establishing risk-based safety objectives is a key factor to determining the risks due to fires. Use of PRA, without consideration of fire risk, may result in not providing adequate fire protection j features. The Appendix R rule involves ensuring the ability to safely shut down the plant is not affected by a fire.- This ability is dependent on available fire protection features (e.g., fire barriers, suppression, detection, fire brigade, etc.). Therefore, although a PRA takes into consideration the plant's past performance, it should not be the sole determination for the adequacy of fire protection.

The curent rule provides methods of protecting safe shutdown equipment (e.g.,3-hour fire barriers,1-hour fire barriers, spatial separation, fire protection features, etc.). Because of these i features, the risks to core damage due to a fire are expected to be zero. That is, the ability to l safely shut down the plant is not affected. However, without these features, the risks to core damage due to a fire, could not be easily determined. The fire risk assessment requires a fire l

< hazards analysis that takes into account combustible materials, location of materials, available fire protection equipment, and other features necessary to assure that safe shutdown would not be affected. 4 Acceptability of exemptions / deviations from the current rules are typically based on the results of a fire hazards analysis. Therefore, previously approved exemptions / deviations should already be enveloped within the risk-based objectives. Without an acceptance criteria for protecting

_ equipment required for safe shutdown, the risks due to tires are difficult to determine. The risk-based objectives could be effectively provided in a new guidance document that allows alternative

, methods of protecting equipment. If additional guidance documents are provided allowing alternative methods of protecting equipment required for safe shutdown, the need to revise 10 CFR 50.48 would not be necessary.

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6. Voluntary Adoption in Whole orin Part: Extent to which licensees should bepermitted to voluntarily adopt parts of a revised regulation.

Consistent with the approved NRCpolicy (SEC-94-090) in which proposed regulations developed by the Regidatory improvement Program woodd not be mandatory, but would be proposed as a : alternative to existing requirements that may be voluntarily adopted by licensees. The NRC is soliciting comments on the advantages and disadvantages thispartial adoption maypresent.

PG&E Response Providing licensees the option to adopt a new regulation ensures that unnecessary backfit modifications are not required. The proposed rule or new guidance documents should apply to future changes to the fire protection program. Unless a safety concern is identified, the proposed ,

rules or new guidance documents should not have any bearing on the level of safety provided l

. when complying with current regulations (safety-neutral).

Unless licensees' commitments, as reflected in their operating license conditions, are changed, the option of complying with either Appendix R or Appendix S could not be done without NRC approval. If a licensee'.; operating license does not reflect the standard license condition provided in GL 86-10, then most likely the license condition involves a commitment to meet Appendix R, in whole, or in part (Sections III.G, III.J, and III.0) provided the licensee's program satisfied Appendix A to BTP (APCSB) 9.5-1. In addition, revising the rule (10 CFR 50.48) to allow licensees an option to comply with Appendix R or Appendix S may still require a change to the license condition. Amending the license condition to reflect the standard condition provided l '

in GL 86-10, and providing additional guidance documents for acceptable alternative methods of meeting Appendix R, will meet the intent of the proposed rulemaking. Partial adoption of rules would present undue burden on both the regulators and licensees.

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7. Allowable Repairs During Fire Events: Extent of allowablefire damage and repairs to one train neededfor hot shutdown.

The current regsdations require that one train ofsystems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown befree offire damage. The proposednde will allowpre damage to redundant equipment neededfor hot shutdown, provided an analysis demonstrates that a sufficient quantity ofshutdown equipment could be made " functionally available " through repairs in a timeframe commensurate with assuring safe shutdown of the plant. Ih r NRC is seeking information on whether the proposed rule is acceptable or should the revised rule retain theperformance goals established in the current rulefor limitingpre damage to one train ofsafe shutdown systems.

PG&E Resoonse PG&E believes repairs should be considered an acceptable alternative to protecting one train of safe shutdown systems required for hot shutdown. Performing a repair would be analogous to performing operator actions to mitigate the consequences of fire damage to cables required for

- safe shutdown.

Similar to operator actions, procedures should be in place and equipment required for the repairs ,

should be on-site. In addition, operators should be familiar with performing the repair and l l

capable of performing the repair within the required timeframes. Emergency lighting should also be available when performing this repair. However, in lieu of a new rule, allowance of repair  ;

actions could be clarified in a guidance document consistent with the document that allows l operator actions (e.g., GL 81-12).

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8. Automatic Actuation ofSuppression Systems: Means to address adverse impacts of

- inadvertent actuation ofsuppression systems.

Given the potentialfor inadvertent actuation of automatic suppression systems, the proposed rule claims that the marginal improvement to safetyfrom a defense-in-depth perspective may not warrant the increased risk of water damage to safety systems or exposure topersonnel.

The NRC is seeking information on the accuracy of the assertion and ofsome automatic suppression systems should be eliminated because of the adverse impact on safety.

PG&E Response .

Inadvertent actuation of suppression systems has been addressed by PG&E in response to GL 83-41," Actuation of Fire Protection Systems Affecting Safety Related Equipment," in the Long Term Seismic Program Final Report, and in the IPEEE Report. There are no cases where inadvertent actuation would warrant removal of a suppression system. Any potential adverse impact to safety should have been addressed by licensees in response to GL 83-41, and corrective ;

measures should have been implemented.

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9. Alternative and DedicatedShutdown Capability:

, (a) Nesdfor an independent shutdown path.

Current NRC regtdations require that an alternative or dedicated shutdown capability be providedindependent of thefre area where redundant systems are damaged by afire. The proposed rule does not specify this requirement, but the rule is similar in that it specifies that shutdown equipment must be able to achieve and maintain criticalfunctions.' Theproposed rule allows licensees to take advantage of the extensive operating experience withfire protection, prior NRC determinations, arut the sigmficant developments infire sciences in providingpreprotectionfor the appropriate equipment. The NRC is seeking information on this methodology to ensure that an equivalent level offire safety to that which is currently implemented amt incorporated iato operatingplant design is maintained PG&E Response ,

Like any design basis event, a methodology should be in place to demonstrate the capability to safely shut down the plant. At Diablo Canyon, an alternative shutdown methodology is used for a  ;

fire requiring evacuation of the control room. Operator actions are performed to mitigate the effects of fire damage to circuits (i.e., transfer switchu). Demonstration of an independent shutdown methodology assures that the ability to safely shut down the plant is not affected.

The proposed rule states that shutdown equipment must be able to achieve and maintain critical functions, which would result from an independent shutdown methodology. It is not clear how extensive operating experience with fire protection and the developments in fire sciences will ensure protection of equipment required for safe shutdown. A fire hazards analysis, however, can determine the ex. tent of fire damage to equipment or instruments necessary for safe shutdown.

Diablo Canyon's alternative shutdown procedure takes into consideration the possibility of equipment not being damaged by the fire, and allows the operator, based on his experience, to attempt operation of equipment. However, in the event indications determine that the equipment or instrument is not functioning properly, an alternative equipment / action is taken. The availability of the alternative equipment / action should be determined prior to crediting in the methodology.

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9. (b) The need to have abnormal operatingprxedures thatprovide guidance on which safe -

shutdown path isfreefromfire damage and can be used to achieve and maintain safe

'. shutdown.

The current regsdations require that post-fire safe shutdown procedures beprovided to

}_ control reactor coolant system inventory and to maintain process variables within those i

predictedfor a loss ofnormala.c. power. The proposedrule allows the reactor coolant a process variables to be controlled commensurate withparameters in the plant emergency operatingprocedures (EOP). Becausefires can cause rapid and widespread damage ifnot controlled during the early stages, this may result in unusual conditions requiring operation '

of unique plant shutdown equipment to meet the establishedperformance goals. The NRC is seeking comments regarding the proposed intent to eliminate the need to develop procedures that address uniquefire damage andshutdown conditions, andprovide operators with specific guidance regarding which safe shutdown systems have been properlyprotectedfrom -

potentialfire damage.

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1 PG&E does not agree with eliminating the development of procedures. However, guidance in development of, .ocedures should be provided regarJing the level of detail expected in a procedure. Procedures should provide operators the flexibility of performing actions they feel necessary at the time of the event, since the extent of cable damage may be different for each component. A detailed fire hazards analysis of the area of concern could provide the basis for prioritizing operator actions. Again, the current regulations allow licensees to make changes to procedures under the 10 CFR 50.59 process.

1 As shown by the Browas Ferry fire in 1976, fire damage to cables could result in spurious operations and erroneous indications for process variables. The need for post-fire safe shutdown  ;

procedures is necessary to ensure unique actions credited for safe shutdown are performed properly. The existing EOPr may not necessarily include actions credited to mitigate the effects of fire damage, but could be revised to include such actions. The shutdown procedures are typically consistent with EOP format and operators should be familiar with the content and format.

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10. 72-Hour Requirement to Achieve ColdShutdown: Elimination ofthe requirement to allow repairs andprovideflexibility.

The proposed rule would eliminate the current requirementfor a 72-hour timeframe to achieve coldshutdown with onsitepower. In addition, theproposedrsde states that inadvertent actuation ofprotectivefeatures designed to addresspostulated simultaneous loss

. of offsite power scenarios in the event ofa realfire that would create abnormal corulitions that would challenge control of the plant. The NRC is seeking comments on thejustification of the proposal to not imposefire damage limits arut allow repairs ofshutdown equipment that would require more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, arulmaintain hot standby or hot shutdown conditions until cold shutdown equipment can be made amilable. The NRC is concerned with the risk impactfor this relaxation, arul the operating history, accumulated operator training, arul experiences citedin the petition.

PG&E Resosng r CFR 50, Appendix R, requires that, for areas requiring an alternative Section III.L o 10 shutdown methodology, loss of offsite power is assumed concurrent with a fire, and cold 1 l

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shutdown conditions must be achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.Section III.G of 10 CFR 50.

Appendix R, requires that cold shutdown equipment can be icpaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and does )

not require cold shutdown conditions be achieved within that timeframe.Section III.G does not )

require loss of offsite power to be considered concurrent with a fire.

For non-alternate shutdown areas, the licensee could choose to assume offsite power available provided circuits for the ofTsite power source are not damaged by the fire. The proposed rule l does not give licensees new guidance with respect to loss ofoffsite power. l l

The basis for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is not clear. However, if a licensee can maintain hot shutdown conditions for greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (with or without offsite power available), then the proposed relaxation ,

I should be allowed. Again, this relaxation could be clarified in a new guidance document rather than in a new rule, since Section III.G allows maintaining hot shutdown conditions past 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.  !

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11. Rulemaking Finding: Necessity offinding ofcompliance with current requirements.

Paragraph (c) of the proposed revision to 10 CFR 50.48 would include a rulemakingfruling that all nuclear powerplants licensed after January 1,1979, met the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, andsatisfy GDC 3. The NRC is unclear on the language with this rulemakingfinding and is concerned offuture enforcement ofAppendix Rfor licensees who arefound to be in noncompliance.

PG&E Response PG&E agrees with the NRC's concern, and does not consider the proposed revision to 10 CFR 50.48 to be advantageous. The fire protection program for licensees is based on the commitments made in their operating license, as well as conditic,ns previously approved by the NRC. This revision to the regulation would not affect plants that were not required to meet Appendix R, yet could be used by licensees to claim compliance with Appendix R in the future.

In addition, for a given condition (i.e., conditions found to be in nonconformance with commitments and requirements), licensees who chose the option not to comply with the proposed Appendix S rule could argue that they comply with Appendix R under 10 CFR 50.48. This contradiction in compliance approaches appears more of a burden for regulators.

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12. Exemptions: Treatment ofexemptionsfrom current requirements when adopting revised requirements.

Paragraph (d) of the proposed revision to 10 CFR 50.48 allows all exemptions to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, to " apply infull under the terms ofAppendix S. " The NRC is seeking comments on how exemptions to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, should be treated ofa licensee chooses to comply, infidl or in part, with the alternative requirements in the proposed Appendix S.

PG&E Response In theory, the safety evaluation approved for a configuration that deviates from an Appendix R requirement should satisfy the intent of the proposed Appendix S rule. The safety evaluation for a deviation would conclude that the condition does not affect the ability to safely shutdown, and that the configuration will provide an equivalent level of safety as that required by the applicable section of Appendix R. The proposed revision to 10 CFR 50.48 (d)is not clear how an approved Appendix R deviation would be affected by the proposed Appendix S. Therefore, PG&E does not see a benefit to this revision of the rule.

For Diablo Canyon, de.itions from the requirements of Sect ins III.G, III.J, and III.L have been approved in SERs 23 and 31. A future change that affects the deviation would be evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 (safety evaluations) to determine the impact the change has on the consequences of a design basis accident (i.e., the postulated fire). The response to this potential unreviewed safety question would typically involve performance of a fire hazards analysis crediting combustible loading, location of combustibles, available fire protection features, and the affect on the ability to safely shut down. If the 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation results do not reduce the consequences of a design basis fire and do not afTect the ability to safely shutdown the plant, the licensee would not need to choose the option to comply with the proposed Appendix S rule.

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13. Regulatory Analysis: The needfor regulatory analysisfor rulemakings that reduce burden.

Because the proposed nde provides an alternative method ofcompliance with GDC 3, the l l

petitioner does not think Appendix 5 imposes a new requirement. Furthermore, because the proposed rule is intended to restdt in cost savings, there is no needfor a regulatory asuitysis.

The NRC is concerned that important information could be identified when performing the }

regadatory analysis to determine if the proposed rule does, infact, increase eficiency in maintaining the desired level ofsafety while reducing regulatory burden. The regula:ory analysisprocess would also be useful in identifying alternativesfor reducing regulatory burden . The NRC requests comments on the need to perform a regulatory analysis.

EG&E Response:

PG&E agrees with the NRC's concern with performing a regulatory analysis. A regulatory analysis would identify the NRC's concerns and result in recommending alternative approaches to improving fire protection regulation in lieu of a new rule. PG&E continues to believe that providing a new guidance document clarifying acceptable alternatives to the prescriptive requirements of Appendix R would benefit licensees. Imposing a new rule, or an option to meet a new rule, would not reduce NRC regulatory burden.

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